V.- For a long time, this Chamber has indicated that standing (legitimación) ad causam refers to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and the person obligated to the performance (the defendant). In that sense, the persons who are legally and directly going to be affected in their rights by the judgment have standing in the cause. Thus, for the effective concurrence of that standing, the existence of a direct and legitimate interest of the one who sues (active) and against whom the action is brought (passive) becomes necessary. The latter - of interest in the case under study - assumes that the defendant must be the person who by law must oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits the substantial legal relationship subject to the lawsuit to be declared. Seen another way, passive standing exists when the defendant is the subject who must satisfy the required performance, that is, given the factual and legal circumstances invoked, it is the one who must answer and attend to the proposed performance. (On this point, see, among others, Voto No. 1023 of 14:50 on October 1, 2009, and Voto No. 475 of 10:40 on February 21, 2020). Numeral 12 of the CPCA focuses the analysis of passive standing, primarily, on the administrative conduct that is the subject of the litigation (litis). Thus, the agency or entity that is the holder or author of the reproached conduct, or the one who by legislative mandate must answer for it, will have passive standing in the cause. In this case, according to the complaint, the plaintiff accuses an omissive conduct by the defendants, specifically, lack of signage on the street where the traffic accident occurred, as there were no speed limits, vertical or horizontal signage, white or yellow lines. Likewise, the bus stop was not demarcated, nor did it have a shelter that safeguarded the safety of the travelers. As a result of the foregoing, it requests that the defendants be ordered to execute the necessary safety measures on the respective highway to prevent new tragedies, and that they be ordered to pay damages for the moral harm (daño moral) caused on the occasion of the accident in question. In relation to these requests, the Court found, grosso modo, that CONAVI and the State lacked passive standing in the case, basically because, since the street in question belongs to the cantonal road network, it would be the municipality of that locality that should attend to and answer for that omissive conduct, in accordance with cardinal 1 of the Ley de Caminos Públicos. Furthermore, regarding the complaint related to the bus stop, it explained, canon 7 of the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, establishes as one of the powers of the Consejo de Transporte Público (CTP): to set the terminal and intermediate stops for all remunerated public passenger transport services. It found that, by virtue of what is provided therein, the CTP is the body that has a legal relationship with the questioned administrative conduct and not the defendants. Moreover, since said Council possesses instrumental legal personality (Articles 3 and 4 ídem), it should have been the defendant pursuant to precept 12.2 of the CPCA. In relation to this latter determination, there is no objection from the appellant, and, therefore, no pronouncement will be made on the matter. The issue that raises the disagreement lies in the fact that, in the appellant's view, the State has standing in this cause because canons 2 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos and 2 of the Ley de Creación del MOPT, attribute to said ministry the competence for the construction and maintenance of public roads, thereby generating a legal duty of cooperation between the municipalities and the State (MOPT). This Chamber disagrees with that position. As terrestrial communication routes (highways, expressways, roads, streets, bridges, and other elements that are part of the road networks) are of public domain, their ownership, construction, and maintenance fall upon the Public Administration. Now, it must be noted that in our country, there is a bifurcation regarding the domain and administration of these assets. According to canon 1 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, on one hand, there are the roads belonging to the national road network (primary, secondary, tertiary highways and those designated by the MOPT as restricted-access roads and expressways), the domain of which is held by the MOPT, and, on the other, those pertaining to the cantonal road network (local roads (caminos vecinales), local streets, and classified roads), which belong to the municipalities of each locality. Now, precept 2 of that same regulatory body states: “All land occupied by existing public highways and roads or those built in the future are property of the State. Municipalities have ownership of the streets in their jurisdiction. Public highways and roads may only be built and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, municipalities and decentralized state institutions that have functions related to the construction of public roads may execute them directly or through third parties […]”. Based on that provision, this Chamber has inferred that the State, through the MOPT, or else, the municipalities (depending on whether they are national or cantonal roads, respectively), as holders of the real property right over those road areas, are responsible for their administration, which involves, among other aspects, ensuring that the infrastructure is safe and functional (on this point, see Votos No. 136 of 14:40 on August 23, 1991, No. 74 of 10:15 on February 2, 2007, No. 674 of 9:05 on June 4, 2013). And, of course, neglecting those obligations could bring about the corresponding responsibility, according to the scope of competence of each one. Now, it is true that the transcribed numeral entrusts the MOPT with the construction and improvement of roads; however, as noted by the Constitutional Chamber in the ruling cited by the appellant (Voto No. 5445 of 14:30 on July 14, 1999, reiterated in other recent ones such as No. 16362 of 9:30 on October 21, 2015, and No. 9514 of 9:15 on June 21, 2017), that function must be understood in relation to the provisions of Article 2, subsection a) of the Ley de Creación del MOPT, which provides: “The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the following purpose: a) To plan, build, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads (caminos vecinales)” (the underlining is supplied). In the opinion of the Constitutional Body: “It is evident that it is not a matter of taking away powers or attributions from the municipalities, but rather of the due coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, as the maintenance of the national network does not imply their administration or regulation”. Thus, it is clear that the powers that the territorial entities hold over the roads of their canton are not altered or supplanted in any way by the aforementioned ministry. The coordination provided for there between the MOPT and the municipalities is logical and reasonable, given the nature of specialization, stewardship, and oversight that said ministry possesses in the matter. That is, it is a principle of sound administration that obliges the territorial entities to establish coordination mechanisms with the administrative instances of the central government that carry out, at a macro level, functions related to those locally deployed by the corporation, in order to achieve efficient attention to public needs and interests (on this particular point, see Judgment No. 979 of 7:55 on December 19, 2006, from this Chamber). However, that does not mean that the MOPT must take on functions proper to the local corporations and on assets over the jurisdiction of which the municipalities enjoy by express mandate of Law. In that sense, that coordination is not sufficient to infer that the administrative conduct - omissive - subject to debate (lack of signage on a cantonal street) is also attributable to the State, which is why the lack of passive standing determined by the A-quo with respect to said entity must be upheld. In accordance with the foregoing, the claim will be denied.
Appeal (Recurso de casación) of the State and CONAVI
VI.- The first claim formulated by the representation of CONAVI is based on the ground for appeal (causal de casación) established in Article 137, subsection d) of the CPCA, as well as in ordinal 61.2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), that is, lack of reasoning (falta de motivación). It alleges that the Court incurred in a contradiction regarding the exemption from the payment of costs. It explains that the A-quo first attributed an error to the representation of the plaintiff when suing CONAVI. It transcribes what was resolved in this regard in the appealed judgment: “In conclusion, the administration, construction, maintenance, and repair of cantonal routes is the competence of the municipalities, so the legal representative of the plaintiff starts from an erroneous assumption when trying to attribute responsibility to CONAVI for a route that is cantonal, as already stated, and that is the competence of the municipal entity”. However, later, when justifying the exemption from costs, the Court attributed an error to the plaintiffs regarding which body to sue and the serious loss that they suffered with the accident. It asserts that the contradiction lies in the fact that the error was not now attributed to the legal representative, but to the plaintiffs directly. It claims that two different assumptions cannot be supported under the same conclusion: a) The error is attributable to the legal representative of the plaintiffs when suing CONAVI, perhaps originated or motivated by their strategy or theory of the case. b) The error covers (or is that of) the plaintiffs, by virtue of the serious loss that some suffered and the physical and psychological injuries that afflicted others. It insists that it is contradictory that, to grant the defense of lack of standing, the error is attributed to the legal representative of the plaintiffs; however, for the exemption from costs, the error is attributed to the plaintiffs directly. In the second argument, the violation of canons 193 of the CPCA, 221 and 222 of the former CPC, and 73.1 and 73.2 of the new CPC is alleged. It explains that the imposition of costs on the losing party arises by legal imperative, that is, the one who loses the trial must pay the procedural and personal expenses of the controversy. Thus, it adds, costs constitute an economic consequence of the process that is independent of the merits of what was debated. It points out that, in this case, both CONAVI and the State introduced objective arguments and evidence showing that the road where the accident in question occurred was cantonal and not national. Despite that, it highlights, the plaintiff insisted on maintaining the litigation (litis) against CONAVI. It emphasizes that, if the thesis that the plaintiffs had a generic conception of the State were accepted, this should have dissipated since the complaints were answered and the evidence provided for that purpose. It adds that there was never any discussion as to whether it was a national or cantonal route or whether there were reciprocal faults to define the competences of CONAVI and the Municipality of Escazú. In this way, it asserts, if at the time of filing the complaint (with legal representation), the plaintiffs were mistaken regarding the defendants, such error should have been overcome with the evidence provided and the actions of the parties in the process, since there were several moments in which the plaintiff could well have withdrawn its claim against CONAVI. In this regard, it asks to take into consideration that, in the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) of July 13, 2015, the plaintiff requested that the following orders be sent: “1. To the Department of Sectoral Planning of the MOPT, so that it certifies that the highway where the mentioned accident occurred is part of the National Road Network […] 3. To CONAVI, to the corresponding Department, so that it certifies that the highway where the mentioned accident occurred is not subject to any concession for its maintenance; 4. To the Municipality of Escazú, so that it certifies that the highway where the mentioned accident occurred is not a cantonal road, and therefore, its maintenance does not correspond to that City Hall”. It notes that, regarding point 1, the instructing judge stated that CONAVI had already provided evidence to the effect that where the accident occurred is not a national route but a cantonal one. It adds that later, in the preliminary hearing of January 20, 2017, the plaintiff had sufficient time to analyze and verify the location of the accident site and the state entity responsible for its administration. Even, it argues, proof of that analysis that the plaintiff must have carried out is that on October 8, 2015, it sued the municipal entity of Escazú, thus understanding that this was the competent entity for the administration of the route where the accident happened, since in that process it provided all the evidence gathered in the present one. Furthermore, it points out, the sued municipality accepted that the route in question was cantonal, and the plaintiff's representation refuted the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by that party, under the following argument: “It is not correct since it does have responsibility for the street in accordance with the regulations and because it constitutes a cantonal street over which the Municipality has all the competence and the obligation of maintenance of the roads”. It considers that there was no sufficient reason to litigate (motivo suficiente para litigar) on the part of the plaintiffs, as they kept the lawsuit against CONAVI going on a fact that was not disputed. In its view, the conviction of the plaintiffs was not based on an objective fact, nor are there elements in the record on which the party can base reasons of fact and law that justified continuing to maintain a litigation against that co-defendant. It requests that the provisions of Judgments of this Chamber numbers 8-97, 1692-2012, 1283-2015, 1354-2016, and 577-2017 be taken into consideration. It notes that if the plaintiff decided to continue with its claim against CONAVI, it did so consciously and informedly, and to that extent, the ground for exemption applied (sufficient reason to litigate) is not met. On the other hand, with support from several doctrinal citations, the appellant explains what good faith is and concludes that the plaintiff's actions did not show the manifestation of that principle. It specifies that the plaintiffs acted with legal representation and, despite the fact that from the outset it was clear that the route was cantonal, that representation insisted on keeping CONAVI as a defendant. It considers that the Court erred in exempting the plaintiff from costs, for which reason it requests that the judgment be revoked in that respect and, instead, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay that item along with the payment of interest.
VII.- In the sole criticism raised by the representation of the State, the erroneous interpretation of cardinal 193 of the CPCA is alleged. It explains that, in the case at hand (sub-lite) the plaintiffs were exempted from paying costs, because, as stated in the judgment, they were unaware of the specific subject matter of administrative organization, therefore, they lacked the capacity to understand that they should sue the Municipality and not the State, considering, moreover, that they lost a loved one. It argues that, for the Court, those circumstances supported the sufficient reason to litigate; however, that ground implies that the party was convinced of the existence of sufficient right to go to the jurisdictional route. In these cases, it notes, legal representation is mandatory and, therefore, the plaintiffs chose to be represented by Dr.\n\nAngie Arce Acuña, who, in accordance with her academic preparation, imperatively should have known and must know the structure of the State and, with that, that municipalities are autonomous entities and represent themselves. Hence, she adds, although the plaintiffs are not legal experts, the truth is that for this reason a legal professional is required to conduct the defense of their interests. Furthermore, she mentions, if one thinks that the legal advisor had justification for not correctly identifying the public entity that had to be sued, it cannot be overlooked that the State and CONAVI pointed this out when answering the complaint, providing a public document regarding the nature of the road (cantonal) and the normative support that indicated its municipal oversight. In addition to the above, she alludes, in the preliminary hearing, the judge made Dr. Arce Acuña see that the evidence she herself was requesting referred to characteristics of the road subject to litigation as cantonal, being at the opportune procedural moment to withdraw from this matter without a special award of costs (requests viewing the hearing from minute 1:00:36 to 1:00:51). She concludes, if the plaintiff's representation sued the wrong public entity, it is impossible to assert sufficient grounds for litigating, when there was no act or omission attributable to that co-defendant. On the other hand, she argues, the reasoning regarding the death of a loved one suffers the same fate, since, “*although that circumstance is very regrettable, it is clear that, the late Xinia Guevara Madrigal perished as a result of a third party's actions and also, since the answer to the complaint was filed, the body of evidence proving the existence of signage on the street where the accident occurred was provided, therefore, the justification set forth does not support the exemption at hand. A contrary inference would lead to affirming that all persons who suffer losses due to third parties have ample cause to sue, not only, the wrong legal entity, but, furthermore, those who had no correlation with what happened*.” She considers that, with all the foregoing, the sufficient cause justifying the waiver of costs in favor of the plaintiffs is not observed and, therefore, she requests the reversal of the judgment on that point.\n\n**VIII.-** When ruling on the economic repercussions of the process, the Court of Appeals ordered, as relevant: “[…] In this case, in the Court’s judgment, sufficient cause to litigate did exist, given an error by the plaintiffs regarding the determination of the public legal entity that should have been brought into the process, based on a generic conception of State, which in this Chamber's judgment, and taking into account the grave loss (sic) suffered by the plaintiffs Leonel Carranza Álvarez, Paola Carranza Guevara, and Mónica Carranza Guevara of their wife and mother, as well as the physical and psychological injuries afflicting Jorge Steven Cabrera Altamirano, they had sufficient cause to litigate […]”\n\n**IX.-** As all the objections refer to the same issue, they will be resolved jointly, although, of course, respecting the arguments and special circumstances of each party. In relation to the first objection formulated by CONAVI’s representation, it must be noted that this Chamber does not observe the argued contradiction. From reading the judgment, it is seen that both the lack of passive legal standing and the exoneration of costs were based on the same fact: the error of the plaintiff in suing the wrong public entities. Certainly, when grounding the lack of passive legal standing, the Court of Appeals spoke of the error of “the legal representative of the plaintiff” and in justifying the waiver of costs, it referred to the error of “the plaintiffs”; however, this does not mean that the error had different authorships, as interpreted by the appellant. Speaking of the plaintiffs or the legal representative of the plaintiff is merely a way of identifying the same party, although in different ways. It should not be overlooked that the agent acts in the name of their principal, hence the actions carried out by Dr. Arce Acuña within this process were always in the name or on behalf of the plaintiffs. Thus, without further preamble, the objection under consideration will be denied.\n\n**X.-** Regarding the second charge formulated by CONAVI’s representation, it is necessary to recall that having sufficient grounds to litigate implies not only the losing party's conviction in the thesis defended by them, but also that this conviction is supported by objective data from the process, from which the adjudicator can conclude that the losing party had rationally founded reasons to believe in the soundness of their claim, or their defense, as the case may be. In the subexamine, this Chamber observes that although, upon filing the complaint, the plaintiff relied on jurisprudential precedents in which the State and CONAVI were condemned for situations similar to the present one and lacked proof that would allow her to detect that the route where the accident occurred was of a cantonal nature, that is, she had the conviction that she had directed the action against the correct public law entities, that conviction should have been dissipating as the process progressed in light of the arguments and evidence provided therein, as the appellant warns. Even if, later, the plaintiff's representation sued the Municipality of Escazú and considered that this local entity should answer to the claims raised because it was a cantonal route, it is evident that said party had clarity regarding the factual and legal situation of the subjúdice and that, ultimately, served as the basis for the Court of Appeals to declare the lack of passive legal standing of CONAVI. Thus, in that context, the plaintiff could well have withdrawn the complaint against that co-defendant without being ordered to pay costs pursuant to canon 197, subsection a) of the CPCA. However, by maintaining the complaint against said party until the end, this Chamber does not perceive the existence of sufficient grounds to litigate. Even if it was an error, as the Court of Appeals classified it, the plaintiff had the necessary legal counsel to detect it and amend it during the course of the process and, in that sense, the configuration of the exemption ground applied in the sub-lite is not observed. Based on the foregoing, the grievance will be upheld with the consequences to be stated.\n\n**XI.-** In relation to the sole objection of the State, it must be warned that, although what was set forth in the preceding considerando also affects the State's defense, against said party it is considered that the plaintiff did have sufficient grounds to litigate. The foregoing, by virtue of the duty of collaboration that the plaintiff alleged with respect to the MOPT and the municipalities, which she supported in canons 1 and 2 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, as well as 2 of the Law Creating the MOPT. A thesis that she even defended in this instance, as analyzed in previous considerandos. As observed, with respect to said party, the plaintiff maintained the conviction that it had to answer or address the claims raised, precisely because of the provisions in the cited canons. Thus, due to that special circumstance, this Chamber considers that the plaintiffs had a plausible reason to maintain the litigation against that co-defendant, for which reason the waiver from the payment of costs with respect to said party will be upheld and, consequently, the objection under consideration will be denied.\n\n**XII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeals filed by the plaintiff and the State's representation are declared without merit, with respect to which judgment is rendered without a special award of costs, in accordance with canon 150.3 of the CPCA and due to the reciprocal occurrence of losses. The appeal formulated by CONAVI's representation is upheld and, consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed only insofar as it exonerated the plaintiff from paying CONAVI's costs. In its place, ruling on the merits, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay CONAVI the personal and procedural costs of this litigation, which shall be settled in execution of the judgment.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeals filed by the plaintiff and the State's representation are declared without merit, with respect to which judgment is rendered without a special award of costs. The appeal formulated by CONAVI's representation is upheld and, consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed only insofar as it exonerated the plaintiff from paying CONAVI's costs. In its place, ruling on the merits, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay CONAVI the personal and procedural costs of this litigation, which shall be settled in execution of the judgment.\n\n**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga**\n\n**Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales**\n\n**William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez**\n\nERAMIREZCA\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nIn this sense, that coordination is not sufficient to infer that the administrative conduct – omissive – under debate (lack of signage on a cantonal street) is also attributable to the State, which is why the lack of passive standing (voto 595-F-2021) must be upheld.\n\nIt also considered that, from a reading of article 2 of the Law Creating the MOPT, the following could be inferred: “[…] as for local roads, what is attributed to the MOPT is a duty of collaboration and coordination, as is logical since it is the highest authority at the national level in this matter, but it is not possible, as the legal representation of the plaintiff intends, to start from a general assumption that it is responsible for all roads nationwide, without any distinction as to their nature, a distinction which, as noted earlier, is established by law”.
V.- For a long time, this Chamber has indicated that standing (legitimación ad causam) refers to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and the person obliged to provide the performance (the defendant). In that sense, persons who will be legally and directly affected in their rights by the judgment have standing in the case. Thus, for the effective concurrence of such standing, a direct and legitimate interest is required from the person who sues (active standing) and against whom the action is brought (passive standing). The latter —of interest in the case under study— assumes that the defendant must be the person who, by law, must oppose the plaintiff’s claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship subject to the lawsuit to be declared. Put another way, passive standing exists when the defendant is the subject who must satisfy the required performance, that is, due to the factual and legal circumstances invoked, it is the one who must respond and attend to the performance sought. (In this regard, see, among others, rulings No. 1023 of 14 hours 50 minutes on October 1, 2009, and No. 475 of 10 hours 40 minutes on February 21, 2020). Numeral 12 of the CPCA focuses the analysis of passive standing primarily on the administrative conduct subject to the litigation. Thus, the organ or entity that owns or authored the reproached conduct, or who by legislative mandate must answer for it, shall have passive standing. In this case, as stated in the complaint, the plaintiff accuses the defendants of an omission, specifically, a lack of signage on the street where the traffic accident occurred, as there were no speed limits, vertical or horizontal signage, or white or yellow lines. Likewise, the bus stop was not demarcated, nor did it have a shelter to protect the safety of travelers. In view of the foregoing, it requests that the defendants be ordered to implement the necessary safety measures on the respective road to prevent further tragedies, as well as that they be held liable for the moral damages caused by the accident in question. Regarding these claims, the lower court (Tribunal) considered, grosso modo, that CONAVI and the State lacked passive standing in the present case, basically because since the street in question belongs to the cantonal road network, the municipality of that locality would be the one obliged to attend to and answer for that omission, in accordance with article 1 of the Ley de Caminos Públicos. Furthermore, regarding the complaint related to the bus stop, it explained, article 7 of the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, establishes as one of the powers of the Consejo de Transporte Público (CTP): to set the terminal and intermediate stops for all remunerated public passenger transport services. It considered that, by virtue of what is provided therein, the CTP is the body that has a legal relationship with the questioned administrative conduct, and not the defendants. Moreover, since said Council holds instrumental legal personality (articles 3 and 4 ídem), it should have been the defendant according to precept 12.2 of the CPCA. Regarding this last determination, there is no objection from the appellant and, therefore, no pronouncement will be made on this matter. The issue that raises disagreement lies in the fact that, in the appellant's opinion, the State has standing in this case because articles 2 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos and 2 of the Ley de Creación del MOPT, assign to said ministry the competence for the construction and maintenance of public roads, thereby generating a legal duty of cooperation between the municipalities and the State (MOPT). This Chamber disagrees with that position. Since land communication routes (highways, freeways, roads, streets, bridges, and other elements comprising road networks) are public domain, their ownership, construction, and maintenance fall to the Public Administration. Now, it must be noted that in our country there is a bifurcation regarding the domain and administration of these assets. According to article 1 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, on one hand, there are roads belonging to the national road network (primary, secondary, tertiary highways, and those that the MOPT designates as restricted access highways and freeways), the domain of which is held by the MOPT, and, on the other, those concerning the cantonal road network (local roads, local streets, and classified roads), which belong to the municipalities of each locality. Now, precept 2 of that same regulatory body states: “All land occupied by existing public highways and roads or those that will be built in the future are property of the State. Municipalities have ownership of the streets within their jurisdiction. Public highways and roads may only be built and improved by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, municipalities and decentralized State institutions that have functions related to the construction of public roads may carry them out directly or through third parties […]”. Based on that provision, this Chamber has inferred that the State, through the MOPT, or, as the case may be, the municipalities (depending on whether they are national or cantonal roads, respectively), as holders of the real property right over those road areas, are responsible for their administration, which includes, among other aspects, ensuring that the infrastructure is safe and functional (in this regard, see rulings No. 136 of 14 hours 40 minutes on August 23, 1991, No. 74 of 10 hours 15 minutes on February 2, 2007, No. 674 of 9 hours 5 minutes on June 4, 2013). And, of course, neglect of those obligations could entail the corresponding liability, according to the scope of competences of each. Now, it is true that the transcribed numeral entrusts the MOPT with the construction and improvement of roads; however, as warned by the Sala Constitucional in the ruling cited by the appellant (ruling No. 5445 of 14 hours 30 minutes on July 14, 1999, reiterated in other recent ones such as No. 16362 of 9 hours 30 minutes on October 21, 2015, and No. 9514 of 9 hours 15 minutes on June 21, 2017), said function must be understood in relation to the provisions of article 2, subsection a) of the Ley de Creación del MOPT, which provides: “The Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes has the following objective: a) To plan, build and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads” (the underlining is added). In the opinion of the Constitutional Body: “It is evident that it is not a matter of taking away competences or powers from the municipalities, but rather of the proper coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, as the maintenance of the national network does not imply the administration or regulation thereof”. Thus, it is clear that the competences held by the territorial entities over the roads of their canton are not altered or supplanted in any way by the referred ministry. The coordination provided therein between the MOPT and the municipalities is logical and reasonable, given the specialization, stewardship, and oversight character that said ministry possesses in the matter. That is, it is a principle of sound administration that obliges the territorial entities to establish coordination mechanisms with the administrative bodies of the central government that carry out, at a macro level, functions related to those deployed locally by the corporation, in order to achieve efficient attention to public needs and interests (in this regard, see judgment No. 979 of 7 hours 55 minutes on December 19, 2006, of this Chamber). However, this does not mean that the MOPT must take on functions proper to the local corporations and over assets whose jurisdiction is held by the municipalities by express mandate of Law. In that sense, such coordination is not sufficient to infer that the administrative conduct—omission—under discussion (lack of signage on a cantonal street) is also attributable to the State, which is why the lack of passive standing regarding said entity, as determined by the lower court (A-quo), must be upheld. In accordance with the foregoing, the challenge will be denied.
Appeal (Recurso de casación) of the State and CONAVI
VI.- The first challenge formulated by the representation of CONAVI is based on the ground for appeal stated in article 137, subsection d) of the CPCA, as well as in numeral 61.2 of the Código Procesal Civil (CPC), namely, lack of reasoning. It argues that the lower court incurred a contradiction regarding the exemption from the payment of costs. It explains, the lower court (A-quo) first attributed an error to the representation of the plaintiff in suing CONAVI. It transcribes what was decided in this regard in the appealed judgment: “In conclusion, the administration, construction, maintenance, and repair of cantonal routes is the competence of the municipalities; therefore, the plaintiff's legal representative bases her argument on an erroneous assumption when seeking to attribute liability to CONAVI for a route that is cantonal, as already stated, and which is the competence of the municipal entity”. However, later, when justifying the exemption from costs, the lower court attributed an error to the plaintiffs regarding which organ to sue and the grave loss they suffered from the accident. It asserts that the contradiction lies in the fact that the error was then imputed not to the legal representative, but to the plaintiffs directly. It claims that two different assumptions cannot be supported under the same conclusion: a) The error is attributable to the legal representative of the plaintiffs when suing CONAVI, perhaps originated or motivated by their strategy or theory of the case. b) The error covers (or is) that of the plaintiffs, by virtue of the grave loss that some suffered and the physical and psychological injuries that afflicted others. It insists, it is contradictory that, in order to uphold the defense of lack of standing, the error is imputed to the legal representative of the plaintiffs; however, for the exemption from costs, the error is attributed to the plaintiffs directly. In the second challenge, a violation of canons 193 of the CPCA, 221 and 222 of the former CPC, and 73.1 and 73.2 of the new CPC is alleged. It states that the imposition of costs on the losing party arises by legal imperative, that is, whoever loses the trial must pay the procedural and personal expenses of the dispute. Thus, it adds, costs constitute an economic consequence of the process that is independent of the merits of the matter discussed. It points out that, in this case, both CONAVI and the State introduced objective arguments and evidence showing that the road where the accident in question occurred was cantonal and not national. Despite that, it highlights, the plaintiff insisted on maintaining the litigation against CONAVI. It emphasizes that, if the thesis were accepted that the plaintiffs had a generic conception of the State, this should have dissipated from the moment the complaints were answered and the evidence provided to that effect. It adds that there was never any discussion as to whether it was a national or cantonal route or whether there were reciprocal faults to define the competences of CONAVI and the Municipalidad de Escazú. Thus, it asserts, if at the time of filing the complaint (with legal representation), the plaintiffs were mistaken regarding the defendants sued, such error should have been overcome with the evidence provided and the actions of the parties in the process, as there were several moments when the plaintiff could very well have withdrawn its complaint against CONAVI. In this regard, it requests to take into consideration that, in the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) of July 13, 2015, the plaintiff requested to send the following orders: “1. To the Department of Sectoral Planning of the MOPT, so that it certifies that the road where the mentioned accident occurred is part of the Red Vial Nacional […] 3. To CONAVI, to the corresponding Department, so that it certifies that the road where the mentioned accident occurred is not subject to any concession for its maintenance; 4. To the Municipalidad de Escazú, so that it certifies that the road where the mentioned accident occurred is not a cantonal road, and therefore its maintenance is not the responsibility of that City Hall”. It notes that, regarding point 1, the investigating judge indicated that CONAVI had already provided evidence to the effect that where the accident occurred is not a national route but of a cantonal nature. It adds that later, in the preliminary hearing of January 20, 2017, the plaintiff had sufficient time to analyze and verify the location of the accident site and the state entity responsible for its administration. In fact, it argues, proof of this analysis that the plaintiff must have carried out is that on October 8, 2015, it sued the municipal entity of Escazú, thereby understanding that that was the entity competent for the administration of the route where the accident occurred, since it provided all the evidence gathered in the present case in that process. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the defendant municipality accepted that the route in question was cantonal, and the plaintiff's representation refuted the defense of lack of right raised by that party, under the following argument: “It is not correct, since it does have responsibility for the street in accordance with the regulations and because it constitutes a cantonal street for which the Municipality has full competence and the obligation of road maintenance”. It considers that there was no sufficient reason for the plaintiffs to litigate, as they kept the lawsuit ongoing against CONAVI over a fact that was not in dispute. In its view, the plaintiffs' belief was not based on objective data, nor are there elements in the case file on which the party can base reasons of fact and law that justified continuing to maintain litigation against that co-defendant. It requests consideration of the provisions in rulings of this Chamber numbers 8-97, 1692-2012, 1283-2015, 1354-2016, and 577-2017. It notes that if the plaintiff decided to continue with its lawsuit against CONAVI, it did so consciously and informedly, and to that extent, the applied cause for exemption (sufficient reason to litigate) is not established. On the other hand, with support from various doctrinal citations, the appellant explains what good faith is and concludes that the plaintiff's actions did not demonstrate the expression of that principle. It points out that the plaintiffs acted with legal representation and, although it was clear from the outset that the route was cantonal, that representation insisted on keeping CONAVI as a defendant. It considers that the lower court erred in exempting the plaintiff from costs, which is why it requests that the ruling be reversed in that respect and, instead, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay that item along with the payment of interest.
VII.- In the only objection raised by the representation of the State, an erroneous interpretation of article 193 of the CPCA is alleged. It explains that, in the case under review (sub-lite), the plaintiffs were exempted from the payment of costs, because, as stated in the judgment, they were unaware of the specific nature of administrative organization and, therefore, lacked the capacity to understand that they should sue the Municipality and not the State, considering also that they lost a loved one. It argues that, for the lower court, these circumstances supported the sufficient reason to litigate; however, said cause implies that the party was convinced of the existence of a sufficient right to resort to the courts. In these cases, it highlights, legal representation is mandatory and, therefore, the plaintiffs chose to be represented by Dr.\n\nAngie Arce Acuña, who, according to her academic background, imperatively should have known and must know the structure of the State and, thereby, that municipalities are autonomous entities and represent themselves. Hence, she adds, although the plaintiffs are not legal experts, the truth is that for this reason a professional in the field is required to conduct the defense of their interests. Furthermore, she mentions, if one thinks that the legal advisor had justification for not correctly identifying the public entity that should have been sued, it cannot be overlooked that the State and CONAVI made this clear when answering the complaint, by providing a public document regarding the nature of the road (cantonal) and the regulatory basis indicating its municipal oversight. In addition to the foregoing, she alludes, during the preliminary hearing, the judge pointed out to Dr. Arce Acuña that the evidence she herself was requesting referred to characteristics of the road at issue in the litigation as cantonal, thus being at the appropriate procedural moment to desist from this matter without a special award of costs (she asks to review the hearing from minute 1:00:36 to 1:00:51). She concludes, if the plaintiff’s representation sued the wrong public entity, it is impossible to assert sufficient grounds to litigate, when there was no conduct by action or omission that could be reproachable to that co-defendant. On the other hand, she argues, the reasoning referring to the death of a loved one suffers the same fate, since, “although that circumstance is very lamentable, it is glaringly obvious that, the late Xinia Guevara Madrigal perished as a result of the actions of a third party and also from the answer to the complaint the body of evidence was provided that accredited the existence of signage on the street where the accident occurred, therefore, neither does the justification provided support the exemption from costs that concerns us. A contrary inference would lead to affirming that all persons who suffer losses due to third parties have ample cause to sue, not only the wrong legal entity, but also those who had no correlation whatsoever with what happened.” She considers that, with everything stated, the sufficient cause justifying the exemption from costs in favor of the plaintiffs is not observed and, therefore, she requests the reversal of the judgment on that point.\n\n**VIII.-** When ruling on the economic repercussions of the proceeding, the Court held, as relevant: “[…] In this case, in the Court’s opinion, there did exist sufficient cause to litigate, there being an error on the part of the plaintiffs regarding the determination of the organ or legal entity that should have been brought into the process, based on a generic conception of the State, which in the opinion of this Chamber, and taking into account the grave loss (sic) suffered by the plaintiffs Leonel Carranza Álvarez, Paola Carranza Guevara, and Mónica Carranza Guevara of their wife and mother, as well as the physical and psychological injuries afflicting Jorge Steven Cabrera Altamirano, they had sufficient cause to litigate […].”\n\n**IX.-** Since all the objections refer to the same issue, they will be resolved jointly, although, of course, respecting the arguments and special circumstances of each party. Regarding the first objection formulated by the representation of CONAVI, it must be noted that this Chamber does not observe the contradiction argued. From a reading of the judgment, it is seen that both the lack of passive legal standing and the exemption from costs were based on the same fact: the error of the plaintiff in suing the wrong public entities. Certainly, when substantiating the lack of passive legal standing, the Court spoke of the error of “the legal representative of the plaintiff” and in the justification for the exemption from costs it referred to the error of “the plaintiffs”; however, this does not mean that the error had different authors, as the appellant interprets it. Speaking of the plaintiffs or of the legal representative of the plaintiff is merely a way of identifying the same party, although in different ways. It must not be overlooked that the attorney-in-fact acts in the name of their principal, hence the actions performed by Dr. Arce Acuña within this proceeding were always in the name or on behalf of the plaintiffs. Thus, without further preamble, the objection under examination will be denied.\n\n**X.-** Regarding the second charge formulated by the representation of CONAVI, it is necessary to recall that having sufficient grounds to litigate implies not only the conviction of the losing party in the thesis defended by them, but also that such conviction must be supported by objective data from the proceeding, from which the adjudicator can conclude that the losing party had rationally founded reasons to believe in the soundness of their claim, or their defense, as the case may be. In the sub-examine, this Chamber observes that, although when filing the complaint, the plaintiff relied on jurisprudential precedents in which the State and CONAVI were condemned for situations similar to the present one and lacked evidence allowing her to detect that the route where the accident occurred was of a cantonal nature, that is, she was convinced that she had directed the action against the correct public law entities, that conviction should have faded as the proceeding progressed, given the arguments and evidence provided therein, as the appellant warns. In fact, if afterward the plaintiff’s representation sued the Municipality of Escazú and considered that this local entity should respond to the claims raised because it was a cantonal route, it is evident that said party had clarity regarding the factual and legal situation of the sub judice and which, ultimately, served as the basis for the Court to declare the lack of passive legal standing of CONAVI. Thus, in that context, the plaintiff could well have desisted from the complaint against that co-defendant without being ordered to pay costs, pursuant to canon 197, subsection a) of the CPCA. However, by maintaining the complaint against said party until the end, this Chamber does not appreciate the existence of sufficient grounds to litigate. Even if it was an error, as the Court categorized it, the plaintiff had the necessary legal representation to detect and amend it during the course of the proceeding, and, in that sense, the configuration of the causal basis for the exemption applied in the sub-lite is not observed. Pursuant to what has been stated, the grievance will be upheld with the consequences that will be set forth.\n\n**XI.-** In relation to the sole objection of the State, it must be warned that, although what was stated in the preceding recital also affects the defense of the State, it is considered that the plaintiff did have sufficient grounds to litigate against said party. The foregoing, by virtue of the duty of collaboration that the plaintiff alleged regarding MOPT and the municipalities and which she supported with canons 1 and 2 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, as well as 2 of the Law creating MOPT. A thesis that she even defended in this instance, as analyzed in previous recitals. As observed, with respect to said party, the plaintiff maintained the conviction that it should answer or address the claims raised, precisely because of the provisions of the cited canons. Thus, due to that special circumstance, this Chamber considers that the plaintiffs had a plausible reason to maintain the litigation against that co-defendant, which is why the exemption from the payment of costs with respect to said party will be upheld and, consequently, the objection under examination will be denied.\n\n**XII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeals for cassation filed by the plaintiff and the representation of the State will be declared without merit, which will be decided without a special award of costs, in accordance with canon 150.3 of the CPCA and by virtue of the mutual defeat incurred. The appeal filed by the representation of CONAVI will be upheld and, consequently, the appealed judgment will be reversed only insofar as it exempted the plaintiff from the payment of CONAVI’s costs. In its place, ruling on the merits, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay CONAVI the personal and procedural costs of this litigation, which will be settled in the execution of the judgment.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeals for cassation filed by the plaintiff and the representation of the State are declared without merit, and are decided without a special award of costs. The appeal filed by the representation of CONAVI is upheld and, consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed only insofar as it exempted the plaintiff from the payment of CONAVI’s costs. In its place, ruling on the merits, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay CONAVI the personal and procedural costs of this litigation, which will be settled in the execution of the judgment.\n\n**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga**\n\n**Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales**\n\n**William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez**\n\nERAMIREZCA" }