{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-1063196",
  "citation": "Res. 01748-2021 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Responsabilidad del concesionario por daños en carretera de peaje",
  "title_en": "Concessionaire liability for damages on toll road",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia rechaza un recurso de casación interpuesto por usuarios que alegaron haber sufrido daños en su vehículo tras colisionar con una piedra en la ruta 27, una carretera concesionada a Autopistas del Sol. Los recurrentes demandaron solidariamente al Estado, al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones y a la concesionaria, pero el tribunal de instancia desestimó la demanda por falta de prueba del siniestro. En casación, se argumenta la inconstitucionalidad de las normas que excluyen la responsabilidad del Estado en concesiones y la indebida valoración de la prueba. La Sala declara sin lugar el recurso. Primero, determina que carece de competencia para analizar la constitucionalidad de la Ley 7762, pues corresponde a la Sala Constitucional. Segundo, confirma que la prueba presentada —el testimonio de una acompañante, el reporte de la concesionaria y los informes técnicos de la Contraloría y la Asociación Costarricense de Geotecnia— es insuficiente para acreditar el accidente y el nexo causal. La Sala subraya que, según la normativa sobre concesiones, la responsabilidad primaria por daños a terceros recae en el concesionario, y en el caso de autopistas de peaje existe una relación de consumo que activa el régimen objetivo de la Ley 7472, pero la falta de prueba del daño impide cualquier condena. Se condena en costas a los recurrentes.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice denies a cassation appeal filed by users who alleged damages to their vehicle after colliding with a rock on Route 27, a road under concession to Autopistas del Sol. The plaintiffs sued jointly the State, the National Concessions Council, and the concessionaire, but the trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of proof of the accident. In cassation, they argued the unconstitutionality of norms that exclude State liability in concessions and the improper assessment of evidence. The Chamber declares the appeal without merit. First, it rules that it lacks jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Law 7762, a matter reserved for the Constitutional Chamber. Second, it confirms that the evidence presented —testimony of a passenger, the concessionaire’s report, and technical reports from the Comptroller General’s Office and the Costa Rican Geotechnical Association— is insufficient to prove the accident and causal link. The Chamber stresses that under concession law, primary liability for third-party damages lies with the concessionaire, and in toll road cases, a consumer relationship exists that triggers the strict liability regime of Law 7472, but the lack of proof of injury precludes any award. Costs are imposed on the appellants.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "12/10/2021",
  "year": "2021",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "concesión de obra pública",
    "nexo causal",
    "caso fortuito",
    "responsabilidad objetiva",
    "relación de consumo",
    "Ley 7472",
    "Ley 7762",
    "peaje"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "responsabilidad concesionario",
    "concesión obra pública",
    "Ley 7762",
    "ruta 27",
    "Autopistas del Sol",
    "caso fortuito",
    "nexo causal",
    "prueba daños",
    "testimonio insuficiente",
    "relación de consumo",
    "Ley 7472",
    "responsabilidad objetiva",
    "responsabilidad subjetiva",
    "costas",
    "Sala Primera"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "concessionaire liability",
    "public works concession",
    "Law 7762",
    "Route 27",
    "Autopistas del Sol",
    "fortuitous event",
    "causal link",
    "proof of damages",
    "insufficient testimony",
    "consumer relationship",
    "Law 7472",
    "strict liability",
    "subjective liability",
    "costs",
    "First Chamber"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Tal y como se puede observar, de tales manifestaciones, no hay manera de comprobar, que el día que los actores iban circulando por la carretera 27, efectivamente colisionaran con una piedra de grandes dimensiones, provocando graves daños materiales relacionados con el vehículo y, en consecuencia, los daños directamente a los actores. Tratándose de un suceso como el que relatan, quienes afirman que casi se vuelca el vehículo, que perdieron el control por un instante, básicamente se trata de una situación traumática difícil de olvidar; sin embargo, la supuesta acompañante, ni siquiera logró relatar de qué lado del carro fue que colisionaron. Tampoco hizo mención alguna a que se hubiese dado una situación como la recién descrita, por el contrario, se limita a indicar que “se montaron” sobre una piedra y que la conductora lentamente se dirigió hasta el peaje. Casi pareciera un testimonio elaborado, por ello, tampoco a esta Cámara le merecen credibilidad tales manifestaciones y, por ende, no pueden servir como base para tener por demostrado lo aducido por los actores. Por otro lado, el documento SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, del 7 junio de 2010, emitido por la Concesionaria, visible a folio 31 del expediente, rechazó categóricamente la existencia de piedras en la vía, y, por ende, el reclamo de Bolaños Masís y Mena Brenes. Tal documento, no puede ser considerado prueba que evidencie los hechos relatados en la demanda. Por último, los informes a los que se hace referencia como mal valorados, sea: el Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27 y el informe DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 emitido por la CGR, como bien lo indican los propios recurrentes, no son probanza alguna que se relacione ni que evidencie por sí misma, lo ocurrido el 22 de mayo de 2010. La existencia de un problema en la concesión, en la fiscalización o en el resultado de la construcción y mantenimiento de la ruta en cuestión, no es objeto de esta litis; lo solicitado por los actores se limita a una condena de daños y perjuicios, la cual no es posible conceder, en virtud de que no fue aportado en este proceso, prueba que demostrara la existencia de una colisión con una piedra en la ruta 27, que les ocasionara los daños alegados. Así las cosas, ambos agravios deberán ser denegados.",
  "excerpt_en": "As can be observed, from such statements there is no way to verify that on the day the plaintiffs were traveling on Route 27, they actually collided with a large rock, causing serious material damage to the vehicle and, consequently, direct harm to the plaintiffs. In the case of an event like the one they recount, in which they claim the vehicle nearly overturned and they lost control momentarily, it is basically a traumatic situation difficult to forget; however, the alleged passenger could not even tell on which side of the car the collision occurred. Nor did she make any mention of the situation just described; to the contrary, she limited herself to saying they “rode up” onto a rock and the driver slowly headed to the toll booth. The testimony almost seems fabricated, and therefore this Chamber gives no credibility to such statements, and they cannot serve as a basis to prove the plaintiffs’ allegations. On the other hand, document SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, dated June 7, 2010, issued by the Concessionaire, found on page 31 of the file, categorically denied the existence of rocks on the road and, thus, the claim of Bolaños Masís and Mena Brenes. This document cannot be considered evidence that proves the facts alleged in the complaint. Finally, the reports referred to as improperly weighed, namely the Inspection Report of Route 27 and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 issued by the Comptroller General’s Office, as the appellants themselves indicate, are not evidence that relates to or by itself demonstrates what occurred on May 22, 2010. The existence of a problem in the concession, in oversight, or in the outcome of the construction and maintenance of the road in question is not the object of this litigation; what the plaintiffs requested is limited to an award for damages and losses, which cannot be granted because no evidence was produced in this proceeding demonstrating the existence of a collision with a rock on Route 27 that caused the alleged damages. Therefore, both grounds for appeal must be denied.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The cassation appeal is denied, confirming the ruling that dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of proof of the accident and causal link; costs are imposed on the appellants.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación, confirmando la sentencia que denegó la demanda por falta de prueba del accidente y del nexo causal, con costas a cargo de los recurrentes."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando Art. 38 Ley 7762",
      "quote_en": "Regarding rights and duties toward third parties, the concessionaire shall be governed by the rules of Private Law.",
      "quote_es": "En lo referente a derechos y deberes con terceros, el concesionario se regirá por las normas del Derecho Privado."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando Art. 69.2 Decreto Ejecutivo 27098-MOPT",
      "quote_en": "The concessionaire shall be solely liable for any damage, of any nature, caused to third parties by reason of the construction of the work or the operation of the service [...], unless the damage is attributable to the conceding Administration due to measures it imposed on the concessionaire.",
      "quote_es": "El concesionario será el único responsable de todo daño, de cualquier naturaleza, que con motivo de la construcción de la obra o la explotación del servicio se ocasione a terceros [...], a menos que los daños le sean imputables a la Administración concedente por medidas que ésta le impuso al concesionario."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, refiriéndose al Art. 35 Ley 7472",
      "quote_en": "By virtue of this provision, this Chamber has held the view that it is for the producer, merchant, or service provider to demonstrate their lack of involvement with respect to the claimed damage.",
      "quote_es": "Es en virtud de este enunciado, esta Sala ha sostenido el criterio de que corresponde al productor, comerciante o proveedor del servicio acreditar su ajenidad con respecto al daño reclamado."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "The existence of a problem in the concession, in oversight, or in the outcome of the construction and maintenance of the road in question is not the object of this litigation; what the plaintiffs requested is limited to an award for damages and losses, which cannot be granted because no evidence was produced in this proceeding demonstrating the existence of a collision with a rock on Route 27 that caused the alleged damages.",
      "quote_es": "La existencia de un problema en la concesión, en la fiscalización o en el resultado de la construcción y mantenimiento de la ruta en cuestión, no es objeto de esta litis; lo solicitado por los actores se limita a una condena de daños y perjuicios, la cual no es posible conceder, en virtud de que no fue aportado en este proceso, prueba que demostrara la existencia de una colisión con una piedra en la ruta 27, que les ocasionara los daños alegados."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-26481",
      "citation": "Ley 7472",
      "title_en": "Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection",
      "title_es": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "20/12/1994",
      "year": "1994"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-30464",
      "citation": "Ley 7762",
      "title_en": "General Law on Public Works Concessions with Public Services",
      "title_es": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "14/04/1998",
      "year": "1998"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-769731",
      "citation": "Res. 00925-2015 Sala Primera de la Corte",
      "title_en": "Concessionaire's civil liability for landslide during public works construction",
      "title_es": "Responsabilidad civil del concesionario por deslizamiento en obra pública",
      "doc_type": "court_decision",
      "date": "06/08/2015",
      "year": "2015"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-26481",
      "citation": "Ley 7472",
      "title_en": "Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection",
      "title_es": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "20/12/1994",
      "year": "1994"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-30464",
      "citation": "Ley 7762",
      "title_en": "General Law on Public Works Concessions with Public Services",
      "title_es": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "14/04/1998",
      "year": "1998"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1063196",
  "tier": 2,
  "is_environmental": false,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
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  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-26481",
      "norm_num": "7472",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "20/12/1994"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-30464",
      "norm_num": "7762",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "14/04/1998"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "Documento PJEDITOR\n\n\n\nExp. 11-002660-1027-CA \n\nRes. 001748-F-S1-2021\n\n SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las trece horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del doce de octubre de dos mil veintiuno\n\nProceso de conocimiento, establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por LORENA BOLAÑOS MASÍS, psicóloga y MARCOS ANTONIO MENA BRENES, administrador de empresas; contra el ESTADO representado por el procurador Alonso Arnesto Moya, el CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CONCESIONES, representado por el entonces ministro Luis Llach Cordero, ingeniero civil, vecino de Cartago y AUTOPISTAS DEL SOL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por sus apoderados generalísimos sin límite de suma José Antonio Cuadrado Fernández, ingeniero de caminos, canales y puertos y Valentín Antonio Camacho Fábregas, soltero, economista. Figura como apoderado especial judicial, de los actores Arnoldo Segura Santiesteban; por el Consejo, Jorge Arturo Madrigal Sancho, vecino de Cartago, así como Francisco Santos Méndez y por la sociedad Gabriela Arguedas Vargas. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José.\n\nRedacta la magistrada Vargas Vásquez;\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI. El 13 de mayo de 2011, Lorena Bolaños Masís y Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes presentaron demanda contenciosa contra el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC) y Autopistas del Sol S.A. (en adelante Autopistas del Sol o Concesionaria). Allí en lo medular señalaron, el 22 de mayo de 2010, se encontraban circulando por la ruta 27 en el vehículo placas números 228783, propiedad de Mena Brenes y conducido por Bolaños Masís, acompañados de Carmen Lidia Irías Rojas y Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías. Circulaban de Orotina y con destino a Ciudad Colón, aproximadamente a las 8:00 pm, con poca visibilidad. Antes de llegar al kilómetro 45 notaron que, al lado de la calle, había una acumulación de piedras pequeñas, debido a desprendimientos de las laderas. Llegando a ese kilómetro, se encontraron el tránsito detenido, poco tiempo después abrieron el paso de nuevo y los dejaron continuar, sin que se les haya indicado ninguna situación en particular. Al acercarse al kilómetro 44 notaron una piedra de grandes dimensiones en medio del carril por el cual circulaban, y que les fue imposible esquivar, colisionando el carro de frente. En virtud de ello, la conductora perdió el control y casi se vuelca el vehículo, incluso estuvieron en riesgo de caer en un guindo. Estabilizado el carro, constataron que nadie hubiese sufrido lesiones físicas de importancia y que el motor no se detuviera por el impacto. Decidieron mantenerse en movimiento para llegar a un trayecto de la vía donde no corrieran riesgo puesto que seguían cayendo piedras de todos tamaños. Al alcanzar la estación del peaje de Atenas, se detuvieron para hacer la revisión del vehículo y determinar los daños causados a este, asimismo hicieron el reporte correspondiente ante la Concesionaria. Como consecuencia de la situación descrita, el auto sufrió múltiples menoscabos, no lo han podido reparar, además se encuentra inutilizado en su casa. Ello les ha ocasionado problemas para desplazarse a otros lugres como: trabajo, casa de familiares, supermercados, centros de diversión; ya que, habitan en un pequeño poblado a cinco kilómetros de Ciudad Colón donde no hay servicios de transporte públicos, lo que los obliga a tomar un taxi hasta el pueblo más cercano y de allí utilizar el autobús. Aunado a lo anterior, la zona donde viven es boscosa, se generan derrumbes con cierta frecuencia que bloquean el camino principal. Para poder salir, deben acudir a vías rurales que solo pueden ser transitadas por vehículos de doble tracción. Toda esta situación, aún y cuando no les generó lesiones físicas de consideración, les ha afectado el ánimo de manera grave, pues han padecido nerviosismos, miedo, inseguridad, aflicción y ansiedad, cada vez que hacen viajes distantes. Además, perdieron su confianza en la ruta 27, sobre la cual se dura menos tiempo para llegar de un sitio a otro. Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes, ha sido el mayor perjudicado con toda esta situación, pues tiene que trasladarse todos los días desde su casa a su trabajo en San José, y lo ha tenido que hacer en transporte público. Asimismo, Lorena Bolaños Masís, tampoco ha tenido facilidad de traslado para realizar su profesión como contadora pública y psicóloga, pues se ha visto en la obligación de hacer uso de su carro que es de bajo cilindro. En oficio SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, la Concesionaria les informó que no se iban a hacer responsables por los daños por tratarse de un caso fortuito. Criterio que no comparten pues hay muchos informes y reportajes que demuestran que la carretera fue abierta prematuramente, aún y cuando tenía problemas en el diseño, construcción y mantenimiento que propiciaron los derrumbes. Con base en esta relación de hechos y conforme a audiencia preliminar, en lo de interés solicitaron se declare: 1- responsables de manera solidaria a los codemandados, por los daños que se les causaron con el evento del 22 de mayo de 2010. 2- El pago de los daños causados al vehículo, ya sea pagando su reparación en la agencia correspondiente o bien, entregándole un auto de la misma naturaleza, condición y características que el dañado, a satisfacción de los actores. 3- Las costas a cargo de los accionados. Los daños los desglosó de la siguiente manera: Materiales: la suma de ¢5.716.470,00 que es el costo del arreglo del automotor; ¢2.000.000,00 como depreciación estimada y ¢1.500.000,00 que es la sobre utilización que han tenido que hacer del vehículo placas 511422. Morales: a favor del señor Mena Brenes un monto de ¢25.000.000,00 y para la actora Bolaños Masís la suma de ¢15.000.000,00. En calidad de perjuicios solicitaron a nombre del primero ¢10.000.000,00 y de la segunda ¢5.000.000,00. El Estado contestó de manera negativa y opuso las excepciones de falta de: competencia, legitimación pasiva y derecho, así como de defectos formarles en escrito de demanda, prejudicialidad y litispendencia. Igualmente, el CNC, contradijo la demanda, y adujo falta de legitimación pasiva y la expresión genérica “sine actione agit”. Por su parte Autopistas del Sol, también se manifestó opuesta a la acción e invocó las defensas de falta de: derecho, legitimación activa y pasiva e interés. La litispendencia fue desistida y la prejudicialidad y falta de competencia denegada de manera interlocutoria. El Tribunal denegó las excepciones de falta de interés, legitimación activa y pasiva y la expresión genérica “sine actione agit”. Acogió la falta de derecho. Declaró sin lugar la demanda. Las costas a cargo de los actores. Inconforme los actores presentan recurso de casación. \n\nII. Aducen los siguientes tres motivos por razones de fondo. Primero: dice se han conculcado los numerales 18 inciso f) y 38 ambos de la Ley 7762, así como el canon 69 del Reglamento General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, Decreto Ejecutivo número 27098-Mopt del 12 de junio de 1998 (en adelante el Reglamento); asimismo de los artículos 7, 9, 11, 28, 41, 49, 129, 153 y 154 de la Constitución Política; preceptos 1 y 2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA); ordinal 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Todo lo anterior, en virtud de haber considerado el Tribunal, que en materia de concesiones el único responsable ante terceros es el concesionario y no la Administración. Aún y cuando la ley y el Reglamento mencionados, así lo disponen, tal situación contraviene la supremacía constitucional. Descargar la responsabilidad del Estado, a través de una norma jurídica, es inconstitucional. De esta manera, se han visto afectados sus derechos de debido proceso y derecho de defensa, en el tanto se les ha privado del derecho a ser indemnizados.\n\nIII. El reparo en cuestión, no combate un argumento específico del fallo del Tribunal, más bien se decanta por aducir un problema de constitucionalidad de las normas cuestionadas, en específico los artículos 18 inciso f) y 38 de la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos (en adelante Ley de Concesión), así como el numeral 69 del Reglamento. Conforme lo establece el artículo 10 de la Carta Magna, corresponde a la Sala Constitucional resolver los asuntos concernientes a la discusión de inconstitucionalidad de las normas de cualquier naturaleza. Lo cual, además, está regulado en el numeral 2 inciso b) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. De lo anterior se desprende con claridad que esta Cámara no tiene competencia para resolver el punto que se somete a su debate. Asimismo, importa mencionar, del estudio de las acciones cursadas y resueltas por el Tribunal Constitucional, al momento de dictarse esta sentencia, no se evidencia que las normas en cuestión hayan sido objeto de análisis; es decir, no existe ni ha habido un cuestionamiento sobre su constitucionalidad que pudiera llevar a este Órgano decisor a suspender la resolución del caso, o desaplicar las normas de la Ley 7762. De tal manera, el agravio deberá ser denegado. \n\nIV. En el segundo reparo aduce indebida valoración de probatoria en el tanto el Tribunal consideró que no había prueba que sustentara los hechos ocurridos el 22 de mayo de 2010, lo cual impedía establecer la responsabilidad que se solicitaba a la Concesionaria y a los órganos estatales, de tal manera que la discusión sobre daños resultaba estéril. Sin embargo, en este sentido, se obvia el testimonio de Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías, quien relató todo lo sucedido ese día, y la demostración de que el vehículo había colisionado con una piedra. Con el actuar de los juzgadores se conculca lo dispuesto en los preceptos 82 incisos 2) y 4) del CPCA, transgrediendo la sana crítica racional, pues deja ayuno de análisis dicha testimonial. Igualmente, no se tomó en cuenta el reporte del accidente que ellos hicieron ese mismo día en el puesto de peaje de Autopistas del Sol, así como el documento en donde rechaza la indemnización reclamada con fecha 7 de junio de 2010, mediante documento SJ-C/DE 07-001/01. No es cierto que la testigo fue dubitativa en cuanto el suceso, solo lo fue sobre los detalles, lo cual es lógico que suceda por el paso del tiempo. Además, el Tribunal la descarta atendiendo al grado de parentesco familiar, sin que dé una explicación sobre tal descalificación. Según el fallo, el hecho de que la testigo viajara atrás, fuera de noche y que dijera que no vio los daños causados, no sustentan lo peticionado por los actores; afirmación que es errónea, pues la testigo claramente relató lo sucedido con la piedra. El que no haya visto los daños no significa que estos no existieran. Para resolver este asunto, se hace necesario acudir a las reglas de la lógica y de la experiencia, debiendo tener claro que el choque con la piedra en la carretera fue la que los causó. Se debe aplicar lo dispuesto en el numeral 417 del Código Procesal Civil (CPC) relativo a las presunciones humanas. Para los juzgadores, ni siquiera los informes técnicos relacionados con las inspecciones que hicieran diversos entes del Estado con relación a la ruta 27 durante el año 2010, demuestra el evento en cuestión; valorando mal la prueba. Indican, es cierto, tales documentos no demostraban la existencia del evento, para eso están los testimonios, el reporte del accidente y el oficio de la Concesionaria referido; aquellos dictámenes sirven para demostrar el nexo causal. Conforme lo establecen los numerales 8 incisos d) y l), 9 acápite 1) punto d), 16 inciso a) y 37 párrafo primero, es obligación del Estado vigilar que la Concesionaria tenga en buen estado la carretera. En este caso hay un funcionamiento ilegítimo de la Administración, lo que se demuestra con los documentos técnicos aportados: “Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27”, elaborado por la Asociación Costarricense de Geotecnia (ACG) y el informe DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 de la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), aquel primero determina el lugar donde sucedió el percance como crítico en aspectos geométricos como lo son: la pendiente, altura de los taludes; en cuanto a los geotécnicos: tipo de terreno, litología, condiciones de la meteorización, alteración, erosión y grado de fracturamiento. El de la CGR concluyó que la inauguración de dicha ruta fue hecha sin que se garantizara a los usuarios el tránsito sin poner en riesgo sus vidas y propiedades. Dichos documentos son prueba irrefutable de que el Estado no cumplió con su deber de fiscalización para mantener segura la carretera sin derrumbes. De tal manera que es fácil presumir que la piedra con la que colisionó y le causó daños, viene de uno de esos desprendimientos, no es un asunto de causa natural, pues corresponde a la Concesionaria y al Estado verificar que esta situación no se dé, debe prevenirlo y evitarlo. Tercero: alega conforme a lo expuesto en el agravio anterior, el Tribunal yerra en su cuadro fáctico en especial en relación con los hechos tenidos por no probados, pues no aceptó la colisión y los daños sufridos, la inutilización del vehículo, uso de otro automotor o de servicios de transporte público; tampoco consideró que donde vive no existieran esos servicios. Tampoco aceptó la tesis de la responsabilidad del Estado por negligencia; siendo que como explicó supra, para todo lo anterior existe prueba en el expediente que demuestra la situación. \n\nV. Por estar íntimamente relacionados, ambos agravios se resolverán en conjunto. Sobre el particular el Tribunal consideró que los actores no se preocuparon en traer al proceso prueba que demuestre lo sucedido el 22 de mayo de 2010, pues, se restringe al relato de la demanda, y el testimonio de Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías, quien fue dubitativa en su exposición, no recordó detalles y además afirmó ser prima segunda del actor; todo lo cual, hizo que los juzgadores perdieran credibilidad en su testimonio. Para el Tribunal, no existe prueba técnica, documental o testimonial que pudiese permitir arribar a la conclusión de que los hechos sucedieron como lo relatan los accionantes, así no reconocen la existencia de nexo causal con el evento. Se indica en el fallo, los informes y evaluaciones realizadas por diversos entes del Estado, no demuestran por sí solas, que se haya fallado en la fiscalización, diseño o construcción de las obras de la ruta 27, ni que el Concesionario haya incurrido en negligencia al momento de realizar las obras. \n\nVI. Sobre la responsabilidad objetiva en la función administrativa y la responsabilidad generada por concesión de obra pública. El sistema de responsabilidad de la Administración Pública y del Estado en general, se desprende de la Constitución Política, artículos 11 (principio de legalidad), 18 y 33 (igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas), 34 (resguardo de los derechos adquiridos y de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), 41 (derecho a la resarcibilidad plena de los daños); 45 (protección de la propiedad privada); 49 (tutela de los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos), 50 (responsabilidad por daños ambientales); 74 (solidaridad social), 148, 149, 154, 166 y 188 (responsabilidad del Presidente de la República, Poder Ejecutivo, Consejo de Gobierno, Poder Judicial e Instituciones Autónomas), y 139 inciso 4), 140 y 191 (derecho al buen funcionamiento del servicio público). En este sentido puede consultarse las sentencias no. 5207-2004 del 18 de mayo de 2004 de la Sala Constitucional y no. 308-F-2006 del 25 de mayo de 2006 de esta Sala. Asimismo, esta Cámara ha indicado, que el Estado es responsable frente al particular, si este ha sufrido una lesión antijurídica la cual no tiene el deber de soportar; provocada por el funcionamiento público. Ahora bien, resulta indispensable mencionar, para que se dé tal imputación, entre la conducta o situación administrativa y el daño que sufre la víctima es necesario acreditar el nexo de causalidad, el cual se rompe únicamente si se presenta alguna de las eximentes, a saber: fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero (artículo 190 ídem). En síntesis, debe indicarse que los parámetros de imputación para determinar la responsabilidad administrativa son objetivos (funcionamiento normal o anormal, lícito o ilícito), lo cual significa que para atribuir a la Administración responsabilidad por un hecho, se requiere la existencia de un daño, una actividad o inactividad administrativa y un nexo de causalidad. Ahora bien, con relación a la responsabilidad generada a raíz de relaciones de concesión de obra pública, esta Sala ha manifestado que la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, número 7762 (en adelante LGCOP), contiene normas propias que definen la responsabilidad extracontractual de las partes frente a terceros; y en particular, respecto del sujeto responsable. De esta manera, las normas vigentes al momento en que acontecieron los hechos establecen en el artículo 18 inciso f) como obligación del Concesionario: “Indemnizar por los daños y perjuicios que se ocasionen a terceros como consecuencia de la ejecución de la concesión”. El canon 36, que se refiere a la etapa de construcción, instituye que el régimen de la concesión estará sujeto a las siguientes disposiciones, que en lo que interesa, se hará referencia a los acápites a) y e), los cuales disponen: “a) Las obras se ejecutarán a riesgo del concesionario […] e) Apegarse a los mejores procedimientos constructivos y a los planos de construcción de las obras aprobadas […].”. Finalmente, el precepto 38 hace referencia al régimen aplicable a las relaciones del Concesionario: “En lo referente a derechos y deberes con terceros, el concesionario se regirá por las normas del Derecho Privado. Será responsable ante la Administración concedente por los daños y perjuicios que puedan derivarse de cualquier subcontratación.”. Importa mencionar, que el artículo 16 de este cuerpo normativo, el cual, hace referencia a las obligaciones que tiene la Administración concedente, no se incluyó ningún aspecto relacionado con la reparación de los daños y perjuicios que se produjeran en la ejecución del contrato por parte del concesionario. En esta línea de pensamiento, ha de señalarse, la titularidad por sí misma, no es suficiente como criterio primigenio de imputación, de allí, no resulte lógico que la entidad pública deba responder por una conducta -que aún en el marco de un contrato administrativo- le es ajena. Así las cosas, en este punto, cabría cuestionarse si ha de seguirse la condición de sujeto privado del contratista o bien el carácter público de la obra y del servicio que le ha sido delegado; debiéndose elegir de manera fundada, el sistema de responsabilidad aplicable al concesionario: subjetivo de derecho privado u objetivo propio de la responsabilidad administrativa. Lo cual en criterio de este Órgano decisor, se esclarece en la LGCOP conforme a la normativa mencionada supra y en específico en el artículo 38. En este mismo sentido, el Reglamento General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, Decreto Ejecutivo 27.098-MOPT (en lo sucesivo el Reglamento), en el ordinal 69 que se refiere a los daños causados a terceros, impone: “69.1 Durante el plazo de la concesión, el concesionario está obligado a adoptar todas las medidas que sean razonables, para evitar daños a terceros y al personal que trabaja en la construcción de la obra o en la explotación del servicio. Igualmente deberá tomar todas las precauciones para evitar daños a la propiedad de terceros y al ambiente. / 69.2 El concesionario será el único responsable de todo daño, de cualquier naturaleza, que con motivo de la construcción de la obra o la explotación del servicio se ocasione a terceros, al personal de la obra, a la propiedad de terceros o al ambiente, a menos que los daños le sean imputables a la Administración concedente por medidas que ésta le impuso al concesionario.”. Es en este último supuesto, cuando la Administración se ve obligada a responder por los daños que se le causen a terceros. Consúltese la resolución 925-F-S1-2015 antes mencionada. Ahora bien, años después, esta Cámara amplía el tema de la responsabilidad en casos de concesión de obras públicas con servicios públicos y advirtió que en situaciones relacionadas con el uso de autopistas existe una relación de consumo, en el tanto, se ha pagado mediante el peaje, determinada suma de dinero a cambio de recibir un servicio de la concesionaria, que en este caso es el transitar por esa carretera. En ello, no tiene participación ni el Estado ni el CNC. De tal manera, en este tipo de situaciones ha de acudirse a la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, número 7472 (Ley de Defensa del Consumidor), que en su artículo 35 en lo que interesa estipula: “Régimen de responsabilidad. El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos. Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño”. Es en virtud de este enunciado, esta Sala ha sostenido el criterio de que corresponde al productor, comerciante o proveedor del servicio acreditar su ajenidad con respecto al daño reclamado. Así, lo anterior de conformidad con lo estipulado en la LGCOP y el Reglamento la responsabilidad del concesionario podría ser de tipo subjetivo, regulada por el derecho privado, pero también, de carácter objetivo, que sería el dispuesto en la Ley de Protección al Consumidor. Puede consultarse el fallo de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 15 de noviembre de 2018, que responde al voto número 984-F-S1-2018. \n\nVII. En el caso de estudio conforme al objeto y causa de pedir por parte de los actores, ha de atenderse a la responsabilidad subjetiva del concesionario ya explicada con anterioridad y desde esta óptica se analizará. En lo particular, los coactores, aportan como prueba para demostrar el accidente que tuvieron el 22 de mayo de 2010, día en que, aducen, chocaron en la ruta nacional 27, el testimonio de la señora Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías. Esta, en juicio oral y público manifestó, tener interés en la resolución del asunto, en virtud que la cercanía que tiene con los coaccionantes, pues también afirmó ser prima segunda del señor Mena Brenes. Ahora bien, sobre los sucesos de ese día, la testigo no resulta una fuente probatoria suficiente para poder tener por acreditado lo dicho en la demanda. Lo anterior en virtud de que aún y cuando aseguró que ese día viajaba en la parte trasera del automotor junto a su madre, no pudo dar mayores detalles sobre lo acontecido, pues se restringió a manifestar que era de noche, estaba lloviendo y había mucha neblina, y sintió que el carro se balanceó; adujo fue porque pasaron por encima de una piedra, quedando montados sobre esta. Sin embargo, a continuación, manifestó no recordar de qué lado del carro golpearon con el objeto, pero al mismo tiempo, asegura, pudo ver por la ventana el tamaño de la roca, afirmando que era de grandes dimensiones. Además, refirió, una vez sucedido esto, la conductora continuó su camino hasta el peaje, para hacer el reclamo correspondiente; decidiendo la señora Bolaños Masís, no llamar a nadie, ni solicitar que llegaran a socorrerlos. En un primer momento aseguró no saber en qué parte de la vía sucedió el percance, ni cuánto tiempo duraron hasta llegar al peaje, pero, posteriormente determinó que entre una cosa y la otra, transcurrieron aproximadamente cinco minutos. De igual manera, testificó haberse quedado en el vehículo todo el tiempo, sin bajarse a ver los daños, de tal manera que nunca presenció lo que le sucedió al carro. Después de contactar con personeros de la Concesionaria, continuaron su camino hasta Ciudad Colón, sin que fuese necesaria ninguna grúa, como tampoco que se escuchara algún sonido extraño proveniente del vehículo. Tal y como se puede observar, de tales manifestaciones, no hay manera de comprobar, que el día que los actores iban circulando por la carretera 27, efectivamente colisionaran con una piedra de grandes dimensiones, provocando graves daños materiales relacionados con el vehículo y, en consecuencia, los daños directamente a los actores. Tratándose de un suceso como el que relatan, quienes afirman que casi se vuelca el vehículo, que perdieron el control por un instante, básicamente se trata de una situación traumática difícil de olvidar; sin embargo, la supuesta acompañante, ni siquiera logró relatar de qué lado del carro fue que colisionaron. Tampoco hizo mención alguna a que se hubiese dado una situación como la recién descrita, por el contrario, se limita a indicar que “se montaron” sobre una piedra y que la conductora lentamente se dirigió hasta el peaje. Casi pareciera un testimonio elaborado, por ello, tampoco a esta Cámara le merecen credibilidad tales manifestaciones y, por ende, no pueden servir como base para tener por demostrado lo aducido por los actores. Por otro lado, el documento SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, del 7 junio de 2010, emitido por la Concesionaria, visible a folio 31 del expediente, rechazó categóricamente la existencia de piedras en la vía, y, por ende, el reclamo de Bolaños Masís y Mena Brenes. Tal documento, no puede ser considerado prueba que evidencie los hechos relatados en la demanda. Por último, los informes a los que se hace referencia como mal valorados, sea: el Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27 y el informe DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 emitido por la CGR, como bien lo indican los propios recurrentes, no son probanza alguna que se relacione ni que evidencie por sí misma, lo ocurrido el 22 de mayo de 2010. La existencia de un problema en la concesión, en la fiscalización o en el resultado de la construcción y mantenimiento de la ruta en cuestión, no es objeto de esta litis; lo solicitado por los actores se limita a una condena de daños y perjuicios, la cual no es posible conceder, en virtud de que no fue aportado en este proceso, prueba que demostrara la existencia de una colisión con una piedra en la ruta 27, que les ocasionara los daños alegados. Así las cosas, ambos agravios deberán ser denegados. \n\nVIII. Según lo expuesto, el recurso planteado por Lorena Bolaños Masís y Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes deberá ser denegado. Son las costas de este a cargo de ambos. (Artículo 150 inciso 3 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). \n\nPOR TANTO\n\nSe declara sin lugar el recurso planteado. Son sus costas a cargo de quien lo interpuso.\n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáciga\n\n \n\n \n\nRocio Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez\n\n \n\n \n\nJorge Alberto López González Jéssica Jiménez Ramírez\n\n \n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "**Document PJEDITOR**\n\n****\n\n**Exp. 11-002660-1027-CA**\n\n**Res. 001748-F-S1-2021**\n\n**SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at thirteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twelfth of October, two thousand twenty-one.\n\nOrdinary proceeding, established in the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda by LORENA BOLAÑOS MASÍS, psychologist and MARCOS ANTONIO MENA BRENES, business administrator; against the STATE represented by the prosecutor Alonso Arnesto Moya, the CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CONCESIONES, represented by the then minister Luis Llach Cordero, civil engineer, resident of Cartago and AUTOPISTAS DEL SOL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by its unlimited general attorneys-in-fact José Antonio Cuadrado Fernández, civil engineer (roads, canals and ports) and Valentín Antonio Camacho Fábregas, single, economist. Arnoldo Segura Santiesteban appears as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiffs; Jorge Arturo Madrigal Sancho, resident of Cartago, and Francisco Santos Méndez for the Council, and Gabriela Arguedas Vargas for the company. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, and residents of San José.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Vargas Vásquez;\n\n**CONSIDERANDO**\n\nI. On May 13, 2011, Lorena Bolaños Masís and Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes filed a contentious-administrative lawsuit against the State, the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC), and Autopistas del Sol S.A. (hereinafter Autopistas del Sol or Concessionaire). Therein, they essentially stated that on May 22, 2010, they were traveling on Route 27 in vehicle license plate number 228783, owned by Mena Brenes and driven by Bolaños Masís, accompanied by Carmen Lidia Irías Rojas and Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías. They were traveling from Orotina heading to Ciudad Colón, at approximately 8:00 pm, with low visibility. Before reaching kilometer 45, they noticed an accumulation of small stones on the side of the road due to landslides on the slopes. Upon reaching that kilometer, they found traffic stopped; a short time later, they opened the passage again and let them continue, without being informed of any particular situation. As they approached kilometer 44, they noticed a large stone in the middle of the lane they were traveling in, which was impossible for them to avoid, causing the car to collide head-on. As a result, the driver lost control and the vehicle nearly overturned; they were even at risk of falling into a ravine (guindo). After the car stabilized, they verified that no one had suffered significant physical injuries and that the engine had not stopped from the impact. They decided to keep moving to reach a stretch of road where they would not be at risk since stones of all sizes were still falling. Upon reaching the Atenas toll station, they stopped to inspect the vehicle and determine the damage caused to it; they also made the corresponding report to the Concessionaire. As a consequence of the described situation, the car suffered multiple damages, they have not been able to repair it, and it is also disabled at their home. This has caused them problems traveling to other places such as: work, relatives' homes, supermarkets, entertainment centers; since they live in a small town five kilometers from Ciudad Colón where there are no public transportation services, which forces them to take a taxi to the nearest town and from there use the bus. In addition to the above, the area where they live is densely wooded (boscosa), and landslides occur with some frequency blocking the main road. To be able to get out, they must use rural roads that can only be traveled by four-wheel-drive vehicles. This entire situation, even though it did not cause them significant physical injuries, has severely affected their spirits, as they have suffered nervousness, fear, insecurity, affliction, and anxiety every time they make long trips. Furthermore, they lost their confidence in Route 27, which takes less time to get from one place to another. Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes has been the most affected by this entire situation, since he has to commute every day from his home to his job in San José, and he has had to do so by public transportation. Likewise, Lorena Bolaños Masís has also not had ease of travel to practice her profession as a public accountant and psychologist, as she has been forced to use her car, which is a low-cylinder vehicle. In official letter SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, the Concessionaire informed them that they would not be held responsible for the damages because it was an act of God (caso fortuito). A criterion they do not share because there are many reports and news stories demonstrating that the road was opened prematurely, even though it had design, construction, and maintenance problems that caused the landslides. Based on this statement of facts and pursuant to the preliminary hearing, they requested the following be declared in the relevant part: 1- the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for the damages caused to them by the event of May 22, 2010. 2- Payment for the damages caused to the vehicle, either by paying for its repair at the corresponding agency, or by delivering a car of the same nature, condition, and characteristics as the damaged one, to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs. 3- Costs to be borne by the defendants. They broke down the damages as follows: Material: the sum of ¢5,716,470.00, which is the cost of repairing the motor vehicle; ¢2,000,000.00 as estimated depreciation, and ¢1,500,000.00 for the overuse they have had to make of vehicle license plate 511422. Moral: in favor of Mr. Mena Brenes an amount of ¢25,000,000.00 and for the plaintiff Bolaños Masís the sum of ¢15,000,000.00. As consequential damages (perjuicios), they requested in the name of the former ¢10,000,000.00 and for the latter ¢5,000,000.00. The State answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: jurisdiction, passive standing (legitimación pasiva), and right (derecho), as well as formal defects in the complaint, prejudiciality (prejudicialidad), and lis pendens (litispendencia). Likewise, the CNC contested the lawsuit and alleged lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) and the generic expression \"sine actione agit.\" For its part, Autopistas del Sol also stated its opposition to the action and invoked the defenses of lack of: right (derecho), active standing (legitimación activa) and passive standing (legitimación pasiva), and interest. The lis pendens (litispendencia) was withdrawn, and the prejudiciality (prejudicialidad) and lack of jurisdiction were denied in an interlocutory manner. The Tribunal denied the defenses of lack of interest, active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), and the generic expression \"sine actione agit.\" It upheld the lack of right (derecho). It declared the lawsuit without merit. Costs to be borne by the plaintiffs. In disagreement, the plaintiffs file a cassation appeal.\n\nII. They allege the following three grounds on substantive grounds. First: they state that numerals 18(f) and 38, both of Law 7762, have been violated, as well as canon 69 of the Reglamento General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, Decreto Ejecutivo number 27098-Mopt of June 12, 1998 (hereinafter the Reglamento); likewise, articles 7, 9, 11, 28, 41, 49, 129, 153, and 154 of the Political Constitution; precepts 1 and 2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA); ordinal 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. All of the foregoing, by virtue of the Tribunal having considered that, in concession matters, the only party liable to third parties is the concessionaire and not the Administration. Even though the aforementioned law and Reglamento so provide, such a situation contravenes constitutional supremacy. Relieving the State of liability, through a legal norm, is unconstitutional. In this way, their rights to due process and right of defense have been affected, insofar as they have been deprived of the right to be indemnified.\n\nIII. The objection in question does not challenge a specific argument of the Tribunal's ruling; rather, it opts to allege a problem of constitutionality of the questioned norms, specifically articles 18(f) and 38 of the Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos (hereinafter Ley de Concesión), as well as numeral 69 of the Reglamento. As established by article 10 of the Magna Carta, it falls to the Constitutional Chamber to resolve matters concerning the discussion of unconstitutionality of norms of any nature. Which, moreover, is regulated in numeral 2(b) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. From the foregoing, it clearly follows that this Chamber does not have jurisdiction to resolve the point submitted for debate. Furthermore, it is important to mention that from the study of the actions filed and resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal, at the time of issuing this judgment, there is no evidence that the norms in question have been subject to analysis; that is, there is not nor has there been any question regarding their constitutionality that could lead this deciding body to suspend the resolution of the case, or to refrain from applying the norms of Law 7762. Accordingly, the grievance must be denied.\n\nIV. In the second objection, they allege improper weighing of the evidence insofar as the Tribunal considered that there was no evidence to support the events that occurred on May 22, 2010, which prevented establishing the liability sought from the Concessionaire and the state entities, such that the discussion regarding damages was futile. However, in this regard, the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías is ignored, who recounted everything that happened that day, and the demonstration that the vehicle had collided with a stone. With the judges' action, what is provided in precepts 82(2) and (4) of the CPCA is violated, transgressing sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), since said testimony is left devoid of analysis. Likewise, the accident report they made that same day at the Autopistas del Sol toll booth was not taken into account, nor the document rejecting the compensation claimed, dated June 7, 2010, through document SJ-C/DE 07-001/01. It is not true that the witness was hesitant regarding the event; she was only hesitant about the details, which is logical due to the passage of time. Moreover, the Tribunal discounts her based on the degree of family relationship, without giving an explanation for such disqualification. According to the ruling, the fact that the witness was traveling in the back, at night, and that she said she did not see the damage caused, does not support what was petitioned by the plaintiffs; an assertion that is erroneous because the witness clearly recounted what happened with the stone. The fact that she did not see the damage does not mean it did not exist. To resolve this matter, it is necessary to resort to the rules of logic and experience, making it clear that the collision with the stone on the highway was what caused them. What is provided in numeral 417 of the Código Procesal Civil (CPC) regarding human presumptions must be applied. For the judges, not even the technical reports related to the inspections carried out by various State entities concerning Route 27 during the year 2010 demonstrate the event in question; incorrectly weighing the evidence. They indicate it is true that such documents did not demonstrate the existence of the event; the testimonies, the accident report, and the aforementioned Concessionaire's official letter are for that; those expert opinions serve to demonstrate the causal link. As established by numerals 8(d) and (l), 9, section 1(d), 16(a), and 37, first paragraph, it is the State's obligation to monitor that the Concessionaire keeps the highway in good condition. In this case, there is an illegitimate functioning of the Administration, which is demonstrated by the technical documents provided: “Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27”, prepared by the Asociación Costarricense de Geotecnia (ACG), and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 of the Contraloría General de la República (CGR); the former identifies the place where the incident occurred as critical in geometric aspects such as: the slope, height of the cuts (taludes); regarding geotechnical aspects: type of terrain, lithology, weathering conditions, alteration, erosion, and degree of fracturing. The CGR's report concluded that the inauguration of said route was done without guaranteeing users safe transit without putting their lives and property at risk. Said documents are irrefutable proof that the State did not comply with its oversight duty to keep the highway safe from landslides. It is therefore easy to presume that the stone with which they collided and which caused them damage comes from one of those landslides; it is not a matter of natural cause, as it falls to the Concessionaire and the State to verify that this situation does not occur and must prevent and avoid it. Third: they allege, based on what was stated in the previous grievance, the Tribunal errs in its factual framework, especially in relation to the facts deemed not proven, as it did not accept the collision and the damage suffered, the disabling of the vehicle, the use of another motor vehicle or public transportation services; nor did it consider that public transportation services did not exist where they live. Nor did it accept the thesis of State liability for negligence; given that, as explained supra, there is evidence in the case file that demonstrates the situation for all of the above.\n\nV. Being closely related, both grievances will be resolved jointly. On this particular, the Tribunal considered that the plaintiffs did not take care to bring evidence to the process demonstrating what happened on May 22, 2010, since they restricted themselves to the account in the lawsuit and the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías, who was hesitant in her testimony, did not remember details, and also stated she was the plaintiff's second cousin; all of which caused the judges to lose credibility in her testimony. For the Tribunal, there is no technical, documentary, or testimonial evidence that could allow reaching the conclusion that the events happened as the plaintiffs recount; thus, they do not recognize the existence of a causal link with the event. The ruling indicates that the reports and evaluations carried out by various State entities do not, by themselves, demonstrate that there was a failure in the oversight, design, or construction of the Route 27 works, nor that the Concessionaire incurred negligence when carrying out the works.\n\nVI. Regarding strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in the administrative function and liability generated by public works concessions. The liability system of the Public Administration and the State in general derives from the Political Constitution, articles 11 (principle of legality), 18 and 33 (equal bearing of public burdens), 34 (protection of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations), 41 (right to full compensation for damages); 45 (protection of private property); 49 (safeguarding of subjective rights and legitimate interests), 50 (liability for environmental damages); 74 (social solidarity), 148, 149, 154, 166, and 188 (liability of the President of the Republic, Executive Branch, Government Council, Judicial Branch, and Autonomous Institutions), and 139(4), 140, and 191 (right to the proper functioning of public services). In this regard, see judgments no. 5207-2004 of May 18, 2004, from the Constitutional Chamber and no. 308-F-2006 of May 25, 2006, from this Chamber. Furthermore, this Chamber has indicated that the State is liable to the individual if the latter has suffered an unlawful injury (lesión antijurídica) which they have no duty to bear, caused by public functioning. Now, it is essential to mention that for such imputation to occur, it is necessary to prove the causal link between the administrative conduct or situation and the damage suffered by the victim, which link is broken only if any of the exempting circumstances arise, namely: force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party (article 190, idem). In summary, it must be stated that the imputation parameters for determining administrative liability are objective (normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful functioning), which means that to attribute liability to the Administration for an event, the existence of damage, an administrative activity or inactivity, and a causal link are required. Now, regarding the liability generated as a result of public works concession relationships, this Chamber has stated that the Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, number 7762 (hereinafter LGCOP), contains its own rules that define the tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) of the parties towards third parties; and in particular, regarding the liable subject. Thus, the rules in force at the time the events occurred establish in article 18(f) as an obligation of the Concessionaire: \"To indemnify for the damages and consequential damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to third parties as a consequence of the execution of the concession.\" Canon 36, which refers to the construction phase, institutes that the concession regime will be subject to the following provisions, of which, in the relevant part, reference will be made to sections a) and e), which provide: \"a) The works shall be executed at the Concessionaire's risk […] e) Adhere to the best construction procedures and the approved construction plans […].\" Finally, precept 38 refers to the regime applicable to the Concessionaire's relations: \"Regarding rights and duties with third parties, the concessionaire shall be governed by the rules of Private Law. They shall be responsible to the granting Administration for the damages and consequential damages (daños y perjuicios) that may arise from any subcontracting.\" It is important to mention that article 16 of this body of law, which refers to the obligations of the granting Administration, did not include any aspect related to the reparation of damages and consequential damages (daños y perjuicios) produced in the execution of the contract by the concessionaire. In this line of thought, it must be noted that ownership, by itself, is not sufficient as a primary imputation criterion; hence, it is not logical that the public entity must answer for conduct that—even within the framework of an administrative contract—is alien to it. This being the case, at this point, it could be questioned whether the contractor's condition as a private subject or the public nature of the work and the service delegated to them should be followed; having to choose, in a well-founded manner, the liability system applicable to the concessionaire: subjective private law or objective, characteristic of administrative liability. Which, in the opinion of this Deciding Body, is clarified in the LGCOP according to the regulations mentioned supra and specifically in article 38. In this same vein, the Reglamento General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, Decreto Ejecutivo 27.098-MOPT (hereinafter the Reglamento), in ordinal 69, which refers to damages caused to third parties, imposes: \"69.1 During the concession term, the concessionaire is obliged to adopt all reasonable measures to avoid damages to third parties and to personnel working on the construction of the work or the operation of the service. Likewise, they must take all precautions to avoid damages to third-party property and the environment. / 69.2 The concessionaire shall be the sole party responsible for any damage, of any nature, caused to third parties, work personnel, third-party property, or the environment by reason of the construction of the work or the operation of the service, unless the damages are attributable to the granting Administration due to measures it imposed on the concessionaire.\" It is in this latter scenario that the Administration is obligated to answer for damages caused to third parties. See the aforementioned resolution 925-F-S1-2015. Now, years later, this Chamber expanded on the issue of liability in cases of public works concessions with public services and noted that in situations related to the use of highways, there is a consumer relationship, insofar as a certain sum of money has been paid through the toll in exchange for receiving a service from the concessionaire, which in this case is traveling on that highway. Neither the State nor the CNC has any participation in that. Therefore, in this type of situation, one must resort to the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, number 7472 (Ley de Defensa del Consumidor), which in its article 35, in the relevant part, stipulates: \"Liability regime. The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Only he who demonstrates that he was unrelated to the damage is released.\" It is by virtue of this statement that this Chamber has held the criterion that it falls to the producer, merchant, or service provider to prove their lack of involvement with respect to the claimed damage. Thus, according to what is stipulated in the LGCOP and the Reglamento, the concessionaire's liability could be of a subjective type, regulated by private law, but also of an objective nature, which would be that established in the Ley de Protección al Consumidor. See the ruling from 9:50 a.m. on November 15, 2018, corresponding to vote number 984-F-S1-2018.\n\nVII. In the case under study, according to the object and cause of action (objeto y causa de pedir) by the plaintiffs, the concessionaire's subjective liability, already explained above, must be addressed, and it will be analyzed from this perspective. Specifically, the co-plaintiffs provide, as evidence to demonstrate the accident they had on May 22, 2010, the day they claim they crashed on national Route 27, the testimony of Mrs. Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías. She, in oral and public trial, stated she had an interest in the resolution of the matter, by virtue of the closeness she has with the co-plaintiffs, as she also stated she is a second cousin of Mr. Mena Brenes. Now, regarding the events of that day, the witness is not a sufficient evidentiary source to be able to consider what was stated in the lawsuit as proven. The foregoing, by virtue of the fact that even though she assured that on that day she was traveling in the back of the motor vehicle with her mother, she was unable to provide further details about what happened, as she restricted herself to stating that it was nighttime, it was raining, and there was a lot of fog, and she felt the car sway; she claimed it was because they drove over a stone, ending up stuck on top of it. However, next, she stated she did not remember which side of the car hit the object, but at the same time, she assures she could see the size of the rock through the window, affirming that it was of large dimensions. Furthermore, she stated that once this happened, the driver continued on her way to the toll booth to make the corresponding claim; with Mrs. Bolaños Masís deciding not to call anyone or request anyone to come to their aid. At first, she assured she did not know on what part of the road the incident occurred, nor how long it took them to reach the toll booth, but subsequently determined that approximately five minutes elapsed between one thing and the other. Likewise, she testified that she remained in the vehicle the entire time, without getting out to see the damage, such that she never witnessed what happened to the car. After contacting personnel of the Concessionaire, they continued on their way to Ciudad Colón, without needing any tow truck, nor was any strange sound heard coming from the vehicle. As can be observed, from such statements, there is no way to verify that on the day the plaintiffs were traveling on Highway 27, they effectively collided with a large stone, causing serious material damages related to the vehicle and, consequently, damages directly to the plaintiffs. Dealing with an event such as the one they relate, where they affirm that the vehicle almost overturned and that they lost control for a moment, it is basically a traumatic situation difficult to forget; however, the supposed passenger was not even able to relate which side of the car they collided on. She also made no mention whatsoever that a situation like the one just described had occurred; on the contrary, she merely indicates that they \"got stuck\" on top of a stone and that the driver slowly drove to the toll booth. It almost seemed like a rehearsed testimony, therefore this Chamber also does not find credibility in such statements and, consequently, they cannot serve as a basis for considering what was alleged by the plaintiffs as demonstrated. On the other hand, document SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, dated June 7, 2010, issued by the Concessionaire, visible on folio 31 of the case file, categorically rejected the existence of stones on the road and, therefore, the claim by Bolaños Masís and Mena Brenes. Such document cannot be considered evidence that demonstrates the facts related in the lawsuit. Finally, the reports referred to as incorrectly weighted, i.e., the Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27 and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 issued by the CGR, as the appellants themselves correctly indicate, are not any evidence that relates to or evidences, by themselves, what happened on May 22, 2010. The existence of a problem in the concession, in the oversight, or in the result of the construction and maintenance of the route in question is not the object of this litis; what is requested by the plaintiffs is limited to a condemnation for damages and consequential damages (daños y perjuicios), which is not possible to grant, by virtue of the fact that evidence was not provided in this process that demonstrated the existence of a collision with a stone on Route 27, which caused them the alleged damages. This being the case, both grievances must be denied.\n\nVIII. According to the foregoing, the appeal filed by Lorena Bolaños Masís and Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes must be denied. The costs of this appeal are borne by both. (Article 150(3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal filed is declared without merit.\n\nIts costs are borne by the party who filed it.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáciga\n\nRocio Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez\n\nJorge Alberto López González Jéssica Jiménez Ramírez\n\nTelephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\n2- Payment of the damages caused to the vehicle, either by paying for its repair at the corresponding dealership or by delivering to them a car of the same nature, condition, and characteristics as the damaged one, to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs. 3- Costs to be borne by the defendants. He broke down the damages as follows: <u>Material:</u> the sum of ¢5,716,470.00, which is the cost of repairing the motor vehicle; ¢2,000,000.00 as estimated depreciation and ¢1,500,000.00 for the over-utilization they have had to make of the vehicle with license plate 511422. <u>Moral:</u> in favor of Mr. Mena Brenes an amount of ¢25,000,000.00 and for the plaintiff Bolaños Masís the sum of ¢15,000,000.00. As consequential damages (perjuicios), they requested on behalf of the former ¢10,000,000.00 and of the latter ¢5,000,000.00. The State responded negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: jurisdiction (competencia), passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva), and right, as well as formal defects in the complaint, prejudiciality (prejudicialidad), and lis pendens (litispendencia). Likewise, the CNC contradicted the claim and alleged lack of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva) and the generic expression *“sine actione agit”*. For its part, Autopistas del Sol also declared itself opposed to the action and invoked the defenses of lack of: right, active and passive legal standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), and interest. The lis pendens (litispendencia) was withdrawn, and the prejudiciality (prejudicialidad) and lack of jurisdiction (competencia) were denied in an interlocutory ruling. The Court denied the defenses of lack of interest, active and passive legal standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), and the generic expression “sine actione agit”. It upheld the lack of right. It declared the lawsuit without merit. Costs to be borne by the plaintiffs. Disagreeing, the plaintiffs file a cassation appeal (recurso de casación).\n\n**II.** They adduce the following **three** grounds on the merits. **First**: they state that numerals 18(f) and 38, both of Law 7762, have been violated, as well as canon 69 of the General Regulation for the Concession of Public Works with Public Services, Executive Decree Number 27098-Mopt of June 12, 1998 (hereinafter the Regulation); likewise, Articles 7, 9, 11, 28, 41, 49, 129, 153, and 154 of the Political Constitution; precepts 1 and 2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA); ordinal 102 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. All of the foregoing, by virtue of the Court having considered that in concession matters the sole party responsible to third parties is the concessionaire and not the Administration. Even though the aforementioned law and Regulation so provide, such a situation contravenes constitutional supremacy. Discharging the State's responsibility through a legal norm is unconstitutional. In this manner, their due process and defense rights have been affected, insofar as they have been deprived of the right to be compensated.\n\n**III.** The objection in question does not combat a specific argument of the Court's ruling, but rather leans toward adducing a problem of constitutionality regarding the questioned norms, specifically Articles 18(f) and 38 of the General Law for the Concession of Public Works with Public Services (hereinafter the Concession Law), as well as numeral 69 of the Regulation. As established by Article 10 of the Magna Carta, it is the Constitutional Chamber's responsibility to resolve matters concerning the discussion of the unconstitutionality of norms of any nature. This is, furthermore, regulated in numeral 2(b) of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. From the foregoing, it clearly emerges that this Chamber lacks jurisdiction (competencia) to resolve the point submitted for debate. Likewise, it is important to mention that from the study of the actions filed and resolved by the Constitutional Court, at the time of issuing this judgment, there is no evidence that the norms in question have been subject to analysis; that is, there neither exists nor has there been a challenge to their constitutionality that could lead this Deciding Body to suspend the resolution of the case, or to disapply the norms of Law 7762. Therefore, the grievance must be denied.\n\n**IV.** In the **second** objection, they adduce an improper evaluation of the evidence inasmuch as the Court considered that there was no proof to support the events that occurred on May 22, 2010, which prevented establishing the liability sought from the Concessionaire and the state bodies, such that the discussion regarding damages was moot. However, in this sense, the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías is overlooked, who related everything that happened that day, and the demonstration that the vehicle had collided with a rock. The judges' actions violate the provisions of precepts 82(2) and (4) of the CPCA, transgressing sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), since said testimony is left void of analysis. Equally, the accident report they made that same day at the Autopistas del Sol toll booth was not taken into account, nor the document dated June 7, 2010, rejecting the claimed compensation, through document SJ-C/DE 07-001/01. It is not true that the witness was hesitant regarding the event; she was only so regarding the details, which is logical to occur with the passage of time. Furthermore, the Court discards it based on the degree of family relationship, without giving an explanation for such disqualification. According to the ruling, the fact that the witness was traveling in the back, that it was nighttime, and that she said she did not see the damages caused, does not support what was petitioned by the plaintiffs; an assertion that is erroneous, since the witness clearly related what happened with the rock. That she did not see the damages does not mean they did not exist. To resolve this matter, it is necessary to resort to the rules of logic and experience, making it clear that the collision with the rock on the road was what caused them. The provisions of numeral 417 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding human presumptions must be applied. For the judges, even the technical reports related to the inspections carried out by various State entities regarding Route 27 during the year 2010 do not demonstrate the event in question; valuing the evidence poorly. They indicate, it is true, such documents did not demonstrate the existence of the event, that is what the testimonies, the accident report, and the aforementioned Concessionaire's official letter are for; those expert opinions serve to demonstrate the causal link. As established by numerals 8(d) and (l), 9(1)(d), 16(a), and 37, first paragraph, it is the State's obligation to monitor that the Concessionaire keeps the road in good condition. In this case, there is an illegitimate functioning of the Administration, which is demonstrated by the technical documents provided: “Route 27 Inspection Report”, prepared by the Costa Rican Geotechnical Association (ACG) and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), the former determines the place where the mishap occurred as critical in geometric aspects such as: the slope, height of the cut slopes (taludes); regarding geotechnical aspects: type of terrain, lithology, weathering conditions, alteration, erosion, and degree of fracturing. The CGR's report concluded that the inauguration of said route was carried out without guaranteeing users transit without putting their lives and property at risk. Said documents constitute irrefutable proof that the State did not fulfill its oversight duty to keep the road safe from landslides. Therefore, it is easy to presume that the rock with which it collided and caused damages comes from one of those rockfalls, it is not a matter of natural cause, since it is incumbent upon the Concessionaire and the State to verify that this situation does not occur; they must prevent and avoid it. **Third**: they allege in accordance with the foregoing grievance, the Court errs in its factual framework especially in relation to the facts deemed not proven, since it did not accept the collision and the damages suffered, the disablement of the vehicle, use of another motor vehicle or of public transport services; nor did it consider that public services did not exist where they live. It also did not accept the thesis of State liability for negligence; whereas, as explained supra, for all of the foregoing there is evidence in the expediente that demonstrates the situation.\n\n**V.** Since they are intimately related, both grievances will be resolved jointly.\n\nRegarding this matter, the Court considered that the plaintiffs did not take care to bring to the process proof that demonstrates what happened on May 22, 2010, since it is restricted to the account in the lawsuit, and the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías, who was hesitant in her statement, did not remember details and also affirmed being the plaintiff's second cousin; all of which caused the judges to lose credibility in her testimony. For the Court, there is no technical, documentary, or testimonial proof that could allow arriving at the conclusion that the events happened as the plaintiffs relate, thus they do not recognize the existence of a causal link with the event. The judgment indicates that the reports and evaluations carried out by various State entities do not demonstrate, by themselves, that there was a failure in the oversight, design, or construction of the works on Route 27, nor that the Concessionaire incurred negligence when carrying out the works.\n\n**VI. On strict liability in the administrative function and liability generated by public works concessions.** The system of liability of the Public Administration and the State in general stems from the Political Constitution, articles 11 (principle of legality), 18 and 33 (equality in bearing public burdens), 34 (protection of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations), 41 (right to full compensation for damages); 45 (protection of private property); 49 (protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests), 50 (liability for environmental damages); 74 (social solidarity), 148, 149, 154, 166 and 188 (liability of the President of the Republic, Executive Branch, Government Council, Judicial Branch and Autonomous Institutions), and 139 subsection 4), 140 and 191 (right to the proper functioning of public services). In this sense, judgments no. 5207-2004 of May 18, 2004, from the Constitutional Chamber and no. 308-F-2006 of May 25, 2006, from this Chamber may be consulted. Likewise, this Chamber has indicated that the State is liable to the individual, if the individual has suffered an unlawful injury which they have no duty to bear; caused by the public functioning. However, it is essential to mention that for such imputation to occur, it is necessary to prove the causal link between the administrative conduct or situation and the damage suffered by the victim, which is broken only if one of the exempting circumstances is present, namely: force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party (article 190 ibidem). In summary, it must be indicated that the imputation parameters for determining administrative liability are strict (normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful functioning), which means that to attribute liability to the Administration for a fact, the existence of a damage, an administrative activity or inactivity, and a causal link are required. Now, regarding the liability generated from public works concession relationships, this Chamber has stated that the General Law of Public Works Concession with Public Services, number 7762 (hereinafter LGCOP), contains its own norms defining the tort liability of the parties towards third parties; and in particular, regarding the responsible subject. Thus, the norms in force at the time the events occurred establish in article 18 subsection f) as an obligation of the Concessionaire: \"*Compensate for the damages and losses caused to third parties as a consequence of the execution of the concession*\". Precept 36, which refers to the construction stage, institutes that the concession regime will be subject to the following provisions, of which, for what is relevant, reference will be made to subsections a) and e), which provide: \"*a) The works will be executed at the risk of the concessionaire* [...] *e) Adhere to the best construction procedures and the approved construction plans* [...]\". Finally, precept 38 refers to the regime applicable to the Concessionaire's relations: \"*Regarding rights and duties with third parties, the concessionaire will be governed by the norms of Private Law. It will be responsible to the granting Administration for the damages and losses that may derive from any subcontracting.*\" It is important to mention that article 16 of this normative body, which refers to the obligations that the granting Administration has, did not include any aspect related to the reparation of damages and losses that might be produced in the execution of the contract by the concessionaire. In this line of thought, it must be pointed out that ownership by itself is not sufficient as a primary criterion of imputation; hence, it is not logical that the public entity must answer for conduct that—even within the framework of an administrative contract—is alien to it. Thus, at this point, it would be worth questioning whether the private subject condition of the contractor or the public character of the work and the service that has been delegated to it should be followed; the applicable liability system for the concessionaire must be chosen on a reasoned basis: subjective under private law or strict under administrative liability. Which, in the opinion of this Deciding Body, is clarified in the LGCOP in accordance with the regulations mentioned above and specifically in article 38. In this same sense, the General Regulation of Public Works Concession with Public Services, Executive Decree 27.098-MOPT (hereinafter the Regulation), in ordinal 69 which refers to damages caused to third parties, imposes: \"*69.1 During the concession term, the concessionaire is obliged to adopt all reasonable measures to avoid damages to third parties and to the personnel working on the construction of the work or the operation of the service. It must also take all precautions to avoid damages to the property of third parties and to the environment.* / *69.2 The concessionaire will be the sole responsible party for any damage, of any nature, that on the occasion of the construction of the work or the operation of the service is caused to third parties, to the work personnel, to the property of third parties, or to the environment, unless the damages are imputable to the granting Administration due to measures that the latter imposed on the concessionaire.*\" It is in this last scenario when the Administration is obliged to respond for the damages caused to third parties. Consult the aforementioned resolution 925-F-S1-2015. Now, years later, this Chamber expands on the topic of liability in cases of public works concessions with public services and warned that in situations related to the use of highways, a consumer relationship exists, insofar as, by means of the toll, a certain sum of money has been paid in exchange for receiving a service from the concessionaire, which in this case is transiting that road. In this, neither the State nor the CNC has participation. Thus, in this type of situation, one must resort to the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, number 7472 (Consumer Defense Law), which in its article 35, where relevant, stipulates: \"*Liability Regime. The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Only he who demonstrates that he is alien to the damage is released*\". It is by virtue of this statement that this Chamber has held the criterion that it corresponds to the producer, merchant, or service supplier to prove their unrelatedness to the claimed damage. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the LGCOP and the Regulation, the concessionaire's liability could be of a subjective type, regulated by private law, but also of a strict nature, which would be that set forth in the Consumer Protection Law. The judgment of 9 hours 50 minutes on November 15, 2018, corresponding to vote number 984-F-S1-2018, may be consulted.\n\n**VII.** In the case under study, in accordance with the object and cause of the claim by the plaintiffs, the subjective liability of the concessionaire, as previously explained, must be addressed, and from this perspective it will be analyzed. In particular, the co-plaintiffs provide, as proof to demonstrate the accident they had on May 22, 2010, the day on which they allege they collided on national Route 27, the testimony of Mrs. Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías.\n\nThis individual, in an oral and public hearing, stated that she has an interest in the resolution of the matter, given her close relationship with the plaintiffs, as she also affirmed that she is a second cousin of Mr. Mena Brenes. That said, regarding the events of that day, the witness does not constitute a sufficient evidentiary source to be able to hold the claims in the complaint as proven. The foregoing by virtue of the fact that even though she assured that on that day she was traveling in the rear part of the motor vehicle with her mother, she could not provide greater details about what happened, as she limited herself to stating that it was night, it was raining and there was a lot of fog, and she felt the car sway; she claimed it was because they drove over a rock, ending up mounted on it. However, subsequently, she stated she did not remember which side of the car hit the object, but at the same time, she assures, she could see the size of the rock through the window, affirming that it was of large dimensions. Furthermore, she related that once this happened, the driver continued on her way to the toll booth, to file the corresponding claim; Mrs. Bolaños Masís decided not to call anyone, nor to request that anyone come to help them. At first, she assured she did not know on which part of the road the mishap occurred, nor how long it took them to reach the toll booth, but she later determined that between one thing and the other, approximately five minutes elapsed. Likewise, she testified that she stayed in the vehicle the entire time, without getting out to see the damages, such that she never witnessed what happened to the car. After contacting representatives of the Concessionaire, they continued on their way to Ciudad Colón, without any tow truck being necessary, nor was any strange sound heard coming from the vehicle. As can be observed, from such statements, there is no way to verify that on the day the plaintiffs were traveling along Route 27, they effectively collided with a large rock, causing serious material damages related to the vehicle and, consequently, damages directly to the plaintiffs. In dealing with an event such as the one they relate, those who affirm that the vehicle nearly overturned, that they lost control for an instant, basically it involves a traumatic situation that is difficult to forget; however, the alleged companion could not even relate which side of the car was hit. Nor did she make any mention that a situation like the one just described occurred; on the contrary, she limits herself to indicating that \"they mounted\" on a rock and that the driver slowly headed to the toll booth. It almost seems like a fabricated testimony, and therefore, these statements also do not merit credibility in the eyes of this Chamber and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis to find what the plaintiffs have alleged as proven. On the other hand, the document SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, of June 7, 2010, issued by the Concessionaire, visible on page 31 of the case file, categorically rejected the existence of rocks on the road, and, therefore, the claim of Bolaños Masís and Mena Brenes. Such a document cannot be considered evidence that demonstrates the facts related in the complaint. Finally, the reports referred to as poorly evaluated, namely: the Inspection Report of Route 27 and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 issued by the CGR, as the appellants themselves correctly indicate, are not any form of proof that relates to or demonstrates in and of themselves what occurred on May 22, 2010. The existence of a problem in the concession, in the oversight, or in the result of the construction and maintenance of the route in question is not the object of this litigation; what the plaintiffs requested is limited to an award of damages, which cannot be granted, given that no evidence was provided in this proceeding demonstrating the existence of a collision with a rock on Route 27 that caused them the alleged damages. Such being the case, both grievances must be denied.\n\nVIII. According to the foregoing, the appeal filed by Lorena Bolaños Masís and Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes must be denied. The costs of this appeal are to be borne by both of them. (Article 150, subsection 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal filed is declared without merit. Its costs are to be borne by the party who filed it.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáciga\n\nRocio Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez\n\nJorge Alberto López González Jéssica Jiménez Ramírez\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nFrom the study of the actions filed and resolved by the Constitutional Court, at the time this judgment was issued, it is not evident that this regulation has been subject to analysis; that is, there neither exists nor has there been a challenge to its constitutionality that could lead this decision-making Body to suspend the resolution of the case or to set aside the provisions of the cited law (voto 1748-F-2021).\n\nThe existence of a problem in the concession, in the oversight, or in the result of the construction and maintenance of the route in question is not the object of this litigation; the plaintiffs' request is limited to an award of damages (condena de daños y perjuicios), which it is not possible to grant, by virtue of the fact that no evidence was provided in this proceeding demonstrating the existence of said collision, which caused them the alleged damages (voto 1748-F-2021).\n\nBased on this account of facts and in accordance with the preliminary hearing, they requested that the following be declared: 1- the co-defendants be held jointly and severally liable for the damages caused to them by the event of May 22, 2010. 2- Payment of the damages caused to the vehicle, either by paying for its repair at the corresponding agency or by delivering a vehicle of the same nature, condition, and characteristics as the damaged one, to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs. 3- Costs to be borne by the defendants. The damages were broken down as follows: *Material*: the sum of ¢5,716,470.00, which is the cost of repairing the motor vehicle; ¢2,000,000.00 as estimated depreciation; and ¢1,500,000.00 for the overuse they have had to make of vehicle license plate 511422. *Non-economic (Morales)*: in favor of Mr. Mena Brenes an amount of ¢25,000,000.00 and for the plaintiff Bolaños Masís the sum of ¢15,000,000.00. As consequential damages (perjuicios), they requested on behalf of the former ¢10,000,000.00 and for the latter ¢5,000,000.00. The State answered negatively and raised the exceptions of lack of: jurisdiction, passive standing (legitimación pasiva), and right (derecho), as well as formal defects in the complaint, prejudiciality (prejudicialidad), and lis pendens (litispendencia). Likewise, the CNC opposed the complaint and alleged lack of passive standing and the generic expression “sine actione agit”. For its part, Autopistas del Sol also manifested its opposition to the action and invoked the defenses of lack of: right, active standing (legitimación activa) and passive standing, and interest. The lis pendens was withdrawn, and the prejudiciality and lack of jurisdiction were denied in an interlocutory manner. The Court denied the exceptions of lack of interest, active and passive standing, and the generic expression “sine actione agit”. It upheld the lack of right (falta de derecho). It dismissed the complaint. Costs to be borne by the plaintiffs. Disagreeing, the plaintiffs file an appeal in cassation.\n\n**II.** They adduce the following **three** grounds on the merits. **First**: they say the following have been infringed: sections 18(f) and 38, both of Law 7762, as well as canon 69 of the *Reglamento General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos*, Decreto Ejecutivo número 27098-Mopt of June 12, 1998 (hereinafter the Reglamento); likewise articles 7, 9, 11, 28, 41, 49, 129, 153, and 154 of the Constitución Política; precepts 1 and 2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA); ordinal 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. All of the foregoing, by virtue of the Court having considered that, in matters of concessions, the sole responsible party before third parties is the concessionaire and not the Administration. Even though the aforementioned law and Reglamento so provide, such a situation contravenes constitutional supremacy. Discharging the State's responsibility through a legal norm is unconstitutional. In this way, their rights to due process and right of defense have been affected, insofar as they have been deprived of the right to be indemnified.\n\n**III.** The objection in question does not attack a specific argument of the Court's judgment, but rather leans toward adducing a problem of constitutionality of the questioned norms, specifically articles 18(f) and 38 of the *Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos* (hereinafter Ley de Concesión), as well as numeral 69 of the Reglamento. As established in article 10 of the Carta Magna, it is the responsibility of the Sala Constitucional to resolve matters concerning the discussion of unconstitutionality of norms of any nature. Which, moreover, is regulated in numeral 2(b) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. From the foregoing, it is clearly evident that this Chamber lacks jurisdiction to resolve the point submitted for its debate. Likewise, it is important to mention that from the study of the actions filed and resolved by the Tribunal Constitucional, at the time of issuing this judgment, there is no evidence that the norms in question have been the subject of analysis; that is, there is not and has not been a questioning of their constitutionality that could lead this Deciding Body to suspend the resolution of the case, or to disapply the norms of Law 7762. Therefore, the grievance must be denied.\n\n**IV.** In the **second** objection, they adduce improper weighing of evidence insofar as the Court considered there was no proof to support the facts that occurred on May 22, 2010, which prevented establishing the liability that was requested of the Concessionaire and the state bodies, such that the discussion of damages was moot. However, in this sense, the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías is ignored; she narrated everything that happened that day, and the demonstration that the vehicle had collided with a rock. With the judges' action, the provisions of precepts 82(2) and (4) of the CPCA are infringed, transgressing sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), as said testimony is left without analysis. Likewise, the report of the accident that they made that same day at the Autopistas del Sol tollbooth was not taken into account, nor the document rejecting the indemnification claimed, dated June 7, 2010, via document SJ-C/DE 07-001/01. It is not true that the witness was hesitant regarding the event; she was only hesitant about the details, which is logical due to the passage of time. Furthermore, the Court discards it based on the degree of family relationship, without giving an explanation for such disqualification. According to the judgment, the fact that the witness was traveling in the back, that it was nighttime, and that she said she did not see the damages caused, do not support what was petitioned by the plaintiffs; an assertion that is erroneous, as the witness clearly narrated what happened with the rock. That she did not see the damages does not mean they did not exist. To resolve this matter, it is necessary to resort to the rules of logic and experience, making it clear that the collision with the rock on the highway was what caused them. The provisions of numeral 417 of the Código Procesal Civil (CPC) regarding human presumptions (presunciones humanas) must be applied. For the judges, not even the technical reports related to the inspections that various State entities carried out regarding route 27 during the year 2010 demonstrate the event in question; poorly weighing the evidence. They indicate, it is true, such documents did not demonstrate the existence of the event; that is what the testimonies, the accident report, and the referred-to official communication from the Concessionaire are for; those expert opinions serve to demonstrate the causal link (nexo causal). As established in numerals 8(d) and (l), 9(1)(d), 16(a), and 37 first paragraph, it is the State's obligation to monitor that the Concessionaire keeps the highway in good condition. In this case, there is an unlawful functioning of the Administration, which is demonstrated by the technical documents provided: “*Reporte de Inspección de la Ruta 27*”, prepared by the Asociación Costarricense de Geotecnia (ACG), and the report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 from the Contraloría General de la República (CGR); the former determines the place where the incident occurred as critical in geometric aspects such as: slope, height of the slopes (taludes); regarding geotechnical aspects: terrain type, lithology (litología), weathering conditions (meteorización), alteration, erosion, and degree of fracturing. The CGR report concluded that the inauguration of said route was done without guaranteeing users transit without putting their lives and properties at risk. Said documents are irrefutable proof that the State did not fulfill its oversight duty to keep the highway safe from landslides (derrumbes). Thus, it is easy to presume that the rock with which it collided and caused damages came from one of those detachments; it is not a matter of natural cause, as it is the Concessionaire's and the State's responsibility to verify that this situation does not occur, they must prevent and avoid it. **Third**: they allege that, according to what was set forth in the previous grievance, the Court errs in its factual framework, especially in relation to the facts held as not proven, as it did not accept the collision and the damages suffered, the unavailability of the vehicle, use of another motor vehicle or public transportation services; nor did it consider that where they live, those services did not exist. Nor did it accept the thesis of State liability for negligence; being that, as explained supra, for all of the foregoing there is evidence in the case file demonstrating the situation.\n\n**V.** Because they are intimately related, both grievances will be resolved jointly.\n\nRegarding this matter, the Court considered that the plaintiffs did not take care to bring to the process evidence demonstrating what happened on May 22, 2010, as they are limited to the account in the complaint, and the testimony of Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías, who was hesitant in her statement, did not remember details, and also affirmed being the plaintiff's second cousin; all of which caused the judges to lose credibility in her testimony. For the Court, there is no technical, documentary, or testimonial evidence that could allow reaching the conclusion that the events occurred as the plaintiffs recount; thus, they do not recognize the existence of a causal link (nexo causal) with the event. The ruling states that the reports and evaluations carried out by various State entities do not demonstrate by themselves that there was a failure in the oversight, design, or construction of the works on route 27, nor that the Concessionaire incurred negligence when carrying out the works.\n\n**VI. On strict liability in administrative function and liability arising from public works concessions.** The liability system of the Public Administration and the State in general derives from the Political Constitution, articles 11 (principle of legality), 18 and 33 (equality in bearing public burdens), 34 (protection of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations), 41 (right to full compensation for damages); 45 (protection of private property); 49 (protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests), 50 (liability for environmental damage); 74 (social solidarity), 148, 149, 154, 166 and 188 (liability of the President of the Republic, Executive Branch, Government Council, Judicial Branch and Autonomous Institutions), and 139 subsection 4), 140 and 191 (right to the proper functioning of public service). In this regard, rulings no. 5207-2004 of May 18, 2004, of the Constitutional Chamber and no. 308-F-2006 of May 25, 2006, of this Chamber can be consulted. Likewise, this Chamber has indicated that the State is liable to the individual if the latter has suffered an unlawful injury (lesión antijurídica) which they have no duty to bear, caused by the public functioning. However, it is essential to mention that, for such an imputation to occur, it is necessary to prove the causal link between the administrative conduct or situation and the damage suffered by the victim, a link that is only broken if any of the defenses arises, namely: force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party (article 190 ibidem). In summary, it must be stated that the parameters of imputation for determining administrative liability are objective (normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful functioning), which means that to attribute liability to the Administration for an event, the existence of a damage, an administrative activity or inactivity, and a causal link are required. Now, regarding the liability generated as a result of public works concession relationships, this Chamber has stated that the General Law of Concession of Public Works with Public Services, number 7762 (hereinafter LGCOP), contains its own rules defining the extracontractual liability of the parties towards third parties; and in particular, regarding the liable subject. In this way, the rules in force at the time the events occurred establish in article 18 subsection f) as an obligation of the Concessionaire: \"*Compensate for the damages and losses caused to third parties as a consequence of the execution of the concession*.\" Canon 36, which refers to the construction stage, establishes that the concession regime will be subject to the following provisions, and as relevant here, reference will be made to subsections a) and e), which state: \"*a) The works will be executed at the risk of the concessionaire* [...] *e) Adhere to the best construction procedures and to the approved construction plans* [...].\" Finally, precept 38 refers to the regime applicable to the Concessionaire's relationships: \"*Regarding rights and duties with third parties, the concessionaire shall be governed by the rules of Private Law. They shall be liable to the granting Administration for the damages and losses that may arise from any subcontracting.*\" It is important to mention that article 16 of this normative body, which refers to the obligations of the granting Administration, did not include any aspect related to the repair of the damages and losses produced in the execution of the contract by the concessionaire. Along this line of thought, it must be pointed out that ownership alone is not sufficient as a primary criterion for imputation; hence, it is not logical that the public entity must answer for a conduct that—even within the framework of an administrative contract—is foreign to it. That being the case, at this point, it would be worth questioning whether the contractor's condition as a private subject or the public character of the work and the service delegated to it should be followed; the system of liability applicable to the concessionaire—subjective private law or objective administrative liability—must be chosen in a well-founded manner. Which, in this Decision-Making Body's opinion, is clarified in the LGCOP according to the regulations mentioned above and specifically in article 38. In this same sense, the General Regulation for the Concession of Public Works with Public Services, Executive Decree 27.098-MOPT (hereinafter the Regulation), in clause 69, which refers to damages caused to third parties, imposes: \"*69.1 During the term of the concession, the concessionaire is obliged to adopt all reasonable measures to avoid damage to third parties and to the personnel working on the construction of the work or the operation of the service. They must also take all precautions to avoid damage to third-party property and the environment.* / *69.2 The concessionaire shall be solely responsible for all damage, of any nature, that is caused to third parties, work personnel, third-party property, or the environment due to the construction of the work or the operation of the service, unless the damages are attributable to the granting Administration due to measures it imposed on the concessionaire.*\" It is in this last scenario when the Administration is forced to answer for the damages caused to third parties. See resolution 925-F-S1-2015 mentioned above. Now, years later, this Chamber expands on the issue of liability in cases of public works concessions with public services and warned that in situations related to the use of highways, there is a consumer relationship, insofar as a certain sum of money has been paid via the toll in exchange for receiving a service from the concessionaire, which in this case is traveling on that road. Neither the State nor the CNC participates in this. Thus, in this type of situation, one must resort to the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, number 7472 (Consumer Defense Law), which in its article 35, as relevant here, stipulates: \"*Liability regime. The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed due to the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them or their use and risks. Only he who proves they were unrelated to the damage is released.*\" It is by virtue of this statement that this Chamber has held the criterion that it corresponds to the producer, merchant, or service provider to prove their non-involvement with respect to the claimed damage. Thus, according to what is stipulated in the LGCOP and the Regulation, the concessionaire's liability could be subjective, regulated by private law, but also objective, which would be that provided for in the Consumer Protection Law. The ruling of 9 hours 50 minutes on November 15, 2018, corresponding to vote number 984-F-S1-2018, can be consulted.\n\n**VII.** In the case under study, according to the object and cause of action by the plaintiffs, the subjective liability of the concessionaire as previously explained must be addressed, and it will be analyzed from this perspective. Specifically, the joint plaintiffs provide as evidence to demonstrate the accident they had on May 22, 2010, the day on which, they claim, they crashed on national route 27, the testimony of Mrs. Tatiana Paola Alvarado Irías.\n\nThis, in oral and public trial, stated having an interest in the resolution of the matter, by virtue of her proximity to the co-plaintiffs, as she also affirmed being a second cousin of Mr. Mena Brenes. Now, regarding the events of that day, the witness is not a sufficient evidentiary source to be able to hold what was stated in the claim as proven. The foregoing by virtue of the fact that even though she assured that on that day she was traveling in the rear part of the motor vehicle with her mother, she could not give further details about what happened, since she restricted herself to stating that it was night, it was raining and there was a lot of fog, and she felt the car sway; she claimed it was because they drove over a rock, ending up mounted on it. However, subsequently, she stated she did not remember which side of the car hit the object, but at the same time, she assured, she could see the size of the rock through the window, affirming it was large. Furthermore, she related, once this happened, the driver continued on her way to the toll booth, to make the corresponding claim; Mrs. Bolaños Masís decided not to call anyone, nor to request anyone to come to their aid. At first, she assured she did not know at which part of the road the mishap occurred, nor how long it took them to reach the toll booth, but, later she determined that between one thing and the other, approximately five minutes elapsed. Likewise, she testified to having stayed in the vehicle the whole time, without getting out to see the damage, such that she never witnessed what happened to the car. After contacting representatives of the Concessionaire, they continued on their way to Ciudad Colón, without any tow truck being necessary, nor was any strange sound heard coming from the vehicle. As can be observed, from such statements, there is no way to verify that the day the plaintiffs were traveling on Route 27, they effectively collided with a large rock, causing serious material damage related to the vehicle and, consequently, damages directly to the plaintiffs. Dealing with an event such as the one they relate, in which they affirm the vehicle almost overturned, that they lost control for an instant, it is basically a traumatic situation difficult to forget; however, the alleged companion could not even relate which side of the car it was that they collided with. Nor did she make any mention that a situation such as the one just described had occurred; on the contrary, she limits herself to indicating that “they mounted” onto a rock and that the driver slowly headed to the toll booth. It almost seems like a fabricated testimony, therefore, these statements also do not merit credibility with this Chamber and, hence, cannot serve as a basis to hold what the plaintiffs alleged as proven. On the other hand, document SJ-C/DE 07-001/10, of June 7, 2010, issued by the Concessionaire, visible on folio 31 of the expediente, categorically rejected the existence of rocks on the road, and, therefore, the claim of Bolaños Masís and Mena Brenes. Such document cannot be considered proof evidencing the facts related in the claim. Lastly, the reports referred to as poorly valued, namely: the Inspection Report of Route 27 and report DFOE-OP-IF-13-2010 issued by the CGR, as the appellants themselves well indicate, are not proof whatsoever that relates to nor that evidences by itself, what occurred on May 22, 2010. The existence of a problem in the concession, in the oversight or in the result of the construction and maintenance of the route in question, is not the object of this litis; what was requested by the plaintiffs is limited to an award of damages (daños y perjuicios), which it is not possible to grant, by virtue of the fact that proof demonstrating the existence of a collision with a rock on Route 27, which caused them the alleged damages, was not submitted in this proceeding. This being the case, both grievances must be denied.\n\n**VIII.** According to the foregoing, the appeal filed by Lorena Bolaños Masís and Marcos Antonio Mena Brenes must be denied. The costs (costas) of this are the responsibility of both. (Article 150, subsection 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal is declared without merit. Its costs (costas) are the responsibility of the party who filed it.\n\n**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáciga**\n\n**Rocio Rojas Morales**                      **Damaris Vargas Vásquez**\n\n**Jorge Alberto López González**             **Jéssica Jiménez Ramírez**\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr"
}