{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0005-1262878", "citation": "Res. 03075-2024 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Mantenimiento de recargo salarial a docente reubicada por razones de salud", "title_en": "Retention of salary surcharge for teacher reassigned due to health reasons", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resuelve un recurso de apelación interpuesto por el Estado contra la sentencia que condenó al pago de diferencias salariales por el recargo de Recuperación Integral de Niños (PRIN) a una docente reubicada en funciones administrativas por razones de salud. La mayoría de la Sala confirma la decisión de primera instancia, sosteniendo que, conforme al Reglamento de Licencias Especiales del MEP (Decreto Ejecutivo 19113) y al artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, la reubicación por motivos de salud equivale a una licencia especial y, por tanto, la persona servidora tiene derecho a un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario, incluyendo los sobresueldos que percibía al momento de la reubicación. Se rechaza así el argumento estatal de que los recargos son temporales y no constituyen un derecho adquirido, ya que se trata de una situación excepcional de protección a la salud. Se confirman también las diferencias en aguinaldo y salario escolar, así como la condena en costas. Un voto salvado de dos magistrados argumenta que la reubicación no es una incapacidad y que los recargos no pueden mantenerse indefinidamente, por lo que debió revocarse el fallo.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ruled on an appeal by the State against a judgment that ordered the payment of salary differences for the 'Recargo de Recuperación Integral de Niños' (PRIN) to a teacher reassigned to administrative duties for health reasons. The majority upheld the lower court's decision, holding that under the MEP Special Licenses Regulation (Executive Decree 19113) and Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, reassignment for health reasons is equivalent to a special license, thus entitling the employee to a subsidy equal to her full salary, including surcharges she was receiving at the time of reassignment. This rejects the State's argument that surcharges are temporary and not an acquired right, given the exceptional health-protection context. Differences in Christmas bonus and school salary, as well as costs, were also confirmed. Two dissenting judges argued that reassignment is not a disability and surcharges cannot be maintained indefinitely, so the judgment should have been overturned.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "15/11/2024", "year": "2024", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "recargo", "sobresueldo", "reubicación por salud", "licencia especial", "subsidio equivalente al salario total", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil art. 174", "Decreto Ejecutivo 19113", "principio de legalidad" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "recargo salarial", "docente reubicada", "licencia especial", "subsidio equivalente", "derecho a la salud", "sobresueldo", "Principio de legalidad", "PRIN", "Sala Segunda", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Reglamento de Licencias Especiales MEP", "voto salvado", "costas laborales" ], "keywords_en": [ "salary surcharge", "reassigned teacher", "special license", "equivalent subsidy", "right to health", "supplementary salary", "principle of legality", "PRIN surcharge", "Second Chamber", "Civil Service Statute", "MEP Special Licenses Regulation", "dissenting vote", "labor costs" ], "excerpt_es": "En el caso, el recargo no fue laborado dada la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a la docencia, por razones de salud. Es decir, el pago del sobresueldo no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones del recargo, sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación. La normativa contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”. De ahí que no pueda concluirse, como se pretende, que se desvirtuó la naturaleza del recargo, puesto que las normas aplicadas al caso son las vigentes, que establecen esa consecuencia jurídica.", "excerpt_en": "In this case, the surcharge was not worked due to the need to reassign the employee to non-teaching duties for health reasons. In other words, the payment of the surcharge does not originate from the performance of the surcharge duties, but rather in consideration of the rule that provides for the transfer with recognition of the equivalent of the total salary the employee was earning at the time of reassignment. The regulations provide the right to continue receiving, in such circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary.” Thus, it cannot be concluded, as intended, that the nature of the surcharge was distorted, since the rules applied to the case are those in force, which establish this legal consequence.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The State's appeal was dismissed, confirming the lower court's judgment that ordered payment of salary differences for the PRIN surcharge to the teacher reassigned for health reasons, as well as differences in Christmas bonus and school salary, with costs to be borne by the State.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso del Estado y se confirma la sentencia de primera instancia que condenó al pago de diferencias salariales por el recargo PRIN a la docente reubicada por razones de salud, así como diferencias en aguinaldo y salario escolar, con costas a cargo del Estado." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Decreto Ejecutivo 19113, artículo 17", "quote_en": "The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.", "quote_es": "Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia." }, { "context": "Considerando III.b", "quote_en": "In this case, the surcharge was not worked due to the need to reassign the employee to non-teaching duties for health reasons. In other words, the payment of the surcharge does not originate from the performance of the surcharge duties, but rather in consideration of the rule that provides for the transfer with recognition of the equivalent of the total salary the employee was earning at the time of reassignment.", "quote_es": "En el caso, el recargo no fue laborado dada la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a la docencia, por razones de salud. Es decir, el pago del sobresueldo no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones del recargo, sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación." }, { "context": "Voto salvado, citando jurisprudencia constitucional", "quote_en": "It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the performance of a worker that may be classified as a function surcharge does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned and does not oblige the Administration to keep them in that condition.", "quote_es": "Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-13231", "citation": "Ley 6227", "title_en": "General Law of Public Administration", "title_es": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1978", "year": "1978" }, { "id": "norm-31486", "citation": "Ley 181", "title_en": "Education Code", "title_es": "Código de Educación", "doc_type": "law", "date": "28/01/2025", "year": "2025" }, { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-3672", "citation": "Ley 2166", "title_en": "Public Administration Salary Law", "title_es": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/10/1957", "year": "1957" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-13231", "citation": "Ley 6227", "title_en": "General Law of Public Administration", "title_es": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1978", "year": "1978" }, { "id": "norm-31486", "citation": "Ley 181", "title_en": "Education Code", "title_es": "Código de Educación", "doc_type": "law", "date": "28/01/2025", "year": "2025" }, { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-3672", "citation": "Ley 2166", "title_en": "Public Administration Salary Law", "title_es": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/10/1957", "year": "1957" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0005-1262878", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-31486", "norm_num": "181", "norm_name": "Código de Educación", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "28/01/2025" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32708", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953" }, { "doc_id": "norm-3672", "norm_num": "2166", "norm_name": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/10/1957" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8975", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "16/01/1955" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\n \n\nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\nSALA SEGUNDA\n\n \n\nExp: 22-000477-0173-LA \n\nRes: 2024003075\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas veinte minutos del quince de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro .\n\nProceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre 001], divorciada, docente y vecina de San José; contra el ESTADO, representado por su procurador adjunto, el licenciado Luis Fernando Cartín Gulubay, soltero, abogado y vecino de Montes de Oca. Figuran, como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora, la licenciada Hazel Virginia Montoya Jenkins, abogada, divorciada y vecina de San José y el licenciado Luis Fernando Sánchez Villalobos, abogado, casado y vecino de Alajuela. Todos mayores.\n\nRedacta el Magistrado Sánchez Rodríguez; y, \n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\n I.- ANTECEDENTES: Por medio de su apoderado especial judicial, la actora formuló la demanda para que se condene al Estado a restituir el pago del recargo denominado Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN y se le ordene seguir cancelándoselo mientras mantenga su condición de reubicada. Reclamó el pago de diferencias salariales correspondientes al recargo y demás incentivos, a partir de la fecha en que dejó de reconocérsele -1º de febrero del 2020- y hasta la sentencia, siempre que se mantenga reubicada. Solicitó las diferencias derivadas en aguinaldo, salario escolar e incentivo de desarrollo docente. Asimismo, pidió que se condene al accionado a pagar las diferencias correspondientes a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y a la Caja de Ande. De forma accesoria pidió intereses e indexación. El procurador representante del Estado contestó en términos negativos y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. El Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Segunda, mediante sentencia número 460, de las 16:00 horas del 6 de marzo de 2024, condenó al vencido a pagar las diferencias salariales por concepto del recargo dicho, a partir del 1º de febrero de 2020 y mientras la demandante se mantenga reubicada, así como las ocasionadas en aguinaldo, salario escolar y el incentivo de desarrollo docente. Estableció que se deberá rebajar lo correspondiente por las cargas sociales e impositivas y que el Estado deberá realizar los aportes que procedan en su condición de empleador, concretamente respecto de las obligaciones que derivan de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, el seguro de enfermedad, las correspondientes al régimen especial del Magisterio Nacional, la Caja de Ande y cualesquiera otras dispuestas por ley. Concedió intereses legales a partir de la fecha en que cada tracto se hizo exigible y hasta la del efectivo pago, conforme a la tasa prevista en el canon 565 del Código de Trabajo. La indexación la concedió en los términos de dicha norma. Le impuso al demandado el pago de ambas costas y las personales las fijó en el quince por ciento de la condena. \n\n II.- AGRAVIOS: El procurador representante del Estado objeta lo decidido. En primer lugar, indica que la sentencia carece de fundamentación y reprocha la forma como se valoraron las pruebas. Al respecto, sostiene que el fallo no expone un análisis propio del caso concreto, conforme lo exige el numeral 560 del Código de Trabajo, lo que evidencia la falta de fundamentación y conduce a declarar la nulidad del pronunciamiento, lo que pide. Plantea que las pruebas fueron incorrectamente ponderadas, pues ha quedado debidamente acreditado que el recargo de Recuperación Integral de Niños fue otorgado únicamente para el curso lectivo del año 2019, concretamente del 1º de febrero al 30 de noviembre de ese año, según consta en la correspondiente acción de personal. En consecuencia, el recargo finalizó desde el 30 de noviembre y, al verificarse su vencimiento, no existe fundamento jurídico que justifique su asignación a quien no lo ejerce. Advierte que la actora fue reubicada a partir del 1º de noviembre del 2019, al amparo del canon 254 del Código de Trabajo, fecha a partir de la cual cumplió funciones administrativas y no de docencia. De ahí que no es cierto que se haya suprimido el pago del recargo de manera arbitraria, pues este fue otorgado por un período concreto y para la realización de funciones docentes. La jueza no analizó el carácter temporal del sobresueldo, que venció el 30 de noviembre del 2019, razón por la cual no mediaba justificación para continuar pagándolo. Insiste en que el recargo era temporal, lo que no fue ponderado por el Juzgado. A su juicio, no medió trasgresión alguna al derecho a la salud de la demandante y tampoco a su salario. Expone que los recargos no pueden ser otorgados de manera indefinida, sino que para su otorgamiento deben constatarse los presupuestos legales necesarios y deben ponderarse la realidad de los centros educativos y el presupuesto, cuestiones que son futuras e inciertas, las cuales deben valorarse en cada curso lectivo. De seguido, señala que se interpretaron y aplicaron incorrectamente el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo y el 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, así como el Reglamento de Licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública. Indica que el análisis parte de una falsa premisa, pues se aplicó el artículo 174 citado al considerar que se está ante un caso de incapacidad por enfermedad o licencia especial, cuando la actora está reubicada por razones de salud, lo que implica un cambio de condiciones laborales, al variar las funciones de docencia a administrativas, lo que está regulado en el canon 254 del Código de Trabajo. De ahí que no proceda otorgar un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad del salario que se venía devengando; pues, como se dijo, no se está en un supuesto de incapacidad o licencia especial, porque lo otorgado fue una reubicación, a solicitud de la accionante, sin que se haya procedido al tenor del Decreto Ejecutivo n.º 19113, del 28 de julio de 1989, sino que se procedió al amparo del numeral 254 del Código de Trabajo, norma que habilita la reubicación de la persona servidora, pero no obliga a mantener el salario anterior a la medida adoptada. Incluso autoriza el cese, cuando el cambio de funciones no sea viable. Reitera que no resultan aplicables las normas relativas a incapacidades o licencias, pues ello conlleva una aplicación extensiva de la ley, contraria a derecho y en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública, al grado de que se equipara el pago del recargo a un derecho adquirido, en contra de la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre el particular. Según afirma, la incapacidad es causal de suspensión de la relación de empleo, que exime a la persona servidora de la obligación de prestar el servicio y a la empleadora de pagar el salario, pues lo reconocido es un subsidio. En el caso, la persona servidora no dejó de laborar, no hubo suspensión del vínculo, y solo medió un cambio de funciones, con ocasión de su estado de salud. Refiere que, de considerarse la existencia de una licencia especial y no una reubicación por salud debe aplicarse el artículo 166 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, conforme se analizó en el dictamen C-250-2004. Hace ver que su representado ha pagado a la actora el salario completo, según el puesto ocupado en propiedad, durante todo el período en que ha estado reubicada. Vuelve sobre la idea de que los recargos tienen un período de vigencia y que se acuerdan según las necesidades del centro educativo y de conformidad con el contenido presupuestario. En el caso, señala que no se suprimió el recargo, sino que este expiró, se respetó el plazo y no existe motivo alguno para mantener el pago, especialmente cuando no existe claridad de si se requiere en los subsiguientes cursos lectivos, lo que fue ignorado por el Juzgado. Acota que el sobresueldo no forma parte del salario del puesto, sino que se asignan cada año, según las necesidades del centro educativo respecto de cada curso lectivo. Insiste en que no se suprimió el pago, sino que el recargo expiró y que, de conformidad con la jurisprudencia constitucional, no constituyen un derecho fundamental ni adquirido, dado su carácter temporal. Aduce que el recargo de funciones responde a los requerimientos del servicio, tiene carácter temporal y se paga por labores específicas que deben ejercerse para que proceda el pago. Enfatiza el carácter temporal y excepcional de los sobresueldos, circunstancia que es conocida por el personal. A su juicio, la pretensión de diferencias salariales no tiene respaldo jurídico y no procede ordenar el pago de una prestación que no se ha brindado. En apoyo de su tesis, invoca los principios de legalidad, racionalidad, razonabilidad y legalidad presupuestaria, al tiempo en que insiste sobre la improcedencia de cancelar el sobresueldo por unas funciones que no se cumplen, lo que atenta contra su propia naturaleza, finalidad y el interés público. Apunta que el recargo tiene como fin la satisfacción de una necesidad institucional y de dicho interés, y por su medio se retribuye una labor extraordinaria. Considera que la decisión implica dar una finalidad diferente, no prevista por la norma. Reitera que no se puede alegar la existencia de un derecho adquirido, pues el recargo no se concede por la mera existencia del vínculo entre las partes, sino ante ciertas condiciones normativas. La decisión conlleva el deterioro del servicio y el empobrecimiento del erario, porque no se impartirán las lecciones o se tendrá que asignar un nuevo recargo, con lo que se incurre en un pago doble. Indica que varios órganos jurisdiccionales se han decantado por la tesis de la parte que representa y han desestimado pretensiones de igual naturaleza. Recrimina que esta Sala haya concluido que su posición no se contrapone al de la Sala Constitucional, lo que afirma, es inexacto. Transcribe parcialmente la sentencia constitucional número 2019-7081; la cual, a su juicio, ampara su posición y constata que el recargo no constituye un derecho adquirido. Apunta que la tesis sostenida no es una ocurrencia, sino que tiene asidero en la jurisprudencia constitucional. En el caso, no hay prueba de que la servidora haya sido contratada con el goce del recargo que reclama, no se trata de un derecho adquirido. Asegura que el Estado ha procedido conforme a derecho, al amparo de los principios de legalidad y legalidad presupuestaria, sin que haya mediado desmejora alguna del salario. El sobresueldo cesó con motivo del vencimiento, pues se trataba de una obligación sujeta a plazo, concretamente al ciclo lectivo del 2019, con vencimiento al 30 de noviembre de ese año. Luego, la actora no está ejerciendo labores docentes y el sobresueldo no forma parte de su salario ordinario. Reitera sus argumentaciones en cuanto a la temporalidad y consecuente vencimiento de los recargos. Asegura que no media infracción alguna al derecho a la salud y requiere que se valore el criterio más reciente del Tribunal Constitucional. Hace ver que el criterio de esta Sala ha ido variando, para lo cual trae a colación los votos 2021-173 y 2023-2295, de los cuales se sigue la improcedencia de mantener el pago del recargo a una persona reubicada, la improcedencia de equiparar la reubicación con la incapacidad y la temporalidad del sobresueldo. En otro orden de ideas, objeta la condena a pagar diferencias en el aguinaldo, bajo el argumento de que este le fue cancelado debidamente. En relación con las diferencias en el salario escolar, arguye que no se trata de un monto adicional reconocido sin sustento legal, sino de una retención que procede conceder en el mes de enero. Añade que no cabe el reconocimiento de un recargo que no se está cumpliendo, por lo que igual suerte debe correr cualquier derecho accesorio. Acusa una aplicación incorrecta del canon 565 del Código de Trabajo, en cuanto se condenó al Estado a pagar intereses e indexación. Dice que deben correr la suerte del principal y que procederían conforme se fueron generando las obligaciones. En caso de que se mantenga la decisión, pide que su otorgamiento se ajuste a los supuestos de esa norma, en cuanto a porcentaje y temporalidad. Finalmente, ataca lo resuelto en cuanto se impuso al Estado la obligación de pagar ambas costas. Al respecto, aduce que su representado ha procedido de buena fe, en cumplimiento de las normas aplicables al caso. Solicita la revocatoria de la sentencia recurrida.\n\n III.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO: a) Falta de fundamentación: La Sala observa que la jueza de primera instancia expuso las razones propias por las cuales concluyó sobre la procedencia del reclamo. Si bien citó antecedentes de esta Sala sobre el mismo tema, también dio los razonamientos sobre los cuales sustentó su decisión. De ahí que no se perciba el vicio de falta de fundamentación que se acusa. b) Diferencias salariales: En el caso bajo estudio, hay prueba de que la actora inicialmente fue reubicada del 1º al 30 de noviembre del 2019. Esa condición se prorrogó, de manera inmediata, del 1º de diciembre del 2019 al 31 de enero del 2020; del 1º de febrero del 2020 al 31 de enero del 2021; del 1º de febrero del 2021 al 31 de enero del 2022 y del 1º de febrero del 2022 al 31 de enero del 2023. A pesar de la reubicación, se mantuvo el pago del recargo de Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN al 30 de noviembre del 2019. Tal recargo había venido siendo ejercido por la actora desde el 2017, y había sido aprobado para el ciclo lectivo 2019, del 1º de marzo al 30 de noviembre de ese año. La prórroga de reubicación de la demandante, con sustento en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo, fue dispuesta de manera inmediata a partir del 1º de diciembre de 2019, momento a partir del cual le dejaron de reconocer y pagar lo correspondiente por el recargo en cuestión. Como se advierte, el cambio de funciones se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo, que establece la obligación de la parte empleadora de reponer en su plaza a las personas que hayan sufrido un riesgo y puedan trabajar. Además, prevé el deber patronal de proporcionarle un puesto diferente de acuerdo con sus posibilidades, cuando por recomendación médica no pueda regresar a ejercer las funciones que venía desempeñando, pero sí esté en capacidad de realizar otras tareas. Los artículos 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente precisamente establecen la posibilidad de acordar ciertos recargos. Es verdad que los sobresueldos no constituyen un derecho adquirido y que debe suspenderse su pago cuando la persona servidora, en el ejercicio de sus funciones habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento o bien, deja de ejecutar las funciones por las cuales se le remunera ese plus. No obstante, el presente asunto no versa sobre una persona servidora que en el ejercicio normal de sus funciones deja de estar en los supuestos que hacen viable el recargo sino, de una persona que por razones de salud queda impedida para seguir ejecutando sus labores habituales. Debe indicarse que la Sala ha conocido y resuelto reiterados asuntos de iguales características, sin que advierta alguna circunstancia que haga posible variar el criterio sostenido. Se ha estimado que en casos de esta naturaleza resulta de aplicación el Decreto Ejecutivo número 19.113, del 28 de julio de 1989, que es el Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública, sin que pueda considerarse que este quedó sin efecto al haberse derogado el numeral 167 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no fue esta la única norma que le dio sustento. En el canon primero de esa reglamentación se prevén las normas y procedimientos que debe seguir el citado Ministerio para conceder licencia a las personas servidoras con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, derivada de un riesgo del trabajo o de una enfermedad común. En el artículo segundo se reafirma que las licencias contempladas en la reglamentación se concederán a quienes sufran una disminución en sus facultades y que por ello no puedan cumplir las funciones y atribuciones del cargo que venían desempeñando. De conformidad con lo regulado en los numerales 5 y 8, las personas servidoras a quienes la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros les declaren una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y les recomienden un cambio de funciones tienen derecho a una licencia especial. Ahora bien, el canon 9 estipula que, de previo a la concesión de la licencia, el Ministerio procederá a la reubicación de la persona servidora, lo que se ratifica en las normas siguientes, según las cuales “…esta licencia especial podrá ser suspendida, a juicio del Ministro de Educación Pública, a los efectos de asignar labores y funciones compatibles con sus condiciones personales, con las recomendaciones médicas y la formación académica del beneficiario, que con carácter temporal se requiera” y que “…el Ministerio de Educación Pública, podrá hacer uso del recurso humano que estuviere en disfrute de licencia especial para la atención de tareas y funciones de carácter administrativo, administrativo-docente o de carácter técnico, en cualquiera de sus dependencias cuando tales servicios se requieran para la buena marcha de las instituciones o para implementar programas especiales”, lo cual guarda absoluta correspondencia con el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. En el artículo 17 se estipula, de manera expresa, que “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De esa manera, se ha considerado que esta normativa complementa el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, el cual no hace diferencia alguna entre incapacidades permanentes o parciales y de ahí que tampoco se pueda realizar diferenciación para los efectos del pago entre las licencias permanentes y especiales. De ahí que no se concluya sobre la incorrecta aplicación acusada. En consecuencia, si al momento de la reubicación, la actora devengaba el sobresueldo referido, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a esa normativa especial, a que, dentro de su remuneración como funcionaria administrativa reubicada por razones de salud, se le contemple ese plus. En el sentido expuesto, en la sentencia de esta Sala número 308, de las 10:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2014, se explicó cuanto sigue: “[…] en la especie no se está frente al reclamo que hace un funcionario o funcionaria del sector administrativo del Ministerio de Educación Pública, para el reconocimiento de los pluses como parte integrante e indisoluble de su salario. La situación en estudio difiere de ese supuesto porque aquí se trata de definir la correspondencia de ese derecho a una funcionaria docente quien por razones de salud ha debido ser reubicada en un cargo administrativo. La diferencia que pretende hacer valer la representación estatal entre ΄incapacidad΄ y ΄reubicación´ desconoce que el origen de ambas es una enfermedad del funcionario o la funcionaria que le impide mantenerse en el servicio activo de la docencia. Es por esta razón que la normativa aplicable en casos como este no es únicamente la relacionada con el derecho al reconocimiento de horario alterno, sino la especialmente prevista al efecto. De primera mano, el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989), cuyo artículo 1° menciona que esta reglamentación tiene por objeto establecer las normas y los procedimientos que deberá seguir el Ministerio de Educación Pública para conceder licencia a sus servidores o servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, sobrevinientes de riesgos del trabajo o enfermedad. Por su parte, el numeral 2 establece: ´Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares´. (Lo resaltado es agregado). Luego, de conformidad con el artículo 5 tienen derecho a que se les conceda una licencia especial aquellos servidores y servidoras respecto de los cuales la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en su valoración final, declaren una incapacidad menor permanente o una incapacidad parcial o permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones. El artículo 8 trata específicamente el supuesto de la concesión de la licencia especial en los siguientes términos: ´De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 5° anterior, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, concederá una licencia especial a aquellos servidores que encuentren en las siguientes circunstancias: a) Que de acuerdo con su dolencia la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, recomiende en la valoración final del tratamiento su cambio de funciones. b) Que en la valoración final de los efectos del riesgo de trabajo acaecido, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, determine una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomiende su incorporación al servicio con cambio de funciones΄ (énfasis suplido). Seguidamente los artículos 9 y 10, por su orden, establecen: ΄De previo a la concesión de la licencia y de acuerdo con las disponibilidades de plazas y con los requisitos del interesado, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, procederá a su reubicación, traslado o ascenso, según corresponda΄. Y, ΄Cuando fuere viable, en forma inmediata, la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo anterior se concederá la licencia especial hasta tanto se pueda realizar el movimiento de personal correspondiente΄. Además, el numeral 12 señala: ΄Igualmente el Ministerio de Educación Pública, podrá hacer uso del recurso humano que estuviere en disfrute de licencia especial para la atención de tareas y funciones de carácter administrativo, administrativo-docente o de carácter técnico, en cualquiera de sus dependencias cuando tales servicios se requieran para la buena marcha de las instituciones o para implementar programas especiales΄. Finalmente, el artículo 17 dice: ΄Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia΄ (énfasis suplido). De modo que esta normativa complementa y no contradice lo dispuesto por el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que reza: ΄a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder΄. (Lo resaltado es agregado). La normativa reglamentaria desarrolla esta expresa disposición, contemplando de manera indistinta el derecho a la indemnización tanto para el caso de la licencia permanente como de la especial”. (Los destacados constan en el original. Sic.). En el caso, el recargo no fue laborado dada la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a la docencia, por razones de salud. Es decir, el pago del sobresueldo no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones del recargo, sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación. La normativa contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”. De ahí que no pueda concluirse, como se pretende, que se desvirtuó la naturaleza del recargo, puesto que las normas aplicadas al caso son las vigentes, que establecen esa consecuencia jurídica. Por lo expuesto, tampoco es cierto que se haya violentado el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, que hace referencia a la posibilidad de que el límite de cuarenta lecciones semanales se exceda cuando el servicio así lo requiera, manteniéndose el exceso como un recargo, de carácter temporal. Tal disposición no regula la situación que aquí se plantea y está prevista para el ejercicio efectivo de las funciones de docencia, no para los casos de personas servidoras a quienes se les prescribe una incapacidad o licencia. Tampoco se advierte la violación de los principios de legalidad, legalidad presupuestaria y razonabilidad invocados en el recurso, pues más bien, la normativa referida establece la consecuencia jurídica aplicada para el caso de personas servidoras reubicadas por razones de salud. Asimismo, cabe señalar que las decisiones de otros órganos jurisdiccionales sobre el particular no son vinculantes para esta Sala. Lo decidido no resulta contrapuesto al criterio del Tribunal Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos tienen naturaleza temporal y no constituyen un derecho adquirido. En esa instancia se han analizado este tipo de casos a la luz de una posible violación del derecho a la salud, mientras que, en esta sede, se determina la remuneración que la persona servidora debe devengar durante la reubicación. Se insiste, el caso en análisis no se refiere a la situación de una persona servidora activa que demande los recargos, sino que el tema se reduce a establecer la remuneración que debe percibir una persona servidora trasladada a desempeñar un cargo distinto, por no poder seguir efectuando sus labores normales ni los recargos que venía ejerciendo, debido a un padecimiento o afectación en su salud; causa de una incapacidad temporal o permanente, tema totalmente distinto al planteamiento que hace el recurrente. De ahí que no se esté desconociendo el carácter temporal de los recargos y la inexistencia de derechos adquiridos. El agravio formulado en el sentido de que debió aplicarse el artículo 166 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil no es admisible en tanto este solo se enuncia, mas no se dan las razones en que se sustenta, faltándole claridad al planteamiento. c) Diferencias de aguinaldo: En cuanto a las diferencias de aguinaldo, el reproche no puede prosperar, porque aun cuando el demandado haya cancelado lo correspondiente por tal concepto, es evidente que no incluyó en el cálculo el monto del recargo, que no estaba reconociendo. d) Diferencias en salario escolar: El alegato de la representación del Estado es que no procede otorgar diferencias en el salario escolar, por cuanto este rubro se conforma por medio de una retención del aumento salarial, que después se paga en forma diferida en el mes de enero. El tema relacionado con la naturaleza jurídica del salario escolar ha sido ampliamente debatido. En algunas ocasiones se le consideró como una retención de pago diferido, como lo apunta el recurrente, y esta Sala, mantuvo el criterio de que constituyó un componente salarial más. Sin embargo, la Sala Constitucional abordó el análisis del tema y concluyó que el salario escolar está conformado por una retención del aumento salarial, cuyo pago se difiere para otorgarlo en el mes de enero de cada año. En ese sentido, en el voto 9188, de las 9:50 horas del 21 de mayo de 2020, estableció: “Ahora bien, de lo expuesto anteriormente se desprende que el salario escolar surge a partir de los ajustes en los aumentos que por concepto de costo de vida fueron decretados en el año 1994, y que con base en el acuerdo de política salarial de ese año, fueron cancelados en forma gradual, pagándose un porcentaje de estos en forma acumulativa en el mes de enero ...Así, en resumen, el salario escolar surge como un porcentaje del aumento salarial de los trabajadores que sería pagado por los patronos en forma acumulada y diferida durante el mes de enero de cada año y que, por lo tanto, se encuentra dentro patrimonio del empleado. Lo anterior, implica que no se trata de un pago extraordinario, como es el caso del aguinaldo, sino que forma parte del salario del trabajador.” Determinado lo anterior, la Sala observa que, para los efectos de la decisión, la naturaleza advertida por el recurrente no tiene ninguna incidencia. El cálculo del salario escolar se hace tomando en cuenta los mismos componentes que se usan para determinar el monto que procede por aguinaldo. En ese tanto, significa que lo correspondiente por el recargo en cuestión debió sumarse para su cálculo. Como este no se pagó, tampoco pudo haber sido incluido al momento de calcular lo que hubiera correspondido por salario escolar. En consecuencia, el reconocimiento del sobresueldo en sede judicial genera una diferencia en los montos que la actora ha percibido por salario escolar desde febrero de 2020, en que se dejó de reconocer el plus en cuestión. e) Intereses e indexación: En otro orden de ideas, el recurrente solicita que se ajuste la condena por intereses e indexación a los parámetros que regula el canon 565 del Código de Trabajo. Sin embargo, no indica cuál sería el error de la sentencia sobre el particular y la Sala no nota que la decisión se haya adoptado al margen de dicha norma. Los intereses se otorgaron a partir de la exigibilidad de cada de derecho, como se alega en el recurso. \n\nIV.- COSTAS: El recurrente pretende que se exima a su representado del pago de ambas costas, por haber procedido con evidente buena fe. El artículo 563 del Código de Trabajo señala: “No obstante, se podrá eximir al vencido del pago de las costas personales y aun de las procesales, cuando:/ 1) Se haya litigado con evidente buena fe. /2) Las proposiciones hayan prosperado parcialmente. /3) Cuando haya habido vencimiento recíproco. /La exoneración debe ser siempre razonada. /No podrá considerarse de buena fe a la parte que negó pretensiones evidentes que el resultado del proceso indique que debió aceptarlas, no asistió a la totalidad de la audiencia, adujo testigos sobornados o testigos y documentos falsos, no ofreció ninguna probanza para justificar su demanda o excepciones, si se fundaran en hechos disputados…” No debe perderse de vista que el numeral 563 transcrito prevé una facultad y no una obligación de exonerar a la parte vencida cuando se presente alguno de esos supuestos. En casos como el presente, la Sala no ha advertido como procedente la exoneración pedida ni que se cargue a la parte actora con el costo de los gastos efectuados en defensa de su remuneración, razón por la cual no se estima posible variar lo decidido. \n\n V.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: Con sustento en las razones dadas, el recurso de la representación estatal debe desestimarse. \n\nVI.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA VARELA ARAYA Y EL MAGISTRADO ORTEGA TELLERÍA: Los suscritos nos apartamos del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago del sobresueldo correspondiente a Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN, a partir del 1º de febrero de 2020. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que, en el año 2019, la demandante devengaba ese plus y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas; razón por la cual aquel sobresueldo se le dejó de pagar a partir del 1° de diciembre de 2019. Asimismo, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. La Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y la servidora no se encuentra en los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no se encuentra incapacitada por enfermedad, que la hagan acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluimos que lo resuelto debe revocarse. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, antes citados, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno\" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…” Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por el recargo relacionado constituyen un sobresueldo temporal, anexo a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no es un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede con razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes y ocurre en el caso de estudio, los recargos no constituyen un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del sobresueldo, al pasar la parte actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho. Por lo expuesto, los suscritos concluimos que debe acogerse el recurso del Estado, anular lo fallado y declarar sin lugar la demanda. Sin especial sanción en costas.\n\nPOR TANTO: \n\nSe declara sin lugar el recurso. La magistrada Varela Araya y el magistrado Ortega Tellería salvan el voto, declaran con lugar el recurso del Estado, anulan lo fallado, acogen la excepción de falta de derecho y declaran sin lugar la demanda. Resuelven sin especial sanción en costas. \n\nRes: 2024003075\n\nGGONZALEZ \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n \n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nRafael Antonio Ortega Telleria\n\n \n\nGrace del Carmen Agüero Alvarado\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n 3R2HCLSVBH461 \n\n1 \n\nEXP: 22-000477-0173-LA\n\n \n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2295-3009. Correo Electrónico: sala-segunda@poder-judicial.go.cr", "body_en_text": "**Review of the Document**\n\n**Supreme Court of Justice**\n\n**SECOND CHAMBER**\n\n**Case File: 22-000477-0173-LA**\n**Resolution: 2024003075**\n\n**SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of November of two thousand twenty-four.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José by [Name 001], divorced, teacher, and resident of San José, against the STATE, represented by its deputy procurator, attorney Luis Fernando Cartín Gulubay, unmarried, lawyer, and resident of Montes de Oca. Appearing as special judicial attorneys for the plaintiff are attorney Hazel Virginia Montoya Jenkins, lawyer, divorced, and resident of San José, and attorney Luis Fernando Sánchez Villalobos, lawyer, married, and resident of Alajuela. All of legal age.\n\nDrafted by Judge Sánchez Rodríguez; and,\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND:** Through her special judicial attorney, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit to order the State to reinstate the payment of the additional pay (recargo) called Comprehensive Child Recovery (Recuperación Integral de Niños) PRIN and to order it to continue paying it to her as long as she maintains her status as reassigned (reubicada). She claimed the payment of salary differences corresponding to the additional pay and other incentives, starting from the date it ceased to be recognized—February 1, 2020—and until the judgment, provided she remains reassigned. She requested the resulting differences in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and teacher development incentive (incentivo de desarrollo docente). She also requested that the defendant be ordered to pay the corresponding differences to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) and to the Caja de Ande. Accessorily, she requested interest and indexation. The State's representative procurator responded in negative terms and raised the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho). The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Second Section, by judgment number 460, at 16:00 hours on March 6, 2024, ordered the losing party to pay the salary differences for the concept of said additional pay, starting from February 1, 2020, and for as long as the plaintiff remains reassigned, as well as those caused in Christmas bonus, school salary, and the teacher development incentive. It established that the corresponding amounts must be deducted for social security contributions and taxes, and that the State must make the applicable contributions in its capacity as employer, specifically regarding the obligations arising from the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), sickness insurance, those corresponding to the special regime of the National Teachers' Union (Magisterio Nacional), the Caja de Ande, and any others provided by law. It granted legal interest from the date each installment became due and until the date of effective payment, in accordance with the rate provided in article 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It granted indexation under the terms of said provision. It imposed the payment of both court costs on the defendant, setting the attorney's fees at fifteen percent of the award.\n\n**II.- AGGRIEVANCES:** The State's representative procurator objects to what was decided. First, he indicates that the judgment lacks reasoning and criticizes the way the evidence was assessed. In this regard, he argues that the ruling does not present an analysis specific to the case, as required by article 560 of the Labor Code, which demonstrates a lack of reasoning and leads to a declaration of nullity of the pronouncement, which he requests. He argues that the evidence was incorrectly weighed, as it has been duly accredited that the Comprehensive Child Recovery additional pay was granted solely for the 2019 school year, specifically from February 1 to November 30 of that year, as evidenced in the corresponding personnel action. Consequently, the additional pay ended on November 30, and, upon verifying its expiration, there is no legal basis to justify its assignment to someone who is not performing it. He notes that the plaintiff was reassigned starting November 1, 2019, under article 254 of the Labor Code, a date from which she performed administrative functions and not teaching duties. Hence, it is not true that the payment of the additional pay was arbitrarily suppressed, as it was granted for a specific period and for the performance of teaching functions. The judge did not analyze the temporary nature of the salary supplement (sobresueldo), which expired on November 30, 2019, which is why there was no justification to continue paying it. He insists that the additional pay was temporary, which was not weighed by the Court. In his view, there was no violation of the plaintiff's right to health or of her salary. He explains that additional payments cannot be granted indefinitely, but that their granting requires verifying the necessary legal prerequisites and weighing the reality of the educational centers and the budget, matters that are future and uncertain, which must be assessed in each school year. Subsequently, he points out that article 254 of the Labor Code and article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), as well as the Leave Regulations of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública), were incorrectly interpreted and applied. He indicates that the analysis starts from a false premise, as article 174 cited was applied by considering this to be a case of disability (incapacidad) due to illness or special leave (licencia especial), when the plaintiff is reassigned for health reasons, which implies a change in working conditions by varying her functions from teaching to administrative, a situation regulated in article 254 of the Labor Code. Hence, it is not appropriate to grant a subsidy equivalent to the total salary that was being earned; because, as stated, this is not a case of disability or special leave, because what was granted was a reassignment, at the plaintiff's request, without having proceeded under Executive Decree No. 19113, of July 28, 1989, but rather proceeding under article 254 of the Labor Code, a provision that enables the reassignment of the employee but does not obligate maintaining the salary prior to the adopted measure. It even authorizes termination when the change of functions is not viable. He reiterates that the provisions related to disabilities or leaves are not applicable, as this entails an extensive application of the law, contrary to law and to the detriment of the Public Treasury, to the extent that the payment of the additional pay is equated to a vested right (derecho adquirido), against constitutional jurisprudence on the matter. According to his statement, disability is a cause for suspension of the employment relationship, which exempts the employee from the obligation to provide service and the employer from paying the salary, as what is recognized is a subsidy. In this case, the employee did not cease working, there was no suspension of the bond, and there was only a change of functions due to her health condition. He refers that, if the existence of a special leave is considered and not a reassignment for health, article 166 of the Civil Service Statute should be applied, as analyzed in opinion C-250-2004. He points out that his represented party has paid the plaintiff the full salary, according to the permanently held position, during the entire period she has been reassigned. He returns to the idea that additional payments have a validity period and are agreed upon according to the needs of the educational center and in accordance with the budgetary content. In this case, he points out that the additional pay was not suppressed but rather expired, the term was respected, and there is no reason whatsoever to maintain the payment, especially when there is no clarity on whether it is required in subsequent school years, which was ignored by the Court. He notes that the salary supplement is not part of the base salary of the position, but rather is assigned each year according to the needs of the educational center for each school year. He insists that the payment was not suppressed, but that the additional pay expired, and that, in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence, these do not constitute a fundamental right or a vested right, given their temporary nature. He argues that the additional pay for functions responds to service requirements, has a temporary nature, and is paid for specific tasks that must be performed for the payment to proceed. He emphasizes the temporary and exceptional nature of salary supplements, a circumstance known to the staff. In his view, the claim for salary differences has no legal support, and it is not appropriate to order payment for a benefit that has not been provided. In support of his thesis, he invokes the principles of legality, rationality, reasonableness, and budget legality, while insisting on the impropriety of paying the salary supplement for functions that are not being performed, which goes against its very nature, purpose, and the public interest. He notes that the additional pay aims to satisfy an institutional need and this interest, and by its means, extraordinary work is remunerated. He considers that the decision implies giving it a different purpose, not provided for by the provision. He reiterates that one cannot allege the existence of a vested right, as the additional pay is not granted by the mere existence of the bond between the parties, but under certain regulatory conditions. The decision entails the deterioration of the service and the impoverishment of the treasury, because the lessons will not be given or a new additional pay will have to be assigned, thus incurring a double payment. He indicates that several jurisdictional bodies have opted for the thesis of the party he represents and have dismissed claims of the same nature. He reproaches that this Chamber has concluded that its position does not contradict that of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which, he asserts, is inaccurate. He partially transcribes constitutional judgment number 2019-7081; which, in his opinion, supports his position and confirms that the additional pay does not constitute a vested right. He points out that the thesis held is not a whim but is grounded in constitutional jurisprudence. In this case, there is no evidence that the employee was hired with the enjoyment of the additional pay she claims; it is not a vested right. He assures that the State has proceeded in accordance with the law, under the principles of legality and budgetary legality, without any worsening (desmejora) of the salary having occurred. The salary supplement ceased due to expiration, as it was an obligation subject to a term, specifically the 2019 school year, expiring on November 30 of that year. Subsequently, the plaintiff is not performing teaching duties and the salary supplement is not part of her ordinary salary. He reiterates his arguments regarding the temporality and consequent expiration of additional payments. He assures that there is no infringement of the right to health and requests that the most recent criterion of the Constitutional Court be assessed. He points out that the criterion of this Chamber has been varying, for which he brings up rulings 2021-173 and 2023-2295, from which it follows that it is improper to maintain the payment of the additional pay to a reassigned person, the impropriety of equating reassignment with disability, and the temporality of the salary supplement. In another vein, he objects to the order to pay differences in the Christmas bonus, arguing that this was duly paid to her. Regarding the differences in the school salary, he argues that it is not an additional amount recognized without legal basis, but rather a withholding (retención) that is appropriate to grant in the month of January. He adds that the recognition of an additional pay that is not being performed is not appropriate, so any accessory right must meet the same fate. He accuses an incorrect application of article 565 of the Labor Code, insofar as the State was ordered to pay interest and indexation. He says that they must follow the fate of the principal and that they would be applicable as the obligations were generated. In the event that the decision is upheld, he requests that its granting be adjusted to the assumptions of that provision, in terms of percentage and temporality. Finally, he attacks the decision to impose on the State the obligation to pay both court costs. In this regard, he argues that his represented party has proceeded in good faith, in compliance with the provisions applicable to the case. He requests the reversal of the appealed judgment.\n\n**III.- ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:** a) Lack of reasoning: The Chamber observes that the first-instance judge set forth her own reasons for concluding that the claim was admissible. Although she cited precedents from this Chamber on the same topic, she also provided the reasoning on which she based her decision. Hence, the defect of lack of reasoning alleged is not perceived. b) Salary differences: In the case under study, there is evidence that the plaintiff was initially reassigned from November 1 to 30, 2019. This condition was extended immediately from December 1, 2019, to January 31, 2020; from February 1, 2020, to January 31, 2021; from February 1, 2021, to January 31, 2022; and from February 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023. Despite the reassignment, the payment of the Comprehensive Child Recovery PRIN additional pay was maintained until November 30, 2019. Said additional pay had been exercised by the plaintiff since 2017 and had been approved for the 2019 school year, from March 1 to November 30 of that year. The extension of the plaintiff's reassignment, based on article 254 of the Labor Code, was ordered immediately starting December 1, 2019, a point from which they ceased to recognize and pay her the corresponding amount for the additional pay in question. As noted, the change of functions was agreed upon following a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Labor Code, which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate in their position persons who have suffered a risk and can work. Furthermore, it provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their possibilities, when due to a medical recommendation they cannot return to perform the functions they were performing but are capable of performing other tasks. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Staff precisely establish the possibility of agreeing to certain additional payments. It is true that salary supplements do not constitute a vested right and that their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their usual functions, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition or ceases to perform the functions for which they are remunerated that plus. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their functions, ceases to be in the situations that make the additional pay viable but rather a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform their usual tasks. It should be noted that the Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters with the same characteristics, without observing any circumstance that makes it possible to vary the criterion held. It has been considered that in cases of this nature, Executive Decree number 19,113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Regulations for Special Leaves for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education, is applicable, without it being possible to consider that this was rendered ineffective by the repeal of article 167 of the Civil Service Statute, as this was not the only provision that supported it. Article one of that regulation provides for the norms and procedures the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave to employees due to the reduction of their faculties or aptitudes for work, derived from an occupational hazard (riesgo del trabajo) or common illness. Article two reaffirms that the leaves contemplated in the regulation shall be granted to those who suffer a reduction in their faculties and, because of this, cannot fulfill the functions and attributions of the position they were performing. In accordance with the provisions of articles 5 and 8, employees whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) declare to have a minor or partial permanent disability and recommend a change of functions are entitled to a special leave. Now, article 9 stipulates that, prior to granting the leave, the Ministry shall proceed with the reassignment of the employee, which is ratified in the following provisions, according to which \"...this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purposes of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, medical recommendations, and the academic background of the beneficiary, that are required on a temporary basis\" and that \"...the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource who is enjoying special leave for the attention of administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical tasks and functions, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs\", which absolutely corresponds to article 254 of the Labor Code. Article 17 stipulates, expressly, that \"The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.\" In this way, it has been considered that this regulation complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which makes no distinction between permanent or partial disabilities, and hence, no differentiation can be made, for payment purposes, between permanent and special leaves. Hence, it is not concluded that the alleged incorrect application exists. Consequently, if at the time of the reassignment, the plaintiff was earning the referred salary supplement, her right is indisputable, in accordance with that special regulation, for this plus to be included within her remuneration as an administrative employee reassigned for health reasons. In the sense expressed, in judgment number 308 of this Chamber, at 10:30 hours on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: “[…] in this case we are not faced with a claim made by a male or female employee of the administrative sector of the Ministry of Public Education for the recognition of pluses as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that scenario because here it is a matter of defining the correspondence of that right to a female teaching employee who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. The difference the state representation seeks to assert between 'disability' and 'reassignment' ignores that the origin of both is an illness of the employee that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulation in cases like this is not only that related to the right to the recognition of alternate schedule but that specifically provided for this purpose. Primarily, the Regulations for Special Leaves of the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose article 1° mentions that this regulation aims to establish the norms and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the reduction of their faculties or aptitudes for work, supervening from occupational hazards or illness. For its part, article 2 states: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the reduction suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they were performing as regular employees. (Highlighting is added). Then, in accordance with article 5, those employees for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions, are entitled to be granted a special leave. Article 8 specifically addresses the assumption of granting special leave in the following terms: 'In accordance with the provisions of the preceding article 5, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That, according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund recommends in the final assessment of the treatment their change of functions. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the occurred occupational hazard, the National Insurance Institute determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their incorporation into the service with a change of functions' (emphasis supplied). Subsequently, articles 9 and 10, in order, state: 'Prior to granting the leave and in accordance with the availability of positions and the requirements of the interested party, the Ministry of Public Education shall proceed with their reassignment, transfer, or promotion, as appropriate.' And, 'When the application of the provisions of the preceding article is viable immediately, the special leave shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be carried out.' Furthermore, article 12 states: 'Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource who is enjoying special leave for the attention of administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical tasks and functions, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs.' Finally, article 17 says: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter' (emphasis supplied). Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: 'a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning an additional salary for location zone (zonaje), alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any salary supplement (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at said time. b) Leaves for illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond.' (Highlighting is added). The regulatory provision develops this express disposition, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation for both the case of permanent leave and special leave.” (The highlights appear in the original. Sic.). In this case, the additional pay was not worked given the need to reassign the employee to functions other than teaching, for health reasons. That is, the payment of the salary supplement does not originate from the fulfillment of the additional pay functions but in attention to the provision that orders the transfer with the recognition of the equivalent of the total salary that the employee was earning at the time of reassignment. The regulation provides for the right to continue receiving, under these circumstances, \"a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary.\" Hence, it cannot be concluded, as intended, that the nature of the additional pay was distorted, since the provisions applied to the case are the current ones that establish this legal consequence. For the foregoing, it is also not true that article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) was violated, which refers to the possibility that the limit of forty weekly lessons be exceeded when the service so requires, maintaining the excess as an additional pay of a temporary nature. Such provision does not regulate the situation posed here and is provided for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees who are prescribed a disability or leave. The violation of the principles of legality, budgetary legality, and reasonableness invoked in the appeal is also not observed, as rather, the referred regulation establishes the legal consequence applied for the case of employees reassigned for health reasons. Likewise, it should be noted that the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on the matter are not binding on this Chamber. What was decided is not contrary to the criterion of the Constitutional Court in the sense that additional payments have a temporary nature and do not constitute a vested right. That instance has analyzed these types of cases in light of a possible violation of the right to health, whereas, in this venue, the remuneration that the employee must earn during the reassignment is determined. It is insisted, the case under analysis does not refer to the situation of an active employee demanding additional payments, but rather the issue is reduced to establishing the remuneration that an employee transferred to perform a different position must receive, because they cannot continue performing their normal work nor the additional payments they were exercising, due to a health condition or affectation; the cause of a temporary or permanent disability, a topic entirely different from the assertion made by the appellant. Hence, the temporary nature of the additional payments and the nonexistence of vested rights are not being denied. The grievance formulated in the sense that article 166 of the Civil Service Statute should have been applied is not admissible insofar as it is merely enunciated, but the reasons on which it is based are not given, the argument lacking clarity. c) Christmas bonus differences: Regarding the Christmas bonus differences, the reproach cannot succeed, because even if the defendant had paid the corresponding amount for this concept, it is evident that it did not include in the calculation the amount of the additional pay, which it was not recognizing. d) Differences in school salary: The State's representation's argument is that it is not appropriate to grant differences in school salary, since this item is formed by means of a withholding of the salary increase, which is later paid in a deferred manner in the month of January. The issue related to the legal nature of the school salary has been widely debated. On some occasions, it was considered a deferred payment retention, as the appellant points out, and this Chamber maintained the criterion that it constituted one more salary component. However, the Constitutional Chamber analyzed the issue and concluded that the school salary is made up of a withholding from the salary increase, the payment of which is deferred to be granted in the month of January of each year. In this sense, in ruling 9188, at 9:50 hours on May 21, 2020, it established: \"Now then, from the foregoing it is inferred that the school salary arises from the adjustments in the increases for cost of living that were decreed in 1994, and that based on the salary policy agreement of that year, were paid gradually, a percentage of these being paid cumulatively in the month of January ...Thus, in summary, the school salary arises as a percentage of the workers' salary increase that would be paid by the employers in an accumulated and deferred manner during the month of January of each year and that, therefore, is within the employee's estate. The foregoing implies that it is not an extraordinary payment, as is the case with the Christmas bonus, but rather forms part of the worker's salary.\" Having determined this, the Chamber observes that, for the purposes of the decision, the nature noted by the appellant has no impact whatsoever. The calculation of the school salary is made taking into account the same components used to determine the amount applicable for the Christmas bonus. To that extent, it means that the corresponding amount for the additional pay in question should have been added for its calculation. Since this was not paid, it could not have been included when calculating what would have corresponded for school salary.\n\nConsequently, the recognition of the additional pay (sobresueldo) in court generates a difference in the amounts the plaintiff has received for school salary (salario escolar) since February 2020, when the bonus in question ceased to be recognized. e) Interest and indexation: In another vein, the appellant requests that the award of interest and indexation be adjusted to the parameters regulated by canon 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). However, it does not indicate what the error of the judgment would be on this particular point, and the Chamber does not find that the decision was adopted outside the scope of said norm. Interest was granted from the enforceability of each right, as alleged in the appeal.\n\nIV.- COSTS: The appellant seeks to have its represented party exempted from the payment of both costs, for having proceeded with evident good faith. Article 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) states: \"Nevertheless, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even procedural costs, when:/ 1) Litigation has been conducted with evident good faith. /2) The propositions have partially succeeded. /3) When there has been reciprocal defeat. /The exemption must always be reasoned. /A party may not be considered to be in good faith if it denied evident claims that the outcome of the proceedings indicates it should have accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any evidence to justify its claim or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts...\" It must not be overlooked that transcribed numeral 563 provides a power and not an obligation to exempt the losing party when any of those circumstances occur. In cases such as the present one, the Chamber has not found the requested exemption to be appropriate, nor that the plaintiff should bear the cost of the expenses incurred in defense of her remuneration, which is why it is not considered possible to vary what was decided.\n\nV.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Based on the reasons given, the appeal of the State representation must be dismissed.\n\nVI.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA AND MAGISTRATE ORTEGA TELLERÍA: The undersigned depart from the majority criterion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's payment of the additional pay (sobresueldo) corresponding to Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN, as of February 1, 2020. It has been duly accredited that, in the year 2019, the plaintiff earned that bonus and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions; reason for which that additional pay (sobresueldo) ceased to be paid to her as of December 1, 2019. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon due to a medical recommendation, based on Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability leave (incapacidad) per se. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, so it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the employee does not find herself in the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not disabled by illness, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After a reconsideration of the analysis on the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that what was decided must be revoked. The ordinals 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional duties (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right and, therefore, their payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), establishes that: “a) If the servant, at the moment of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, were earning additional salary for zonage (zonaje), alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment. /b) Leave due to illness, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive corresponding salary increases. (As reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall, consequently, be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other ends, that may correspond. / (Thus added the previous subsection by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (highlighting added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that the public servant who is disabled by illness, or the female official on maternity leave, who has been earning additional salary for additional pay (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is not on disability leave (incapacitada), so her situation is not subsumed into the factual presupposition of the norm. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, pursuant to the provisions in numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses (pluses) are granted when the public servant performs additional functions to those ordinarily performed in their position, temporarily, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional pays (sobresueldos) depends on whether circumstances so warrant, and for this reason they are assigned with a temporary character, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in ordinal 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the occasional service would become distorted and would turn into an ordinary one. In line with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that \"the excess shall be maintained as an additional duty (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.\" Consequently, those additional duties (recargos) that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is intended in this case. There is vast jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the sense that additional duties for functions (recargos de funciones) cannot be considered an acquired right of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that may be classified as an additional duty for functions (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such additional duties (recargos) - because it responds to the need for service provision at a given moment -, has a temporary character and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are strictly within its interest and competence (see in that sense judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve twenty-eight p.m. on September fifth, two thousand three and 2006-7717 of four forty-seven p.m. on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the additional duties (recargo) constitute a salary 'bonus' or benefit that depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party for that amount to continue being paid, or for the additional duties (recargo) or alternate schedule (horario alterno) to be maintained\" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011 and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the conditions under which an additional pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled (Judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006)”. In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “In a similar fashion, it is necessary to rule on what concerns the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on occasion of the questioned act, since the compensation for the cited additional duties (recargo) constitutes a salary 'bonus' or benefit, which depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, for that amount to continue being paid, or for the indicated additional duties (recargo) to be maintained, so that the appeal, with regard to this last objection, is also inadmissible…” Finally, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that additional pays (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled”. According to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the related additional duty (recargo) constitute a temporary additional pay (sobresueldo), annexed to the salary structure, which, although it forms part of the final compensation received by the public servant, is not a substantial permanent component, but an additional one, whose recognition depends on whether that person meets the legal conditions established in the legal system for its concession and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be noted that the payment of these additional duties (recargos) proceeds by reason of the position and the functions that the public servant performs, and can therefore be denied when the original conditions of its granting disappear. Forcing the State to pay a compensation for a service that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing functions by way of some type of additional duty (recargo), since they are not under equal conditions and earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same additional duty (recargo), whenever it has been necessary for it to be assumed by the person who replaces the one who has been reassigned for health reasons. As stated before and as occurs in the case under study, additional duties (recargos) do not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the issue, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixed) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the additional duties (recargo), a norm that authorizes it is necessarily required (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and presuppositions established by it; which does not happen in this case. By virtue of the above, the suppression of the additional pay (sobresueldo), when the plaintiff went from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law. For the reasons stated, the undersigned conclude that the State's appeal must be accepted, the ruling annulled, and the lawsuit declared without merit. No special sanction on costs.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nThe appeal is declared without merit. Magistrate Varela Araya and Magistrate Ortega Tellería dissent, declare the State's appeal with merit, annul the ruling, accept the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), and declare the lawsuit without merit. They resolve without special sanction on costs.\n\nRes: 2024003075\n\nGGONZALEZ\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n \n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nRafael Antonio Ortega Telleria\n\n \n\nGrace del Carmen Agüero Alvarado\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n 3R2HCLSVBH461\n\n1\n\nEXP: 22-000477-0173-LA\n\n \n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2295-3009.\n\nExp: 22-000477-0173-LA\n\nRes: 2024003075\n\n**SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**.\n\nSan José, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of November two thousand twenty-four.\n\nOrdinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre 001], divorced, teacher and resident of San José; against the ESTADO, represented by its deputy procurator, Licenciado Luis Fernando Cartín Gulubay, single, lawyer and resident of Montes de Oca. Appearing as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff are Licenciada Hazel Virginia Montoya Jenkins, lawyer, divorced and resident of San José and Licenciado Luis Fernando Sánchez Villalobos, lawyer, married and resident of Alajuela. All of legal age.\n\nRedacted by Magistrate Sánchez Rodríguez; and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI.- ANTECEDENTES: Through her special judicial representative, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit seeking to have the State ordered to restore payment of the additional pay called Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN and to be ordered to continue paying it to her as long as she maintains her reassigned (reubicada) status. She claimed payment of salary differences corresponding to the additional pay and other incentives, from the date it ceased to be recognized—February 1, 2020—until the judgment, so long as she remains reassigned. She requested the resulting differences in year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and teacher development incentive (incentivo de desarrollo docente). Likewise, she requested that the defendant be ordered to pay the corresponding differences to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and to the Caja de Ande. Ancillary to this, she requested interest and indexation. The procurator representing the State answered in negative terms and raised the defense (excepción) of lack of right. The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Second Section, through judgment number 460, at 16:00 hours on March 6, 2024, ordered the losing party to pay the salary differences for the said additional pay, starting from February 1, 2020, and for as long as the plaintiff remains reassigned, as well as those arising in year-end bonus, school salary and the teacher development incentive. It established that the corresponding social security and tax contributions must be deducted and that the State must make the applicable contributions in its capacity as employer, specifically regarding the obligations deriving from the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, sickness insurance, those corresponding to the special regime of the Magisterio Nacional, the Caja de Ande and any others provided by law. It granted legal interest from the date each installment became due until the date of effective payment, according to the rate provided in canon 565 of the Código de Trabajo. It granted indexation under the terms of that same rule. It imposed on the defendant the payment of both costs and set personal costs at fifteen percent of the award.\n\nII.- AGRAVIOS: The procurator representing the State objects to the decision. Firstly, he indicates that the judgment lacks proper reasoning (fundamentación) and criticizes the way the evidence was assessed. In this regard, he maintains that the ruling does not present an analysis specific to the particular case, as required by numeral 560 of the Código de Trabajo, which demonstrates the lack of reasoning and leads to declaring the pronouncement null, which he requests. He argues that the evidence was incorrectly weighed, because it has been duly proven that the additional pay of Recuperación Integral de Niños was granted solely for the 2019 school year, specifically from February 1 to November 30 of that year, as recorded in the corresponding personnel action (acción de personal). Consequently, the additional pay ended as of November 30, and, its expiry having been verified, there is no legal basis to justify its allocation to someone who does not perform it. He notes that the plaintiff was reassigned as of November 1, 2019, under canon 254 of the Código de Trabajo, a date from which she performed administrative functions and not teaching duties. Hence, it is not true that the payment of the additional pay was arbitrarily suppressed, since it was granted for a specific period and for the performance of teaching duties. The judge did not analyze the temporary nature of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo), which expired on November 30, 2019, reason for which there was no justification to continue paying it. He insists that the additional pay was temporary, which was not weighed by the Court. In his opinion, there was no violation whatsoever of the plaintiff's right to health, nor to her salary. He explains that additional pays cannot be granted indefinitely, but rather, for their granting, the necessary legal requirements must be verified and the reality of the educational centers and the budget must be weighed, matters which are future and uncertain, and which must be assessed for each school year. Next, he points out that Article 254 of the Código de Trabajo and Article 174 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil were interpreted and applied incorrectly, as was the Reglamento de Licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública. He indicates that the analysis starts from a false premise, since the cited Article 174 was applied by considering that this is a case of disability due to illness or special leave, when the plaintiff is reassigned for health reasons, which implies a change in working conditions, by shifting functions from teaching to administrative, which is regulated in canon 254 of the Código de Trabajo. Hence, it is not appropriate to grant a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of the salary that was being earned; because, as stated, this is not a case of disability or special leave, because what was granted was a reassignment, at the plaintiff's request, without having proceeded under the terms of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 19113, of July 28, 1989, but rather under the protection of numeral 254 of the Código de Trabajo, a rule that enables the reassignment of the employee, but does not obligate the maintenance of the salary prior to the adopted measure. It even authorizes termination when the change of functions is not viable. He reiterates that the rules related to disabilities or leaves are not applicable, as this entails an extensive application of the law, contrary to law and to the detriment of the Public Treasury, to the degree that the payment of the additional pay is equated to a vested right, contrary to the constitutional jurisprudence on the matter. According to his statement, disability is a cause for suspension of the employment relationship, which exempts the employee from the obligation to provide the service and the employer from paying the salary, since what is recognized is a subsidy. In this case, the employee did not stop working, there was no suspension of the bond, and only a change of functions occurred, on the occasion of her state of health. He refers that, if the existence of a special leave and not a reassignment for health reasons were to be considered, Article 166 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil must be applied, as analyzed in opinion C-250-2004. He points out that his represented party has paid the plaintiff her full salary, according to the position held permanently, during the entire period she has been reassigned. He returns to the idea that additional pays have a period of validity and that they are agreed upon according to the needs of the educational center and in accordance with the budgetary content. In this case, he points out that the additional pay was not suppressed, but rather it expired, the term was respected, and there is no reason whatsoever to maintain the payment, especially when there is no clarity as to whether it is needed in subsequent school years, which was ignored by the Court. He notes that the supplementary salary is not part of the position's salary, but rather it is assigned each year, according to the needs of the educational center for each school year. He insists that the payment was not suppressed, but rather the additional pay expired and that, in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence, they do not constitute a fundamental or vested right, given their temporary nature. He argues that the additional pay for functions corresponds to the requirements of the service, it has a temporary nature, and it is paid for specific tasks that must be performed for the payment to proceed. He emphasizes the temporary and exceptional nature of supplementary salaries, a circumstance known to the personnel. In his judgment, the claim for salary differences has no legal support and it is not appropriate to order the payment of a service that has not been provided. In support of his thesis, he invokes the principles of legality, rationality, reasonableness and budgetary legality, while insisting on the impropriety of paying the supplementary salary for functions that are not being performed, which contravenes its own nature, purpose, and the public interest. He notes that the additional pay's purpose is the satisfaction of an institutional need and of said interest, and through it, extraordinary work is compensated. He considers that the decision implies giving it a different purpose, not foreseen by the rule. He reiterates that one cannot allege the existence of a vested right, because the additional pay is not granted by the mere existence of the bond between the parties, but rather upon certain regulatory conditions. The decision entails the deterioration of service and the impoverishment of the treasury, because the lessons will not be taught or a new additional pay will have to be assigned, thus incurring a double payment. He indicates that several jurisdictional bodies have leaned towards the thesis of the party he represents and have dismissed claims of the same nature. He reproaches that this Chamber has concluded that his position does not conflict with that of the Constitutional Chamber, which he affirms is inaccurate. He partially transcribes constitutional judgment number 2019-7081; which, in his opinion, supports his position and verifies that the additional pay does not constitute a vested right. He notes that the thesis sustained is not a whim, but rather has a basis in constitutional jurisprudence. In this case, there is no proof that the employee was hired with the enjoyment of the additional pay she claims; it is not a vested right. He assures that the State has proceeded in accordance with the law, under the principles of legality and budgetary legality, without any worsening of her salary having occurred.\n\nThe additional pay ceased upon expiration, as it was an obligation subject to a deadline, specifically the 2019 academic year, with expiration on November 30 of that year. Subsequently, the plaintiff is not performing teaching duties and the additional pay is not part of her ordinary salary. It reiterates its arguments regarding the temporality and consequent expiration of the additional duties (recargos). It asserts there is no violation whatsoever of the right to health and requests that the most recent criterion of the Constitutional Court be assessed. It points out that this Chamber's criterion has been changing, for which it brings up Votos 2021-173 and 2023-2295, from which it follows that maintaining the payment of the additional duty to a reassigned person is improper, that equating reassignment (reubicación) with disability is improper, and the temporality of the additional pay. In another vein, it objects to the order to pay differences in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), under the argument that it was duly paid to her. Regarding the differences in the school salary (salario escolar), it argues that it is not an additional amount recognized without legal basis, but rather a withholding that it is appropriate to grant in the month of January. It adds that the recognition of an additional duty that is not being performed is not appropriate, so any accessory right must suffer the same fate. It accuses an incorrect application of canon 565 of the Código de Trabajo, insofar as the State was ordered to pay interest and indexation (indexación). It says they must follow the fate of the principal and that they would be appropriate as the obligations were generated. In the event the decision is upheld, it requests that its granting be adjusted to the assumptions of that norm, regarding percentage and temporality. Finally, it attacks the ruling insofar as the State was imposed the obligation to pay both costs. In this regard, it argues that its represented party has acted in good faith, in compliance with the rules applicable to the case. It requests the revocation of the appealed judgment.\n\nIII.- CASE ANALYSIS: a) Lack of reasoning: The Chamber observes that the trial judge set forth her own reasons for concluding that the claim was appropriate. Although she cited precedents from this Chamber on the same subject, she also gave the reasoning on which she based her decision. Hence, the defect of lack of reasoning alleged is not perceived. b) Salary differences: In the case under study, there is proof that the plaintiff was initially reassigned from November 1 to November 30, 2019. That condition was extended, immediately, from December 1, 2019, to January 31, 2020; from February 1, 2020, to January 31, 2021; from February 1, 2021, to January 31, 2022; and from February 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023. Despite the reassignment, the payment of the Comprehensive Recovery for Children PRIN additional duty (Recargo de Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN) was maintained until November 30, 2019. Said additional duty had been exercised by the plaintiff since 2017, and had been approved for the 2019 academic year, from March 1 to November 30 of that year. The extension of the plaintiff's reassignment, based on article 254 of the Código de Trabajo, was ordered immediately starting December 1, 2019, from which point they stopped recognizing and paying her the corresponding amount for the additional duty in question. As noted, the change of duties was agreed upon due to a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Código de Trabajo, which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate to their position persons who have suffered a workplace risk and can work. Furthermore, it provides for the employer's duty to provide them with a different position according to their possibilities, when due to medical recommendation they cannot return to perform the duties they had been carrying out, but are capable of performing other tasks. Articles 118 of the Código de Educación and 13 of the Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente precisely establish the possibility of agreeing to certain additional duties. It is true that additional pays do not constitute a vested right and that their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition or ceases to perform the duties for which that supplement is remunerated. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their duties, ceases to be in the circumstances that make the additional duty viable, but rather, a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to carry out their usual tasks. It must be noted that the Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters of identical characteristics, without noticing any circumstance that makes it possible to vary the sustained criterion. It has been deemed that in cases of this nature, Decreto Ejecutivo number 19.113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública, is applicable, without it being possible to consider that it was rendered ineffective by the repeal of numeral 167 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, since this was not the only norm that supported it. The first canon of that regulation provides for the rules and procedures that the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave to employees due to the diminution of their faculties or aptitudes for work, derived from a workplace risk or a common illness. The second article reaffirms that the leaves contemplated in the regulation will be granted to those who suffer a diminution in their faculties and who, for that reason, cannot perform the duties and attributions of the position they had been carrying out. In accordance with what is regulated in numerals 5 and 8, employees to whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros declare a minor or partial permanent disability and recommend a change of duties are entitled to a special leave. Now, canon 9 stipulates that, prior to the granting of the leave, the Ministry will proceed to the reassignment of the employee, which is ratified in the following norms, according to which “…this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Educación Pública, for the purpose of assigning tasks and duties compatible with their personal conditions, with medical recommendations and the academic background of the beneficiary, which are required on a temporary basis” and that “…the Ministerio de Educación Pública may make use of the human resources who were enjoying special leave for attending tasks and duties of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the smooth running of the institutions or to implement special programs”, which absolutely corresponds with article 254 of the Código de Trabajo. Article 17 expressly stipulates that “The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and the Código de Educación on the matter”. Thus, it has been considered that this regulation complements article 174 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, which makes no distinction whatsoever between permanent or partial disabilities, and hence no differentiation can be made for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves. Hence, it is not concluded that there was an incorrect application as alleged. Consequently, if at the time of reassignment, the plaintiff was earning the referred additional pay, the right she has, according to that special regulation, to have that supplement included within her remuneration as an administrative employee reassigned for health reasons is indisputable. In the sense expressed, in judgment of this Chamber number 308, of 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: “[…] in the case at hand, we are not faced with the claim made by a male or female employee of the administrative sector of the Ministerio de Educación Pública, for the recognition of supplements as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that assumption because here it is a matter of defining the correspondence of that right to a female teaching employee who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. The difference that the state representation seeks to assert between ‘disability’ and ‘reassignment’ ignores that the origin of both is an illness of the employee that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulations in cases like this are not solely those related to the right to the recognition of alternate hours, but rather those specially provided for the matter.”\n\nFirsthand, the Special Leave Regulations of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree No. 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose Article 1 mentions that these regulations aim to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from workplace accidents or illness. For its part, section 2 establishes: \"The leaves referred to in these regulations shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and duties corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.\" (Highlighting added). Then, in accordance with Article 5, those employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment (valoración), declare a minor permanent incapacity or a partial or permanent incapacity and recommend a change of functions have the right to be granted a special leave. Article 8 specifically addresses the scenario of granting special leave in the following terms: \"In accordance with the provisions of Article 5° above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That according to their ailment, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social recommends, in the final assessment of the treatment, their change of functions. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the workplace accident that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor or partial permanent incapacity and recommends their reincorporation into service with a change of functions\" (emphasis supplied). Next, Articles 9 and 10, in order, establish: \"Prior to granting the leave and in accordance with the availability of positions and the interested party's qualifications, the Ministry of Public Education shall proceed with their relocation (reubicación), transfer, or promotion, as applicable.\" And, \"When the application of the provisions of the previous article is not immediately feasible, the special leave shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be carried out.\" Furthermore, section 12 states: \"Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resources enjoying special leave for attending to tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs.\" Finally, Article 17 states: \"The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in these regulations shall receive a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the entirety of their salary, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code on the matter\" (emphasis supplied). Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of section 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: \"a) If the employee, at the time of being incapacitated due to illness or maternity, is earning additional salary for location (zonaje), for an alternate schedule, or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. b) Leaves due to illness, regardless of their duration, shall not interrupt the right employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aid referred to in Article 167 shall be considered salary, and shall consequently be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other aspects, that may correspond\" (Highlighting added). The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to the compensation both for the case of permanent leave and special leave.\" (The highlights appear in the original. Sic.). In this case, the additional duties (recargo) were not worked given the need to relocate the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. That is, the payment of the additional pay does not originate from the fulfillment of the additional duties functions, but rather in consideration of the rule that mandates the transfer with the recognition of the equivalent of the total salary that the employee was earning at the time of the relocation (reubicación). The regulation contemplates the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, \"a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary.\" Hence, it cannot be concluded, as is intended, that the nature of the additional duties was distorted, since the rules applied to the case are the current ones, which establish that legal consequence. For the foregoing reasons, it is also untrue that Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) was violated, which refers to the possibility of the limit of forty weekly lessons being exceeded when the service so requires, maintaining the excess as an additional duty (recargo), of a temporary nature. Such provision does not regulate the situation presented here and is intended for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees who are prescribed an incapacity or leave. Nor is the violation of the principles of legality, budgetary legality, and reasonableness invoked in the appeal evident, as rather, the referenced regulation establishes the legal consequence applied for the case of employees relocated for health reasons. Likewise, it should be noted that the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on the matter are not binding for this Chamber. The decision is not contrary to the Constitutional Court's criterion that additional duties are temporary in nature and do not constitute a vested right. In that instance, these types of cases have been analyzed in light of a possible violation of the right to health, while, in this venue, the remuneration that the employee must earn during the relocation is determined. It is reiterated, the case under analysis does not refer to the situation of an active employee demanding additional duties, but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that a transferred employee must receive for performing a different position, due to being unable to continue performing their normal duties nor the additional duties they had been exercising, because of a suffering or health condition; the cause of a temporary or permanent incapacity, a topic entirely distinct from the approach taken by the appellant. Hence, the temporary nature of additional duties and the absence of vested rights are not being disregarded. The grievance raised that Article 166 of the Civil Service Statute should have been applied is not admissible insofar as it is only stated, but the reasons supporting it are not provided, the argument lacking clarity.\n\nc) Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) differences: Regarding the Christmas bonus differences, the objection cannot succeed, because even though the defendant may have paid what corresponded for such concept, it is evident that they did not include the amount of the additional duties in the calculation, which they were not recognizing.\n\nd) School salary (salario escolar) differences: The State's representation argument is that granting school salary differences is not appropriate, as this item is formed through a withholding (retención) from the salary increase, which is later paid in deferred form in January. The issue related to the legal nature of the school salary has been widely debated. On some occasions, it was considered a deferred payment withholding, as the appellant points out, and this Chamber maintained the criterion that it constituted another salary component. However, the Constitutional Court (Sala Constitucional) addressed the analysis of the issue and concluded that the school salary is comprised of a withholding from the salary increase, the payment of which is deferred to be granted in the month of January of each year.\n\nIn that regard, in vote 9188, at 9:50 a.m. on May 21, 2020, it established: \"*Now, from the foregoing it follows that the school salary (salario escolar) arose from adjustments to the cost-of-living increases decreed in 1994, and that based on that year's salary policy agreement, were paid gradually, with a percentage thereof being paid cumulatively in the month of January ... Thus, in summary, the school salary arises as a percentage of the workers' salary increase that was to be paid by the employers in a cumulative and deferred manner during the month of January of each year and which, therefore, is within the employee's assets. The foregoing implies that it is not an extraordinary payment, as is the case with the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), but rather forms part of the worker's salary.*\" Having determined the foregoing, the Chamber observes that, for the purposes of the decision, the nature noted by the appellant has no impact. The calculation of the school salary is made taking into account the same components used to determine the amount applicable for the year-end bonus. To that extent, it means that the amount corresponding to the extra pay in question should have been added for its calculation. Since this was not paid, it could not have been included when calculating what would have been owed for school salary. Consequently, the recognition of the extra pay (sobresueldo) in court generates a difference in the amounts the plaintiff has received for school salary since February 2020, when the extra pay in question ceased to be recognized.\n\n**e) Interest and indexation:** In another vein, the appellant requests that the award for interest and indexation be adjusted to the parameters governed by article 565 of the *Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)*. However, he does not indicate what the error of the judgment would be in this regard, and the Chamber does not note that the decision was adopted outside the bounds of said norm. The interest was granted from the date each right became due, as alleged in the appeal.\n\n**IV.- COSTS:** The appellant seeks to have his client exempted from the payment of both types of costs, for having acted with evident good faith. Article 563 of the *Labor Code* states: \"*Nevertheless, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even procedural costs, when: / 1) The litigation was conducted with evident good faith. / 2) The claims have partially succeeded. / 3) There has been reciprocal defeat. / The exoneration must always be reasoned. / A party that denied evident claims which the outcome of the process indicates it should have accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any evidence to justify its claim or exceptions, if they were based on disputed facts... may not be considered to have acted in good faith.*\" It must not be lost sight of that transcribed article 563 provides a power, not an obligation, to exonerate the losing party when any of those circumstances are present. In cases such as the present one, the Chamber has not found the requested exoneration to be appropriate, nor that the plaintiff should be burdened with the cost of the expenses incurred in defense of her remuneration, which is why it is not considered possible to vary what was decided.\n\n**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** Based on the reasons given, the appeal of the State representation must be dismissed.\n\n**VI.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA AND MAGISTRATE ORTEGA TELLERÍA:** The undersigned depart from the majority opinion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's payment of the extra pay corresponding to **Comprehensive Recovery of Children PRIN (Recuperación Integral de Niños PRIN)**, as of **February 1, 2020**. It has been duly accredited that, in the year **2019**, the plaintiff was earning that extra pay and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties; reason for which that extra pay ceased to be paid to her as of **December 1, 2019**. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon in response to a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the *Labor Code*. We are not dealing with a disability properly speaking. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, therefore it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (articles 11 of the *Political Constitution (Constitución Política)* and 11 and 13 of the *General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)*), and the employee does not meet the factual conditions provided in article 22 bis subsection a) of the *Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil)*, as she is not disabled by illness, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After a reconsideration of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that what was resolved must be revoked. Articles 118 of the *Education Code (Código de Educación)* and 13 of the *Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Staff (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente)* stipulate the possibility of assigning certain extra pays, which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, the payment thereof must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the *Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil)*, establishes that: \"*a) If the servant, **at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity**, was earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), alternate schedule, or any extra pay, **shall be entitled to a subsidy** equivalent to the **total salary** that at that time she was earning. / b) Sick leave, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). / c) For all legal effects, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that might apply. / (Thus the previous subsection was added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)*\" (the highlighting is added). From the text transcribed above it is clearly and expressly deduced that the servant who finds herself disabled by illness, or the female worker on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary for extra pays, is entitled to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to her. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties and is not disabled, therefore her situation does not fit the factual condition of the norm. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that pursuant to the provisions of articles 118, subsection j), of the *Education Code* and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these extra pays are granted when the servant carries out duties additional to those she ordinarily performs in her position, temporarily, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these extra pays depends on whether the circumstances so warrant and for this reason they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school term, according to the start and end dates regulated in article 176 of the *Civil Service Statute*; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In accordance with the foregoing, article 15 of the *Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública)* prescribes that \"*the excess shall be maintained as an extra pay, therefore, of a temporary nature*.\" Consequently, those extra pays that depend on some particular condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is sought in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that function-related extra pays cannot be considered an acquired right of the servant.\n\nThus, in judgment no. 3681, of 15:45 hours of March 22, 2011, it was stated: \"It must be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that may be classified as an overload of functions (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, obligating the Administration to maintain that condition. Generally, the assignment of such overloads—because it responds to the need to provide service at a given moment—has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in that sense judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes of May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For that reason, the overload constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a set period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the overload or alternate schedule is maintained\" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 15:14 hours of May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 hours of January 18, 2013). Likewise, in vote no. 3306, of 12:48 hours of March 9, 2007, it was noted: \"…if the assumptions under which a bonus (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 17:51 hours of July 26, 2006).\"\n\nIn this same ruling, reference was made to judgment no. 296, of 11:54 hours of January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: \"One must similarly rule regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited overload constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a set period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated overload is maintained; therefore, the appeal, with regard to this last objection, is also inadmissible…\"\n\nFinally, in resolution no. 10959, of 17:51 hours of July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: \"This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that bonuses (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a bonus was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met.\"\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the related overload constitute a temporary bonus, annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the public servant, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on said servant meeting the assumptions established in the legal system for its concession and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be noted that the payment of these overloads proceeds by reason of the position and the functions performed by the servant, and therefore may be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Obliging the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, it would give an undue advantage to relocated persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing functions by overload of some type, since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying twice (to two officials) for the same overload, when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been relocated for health reasons to assume it. As stated before and as occurs in the case under study, overloads do not constitute an acquired right, besides which, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be borne in mind that to be able to demand the payment of the overload, it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes (principle of legality that governs the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and assumptions established by it; which is not the case here.\n\nBy virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the bonus, when the plaintiff passed from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to relocation (reubicación), is in accordance with the law. For the reasons set forth, the undersigned conclude that the State's appeal must be granted, the ruling annulled, and the lawsuit dismissed. Without special sanction as to costs.\n\n**THEREFORE:**\n\nThe appeal is dismissed. Judge Varela Araya and Judge Ortega Tellería issue a dissenting vote, declare the State's appeal granted, annul the ruling, uphold the exception of lack of right, and declare the lawsuit dismissed. They resolve without special sanction as to costs.\n\nRes: 2024003075\n\n\nGGONZALEZ\n\n\n\nLuis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n\n\n|| **PROVISIONAL TECHNICAL REPORT** ||||||\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| **DD-MM-YYYY** | **Law 7575** |||||\n| **Date** | **Management Plan (Plan de Manejo)** |||||\n| **15-04-2024** | **Globision S. A.** | **Signature** ||||\n| Página **5** | | | **Lic. Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** |||\n\nThe certification block is signed by:\n\n| Signature | | Signature |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| Julia Varela Araya | | Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez |\n| Signature | | Signature |\n| Rafael Antonio Ortega Telleria | | |\n\nAs extracted from the National Notary Directorate's Digital Registration System. I issue this certification at the request of Autónomo of the Notary Public Álvaro Carvajal Alvarado. Given in the city of San José, on the sixteenth day of May of the year two thousand twenty-three. Time: 08:29:20.\n\n

Grace del Carmen Agüero Alvarado

 

 

Digitally Signed Document

-- Verification code --



 3R2HCLSVBH461

1

EXP: 22-000477-0173-LA

 

 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406.

\n\n**THE PAYMENT OF THE EXTRA-DUTY SUPPLEMENT TO A REASSIGNED OFFICIAL ON HEALTH GROUNDS IS APPROPRIATE.**\nAlthough extra-duty supplements (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute acquired rights (derechos adquiridos), in cases of medical reassignment (reubicación) pursuant to Article 254 of the Código de Trabajo and the Reglamento de Licencias Especiales del MEP (Decreto Ejecutivo N.º 19113), the additional salary that had been earned must be integrated into the allowance equivalent to the total salary. **THE PAYMENT OF** **DIFFERENCES IN CHRISTMAS BONUS, SCHOOL SALARY, INTEREST, INDEXATION, AND COSTS IS APPROPRIATE.**\n[3075-24]\n\n**DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA AND MAGISTRATE ORTEGA TELLERÍA.** They consider that the extra-duty supplement should not be maintained after the reassignment, since the plaintiff was not in a state of disability but simply performing different duties. They noted that extra-duty supplements are temporary in nature, are not acquired rights, and depend on the effective performance of extraordinary duties.\n\nBased on constitutional case law and on articles 118 of the Education Code, 13 of the MEP Procedures Manual, 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law, and 174 of the Civil Service Statute, they determined that it was not appropriate to recognize the surcharge as part of the salary of a person who no longer performs it, since that would imply a double payment and a distortion of the public remuneration system. [3075-24]

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Document Review



 

Supreme Court of Justice

SALA SEGUNDA

\\\"\\\"

 

Exp: 22-000477-0173-LA

Res: 2024003075

Grace del Carmen Agüero Alvarado

 

 

Digitally Signed Document

-- Verification Code --



 3R2HCLSVBH461

1

EXP: 22-000477-0173-LA

 

 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406.

\n\nFacsimile: 2295-3009. Email: sala-segunda@poder-judicial.go.cr" }