{
"id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-1281810",
"citation": "Res. 00245-2025 Sala Primera de la Corte",
"section": "nexus_decisions",
"doc_type": "court_decision",
"title_es": "Improcedencia de indemnización por ejecución de garantía hipotecaria tras hallazgo de traslape",
"title_en": "Dismissal of indemnification claim for mortgage guarantee enforcement after overlap discovery",
"summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia confirmó la improcedencia de una demanda de indemnización presentada contra el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por un deudor hipotecario. El actor alegaba daños por el remate de su vivienda, derivados de un traslape inmobiliario descubierto al solicitar una readecuación de deudas y de un presunto bloqueo del sistema bancario que le impidió realizar pagos. La Sala resolvió que el banco no cometió ninguna irregularidad, pues tenía pleno derecho a rechazar la readecuación en virtud de su autonomía mercantil y a no aceptar una garantía que considerara insatisfactoria. Además, se determinó que el deudor no probó que el banco le impidiera pagar, ya que el sistema bancario simplemente no permitía abonar cuotas de operaciones en mora, lo cual es conforme a la legislación bancaria. La Sala declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación, confirmando la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo que rechazó la demanda y condenó en costas a la parte actora.",
"summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim for damages filed against Banco Nacional de Costa Rica by a mortgage debtor. The plaintiff alleged damages from the auction of his home, arising from a property overlap discovered when he requested debt restructuring, and from an alleged system block that prevented him from making payments. The Chamber held that the bank committed no irregularity, as it had the full right to reject the restructuring under its commercial autonomy and was not obligated to accept a guarantee it considered unsatisfactory. It was also determined that the debtor failed to prove the bank prevented him from making payments; the banking system merely did not allow payments on overdue accounts, which is in accordance with banking legislation. The cassation appeal was dismissed, confirming the judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Court, which had rejected the claim and awarded costs against the plaintiff.",
"court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
"date": "20/02/2025",
"year": "2025",
"topic_ids": [
"_off-topic"
],
"primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
"es_concept_hints": [
"tasación hipotecaria",
"novación de deudas",
"expediente de crédito",
"cobro judicial",
"mora",
"derecho real de garantía",
"autonomía de la voluntad",
"práctica abusiva en consumo"
],
"article_citations": [],
"keywords_es": [
"remate",
"hipoteca",
"traslape",
"readecuación de deudas",
"responsabilidad objetiva",
"consumidor bancario",
"práctica abusiva",
"cobro judicial",
"garantía hipotecaria",
"Sala Primera de la Corte"
],
"keywords_en": [
"foreclosure auction",
"mortgage",
"overlap",
"debt restructuring",
"strict liability",
"bank consumer",
"abusive practice",
"judicial collection",
"mortgage guarantee",
"First Chamber of the Court"
],
"excerpt_es": "Para la Sala no cabe ninguna duda de que tanto el recurso como la demanda deben ser rechazadas. En este proceso, se pide una indemnización derivada de un remate que la parte actora califica como “Injusto”. (...) Lo primero es evidentemente improcedente. Tal y como el a quo lo indicó, si alguien pudo verse perjudicado por no advertir de un traslape entre la finca dada en garantía por el actor y un terreno colindante, es el banco acreedor. (...) Luego, tampoco es de recibo lo alegado sobre el hecho de que el banco impidió al actor pagar su operación. Esto ha quedado totalmente indemostrado.",
"excerpt_en": "For the Chamber, there is no doubt that both the appeal and the claim must be dismissed. In this proceeding, compensation is sought for an auction the plaintiff deems 'Unfair.' (...) The first [allegation] is clearly inadmissible. As the lower court indicated, if anyone could have been harmed by not detecting an overlap between the property given as collateral by the plaintiff and an adjoining plot, it is the creditor bank. (...) Likewise, the allegation that the bank prevented the plaintiff from paying his obligation has been completely unproven.",
"outcome": {
"label_en": "Denied",
"label_es": "Sin lugar",
"summary_en": "The cassation appeal is dismissed, upholding the judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Court, which fully rejected the claim for damages against the bank.",
"summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación, confirmando la decisión del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo que rechazó integralmente la demanda de indemnización contra el banco."
},
"pull_quotes": [
{
"context": "Considerando IV",
"quote_en": "if anyone could have been harmed by not detecting an overlap between the property given as collateral by the plaintiff and an adjoining plot, it is the creditor bank.",
"quote_es": "si alguien pudo verse perjudicado por no advertir de un traslape entre la finca dada en garantía por el actor y un terreno colindante, es el banco acreedor."
},
{
"context": "Considerando IV",
"quote_en": "state banking institutions, when acting as such, in light of the principles of autonomy of will and freedom of enterprise, have every ability to set the requirements and conditions necessary to grant a particular credit.",
"quote_es": "las instituciones bancarias estatales, cuando actúan como tales, a la luz del principio de autonomía de la voluntad y de libertad de empresa, tienen toda la aptitud de establecer los requisitos y condiciones necesarias para otorgar un crédito determinado."
},
{
"context": "Considerando V",
"quote_en": "there is no irregularity whatsoever in the fact that the banking system does not allow payment of an account that has overdue installments, given that the law itself establishes that, in such case, the entire obligation becomes due and payable.",
"quote_es": "no hay irregularidad alguna en el hecho de que el sistema bancario no permita el pago de una operación que tiene cuotas en mora, en el tanto es la ley misma la que establece que, en tal supuesto, la operación es exigible en su totalidad."
}
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"body_es_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\nExp. 21-004372-1027-CA \n\nRes. 000245-F-S1-2025\n\n SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas cincuenta y seis minutos del veinte de febrero de dos mil veinticinco .\n\nEn proceso de conocimiento, presentado por FREDDY MENA VENEGAS, cédula 1-625-480; contra el BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, representado por su apoderada general judicial, la Licenciada Carolina Villalobos Sancho, carné 15510; la Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero, actuando como apoderada especial judicial del actor, interpuso recurso de casación impugnando la sentencia número 2024001099, emitida a las 07 horas 15 minutos del 23 de febrero de 2024, por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera, integrado por las personas juzgadoras Alejandra Soto Fonseca, Claudia Bolaños Salazar y Carlos José Mejías Rodríguez. \n\nMagistrado ponente Jorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI. En el presente proceso, cuya demanda fue instaurada el 15 de julio de 2021, se persigue una declaratoria de responsabilidad a cargo del banco demandado, en el contexto de una relación de consumo crediticia. Se realiza una síntesis de los principales aspectos de la exposición de hechos y alegatos contenidos en la demanda, además de la posición asumida por la parte demandada frente a lo peticionado, sin perjuicio de la lectura minuciosa que se ha hecho de los alegatos y peticiones de las partes (doctrina del numeral 61.2 de la ley no. 9342, en lo que respecta a los elementos de la sentencia de casación, aplicable en esta materia, en virtud de la cláusula de integración prevista en el precepto 220 de la ley no. 8508). El demandante, por medio de su representación, hizo ver que adquirió un préstamo hipotecario del banco demandado, sobre la finca 145475-000, del Partido de San José, en el año 2012. También pignoró, en respaldo de sus obligaciones, otro inmueble que posteriormente vendió, cancelando parte de la deuda. Luego, en el año 2017, volvió a respaldar un nuevo financiamiento con el inmueble anteriormente mencionado. Reprocha que, ni en ese momento, ni en posteriores visitas de seguimiento a la finca 145475-000, se advirtió de la existencia de un traslape de esta heredad con otra colindante. Específicamente, se recriminó que, cuando el accionante solicitó una refundición de créditos, en un contexto de dificultad en la marcha del negocio al que se dedicaba, se le negó lo solicitado, por cuanto en el nuevo peritaje llevado a cabo, se determinó la existencia de un traslape de una construcción del inmueble hipotecado con otro terreno. Expuso la parte actora que, además de lo anterior, se le impidió realizar los pagos de sus operaciones, por presunto error del banco. Sobre esto, asegura, se le informó que el impedimento se debió a que las cuotas que no se le permitió pagar serían canceladas con la readecuación. Así, aseveró que fue por error del banco que no pudo pagar oportunamente, entrando en mora. Narró, adicionalmente, que presentó un reclamo ante la Contraloría de Servicios, por el rechazo de su nueva solicitud. Empero, el banco presentó un cobro judicial para hacer valer la garantía hipotecaria, lo que propició que esta fuera rematada en noviembre de 2020. Alegó la parte demandante, además, que la operación cuenta con una tasa piso y una tasa techo que son desproporcionadamente favorables para el banco demandado. Afirmó que, de no ser por las condiciones de la tasa inferior, habría podido mantener la operación al día. En criterio del promotor de este proceso, los hechos que ha sometido a debate generan responsabilidad para el banco y le han causado diversos daños materiales y morales, además de perjuicios. Las pretensiones, según quedaron fijadas en audiencia preliminar, quedaron en los siguientes términos: “1. Que se condene al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al pago de la indemnización por daño material por responsabilidad objetiva en consumo bancario por la suma de 37.564.388 colones, por el remate injusto de mi vivienda (...) 2. Que se condene al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica al pago de la indemnización por daño material por responsabilidad objetiva en consumo bancario por la suma que indique el perito, por el monto cobrado en exceso por la tasa piso, el cual aproximadamente corresponde a la suma de 10 millones de colones. 3. Que se condene al Banco Nacional al Daño Moral Subjetivo por el sufrimiento humano generado por el remate de la vivienda por la suma de 3 millones de colones. 4. Que se condene en ambas costas al banco demandado”. La parte demandada se opuso a los ruegos formulados en su contra. Interpuso la defensa de falta de derecho, misma que fue acogida en la sentencia impugnada, en la que se declaró la demanda sin lugar en todos sus extremos. Además, se impuso a la actora el pago de ambas costas. Disconforme, su representación, recurre. \n\nII. El primer agravio se presenta violación de normas sustantivas. Concretamente, se anuncia el quebranto de los preceptos 32 y 34 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, en lo referente al derecho a la información de la persona consumidora. Explica la casacionista que, cuando el accionante hipotecó en favor del banco su finca inscrita con la matrícula 145475-000, en el año 2012, se aceptó esa garantía, sin advertirle de la existencia de un traslape. Del mismo modo, destaca que, cuando se hicieron inspecciones posteriores en el terreno, de parte de la institución, tampoco se observó la existencia de dicha situación. En cambio, destaca que, cuando se solicitó una unificación de deudas, ahí sí se le hizo ver de esa anomalía, exigiéndose al actor que la resolviera para que se pudiera continuar con el trámite. Según su juicio, lo anterior vulneró el derecho de información del consumidor, lo que no fue apreciado por el Tribunal. En el segundo embate, se recrimina una indebida aplicación del artículo 32 de la ley no. 7472. Ahora, por desprotección de los intereses económicos y sociales del accionante, como consumidor. Señala la recurrente que no es controvertido que los funcionarios bancarios, inicialmente, se mostraron anuentes a la solicitud de readecuación y que, por ello, solicitaron un nuevo avalúo pericial. Señala, en cambio, que el problema surgió a raíz del nuevo informe, de fecha 10 de abril de 2019, en el que se indicó la existencia de un traslape con el terreno colindante, en 65 centímetros, recomendándose que el propietario corrigiera la situación, ya fuere realizando un nuevo plano o modificando la construcción. Destaca que, a ese momento, llevaba siete años de estar pagando el crédito hipotecario respaldado con ese mismo bien. Asevera que nunca se hizo entrega al actor de planos que demostraran el traslape. En cambio, reprocha, se le exigió resolver algo que no estaba en sus posibilidades, puesto que un topógrafo no podía eliminar el traslape y para modificar la construcción requería de medios económicos con los cuales no contaba. Asevera que, como ya existía hipoteca, en favor de la misma entidad, no era un requisito sine qua non lo que ahora se le estaba exigiendo para la unificación de deudas. Relata que el 24 de enero de 2020, el banco informó al actor que debía continuar pagando sus obligaciones. Lamenta que el Tribunal no apreció la vulneración del derecho de protección del interés económico del consumidor. El tercer cargo se presenta por violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. Sostiene la casacionista que, a diferencia de lo que indica el Tribunal, el error administrativo sí se demostró. Destaca que, en el expediente consta el oficio de fecha 24 de enero de 2020, suscrito por el encargado de crédito de la Agencia de Aserrí, en el que, según el texto transcrito, se indica como un error que, en el peritaje realizado inicialmente, cuando se otorgó el primer crédito, no se indicara la existencia del traslape, aunque acotándose que esa situación no crea derecho. También se combate, del hecho no probado sétimo, que no se demostrara que el perito recomendara rechazar el crédito por el traslape. Asegura que nunca se afirmó que el experto recomendara la denegatoria de la unificación de deudas; en cambio, lo que se dijo y demostró es que lo que solicitaban los funcionarios bancarios al deudor para la aprobación del trámite era de imposible cumplimiento, por falta de recursos y no por haber conseguido ningún topógrafo que cambiara el plano existente. Según explica, sí se demostró que la decisión bancaria se basó en las recomendaciones del perito. El cuarto reparo se presenta por indebida valoración de la prueba, en contradicción con las reglas de la sana crítica, así como por indebida aplicación del canon 34, inciso e, de la ley no. 7472, en el tanto prohíbe prácticas abusivas. Ahora, hace ver la disconforme que la parte actora no reprochó un error administrativo que impidiera que el deudor pagara sus cuotas mensuales, como se intenta hacer entender en los hechos indemostrados 3 y 6. Asegura que en el expediente administrativo se comprueba que el banco impidió el pago de las cuotas mensuales, como una práctica abusiva. Destaca que a folio 390 de ese dossier se hizo constar que, si bien no se registra en el sistema que administra la cartera de crédito del banco que algún funcionario haya realizado un bloqueo, estaba “parametrizado” para que, cuando una operación tuviese dos o más cuotas atrasadas, no se permitiera el pago, de modo tal que el cliente debía obtener autorización para poner al día las cuotas atrasadas o acordar un arreglo de pago. Observa la recurrente, además, que el señor Mena declaró en juicio, bajo fe de juramento, que intentó “por todos los medios pagar cuotas mensuales”, para que no se tramitara un cobro judicial, lo que fue impedido por el sistema. Resalta que el banco aceptó que no permitía el pago, lo que es una práctica abusiva. En el quinto agravio, se reprocha la indebida aplicación del artículo 35 de la ley no. 7472, desde la perspectiva de la responsabilidad civil objetiva, en materia de consumo. Aduce la promotora de la impugnación bajo análisis que el banco pidió al actor un requisito de imposible cumplimiento para que este pudiera readecuar sus deudas y mejorar su capacidad de pago. Dice que un año después de que este último se quejara ante la Contraloría de Servicios, el banco aprobó la readecuación, señalando que no se había firmado porque el deudor no había cumplido los requisitos, aunque no se trataba del traslape, sino por la no presentación de una personería jurídica actualizada. Sin embargo, reclama que el consumidor es una persona física, por lo que tal exigencia no tenía sentido. Además, observa que, durante el año de espera, la carga financiera aumentó en veinte millones de colones, aproximadamente, superando el valor de la propiedad misma. Asevera, finalmente, que en la sentencia no se observaron los derechos fundamentales del consumidor, ni la responsabilidad civil objetiva propia de esta materia, la que opera sin culpa. En cambio, increpa, la decisión se fundó en un marco de responsabilidad civil subjetiva, basado en “la no prueba de errores administrativos” (imagen 11 del libelo de casación). \n\nIII. Para dar respuesta al agravio incoado es necesario antes prestar atención a lo que dijo el Tribunal, en lo que se relacione a los agravios. Básicamente, la demanda fue analizada desde dos perspectivas. Una, desde la óptica del reclamo asociado a que el banco no permitió al actor pagar oportunamente sus créditos. Segundo, que no se le informó oportunamente que su finca dada en garantía tenía un traslape. Sobre lo primero, el a quo descartó que la entidad accionada impidiera, por un error administrativo, que el accionante honrara sus obligaciones de pago. Concluyó, en cambio, que el actor no demostró que el banco le haya impedido el pago de sus cuotas por medio del sistema de banca en línea, por cuanto las iba a incluir, presuntamente, en la readecuación. Además, dijo que no probó esa parte tampoco, haber intentado realizar sus pagos de una manera diversa al internet banking. También resaltaron las personas juzgadoras de instancia que el demandante no demostró haber estado al día en el pago de las operaciones de crédito que tenía con el banco. Más bien, acotaron que para inicios del año 2020 -aproximadamente un año después de la solicitud de readecuación-, ya el accionante contaba con cinco operaciones de crédito en cobro judicial, por atrasos de más de un año, lo que dio lugar a la presentación de sendos cobros judiciales (“demandas ejecutivas”). También concedió valor al testimonio del señor Alonso García Brenes quien indicó que, para el año 2019, el actor ya tenía un atraso considerable, por lo que se valoraron diversas soluciones, siendo una de ellas la unificación de las deudas en mora, aunque esta no fue finalmente materializada. Sobre el tema del traslape, indicó el Tribunal que, en el peritaje llevado a cabo ante la solicitud de readecuación, su autor recomendó el bien valorado como garantía, aunque previa corrección del traslape detectado entre la construcción que se yergue sobre el terreno y el terreno vecino, en 65 cm, ya fuere realizando un nuevo plano, o bien, modificando la construcción. Por esa razón, dijo que no se acreditó una relación directa entre la no aprobación de la readecuación y la recomendación contenida en el informe. Además, indicó que el hecho de que en el peritaje que se realizó inicialmente no se indicara el peritaje no causó un peligro sino para el acreedor mismo. Mencionó, además, que no hay una obligación para el acreedor de aceptar cualquier garantía que se le ofrezca, siendo, en consecuencia, la entidad bancaria la que determina las condiciones de “deseabilidad o viabilidad” de una garantía. De tal manera, añadió, el peritaje únicamente valora lo que es de interés para el prestamista. Descartó que la falta de advertencia del traslape en el primer informe hubiese incidido en el crédito otorgado, o bien, que haya causado daño al demandante, en el tanto es el banco mismo el que asumió el riesgo de la cosa dada en garantía, sin efecto alguno sobre la esfera patrimonial del deudor. Observó, adicionalmente, que la tramitación de un refinanciamiento posterior es independiente del primer crédito, siendo que la novación o refundición de deudas no es forzosa para el banco, el cual puede, en ejercicio de su actividad mercantil, declinar una solicitud de esa naturaleza. Consideró el Tribunal que el accionante lo que pretende es que se conserven las condiciones de la valoración que se hizo en la hipoteca formalizada, para la solicitud de readecuación que consideró posteriormente. Zanjó el tema indicando que es el propietario el que debe soportar las consecuencias del problema inmobiliario presentado, en el tanto es a este al que corresponden las atribuciones reales, y no a sus acreedores, conforme al canon 264 del Código Civil. \n\nIV. Para la Sala no cabe ninguna duda de que tanto el recurso como la demanda deben ser rechazadas. En este proceso, se pide una indemnización derivada de un remate que la parte actora califica como “Injusto”. Además, se alegaron menoscabos derivados de una presunta tasa “piso” de interés irregular. Sin embargo, este último tema no fue traído a casación. Por ende, el análisis se restringirá a la indemnización, por la ejecución judicial de la garantía otorgada por el actor, en beneficio del banco. Efectivamente, la demanda se asentó en dos premisas básicas: 1) Que, al valorarse la finca hipotecada por el actor, en favor del banco, en el año 2012, no se advirtió de la existencia de un traslape entre una construcción del inmueble y un predio vecino, siendo que fue este el motivo que llevó al rechazo de la readecuación solicitada años después por el mismo deudor. 2) Que el banco no permitió al demandante pagar oportunamente sus obligaciones. Veamos. Lo primero es evidentemente improcedente. Tal y como el a quo lo indicó, si alguien pudo verse perjudicado por no advertir de un traslape entre la finca dada en garantía por el actor y un terreno colindante, es el banco acreedor. En ningún momento se acreditó que la situación jurídica del señor Mena Venegas se haya visto desmejorada, por el posterior hallazgo de esa anomalía inmobiliaria. En este punto, debe recordarse que la hipoteca es un derecho real de garantía que se otorga en favor de la persona acreedora (numeral 409 del Código Civil); en este caso, en el contexto de una relación bancaria. Por ende, si el inmueble tiene algún vicio oculto o que no fue advertido al momento de consentirse la garantía, esto perjudica directamente el interés del acreedor, desde la perspectiva de la calidad de la garantía. Podría, eventualmente, buscar protección judicial, la persona deudora, si el banco emprende actos que desmejoren o perjudiquen su status jurídico como deudor. Verbigracia, si a raíz del hallazgo se hubiese desconocido la garantía, o bien, el beneficio de plazo. Empero, nada de esto se ha demostrado. Por el contrario, al no haberse demostrado lo contrario, más parece que el banco procedió de buena fe, pues en ningún momento desconoció la garantía que aceptó inicialmente, aunque después se percató del traslape. Por lo demás, es cierto, en línea con lo indicado en el fallo, que una eventual unificación de esa y otras operaciones, no es una situación de forzosa aceptación para el Banco Nacional. Debe recordarse que, en el ejercicio de su giro mercantil, dicha entidad funge con plena capacidad de Derecho Privado, tal y como lo reconoce el precepto tercero, párrafo segundo, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al disponer que: “El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes”. Desde esta óptica, las instituciones bancarias estatales, cuando actúan como tales, a la luz del principio de autonomía de la voluntad y de libertad de empresa, tienen toda la aptitud de establecer los requisitos y condiciones necesarias para otorgar un crédito determinado, según la línea que se trate. Así, mientras no se demuestre alguna suerte de trato discriminatorio, desleal, contrario a las buenas prácticas mercantiles, o bien, la violación de normas especiales aplicables a las entidades financieras, no hay por qué motivo partir de que la aceptación de una garantía hipotecaria obliga al banco a consentir en una posterior, sobre el mismo bien, a pesar de que detecte que existe un motivo contrario a sus propios intereses comerciales y económicos. Debe resaltarse aquí lo dispuesto en el artículo 66 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional: “Los créditos que concedan los bancos comerciales deberán ser asegurados con garantías que a juicio suyo sean satisfactorias” (El subrayado y énfasis se añaden). Nótese como la normativa bancaria resalta el derecho del banco -como no podría ser de otra forma-, de determinar, conforme a sus propios parámetros, si una garantía ofrecida es satisfactoria o no. Ergo, no hay vicio alguno en que se denegara o solicitara la corrección de anomalías en el bien ofrecido como garantía, a efectos de acceder a la misma, sea que exista o no una previa operación respaldada con el mismo bien. Esto es motivo suficiente para descartar todo lo alegado, puesto que no se advierte violación alguna al derecho de información de la persona consumidora, por el hecho de que se haya descubierto, con posterioridad, la existencia de un traslape inmobiliario que resultaba contrario a los intereses del Banco Nacional, como para consentir en la garantía ofrecida. Desde esta óptica, jamás podría concluirse que el impago de esa primera operación se deba a la falta de aceptación, de parte de la entidad, de una posterior reunificación; menos aún, a que se haya violentado el derecho a la información, o bien a la seguridad económica del actor como consumidor. Desde este punto de vista, es totalmente baladí la discusión en la que insiste la recurrente cuando intenta dirigir el análisis hacia la verificación de si existió o no un “error” en la no determinación de un traslape, de previo al otorgamiento del primer crédito respaldado con la garantía hipotecaria de interés. Lo cierto es que esta situación no incidió en la posibilidad del actor de pagar el crédito respaldado, siendo que no era parte de sus derechos, exigir una nueva operación, con el mismo respaldo inmobiliario, para lo cual debía superar los filtros de análisis bancario que son usuales en este tipo de negociaciones. \n\nV. Luego, tampoco es de recibo lo alegado sobre el hecho de que el banco impidió al actor pagar su operación. Esto ha quedado totalmente indemostrado. Ahora intenta alegar la casacionista que esa entidad aceptó que no permitió el pago. Empero, el documento probatorio que señala, en respaldo de su dicho, es totalmente inocuo como para probar esa circunstancia. Resalta la recurrente que en el oficio visible a folio 390 del expediente de crédito se lee lo siguiente: “La operación que se indica se encontraba contablemente en cobro judicial, no al día. A nivel de sistema no se registra ningún bloqueo realizado por algún funcionario. Lo que sucede es que el sistema que administra la cartera de crédito, en ese momento estaba parametrizado para que cuando una operación de crédito tuviese 2 o más cuotas atrasadas, no permitía el pago. El cliente debía coordinar la autorización para poner al día las cuotas atrasadas o bien, concretar el arreglo de pago. Se adjunta reporte de movimientos que tuvo la operación del 01-01-2019 al 31-12-2019, en donde se evidencia que no se registra ningún bloqueo a la operación indicada.” Sin embargo, de dicho extracto no se entiende, de ninguna manera, que el banco haya obstaculizado, de manera abusiva, que el actor honrara sus obligaciones oportunamente. Por el contrario, lo que se colige de esa parcial reproducción es que, si una operación tiene dos o más cuotas atrasadas, el sistema de la cartera de crédito no permite el pago, de manera tal que, encontrándose en ese estado, la persona deudora debe buscar un arreglo de pago o autorización para poner al día su operación. Esto no es, desde ninguna óptica, una práctica abusiva. Por el contrario, la falta de pago de una cuota mensual de una deuda bancaria, por disposición legislativa expresa, permite a la entidad a tener por incumplida y exigible la totalidad de la obligación. En ese sentido, el mandato 67 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, en lo que ahora interesa, establece: “Toda deuda constituida a favor de un banco comercial, pagadera por partes o en cuotas periódicas, o cuyos intereses se paguen en períodos distintos al plazo final del crédito, llevará implícita la condición de que el total de la deuda podrá considerarse vencido y judicialmente exigible, con sólo la falta de pago de un período de intereses o de una de las cuotas o partes del principal que se hubieren convenido, sin perjuicio de que el banco cargue intereses moratorios sobre el monto del abono atrasado al capital. a tasas que podrán ser superiores hasta en dos puntos porcentuales sobre la tasa pactada para la obligación”. Como es claro, entonces, no hay irregularidad alguna en el hecho de que el sistema bancario no permita el pago de una operación que tiene cuotas en mora, en el tanto es la ley misma la que establece que, en tal supuesto, la operación es exigible en su totalidad, sin que sea una obligación del banco permitir el pago atraso de cuotas vencidas que no fueron honradas oportunamente. Luego, si bien alega la recurrente que el actor declaró bajo fe de juramente que intentó pagar “cuotas mensuales”; en ningún momento acreditó que se le haya impedido hacerlo estando al día en sus obligaciones. En cambio, el banco sí probó que el sistema no permite el pago de operaciones atrasadas, lo que debe concatenarse con el propio dicho de la parte actora, la que desde un inicio ha dejado claro que se encontraba atravesando dificultades económicas que le impedían -según dice-, hacer frente a sus obligaciones. Así, por ejemplo, en el hecho 13 del relato de hechos contenido en el escrito inicial se lee: “Por la disminución de ingresos, Freddy Mena, estando al día en la operación de crédito, le solicitó al banco una readecuación, un arreglo de pago con la finalidad de mejorar la capacidad de pago, porque sabía que no le iba a poder pagar”. No hay duda, entonces, que son las mismas manifestaciones de la parte actora, relacionadas a la prueba que consta en autos, las que dan cuenta de que fue el atraso en el que incurrió el demandante, lo que llevó a que se ejecutara judicialmente la garantía que había otorgado. Así las cosas, tampoco son de recibo los alegatos con los cuales se pretende que esta Sala declare que el banco incurrió en alguna práctica abusiva por medio de la cual impedía al demandante pagar. Por el contrario, tampoco se desmintió que, para inicios del año 2020, este último ya tenía cinco operaciones en mora, con atrasos de más de un año, cuando la readecuación fue solicitada a inicios del año 2019, lo que es conforme con lo reseñado en el fallo sobre la declaración del señor Alonso García Brenes, quien indicó que, en el año 2019, el actor ya tenía un atraso considerable, por lo que se buscaron diversas soluciones a su situación. Una vez más, se verifica que fue un atraso del deudor y no una práctica abusiva del actor, lo que llevó al estado de incumplimiento del actor, así como a la persecución judicial del pago de las obligaciones. Finalmente, debe observarse, el recurso tiene algunas manifestaciones que no son contestes con la teoría del caso traída al inicio del proceso. Así, cuando se argumenta que en ningún momento se dijo que en el peritaje realizado con ocasión de la solicitud de unificación de deudas se recomendó que no se aprobara la gestión. Esto se desmiente con el hecho diecisiete, donde así se indicó expresamente. Ahora, con un reclamo diverso, se alegó que se exigieron condiciones de imposible cumplimiento, cosa que no fue así alegada en la demanda, lo que dota a esas alegaciones de un carácter sorpresivo y novedoso que refuerza su necesario rechazo, en resguardo del derecho de defensa de la contraparte. En todo caso, esta tesis tampoco es de recibo, por el derecho que tiene el banco de determinar si la garantía ofrecida cumple satisfactoriamente o no, con las características que considere oportunas para resguardar sus intereses. Por otra parte se alega que la readecuación no se formalizó por que no se presentó una “personería jurídica”, cuando el actor es persona física. Esto desdice toda la lógica de la demanda, la que parte de que la frustración de la solicitud de reunificación de deudas se debió al traslape advertido por el perito bancario. En todo caso, tampoco fue un alegato sometido oportunamente a debate, ni fue esa circunstancia explicada como motivo de los daños liquidados en la demanda (ver página 10 del escrito inicial, de fecha 15/07/2021). Es claro que se trata de un intento de buscar una variación de lo resuelto, a partir de circunstancias no alegadas oportunamente. En todo caso, tampoco se señala la prueba que demuestra tal afirmación, ni se observa que así se haya tenido por demostrado en el fallo, de manera tal que es un alegato infundado, carente de respaldo probatorio y de correspondencia con lo resuelto y la motivación dada al rechazo de la demanda. Resulta igualmente carente de utilidad la invocación del régimen de responsabilidad objetiva en materia de consumo, así como del carácter prescindible de la culpa, en esta materia. Como ya se ha evidenciado, desde un inicio la parte actora intentó endilgar acciones y omisiones irregulares al banco demandado que no ha conseguido demostrar, sin que su teoría del caso haya tenido como base hechos que puedan subsumirse en la teoría del riesgo creado, desde una perspectiva meramente objetiva; es decir, de circunstancias que, aunque nocivas, no se relacionen con conductas ilegítimas. Una vez más, se advierte un intento de evadir la consecuencia que necesariamente se deriva de la falta de demostración de las anomalías acusadas en la demanda: el rechazo de esta.\n\nVI. En virtud de lo expuesto, se deberá declarar sin lugar el recurso de casación presentado por el Estado. Serán las costas de este a su cargo, conforme artículo 150.3 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Por lo demás, no se aprecia motivo alguno que permita reconocer una razón plausible para recurrir, en el tanto se han traído a colación argumentos evidentemente improcedentes y, en ciertos casos, novedosos. \n\nPOR TANTO\n\n Se declara sin lugar el recurso. Son las costas de este, a cargo de quien lo interpuso. DRUDIN.\n\n \n\n \n\nRocío Rojas Morales\n\n \n\nDamaris Vargas Vásquez\n\n \n\nJorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCarlos Guillermo Zamora Campos\n\n \n\nIgnacio Jose Monge Dobles\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n QWBR43UKCXQG61 \n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr",
"body_en_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\nExp. 21-004372-1027-CA\nRes. 000245-F-S1-2025\n\nSALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at eleven hours fifty-six minutes of February twentieth, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nIn a proceeding of knowledge, filed by FREDDY MENA VENEGAS, identification number 1-625-480; against BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, represented by its general judicial attorney, Licenciada Carolina Villalobos Sancho, bar number 15510; Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero, acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff, filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 2024001099, issued at 07 hours 15 minutes on February 23, 2024, by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera, composed of the judges Alejandra Soto Fonseca, Claudia Bolaños Salazar, and Carlos José Mejías Rodríguez.\n\nReporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI. In the present proceeding, whose complaint was filed on July 15, 2021, a declaration of liability is sought against the defendant bank, in the context of a consumer credit relationship. A synthesis is provided of the main aspects of the statement of facts and allegations contained in the complaint, in addition to the position taken by the defendant with respect to the claims, without prejudice to the thorough reading that has been made of the parties' allegations and petitions (doctrine of numeral 61.2 of Law 9342, with respect to the elements of a cassation judgment, applicable in this matter, by virtue of the integration clause provided in precept 220 of Law 8508). The plaintiff, through his representation, argued that he obtained a mortgage loan from the defendant bank, on property 145475-000, of the Partido de San José, in 2012. He also pledged, in support of his obligations, another property that he later sold, paying off part of the debt. Later, in 2017, he again backed new financing with the aforementioned property. He reproaches that, neither at that time, nor in subsequent follow-up visits to property 145475-000, was he warned of the existence of an overlap of this estate with a neighboring one. Specifically, it was complained that, when the plaintiff requested a debt consolidation (refundición de créditos), in a context of difficulty in the operation of the business in which he was engaged, his request was denied, because in the new expert appraisal (peritaje) conducted, the existence of an overlap of a construction on the mortgaged property with another lot was determined. The plaintiff argued that, in addition to the above, he was prevented from making payments on his operations, allegedly due to a bank error. Regarding this, he asserts, he was informed that the impediment was because the installments he was not allowed to pay would be cancelled with the debt restructuring (readecuación). Thus, he stated that it was due to the bank's error that he could not pay on time, falling into arrears (mora). He additionally narrated that he filed a complaint before the Contraloría de Servicios, due to the rejection of his new application. However, the bank filed a judicial collection action to enforce the mortgage guarantee, which led to it being auctioned in November 2020. The plaintiff also alleged that the operation has an interest rate floor (tasa piso) and an interest rate ceiling (tasa techo) that are disproportionately favorable to the defendant bank. He affirmed that, had it not been for the conditions of the lower rate, he could have kept the operation current. In the opinion of the promoter of this proceeding, the facts he has submitted for debate generate liability for the bank and have caused him various material and moral damages, in addition to losses. The claims, as established in the preliminary hearing, remained in the following terms: \"1. That Banco Nacional de Costa Rica be ordered to pay compensation for material damage based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in banking consumer matters in the sum of 37,564,388 colones, for the unjust auction of my dwelling (...) 2. That Banco Nacional de Costa Rica be ordered to pay compensation for material damage based on strict liability in banking consumer matters for the sum indicated by the expert, for the amount charged in excess due to the interest rate floor, which approximately corresponds to the sum of 10 million colones. 3. That Banco Nacional be ordered to pay for Subjective Moral Damage for the human suffering generated by the auction of the dwelling in the sum of 3 million colones. 4. That the defendant bank be ordered to pay both legal costs.\" The defendant opposed the claims formulated against it. It raised the defense of lack of right, which was upheld in the challenged judgment, in which the complaint was declared without merit in all its aspects. Furthermore, the plaintiff was ordered to pay both legal costs. Disagreeing, her representation appeals.\n\nII. The first grievance alleges violation of substantive norms. Specifically, the breach of precepts 32 and 34 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor is announced, regarding the consumer's right to information. The appellant explains that, when the plaintiff mortgaged his property registered under title 145475-000 in favor of the bank in 2012, that guarantee was accepted, without warning him of the existence of an overlap. Likewise, she highlights that, when subsequent inspections were carried out on the land by the institution, the existence of said situation was also not observed. Instead, she highlights that, when a debt unification (unificación de deudas) was requested, it was then that this anomaly was pointed out to him, requiring the plaintiff to resolve it so that the process could continue. In her judgment, the foregoing violated the consumer's right to information, which was not appreciated by the Tribunal. In the second challenge, an improper application of Article 32 of Law 7472 is complained of. Now, due to lack of protection of the economic and social interests of the plaintiff, as a consumer. The appellant points out that it is not disputed that the bank officials initially showed willingness to the request for debt restructuring and that, therefore, they requested a new expert appraisal (avalúo pericial). She points out, however, that the problem arose from the new report, dated April 10, 2019, in which the existence of an overlap with the neighboring property, by 65 centimeters, was indicated, recommending that the owner correct the situation, either by producing a new survey plan (plano) or modifying the construction. She highlights that, at that time, he had been paying the mortgage loan backed by that same property for seven years. She asserts that the plaintiff was never given survey plans demonstrating the overlap. Instead, she reproaches, he was required to resolve something that was not within his possibilities, since a surveyor could not eliminate the overlap and to modify the construction he required economic means which he did not have. She asserts that, since a mortgage already existed in favor of the same entity, what was now being demanded of him for the debt unification was not a sine qua non requirement. She relates that on January 24, 2020, the bank informed the plaintiff that he had to continue paying his obligations. She laments that the Tribunal did not appreciate the violation of the right to protection of the consumer's economic interest. The third charge is presented for violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). The appellant maintains that, unlike what the Tribunal indicates, the administrative error was indeed proven. She highlights that, in the case file, there is the official communication dated January 24, 2020, signed by the credit officer of the Agencia de Aserrí, in which, according to the transcribed text, it is indicated as an error that, in the expert appraisal initially conducted when the first loan was granted, the existence of the overlap was not indicated, although it was noted that this situation does not create a right. The finding from the seventh unproven fact, that it was not proven that the expert (perito) recommended rejecting the loan due to the overlap, is also contested. She assures that it was never claimed that the expert recommended the denial of the debt unification; instead, what was said and proven is that what the bank officials requested from the debtor for approval of the process was impossible to fulfill, due to lack of resources and not because he had found any surveyor to change the existing plan. As she explains, it was proven that the bank's decision was based on the expert's recommendations. The fourth objection is presented for improper evaluation of evidence, in contradiction with the rules of sound judgment, as well as for improper application of canon 34, subsection e, of Law 7472, insofar as it prohibits abusive practices. Now, the disagreeing party points out that the plaintiff did not reproach an administrative error that prevented the debtor from paying his monthly installments, as is attempted to be implied in unproven facts 3 and 6. She assures that the administrative file proves that the bank prevented the payment of monthly installments, as an abusive practice. She highlights that on folio 390 of that dossier, it was recorded that, although it is not registered in the system that manages the bank's credit portfolio that any official carried out a block, it was \"parameterized\" (parametrizado) so that, when an operation had two or more overdue installments, payment was not allowed, such that the client had to obtain authorization to bring the overdue installments up to date or arrange a payment agreement. The appellant also observes that Mr. Mena testified at trial, under oath, that he tried \"by all means to pay monthly installments,\" so that a judicial collection action would not be processed, which was prevented by the system. She emphasizes that the bank accepted that it did not allow payment, which is an abusive practice. In the fifth grievance, the improper application of Article 35 of Law 7472 is reproached, from the perspective of civil strict liability in consumer matters. The promoter of the appeal under analysis argues that the bank asked the plaintiff for a requirement impossible to fulfill so that he could restructure his debts and improve his payment capacity. She says that one year after the latter complained to the Contraloría de Servicios, the bank approved the debt restructuring, stating that it had not been signed because the debtor had not fulfilled the requirements, although it was not the overlap, but rather the non-presentation of an updated legal capacity certification (personería jurídica). However, she claims that the consumer is a natural person, so such a requirement made no sense. Furthermore, she observes that, during the year of waiting, the financial burden increased by approximately twenty million colones, exceeding the value of the property itself. She finally asserts that the fundamental rights of the consumer were not observed in the judgment, nor the civil strict liability specific to this matter, which operates without fault. Instead, she incriminates, the decision was based on a framework of civil subjective liability, based on \"the non-proof of administrative errors\" (image 11 of the cassation brief).\n\nIII. To respond to the grievance raised, it is necessary first to pay attention to what the Tribunal said, regarding what relates to the grievances. Basically, the complaint was analyzed from two perspectives. One, from the perspective of the claim associated with the fact that the bank did not allow the plaintiff to pay his loans on time. Second, that he was not informed in a timely manner that his property given as guarantee had an overlap. Regarding the first, the lower court (a quo) ruled out that the defendant entity prevented, due to an administrative error, the plaintiff from honoring his payment obligations. It concluded, instead, that the plaintiff did not prove that the bank prevented him from paying his installments through the online banking system, because they were going to be included, presumably, in the debt restructuring. Furthermore, he stated that this party also did not prove having tried to make his payments in a manner other than internet banking. The trial judges also highlighted that the plaintiff did not prove he was current in the payment of the credit operations he had with the bank. Rather, they noted that by early 2020 - approximately one year after the debt restructuring request -, the plaintiff already had five credit operations in judicial collection, with arrears of more than one year, which gave rise to the filing of respective judicial collection actions (\"ejecutive demands\"). It also gave value to the testimony of Mr. Alonso García Brenes, who indicated that, by the year 2019, the plaintiff already had a considerable arrears, so various solutions were evaluated, one of them being the unification of the debts in arrears, although this was not finally materialized. On the subject of the overlap, the Tribunal indicated that, in the expert appraisal (peritaje) conducted upon the debt restructuring request, its author recommended the property valued as guarantee, but only after correcting the overlap detected between the construction that stands on the land and the neighboring land, by 65 cm, either by producing a new survey plan, or by modifying the construction. For this reason, it stated that a direct relationship was not accredited between the non-approval of the debt restructuring and the recommendation contained in the report. Furthermore, it indicated that the fact that the overlap was not indicated in the expert appraisal initially performed did not cause a danger, except to the creditor itself. It mentioned, in addition, that there is no obligation for the creditor to accept any guarantee offered to it, thus it is the banking entity that determines the conditions of \"desirability or viability\" of a guarantee. In this way, it added, the expert appraisal only assesses what is of interest to the lender. It ruled out that the failure to warn of the overlap in the first report had affected the granted loan, or caused damage to the plaintiff, insofar as it is the bank itself that assumed the risk of the thing given as guarantee, without any effect on the debtor's patrimonial sphere. It observed, additionally, that the processing of a subsequent refinancing is independent of the first loan, since the novation or debt consolidation (refundición de deudas) is not mandatory for the bank, which may, in the exercise of its mercantile activity, decline a request of that nature. The Tribunal considered that the plaintiff sought to preserve the conditions of the valuation performed in the formalized mortgage, for the debt restructuring request that he considered later. It settled the issue stating that it is the owner who must bear the consequences of the real estate problem presented, insofar as it is to him that the real powers correspond, and not to his creditors, according to canon 264 of the Civil Code.\n\nIV. For this Chamber there is no doubt whatsoever that both the appeal and the complaint must be rejected. In this proceeding, compensation derived from an auction that the plaintiff qualifies as \"Unjust\" is requested. Furthermore, impairments derived from an alleged irregular interest rate \"floor\" were alleged. However, this last issue was not brought to cassation. Therefore, the analysis will be restricted to the compensation, for the judicial execution of the guarantee granted by the plaintiff, for the benefit of the bank. Effectively, the complaint was based on two basic premises: 1) That, upon valuing the property mortgaged by the plaintiff in favor of the bank in 2012, the existence of an overlap between a construction on the property and a neighboring plot was not noticed, and that this was the reason that led to the rejection of the debt restructuring requested years later by the same debtor. 2) That the bank did not allow the plaintiff to pay his obligations on time. Let us see. The first is evidently improper. Just as the lower court indicated, if anyone could have been harmed by not noticing an overlap between the property given as guarantee by the plaintiff and a neighboring land, it is the creditor bank. At no time was it proven that the legal situation of Mr. Mena Venegas was worsened by the subsequent discovery of that real estate anomaly. On this point, it must be remembered that the mortgage is a real guarantee right that is granted in favor of the creditor (numeral 409 of the Civil Code); in this case, in the context of a banking relationship. Therefore, if the property has some hidden defect or one that was not noticed at the time of consenting to the guarantee, this directly harms the creditor's interest, from the perspective of the quality of the guarantee. The debtor could, eventually, seek judicial protection, if the bank undertakes acts that worsen or harm his legal status as debtor. For example, if as a result of the discovery the guarantee had been disregarded, or the benefit of the term. However, none of this has been proven. On the contrary, as the contrary was not proven, it seems more like the bank proceeded in good faith, since at no time did it disregard the guarantee it initially accepted, even though it later noticed the overlap. Moreover, it is true, in line with what was indicated in the ruling, that an eventual unification of that and other operations is not a situation of mandatory acceptance for the Banco Nacional. It must be remembered that, in the exercise of its mercantile business, said entity acts with full capacity under Private Law, just as recognized by the third precept, second paragraph, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by providing that: \"Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their business, may be considered as common industrial or mercantile enterprises.\" From this perspective, state banking institutions, when acting as such, in light of the principle of autonomy of will and freedom of enterprise, have full capacity to establish the necessary requirements and conditions to grant a specific loan, according to the line in question. Thus, as long as no sort of discriminatory, unfair treatment contrary to good mercantile practices, or the violation of special norms applicable to financial entities is demonstrated, there is no reason to assume that the acceptance of a mortgage guarantee obligates the bank to consent to a subsequent one, on the same property, despite detecting that there exists a reason contrary to its own commercial and economic interests. What is provided in Article 66 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional must be highlighted here: \"The loans granted by commercial banks must be secured with guarantees that, in their judgment, are satisfactory\" (Underlining and emphasis added). Note how the banking regulation highlights the bank's right - as it could not be otherwise -, to determine, according to its own parameters, whether a guarantee offered is satisfactory or not. Therefore, there is no defect whatsoever in denying or requesting the correction of anomalies in the property offered as guarantee, for the purpose of accessing it, whether or not there is a prior operation backed by the same property. This is sufficient reason to dismiss everything alleged, since no violation whatsoever of the consumer's right to information is perceived, due to the fact that an real estate overlap was subsequently discovered, which was contrary to the interests of Banco Nacional, such that it would not consent to the guarantee offered. From this perspective, it could never be concluded that the non-payment of that first operation was due to the entity's lack of acceptance of a subsequent reunification (reunificación); even less that it violated the right to information, or the economic security of the plaintiff as a consumer. From this point of view, the discussion on which the appellant insists is totally trivial when she attempts to direct the analysis towards verifying whether or not there was an \"error\" in the non-determination of an overlap, prior to the granting of the first loan backed by the mortgage guarantee of interest. The truth is that this situation did not affect the plaintiff's ability to pay the backed loan, since it was not part of his rights to demand a new operation, with the same real estate backing, for which he had to overcome the bank's analysis filters that are usual in this type of negotiation.\n\nV. Likewise, what is alleged regarding the fact that the bank prevented the plaintiff from paying his operation is also unacceptable. This has remained totally unproven. Now the appellant attempts to allege that this entity accepted that it did not allow payment. However, the evidentiary document she points to, in support of her statement, is totally innocuous as to prove that circumstance. The appellant highlights that in the official communication visible on folio 390 of the credit file, the following is read: \"The operation indicated was accounting-wise in judicial collection, not current. At the system level, no block carried out by any official is recorded. What happens is that the system that manages the credit portfolio, at that time, was parametrized (parametrizado) so that when a credit operation had 2 or more overdue installments, it did not allow payment. The client had to coordinate authorization to bring the overdue installments up to date or, alternatively, conclude a payment arrangement. Attached is a report of movements that the operation had from 01-01-2019 to 31-12-2019, where it is evidenced that no block on the indicated operation is recorded.\" However, from said extract it is not understood, in any way, that the bank had abusively obstructed the plaintiff from honoring his obligations on time. On the contrary, what is inferred from that partial reproduction is that, if an operation has two or more overdue installments, the credit portfolio system does not allow payment, so that, being in that state, the debtor must seek a payment arrangement or authorization to bring his operation up to date. This is not, from any perspective, an abusive practice. On the contrary, the failure to pay a monthly installment of a bank debt, by express legislative provision, allows the entity to consider the entire obligation breached and due. In this sense, mandate 67 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, in what is relevant now, establishes: \"Every debt constituted in favor of a commercial bank, payable in parts or in periodic installments, or whose interest is paid in periods distinct from the final term of the loan, shall carry the implied condition that the total debt may be considered due and judicially enforceable, with only the failure to pay a period of interest or one of the installments or parts of the principal that had been agreed, without prejudice to the bank charging moratorium interest on the amount of the overdue payment on the principal, at rates that may be higher by up to two percentage points over the rate agreed upon for the obligation.\" As is clear, then, there is no irregularity whatsoever in the fact that the banking system does not allow the payment of an operation that has installments in arrears, insofar as it is the law itself that establishes that, in such a case, the operation is fully enforceable, without it being an obligation of the bank to allow the late payment of overdue installments that were not honored on time. Then, although the appellant alleges that the plaintiff testified under oath that he tried to pay \"monthly installments\"; at no time did he prove that he was prevented from doing so while being current on his obligations. On the contrary, the bank did prove that the system does not allow the payment of overdue operations, which must be concatenated with the plaintiff's own statements, which from the beginning have made it clear that he was experiencing economic difficulties that prevented him - according to him - from meeting his obligations. Thus, for example, in fact 13 of the account of facts contained in the initial brief, the following is read: \"Due to the decrease in income, Freddy Mena, being current on the credit operation, requested a debt restructuring, a payment arrangement from the bank with the purpose of improving his payment capacity, because he knew that he was not going to be able to pay it.\" There is no doubt, then, that it is the plaintiff's own statements, related to the evidence in the case file, that account for the fact that it was the arrears incurred by the plaintiff that led to the judicial execution of the guarantee he had granted. This being the case, the allegations with which it is intended that this Chamber declare that the bank incurred in some abusive practice by means of which it prevented the plaintiff from paying are also unacceptable. On the contrary, it was also not disproven that, by the beginning of 2020, the latter already had five operations in arrears, with delays of more than one year, when the debt restructuring was requested at the beginning of 2019, which is consistent with what was outlined in the ruling regarding the declaration of Mr. Alonso García Brenes, who indicated that, in 2019, the plaintiff already had a considerable arrears, for which reason various solutions to his situation were sought. Once again, it is verified that it was an arrears by the debtor and not an abusive practice by the bank, that led to the plaintiff's state of default, as well as to the judicial pursuit of the payment of the obligations. Finally, it must be observed that the appeal has some statements that are not consistent with the theory of the case brought at the beginning of the proceeding. Thus, when it is argued that at no time was it said that the expert appraisal (peritaje) conducted on the occasion of the debt unification request recommended that the management not be approved. This is contradicted by fact seventeen, where this was expressly stated. Now, with a different claim, it was alleged that impossible-to-fulfill conditions were demanded, something that was not alleged in the complaint in that way, which gives those allegations a surprising and novel character that reinforces their necessary rejection, in protection of the counterparty's right of defense. In any case, this thesis is also unacceptable, due to the bank's right to determine whether the guarantee offered satisfactorily meets, or not, the characteristics it considers appropriate to safeguard its interests. Moreover, it is alleged that the debt restructuring was not formalized because an \"legal capacity certification (personería jurídica)\" was not presented, when the plaintiff is a natural person. This contradicts the entire logic of the complaint, which starts from the premise that the frustration of the debt reunification request was due to the overlap noted by the bank's expert. In any case, it was also not an allegation submitted for debate in a timely manner, nor was that circumstance explained as a reason for the damages claimed in the complaint (see page 10 of the initial brief, dated 07/15/2021). It is clear that this is an attempt to seek a variation of the decision, based on circumstances not alleged in a timely manner. In any case, the evidence demonstrating such an assertion is also not pointed out, nor is it observed that it was held as proven in the ruling, so it is an unfounded allegation, lacking evidentiary support and correspondence with the decision and the reasoning given for the rejection of the complaint. The invocation of the system of strict liability in consumer matters, as well as the dispensable nature of fault in this subject, is equally lacking in usefulness. As has already been evidenced, from the beginning the plaintiff attempted to attribute irregular actions and omissions to the defendant bank that he has not managed to prove, without his theory of the case having been based on facts that can be subsumed into the theory of created risk, from a merely strict perspective; that is, from circumstances that, although harmful, are not related to illegitimate conduct. Once again, an attempt is warned to evade the consequence that necessarily derives from the lack of proof of the anomalies accused in the complaint: its rejection.\n\nVI. By virtue of the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the State must be declared without merit. The legal costs of this appeal shall be borne by the appellant, according to Article 150.3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Furthermore, no reason whatsoever is appreciated that would allow recognizing a plausible reason to appeal, insofar as evidently improper and, in certain cases, novel arguments have been brought up.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal is declared without merit. The legal costs of this shall be borne by the appellant.\n\nRocío Rojas Morales\n\nDamaris Vargas Vásquez\n\nJorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCarlos Guillermo Zamora Campos\n\nIgnacio Jose Monge Dobles\n\nDigitally Signed Document\n\n-- Verification Code --\n\n\\*PWGCR43UKCXQG61\\*\n\nPhones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nExp. 21-004372-1027-CA\n\nRes. 000245-F-S1-2025\n\n**FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at eleven hours fifty-six minutes on the twentieth of February, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nIn an ordinary proceeding, filed by **FREDDY MENA VENEGAS**, identity card 1-625-480; against **BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA**, represented by its judicial attorney-in-fact, Licenciada Carolina Villalobos Sancho, bar card 15510; Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero, acting as special judicial attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff, filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 2024001099, issued at 07 hours 15 minutes on February 23, 2024, by the First Section of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera), composed of the judges Alejandra Soto Fonseca, Claudia Bolaños Salazar and Carlos José Mejías Rodríguez.\n\n**Reporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda**\n\n**CONSIDERING**\n\n**I.** In the present proceeding, the claim for which was filed on July 15, 2021, a declaration of liability is sought against the defendant bank, in the context of a credit consumer relationship. A summary is provided of the main aspects of the statement of facts and allegations contained in the claim, in addition to the position taken by the defendant party regarding what was requested, without prejudice to the thorough reading that has been made of the parties' allegations and requests (doctrine of Article 61.2 of Law No. 9342, regarding the elements of the cassation judgment, applicable in this matter, by virtue of the integration clause provided for in Article 220 of Law No. 8508). The plaintiff, through his representation, made it known that he obtained a mortgage loan from the defendant bank, on property 145475-000, of the San José Registry, in the year 2012. He also pledged, in support of his obligations, another real estate that he later sold, paying off part of the debt. Then, in the year 2017, he again backed new financing with the aforementioned real estate. He reproaches that, neither at that time, nor in subsequent follow-up visits to property 145475-000, was the existence of an overlap of this estate with an adjacent one pointed out. Specifically, it was criticized that, when the plaintiff requested a loan consolidation (refundición de créditos), in a context of difficulty in the operation of the business he was engaged in, his request was denied, because in the new appraisal carried out, the existence of an overlap of a construction on the mortgaged real estate with another piece of land was determined. The plaintiff stated that, in addition to the above, he was prevented from making payments on his operations, due to an alleged error by the bank. Regarding this, he assures, he was informed that the impediment was because the installments he was not allowed to pay would be paid off with the restructuring (readecuación). Thus, he asserted that it was due to the bank's error that he could not pay on time, entering into default. He further recounted that he filed a claim with the Customer Service Office (Contraloría de Servicios), for the rejection of his new application. However, the bank filed a judicial collection action to enforce the mortgage guarantee, which led to it being auctioned in November 2020. The plaintiff further alleged that the operation has a floor rate and a ceiling rate that are disproportionately favorable to the defendant bank. He affirmed that, were it not for the conditions of the lower rate, he would have been able to keep the operation current. In the opinion of the promoter of this process, the facts that he has submitted for debate generate liability for the bank and have caused him various material and moral damages, in addition to losses. The claims, as they were fixed in the preliminary hearing, remained in the following terms: *“1. That the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica be ordered to pay compensation for material damage for strict liability in bank consumer affairs for the sum of 37,564,388 colones, for the unjust auction of my home (...) 2.*\n\nThat the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica be ordered to pay compensation for material damage under objective liability in banking consumer matters, in the amount to be indicated by the expert, for the amount overcharged due to the floor rate, which approximately corresponds to the sum of 10 million colones. 3. That the Banco Nacional be ordered to pay Subjective Moral Damages for the human suffering generated by the foreclosure of the home, in the sum of 3 million colones. 4. That the defendant bank be ordered to pay both costs”. The defendant opposed the claims made against it. It raised the defense of lack of right, which was upheld in the challenged judgment, in which the claim was declared without merit in all its aspects. Furthermore, the plaintiff was ordered to pay both costs. Disagreeing, her representation appeals.\n\nII. The first grievance alleges a violation of substantive norms. Specifically, the breach of precepts 32 and 34 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer is announced, regarding the consumer’s right to information. The appellant explains that, when the plaintiff mortgaged his property registered under folio number 145475-000 in favor of the bank, in 2012, that guarantee was accepted without warning him of the existence of an overlap (traslape). Likewise, she emphasizes that, when subsequent inspections of the land were conducted by the institution, the existence of this situation was not observed either. In contrast, she highlights that when a debt consolidation was requested, it was then that this anomaly was pointed out to him, demanding that the plaintiff resolve it so that the process could continue. In her judgment, the foregoing violated the consumer’s right to information, which was not appreciated by the Tribunal. In the second challenge, an improper application of article 32 of Law No. 7472 is reproached. Now, due to a lack of protection of the plaintiff’s economic and social interests as a consumer. The appellant points out that it is undisputed that the bank officials were initially receptive to the restructuring (readecuación) request and that, therefore, they requested a new expert appraisal. She notes, instead, that the problem arose from the new report, dated April 10, 2019, which indicated the existence of an overlap with the adjacent property by 65 centimeters, recommending that the owner correct the situation, either by preparing a new plat or modifying the construction. She highlights that, at that time, he had been paying the mortgage loan secured by that same property for seven years. She asserts that plats demonstrating the overlap were never delivered to the plaintiff. Instead, she reproaches, he was required to resolve something that was not within his means, since a surveyor could not eliminate the overlap and to modify the construction he required economic means that he did not have. She asserts that, since a mortgage already existed in favor of the same entity, what was now being required of him for the debt consolidation was not a sine qua non requirement. She relates that on January 24, 2020, the bank informed the plaintiff that he had to continue paying his obligations. She laments that the Tribunal did not appreciate the violation of the right to protection of the consumer’s economic interest. The third charge is presented for violation of the rules of sound judgment. The appellant maintains that, unlike what the Tribunal indicates, the administrative error was indeed demonstrated. She emphasizes that the case file contains the official communication dated January 24, 2020, signed by the credit officer of the Agencia de Aserrí, in which, according to the transcribed text, it is indicated as an error that, in the initial appraisal conducted when the first loan was granted, the existence of the overlap was not stated, although it was noted that this situation does not create a right. She also challenges, regarding the seventh unproven fact, that it was not demonstrated that the expert recommended rejecting the credit due to the overlap. She assures that it was never stated that the expert recommended the denial of the debt consolidation; instead, what was said and demonstrated is that what the bank officials were requesting from the debtor for the approval of the process was impossible to fulfill, due to a lack of resources and not for having found any surveyor who would change the existing plat. According to her explanation, it was indeed demonstrated that the bank’s decision was based on the expert’s recommendations. The fourth objection is presented for improper valuation of evidence, in contradiction with the rules of sound judgment, as well as for improper application of canon 34, subsection e, of Law No. 7472, insofar as it prohibits abusive practices. Now, the dissatisfied party points out that the plaintiff did not reproach an administrative error that prevented the debtor from paying his monthly installments, as is attempted to be conveyed in unproven facts 3 and 6. She assures that the administrative file confirms that the bank prevented the payment of monthly installments, as an abusive practice. She highlights that on folio 390 of that dossier, it was recorded that, although the system that manages the bank’s credit portfolio does not record that any official carried out a block, it was “parameterized” so that when an operation had two or more overdue installments, payment was not permitted, such that the client had to obtain authorization to bring the overdue installments current or agree to a payment arrangement. The appellant further observes that Mr. Mena declared at trial, under oath, that he tried “by all means to pay monthly installments” so that a judicial collection would not be processed, which was prevented by the system. She emphasizes that the bank accepted that it did not permit payment, which is an abusive practice. In the fifth grievance, the improper application of article 35 of Law No. 7472 is reproached, from the perspective of objective civil liability in consumer matters. The promoter of the appeal under analysis argues that the bank asked the plaintiff for a requirement that was impossible to fulfill so that he could restructure his debts and improve his payment capacity. She says that one year after the latter complained to the Consumer Protection Authority (Contraloría de Servicios), the bank approved the restructuring, pointing out that it had not been signed because the debtor had not met the requirements, although it was not due to the overlap, but rather the failure to present an updated legal status certificate (personería jurídica). However, she claims that the consumer is a natural person, so such a demand made no sense. Furthermore, she observes that during the year of waiting, the financial burden increased by approximately twenty million colones, surpassing the value of the property itself. She asserts, finally, that the judgment did not observe the fundamental rights of the consumer, nor the objective civil liability inherent to this area, which operates without fault.\n\nBy contrast, it decries, the decision was based on a framework of subjective civil liability, founded on \"the failure to prove administrative errors\" (image 11 of the cassation brief).\n\n**III.** To respond to the grievance raised, it is first necessary to pay attention to what the Court said, insofar as it relates to the grievances. Basically, the lawsuit was analyzed from two perspectives. One, from the standpoint of the claim associated with the bank not allowing the plaintiff to pay his credits on time. Second, that he was not timely informed that his farm given as collateral (garantía) had an overlap. On the first point, the *a quo* dismissed that the defendant entity prevented, through an administrative error, the plaintiff from honoring his payment obligations. It concluded, instead, that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the bank prevented him from paying his installments through the online banking system, since he was going to include them, presumably, in the restructuring (readecuación). Furthermore, it stated that this party also did not prove having attempted to make his payments in a manner different from *internet banking*. The trial judges also highlighted that the plaintiff did not prove having been up to date on the payment of the credit operations he had with the bank. Rather, they noted that by the beginning of the year 2020—approximately one year after the restructuring (readecuación) request—the plaintiff already had five credit operations in judicial collection, due to delays of more than a year, which led to the filing of respective judicial collections (\"ejecutive lawsuits\"). It also gave weight to the testimony of Mr. Alonso García Brenes, who indicated that by the year 2019, the plaintiff already had a considerable delay, so various solutions were evaluated, one of them being the consolidation of the debts in default, although this was not ultimately materialized. On the issue of the overlap, the Court indicated that, in the appraisal carried out upon the restructuring (readecuación) request, its author recommended the property valued as collateral (garantía), although after prior correction of the overlap detected between the construction erected on the land and the neighboring land, by 65 cm, either by producing a new plan or modifying the construction. For that reason, it said that a direct relationship between the non-approval of the restructuring (readecuación) and the recommendation contained in the report was not accredited. Moreover, it indicated that the fact that the overlap was not indicated in the appraisal initially performed did not cause a danger except to the creditor itself. It mentioned, additionally, that there is no obligation for the creditor to accept any collateral (garantía) that is offered, and consequently, it is the banking entity that determines the conditions of \"desirability or viability\" of a collateral (garantía). Thus, it added, the appraisal only values what is of interest to the lender. It dismissed that the lack of warning about the overlap in the first report had influenced the credit granted, or that it caused damage to the plaintiff, insofar as it is the bank itself that assumed the risk of the thing given as collateral (garantía), without any effect on the debtor's patrimonial sphere. It observed, additionally, that the processing of a subsequent refinancing is independent of the first credit, such that the novation or consolidation of debts is not mandatory for the bank, which may, in the exercise of its commercial activity, decline a request of that nature. The Court considered that the plaintiff seeks to have the conditions of the valuation made in the formalized mortgage preserved, for the restructuring (readecuación) request that was considered later. It settled the issue by indicating that it is the owner who must bear the consequences of the real estate problem presented, insofar as the real attributions correspond to him, and not to his creditors, in accordance with canon 264 of the Civil Code.\n\n**IV.** For this Chamber, there is no doubt whatsoever that both the appeal and the lawsuit must be rejected. In this proceeding, compensation is requested derived from a foreclosure auction that the plaintiff party qualifies as \"Unfair.\" Additionally, impairments derived from an alleged irregular \"floor\" interest rate were alleged. However, this last issue was not brought to cassation. Therefore, the analysis will be restricted to the compensation, for the judicial execution of the collateral (garantía) granted by the plaintiff, for the benefit of the bank. Indeed, the lawsuit was based on two basic premises: 1) That, when the farm mortgaged by the plaintiff, in favor of the bank, was valued in the year 2012, the existence of an overlap between a construction on the property and a neighboring parcel was not warned of, this being the reason that led to the rejection of the restructuring (readecuación) requested years later by the same debtor. 2) That the bank did not allow the plaintiff to pay his obligations on time. Let us see. The first is evidently unfounded. Just as the *a quo* indicated, if someone could have been harmed by not warning of an overlap between the farm given as collateral (garantía) by the plaintiff and an adjoining land, it is the creditor bank. At no time was it proven that the legal situation of Mr. Mena Venegas was worsened by the subsequent discovery of that real estate anomaly. On this point, it must be remembered that a mortgage is a real right of collateral (garantía) that is granted in favor of the creditor (numeral 409 of the Civil Code); in this case, in the context of a banking relationship. Therefore, if the property has some hidden defect or one that was not warned at the time the collateral (garantía) was consented to, this directly harms the creditor's interest, from the perspective of the quality of the collateral (garantía). The debtor could, eventually, seek judicial protection if the bank undertakes acts that worsen or harm his legal status as debtor. For example, if as a result of the discovery, the collateral (garantía) had been disavowed, or the benefit of term. However, none of this has been demonstrated. On the contrary, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it rather seems that the bank acted in good faith, since at no time did it disavow the collateral (garantía) it initially accepted, even though it later noticed the overlap.\n\nMoreover, it is true, in line with what is indicated in the ruling, that a potential unification of that and other operations is not a situation of mandatory acceptance for the Banco Nacional. It must be remembered that, in the exercise of its commercial activity, said entity acts with full Private Law capacity, as recognized by the third precept, second paragraph, of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), when it provides that: \"Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their activity, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises.\" From this perspective, state banking institutions, when acting as such, in light of the principle of autonomy of will and freedom of enterprise, have full capacity to establish the necessary requirements and conditions to grant a specific loan, according to the line in question. Thus, as long as no sort of discriminatory, unfair treatment contrary to good commercial practices is demonstrated, or the violation of special rules applicable to financial entities, there is no reason to assume that the acceptance of a mortgage guarantee (garantía hipotecaria) obliges the bank to consent to a subsequent one on the same property, despite detecting a reason contrary to its own commercial and economic interests. What is provided in Article 66 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional) must be highlighted here: \"The loans granted by commercial banks must be secured with guarantees that in their judgment are satisfactory\" (Underlining and emphasis added). Note how the banking regulations emphasize the bank's right -as it could not be otherwise- to determine, according to its own parameters, whether an offered guarantee is satisfactory or not. Therefore, there is no defect whatsoever in denying or requesting the correction of anomalies in the property offered as a guarantee, for the purpose of accessing it, whether or not a prior operation exists that is backed by the same property. This is sufficient reason to dismiss everything alleged, since no violation of the consumer's right to information is observed from the fact that a property overlap (traslape inmobiliario) was subsequently discovered, which was contrary to the interests of the Banco Nacional, so as to consent to the offered guarantee. From this perspective, it could never be concluded that the non-payment of that first operation was due to the entity's lack of acceptance of a subsequent reunification; even less so, that the right to information or the economic security of the plaintiff as a consumer was violated. From this point of view, the discussion that the appellant insists upon is completely trivial when she attempts to direct the analysis towards verifying whether or not there was an \"error\" in the non-determination of an overlap, prior to the granting of the first loan backed by the mortgage guarantee of interest. The truth is that this situation did not affect the plaintiff's ability to pay the backed loan, given that it was not part of his rights to demand a new operation with the same property backing, for which he had to pass the banking analysis filters that are usual in this type of negotiation.\n\nV. Then, the allegation regarding the fact that the bank prevented the plaintiff from paying his operation is also not admissible. This has remained entirely unproven. The cassation appellant now tries to argue that said entity accepted that it did not allow payment. However, the evidentiary document she points to, in support of her statement, is completely innocuous to prove that circumstance. The appellant highlights that in the official letter visible on folio 390 of the credit file, the following is read: \"The indicated operation was not in judicial collection (cobro judicial) as of today's accounting. At the system level, no block made by any official is registered. What happens is that the system that manages the credit portfolio was, at that moment, parameterized so that when a credit operation had 2 or more overdue installments, it did not allow payment. The client had to coordinate authorization to bring the overdue installments up to date, or else, finalize the payment arrangement. A report of movements that the operation had from 01-01-2019 to 12-31-2019 is attached, where it is evidenced that no block on the indicated operation is registered.\" However, from that excerpt, it is in no way understood that the bank abusively obstructed the plaintiff from honoring his obligations in a timely manner. On the contrary, what is inferred from that partial reproduction is that, if an operation has two or more overdue installments, the credit portfolio system does not allow payment, such that, finding itself in that state, the debtor must seek a payment arrangement or authorization to bring his operation up to date. This is, from no perspective, an abusive practice. On the contrary, failure to pay a monthly installment of a bank debt, by express legislative provision, allows the entity to consider the entire obligation as breached and demandable. In that sense, Article 67 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), in what is now of interest, establishes: \"Every debt constituted in favor of a commercial bank, payable in parts or in periodic installments, or whose interests are paid in periods different from the final term of the loan, shall carry the implicit condition that the total of the debt may be considered matured and judicially demandable, with only the failure to pay one period of interests or one of the installments or parts of the principal that had been agreed upon, without prejudice to the bank charging default interest on the amount of the late payment to the capital, at rates that may be higher by up to two percentage points over the rate agreed for the obligation.\" As is clear, then, there is no irregularity whatsoever in the fact that the banking system does not allow the payment of an operation that has installments in arrears, insofar as it is the law itself that establishes that, in such a case, the operation is demandable in its entirety, without it being an obligation of the bank to allow the late payment of overdue installments that were not honored in a timely manner. Then, although the appellant alleges that the plaintiff declared under oath that he tried to pay \"monthly installments,\" at no time did he prove that he was prevented from doing so while being up to date on his obligations.\n\nIn contrast, the bank did prove that the system does not allow the payment of overdue transactions, which must be read together with the plaintiff's own statements, who from the outset has made clear that he was going through economic difficulties that prevented him—according to his account—from meeting his obligations. Thus, for example, in fact 13 of the statement of facts contained in the initial filing, it reads: \"Due to the decrease in income, Freddy Mena, being current on the credit transaction, requested a restructuring (readecuación) from the bank, a payment arrangement to improve his payment capacity, because he knew he was not going to be able to pay.\" There is no doubt, therefore, that it is the plaintiff's own statements, in relation to the evidence on file, which demonstrate that it was the delay the plaintiff incurred that led to the judicial enforcement of the guarantee (garantía) he had granted. This being the case, the arguments by which it is sought that this Chamber declare that the bank engaged in some abusive practice (práctica abusiva) by means of which it prevented the plaintiff from paying are also inadmissible. On the contrary, it was also not rebutted that, by the beginning of 2020, the latter already had five transactions in default, with delays of more than one year, when the restructuring (readecuación) was requested in early 2019, which is consistent with what was outlined in the judgment regarding the statement of Mr. Alonso García Brenes, who indicated that, in 2019, the plaintiff already had a considerable delay, for which reason various solutions to his situation were sought. Once again, it is verified that it was a delay by the debtor, and not an abusive practice by the plaintiff, that led to the plaintiff's state of breach of contract, as well as to the judicial pursuit of payment of the obligations. Finally, it must be noted that the appeal contains some statements that are inconsistent with the theory of the case brought at the start of the proceedings. Thus, when it is argued that at no time was it said that the expert report (peritaje) carried out for the debt consolidation (unificación de deudas) request recommended that the application not be approved, this is contradicted by fact seventeen, where this was expressly stated. Now, with a different claim, it was alleged that conditions of impossible fulfillment were demanded, something that was not alleged as such in the complaint (demanda), which gives these allegations a surprising and novel character that reinforces their necessary rejection, in safeguarding the counterparty's right of defense. In any case, this thesis is also inadmissible, due to the bank's right to determine whether the offered guarantee (garantía) satisfactorily meets the characteristics it deems appropriate to protect its interests. Furthermore, it is alleged that the restructuring (readecuación) was not formalized because a \"juridical personhood (personería jurídica)\" was not presented, when the plaintiff is a natural person (persona física). This contradicts the entire logic of the complaint (demanda), which is based on the premise that the frustration of the debt reunification (reunificación de deudas) request was due to the overlap noted by the bank's expert. In any case, this was also not an argument submitted for debate in a timely manner, nor was this circumstance explained as a reason for the damages (daños) liquidated in the complaint (demanda) (see page 10 of the initial filing, dated 07/15/2021). It is clear that this is an attempt to seek a variation of what was decided, based on circumstances not alleged in a timely manner. In any event, the evidence demonstrating such an assertion is not indicated, nor is it observed to have been held as proven in the judgment, such that it is an unfounded allegation, lacking evidentiary support and correspondence with what was decided and the reasoning given for the dismissal of the complaint (demanda). Equally lacking in utility is the invocation of the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) regime in consumer matters, as well as the expendable nature of fault in this area. As has already been shown, from the outset the plaintiff attempted to attribute irregular actions and omissions to the defendant bank, which he has not managed to prove, and his theory of the case was not based on facts that can be subsumed under the theory of created risk, from a merely objective perspective; that is, from circumstances that, although harmful, are not related to illegitimate conduct. Once again, an attempt is noted to evade the consequence that necessarily derives from the lack of proof of the anomalies alleged in the complaint (demanda): its dismissal.\n\n**VI.** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the State must be declared without merit. The costs of this appeal shall be borne by the appellant, pursuant to article 150.3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Moreover, no reason whatsoever is appreciated that would allow recognizing a plausible ground to appeal, insofar as arguments have been brought up that are evidently improper and, in certain cases, novel.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal is declared without merit.\n\nThe costs of this are borne by the party who filed it. DRUDIN.\n\n| | | |\n|---|---|---|\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n\n
Ignacio Jose Monge Dobles
Digitally Signed Document
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