{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-1350056", "citation": "Res. 01637-2025 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Recurso de nulidad contra laudo arbitral por notificación en domicilio social desactualizado", "title_en": "Appeal for annulment of arbitral award due to service at outdated corporate domicile", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia rechaza por extemporáneo el recurso de nulidad planteado por Cleerco Properties CR Limitada contra un laudo arbitral que ordenó respetar una servidumbre ecológica y condenó al pago solidario de costas. La recurrente alegó violación al debido proceso porque fue notificada en un domicilio social que ya no ocupaba, afirmando que su agente residente se había mudado y actualizado sus datos ante el Colegio de Abogados. La Sala determina que la notificación en el domicilio social registrado fue válida, pues la empresa incumplió su deber de mantenerlo actualizado en el Registro Público. Desestima el argumento de que debían agotarse todas las opciones de notificación, al ser suficiente con realizarla en el domicilio social. A mayor abundamiento, verifica que la servidumbre ecológica estaba inscrita antes de que Cleerco adquiriera el inmueble, por lo que era oponible por publicidad registral, y la condena en costas deriva de su propia negligencia procesal. El recurso, presentado siete meses después del laudo, resulta palmariamente extemporáneo pues el plazo de quince días se cuenta desde su notificación automática.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice dismisses as time-barred the appeal for annulment filed by Cleerco Properties CR Limitada against an arbitral award that ordered respect for an ecological easement and imposed joint payment of costs. The appellant argued violation of due process because service was made at a corporate domicile it no longer occupied, claiming its resident agent had moved and updated information with the Bar Association. The Chamber rules that service at the registered corporate domicile was valid, as the company failed to keep it updated in the Public Registry. It rejects the argument that all notification options must be exhausted, finding service at the corporate domicile sufficient. Furthermore, the Chamber confirms that the ecological easement was registered before Cleerco acquired the property, thus binding via registry publicity, and the cost order follows from its own procedural negligence. The appeal, filed seven months after the award, is manifestly untimely as the fifteen-day period runs from automatic notification.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "06/11/2025", "year": "2025", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "domicilio social", "agente residente", "servidumbre ecológica", "publicidad registral", "Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales", "Ley sobre RAC", "recurso de nulidad", "extemporáneo" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "arbitraje", "recurso de nulidad", "laudo arbitral", "notificación", "domicilio social", "debido proceso", "servidumbre ecológica", "costas", "publicidad registral", "extemporáneo" ], "keywords_en": [ "arbitration", "annulment appeal", "arbitral award", "service of process", "corporate domicile", "due process", "ecological easement", "costs", "registry publicity", "time-barred" ], "excerpt_es": "Así las cosas, la tesis del recurrente convertiría la carga de la notificación personal en alguno de los lugares habilitados por la ley, en un deber de agotarlos todos, lo cual resulta contrario a los principios de justicia y responsabilidad constitucionales y al propio texto de la ley en cuestión. Así las cosas, si Cleerco fue notificada en su domicilio social de entonces, pero había omitido actualizarlo en el Registro Público, no estaba su contraparte obligada, en modo alguno, a acudir a alguno de los otros lugares posibles de notificación para las personas jurídicas, de modo que el proceso arbitral se siguió sin su presencia por su propia incuria. Con todo, el laudo debe entenderse notificado automáticamente a la parte recurrente, en los términos del artículo 11 de la Ley de Notificaciones, 24 horas después de dictado, por lo que el recurso es palmariamente extemporáneo porque se promovió siete meses después de emitida la decisión arbitral.", "excerpt_en": "Thus, the appellant's thesis would convert the duty to effect personal service at one of the places authorized by law into an obligation to exhaust all of them, which is contrary to constitutional principles of justice and responsibility and to the text of the law itself. Therefore, if Cleerco was served at its then corporate domicile but had omitted to update it in the Public Registry, its counterpart was in no way obliged to resort to any other possible place of service for legal entities, meaning the arbitral proceeding continued without its presence due to its own neglect. In any event, the award must be deemed automatically notified to the appellant, under the terms of Article 11 of the Notifications Law, 24 hours after being rendered, making the appeal manifestly untimely as it was filed seven months after the arbitral decision was issued.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Dismissed", "label_es": "Rechazado", "summary_en": "The appeal for annulment of the arbitral award is dismissed as time-barred, having been filed seven months after the award was rendered, when the statutory period is fifteen days from automatic notification. Additionally, the claimed lack of defense is rejected because service at the registered corporate domicile was valid and the ecological easement was binding on the appellant.", "summary_es": "Se rechaza por extemporáneo el recurso de nulidad contra el laudo arbitral, al haber sido presentado siete meses después de emitido, cuando el plazo legal es de quince días desde su notificación automática. Adicionalmente, se descarta la indefensión alegada porque la notificación en el domicilio social registrado fue válida y la servidumbre ecológica era oponible a la recurrente." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "Thus, the appellant's thesis would convert the duty to effect personal service at one of the places authorized by law into an obligation to exhaust all of them, which is contrary to constitutional principles of justice and responsibility and to the text of the law itself.", "quote_es": "Así las cosas, la tesis del recurrente convertiría la carga de la notificación personal en alguno de los lugares habilitados por la ley, en un deber de agotarlos todos, lo cual resulta contrario a los principios de justicia y responsabilidad constitucionales y al propio texto de la ley en cuestión." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "According to the background of the arbitral proceeding, it is verified that Cleerco Properties Limitada was served at its corporate domicile. If that was not, at that time, its actual domicile, its negligence in updating that address is not attributable to the counterparty.", "quote_es": "Conforme a los antecedentes del proceso arbitral, se constata que Cleerco Properties Limitada fue notificada en su domicilio social. Si ese, no era, para ese momento, su domicilio real, su negligencia en actualizar esa dirección no es imputable a la contraparte." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "what the arbitral ruling does is nothing other than recognize the existence of that easement, which was known to Cleerco from the moment of its acquisition.", "quote_es": "lo que hace el fallo arbitral no es otra cosa que reconocer la existencia de esa servidumbre que era de conocimiento de Cleerco desde el momento de su adquisición." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "lack of defense regarding its rights would not be found in the situation under debate, so that, ultimately, even disregarding what was stated in the preceding recital, its claim of lack of defense should be denied.", "quote_es": "la indefensión respecto de sus derechos, no se constataría en la situación debatida, por lo que, a la postre, aún obviando lo señalado en el considerando previo, su reclamo de indefensión debería denegarse." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1351527", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-1351527" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1350056", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-1351527" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\nExp. 23-000067-0004-AR \n\nRes. 001637-A-S1-2025\n\n SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas cuarenta y dos minutos del seis de noviembre de dos mil veinticinco . \n\n Proceso arbitral tramitado ante el Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica, interpuesto por LEMJOY R S SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, entidad representada por su presidenta con facultades de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma, Sandra Lynne Frost, y por su apoderado especial arbitral, Álvaro Meza Lázarus, contra 1) RICHARD HERVE LEMIRE, representado por su apoderado especial arbitral, Jorge Sánchez Chacón, y 2) CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR LIMITADA, representada por su gerente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Brendon Kile Cleer, quien no se apersonó al litigio, en el que esta última sociedad, bajo el patrocinio legal de Néstor Morera Víquez, plantea recurso de nulidad contra el laudo arbitral emitido el seis de noviembre de dos mil veintidós por los árbitros Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Diego Baudrit Carrillo y Federico Torrealba Navas. \n\nMagistrado ponente Jorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI. En este asunto, Lemjoy S.A. formuló requerimiento arbitral ante el Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio contra Richard Herve Lemire y Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, entidad representada por su gerente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Brendon Kile Cleer. Adujo, en lo medular, ser dueña de un terreno en la provincia de Puntarenas y que la empresa Bixco S.A., representada por el señor Lemire, era dueña de varias heredades colindantes a la suya. Narró que el señor Lemire vendió una de esas propiedades a Cleerco Properties CR Limitada en el 2014, momento para el cual existía una controversia sobre las segregaciones hechas previamente en el sitio, por el propio señor Lemire pues una casa se construyó en parte del inmueble propiedad de Lemjoy, lo que provocó una disminución de cabida del terreno de quinientos metros cuadrados. Sin embargo, explicó, el señor Lemire reconoció la situación y acordaron resolver la diferencia y al efecto acordaron que se le daría a Lemjoy una franja de terreno equivalente a los quinientos metros cuadrados de un terreno lindante, permutando la franja invadida. Según la tesis de la requirente, el señor Lemire informaría al futuro adquirente de esa propiedad los términos del acuerdo, en el sentido de que debía hacerse la segregación a favor de Lemjoy, y en defecto de ello le indemnizaría. La actora informó que Cleerco adquirió el inmueble colindante del que debía segregársele una porción, en el 2014, y tuvo conocimiento del problema de cabida pues incluso pidió un rebajo del precio por la reducción del terreno que adquiriría. Según dice hay numerosos correos electrónicos en los que la abogada del representante de Cleerco daba cuenta de que su patrocinada conocía la existencia del convenio referido y si bien no lo firmó, es la obligada a segregar y reunir la porción de los 500 metros cuadrados a favor de Lemjoy. Adujo que el acuerdo previo se reflejó en escritura pública y contenía una cláusula arbitral para dirimir eventuales conflictos futuros. Advirtió que el señor Cleer y la sociedad que representa -Cleerco-, propietaria del inmueble, “(…) es traída a este proceso aprovechando la jurisprudencia que sobre el tema han determinado los tribunales arbitrales y la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.”. Para efectos de notificación del requerimiento arbitral, la sociedad requirente aportó la dirección de ambos requeridos. Respecto a Cleerco Properties CR Limitada adjuntó acta de notificación notarial según la cual fue comunicada en su domicilio social, ubicado en San José, Santa Ana, Plaza Murano, quinto piso, oficina cincuenta y ocho. El notario autorizado para la notificación indicó que la comunicación fue recibida por la administración del condominio y en el acta respectiva incluyó la siguiente leyenda “Se me indica que la empresa ya no está en el Condominio.”. Al señor Richard Herve Lemire se le notificó en Puntarenas, Quepos, Manuel Antonio, en la oficina Manuel Antonio Estate. El notario precisó en el acta correspondiente: “Se conversó por teléfono con el señor Lemire. Se dejan los documentos en la oficina del señor Lemire en Quepos.”. Este último, a diferencia de la sociedad codemandada, se apersonó al proceso. El Tribunal se instaló y el proceso continuó su trámite usual. El seis de noviembre de 2022 el Tribunal Arbitral emitió el laudo correspondiente. En los hechos probados de su decisión, las personas árbitras juzgaron acreditado lo siguiente: Lemjoy S.A., representada por Sandra Lyn Frost, adquirió cuatro lotes propiedad de Richard Lemire, en el 2001, ubicados en la zona de Quepos, Puntarenas. Una de ellas está inscrita con la matrícula de Folio Real 116546-000, en la que construyó una casa en el 2007. En los años posteriores surgió una controversia relativa a la falta de cabida de los lotes en cuestión. Lemjoy S.A. contrató a un topógrafo y lo mismo hizo el señor Lemire. Ambos determinaron que una calle de salida a los lotes, construida por Richard Lemire, paralela a los lotes de Lemjoy, invadía en 520 metros cuadrados el terreno propiedad de Lemjoy. Para ese momento -2014- Bixco S.A. tenía a la venta el inmueble matrícula de Folio Real 116538-000 que linda con la finca 116546-000 propiedad de Lemjoy y le ofreció, a esta última, traspasarle una parcela de 520 metros cuadrados de ese terreno lindante (116538-000) para compensar el faltante de cabida. El 4 de abril de 2014 comparecieron, ante notario público, Bixco, el señor Lemire -a título personal y como apoderado de Bixco- y Lemjoy. En la escritura correspondiente se otorgaron diversos negocios jurídicos. En primer lugar, Bixco segregó de su finca 116538-000 un lote de 520 m2 que para ese momento carecía de plano catastrado. En segundo lugar, Bixco le vendió a Lemjoy el lote segregado por el precio de cinco millones de colones que la vendedora declaró recibidos. La segregación y la venta se realizaron bajo la fórmula “Sin que tome nota el Registro.” En tercer lugar se constituyó una “servidumbre ecológica” cuyo fundo sirviente es la finca 116538-000, para entonces perteneciente a Bixco, definiendo como fundo dominante la finca 116546-000, propiedad de Lemjoy. El contenido de esa servidumbre es la proscripción de edificación en el lote de 520 metros ya citado y el derecho, a favor del fundo dominante, de sembrar árboles, edificar y disfrutar fuentes de agua y piscinas en el fundo sirviente. Finalmente, en esa misma escritura ambas partes indicaron: “ (…) el presente instrumento público refleja un entendimiento material para superar diferencias materiales entre la señora FROST y el señor RICHARD HERVE (nombre) LEMIRE (apellido) (…) relacionado con la confección de los planos catastrados todos del Partido de Puntarenas, números (….). Por razones no imputables a la señora Frost ni al señor Lemire, se confeccionaron los planos señalados, impidiendo en principio que la señora Frost lograra hacer uso directo de una servidumbre que por error se confeccionó en dichos planos (…), por lo tanto a partir de esta fecha la señora Frost se da por satisfecha en el sentido de que con la venta de la segregación indicada anteriormente, renuncia expresamente a cualquier reclamo administrativo, civil o penal contra el señor Lemire o cualquiera de sus representadas (…). Las partes manifiestan expresamente que ante la imposibilidad administrativa y catastral de inscribir el croquis señalado como un instrumento de plano catastrado, la aquí compradora disfrutará y reunirá de hecho, los quinientos metros cuadrados adquiridos, y utilizará este instrumento únicamente para efectos de defensa de un derecho de posesión y eventualmente como titular propietaria del mismo.(…) Las partes manifiestan que si este acuerdo se incumple de manera que por cualquier motivo no pueda la señora Frost utilizar la servidumbre actual ni los quinientos veinte metros que le han sido transferidos en este acto por cualquier razón incluyendo pero no limitada a que nuevos propietarios de los inmuebles, de los cuales son representantes los actuales comparecientes el día de hoy, no quieran respetar este acuerdo porque no se les hizo de su conocimiento o porque no están inscritos o representados en el Registro, este acuerdo se entiende resuelto de pleno derecho y la señor Frost tendrá el derecho de ir a los Tribunales a reclamar que la servidumbre de paso se debe respetar tal y cual fue designada en los planos originales de segregación de los lotes de la urbanización realizada por el señor Lemire, así como una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios causados (…). (…) las partes se obligan a revelar este documento a todo aquel que adquiera derechos sobre algún inmueble que se ubica donde están las fincas involucradas de los aquí comparecientes o sus sociedades representadas y procurar que ellos manifiesten que respetan el documento y que cuando se realice la segregación y la reunión todos estarán de acuerdo en firmar los documentos necesarios. (…)”. Esta segregación, según el Tribunal, tuvo carácter putativo, porque no se basó en un plano catastrado, de modo que el lote continuó formando parte de la finca 116538. La supuesta segregación y la venta del lote no fueron presentadas al Registro Público. La servidumbre ecológica fue presentada al Registro y quedó inscrita en el 2014 a favor de la finca que pertenece a la aquí actora y contra la finca 116538-000. El 23 de abril de 2014 Bixco, representada por el señor Lemire, le vendió a Cleerco Properties CR Limitada el inmueble 116538-000. En la escritura pública no se consignó manifestación alguna de la adquirente en el sentido de que esa empresa hubiera aceptado excluir, de la compra, el lote de 520 metros cuadrados referido, o que se hubiera obligado a segregarlo o traspasarlo. En el 2020 Cleerco se opuso a que la actora construyera una piscina en el lote de 520 metros cuadrados que soporta la servidumbre mencionada, e interpuso una demanda interdictal que se tramitó en el Juzgado Civil de Quepos. El laudo tuvo por indemostrado que la actora tenga un derecho de propiedad sobre los 520 metros cuadrados que resulte oponible a Cleerco. Al resolver el fondo de lo peticionado, el laudo, en resumen, acogió la pretensión subsidiaria según la cual impuso a Cleerco Properties CR S.A. el deber de respetar la servidumbre ecológica y permitir la construcción de la piscina que deseaba construir la actora, para lo cual debía firmar los documentos que se le presenten y permitir el acceso para realizar las obras necesarias. Le impuso al señor Lemire indemnizar a la actora por el perjuicio consistente en la diferencia entre ser propietario de los 520 metros cuadrados y ser titular de una servidumbre ecológica, e impuso a ambos codemandados el pago de las costas. Esta decisión fue emitida por el Tribunal Arbitral el seis de noviembre de dos mil veintidós, notificada a las partes en esa misma fecha. El siete de julio de 2023 Cleerco Properties CR Limitada acudió a la Sala y planteó recurso de nulidad. Adujo que si bien “han trascurrido meses desde la emisión del Laudo” nunca había sido notificada del proceso arbitral y se enteró de su existencia el 30 de junio de 2023, al ser notificada del proceso de ejecución de sentencia promovida por Lemjoy, de modo que siendo esa la fecha en que tuvo conocimiento del laudo, el recurso de nulidad se planteaba en tiempo y forma. \n\nII. En su primer motivo de nulidad -de dos que plantea- señala violación al debido proceso por notificación inválida y vulneración a su derecho de defensa. Al efecto, alega lo siguiente. Cleerco Properties está representada por Bendon Kile Cleer, extranjero no residente en Costa Rica, de modo que desde la constitución de la sociedad nombró a la abogada Natalia González Bogarían como agente residente, en cumplimiento de lo que al efecto dispone el artículo 13 inciso 18 del Código de Comercio. Señaló que la licenciada González se cambió de oficina el 7 de mayo de 2020 e hizo entrega oficial de la oficina no. 58 de Plaza Murano y actualizó sus datos ante el Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica. El notario que comunicó de este proceso indicó, en el acta respectiva, que procedía a notificar en el domicilio social y consignó que la administración del condominio le manifestó que la empresa no se ubicaba en ese edificio. Si bien existe obligación de mantener el domicilio social actualizado, “no es la única posibilidad de notificación y tampoco acredita la procedencia de notificar en un domicilio social inexistente.” . Por ello, en su tesis, el artículo 5 de la Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales brinda la posibilidad de otros domicilios y formas de notificar a una persona jurídica. Según dice, la finalidad de la notificación es llevar conocimiento real a las partes involucradas en el conflicto, lo que no se satisface con la notificación en domicilios inexistentes o desactualizados. Su representada no se enteró del proceso arbitral ni ha suscrito cláusulas de arbitraje, pero se emitió un laudo que genera efectos negativos en su patrimonio. En el segundo motivo reprocha inexistencia de una cláusula arbitral e incompetencia del Tribunal y solicita se anule el laudo. En su escrito de réplica al recurso de nulidad, el apoderado de la parte actora niega el desconocimiento del proceso arbitral de Cleerco y remite -según dice- copias de correos electrónicos cursados con el licenciado Morera Víquez en noviembre de 2021 en los que se refiere la existencia del proceso arbitral. Al efecto alega que en correo electrónico del 10 de noviembre se dio la siguiente comunicación entre ellos: “Mi cliente doña Sandra Fros había hablado con su cliente Brandon Cleer y él le indicó que habláramos con usted para el finiquito del expediente de Interdicto que se tramitó en el Juzgado de Quepos. En ese expediente habíamos metido la ejecución, son los honorarios profesionales nada más que son por la suma de (…) de acuerdo a la tabla de aranceles (…) es simplemente depositarlo y nosotros enviar un escrito dando por satisfechos (sic) (…). Ahora, existe otro expediente que iniciamos nosotros en el Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio. Se le notificó a la sociedad Cleerco y nunca contestaron la demanda arbitral. Ahí tenemos como corequeridos otro señor que tuvo que ver con las negociaciones cuando el señor Brandon adquirió y solo el (sic) contesto (sic) y tenemos audiencia de pruebas pronto, no sé porque (sic) ese asunto no lo continuó el señor Cleer pero se le indicó varias veces por correo (mi cliente) y nunca pareció interesarle. Ahí podríamos sentarnos a discutir el asunto porque también es bastante sencillo de resolver, únicamente se requiere voluntad. (…)”. Según dice, el licenciado Morera, ahora recurrente del laudo, le contesta, en esa misma fecha, y le indica: “Me gustaría que conversemos ambos temas. (…)”, con base en lo cual se opone a la interposición del recurso de nulidad. \n\nIII. El primer asunto a dilucidar es si el recurso ahora en análisis de esta Sala fue formulado en tiempo. Al respecto, el artículo 65 de la Ley sobre Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social, en la versión aplicable al debate (anterior a la reforma de setiembre de 2024) dispone: \"ARTÍCULO 65.- Recurso de nulidad. El recurso de nulidad deberá interponerse ante la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por las causales establecidas en el artículo 67 de la presente ley, dentro de los quince días siguientes a la notificación del laudo o la resolución que aclare o adicione la resolución. Este recurso no estará sujeto a formalidad alguna, pero deberá indicar la causa de nulidad en que se funda.”. (El énfasis se añade). De tal modo que el plazo para argüir la nulidad del laudo es de quince días a partir de su notificación. En tesis del recurrente ese plazo se contabilizaría desde que tuvo conocimiento del proceso de ejecución del laudo, no así desde la emisión del laudo, porque fue notificada en un lugar en el que ya no se encontraba su domicilio ni su agente residente. Conforme fue reseñado en el primer considerando, la parte requirente promovió el arbitral contra el señor Lemire y Cleerco Properties Limitada, e invocó una cláusula arbitral suscrita por el primero que, en su dicho, conocía esa segunda sociedad. El numeral 19 de la Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales establece una amplia gama de posibilidades para la notificación a las personas jurídicas, con el fin de procurar que la parte demandada no evada el proceso. Al respecto dispone que son las siguientes: notificación personal del representante en el lugar en que pueda ser hallado, en su casa de habitación, en su domicilio real, en el domicilio societario -indicado en el Registro Público-, en el eventual domicilio contractual -cuando hubiere-, en su domicilio real, o en la oficina de su agente residente. La ley establece, en su numeral 21, el deber de toda persona de mantener actualizado su domicilio, pero ninguno de sus preceptos establece que la parte que procura la notificación personal deba agotar todas las opciones habilitadas de comunicación. Las distintas posibilidades contempladas en la norma son opciones viables, todas ellas, pero ningún precepto obliga a que se agoten para poder tener por notificada a una persona en el contexto de una controversia patrimonial disponible. Conforme a los antecedentes del proceso arbitral, se constata que Cleerco Properties Limitada fue notificada en su domicilio social. Si ese, no era, para ese momento, su domicilio real, su negligencia en actualizar esa dirección no es imputable a la contraparte. Así las cosas, la tesis del recurrente convertiría la carga de la notificación personal en alguno de los lugares habilitados por la ley, en un deber de agotarlos todos, lo cual resulta contrario a los principios de justicia y responsabilidad constitucionales y al propio texto de la ley en cuestión. Así las cosas, si Cleerco fue notificada en su domicilio social de entonces, pero había omitido actualizarlo en el Registro Público, no estaba su contraparte obligada, en modo alguno, a acudir a alguno de los otros lugares posibles de notificación para las personas jurídicas, de modo que el proceso arbitral se siguió sin su presencia por su propia incuria. Con todo, el laudo debe entenderse notificado automáticamente a la parte recurrente, en los términos del artículo 11 de la Ley de Notificaciones, 24 horas después de dictado, por lo que el recurso es palmariamente extemporáneo porque se promovió siete meses después de emitida la decisión arbitral. \n\nIV. En adición a lo dicho, y con vista en el alegato de indefensión y violación al debido proceso que formula el recurrente, conviene señalar algunas consideraciones adicionales, a mayor abundamiento. La revisión del acápite dispositivo del laudo permite constatar que el pronunciamiento del tribunal arbitral se constriñe, en forma literal, a lo siguiente: “POR TANTO Con base en lo expuesto y normas legales citadas y habiendo el tribunal arbitral en pleno considerado todas las pretensiones expuestas por la actora en su demanda y excepciones opuestas por el co-demandado Richard H Lemire, se falla este asunto como sigue: I.- Se declara parcialmente con lugar la Demanda de Lemjoy S.A., representada por Sandra Frost, respecto a los co-demandados Richard Herve Lemire y Cleerco Properties Limitada, representada por Brendon Cleer, en los extremos que se indican: A) Se declara sin lugar la excepción de prescripción opuesta por el señor LEMIRE. B) Se rechazan las pretensiones principales de Lemjoy S.A. A), C) y E), en cuanto a que se declare que es dueña de la porción de terreno de 520 metros cuadrados; que dicha porción debe ser segregada y traspasada a la sociedad actora y que debe ser inscrita a su nombre. C) Se acoge la pretensión subsidiaria E) de la sociedad actora en el sentido de que la sociedad CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR S.A. debe respetar la servidumbre ecológica y permitir la construcción de la piscina que desea construir doña Sandra Frost para lo cual debe firmar todos los papeles que se le presenten y permitir el acceso para la realización de las obras necesarias. D) Se condena al señor Richard Herve Lemire a indemnizar a la actora el perjuicio consistente en la diferencia entre ser propietario de los 520 metros cuadrados y ser titular de la servidumbre ecológica. Dicha indemnización será liquidada en fase de ejecución de sentencia, donde, con auxilio de peritos, se determinará el importe del valor dejado de percibir por la actora. E) Se declara sin lugar la pretensión de indemnización de daño moral objetivo solicitado por la actora respecto al co-demandado Richard Herve Lemire. En relación con esta pretensión, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. F) Se rechaza la pretensión de condenar al señor Lemire a costear los planos de la porción de terreno reclamado por la actora e inscribirlos en el Registro. En relación con esta pretensión, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. G) Se rechaza la pretensión principal “D”, respecto de la cual se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. H) Se rechazan las pretensiones “B”, principal y subsidiaria. I) Se condena a ambos co-demandados de forma solidaria al pago de las costas de este proceso arbitral. Respecto a las procesales, se detallan las mismas: (…). Para un total de: $7,118.98.” (Los énfasis se añaden). Esto permite constatar que a Cleerco Properties CR S.A. se le impusieron dos conductas que afectan su situación jurídica: el respeto de la servidumbre ecológica -y sus términos- y el pago solidario de las costas del proceso arbitral. Respecto al primer pronunciamiento, la decisión de los árbitros no impone ni crea una situación o relación jurídica ex novo, sino que se limita a declarar una situación preexistente, según se verá. La revisión oficiosa de las bases de datos del Registro Público (por intermedio de su función de consulta pública gratuita) permite constatar a esta Sala -aspectos que no constan en el laudo- que la servidumbre en cuestión fue constituida entre el señor Lemire sobre su finca 116538, en beneficio de la propiedad 116546 de la actora, servidumbre que quedó inscrita el 22 de abril de 2014. Además, Cleerco adquirió la heredad 116538 que soportaba la servidumbre mediante compraventa efectuada el 23 de abril de 2014 y quedó inscrita hasta el 30 de septiembre de 2014. Es decir, que para el momento en que adquirió el bien, la servidumbre ya estaba inscrita y formaba parte de las características de la propiedad que por publicidad registral le eran oponibles (artículo 455 párrafo 1 del Código Procesal Civil). Así, lo que hace el fallo arbitral no es otra cosa que reconocer la existencia de esa servidumbre que era de conocimiento de Cleerco desde el momento de su adquisición. La condena en costas del proceso no es más que la consecuencia de su negligencia en actualizar oportunamente su domicilio social y permitir con ello que el proceso se siguiera en su ausencia y haber resultado vencido en el proceso arbitral. Con todo, la indefensión respecto de sus derechos, no se constataría en la situación debatida, por lo que, a la postre, aún obviando lo señalado en el considerando previo, su reclamo de indefensión debería denegarse. \n\nV. Finalmente y en atención a lo alegado -ante esta sede- por los apoderados especiales arbitrales de ambas partes respecto al desconocimiento (tesis del abogado del recurrente) o conocimiento (línea que sostiene el abogado de la actora) del proceso arbitral por parte de Cleerco, se recuerda que es deber ético del abogado conducirse, en el ejercicio de su profesión, en forma veraz, de buena fe y con probidad en la defensa de los intereses de sus clientes, en función de posibilitar la justicia (artículos 1, 3, 7 y 11 del Código de Moral del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica). \n\nPOR TANTO\n\nPor extemporáneo, se rechaza el recurso de nulidad planteado por Cleerco Properties CR Limitada. rgonzalezu.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga\n\n \n\nRocío Rojas Morales\n\n \n\nDamaris Vargas Vásquez\n\nJorge Leiva Poveda\n\n \n\nCarlos Guillermo Zamora Campos\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n WH0CYKTNOJW61 \n\n1", "body_en_text": "Review of the Document\n\n\n\nExp. 23-000067-0004-AR\n\nRes. 001637-A-S1-2025\n\n FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours and forty-two minutes of November sixth, two thousand twenty-five.\n\n Arbitral proceeding conducted before the Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica, filed by LEMJOY R S SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, an entity represented by its president with powers of unlimited general attorney, Sandra Lynne Frost, and by its special arbitral attorney, Álvaro Meza Lázarus, against 1) RICHARD HERVE LEMIRE, represented by his special arbitral attorney, Jorge Sánchez Chacón, and 2) CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR LIMITADA, represented by its manager with powers of unlimited general attorney, Brendon Kile Cleer, who did not appear in the litigation, in which the latter company, under the legal sponsorship of Néstor Morera Víquez, files an annulment appeal against the arbitral award issued on November sixth, two thousand twenty-two by the arbitrators Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Diego Baudrit Carrillo, and Federico Torrealba Navas.\n\nReporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI. In this matter, Lemjoy S.A. filed an arbitral claim before the Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce against Richard Herve Lemire and Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, an entity represented by its manager with powers of unlimited general attorney, Brendon Kile Cleer. It alleged, in essence, that it was the owner of a property in the province of Puntarenas and that the company Bixco S.A., represented by Mr. Lemire, was the owner of several properties adjacent to its own. It recounted that Mr. Lemire sold one of those properties to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada in 2014, at which time there was a dispute regarding segregations (segregaciones) previously made on the site by Mr. Lemire himself, because a house was built partly on the property owned by Lemjoy, which caused a reduction in the area of its land of five hundred square meters. However, it explained, Mr. Lemire acknowledged the situation and they agreed to resolve the difference, and to that end, they agreed that Lemjoy would receive a strip of land equivalent to the five hundred square meters from an adjoining property, exchanging the invaded strip. According to the claimant's thesis, Mr. Lemire would inform the future acquirer of that property of the terms of the agreement, in the sense that the segregation had to be made in favor of Lemjoy, and failing that, he would indemnify it. The plaintiff reported that Cleerco acquired the adjoining property from which a portion was to be segregated in 2014 and was aware of the area deficiency problem, as it even requested a price reduction for the reduction of the land it would acquire. It says there are numerous emails in which the lawyer for Cleerco's representative reported that her client knew of the existence of the referred agreement, and although she did not sign it, she is the party obligated to segregate and reunite the 500-square-meter portion in favor of Lemjoy. It alleged that the prior agreement was recorded in a public deed and contained an arbitration clause to resolve potential future conflicts. It noted that Mr. Cleer and the company he represents—Cleerco—, owner of the property, \"(…) is brought into this process taking advantage of the jurisprudence that arbitral tribunals and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice have determined on the matter.\" For the purposes of notifying the arbitral claim, the claimant company provided the address of both respondents. Regarding Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, it attached a notarial service of process record according to which it was notified at its corporate domicile, located in San José, Santa Ana, Plaza Murano, fifth floor, office fifty-eight. The notary authorized for the notification indicated that the communication was received by the condominium administration, and the respective record included the following legend: \"I am informed that the company is no longer in the Condominium.\" Mr. Richard Herve Lemire was notified in Puntarenas, Quepos, Manuel Antonio, at the Manuel Antonio Estate office. The notary specified in the corresponding record: \"A telephone conversation was held with Mr. Lemire. The documents are left at Mr. Lemire's office in Quepos.\" The latter, unlike the co-defendant company, appeared in the proceeding. The Tribunal was installed and the proceeding continued its usual course. On November 6, 2022, the Arbitration Tribunal issued the corresponding award. In the proven facts of its decision, the arbitrators deemed the following to be accredited: Lemjoy S.A., represented by Sandra Lyn Frost, acquired four lots owned by Richard Lemire in 2001, located in the Quepos area, Puntarenas. One of them is registered under Folio Real registration number 116546-000, on which it built a house in 2007. In the following years, a dispute arose regarding the deficient area of the lots in question. Lemjoy S.A. hired a surveyor as did Mr. Lemire. Both determined that an access road to the lots, built by Richard Lemire, parallel to Lemjoy's lots, encroached by 520 square meters on the property owned by Lemjoy. At that time—2014—Bixco S.A. had for sale the property with Folio Real registration number 116538-000, which borders property 116546-000 owned by Lemjoy, and offered the latter to transfer a parcel of 520 square meters from said adjoining land (116538-000) to compensate for the area deficiency. On April 4, 2014, Bixco, Mr. Lemire—personally and as attorney-in-fact of Bixco—and Lemjoy appeared before a notary public. Various legal transactions were executed in the corresponding deed. First, Bixco segregated from its property 116538-000 a lot of 520 m2 that at that time lacked a cadastral plan (plano catastrado). Second, Bixco sold Lemjoy the segregated lot for the price of five million colones, which the seller declared received. The segregation and sale were carried out under the formula \"Without the Registry taking note.\" Third, an \"ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica)\" was constituted, with the servient tenement being property 116538-000, then belonging to Bixco, and defining property 116546-000, owned by Lemjoy, as the dominant tenement. The content of that easement is the prohibition of construction on the already referenced 520-square-meter lot and the right, in favor of the dominant tenement, to plant trees, build, and enjoy water springs (fuentes de agua) and pools on the servient tenement. Finally, in that same deed, both parties indicated: \"(…) this public instrument reflects a material understanding to overcome material differences between Mrs. FROST and Mr. RICHARD HERVE (first name) LEMIRE (surname) (…) related to the preparation of all the cadastral plans (planos catastrados) of the Puntarenas Registry Office, numbers (….). For reasons not attributable to Mrs. Frost or Mr. Lemire, the indicated plans were prepared, initially preventing Mrs. Frost from making direct use of an easement that was erroneously created in said plans (…), therefore, as of this date, Mrs. Frost declares herself satisfied in the sense that with the sale of the aforementioned segregation, she expressly waives any administrative, civil, or criminal claim against Mr. Lemire or any of his represented entities (…). The parties expressly state that given the administrative and cadastral impossibility of registering the indicated sketch as a cadastral plan instrument, the buyer herein will enjoy and reunite, in fact, the acquired five hundred square meters, and will use this instrument solely for the purpose of defending a possessory right and eventually as the owner thereof. (…) The parties state that if this agreement is breached such that for any reason Mrs. Frost cannot use the current easement nor the five hundred twenty meters that have been transferred to her in this act, for any reason including but not limited to new owners of the properties, of which the current appearing parties are representatives today, not wanting to respect this agreement because it was not made known to them or because it is not registered or represented in the Registry, this agreement shall be deemed automatically rescinded and Mrs. Frost shall have the right to go to the Courts to claim that the right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) must be respected as it was designated in the original segregation plans for the lots of the urbanization carried out by Mr. Lemire, as well as compensation for damages and losses caused (…). (…) the parties undertake to disclose this document to anyone who acquires rights over any property located where the properties involved belonging to the appearing parties herein or their represented companies are located, and to ensure that they state that they respect the document and that when the segregation and reunification are carried out, everyone will agree to sign the necessary documents. (…)\" This segregation, according to the Tribunal, was putative in nature because it was not based on a cadastral plan, so the lot remained part of property 116538. The purported segregation and the sale of the lot were not submitted to the Public Registry. The ecological easement was submitted to the Registry and was registered in 2014 in favor of the property belonging to the plaintiff here and against property 116538-000. On April 23, 2014, Bixco, represented by Mr. Lemire, sold property 116538-000 to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada. In the public deed, no statement was recorded from the acquirer to the effect that said company had agreed to exclude, from the purchase, the referenced 520-square-meter lot, or that it had obligated itself to segregate or transfer it. In 2020, Cleerco opposed the plaintiff building a pool on the 520-square-meter lot that supports the mentioned easement and filed an interdict claim that was processed in the Civil Court of Quepos. The award considered it not proven that the plaintiff had a property right over the 520 square meters that could be enforced against Cleerco. In ruling on the merits of the claims, the award, in summary, upheld the subsidiary relief claim whereby it imposed on Cleerco Properties CR S.A. the duty to respect the ecological easement and allow the construction of the pool that the plaintiff wished to build, for which purpose it had to sign the documents presented to it and allow access to carry out the necessary works. It ordered Mr. Lemire to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss consisting of the difference between being the owner of the 520 square meters and being the holder of an ecological easement, and ordered both co-defendants to pay the costs. This decision was issued by the Arbitration Tribunal on November sixth, two thousand twenty-two, and was notified to the parties on that same date. On July seventh, 2023, Cleerco Properties CR Limitada came before this Chamber and filed an annulment appeal. It argued that although \"months have passed since the issuance of the Award,\" it had never been notified of the arbitration proceeding and learned of its existence on June 30, 2023, upon being notified of the enforcement proceeding for the judgment brought by Lemjoy, so that being the date it became aware of the award, the annulment appeal was filed on time and in proper form.\n\nII. In its first ground for annulment—of the two it raises—it points to a violation of due process due to invalid notification and a violation of its right of defense. To this end, it alleges the following. Cleerco Properties is represented by Brendon Kile Cleer, a foreigner not residing in Costa Rica, such that since the incorporation of the company, it appointed lawyer Natalia González Bogarían as resident agent, in compliance with the provisions of article 13, subsection 18 of the Commercial Code. It indicated that Ms. González changed offices on May 7, 2020, officially surrendered office no. 58 of Plaza Murano, and updated her information with the Costa Rican Bar Association. The notary who served notice of this proceeding indicated, in the respective record, that they were proceeding to notify at the corporate domicile and recorded that the condominium administration informed them that the company was not located in that building. While there is an obligation to keep the corporate domicile updated, \"it is not the only possibility for notification, nor does it prove the appropriateness of notifying at a non-existent corporate domicile.\" Therefore, in its thesis, Article 5 of the Judicial Notifications Law provides the possibility of other addresses and ways of notifying a legal entity. It argues that the purpose of notification is to bring actual knowledge to the parties involved in the conflict, which is not satisfied by notification at non-existent or outdated addresses. Its represented party did not learn of the arbitration proceeding, nor has it signed arbitration clauses, but an award was issued that generates negative effects on its assets. In the second ground, it criticizes the lack of an arbitration clause and the incompetence of the Tribunal and requests that the award be annulled. In its reply brief to the annulment appeal, the attorney for the plaintiff denies Cleerco's lack of knowledge of the arbitration proceeding and refers—it says—to copies of emails exchanged with lawyer Morera Víquez in November 2021, which refer to the existence of the arbitration proceeding. To this end, it claims that in an email of November 10, the following communication occurred between them: \"My client, Mrs. Sandra Frost, had spoken with your client Brandon Cleer, and he told her to speak with you for the settlement of the Interdict file that was processed in the Court of Quepos. In that file, we had filed the enforcement, it is only the professional fees which are for the sum of (…) according to the fee schedule (…) it is simply depositing it and we sending a brief stating we are satisfied (sic) (…). Now, there is another file that we initiated at the Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce. The company Cleerco was notified and never answered the arbitral claim. We have another gentleman there as a co-respondent who had to do with the negotiations when Mr. Brandon acquired it, and only he (sic) answered, and we have an evidence hearing soon, I don't know why (sic) Mr. Cleer did not continue that matter but he was told several times by email (my client) and he never seemed interested. We could sit down and discuss the matter there because it is also quite simple to resolve, only willingness is needed. (…)\" It says that lawyer Morera, now the appellant of the award, replied on the same date, telling him: \"I would like for us to discuss both topics. (…)\", based on which it opposes the filing of the annulment appeal.\n\nIII. The first matter to clarify is whether the appeal now under analysis by this Chamber was filed on time. In this regard, Article 65 of the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace, in the version applicable to the debate (before the September 2024 reform), provides: \"ARTICLE 65.- Annulment appeal. The annulment appeal must be filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, based on the grounds established in Article 67 of this law, within fifteen days following the notification of the award or the resolution that clarifies or supplements the resolution. This appeal shall not be subject to any formality but must indicate the ground for annulment on which it is based.\" (Emphasis added). Therefore, the period to argue the nullity of the award is fifteen days from its notification. According to the appellant's theory, that period would be calculated from the time it learned of the award enforcement proceeding, not from the issuance of the award, because it was notified at a place where its domicile and its resident agent were no longer located. As outlined in the first considering clause, the claimant filed the arbitration against Mr. Lemire and Cleerco Properties Limitada, and invoked an arbitration clause signed by the former which, according to it, was known to the latter company. Provision 19 of the Judicial Notifications Law establishes a wide range of possibilities for notifying legal entities, in order to ensure that the respondent party does not evade the proceeding. In this regard, it provides that these are the following: personal notification of the representative at the place where they can be found, at their home, at their actual domicile, at the corporate domicile—indicated in the Public Registry—, at the potential contractual domicile—if any—, at their actual domicile, or at the office of their resident agent. The law establishes, in provision 21, the duty of every person to keep their domicile updated, but none of its precepts establish that the party seeking personal notification must exhaust all the enabled communication options. The different possibilities contemplated in the regulation are all viable options, but no provision requires that they be exhausted in order to deem a person notified in the context of a disposable patrimonial dispute. According to the records of the arbitration proceeding, it is verified that Cleerco Properties Limitada was notified at its corporate domicile. If that was not, at that time, its actual domicile, its negligence in updating that address is not attributable to the opposing party. Thus, the appellant's thesis would convert the burden of personal notification at one of the places authorized by law into a duty to exhaust them all, which is contrary to the constitutional principles of justice and responsibility and to the text of the law in question. Thus, if Cleerco was notified at its corporate domicile of the time, but had omitted to update it in the Public Registry, its counterpart was in no way obliged to resort to any of the other possible places of notification for legal entities, so the arbitration proceeding proceeded without its presence due to its own negligence. In any case, the award must be understood to have been automatically notified to the appealing party, under the terms of Article 11 of the Notifications Law, 24 hours after it was issued, such that the appeal is plainly untimely because it was filed seven months after the arbitration decision was issued.\n\nIV. In addition to the foregoing, and in view of the claim of defenselessness and violation of due process made by the appellant, it is appropriate to note some additional considerations, for greater clarity. Review of the operative section of the award allows us to verify that the pronouncement of the arbitration tribunal is limited, in literal form, to the following: \"THEREFORE Based on the foregoing and the cited legal norms, and having the full arbitration tribunal considered all the claims made by the plaintiff in its complaint and the defenses raised by the co-defendant Richard H Lemire, this matter is decided as follows: I.- The Complaint of Lemjoy S.A., represented by Sandra Frost, is partially granted with respect to the co-defendants Richard Herve Lemire and Cleerco Properties Limitada, represented by Brendon Cleer, for the following items: A) The statute of limitations defense raised by Mr. LEMIRE is denied. B) The main claims of Lemjoy S.A. A), C), and E) are rejected, insofar as they seek a declaration that it is the owner of the 520-square-meter portion of land; that said portion must be segregated and transferred to the plaintiff company; and that it must be registered in its name. C) The subsidiary claim E) of the plaintiff company is granted, in that the company CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR S.A. must respect the ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica) and allow the construction of the pool that Mrs. Sandra Frost wishes to build, for which purpose it must sign all the papers presented to it and allow access for carrying out the necessary works. D) Mr. Richard Herve Lemire is ordered to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss consisting of the difference between being the owner of the 520 square meters and being the holder of the ecological easement. Said indemnification will be liquidated in the enforcement phase of the judgment, where, with the assistance of experts, the amount of the value not received by the plaintiff will be determined. E) The claim for compensation for objective moral damages requested by the plaintiff against co-defendant Richard Herve Lemire is denied. Regarding this claim, the lack of right defense raised by Mr. Lemire is granted. F) The claim to order Mr. Lemire to pay for the plans for the portion of land claimed by the plaintiff and to register them in the Registry is rejected. Regarding this claim, the lack of right defense raised by Mr. Lemire is granted. G) The main claim \"D\" is rejected, as to which the lack of right defense raised by Mr. Lemire is granted. H) The claims \"B\", principal and subsidiary, are rejected. I) Both co-defendants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the costs of this arbitration proceeding. Regarding procedural costs, they are detailed as follows: (…). For a total of: $7,118.98.\" (Emphasis added). This allows us to verify that two obligations affecting its legal situation were imposed on Cleerco Properties CR S.A.: the respect for the ecological easement—and its terms—and joint and several payment of the costs of the arbitration proceeding. Regarding the first pronouncement, the arbitrators' decision does not impose or create a new legal situation or relationship ex novo, but is limited to declaring a pre-existing situation, as will be seen. The ex officio review of the Public Registry databases (through its free public consultation function) allows this Chamber to verify—aspects not recorded in the award—that the easement in question was constituted by Mr. Lemire over his property 116538, for the benefit of the plaintiff's property 116546, an easement that was registered on April 22, 2014. Furthermore, Cleerco acquired property 116538, which supported the easement, through a sale executed on April 23, 2014, and it was not registered until September 30, 2014. That is, at the time it acquired the asset, the easement was already registered and formed part of the characteristics of the property that, by registry publicity, were enforceable against it (paragraph 1 of Article 455 of the Civil Procedure Code). Thus, what the arbitration award does is nothing more than recognize the existence of that easement, which Cleerco knew of from the moment of its acquisition. The order to pay the costs of the proceeding is nothing more than the consequence of its negligence in timely updating its corporate domicile and thereby allowing the proceeding to continue in its absence, and for having been unsuccessful in the arbitration proceeding. In any case, the defenselessness (indefensión) regarding its rights would not be verified in the debated situation, so that, in the end, even disregarding what was stated in the previous considering clause, its claim of defenselessness should be denied.\n\nV. Finally, and in attention to what was alleged—before this forum—by the special arbitral attorneys of both parties regarding the lack of knowledge (thesis of the appellant's attorney) or knowledge (line maintained by the plaintiff's attorney) of the arbitration proceeding by Cleerco, it is recalled that it is the ethical duty of the lawyer to conduct themselves, in the exercise of their profession, truthfully, in good faith, and with probity in defending the interests of their clients, in order to enable justice (Articles 1, 3, 7, and 11 of the Moral Code of the Costa Rican Bar Association).\n\nTHEREFORE\n\nOn grounds of being untimely, the annulment appeal filed by Cleerco Properties CR Limitada is rejected.\n\nRgonzalezu.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga\n\nRocío Rojas Morales\n\nDamaris Vargas Vásquez\n\nJorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCarlos Guillermo Zamora Campos\n\nDigitally Signed Document\n\n-- Verification code --\n\n\n\n WH0CYKTNOJW61\n\n1\n\nExp. 23-000067-0004-AR\n\nRes. 001637-A-S1-2025\n\nFIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours forty-two minutes on the sixth of November of two thousand twenty-five.\n\nArbitral proceeding handled before the Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica, filed by LEMJOY R S SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, an entity represented by its president with the powers of a generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit on amount, Sandra Lynne Frost, and by its special arbitral attorney-in-fact, Álvaro Meza Lázarus, against 1) RICHARD HERVE LEMIRE, represented by his special arbitral attorney-in-fact, Jorge Sánchez Chacón, and 2) CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR LIMITADA, represented by its manager with the powers of a generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit on amount, Brendon Kile Cleer, who did not appear in the litigation, in which this latter company, under the legal sponsorship of Néstor Morera Víquez, files an annulment recourse (recurso de nulidad) against the arbitral award (laudo arbitral) issued on the sixth of November of two thousand twenty-two by the arbitrators Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Diego Baudrit Carrillo and Federico Torrealba Navas.\n\nReporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI. In this matter, Lemjoy S.A. filed an arbitral claim before the Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce against Richard Herve Lemire and Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, an entity represented by its manager with the powers of a generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit on amount, Brendon Kile Cleer. It alleged, in essence, that it was the owner of a plot of land in the province of Puntarenas and that the company Bixco S.A., represented by Mr. Lemire, was the owner of several properties adjacent to its own. It recounted that Mr. Lemire sold one of those properties to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada in 2014, at which time a controversy existed over segregations (segregaciones) previously carried out on the site by Mr. Lemire himself, because a house was built on part of the property belonging to Lemjoy, which caused a reduction in the area (disminución de cabida) of the land by five hundred square meters. However, it explained, Mr. Lemire acknowledged the situation and they agreed to resolve the difference, and to that end they agreed that Lemjoy would be given a strip of land equivalent to the five hundred square meters from an adjoining property, exchanging (permutando) the invaded strip. According to the claimant's thesis, Mr. Lemire would inform the future purchaser of that property of the terms of the agreement, in the sense that the segregation (segregación) in favor of Lemjoy had to be carried out, and failing that he would indemnify it. The plaintiff reported that Cleerco acquired the adjoining property from which a portion was to be segregated in 2014, and was aware of the area (cabida) problem, since it even requested a price reduction for the reduction of the land it would acquire. According to what it says, there are numerous emails in which the attorney for Cleerco's representative gave an account that her client was aware of the existence of the referenced agreement and, although it did not sign it, it is the one obligated to segregate and assemble (reunir) the portion of 500 square meters in favor of Lemjoy. It alleged that the prior agreement was reflected in a public deed (escritura pública) and contained an arbitration clause to resolve any future disputes.\n\nHe warned that Mr. Cleer and the company he represents —Cleerco—, owner of the property, “(…) is brought into this proceeding taking advantage of the jurisprudence on the matter established by arbitral tribunals and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.”. For purposes of notification of the arbitral request, the requesting party provided the address of both respondents. Regarding Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, it attached a notarial deed of notification (acta de notificación notarial) according to which it was served at its registered office, located in San José, Santa Ana, Plaza Murano, fifth floor, office fifty-eight. The notary authorized for the notification stated that service was received by the condominium administration and included the following legend in the respective deed: “I am told that the company is no longer in the Condominium.”. Mr. Richard Herve Lemire was notified in Puntarenas, Quepos, Manuel Antonio, at the Manuel Antonio Estate office. The notary specified in the corresponding deed: “A telephone conversation was held with Mr. Lemire. The documents are left at Mr. Lemire’s office in Quepos.”.\n\nThe latter, unlike the co-defendant company, appeared in the proceeding. The Tribunal was constituted and the proceeding continued its usual course. On November sixth, two thousand twenty-two, the Arbitral Tribunal issued the corresponding award. In the proven facts of its decision, the arbitrators deemed the following to be established: Lemjoy S.A., represented by Sandra Lyn Frost, acquired four lots owned by Richard Lemire, in 2001, located in the Quepos area, Puntarenas. One of them is registered under Folio Real registration number 116546-000, on which it built a house in 2007. In the following years, a controversy arose regarding the shortage of area (falta de cabida) of the lots in question. Lemjoy S.A. hired a surveyor, and Mr. Lemire did the same. Both determined that an access road to the lots, built by Richard Lemire, parallel to Lemjoy’s lots, encroached on 520 square meters of Lemjoy’s land. At that time —2014— Bixco S.A. had the property with Folio Real registration number 116538-000 for sale, which borders farm 116546-000 owned by Lemjoy, and offered the latter to transfer a 520-square-meter parcel of that adjoining land (116538-000) to compensate for the shortage of area (faltante de cabida). On April 4, 2014, Bixco, Mr. Lemire —in his personal capacity and as attorney-in-fact for Bixco— and Lemjoy appeared before a notary public. In the corresponding deed, various legal transactions were executed. First, Bixco segregated (segregó) from its farm 116538-000 a 520 m2 lot that at that time lacked a cadastral map (plano catastrado). Second, Bixco sold to Lemjoy the segregated lot for the price of five million colones, which the seller declared received. The segregation (segregación) and the sale were carried out under the formula “Without the Registry taking note.” Third, an “ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica)” was constituted, the servient tenement (fundo sirviente) being farm 116538-000, then belonging to Bixco, and defining farm 116546-000, owned by Lemjoy, as the dominant tenement (fundo dominante). The content of that easement is the prohibition of building on the aforementioned 520-meter lot and the right, in favor of the dominant tenement, to plant trees, build, and enjoy water sources and pools on the servient tenement. Finally, in that same deed both parties stated: “ (…) this public instrument reflects a material understanding to overcome material differences between Mrs. FROST and Mr. RICHARD HERVE (first name) LEMIRE (last name) (…) relating to the preparation of the cadastral maps (planos catastrados) all of the Partido of Puntarenas, numbers (….). For reasons not attributable to Mrs. Frost or Mr. Lemire, the indicated maps were prepared, initially preventing Mrs. Frost from making direct use of an easement that was erroneously created in those maps (…), therefore from this date Mrs. Frost considers herself satisfied in the sense that with the sale of the segregation indicated above, she expressly waives any administrative, civil, or criminal claim against Mr. Lemire or any of his represented companies (…). The parties expressly state that given the administrative and cadastral impossibility of registering the indicated sketch as a cadastral map instrument, the purchaser herein shall de facto enjoy and assemble the five hundred square meters acquired, and shall use this instrument solely for the purpose of defending a possessory right and eventually as the titled owner thereof. (…) The parties state that if this agreement is breached such that for any reason Mrs. Frost cannot use the current easement or the five hundred twenty meters that have been transferred to her in this act for any reason, including but not limited to new owners of the properties, of which the current parties appearing today are representatives, not wishing to respect this agreement because it was not made known to them or because it is not registered or represented in the Registry, this agreement shall be deemed resolved by operation of law (resuelto de pleno derecho) and Mrs. Frost shall have the right to go to the Courts to claim that the right of way (servidumbre de paso) must be respected exactly as it was designated in the original segregation maps of the lots of the subdivision (urbanización) carried out by Mr. Lemire, as well as compensation for the damages and losses caused (…). (…) the parties undertake to disclose this document to anyone who acquires rights over any property located where the farms of the parties appearing herein or their represented companies are situated, and to ensure that they state they respect the document and that when the segregation and the assemblage are carried out, everyone will agree to sign the necessary documents. (…)”.\n\nThis segregation, according to the Tribunal, was putative in nature, because it was not based on a cadastral map, so the lot continued to form part of farm 116538. The supposed segregation and the sale of the lot were not submitted to the Public Registry. The ecological easement was submitted to the Registry and was registered in 2014 in favor of the farm belonging to the plaintiff herein and against farm 116538-000. On April 23, 2014, Bixco, represented by Mr. Lemire, sold property 116538-000 to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada.\n\nIn the public deed, no statement whatsoever was recorded by the acquirer to the effect that this company had agreed to exclude, from the purchase, the referenced 520-square-meter lot, or that it had obligated itself to segregate or transfer it. In 2020, Cleerco opposed the plaintiff’s construction of a swimming pool on the 520-square-meter lot encumbered by the mentioned easement (servidumbre), and filed an interdictal claim that was processed in the Civil Court of Quepos. The award (laudo) found it unproven that the plaintiff holds a property right over the 520 square meters that is enforceable against Cleerco. In deciding the merits of the claim, the award, in summary, granted the alternative claim whereby it imposed upon Cleerco Properties CR S.A. the duty to respect the ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica) and allow the construction of the swimming pool that the plaintiff wished to build, for which purpose it had to sign the documents presented to it and permit access to carry out the necessary works. It imposed on Mr. Lemire the obligation to compensate the plaintiff for the harm consisting of the difference between being the owner of the 520 square meters and being the holder of an ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica), and imposed on both co-defendants the payment of costs. This decision was issued by the Arbitral Tribunal on November 6, 2022, and notified to the parties on that same date. On July 7, 2023, Cleerco Properties CR Limitada appealed to this Chamber and filed a motion to set aside (recurso de nulidad). It argued that although “months have elapsed since the issuance of the Award” it had never been notified of the arbitration proceeding and learned of its existence on June 30, 2023, upon being notified of the enforcement of judgment proceeding brought by Lemjoy, so that, with that being the date on which it learned of the award, the motion to set aside was filed in a timely and proper manner.\n\nII. In its first ground for setting aside—out of the two it raises—it points to a violation of due process (debido proceso) due to invalid notification and a violation of its right of defense. In support, it alleges the following. Cleerco Properties is represented by Bendon Kile Cleer, a foreigner not residing in Costa Rica, so that from the incorporation of the company it appointed attorney Natalia González Bogarín as resident agent (agente residente), in compliance with the provisions of Article 13, subsection 18 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio). It indicated that Ms. González changed offices on May 7, 2020, officially vacated office no. 58 of Plaza Murano, and updated her information with the Costa Rica Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica). The notary who gave notice of this proceeding indicated, in the corresponding record, that he proceeded to notify at the corporate domicile (domicilio social) and recorded that the condominium administration informed him that the company was not located in that building. Even though there is an obligation to keep the corporate domicile updated, “it is not the only possibility for notification, nor does it prove the propriety of notifying at a non-existent corporate domicile.” Therefore, in its view, Article 5 of the Judicial Notifications Law (Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales) offers the possibility of other domiciles and means of notifying a legal entity. According to it, the purpose of notification is to bring actual knowledge to the parties involved in the dispute, which is not satisfied by notification at non-existent or outdated domiciles. Its client did not learn of the arbitration proceeding nor has it signed arbitration clauses, yet an award was issued that generates negative effects on its assets. In the second ground, it reproaches the non-existence of an arbitration clause (cláusula arbitral) and the incompetence of the Tribunal and requests that the award be annulled. In its reply brief to the motion to set aside, the representative of the plaintiff denies Cleerco’s unawareness of the arbitration proceeding and refers—as it states—to copies of electronic mail exchanged with attorney Morera Víquez in November 2021 in which the existence of the arbitration proceeding is mentioned. To this effect, it alleges that in an email of November 10, the following communication took place between them: “My client Mrs. Sandra Fros had spoken with your client Brandon Cleer and he told her that we should speak with you to finalize the Interdicto case file that was processed in the Court of Quepos. In that case file we had filed the execution, it is only the professional fees which are in the amount of (…) according to the fee schedule (…) it is simply to deposit them and for us to send a brief deeming them satisfied [sic] (…). Now, there is another case file that we initiated in the Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce (Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio). The company Cleerco was notified and it never answered the arbitration complaint. There we have as co-defendants another gentleman who was involved in the negotiations when Mr. Brandon acquired and only he [sic] answered and we have an evidentiary hearing soon, I don’t know why [sic] Mr. Cleer did not continue that matter but he was told several times by email (my client) and he never seemed to be interested. There we could sit down to discuss the matter because it is also quite simple to resolve, it only requires willingness. (…).” According to it, attorney Morera, who is now challenging the award, replies on that same date and states: “I would like for us to discuss both topics. (…),” based on which it opposes the filing of the motion to set aside.\n\nIII. The first matter to be elucidated is whether the motion now under review by this Chamber was filed in a timely manner. In this regard, Article 65 of the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley sobre Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social), in the version applicable to the debate (prior to the September 2024 amendment), provides: “ARTICLE 65.- Motion to set aside. The motion to set aside must be filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, on the grounds established in Article 67 of this law, within the fifteen days following notification of the award or the decision that clarifies or supplements the decision. This motion shall not be subject to any formality, but must indicate the ground of nullity on which it is based.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the time limit to allege the nullity of the award is fifteen days from its notification. Under the appellant’s thesis, this time limit would be counted from the time it learned of the award enforcement proceeding, not from the issuance of the award, because it was notified at a place where its domicile and its resident agent no longer were.\n\nAs outlined in the first recital, the claimant initiated the arbitration against Mr. Lemire and Cleerco Properties Limitada, and invoked an arbitration clause signed by the former which, in its submission, bound the latter company. Article 19 of the Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales establishes a wide range of possibilities for service of process (notificación) upon legal entities, with the aim of ensuring that the defendant does not evade the proceedings. In this regard, it provides that the following are possible: personal service on the representative at the place where they can be found, at their place of residence, at their actual domicile, at the corporate domicile—indicated in the Public Registry (Registro Público)—at any potential contractual domicile—if any—or at the office of their resident agent. The law establishes, in its Article 21, the duty of every person to keep their domicile updated, but none of its provisions establish that the party seeking personal service must exhaust all available means of communication. The different possibilities contemplated in the rule are all viable options, but no provision requires that they be exhausted in order to deem a person served in the context of an available patrimonial dispute. According to the records of the arbitral proceeding, it is verified that Cleerco Properties Limitada was served at its corporate domicile. If, at that time, that was not its actual domicile, its negligence in updating that address is not attributable to the opposing party. Therefore, the appellant's thesis would turn the burden of personal service at one of the places authorized by law into a duty to exhaust all of them, which is contrary to the constitutional principles of justice and responsibility and to the text of the law in question. Thus, if Cleerco was served at its then-corporate domicile, but had failed to update it in the Public Registry, its counterpart was in no way obligated to resort to any of the other possible places of service for legal entities, meaning the arbitral proceeding continued in its absence due to its own carelessness. Nevertheless, the award is understood to be automatically notified to the appellant, under the terms of Article 11 of the Ley de Notificaciones, 24 hours after being issued, meaning the appeal is manifestly untimely (extemporáneo) because it was filed seven months after the arbitral decision was issued.\n\nIV. In addition to the foregoing, and in view of the claim of defenselessness (indefensión) and violation of due process formulated by the appellant, it is appropriate to point out some additional considerations, for the sake of completeness. A review of the operative part of the award confirms that the pronouncement of the arbitral tribunal is limited, literally, to the following: “POR TANTO Con base en lo expuesto y normas legales citadas y habiendo el tribunal arbitral en pleno considerado todas las pretensiones expuestas por la actora en su demanda y excepciones opuestas por el co-demandado Richard H Lemire, se falla este asunto como sigue: I.- Se declara parcialmente con lugar la Demanda de Lemjoy S.A., representada por Sandra Frost, respecto a los co-demandados Richard Herve Lemire y Cleerco Properties Limitada, representada por Brendon Cleer, en los extremos que se indican: A) Se declara sin lugar la excepción de prescripción opuesta por el señor LEMIRE. B) Se rechazan las pretensiones principales de Lemjoy S.A. A), C) y E), en cuanto a que se declare que es dueña de la porción de terreno de 520 metros cuadrados; que dicha porción debe ser segregada y traspasada a la sociedad actora y que debe ser inscrita a su nombre. C) Se acoge la pretensión subsidiaria E) de la sociedad actora en el sentido de que la sociedad CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR S.A. debe respetar la servidumbre ecológica y permitir la construcción de la piscina que desea construir doña Sandra Frost para lo cual debe firmar todos los papeles que se le presenten y permitir el acceso para la realización de las obras necesarias. D) Se condena al señor Richard Herve Lemire a indemnizar a la actora el perjuicio consistente en la diferencia entre ser propietario de los 520 metros cuadrados y ser titular de la servidumbre ecológica. Dicha indemnización será liquidada en fase de ejecución de sentencia, donde, con auxilio de peritos, se determinará el importe del valor dejado de percibir por la actora. E) Se declara sin lugar la pretensión de indemnización de daño moral objetivo solicitado por la actora respecto al co-demandado Richard Herve Lemire. En relación con esta pretensión, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. F) Se rechaza la pretensión de condenar al señor Lemire a costear los planos de la porción de terreno reclamado por la actora e inscribirlos en el Registro. En relación con esta pretensión, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. G) Se rechaza la pretensión principal “D”, respecto de la cual se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Lemire. H) Se rechazan las pretensiones “B”, principal y subsidiaria. I) Se condena a ambos co-demandados de forma solidaria al pago de las costas de este proceso arbitral. Respecto a las procesales, se detallan las mismas: (…). Para un total de: $7,118.98.” (Emphasis added). This confirms that Cleerco Properties CR S.A. was ordered to perform two actions affecting its legal situation: respect for the ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica)—and its terms—and the joint and several payment of the costs of the arbitral proceeding. Regarding the first pronouncement, the arbitrators' decision does not impose or create a new legal situation or relationship, but is limited to declaring a pre-existing one, as will be seen. An ex officio review of the Public Registry databases (through its free public consultation function) allows this Chamber to verify—aspects not recorded in the award—that the easement in question was constituted by Mr. Lemire over his farm 116538, for the benefit of property 116546 of the claimant, an easement that was registered on April 22, 2014. Furthermore, Cleerco acquired the estate 116538, which bore the easement, through a purchase-sale executed on April 23, 2014, which was registered until September 30, 2014. That is to say, at the time it acquired the property, the easement was already registered and formed part of the characteristics of the property that were enforceable against it by virtue of registry publicity (Article 455, paragraph 1 of the Código Procesal Civil). Thus, what the arbitral award does is nothing other than recognize the existence of that easement, which was known to Cleerco from the moment of its acquisition. The order to pay the costs of the proceeding is nothing more than the consequence of its negligence in timely updating its corporate domicile and thereby allowing the proceeding to continue in its absence and having been unsuccessful in the arbitral proceeding. In sum, defenselessness with respect to its rights would not be found in the debated situation, such that, in the end, even disregarding what was indicated in the previous recital, its claim of defenselessness would have to be denied.\n\nV.\n\nFinally, and in response to what has been alleged before this venue by the special arbitral representatives of both parties regarding the lack of knowledge (thesis of the appellant's attorney) or knowledge (line maintained by the plaintiff's attorney) of the arbitral process by Cleerco, it is recalled that it is the ethical duty of the attorney to conduct themselves, in the exercise of their profession, in a **truthful** manner, in **good faith**, and with **probity** in the defense of their clients' interests, in order to enable justice (Articles 1, 3, 7, and 11 of the Código de Moral of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica).\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nAs being out of time (extemporáneo), the nullity appeal (recurso de nulidad) filed by Cleerco Properties CR Limitada is dismissed.\n\nThe Constitutional Chamber’s repeated jurisprudence has maintained, in synthesis, that: “… the property of private media in terms of their editorial line and informative content is subject to the requirements and responsibilities imposed by the principles of veracity and accuracy, as well as the rights of reply and rectification that the LFAP grants to individuals (Art. 66 LFAP). For this reason, the constitutional right of reply and rectification (Art. 29 of the Constitution) constitutes one of the main instruments through which the State can ensure the fundamental rights of individuals vis-à-vis the media, without this implying a prior censorship mechanism over it. Therefore, failure to fulfill this obligation may entail subsequent liabilities for the media (civil or criminal liability, for example), but it does not entail, in any way, a mechanism for preventive intervention or prior censorship over the editorial line or content published.” (Voto 4654-2003). Consequently, the subsequent liability of the media is derived in cases of non-compliance with legal obligations or as a consequence of illicit acts, including the eventual commission of electoral crimes, for which the jurisdictional authorities were established.\n\nCarlos Guillermo Zamora Campos\n\nDigitally Signed Document \n-- Verification code -- \n \nWH0CYTKNOJW61\n\n001637-A-S1-2025\n\nSALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten hours forty-two minutes on the sixth of November of two thousand twenty-five.\n\nArbitral proceeding processed before the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica, filed by LEMJOY R S SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, entity represented by its president with powers of generalísimo without limit of sum, Sandra Lynne Frost, and by its special arbitral attorney-in-fact, Álvaro Meza Lázarus, against 1) RICHARD HERVE LEMIRE, represented by his special arbitral attorney-in-fact, Jorge Sánchez Chacón, and 2) CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR LIMITADA, represented by its manager with powers of generalísimo without limit of sum, Brendon Kile Cleer, who did not appear in the litigation, in which the latter company, under the legal representation of Néstor Morera Víquez, files an action for annulment against the arbitral award issued on the sixth of November of two thousand twenty-two by the arbitrators Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Diego Baudrit Carrillo and Federico Torrealba Navas.\n\n**Reporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda**\n\n**CONSIDERANDO**\n\n**I.** In this matter, Lemjoy S.A. filed an arbitral claim before the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio against Richard Herve Lemire and Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, an entity represented by its manager with powers of generalísimo without limit of sum, Brendon Kile Cleer. It alleged, in essence, that it is the owner of a piece of land in the province of Puntarenas and that the company Bixco S.A., represented by Mr. Lemire, was the owner of several properties adjoining its own. It narrated that Mr. Lemire sold one of those properties to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada in 2014, at which time there was a controversy regarding the segregations (segregaciones) previously made on the site by Mr. Lemire himself, because a house was built partly on the property owned by Lemjoy, which caused a reduction in the area (disminución de cabida) of the land by five hundred square meters. However, it explained, Mr. Lemire acknowledged the situation and they agreed to resolve the difference, and to that effect they agreed that Lemjoy would be given a strip of land equivalent to five hundred square meters from an adjoining property, exchanging the encroached-upon strip. According to the claimant's theory, Mr. Lemire would inform the future purchaser of that property of the terms of the agreement, in the sense that the segregation had to be made in favor of Lemjoy, and failing that, he would indemnify it. The plaintiff reported that Cleerco acquired the adjoining property from which a portion was to be segregated, in 2014, and had knowledge of the area discrepancy problem since it even requested a price reduction for the reduction of the land it would be acquiring. According to what is stated, there are numerous electronic emails in which the attorney for Cleerco's representative informed that her client knew of the existence of the referred agreement and, although it did not sign it, it is the party obligated to segregate and annex the 500-square-meter portion in favor of Lemjoy. It alleged that the prior agreement was reflected in a public deed and contained an arbitration clause to resolve potential future conflicts. It warned that Mr. Cleer and the company he represents -Cleerco-, owner of the property, \"* (...) is brought into this process taking advantage of the jurisprudence on the subject as determined by arbitral tribunals and the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.*\". For purposes of notification of the arbitral claim, the claimant provided the address of both respondents. Regarding Cleerco Properties CR Limitada, it attached a notarial notification certificate (acta de notificación notarial) according to which it was notified at its corporate domicile, located in San José, Santa Ana, Plaza Murano, fifth floor, office fifty-eight. The notary authorized for the notification indicated that the communication was received by the condominium administration and in the respective certificate included the following statement: \"*I am told that the company is no longer in the Condominium.*\". Mr. Richard Herve Lemire was notified in Puntarenas, Quepos, Manuel Antonio, at the Manuel Antonio Estate office. The notary specified in the corresponding certificate: \"*A telephone conversation was held with Mr. Lemire. The documents are left at Mr. Lemire’s office in Quepos.*\". The latter, unlike the co-defendant company, appeared in the proceeding. The Tribunal was installed and the process continued its usual course. On November 6, 2022, the Arbitral Tribunal issued the corresponding award. In the proven facts (hechos probados) of its decision, the arbitrators judged the following to be accredited: Lemjoy S.A., represented by Sandra Lyn Frost, acquired four lots owned by Richard Lemire, in 2001, located in the area of Quepos, Puntarenas. One of them is registered under the Folio Real registration number 116546-000, on which it built a house in 2007. In the following years, a controversy arose regarding the lack of area (falta de cabida) of the lots in question. Lemjoy S.A. hired a surveyor (topógrafo) and Mr. Lemire did the same. Both determined that an access road to the lots, built by Richard Lemire, parallel to Lemjoy's lots, encroached by 520 square meters on the land owned by Lemjoy. At that time -2014- Bixco S.A. had the property with Folio Real registration number 116538-000, which borders farm 116546-000 owned by Lemjoy, for sale, and offered the latter to transfer a parcel of 520 square meters from that adjoining land (116538-000) to compensate for the area shortfall. On April 4, 2014, Bixco, Mr. Lemire -in his personal capacity and as attorney-in-fact of Bixco- and Lemjoy appeared before a notary public. In the corresponding deed, various legal transactions were executed. First, Bixco segregated (segregó) from its farm 116538-000 a 520 m2 lot that at that time lacked a cadastral plan (plano catastrado). Second, Bixco sold to Lemjoy the segregated lot for the price of five million colones, which the seller declared as received.\n\nThe segregation and the sale were carried out under the formula “Without the Registry taking note.” Thirdly, an “ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica)” was constituted whose servient tenement is farm 116538-000, then belonging to Bixco, defining farm 116546-000, property of Lemjoy, as the dominant tenement. The content of that easement (servidumbre) is the prohibition of building on the aforementioned 520-meter lot and the right, in favor of the dominant tenement, to plant trees, build, and enjoy water sources and pools on the servient tenement. Finally, in that same deed both parties stated: “(…) this public instrument reflects a material understanding to overcome material differences between Mrs. FROST and Mr. RICHARD HERVE (first name) LEMIRE (surname) (…) related to the preparation of the cadastral plans all of the Partido de Puntarenas, numbers (…). For reasons not attributable to Mrs. Frost or Mr. Lemire, the indicated plans were prepared, initially preventing Mrs. Frost from making direct use of an easement (servidumbre) that was erroneously created in said plans (…), therefore as of this date Mrs. Frost is satisfied in the sense that with the sale of the segregation indicated above, she expressly waives any administrative, civil or criminal claim against Mr. Lemire or any of his represented companies (…). The parties expressly state that given the administrative and cadastral impossibility of registering the indicated sketch as a cadastral plan instrument, the buyer herein shall enjoy and in fact gather the five hundred square meters acquired, and shall use this instrument solely for the purpose of defending a right of possession and eventually as the titled owner thereof. (…) The parties state that if this agreement is breached in such a way that for any reason Mrs. Frost cannot use the current easement (servidumbre) nor the five hundred twenty meters that have been transferred to her in this act for any reason including but not limited to new owners of the properties, of which the current appearing parties are representatives as of today, not wanting to respect this agreement because it was not made known to them or because they are not registered or represented in the Registry, this agreement shall be understood as resolved by operation of law and Mrs. Frost shall have the right to go to the Courts to claim that the right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) must be respected exactly as it was designated in the original segregation plans of the lots of the subdivision (urbanización) carried out by Mr. Lemire, as well as compensation for the damages caused (…). (…) the parties undertake to disclose this document to anyone who acquires rights over any property located where the farms involved of the appearing parties or their represented companies are located and to ensure that they state that they respect the document and that when the segregation and the reunification are carried out, everyone will be in agreement to sign the necessary documents. (…).” This segregation, according to the Tribunal, had a putative character, because it was not based on a cadastral plan, so the lot continued to form part of farm 116538. The supposed segregation and the sale of the lot were not presented to the Public Registry. The ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica) was presented to the Registry and was registered in 2014 in favor of the farm belonging to the plaintiff here and against farm 116538-000. On April 23, 2014, Bixco, represented by Mr. Lemire, sold property 116538-000 to Cleerco Properties CR Limitada. In the public deed, no statement was recorded by the acquirer to the effect that said company had agreed to exclude, from the purchase, the referenced 520-square-meter lot, or that it had obligated itself to segregate or transfer it. In 2020, Cleerco opposed the plaintiff's construction of a pool on the 520-square-meter lot that supports the mentioned easement (servidumbre), and filed an interdictal claim that was processed in the Civil Court of Quepos. The award found it unproven that the plaintiff has a property right over the 520 square meters that is enforceable against Cleerco. In resolving the merits of the petition, the award, in summary, granted the subsidiary claim according to which it imposed on Cleerco Properties CR S.A. the duty to respect the ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica) and allow the construction of the pool that the plaintiff wished to build, for which it had to sign the documents presented to it and allow access to carry out the necessary works. It imposed on Mr. Lemire the duty to compensate the plaintiff for the harm consisting of the difference between being the owner of the 520 square meters and being the holder of an ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica), and imposed on both co-defendants the payment of costs. This decision was issued by the Arbitral Tribunal on November sixth, two thousand twenty-two, notified to the parties on that same date. On July seventh, 2023, Cleerco Properties CR Limitada appeared before the Chamber and filed a recourse for annulment. It argued that although “months have elapsed since the issuance of the Award,” it had never been notified of the arbitral process and learned of its existence on June 30, 2023, upon being notified of the enforcement of judgment process initiated by Lemjoy, such that that being the date on which it became aware of the award, the recourse for annulment was filed in a timely and proper manner.\n\nII. In its first ground for annulment—of the two it raises—it points out a violation of due process due to invalid notification and violation of its right to defense. To this effect, it alleges the following. Cleerco Properties is represented by Bendon Kile Cleer, a foreigner not resident in Costa Rica, such that since the incorporation of the company, it appointed attorney Natalia González Bogarín as resident agent, in compliance with the provisions of article 13 section 18 of the Code of Commerce. It indicated that Ms. González changed offices on May 7, 2020, and made official delivery of office no. 58 of Plaza Murano and updated her information with the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica). The notary who provided notice of this process indicated, in the respective record, that he proceeded to notify at the corporate domicile and recorded that the condominium administration informed him that the company was not located in that building. Although there is an obligation to keep the corporate domicile updated, “it is not the only possibility for notification and neither does it prove the propriety of notifying at a non-existent corporate domicile.” For this reason, in its thesis, article 5 of the Judicial Notifications Law provides the possibility of other domiciles and ways of notifying a legal entity. According to it, the purpose of notification is to bring real knowledge to the parties involved in the conflict, which is not satisfied by notification at non-existent or outdated domiciles. Its represented party did not learn of the arbitral process nor has it signed arbitration clauses, but an award was issued that generates negative effects on its patrimony.\n\nIn the second ground, it reproaches the non-existence of an arbitration clause (cláusula arbitral) and the incompetence of the Tribunal and requests that the award be annulled. In its reply brief to the application for annulment (recurso de nulidad), the attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff denies any ignorance of the arbitral proceeding by Cleerco and refers—according to what is stated—to copies of emails exchanged with Lic. Morera Víquez in November 2021, in which the existence of the arbitral proceeding is mentioned. To this effect, it alleges that in an email dated November 10, the following communication between them occurred: “My client Ms. Sandra Fros had spoken with your client Brandon Cleer and he indicated that we should speak with you regarding the settlement of the Interdict file that was processed in the Court of Quepos. In that file, we had filed the execution, it is only the professional fees, which are for the sum of (...) according to the tariff table (...) it is simply a matter of depositing it and us sending a brief declaring ourselves satisfied (sic) (...). Now, there is another file that we initiated at the Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce (Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio). Notice was served on the company Cleerco and they never answered the arbitration demand. There, we have as a co-defendant another gentleman who had to do with the negotiations when Mr. Brandon acquired and only the (sic) answered (sic) and we have an evidentiary hearing soon, I don’t know why (sic) that matter was not continued by Mr. Cleer but he was informed several times by email (my client) and he never seemed interested. There we could sit down and discuss the matter because it is also quite simple to resolve, only willingness is required. (...)” . According to what is stated, Lic. Morera, now appellant (recurrente) of the award, answers him, on that same date, and indicates: “I would like us to discuss both topics. (...)”, based on which it objects to the filing of the application for annulment.\n\nIII. The first matter to elucidate is whether the application for annulment (recurso) now under analysis by this Chamber was filed in a timely manner. In this regard, article 65 of the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley sobre Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social), in the version applicable to the debate (prior to the reform of September 2024), provides: \"ARTICLE 65.- Application for annulment (Recurso de nulidad). The application for annulment (recurso de nulidad) must be filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, on the grounds established in article 67 of this law, within fifteen days following the notification of the award or the resolution that clarifies or supplements the resolution. This application shall not be subject to any formality, but it must indicate the ground for annulment (causa de nulidad) on which it is based.\" (Emphasis added). Thus, the time limit to argue the annulment of the award is fifteen days from its notification. Under the appellant's theory, that time limit would be counted from when it became aware of the enforcement process of the award, not from the issuance of the award, because it was notified at a place where neither its domicile nor its resident agent was any longer located. As was outlined in the first recital (considerando), the claimant promoted the arbitration against Mr. Lemire and Cleerco Properties Limitada, and invoked an arbitration clause (cláusula arbitral) signed by the former which, in its statement, that latter company was aware of. Section 19 of the Judicial Notifications Law (Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales) establishes a wide range of possibilities for notifying legal entities, for the purpose of ensuring that the defendant does not evade the proceeding. In this regard, it provides that they are the following: personal notification (notificación) of the representative in the place where he may be found, at his home, at his actual domicile (domicilio real), at the corporate domicile (domicilio societario)—indicated in the Public Registry (Registro Público)—, at any contractual domicile—when there is one—, at his actual domicile, or at the office of his resident agent. The law establishes, in its section 21, the duty of every person to keep their domicile updated, but none of its precepts establishes that the party seeking personal notification must exhaust all the enabled communication options. The different possibilities contemplated in the rule are viable options, all of them, but no precept requires them to be exhausted in order to deem a person notified in the context of an available patrimonial dispute. According to the background of the arbitral proceeding, it is verified that Cleerco Properties Limitada was notified at its corporate domicile (domicilio social). If that was not, at that moment, its actual domicile (domicilio real), its negligence in updating that address is not attributable to the counterparty. This being so, the appellant's theory would convert the burden of personal notification at one of the places authorized by law into a duty to exhaust all of them, which is contrary to the constitutional principles of justice and responsibility and to the text of the law in question itself. This being so, if Cleerco was notified at its then-corporate domicile, but had failed to update it in the Public Registry, its counterparty was not obligated in any way to resort to any of the other possible places of notification for legal entities, such that the arbitral proceeding continued without its presence due to its own carelessness. Nonetheless, the award must be understood as automatically notified to the appellant, under the terms of article 11 of the Judicial Notifications Law (Ley de Notificaciones), 24 hours after being rendered, so the application (recurso) is clearly untimely because it was filed seven months after the arbitral decision was issued.\n\nIV. In addition to the foregoing, and in view of the allegation of defenselessness and violation of due process that the appellant formulates, it is appropriate to point out some additional considerations, for further amplification. A review of the operative section of the award allows verification that the pronouncement of the arbitral tribunal is constrained, literally, to the following: “THEREFORE Based on the foregoing and cited legal norms and the full arbitral tribunal having considered all the claims set forth by the plaintiff in its demand and the defenses (excepciones) asserted by the co-defendant Richard H Lemire, this matter is decided as follows: I.- The Demand of Lemjoy S.A., represented by Sandra Frost, is partially granted with regard to the co-defendants Richard Herve Lemire and Cleerco Properties Limitada, represented by Brendon Cleer, in the following terms: A) The statute of limitations defense (excepción de prescripción) asserted by Mr. LEMIRE is declared without merit. B) The main claims A), C) and E) of Lemjoy S.A. are rejected, in that it be declared that it is the owner of the 520-square-meter portion of land; that said portion must be segregated and transferred to the plaintiff company and that it must be registered in its name. C) The subsidiary claim E) of the plaintiff company is granted in the sense that the company CLEERCO PROPERTIES CR S.A.\n\n...must respect the ecological easement (servidumbre ecológica) and permit the construction of the swimming pool that Mrs. Sandra Frost wishes to build, for which she must sign all papers presented to her and allow access for the carrying out of the necessary works. D) Mr. Richard Herve Lemire is ordered to compensate the plaintiff for the loss consisting of the difference between being the owner of the 520 square meters and being the holder of the ecological easement. Said compensation shall be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase, where, with the assistance of experts, the amount of the value not received by the plaintiff shall be determined. E) The claim for objective moral damages sought by the plaintiff against the co-defendant Richard Herve Lemire is dismissed. In relation to this claim, the objection of lack of right raised by Mr. Lemire is upheld. F) The claim seeking to order Mr. Lemire to pay for the plans of the portion of land claimed by the plaintiff and to register them in the Registry is rejected. In relation to this claim, the objection of lack of right raised by Mr. Lemire is upheld. G) The main claim \"D\" is rejected, in respect of which the objection of lack of right raised by Mr. Lemire is upheld. H) The claims \"B,\" main and subsidiary, are rejected. I) Both co-defendants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the costs of this arbitration process. Regarding procedural costs, these are detailed as follows: (...). For a total of: $7,118.98.\" (Emphasis added). This allows us to verify that two legally binding actions affecting its legal situation were imposed on Cleerco Properties CR S.A.: respect for the ecological easement—and its terms—and the joint and several payment of the costs of the arbitration process. Regarding the first pronouncement, the arbitrators' decision does not impose or create a legal situation or relationship ex novo, but rather limits itself to declaring a pre-existing situation, as will be seen. An ex officio review of the Public Registry databases (through its free public inquiry function) allows this Chamber to verify—aspects that do not appear in the award—that the easement in question was constituted by Mr. Lemire over his property 116538, for the benefit of the plaintiff's property 116546, an easement that was registered on April 22, 2014. Furthermore, Cleerco acquired the estate 116538 that bore the easement through a purchase and sale executed on April 23, 2014, and it was registered only on September 30, 2014. That is to say, that at the time it acquired the property, the easement was already registered and formed part of the property's characteristics, which by registry publicity were enforceable against it (article 455, paragraph 1 of the Civil Procedure Code). Thus, what the arbitration ruling does is nothing other than recognize the existence of that easement, of which Cleerco had knowledge from the moment of its acquisition. The order to pay the costs of the process is nothing more than the consequence of its negligence in timely updating its corporate domicile, thereby allowing the process to proceed in its absence, and having been the losing party in the arbitration process. All told, the situation of defenselessness regarding its rights would not be verified in the matter under debate, so that, in the end, even ignoring what was indicated in the preceding considerando, its claim of defenselessness should be denied.\n\nV. Finally, and in light of what was alleged—before this venue—by the special arbitration representatives of both parties regarding the lack of knowledge (the thesis of the appellant's attorney) or knowledge (the line maintained by the plaintiff's attorney) of the arbitration process by Cleerco, it is recalled that it is the ethical duty of the attorney to conduct themselves, in the exercise of their profession, in a truthful manner, in good faith, and with probity in defending the interests of their clients, in order to enable justice (articles 1, 3, 7, and 11 of the Code of Ethics of the Costa Rica Bar Association).\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nDue to being untimely, the appeal for annulment filed by Cleerco Properties CR Limitada is rejected.\n\nAccountant’s Office\nrgonzalezu.\n\n \n\n \n\n| | | |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| | | |\n| Luis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga | | Rocío Rojas Morales |\n\n| | | |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| | | |\n| Damaris Vargas Vásquez | | Jorge Leiva Poveda |\n\n| `padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top` | `padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top` |\n|---|---|\n| ![Carlos Guillermo Zamora Campos]() | |\n| **Carlos Guillermo Zamora Campos** | |\n\n \n\n \nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente \n-- Código verificador -- \n \nWH0CYKTNOJW61 \n\n1" }