{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-986870", "citation": "Res. 02017-2020 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Subcontratación en la contratación administrativa y responsabilidad solidaria del grupo económico", "title_en": "Subcontracting in administrative contracting and joint liability of the economic group", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conoce el recurso de casación interpuesto por Verizon Communications Inc. y Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC contra una sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo que las condenó solidariamente al pago de daños y perjuicios a Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (THS). La controversia deriva de la terminación de un \"Contrato Maestro de Compra\" entre Verizon y THS, el cual era una subcontratación del contrato administrativo celebrado entre el ICE y GTE (hoy Verizon) para la edición de guías telefónicas. La Sala confirma que el Contrato Maestro califica como subcontratación, pues GTE (Verizon) subcontrató a THS para cumplir parte de sus obligaciones. Asimismo, determina que las empresas Verizon constituían un grupo de interés económico y, por tanto, respondían solidariamente. La Sala rechaza todos los agravios: confirma la competencia del Contencioso Administrativo, la aplicación del plazo de prescripción de cuatro años, la correcta valoración de la prueba pericial y documental, y la condena por los daños sufridos por THS ante la terminación anticipada del contrato maestro.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice hears the cassation appeal filed by Verizon Communications Inc. and Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC against a judgment of the Administrative Litigation Court that held them jointly and severally liable for damages to Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (THS). The dispute arises from the termination of a \"Master Purchase Agreement\" between Verizon and THS, which was a subcontract of the administrative contract between ICE and GTE (now Verizon) for the publication of telephone directories. The Chamber confirms that the Master Agreement qualifies as a subcontract, since GTE (Verizon) subcontracted THS to fulfill part of its obligations. It also determines that the Verizon companies constituted an economic interest group and, therefore, were jointly liable. The Chamber rejects all grievances: it confirms the jurisdiction of the Administrative Litigation Court, the application of the four-year statute of limitations, the correct assessment of expert and documentary evidence, and the award for damages suffered by THS due to the early termination of the master agreement.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "25/06/2020", "year": "2020", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "subcontratación", "contratación administrativa", "grupo de interés económico", "responsabilidad solidaria", "prescripción cuatrienal", "silencio positivo" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "subcontratación", "contratación administrativa", "grupo de interés económico", "responsabilidad solidaria", "casación", "prescripción", "daños y perjuicios", "contrato administrativo", "licitación pública", "silencio positivo" ], "keywords_en": [ "subcontracting", "administrative contracting", "economic interest group", "joint liability", "cassation", "statute of limitations", "damages", "administrative contract", "public tender", "administrative silence" ], "excerpt_es": "En el caso de examen, según consta en autos, GTE (hoy Verizon) resultó adjudicataria de la licitación pública no. 6378-T. De esta manera, suscribió con el ICE el “Contrato para la Edición de la Guía Telefónica y Desarrollo e Implementación de Servicios de Información entre el ICE y GTE.” En la cláusula 2.13.1 de dicho convenio, se otorgó a Verizon la posibilidad de subcontratar a una empresa para la realización del desarrollo, producción y distribución de las guías telefónicas hasta en un 50% del total del contrato. Es así como Verizon suscribe con THS el Contrato Maestro de Compra VIS-2001-21-IP. Lo expuesto, permite entrever, el contrato maestro se origina como una subcontratación del contrato administrativo celebrado entre el ICE y GTE (hoy Verizon), razón por la cual, estima esta Sala, la interpretación realizada por el Tribunal respecto a la figura de subcontratación es correcta.", "excerpt_en": "In the case under examination, as evidenced in the record, GTE (now Verizon) was awarded the public tender no. 6378-T. Thus, it entered into the \"Contract for the Publication of Telephone Directories and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE\" with ICE. In clause 2.13.1 of said agreement, Verizon was granted the possibility of subcontracting a company for the development, production and distribution of telephone directories up to 50% of the total contract. That is how Verizon entered into the Master Purchase Agreement VIS-2001-21-IP with THS. The foregoing allows us to see that the master agreement originated as a subcontract of the administrative contract between ICE and GTE (now Verizon), which is why this Chamber considers that the interpretation made by the Court regarding the figure of subcontracting is correct.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The cassation appeals filed by Verizon are denied, with costs against the appellants, and the judgment for damages imposed by the Administrative Litigation Court is upheld.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar los recursos de casación interpuestos por Verizon, con costas a cargo de las promoventes, y se confirma la condena por daños y perjuicios impuesta por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IX", "quote_en": "Subcontracting, on the other hand, is not in itself a form of participation in the contract, but rather implies that the awardee of the tender agrees with a third party entirely unrelated to the procurement, the performance of a part of what was agreed (Article 62 of the LCA and canon 69 of the RLCA).", "quote_es": "La subcontratación, por su parte, no es en sí misma una forma de participación en el contrato, sino que implica que el adjudicatario del concurso acuerda con un tercero totalmente ajeno a la contratación, la realización de una parte de lo pactado (artículo 62 de la LCA y el canon 69 del RLCA)." }, { "context": "Considerando X", "quote_en": "Once the applicability of the figure of subcontracting is established, it is appropriate to analyze whether or not the liability exemptions agreed in the master agreement apply… THS had at least 103,000 copies of the white pages of the telephone directories in stock and had incurred debts with other entities to purchase the necessary machinery… These situations fit the aforementioned impediment scenarios that made it impossible to apply the liability exemption provided in the clause, so the compensation is appropriate.", "quote_es": "Establecida la procedencia de la figura de la subcontratación, deviene analizar si aplican o no los eximentes de responsabilidad acordados en el contrato maestro… THS tenía en existencia al menos 103.000 ejemplares de las páginas blancas de las guías telefónicas y había adquirido deudas con otras entidades para comprar la maquinaria necesaria... Esas situaciones se ajustan a los supuestos de impedimento supra indicados que imposibilitaban la aplicación de la eximente de responsabilidad prevista en la cláusula, por lo que procede la indemnización." }, { "context": "Considerando XXI", "quote_en": "Thus, given the financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationship between both companies, this Chamber considers that an economic interest group exists.", "quote_es": "Así, al existir una relación financiera, administrativa y patrimonial de ambas empresas; estima esta Sala, se está en presencia de un GIE." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-26393", "citation": "Ley 7727", "title_en": "Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/12/1997", "year": "1997" }, { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "norm-6239", "citation": "Ley 3284", "title_en": "Commercial Code", "title_es": "Código de Comercio", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/04/1964", "year": "1964" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-26393", "citation": "Ley 7727", "title_en": "Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/12/1997", "year": "1997" }, { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "norm-6239", "citation": "Ley 3284", "title_en": "Commercial Code", "title_es": "Código de Comercio", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/04/1964", "year": "1964" }, { "id": "pgr-24060", "citation": "C-177-2023", "title_en": "Feasibility of ICE Using RACSA's Spectrum Concessions", "title_es": "Viabilidad del ICE para explotar concesiones de espectro de RACSA", "doc_type": "dictamen", "date": "18/09/2023", "year": "2023" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-986870", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-26393", "norm_num": "7727", "norm_name": "Ley sobre Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/12/1997" }, { "doc_id": "norm-58314", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "27/09/2006" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6239", "norm_num": "3284", "norm_name": "Código de Comercio", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1964" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "20170004001000-2693731-1.rtf\n\n*080015051027CA*\n\nEXP. 08-001505-1027-CA\n\nRES. 002017-F-S1-2020\n\nSALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas del veinticinco de junio de dos mil veinte.\n\nEn el proceso de conocimiento establecido por TREJOS HERMANOS SUCESORES SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representado su presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Álvaro Trejos Fonseca, cédula de identidad no. 1-0390-0895, bínubo, máster en ciencias; contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD, VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. y VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES COSTA RICA LLC. Figuran además, como apoderados especiales judiciales, de la actora, los licenciados Eduardo Sancho González, cédula de identidad no. 1-380-073, Andrés Meza Villalobos, cédula de identidad no. 2-638-788, Diego Baudrit Carrillo, cédula de identidad no. 1-323-212 y Luis Gerardo Villanueva Monge, cédula de identidad no. 3-221-204, vecino de Cartago; por el Instituto co-demandado, la licenciada Ana Victoria Zapata Calvo, cédula de identidad no. 1-892-491, divorciada y los licenciados Carlos Cerdas Delgado, cédula de identidad no. 1-896-201, Juan Pablo Hernández Cortés, cédula de identidad no. 1-849-120, ambos de domicilio no indicado; por Verizon Comunication Incorporated, la licenciada Andrea Hulbert Volio, cédula de identidad no. 9-100-121 y los licenciados, Alexander Salazar Solórzano, cédula de identidad no. 1-835-398, Juan Carlos Pizarro Corrales, cédula de identidad no. 1-825-376, Rodrigo Alberto Pérez González, cédula de identidad no. 4-211-250, de estado civil y domicilio no indicados y Marvin Céspedes Méndez, cédula de identidad no. 1-531-965; y, por Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC, el licenciado Gino Capella Molina, cédula de identidad no. 1-569-226. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y, con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José. Las sociedades co-demandadas formulan recurso de casación contra la sentencia no. 66-2017-V, emitida por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Quinta, a las 8 horas del 19 de julio de 2017.\n\nRedacta el magistrado Solís Zelaya \n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- A la luz de los hechos tenidos por probados, el 10 de marzo de 2000, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (en futuras referencias ICE) y el Grupo GTE (en adelante GTE) suscribieron el “Contrato para la Edición de la Guía Telefónica y Desarrollo e Implementación de Servicios de Información entre el ICE y GTE” (contratación administrativa Licitación Pública 6378-T). En dicho convenio se acordó subcontratar hasta el 50% del desarrollo, producción y distribución de las guías telefónicas, previa autorización escrita del ICE (cláusula 2.13.1). Asimismo, se dispuso, la totalidad de las etapas de ejecución del contrato se realizarían en Costa Rica y, en caso de cambio de nombre por fusión o asociación con otra empresa, el contrato permanecería invariable y vigente entre las partes, bajo las nuevas denominaciones legales de las entidades jurídicas. Derivado del contrato supra indicado, el 28 de febrero de 2002, Verizon y Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (en adelante THS) suscribieron el Contrato Maestro de Compra VIS-2001-21-IP para la elaboración, empaque y distribución de las guías telefónicas en Costa Rica y Belice, por un plazo de 168 meses (regulado por el Código Civil -en adelante CC- y el Código de Comercio -en futuras referencias CoCo). Como requisito de efectividad, se estableció la sujeción del Contrato Maestro a la ejecución del contrato celebrado con motivo de la licitación 6378-T (cláusula 2.b). En cuanto a su terminación, se dispuso que el comprador pudiera finalizar el contrato cuando no pudiera acordar cualquier revisión de precio o reforma. Para ello, debía notificar por escrito al vendedor con al menos 90 días de anticipación. También podía dar por terminada la relación contractual de manera inmediata, si durante el plazo del contrato, el convenio suscrito entre el ICE y Verizon era terminado por cualquier razón (cláusula 28). En otro orden de ideas, se le pidió a THS modernizar sus equipos para enfrentar los cambios tecnológicos y requerimiento de los contratantes. El 16 de mayo de 2002, GTE informó a la Dirección de Proveeduría del ICE que General Telephone Directory Company C por A cambió de nombre a Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC (sucesivamente Verizon LLC) y se pidió tener oficialmente comunicado el cambio de razón social de las empresas integrantes de GTE. Luego, GTE se fusionó con Bell Atlantic y creó el Grupo Verizon, sustituyéndose así la razón de GTE por Grupo Verizon (en lo sucesivo Verizon). En el año 2004 Verizon le propuso al ICE hacer unos ajustes al contrato. El 13 de mayo de ese año, planteó a la Subgerencia de Telecomunicaciones (en adelante Subgerencia) la revisión de las guías telefónicas. Mediante oficio 6000-41046-2004 del 15 de julio de 2004, la Subgerencia le indicó a Verizon que las guías telefónicas del año 2005 debían mantener la misma estructura y cantidad de ejemplares del 2004. El 14 de octubre de ese año Verizon y THS suscribieron el \"Cronograma de Producción, Guía Provincias 2005\", señalando el 15 de diciembre como fecha límite para modificar el número de páginas y la cantidad de libros. El vicepresidente de Verizon, mediante nota de data 8 de setiembre de 2004 informó al Departamento de Proveeduría del ICE (recibida el 16 de diciembre de 2004) que al no haber recibido respuesta a la nota de fecha 13 de mayo de 2004, tendría por aplicado el silencio positivo. En oficio 6000-52278-2004 del 14 de setiembre de 2004, la Subgerencia rechazó la aplicación del silencio positivo. Indicó, la petición había sido atendida mediante oficio 6000-41046-2004 del 15 de julio de 2004 y reiteró que la estructura y cantidad de los ejemplares de las guías telefónicas debía ser igual a la del año 2004. A través de la nota de data 8 de noviembre de 2004, el vicepresidente de Verizon insistió en que no había tenido respuesta dentro del plazo de 30 días hábiles y, por tanto, aplicaba el silencio positivo. En oficio 600-64540-2004 del 18 de noviembre de 2004 la Subgerencia reiteró que la aplicación del silencio positivo era improcedente. En oficio S1-0726-11-04 del 15 de noviembre de 2004, la Jefatura del Proceso de Servicios de Información del ICE informó al gerente general de Verizon que la vigencia de la garantía de cumplimiento pedida el 30 de junio de 2004 no se había ampliado (oficio 6000-35344-2044) y destacó, la estructura de las guías telefónicas presentaba incumplimientos en desacato de notas 6000-41046-2004 y 6000-52278-2004. Durante una visita al local industrial de THS (12 de noviembre de 2004), el ICE levantó unas actas notariales donde hizo constar la existencia de ejemplares de las páginas blancas residenciales de las guías telefónicas que excluían la información de los abonados de Los Santos y las provincias. En oficio S.I.0730-11-04 se le comunicó a Verizon el incumplimiento de las cláusulas 3.1 y 3.4.1.3 del Cartel de la Licitación Pública y la segunda del contrato. En el artículo 10 de la sesión no. 5649 efectuada de 23 de noviembre de 2004, se acordó rechazar el intento de modificación unilateral de las condiciones contractuales pactadas. El 2 de diciembre de 2004, en visita realizada a las instalaciones de la actora, el ICE comprobó que THS, siguiendo las órdenes de compra entregadas por Verizon, había confeccionado 103.000 ejemplares de páginas blancas residenciales del Área Metropolitana que contenían modificaciones en el diseño de impresión y encuadernación no autorizadas. Como consecuencia de la violación de los requerimientos pactados, la Subgerencia inició un procedimiento de resolución contractual (oficio 5225-69163-2004 del 14 de diciembre de 2004) en contra de Verizon, el cual finalizó con la rescisión del contrato (oficio 6000-27733-2005 de SGT-2326-2005 del 1 de junio de 2005, ratificado por el oficio 0150-36359-2005 de GG-680-2005 de la Gerencia General del ICE). Mediante nota de data 2 de setiembre de 2005, el gerente general de Verizon informa a THS que debido a que el ICE había irrespetado los derechos contractuales y, distorsionando la realidad de los hechos había iniciado un procedimiento administrativo para la resolución del contrato originado de licitación pública 6378-T, daba por finalizada la relación contractual originada en el contrato maestro. En laudo arbitral de las 15 horas del 4 de diciembre de 2015, dictada dentro del proceso arbitral establecido por el ICE contra Verizon LLC, se condenó a la última al pago de diversas sumas de dinero por haber incurrido en incumplimiento contractual. \n\nII.- THS demandó al ICE y a las empresas Verizon Co. y Verizon LLC (folios 1 a 92). Solicitó, se declarara con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos y se condenara a las co-accionadas al pago solidario de los daños y perjuicios, así como las costas personales y procesales del proceso. Pidió, se calificara al Contrato Maestro de Compra como un medio de ejecución del contrato celebrado entre el Consorcio GTE (hoy Verizon LLC y Verizon Co.) y el ICE. Además, se estableciera, la extinción del contrato administrativo suprimía al contrato maestro, aunque THS no tuviera responsabilidad alguna en los hechos generadores de la rescisión. El ICE contestó a folios 292 a 345. Opuso, la defensa previa de falta de competencia y la excepción de falta de legitimación en sus dos modalidades. Verizon, contestó negativamente e interpuso las defensas previas de falta de competencia, litis consorcio pasivo necesario y la excepción de falta de derecho. En la audiencia celebrada el 23 de setiembre de 2010, se acogió la defensa previa de litis consorcio pasivo necesario y se integró a la litis a Verizon LLC. Asimismo, mediante resolución no. 1078-2009 se rechazó la defensa previa de competencia. Posteriormente, esa decisión fue confirmada por la Sala Primera mediante voto 00874-C-S1-2009 de las 11 horas 15 minutos del 25 de agosto de 2009. El Tribunal en sentencia no. 66-2017-V de las 8 horas del 19 de julio de 2017, rechazó las defensas de prescripción, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de legitimación ad procesum opuestas por las co-demandadas y acogió parcialmente la de falta de derecho interpuesta por las mismas. Acogió la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por el ICE. Declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Estableció: 1) el \"Contrato Maestro de Compra\" era una subcontratación entre HTS y GTE (hoy Verizon LLC); 2) la extinción del contrato administrativo celebrado entre el ICE y Verizon, había provocado la extinción del contrato de reciente cita; 3) THS no tenía responsabilidad alguna en los hechos que provocaron la extinción del contrato administrativo y el \"Contrato Maestro de Compra\"; 5) la extinción del contrato maestro había causado los daños y perjuicios inmediatos y directos a THS; 6) Verizon Co. y Verizon LLC integraban un grupo económico sucesor a GTE; 7) Verizon Co. respondía solidariamente tanto por las obligaciones contraídas por Verizon LLC, como por consecuencias negativas ocasionadas a THS con la extinción del Contrato Maestro de Compra; 9) las cláusulas nos. 24 y 28 del citado contrato eran ineficaces respecto de la exoneración de responsabilidad civil de Verizon por incumplimiento contractual. Asimismo, condenó a las co-demandadas a pagarle a la actora las sumas de: $2.582.156,00 por inversión de maquinaria; $2.860.696,00 por incremento en inventarios; $8.806.872 por concepto de flujo de caja operativos correspondientes al periodo 2004-2013; $7.237.068,00 por pérdidas del periodo 2004-2007; $983.825,00 por intereses pagados; y, $28.885.195,00 por daños por interrupción de operaciones. Ordenó la indexación y el pago de intereses sobre los montos supra indicados. Impuso a las co-demandadas al pago solidario de las costas personales y procesales a favor de la sociedad actora y, a THS al pago de las costas personales y procesales a favor del ICE. Verizon LLC solicitó adición y aclaración del voto no. 66-2017-V, la cual se rechazó mediante resolución no. 66-2017-V-BIS de las 8 horas del 8 de agosto de 2017. Inconformes, las co-demandadas acuden a casación.\n\nRecurso por motivos procesales\n\nIII.- Las casacionistas formulan seis agravios. En virtud de que los recursos formulados son idénticos en el número de quebrantos y su contenido, se abordarán de manera conjunta. En el primer motivo, las recurrentes arguyen incompetencia en razón de la materia. Indican, lo debatido en este asunto es una contratación entre particulares, cuya terminación está regulada por una cláusula arbitral. De ahí, su conocimiento por el fondo se encuentra vedado a la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa. En su criterio, lo procedente es la declaración de incompetencia y el traslado del caso al órgano jurisdiccional competente. Invoca quebranto de los artículos 7, 8 y 10 del CPC. Agregan, durante el juicio estableciò la excepción de falta de competencia.\n\nIV.- En el sub lite, la parte actora dirige sus pretensiones hacia el ICE y Verizon. Contra el primero, por ser el ente con el que Verizon suscribe el contrato por la licitación pública 6378-T que otorga la posibilidad de realizar una subcontratación para la ejecución de lo ahí pactado; y, contra el segundo, porque es con dicha empresa que se suscribe el contrato maestro para la elaboración, empaque y distribución de las guías telefónicas en Costa Rica y Belice. Denótese, para la accionante, tanto en el ente como las empresas co-demandadas, eran responsables de la terminación anticipada del contrato maestro y el daño producido. De ahí, plantee la demanda ante la sede contenciosa. Verizon LLC y el ICE interpusieron la excepción de incompetencia. La corporación co-demandada arguye la existencia de una cláusula arbitral y, el ente que lo dirimido es un asunto entre privados. La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en resolución no. 000874-C-S1-2009 de las 11 horas 15 minutos de 2009, señala que los casos donde se discute sobre la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública (incluidas las Instituciones Autónomas, como el ICE), son propios de la jurisdicción civil de hacienda (artículo 97 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial- en adelante LOPJ) y, por tanto, el conocimiento del asunto correspondía a la sede contenciosa administrativa. Durante la audiencia oral las co-accionadas insisten sobre la incompetencia y el Tribunal les indica que el tema esta precluido. El principio de preclusión pretende ordenar el debate y posibilitar el avance del proceso en la forma determinada por el legislador. Así, según lo ha indicado de manera reiterada este órgano decisor, transcurrido dicho estadio procesal de la lite, se avanza hacia la etapa siguiente, sin que exista la posibilidad de retroceder hacia una etapa superada. (Consúltense las sentencias 793 de 10 horas del 27 de noviembre de 2008 y no. 615 de las 9 horas del 20 de mayo de 2010). Con base en lo expuesto, coincide esta Sala con lo indicado por el Tribunal, respecto a que el tema de la competencia es un aspecto precluido, en donde esta Sala ya ha determinado cuál es la sede a la que corresponde su conocimiento. La tesis de que el Tribunal debe declinar su competencia para conocer del asunto por haberse establecido que las pretensiones contra el ICE no eran fundamentadas y, el ente no tenía responsabilidad alguna por el menoscabo causado con el rompimiento del contrato maestro, no es de recibo. De conformidad con el canon 37 del CPC de aplicación supletoria por remisión del ordinal 220 del CPCA, la competencia de un órgano jurisdiccional se pierde únicamente cuando el proceso fue decidido, la sentencia ejecutada, la persona juzgadora realizó el acto procesal que se le encomendó (artículo 36 del CPC), es un proceso accesorio que debe pasar al juzgador que conoce el proceso principal o cuando la persona juzgadora es declarada inhábil en virtud de impedimento, excusa o recusación. En el caso de examen, ninguno de los supuestos de reciente cita se produce. Por tanto, resulta improcedente lo pretendido por las co-demandantes en cuanto a que se declare la incompetencia y se delegue el conocimiento y resolución del asunto a otro órgano jurisdiccional por haberse establecido que el ICE no era responsable del daño producido a THS. Esa determinación no se configura en ninguno de los supuestos de la normativa procesal civil supra indicada, ni representa una avocación del asunto (artículo 4 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). Con base en lo expuesto, deberá rechazarse el cargo.\n\nRecurso por motivos sustantivos\n\nV.- En el segundo embate titulado “Tribunal arbitral es competente para materia patrimonial disponible”, los recurrentes sostienen, la Cámara de Jueces, ingresa al análisis de un contrato de carácter privado que contiene una cláusula arbitral y, por ende, su conocimiento corresponde al Tribunal Arbitral. De esa forma incumple con lo preceptuado en el artículo 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en lo sucesivo LGAP) y el numeral 67 incisos f) de la Ley de Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social (en futuras referencias RAC), \n\nVI.- Según lo manifestado por las recurrentes, el Tribunal resuelve sobre un contrato cuyo conocimiento le está vedado. Sin embargo, observa esta Cámara, en el caso de examen, lo analizado y resuelto es el “Contrato para la Edición de la Guía Telefónica y Desarrollo e Implementación de Servicios de Información entre el ICE y GTE” (licitación pública 6378-T), no el contrato maestro como lo afirman las casacionistas. Véase, lo establecido por el Tribunal fue la actuación dolosa por parte de las co-accionadas, al desatender las repetidas misivas enviadas por el ICE (Oficios 6000-41046-2004 del 15 de julio de 2004, 6000-52278-2004 del 14 de setiembre de 2004 y 600-64540-2004 del 18 de noviembre de 2004), manifestando explícitamente su desacuerdo con las modificaciones sugeridas y, enfatizando, la estructura y cantidad de ejemplares de las guías telefónicas para el 2005 debía ajustarse a lo pactado (igual al 2004). Dicho incumplimiento generó la recisión del contrato administrativo (oficio 6000-27733-2005 de SGT-2326-2005 del 1 de junio de 2005, ratificado por el oficio 0150-36359-2005 de GG-680-2005 de la Gerencia General del ICE) y, subsecuentemente, la terminación del contrato maestro, por tratarse de una “subcontratación” para la ejecución del contrato para la edición de las guías telefónicas. Según puede observarse, dicho análisis no implica la resolución del contrato maestro sino del contrato administrativo celebrado entre el ICE y Consorcio GTE (hoy Verizon), razón por la cual, estima esta Sala, la normativa administrativa y arbitral que se endilga violentada (artículo 66 de la LGAP y canon 67 inciso f) de la Ley RAC) no fue quebranta. Tampoco se da la incorrecta apreciación del contrato maestro que fuera aportado como prueba. En consecuencia, deberá rechazarse el cargo.\n\nVII.- En el tercer cargo, lo reprochado por las recurrentes es la interpretación de la figura de la contratación. Dicen, el haberse incluido el Contrato Maestro de Compra no. VIS-2001-21-IP dentro de ese tipo de figura es un error que conlleva la incorrecta aplicación de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (sucesivamente LCA) y quebranta, además, el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios (artículo 34 constitucional) y los numerales 7, 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política, los cánones 6 y 9 de la LGAP, los artículos 58 y 62 de la LCA, los ordinales 69 y 149 del Reglamento de la LCA (en futuras referencias RLCA) RLCA y los preceptos 18, 19, 20, 21 y 22 del Código Civil (en lo sucesivo CC). Explican, según las limitaciones de las normas 22 y 22 bis de la LCA y el criterio de la Contraloría General de la República, la subcontratación es una relación accesoria de la principal, revestida de carácter privado que procede en convenios de ejecución o construcción de obra pública. De ahí, el intento del ICE por configurarlo dentro esa figura excede las limitaciones previstas en la LCA y violenta los principios de legalidad e intangibilidad de los actos propios. En otro orden de ideas, resaltan el error que a su juicio comete el Tribunal al otorgar mayor vida jurídica al subcontrato que al contrato principal. Exponen, si el plazo de la licitación pública no. 6378-T era de 96 meses (2001 al 2008), no es factible que el plazo máximo del contrato maestro sea de 168 meses como se tiene acreditado en el hecho probado no. 7 de la sentencia impugnada. Esa contradicción ocasiona la imposición de sumas exorbitantes, irrazonables, desproporcionales e ilegales por concepto de indemnización.\n\nVIII.- Respecto a la figura de la subcontratación, el Tribunal indica: “[…] surge cuando uno de los obligados en una relación contractual básicamente binaria, acude a terceros para obtener bienes o servicios que resultan necesarios para cumplir las obligaciones contractuales primarias. En este orden de ideas, existe una relación de primer nivel en el contrato inicial, siendo así que una de las partes, por su cuenta y riesgo y de manera exclusiva según su voluntad, acude a entablar una o varias relaciones contractuales de segundo nivel con sub contratistas, en tanto que éstos poseen los medios para que el contratista cumpla su carga obligacional. (El subrayado no corresponde al original) Consecuentemente, estamos en presencia de un contrato principal y un contrato secundario suscrito por una de las partes, para la realización de alguna de las prestaciones que son, a su vez, objeto del contrato principal o que contribuyen al menos al cumplimiento. Es evidente entonces que la sub contratación nace con motivo de la especialización de las organizaciones empresariales y la imposibilidad material que un contratista tenga a su alcance todos los bienes y servicios necesarios para el cumplimiento de la obligación principal. Consecuentemente, la sub contratación opera en diferentes niveles y si bien, resulta indudable que de la buena operación de la sub contratación depende la debida ejecución de la contratación principal, no es dable verla como un entramado, dada la naturaleza instrumental de aquella para con el contrato rubricado por la contratista. (Lo destacado es suplido) Así el destino del contrato secundario o sea el originado con la sub contratación no debe tener una consecuencia jurídica o fáctica directa en la ejecución del contrato principal, es decir, el incumplimiento del sub contratista no releva al contratista de cumplir en tiempo y forma los términos y condiciones del contrato principal. […]” Según lo trascrito, la Cámara de Juzgadores concluyó, aunque la LCA originalmente preveía la subcontratación para los contratos de ejecución o construcción de obra pública, vía jurisprudencial se había abierto la posibilidad de utilizar esta figura en otros tipos de contratación administrativa. Determinaron que el contrato con el ICE permitía subcontratar una empresa para el desarrollo, producción y distribución de las Guías Telefónicas, sin que ello constituyera una obligación para el ente en caso de incumplimiento, pero sin relevarse al GTE (hoy Verizon) de su responsabilidad por la ejecución total del contrato. Establecieron la prevalencia de la contratación administrativa (mecanismo para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos) frente al contrato maestro (figura de derecho privado). Tocante al término del plazo de la subcontratación, tuvieron por acreditado que el plazo máximo pactado para la producción, empaque y distribución de los directorios telefónicos fue de 168 meses (cláusula 2.b del contrato maestro – Elenco de hechos probados Considerando V.I; inciso b), subinciso 7).\n\nIX.- En lo medular, las casacionistas discrepan de la categoría de subcontratación que se otorga al Contrato Maestro de Compra no. VIS-2001-21-IP y, de la indemnización que se concede a THS a partir de dicha calificación. Previo al análisis del cargo, conviene hacer referencia de las figuras del contrato administrativo y la subcontratación. Se define al contrato administrativo como el acuerdo de voluntades que se celebra entre un ente público (administración pública) y un sujeto de derecho privado; o dos entes públicos. La subcontratación, por su parte, no es en sí misma una forma de participación en el contrato, sino que implica que el adjudicatario del concurso acuerda con un tercero totalmente ajeno a la contratación, la realización de una parte de lo pactado (artículo 62 de la LCA y el canon 69 del RLCA). En este asunto, según consta en autos, GTE (hoy Verizon) resultó adjudicataria de la licitación pública no. 6378-T. De esta manera, suscribió con el ICE el “Contrato para la Edición de la Guía Telefónica y Desarrollo e Implementación de Servicios de Información entre el ICE y GTE.” En la cláusula 2.13.1 de dicho convenio, se otorgó a Verizon la posibilidad de subcontratar a una empresa para la realización del desarrollo, producción y distribución de las guías telefónicas hasta en un 50% del total del contrato. Es así como Verizon suscribe con THS el Contrato Maestro de Compra VIS-2001-21-IP. Lo expuesto, permite entrever, el contrato maestro se origina como una subcontratación del contrato administrativo celebrado entre el ICE y GTE (hoy Verizon), razón por la cual, estima esta Sala, la interpretación realizada por el Tribunal respecto a la figura de subcontratación es correcta. \n\nX.- Establecida la procedencia de la figura de la subcontratación, deviene analizar si aplican o no los eximentes de responsabilidad acordados en el contrato maestro, para determinar si se hizo o no la incorrecta apreciación del convenio (prueba que se alega mal apreciada). En lo de interés, la cláusula 28 del contrato maestro indica que Verizon podía terminar el convenio de manera inmediata en cualquier momento, si el contrato con el ICE era terminado por cualquier razón. Además, se establecía, no sería responsable de la compensación por los daños (pérdidas, ganancias, gastos, inversiones, entre otros) siempre que la terminación no perjudicara o afectara los derechos y responsabilidades de THS con respecto a los directorios previamente producidos o cualquier otra deuda que tuvieran entre las partes. En el caso de examen, cuando se comunicó la terminación del contrato maestro, THS tenía en existencia al menos 103.000 ejemplares de las páginas blancas de las guías telefónicas y había adquirido deudas con otras entidades para comprar la maquinaria necesaria para cumplir con el desarrollo, producción y distribución de las guías telefónicas. Esas situaciones se ajustan a los supuestos de impedimento supra indicados que imposibilitaban la aplicación de la eximente de responsabilidad prevista en la cláusula, por lo que procede la indemnización.\n\nXI.- Adicionalmente, en este agravio, las recurrentes señalan otros aspectos de disconformidad. En primer término, refieren el impedimento para utilizar la figura de la subcontratación en contratos administrativos que no sean obra pública (artículos 58 y 62 de la LCA y numeral 69 del RLCA). Explican, el contrato maestro suscrito entre Verizon y THS se efectúa para la adquisición de suministros, por lo que no puede calificarse como subcontratación. En torno a este tema, cabe indicar, el uso de la figura de la subcontratación se ha extendido a otros tipos de contratos administrativos, en los cuales, tal y como en el caso que nos ocupa, su utilización se dispone por medio de acuerdo de las voluntades de los contratantes, vía cláusula cartelaria. Por tanto, estima este Órgano jurisdiccional, si se está en presencia de una subcontratación. Como segundo aspecto, reclaman el quebranto del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios (artículo 34 constitucional). Con relación a este tema, debe tenerse presente, la endilgada transgresión se da por la anulación de acto declarativo de derechos, sin la previa declaración del acto como lesivo. En el presente asunto, lo debatido no es un acto declarativo de derechos, sino la extinción de un contrato administrativo a causa del incumplimiento contractual “doloso” por parte de las co-demandadas. Ergo, la endilga violación no se da. Como último punto, las recurrentes refutan el plazo de 168 meses otorgado a la subcontratación. Al respecto, debe indicarse, dicho plazo fue otorgado de común acuerdo por las partes en la cláusula 2.b del Contrato Maestro no. VIS-2001-21-JP. Por tanto, no es cierto que fuera la Cámara de Juzgadores la que estableció el tiempo de duración de la subcontratación. Conforme lo expuesto, a criterio de esta Sala, el Contrato Maestro no. VIS-2001-21-JP fue correctamente apreciado. Se coincide con el Tribunal en cuanto a que estamos en presencia de una subcontratación, donde en una de sus cláusulas se define el plazo máximo para la producción, empaque y distribución de los directorios telefónicos; y, cuya causa de terminación obedece al incumplimiento contractual “doloso” por parte de las co-accionadas del contrato administrativo derivado de la licitación pública no. 6378-T. En consecuencia, no se produce la transgresión del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios y la normativa que se invoca soslayada, por lo que sobrevendrá el rechazo del agravio.\n\nXII.- En el cuarto vicio, las promoventes alegan la preterición del informe pericial aportado por la parte actora. Destacan, ese elemento probatorio, excluye el contrato suscrito entre THS y Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. (en futuras referencias RACSA) el 28 de abril de 2006. Dicha omisión produce un sesgo en los ingresos monetarios (ganancias) percibidos por THS desde esa fecha e incumple con los principios de las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (sucesivamente NIIF) y concede un enriquecimiento sin causa al otorgar a THS sumas sobrevaloradas por concepto de inversión de maquinaria, flujos de caja no recibido, pérdidas realizadas del 2004 al 2007 e interrupción de operaciones. Relatan, el yerro en el peritaje se produce debido a que la accionante en lugar de pedir al señor Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez, que se examinaran los libros contables que demuestran su estado financiero-contable, solicita la corroboración del estudio realizado por el señor Tomás Evans Salazar, el cual, tal y como se indicó, se encuentra sesgado. Invocan la violación del numeral 267 del CoCo.\n\nXIII.- Respecto del contrato suscrito entre THS y RACSA, el Tribunal en el Considerando V.XV.- del fallo impugnado, indicó: “V.XV.- Sobre los Montos liquidados […] Al monto indicado, se le deberá deducir las sumas que se le hayan pagado a la actora por parte de Radiográfica Costarricense S.A., por concepto de cualquier contrato de elaboración de guías telefónicas que se haya realizado con posterioridad al rompimiento contractual por parte de Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC. […]” En ese mismo apartado, tocante a los informes de los señores Tomás Evans Salazar y Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez, dijo: “4. Las sumas determinadas en los documentos en mención, tanto de Evans Salazar como Romero Rodríguez se fundan en la técnica aplicable, son coincidentes y comprenden los rubros de maquinaria, incremento en inventarios, flujos de caja operativos según el contrato, pérdidas realizadas, intereses pagados y afectación por interrupción de operaciones. […] La parte demandada no objetó ni aportó prueba que desvirtuara, la metodología ni las fechas estimadas para valor futuro de las pérdidas realizadas, las tasas de interés aplicadas, proyecciones, cálculos, metodologías o las conclusiones obtenidas. Por lo anterior, este Tribunal no cuenta con elementos de convicción que permitan cuestionar los alcances de los documentos objeto de análisis. (El subrayado es suplido) […]” \n\nXIV.- En este embate, los recurrentes acusan la preterición de la prueba pericial. Sin embargo, según se indicó en el Considerando anterior, el Tribunal sí valora ese elemento probatorio. Ello se evidencia de lo dicho por la Cámara de Juzgadores respecto a que deben rebajarse al monto reconocido, las sumas pagadas por RACSA a THS, por concepto de cualquier contrato de elaboración de las guías telefónicas posterior al rompimiento contractual con Verizon; así como de la indicación de la falta de objeción contra la prueba o el aporte de otro elemento probatorio para desvirtuar la metodología utilizada por los señores Evans Salazar y Romero Rodríguez. De ahí, estime esta Cámara, aunque lo alegado por las casacionistas es la preterición del informe pericial aportado por THS (exclusión del contrato con RACSA y los libros contables), lo que se debate es la valoración que hace el Tribunal de ese elemento probatorio. Pero, además, a juicio de esta Sala, las recurrentes pretenden ingresar nuevamente al análisis de su oposición al dictamen, aspecto resuelto por las personas juzgadoras en el momento procesal oportuno. Con base en lo anteriormente expuesto, el cargo no es de recibo, por lo que procederá su rechazo. \n\nXV.-En la quinta censura, las recurrentes invocan la excepción de prescripción. Alegan el quebranto del inciso e) del artículo 984 del CoCo, el numeral 155 del Código Procesal Civil (en lo sucesivo CPC) CPC y el principio de seguridad jurídica. Las casacionistas sostienen que al ser el Contrato Maestro un acuerdo para la producción y confección de las guías telefónicas, aplica el plazo prescriptivo previsto en el artículo 984 inciso e) del CoCo. Desde esa óptica, si la notificación del término de la relación contractual se notificó a THS el 2 de setiembre de 2005, el plazo para la interposición de la demandaVI fenecía el 2 de setiembre de 2006. Sin embargo, la actora plantea la demanda hasta el 15 de diciembre de 2008 (folios 1 a 93 del expediente electrónico) y el auto de intimación notificado hasta el 28 de enero de 2008, por lo que, a la luz de la norma supra citada, el plazo estaba prescriptivo estaba sobrepasado. Pese a ello, el Tribunal sin motivación e indicación alguna de la norma que aplica, efectúa un conteo de prescripción de cuatro años y deniega la excepción. \n\nXVI.- Respecto a la excepción de prescripción, el Tribunal señaló: “V.IV.- Sobre la defensa de prescripción opuesta: a) En sus alegatos de cierre el representante de la codemandada Verizon Communications Inc invocó la aplicación del artículo 984 del Código de Comercio […] De conformidad con una lectura de las pretensiones se advierte que la parte actora solicita el pago de los daños y perjuicios causados con motivo del incumplimiento contractual que alega doloso de las sociedades y el ente codemandados. En razón de lo anterior, estima este Tribunal que en el caso de marras estamos ante un plazo de prescripción de 4 años. En este orden de ideas, se advierte que mediante nota de fecha 2 de setiembre de 2005, el Gerente General de Verizon Information Services- Costa Rica LLC le informa a la parte actora que está dando por terminada la relación contractual originada en el respectivo contrato maestro, siendo así que la demanda fue interpuesta el día 15 de diciembre de 2008. El 28 de enero de 2009 la demanda fue notificada al representante de Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC y el día 18 de marzo de 2009 a la representante de Verizon Communications Inc. Consecuentemente, estima este Tribunal que procede rechazar la defensa opuesta, habida cuenta que la demanda fue notificada sin que haya operado la prescripción cuatrienal. […]” \n\nXVII.- En el caso de examen, la tesis de los casacionistas es que, debido a que las acciones del Contrato Maestro correspondían a la producción y confección de las guías telefónicas pactada en el Contrato Maestro, procedía la aplicación del plazo prescriptivo de un año, dispuesto en el inciso e) del numeral 984 del CoCo. No obstante, el Tribunal difiere de lo argumentado por las co-demandadas. En su criterio, las pretensiones de la actora estaban dirigidas al reconocimiento de los daños y perjuicios causados con motivo del incumplimiento contractual doloso de las co-accionadas y, por ende, resultaba aplicable el plazo de cuatro años también previsto en el canon supra citado. Al respecto, observa esta Cámara, el objeto del Contrato Maestro de Compra VIS-2001-21-IP era la elaboración, empaque y distribución de las guías telefónicas en Costa Rica y Belice. El inciso e) del artículo 984 del CoCo, literalmente reza: “[…]e) Las acciones derivadas de ventas al por mayor y al detalle a otros comerciantes o al consumidor directamente.” Véase, el objeto del convenio y lo dispuesto en el inciso e) de la norma de reciente cita no son coincidentes, ya que THS no está “vendiendo” las guías telefónicas. Por ende, resulta improcedente la aplicación de lo preceptuado en el inciso señalado ut supra. Contrario sensu, deviene la aplicación del plazo prescriptivo cuatrienal determinado por la Cámara de Juzgadores. No es de recibo lo esbozado por los co-demandados, respecto a que el Tribunal no indica la norma aplicada para la determinación del plazo de los cuatro años de prescripción, toda vez que a inicios del considerando donde se resuelve sobre este tema, se señala claramente que se está analizando el contenido del artículo 984 del CoCo. De ahí, puede colegirse fácilmente que lo decidido se circunscribe a esa norma. Tampoco se observa la violación del numeral 155 del CPC y el principio de seguridad jurídica, ya que el tema de la prescripción fue resuelto en el aparte V.IV de la sentencia recurrida y se observaron las normas válidas y vigentes aplicables al caso. Por consiguiente, coincide esta Cámara con lo dispuesto por el Tribunal y procederá el rechazo del quebranto invocado.\n\n XVIII.- En el sexto yerro, alegan violación indirecta por indebida valoración de la prueba. Indican, la errónea apreciación de los poderes otorgados por la Secretaria Corporativa de Verizon LLC y Verizon Co., Marianne Drost y de los documentos nos. 6 y 15 del expediente de prueba del actor (cambio de denominación de la empresa, fusión y aceptación de derechos y obligaciones de la licitación 6378-T y de la sub contratación); provoca que el Tribunal, a partir de una similitud fonética y de denominación social, tenga por demostrada la existencia de un grupo de interés económico entre las empresas supra indicadas. Por otra parte, destacan, la transformación de la compañía GTE a Verizon LLC, Verizon Co. y el actuar doloso o abusivo por parte de las co-demandadas nunca fue probado, por lo que la regla de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las personas jurídicas no es aplicable. Refieren el quebranto del numeral 82 inciso 4) del CPCA. \n\nXIX.- En torno a la transformación de la compañía GTE a Verizon LLC, Verizon Co., el Tribunal, indicó: “V.I.- En particular sobre los hechos probados: […] a) Hechos probados con respecto a las relaciones jurídicas existentes entre el ICE las sociedades codemandadas: […] 11. Que la empresa GTE Information Service pasó a denominarse, Verizon Information Services Inc, la empresa GTE Directories Corporation pasó a llamarse Verizon Directories Corp y General Telephone Directory Company C por A cambió de nombre a Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC. (Documento 6, correspondiente a un foliado que va del folio 3045 a 3022 del expediente de prueba del actor) 12. Que los representantes legales de Verizon lnformation Services, lnc, Verizon Directorias Corp. y Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, aceptaron los derechos y obligaciones con motivo de la licitación 6378-T y del contrato derivado de la misma\" (folios 3035, 3036 y 3037 del expediente administrativo, documento No. 15 del expediente de prueba del actor). 13. Que VERIZON lnformation Services- Costa Rica, LLC, le envió a la Dirección de Proveeduría del ICE una nota con fecha 16 de mayo del 2002, en la que le manifiesta, que \"General Telephone Directory Company C por A\" cambió de nombre a Verizon lnformation Services Costa Rica, LLC y pide que se tenga por oficialmente comunicado el cambio de la razón social de las empresas que integran el Consorcio GTE. (folios 3035, 3036 y 3037 del expediente administrativo, documento No. 15 del expediente de prueba del actor). 14. Que GTE se fusionó con la firma americana Bell Atlantic y como resultado de la fusión se creó el GRUPO VERIZON, sustituyéndose la razón social de GTE por el GRUPO VERIZON (folios 3035, 3036 y 3037 del expediente administrativo, documento No. 15 del expediente de prueba del actor).” Teniendo por probada la fusión de GTE con Bell Atlantic y el cambio de nombre de Grupo Verizon, así como la fusión la corporación, la Cámara de Juzgadores, estableció: “VIII.- Argumento relacionado con la falta de solidaridad de la empresa codemandada con la garantía solidaria de GTE Corporation: […] consta en autos que mediante escrito de fecha 28 de agosto de 2002, Verizon lnformation Services Costa Rica, LLC, expresó lo siguiente al ICE: \"11.- MANTENIMIENTO DE TODAS LAS OBLIGACIONES Y DERECHOS. De acuerdo con lo requerido en la nota del 18 de junio del 2002, también me permito adjuntar al presente documento una DECLARACION JURADA sobre el Mantenimiento de Obligaciones y Derechos, firmada por los representantes legales de Verizon lnformation Services, lnc, Verizon Directorias Corp. y Verizon lnformation Services-Costa Rica, LLC, en la cual aceptan los derechos y obligaciones derivados de la licitación 6378-T y del contrato derivado de la misma\" (lo subrayado no es del original). Adicionalmente, la cláusula Vigésima Quinta del contrato entre el ICE y el Consorcio GTE estipuló lo siguiente: \"En el caso de que por modificación en la ley del ICE esta entidad cambiase de nombre o que, por su parte, GTE cambiase de nombre como resultado de fusionarse o asociarse con otra empresa, en ambos casos el presente contrato permanecerá invariable y vigente entre las partes, bajo las nuevas denominaciones legales que sustituyan los nombres de las entidades jurídicas aquí representadas\" De conformidad con lo anterior además de lo dispuesto expresamente, hubo manifestación expresa de la codemandada en cuanto al mantenimiento de las obligaciones contraídas originalmente por el grupo GTE.[…] (lo destacado no corresponde al original)” En cuanto a los poderes otorgados por la señora Marianne Drost, en su calidad de Secretaria Corporativa de Verizon LLC y Verizon Co. (prueba visible a folios 1183 a 1188 del expediente judicial), señaló: b) Hechos probados de relevancia para la resolución del presente asunto relacionados con la vinculación entre las sociedades codemandadas y la parte actora: […] 13. Que la señora MARIANNE DROST, ciudadana norteamericana, otorgó poderes y actuó en su condición de Secretaria Corporativa de las firmas VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., y de VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES-COSTA RICA, LLC. (folios 1183 a 1188 del expediente judicial)”\n\nXX.- Previo a determinar si se realizó o no correctamente la valoración de los documentos nos. 6, 15 y los poderes otorgados por la señora Marianne Drost en su condición de Secretaria Corporativa de las firmas Verizon Communications Inc. y Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLCC (prueba aportada por THS), resulta pertinente definir qué es un grupo de interés económico (en adelante GIE). En materia comercial, el GIE es un conjunto de personas físicas o morales de naturaleza jurídica original, distinta de la sociedad y de la asociación, con intereses comerciales y financieros afines. Su objeto es facilitar el ejercicio de la actividad económica de sus integrantes, por el hecho de poner en común ciertos aspectos de dicha actividad. La Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (en lo sucesivo Sugef) en el artículo no. 8 del acuerdo SUGEF 5-04 del “Reglamento sobre límites de crédito a personas individuales y grupos de interés económico”, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero mediante artículo 15 del acta de la Sesión no. 480-2004, celebrada el 4 de noviembre de 2004 (publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta no. 227 del 19 de noviembre de 2004), define al GIE como: “Conformación de los grupos de interés económico. Un grupo de interés económico estará conformado por el conjunto de dos o más personas que mantengan relaciones financieras, administrativas o patrimoniales significativas entre sí, identificadas según los artículos 4, 5, 6 y 7 de este cuerpo normativo, así como por las personas por medio de las cuales se constituyan las relaciones administrativas y patrimoniales según el inciso a) del artículo 6 y el inciso b) del artículo 7 de este Reglamento. Las personas que formen parte de un grupo de interés económico podrán estar o no vinculadas a la entidad. Para las personas vinculadas, adicionalmente a lo dispuesto en este Reglamento, regirá lo dispuesto en el “Reglamento sobre el Grupo Vinculado a la Entidad.” Los preceptos 4, 5, 6 y 7 del referido reglamento determinan los parámetros de identificación de los grupos y relaciones financieras, administrativas y patrimoniales significativas que deben existir entre quienes conforman ese GIE. \n\nXXI.- En el caso de examen, GTE y la firma americana Bell Atlantic se fusionaron para aumentar sus patrimonios. Esa unificación produjo un cambio en la denominación social de GTE Information Service a Verizon Information Services Inc; GTE Directories Corporation a Verizon Directories Corp.; y, General Telephone Directory Company C a Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC., el cual no puede verse como un simple cambio de nombre o una similitud fonética, ya que las empresas involucradas se beneficiaron de factores afines tales como: inmuebles, edificaciones y otros. Así, al existir una relación financiera, administrativa y patrimonial de ambas empresas; estima esta Sala, se está en presencia de un GIE. Ahora bien, si a lo indicado añadimos, el ICE previendo que una situación de este tipo (fusión o asociación) había dispuesto que el convenio se mantuviera “invariable y vigente” bajo las nuevas denominaciones (folios 3022 a 3045 del expediente administrativo), al darse la mencionada fusión, los representantes legales de Verizon como un GIE, asumieron los derechos y obligaciones contraídos en la licitación 6378-T y el Contrato para Edición de la Guía Telefónica y Desarrollo e Implementación de Servicios de Información entre el ICE y GTE. Ergo, no se aprecia la indebida valoración de los documentos nos. 6 y 15 que acusan las co-demandadas. En cuanto a los poderes especiales judiciales otorgados por la señora Marianne Drost en su condición de Secretaria Corporativa de Verizon LLC y Verizon Co., visto el expediente judicial (folios 1183 y 1188); debe señalarse, en la escritura no. 1 de las 15 horas del 25 de marzo de 2009, otorgada ante el notario Fernando Vargas Winiker en la Ciudad de Basking Ridge, New Yersey; se acreditan las facultades de la señora Drost para dar los poderes supra citados y la validez de los mismos. De ahí, no se dé la incorrecta valoración alegada. A partir de lo expuesto, por lo que procederá rechazar el motivo.\n\nXXII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone rechazar los recursos formulados, con sus costas a cargo de quienes lo interpusieron (inciso 3) del canon 150 del CPCA).\n\nPOR TANTO \n\nSe declara sin lugar los recursos interpuestos, con sus costas a cargo de las promoventes.\n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga\n\n \n\n \n\nRomán Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales\n\n \n\n \n\nWilliam Molinari Vílchez José Rodolfo León Díaz\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nMCAMPOSS", "body_en_text": "EXP. 08-001505-1027-CA\n\nRES. 002017-F-S1-2020\n\nFIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine o'clock on the twenty-fifth of June, two thousand twenty.\n\nIn the ordinary proceeding brought by TREJOS HERMANOS SUCESORES SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by its president with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact, Álvaro Trejos Fonseca, identity card no. 1-0390-0895, remarried, master of science; against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD, VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. and VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES COSTA RICA LLC. Appearing also as judicial special attorneys-in-fact, for the plaintiff, attorneys Eduardo Sancho González, identity card no. 1-380-073, Andrés Meza Villalobos, identity card no. 2-638-788, Diego Baudrit Carrillo, identity card no. 1-323-212 and Luis Gerardo Villanueva Monge, identity card no. 3-221-204, resident of Cartago; for the co-defendant Institute, attorney Ana Victoria Zapata Calvo, identity card no. 1-892-491, divorced, and attorneys Carlos Cerdas Delgado, identity card no. 1-896-201, and Juan Pablo Hernández Cortés, identity card no. 1-849-120, both of unspecified domicile; for Verizon Communication Incorporated, attorney Andrea Hulbert Volio, identity card no. 9-100-121 and attorneys Alexander Salazar Solórzano, identity card no. 1-835-398, Juan Carlos Pizarro Corrales, identity card no. 1-825-376, Rodrigo Alberto Pérez González, identity card no. 4-211-250, of unspecified marital status and domicile, and Marvin Céspedes Méndez, identity card no. 1-531-965; and, for Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC, attorney Gino Capella Molina, identity card no. 1-569-226. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, and residents of San José. The co-defendant companies file a cassation appeal against judgment no. 66-2017-V, issued by the Administrative-Contentious Tribunal, Fifth Section, at 8 o'clock on July 19, 2017.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Solís Zelaya\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI.- In light of the facts deemed proven, on March 10, 2000, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (hereinafter ICE) and Grupo GTE (hereinafter GTE) signed the \"Contract for the Edition of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE\" (administrative contracting Public Tender 6378-T). In said agreement, it was agreed to subcontract up to 50% of the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories, subject to prior written authorization from ICE (clause 2.13.1). Likewise, it was stipulated that all stages of contract execution would be carried out in Costa Rica, and, in the event of a name change due to merger or association with another company, the contract would remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal designations of the legal entities. Arising from the aforementioned contract, on February 28, 2002, Verizon and Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (hereinafter THS) signed the Master Purchase Agreement VIS-2001-21-IP for the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize, for a term of 168 months (governed by the Civil Code—hereinafter CC—and the Commercial Code—hereinafter CoCo). As a condition of effectiveness, the Master Agreement was made subject to the execution of the contract entered into for Public Tender 6378-T (clause 2.b). Regarding its termination, it was provided that the buyer could terminate the contract when it could not agree on any price revision or amendment. To do so, it had to notify the seller in writing at least 90 days in advance. It could also terminate the contractual relationship immediately if, during the term of the contract, the agreement signed between ICE and Verizon was terminated for any reason (clause 28). In another vein, THS was asked to modernize its equipment to face the technological changes and requirements of the contracting parties. On May 16, 2002, GTE informed the ICE Procurement Directorate that General Telephone Directory Company C por A had changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC (successively Verizon LLC), and requested that the change of corporate name of the companies comprising GTE be officially communicated. Subsequently, GTE merged with Bell Atlantic and created the Verizon Group, thus replacing the corporate name of GTE with Grupo Verizon (hereinafter Verizon). In 2004, Verizon proposed to ICE that certain adjustments be made to the contract. On May 13 of that year, it proposed to the Telecommunications Sub-Management (hereinafter Sub-Management) a review of the telephone directories. By official letter 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, the Sub-Management informed Verizon that the 2005 telephone directories had to maintain the same structure and number of copies as in 2004. On October 14 of that year, Verizon and THS signed the \"Production Schedule, Provinces Directory 2005,\" indicating December 15 as the deadline for modifying the number of pages and the quantity of books. The Vice President of Verizon, by note dated September 8, 2004, informed the ICE Procurement Department (received December 16, 2004) that, having received no response to the note dated May 13, 2004, he would deem the positive silence (silencio positivo) to have been applied. In official letter 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, the Sub-Management rejected the application of the positive silence. It indicated that the request had been addressed via official letter 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, and reiterated that the structure and number of copies of the telephone directories had to be the same as in 2004. Through the note dated November 8, 2004, the Vice President of Verizon insisted that he had not received a response within the 30-business-day period and, therefore, the positive silence applied. In official letter 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004, the Sub-Management reiterated that the application of the positive silence was improper. In official letter S1-0726-11-04 of November 15, 2004, the Head of the ICE Information Services Process informed the General Manager of Verizon that the validity of the performance guarantee requested on June 30, 2004 had not been extended (official letter 6000-35344-2044) and highlighted that the structure of the telephone directories presented non-compliances in disregard of notes 6000-41046-2004 and 6000-52278-2004. During a visit to the industrial premises of THS (November 12, 2004), ICE recorded notarial acts attesting to the existence of copies of the residential white pages of the telephone directories that excluded the subscriber information for Los Santos and the provinces. In official letter S.I.0730-11-04, Verizon was notified of the breach of clauses 3.1 and 3.4.1.3 of the Public Tender Specifications and the second clause of the contract. In Article 10 of session no. 5649, held on November 23, 2004, it was agreed to reject the attempt to unilaterally modify the agreed contractual conditions. On December 2, 2004, during a visit to the plaintiff's facilities, ICE verified that THS, following the purchase orders delivered by Verizon, had produced 103,000 copies of residential white pages for the Metropolitan Area containing unauthorized modifications to the printing and binding design. As a result of the violation of the agreed requirements, the Sub-Management initiated a contractual termination proceeding (official letter 5225-69163-2004 of December 14, 2004) against Verizon, which concluded with the rescission of the contract (official letter 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by official letter 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 from the ICE General Management). By note dated September 2, 2005, the General Manager of Verizon informed THS that, because ICE had disrespected contractual rights and, distorting the reality of the facts, had initiated an administrative procedure for the termination of the contract arising from Public Tender 6378-T, he was terminating the contractual relationship arising from the Master Agreement. In the arbitration award of 3:00 p.m. on December 4, 2015, issued within the arbitration proceeding brought by ICE against Verizon LLC, the latter was ordered to pay various sums of money for having incurred a contractual breach.\n\nII.- THS sued ICE and the companies Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC (folios 1 to 92). It requested that the lawsuit be granted in all its aspects and that the co-defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay damages, as well as personal and procedural costs of the proceeding. It requested that the Master Purchase Agreement be classified as a means of executing the contract entered into between the Consorcio GTE (now Verizon LLC and Verizon Co.) and ICE. Furthermore, it sought to establish that the termination of the administrative contract extinguished the master agreement, even though THS bore no responsibility whatsoever for the events that led to the rescission. ICE answered on folios 292 to 345. It raised the preliminary defense of lack of jurisdiction and the exception of lack of standing in both its forms. Verizon answered negatively and raised the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction, necessary joinder of parties, and the exception of lack of right. At the hearing held on September 23, 2010, the preliminary defense of necessary joinder of parties was granted and Verizon LLC was joined to the dispute. Likewise, by resolution no. 1078-2009, the preliminary defense of jurisdiction was rejected. Subsequently, that decision was confirmed by the First Chamber via vote 00874-C-S1-2009 at 11:15 a.m. on August 25, 2009. The Tribunal, in judgment no. 66-2017-V of 8:00 a.m. on July 19, 2017, rejected the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of active and passive standing, and lack of ad processum standing raised by the co-defendants, and partially granted the one for lack of right raised by them. It granted the exception of lack of passive standing raised by ICE. It declared the lawsuit partially granted. It established: 1) the \"Master Purchase Agreement\" was a subcontract between HTS and GTE (now Verizon LLC); 2) the termination of the administrative contract between ICE and Verizon had caused the termination of the recently cited contract; 3) THS bore no responsibility whatsoever for the facts that caused the termination of the administrative contract and the \"Master Purchase Agreement\"; 5) the termination of the master agreement had caused immediate and direct damages to THS; 6) Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC constituted an economic group successor to GTE; 7) Verizon Co. was jointly and severally liable both for the obligations contracted by Verizon LLC and for the negative consequences caused to THS by the termination of the Master Purchase Agreement; 9) clauses nos. 24 and 28 of the cited contract were ineffective regarding the exoneration of Verizon's civil liability for contractual breach. Likewise, it ordered the co-defendants to pay the plaintiff the sums of: $2,582,156.00 for machinery investment; $2,860,696.00 for inventory increase; $8,806,872.00 for operating cash flows corresponding to the 2004-2013 period; $7,237,068.00 for losses during the 2004-2007 period; $983,825.00 for interest paid; and $28,885,195.00 for business interruption damages. It ordered indexation and the payment of interest on the aforementioned amounts. It imposed on the co-defendants the joint and several payment of personal and procedural costs in favor of the plaintiff company, and on THS the payment of personal and procedural costs in favor of ICE. Verizon LLC requested addition and clarification of vote no. 66-2017-V, which was denied by resolution no. 66-2017-V-BIS of 8:00 a.m. on August 8, 2017. Disagreeing, the co-defendants appeal to cassation.\n\nAppeal on procedural grounds\n\nIII.- The cassation appellants lodge six grievances. Given that the appeals filed are identical in the number of grievances and their content, they will be addressed jointly. In the first ground, the appellants argue lack of competence by reason of subject matter. They indicate that what is debated in this matter is a contract between private parties, whose termination is governed by an arbitration clause. Hence, its examination on the merits is barred to the Administrative-Contentious jurisdiction. In their view, the appropriate course is the declaration of lack of competence and the transfer of the case to the competent judicial body. They invoke the violation of Articles 7, 8, and 10 of the CPC. They add that during the trial they raised the exception of lack of jurisdiction.\n\nIV.- In the sub lite case, the plaintiff directs its claims against ICE and Verizon. Against the first, for being the entity with which Verizon signed the contract for Public Tender 6378-T, which grants the possibility of subcontracting for the execution of what was agreed therein; and against the second, because it is with that company that the master agreement was signed for the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. It must be noted that, for the plaintiff, both the entity and the co-defendant companies were responsible for the early termination of the master agreement and the resulting damage. Hence, it filed the lawsuit before the Administrative-Contentious venue. Verizon LLC and ICE raised the exception of lack of jurisdiction. The co-defendant corporation argues the existence of an arbitration clause, and the entity argues that what is being litigated is a matter between private parties. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in resolution no. 000874-C-S1-2009 at 11:15 a.m. on 2009, noted that cases where the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration is discussed (including Autonomous Institutions, such as ICE) are proper to the civil public treasury jurisdiction (Article 97 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial—hereinafter LOPJ) and, therefore, knowledge of the matter corresponded to the Administrative-Contentious venue. During the oral hearing, the co-defendants insisted on the lack of jurisdiction, and the Tribunal indicated that the issue was precluded. The principle of preclusion is intended to organize the debate and enable the proceeding to advance in the manner determined by the legislator. Thus, as this deciding body has repeatedly indicated, once that procedural stage of the lite has passed, it proceeds to the next stage, without the possibility of going back to a superseded stage. (Consult judgments 793 of 10:00 a.m. on November 27, 2008, and no. 615 of 9:00 a.m. on May 20, 2010). Based on the foregoing, this Chamber agrees with what the Tribunal indicated, regarding that the issue of jurisdiction is a precluded aspect, where this Chamber has already determined which venue has competence over the matter. The thesis that the Tribunal must decline its competence to hear the matter because it was established that the claims against ICE were unfounded and that the entity had no liability whatsoever for the loss caused by the breaking of the master agreement is not acceptable. In accordance with canon 37 of the CPC, of supplementary application by referral of ordinal 220 of the CPCA, the jurisdiction of a judicial body is lost only when the proceeding has been decided, the judgment executed, the adjudicator performed the procedural act entrusted to them (Article 36 of the CPC), it is an ancillary proceeding that must pass to the judge hearing the main proceeding, or when the adjudicator is declared incapable by virtue of disqualification, excusal, or recusal. In the case under review, none of the recently cited scenarios occur. Therefore, what the co-plaintiffs seek regarding declaring a lack of competence and delegating the knowledge and resolution of the matter to another judicial body because it was established that ICE was not responsible for the damage caused to THS is improper. That determination does not constitute any of the scenarios of the aforementioned civil procedural regulations, nor does it represent an assumption of cognizance of the matter (Article 4 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). Based on the foregoing, the charge must be rejected.\n\nAppeal on substantive grounds\n\nV.- In the second challenge, titled \"Arbitral Tribunal is competent for available patrimonial matters,\" the appellants argue that the Chamber of Judges entered into an analysis of a private contract containing an arbitration clause, and, therefore, its knowledge corresponds to the Arbitration Tribunal. In doing so, it fails to comply with the provisions of Article 66 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP) and numeral 67, subsections f) of the Ley de Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social (hereinafter RAC).\n\nVI.- According to what the appellants stated, the Tribunal resolved a contract whose knowledge is barred to it. However, this Chamber observes that, in the case under review, what was analyzed and resolved is the \"Contract for the Edition of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE\" (Public Tender 6378-T), not the master agreement as the cassation appellants affirm. Observe that what the Tribunal established was the willful misconduct (actuación dolosa) on the part of the co-defendants in disregarding the repeated missives sent by ICE (Official letters 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, and 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004), explicitly expressing its disagreement with the suggested modifications and emphasizing that the structure and quantity of copies of the telephone directories for 2005 had to conform to what was agreed (same as 2004). Said breach led to the rescission of the administrative contract (official letter 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by official letter 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 from the ICE General Management) and, subsequently, the termination of the master agreement, as it was a \"subcontract\" for the execution of the contract for the edition of the telephone directories. As can be observed, said analysis does not imply the resolution of the master agreement but of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and Consorcio GTE (now Verizon), which is why this Chamber considers that the administrative and arbitration regulations alleged to have been violated (Article 66 of the LGAP and canon 67, subsection f) of the RAC Law) were not breached. Neither does the incorrect appreciation of the master agreement that was submitted as evidence occur. Consequently, the charge must be rejected.\n\nVII.- In the third charge, what the appellants reproach is the interpretation of the subcontracting figure. They say that having included the Master Purchase Agreement no. VIS-2001-21-IP within this type of figure is an error that entails the incorrect application of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa (successively LCA) and also violates the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (Article 34 of the Constitution) and numerals 7, 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution, canons 6 and 9 of the LGAP, Articles 58 and 62 of the LCA, ordinals 69 and 149 of the Reglamento de la LCA (hereinafter RLCA), and precepts 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code (hereinafter CC). They explain that, according to the limitations of rules 22 and 22 bis of the LCA and the criterion of the Contraloría General de la República, subcontracting is an ancillary relationship to the main one, vested with a private character, which applies in agreements for the execution or construction of public works. Hence, ICE's attempt to configure it within that figure exceeds the limitations provided in the LCA and violates the principles of legality and intangibility of one's own acts. In another vein, they highlight the error that, in their view, the Tribunal makes by granting greater legal life to the subcontract than to the main contract. They state that if the term of Public Tender no. 6378-T was 96 months (2001 to 2008), it is not feasible for the maximum term of the master agreement to be 168 months, as is accredited in proven fact no. 7 of the contested judgment. That contradiction causes the imposition of exorbitant, unreasonable, disproportionate, and illegal sums for compensation.\n\nVIII.- Regarding the figure of subcontracting, the Tribunal states: \"[…] it arises when one of the obligors in a basically binary contractual relationship resorts to third parties to obtain goods or services that are necessary to fulfill the primary contractual obligations. In this vein, there exists a first-level relationship in the initial contract, such that one of the parties, at their own account and risk and exclusively according to their will, proceeds to enter into one or more second-level contractual relationships with subcontractors, insofar as they possess the means for the contractor to fulfill their obligation burden. (The underlining does not correspond to the original). Consequently, we are in the presence of a main contract and a secondary contract signed by one of the parties for the performance of some of the obligations that are, in turn, the object of the main contract or that at least contribute to its fulfillment. It is evident, then, that subcontracting arises due to the specialization of business organizations and the material impossibility for a contractor to have within their reach all the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of the main obligation. Consequently, subcontracting operates at different levels, and although it is undeniable that the proper functioning of subcontracting depends on the due execution of the main contract, it is not feasible to view it as a network, given the instrumental nature of the former with respect to the contract signed by the contractor. (The highlighted portion is supplied). Thus, the fate of the secondary contract, i.e., the one originating from the subcontracting, must not have a direct legal or factual consequence on the execution of the main contract; that is, the subcontractor's breach does not relieve the contractor from fulfilling, in time and form, the terms and conditions of the main contract. […]\" According to the transcribed text, the Chamber of Judges concluded that, although the LCA originally provided for subcontracting only for public works execution or construction contracts, via case law, the possibility of using this figure in other types of administrative contracting had been opened. They determined that the contract with ICE permitted subcontracting a company for the development, production, and distribution of the Telephone Directories, without that constituting an obligation for the entity in the event of a breach, but without relieving GTE (now Verizon) of its responsibility for the total execution of the contract. They established the prevalence of the administrative contracting (mechanism for fulfilling public purposes) over the master agreement (a figure of private law). Regarding the term of the subcontracting period, they deemed it accredited that the maximum agreed term for the production, packaging, and distribution of the telephone directories was 168 months (clause 2.b of the master agreement – List of proven facts Considering V.I; subsection b), sub-item 7).\n\nIX.- At its core, the cassation appellants disagree with the category of subcontracting given to the Master Purchase Agreement no. VIS-2001-21-IP and with the compensation granted to THS based on that classification. Before analyzing the charge, it is appropriate to refer to the figures of the administrative contract and subcontracting. The administrative contract is defined as the meeting of the wills between a public entity (public administration) and a subject of private law; or two public entities. Subcontracting, for its part, is not in itself a form of participation in the contract; rather, it implies that the awardee of the tender agrees with a third party, totally alien to the contracting, for the performance of part of what was agreed (Article 62 of the LCA and canon 69 of the RLCA). In this matter, as stated in the case file, GTE (now Verizon) was the awardee of Public Tender no. 6378-T. Thus, it signed with ICE the \"Contract for the Edition of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE.\" In clause 2.13.1 of said agreement, Verizon was granted the possibility of subcontracting a company to carry out the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories up to 50% of the total contract. This is how Verizon signed the Master Purchase Agreement VIS-2001-21-IP with THS. The foregoing allows one to infer that the master agreement originates as a subcontract of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and GTE (now Verizon), which is why this Chamber considers that the interpretation carried out by the Tribunal regarding the figure of subcontracting is correct.\n\nX.- Having established the applicability of the figure of subcontracting, it becomes necessary to analyze whether or not the exonerations of liability agreed upon in the master agreement apply, to determine whether or not the incorrect appreciation of the agreement (evidence alleged to have been poorly appreciated) occurred. For purposes of interest, clause 28 of the master agreement indicates that Verizon could terminate the agreement immediately at any time if the contract with ICE was terminated for any reason. Furthermore, it was established that it would not be liable for compensation for damages (losses, profits, expenses, investments, among others) provided that the termination did not prejudice or affect the rights and responsibilities of THS with respect to the directories previously produced or any other debt existing between the parties. In the case under review, when the termination of the master agreement was communicated, THS had at least 103,000 copies of the white pages of the telephone directories in stock and had acquired debts with other entities to purchase the machinery necessary to fulfill the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories. These situations fall within the impediment scenarios mentioned above that made the application of the exoneration of liability provided for in the clause impossible, and therefore, compensation is proper.\n\nXI.- Additionally, in this grievance, the appellants point out other aspects of disagreement. First, they refer to the impediment to using the subcontracting figure in administrative contracts that are not for public works (Articles 58 and 62 of the LCA and numeral 69 of the RLCA). They explain that the master agreement between Verizon and THS was executed for the acquisition of supplies, and therefore, it cannot be classified as subcontracting. Regarding this topic, it must be noted that the use of the subcontracting figure has been extended to other types of administrative contracts, in which, as in the case at hand, its use is provided for by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, via a clause in the tender specifications (cláusula cartelaria). Therefore, this Jurisdictional Body considers that we are indeed in the presence of a subcontract. As a second aspect, they claim the violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (Article 34 of the Constitution). In relation to this topic, it must be borne in mind that the alleged transgression occurs due to the annulment of a declaratory act of rights, without the prior declaration of the act as harmful. In the present matter, what is debated is not a declaratory act of rights, but the termination of an administrative contract due to \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants. Ergo, the alleged violation does not occur. As a final point, the appellants challenge the 168-month term granted to the subcontract. In this regard, it must be noted that said term was granted by mutual agreement of the parties in clause 2.b of Master Agreement no. VIS-2001-21-JP. Therefore, it is not true that it was the Chamber of Judges that established the duration of the subcontract. In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, Master Agreement no. VIS-2001-21-JP was correctly appreciated. We agree with the Tribunal in that we are in the presence of a subcontract, in which one of its clauses defines the maximum term for the production, packaging, and distribution of the telephone directories; and whose cause for termination is due to the \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants of the administrative contract derived from Public Tender no. 6378-T.\n\nConsequently, there is no violation of the principle of intangibility of prior acts nor of the regulations cited as circumvented, and therefore the grievance will be dismissed.\n\nXII.- In the fourth defect, the petitioners allege the pretermission of the expert report submitted by the plaintiff. They emphasize that this evidentiary element excludes the contract signed between THS and Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. (hereinafter RACSA) on April 28, 2006. This omission produces a bias in the monetary income (earnings) received by THS since that date and violates the principles of the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter IFRS) and grants unjust enrichment by awarding THS overvalued sums for machinery investment, cash flows not received, realized losses from 2004 to 2007, and interruption of operations. They relate that the error in the expert report occurs because the plaintiff, instead of asking Mr. Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez to examine the accounting books that demonstrate its financial-accounting status, requests corroboration of the study conducted by Mr. Tomás Evans Salazar, which, as indicated, is biased. They invoke the violation of section 267 of the CoCo.\n\nXIII.- Regarding the contract signed between THS and RACSA, the Court, in Considerando V.XV.- of the challenged judgment, stated: “V.XV.- On the Liquidated Amounts […] From the indicated amount, the sums that have been paid to the plaintiff by Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. must be deducted, for any telephone directory production contract entered into after the contractual breach by Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC. […]”\n\nIn that same section, regarding the reports of Messrs. Tomás Evans Salazar and Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez, it stated: “4. The sums determined in the documents in question, from both Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez, are based on applicable technique, are coincident, and include the items of machinery, increase in inventories, operational cash flows according to the contract, realized losses, interest paid, and impact from interruption of operations. […] The defendant did not object to or provide evidence to rebut the methodology or the estimated dates for the future value of realized losses, the applied interest rates, projections, calculations, methodologies, or the conclusions reached. Therefore, this Court lacks convincing elements to question the scope of the documents under analysis. (The underlining is supplied) […]”\n\nXIV.- In this challenge, the appellants accuse the pretermission of the expert evidence. However, as indicated in the previous Considerando, the Court does assess this evidentiary element. This is evidenced by the Trial Chamber's statement that the sums paid by RACSA to THS for any telephone directory production contract subsequent to the contractual breach with Verizon must be deducted from the recognized amount; as well as by the indication of the lack of objection against the evidence or the provision of another evidentiary element to rebut the methodology used by Messrs. Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez. Hence, this Chamber considers that although what is alleged by the cassation appellants is the pretermission of the expert report submitted by THS (exclusion of the contract with RACSA and the accounting books), what is actually debated is the Court's assessment of that evidentiary element. Furthermore, in this Chamber's judgment, the appellants seek to re-engage in the analysis of their opposition to the expert opinion, a matter resolved by the judges at the appropriate procedural stage. Based on the foregoing, the claim is not admissible, and its dismissal will proceed.\n\nXV.- In the fifth censure, the appellants invoke the statute of limitations exception (excepción de prescripción). They allege the violation of subsection e) of section 984 of the CoCo, section 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC), and the principle of legal certainty. The cassation appellants maintain that since the Master Contract was an agreement for the production and preparation of telephone directories, the prescriptive period provided in section 984, subsection e) of the CoCo applies. From that perspective, if notification of the termination of the contractual relationship was notified to THS on September 2, 2005, the period for filing the lawsuit expired on September 2, 2006. However, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit only on December 15, 2008 (folios 1 to 93 of the electronic case file) and the order to enter an appearance was not notified until January 28, 2008, meaning that, in light of the above-cited rule, the prescriptive period had been exceeded. Despite this, the Court, without stating reasons or any indication of the rule applied, performs a four-year prescription calculation and denies the exception.\n\nXVI.- Regarding the statute of limitations exception, the Court stated: “V.IV.- On the defense of prescription raised: a) In its closing arguments, the representative of the co-defendant Verizon Communications Inc invoked the application of section 984 of the Code of Commerce […] In accordance with a reading of the claims, it is noted that the plaintiff requests payment for damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the alleged willful breach of contract by the co-defendant companies and entity. Due to the foregoing, this Court considers that in the instant case we are before a four-year prescription period (plazo de prescripción). In this vein, it is noted that by means of a communication dated September 2, 2005, the General Manager of Verizon Information Services- Costa Rica LLC informed the plaintiff that it was terminating the contractual relationship originating from the respective master contract, and the lawsuit was filed on December 15, 2008. On January 28, 2009, the lawsuit was notified to the representative of Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC, and on March 18, 2009, to the representative of Verizon Communications Inc. Consequently, this Court considers it appropriate to reject the defense raised, given that the lawsuit was notified without the four-year statute of limitations having taken effect. […]”\n\nXVII.- In the case under review, the cassation appellants' theory is that, because the actions of the Master Contract corresponded to the production and preparation of the telephone directories agreed upon in the Master Contract, the application of the one-year prescriptive period, set forth in subsection e) of section 984 of the CoCo, was appropriate. However, the Court disagrees with what was argued by the co-defendants. In its opinion, the plaintiff's claims were aimed at recognition of the damages caused by the willful breach of contract of the co-defendants and, therefore, the four-year period also provided in the above-cited section was applicable. In this regard, this Chamber observes that the object of the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP was the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. Subsection e) of section 984 of the CoCo literally reads: “[…]e) Actions arising from wholesale and retail sales to other merchants or directly to the consumer.” Note that the object of the agreement and the provisions of subsection e) of the recently cited rule are not coincident, since THS is not \"selling\" the telephone directories. Therefore, the application of the provision in the subsection indicated above is inappropriate. Conversely, the application of the four-year prescriptive period determined by the Trial Chamber is appropriate. The argument sketched by the co-defendants that the Court does not indicate the rule applied for determining the four-year prescription period is not admissible, given that at the beginning of the considerando resolving this issue, it is clearly indicated that the content of section 984 of the CoCo is being analyzed. Hence, it can be easily inferred that the decision is circumscribed to that rule. Nor is a violation of section 155 of the CPC and the principle of legal certainty observed, since the matter of the statute of limitations was resolved in section V.IV of the appealed judgment, and the valid and current rules applicable to the case were observed. Consequently, this Chamber agrees with the Trial Court's decision, and the rejection of the invoked violation will proceed.\n\nXVIII.- In the sixth error, they allege indirect violation due to improper assessment of the evidence. They indicate that the erroneous appreciation of the powers of attorney granted by the Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., Marianne Drost, and of documents no. 6 and 15 from the plaintiff's evidentiary record (change of company name, merger, and acceptance of rights and obligations from tender 6378-T and subcontracting); causes the Court, based on a phonetic and corporate name similarity, to consider the existence of an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) between the above-indicated companies as proven. On the other hand, they emphasize that the transformation of the company GTE to Verizon LLC, Verizon Co., and the willful or abusive conduct on the part of the co-defendants was never proven, so the rule of asset-based liability of legal persons is not applicable. They refer to the violation of section 82, subsection 4) of the CPCA.\n\nXIX.- Regarding the transformation of the company GTE to Verizon LLC, Verizon Co., the Court stated: “V.I.- In particular on the proven facts: […] a) Proven facts regarding the legal relationships existing between ICE and the co-defendant companies: […] 11. That the company GTE Information Service was renamed Verizon Information Services Inc, the company GTE Directories Corporation was renamed Verizon Directories Corp, and General Telephone Directory Company C por A changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC. (Document 6, corresponding to a foliated record running from folio 3045 to 3022 of the plaintiff's evidentiary record) 12. That the legal representatives of Verizon lnformation Services, lnc, Verizon Directorias Corp., and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, accepted the rights and obligations arising from tender 6378-T and the contract derived from it\\\" (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary record). 13. That VERIZON lnformation Services- Costa Rica, LLC, sent a communication dated May 16, 2002, to the Procurement Directorate of ICE, stating that \\\"General Telephone Directory Company C por A\\\" changed its name to Verizon lnformation Services Costa Rica, LLC and requested that the change of the registered company name of the companies comprising the GTE Consortium be officially communicated. (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary record). 14. That GTE merged with the American firm Bell Atlantic, and as a result of the merger, the VERIZON GROUP was created, replacing the registered company name of GTE with the VERIZON GROUP (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary record).”\n\nHaving considered the merger of GTE with Bell Atlantic and the name change to Grupo Verizon, as well as the corporate merger, as proven, the Trial Chamber established: “VIII.- Argument related to the lack of joint liability of the co-defendant company with the joint and several guarantee of GTE Corporation: […] it is recorded in the case file that by means of a document dated August 28, 2002, Verizon lnformation Services Costa Rica, LLC, expressed the following to ICE: \\\"11.- MAINTENANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS. In accordance with what was requested in the communication of June 18, 2002, I also attach to this document a SWORN STATEMENT on the Maintenance of Obligations and Rights, signed by the legal representatives of Verizon lnformation Services, lnc, Verizon Directorias Corp., and Verizon lnformation Services-Costa Rica, LLC, in which they accept the rights and obligations derived from tender 6378-T and the contract derived from it\\\" (the underlining is not from the original). Additionally, the Twenty-Fifth clause of the contract between ICE and the GTE Consortium stipulated the following: \\\"In the event that, due to a modification in ICE's law, this entity were to change its name, or that GTE were to change its name as a result of merging or associating with another company, in both cases this contract shall remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal names replacing the names of the legal entities represented herein.\\\" In accordance with the foregoing, in addition to what was expressly provided, there was an express statement from the co-defendant regarding the maintenance of the obligations originally contracted by the GTE group.[…] (the highlighting is not from the original)”\n\nRegarding the powers of attorney granted by Ms. Marianne Drost, in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co. (evidence visible at folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file), it stated: b) Proven facts of relevance for resolving this matter related to the connection between the co-defendant companies and the plaintiff: […] 13. That Ms. MARIANNE DROST, a U.S. citizen, granted powers of attorney and acted in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., and VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES-COSTA RICA, LLC. (folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file)”\n\nXX.- Prior to determining whether or not the assessment of documents no. 6, 15, and the powers of attorney granted by Ms. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms Verizon Communications Inc. and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC (evidence submitted by THS) was correctly performed, it is pertinent to define what an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, hereinafter GIE) is. In commercial matters, a GIE is a group of natural or legal persons of an original juridical nature, distinct from a corporation and an association, with related commercial and financial interests. Its purpose is to facilitate the exercise of the economic activity of its members by pooling certain aspects of that activity. The General Superintendency of Financial Entities (Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, hereinafter Sugef), in article 8 of agreement SUGEF 5-04 of the “Regulation on credit limits for individuals and economic interest groups,” approved by the National Supervisory Council of the Financial System through article 15 of the minutes of Session No. 480-2004, held on November 4, 2004 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 227 of November 19, 2004), defines a GIE as: “Composition of economic interest groups. An economic interest group shall be composed of the set of two or more persons who maintain significant financial, administrative, or asset-based relationships among themselves, identified according to articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this regulatory body, as well as by the persons through whom the administrative and asset-based relationships are constituted according to subsection a) of article 6 and subsection b) of article 7 of this Regulation. The persons forming part of an economic interest group may or may not be linked to the entity. For linked persons, in addition to the provisions of this Regulation, the provisions of the “Regulation on the Group Linked to the Entity” shall apply.” Precepts 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the aforementioned regulation determine the parameters for identifying the groups and the significant financial, administrative, and asset-based relationships that must exist among those who make up that GIE.\n\nXXI.- In the case under review, GTE and the American firm Bell Atlantic merged to increase their assets. This unification produced a change in the registered company name from GTE Information Service to Verizon Information Services Inc; GTE Directories Corporation to Verizon Directories Corp.; and General Telephone Directory Company C to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC., which cannot be seen as a simple name change or phonetic similarity, since the involved companies benefited from related factors such as real estate, buildings, and others. Thus, given the existence of a financial, administrative, and asset-based relationship between both companies, this Chamber considers that we are in the presence of a GIE. Now, if to what has been indicated we add that ICE, foreseeing a situation of this type (merger or association), had provided that the agreement would remain “unchanged and in force” under the new names (folios 3022 to 3045 of the administrative file), upon the mentioned merger occurring, the legal representatives of Verizon, as a GIE, assumed the rights and obligations contracted in tender 6378-T and the Contract for the Edition of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE. Ergo, the improper assessment of documents no. 6 and 15 alleged by the co-defendants is not observed. As for the special judicial powers of attorney granted by Ms. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., having seen the judicial file (folios 1183 and 1188); it must be noted that in deed no. 1 of 3:00 p.m. on March 25, 2009, granted before notary Fernando Vargas Winiker in the City of Basking Ridge, New Jersey; the powers of Ms. Drost to grant the above-cited powers of attorney and their validity are attested to. Hence, the incorrect assessment alleged does not occur.\n\nBased on the foregoing, the appeal will be dismissed.\n\nXXII.- In view of the foregoing, the appeals filed must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by the appellants (subsection 3) of canon 150 of the CPCA).\n\nTHEREFORE\n\nThe appeals filed are declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellants.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga\n\nRomán Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales\n\nWilliam Molinari Vílchez José Rodolfo León Díaz\n\nMCAMPOSS\n\n1-849-120, both of unstated domicile; by Verizon Comunication Incorporated, attorney Andrea Hulbert Volio, identity card no. 9-100-121 and attorneys Alexander Salazar Solórzano, identity card no. 1-835-398, Juan Carlos Pizarro Corrales, identity card no. 1-825-376, Rodrigo Alberto Pérez González, identity card no. 4-211-250, of unstated marital status and domicile, and Marvin Céspedes Méndez, identity card no. 1-531-965; and, by Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC, attorney Gino Capella Molina, identity card no. 1-569-226. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the noted exceptions, married, attorneys, and residents of San José. The co-defendant corporations file a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) against judgment no. 66-2017-V, issued by the Administrative-Contentious Tribunal, Fifth Section, at 8:00 a.m. on July 19, 2017.\n\n**Authored by Judge Solís Zelaya**\n\n**CONSIDERANDO**\n\n**I.-** In light of the facts held as proven, on March 10, 2000, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, hereinafter ICE) and Grupo GTE (hereinafter GTE) entered into the *“Contract for the Publication of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE”* (administrative procurement Public Tender 6378-T). In said agreement, it was agreed to subcontract up to 50% of the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories, subject to prior written authorization from ICE (clause 2.13.1). Likewise, it was stipulated that all stages of the contract’s execution would be carried out in Costa Rica and, in the event of a name change due to merger (fusión) or association with another company, the contract would remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal names of the legal entities. Derived from the aforementioned contract, on February 28, 2002, Verizon and Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (hereinafter THS) entered into the Master Purchase Agreement VIS-2001-21-IP for the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize, for a term of 168 months (governed by the Civil Code—hereinafter CC—and the Commercial Code—hereinafter CoCo). As a condition of effectiveness, the Master Agreement’s subjection to the execution of the contract concluded pursuant to tender 6378-T was established (clause 2.b). Regarding its termination, it was stipulated that the buyer could terminate the contract when unable to agree on any price revision or amendment. To do so, it had to notify the seller in writing at least 90 days in advance.\n\nIt could also terminate the contractual relationship immediately if, during the term of the contract, the agreement signed between ICE and Verizon was terminated for any reason (clause 28). In another vein, THS was asked to modernize its equipment to meet technological changes and the requirements of the contracting parties. On May 16, 2002, GTE informed the ICE Procurement Department (Dirección de Proveeduría) that General Telephone Directory Company C por A had changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC (successively Verizon LLC) and a request was made to have the change of corporate name (razón social) of the companies making up GTE officially communicated. Later, GTE merged with Bell Atlantic and created the Verizon Group, thus substituting GTE's corporate name (razón social) with Grupo Verizon (hereinafter Verizon). In 2004, Verizon proposed to ICE that some adjustments be made to the contract. On May 13 of that year, it proposed to the Telecommunications Sub-Management (Subgerencia de Telecomunicaciones, hereinafter Sub-Management) a review of the telephone directories. Through official communication 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, the Sub-Management indicated to Verizon that the 2005 telephone directories should maintain the same structure and number of copies as in 2004. On October 14 of that year, Verizon and THS signed the \"2005 Province Directory Production Schedule (Cronograma de Producción, Guía Provincias 2005)\", setting December 15 as the deadline to modify the number of pages and the quantity of books. The vice president of Verizon, via a note dated September 8, 2004, informed the ICE Procurement Department (received on December 16, 2004) that, having received no response to the note dated May 13, 2004, they would consider the positive silence (silencio positivo) to have been applied. In official communication 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, the Sub-Management rejected the application of positive silence (silencio positivo). It indicated that the request had been addressed through official communication 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, and reiterated that the structure and quantity of copies of the telephone directories had to be the same as in 2004. Through a note dated November 8, 2004, the vice president of Verizon insisted that they had not received a response within the 30-business-day period and, therefore, positive silence (silencio positivo) applied. In official communication 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004, the Sub-Management reiterated that the application of positive silence (silencio positivo) was improper. In official communication S1-0726-11-04 of November 15, 2004, the Head of the ICE Information Services Process informed the general manager of Verizon that the validity of the performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento) requested on June 30, 2004, had not been extended (official communication 6000-35344-2044) and highlighted that the structure of the telephone directories presented non-compliances in disregard of notes 6000-41046-2004 and 6000-52278-2004.\n\nDuring a visit to the THS industrial premises (November 12, 2004), ICE prepared notarial records (actas notariales) documenting the existence of copies of the residential white pages of the telephone directories that excluded the subscriber information for Los Santos and the provinces. In official letter S.I.0730-11-04, Verizon was notified of the breach of clauses 3.1 and 3.4.1.3 of the Public Tender Specifications (Cartel de la Licitación Pública) and the second clause of the contract. In article 10 of session no. 5649, held on November 23, 2004, it was agreed to reject the attempt at a unilateral modification (modificación unilateral) of the agreed contractual conditions. On December 2, 2004, during a visit to the plaintiff's premises, ICE verified that THS, following the purchase orders (órdenes de compra) delivered by Verizon, had manufactured 103,000 copies of the residential white pages for the Metropolitan Area (Área Metropolitana) that contained unauthorized modifications to the printing design (diseño de impresión) and binding (encuadernación). As a consequence of the violation of the agreed requirements, the Sub-Management initiated a contractual termination procedure (procedimiento de resolución contractual) (official letter 5225-69163-2004 of December 14, 2004) against Verizon, which concluded with the rescission of the contract (official letter 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by official letter 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 from the ICE General Management). By note dated September 2, 2005, the general manager of Verizon informed THS that because ICE had violated the contractual rights and, distorting the reality of the facts, had initiated an administrative procedure for the termination of the contract originating from public tender 6378-T, the contractual relationship arising from the master contract was terminated. In the arbitration award (laudo arbitral) at 3:00 p.m. on December 4, 2015, issued within the arbitration proceedings filed by ICE against Verizon LLC, the latter was ordered to pay various sums of money for having incurred in contractual breach.\n\nII.- THS sued ICE and the companies Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC (folios 1 to 92). It requested that the lawsuit be granted in its entirety and that the co-defendants be ordered to jointly and severally pay damages (daños y perjuicios), as well as the personal and procedural costs of the proceeding. It requested that the Master Purchase Contract be classified as a means of executing the contract entered into between the Consorcio GTE (now Verizon LLC and Verizon Co.) and ICE. Additionally, it sought a declaration that the extinguishment of the administrative contract eliminated the master contract, even though THS bore no responsibility for the events giving rise to the rescission. ICE responded at folios 292 to 345. It raised the preliminary defense of lack of jurisdiction and the exception of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) in both its forms. Verizon responded in the negative and interposed the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction, necessary joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario), and the exception of lack of right. At the hearing held on September 23, 2010, the preliminary defense of necessary joinder of parties was upheld, and Verizon LLC was joined to the litis. Likewise, through resolution no. 1078-2009, the preliminary defense of jurisdiction was rejected. Subsequently, that decision was confirmed by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) through vote 00874-C-S1-2009 at 11:15 a.m. on August 25, 2009. The Tribunal, in judgment no.\n\n66-2017-V of 8:00 a.m. on July 19, 2017, rejected the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of standing (falta de legitimación) active and passive, and lack of procedural standing (falta de legitimación ad procesum) raised by the co-defendants and partially granted the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) filed by them. It granted the exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by ICE. It partially granted the lawsuit. It established: 1) the \"Master Purchase Agreement\" was a subcontract (subcontratación) between HTS and GTE (now Verizon LLC); 2) the termination (extinción) of the administrative contract executed between ICE and Verizon had caused the termination (extinción) of the recently cited contract; 3) THS bore no responsibility for the events that caused the termination (extinción) of the administrative contract and the \"Master Purchase Agreement\"; 5) the termination (extinción) of the master contract had caused immediate and direct damages (daños y perjuicios) to THS; 6) Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC comprised a successor economic group to GTE; 7) Verizon Co. was jointly and severally liable both for the obligations incurred by Verizon LLC and for the negative consequences caused to THS by the termination (extinción) of the Master Purchase Agreement; 9) clauses nos. 24 and 28 of the cited contract were ineffective regarding the exoneration of Verizon's civil liability for breach of contract. Likewise, it ordered the co-defendants to pay the plaintiff the sums of: $2,582,156.00 for investment in machinery; $2,860,696.00 for increase in inventories; $8,806,872.00 for operating cash flow corresponding to the 2004-2013 period; $7,237,068.00 for losses in the 2004-2007 period; $983,825.00 for interest paid; and, $28,885,195.00 for damages due to business interruption. It ordered indexation (indexación) and the payment of interest on the amounts indicated above. It ordered the co-defendants to jointly and severally pay personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) to the plaintiff company and, THS to pay personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) to ICE. Verizon LLC requested amplification and clarification (adición y aclaración) of vote no. 66-2017-V, which was rejected by resolution no. 66-2017-V-BIS of 8:00 a.m. on August 8, 2017. Disagreeing, the co-defendants bring a cassation appeal (casación).\n\nAppeal on procedural grounds\n\nIII.- The cassation appellants formulate six grievances. Given that the appeals filed are identical in the number of breaches and their content, they will be addressed jointly. In the first ground, the appellants argue lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (incompetencia en razón de la materia). They indicate that what is debated in this matter is a contract between private parties, whose termination is regulated by an arbitration clause (cláusula arbitral). Hence, its merits are barred from the knowledge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In their view, the proper course is a declaration of lack of jurisdiction (incompetencia) and the transfer of the case to the competent jurisdictional body. They invoke the violation of articles 7, 8, and 10 of the CPC. They add that during the trial, the exception of lack of jurisdiction (falta de competencia) was raised.\n\nIV.- In the sub lite, the plaintiff directs its claims against ICE and Verizon.\n\nAgainst the first, for being the entity with which Verizon signed the contract under public tender 6378-T, which grants the possibility of carrying out a subcontracting arrangement (subcontratación) for the execution of what was agreed therein; and, against the second, because it is with said company that the master contract was signed for the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. It should be noted, according to the plaintiff, that both the entity and the co-defendant companies were responsible for the early termination of the master contract and the damage caused. Hence, I filed the lawsuit before the contentious-administrative court. Verizon LLC and ICE filed a plea of lack of jurisdiction (excepción de incompetencia). The co-defendant corporation argues the existence of an arbitration clause (cláusula arbitral) and, the entity argues that what was settled is a matter between private parties. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in resolution no. 000874-C-S1-2009 of 11:15 a.m. on 2009, indicates that cases where the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration (Administración Pública) (including Autonomous Institutions (Instituciones Autónomas), such as ICE) is discussed, are proper to the civil treasury jurisdiction (jurisdicción civil de hacienda) (article 97 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)- hereinafter LOPJ) and, therefore, the knowledge of the matter corresponded to the contentious-administrative court. During the oral hearing, the co-defendants insist on the lack of jurisdiction, and the Court indicates to them that the matter is precluded (precluido). The principle of preclusion (principio de preclusión) aims to order the debate and enable the advancement of the process in the manner determined by the legislator. Thus, as this decision-making body has repeatedly indicated, once that procedural stage of the litigation (lite) has passed, it advances to the next stage, without the possibility of going back to a superseded stage. (See judgments 793 of 10:00 a.m. on November 27, 2008, and no. 615 of 9:00 a.m. on May 20, 2010). Based on the foregoing, this Chamber agrees with what the Court indicated, regarding that the issue of jurisdiction (competencia) is a precluded aspect, where this Chamber has already determined which is the court that corresponds to its knowledge. The thesis that the Court must decline its jurisdiction to hear the matter because it was established that the claims against ICE were unfounded and the entity had no responsibility for the impairment caused by the breaking of the master contract is not acceptable. In accordance with canon 37 of the CPC, of supplementary application by referral of ordinal 220 of the CPCA, the jurisdiction of a jurisdictional body is lost only when the process was decided, the judgment executed, the adjudicating person carried out the procedural act entrusted to them (article 36 of the CPC), it is an ancillary process that must pass to the judge hearing the main process, or when the adjudicating person is declared disqualified by virtue of impediment, excuse, or recusal (impedimento, excusa o recusación). In the case under examination, none of the recently cited scenarios occur. Therefore, what was sought by the co-plaintiffs, regarding declaring lack of jurisdiction and delegating the knowledge and resolution of the matter to another jurisdictional body because it was established that ICE was not responsible for the damage caused to THS, is inappropriate. That determination does not configure any of the scenarios of the civil procedural regulations indicated above, nor does it represent a taking up of the matter (avocación) (article 4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)).\n\nBased on the foregoing, the claim must be dismissed.\n\n**Appeal on substantive grounds**\n\n**V.-** In the second attack titled “**The Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction over disposable patrimonial matters**”, the appellants argue that the Chamber of Judges enters into the analysis of a private contract containing an arbitration clause and, therefore, its cognizance corresponds to the Arbitral Tribunal. In this way, it fails to comply with the provisions of article 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, in subsequent references LGAP) and subsection 67 f) of the Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley de Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social, in future references RAC),\n\n**VI.-** According to what was stated by the appellants, the Tribunal resolves on a contract whose cognizance is barred to it. However, this Chamber observes, in the case under review, what was analyzed and resolved is the “Contract for the Publication of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE” (public tender 6378-T), not the master contract as the cassation appellants affirm. See, what the Tribunal established was the willful conduct of the co-defendants, in ignoring the repeated missives sent by ICE (Official Letters 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, and 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004), explicitly expressing their disagreement with the suggested modifications and, emphasizing, that the structure and quantity of copies of the telephone directories for 2005 had to conform to what was agreed (the same as 2004). Said breach generated the rescission (recisión) of the administrative contract (official letter 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by official letter 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 of the General Management of ICE) and, subsequently, the termination of the master contract, as it was a “subcontract” for the execution of the contract for the publication of the telephone directories. As can be observed, said analysis does not imply the resolution of the master contract but rather of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and Consorcio GTE (now Verizon), which is why, this Chamber considers, the administrative and arbitration regulations alleged to have been violated (article 66 of the LGAP and canon 67 subsection f) of the RAC Law) were not breached. Nor does the incorrect interpretation of the master contract that was submitted as evidence occur. Consequently, the claim must be dismissed.\n\n**VII.-** In the third claim, what is reproached by the appellants is the interpretation of the figure of contracting. They state, the inclusion of the Master Purchase Contract no.\n\nVIS-2001-21-IP within that type of legal figure is an error that entails the incorrect application of the Administrative Contracting Law (sucesivamente LCA) and further violates the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (article 34 of the Constitution) and numerals 7, 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution, canons 6 and 9 of the LGAP, articles 58 and 62 of the LCA, ordinals 69 and 149 of the Regulation to the LCA (in future references RLCA), and precepts 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code (hereinafter CC). They explain, according to the limitations of rules 22 and 22 bis of the LCA and the criterion of the Contraloría General de la República, that subcontracting (subcontratación) is an accessory relationship to the principal one, vested with a private character that is appropriate in agreements for the execution or construction of public works. Hence, the attempt by ICE to configure it within that figure exceeds the limitations provided in the LCA and violates the principles of legality and intangibility of one's own acts. In another line of reasoning, they highlight the error they believe the Tribunal makes by granting greater legal life to the subcontract than to the principal contract. They state that if the term of public tender no. 6378-T was 96 months (2001 to 2008), it is not feasible that the maximum term of the master contract is 168 months, as attested in proven fact no. 7 of the challenged judgment. This contradiction causes the imposition of exorbitant, unreasonable, disproportionate, and illegal sums for compensation (indemnización).\n\n**VIII.-** Regarding the figure of subcontracting (subcontratación), the **Tribunal** indicates: “[…] *it arises when one of the obligors in a basically binary contractual relationship resorts to third parties to obtain goods or services that are necessary to fulfill the primary contractual obligations. In this line of reasoning, a first-level relationship exists in the initial contract, such that one of the parties, at its own account and risk and exclusively according to its will, proceeds to establish one or several second-level contractual relationships with sub-contractors, since these possess the means for the contractor to fulfill its obligation burden.* (The underlining does not correspond to the original) *Consequently, we are in the presence of a principal contract and a secondary contract signed by one of the parties, for the realization of some of the performances that are, in turn, the object of the principal contract or that at least contribute to its fulfillment. It is evident then that subcontracting (subcontratación) is born from the specialization of business organizations and the material impossibility of a contractor having within its reach all the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of the principal obligation. Consequently, subcontracting operates at different levels, and although it is undeniable that the proper execution of the principal contracting depends on the good operation of the subcontracting, it cannot be seen as a network, given the instrumental nature of the former towards the contract signed by the contractor.* (The highlighting is supplied) *Thus, the fate of the secondary contract, that is, the one originated with the subcontracting, must not have a direct legal or factual consequence on the execution of the principal contract; meaning, the default of the sub-contractor does not relieve the contractor from fulfilling the terms and conditions of the principal contract on time and in proper form.*\n\n[...]” According to the above, the Panel of Judges concluded that, although the LCA originally provided for subcontracting for execution or construction contracts for public works, through case law the possibility of using this mechanism in other types of administrative contracting had been opened. They determined that the contract with ICE allowed subcontracting a company for the development, production, and distribution of the Telephone Directories, without this constituting an obligation for the entity in case of non-compliance, but without relieving GTE (now Verizon) of its responsibility for the total execution of the contract. They established the prevalence of the administrative contracting (mechanism for fulfilling public purposes) over the master contract (instrument of private law). Regarding the term of the subcontracting period (plazo de la subcontratación), they deemed it proven that the maximum period agreed for the production, packaging, and distribution of the telephone directories was 168 months (clause 2.b of the master contract – List of Proven Facts Considerando V.I; subsection b), sub-subsection 7).\n\n**IX.-** In essence, the appellants disagree with the category of subcontracting (subcontratación) granted to the Master Purchase Contract no. VIS-2001-21-IP and with the compensation (indemnización) awarded to THS based on that classification. Prior to the analysis of the charge, it is appropriate to refer to the concepts of the administrative contract (contrato administrativo) and subcontracting. The administrative contract is defined as the agreement of wills celebrated between a public entity (public administration) and a subject of private law; or between two public entities. Subcontracting, for its part, is not in itself a form of participation in the contract, but rather implies that the awardee of the tender agrees with a third party completely unconnected to the contracting process, for the performance of a part of what was agreed (article 62 of the LCA and canon 69 of the RLCA). In this matter, as stated in the case file, GTE (now Verizon) was the awardee of public tender no. 6378-T.\n\nIn this manner, it signed with ICE the “Contract for the Editing of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE.” In clause 2.13.1 of said agreement, Verizon was granted the possibility of subcontracting a company to carry out the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories up to 50% of the total contract. It is thus that Verizon signs with THS the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP. The foregoing allows one to glimpse that the master contract originates as a subcontract of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and GTE (now Verizon), which is why, this Chamber considers, the interpretation made by the Tribunal regarding the figure of subcontracting is correct.\n\nX.- Having established the appropriateness of the figure of subcontracting, it becomes necessary to analyze whether or not the exemptions from liability agreed upon in the master contract apply, to determine whether or not the agreement was incorrectly assessed (evidence alleged to be poorly appreciated). Of relevance, clause 28 of the master contract indicates that Verizon could terminate the agreement immediately at any time, if the contract with ICE was terminated for any reason. Furthermore, it was established that it would not be responsible for compensation for damages (losses, profits, expenses, investments, among others) provided that the termination did not prejudice or affect the rights and responsibilities of THS regarding previously produced directories or any other debt existing between the parties. In the case under examination, when the termination of the master contract was communicated, THS had in stock at least 103,000 copies of the white pages of the telephone directories and had acquired debts with other entities to buy the necessary machinery to fulfill the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories. These situations conform to the impediment assumptions indicated above that made the application of the exemption from liability provided in the clause impossible, therefore compensation is appropriate.\n\nXI.- Additionally, in this grievance, the appellants point out other aspects of disagreement. Firstly, they refer to the impediment to using the figure of subcontracting in administrative contracts that are not public works (articles 58 and 62 of the LCA and numeral 69 of the RLCA). They explain that the master contract signed between Verizon and THS was executed for the acquisition of supplies, and therefore cannot be classified as a subcontract.\n\nRegarding this issue, it should be noted that the use of the subcontracting (subcontratación) mechanism has been extended to other types of administrative contracts, in which, as in the case at hand, its use is provided for by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, via a tender clause. Therefore, this jurisdictional body deems that a subcontracting (subcontratación) is indeed present. As a second aspect, they claim a violation of the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios) (article 34 of the Constitution). In relation to this matter, it must be borne in mind that the alleged transgression is claimed to arise from the annulment of a declaratory act of rights, without the prior declaration of the act as detrimental. In the present matter, what is debated is not a declaratory act of rights, but the termination of an administrative contract due to \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants. Ergo, the alleged violation does not occur. As a final point, the appellants challenge the 168-month term granted for the subcontracting (subcontratación). In this regard, it must be stated that said term was granted by mutual agreement of the parties in clause 2.b of Master Contract No. VIS-2001-21-JP. Therefore, it is not true that it was the Chamber of Judges that established the duration of the subcontracting (subcontratación). In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, Master Contract No. VIS-2001-21-JP was correctly interpreted. We concur with the Tribunal that we are in the presence of a subcontracting (subcontratación), where one of its clauses defines the maximum term for the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories; and whose cause for termination is due to \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants of the administrative contract derived from public tender no. 6378-T. Consequently, no violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios) or the regulations cited as violated has occurred, and therefore the rejection of this grievance will follow.\n\nXII.- In the fourth defect, the petitioners allege the omission of the expert report submitted by the plaintiff. They emphasize that this evidentiary element excludes the contract signed between THS and Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. (hereinafter RACSA) on April 28, 2006. Said omission creates a bias in the monetary income (profits) received by THS from that date and breaches the principles of the International Financial Reporting Standards (Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera, IFRS) and confers an unjust enrichment by granting THS overvalued sums for machinery investment, unrealized cash flows, losses incurred from 2004 to 2007, and business interruption. They recount that the error in the expert report occurs because the plaintiff, instead of asking Mr. Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez to examine the accounting books that demonstrate its financial-accounting status, requests the corroboration of the study conducted by Mr. Tomás Evans Salazar, which, as was indicated, is biased.\n\nThey invoke the violation of numeral 267 of the CoCo.\n\n**XIII.-** Regarding the contract signed between THS and RACSA, the **Tribunal** in Considerando V.XV.- of the challenged judgment, stated: *“**V.XV.- On the Amounts liquidated** […] *From the indicated amount, the sums paid to the plaintiff by Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. must be deducted, for any telephone directory (guías telefónicas) production contract executed after the contractual breach by Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC.* […]” In that same section, concerning the reports of Messrs. Tomás Evans Salazar and Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez, it said: *“4. The sums determined in the aforementioned documents, both by Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez, are based on applicable technique, are coincident, and include the items of machinery, inventory increases, operating cash flows according to the contract, realized losses (pérdidas realizadas), interest paid, and impact due to business interruption (afectación por interrupción de operaciones).* […] *The defendant did not object to or provide evidence to contradict the methodology or the estimated dates for the future value of the realized losses (pérdidas realizadas), the interest rates applied, projections, calculations, methodologies, or the conclusions obtained. Therefore, this Tribunal lacks elements of conviction to question the scope of the documents under analysis.* (Underlining supplied) […]”\n\n**XIV.-** In this challenge, the appellants accuse the pretermission (preterición) of the expert evidence. However, as indicated in the preceding Considerando, the Tribunal does indeed assess that evidentiary element. This is evident from the statement by the Chamber of Judges that the amounts paid by RACSA to THS for any telephone directory (guías telefónicas) production contract after the contractual breach with Verizon must be deducted from the recognized amount; as well as from the indication of the lack of objection against the evidence or the provision of another evidentiary element to contradict the methodology used by Messrs. Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez. Hence, this Chamber deems that, although what is alleged by the cassation appellants is the pretermission (preterición) of the expert report provided by THS (exclusion of the contract with RACSA and the accounting books), what is debated is the assessment the Tribunal makes of that evidentiary element. But, furthermore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the appellants seek to re-enter into the analysis of their opposition to the opinion, an aspect resolved by the judging persons at the appropriate procedural moment. Based on the foregoing, the charge is not receivable, and therefore its rejection shall proceed.\n\n**XV.-** In the fifth objection, the appellants invoke the exception of prescription (excepción de prescripción). They allege the violation of subsection e) of article 984 of the CoCo, numeral 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (in subsequent mentions CPC), and the principle of legal certainty. The cassation appellants maintain that since the Master Contract is an agreement for the production and preparation of telephone directories, the prescriptive period provided in article 984 subsection e) of the CoCo applies. From that perspective, if the notification of the termination of the contractual relationship was notified to THS on September 2, 2005, the period for filing the lawsuit expired on September 2, 2006. However, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit until December 15, 2008 (folios 1 to 93 of the electronic file) and the order for service of process (auto de intimación) was not notified until January 28, 2008, meaning that, in light of the aforementioned rule, the prescriptive period had been exceeded. Despite this, the Tribunal, with no reasoning and without any indication of the rule it applies, carries out a four-year prescription count and denies the exception.\n\n**XVI.-** Regarding the exception of prescription, the **Tribunal** stated: “*V.IV.- On the defense of prescription raised: a) In its closing arguments, the representative of the co-defendant Verizon Communications Inc invoked the application of article 984 of the Commerce Code […] Pursuant to a reading of the claims, it is noted that the plaintiff requests payment for damages caused by the alleged willful breach of contract by the co-defendant companies and entity. For the foregoing reason, this Tribunal finds that in the case at hand we are dealing with a prescriptive period of 4 years. In this vein, it is noted that through a note dated September 2, 2005, the General Manager of Verizon Information Services- Costa Rica LLC informs the plaintiff that it is terminating the contractual relationship originating from the respective master contract, and thus the lawsuit was filed on December 15, 2008. On January 28, 2009, the lawsuit was notified to the representative of Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC and on March 18, 2009, to the representative of Verizon Communications Inc. Consequently, this Tribunal finds that the raised defense should be rejected, given that the lawsuit was notified without the four-year prescription having taken effect.* […]”\n\n**XVII.-** In the case under review, the cassation appellants' thesis is that, because the actions of the Master Contract corresponded to the production and preparation of telephone directories agreed upon in the Master Contract, the application of the one-year prescriptive period set forth in subsection e) of numeral 984 of the CoCo was appropriate. However, the Tribunal disagrees with what was argued by the co-defendants.\n\nIn its view, the plaintiff's claims were aimed at recognition of the damages and losses caused by the co-defendants' willful breach of contract, and therefore the four-year statute of limitations period also provided for in the aforementioned canon was applicable. In this regard, this Chamber observes that the object of the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP was the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. Subsection e) of article 984 of the CoCo literally states: “[…] e) Actions arising from wholesale and retail sales to other merchants or directly to the consumer.” It is clear that the object of the agreement and the provisions of subsection e) of the recently cited rule do not coincide, since THS is not “selling” the telephone directories. Therefore, the application of the precept set forth in the subsection indicated ut supra is inappropriate. Contrario sensu, the application of the four-year prescriptive period determined by the Chamber of Judges becomes applicable. The argument put forth by the co-defendants, that the Tribunal does not indicate which rule was applied to determine the four-year statute of limitations period, cannot be accepted, given that at the beginning of the recital where this matter is decided, it is clearly indicated that the content of article 984 of the CoCo is being analyzed. From this, it can easily be inferred that the decision is limited to that rule. Nor is a violation of numeral 155 of the CPC and the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica) observed, since the issue of prescription was resolved in section V.IV of the appealed judgment and the valid and current rules applicable to the case were observed. Consequently, this Chamber agrees with the Tribunal's ruling and will proceed to reject the alleged violation.\n\n XVIII.- In the sixth error, the appellants allege indirect violation due to improper weighing of the evidence. They indicate the erroneous assessment of the powers of attorney granted by Marianne Drost, Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., and of documents nos. 6 and 15 from the plaintiff's evidentiary file (change of company name, merger, and acceptance of rights and obligations of bidding process no. 6378-T and of the subcontract); which causes the Tribunal, based on a phonetic and corporate-name similarity, to deem proven the existence of an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) among the companies indicated above. On the other hand, they emphasize that the transformation of the company GTE into Verizon LLC, Verizon Co. and the willful or abusive conduct on the part of the co-defendants was never proven, so the rule of patrimonial liability of legal entities (responsabilidad patrimonial de las personas jurídicas) is not applicable. They cite the violation of numeral 82, subsection 4) of the CPCA.\n\nXIX.- Regarding the transformation of the company GTE into Verizon LLC, Verizon Co., the **Tribunal** stated: *“V.I.- In particular regarding the proven facts: […] a) Proven facts with respect to the legal relations existing between ICE and the co-defendant companies: […] 11. That the company GTE Information Service changed its name to Verizon Information Services Inc, the company GTE Directories Corporation changed its name to Verizon Directories Corp, and General Telephone Directory Company C por A changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC. (Document 6, corresponding to a paginated file from folio 3045 to 3022 of the plaintiff's evidentiary file) 12. That the legal representatives of Verizon Information Services, Inc, Verizon Directories Corp. and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, accepted the rights and obligations arising from bid process 6378-T and the contract derived therefrom\" (folios 3035, 3036 and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary file). 13. That VERIZON Information Services- Costa Rica, LLC, sent a note dated May 16, 2002, to the ICE Procurement Department, stating that \"General Telephone Directory Company C por A\" changed its name to Verizon Information Services Costa Rica, LLC and requesting that the change of corporate name of the companies comprising the GTE Consortium be officially recorded. (folios 3035, 3036 and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary file). 14. That GTE merged with the American firm Bell Atlantic and as a result of the merger, the VERIZON GROUP was created, replacing the corporate name of GTE with the VERIZON GROUP (folios 3035, 3036 and 3037 of the administrative file, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff's evidentiary file).”* Having proven the merger of GTE with Bell Atlantic and the name change to Verizon Group, as well as the merger of the corporation, the Panel of Judges established: *“VIII.- Argument related to the lack of joint liability of the co-defendant company regarding the joint guarantee of GTE Corporation: […] it is evident in the case file that through a document dated August 28, 2002, Verizon Information Services Costa Rica, LLC, expressed the following to ICE: \"11.- MAINTENANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS. In accordance with what was required in the note of June 18, 2002, I also take the liberty of attaching to this document a SWORN DECLARATION regarding the Maintenance of Obligations and Rights, signed by the legal representatives of Verizon Information Services, Inc, Verizon Directories Corp. and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, in which they accept the rights and obligations derived from bid process 6378-T and the contract derived therefrom\" (the underlining is not from the original). Additionally, the Twenty-Fifth Clause of the contract between ICE and the GTE Consortium stipulated the following: \"In the event that, due to a modification in the law governing ICE, this entity changes its name or that, for its part, GTE changes its name as a result of merging or associating with another company, in both cases this contract shall remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal names that replace the names of the legal entities represented herein\" In accordance with the foregoing, in addition to what was expressly stipulated, there was an express manifestation by the co-defendant regarding the maintenance of the obligations originally contracted by the GTE group. […] (the highlighting does not correspond to the original)”* Regarding the powers of attorney granted by Ms. Marianne Drost, in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co.\n\n(evidence visible at folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file), indicated: b) Proven facts relevant to the resolution of this matter related to the connection between the co-defendant companies and the plaintiff: […] 13. That Mrs. MARIANNE DROST, a United States citizen, granted powers of attorney and acted in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., and VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES-COSTA RICA, LLC. (folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file)”\n\nXX.- Before determining whether the assessment of documents nos. 6, 15 and the powers of attorney granted by Mrs. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms Verizon Communications Inc. and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLCC (evidence provided by THS) was carried out correctly or not, it is pertinent to define what an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE) is. In commercial matters, a GIE is a group of natural or legal persons of an original legal nature, distinct from a corporation and an association, with related commercial and financial interests. Its purpose is to facilitate the exercise of the economic activity of its members, by pooling certain aspects of said activity. The General Superintendency of Financial Entities (Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, hereinafter Sugef) in article no. 8 of agreement SUGEF 5-04 of the “Regulation on credit limits for individuals and economic interest groups” (Reglamento sobre límites de crédito a personas individuales y grupos de interés económico), approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero) through article 15 of the minutes of Session no. 480-2004, held on November 4, 2004 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta no. 227 of November 19, 2004), defines a GIE as: “Conformation of economic interest groups. An economic interest group shall be composed of a group of two or more persons that maintain significant financial, administrative, or patrimonial relationships among themselves, identified according to articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this regulatory body, as well as by the persons through whom the administrative and patrimonial relationships are constituted according to subsection a) of article 6 and subsection b) of article 7 of this Regulation. The persons forming part of an economic interest group may or may not be linked to the entity. For linked persons, in addition to the provisions of this Regulation, the provisions of the \"Regulation on the Group Linked to the Entity\" (Reglamento sobre el Grupo Vinculado a la Entidad) shall apply.” Precepts 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the referenced regulation determine the identification parameters for groups and the significant financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationships that must exist among those who form that GIE.\n\nXXI.- In the case under review, GTE and the American firm Bell Atlantic merged to increase their assets. That unification produced a change in the corporate name of GTE Information Service to Verizon Information Services Inc; GTE Directories Corporation to Verizon Directories Corp.; and, General Telephone Directory Company C to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC., which cannot be seen as a simple name change or a phonetic similarity, since the companies involved benefited from related factors such as: real estate, buildings, and others. Thus, given the existence of a financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationship between both companies, this Chamber considers that we are in the presence of an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE). Now then, if we add to the foregoing that ICE, foreseeing a situation of this type (merger or association), had provided that the agreement would remain \"unchanged and in force\" under the new names (folios 3022 to 3045 of the administrative file), upon the aforementioned merger, the legal representatives of Verizon as a GIE assumed the rights and obligations contracted in tender (licitación) 6378-T and the Contract for the Editing of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE. Ergo, the improper assessment of documents nos. 6 and 15 alleged by the co-defendants is not evident. Regarding the special judicial powers of attorney granted by Ms. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., upon review of the judicial file (folios 1183 and 1188), it must be noted that in deed no. 1 of 3:00 p.m. on March 25, 2009, granted before notary Fernando Vargas Winiker in the City of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, the authority of Ms. Drost to grant the aforementioned powers and their validity are accredited. Hence, the alleged improper assessment does not occur. Based on the foregoing, the ground must be rejected.\n\nXXII.- By virtue of the above, the appeals filed must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by those who filed them (subsection 3) of canon 150 of the CPCA).\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeals filed are dismissed on the merits, with costs to be borne by the appellants.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga\n\nRomán Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales\n\nWilliam Molinari Vílchez José Rodolfo León Díaz\n\nMCAMPOSS\n\nThis Chamber agrees with the Tribunal's indication that the issue of jurisdiction in this matter is a precluded aspect, where this Chamber has already determined which venue is responsible for hearing it (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe jurisdiction of a judicial body is lost only when the proceeding has been decided, the judgment executed, the adjudicator performed the procedural act entrusted to them, it is an ancillary proceeding that must pass to the adjudicator hearing the main proceeding, or when the adjudicator is declared disqualified by virtue of impediment, excuse, or recusal (articles 36 and 37 of the Código Procesal Civil and 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). In the case under examination, none of the studied scenarios occurs, nor does it represent an avocación (rule 4 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe appellants argue that the Tribunal entered into the analysis of a private contract containing an arbitration clause and, therefore, its hearing corresponds to the Arbitral Tribunal; violating articles 66 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 67.f of the Ley RAC. This Chamber observes that what was analyzed and decided is a contract for the editing of the telephone directory (public bidding process), not the master contract. Note that what the Tribunal established was the fraudulent conduct of the co-defendants in disregarding the repeated missives sent by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Said non-compliance generated the rescission of the administrative contract and, subsequently, the termination of the master contract, as it was a subcontract for the execution of the contract to edit the telephone directories. This analysis does not imply the termination of the master contract but rather of the administrative contract; for which reason the cited rules are not violated (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe administrative contract is defined as the meeting of wills entered into between a public entity (public administration) and a subject of private law; or two public entities. Subcontracting, for its part, is not in itself a form of participation in the contract, but rather implies that the successful bidder of the competition agrees with a third party —entirely foreign to the contracting process— to perform a part of what was agreed (articles 62 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa (LCA hereinafter) and 69 of its Reglamento (RLCA hereinafter)). In this matter, the successful bidder entered into a contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the editing of the telephone directory. In one of the clauses of the agreement, it was granted the possibility of subcontracting a company to carry out the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories up to 50% of the total contract. It is thus that it enters into a master contract with a third party. Therefore, the master contract originates as a subcontract of the administrative contract entered into between the Institute and the successful bidder. Moreover, the use of the subcontracting mechanism, in addition to public works (numerals 58 and 62 LCA and 69 RLCA), has been extended to other types of administrative contracts, in which, as in the present case, its use was provided for by means of a meeting of wills of the contracting parties, via a bid-specification clause (cláusula cartelaria) (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (norm 34 Constitucional) occurs through the annulment of a declaratory act of rights, without the prior declaration of the act as detrimental. In the present matter, what is debated is not a declaratory act of rights, but rather the extinguishment of an administrative contract due to \"fraudulent\" contractual non-compliance by the co-defendants. Ergo, the alleged violation does not occur (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe pretermission of expert evidence is alleged. However, the Tribunal does assess that evidentiary element; therefore, the charge is rejected (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nThe object of the contract under study was the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. Article 984.e of the Código de Comercio states: \"Actions derived from wholesale and retail sales to other merchants or directly to the consumer.\" Note that the object of the agreement and the provisions of that subsection are not coincident, since the company is not \"selling\" the telephone directories. Therefore, the application of the cited rule is inappropriate. Contrario sensu, the application of the four-year prescriptive period of ordinal 984 ibídem, determined by the Tribunal, becomes operative (voto 2017-F-2020).\n\nIn commercial matters, the economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE hereinafter) is the set of natural or legal persons of an original legal nature, distinct from the corporation and the partnership, with related commercial and financial interests. Its object is to facilitate the exercise of the economic activity of its members, by virtue of pooling certain aspects of said activity. The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras defines it in numeral 8 of agreement SUGEF 5-04 of the \"Reglamento sobre límites de crédito a personas individuales y grupos de interés económico.\" Precepts 4, 5, 6, and 7 ibídem determine the parameters for identifying the groups and the significant financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationships that must exist among those who make up that GIE.\n\nIn the instant case, given the existence of a financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationship between both companies, this Chamber deems that an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE) is present. That being said, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, foreseeing a situation of this type (merger or association), stipulated that the agreement would remain \"unalterable and in force\" under the new designations upon a merger; the legal representatives of the defendant, as a GIE, assumed the rights and obligations contracted in the public bidding and the contract for the telephone directory publication (vote 2017-F-2021).\n\n1-896-201, Juan Pablo Hernández Cortés, identity card no. 1-849-120, both of unspecified domicile; for Verizon Comunication Incorporated, attorney Andrea Hulbert Volio, identity card no. 9-100-121 and attorneys Alexander Salazar Solórzano, identity card no. 1-835-398, Juan Carlos Pizarro Corrales, identity card no. 1-825-376, Rodrigo Alberto Pérez González, identity card no. 4-211-250, of unspecified marital status and domicile, and Marvin Céspedes Méndez, identity card no. 1-531-965; and, for Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC, attorney Gino Capella Molina, identity card no. 1-569-226. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, and residents of San José. The co-defendant companies file a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) against judgment no. 66-2017-V, issued by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section Five, at 8:00 a.m. on July 19, 2017.\n\n**Judge Solís Zelaya writes**\n\n**CONSIDERING**\n\n**I.-** In light of the facts held as proven, on March 10, 2000, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (hereinafter ICE) and Grupo GTE (hereinafter GTE) signed the “Contract for the Editing of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE” (administrative procurement Public Tender 6378-T). In that agreement, it was agreed to subcontract up to 50% of the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories, with prior written authorization from ICE (clause 2.13.1). Likewise, it was stipulated that all stages of contract execution would be carried out in Costa Rica and, in the event of a name change due to merger or association with another company, the contract would remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal names of the legal entities. Derived from the aforementioned contract, on February 28, 2002, Verizon and Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. (hereinafter THS) signed the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP for the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize, for a term of 168 months (governed by the Civil Code - hereinafter CC - and the Commercial Code - hereinafter CoCo). As a condition of effectiveness, the subordination of the Master Contract to the execution of the contract entered into under tender 6378-T was established (clause 2.b). Regarding its termination, it was stipulated that the buyer could terminate the contract when it could not agree on any price revision or amendment.\n\nTo do so, it had to notify the seller in writing at least 90 days in advance. It could also terminate the contractual relationship immediately if, during the term of the contract, the agreement executed between ICE and Verizon was terminated for any reason (clause 28). In another vein, THS was asked to modernize its equipment to face technological changes and the contracting parties' requirements. On May 16, 2002, GTE informed the ICE Procurement Department (Dirección de Proveeduría) that General Telephone Directory Company C por A changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC (successively Verizon LLC) and requested that the change of corporate name (razón social) of the companies comprising GTE be officially communicated. Later, GTE merged with Bell Atlantic and created the Verizon Group, thus substituting the corporate name of GTE for Verizon Group (hereinafter Verizon). In 2004, Verizon proposed to ICE to make some adjustments to the contract. On May 13 of that year, it raised with the Telecommunications Sub-Management (Subgerencia de Telecomunicaciones) (hereinafter Sub-Management) the review of the telephone directories. Through official communication 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, the Sub-Management indicated to Verizon that the 2005 telephone directories had to maintain the same structure and number of copies as 2004. On October 14 of that year, Verizon and THS executed the \"Production Schedule, Provinces Guide 2005\" (Cronograma de Producción, Guía Provincias 2005), indicating December 15 as the deadline to modify the number of pages and the quantity of books. The vice president of Verizon, through a note dated September 8, 2004, informed the ICE Procurement Department (received December 16, 2004) that, having received no response to the note dated May 13, 2004, it would consider the positive silence (silencio positivo) to have been applied. In official communication 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, the Sub-Management rejected the application of positive silence. It indicated that the request had been addressed through official communication 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, and reiterated that the structure and number of copies of the telephone directories had to be the same as in 2004. Through the note dated November 8, 2004, the vice president of Verizon insisted that it had not received a response within the 30-business-day period and, therefore, positive silence applied. In official communication 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004, the Sub-Management reiterated that the application of positive silence was improper.\n\nIn official communication S1-0726-11-04 of November 15, 2004, the Head of the Information Services Process of ICE informed the general manager of Verizon that the validity of the performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento) requested on June 30, 2004 had not been extended (communication 6000-35344-2044) and highlighted that the structure of the telephone directories (guías telefónicas) presented breaches in defiance of notes 6000-41046-2004 and 6000-52278-2004. During a visit to the industrial premises of THS (November 12, 2004), ICE drew up notarial certificates (actas notariales) in which it recorded the existence of copies of the residential white pages of the telephone directories that excluded the information of the subscribers of Los Santos and the provinces. In official communication S.I.0730-11-04, Verizon was notified of the breach of clauses 3.1 and 3.4.1.3 of the Public Bid (Cartel de la Licitación Pública) and the second clause of the contract. In article 10 of session no. 5649 held on November 23, 2004, it was agreed to reject the attempt at unilateral modification of the agreed contractual conditions. On December 2, 2004, during a visit to the plaintiff's facilities, ICE verified that THS, following the purchase orders delivered by Verizon, had produced 103,000 copies of residential white pages for the Metropolitan Area that contained unauthorized modifications in print design and binding. As a consequence of the violation of the agreed requirements, the Sub-Management initiated a contract termination procedure (procedimiento de resolución contractual) (communication 5225-69163-2004 of December 14, 2004) against Verizon, which concluded with the rescission (rescisión) of the contract (communication 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by communication 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 from the General Management of ICE). By note dated September 2, 2005, the general manager of Verizon informed THS that, because ICE had disrespected contractual rights and, distorting the reality of the facts, had initiated an administrative proceeding for the termination of the contract originating from public bid 6378-T, it was terminating the contractual relationship originating from the master contract. In the arbitration award (laudo arbitral) of 3 p.m. on December 4, 2015, issued within the arbitration proceeding established by ICE against Verizon LLC, the latter was ordered to pay various sums of money for having incurred contractual breach.\n\n**II.-** **THS** sued ICE and the companies Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC (folios 1 to 92). It requested that the lawsuit be declared with merit (con lugar la demanda) in all its aspects and that the co-defendants be jointly and severally ordered (condenara al pago solidario) to pay damages (daños y perjuicios), as well as the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) of the proceeding. It requested that the Master Purchase Agreement be qualified as a means of executing the contract entered into between the GTE Consortium (now Verizon LLC and Verizon Co.) and ICE. Furthermore, it sought to establish the extinction of the administrative contract that underpinned the master contract, even though THS bore no responsibility for the events giving rise to the rescission. **ICE** responded on folios 292 to 345. It raised the preliminary defense of lack of competence (falta de competencia) and the exception (excepción) of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) in both its modalities. **Verizon** responded negatively and filed the preliminary defenses of lack of competence, necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario), and the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho). At the hearing held on September 23, 2010, the preliminary defense of necessary passive joinder was upheld and Verizon LLC was joined (integró a la litis) to the litigation.\n\nLikewise, through resolution no. 1078-2009, the prior defense of lack of jurisdiction was rejected. Subsequently, that decision was confirmed by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) through vote 00874-C-S1-2009 of 11:15 a.m. on August 25, 2009. The **Court** in judgment no. 66-2017-V of 8:00 a.m. on July 19, 2017, rejected the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of standing (legitimación) both active and passive, and lack of capacity to be a party (legitimación ad procesum) raised by the co-defendants, and partially upheld the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) filed by them. It upheld the exception of lack of passive standing raised by ICE. It partially granted the lawsuit. It established: 1) the \"Master Purchase Agreement\" (Contrato Maestro de Compra) was a subcontract between HTS and GTE (now Verizon LLC); 2) the termination of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and Verizon had caused the termination of the recently cited contract; 3) THS bore no responsibility for the events that caused the termination of the administrative contract and the \"Master Purchase Agreement\"; 5) the termination of the master agreement had caused immediate and direct damages (daños y perjuicios) to THS; 6) Verizon Co. and Verizon LLC constituted an economic group succeeding GTE; 7) Verizon Co. was jointly and severally liable both for the obligations contracted by Verizon LLC and for the negative consequences caused to THS by the termination of the Master Purchase Agreement; 9) clauses nos. 24 and 28 of the cited contract were ineffective with respect to the exoneration of Verizon's civil liability for contractual breach. Likewise, it ordered the co-defendants to pay the plaintiff the sums of: $2,582,156.00 for machinery investment; $2,860,696.00 for increase in inventories; $8,806,872.00 for operating cash flows corresponding to the period 2004-2013; $7,237,068.00 for losses for the period 2004-2007; $983,825.00 for interest paid; and, $28,885,195.00 for damages for business interruption (interrupción de operaciones). It ordered indexation and the payment of interest on the aforementioned amounts. It imposed on the co-defendants the joint and several payment of personal and procedural costs in favor of the plaintiff company, and on THS the payment of personal and procedural costs in favor of ICE. Verizon LLC requested addition and clarification of vote no. 66-2017-V, which was rejected through resolution no. 66-2017-V-BIS of 8:00 a.m. on August 8, 2017. Disagreeing, the co-defendants appeal to cassation (casación).\n\n**Appeal on procedural grounds**\n\n**III.-** The appellants formulate **six** grievances. By virtue of the fact that the appeals filed are identical in the number of grievances and their content, they will be addressed jointly. In the **first** ground, the appellants argue lack of jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter (incompetencia en razón de la materia). They indicate that what is debated in this matter is a contract between private parties, whose termination is regulated by an arbitration clause. Hence, its examination on the merits is barred from the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In their view, the proper course is a declaration of lack of jurisdiction and the transfer of the case to the competent jurisdictional body. They invoke violation of articles 7, 8, and 10 of the CPC. They add that during the trial, the exception of lack of jurisdiction was raised.\n\n**IV.-** In the case at bar (sub lite), the plaintiff directs its claims against ICE and Verizon.\n\nagainst the first, because it is the entity with which Verizon signed the contract under public tender 6378-T, which grants the possibility of entering into a subcontract to carry out what was agreed therein; and, against the second, because it is with that company that the master contract was signed for the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. Note, for the plaintiff, both the entity and the co-defendant companies were responsible for the early termination of the master contract and the damage caused. Hence, she filed the lawsuit before the contentious-administrative court. Verizon LLC and ICE filed a plea of lack of jurisdiction. The co-defendant corporation argues the existence of an arbitration clause and, the entity argues that what is at issue is a matter between private parties. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in resolution no. 000874-C-S1-2009 at 11:15 a.m. of 2009, indicates that cases where the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration (including Autonomous Institutions, such as ICE) is discussed belong to the civil jurisdiction of the Treasury (article 97 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—hereinafter LOPJ) and, therefore, the hearing of the matter corresponds to the contentious-administrative court. During the oral hearing, the co-defendants insist on the lack of jurisdiction and the Tribunal indicates that the matter is precluded. The principle of preclusion (preclusión) aims to order the debate and enable the progress of the process in the manner determined by the legislator. Thus, as this deciding body has repeatedly indicated, once that procedural stage of the litigation has passed, one advances to the next stage, without the possibility of returning to a stage that has been passed. (See judgments 793 at 10:00 a.m. on November 27, 2008 and no. 615 at 9:00 a.m. on May 20, 2010). Based on the foregoing, this Chamber agrees with the Tribunal's statement that the issue of jurisdiction is a precluded matter, regarding which this Chamber has already determined the court to which its hearing corresponds. The thesis that the Tribunal must decline its jurisdiction to hear the matter because it was established that the claims against ICE were unfounded and the entity had no liability for the detriment caused by the breach of the master contract is not acceptable. Pursuant to canon 37 of the CPC, applicable supplementarily by remission of article 220 of the CPCA, the jurisdiction of a judicial body is lost only when the process has been decided, the judgment executed, the judge performed the procedural act entrusted to them (article 36 of the CPC), it is an accessory process that must pass to the judge hearing the main process, or when the judge is declared disqualified by virtue of impediment, excuse, or recusal. In the case under review, none of the recently cited scenarios occurs. Therefore, what the co-plaintiffs sought, that a lack of jurisdiction be declared and the hearing and resolution of the matter be delegated to another judicial body because it was established that ICE was not liable for the damage caused to THS, is inadmissible. That determination does not conform to any of the scenarios of the civil procedural rules indicated above, nor does it represent an assumption of jurisdiction over the matter (article 4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch).\n\nBased on the foregoing, the claim must be dismissed.\n\n**Appeal on substantive grounds**\n\n**V.-** In the second attack titled “**The Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction over disposable patrimonial matters**”, the appellants argue that the Chamber of Judges enters into the analysis of a private contract containing an arbitration clause and, therefore, its cognizance corresponds to the Arbitral Tribunal. In this way, it fails to comply with the provisions of article 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, in subsequent references LGAP) and subsection 67 f) of the Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley de Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social, in future references RAC),\n\n**VI.-** According to what was stated by the appellants, the Tribunal resolves on a contract whose cognizance is barred to it. However, this Chamber observes, in the case under review, what was analyzed and resolved is the “Contract for the Publication of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE” (public tender 6378-T), not the master contract as the cassation appellants affirm. See, what the Tribunal established was the willful conduct of the co-defendants, in ignoring the repeated missives sent by ICE (Official Letters 6000-41046-2004 of July 15, 2004, 6000-52278-2004 of September 14, 2004, and 600-64540-2004 of November 18, 2004), explicitly expressing their disagreement with the suggested modifications and, emphasizing, that the structure and quantity of copies of the telephone directories for 2005 had to conform to what was agreed (the same as 2004). Said breach generated the rescission (recisión) of the administrative contract (official letter 6000-27733-2005 of SGT-2326-2005 of June 1, 2005, ratified by official letter 0150-36359-2005 of GG-680-2005 of the General Management of ICE) and, subsequently, the termination of the master contract, as it was a “subcontract” for the execution of the contract for the publication of the telephone directories. As can be observed, said analysis does not imply the resolution of the master contract but rather of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and Consorcio GTE (now Verizon), which is why, this Chamber considers, the administrative and arbitration regulations alleged to have been violated (article 66 of the LGAP and canon 67 subsection f) of the RAC Law) were not breached. Nor does the incorrect interpretation of the master contract that was submitted as evidence occur. Consequently, the claim must be dismissed.\n\n**VII.-** In the third claim, what is reproached by the appellants is the interpretation of the figure of contracting. They state, the inclusion of the Master Purchase Contract no.\n\nVIS-2001-21-IP within that type of legal figure is an error that entails the incorrect application of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, successively LCA) and further violates the principle of the finality of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) (Article 34 of the Constitution) and Articles 7, 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution, Canons 6 and 9 of the LGAP, Articles 58 and 62 of the LCA, Articles 69 and 149 of the Regulation to the LCA (in future references RLCA), and provisions 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code (hereinafter CC). They explain that, according to the limitations of Rules 22 and 22 bis of the LCA and the criterion of the Contraloría General de la República, subcontracting (subcontratación) is an ancillary relationship to the principal one, vested with a private character that is appropriate in agreements for the execution or construction of public works. Hence, ICE's attempt to configure it within that figure exceeds the limitations provided for in the LCA and violates the principles of legality and finality of one's own acts. In another line of reasoning, they highlight the error that, in their judgment, the Tribunal makes by granting greater legal life to the subcontract than to the main contract. They state that if the term of public bidding no. 6378-T was 96 months (2001 to 2008), it is not feasible for the maximum term of the master contract to be 168 months, as is attested in Proven Fact no. 7 of the challenged judgment. This contradiction causes the imposition of exorbitant, unreasonable, disproportionate, and illegal sums as compensation (indemnización).\n\n**VIII.-** Regarding the figure of subcontracting (subcontratación), the **Tribunal** indicates: \"[…] *it arises when one of the obligors in a basically binary contractual relationship turns to third parties to obtain goods or services that are necessary to fulfill the primary contractual obligations. In this line of thought, a first-level relationship exists in the initial contract, and so one of the parties, for its own account and risk and exclusively according to its will, proceeds to enter into one or several second-level contractual relationships with subcontractors, since the latter possess the means for the contractor to fulfill its obligation load.* (The underline does not correspond to the original) *Consequently, we are in the presence of a main contract and a secondary contract signed by one of the parties, for the performance of some of the services that are, in turn, the object of the main contract or that at least contribute to its fulfillment. It is evident, then, that subcontracting arises due to the specialization of business organizations and the material impossibility for a contractor to have within its reach all the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of the principal obligation. Consequently, subcontracting operates at different levels and, although it is undeniable that the proper execution of the main contract depends on the proper operation of the subcontracting, it is not permissible to view it as an intricate framework, given the instrumental nature of the former with respect to the contract signed by the contractor.* (The highlighted text is supplied) *Thus, the fate of the secondary contract, that is, the one originating from the subcontracting, must not have a direct legal or factual consequence on the execution of the main contract; meaning, the subcontractor's non-compliance does not relieve the contractor from fulfilling the terms and conditions of the main contract in a timely manner.*\n\n[...]” According to the above, the Panel of Judges concluded that, although the LCA originally provided for subcontracting for execution or construction contracts for public works, through case law the possibility of using this mechanism in other types of administrative contracting had been opened. They determined that the contract with ICE allowed subcontracting a company for the development, production, and distribution of the Telephone Directories, without this constituting an obligation for the entity in case of non-compliance, but without relieving GTE (now Verizon) of its responsibility for the total execution of the contract. They established the prevalence of the administrative contracting (mechanism for fulfilling public purposes) over the master contract (instrument of private law). Regarding the term of the subcontracting period (plazo de la subcontratación), they deemed it proven that the maximum period agreed for the production, packaging, and distribution of the telephone directories was 168 months (clause 2.b of the master contract – List of Proven Facts Considerando V.I; subsection b), sub-subsection 7).\n\n**IX.-** In essence, the appellants disagree with the category of subcontracting (subcontratación) granted to the Master Purchase Contract no. VIS-2001-21-IP and with the compensation (indemnización) awarded to THS based on that classification. Prior to the analysis of the charge, it is appropriate to refer to the concepts of the administrative contract (contrato administrativo) and subcontracting. The administrative contract is defined as the agreement of wills celebrated between a public entity (public administration) and a subject of private law; or between two public entities. Subcontracting, for its part, is not in itself a form of participation in the contract, but rather implies that the awardee of the tender agrees with a third party completely unconnected to the contracting process, for the performance of a part of what was agreed (article 62 of the LCA and canon 69 of the RLCA). In this matter, as stated in the case file, GTE (now Verizon) was the awardee of public tender no. 6378-T.\n\nIn this manner, it signed with ICE the “Contract for the Editing of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE.” In clause 2.13.1 of said agreement, Verizon was granted the possibility of subcontracting a company to carry out the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories up to 50% of the total contract. It is thus that Verizon signs with THS the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP. The foregoing allows one to glimpse that the master contract originates as a subcontract of the administrative contract entered into between ICE and GTE (now Verizon), which is why, this Chamber considers, the interpretation made by the Tribunal regarding the figure of subcontracting is correct.\n\nX.- Having established the appropriateness of the figure of subcontracting, it becomes necessary to analyze whether or not the exemptions from liability agreed upon in the master contract apply, to determine whether or not the agreement was incorrectly assessed (evidence alleged to be poorly appreciated). Of relevance, clause 28 of the master contract indicates that Verizon could terminate the agreement immediately at any time, if the contract with ICE was terminated for any reason. Furthermore, it was established that it would not be responsible for compensation for damages (losses, profits, expenses, investments, among others) provided that the termination did not prejudice or affect the rights and responsibilities of THS regarding previously produced directories or any other debt existing between the parties. In the case under examination, when the termination of the master contract was communicated, THS had in stock at least 103,000 copies of the white pages of the telephone directories and had acquired debts with other entities to buy the necessary machinery to fulfill the development, production, and distribution of the telephone directories. These situations conform to the impediment assumptions indicated above that made the application of the exemption from liability provided in the clause impossible, therefore compensation is appropriate.\n\nXI.- Additionally, in this grievance, the appellants point out other aspects of disagreement. Firstly, they refer to the impediment to using the figure of subcontracting in administrative contracts that are not public works (articles 58 and 62 of the LCA and numeral 69 of the RLCA). They explain that the master contract signed between Verizon and THS was executed for the acquisition of supplies, and therefore cannot be classified as a subcontract.\n\nRegarding this issue, it should be noted that the use of the subcontracting (subcontratación) mechanism has been extended to other types of administrative contracts, in which, as in the case at hand, its use is provided for by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, via a tender clause. Therefore, this jurisdictional body deems that a subcontracting (subcontratación) is indeed present. As a second aspect, they claim a violation of the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios) (article 34 of the Constitution). In relation to this matter, it must be borne in mind that the alleged transgression is claimed to arise from the annulment of a declaratory act of rights, without the prior declaration of the act as detrimental. In the present matter, what is debated is not a declaratory act of rights, but the termination of an administrative contract due to \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants. Ergo, the alleged violation does not occur. As a final point, the appellants challenge the 168-month term granted for the subcontracting (subcontratación). In this regard, it must be stated that said term was granted by mutual agreement of the parties in clause 2.b of Master Contract No. VIS-2001-21-JP. Therefore, it is not true that it was the Chamber of Judges that established the duration of the subcontracting (subcontratación). In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, Master Contract No. VIS-2001-21-JP was correctly interpreted. We concur with the Tribunal that we are in the presence of a subcontracting (subcontratación), where one of its clauses defines the maximum term for the production, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories; and whose cause for termination is due to \"willful\" contractual breach by the co-defendants of the administrative contract derived from public tender no. 6378-T. Consequently, no violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios) or the regulations cited as violated has occurred, and therefore the rejection of this grievance will follow.\n\nXII.- In the fourth defect, the petitioners allege the omission of the expert report submitted by the plaintiff. They emphasize that this evidentiary element excludes the contract signed between THS and Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. (hereinafter RACSA) on April 28, 2006. Said omission creates a bias in the monetary income (profits) received by THS from that date and breaches the principles of the International Financial Reporting Standards (Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera, IFRS) and confers an unjust enrichment by granting THS overvalued sums for machinery investment, unrealized cash flows, losses incurred from 2004 to 2007, and business interruption. They recount that the error in the expert report occurs because the plaintiff, instead of asking Mr. Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez to examine the accounting books that demonstrate its financial-accounting status, requests the corroboration of the study conducted by Mr. Tomás Evans Salazar, which, as was indicated, is biased.\n\nThey invoke the violation of numeral 267 of the CoCo.\n\n**XIII.-** Regarding the contract signed between THS and RACSA, the **Tribunal** in Considerando V.XV.- of the challenged judgment, stated: *“**V.XV.- On the Amounts liquidated** […] *From the indicated amount, the sums paid to the plaintiff by Radiográfica Costarricense S.A. must be deducted, for any telephone directory (guías telefónicas) production contract executed after the contractual breach by Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC.* […]” In that same section, concerning the reports of Messrs. Tomás Evans Salazar and Ramón Humberto Romero Rodríguez, it said: *“4. The sums determined in the aforementioned documents, both by Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez, are based on applicable technique, are coincident, and include the items of machinery, inventory increases, operating cash flows according to the contract, realized losses (pérdidas realizadas), interest paid, and impact due to business interruption (afectación por interrupción de operaciones).* […] *The defendant did not object to or provide evidence to contradict the methodology or the estimated dates for the future value of the realized losses (pérdidas realizadas), the interest rates applied, projections, calculations, methodologies, or the conclusions obtained. Therefore, this Tribunal lacks elements of conviction to question the scope of the documents under analysis.* (Underlining supplied) […]”\n\n**XIV.-** In this challenge, the appellants accuse the pretermission (preterición) of the expert evidence. However, as indicated in the preceding Considerando, the Tribunal does indeed assess that evidentiary element. This is evident from the statement by the Chamber of Judges that the amounts paid by RACSA to THS for any telephone directory (guías telefónicas) production contract after the contractual breach with Verizon must be deducted from the recognized amount; as well as from the indication of the lack of objection against the evidence or the provision of another evidentiary element to contradict the methodology used by Messrs. Evans Salazar and Romero Rodríguez. Hence, this Chamber deems that, although what is alleged by the cassation appellants is the pretermission (preterición) of the expert report provided by THS (exclusion of the contract with RACSA and the accounting books), what is debated is the assessment the Tribunal makes of that evidentiary element. But, furthermore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the appellants seek to re-enter into the analysis of their opposition to the opinion, an aspect resolved by the judging persons at the appropriate procedural moment. Based on the foregoing, the charge is not receivable, and therefore its rejection shall proceed.\n\n**XV.-** In the fifth objection, the appellants invoke the exception of prescription (excepción de prescripción). They allege the violation of subsection e) of article 984 of the CoCo, numeral 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (in subsequent mentions CPC), and the principle of legal certainty. The cassation appellants maintain that since the Master Contract is an agreement for the production and preparation of telephone directories, the prescriptive period provided in article 984 subsection e) of the CoCo applies. From that perspective, if the notification of the termination of the contractual relationship was notified to THS on September 2, 2005, the period for filing the lawsuit expired on September 2, 2006. However, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit until December 15, 2008 (folios 1 to 93 of the electronic file) and the order for service of process (auto de intimación) was not notified until January 28, 2008, meaning that, in light of the aforementioned rule, the prescriptive period had been exceeded. Despite this, the Tribunal, with no reasoning and without any indication of the rule it applies, carries out a four-year prescription count and denies the exception.\n\n**XVI.-** Regarding the exception of prescription, the **Tribunal** stated: “*V.IV.- On the defense of prescription raised: a) In its closing arguments, the representative of the co-defendant Verizon Communications Inc invoked the application of article 984 of the Commerce Code […] Pursuant to a reading of the claims, it is noted that the plaintiff requests payment for damages caused by the alleged willful breach of contract by the co-defendant companies and entity. For the foregoing reason, this Tribunal finds that in the case at hand we are dealing with a prescriptive period of 4 years. In this vein, it is noted that through a note dated September 2, 2005, the General Manager of Verizon Information Services- Costa Rica LLC informs the plaintiff that it is terminating the contractual relationship originating from the respective master contract, and thus the lawsuit was filed on December 15, 2008. On January 28, 2009, the lawsuit was notified to the representative of Verizon Information Services Costa Rica LLC and on March 18, 2009, to the representative of Verizon Communications Inc. Consequently, this Tribunal finds that the raised defense should be rejected, given that the lawsuit was notified without the four-year prescription having taken effect.* […]”\n\n**XVII.-** In the case under review, the cassation appellants' thesis is that, because the actions of the Master Contract corresponded to the production and preparation of telephone directories agreed upon in the Master Contract, the application of the one-year prescriptive period set forth in subsection e) of numeral 984 of the CoCo was appropriate. However, the Tribunal disagrees with what was argued by the co-defendants.\n\nIn its view, the plaintiff's claims were aimed at recognition of the damages and losses caused by the co-defendants' willful breach of contract, and therefore the four-year statute of limitations period also provided for in the aforementioned canon was applicable. In this regard, this Chamber observes that the object of the Master Purchase Contract VIS-2001-21-IP was the preparation, packaging, and distribution of telephone directories in Costa Rica and Belize. Subsection e) of article 984 of the CoCo literally states: “[…] e) Actions arising from wholesale and retail sales to other merchants or directly to the consumer.” It is clear that the object of the agreement and the provisions of subsection e) of the recently cited rule do not coincide, since THS is not “selling” the telephone directories. Therefore, the application of the precept set forth in the subsection indicated ut supra is inappropriate. Contrario sensu, the application of the four-year prescriptive period determined by the Chamber of Judges becomes applicable. The argument put forth by the co-defendants, that the Tribunal does not indicate which rule was applied to determine the four-year statute of limitations period, cannot be accepted, given that at the beginning of the recital where this matter is decided, it is clearly indicated that the content of article 984 of the CoCo is being analyzed. From this, it can easily be inferred that the decision is limited to that rule. Nor is a violation of numeral 155 of the CPC and the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica) observed, since the issue of prescription was resolved in section V.IV of the appealed judgment and the valid and current rules applicable to the case were observed. Consequently, this Chamber agrees with the Tribunal's ruling and will proceed to reject the alleged violation.\n\n XVIII.- In the sixth error, the appellants allege indirect violation due to improper weighing of the evidence. They indicate the erroneous assessment of the powers of attorney granted by Marianne Drost, Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., and of documents nos. 6 and 15 from the plaintiff's evidentiary file (change of company name, merger, and acceptance of rights and obligations of bidding process no. 6378-T and of the subcontract); which causes the Tribunal, based on a phonetic and corporate-name similarity, to deem proven the existence of an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) among the companies indicated above. On the other hand, they emphasize that the transformation of the company GTE into Verizon LLC, Verizon Co. and the willful or abusive conduct on the part of the co-defendants was never proven, so the rule of patrimonial liability of legal entities (responsabilidad patrimonial de las personas jurídicas) is not applicable. They cite the violation of numeral 82, subsection 4) of the CPCA.\n\n**XIX.-** Regarding the transformation of the company GTE into Verizon LLC, Verizon Co., the **Court** stated: *“V.I.- In particular regarding the proven facts:* […] *a) Proven facts with respect to the existing legal relations between ICE and the co-defendant companies:* […] *11. That the company GTE Information Service changed its name to Verizon Information Services Inc., the company GTE Directories Corporation changed its name to Verizon Directories Corp., and General Telephone Directory Company C por A changed its name to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC. (Document 6, corresponding to a file running from folio 3045 to 3022 of the plaintiff’s evidentiary record) 12. That the legal representatives of Verizon Information Services, Inc., Verizon Directories Corp., and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, accepted the rights and obligations arising from tender (licitación) 6378-T and the contract derived therefrom” (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative record, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff’s evidentiary record). 13. That VERIZON Information Services- Costa Rica, LLC, sent a note dated May 16, 2002, to the ICE Procurement Department (Dirección de Proveeduría), stating that “General Telephone Directory Company C por A” changed its name to Verizon Information Services Costa Rica, LLC and requesting that the change of the corporate name (razón social) of the companies comprising the GTE Consortium be officially recorded. (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative record, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff’s evidentiary record). 14. That GTE merged with the American firm Bell Atlantic and as a result of the merger, the VERIZON GROUP was created, substituting the corporate name of GTE with the VERIZON GROUP (folios 3035, 3036, and 3037 of the administrative record, Document No. 15 of the plaintiff’s evidentiary record).”* Having proven the merger of GTE with Bell Atlantic and the name change to Grupo Verizon, as well as the merger of the corporation, the Chamber of Judges established: *“VIII.- Argument related to the lack of joint and several liability of the co-defendant company with the joint and several guarantee of GTE Corporation:* […] *it appears in the record that through a document dated August 28, 2002, Verizon Information Services Costa Rica, LLC, expressed the following to ICE: “11.- MAINTENANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS. In accordance with what was required in the note of June 18, 2002, I also allow myself to attach to this document a SWORN DECLARATION regarding the Maintenance of Obligations and Rights, signed by the legal representatives of Verizon Information Services, Inc., Verizon Directories Corp., and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLC, in which they accept the rights and obligations arising from tender 6378-T and the contract derived therefrom”* (the underlining is not from the original). *Additionally, the Twenty-Fifth Clause of the contract between ICE and the GTE Consortium stipulated the following: “In the event that due to a modification in the law of ICE this entity changes its name or that, for its part, GTE changes its name as a result of merging or associating with another company, in both cases this contract shall remain unchanged and in force between the parties, under the new legal denominations that substitute the names of the legal entities represented herein” In accordance with the foregoing, in addition to what was expressly provided, there was an express declaration by the co-defendant regarding the maintenance of the obligations originally contracted by the GTE group.* […] (the highlighting does not correspond to the original)” Regarding the powers of attorney granted by Mrs. Marianne Drost, in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co.\n\n(evidence visible at folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file), it indicated: b) Proven facts of relevance for the resolution of this matter related to the connection between the co-defendant companies and the plaintiff: […] 13. That Mrs. MARIANNE DROST, a North American citizen, granted powers of attorney and acted in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., and VERIZON INFORMATION SERVICES-COSTA RICA, LLC. (folios 1183 to 1188 of the judicial file)”\n\nXX.- Before determining whether the assessment of documents nos. 6, 15 and the powers of attorney granted by Mrs. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of the firms Verizon Communications Inc. and Verizon Information Services-Costa Rica, LLCC (evidence provided by THS) was conducted correctly or not, it is pertinent to define what an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE) is. In commercial matters, a GIE is a group of natural or legal persons of an original legal nature, distinct from a corporation and an association, with related commercial and financial interests. Its purpose is to facilitate the exercise of the economic activity of its members, by pooling certain aspects of that activity. The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (hereinafter Sugef) in article no. 8 of the SUGEF 5-04 agreement of the “Reglamento sobre límites de crédito a personas individuales y grupos de interés económico”, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero through article 15 of the minutes of Session no. 480-2004, held on November 4, 2004 (published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta no. 227 of November 19, 2004), defines a GIE as: “Conformación de los grupos de interés económico. A group of economic interest shall be formed by the set of two or more persons who maintain significant financial, administrative, or patrimonial relationships among themselves, identified according to articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this regulatory body, as well as by the persons through whom the administrative and patrimonial relationships are constituted according to subsection a) of article 6 and subsection b) of article 7 of this Reglamento. The persons who form part of an economic interest group may or may not be linked to the entity. For linked persons, in addition to the provisions of this Reglamento, the provisions of the “Reglamento sobre el Grupo Vinculado a la Entidad” shall apply.” Precepts 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the aforementioned regulation determine the identification parameters of the groups and the significant financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationships that must exist among those who form that GIE.\n\n

XXI.- In the case under review, GTE and the American firm Bell Atlantic merged to increase their assets. That unification produced a change in the corporate name of GTE Information Service to Verizon Information Services Inc; GTE Directories Corporation to Verizon Directories Corp.; and, General Telephone Directory Company C to Verizon Information Service Costa Rica, LLC., which cannot be seen as a simple name change or a phonetic similarity, since the companies involved benefited from related factors such as: properties, buildings, and others. Thus, given the existence of a financial, administrative, and patrimonial relationship between both companies, this Chamber considers that we are in the presence of an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico, GIE). Now then, if to the foregoing we add that ICE, foreseeing a situation of this type (merger or association), had stipulated that the agreement would remain “unchanged and in force” under the new names (folios 3022 to 3045 of the administrative file), when the aforementioned merger occurred, the legal representatives of Verizon as a GIE assumed the rights and obligations contracted in tender (licitación) 6378-T and the Contract for the Editing of the Telephone Directory and Development and Implementation of Information Services between ICE and GTE. Therefore, the improper assessment of documents nos. 6 and 15 that the co-defendants allege is not appreciated. Regarding the special judicial powers of attorney granted by Mrs. Marianne Drost in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Verizon LLC and Verizon Co., seen the judicial file (folios 1183 and 1188); it must be noted that in deed no. 1 of 3:00 p.m. on March 25, 2009, executed before notary Fernando Vargas Winiker in the City of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, the authority of Mrs. Drost to grant the above-cited powers of attorney and the validity thereof are accredited. Hence, the alleged incorrect assessment is not given. Based on the foregoing, the ground will consequently be dismissed.

XXII.- In virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the appeals filed, with costs to be borne by those who interposed them (subsection 3) of canon 150 of the CPCA).

POR TANTO

The appeals are hereby dismissed, with costs to be borne by the petitioners.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga

Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales

William Molinari Vílchez José Rodolfo León Díaz

MCAMPOSS

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