{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0005-1038667",
  "citation": "Res. 01377-2021 Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Despido discriminatorio por razones de salud y cargas probatorias",
  "title_en": "Discriminatory dismissal on health grounds and burden of proof",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conoce de un recurso de casación en un proceso laboral donde una trabajadora alegó haber sido despedida de forma discriminatoria por su condición de salud (padecimientos psicológicos de vieja data, conocidos por el empleador). El empleador, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, se defendió alegando que el despido se realizó con responsabilidad patronal conforme al artículo 160 de su Convención Colectiva, sin involucrar un móvil discriminatorio. La Sala analiza las reglas de distribución de la carga probatoria en casos de discriminación: la parte trabajadora debe acreditar, incluso mediante indicios, los hechos en que sustenta su reclamo, mientras que el empleador debe demostrar la objetividad, racionalidad y proporcionalidad de la medida cuestionada. En el caso, la trabajadora logró acreditar su delicado estado de salud y que este era conocido por la demandada; el empleador no justificó objetivamente el despido, limitándose a invocar la facultad convencional. La Sala confirma la declaratoria de despido discriminatorio, ordena la reinstalación con pago de salarios caídos (limitados a 24 meses) y mantiene la condena en costas, pero revoca la condena por daño moral al considerar que este no fue probado. El voto salvado de dos magistrados sostiene que el daño moral sí era procedente por el ejercicio abusivo de la facultad convencional, dada la afectación psicológica demostrada.",
  "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice hears an appeal in a labor proceeding where a worker alleged discriminatory dismissal based on her health condition (long-standing psychological ailments known to the employer). The employer, the National Insurance Institute, defended itself by arguing the dismissal was with employer liability under article 160 of its Collective Bargaining Agreement, without discriminatory intent. The Chamber analyzes the rules on burden of proof in discrimination cases: the worker must prove, even by circumstantial evidence, the facts supporting her claim, while the employer must demonstrate the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the challenged measure. Here, the worker proved her delicate health and the employer's knowledge of it; the employer did not objectively justify the dismissal, merely invoking the contractual power. The Chamber upholds the finding of discriminatory dismissal, orders reinstatement with back pay (capped at 24 months), and confirms the costs order, but reverses the moral damages award for lack of proof. A dissenting vote by two judges holds that moral damages were appropriate given the abusive exercise of the contractual power and the demonstrated psychological harm.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "date": "18/06/2021",
  "year": "2021",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "despido con responsabilidad patronal",
    "salarios caídos",
    "daño moral in re ipsa",
    "prueba indiciaria",
    "carga probatoria dinámica",
    "fraude de ley",
    "voto salvado",
    "Convención Colectiva INS"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "despido discriminatorio",
    "carga de la prueba",
    "salarios caídos",
    "daño moral",
    "Convención Colectiva",
    "Código de Trabajo",
    "artículo 404",
    "artículo 478",
    "Sala Segunda",
    "voto salvado",
    "discriminación por salud",
    "reinstalación",
    "prueba indiciaria",
    "objetividad y razonabilidad"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "discriminatory dismissal",
    "burden of proof",
    "back pay",
    "moral damages",
    "collective bargaining agreement",
    "Labor Code",
    "article 404",
    "article 478",
    "Second Chamber",
    "dissenting vote",
    "health discrimination",
    "reinstatement",
    "circumstantial evidence",
    "objectivity and reasonableness"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "V.- FONDO DEL ASUNTO: (...) Ante el reclamo de discriminación, una vez demostrado el padecimiento de la actora, que éste era de conocimiento de la demandada -por ser de vieja data- y que no se trató de un despido sancionatorio, la tesis de defensa, en el sentido de que el despido no fue por el estado de salud de la trabajadora, sino que se actuó en el ejercicio de la potestad prevista en la Convención Colectiva, no es suficiente para admitir que se trató de un despido objetivo y razonable, tal y como se lo exige el numeral 478 inciso 10 del Código de Trabajo. En autos quedó acreditado el motivo discriminatorio que alega la actora, atribuible a su delicado estado de salud, el cual la venía aquejando desde hacía varios años. La potestad conferida por esa normativa convencional no puede ejercerse para lograr un fin ilegítimo y prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, como es la discriminación, no solo prohibida por el numeral 404 antes citado, sino también por el Código Civil (…)",
  "excerpt_en": "V.- MERITS OF THE CASE: (...) Given the claim of discrimination, once the plaintiff's suffering was proven, that it was known to the defendant—since it was of long standing—and that it was not a disciplinary dismissal, the defense argument that the dismissal was not due to the worker's health but was an exercise of the power under the Collective Bargaining Agreement is insufficient to accept that it was an objective and reasonable dismissal, as required by article 478, section 10 of the Labor Code. The discriminatory motive alleged by the plaintiff was proven, attributable to her delicate state of health, which had been affecting her for several years. The power granted by that contractual rule cannot be exercised to achieve an illegitimate end prohibited by the legal system, such as discrimination, prohibited not only by article 404 cited above but also by the Civil Code (…)",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Second Chamber partially granted the appeal: it reversed the moral damages award and upheld the reinstatement, back pay (capped at 24 months), and costs.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda acogió parcialmente el recurso: anuló la condena por daño moral y confirmó la reinstalación, los salarios caídos (topados a 24 meses) y las costas."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "The power granted by that contractual rule cannot be exercised to achieve an illegitimate end prohibited by the legal system, such as discrimination, prohibited not only by article 404 cited above but also by the Civil Code.",
      "quote_es": "La potestad conferida por esa normativa convencional no puede ejercerse para lograr un fin ilegítimo y prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, como es la discriminación, no solo prohibida por el numeral 404 antes citado, sino también por el Código Civil."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "The discriminatory motive alleged by the plaintiff was proven in the record, attributable to her delicate state of health, which had been afflicting her for several years.",
      "quote_es": "En autos quedó acreditado el motivo discriminatorio que alega la actora, atribuible a su delicado estado de salud, el cual la venía aquejando desde hacía varios años."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "For granting such claim in the labor field, it must be proven through reliable evidence that justifies the award. Granting this claim 'in re ipsa' is not possible, because it cannot be presumed that the mere fact of dismissal results as a 'logical consequence' in suffering; rather, it must be proven.",
      "quote_es": "Para el otorgamiento de esa petición, en el campo laboral, se deben demostrar a través de pruebas fehacientes que justifican el otorgamiento de ese rubro. El otorgamiento de esa pretensión 'in re ipsa' no es posible, porque no se puede presumir que el solo hecho del despido deriva como 'consecuencia lógica' un sufrimiento, sino que éste debe demostrarse."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando X (Voto Salvado)",
      "quote_en": "The undersigned dissent from the majority vote, insofar as it granted the appeal and denied the plaintiff moral damages. ... the dismissal caused her greater harm.",
      "quote_es": "Los suscritos nos apartamos del voto de mayoría, en cuanto acogió el recurso y denegó a la actora, la indemnización por daño moral. ... el despido le generaba una mayor afectación."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-12443",
      "citation": "Ley 7130",
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      "title_en": "Civil Code of Costa Rica",
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      "id": "norm-8045",
      "citation": "Ley 5089",
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      "id": "norm-81360",
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      "title_en": "Civil Procedure Code — Reversal of Burden of Proof in Environmental Matters",
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    {
      "id": "norm-871",
      "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)",
      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
      "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
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  "body_es_text": "*170017180166LA*\r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\r\r\n \nSALA SEGUNDA\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nExp: 17-001718-0166-LA \n\r\r\n\nRes: 2021-001377\n\r\r\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las \r\r\nonce horas quince minutos del dieciocho de junio de dos mil veintiuno.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nProceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito \r\r\nJudicial de San José, por [Nombre 001], divorciada, de oficios domésticos y \r\r\nvecina de Cartago, contra el INSTITUTO \r\r\nNACIONAL DE SEGUROS, representado por su apoderado general judicial el \r\r\nlicenciado Jonathan Esteban Fallas Molina, vecino de Heredia. Actúan como \r\r\napoderados especiales judiciales; de la actora, la licenciada Carolina Soto Monge; \r\r\ny de la demandada, el licenciado Erick Porras Retana, soltero. Todos mayores, \r\r\ncasados y vecinos de San José con las excepciones indicadas.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\n \r\r\nRedacta el Magistrado Olaso Álvarez; y,\n\r\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nI.- ANTECEDENTES: En la demanda, la actora mencionó que inició labores \r\r\npara las demandadas, el 11 de julio de 1995; y que fue despedida con \r\r\nresponsabilidad patronal, el 2 de enero de 2017. Considera haber sido víctima de \r\r\nacoso laboral, por cuanto le recargaban su trabajo, le presionaban con las cargas \r\r\nde trabajo sin darle capacitación debida; constantemente su jefa superior se \r\r\nmolestaba por las incapacidades o permisos que pedía para asistir a reuniones de \r\r\nsu hija menor de edad. Que a raíz del despido injustificado ha sufrido mucho y se \r\r\nle ha causado daños y perjuicios así como un daño moral subjetivos en su salud \r\r\nfísica, psicológica y emocional, consistente en el sufrimiento que experimenta a raíz \r\r\ndel despido (ansiedad, tristeza, dolor, pues se le ha dificultado encontrar un nuevo \r\r\nempleo, no tiene dinero ni seguro social). Asevera que el despido se ordenó, al \r\r\ntener conocimiento, la demandada, de su enfermedad. Reprochó un rebajo, que \r\r\nconsidera ilegal, en su liquidación, por la suma de Ë\r\r\n407.736. Solicita se condene a \r\r\nla demandada al pago de las diferencias que puedan existir en el pago del \r\r\npreaviso, cesantía, vacaciones, salario escolar y aguinaldo; a devolverle la suma \r\r\nrebajada en la liquidación; a pagarle el salario correspondiente a 404 horas \r\r\nrecibidas en cursos de capacitación obligatoria y fuera del horario de trabajo; \r\r\ndaños y perjuicios; daño moral; reconocimiento del salario escolar, sobre el 60% \r\r\nque paga el INS por incapacidades retroactivas al 2012; intereses legales sobre \r\r\nlas sumas reclamadas, su indexación y el pago de ambas costas. En escrito \r\r\nulterior, la demanda fue ampliada en cuanto a ciertos hechos, así como en la \r\r\ndescripción de los daños y perjuicios que estima le fueron ocasionados. El instituto \r\r\naccionado contestó de manera negativa los hechos. Adujo que a su representado \r\r\nno le constan los aparentes problemas de ansiedad y depresión mencionados por \r\r\nla accionante y que el cese de la relación laboral se debió a un despido con \r\r\nresponsabilidad patronal, de conformidad con el artículo 160 de la Convención \r\r\nColectiva. Opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y de pago. El Juzgado \r\r\nacogió parcialmente la demanda y declaró que en virtud de que la actora fue \r\r\ndespedida por un acto discriminatorio, en razón de su estado de salud, tiene \r\r\nderecho a ser reinstalada, con el pago de los salarios caídos y/o dejados de \r\r\npercibir desde la fecha del despido discriminatorio hasta su efectiva reinstalación y \r\r\nal pago de una indemnización equivalente a veinticuatro meses de salario, de \r\r\nconformidad con el artículo 566 del Código de Trabajo; así como al pago de siete \r\r\nmillones y medio de colones por concepto de daño moral, la cual devengará \r\r\nintereses e indexación al momento de la firmeza de la sentencia y del efectivo \r\r\npago, cuyo cálculo será realizado en ejecución de sentencia, debiendo deducirse, \r\r\ndel importe total de la condenatoria, la suma pagada por preaviso y cesantía. Se \r\r\ncondenó a la demandada al pago de ambas costas de la acción, fijando las \r\r\npersonales en la suma prudencial de un millón de colones. Contra esa decisión \r\r\nrecurre la representación del instituto accionado.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nII.- AGRAVIOS DEL RECURSO: Como motivos de nulidad se plantean: \r\r\n1) Que el \r\r\nJuzgado no le dio traslado a la demanda en contra de la señora [Nombre 020], por \r\r\nlo cual solicita se anule la sentencia, para que se cumpla con esa gestión. 2)\r\r\n Se le \r\r\nbrinda credibilidad a los argumentos de la actora a pesar de no \r\r\ndemostrar, con prueba idónea, lo alegado. 3) La sentencia está viciada de \r\r\nincongruencia porque, por un lado señala que hay “certeza” y, por otro “sospecha” \r\r\nde discriminación; y no se menciona prueba concreta que respalde cada \r\r\nconclusión. 4) Se tiene por acreditado, que el despido obedeció al comunicado \r\r\nverbal del diagnóstico por déficit atencional, sin tener prueba de la veracidad del \r\r\ndicho de la actora, pues no consta que ella haya informado, a la señora [Nombre \r\r\n006], lo que indica en la demanda. Agrega, que sobre ese tema no presentó \r\r\nprueba, solo se cuenta con el dicho de la actora. Insiste en que la accionante no \r\r\ndemostró la supuesta discriminación y que no existe relación de causalidad entre \r\r\nel supuesto comunicado –no acreditado en el expediente- y el despido con \r\r\nresponsabilidad patronal, pues de ser cierto el comunicado (que niega), \r\r\ntranscurrieron dos meses entre ese supuesto hecho y el despido. Que una \r\r\nadecuada valoración de los hechos por parte del juzgador, lo hubiera llevado a \r\r\nconcluir que no existen elementos demostrativos de un nexo entre algún hecho \r\r\ndiscriminatorio y el despido. Afirma que, por el contrario, se acreditó que el Instituto \r\r\nmantuvo a la actora laborando, pese a que padecía de algunos trastornos \r\r\npsicológicos desde el 2011, es decir, no era un hecho novedoso (se refiere al \r\r\nestado de salud de la petente), por lo que se debe tener por demostrado, que el \r\r\ndespido no estuvo motivado en el estado de salud de la trabajadora. Atribuye a \r\r\nsus rasgos de personalidad, la causa de sentirse perseguida. Transcribe, \r\r\nparcialmente, el contenido de la pericia médico-forense, para señalar que la actora \r\r\nutilizó su enfermedad como instrumento y medida de desesperación ante el \r\r\ndespido aplicado, distorsionando la realidad, asumiendo de manera errónea y \r\r\nnegativa, que había sido despedida y discriminada por razones de salud, \r\r\ndescribiendo un panorama que no aconteció, no logrando acreditar el nexo causal \r\r\nentre el estado de salud y el despido, pues los padecimientos iniciaron varios años \r\r\nantes del despido, no son nuevos, lo que descarta el nexo de causalidad entre los \r\r\npadecimientos y la decisión de despedirla. También niega que la causa del \r\r\ndespido haya estado relacionada con faltas de la actora; o que sus evaluaciones \r\r\nfuesen poco satisfactorias; al respecto afirma que éstas (evaluaciones) fueron \r\r\n“efectivo” y “aceptable”, por lo que no recibió alguna calificación negativa ni \r\r\ndeficiente. En cuanto a la utilización de la norma convencional que permite al \r\r\nInstituto hacer despidos con responsabilidad patronal, afirma que la \r\r\nconstitucionalidad de la norma convencional ya ha sido revisada y no se requiere \r\r\nde la comisión de alguna falta si se el despido se aplica con el pago de preaviso y \r\r\ncesantía. En este aspecto se apoya en lo resuelto por el Tribunal Contencioso \r\r\nAdministrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Sexta, del Segundo Circuito Judicial \r\r\nNo. 253-2012. Afirma que en el fallo se realizan conclusiones erróneas en cuanto a \r\r\nla no resolución de la apelación de la actora sobre el despido, sobre las \r\r\nenfermedades de ell y sobre la falta de un plan para que las evaluaciones fueran \r\r\nmás. 5) Considera que al tenerse por ciertos, hechos de la demanda, sin que la \r\r\nactora haya demostrado su dicho, le genera indefensión y también por no tomar en \r\r\ncuenta que el despido se llevó a cabo con base en la potestad patronal prevista en \r\r\nel numeral 160 de la Convención Colectiva, sea, con responsabilidad patronal y el \r\r\npago de prestaciones, por lo que no estamos ante una despido discriminatorio, ni \r\r\ninjusto, ni improcedente. 6). En cuanto a lo resuelto sobre daño moral, afirma que \r\r\npara su otorgamiento no se indica si el despido es objetivo o subjetivo; además de \r\r\ncarecer de fundamento legal, de proporcionalidad y de coherencia; pues el \r\r\ndespido en aplicación del artículo 160 de la Convención Colectiva no puede \r\r\ngenerar a la trabajadora daño moral, pues esa norma prevé claramente la forma de \r\r\nindemnizar los daños por el despido con responsabilidad patronal. Alega que la \r\r\ncondena por daño moral carece de una argumentación clara y concreta, sobre el \r\r\nsustento fáctico y normativo de esa decisión. Considera una contradicción en el \r\r\nanális sobre el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria y lo resuelto, pues está claro \r\r\nque el despido fue con responsabilidad patronal y no se discute la aplicación del \r\r\nrégimen disciplinario. 7) \r\r\nSalarios caídos: Reclama la indebida aplicación del \r\r\nartículo 566 del Código de Trabajo, al haberse condenado al demandado al pago \r\r\nde salarios caídos y 24 meses de salario por despido discriminatorio, se incurre en \r\r\nuna condena doble. Asegura que, conforme a esa norma, el pago de salarios \r\r\ncaídos no puede ser superior al importe de 24 veces el salario mensual de la parte \r\r\nactora y, como el despido de la actora fue en enero de 2017, a la fecha han \r\r\ntranscurrido, de sobra, los veinticuatro meses. 8) Extremos otorgados. Dice que \r\r\nse incurrió en el vicio de ultrapetita, pues se concedió indemnización por \r\r\ndiscriminación, que no está dentro de las pretensiones de la demanda, \r\r\notorgándole por ese concepto una indemnización equivalente a 24 meses de \r\r\nsalario. Afirma que lo solicitado por la actora es el pago de supuestas diferencias, \r\r\nresarcimiento de daños y perjuicios por el despido, daño moral por el despido, \r\r\nintereses, indexación y costas. Que se da una condena doble por un mismo \r\r\naspecto, pues al ordenar la reinstalación de la actora también impuso el pago de \r\r\nsalarios caídos, por lo que al aplicar el artículo 566 del Código de Trabajo se da \r\r\nuna doble imposición de ese rubro, lo que es improcedente. También reprocha el \r\r\nmonto otorgado, por falta de motivación y por considerarlo desproporcionado. 9) \r\r\nCondena en costas: Solicita la exoneración en ese rubro, en primer lugar, por \r\r\nconsiderar que el despido no fue discriminatorio sino que se realizó con base en el \r\r\n160 de la Convención Colectiva; y, en segundo término, por haber litigado de \r\r\nbuena fe, pues su defensa la hizo a la luz del citado artículo convencional. Solicita \r\r\nque, de mantenerse la condena en costas, se reduzca el monto, fijado en forma \r\r\nprudencial, pues lo otorgado es desproporcionado. Todos esos motivos de agravio \r\r\nlos reiteró en el escrito presentado el 17 de junio de 2019 (dentro del plazo que \r\r\ntenía para recurrir del fallo), alegando, en forma expresa, que se incurrió en \r\r\nindebida valoración de pruebas, al tener por acreditados hechos, en contradicción \r\r\ncon la prueba del proceso, sustentando el fallo únicamente en la declaración de la \r\r\nactora, a la cual se le brindó valor supremo frente a los demás elementos \r\r\nprobatorios aportados, que demuestran que el despido ordenado por el Gerente \r\r\nGeneral no fue un acto discriminatorio sino basado en la potestad establecida en la \r\r\nConvención Colectiva, por lo que no existe un nexo entre la comunicación de la \r\r\ncondición de la actora a la señora [Nombre 006] y la decisión de despedirla. Que \r\r\nconforme al numeral 409 del Código de Trabajo, la actora debió acreditar el móvil \r\r\ndiscriminatorio del despido, lo que la recurrente echa de menos. Dice que no se ha \r\r\ntomado en cuenta que la actora tampoco demostró que el INS la haya incurrido en \r\r\nalguna otra conducta discriminatoria en su contra. Que la admisión del dicho de la \r\r\nactora y la imposición al INS de la obligación de demostrar un hecho negativo (no \r\r\nhaber despedido por razones de salud), violenta la sana crítica racional y el \r\r\nderecho de defensa. También acusa violación sustancial de los artículos 409, \r\r\n410 y 478 del Código de Trabajo, así como del numeral 160 de la \r\r\nConvención Colectiva del INS, en cuanto exigen a la actora la prueba de la \r\r\ndiscriminación y lo único que ésta aportó fue su declaración. Reclama una indebida \r\r\ninterpretación de esas normas, al exigírsele al INS la demostración de la causa \r\r\nobjetiva del despido. Reitera que se aplicó indebidamente el 566 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo y que se le debió eximir del pago de costas, por haber actuado de buena \r\r\nfe, acusando falta de fundamentación de las razones por las cuales se condenó a \r\r\n\"un porcentaje superior al inferior legal del 15%\".\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nIII.- DEL AGRAVIO DE ORDEN FORMAL: El artículo 587 del Código de Trabajo \r\r\nregula el recurso de casación por razones procesales en los siguientes términos: \r\r\n“Por razones procesales será admisible cuando se invoque:/ 1.-\r\r\n Cualquiera de \r\r\nlos vicios por los cuales procede la nulidad de actuaciones, siempre y \r\r\ncuando estos hayan sido alegados en alguna de las fases precedentes del \r\r\nproceso y la reclamación se haya desestimado. / 2.- Incongruencia de la \r\r\nsentencia u oscuridad absoluta de esta última parte. En los supuestos de \r\r\nincongruencia, el recurso solo es admisible cuando se ha agotado el trámite de \r\r\nla adición o aclaración./3.- Falta de determinación, clara y precisa, de los hechos \r\r\nacreditados por el juzgado./4.- Haberse fundado la sentencia en medios \r\r\nprobatorios ilegítimos o introducidos ilegalmente al proceso./ 5.- Falta de \r\r\nfundamento o fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia./ 6.- Haberse dictado la \r\r\nsentencia con inobservancia de las reglas establecidas en el párrafo tercero del \r\r\nartículo 537.\" [el énfasis es agregado]. El inciso 1° debe relacionarse con el \r\r\nnumeral 471 ídem, que enuncia los yerros procesales susceptibles de generar \r\r\nnulidad. Además, conforme a tales disposiciones, la parte debe haber formulado el \r\r\nreclamo en forma oportuna. La petición de nulidad que plantea la representación \r\r\ndel demandado, porque la codemandada [Nombre 020] no fue traída al proceso, \r\r\nno es de recibo, por tratarse de un argumento novedoso, es decir, porque no fue \r\r\nsolicitado dentro del marco de debate, sea con la contestación. El agravio por \r\r\nincongruencia, tampoco merece ser atendido. De conformidad con la doctrina y la \r\r\njurisprudencia, de esta Sala, el vicio de incongruencia ocurre cuando no existe \r\r\ncorrelación entre lo peticionado en la demanda y lo resuelto en el fallo (ver al \r\r\nrespecto los votos números 2013-623 de las 10:45 horas del 7 de junio de 2013; \r\r\n074-2021 de las 10:50 horas del 15 de enero de 2021; entre otros). En el caso de \r\r\nestudio no se está en presencia de ese vicio. Según se observa del escrito de \r\r\ndemanda y su aclaración y adición, la petición de la accionante fue la condena a la \r\r\ndemandada, al pago de “las diferencias que pueda existir en el pago de preaviso, \r\r\ncesantía, vacaciones, salario escolar y aguinaldo”; el pago de ¢407.736 que le \r\r\nfueron rebajados de su liquidación laboral; el salario correspondiente a 404 horas \r\r\nrecibidas en cursos de capacitación, daños y perjuicios y daño moral ocasionados; \r\r\nel reconocimiento del salario escolar sobre el 60% que paga el INS por \r\r\nincapacidades retroactivas al 2012; los intereses legales y la indexación sobre los \r\r\nrubros solicitados; y las costas de la acción. En escrito ulterior, visible a imagen \r\r\n585, del expediente virtual del Juzgado, aclaró que los daños y perjuicios consisten \r\r\nen “el sufrimiento que a raíz del despido injusto, tengo ansiedad, tristeza, dolor ya \r\r\nque se me ha dificultado mucho encontrar un nuevo empleo, no tengo dinero, no \r\r\ntengo seguro social”, también mencionó que con ocasión del despido, \r\r\nintempestivo, su condición de salud ha empeorado, no puede dormir, se muerde la \r\r\nlengua, se le ha quitado el apetito, ha perdido su autoestima ya que el INS al creer \r\r\nque no le sirvo como trabajadora simplemente la despide. También mencionó otras \r\r\nrazones personales que debió enfrentar como consecuencia del despido, por las \r\r\ncuales estimó el daño moral en la suma de cinco millones de colones y los daños y \r\r\nperjuicios en dos millones quinientos mil colones. Concluyó señalando “Reitero \r\r\nademás la solicitud de reinstalación y el pago de salarios caídos” (imagen \r\r\n588). La sentencia acogió la pretensión de reinstalación, con el pago de salarios \r\r\ncaídos y daño moral, por lo tanto, no existe incongruencia que atender como vicio \r\r\nprocesal de nulidad del fallo, resultando falta de sustento fáctico el pedido de \r\r\nnulidad por vicios procesales.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nIV.- SOBRE LA TUTELA POR ACTOS DISCRIMINATORIOS: \r\r\nEl artículo 404 del \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo, vigente (reformado por Ley número 9797 de 2 de diciembre \r\r\ndel año 2019) prohíbe toda discriminación en el trabajo por “…razones de edad, \r\r\netnia, sexo, religión, raza, orientación sexual, estado civil, opinión política, \r\r\nascendencia nacional, origen social, filiación, condición de salud, discapacidad, \r\r\nafiliación sindical, situación económica o cualquier otra forma análoga de \r\r\ndiscriminación” [el énfasis es agregado]. En el artículo 406 siguiente se prohíben \r\r\nlos despidos por cualquier causa discriminatoria. La sanción prevista por el \r\r\nquebranto a esa disposición es la nulidad del acto del despido y la consecuente \r\r\nreinstalación de la persona trabajadora en su puesto de trabajo, con el pleno goce \r\r\nde sus derechos y las consecuencias previstas para la sentencia de reinstalación \r\r\n(artículos 410 y 566 ídem). La prohibición contra la discriminación en el ámbito \r\r\nlaboral, no es novedosa. La ley 8107 de 30 de mayo de 2001 había incorporado el \r\r\nTítulo Undécimo, al Código de Trabajo, denominado “Prohibición de discriminar” \r\r\naunque la limitó a razones de edad, etnia, género o religión. Sin embargo, desde \r\r\n1960, la ley 2694 de 22 de mayo de ese año, había dispuesto “Prohíbase toda \r\r\nsuerte de discriminación, determinada por distinciones, exclusiones o \r\r\npreferencias, fundada en consideraciones sobre raza, color, sexo, edad, religión, \r\r\nestado civil, opinión política, ascendencia nacional, origen social, filiación o \r\r\nsituación económica, que limite la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en \r\r\nmateria de empleo u ocupación. Artículo 2º.- De la prohibición anterior se \r\r\nexceptúan aquellas distinciones, exclusiones o preferencias procedentes según \r\r\nlas calificaciones necesarias para el cabal cumplimiento de las funciones o \r\r\ntareas propias del género de cargo o empleo, exclusivamente conforme a la \r\r\nnaturaleza de éstas y a las condiciones del trabajador. Artículo 3º.- En cuanto al \r\r\nEstado, sus instituciones y corporaciones, todo nombramiento, despido, \r\r\nsuspensión, traslado, permuta, ascenso o reconocimiento que se efectúe en \r\r\ncontra de lo dispuesto por la presente ley, será anulable a solicitud de parte \r\r\ninteresada; y los procedimientos seguidos en cuanto a reclutamiento o selección \r\r\nde personal carecerán de eficacia en lo que resulte violatorio de esta ley. Por \r\r\notra parte, la Sala Constitucional, en una vasta jurisprudencia se ha referido a la \r\r\nimposibilidad de que los actos discriminatorios por razón de la salud, encuentren \r\r\ntutela en el ordenamiento jurídico. En el antecedente número 13.205-2005 de las \r\r\n15:13 horas del 27 de setiembre de 2005, dijo esa Sala: “III.- Sobre el Estado \r\r\nSocial de Derecho, la Igualdad y la Dignidad Humana. El Estado Social de \r\r\nDerecho, elemento fundamental de nuestro orden constitucional, entraña una \r\r\norientación de nuestro régimen político hacia la solidaridad social, esto es, hacia \r\r\nla equidad en las relaciones societarias, la promoción de la justicia social y la \r\r\nigualdad de todos los ciudadanos en el ejercicio de sus derechos, descartando \r\r\ndiscriminaciones arbitrarias e irrazonables. En tal sentido, el numeral 74 \r\r\nconstitucional establece, explícitamente, el deber de procurar una política \r\r\npermanente de solidaridad nacional con asidero en el principio cristiano de \r\r\njusticia social, lo que hace de ella un valor constitucional de primer orden (ver \r\r\nsentencia número 2170-93 de las 10:12 horas del 21 de mayo de 1993). En \r\r\nforma consecuente, con sustento en el Estado Social de Derecho, nuestra \r\r\nConstitución Política contempla un conjunto de derechos prestacionales relativos \r\r\na la protección de la familia, los trabajadores, sectores vulnerables de la \r\r\npoblación, la educación, el ambiente y bienes de la Nación como el patrimonio \r\r\ncultural. Este deber de sujetarse según los lineamientos del Estado Social de \r\r\nDerecho no está constreñido a la Administración, sino que se extiende a toda la \r\r\ncomunidad nacional, pues se trata de una regla fundamental de la convivencia \r\r\nciudadana en nuestro sistema político. En su condición de principio general, \r\r\nemana una particular proyección normativa en todos los ámbitos de creación, \r\r\ninterpretación y ejecución del Derecho. Propiamente en lo concerniente al \r\r\ncontrol de constitucionalidad, el Principio del Estado Social Derecho resulta útil \r\r\ncomo parámetro de validez normativa, criterio hermenéutico e instrumento \r\r\nfuncional integrador del ordenamiento jurídico. En cuanto al derecho a no ser \r\r\ndiscriminado, el parámetro de constitucionalidad comprende normas de rango \r\r\nconstitucional, como el artículo 33 de la Carta Fundamental, y regulaciones del \r\r\nderecho internacional de los derechos humanos, cuya aplicación como criterio \r\r\nde validez constitucional goza de expreso sustrato positivo y ha sido \r\r\nampliamente cimentada por la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. De esta forma, el \r\r\nartículo 1º de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos dispone que \r\r\n\"todos los seres humanos nacen libres e iguales en dignidad y derechos y, \r\r\ndotados como están de razón y conciencia, deben comportarse fraternalmente \r\r\nlos unos con los otros\". Este numeral evidencia la íntima relación entre el \r\r\nderecho a la igualdad y la convivencia fraternal -entiéndase solidaridad- en una \r\r\nsociedad, de manera que el uno sin la otra no se puede dar. El numeral 2 de esa \r\r\nDeclaración concretiza el derecho a no ser discriminado, en tanto \"toda persona \r\r\ntiene todos los derechos y libertades proclamados en esta Declaración, sin \r\r\ndistinción alguna de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o de \r\r\ncualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o \r\r\ncualquier otra condición (el subrayado no corresponde al original). Asimismo, la \r\r\nConvención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos estipula en su primer artículo \r\r\nel deber de los Estados Partes de resguardar los derechos en ella contemplados \r\r\nsin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, \r\r\nopiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición \r\r\neconómica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social (el subrayado no \r\r\ncorresponde al original), y, por otra parte, de manera expresa regula el derecho a \r\r\nla igualdad en su numeral 24. Propiamente en materia de discriminación laboral, \r\r\nel Estado ha ratificado una serie de convenios sobre la materia, como el \r\r\nConvenio OIT 111 Sobre Discriminación en Materia de Empleo y Ocupación, la \r\r\nConvención Interamericana contra la Discriminación de Discapacitados, la \r\r\nConvención para la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra \r\r\nla Mujer, entre otros. Sin bien ninguno de estos convenios contempla \r\r\nexplícitamente la enfermedad -término más amplio que la mera discapacidad, \r\r\npues no toda persona enferma es discapacitada- como motivo de discriminación, \r\r\nno menos cierto es que, por una parte, el inciso b) del primer artículo del \r\r\nConvenio 111 admite la posibilidad de especificar, a través de cierta vía, \r\r\ncualquier tipo de discriminación que anule o altere la igualdad de oportunidades \r\r\no de trato en el empleo u ocupación y, por otra parte, tanto la Declaración \r\r\nUniversal de los Derechos Humanos como la Convención Americana sobre \r\r\nDerechos Humanos proscriben de manera expresa toda clase de trato \r\r\ndiscriminatorio. Esta concepción es recogida por el referido numeral 33 de \r\r\nnuestra Constitución Política que dispone que toda persona sea igual ante la ley \r\r\ny no pueda practicarse discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana. En \r\r\nconsecuencia, el Principio del Estado Social de Derecho, el derecho a no sufrir \r\r\ntrato discriminatorio por cualesquiera motivos y el respeto a la dignidad humana \r\r\nson elementos de nuestro orden constitucional que coexisten pacíficamente, \r\r\ncuya tutela y fomento no solo le corresponde al Estado, sino también a todos los \r\r\nintegrantes de la comunidad”. Ese criterio ha sido reiterado entre muchos otros, \r\r\nen los votos números 8711-2010 y 7064-2013 de esa Sala; en donde queda \r\r\nratificada la improcedencia de la discriminación laboral por motivos de salud. El \r\r\nartículo 409 ídem estipula que “…quien alegue la discriminación deberá señalar \r\r\nespecíficamente el sustento fáctico en el que funda su alegato y los términos de \r\r\ncomparación que substancie su afirmación”. Como tales circunstancias \r\r\nconstituyen el supuesto fáctico para la tutela que se demanda, sobre la persona \r\r\ntrabajadora recae la carga de acreditar los hechos en que consiste la \r\r\ndiscriminación (artículo 477 en relación con el 409 del Código de Trabajo); y, a los \r\r\nfines de desvirtuar el sesgo discriminatorio, a la parte patronal corresponde \r\r\ndemostrar la justificación de la objetividad, racionalidad y proporcionalidad de las \r\r\nmedidas o las conductas señaladas como discriminatorias (artículo 478 inciso 10, \r\r\nídem).\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nV.- FONDO DEL ASUNTO: Los agravios sobre la causa de la reinstalación \r\r\nordenada por el Juzgado no son de recibo. No es cierto, como se plantea en el \r\r\nrecurso, que la actuación discriminatoria, declarada en el fallo, se haya sustentado \r\r\nen la comunicación del diagnóstico médico, que le hiciera la actora a la señora \r\r\n[Nombre 006]. Tampoco es atendible el reproche en el sentido de que la prueba de \r\r\nla discriminación, en la que se apoyó el fallo, fuera únicamente, el dicho \r\r\nde la actora. Del razonamiento vertido por la señora jueza A quo, se observa que el \r\r\nargumento de la trabajadora en relación con el despido discriminatorio por salud, \r\r\nse tuvo por acreditado con la información aportada, en el sentido de que el médico \r\r\nde empresa la había atendido en diversas ocasiones de crisis depresivas; y en una \r\r\ngran cantidad de incapacidades que constan en su expediente personal. El \r\r\nargumento de que el despido fue con responsabilidad patronal y no disciplinario, \r\r\nno tiene relevancia para resolver el recurso, puesto que el Juzgado no se basó en \r\r\nese supuesto de hecho, sino que atendió lo expuesto por la trabajadora, en el \r\r\nsentido de que la decisión del despido estuvo basada en el conocimiento de su \r\r\nestado de salud, que ella había comunicado a la jefatura inmediata. Nótese que \r\r\nese no es un tema en discordia dentro del marco del debate. Existe claridad en \r\r\nque, el cese de la funcionaria se sustentó en la aplicación de lo dispuesto por el \r\r\nartículo 160 de la Convención Colectiva, según el cual: \"...Tanto el Instituto como el \r\r\ntrabajador podrán ponerle término al contrato de trabajo sin justa causa, pero \r\r\nsiempre deberán notificar por escrito esa decisión con base en las siguientes \r\r\nreglas (…) El trabajador en estos casos, tendrá derecho al pago de cesantía \r\r\nsegún las siguientes reglas: (…) Después de un trabajo continuo mayor de un \r\r\naño, con un importe igual a un mes de salario por cada año o fracción no menor \r\r\nde seis meses, aplicándose un límite máximo de 20 años”. \n\r\r\n\nCon base en esa disposición, mediante oficio G-00014-2017 de 02 de enero de \r\r\n2017, a la actora se le informó la decisión de la demandada de ponerle fin a su \r\r\ncontrato de trabajo, con responsabilidad patronal, a partir del día 03 de enero de \r\r\n2017 (ver imagen 19 del expediente virtual del juzgado). Es decir, no se discute en \r\r\nesta litis, la imputación de una falta laboral cometida por la persona trabajadora, \r\r\nsino más bien, la imputación de una acción ilegítima, a la parte patronal, de haber \r\r\ndiscriminado a la funcionaria, al despedirla en razón de la afectación en su salud, \r\r\ndisfrazando su accionar, con la potestad de despido prevista en la Convención \r\r\nColectiva. La Reforma Procesal Laboral, como se indicó supra, estableció las \r\r\nobligaciones de quien requiere la tutela por discriminación, e introdujo un \r\r\nprocedimiento específico para tramitar denuncias como estas (artículo 540 y \r\r\nsiguientes, del Código de Trabajo), con especial tratamiento e indicación de las \r\r\ncargas probatorias que competen a cada una de las partes; especificando, para el \r\r\ncaso de la parte demandante, la obligación de \" ...señalar específicamente el \r\r\nsustento fáctico en el que funda su alegato y los términos de comparación que \r\r\nsubstancie su afirmación\". En el subexámine, la actora indicó, como sustento \r\r\nfáctico de la discriminación alegada, que su despido se produjo por su afectación \r\r\nen la salud, al comunicarlo a su jefatura, pocos días antes del despido. Es \r\r\nconveniente recordar que, en cuanto a las cargas probatorias, cuando se alegan \r\r\ndespidos discriminatorios, el actual artículo 478 del Código de Trabajo, dispone \r\r\n\"En los conflictos derivados de los contratos de trabajo, le corresponde...a la \r\r\nparte empleadora, la demostración de los hechos impeditivos que invoque y de \r\r\ntodos aquellos que tiene la obligación de mantener debidamente documentados \r\r\no registrados...10. La justificación de la objetividad, racionalidad y \r\r\nproporcionalidad de las medidas o las conductas señaladas como \r\r\ndiscriminatorias en todas las demandas relacionadas con discriminación. 11. \r\r\nCualquier otra situación fácticas cuya fuente probatoria le sea de más fácil \r\r\nacceso que al trabajador o la trabajadora.\". Aún antes de la vigencia de esa \r\r\nnorma, ya esta Sala y la Constitucional también, se habían referido a las cargas \r\r\nprobatorias, en las demandas por discriminación. En la sentencia n.° 13205, de las \r\r\n15:13 horas del 27 de setiembre de 2005, la Sala Constitucional resolvió: \"(...) \r\r\nes ineludible traer a colación la importancia que tiene la distribución de la carga \r\r\nde la prueba para procurarle al trabajador resguardo frente a actuaciones \r\r\npatronales que constituyan discriminación. (…) prima facie, el amparado que \r\r\nalega discriminación laboral debe desarrollar una actividad alegatoria \r\r\nsuficientemente concreta y precisa, en torno a los indicios de que ha existido tal \r\r\nviolación al derecho a la igualdad. Esta condición ha sido ampliamente reiterada \r\r\npor la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (ver sentencia número 2004-11984 de las \r\r\n10:10 horas del 29 de octubre de 2004 y 2004-11437 de las 9:53 horas del 15 de \r\r\noctubre de 2004). Alcanzado, en su caso, un resultado probatorio suficiente por el \r\r\naccionante, sobre la parte recurrida recae la carga de probar la existencia de \r\r\ncausas suficientes, reales y serias, para calificar de razonable y ajena a todo \r\r\npropósito discriminatorio la decisión o práctica patronal cuestionada, único \r\r\nmedio de destruir la apariencia lesiva creada por los indicios” ). Es decir, que en \r\r\ntoda protesta por discriminación, a la parte demandante le corresponde acreditar, \r\r\naún mediante prueba indiciaria, los hechos en los que sustenta su reclamo; y los \r\r\ntérminos de comparación en que substancie su afirmación (artículo 409 del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo); en tanto al patrono corresponderá demostrar, la justificación de la \r\r\nobjetividad, racionalidad y proporcionalidad de las conductas señaladas como \r\r\ndiscriminatorias, aportando la prueba que tenga en relación con lo discutido, para \r\r\npermitir, de esa forma, llegar a la verdad real y a la resolución justa del caso \r\r\nconcreto, por parte de quienes administran justicia (artículo 478 inciso 10, ídem). \r\r\nDe la copia del expediente médico de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social \r\r\naportado (ver imagen 814 y siguientes, del expediente virtual del juzgado), la \r\r\nepicrisis extendida por esa institución (ver imagen 462 ídem), así como de la \r\r\nconstancia extendida por el Servicio Médico de la demandada (imagen 464), se \r\r\ndesprende con claridad, que la actora es una persona que ha enfrentado \r\r\npadecimientos de orden psicológico relacionados con problemas ansioso \r\r\ndepresivos, por lo menos desde el año 2012. En el Dictamen Pericial Psicológico \r\r\nForense, Nº PPF-2018-0002223 (visible a imagen 106 del expediente virtual) se \r\r\nhace un recuento de las atenciones médicas recibidas en el servicio de Salud, el \r\r\ncual refleja los padecimientos psicológicos por los que estaba siendo atendida por \r\r\nlo menos, desde el 2011. Se indica así, en ese dictamen: “Copia de Epicrisis \r\r\nPFC-8006-18, Área de Salud de Coronado, Jefatura de Consulta Externa: \r\r\nextendida con fecha 02 de abril del 2018. Se documentan atenciones a partir del \r\r\n26/01/1996 y la última documentada en fecha 26/10/2017. En Medicina General \r\r\ncuenta con varias atenciones, entre ellas: embarazo, lesión rodilla izquierda \r\r\n(incapacidad del 12 al 25 de agosto del 2004), sobrepeso, embarazo y fibroma \r\r\nuterino (incapacidad de quince días a partir del 9/11/2010); amenaza de aborto por \r\r\nmiomatosis (incapacidad de quince días a partir de 24/11/2010); amenaza de \r\r\nparto prematuro (incapacidad de quince días a partir del 31/01/2011); embarazo, \r\r\ndistimia incapacidad de quince días, a partir del 15/02/2011); depresión recurrente \r\r\n(incapacidad de ocho días a partir del 22/07/2013, tratamiento con Clonazepan, \r\r\nFluoxetina); acné y trastorno depresivo (con fecha 21/10/2013, tratamiento con \r\r\nFluoxetina, Quitacel); colitis (23/09/2014); crisis de ansiedad (incapacidad de un \r\r\ndías, 20/10/2014); trastorno de ansiedad, HTA (incapacidad de un día, \r\r\n21/10/2014); trastorno depresivo (incapacidad de tres días a partir del 22/10/2014, \r\r\ntratamiento con Amitriptilina); estrés laboral (incapacidad de tres días a partir del \r\r\n27/10/2014, tratamiento con Amitriptilina); conflictiva laboral (incapacidad de 3 días \r\r\na partir del 28/10/2014, tratamiento con Amitriptilina, Benadryl). Atención por la \r\r\nespecialidad de Psiquiatría, se documenta atención en Psiquiatría de la Clínica \r\r\nSolón Núñez en fecha 3/09/2001, por reacción depresiva ansiosa, incapacidad por \r\r\ndoce días, tratamiento con Fluoxetina y Atarax. Cita para atención el 12/04/2011, \r\r\nse reporta ausente. Atención por la especialidad de Psicología a partir del \r\r\n11/03/2013 “sobreviviente de violencia intrafamiliar, trastorno ansioso depresivo, \r\r\nsobreviviente de abuso sexual”. Cita 13/11/2013 “en seguimiento por situaciones \r\r\nde la dinámica familiar y relaciones laborales. Cita en fecha12/03/2014 se anota \r\r\nausente. Atención en Trabajo Social anotándose ausente en las citas de \r\r\n26/03/2013 y 18/04/2013. Cita del 18/06/2013 seguimiento de caso. Cita del \r\r\n6/01/2014 ausente. Atención para Protocolos de Pensión del IVM en fechas \r\r\n14/18/2017 y 26/10/2017.”\n\r\r\n\n Esa condición era de conocimiento de su jefatura. Así consta en la respuesta que \r\r\nremitió la actora, ante una llamada de atención que se le impuso, el 21 de julio de \r\r\n2016. En ese oficio, expresó: “En este momento me siento en un momento frágil, \r\r\ncomo ustedes saben yo debo estar en tratamiento sicológico y psiquiátrico, he \r\r\nfaltado a las citas de la CCSS para no sacar permiso (…) (ver imagen 311). De \r\r\nigual manera, en el recurso planteado ante esta Sala, se reafirma que esa \r\r\nenfermedad no era un hecho novedoso, sino que el demandado y sus jefaturas lo \r\r\nconocían desde el 2011, “pues este tipo de enfermedad mental difícilmente se \r\r\npuede disimular”. Es decir, que la actora era una persona con un problema de \r\r\nsalud, lo cual es un supuesto que pone a las personas trabajadoras en una \r\r\nsituación de desventaja ante el empleador, con respecto a quienes no tienen esa \r\r\ncondición, que bien podría ser un detonante para que le cesen bajo el ejercicio del \r\r\nlibre despido que tiene, como regla de principio, todo empleador que se rige por el \r\r\nderecho privado. Es precisamente, el reconocimiento de que esa es una \r\r\ncircunstancia natural que pueden enfrentar las personas, que no puede afectar su \r\r\nderecho al trabajo, por lo que el legislador estableció la imposibilidad de depedir a \r\r\nlas personas trabajadoras por razones de salud, salvo en el caso de que hayan \r\r\ncometido una falta grave y que legitime al dador de trabajo para ponerle término al \r\r\ncontrato de trabajo. Es por ello que, para proceder al despido de personas con \r\r\nproblemas de salud, como es el caso de estudio, el empleador, debe demostrar la \r\r\nobjetividad y racionalidad de la decisión tomada, para descartar un móvil \r\r\ndiscriminatorio. El demandado alega que el problema de salud de la trabajadora \r\r\nno era nuevo, que no está ligado a la última comunicación que la trabajadora hizo \r\r\nante su jefatura y que por eso no hay relación de causa -efecto entre la última \r\r\ninformación que la actora dice haberle hecho a la funcionaria [Nombre 006] y la \r\r\ndecisión del despido con responsabilidad patronal. Lleva razón la recurrente en \r\r\ncuanto a que el conocimiento del difícil estado de salud de la trabajadora no le era \r\r\ndesconocido desde mucho tiempo antes, pero eso no la libera del resultado \r\r\nimpuesto por el Juzgado, pues si no dio ninguna justificación objetiva y racional \r\r\npara tomar la decisión del despido, apoyándose en la norma convencional que \r\r\nautoriza los despidos con responsabilidad patronal, ello no es suficiente para tener \r\r\npor acreditado que el despido no fue por motivos del estado de salud de la actora. \r\r\nAnte la acreditación con prueba documental y reconocimiento de la recurrente, de \r\r\nque la enfermedad de la trabajadora era de vieja data, de conformidad con lo \r\r\ndispuesto en el numeral 404 del Código de Trabajo la potestad de proceder a su \r\r\ndespido, estaba limitada. Esta limitación tiene un sentido de tutela de derechos \r\r\nfundamentales, pues con ello se evita que se prive a la persona trabajadora de la \r\r\nnormal fuente de ingresos que tienen (como es el trabajo), cuando se ven \r\r\nenfrentadas a problemas de salud; de manera que, bajo ese supuesto de hecho \r\r\n(problemas de salud de la persona trabajadora) el empleador ve limitada la \r\r\npotestad prevista en el artículo 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, pues otra fuente \r\r\nnormativa de igual rango -artículo 404 del mismo cuerpo normativo- y de posterior \r\r\naprobación, le vino a limitar, temporalmente (mientras la persona trabajadora esté \r\r\nsufriendo problemas de salud que le afecten en su desempeño y no cometa faltas \r\r\nque autoricen su despido disciplinario) esa potestad prevista en el numeral 160 de \r\r\nla Convención Colectiva y en el 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo. Esta Sala no \r\r\nignora que las incapacidades -especialmente cuando la afectación es psicológica \r\r\no psiquiátrica- ubican a la persona enferma en una condición vulnerable y expuesta \r\r\na un despido, ante la disminución en su capacidad de cumplir cabalmente la \r\r\nprestación contratada. El derecho reacciona frente a este tiempo de situaciones, \r\r\ncon previsiones como la del numeral 404 del Código de Trabajo, por cuanto el \r\r\ntrabajo es un derecho fundamental de todas las personas; y resulta, de ordinario, la \r\r\nprincipal fuente de ingresos con los que las personas satisfacen sus necesidades \r\r\n de subsistencia y las de su familia. La enfermedad es una condición natural a la \r\r\nque están expuestas las personas, tal y como sucede con el embarazo en las \r\r\nmujeres; además, se presenta en forma inesperada e involuntaria y frente a ello, las \r\r\npersonas solo pueden recurrir al auxilio médico. Por esa razón, en una sociedad \r\r\nsolidaria y civilizada, lo propio es la consideración a esa situación, en la que no por \r\r\nel hecho de la enfermedad las personas dejan de necesitar del trabajo. Por el \r\r\ncontrario, la enfermedad es un hecho que abona a los gastos de una persona y los \r\r\nde su familia. No amparar esa situación pone en grave riesgo la vida de la persona \r\r\ntrabajadora, no solo al marginarle del acceso a la seguridad social, como persona \r\r\ncotizante, sino por impedirle la posibilidad de solventar los gastos necesarios para \r\r\nsu recuperación. Es por ello que la Sala, en atención a los motivos del recurso, ha \r\r\nprocedido, tal y como lo hizo la juzgadora de instancia, a contrastar las alegaciones \r\r\nde las partes, con la prueba aportada. Ante el reclamo de discriminación, una vez \r\r\ndemostrado el padecimiento de la actora, que éste era de conocimiento de la \r\r\ndemandada -por ser de vieja data- y que no se trató de un despido sancionatorio, \r\r\nla tesis de defensa, en el sentido de que el despido no fue por el estado de salud \r\r\nde la trabajadora, sino que se actuó en el ejercicio de la potestad prevista en la \r\r\nConvención Colectiva, no es suficiente para admitir que se trató de un despido \r\r\nobjetivo y razonable, tal y como se lo exige el numeral 478 inciso 10 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo. En autos quedó acreditado el motivo discriminatorio que alega la actora, \r\r\natribuible a su delicado estado de salud, el cual la venía aquejando desde hacía \r\r\nvarios años. La potestad conferida por esa normativa convencional no puede \r\r\nejercerse para lograr un fin ilegítimo y prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, como \r\r\nes la discriminación, no solo prohibida por el numeral 404 antes citado, sino \r\r\ntambién por el Código Civil, cuyas disposiciones se aplican de manera supletoria \r\r\nen esta materia, por así permitirlo el numeral 15 del Código de Trabajo. En el \r\r\nartículo 19 de ese otro Código se dispone: “Los actos contrarios a las normas \r\r\nimperativas y a las prohibitivas son nulos de pleno derecho (…)” El numeral \r\r\nsiguiente, reafirma: “Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que \r\r\npersigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, o contrario a él, se \r\r\nconsiderarán ejecutados en fraude de la ley y no impedirán la debida aplicación \r\r\nde la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir”. Es decir, que estando en presencia \r\r\nde una actuación con visos de discriminación, la demandada no podía limitarse a \r\r\njustificar su actuación en el ejercicio de una facultad autorizada por la Convención, \r\r\nsi dicha facultad comporta el posible ejercicio de una actividad prohibida. En su \r\r\ndefensa, la accionada se limitó a señalar el ejercicio de aquella facultad, posición \r\r\nque conforme lo indicado, resulta insuficiente a los fines de acoger el recurso. La \r\r\nparte recurrente en aras de justificar su decisión de ignorar lo previsto en el \r\r\nnumeral 404 del Código de Trabajo, alega que quien adoptó la decisión del \r\r\ndespido no era la jefatura inmediata de la actora y desconocía de las condiciones \r\r\nde salud de la funcionaria. Tal argumento tampoco es de recibo. Con \r\r\nindependencia de quien fuera la persona competente para aplicar el despido en \r\r\nlos términos que se dio, lo relevante en este caso es que la representación \r\r\npatronal sí conocía de la condición de la actora y por ende, la parte patronal no \r\r\npodía (mientras el estado de salud de la actora se mantenga sin solución y no \r\r\ncometa alguna falta que autorice el despido sin responsabilidad patronal) ejercer \r\r\naquella facultad. A lo anterior abonan las manifestaciones que se plantean en el \r\r\nrecurso, en el sentido de que sus evaluaciones fueron “efectivo” y “aceptable”; que \r\r\nla actora no tenía ninguna calificación negativa ni deficiente. Ante esa constatación \r\r\nse reafirma la inexistencia de razones objetivas que legitimaran prescindir de sus \r\r\nservicios. Si era una trabajadora con un desempeño aceptable, cuál otra razón \r\r\n–sino su enfermedad- fue realmente el motivo para prescindir de sus servicios? En \r\r\nadición, el dictamen pericial psicológico forense, cuya indebida apreciación \r\r\nprotesta el recurrente, confirma la psicopatología severa de la actora, compatible \r\r\ncon depresión y ansiedad, que le dificultan su ajuste interpersonal, así como el \r\r\ntratamiento recibido por la accionante, tanto en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro \r\r\nSocial como por en el servicio médico del demandado, de modo que no es \r\r\nadmisible la tesis del recurrente, de que el reclamo es generado por los propios \r\r\nproblemas psiquiátricos –una distorsión de la realidad- por parte de la accionante. \r\r\nFinalmente, debe hacer la expresa aclaración de que en esta sede ninguna \r\r\nincidencia tiene lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional, pues no se discute la \r\r\nconstitucionalidad de la norma convencional, al quedar constatado que en realidad, \r\r\nesa norma fue empleada para ordenar un despido discriminatorio. Por estas \r\r\nrazones, lo resuelto por la jueza A quo, en cuanto determinó que el despido de la \r\r\nactora fue discriminatorio, no merece reproche.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nVI.- SALARIOS CAÍDOS: la sentencia condenó al demandado al pago de “\r\r\ntodos \r\r\nlos salarios caídos y/o dejados de percibir desde la fecha del despido \r\r\ndiscriminatorio, hasta su efectiva reinstalación. En virtud de que la señora \r\r\n[Nombre 001], fue despedida de un acto discriminatorio, en razón de su estado \r\r\nde salud, se condena a la demandada al pago de la indemnización equivalente a \r\r\nveinticuatro meses de salarios, de conformidad con el artículo 566 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo. Se condena al pago de siete millones y medio por concepto de daño \r\r\nmoral, la cual devengará intereses e indexación al momento de la firmeza de \r\r\nesta sentencia y del efectivo pago cuyo cálculo será realizado en ejecución de \r\r\nsentencia.(…)” El recurrente protesta contra esa decisión porque considera que \r\r\nse produce una doble imposición y porque el límite de la norma es de veinticuatro \r\r\nsalarios. La Sala no encuentra contradicción o disposición que violente el artículo \r\r\n566 del Código de Trabajo. Al tenor de ese artículo (566), que la resolución \r\r\nrecurrida cita para ordenar la reinstalación de la actora y el pago de salarios \r\r\ncaídos, lo que hace es poner un tope a la obligación de pago de salarios caídos, \r\r\nesto para el supuesto de que la restitución en el puesto se produzca pasados dos \r\r\naños del despido. En tales casos, el importe por salarios caídos se limita a un \r\r\nperiodo de veinticuatro meses. De modo que no se trata de una doble \r\r\ncondenatoria, sino de la indicación expresa de que los salarios caídos que se \r\r\nordenan, se limitan conforme a la indicada disposición, a veinticuatro salarios. Con \r\r\nesta aclaración, y bajo el entendido de que del monto resultante la demandada \r\r\npodrá deducir los montos que le canceló a la actora por concepto de preaviso y \r\r\ncesantía - detalle de liquidación visible a imágenes 338 al 340 del expediente \r\r\nvirtual del Juzgado- lo resuelto debe mantenerse, dado que el despido de la actora \r\r\nse ordenó el 2 de enero de 2017. Debe tomarse en consideración que la limitación \r\r\na 24 meses es para los salarios caídos hasta la firmeza del fallo, porque el \r\r\nlegislador también estableció la obligación de seguir pagando salarios caídos, \r\r\ndespués de la firmeza del fallo y mientras no se cumpla con la orden de \r\r\nreinstalación (doctrina del numeral 576 del Código de Trabajo).\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nVII.- DAÑO MORAL: Para el otorgamiento de esa petición, en el campo laboral, \r\r\nse deben demostrar a través de pruebas fehacientes que justifican el otorgamiento \r\r\nde ese rubro. En el sub-júdice, la actora pretende justificar el resarcimiento \r\r\npretendido, en el hecho de que el despido le ha causado daños y perjuicios así \r\r\ncomo un daño moral subjetivo en su salud física, psicológica y emocional, \r\r\nconsistente en el sufrimiento que experimentó (ansiedad, tristeza, dolor, pues se le \r\r\nha dificultado encontrar un nuevo empleo, no tiene dinero ni seguro social). El \r\r\notorgamiento de esa pretensión \"in re ipsa\" no es posible, porque no se puede \r\r\npresumir que el solo hecho del despido deriva como \"consecuencia lógica\" un \r\r\nsufrimiento, sino que éste debe demostrarse. En primer término, se debe \r\r\nclarificar de dónde deriva la posibilidad de resarcimiento ante un despido. El autor \r\r\nnacional Víctor Pérez Vargas, citando a Manava Dharma Sastra quien hacía \r\r\nreferencia al Código de Manú, evidencia como ya en la Antigua India se regulaba la \r\r\nposibilidad de satisfacción ante un interés lesionado. En dicho Código, su artículo \r\r\n288, del Libro Octavo establecía \"...el que daña los bienes de otro, a sabiendas o \r\r\npor descuido (dolo o culpa), debe darle satisfacción\". Esa premisa es la misma \r\r\ncontenida en el numeral 1045 del Código Civil costarricense que preceptúa una \r\r\nobligación de \"reparar\" o sea de \"satisfacer\". En otras palabras, el resarcimiento \r\r\nes una restauración patrimonial en la persona o en sus bienes. Al respecto, \r\r\nMessineo indica que el resarcimiento patrimonial vuelve el valor, a pesar de que \r\r\nsea diversa su composición. En cuanto al daño moral, la función del resarcimiento \r\r\nsufre variables. En Derecho Romano se le denominaba \"pretium doloris\", en \r\r\nderecho germánico \"Schmerzgelt\", o sea \"pagar un precio por el dolor\", por lo que \r\r\nno tiende directamente a la restitución integra del daño causado, pues al tratarse \r\r\nde un daño que afecta valores de orden no patrimonial la situación es diversa. A \r\r\npesar de lo anterior, el resarcimiento por el daño moral no busca una genérica \r\r\nfunción satisfactoria sino una forma de compensación del sufrimiento o humillación \r\r\npadecida (Trabucchi y Borrel, citados por Víctor Pérez Vargas, en \"Derecho \r\r\nPrivado\", pág. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explica que, en razón de esa \r\r\nnaturaleza no patrimonial, surgen \"tensiones\" en su concreción a una determinada \r\r\nsuma pues de su correcta reparación a una llamada \"lotería judicial\" hay un paso. \r\r\nAsimismo, dicha autora española recalca el aspecto de que EL DAÑO MORAL \r\r\nHA DE PROBARSE. Para fundar su posición, la cual se comparte por la mayoría \r\r\nde la Sala, cita una sentencia del Tribunal Supremo Español del 30 de julio de \r\r\n1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), en la que se afirma que \r\r\nuna separación judicial por infidelidad conyugal no origina \"per se\" \r\r\nuna \r\r\nindemnización de daño moral, como tampoco lo genera el incumplimiento de una \r\r\npromesa de contraer matrimonio (Ver \"Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil\", \"El \r\r\nDaño\", Vicente Domingo, Elena, pág. 80). Siguiendo esta misma línea conceptual, \r\r\nel autor español Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León, establece que, en una \r\r\nconcepción estricta del daño moral no es posible presumirlo como una \r\r\nconsecuencia de las lesiones sufridas. Él recalca que el daño moral DEBE SER \r\r\nOBJETO DE ALGÚN TIPO DE PRUEBA, pues de lo contrario se pierde la noción \r\r\nde reparación por la conducta antijurídica que lo genera, y entonces se convertiría \r\r\nen una forma de \"daño punitivo\" (DIEZ PICAZO y PONCE DE LEÓN, Luis, \r\r\n\"DERECHO DE DAÑOS\", pág. 329), lo cual -se agrega- rebalsa las nociones del \r\r\ndaño como reparación que prevé el numeral 41 de nuestra Constitución Política. \r\r\nDe esta forma, con un planteamiento sustantivo se debe denegar el daño \r\r\npretendido por la demandante, ya que no ofreció prueba que acredite sus \r\r\nafirmaciones en cuanto a ese daño. Pero también existen razones procesales para \r\r\ndenegar el daño moral en este caso. El resarcimiento del daño moral por un \r\r\ndespido injustificado provoca por sí solo sufrimiento, o sea es mediante una \r\r\npresunción humana de la que se puede derivar ese sufrimiento y, por ende el \r\r\nresarcimiento. Las presunciones humanas fueron eliminadas como un medio de \r\r\nprueba dentro de la nueva legislación procesal civil (artículo 41.2). No obstante, sí \r\r\ngozaban de una regulación concreta en la norma procesal civil derogada, \r\r\nconcretamente en el artículo 417. Ese numeral establecía que ese tipo de \r\r\npresunciones solo constituyen prueba si son consecuencia DIRECTA, PRECISA Y \r\r\nLÓGICAMENTE DEDUCIDA DE UN HECHO COMPROBADO. Asimismo, \r\r\nrecalcaba que la prueba de las presunciones debe ser grave y concordar con las \r\r\ndemás rendidas en el proceso. Aún y cuando se aplicara esa norma derogada al \r\r\ncaso que nos ocupa, debe concluirse que no hay pruebas que permitan una \r\r\n\"inferencia lógica\" del despido con las pretensiones de daño moral que esbozó la \r\r\nactora en su demanda, dado que no acreditó ninguna de las circunstancias \r\r\nfácticas con las que pretende el resarcimiento por lo que no es posible inferir la \r\r\nexistencia del daño moral reclamado.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nVIII.- COSTAS: La condena en costas es una consecuencia dispuesta por ley, \r\r\npara la parte perdidosa. Ciertamente el artículo 563 inciso 1, del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo autoriza la exención en ese rubro cuando esa parte haya litigado con \r\r\nevidente buena fe. Sin embargo, la posición de la parte demandada, en juicio, no \r\r\npuede calificarse en esa condición. Tal y como se mencionó, la justificación que ha \r\r\nbrindado a su decisión patronal, al alero del artículo 160 convencional ha quedado \r\r\ndescartada, cuando por el contrario, se ha acreditado que en realidad incurrió en \r\r\nun despido prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico (artículo 404 del C.T) y en aras \r\r\nde liberarse de las consecuencias económicas que conforme a la legislación \r\r\nvigente le podían acarrear, entró en contradicciones en su tesis de defensa, \r\r\naceptando por un lado que la enfermedad de la actora era de vieja data y, por otra \r\r\nparte, negando conocerla por parte de la jefatura inmediata de la actora. En cuanto \r\r\nal monto de un millón de colones -fijado en concepto de costas personales- se \r\r\nestima que debe mantenerse, por considerarse acorde a los parámetros \r\r\nestablecidos en el numeral 562 del Código de Trabajo, sea, la labor realizada, la \r\r\ncuantía de la cosa litigada y la posición económica de las partes. \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nIX.- CONCLUSIÓN: Por lo considerado, el recurso interpuesto deberá ser \r\r\nacogido únicamente para anular el fallo en cuanto condenó al pago por daño moral. \r\r\nEn lo demás, con la aclaración efectuada en el considerando VI, de que el importe \r\r\npor salarios caídos se limita a un periodo de veinticuatro meses; y que, del monto \r\r\nresultante la demandada podrá deducir lo cancelado a la actora por concepto de \r\r\npreaviso y “prestaciones legales” ya cancelados, deberá denegarse.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nX.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO AGUIRRE GÓMEZ Y DE LA \r\r\nMAGISTRADA VARELA ARAYA: Los suscritos nos apartamos del voto de \r\r\nmayoría, en cuanto acogió el recurso y denegó a la actora, la indemnización por \r\r\ndaño moral. Debe considerarse que el recurrente no explica en qué sentido, la \r\r\nfalta de indicación de que se trate de un daño objetivo o de uno subjetivo, sea \r\r\nmotivo para ordenar la nulidad del fallo y denegar ese extremo. El fundamento de \r\r\nesa condena se situó en que el daño moral debe ser indemnizado por estar frente \r\r\na un ejercicio abusivo de una potestad de despido con responsabilidad patronal, \r\r\ncausando un daño distinto a los normales y naturales del despido justificado, lo que \r\r\nno es el caso en estudio. El representante del demandado aduce que el ejercicio \r\r\nde una potestad convencional no puede generar un daño moral, sin embargo, es \r\r\nclaro -como se dijo- que en la especie no se está frente a un despido ordinario, \r\r\nsino ante el ejercicio de una facultad con la clara intención de soslayar un derecho \r\r\nfundamental. Los suscritos avalamos el argumento del Juzgado en cuanto \r\r\nconsideró procedente el reclamo de daño moral, por encontrarnos ante el ejercicio \r\r\nabusivo de la figura convencional, para lograr una finalidad prohibida por el \r\r\nordenamiento jurídico, con evidente daño moral a una persona que, debido a sus \r\r\npadecimientos psicológicos demostrados, es razonable y lógico inferir, por ser un \r\r\nhecho derivado de la experiencia humana, que el despido le generaba una mayor \r\r\nafectación. El tema es determinar el quántum de esa indemnización. El juzgado \r\r\nordenó el reconocimiento por daño moral, en la suma de siete millones quinientos \r\r\nmil colones. En aplicación de un criterio lógico (artículo 481 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo), tomando en consideración la naturaleza de los padecimientos de la \r\r\naccionante, el salario devengado por ella, las obligaciones que como madre jefa \r\r\nde hogar tenía en ese momento y las consecuentes implicaciones en su vida, \r\r\nestimamos que el monto ordenado por el Juzgado, es adecuado y razonable.\n\r\r\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nSe acoge parcialmente el recurso interpuesto. Se anula el fallo en cuanto condenó \r\r\nal pago por daño moral, extremo que se deniega. En lo demás, el recurso se \r\r\ndeniega con la aclaración efectuada en el considerando VI, de que el importe por \r\r\nsalarios caídos se limita a un periodo de veinticuatro meses; y que, del monto \r\r\nresultante la demandada podrá deducir lo cancelado a la actora por concepto de \r\r\npreaviso y cesantía ya cancelados. La Magistrada Varela Araya y el magistrado \r\r\nAguirre Gómez se apartan del voto de mayoría en cuanto deniega el pago de daño \r\r\nmoral, extremo con respecto al cual deniegan el recurso. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nJulia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia \n\r\r\n\nRPC\n\r\r\n\n1 \n\r\r\n\nEXP: 17-001718-0166-LA\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: \r\r\n2295-3009. Correos Electrónicos: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. y \r\r\njmolinab@poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "*170017180166LA*\n\nSupreme Court of Justice\n\nSECOND CHAMBER\n\nCase: 17-001718-0166-LA\nRuling: 2021-001377\nSECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on the eighteenth of June of two thousand twenty-one.\n\nOrdinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre 001], divorced, domestic worker and resident of Cartago, against the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE SEGUROS, represented by its general judicial proxy, attorney Jonathan Esteban Fallas Molina, resident of Heredia. Acting as special judicial proxies; for the plaintiff, attorney Carolina Soto Monge; and for the defendant, attorney Erick Porras Retana, single. All of legal age, married, and residents of San José, except as indicated.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI.- BACKGROUND: In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that she began working for the defendant on July 11, 1995; and that she was dismissed with employer liability on January 2, 2017. She considers herself to have been a victim of workplace harassment (acoso laboral), because her work was overloaded, she was pressured with workloads without being given proper training; her immediate superior constantly became upset about the sick leaves or permissions she requested to attend meetings for her minor daughter. That as a result of the unjustified dismissal, she has suffered greatly and has been caused damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) as well as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) to her physical, psychological, and emotional health, consisting of the suffering she experiences as a result of the dismissal (anxiety, sadness, pain, since it has been difficult for her to find new employment, she has no money or social security). She asserts that the dismissal was ordered when the defendant became aware of her illness. She objected to a deduction, which she considers illegal, in her settlement, for the sum of ¢407,736. She requests that the defendant be ordered to pay any differences that may exist in the payment of notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), vacations, school bonus (salario escolar), and Christmas bonus (aguinaldo); to return the sum deducted from the settlement; to pay her the salary corresponding to 404 hours received in mandatory training courses outside of working hours; damages and losses (daños y perjuicios); moral damages (daño moral); recognition of the school bonus (salario escolar), on the 60% that INS pays for retroactive sick leaves to 2012; legal interest on the claimed sums, their indexation, and the payment of both costs. In a subsequent brief, the complaint was expanded regarding certain facts, as well as in the description of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) she estimates were caused to her. The defendant institute responded negatively to the facts. It argued that its represented party has no knowledge of the apparent anxiety and depression problems mentioned by the plaintiff and that the termination of the employment relationship was due to a dismissal with employer liability, in accordance with Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva). It raised the defenses of lack of right and payment. The Court partially granted the complaint and declared that, by virtue of the plaintiff having been dismissed due to a discriminatory act based on her health status, she has the right to be reinstated, with the payment of lost wages and/or wages not received (salarios caídos y/o dejados de percibir) from the date of the discriminatory dismissal until her effective reinstatement, and to the payment of compensation equivalent to twenty-four months of salary, in accordance with Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo); as well as to the payment of seven and a half million colones for moral damages (daño moral), which will accrue interest and indexation at the time the judgment becomes final and upon effective payment, the calculation of which will be made in the execution of the judgment, having to deduct, from the total amount of the award, the sum paid for notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). The defendant was ordered to pay both costs of the action, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of one million colones. The representation of the defendant institute appeals against this decision.\n\nII.- GRIEVANCES OF THE APPEAL: As grounds for nullity, the following are raised: 1) That the Court did not serve notice of the complaint against Mrs. [Nombre 020], therefore requesting that the judgment be annulled, so that this procedure can be carried out. 2) Credibility is given to the plaintiff's arguments despite not proving, with suitable evidence, what was alleged. 3) The judgment is vitiated by inconsistency (incongruencia) because, on the one hand, it indicates there is \"certainty\" and, on the other, \"suspicion\" of discrimination; and no specific evidence is mentioned to support each conclusion. 4) It is considered proven that the dismissal was due to the verbal communication of the diagnosis of attention deficit disorder, without having proof of the veracity of the plaintiff's statement, since there is no record that she informed Mrs. [Nombre 006] of what is indicated in the complaint. It adds that on this subject, she presented no evidence; only the plaintiff's statement is available. It insists that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the alleged discrimination and that there is no causal relationship between the alleged communication – not proven in the case file – and the dismissal with employer liability, since if the communication were true (which it denies), two months elapsed between that alleged fact and the dismissal. That a proper assessment of the facts by the judge would have led to the conclusion that there are no elements demonstrating a link between any discriminatory act and the dismissal. It affirms that, on the contrary, it was proven that the Institute kept the plaintiff working despite her suffering from some psychological disorders since 2011, meaning it was not a new fact (referring to the petitioner's health status), so it must be considered proven that the dismissal was not motivated by the worker's health status. It attributes the cause of her feeling persecuted to her personality traits. It partially transcribes the content of the forensic medical expert report to point out that the plaintiff used her illness as an instrument and a measure of desperation in the face of the applied dismissal, distorting reality, erroneously and negatively assuming that she had been dismissed and discriminated against for health reasons, describing a scenario that did not happen, failing to prove the causal link between the health condition and the dismissal, since the ailments began several years before the dismissal, they are not new, which rules out the causal link between the ailments and the decision to dismiss her. It also denies that the cause of the dismissal was related to the plaintiff's faults, or that her evaluations were less than satisfactory; in this regard, it affirms that these (evaluations) were \"effective\" and \"acceptable,\" so she did not receive any negative or deficient rating. Regarding the use of the conventional norm that allows the Institute to carry out dismissals with employer liability, it affirms that the constitutionality of the conventional norm has already been reviewed and no commission of a fault is required if the dismissal is applied with the payment of notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). In this aspect, it relies on the resolution of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Sixth Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit No. 253-2012. It affirms that the ruling makes erroneous conclusions regarding the non-resolution of the plaintiff's appeal about the dismissal, about her illnesses, and about the lack of a plan for the evaluations to be better. 5) It considers that taking the facts of the complaint as true without the plaintiff having proven her statement creates a defenseless situation (indefensión), and also for not taking into account that the dismissal was carried out based on the employer's power (potestad patronal) provided for in Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), that is, with employer liability and the payment of benefits, so we are not dealing with a discriminatory, unjust, or improper dismissal. 6) Regarding what was decided on moral damages (daño moral), it affirms that the ruling does not indicate whether the damage is objective or subjective; in addition to lacking legal basis, proportionality, and coherence; since a dismissal under Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) cannot generate moral damages (daño moral) for the worker, as that norm clearly provides the way to compensate damages for a dismissal with employer liability. It alleges that the award for moral damages (daño moral) lacks clear and specific reasoning regarding the factual and normative basis for that decision. It considers a contradiction in the analysis of the exercise of disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) and what was decided, since it is clear that the dismissal was with employer liability and the application of the disciplinary regime is not being discussed. 7) Lost wages (Salarios caídos): It complains of the improper application of Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as having condemned the defendant to the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos) and 24 months' salary for discriminatory dismissal constitutes a double penalty. It asserts that, according to that norm, the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos) cannot exceed the amount of 24 times the monthly salary of the plaintiff and, since the plaintiff's dismissal was in January 2017, twenty-four months have more than elapsed to date. 8) Items granted. It states that the vice of ruling beyond what was requested (ultrapetita) was incurred, since compensation for discrimination was granted, which is not among the claims of the complaint, awarding her compensation equivalent to 24 months of salary for that concept. It affirms that what was requested by the plaintiff is the payment of alleged differences, compensation for damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) due to the dismissal, moral damages (daño moral) due to the dismissal, interest, indexation, and costs. That a double penalty is applied for the same aspect, since by ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement, it also imposed the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos), so that applying Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) results in a double imposition of that item, which is improper. It also criticizes the amount granted for lack of motivation and for considering it disproportionate. 9) Award of costs: It requests exoneration from this item, firstly, considering that the dismissal was not discriminatory but was carried out based on Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva); and secondly, for having litigated in good faith, as its defense was conducted in light of the cited conventional article. It requests that, if the cost award is upheld, the amount, set at a prudential level, be reduced, as what was granted is disproportionate. All these grounds of grievance were repeated in the brief filed on June 17, 2019 (within the deadline it had to appeal the ruling), expressly alleging that improper assessment of evidence was incurred by considering facts as proven in contradiction with the evidence in the proceeding, basing the ruling solely on the plaintiff's statement, which was given supreme value against the other evidentiary elements provided, which demonstrate that the dismissal ordered by the General Manager was not a discriminatory act but based on the power established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), so there is no link between the communication of the plaintiff's condition to Mrs. [Nombre 006] and the decision to dismiss her. That pursuant to Article 409 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the plaintiff had to prove the discriminatory motive for the dismissal, which the appellant finds lacking. It says it has not been taken into account that the plaintiff also did not demonstrate that INS had engaged in any other discriminatory conduct against her. That the admission of the plaintiff's statement and the imposition on INS of the obligation to prove a negative fact (not having dismissed for health reasons) violates the rules of sound rational judgment (sana crítica racional) and the right of defense. It also accuses a substantial violation of Articles 409, 410, and 478 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as well as Article 160 of the INS Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), insofar as they require the plaintiff to provide proof of discrimination and the only thing she provided was her statement. It complains of an improper interpretation of these norms, as INS is required to demonstrate the objective cause of the dismissal. It reiterates that Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) was improperly applied and that it should be exempted from the payment of costs for having acted in good faith, accusing a lack of reasoning for the reasons why it was condemned to \"a percentage higher than the legal lower limit of 15%.\"\n\nIII.- FORMAL GRIEVANCE: Article 587 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) regulates the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) for procedural reasons in the following terms: \"For procedural reasons, it will be admissible when invoking:/ 1.- Any of the vices for which the nullity of actions proceeds, provided that these have been alleged in one of the preceding phases of the proceeding and the claim has been dismissed. / 2.- Inconsistency (incongruencia) of the judgment or absolute obscurity of this last part. In cases of inconsistency (incongruencia), the appeal is only admissible when the procedure of addition or clarification has been exhausted./3.- Lack of clear and precise determination of the facts proven by the court./4.- The judgment having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding./ 5.- Lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment./ 6.- The judgment having been issued in non-observance of the rules established in the third paragraph of Article 537.\" [emphasis added]. Subsection 1° must be related to Article 471 of the same code, which enunciates the procedural errors capable of generating nullity. Furthermore, pursuant to these provisions, the party must have formulated the claim in a timely manner. The petition for nullity raised by the defendant's representation, because the co-defendant [Nombre 020] was not brought into the proceeding, is not admissible, as it constitutes a novel argument, meaning it was not requested within the framework of the debate, i.e., with the response to the complaint. The grievance regarding inconsistency (incongruencia) also does not deserve to be addressed. In accordance with the doctrine and jurisprudence of this Chamber, the vice of inconsistency (incongruencia) occurs when there is no correlation between what is requested in the complaint and what is decided in the ruling (see in this regard rulings numbers 2013-623 of 10:45 hours on June 7, 2013; 074-2021 of 10:50 hours on January 15, 2021; among others). In the case under study, we are not in the presence of that vice. As observed from the complaint brief and its clarification and addition, the plaintiff's petition was the conviction of the defendant to pay \"the differences that may exist in the payment of notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), vacations, school bonus (salario escolar), and Christmas bonus (aguinaldo)\"; the payment of ¢407,736 that was deducted from her employment settlement; the salary corresponding to 404 hours received in training courses, damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) and moral damages (daño moral) caused; the recognition of the school bonus (salario escolar) on the 60% that INS pays for retroactive sick leaves to 2012; the legal interest and indexation on the requested items; and the costs of the action. In a subsequent brief, visible at image 585 of the Court's virtual file, she clarified that the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) consist of \"the suffering that as a result of the unjust dismissal, I have anxiety, sadness, pain since it has been very difficult for me to find a new job, I have no money, I have no social security,\" she also mentioned that on the occasion of the sudden dismissal, her health condition has worsened, she cannot sleep, she bites her tongue, her appetite has disappeared, she has lost her self-esteem since INS, believing she is no longer useful as a worker, simply dismisses her. She also mentioned other personal reasons she had to face as a consequence of the dismissal, for which she estimated moral damages (daño moral) at the sum of five million colones and damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) at two million five hundred thousand colones. She concluded by stating, \"I also reiterate the request for reinstatement and the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos)\" (image 588). The judgment granted the claim for reinstatement, with the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos) and moral damages (daño moral); therefore, there is no inconsistency (incongruencia) to address as a procedural vice of nullity of the ruling, the request for nullity due to procedural vices lacking factual basis.\n\nIV.- PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY ACTS: Article 404 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in force (amended by Law number 9797 of December 2, 2019), prohibits all discrimination at work for \"…reasons of age, ethnicity, sex, religion, race, sexual orientation, civil status, political opinion, national origin, social origin, parentage, health condition, disability, union affiliation, economic situation, or any other analogous form of discrimination\" [emphasis added]. The following Article 406 prohibits dismissals for any discriminatory cause. The sanction provided for the breach of this provision is the nullity of the dismissal act and the consequent reinstatement of the worker in their job position, with full enjoyment of their rights and the consequences provided for a reinstatement judgment (Articles 410 and 566 of the same code). The prohibition against discrimination in the labor sphere is not novel. Law 8107 of May 30, 2001, had incorporated Title Eleven into the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), called \"Prohibition to Discriminate,\" although it limited it to reasons of age, ethnicity, gender, or religion. However, since 1960, Law 2694 of May 22 of that year had provided: \"Any form of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national origin, social origin, parentage, or economic situation, which limits equality of opportunities or treatment in matters of employment or occupation, is prohibited. Article 2.- Excepted from the previous prohibition are those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences appropriate according to the qualifications necessary for the full performance of the functions or tasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to the nature of these and the conditions of the worker. Article 3.- Regarding the State, its institutions, and corporations, any appointment, dismissal, suspension, transfer, swap, promotion, or recognition that is carried out contrary to the provisions of this law shall be voidable at the request of the interested party; and the procedures followed regarding recruitment or selection of personnel shall lack efficacy insofar as they violate this law.\" On the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in extensive jurisprudence, has referred to the impossibility of discriminatory acts based on health finding protection in the legal system. In precedent number 13.205-2005 of 15:13 hours on September 27, 2005, that Chamber stated: \"III.- On the Social State of Law, Equality, and Human Dignity. The Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), a fundamental element of our constitutional order, entails an orientation of our political regime towards social solidarity, that is, towards equity in societal relations, the promotion of social justice, and the equality of all citizens in the exercise of their rights, discarding arbitrary and unreasonable discriminations. In this sense, Constitutional Article 74 explicitly establishes the duty to pursue a permanent policy of national solidarity based on the Christian principle of social justice, which makes it a constitutional value of the first order (see judgment number 2170-93 of 10:12 hours on May 21, 1993). Consequently, based on the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), our Political Constitution contemplates a set of welfare rights related to the protection of the family, workers, vulnerable sectors of the population, education, the environment, and assets of the Nation such as cultural heritage. This duty of compliance according to the guidelines of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) is not constrained to the Administration but extends to the entire national community, as it is a fundamental rule of civic coexistence in our political system. In its condition as a general principle, it emanates a particular normative projection in all areas of law creation, interpretation, and execution. Specifically concerning constitutional review, the Principle of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) is useful as a parameter of normative validity, a hermeneutic criterion, and a functional integrating instrument of the legal system. Regarding the right not to be discriminated against, the constitutionality parameter comprises norms of constitutional rank, such as Article 33 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental), and regulations of international human rights law, whose application as a criterion of constitutional validity enjoys express positive basis and has been widely grounded by the jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that \"all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and, endowed with reason and conscience, should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.\" This article shows the intimate relationship between the right to equality and fraternal coexistence – understood as solidarity – in a society, so that one cannot exist without the other. Article 2 of that Declaration specifies the right not to be discriminated against, insofar as \"everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (underline not in original). Likewise, the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates in its first article the duty of the States Parties to safeguard the rights recognized therein without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition (underline not in original), and, on the other hand, expressly regulates the right to equality in Article 24 thereof. Specifically in matters of labor discrimination, the State has ratified a series of conventions on the subject, such as ILO Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, among others. Although none of these conventions explicitly contemplate illness – a broader term than mere disability, as not every sick person is disabled – as a ground for discrimination, it is no less true that, on the one hand, subsection b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain means, any type of discrimination that nullifies or impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation, and on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe all types of discriminatory treatment. This conception is embodied in the aforementioned Article 33 of our Political Constitution, which provides that every person is equal before the law and no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced. Consequently, the Principle of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any reason, and respect for human dignity are elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, whose protection and promotion correspond not only to the State but also to all members of the community.\" This criterion has been reiterated, among many others, in rulings numbers 8711-2010 and 7064-2013 of that Chamber; where the impropriety of labor discrimination based on health is ratified. Article 409 of the same code stipulates that \"...whoever alleges discrimination must specifically indicate the factual basis on which their allegation is founded and the terms of comparison that substantiate their affirmation.\" As such circumstances constitute the factual basis for the protection being sought, the burden falls on the worker to prove the facts constituting the discrimination (Article 477 in relation to Article 409 of the Labor Code [Código de Trabajo]); and, for the purpose of disproving the discriminatory bias, the employer must demonstrate the justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the measures or conducts identified as discriminatory (Article 478, subsection 10, of the same code).\n\nV.- MERITS OF THE MATTER: The grievances regarding the cause for the reinstatement ordered by the Court are not admissible. It is not true, as raised in the appeal, that the discriminatory action declared in the ruling was based on the communication of the medical diagnosis that the plaintiff made to Mrs. [Nombre 006]. Nor is the reproach admissible that the only proof of discrimination on which the ruling relied was the plaintiff's statement. From the reasoning provided by the trial judge (A quo), it is observed that the worker's argument regarding discriminatory dismissal based on health was considered proven with the information provided, in the sense that the company doctor had treated her on various occasions for depressive crises and with a large number of sick leaves recorded in her personnel file. The argument that the dismissal was with employer liability and not disciplinary has no relevance for resolving the appeal, since the Court did not base its decision on that factual assumption but rather addressed what was stated by the worker, in the sense that the dismissal decision was based on knowledge of her health status, which she had communicated to her immediate superior. Note that this is not a matter in dispute within the framework of the debate. There is clarity that the employee's termination was based on the application of the provisions of Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), according to which: \"...Both the Institute and the worker may terminate the employment contract without just cause, but must always notify this decision in writing based on the following rules (...) The worker in these cases shall have the right to the payment of severance pay (cesantía) according to the following rules: (...) After continuous work of more than one year, with an amount equal to one month's salary for each year or fraction of no less than six months, applying a maximum limit of 20 years.\"\n\nBased on that provision, through official communication G-00014-2017 of January 2, 2017, the plaintiff was informed of the defendant's decision to terminate her employment contract, with employer liability, effective January 3, 2017 (see image 19 of the court's virtual case file). That is, this litigation does not dispute the allegation of a labor offense committed by the worker, but rather, the allegation of an illegitimate action by the employer, having discriminated against the employee by dismissing her due to her health condition, disguising its action with the dismissal authority provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Labor Procedural Reform, as indicated supra, established the obligations of whoever seeks protection for discrimination, and introduced a specific procedure to process complaints such as these (Article 540 and following, of the Labor Code), with special treatment and indication of the evidentiary burdens incumbent upon each of the parties; specifying, for the case of the plaintiff, the obligation to \"...specifically indicate the factual basis on which her claim is founded and the terms of comparison that substantiate her affirmation.\" In the case under examination, the plaintiff indicated, as the factual basis for the alleged discrimination, that her dismissal occurred due to her health condition, upon communicating it to her superior, a few days before the dismissal. It is convenient to recall that, regarding evidentiary burdens, when discriminatory dismissals are alleged, current Article 478 of the Labor Code provides: \"In conflicts arising from employment contracts, it is incumbent upon... the employer, to demonstrate the barring facts it invokes and all those it is obligated to keep duly documented or registered... 10. The justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the measures or conduct indicated as discriminatory in all claims related to discrimination. 11. Any other factual situation whose evidentiary source is more easily accessible to the employer than to the worker.\" Even before the effectiveness of that norm, this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber had also referred to the evidentiary burdens in discrimination claims. In judgment No. 13205, of 3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber resolved: \"(...) it is unavoidable to bring up the importance of the distribution of the burden of proof to provide the worker with protection against employer actions that constitute discrimination. (…) prima facie, the protected person alleging labor discrimination must develop a sufficiently concrete and precise pleading activity, regarding the indications that such a violation of the right to equality has existed. This condition has been widely reiterated by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see judgment number 2004-11984 of 10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004, and 2004-11437 of 9:53 a.m. on October 15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result has been achieved by the plaintiff, where applicable, the burden falls on the respondent party to prove the existence of sufficient, real, and serious causes to qualify the questioned employer decision or practice as reasonable and unrelated to any discriminatory purpose, the only means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications\"). That is, in any protest of discrimination, the plaintiff is responsible for proving, even through circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria), the facts on which her claim is based; and the terms of comparison that substantiate her affirmation (Article 409 of the Labor Code); while the employer will be responsible for demonstrating the justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the conduct indicated as discriminatory, providing the evidence it has in relation to what is disputed, to thus allow those who administer justice to reach the real truth and a fair resolution of the specific case (Article 478, subsection 10, idem). From the copy of the medical record from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) provided (see image 814 and following, of the court's virtual case file), the discharge summary (epicrisis) issued by that institution (see image 462 idem), as well as the certificate issued by the Medical Service of the defendant (image 464), it clearly emerges that the plaintiff is a person who has faced psychological ailments related to anxious-depressive problems, at least since 2012. In the Forensic Psychological Expert Opinion (Dictamen Pericial Psicológico Forense), No. PPF-2018-0002223 (visible at image 106 of the virtual case file), a recount of the medical attentions received in the Health service is made, which reflects the psychological ailments for which she had been treated at least since 2011. It is thus indicated in that opinion: “Copy of Discharge Summary PFC-8006-18, Coronado Health Area, Outpatient Consultation Management: issued on April 2, 2018. Attentions are documented starting from January 26, 1996, and the last one documented on October 26, 2017. In General Medicine, she has several attentions, among them: pregnancy, left knee injury (disability from August 12 to 25, 2004), overweight, pregnancy and uterine fibroma (fifteen-day disability starting November 9, 2010); threatened abortion due to myomatosis (fifteen-day disability starting November 24, 2010); threatened premature labor (fifteen-day disability starting January 31, 2011); pregnancy, dysthymia fifteen-day disability, starting February 15, 2011); recurrent depression (eight-day disability starting July 22, 2013, treatment with Clonazepam, Fluoxetine); acne and depressive disorder (dated October 21, 2013, treatment with Fluoxetine, Quitacel); colitis (September 23, 2014); anxiety crisis (one-day disability, October 20, 2014); anxiety disorder, HTA (one-day disability, October 21, 2014); depressive disorder (three-day disability starting October 22, 2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); work stress (three-day disability starting October 27, 2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); labor conflict (3-day disability starting October 28, 2014, treatment with Amitriptyline, Benadryl). Attention by the Psychiatry specialty, attention in Psychiatry at the Solón Núñez Clinic is documented on September 3, 2001, for anxious depressive reaction, twelve-day disability, treatment with Fluoxetine and Atarax. Appointment for attention on April 12, 2011, reported absent. Attention by the Psychology specialty starting March 11, 2013 “survivor of intrafamily violence, anxious depressive disorder, survivor of sexual abuse”. Appointment November 13, 2013 “in follow-up for situations of family dynamics and work relationships”. Appointment on March 12, 2014, noted absent. Attention in Social Work, noted absent at appointments on March 26, 2013, and April 18, 2013. Appointment on June 18, 2013, case follow-up. Appointment on January 6, 2014, absent. Attention for IVM Pension Protocols on dates 14/18/2017 and 26/10/2017.”\n\nThat condition was known to her superior. This is recorded in the response sent by the plaintiff to a call for attention imposed on her on July 21, 2016. In that official communication, she expressed: “At this moment I feel fragile, as you know I should be in psychological and psychiatric treatment, I have missed CCSS appointments so as not to take leave (...) (see image 311). Likewise, in the appeal filed before this Chamber, it is reaffirmed that this illness was not a new fact, but that the defendant and its superiors had known of it since 2011, “as this type of mental illness is difficult to disguise”. That is, the plaintiff was a person with a health problem, which is a situation that places workers at a disadvantage before the employer, compared to those who do not have that condition, and which could well be a trigger for their dismissal under the exercise of the free dismissal authority held, as a general rule, by every employer governed by private law. It is precisely the recognition that this is a natural circumstance people may face, which cannot affect their right to work, that led the legislator to establish the impossibility of dismissing workers for health reasons, except in the case where they have committed a serious offense that entitles the employer to terminate the employment contract. That is why, to proceed with the dismissal of persons with health problems, as in the case under study, the employer must demonstrate the objectivity and rationality of the decision taken, to rule out a discriminatory motive. The defendant alleges that the worker's health problem was not new, that it is not linked to the last communication the worker made to her superior, and that therefore there is no cause-effect relationship between the last information the plaintiff claims to have given to the official [Name 006] and the decision to dismiss with employer liability. The appellant is right in that knowledge of the worker's difficult health state was not unknown to it for a long time before, but that does not free it from the result imposed by the Court, because if it did not provide any objective and rational justification for making the dismissal decision, relying on the conventional norm that authorizes dismissals with employer liability, this is not sufficient to consider it proven that the dismissal was not for reasons related to the plaintiff's health status. Given the proof through documentary evidence and the appellant's acknowledgment that the worker's illness was of long standing, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 404 of the Labor Code, the authority to proceed with her dismissal was limited. This limitation serves to protect fundamental rights, as it prevents the worker from being deprived of her normal source of income (such as work) when faced with health problems; so that, under that factual circumstance (health problems of the worker), the employer sees the authority provided in Article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code limited, because another normative source of equal rank –Article 404 of the same normative body– and of later approval, came to limit, temporarily (while the worker is suffering health problems that affect her performance and does not commit offenses that authorize her disciplinary dismissal), that authority provided in numeral 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and in Article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code. This Chamber is not unaware that disabilities (incapacidades) –especially when the condition is psychological or psychiatric– place the ill person in a vulnerable condition exposed to dismissal, given the decrease in her ability to fully comply with the contracted service. The law reacts to this type of situation with provisions such as numeral 404 of the Labor Code, because work is a fundamental right of all persons; and it is, ordinarily, the main source of income with which people satisfy their subsistence needs and those of their family. Illness is a natural condition to which people are exposed, just as happens with pregnancy in women; furthermore, it occurs unexpectedly and involuntarily, and faced with it, people can only resort to medical assistance. For that reason, in a supportive and civilized society, consideration for that situation is proper, where people do not cease to need work because of illness. On the contrary, illness is a fact that adds to the expenses of a person and their family. Not protecting that situation puts the worker's life at serious risk, not only by marginalizing her from access to social security as a contributing person, but also by preventing her from being able to cover the necessary expenses for her recovery. It is for this reason that the Chamber, in consideration of the grounds of the appeal, has proceeded, just as the trial judge did, to contrast the allegations of the parties with the evidence provided. Faced with the claim of discrimination, once the plaintiff's ailment was demonstrated, that it was known to the defendant –as it was of long standing– and that it was not a disciplinary dismissal, the defense thesis, to the effect that the dismissal was not due to the worker's health status, but was an act carried out in exercise of the authority provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, is not sufficient to admit that it was an objective and reasonable dismissal, as required by numeral 478, subsection 10 of the Labor Code. In the case file, the discriminatory motive alleged by the plaintiff, attributable to her delicate health condition which had been afflicting her for several years, was proven. The authority conferred by that conventional regulation cannot be exercised to achieve an illegitimate end prohibited by the legal system, such as discrimination, which is not only prohibited by the aforementioned numeral 404, but also by the Civil Code, whose provisions are applied supplementarily in this matter, as permitted by numeral 15 of the Labor Code. Article 19 of that other Code provides: “Acts contrary to mandatory and prohibitory norms are null and void as a matter of law (…)” The following numeral reaffirms: “Acts carried out under the cover of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.” That is, being in the presence of an action with signs of discrimination, the defendant could not limit itself to justifying its action on the exercise of a faculty authorized by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, if said faculty entails the possible exercise of a prohibited activity. In its defense, the defendant limited itself to indicating the exercise of that faculty, a position which, as indicated, is insufficient for the purposes of upholding the appeal. In an effort to justify its decision to ignore the provisions of numeral 404 of the Labor Code, the appellant party alleges that the person who made the dismissal decision was not the plaintiff's immediate superior and was unaware of the employee's health conditions. Such an argument is also not admissible. Regardless of who the competent person was to apply the dismissal in the terms it occurred, what is relevant in this case is that the employer's representation did know of the plaintiff's condition, and therefore, the employer could not (as long as the plaintiff's health status remains unresolved and she does not commit any offense authorizing dismissal without employer liability) exercise that faculty. This is supported by the statements made in the appeal, to the effect that her evaluations were “effective” and “acceptable”; that the plaintiff had no negative or deficient qualification. Given this finding, the non-existence of objective reasons that legitimized dispensing with her services is reaffirmed. If she was a worker with acceptable performance, what other reason –if not her illness– was really the motive for dispensing with her services? In addition, the forensic psychological expert opinion, the improper appreciation of which the appellant protests, confirms the severe psychopathology of the plaintiff, compatible with depression and anxiety, which make her interpersonal adjustment difficult, as well as the treatment received by the plaintiff, both at the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and at the defendant's medical service, such that the appellant's thesis that the claim is generated by the plaintiff's own psychiatric problems –a distortion of reality– is not admissible. Finally, it must be expressly clarified that in this venue, what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber has no incidence, as the constitutionality of the conventional norm is not being discussed, it having been verified that, in reality, that norm was used to order a discriminatory dismissal. For these reasons, what was resolved by the lower court judge (Jueza A quo), in determining that the plaintiff's dismissal was discriminatory, does not merit reproach.\n\nVI.- BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS): the judgment sentenced the defendant to pay “all back pay and/or unearned wages from the date of the discriminatory dismissal, until her effective reinstatement. By virtue of the fact that Mrs. [Name 001] was dismissed by a discriminatory act, due to her health status, the defendant is sentenced to pay compensation equivalent to twenty-four months of wages, in accordance with Article 566 of the Labor Code. It is sentenced to pay seven and a half million for moral damages (daño moral), which will accrue interest and indexation at the time this judgment becomes final and until effective payment, the calculation of which will be carried out in the execution of judgment. (…)” The appellant protests against this decision because it considers that a double imposition is produced and because the limit of the norm is twenty-four salaries. The Chamber finds no contradiction or provision that violates Article 566 of the Labor Code. According to that article (566), which the appealed resolution cites to order the reinstatement of the plaintiff and the payment of back pay, what it does is set a ceiling on the obligation to pay back pay, this for the scenario where reinstatement to the position occurs more than two years after the dismissal. In such cases, the amount for back pay is limited to a period of twenty-four months. So it is not a double sentence, but the express indication that the back pay ordered is limited, in accordance with the indicated provision, to twenty-four salaries. With this clarification, and on the understanding that from the resulting amount the defendant may deduct the amounts it paid to the plaintiff for advance notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía) – settlement detail visible at images 338 to 340 of the Court's virtual case file – what was resolved must be upheld, given that the plaintiff's dismissal was ordered on January 2, 2017. It must be taken into consideration that the 24-month limitation is for the back pay up to the finality of the judgment, because the legislator also established the obligation to continue paying back pay after the judgment becomes final and while the reinstatement order is not complied with (doctrine of numeral 576 of the Labor Code).\n\nVII.- MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL): For the granting of that request, in the labor field, it must be demonstrated through reliable evidence that justifies the granting of that item. In the case sub judice, the plaintiff seeks to justify the compensation sought based on the fact that the dismissal has caused her damages and losses as well as subjective moral damage to her physical, psychological, and emotional health, consisting of the suffering she experienced (anxiety, sadness, pain, as she has found it difficult to find new employment, has no money or social security). The granting of that claim \"in re ipsa\" is not possible, because it cannot be presumed that the mere fact of dismissal derives as a \"logical consequence\" suffering; rather, it must be demonstrated. In the first place, it must be clarified from where the possibility of compensation for a dismissal derives. The national author Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra who referred to the Code of Manu, demonstrates how already in Ancient India the possibility of satisfaction for an injured interest was regulated. In that Code, its Article 288, of the Eighth Book established \"... he who damages the property of another, knowingly or through carelessness (fraud or fault), must give him satisfaction.\" That premise is the same contained in numeral 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code which prescribes an obligation to \"repair\" that is, to \"satisfy.\" In other words, compensation (resarcimiento) is a patrimonial restoration to the person or their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that patrimonial compensation returns the value, even though its composition may be different. Regarding moral damage, the function of compensation undergoes variations. In Roman Law it was called \"pretium doloris\", in Germanic law \"Schmerzgelt\", that is, \"to pay a price for the pain\", so it does not directly aim for the integral restitution of the damage caused, because when dealing with damage affecting values of a non-patrimonial nature, the situation is different. Despite the above, compensation for moral damage does not seek a generic satisfactory function but a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation suffered (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in \"Derecho Privado\", p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, due to that non-patrimonial nature, \"tensions\" arise in its conversion to a specific sum, as there is a fine line between its correct reparation and a so-called \"judicial lottery.\" Likewise, this Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that MORAL DAMAGE MUST BE PROVEN. To support her position, which is shared by the majority of the Chamber, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), in which it is stated that a judicial separation for conjugal infidelity does not originate \"per se\" compensation for moral damage, just as the breach of a promise to marry does not generate it (See \"Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil\", \"El Daño\", Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León establishes that, in a strict conception of moral damage, it is not possible to presume it as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that moral damage MUST BE THE SUBJECT OF SOME TYPE OF PROOF, because otherwise the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of \"punitive damages\" (DIEZ PICAZO y PONCE DE LEÓN, Luis, \"DERECHO DE DAÑOS\", p. 329), which – it is added – overflows the notions of damage as reparation provided for in numeral 41 of our Political Constitution. Thus, with a substantive approach, the damage sought by the plaintiff must be denied, as she did not offer evidence to prove her affirmations regarding that damage. But there are also procedural reasons to deny moral damage in this case. Compensation for moral damage for an unjustified dismissal, by itself, causes suffering, that is, it is through a human presumption from which that suffering and, therefore, the compensation can be derived. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof within the new civil procedural legislation (Article 41.2). However, they did have specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural norm, specifically in Article 417. That numeral established that that type of presumptions only constitute evidence if they are the DIRECT, PRECISE, AND LOGICALLY DEDUCED consequence OF A PROVEN FACT. Likewise, it emphasized that the proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the others rendered in the process. Even if that repealed norm were applied to the case at hand, it must be concluded that there is no evidence that allows a \"logical inference\" from the dismissal to the claims for moral damage that the plaintiff outlined in her claim, given that she did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which she seeks compensation, so it is not possible to infer the existence of the claimed moral damage.\n\nVIII.- COSTS (COSTAS): The sentence of costs is a consequence provided by law for the losing party. Certainly, Article 563, subsection 1, of the Labor Code authorizes exemption from this item when that party has litigated with evident good faith. However, the position of the defendant party in the trial cannot be qualified in that condition. As mentioned, the justification it has given for its employer decision, under the shelter of conventional Article 160, has been ruled out, while on the contrary, it has been proven that it actually incurred in a dismissal prohibited by the legal system (Article 404 of the L.C.) and, in an effort to free itself from the economic consequences that, according to current legislation, it could incur, it fell into contradictions in its defense theory, accepting on the one hand that the plaintiff's illness was of long standing and, on the other hand, denying that the plaintiff's immediate superior knew of it. Regarding the amount of one million colones –set as personal costs– it is considered that it must be upheld, as it is deemed consistent with the parameters established in numeral 562 of the Labor Code, that is, the work performed, the amount in dispute, and the economic position of the parties.\n\nIX.- CONCLUSION: As considered, the appeal filed must be upheld only to annul the judgment in so far as it sentenced the payment for moral damage. In everything else, with the clarification made in considerando VI, that the amount for back pay is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct what was paid to the plaintiff for advance notice and \"legal benefits\" (prestaciones legales) already paid, it must be denied.\n\nX.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE AGUIRRE GÓMEZ AND MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned depart from the majority vote, in as much as it upheld the appeal and denied the plaintiff compensation for moral damage. It must be considered that the appellant does not explain in what sense the lack of indication as to whether it involves objective or subjective damage is a reason to order the annulment of the judgment and deny that point. The basis for that sentence was that moral damage must be compensated because we are facing an abusive exercise of a dismissal authority with employer liability, causing damage distinct from the normal and natural damages of justified dismissal, which is not the case under study. The defendant's representative argues that the exercise of a conventional authority cannot generate moral damage; however, it is clear –as stated– that in this specific case we are not facing an ordinary dismissal, but rather the exercise of a faculty with the clear intention of circumventing a fundamental right. The undersigned endorse the argument of the Court in considering the claim for moral damage appropriate, because we are facing the abusive exercise of the conventional figure to achieve an end prohibited by the legal system, with evident moral damage to a person who, due to her demonstrated psychological ailments, it is reasonable and logical to infer, as a fact derived from human experience, that the dismissal caused her greater harm. The issue is determining the quantum of that compensation. The court ordered the recognition for moral damage in the sum of seven million five hundred thousand colones. Applying logical criteria (Article 481 of the Labor Code), taking into consideration the nature of the plaintiff's ailments, the salary earned by her, the obligations she had as a mother and head of household at that time, and the consequent implications in her life, we estimate that the amount ordered by the Court is adequate and reasonable.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe appeal filed is partially upheld.\n\nThe judgment is annulled insofar as it ordered payment for non-economic damages (daño moral), a claim which is denied. In all other respects, the appeal is denied, with the clarification made in Considerando VI that the amount for back pay (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct what was already paid to the plaintiff for notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). Judge Varela Araya and Judge Aguirre Gómez dissent from the majority vote insofar as it denies the payment of non-economic damages (daño moral), a claim with respect to which they deny the appeal.\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez\n\nJulia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia\nRPC\n1\nEXP: 17-001718-0166-LA\n\nIt states that\nthe vice of ultra petita was incurred, as compensation for\ndiscrimination was granted, which is not among the claims of the complaint,\nawarding for that concept compensation equivalent to 24 months of\nsalary. It affirms that what was requested by the plaintiff is the payment of alleged differences,\ncompensation for damages caused by the dismissal, moral damages for the dismissal,\ninterest, indexation, and costs. That a double condemnation is imposed for the same\naspect, since by ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement it also imposed the payment of\nlost wages, such that by applying Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)\na double imposition of that item is made, which is improper. It also criticizes the\namount granted, for lack of reasoning and for considering it disproportionate.  </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>9)\nCondemnation in costs:</b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> It requests exoneration in this item, firstly, by\nconsidering that the dismissal was not discriminatory but was carried out based on\nArticle 160 (160) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva); and, secondly, for having litigated in\ngood faith, since its defense was made in light of the cited conventional article. It requests\nthat, if the condemnation in costs is upheld, the amount, set in a\nprudential manner, be reduced, since the amount granted is disproportionate. All these grounds for grievance\nwere reiterated in the brief filed on June 17, 2019 (within the period it\nhad to appeal the ruling), alleging, expressly, that an\nimproper assessment of evidence was incurred, by holding facts as proven, in contradiction\nwith the evidence in the proceedings, supporting the ruling solely on the declaration of the\nplaintiff, which was given supreme value over the other\nevidentiary elements provided, which demonstrate that the dismissal ordered by the General\nManager was not a discriminatory act but based on the power established in the\nCollective Bargaining Agreement, therefore there is no link between the communication of the\nplaintiff's condition to Mrs. </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">[Nombre 006]</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> and the decision to dismiss her. That\npursuant to numeral 409 of the Labor Code, the plaintiff had to prove the discriminatory\nmotive for the dismissal, which the appellant finds lacking. It says that it has not\nbeen taken into account that the plaintiff also did not demonstrate that the INS had incurred in\nany other discriminatory conduct against her. That the admission of the plaintiff's statement\nand the imposition on the INS of the obligation to prove a negative fact (not\nhaving dismissed for health reasons), violates sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional) and the\nright of defense. It also accuses </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>substantial violation of Articles 409,\n410 and 478 of the Labor Code, as well as of numeral 160 of the\nINS Collective Bargaining Agreement, </b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">insofar as they require the plaintiff to prove the\ndiscrimination and the only thing she provided was her declaration. It claims an improper\ninterpretation of those norms, by requiring the INS to demonstrate the objective\ncause for the dismissal. It reiterates that Article 566 of the Labor Code was improperly\napplied and that it should have been exempted from the payment of costs, for having acted in good\nfaith, accusing a lack of reasoning for the reasons why it was condemned to\n\"a percentage higher than the legal minimum of 15%\".</span></font></div>\n\n<div align=\"justify\" style=\"line-height: 200%; \"><font face=\"Times New Roman\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> </span></font>\n<font face=\"Bookman Old Style\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>III.- ON THE FORMAL GRIEVANCE:</b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> Article 587 of the Labor Code\nregulates the appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) for procedural reasons in the following terms:\n</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>\"For procedural reasons it shall be admissible when invoked:/ 1.-</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">\n<b><i>  Any of\nthe defects for which the nullity of proceedings (nulidad de actuaciones) is applicable, provided\nthat these have been alleged in one of the preceding phases of the\nproceedings and the claim has been dismissed.</i></b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i> / 2.-  Incongruence (Incongruencia) of the\njudgment or absolute obscurity of this latter part. In cases of\nincongruence, the appeal is only admissible when the procedure for\naddition or clarification has been exhausted./3.-  Lack of clear and precise determination of the facts\nproven by the court./4.- The judgment having been based on\nillegitimate evidentiary means (medios probatorios) or those introduced illegally into the proceedings./ 5.- Lack of\nreasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment./ 6.- The\njudgment having been issued in disregard of the rules established in the third paragraph of\nArticle 537.\"</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> [emphasis added].   Subsection 1° must be related to\nnumeral 471 of the same code, which lists the procedural errors susceptible to generating\nnullity. Furthermore, pursuant to such provisions, the party must have formulated the\nclaim in a timely manner.  The petition for nullity raised by the representation\nof the defendant, because the co-defendant </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">[Nombre 020]</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> was not brought into the proceedings,\nis not admissible, as it is a novel argument, that is, because it was not\nrequested within the framework of the debate, specifically with the statement of defense (contestación). The grievance regarding\nincongruence also does not merit being addressed. In accordance with the doctrine and the\njurisprudence of this Chamber, the defect of incongruence occurs when there is no\ncorrelation between what was requested in the complaint and what was resolved in the ruling (see on this\nmatter rulings number 2013-623 of 10:45 a.m. on June 7, 2013;\n074-2021 of 10:50 a.m. on January 15, 2021; among others). In the case\nunder study, this defect is not present.  As can be observed from the complaint\nbrief and its clarification and addition, the plaintiff’s petition was the condemnation of the\ndefendant to the payment of “the differences that may exist in the payment of notice (preaviso),\nseverance pay (cesantía), vacations, school salary (salario escolar) and year-end bonus (aguinaldo)”; the payment of ₡407,736  that\nwere deducted from her employment settlement (liquidación laboral); the salary corresponding to 404 hours\nreceived in training courses, damages (daños y perjuicios) and moral damages (daño moral) caused;\nthe recognition of the school salary on the 60% that the INS pays for\nretroactive disabilities (incapacidades) to 2012; the legal interest and the indexation on the\nrequested items; and the costs of the action. In a subsequent brief, visible at image\n585 of the virtual court file, she clarified that the damages consist\nof “the suffering that as a result of the unjust dismissal, I have anxiety, sadness, pain since\nit has been very difficult for me to find a new job, I have no money, I have\nno social security”, she also mentioned that on the occasion of the sudden\ndismissal, her health condition has worsened, she cannot sleep, she bites her\ntongue, her appetite has decreased, she has lost her self-esteem since the INS, believing\nthat I am no longer useful as a worker, simply dismisses her. She also mentioned other\npersonal reasons that she had to face as a consequence of the dismissal, for which\nshe estimated the moral damages at the sum of five million colones and the\ndamages at two million five hundred thousand colones. She concluded by stating </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>“I also reiterate\nthe request for reinstatement and the payment of lost wages (salarios caídos)” </b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">(image\n588). The judgment upheld the claim for reinstatement, with the payment of lost wages\nand moral damages, therefore, there is no incongruence to address as a procedural\ndefect (vicio procesal) leading to the nullity of the ruling, the request for\nnullity for procedural defects lacking factual support.</span></font></div>\n\n<div align=\"justify\" style=\"line-height: 200%; \"><font face=\"Times New Roman\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> </span></font>\n<font face=\"Bookman Old Style\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>IV.- ON PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY ACTS: </b></span>\n<span style=\" font-size:12pt\">Article 404 of the\nLabor Code, in force (amended by Law number 9797 of December 2,\n2019) prohibits all discrimination at work based on “…reasons of age,\nethnic origin, sex, religion, race, sexual orientation, marital status, political\nopinion, national origin, social origin, parentage, </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>health condition,</b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> disability,\nunion affiliation, economic status or</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b> </b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">any other analogous form of\ndiscrimination” [emphasis added]. The subsequent Article 406 prohibits\ndismissals for any discriminatory cause. The sanction provided for the\nbreach of that provision is the nullity of the dismissal act and the consequent\nreinstatement of the worker to their job, with the full enjoyment\nof their rights and the consequences provided for a reinstatement judgment\n(Articles 410 and 566 of the same code). The prohibition against discrimination in the\nworkplace is not novel. Law 8107 of May 30, 2001, had incorporated\nTitle Eleven into the Labor Code, called “Prohibition of Discrimination”\nalthough it was limited to reasons of age, ethnic origin, gender, or religion.  However, since\n1960, Law 2694 of May 22 of that year, had provided </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>“All forms\nof discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or\npreferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion,\nmarital status, political opinion, national origin, social origin, parentage, or\neconomic situation, which limit equality of opportunity or treatment in\nmatters of employment or occupation, are hereby prohibited</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">.\n</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>Article 2.- From the foregoing prohibition\nare excepted those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences appropriate according to\nthe qualifications necessary for the full performance of the functions or\ntasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively pursuant to the\nnature thereof and the conditions of the worker. Article 3.- As regards the\nState, its institutions and corporations, any appointment, dismissal,\nsuspension, transfer, exchange, promotion, or recognition carried out in\ncontravention of the provisions of this law shall be annullable at the request of the interested\nparty; and the procedures followed regarding the recruitment or selection\nof personnel shall lack efficacy in that which proves violative of this law.</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">   On the\nother hand, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vast jurisprudence, has referred to the\nimpossibility of discriminatory acts based on health finding\nprotection in the legal system.  In precedent number 13.205-2005 of\n3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005, that Chamber stated: </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b><i>“III.- On the Social State\nof Law (Estado Social de Derecho), Equality, and Human Dignity.</i></b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i> The Social State of\nLaw, a fundamental element of our constitutional order, entails an\norientation of our political regime towards social solidarity, that is, towards\nequity in societal relations, the promotion of social justice and the\nequality of all citizens in the exercise of their rights, discarding\narbitrary and unreasonable discriminations. In this sense, constitutional numeral 74\nexplicitly establishes the duty to pursue a permanent\npolicy of national solidarity based on the Christian principle of\nsocial justice, which makes it a constitutional value of the highest order (see\njudgment number 2170-93 of 10:12 a.m. on May 21, 1993). In\na consistent manner, based on the Social State of Law, our\nPolitical Constitution contemplates a set of benefit rights related\nto the protection of the family, workers, vulnerable sectors of the\npopulation, education, the environment, and Nation's assets such as the cultural\nheritage. This duty to conform to the guidelines of the Social State of\nLaw is not constrained to the Administration, but extends to the entire\nnational community, as it is a fundamental rule of\ncitizen coexistence in our political system. In its condition as a general principle,\nit emanates a particular normative projection in all spheres of creation,\ninterpretation, and execution of the Law. Specifically concerning the\ncontrol of constitutionality, the Principle of the Social State of Law is useful\nas a parameter of normative validity, a hermeneutic criterion, and an\ninstrument for the functional integration of the legal system. Regarding the right not to be\ndiscriminated against, the constitutionality parameter includes norms of constitutional\nrank, such as Article 33 of the Fundamental Charter, and regulations of\ninternational human rights law, whose application as a criterion\nof constitutional validity has express positive basis and has been\nwidely cemented by the jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus,\nArticle 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that\n\"all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and,\nendowed as they are with reason and conscience, must behave fraternally\ntowards one another\". This numeral evidences the intimate relationship between the\nright to equality and fraternal coexistence - understood as solidarity - in a\nsociety, such that one cannot exist without the other. Numeral 2 of that\nDeclaration concretizes the right not to be discriminated against, stating that \"everyone\nis entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without\ndistinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,\npolitical or other opinion, national or social origin, property,\nbirth or other status (emphasis not in the original). Likewise, the\nAmerican Convention on Human Rights stipulates in its first article\nthe duty of the States Parties to safeguard the rights contemplated therein\nwithout any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,\npolitical opinions, or any other nature, national or social origin, economic\nposition, birth, or any other social condition (emphasis not in the\noriginal), and, on the other hand, expressly regulates the right to\nequality in its numeral 24. Specifically in matters of labor discrimination,\nthe State has ratified a series of conventions on the subject, such as\nILO Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the\nInter-American Convention against Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the\nConvention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against\nWomen, among others. Although none of these conventions explicitly contemplates\nillness - a broader term than mere disability,\nsince not every sick person is disabled - as a ground for discrimination,\nit is no less true that, on one hand, subsection b) of the first article of\nConvention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain\nprocedure, any type of discrimination that nullifies or impairs equality of opportunity\nor treatment in employment or occupation and, on the other hand, both the Universal\nDeclaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on\nHuman Rights expressly proscribe all kinds of\ndiscriminatory treatment. This conception is encompassed by the aforementioned numeral 33 of\nour Political Constitution, which provides that every person is equal before the law\nand no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced. In\nconsequence, the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer\ndiscriminatory treatment for any reasons, and respect for human dignity\nare elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully,\nwhose protection and promotion correspond not only to the State but also to all\nmembers of the community”. </i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">This criterion has been reiterated, among many others,\nin rulings number 8711-2010 and 7064-2013 of that Chamber; where the\nimpropriety of labor discrimination for health reasons is\nratified. Article 409 of the same code stipulates that “…</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>whoever alleges discrimination must\nspecifically indicate the\nfactual basis on which they base their allegation and the terms of\ncomparison that substantiate their affirmation</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">”. As such circumstances\nconstitute the factual basis for the protection sought, on the\nworker falls the burden of proving the facts constituting the\ndiscrimination (Article 477 in relation to 409 of the Labor Code); and, for\nthe purpose of disproving the discriminatory bias, the employer has the corresponding duty\nto demonstrate the justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the\nmeasures or conduct identified as discriminatory (Article 478 subsection 10,\nof the same code).</span></font></div>\n\n<div align=\"justify\" style=\"line-height: 200%; \"><font face=\"Times New Roman\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> </span></font>\n<font face=\"Bookman Old Style\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>V.- MERITS OF THE CASE: </b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">The grievances regarding the cause of the reinstatement\nordered by the Court are not admissible. It is not true, as argued in the\nappeal, that the discriminatory action, declared in the ruling, was based\non the communication of the medical diagnosis made by</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b> </b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">the plaintiff to Mrs.\n</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">[Nombre 006]</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">. Nor is the reproach that the evidence of\nthe discrimination, on which the ruling relied, was solely the statement\nof the plaintiff, admissible. From the reasoning provided by the A quo judge, it is observed that the\nworker's argument regarding discriminatory dismissal based on health\nwas held as proven with the information provided, in the sense that the company\nphysician had treated her on various occasions for depressive crises; and with a\nlarge number of medical leave certifications (incapacidades) that appear in her personnel file. The\nargument that the dismissal was with employer liability (responsabilidad patronal) and not disciplinary\nhas no relevance for resolving the appeal, since the Court did not rely on\nthat factual assumption, but rather addressed what was stated by the worker, in the\nsense that the decision to dismiss was based on the knowledge of her\nstate of health, which she had communicated to her immediate superior. Note that\nthis is not a matter of dispute within the framework of the debate.  It is clear\nthat the termination of the employee's employment was based on the application\nof the provisions of Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, according to which: </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>\"...Both the Institute and the\nworker may terminate the employment contract without just cause, but\nmust always notify that decision in writing based on the following\nrules (…) The worker in these cases shall be entitled to the payment of severance pay\naccording to the following rules: (…) After continuous work of more than one\nyear, with an amount equal to one month's salary for each year or fraction not less\nthan six months, applying a maximum limit of 20 years\". </i></span></font></div>\n\n<div align=\"justify\" style=\"line-height: 200%; \"><font face=\"Bookman Old Style\" color=\"#010101\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">Based on that provision, by official letter G-00014-2017 of January 2,\n2017, the plaintiff was informed of the defendant's decision to terminate her\nemployment contract, with employer liability, as of January 3,\n2017 (see image 19 of the virtual court file).  That is to say, what is not discussed in\nthis litigation is the imputation of a labor offense committed by the worker,\nbut rather, the imputation of an illegitimate action to the employer, of having\ndiscriminated against the employee, by dismissing her due to her health\ncondition, disguising its action with the dismissal power provided in the Collective\nBargaining Agreement. The  Labor Procedural Reform (Reforma Procesal Laboral), as indicated above,  established the\nobligations of whoever seeks protection for discrimination, and introduced a\nspecific procedure to process complaints such as these (Article 540 and\nsubsequent ones of the Labor Code), with special treatment and indication of the\nevidentiary burdens (cargas probatorias) incumbent on each of the parties; specifying, for the\ncase of the plaintiff, the obligation to \" ...</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>specifically indicate the\nfactual basis on which they base their allegation and the terms of comparison that\nsubstantiate their affirmation\"</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">. In the sub examine, the plaintiff indicated, as the factual\nbasis for the alleged discrimination, that her dismissal occurred due to her health\ncondition, upon communicating it to her superior, a few days before the dismissal. It is\nappropriate to recall that, regarding evidentiary burdens, when\ndiscriminatory dismissals are alleged, the current Article 478 of the Labor Code provides\n\"</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>In conflicts arising from employment contracts, it corresponds...to the\nemployer, the demonstration of the preclusive facts they invoke and of\nall those they are obligated to keep duly documented\nor registered...10. The justification of the objectivity, rationality, and\nproportionality of the measures or conduct identified as\ndiscriminatory in all complaints related to discrimination. 11.\nAny other factual situation whose evidentiary source is more easily\naccessible to the employer than to the worker.\".</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">   Even before the validity of that\nnorm, this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber also had already referred to the evidentiary\nburdens in discrimination complaints. In judgment No. 13205, of\n3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber resolved: </span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><i>\"(...)\nit is unavoidable to bring up the importance of the distribution of the burden\nof proof to provide the worker protection against employer\nactions that constitute discrimination. (…) prima facie, the protected party who\nalleges labor discrimination must develop a\nsufficiently concrete and precise pleading, regarding the indications that such a\nviolation of the right to equality has existed. This condition has been widely reiterated\nby the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see judgment number 2004-11984 of\n10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004 and 2004-11437 of 9:53 a.m. on October\n15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result is\nachieved by the claimant, the burden falls on the respondent party to prove the existence of\nsufficient, real, and serious causes, to classify the questioned\nemployer decision or practice as reasonable and unrelated to any\ndiscriminatory purpose, the only\nmeans of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications”</i></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"> ). That is to say, in\nany protest for discrimination, the plaintiff is responsible for proving,\neven through indirect evidence, the facts on which they base their claim; and the\nterms of comparison that substantiate their affirmation (Article 409 of the Labor\nCode); meanwhile the employer must demonstrate the justification of the\nobjectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the conduct identified as\ndiscriminatory, providing the evidence they have in relation to what is disputed, to\nallow, in that way, the truth and a just resolution of the specific\ncase to be reached by those who administer justice (Article 478 subsection 10, of the same code).\nFrom the copy of the medical file of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)\nprovided (see image 814 and subsequent ones, of the virtual court file), the\nepicrisis (epicrisis) issued by that institution (see image 462 of the same code), as well as from the\ncertificate issued by the Medical Service of the defendant (image 464), it\nclearly emerges that the plaintiff is a person who has faced\npsychological conditions related to anxiety-depressive\nproblems, at least since the year 2012.   In the Forensic Psychological\nExpert Report (Dictamen Pericial Psicológico Forense), No. PPF-2018-0002223 (visible at image 106 of the virtual file), a\nsummary is made of the medical care received in the Health service, which\nreflects the psychological conditions for which she was being treated at\nleast since 2011. It is stated, in that report: “</span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\"><b>Copy of Epicrisis\nPFC-8006-18, Coronado Health Area (Área de Salud de Coronado), Outpatient Services Department (Jefatura de Consulta Externa):\n</b></span><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">issued on April 2, 2018. Medical care is documented starting from\n01/26/1996 and the last documented on 10/26/2017.\n\nIn General Medicine, she has several consultations, among them: pregnancy, left knee injury (disability from August 12 to 25, 2004), overweight, pregnancy and uterine fibroma (disability of fifteen days starting from 9/11/2010); threatened abortion due to myomatosis (disability of fifteen days starting from 24/11/2010); threatened premature labor (disability of fifteen days starting from 31/01/2011); pregnancy, dysthymia (dysthymia) disability of fifteen days, starting from 15/02/2011); recurrent depression (disability of eight days starting from 22/07/2013, treatment with Clonazepan, Fluoxetine); acne and depressive disorder (dated 21/10/2013, treatment with Fluoxetine, Quitacel); colitis (23/09/2014); anxiety crisis (disability of one day, 20/10/2014); anxiety disorder, HTA (disability of one day, 21/10/2014); depressive disorder (disability of three days starting from 22/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); work stress (disability of three days starting from 27/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); labor conflict (disability of 3 days starting from 28/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline, Benadryl). Consultation with the Psychiatry specialty, a consultation in Psychiatry at the Solón Núñez Clinic is documented on 3/09/2001, for anxious depressive reaction, disability for twelve days, treatment with Fluoxetine and Atarax. Appointment for consultation on 12/04/2011, reported absent. Consultation with the Psychology specialty starting from 11/03/2013 \"survivor of domestic violence, anxious depressive disorder, survivor of sexual abuse\". Appointment 13/11/2013 \"in follow-up for situations of family dynamics and labor relations.\" Appointment on 12/03/2014 noted absent. Consultation in Social Work, noted absent at the appointments of 26/03/2013 and 18/04/2013. Appointment of 18/06/2013 case follow-up. Appointment of 6/01/2014 absent. Consultation for IVM Pension Protocols on dates 14/18/2017 and 26/10/2017.\"\n\nThat condition was known to her management. This is recorded in the response sent by the plaintiff, regarding a notice of reprimand imposed on her on July 21, 2016. In that official communication, she expressed: \"At this moment I feel in a fragile moment, as you know I must be in psychological and psychiatric treatment, I have missed appointments at the CCSS to avoid taking leave (...) (see image 311). Likewise, in the appeal filed before this Chamber, it is reaffirmed that this illness was not a new fact, but rather that the defendant and its management had known about it since 2011, \"because this type of mental illness is difficult to hide.\" That is, the plaintiff was a person with a health problem, which is an assumption that places workers in a situation of disadvantage before the employer, compared to those who do not have that condition, which could well be a trigger for them to be dismissed under the exercise of the free dismissal power that, as a general rule, every employer governed by private law has. It is precisely the recognition that this is a natural circumstance that people may face, which cannot affect their right to work, so the legislator established the impossibility of dismissing workers for health reasons, except in the case that they have committed a serious fault that legitimizes the employer to terminate the employment contract. That is why, in order to proceed with the dismissal of people with health problems, as in the case under study, the employer must demonstrate the objectivity and rationality of the decision taken, to rule out a discriminatory motive. The defendant alleges that the worker's health problem was not new, that it is not linked to the last communication that the worker made to her management, and that therefore there is no cause-effect relationship between the last information that the plaintiff claims to have given to the official [Name 006] and the decision of dismissal with employer liability. The appellant is right in that the knowledge of the worker's difficult state of health had not been unknown to it for a long time before, but that does not release it from the result imposed by the Court, because if it did not provide any objective and rational justification for making the dismissal decision, relying on the conventional norm that authorizes dismissals with employer liability, this is not sufficient to consider it proven that the dismissal was not due to the plaintiff's state of health. Given the proof by documentary evidence and the appellant's acknowledgment that the worker's illness was of long standing, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 404 of the Labor Code, the power to proceed with her dismissal was limited. This limitation has a protective sense of fundamental rights, as it prevents the worker from being deprived of their normal source of income (such as work), when faced with health problems; so that, under that factual assumption (health problems of the worker), the employer sees the power provided in Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code limited, because another normative source of equal rank -Article 404 of the same normative body- and of later approval, came to limit, temporarily (while the worker is suffering from health problems that affect their performance and does not commit faults that authorize their disciplinary dismissal) that power provided in numeral 160 of the Collective Agreement and in 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code. This Chamber does not ignore that disabilities -especially when the condition is psychological or psychiatric- place the sick person in a vulnerable condition exposed to dismissal, given the decrease in their ability to fully fulfill the contracted service. The law reacts against this type of situation, with provisions such as numeral 404 of the Labor Code, because work is a fundamental right of all people; and it is, ordinarily, the main source of income with which people satisfy their subsistence needs and those of their family. Illness is a natural condition to which people are exposed, just as happens with pregnancy in women; furthermore, it occurs unexpectedly and involuntarily, and in the face of it, people can only resort to medical aid. For this reason, in a supportive and civilized society, the proper thing is consideration for that situation, in which people do not stop needing work just because of the illness. On the contrary, illness is a fact that adds to the expenses of a person and their family. Not protecting that situation puts the life of the worker at serious risk, not only by marginalizing them from access to social security, as a contributing person, but by preventing them from being able to cover the necessary expenses for their recovery. That is why the Chamber, in response to the grounds of the appeal, has proceeded, just as the trial judge did, to contrast the allegations of the parties with the evidence provided. Given the claim of discrimination, once the plaintiff's suffering was proven, that this was known to the defendant -as it was of long standing- and that it was not a disciplinary dismissal, the defense thesis, in the sense that the dismissal was not due to the worker's state of health, but that it acted in the exercise of the power provided in the Collective Agreement, is not sufficient to admit that it was an objective and reasonable dismissal, as required by numeral 478 subsection 10 of the Labor Code. In the record, the discriminatory motive alleged by the plaintiff was proven, attributable to her delicate state of health, which had been afflicting her for several years. The power conferred by that conventional regulation cannot be exercised to achieve an illegitimate and prohibited end under the legal system, such as discrimination, prohibited not only by the aforementioned numeral 404, but also by the Civil Code, whose provisions apply supplementarily in this matter, as permitted by numeral 15 of the Labor Code. Article 19 of that other Code provides: \"Acts contrary to mandatory and prohibitive norms are null and void (...) \" The following numeral reaffirms: \"Acts carried out under the protection of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was intended to be circumvented\". That is, when faced with an action with overtones of discrimination, the defendant could not limit itself to justifying its action in the exercise of a power authorized by the Convention, if said power entails the possible exercise of a prohibited activity. In its defense, the defendant limited itself to pointing out the exercise of that power, a position which, as indicated, is insufficient for the purposes of granting the appeal. The appellant, in order to justify its decision to ignore the provisions of numeral 404 of the Labor Code, alleges that the person who adopted the dismissal decision was not the plaintiff's immediate supervisor and was unaware of the official's health conditions. This argument is also not acceptable. Regardless of who the competent person to apply the dismissal in the terms it occurred was, the relevant point in this case is that the employer representation did know of the plaintiff's condition and therefore, the employer could not (while the plaintiff's state of health remained unresolved and she did not commit any fault authorizing dismissal without employer liability) exercise that power. Supporting the above are the statements made in the appeal, to the effect that her evaluations were \"effective\" and \"acceptable\"; that the plaintiff had no negative or deficient rating. Given this finding, the nonexistence of objective reasons that legitimized dispensing with her services is reaffirmed. If she was a worker with an acceptable performance, what other reason -if not her illness- was really the motive for dispensing with her services? In addition, the forensic psychological expert opinion, whose improper assessment the appellant protests, confirms the severe psychopathology of the plaintiff, compatible with depression and anxiety, which hinder her interpersonal adjustment, as well as the treatment received by the plaintiff, both in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and through the defendant's medical service, so that the appellant's thesis is not admissible, that the claim is generated by the plaintiff's own psychiatric problems –a distortion of reality–. Finally, it must be expressly clarified that in this venue, what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber has no incidence, as the constitutionality of the conventional norm is not discussed, it having been verified that in reality, that norm was used to order a discriminatory dismissal. For these reasons, what was resolved by the trial judge, in determining that the plaintiff's dismissal was discriminatory, deserves no reproach.\n\nVI.- BACK WAGES (SALARIOS CAÍDOS): the judgment ordered the defendant to pay \"all back wages (salarios caídos) and/or wages not received from the date of the discriminatory dismissal, until her effective reinstatement. By virtue of the fact that Mrs. [Name 001] was dismissed through a discriminatory act, due to her state of health, the defendant is ordered to pay compensation equivalent to twenty-four months of wages, in accordance with Article 566 of the Labor Code. The defendant is ordered to pay seven and a half million for non-economic damages (daño moral), which will accrue interest and indexation as of the finality of this judgment and the effective payment, the calculation of which shall be made in the enforcement of judgment phase. (...)\" The appellant protests against that decision because it considers that it produces a double imposition and because the limit of the norm is twenty-four wages. The Chamber finds no contradiction or provision that violates Article 566 of the Labor Code. According to that article (566), which the appealed resolution cites to order the reinstatement of the plaintiff and the payment of back wages, what it does is set a cap on the obligation to pay back wages, this for the assumption that the reinstatement in the position occurs two years after the dismissal. In such cases, the amount for back wages is limited to a period of twenty-four months. So it is not a double condemnation, but an express indication that the back wages ordered are limited, in accordance with the indicated provision, to twenty-four salaries. With this clarification, and on the understanding that from the resulting amount the defendant may deduct the amounts it paid to the plaintiff for severance notice and termination pay (cesantía) - settlement detail visible in images 338 to 340 of the virtual court file - the ruling must be upheld, given that the plaintiff's dismissal was ordered on January 2, 2017. It must be considered that the 24-month limitation applies to back wages up to the finality of the judgment, because the legislator also established the obligation to continue paying back wages after the finality of the judgment and while the reinstatement order is not complied with (doctrine of numeral 576 of the Labor Code).\n\nVII.- NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL): For the granting of this request, in the labor field, it must be proven through reliable evidence that justifies the granting of this item. In this case, the plaintiff tries to justify the sought compensation on the fact that the dismissal has caused her damages and losses as well as subjective non-economic damages (daño moral) to her physical, psychological, and emotional health, consisting of the suffering she experienced (anxiety, sadness, pain, as it has been difficult for her to find new employment, she has no money or social insurance). The granting of this claim \"in re ipsa\" is not possible, because it cannot be presumed that the mere fact of dismissal derives as a \"logical consequence\" a suffering, but rather it must be demonstrated. First of all, it must be clarified where the possibility of compensation for a dismissal derives from. The national author Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra who referred to the Code of Manu, demonstrates how already in Ancient India the possibility of satisfaction for an injured interest was regulated. In said Code, its Article 288, of the Eighth Book, established \"...he who damages the property of another, knowingly or through neglect (fraud or fault), must give him satisfaction.\" That premise is the same as contained in numeral 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code, which prescribes an obligation to \"repair\" or to \"satisfy\". In other words, compensation is a patrimonial restoration in the person or in their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that patrimonial compensation restores value, even though its composition is diverse. Regarding non-economic damages (daño moral), the function of compensation suffers variations. In Roman Law it was called \"pretium doloris\", in Germanic law \"Schmerzgelt\", that is, \"to pay a price for the pain\", so it does not directly tend to the integral restitution of the damage caused, since when dealing with damage that affects non-economic values, the situation is different. Despite the above, compensation for non-economic damages (daño moral) does not seek a generic satisfaction function but a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation suffered (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in \"Derecho Privado\", p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, due to this non-economic nature, \"tensions\" arise in its translation into a specific sum, as there is a short step from its correct repair to a so-called \"judicial lottery.\" Likewise, that Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES MUST BE PROVEN. To support her position, which is shared by the majority of the Chamber, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), in which it is stated that a judicial separation for conjugal infidelity does not \"per se\" give rise to compensation for non-economic damages (daño moral), just as the breach of a promise of marriage does not generate it either (See \"Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil\", \"El Daño\", Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León establishes that, in a strict conception, non-economic damages (daño moral) cannot be presumed as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that non-economic damages MUST BE SUBJECT TO SOME TYPE OF PROOF, because otherwise the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of \"punitive damages\" (DIEZ PICAZO y PONCE DE LEÓN, Luis, \"DERECHO DE DAÑOS\", p. 329), which -it is added- exceeds the notions of damage as reparation provided for in numeral 41 of our Political Constitution. Thus, with a substantive approach, the damage claimed by the plaintiff must be denied, as she did not offer proof to support her affirmations regarding that damage. But there are also procedural reasons to deny the non-economic damages (daño moral) in this case. That the compensation for non-economic damages (daño moral) for an unjustified dismissal by itself causes suffering, that is, it is through a human presumption from which that suffering can be derived, and therefore the compensation. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof within the new civil procedural legislation (article 41.2). However, they did have specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural norm, specifically in article 417. That numeral established that this type of presumptions only constitute proof if they are a DIRECT, PRECISE AND LOGICALLY DEDUCED consequence OF A PROVEN FACT. Likewise, it emphasized that the proof of presumptions must be serious and concordant with the others rendered in the process. Even if that repealed norm were applied to the case at hand, it must be concluded that there is no evidence that allows a \"logical inference\" from the dismissal to the claims for non-economic damages (daño moral) outlined by the plaintiff in her lawsuit, given that she did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which she seeks compensation, so it is not possible to infer the existence of the claimed non-economic damages (daño moral).\n\nVIII.- COSTS (COSTAS): The order to pay costs (costas) is a consequence provided by law for the losing party. Certainly, Article 563 subsection 1, of the Labor Code authorizes exemption from this item when that party has litigated with evident good faith. However, the position of the defendant party, in court, cannot be described as such. As mentioned, the justification it has provided for its employer decision, under the shelter of conventional article 160, has been ruled out, when on the contrary, it has been proven that it actually incurred in a dismissal prohibited by the legal system (article 404 of the Labor Code) and, in order to free itself from the economic consequences that according to current legislation it could incur, it entered into contradictions in its defense thesis, accepting on one hand that the plaintiff's illness was of long standing and, on the other, denying knowledge of it by the plaintiff's immediate management. Regarding the amount of one million colones -set for personal costs (costas personales)- it is considered that it must be upheld, as it is deemed consistent with the parameters established in numeral 562 of the Labor Code, that is, the work performed, the amount in dispute, and the economic position of the parties.\n\nIX.- CONCLUSION: For the reasons considered, the filed appeal must be granted solely to annul the ruling insofar as it ordered the payment for non-economic damages (daño moral). In all other respects, with the clarification made in recital VI, that the amount for back wages (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct what was already paid to the plaintiff for severance notice and \"legal benefits\" already paid, it must be denied.\n\nX.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE AGUIRRE GÓMEZ AND JUDGE VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned dissent from the majority vote, insofar as it granted the appeal and denied the plaintiff compensation for non-economic damages (daño moral). It must be considered that the appellant does not explain in what sense the lack of indication as to whether it is objective or subjective damage is a reason to order the annulment of the ruling and deny that point. The basis of that order lay in that non-economic damages (daño moral) must be compensated for being in the presence of an abusive exercise of a power of dismissal with employer liability, causing damage different from the normal and natural damages of a justified dismissal, which is not the case under study. The defendant's representative argues that the exercise of a conventional power cannot generate non-economic damages (daño moral), however, it is clear -as stated- that in this case it is not an ordinary dismissal, but rather the exercise of a power with the clear intention of circumventing a fundamental right. The undersigned endorse the Court's argument in that it considered the claim for non-economic damages (daño moral) to be appropriate, as we are in the presence of the abusive exercise of a conventional figure, to achieve a purpose prohibited by the legal system, with evident non-economic damages (daño moral) to a person who, due to their proven psychological ailments, it is reasonable and logical to infer, as a fact derived from human experience, that the dismissal generated greater impact on her. The issue is determining the quantum of that compensation. The Court ordered recognition for non-economic damages (daño moral) in the sum of seven million five hundred thousand colones. Applying a logical criterion (article 481 of the Labor Code), taking into consideration the nature of the plaintiff's ailments, the salary she earned, the obligations she had as a single mother head of household at that time, and the consequent implications for her life, we estimate that the amount ordered by the Court is adequate and reasonable.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe appeal is partially granted.\n\nThe judgment is annulled regarding the award for moral damages (daño moral), a claim which is denied. In all other respects, the appeal is denied with the clarification made in Considerando VI, that the amount for back pay (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct what has already been paid to the plaintiff for notice of termination (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). Magistrate Varela Araya and Magistrate Aguirre Gómez dissent from the majority vote insofar as it denies the payment of moral damages (daño moral), a point on which they would deny the appeal.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJulia Varela Araya                            Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n\n\n\n    \n\n\n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez                   Roxana Chacón Artavia\nRPC\n\n1\n\nEXP: 17-001718-0166-LA\n\n\n\n Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2295-3009. Emails: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr and  jmolinab@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\n**Exp: 17-001718-0166-LA**\n**Res: 2021-001377**\n**SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at eleven fifteen hours on the eighteenth of June of two thousand twenty-one.\n\nOrdinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Name 001], divorced, domestic worker and resident of Cartago, against the **INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE SEGUROS**, represented by its general judicial attorney, attorney Jonathan Esteban Fallas Molina, resident of Heredia. Acting as special judicial attorneys; for the plaintiff, attorney Carolina Soto Monge; and for the defendant, attorney Erick Porras Retana, single. All of legal age, married, and residents of San José with the exceptions indicated.\n\n**Drafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,**\n\n**CONSIDERING:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND:** In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that she began working for the defendant on July 11, 1995; and that she was dismissed with employer liability on January 2, 2017. She considers herself to have been a victim of workplace harassment (acoso laboral), in that her work was overloaded, she was pressured with workloads without being given proper training; her immediate supervisor was constantly annoyed by the sick leaves or permissions she requested to attend meetings for her minor daughter. That as a result of the unjustified dismissal she has suffered greatly and has been caused damages and losses as well as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) to her physical, psychological, and emotional health, consisting of the suffering she experiences as a result of the dismissal (anxiety, sadness, pain, as it has been difficult for her to find new employment, she has no money or social security). She asserts that the dismissal was ordered when the defendant became aware of her illness. She objected to a deduction, which she considers illegal, from her final settlement (liquidación), in the sum of ¢407,736. She requests that the defendant be ordered to pay any differences that may exist in the payment of notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), vacation, school salary (salario escolar), and year-end bonus (aguinaldo); to return the sum deducted from the settlement; to pay her the salary corresponding to 404 hours received in mandatory training courses outside working hours; damages and losses; moral damages (daño moral); recognition of the school salary, on the 60% that the INS pays for retroactive sick leaves to 2012; legal interest on the sums claimed, their indexation (indexación), and the payment of both costs. In a subsequent filing, the complaint was expanded with respect to certain facts, as well as the description of the damages and losses she estimates were caused to her. The defendant institute answered the facts in the negative. It alleged that its principal is not aware of the apparent anxiety and depression problems mentioned by the plaintiff and that the termination of the employment relationship was due to a dismissal with employer liability, in accordance with article 160 of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva). It raised the defenses of lack of right and of payment. The Court partially granted the complaint and declared that by virtue of the plaintiff having been dismissed by a discriminatory act, due to her health condition, she has the right to be reinstated, with the payment of lost wages and/or wages not received from the date of the discriminatory dismissal until her effective reinstatement and the payment of compensation equivalent to twenty-four months of salary, in accordance with article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo); as well as the payment of seven and a half million colones for moral damages, which will accrue interest and indexation at the time the judgment becomes final and effective payment is made, whose calculation will be carried out in sentence execution (ejecución de sentencia), and the sum paid for notice and severance pay must be deducted from the total amount of the condemnation. The defendant was ordered to pay both costs of the action, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of one million colones. The representation of the defendant institute appeals this decision.\n\n**II.- GRIEVANCES OF THE APPEAL:** The following are raised as grounds for nullity: **1)** That the Court did not transfer the complaint against Mrs. [Name 020], for which reason it requests that the judgment be annulled, so that this procedural step is completed. **2)** Credibility is given to the plaintiff's arguments despite not demonstrating, with suitable evidence, what was alleged. **3)** The judgment is vitiated by incongruence because, on one hand, it indicates there is \"certainty\" and, on the other, \"suspicion\" of discrimination; and no concrete evidence supporting each conclusion is mentioned. **4)** It is taken as proven that the dismissal was due to the verbal communication of the diagnosis of attention deficit, without having proof of the truthfulness of the plaintiff's statement, as it is not on file that she informed Mrs. [Name 006] of what is indicated in the complaint. It adds that on this topic she presented no evidence; only the plaintiff's statement exists. It insists that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the alleged discrimination and that there is no causal relationship between the alleged communication—not accredited in the file—and the dismissal with employer liability, since even if the communication were true (which it denies), two months elapsed between that alleged fact and the dismissal. That a proper assessment of the facts by the judge would have led to the conclusion that there are no probative elements of a nexus between any discriminatory fact and the dismissal. It affirms that, on the contrary, it was proven that the Institute kept the plaintiff working, despite her suffering from some psychological disorders since 2011, meaning it was not a new fact (referring to the petitioner's health condition), for which reason it must be taken as demonstrated that the dismissal was not motivated by the worker's health condition. It attributes the cause of her feeling persecuted to her personality traits. It partially transcribes the content of the forensic medical expertise (pericia médico-forense) to point out that the plaintiff used her illness as an instrument and measure of desperation in the face of the applied dismissal, distorting reality, wrongly and negatively assuming that she had been dismissed and discriminated against for health reasons, describing a scenario that did not occur, and failing to prove the causal nexus between her health condition and the dismissal, since the ailments began several years before the dismissal, they are not new, which rules out the causal nexus between the ailments and the decision to dismiss her. It also denies that the cause of the dismissal was related to the plaintiff's faults; or that her evaluations were less than satisfactory; in this regard, it affirms that these (evaluations) were \"effective\" and \"acceptable,\" so she did not receive any negative or deficient qualification. Regarding the use of the conventional norm that allows the Institute to carry out dismissals with employer liability, it affirms that the constitutionality of the conventional norm has already been reviewed and the commission of a fault is not required if the dismissal is applied with the payment of notice and severance pay. On this aspect, it relies on what was resolved by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Sixth Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit No. 253-2012. It affirms that the ruling makes erroneous conclusions regarding the non-resolution of the plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal, regarding her illnesses, and regarding the lack of a plan for the evaluations to improve. **5)** It considers that taking the facts of the complaint as true, without the plaintiff having demonstrated her statement, generates defenselessness (indefensión), and also for not taking into account that the dismissal was carried out based on the employer's authority (potestad patronal) provided for in numeral 160 of the Collective Labor Agreement, that is, with employer liability and the payment of benefits, so we are not before a discriminatory dismissal, nor an unjust one, nor an improper one. **6).** Regarding what was resolved **on moral damages (daño moral)**, it affirms that for its granting it is not indicated whether the dismissal is objective or subjective; in addition to lacking legal basis, proportionality, and coherence; since dismissal in application of article 160 of the Collective Labor Agreement cannot generate moral damages for the worker, as that norm clearly provides the form of indemnifying damages for dismissal with employer liability. It alleges that the condemnation for moral damages lacks clear and concrete argumentation on the factual and normative basis of that decision. It considers a contradiction in the analysis of the exercise of the disciplinary authority and what was resolved, since it is clear that the dismissal was with employer liability and the application of the disciplinary regime is not discussed. **7) Lost wages (Salarios caídos)**: It claims the improper application of article 566 of the Labor Code, in that by having condemned the defendant to the payment of lost wages and 24 months of salary for discriminatory dismissal, a double condemnation is incurred. It assures that, according to that norm, the payment of lost wages cannot exceed the amount of 24 times the monthly salary of the plaintiff and, since the plaintiff's dismissal was in January 2017, the twenty-four months have more than elapsed to date.\n\n**8)** **Relief Granted**. It states that the court incurred in the vice of ultra petita, because it granted indemnification for discrimination, which is not among the claims of the lawsuit, awarding her for that concept an indemnification equivalent to 24 months of salary. It affirms that what the plaintiff requested is the payment of alleged differences, compensation for damages (resarcimiento de daños y perjuicios) due to the dismissal, moral damages (daño moral) for the dismissal, interest, indexation (indexación), and costs. That a double award is imposed for the same aspect, because by ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement it also imposed the payment of back pay (salarios caídos), so that by applying Article 566 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) there is a double imposition of that item, which is improper. It also criticizes the amount granted, for lack of reasoning and for considering it disproportionate. **9) Award of Costs (Condena en costas):** It requests exoneration from that item, first, for considering that the dismissal was not discriminatory but rather was carried out based on Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva); and, second, for having litigated in good faith, since its defense was made in light of the cited conventional article. It requests that, if the award of costs is upheld, the amount be reduced, having been set in a prudential manner, since what was granted is disproportionate. All of those grounds for grievance were reiterated in the brief filed on June 17, 2019 (within the deadline it had to appeal the judgment), alleging, expressly, that an improper assessment of evidence (indebida valoración de pruebas) was incurred, by having facts deemed accredited, in contradiction with the evidence of the proceeding, supporting the judgment solely on the plaintiff's statement, which was given supreme value before the other evidentiary elements provided, which demonstrate that the dismissal ordered by the General Manager was not a discriminatory act but based on the authority established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, so there is no nexus between the communication of the plaintiff's condition to Mrs. [Name 006] and the decision to dismiss her. That pursuant to numeral 409 of the Labor Code, the plaintiff had to prove the discriminatory motive of the dismissal, which the appellant finds lacking. It says that it has not been taken into account that the plaintiff also did not demonstrate that INS had incurred in any other discriminatory conduct against her. That the admission of the plaintiff's word and the imposition on INS of the obligation to prove a negative fact (not having dismissed for health reasons), violates sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional) and the right of defense. It also alleges **substantial violation of Articles 409, 410 and 478 of the Labor Code, as well as numeral 160 of the INS Collective Bargaining Agreement,** insofar as they require the plaintiff to prove discrimination and the only thing she provided was her statement. It claims an improper interpretation of those norms, by requiring INS to demonstrate the objective cause of the dismissal. It reiterates that Article 566 of the Labor Code was improperly applied and that it should have been exempted from the payment of costs, for having acted in good faith, accusing a lack of reasoning for the reasons why it was condemned to \"a percentage higher than the lower legal limit of 15%\".\n\n**III.- ON THE FORMAL GRIEVANCE:** Article 587 of the Labor Code regulates the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) for procedural reasons in the following terms: *\"For procedural reasons it shall be admissible when invoking:/ 1.- Any of the vices for which the nullity of proceedings proceeds, provided that these have been alleged in one of the preceding phases of the proceeding and the claim has been dismissed. / 2.- Incongruence of the judgment or absolute obscurity of the latter part. In cases of incongruence, the appeal is only admissible when the procedure of addition or clarification has been exhausted./3.- Lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the court./4.- The judgment having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means illegally introduced into the proceeding./ 5.- Lack of grounds or insufficient grounds for the judgment./ 6.- The judgment having been issued with non-observance of the rules established in the third paragraph of Article 537.\"* [emphasis added]. Subsection 1° must be related to numeral 471 ibid., which enunciates the procedural errors susceptible to generating nullity. Furthermore, pursuant to such provisions, the party must have formulated the claim in a timely manner. The petition for nullity raised by the defendant's representative, because the co-defendant [Name 020] was not joined to the proceeding, is not admissible, as it is a novel argument, that is, because it was not requested within the framework of the debate, meaning with the answer to the complaint. The grievance for incongruence also does not merit being addressed. In accordance with the doctrine and jurisprudence of this Chamber, the vice of incongruence occurs when there is no correlation between what was requested in the lawsuit and what was resolved in the judgment (see on this matter votes numbers 2013-623 of 10:45 a.m. on June 7, 2013; 074-2021 of 10:50 a.m. on January 15, 2021; among others). In the case under study, we are not in the presence of that vice. As is observed from the complaint and its clarification and addition, the plaintiff's petition was the condemnation of the defendant to pay \"the differences that may exist in the payment of notice (preaviso), severance pay (cesantía), vacations, school salary (salario escolar), and year-end bonus (aguinaldo)\"; the payment of ¢407,736 that was deducted from her labor settlement; the salary corresponding to 404 hours received in training courses, damages and moral damages caused; the recognition of the school salary over the 60% that INS pays for retroactive disability (incapacidades) periods to 2012; legal interest and indexation on the requested items; and the costs of the action. In a subsequent brief, visible as image 585 of the Trial Court's virtual case file, she clarified that the damages consist of \"the suffering that as a result of the unjust dismissal, I have anxiety, sadness, pain since it has been very difficult for me to find a new job, I have no money, I have no social security\", she also mentioned that on the occasion of the sudden dismissal, her health condition has worsened, she cannot sleep, she bites her tongue, her appetite has been lost, she has lost her self-esteem since INS, believing that I am not useful as a worker, simply dismisses her. She also mentioned other personal reasons she had to face as a consequence of the dismissal, for which she estimated the moral damages at the sum of five million colones and the damages at two million five hundred thousand colones. She concluded by stating **\"I reiterate also the request for reinstatement and the payment of back pay (salarios caídos)\"** (image 588). The judgment granted the claim for reinstatement, with the payment of back pay and moral damages, therefore, there is no incongruence to address as a procedural vice of nullity of the judgment, the request for nullity for procedural vices lacking factual support.\n\n**IV.- ON THE PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY ACTS:** Article 404 of the Labor Code, in force (reformed by Law number 9797 of December 2, 2019) prohibits all discrimination in work for \"...reasons of age, ethnicity, sex, religion, race, sexual orientation, marital status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, filiation, **health condition (condición de salud),** disability, union affiliation, economic situation or any other analogous form of discrimination\" [emphasis added]. The following Article 406 prohibits dismissals for any discriminatory cause. The sanction provided for the breach of that provision is the nullity of the act of dismissal and the consequent reinstatement of the worker in their job, with the full enjoyment of their rights and the consequences provided for the reinstatement judgment (Articles 410 and 566 ibid.). The prohibition against discrimination in the labor sphere is not new. Law 8107 of May 30, 2001, had incorporated the Eleventh Title into the Labor Code, called \"Prohibition to Discriminate,\" although it limited it to reasons of age, ethnicity, gender, or religion. However, since 1960, Law 2694 of May 22 of that year, had provided *\"All sorts of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, founded on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, marital status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, filiation, or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunities or treatment in matters of employment or occupation, are prohibited. Article 2.- From the preceding prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences according to the qualifications necessary for the full performance of the functions or tasks proper to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to the nature of these and the worker's conditions. Article 3.- Regarding the State, its institutions and corporations, any appointment, dismissal, suspension, transfer, exchange, promotion, or recognition carried out contrary to the provisions of this law, shall be voidable at the request of an interested party; and the procedures followed regarding recruitment or selection of personnel shall lack efficacy in what results violative of this law.\"* On the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vast jurisprudence, has referred to the impossibility that discriminatory acts for reasons of health find protection in the legal system. In precedent number 13.205-2005 of 3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005, that Chamber stated: ***\"III.- On the Social State of Law, Equality, and Human Dignity.** The Social State of Law, a fundamental element of our constitutional order, entails an orientation of our political regime towards social solidarity, that is, towards equity in societal relations, the promotion of social justice and the equality of all citizens in the exercise of their rights, discarding arbitrary and unreasonable discriminations. In this sense, constitutional numeral 74 explicitly establishes the duty to pursue a permanent policy of national solidarity based on the Christian principle of social justice, which makes it a constitutional value of the first order (see judgment number 2170-93 of 10:12 a.m. on May 21, 1993). Consequently, based on the Social State of Law, our Political Constitution contemplates a set of benefit rights relative to the protection of the family, workers, vulnerable sectors of the population, education, the environment, and Nation's assets such as cultural heritage. This duty to conform according to the guidelines of the Social State of Law is not constrained to the Administration, but extends to the entire national community, as it is a fundamental rule of citizen coexistence in our political system. In its condition as a general principle, it emanates a particular normative projection in all areas of the creation, interpretation, and execution of Law. Properly concerning constitutionality control, the Principle of the Social State of Law is useful as a parameter of normative validity, a hermeneutical criterion, and an integrating functional instrument of the legal system. Regarding the right not to be discriminated against, the constitutionality parameter includes norms of constitutional rank, like Article 33 of the Fundamental Charter, and regulations of international human rights law, whose application as a criterion of constitutional validity enjoys express positive substratum and has been extensively cemented by the jurisprudence of this Chamber. In this way, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and, endowed as they are with reason and conscience, must behave fraternally towards one another.' This numeral evidences the intimate relationship between the right to equality and fraternal coexistence - understood as solidarity - in a society, so that one cannot exist without the other. Numeral 2 of that Declaration concretizes the right not to be discriminated against, in that 'everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' (underlining not in original). Likewise, the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates in its first article the duty of the States Parties to safeguard the rights contemplated therein without any discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, economic position, birth or any other social condition (underlining not in original), and, on the other hand, expressly regulates the right to equality in its numeral 24. Properly concerning labor discrimination, the State has ratified a series of conventions on the matter, such as ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, among others. Although none of these conventions explicitly contemplates illness - a term broader than mere disability, since not every ill person is disabled - as a ground for discrimination, it is no less true that, on the one hand, subparagraph (b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain means, any type of discrimination that nullifies or impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe all kinds of discriminatory treatment. This conception is gathered by the referenced numeral 33 of our Political Constitution, which provides that every person is equal before the law and no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced. Consequently, the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for whatever grounds, and respect for human dignity are elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, whose protection and promotion is the responsibility not only of the State, but also of all members of the community.\"* That criterion has been reiterated among many others, in votes numbers 8711-2010 and 7064-2013 of that Chamber; where the impropriety of labor discrimination for health reasons is ratified. Article 409 ibid. stipulates that \"...*whoever alleges discrimination must specifically indicate the factual basis on which they base their allegation and the terms of comparison that substantiate their affirmation*\". As such circumstances constitute the factual basis for the protection being demanded, the worker bears the burden of proving the facts that constitute the discrimination (Article 477 in relation to Article 409 of the Labor Code); and, for the purposes of disproving the discriminatory bias, the employer corresponds to prove the justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the measures or conduct indicated as discriminatory (Article 478 subsection 10, ibid.).\n\n**V.- MERITS OF THE CASE (FONDO DEL ASUNTO):** The grievances regarding the cause of the reinstatement ordered by the Trial Court are not admissible. It is not true, as raised in the appeal, that the discriminatory action, declared in the judgment, was based on the communication of the medical diagnosis, made by the plaintiff to Mrs. [Name 006]. Nor is the reproach admissible in the sense that the evidence of discrimination, on which the judgment was supported, was solely the plaintiff's word. From the reasoning offered by the lady Judge A quo, it is observed that the worker's argument in relation to the discriminatory dismissal based on health, was deemed accredited with the information provided, in the sense that the company doctor (médico de empresa) had attended to her on various occasions for depressive crises; and a large number of disabilities (incapacidades) that appear in her personnel file. The argument that the dismissal was with employer liability and not disciplinary, has no relevance for resolving the appeal, since the Trial Court did not base its decision on that factual assumption, but rather considered what the worker set forth, in the sense that the decision to dismiss was based on the knowledge of her health condition, which she had communicated to her immediate superior. Note that this is not a subject in dispute within the framework of the debate. There is clarity that the official's cessation was based on the application of the provisions of Article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, according to which: *\"...Both the Institute and the worker may terminate the employment contract without just cause, but must always notify that decision in writing based on the following rules (...) The worker in these cases, shall be entitled to the payment of severance pay (cesantía) according to the following rules: (...) After continuous work of more than one year, an amount equal to one month's salary for each year or fraction of not less than six months, applying a maximum limit of 20 years.\"*\n\nBased on that provision, through official communication G-00014-2017 of January 2, 2017, the plaintiff was informed of the defendant's decision to terminate her employment contract, with employer liability, as of January 3, 2017 (see image 19 of the Trial Court's virtual case file). That is, it is not disputed in this lawsuit, the imputation of a labor fault committed by the worker, but rather, the imputation of an illegitimate action to the employer, of having discriminated against the official, by dismissing her due to her health condition, disguising its action with the dismissal authority provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Labor Procedural Reform (Reforma Procesal Laboral), as indicated supra, established the obligations of the person seeking protection for discrimination, and introduced a specific procedure to process complaints like these (Article 540 and following, of the Labor Code), with special treatment and indication of the burdens of proof that are the responsibility of each of the parties; specifying, for the case of the plaintiff, the obligation to *\"...specifically indicate the factual basis on which they base their allegation and the terms of comparison that substantiate their affirmation.\"* In the case under review, the plaintiff indicated, as the factual basis of the alleged discrimination, that her dismissal occurred due to her health condition, having communicated it to her superior, a few days before the dismissal. It is convenient to remember that, regarding burdens of proof, when discriminatory dismissals are alleged, the current Article 478 of the Labor Code provides *\"In conflicts arising from employment contracts, it corresponds... to the employer, the demonstration of the estoppel facts it invokes and of all those it has the obligation to keep duly documented or recorded... 10. The justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the measures or conduct indicated as discriminatory in all lawsuits related to discrimination. 11. Any other factual situation whose source of evidence is more easily accessible to it than to the worker.\".* Even before the validity of that norm, this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber also had referred to burdens of proof in discrimination lawsuits. In judgment No. 13205, of 3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber resolved: *\"(...) it is inescapable to bring up the importance of the distribution of the burden of proof to seek protection from the worker against employer actions that constitute discrimination. (...) prima facie, the protected person who alleges labor discrimination must develop a sufficiently concrete and precise pleading activity, around the indicia that such a violation of the right to equality has existed. This condition has been widely reiterated by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see judgment number 2004-11984 of 10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004 and 2004-11437 of 9:53 a.m. on October 15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result has been reached, in its case, by the plaintiff, the burden falls on the respondent party to prove the existence of sufficient, real, and serious causes, to qualify the questioned employer decision or practice as reasonable and unrelated to any discriminatory purpose, the only way to destroy the harmful appearance created by the indicia.\"*). That is, in every protest for discrimination, the plaintiff corresponds to prove, even through circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria), the facts on which they base their claim; and the terms of comparison on which they substantiate their affirmation (Article 409 of the Labor Code); while the employer will correspond to demonstrate the justification of the objectivity, rationality, and proportionality of the conduct indicated as discriminatory, providing the evidence it has in relation to what is discussed, in order to allow, in that way, to arrive at the true truth (verdad real) and the just resolution of the specific case, by those who administer justice (Article 478 subsection 10, ibid.). From the copy of the medical file of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) provided (see image 814 and following, of the Trial Court's virtual case file), the discharge summary (epicrisis) issued by that institution (see image 462 ibid.), as well as the certificate issued by the Medical Service (Servicio Médico) of the defendant (image 464), it is clearly evident that the plaintiff is a person who has faced psychological ailments related to anxious-depressive problems, at least since 2012. In the Forensic Psychological Expert Opinion (Dictamen Pericial Psicológico Forense), No. PPF-2018-0002223 (visible as image 106 of the virtual case file), an account is made of the medical care received in the Health service, which reflects the psychological ailments for which she was being treated at least since 2011. It is indicated thus, in that opinion: **\"Copy of Discharge Summary PFC-8006-18, Coronado Health Area (Área de Salud de Coronado), Head of External Consultation (Jefatura de Consulta Externa):** issued on April 2, 2018.\n\nAttendances are documented starting from 26/01/1996 and the last one documented on 26/10/2017. In General Medicine, there are several attendances, among them: pregnancy, left knee injury (disability from August 12 to 25, 2004), overweight, pregnancy and uterine fibroma (fifteen-day disability starting 9/11/2010); threatened abortion due to myomatosis (fifteen-day disability starting 24/11/2010); threatened premature labor (fifteen-day disability starting 31/01/2011); pregnancy, dysthymia (fifteen-day disability starting 15/02/2011); recurrent depression (eight-day disability starting 22/07/2013, treatment with Clonazepam, Fluoxetine); acne and depressive disorder (on 21/10/2013, treatment with Fluoxetine, Quitacel); colitis (23/09/2014); anxiety crisis (one-day disability, 20/10/2014); anxiety disorder, HTA (one-day disability, 21/10/2014); depressive disorder (three-day disability starting 22/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); work-related stress (three-day disability starting 27/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline); workplace conflict (3-day disability starting 28/10/2014, treatment with Amitriptyline, Benadryl). Attention by the Psychiatry specialty, an attendance in Psychiatry at the Solón Núñez Clinic is documented on 3/09/2001, for anxious depressive reaction, twelve-day disability, treatment with Fluoxetine and Atarax. Appointment for attention on 12/04/2011, reported absent. Attention by the Psychology specialty starting 11/03/2013 “survivor of domestic violence, anxious depressive disorder, survivor of sexual abuse”. Appointment 13/11/2013 “in follow-up for situations of family dynamics and work relationships. Appointment on 12/03/2014 noted absent. Attention in Social Work, noted absent at appointments on 26/03/2013 and 18/04/2013. Appointment of 18/06/2013 case follow-up. Appointment of 6/01/2014 absent. Attention for IVM Pension Protocols on 14/18/2017 and 26/10/2017.”\n\nThat condition was known to her management. This is recorded in the response sent by the plaintiff, regarding a call of attention imposed on her, on July 21, 2016. In that memorandum, she stated: “At this moment I feel fragile, as you know I must be in psychological and psychiatric treatment, I have missed CCSS appointments so as not to take leave (…)” (see image 311). Likewise, in the appeal filed before this Chamber, it is reaffirmed that this illness was not a novel fact, but rather that the defendant and its management had known about it since 2011, “because this type of mental illness can hardly be disguised”. That is to say, the plaintiff was a person with a health problem, which is an assumption that places workers at a disadvantage before the employer, compared to those who do not have that condition, and which could well be a trigger for their dismissal under the exercise of the free dismissal power that, as a rule of principle, every employer governed by private law has. It is precisely the recognition that this is a natural circumstance that people may face, and which cannot affect their right to work, for which reason the legislator established the impossibility of dismissing workers for health reasons, except in the event that they have committed a serious fault that legitimizes the employer to terminate the employment contract. It is for this reason that, to proceed with the dismissal of persons with health problems, as is the case under study, the employer must demonstrate the objectivity and rationality of the decision taken, in order to rule out a discriminatory motive. The defendant alleges that the worker's health problem was not new, that it is not linked to the last communication the worker made to her management and that therefore there is no cause-effect relationship between the last information the plaintiff claims to have given to the official [Name 006] and the decision to dismiss with employer liability. The appellant is right in that the knowledge of the worker's difficult health condition was not unknown to it for a long time before, but that does not free it from the result imposed by the Court, because if it gave no objective and rational justification for making the dismissal decision, relying on the conventional norm that authorizes dismissals with employer liability, this is insufficient to consider it proven that the dismissal was not for reasons of the plaintiff's health condition. Given the proof through documentary evidence and the appellant's acknowledgment that the worker's illness was long-standing, in accordance with the provisions of article 404 of the Labor Code, the power to proceed with her dismissal was limited. This limitation serves to protect fundamental rights, as it prevents the worker from being deprived of the normal source of income they have (which is work), when faced with health problems; so that, under that factual assumption (health problems of the worker), the employer sees the power provided for in article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code limited, since another normative source of equal rank—article 404 of the same normative body—and of later enactment, came to limit, temporarily (while the worker is suffering from health problems that affect her performance and does not commit faults that authorize her disciplinary dismissal), that power provided for in article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) and in 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code. This Chamber does not ignore that disabilities—especially when the condition is psychological or psychiatric—place the sick person in a vulnerable condition and exposed to dismissal, given the decrease in their capacity to fully fulfill the contracted service. The law reacts to this type of situation with provisions such as that of article 404 of the Labor Code, because work is a fundamental right of all persons; and it is, ordinarily, the main source of income with which people meet their subsistence needs and those of their family. Illness is a natural condition to which people are exposed, just as occurs with pregnancy in women; furthermore, it presents itself unexpectedly and involuntarily, and in the face of it, people can only resort to medical help. For this reason, in a supportive and civilized society, the proper response is consideration of that situation, in which people do not cease to need work just because of illness. On the contrary, illness is a fact that adds to the expenses of a person and those of their family. Failing to protect that situation seriously endangers the life of the worker, not only by marginalizing them from access to social security, as a contributing person, but also by preventing them from being able to cover the expenses necessary for their recovery. It is for this reason that the Chamber, in response to the grounds of the appeal, has proceeded, just as the trial judge did, to contrast the allegations of the parties with the evidence provided. Given the claim of discrimination, once the plaintiff's condition was proven, that it was known to the defendant—being long-standing—and that it was not a disciplinary dismissal, the defense theory, to the effect that the dismissal was not due to the worker's health condition but rather was carried out in exercise of the power provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), is not sufficient to admit that it was an objective and reasonable dismissal, as required by article 478 subsection 10 of the Labor Code. The discriminatory motive alleged by the plaintiff, attributable to her delicate health condition which had been afflicting her for several years, was proven in the record. The power conferred by that conventional normative framework cannot be exercised to achieve an illegitimate and prohibited purpose under the legal system, such as discrimination, which is prohibited not only by the aforementioned article 404, but also by the Civil Code, whose provisions apply supplementarily in this matter, as permitted by article 15 of the Labor Code. Article 19 of that other Code provides: “Acts contrary to mandatory and prohibitory norms are null and void (…)” The next article reaffirms: “Acts carried out under the cover of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.” That is to say, being in the presence of an action with overtones of discrimination, the defendant could not limit itself to justifying its action in the exercise of a power authorized by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención), if said power entails the possible exercise of a prohibited activity. In its defense, the respondent limited itself to pointing out the exercise of that power, a position which, as indicated, is insufficient for the purposes of granting the appeal. The appellant, in order to justify its decision to ignore the provisions of article 404 of the Labor Code, alleges that the person who adopted the dismissal decision was not the immediate supervisor of the plaintiff and was unaware of the employee's health conditions. This argument is also not acceptable. Regardless of who the competent person was to apply the dismissal in the terms it occurred, what is relevant in this case is that the employer representation did know of the plaintiff's condition and therefore, the employer could not (while the plaintiff's health condition remains unresolved and she does not commit any fault authorizing dismissal without employer liability) exercise that power. This is supported by the statements made in the appeal, to the effect that her evaluations were \"effective\" and \"acceptable\"; that the plaintiff had no negative or deficient qualification. Given this verification, the nonexistence of objective reasons that would legitimize dispensing with her services is reaffirmed. If she was a worker with acceptable performance, what other reason—if not her illness—was really the motive for dispensing with her services? Additionally, the forensic psychological expert report, whose improper assessment the appellant protests, confirms the severe psychopathology of the plaintiff, compatible with depression and anxiety, which make her interpersonal adjustment difficult, as well as the treatment received by the plaintiff, both at the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) and in the defendant's medical service, such that the appellant's thesis—that the claim is generated by the plaintiff's own psychiatric problems—a distortion of reality—is not admissible. Finally, an express clarification must be made that in this venue, the decision of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has no bearing, because the constitutionality of the conventional norm is not being discussed, given it was verified that this norm was actually used to order a discriminatory dismissal. For these reasons, the decision of the judge A quo, in determining that the plaintiff's dismissal was discriminatory, merits no reproach.\n\nVI.- BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS): the judgment ordered the defendant to pay “all back pay (salarios caídos) and/or lost earnings from the date of the discriminatory dismissal, until her effective reinstatement. By virtue of the fact that Mrs. [Name 001] was dismissed by a discriminatory act, on the grounds of her health condition, the defendant is ordered to pay compensation equivalent to twenty-four months of salary, in accordance with article 566 of the Labor Code. The payment of seven and a half million for moral damages (daño moral) is ordered, which shall accrue interest and be subject to adjustment for inflation (indexación) upon this judgment becoming final and effective payment, the calculation of which shall be performed in judgment execution proceedings. (…)” The appellant protests this decision because it considers there is a double imposition and because the limit of the norm is twenty-four salaries. The Chamber finds no contradiction or disposition that violates article 566 of the Labor Code. According to the terms of that article (566), which the appealed resolution cites to order the plaintiff's reinstatement and the payment of back pay (salarios caídos), what it does is set a cap on the obligation to pay back pay (salarios caídos), for the assumption that the reinstatement to the position occurs after two years from the dismissal. In such cases, the amount for back pay (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months. Therefore, it is not a double order, but rather the express indication that the back pay (salarios caídos) ordered is limited, in accordance with the indicated provision, to twenty-four salaries. With this clarification, and on the understanding that from the resulting amount the defendant may deduct the sums it paid to the plaintiff for severance notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía)—detail of the liquidation visible at images 338 to 340 of the Court's virtual file—the decision must be upheld, given that the plaintiff's dismissal was ordered on January 2, 2017. It must be taken into consideration that the 24-month limitation applies to back pay (salarios caídos) up until the judgment becomes final, because the legislator also established the obligation to continue paying back pay (salarios caídos), after the judgment becomes final and as long as the reinstatement order is not fulfilled (doctrine of article 576 of the Labor Code).\n\nVII.- MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL): For the granting of this claim, in the labor field, it must be demonstrated through reliable evidence that justifies granting this item. In the case at hand, the plaintiff attempts to justify the reparation sought, based on the fact that the dismissal has caused her damages and losses as well as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) to her physical, psychological, and emotional health, consisting of the suffering she experienced (anxiety, sadness, pain, as it has been difficult for her to find new employment, she has no money or social insurance). The granting of that claim \"in re ipsa\" is not possible, because it cannot be presumed that the mere fact of dismissal derives, as a \"logical consequence,\" suffering; rather, it must be demonstrated. In the first place, the origin of the possibility of reparation for a dismissal must be clarified. The national author Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra who referred to the Code of Manu, shows how already in Ancient India the possibility of satisfaction for an injured interest was regulated. In said Code, its article 288, of the Eighth Book, established \"...he who damages another's property, knowingly or by carelessness (dolo or culpa), must give him satisfaction.\" That premise is the same contained in article 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code, which prescribes an obligation to \"repair,\" that is, to \"satisfy.\" In other words, reparation is a patrimonial restoration in the person or in their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that patrimonial reparation restores the value, even if its composition is different. As for moral damages (daño moral), the function of reparation undergoes variations. In Roman Law it was called \"pretium doloris,\" in Germanic law \"Schmerzgelt,\" that is, \"to pay a price for the pain,\" and therefore it does not directly tend toward the integral restitution of the damage caused, because when dealing with damage that affects values of a non-patrimonial nature, the situation is different. Despite the foregoing, compensation for moral damages (daño moral) does not seek a generic satisfaction function but rather a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation suffered (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in \"Derecho Privado,\" p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, because of this non-patrimonial nature, \"tensions\" arise in translating it into a specific sum, as there is a fine line between proper reparation and what is called a \"judicial lottery.\" Likewise, that Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL) MUST BE PROVEN. To support her position, which is shared by the majority of the Chamber, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), in which it is stated that a judicial separation due to marital infidelity does not originate \"per se\" an indemnity for moral damages (daño moral), just as the breach of a promise to marry does not generate one either. (See \"Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil,\" \"El Daño,\" Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León establishes that, in a strict conception of moral damages (daño moral), it is not possible to presume it as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that moral damages (daño moral) MUST BE THE SUBJECT OF SOME TYPE OF EVIDENCE, otherwise the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of \"punitive damages\" (DIEZ PICAZO y PONCE DE LEÓN, Luis, \"DERECHO DE DAÑOS,\" p. 329), which—it is added—overflows the notions of damage as reparation provided for in article 41 of our Political Constitution. Thus, with a substantive approach, the moral damages (daño moral) claimed by the plaintiff must be denied, since she did not offer evidence to substantiate her affirmations regarding that damage. But there are also procedural reasons to deny moral damages (daño moral) in this case. The reparation of moral damages (daño moral) for an unjustified dismissal causes, in and of itself, suffering according to the plaintiff, that is, it is through a human presumption that this suffering can be derived, and thus the reparation. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof within the new civil procedural legislation (article 41.2). However, they did enjoy specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural norm, specifically in article 417. That article established that this type of presumptions only constitute evidence if they are the DIRECT, PRECISE, AND LOGICALLY DEDUCED consequence of a proven fact. Likewise, it emphasized that the proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the other evidence produced in the proceeding. Even if that repealed norm were applied to the present case, it must be concluded that there is no evidence allowing a \"logical inference\" of the dismissal with the claims for moral damages (daño moral) outlined by the plaintiff in her complaint, given that she did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which she seeks reparation, and therefore it is not possible to infer the existence of the moral damages (daño moral) claimed.\n\nVIII.- COSTS: The order for costs is a consequence provided by law for the losing party. It is true that article 563 subsection 1 of the Labor Code authorizes exemption from this item when that party has litigated with evident good faith. However, the position of the defendant party at trial cannot be described as such. As mentioned, the justification it provided for its employer decision, under the shelter of article 160 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención), has been ruled out, while on the contrary, it has been proven that it actually incurred in a dismissal prohibited by the legal system (article 404 of the L.C.) and, in order to free itself from the economic consequences that could result according to current legislation, it entered into contradictions in its defense theory, accepting on the one hand that the plaintiff's illness was long-standing and, on the other hand, denying that the plaintiff's immediate supervisor knew of it. As for the amount of one million colones—set for legal fees (costas personales)—it is considered that it must be upheld, as it is deemed in accordance with the parameters established in article 562 of the Labor Code, that is, the work performed, the amount in controversy, and the economic position of the parties.\n\nIX.- CONCLUSION: Based on the foregoing, the appeal filed must be granted only to annul the judgment insofar as it ordered the payment of moral damages (daño moral). In all other respects, with the clarification made in Considerando VI, that the amount for back pay (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct the sums already paid to the plaintiff for severance notice (preaviso) and “statutory benefits (prestaciones legales),” the appeal must be denied.\n\nX.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE AGUIRRE GÓMEZ AND JUDGE VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned dissent from the majority vote, insofar as it granted the appeal and denied the plaintiff compensation for moral damages (daño moral). It must be considered that the appellant does not explain in what sense the failure to indicate whether it was objective or subjective damage constitutes a reason to order the annulment of the judgment and deny that claim. The basis for that order was that the moral damages (daño moral) must be compensated because of an abusive exercise of a power of dismissal with employer liability, causing damage distinct from the normal and natural damages of a justified dismissal, which is not the case under study. The defendant's representative argues that the exercise of a conventional power cannot generate moral damages (daño moral); however, it is clear—as was said—that in this case we are not facing an ordinary dismissal, but rather the exercise of a power with the clear intention of circumventing a fundamental right. The undersigned endorse the Court's argument in considering the claim for moral damages (daño moral) to be appropriate, because we find ourselves before the abusive exercise of the collective bargaining mechanism to achieve a purpose prohibited by the legal system, with evident moral damages (daño moral) to a person who, due to her demonstrated psychological conditions, it is reasonable and logical to infer—as a fact derived from human experience—that the dismissal caused her greater harm. The issue is determining the quantum of that compensation. The Court ordered the recognition for moral damages (daño moral) in the sum of seven million five hundred thousand colones.\n\nApplying a logical criterion (article 481 of the Labor Code), taking into consideration the nature of the plaintiff's ailments, the salary she earned, the obligations she had at that time as a single mother head of household, and the consequent implications for her life, we consider the amount ordered by the Trial Court to be adequate and reasonable.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe appeal filed is partially granted. The judgment is annulled insofar as it ordered payment for moral damages (daño moral), a claim which is denied. In all other respects, the appeal is denied, with the clarification made in Considerando VI, that the amount for back pay (salarios caídos) is limited to a period of twenty-four months; and that, from the resulting amount, the defendant may deduct what has already been paid to the plaintiff for notice of termination (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). Magistrate Varela Araya and Magistrate Aguirre Gómez dissent from the majority vote insofar as it denies the payment of moral damages, a claim on which they would deny the appeal.\n\n\n\n**Orlando Aguirre Gómez**\n\n\n\n**Julia Varela Araya                             Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez**\n\n\n\n**Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez                     Roxana Chacón Artavia**\n**RPC**\n\n1 \nEXP: 17-001718-0166-LA\n\n Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Fax: 2295-3009. Emails: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. and jmolinab@poder-judicial.go.cr"
}