{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-1011-385704",
  "citation": "Res. 00017-2026 Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Cambio de criterio sobre impugnación judicial de cláusulas penales no objetadas en cartel de licitación",
  "title_en": "Shift in Precedent on Judicial Challenge of Penal Clauses Not Objected to During Tender",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en esta resolución, rechaza un recurso de casación contra una sentencia que validó la aplicación de una cláusula penal impuesta a un contratista por ejecución tardía en la entrega de bienes a la CCSS. El tribunal aprovecha la oportunidad para reafirmar y aplicar el nuevo criterio jurisprudencial establecido en la sentencia No. 137-F-TC-2024, que modificó la línea interpretativa anterior sobre la impugnación de cláusulas penales. Se determina que la impugnación de dichas cláusulas debe realizarse exclusivamente mediante el recurso de objeción al cartel de licitación, de conformidad con los artículos 81 de la LCA y 47 de su Reglamento, dentro del plazo legal correspondiente. La omisión de este mecanismo genera la preclusión del derecho a impugnar judicialmente la cláusula penal, incluso bajo argumentos de nulidad absoluta, pues el oferente al presentar su oferta sin reservas acepta libres y voluntariamente las condiciones del cartel, las cuales adquieren fuerza vinculante entre las partes.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of Cassation, in this decision, dismisses a cassation appeal against a lower court ruling that upheld a penal clause imposed on a contractor for late delivery of goods to the CCSS. The Court takes the opportunity to reaffirm and apply the new jurisprudential criterion established in Judgment No. 137-F-TC-2024, which modified the previous interpretive line on the challenge of penal clauses. It holds that challenges to such clauses must be made exclusively through the objection remedy against the tender conditions provided for in Articles 81 of the LCA and 47 of its Regulation, within the corresponding legal deadline. Failure to use this mechanism precludes the right to later challenge the penal clause in court, even under arguments of absolute nullity, since the bidder, by submitting an offer without reservations, freely and voluntarily accepts the tender conditions, which then become binding between the parties.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "date": "22/01/2026",
  "year": "2026",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "cláusula penal",
    "cartel de licitación",
    "recurso de objeción",
    "preclusión procesal",
    "pacta sunt servanda",
    "buena fe contractual",
    "Ley de Contratación Administrativa (LCA)",
    "Reglamento a la LCA (RLCA)"
  ],
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      "law": "Código Civil",
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      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
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      "law": "Ley 30",
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      "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
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      "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
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    {
      "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "178",
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    {
      "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
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      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
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      "law": "Ley 7494",
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      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "81",
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    {
      "law": "Ley 7494",
      "article": "81",
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      "source": "metadata"
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      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "82",
      "doc_id": "norm-24284",
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      "law": "Ley 7494",
      "article": "82",
      "doc_id": "norm-24284",
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      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
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      "doc_id": "norm-24284",
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      "law": "Ley 7494",
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  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "cláusula penal",
    "contratación administrativa",
    "impugnación de cartel de licitación",
    "recurso de objeción",
    "preclusión procesal",
    "cambio de criterio jurisprudencial",
    "buena fe contractual",
    "seguridad jurídica",
    "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo",
    "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
    "LCA",
    "RLCA"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "penal clause",
    "public procurement",
    "challenge of bidding documents",
    "objection remedy",
    "procedural preclusion",
    "change of jurisprudential criterion",
    "contractual good faith",
    "legal certainty",
    "Contentious-Administrative Court of Cassation",
    "Administrative Procurement Law",
    "LCA",
    "RLCA"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "IV.- Sobre el cambio de criterio jurisprudencial en torno a la impugnación de las cláusulas penales. Conviene destacar, en este punto, que este Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda (Tribunal de Casación en lo que resta) modificó desde finales del año pasado (octubre de 2024) su línea jurisprudencial sobre la posibilidad de impugnar las cláusulas penales incluidas en los carteles de licitación, aun cuando el contratista no las hubiera objetado en la fase de formación del contrato. [...] el Tribunal de Casación concluyó que la impugnación de las cláusulas penales debe formularse necesariamente mediante el recurso de objeción al cartel previsto en el artículo 81 de la LCA y en el artículo 47 de su Reglamento, dentro del plazo conferido para ello. La omisión de este mecanismo genera, por sí misma, la preclusión del derecho de impugnar tales disposiciones en fases posteriores, tanto en la ejecución contractual como en la vía jurisdiccional.\n\nVI.- A la luz de lo anterior, el cargo primero no puede prosperar. [...] El Tribunal explicó con detalle que la actora no interpuso recurso de objeción al cartel, no formuló reserva alguna al ofertar y, por el contrario, consintió inequívocamente en someterse a las condiciones del procedimiento, lo que activa el efecto preclusivo previsto en los artículos 81 a 83 de la LCA y 47 y 178 de su Reglamento. Esa aceptación voluntaria —reiteró el Tribunal— genera fuerza vinculante conforme al artículo 20 de la LCA, al principio pacta sunt servanda y a la doctrina de los actos propios, por lo que no es posible reabrir en sede judicial un debate que la parte contratista dejó precluir.",
  "excerpt_en": "IV.- On the change of jurisprudential criterion regarding the challenge of penal clauses. It is worth highlighting that this Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of Cassation (hereinafter the Court of Cassation) modified, as of late last year (October 2024), its jurisprudential line on the possibility of challenging penal clauses included in tender documents, even when the contractor had not objected to them during the contract formation phase. [...] the Court of Cassation concluded that the challenge of penal clauses must necessarily be made through the objection remedy against the tender document provided for in Article 81 of the LCA and Article 47 of its Regulation, within the term granted for such purpose. The omission of this mechanism, in itself, precludes the right to challenge such clauses in later stages, both during contract execution and in judicial proceedings.\n\nVI.- In light of the foregoing, the first grievance cannot prosper. [...] The Court explained in detail that the plaintiff did not file an objection to the tender document, did not make any reservation when submitting the offer, and, on the contrary, unequivocally consented to be bound by the procedure's conditions, which triggers the preclusive effect set forth in Articles 81 to 83 of the LCA and 47 and 178 of its Regulation. This voluntary acceptance—the Court reiterated—generates binding force pursuant to Article 20 of the LCA, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the doctrine of own acts, so it is not possible to reopen in court a debate that the contracting party allowed to become precluded.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Appeal dismissed",
    "label_es": "Rechazo del recurso",
    "summary_en": "The Court of Cassation dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the lower court ruling that validated the penal clause, applying the new criterion that failure to timely object to the tender conditions precludes any subsequent judicial challenge.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación rechazó el recurso de casación y confirmó la sentencia de instancia que validó la aplicación de la cláusula penal, aplicando el nuevo criterio de que la falta de objeción oportuna al cartel de licitación genera preclusión para impugnarla judicialmente."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "the Court of Cassation concluded that the challenge of penal clauses must necessarily be made through the objection remedy against the tender document provided for in Article 81 of the LCA and Article 47 of its Regulation, within the time granted for such purpose. The omission of this mechanism, in itself, precludes the right to challenge such clauses in later stages, both during contract execution and in judicial proceedings.",
      "quote_es": "el Tribunal de Casación concluyó que la impugnación de las cláusulas penales debe formularse necesariamente mediante el recurso de objeción al cartel previsto en el artículo 81 de la LCA y en el artículo 47 de su Reglamento, dentro del plazo conferido para ello. La omisión de este mecanismo genera, por sí misma, la preclusión del derecho de impugnar tales disposiciones en fases posteriores, tanto en la ejecución contractual como en la vía jurisdiccional."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V (cita de sentencia 137-F-TC-2024)",
      "quote_en": "it would be openly contrary to law and contractual good faith for the contractor to wait until its breach is consummated and proven before attempting to exercise its right to challenge the tender document, as a means to avoid the penal and financial consequences of its breach",
      "quote_es": "resultaría abiertamente contrario al derecho y a la buena fe contractual el hecho de que sea hasta una vez consumado y demostrado el incumplimiento de la contratista, cuando ésta pretenda ejercer su facultad de impugnación contra el cartel, como medio para abstraerse de las consecuencias sancionatorias y pecuniarias de su incumplimiento"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V (cita de sentencia 137-F-TC-2024)",
      "quote_en": "Under no circumstances could the plaintiff obtain a benefit from its own fraud.",
      "quote_es": "De ninguna manera la actora podría obtener beneficio de su propio dolo."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "the challenged judgment did not incur any normative violation. It merely applied the rule of preclusion, objective good faith, the principle of legal certainty, and the binding force of the offer.",
      "quote_es": "la sentencia impugnada no incurrió en violación normativa alguna. Se limitó a aplicar la regla de preclusión, la buena fe objetiva, el principio de seguridad jurídica y la fuerza vinculante de la oferta."
    }
  ],
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    {
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        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Cambio de criterio jurisprudencial sobre la impugnación de cláusulas penales y efecto preclusivo de la falta de objeción al cartel"
        },
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Preclusión, buena fe y fuerza vinculante de la oferta como límites a la impugnación judicial tardía de condiciones cartelarias"
        }
      ],
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      "nombre": "Contratación administrativa"
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      "nombre": "Cláusula penal"
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  "body_es_text": "\"IV.- Sobre el cambio de criterio jurisprudencial en torno a la impugnación de las cláusulas penales. Conviene destacar, en este punto, que este Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda (Tribunal de Casación en lo que resta) modificó desde finales del año pasado (octubre de 2024) su línea jurisprudencial sobre la posibilidad de impugnar las cláusulas penales incluidas en los carteles de licitación, aun cuando el contratista no las hubiera objetado en la fase de formación del contrato. En efecto, durante mucho tiempo, tanto este Tribunal de Casación como la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia habían considerado que la falta de objeción oportuna no impedía que, en sede judicial, el contratista solicitara la nulidad de dichas cláusulas, especialmente cuando no se demostraba la existencia de estudios técnicos que justificaran su establecimiento. En ese entendimiento, la impugnación judicial se admitía incluso si el oferente había guardado silencio frente al contenido del cartel. No obstante, a partir de la sentencia no 137-F-TC-2024, dictada a las 14 horas 54 horas del 24 de octubre de 2024, el Tribunal de Casación revisó de manera integral esa doctrina y dispuso un cambio de criterio, sustentado en una revaloración sistemática de los principios que rigen la contratación administrativa, particularmente la buena fe, la seguridad jurídica, la preclusión procesal y el efecto vinculante de la oferta. En esa decisión, el Tribunal de Casación concluyó que la impugnación de las cláusulas penales debe formularse necesariamente mediante el recurso de objeción al cartel previsto en el artículo 81 de la LCA y en el artículo 47 de su Reglamento, dentro del plazo conferido para ello. La omisión de este mecanismo genera, por sí misma, la preclusión del derecho de impugnar tales disposiciones en fases posteriores, tanto en la ejecución contractual como en la vía jurisdiccional. Se enfatizó que el oferente, al presentar su oferta sin reservas, acepta de forma libre y voluntaria las condiciones del cartel, el cual adquiere fuerza obligatoria entre las partes conforme al principio pacta sunt servanda.\n\nV.- En el citado fallo (137-F-TC-2024) se indicó: “V.- Por estar íntimamente ligados ambos reparos, estos se estudiarán en conjunto. La facultad reconocida al oferente para impugnar el cartel, se encuentra expresamente regulada en una norma legal, sea el artículo 81 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, el cual expresamente señalaba: “Artículo 81.- Plazo y órganos competentes. Contra el cartel de la licitación pública y de la licitación abreviada, podrá interponerse recurso de objeción, dentro del primer tercio del plazo para presentar ofertas. El recurso se interpondrá ante la Contraloría General de la República, en los casos de licitación pública, y en los demás casos, ante la administración contratante”. Como se ve, este numeral prevé un recurso de objeción el cual debe interponerse dentro del primer tercio del plazo para presentar ofertas. Según el precepto 82 ibídem, ese recurso procede cuando el oferente potencial considere que ha habido vicios de procedimiento, se ha incurrido en alguna violación de los principios fundamentales de la contratación, o se ha quebrantado de alguna forma el ordenamiento regulador de la materia. Por su parte, el numeral 178 del RLCA desarrolla los diferentes requisitos formales y de legitimación atinentes a la impugnación, y, en concreto, el precepto 47 regula el caso de la objeción a las multas establecidas en el cartel, indicando lo siguiente: “Multas y cláusula penal. Artículo 47.-Generalidades. La Administración, podrá establecer en el cartel, el pago de multas por defectos en la ejecución del contrato, considerando para ello, aspectos tales como, monto, plazo, riesgo, repercusiones de un eventual incumplimiento para el servicio que se brinde o para el interés público y la posibilidad de incumplimientos parciales o por líneas, siempre que se considere el medio idóneo para el cumplimiento y satisfacción de las obligaciones contractuales. Todo lo anterior con arreglo a criterios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. En caso de que el objeto esté compuesto por líneas distintas, el monto máximo para el cobro de multas, se considerará sobre el mayor valor de cada una y no sobre la totalidad del contrato, siempre que el incumplimiento de una línea no afecte el resto de las obligaciones. Los incumplimientos que originan el cobro de la multa, deberán estar detallados en el cartel. Una vez en firme el cartel, se entenderá que el monto de la multa es definitivo por lo que no se admitirán reclamos posteriores” (resaltado no pertenece a su original). Mal interpreta el demandante al indicar que la preclusión dispuesta por la norma reglamentaria en cuanto a la oportunidad de objetar las multas previstas en el cartel, no le resulta oponible a la nulidad absoluta dispuesta por la LGAP en el caso de los actos administrativos carentes de alguno de sus elementos constitutivos, en este caso, el elemento motivo, sea por la imposición de una cláusula penal establecida sin estudios técnicos previos. No obstante, por aceptados los términos del cartel por parte del oferente (el cual contiene previamente a la presentación de las ofertas, la justificación y estimación de la cláusula penal), y una vez suscrito el contrato respectivo con la Administración, el contenido de ese contrato tiene fuerza de ley entre partes como consecuencia del principio de relatividad de los contratos (numeral 1022 del Código Civil). Entonces, la obligatoriedad de la aplicación de la cláusula penal deriva del contrato mismo que ha sido aceptado libre y voluntariamente por las partes, y que, en virtud de ese consentimiento, adquirió fuerza de ley entre ellas. Nótese que no se está ante un supuesto de un contrato de adhesión donde la parte actora se vio obligada a aceptar las condiciones cartelarias tal cual fueron propuestas por la Administración, sino que la propia legislación le reconocía el derecho de objetar el pliego cartelario en caso de estimarlo disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, o violatorio de sus derechos fundamentales, justamente de cara a la conformación de la voluntad contractual de las partes y a la fuerza de ley que más tarde alcanzarían los términos de la contratación libremente convenidos por ellas. Entonces, en ese entendido, la preclusión que se deriva del artículo 47 del RLCA en cuanto a la impugnación de las multas establecidas en el cartel, deviene razonable y congruente con la finalidad de la norma legal que contempla el recurso de oposición contra el pliego cartelario (81 de la LCA), pues es la antesala a la conformación definitiva de la voluntad de las partes contratantes, quienes, al no hacer uso de esa potestad, manifiestan su libre aceptación de las condiciones de la contratación, que, en caso de resultar adjudicadas, tendrán fuerza de ley para ambas. Luego, esa disposición también es consecuente con el principio de buena fe contractual, en el tanto, se reitera, al no estarse ante un contrato de adhesión, la legislación le ofrece al oferente la oportunidad de impugnar el cartel, para así advertir puntual y oportunamente a la Administración contratante sobre los vicios procedimentales o de fondo que pudiere adolecer el pliego cartelario, todo ello con miras a conformar la voluntad contractual y el consentimiento de los términos del contrato. Se sobreentiende que, en caso no de no ejercerse tal facultad, el oferente manifiesta su conformidad con el contenido del cartel, que más tarde tendrá carácter de contrato vinculante entre las partes contratantes, tanto en sus obligaciones como en sus derechos. De esa manera, ante un cartel cuyas condiciones se estimen violatorias de los derechos fundamentales del oferente, o del propio ordenamiento jurídico, en este caso en lo referido a las multas y tratándose de materia sancionatoria, la lógica dicta que razonablemente el oferente interesado debe abogar por sus propios intereses, procurando el saneamiento de los vicios acusados o el mejoramiento de las condiciones que le resulten perjudiciales, todo ello de previo a que el contenido del pliego cartelario alcance firmeza. No comparte esta Cámara el razonamiento del casacionista, en el sentido de que, es con la aplicación individual de la cláusula penal cuando la Administración puede valorar si se concretó un daño en su contra. La propia LCA y su Reglamento, disponen claramente en qué casos se debe aplicar la cláusula penal, cuáles son los plazos de impugnación, quiénes son los legitimados para interponerla, y bajo qué supuestos. Además, resultaría abiertamente contrario al derecho y a la buena fe contractual el hecho de que sea hasta una vez consumado y demostrado el incumplimiento de la contratista, cuando ésta pretenda ejercer su facultad de impugnación contra el cartel, como medio para abstraerse de las consecuencias sancionatorias y pecuniarias de su incumplimiento, y como mecanismo para obligar a la Administración a recurrir a otras vías procesales más engorrosas para intentar resarcirse de los daños y perjuicios sufridos como consecuencia de la inobservancia de la contratista. De ninguna manera la actora podría obtener beneficio de su propio dolo. Nótese que, como se dijo supra, no se trata de un contrato de adhesión donde la actora se vio obligada a suscribir sin posibilidad de protestar, sino que, desde la fase de formación del contrato, tuvo conocimiento pleno del cartel que le serviría de base a la contratación y desde entonces pudo vislumbrar los defectos procesales y sustantivos de éste, y las eventuales consecuencias perjudiciales que podría acarrear la cláusula penal a sus intereses en el futuro -en caso de resultar adjudicada, como en efecto lo fue-. En cambio, aprecia este Tribunal de Casación, no es sino con ocasión de los incumplimientos comprobados de la contratista, y la consecuente aplicación de la cláusula penal prevista en el contrato, cuando aquella pretende impugnar dicha cláusula para eximirse de sus efectos jurídicos y patrimoniales. Además, nótese que los vicios sustantivos acusados al cartel, concretamente a la cláusula penal, no son sobrevinientes a la ejecución del contrato, sino que pudieron haber sido advertidos por la entonces oferente desde que tuvo conocimiento del cartel que regiría su oferta y su eventual contratación con la Administración, y bien pudo gestionar la rectificación pertinente, no obstante, no lo hizo sino hasta que se vio inmersa en una situación de incumplimiento. Bajo esa tesitura, el presunto vicio de nulidad absoluta endilgado al cartel (inexistencia de estudios técnicos objetivos previos que justificaran el porcentaje de la cláusula penal), no puede ser revisado en esta vía judicial, por haber precluido la oportunidad para alegarlo y demostrarlo, de conformidad con el artículo 47 del RLCA. En vista de que la actora no refuta el incumplimiento que le fuera endilgado por la Administración contratante (ejecución tardía en la entrega) y que se tuvo como hechos demostrados en la sentencia de instancia, se concluye que la aplicación de la cláusula penal en este caso concreto resulta conforme a derecho y al mérito de los autos. En consecuencia, se rechaza el cargo formulado y se confirma la sentencia impugnada”. Así las cosas, la jurisprudencia más reciente abandona el criterio anterior y afirma la imposibilidad de cuestionar en sede judicial las cláusulas penales no objetadas en su oportunidad, por estimarse que dicha impugnación tardía resulta contraria a la buena fe, al principio de seguridad jurídica y al efecto preclusivo que deriva de la aceptación expresa del cartel. Este nuevo entendimiento, que se acoge en la presente causa, responde a una interpretación más coherente y sistemática del régimen jurídico de la contratación administrativa. \n\nVI.- A la luz de lo anterior, el cargo primero no puede prosperar. El casacionista parte de una premisa fáctica incorrecta, pues afirma que la contratación se realizó sin cartel o pliego de condiciones y que, en consecuencia, era jurídicamente imposible imponer una cláusula penal. Sin embargo, los hechos probados incorporados por el Tribunal contradicen frontalmente esa afirmación. De manera específica, quedó acreditado que mediante oficio DABS-AABS-SAIM-0805-2020, remitido a la actora el 16 de julio de 2020, la CCSS formuló la “Solicitud de Oferta Formal” para la compra excepcional, incluyendo un acápite denominado “Condiciones Generales”, donde se indicó expresamente que el procedimiento se regiría por las “Condiciones Generales para la Contratación Administrativa Institucional de Bienes y Servicios” (Condiciones Generales en lo sucesivo) vigentes, y se proporcionó el enlace para su consulta electrónica. Asimismo, consta que la proveedora presentó su oferta ese mismo día, aceptando expresamente someterse a las condiciones y requisitos del concurso y declarando su “pleno sometimiento” a las reglas de la contratación. A la luz de estos hechos —que son firmes y no fueron desvirtuados por el recurrente— carece de sustento la afirmación de que no existía un marco normativo aplicable o que la imposición de la cláusula penal carecía de base jurídica. El Tribunal explicó con detalle que la actora no interpuso recurso de objeción al cartel, no formuló reserva alguna al ofertar y, por el contrario, consintió inequívocamente en someterse a las condiciones del procedimiento, lo que activa el efecto preclusivo previsto en los artículos 81 a 83 de la LCA y 47 y 178 de su Reglamento. Esa aceptación voluntaria —reiteró el Tribunal— genera fuerza vinculante conforme al artículo 20 de la LCA, al principio pacta sunt servanda y a la doctrina de los actos propios, por lo que no es posible reabrir en sede judicial un debate que la parte contratista dejó precluir. En este mismo sentido, el rechazo del agravio se robustece con el nuevo criterio jurisprudencial de este Tribunal, fijado en la sentencia no. 137-F-TC-2024, ante citada, donde se dispuso un cambio de línea interpretativa: la impugnación de las cláusulas penales debe realizarse exclusivamente mediante el recurso de objeción al cartel, dentro del plazo legal correspondiente; la falta de objeción genera preclusión y hace improcedente cualquier examen judicial posterior. Este entendimiento —que el Tribunal invocó expresamente— coincide plenamente con lo que resulta del expediente en este caso. Tampoco tiene sustento la tesis de que las Condiciones Generales carecen de eficacia externa o no pueden integrar el régimen aplicable a la contratación. El Tribunal actuó conforme al ordenamiento al considerar que la Administración sí puede incorporar por referencia documentos reglamentarios institucionales, siempre que se pongan en conocimiento del oferente antes de presentar su oferta, lo que aquí ocurrió de manera acreditada e incontrovertida. Este Tribunal de Casación, en la sentencia no. 137-F-TC-2024, reconoció que cuando las condiciones del procedimiento han sido informadas y aceptadas por el oferente, esas estipulaciones adquieren fuerza vinculante y no pueden ser desconocidas ex post por quien generó el consentimiento. Por consiguiente, la sentencia impugnada no incurrió en violación normativa alguna. Se limitó a aplicar la regla de preclusión, la buena fe objetiva, el principio de seguridad jurídica y la fuerza vinculante de la oferta. El agravio descansa en una reconstrucción selectiva de los hechos y en una interpretación superada por la jurisprudencia más reciente. Así las cosas, el motivo debe ser rechazado\".",
  "body_en_text": "IV.- On the change in jurisprudential criteria regarding the challenge of penalty clauses (cláusulas penales). It is worth noting, at this point, that this Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of Cassation (Court of Cassation hereinafter) modified, since the end of last year (October 2024), its jurisprudential line regarding the possibility of challenging penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) included in bidding documents (carteles de licitación), even when the contractor had not objected to them during the contract formation phase. Indeed, for a long time, both this Court of Cassation and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had considered that the lack of a timely objection did not prevent the contractor from requesting, in court, the annulment of said clauses, especially when the existence of technical studies justifying their establishment was not demonstrated. Under that understanding, judicial challenge was admitted even if the bidder had remained silent regarding the content of the bidding document (cartel). However, as of judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, handed down at 2:54 p.m. on October 24, 2024, the Court of Cassation comprehensively reviewed that doctrine and ordered a change in criteria, based on a systematic reassessment of the principles governing administrative contracting, particularly good faith (buena fe), legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), procedural preclusion (preclusión procesal), and the binding effect of the offer. In that decision, the Court of Cassation concluded that the challenge of penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) must necessarily be formulated through the objection to the bidding document appeal (recurso de objeción al cartel) provided for in article 81 of the LCA and in article 47 of its Regulation, within the period granted for it. The omission of this mechanism generates, by itself, the preclusion of the right to challenge such provisions in later phases, both in contractual execution and in court. It was emphasized that the bidder, by submitting its offer without reservations, freely and voluntarily accepts the conditions of the bidding document (cartel), which acquires binding force between the parties in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.\n\nV.- In the aforementioned ruling (137-F-TC-2024) it was stated: \"V.- As both objections are intimately linked, they will be studied together. The power recognized to the bidder to challenge the bidding document (cartel) is expressly regulated in a legal norm, namely article 81 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, LCA), which expressly stated: 'Article 81.- Term and competent bodies. Against the bidding document (cartel) of the public tender (licitación pública) and the abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), an objection appeal (recurso de objeción) may be filed, within the first third of the term for submitting offers. The appeal shall be filed before the Comptroller General of the Republic, in cases of public tender (licitación pública), and in other cases, before the contracting administration.' As seen, this article provides for an objection appeal (recurso de objeción) which must be filed within the first third of the term for submitting offers. According to precept 82 ibidem, this appeal applies when the potential bidder considers that there have been procedural defects, a violation of the fundamental principles of contracting has been incurred, or the regulatory framework of the matter has been breached in some way. For its part, article 178 of the RLCA develops the different formal and standing requirements concerning the challenge, and, specifically, precept 47 regulates the case of objection to the fines established in the bidding document (cartel), indicating the following: 'Fines and penalty clause (cláusula penal). Article 47.-General provisions. The Administration may establish, in the bidding document (cartel), the payment of fines for defects in the execution of the contract, considering for this, aspects such as, amount, term, risk, repercussions of an eventual breach for the service provided or for the public interest, and the possibility of partial or line-item breaches, provided the ideal means for the fulfillment and satisfaction of contractual obligations is considered. All of the foregoing in accordance with criteria of proportionality and reasonableness. In the event that the object is composed of distinct lines, the maximum amount for the collection of fines shall be considered based on the highest value of each one and not on the totality of the contract, provided that the breach of one line does not affect the rest of the obligations. The breaches that give rise to the collection of the fine must be detailed in the bidding document (cartel). Once the bidding document (cartel) is final, the amount of the fine shall be understood as definitive, and therefore no subsequent claims shall be admitted' (highlighting does not belong to the original). The plaintiff misinterprets when indicating that the preclusion ordered by the regulatory norm regarding the opportunity to object to the fines provided for in the bidding document (cartel), is not opposable to the absolute nullity ordered by the LGAP in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constitutive elements, in this case, the element of motive (motivo), that is, for the imposition of a penalty clause (cláusula penal) established without prior technical studies. However, as the terms of the bidding document (cartel) are accepted by the bidder (which contains, prior to the presentation of offers, the justification and estimation of the penalty clause (cláusula penal)), and once the respective contract is signed with the Administration, the content of that contract has the force of law between parties as a consequence of the principle of relativity of contracts (article 1022 of the Civil Code). Therefore, the mandatory nature of the application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, and which, by virtue of that consent, acquired the force of law between them. Note that we are not facing a case of an adhesion contract where the plaintiff was forced to accept the bidding document (cartel) conditions as proposed by the Administration, but rather the legislation itself recognized the right to object to the bidding document (cartel) if deemed non-compliant with the legal system, or violative of its fundamental rights, precisely in view of the formation of the contractual will of the parties and the force of law that the terms of the contracting, freely agreed upon by them, would later achieve. Therefore, in that understanding, the preclusion that derives from article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of the fines established in the bidding document (cartel), becomes reasonable and congruent with the purpose of the legal norm that contemplates the opposition appeal (recurso de oposición) against the bidding document (cartel) (article 81 of the LCA), as it is the prelude to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not making use of that power, manifest their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, in the event of being awarded, will have the force of law for both. Subsequently, this provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith (buena fe), insofar as, it is reiterated, not facing an adhesion contract, the legislation offers the bidder the opportunity to challenge the bidding document (cartel), in order to timely and punctually warn the contracting Administration about the procedural or substantive defects that the bidding document (cartel) might suffer, all with a view to forming the contractual will and the consent to the terms of the contract. It is understood that, in the event of not exercising such power, the bidder manifests its conformity with the content of the bidding document (cartel), which will later have the character of a binding contract between the contracting parties, both in its obligations and in its rights. In this way, faced with a bidding document (cartel) whose conditions are deemed violative of the bidder's fundamental rights, or of the legal system itself, in this case regarding fines and being a sanctioning matter, logic dictates that the interested bidder should reasonably advocate for its own interests, seeking the remedy of the alleged defects or the improvement of the conditions that are detrimental to it, all prior to the content of the bidding document (cartel) becoming final. This Chamber does not share the reasoning of the cassation appellant, in the sense that it is with the individual application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) that the Administration can assess whether damage materialized against it. The LCA itself and its Regulation, clearly stipulate in which cases the penalty clause (cláusula penal) must be applied, what the challenge deadlines are, who has standing to file it, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, it would be openly contrary to the law and to contractual good faith (buena fe) for the contractor to attempt to exercise its power of challenge against the bidding document (cartel) only once the breach by the contractor has been consummated and proven, as a means to evade the sanctioning and pecuniary consequences of its breach, and as a mechanism to force the Administration to resort to other more cumbersome procedural avenues to attempt to recover the damages suffered as a consequence of the contractor's non-compliance. In no way could the plaintiff obtain benefit from its own bad faith (dolo). Note that, as stated supra, this is not an adhesion contract where the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of protesting, but rather, from the contract formation phase, it had full knowledge of the bidding document (cartel) that would serve as the basis for the contracting and from that moment could have discerned the procedural and substantive defects thereof, and the eventual detrimental consequences that the penalty clause (cláusula penal) could bring to its interests in the future - in the event of being awarded, as it indeed was. Instead, this Court of Cassation observes, it is not until the occasion of the contractor's proven breaches, and the consequent application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) provided for in the contract, that the former seeks to challenge said clause to exempt itself from its legal and patrimonial effects. Moreover, note that the substantive defects alleged against the bidding document (cartel), specifically the penalty clause (cláusula penal), are not supervening upon the execution of the contract, but could have been noticed by the then bidder from the moment it became aware of the bidding document (cartel) that would govern its offer and its eventual contracting with the Administration, and it could very well have managed the pertinent rectification; however, it did not do so until it found itself immersed in a situation of breach. Under this framework, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the bidding document (cartel) (nonexistence of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause (cláusula penal)), cannot be reviewed in this judicial avenue, as the opportunity to allege and prove it has precluded, in accordance with article 47 of the RLCA. Given that the plaintiff does not refute the breach attributed to it by the contracting Administration (late delivery) and which was taken as proven facts in the lower court's judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) in this specific case is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case file. Consequently, the formulated charge is rejected and the challenged judgment is confirmed.\" Thus, the most recent jurisprudence abandons the previous criterion and affirms the impossibility of questioning in court those penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) not objected to in their time, on the grounds that such a late challenge is contrary to good faith (buena fe), the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), and the preclusive effect derived from the express acceptance of the bidding document (cartel). This new understanding, which is adopted in the present case, responds to a more coherent and systematic interpretation of the legal regime of administrative contracting.\n\nVI.- In light of the foregoing, the first charge cannot prosper. The cassation appellant starts from an incorrect factual premise, as he affirms that the contracting was carried out without a bidding document or set of conditions (cartel o pliego de condiciones) and that, consequently, it was legally impossible to impose a penalty clause (cláusula penal). However, the proven facts incorporated by the Court flatly contradict that affirmation. Specifically, it was accredited that through official letter DABS-AABS-SAIM-0805-2020, sent to the plaintiff on July 16, 2020, the CCSS formulated the \"Solicitud de Oferta Formal\" for the exceptional purchase, including a section called \"Condiciones Generales\", where it was expressly indicated that the procedure would be governed by the current \"Condiciones Generales para la Contratación Administrativa Institucional de Bienes y Servicios\" (General Conditions hereinafter), and the link for their electronic consultation was provided. Likewise, it is recorded that the supplier presented its offer that same day, expressly accepting to submit to the conditions and requirements of the competition and declaring its \"full submission\" to the contracting rules. In light of these facts —which are final and were not rebutted by the appellant— the affirmation that there was no applicable regulatory framework or that the imposition of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) lacked a legal basis is unfounded. The Court explained in detail that the plaintiff did not file an objection to the bidding document appeal (recurso de objeción al cartel), did not formulate any reservation when bidding, and, on the contrary, unequivocally consented to submit to the conditions of the procedure, which activates the preclusive effect provided for in articles 81 to 83 of the LCA and 47 and 178 of its Regulation. That voluntary acceptance —the Court reiterated— generates binding force in accordance with article 20 of the LCA, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the doctrine of one's own acts (doctrina de los actos propios), and therefore it is not possible to reopen in court a debate that the contracting party allowed to preclude. In this same sense, the rejection of the grievance is strengthened by the new jurisprudential criterion of this Court, established in judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, cited above, where a change in the interpretative line was ordered: the challenge of penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) must be carried out exclusively through the objection to the bidding document appeal (recurso de objeción al cartel), within the corresponding legal term; the lack of objection generates preclusion and makes any subsequent judicial examination inadmissible. This understanding —which the Court expressly invoked— fully coincides with what results from the case file. Nor is the thesis that the General Conditions lack external efficacy or cannot integrate the applicable regime for the contracting supported. The Court acted in accordance with the legal system when considering that the Administration may incorporate institutional regulatory documents by reference, provided they are made known to the bidder before presenting its offer, which occurred here in an accredited and incontrovertible manner. This Court of Cassation, in judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, recognized that when the conditions of the procedure have been informed and accepted by the bidder, those stipulations acquire binding force and cannot be disregarded ex post by the party who gave consent. Consequently, the challenged judgment did not incur any regulatory violation. It limited itself to applying the rule of preclusion, objective good faith (buena fe objetiva), the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), and the binding force of the offer. The grievance rests on a selective reconstruction of the facts and on an interpretation superseded by the most recent jurisprudence. Thus, the ground must be rejected.\n\nNevertheless, as of judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, issued at 2:54 p.m. on October 24, 2024, the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) comprehensively reviewed that doctrine and ordered a change of criterion, based on a systematic reassessment of the principles governing administrative contracting, particularly good faith (buena fe), legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), procedural preclusion (preclusión procesal), and the binding effect of the offer. In that decision, the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) concluded that the challenge of penal clauses must necessarily be formulated through the objection recourse (recurso de objeción) to the tender specifications (cartel) provided for in Article 81 of the LCA and in Article 47 of its Regulations, within the period granted for that purpose. The omission of this mechanism generates, in itself, the preclusion of the right to challenge such provisions in later phases, both during contractual execution and in the jurisdictional venue. It was emphasized that the offeror, by submitting its offer without reservations, freely and voluntarily accepts the conditions of the tender specifications (cartel), which acquires binding force between the parties in accordance with the principle pacta sunt servanda.\n\nV.- In the cited ruling (137-F-TC-2024), it was indicated: \"V.- As both objections are intimately linked, they will be studied together. The power granted to the offeror to challenge the tender specifications (cartel) is expressly regulated in a legal norm, specifically Article 81 of the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), which expressly stated: 'Article 81.- Term and competent bodies. Against the tender specifications (cartel) of the public tender and the abbreviated tender, an objection recourse (recurso de objeción) may be filed within the first third of the period for submitting offers. The recourse shall be filed before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), in cases of public tender, and in other cases, before the contracting administration.' As can be seen, this numeral provides for an objection recourse (recurso de objeción) which must be filed within the first third of the period for submitting offers.\n\nAccording to precept 82 ibidem, that recourse is available when the potential bidder considers that there have been procedural defects, a violation of the fundamental principles of public procurement (contratación) has occurred, or the regulatory framework governing the matter has been breached in some way. For its part, numeral 178 of the RLCA develops the different formal and standing requirements related to the challenge (impugnación), and, specifically, precept 47 regulates the case of the objection (objeción) to the fines established in the tender document (cartel), indicating the following:\n\n\"Fines and penalty clause. Article 47.-General Provisions. The Administration may establish in the tender document (cartel), the payment of fines for defects in the execution of the contract, considering for this purpose, aspects such as, amount, term, risk, repercussions of a potential breach for the service provided or for the public interest and the possibility of partial breaches or by line items (líneas), provided that the suitable means for the fulfillment and satisfaction of the contractual obligations is considered. All of the foregoing in accordance with criteria of proportionality and reasonableness. In the event that the object is composed of different line items (líneas), the maximum amount for the collection of fines will be considered on the highest value of each one and not on the totality of the contract, provided that the breach of one line item (línea) does not affect the rest of the obligations. The breaches that give rise to the collection of the fine must be detailed in the tender document (cartel). Once the tender document (cartel) is final, the amount of the fine will be understood as definitive, and therefore subsequent claims will not be admitted\" (highlighting does not belong to the original).\n\nThe plaintiff misinterprets by indicating that the preclusion (preclusión) established by the regulatory norm regarding the opportunity to object to the fines provided in the tender document (cartel) is not opposable to the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) established by the LGAP in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constitutive elements, in this case, the grounds (motivo) element, that is, due to the imposition of a penalty clause established without prior technical studies. However, as the terms of the tender document (cartel) were accepted by the bidder (which contains, prior to the submission of the bids, the justification and estimation of the penalty clause), and once the respective contract was signed with the Administration, the content of that contract has the force of law between the parties as a consequence of the principle of privity of contracts (relatividad de los contratos) (numeral 1022 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). Therefore, the binding nature of the application of the penalty clause derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, and which, by virtue of that consent, acquired the force of law between them.\n\nNote that this is not a case of a contract of adhesion (contrato de adhesión) where the plaintiff was forced to accept the bidding conditions as proposed by the Administration, rather the legislation itself recognized the right to object to the bidding documents (pliego cartelario) if deemed inconsistent with the legal system, or violative of their fundamental rights, precisely with a view to the formation of the contractual will of the parties and the force of law that the freely agreed-upon contracting terms would later attain. Therefore, in that understanding, the preclusion derived from article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of penalties established in the bidding documents (cartel), becomes reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the legal rule that contemplates the remedy of opposition (recurso de oposición) against the bidding documents (81 of the LCA), since it is the prelude to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not making use of that power, manifest their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, should they be awarded, will have the force of law for both. Consequently, this provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith (buena fe contractual), insofar as, it is reiterated, not being in the presence of a contract of adhesion, the legislation offers the offeror the opportunity to challenge the bidding documents, in order to point out promptly and opportunely to the contracting Administration the procedural or substantive defects that the bidding documents might suffer from, all with a view to forming the contractual will and the consent to the contract terms. It is understood that, if such power is not exercised, the offeror expresses their conformity with the content of the bidding documents, which will later have the character of a binding contract between the contracting parties, both in their obligations and in their rights. Thus, faced with bidding documents whose conditions are considered violative of the offeror's fundamental rights, or of the legal system itself, in this case regarding penalties and dealing with punitive matters, logic dictates that the interested offeror must reasonably advocate for their own interests, seeking the remedy of the alleged defects or the improvement of conditions that are detrimental to them, all before the content of the bidding documents becomes final. This Chamber does not share the appellant's (casacionista) reasoning, in the sense that it is with the individual application of the penalty clause when the Administration can assess whether it suffered damage. The LCA itself and its Regulation, clearly state in which cases the penalty clause must be applied, what the challenge time limits are, who has standing to file it, and under what circumstances.\n\nFurthermore, it would be openly contrary to law and contractual good faith for it to be only after the contractor's breach has been consummated and demonstrated that the latter seeks to exercise its right of challenge against the bidding terms (cartel), as a means to exempt itself from the punitive and pecuniary consequences of its breach, and as a mechanism to compel the Administration to resort to more cumbersome procedural avenues to seek compensation for the damages and losses suffered as a result of the contractor's non-observance. In no way could the plaintiff obtain benefit from its own willful misconduct. Note that, as stated above, this is not a contract of adhesion where the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of objecting; rather, from the contract formation phase, it had full knowledge of the bidding terms (cartel) that would serve as the basis for the contracting and, from that point, could have discerned the procedural and substantive defects thereof, and the eventual harmful consequences that the penalty clause could bring upon its interests in the future—should it be awarded the contract, as it indeed was. Instead, this Court of Cassation considers that it is only upon the contractor's proven breaches, and the consequent application of the penalty clause provided for in the contract, that the former seeks to challenge said clause to exempt itself from its legal and pecuniary effects. Furthermore, note that the substantive defects alleged against the bidding terms (cartel), specifically the penalty clause, are not supervening upon contract execution, but rather could have been noticed by the then bidder from the moment it became aware of the bidding terms (cartel) that would govern its offer and its eventual contracting with the Administration, and it could well have managed the pertinent rectification; however, it did not do so until it found itself immersed in a situation of breach. Under this context, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the bidding terms (cartel) (the nonexistence of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial venue, as the opportunity to plead and prove it has precluded, in accordance with Article 47 of the RLCA. Given that the plaintiff does not refute the breach attributed to it by the contracting Administration (late delivery performance) and which was taken as proven facts in the lower court judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause in this specific case is consistent with law and the merits of the case file. Consequently, the charge formulated is rejected and the contested judgment is upheld.”\n\nThus, the most recent case law abandons the previous criterion and affirms the impossibility of challenging in court penalty clauses not objected to in a timely manner, considering that such late challenge is contrary to good faith, the principle of legal certainty, and the preclusive effect deriving from the express acceptance of the bidding terms (cartel).\n\nThis new understanding, adopted in the present case, responds to a more coherent and systematic interpretation of the legal regime of administrative procurement.\n\n**VI.-** In light of the foregoing, the first ground cannot succeed. The appellant proceeds from an incorrect factual premise, asserting that the procurement was carried out without a bidding document (cartel) or set of conditions (pliego de condiciones) and that, consequently, it was legally impossible to impose a penalty clause (cláusula penal). However, the proven facts incorporated by the Court directly contradict that assertion. Specifically, it was accredited that through official communication DABS-AABS-SAIM-0805-2020, sent to the plaintiff on July 16, 2020, the CCSS issued the \"Formal Offer Request\" (Solicitud de Oferta Formal) for the exceptional purchase, including a section entitled \"General Conditions\" (Condiciones Generales), where it was expressly indicated that the procedure would be governed by the current \"General Conditions for Institutional Administrative Procurement of Goods and Services\" (Condiciones Generales para la Contratación Administrativa Institucional de Bienes y Servicios) (General Conditions hereinafter), and the link for electronic consultation was provided. Likewise, the record shows that the supplier presented its offer that same day, expressly accepting to submit to the conditions and requirements of the competition and declaring its \"full submission\" (pleno sometimiento) to the procurement rules. In light of these facts —which are firm and were not rebutted by the appellant— the assertion that no applicable regulatory framework existed or that the imposition of the penalty clause lacked a legal basis is unfounded. The Court explained in detail that the plaintiff did not file an objection (recurso de objeción) to the bidding document, formulated no reservation when bidding, and, on the contrary, unequivocally consented to submit to the conditions of the procedure, which triggers the preclusive effect provided for in Articles 81 to 83 of the LCA and 47 and 178 of its Regulation. That voluntary acceptance —the Court reiterated— generates binding force pursuant to Article 20 of the LCA, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the doctrine of one's own acts (doctrina de los actos propios), such that it is not possible to reopen in court a debate that the contracting party allowed to be precluded. In this same vein, the rejection of the grievance is strengthened by the new jurisprudential criterion of this Court, established in judgment No. 137-F-TC-2024, cited above, where a change in interpretive line was ordered: the challenge of penalty clauses must be carried out exclusively through the objection to the bidding document, within the corresponding legal timeframe; the lack of objection generates preclusion and renders any subsequent judicial examination inadmissible.\n\nThis understanding—which the Court expressly invoked—fully coincides with what the case file reveals in this instance. Nor is there any support for the thesis that the General Conditions lack external effect or cannot form part of the regime applicable to the contract. The Court acted in accordance with the legal system when it considered that the Administration may incorporate institutional regulatory documents by reference, provided they are made known to the offeror before submitting its bid, which occurred here in a proven and incontrovertible manner. This Court of Cassation, in judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, recognized that when the conditions of the procedure have been disclosed and accepted by the offeror, those stipulations acquire binding force and cannot be disregarded ex post by the party who gave consent. Consequently, the challenged judgment did not incur any violation of regulations. It merely applied the rule of preclusion (preclusión), objective good faith (buena fe objetiva), the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), and the binding force of the offer. The grievance rests on a selective reconstruction of the facts and on an interpretation superseded by the most recent case law. That being so, the ground must be dismissed.\"\n\nHowever, as of judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, issued at 2:54 p.m. on October 24, 2024, the Court of Cassation comprehensively reviewed that doctrine and ordered a change of criteria, based on a systematic reassessment of the principles governing administrative procurement, particularly good faith (buena fe), legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), procedural preclusion (preclusión procesal), and the binding effect of the offer. In that decision, the Court of Cassation concluded that the challenge to penalty clauses must necessarily be made through the objection (recurso de objeción) to the solicitation document (cartel) provided for in Article 81 of the LCA and in Article 47 of its Regulations, within the period granted for doing so. The omission of this mechanism generates, in itself, the preclusion (preclusión) of the right to challenge such provisions in later phases, both in contractual execution and in the jurisdictional venue. It was emphasized that the offeror, by submitting its offer without reservations, freely and voluntarily accepts the conditions of the solicitation document (cartel), which acquires binding force between the parties in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.\n\nV.- In the cited ruling (137-F-TC-2024) it was stated: \"V.- Because both objections are intimately linked, they will be examined together. The power recognized to the offeror to challenge the solicitation document (cartel) is expressly regulated in a legal norm, that is Article 81 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), which expressly stated: 'Article 81.- Time period and competent bodies. Against the solicitation document (cartel) of the public tender (licitación pública) and the abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), an objection (recurso de objeción) may be filed within the first third of the period for submitting offers. The remedy shall be filed before the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), in cases of public tender (licitación pública), and in all other cases, before the contracting administration.' As seen, this article provides for an objection (recurso de objeción) which must be filed within the first third of the period for submitting offers.\"\n\nAccording to Article 82 ibidem, that recourse is available when the potential offeror considers that there have been procedural defects, that a violation of the fundamental principles of contracting has occurred, or that the regulatory framework governing the matter has been breached in some way. For its part, Article 178 of the RLCA develops the different formal and standing requirements pertaining to the challenge, and, specifically, Article 47 regulates the case of objection to the fines established in the tender specifications (cartel), indicating the following:\n\n\"Fines and penalty clause (cláusula penal). Article 47.-General Provisions. The Administration may establish in the tender specifications (cartel) the payment of fines for defects in the execution of the contract, considering for this purpose aspects such as amount, term, risk, repercussions of a potential breach for the service provided or for the public interest, and the possibility of partial breaches or by line items, provided that the appropriate means for the fulfillment and satisfaction of the contractual obligations is considered. All of the above in accordance with criteria of proportionality and reasonableness. In the event that the object is composed of different line items, the maximum amount for the collection of fines shall be considered on the highest value of each one and not on the totality of the contract, provided that the breach of one line item does not affect the rest of the obligations. The breaches giving rise to the collection of the fine must be detailed in the tender specifications (cartel). Once the tender specifications (cartel) become final, the amount of the fine shall be deemed definitive, and therefore no subsequent claims shall be admitted\" (highlighting not in the original). The plaintiff misinterprets by arguing that the preclusion established by the regulatory norm regarding the opportunity to object to the fines provided for in the tender specifications (cartel) is not applicable to the absolute nullity established by the LGAP in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constituent elements, in this case, the element of grounds (motivo), that is, due to the imposition of a penalty clause (cláusula penal) established without prior technical studies. However, having accepted the terms of the tender specifications (cartel) by the offeror (which contains, prior to the submission of bids, the justification and estimation of the penalty clause (cláusula penal)), and once the respective contract has been signed with the Administration, the content of that contract has the force of law between the parties as a consequence of the principle of privity of contracts (Article 1022 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). Therefore, the binding nature of the application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, and which, by virtue of that consent, acquired the force of law between them.\n\nNote that this is not a scenario of an adhesion contract (contrato de adhesión) where the plaintiff was forced to accept the bidding terms as proposed by the Administration, but rather that the legislation itself recognized the right to object to the bidding documents (pliego cartelario) if deemed inconsistent with the legal system, or violative of their fundamental rights, precisely with a view to the formation of the contractual will of the parties and the force of law that the freely agreed-upon contracting terms would later attain. Thus, in that understanding, the preclusion (preclusión) derived from Article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of the fines established in the bidding documents, becomes reasonable and congruent with the purpose of the legal norm that contemplates the recourse of opposition (recurso de oposición) against the bidding documents (Article 81 of the LCA), as it is the precursor to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not making use of that power, express their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, should they be awarded, will have the force of law for both. Then, this provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith, insofar as, it is reiterated, not being a contract of adhesion (contrato de adhesión), the legislation offers the bidder the opportunity to challenge the bidding documents, in order to punctually and timely warn the contracting Administration of any procedural or substantive defects (vicios) that the bidding documents (pliego cartelario) may suffer from, all with a view to shaping the contractual will and the consent to the contract terms. It is understood that, should such power not be exercised, the bidder expresses their conformity with the content of the bidding documents, which will later have the character of a binding contract between the contracting parties, both in its obligations and in its rights. In this way, faced with bidding documents whose conditions are deemed violative of the bidder's fundamental rights, or of the legal system itself, in this case regarding fines and dealing with sanctioning matters, logic dictates that the interested bidder must reasonably advocate for their own interests, seeking the rectification of the alleged defects or the improvement of conditions that are detrimental to them, all prior to the content of the bidding documents (pliego cartelario) becoming final. This Chamber does not share the reasoning of the appellant in cassation, in the sense that it is with the individual application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) that the Administration can assess whether a damage has materialized against it. The LCA itself and its Regulations clearly state in which cases the penalty clause (cláusula penal) must be applied, what the challenge deadlines are, who has standing to file them, and under what circumstances.\n\nFurthermore, it would be openly contrary to law and contractual good faith for the contractor, once its non-performance has been consummated and demonstrated, to attempt to exercise its power to challenge the tender specifications as a means of evading the punitive and pecuniary consequences of its non-performance, and as a mechanism to force the Administration to resort to more cumbersome procedural avenues to seek compensation for the damages and losses suffered as a consequence of the contractor's failure to observe the contract. In no way could the plaintiff obtain a benefit from its own willful misconduct. Note that, as stated above, this is not a contract of adhesion where the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of objecting; rather, from the contract formation phase, it had full knowledge of the tender specifications that would serve as the basis for the procurement and, from that point, could have discerned the procedural and substantive defects thereof, and the eventual harmful consequences the penalty clause could cause to its interests in the future—in the event it were awarded, as it indeed was. By contrast, this Court of Cassation finds that it is only upon the contractor’s proven non-performance, and the consequent application of the penalty clause provided for in the contract, that the former seeks to challenge said clause to exempt itself from its legal and patrimonial effects. Moreover, note that the substantive defects alleged against the tender specifications, specifically against the penalty clause, did not arise after the contract’s execution; rather, they could have been noticed by the then-bidder from the moment it learned of the tender specifications that would govern its bid and its eventual procurement with the Administration, and it could have requested the pertinent rectification. Nevertheless, it did not do so until it found itself immersed in a situation of non-performance. Under this circumstance, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the tender specifications (nonexistence of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial venue, as the opportunity to allege and demonstrate it has precluded, in accordance with Article 47 of the RLCA. Given that the plaintiff does not refute the non-performance attributed to it by the contracting Administration (late execution of delivery) and that this was taken as a proven fact in the lower court’s judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause in this specific case is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case file. Consequently, the charge made is rejected and the appealed judgment is confirmed.” Thus, the most recent jurisprudence abandons the previous criterion and affirms the impossibility of questioning in court those penalty clauses not objected to in a timely manner, on the grounds that such a belated challenge is contrary to good faith, the principle of legal certainty, and the preclusive effect derived from the express acceptance of the tender specifications.\n\nThis new understanding, adopted in the present case, responds to a more coherent and systematic interpretation of the legal regime governing administrative procurement.\n\n**VI.-** In light of the foregoing, the first claim cannot succeed. The appellant proceeds from an incorrect factual premise, asserting that the procurement was carried out without tender documents or specifications (cartel o pliego de condiciones) and that, consequently, it was legally impossible to impose a penalty clause (cláusula penal). However, the proven facts incorporated by the Trial Court directly contradict that assertion. Specifically, it was established that through official letter DABS-AABS-SAIM-0805-2020, sent to the plaintiff on July 16, 2020, the CCSS issued the “Request for Formal Offer” (Solicitud de Oferta Formal) for the exceptional purchase, including a section called “General Conditions” (Condiciones Generales), where it was expressly indicated that the procedure would be governed by the current “General Conditions for Institutional Administrative Procurement of Goods and Services” (Condiciones Generales para la Contratación Administrativa Institucional de Bienes y Servicios) (General Conditions hereinafter), and the link for its electronic consultation was provided. Likewise, the record shows that the supplier submitted its offer that same day, expressly accepting to submit to the conditions and requirements of the tender and declaring its “full submission” (pleno sometimiento) to the procurement rules. In light of these facts —which are final and were not rebutted by the appellant— the assertion that no applicable regulatory framework existed or that the imposition of the penalty clause lacked a legal basis is unfounded. The Trial Court explained in detail that the plaintiff did not file an objection to the tender documents (recurso de objeción al cartel), made no reservation when bidding, and, on the contrary, unequivocally consented to submit to the procedure's conditions, which triggers the preclusive effect provided for in Articles 81 to 83 of the LCA and 47 and 178 of its Regulations. That voluntary acceptance —the Trial Court reiterated— generates binding force pursuant to Article 20 of the LCA, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the doctrine of own acts (doctrina de los actos propios), making it impossible to reopen in court a debate that the contracting party allowed to become precluded. In this same sense, the rejection of the grievance is strengthened by the new jurisprudential criterion of this Court, established in judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, cited above, where a change in interpretive line was ordered: the challenge of penalty clauses must be carried out exclusively through the objection to the tender documents, within the corresponding legal timeframe; the lack of objection generates preclusion and renders any subsequent judicial review inadmissible.\n\nThis understanding—which the Court expressly invoked—fully coincides with what the record in this case reveals. Nor is there any support for the thesis that the General Conditions lack external effect or cannot form part of the regime applicable to the contract. The Court acted in accordance with the legal order when it considered that the Administration may indeed incorporate institutional regulatory documents by reference, provided they are made known to the offeror before submitting its bid, which occurred here in a proven and incontrovertible manner. This Court of Cassation, in judgment no. 137-F-TC-2024, recognized that when the conditions of the procedure have been disclosed and accepted by the offeror, those stipulations acquire binding force and cannot be disregarded ex post by the party who gave consent. Consequently, the challenged judgment did not incur any violation of norms. It merely applied the rule of preclusion (preclusión), objective good faith, the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), and the binding force of the bid. The grievance rests on a selective reconstruction of the facts and on an interpretation superseded by the most recent case law. That being the case, the ground must be dismissed.\""
}