{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1084112", "citation": "Res. 08735-2022 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Interpretación del artículo 21 de la Ley 9047 sobre destino de licores decomisados", "title_en": "Interpretation of Article 21 of Law 9047 on disposition of seized liquor", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional evacuó una consulta judicial facultativa en la que el Juzgado Contravencional de la Zona Atlántica cuestionó la constitucionalidad del artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley No. 9047) y del artículo 53 del reglamento municipal de Pococí. La jueza consultante alegaba violación al derecho de defensa, principios de legalidad, división de poderes y juez natural, argumentando que el reglamento establecía una sanción de destrucción no prevista en la ley y sin debido proceso. La Sala desestimó la consulta, declarando las normas constitucionales. Sostuvo que el artículo 21 tipifica una contravención penal, cuyo conocimiento compete a los juzgados contravencionales bajo el Código Procesal Penal, garantizando el debido proceso. Aclaró que el artículo 53 del reglamento no obliga a destruir los bienes, sino que remite al juez para que determine lo procedente. El traslado a la vía judicial, lejos de vulnerar derechos, los protege, pues permite al imputado defenderse en un proceso penal con todas las garantías. Finalmente, reiteró que la consulta judicial no puede versar sobre el caso concreto ni indicar al juzgador cómo resolverlo.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber addressed a judicial consultation from the Contraventional Court of the Atlantic Zone, questioning the constitutionality of Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law (Law No. 9047) and Article 53 of the municipal regulation of Pococí. The judge alleged violations of the right to defense, legality, separation of powers, and natural judge, arguing the regulation imposed a destruction penalty not provided by law and without due process. The Chamber rejected the consultation, upholding the norms. It held that Article 21 establishes a criminal contravention, to be tried by contraventional courts under the Criminal Procedure Code, ensuring due process. It clarified that Article 53 does not mandate destruction, but merely refers the matter to the judge for decision. Referral to the judicial process protects rights, allowing the accused to defend in a full criminal proceeding. The Chamber also reaffirmed that judicial consultations cannot address the specific case or tell the judge how to rule.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "20/04/2022", "year": "2022", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "consulta judicial facultativa", "contravención", "juzgado contravencional", "decomiso", "días multa", "debido proceso" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico", "article": "21", "doc_id": "norm-73058", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9047", "article": "21", "doc_id": "norm-73058", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "consulta judicial", "Ley 9047", "venta ilegal de licor", "decomiso", "destrucción de bienes", "juzgado contravencional", "contravención penal", "debido proceso", "derecho de defensa", "legalidad", "competencia jurisdiccional" ], "keywords_en": [ "judicial consultation", "Law 9047", "illegal sale of liquor", "seizure", "destruction of goods", "contraventional court", "criminal contravention", "due process", "right to defense", "legality", "jurisdictional competence" ], "excerpt_es": "Como corolario de lo anterior, se constata que el hecho que las municipalidades trasladen a los respectivos juzgados contravencionales el conocimiento de posibles infracciones al artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047), para que dichos órganos jurisdiccionales conozcan y resuelvan de tales asuntos conforme a procedimiento previsto en el Código Procesal Penal, lejos de suponer una infracción a los principios constitucionales de legalidad, división de poderes, reserva de ley o el derecho de defensa, lo que procura, precisamente, es garantizar plenamente a los eventuales imputados el que se respete el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, por parte del órgano jurisdiccional competente para conocer de la posible comisión de una infracción de naturaleza penal -tipificada por el legislador en el referido artículo 21-, así como de sus consecuencias -comprendido lo referente, específicamente, al destino que debe darse el licor decomisado- conforme lo dispuesto por la normativa aplicable, incluido el Código Penal y el Código Procesal Penal.\n\nIV.- Por lo demás, en lo referente específicamente al numeral 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí, es claro que este ordinal debe interpretarse y aplicarse de consuno con el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico. Incluso, también debe integrarse con lo dispuesto en el artículo 54 de ese mismo reglamento, que establece expresamente que: \"Artículo 54.- Las sanciones contenidas en los artículos 19 y 21 de la Ley N° 9047 deberán ser tramitadas para su aplicación ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente.\" Por ende, debe reiterarse -nuevamente- que el que se disponga el traslado al respectivo juzgado contravencional del conocimiento de una posible infracción al artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047), resulta plenamente acorde con la interpretación que el propio Poder Judicial ha realizado de tal disposición normativa. Asimismo, que el artículo 53 establezca que \"las autoridades de policía mediante el levantamiento de un parte policial podrán realizar su decomiso, el cual deberá ser remitido ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente para que determine la procedencia de su destrucción\", no puede interpretarse -como parece entender la jueza consultante- que imponga al juez la obligación ineludible de disponer la destrucción de los bienes decomisados, sino que tan solo establece -en atención a lo ya previsto en el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico- que debe remitirse al órgano jurisdiccional competente el licor decomisado, para que sea este el que \"determine\" -sea, decida o resuelva- si procede o no la destrucción de los bienes, previa determinación de si se ha configurado o no una contravención. Evidentemente, será finalmente el órgano jurisdiccional competente el que deberá resolver, en el caso concreto, sobre el destino del licor decomisado, conforme lo dispuesto al efecto de la normativa aplicable.", "excerpt_en": "As a corollary of the foregoing, it is verified that the fact that municipalities refer knowledge of possible infractions of Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law (Law No. 9047) to the respective contraventional courts, so that such jurisdictional bodies hear and resolve such matters under the procedure established in the Criminal Procedure Code, far from entailing an infringement of the constitutional principles of legality, separation of powers, legal reserve, or the right to defense, precisely seeks to fully guarantee potential defendants that due process and the right to defense are respected by the competent jurisdictional body to hear the possible commission of a criminal offense—defined by the legislator in said Article 21—as well as its consequences—including specifically the destination to be given to the seized liquor—in accordance with applicable regulations, including the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIV.- Furthermore, specifically regarding numeral 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí, it is clear that this provision must be interpreted and applied together with Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law. It must also be integrated with the provisions of Article 54 of the same regulation, which expressly states: \"Article 54.- The sanctions contained in Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 shall be processed for application before the competent Contraventional Court.\" Therefore, it must be reiterated—again—that ordering the referral to the respective contraventional court for knowledge of a possible infraction of Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law (Law No. 9047) is fully consistent with the interpretation that the Judicial Branch itself has made of said regulatory provision. Likewise, that Article 53 establishes that \"police authorities, by issuing a police report, may seize [the goods], which must be sent to the competent Contraventional Court to determine the appropriateness of their destruction\" cannot be interpreted—as the consulting judge seems to understand—as imposing on the judge an unavoidable obligation to order the destruction of the seized goods, but rather only establishes—in accordance with what is already provided in Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law—that the seized liquor must be sent to the competent jurisdictional body, so that it is the latter that \"determines\"—i.e., decides or resolves—whether or not the destruction of the goods is appropriate, after determining whether a contravention has or has not been established. Obviously, it will ultimately be the competent jurisdictional body that must resolve, in the specific case, the destination of the seized liquor, in accordance with the applicable regulations.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Dismissed", "label_es": "Sentencia desestimatoria", "summary_en": "The Chamber declared that Article 21 of Law 9047 and Article 53 of the municipal regulation are not unconstitutional.", "summary_es": "La Sala declaró que el artículo 21 de la Ley 9047 y el artículo 53 del reglamento municipal no son inconstitucionales." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "...it is verified that the Judicial Branch itself has concluded that Article 21 of the Alcohol Regulation and Commercialization Law (Law No. 9047) establishes a contravention, the knowledge of which corresponds precisely to the respective contraventional courts, in accordance with Article 117, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Criminal Procedure Code.", "quote_es": "...se constata que ha sido el propio Poder Judicial el que ha concluido que el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047) tipifica una contravención, cuyo conocimiento corresponde justamente a los respectivos juzgados contravencionales, conforme lo dispuesto en el artículo 117, inciso 2, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el Código Procesal Penal." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "...the fact that municipalities refer knowledge of possible infractions of Article 21... to the respective contraventional courts, far from entailing an infringement of the constitutional principles of legality, separation of powers, legal reserve, or the right to defense, precisely seeks to fully guarantee potential defendants that due process and the right to defense are respected.", "quote_es": "...el hecho que las municipalidades trasladen a los respectivos juzgados contravencionales el conocimiento de posibles infracciones al artículo 21... lejos de suponer una infracción a los principios constitucionales de legalidad, división de poderes, reserva de ley o el derecho de defensa, lo que procura, precisamente, es garantizar plenamente a los eventuales imputados el que se respete el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "...Article 53's provision that 'police authorities... may seize [the goods], which must be sent to the competent Contraventional Court to determine the appropriateness of their destruction' cannot be interpreted... as imposing on the judge an unavoidable obligation to order the destruction of the seized goods, but rather only establishes... that the seized liquor must be sent to the competent jurisdictional body, so that it is the latter that 'determines'... whether the destruction of the goods is appropriate or not.", "quote_es": "...el artículo 53 establezca que 'las autoridades de policía... podrán realizar su decomiso, el cual deberá ser remitido ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente para que determine la procedencia de su destrucción', no puede interpretarse... que imponga al juez la obligación ineludible de disponer la destrucción de los bienes decomisados, sino que tan solo establece... que debe remitirse al órgano jurisdiccional competente el licor decomisado, para que sea este el que 'determine'... si procede o no la destrucción de los bienes." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-73058", "citation": "Ley 9047", "title_en": "Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages Law", "title_es": "Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico", "doc_type": "law", "date": "25/06/2012", "year": "2012" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-73058", "citation": "Ley 9047", "title_en": "Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages Law", "title_es": "Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico", "doc_type": "law", "date": "25/06/2012", "year": "2012" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-73058", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 9047 Art. 21" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1084112", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-73058", "norm_num": "9047", "norm_name": "Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "25/06/2012" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\nExp: 22-006958-0007-CO \n\nRes. Nº 2022008735\n\n \n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veintidos .\n\n Consulta judicial facultativa formulada por el JUZGADO CONTRAVENCIONAL Y TRÁNSITO DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE LA ZONA ATLÁNTICA, mediante resolución de las 14:00 horas del 16 de febrero de 2022, dictada dentro del expediente número 21-000775-0680-FC, que es proceso por infracción a la Ley de Licores. \n\nResultando:\n\n 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 13:25 horas del 30 de marzo de 2022 y con fundamento en los artículos 8, inciso 1), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; 2, inciso b); 3, 13, 102 y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el despacho consultante solicita a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí, así como el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico, Ley n.° 9047, a fin de determinar si son acordes con los principios constitucionales de legalidad, división de poderes, reserva de ley en materia de determinación de la competencia jurisdiccional y el derecho de defensa. En relación con el derecho de defensa, manifiesta que el artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico del cantón de Pococí establece que el Juzgado Contravencional debe resolver sobre la destrucción de unos bienes decomisados, sin que sea este mismo órgano el que conozca sobre el procedimiento que llegue a establecer la sanción de la destrucción de los bienes decomisados. En este sentido, el reglamento indica que el juez contravencional debe resolver sobre la destrucción de los bienes decomisados sin fundamento alguno en una norma que establezca esa sanción y sin un procedimiento previo que garantice en sede judicial a la persona a quien se decomisaron los bienes, la posibilidad de defenderse para evitar esa destrucción. Mientras tanto, en sede administrativa, se sigue un procedimiento contra el imputado para imponerle sanciones administrativas. En este, se garantiza el derecho de defensa sobre la posible multa a imponer como sanción administrativa, pero no sobre la sanción de destrucción que podría ordenar un juez contravencional sobre los bienes decomisados, que tiene como sustento los hechos que se discuten en sede administrativa. Manifiesta que lo acorde con el principio de defensa es que la persona a la cual se le decomisan unos bienes y se le pueda imponer una sanción de multa pueda, en el mismo proceso, ejercer su derecho de defensa, para evitar la imposición de ambas sanciones y no como lo establece el reglamento y lo señala la Ley, que se trate de dos procesos, uno para conocer la sanción administrativa de multa (sede administrativa) y otro para resolver sobre la destrucción de los bienes decomisados (sede judicial). Considera la jueza consultante que se puede lesionar también, el principio de legalidad, por tratarse de una norma reglamentaria que establece una sanción no contenida en la ley, como única consecuencia sancionatoria. El artículo 21 de la Ley n.° 9047 no señala que la única consecuencia que puede tener el decomiso de los productos, sea su destrucción. Hay otras alternativas como el comiso en favor del Estado o la devolución al imputado. Sin embargo, el artículo 53 del citado reglamento dispone como única posibilidad, la remisión de los bienes al Juzgado Contravencional para que resuelva sobre la destrucción de los mismos, impidiendo dictar una resolución distinta, como si deja abierta la Ley de Regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico. Esto podría vulnerar el principio de legalidad y la jerarquía de las normas. En materia sancionatoria existe el principio de reserva de ley y un reglamento nunca puede regular un asunto de manera distinta o en forma contraria a la ley que le sirve de base. En este caso, el Reglamento limita la sanción a imponer, determinando que sea la más gravosa, cuando la Ley no establece nada en ese sentido. Incluso, es cuestionable la procedencia del comiso, pues el artículo 110 del Código Penal habla de que el comiso es una consecuencia de un delito, no de una falta administrativa. Aún más, el artículo 490 del Código Procesal Penal señala que los objetos decomisados, no sujetos a comiso, restitución o embargo, pueden ser devueltos a quien se le secuestraron. Considera la jueza consultante que se puede producir una violación al principio de división de poderes y al principio del juez natural, pues el artículo 21 de la Ley n.° 9047 señala que los bienes serán entregados a los tribunales de Justicia, sin indicar el despacho competente para ello. La Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, establece una competencia para las autoridades judiciales, sin indicar, específicamente, a cuál despacho le toca resolver. Lo procedente sería que la competencia se defina en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial por ser una norma especial que regula la organización jurisdiccional o que la misma Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de Bebidas con contenido alcohólico, n.° 9047, haya establecido esa competencia, que por ser una competencia que se asigna a un poder de la República, tiene reserva de ley. Vía reglamentaria (artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí) no se podría establecer competencias jurisdiccionales.\n\n 2.- Los artículos 9 y 106 de la Ley de esta sede facultan a la Sala para evacuar la consulta en cualquier momento, cuando considere que está suficientemente contestada mediante la simple remisión a su jurisprudencia y precedentes.\n\nRedacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,\n\nConsiderando:\n\n I.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LAS CONSULTAS JUDICIALES.- El artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisión de las consultas judiciales, disposición de la que se desprenden algunos elementos condicionantes y fundamentales para su procedencia: que sea formulada por un juez; que existan \"dudas fundadas\" sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar; que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal; y que en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad. Tales presupuestos han sido analizados reiteradamente por este Tribunal. Así, desarrollando esos elementos, en la sentencia n.° 01617-97, de las 14:54 horas de 17 de marzo de 1997, señaló:\n\n\"A. Que la formule un \"juez\", término genérico que -desde luego- se aplica tanto a los juzgadores unipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario precisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder jurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales administrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los asuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es que se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una sentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b) que el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente habilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución que sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio a un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).\n\nB. Que existan \"dudas fundadas\" sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar. Esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y ponderado. Además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya constitucionalidad la Sala ya se haya pronunciado. Ello es así no sólo porque aceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las resoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas circunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. Pero subráyese, por su relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva de aquéllos pronunciamientos en que la Sala haya validado expresamente la adecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros constitucionales. En consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen explícito de constitucionalidad (en vía de acción o consulta), no sería viable un nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de un acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque -en este caso- siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya no en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. A la inversa, el hecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente (quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquéllos se fundamenten. Y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.\n\nC. Que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. Al igual que en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución del llamado \"asunto previo\" o \"principal\". Finalmente,\n\nD. Que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que -por su relevancia para el caso- resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión \"deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión\", conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que \"pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión\". La consulta judicial no procede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que -como se explicó arriba- esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los recursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o doctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o al juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad.\"\n\n \n\n Asimismo, el artículo 104 de la misma Ley, exige que la consulta judicial se formule en resolución fundada, se emplace a las partes dentro de tercero día y se suspenda la tramitación del proceso, hasta tanto la Sala no haya evacuado la consulta. \n\nII.- OBJETO DE LA CONSULTA. La jueza consultante formula consulta judicial facultativa respecto del artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047) en cuanto establece:\n\n“ARTÍCULO 21.- Sanciones relativas a la venta ilegal\n\nQuien comercialice bebidas con contenido alcohólico, sin contar con una licencia vigente y expedida por la municipalidad respectiva, recibirá una sanción de entre treinta y sesenta días multa, sin perjuicio del decomiso de los productos, los cuales serán entregados por el ente a los tribunales de justicia.”\n\nAsí como respecto del artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí, que dispone:\n\n“Artículo 53.-Cuando se de cualquier condición asociada a la venta y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico sin contar de previo con la respectiva licencia de funcionamiento, o el consumo de bebidas en vía pública; las autoridades de policía mediante el levantamiento de un parte policial podrán realizar su decomiso, el cual deberá ser remitido ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente para que determine la procedencia de su destrucción. La Municipalidad deberá tramitar simultáneamente la imposición de las sanciones administrativas que correspondan.” \n\nAsevera, la jueza consultante, que el citado artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico del cantón de Pococí establece que el juzgado contravencional debe resolver sobre la destrucción de unos bienes decomisados, pese que no existe una norma legal que establezca tal sanción y sin un procedimiento previo en sede judicial que le garantice a la persona a quien se decomisaron los bienes la posibilidad de defenderse. Mientras que, paralelamente, en sede administrativa, se sigue un procedimiento contra la misma persona para imponerle una sanción administrativa, en el que sí se le garantiza la posibilidad de defenderse para evitar ser multada, pero no sobre la sanción de destrucción que podría ordenar un juez contravencional sobre los bienes decomisados. Alega que esto infringe el derecho de defensa. También aduce que podría configurarse una infracción a los principios de legalidad, jerarquía de las normas y reserva de ley, en tanto que es una norma reglamentaria la que establece una sanción (la destrucción del licor decomisado) que no está contenida en la ley. Sostiene que el artículo 21 de la Ley n.° 9047 no establece que la única consecuencia de los bienes decomisados sea su destrucción, pues, de hecho, existen otras alternativas, como es el comiso en favor del Estado o la devolución al imputado, en atención a lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal. Finalmente, alega que podría producirse una violación al principio de división de poderes y al principio del juez natural, pues el artículo 21 de la Ley n.° 9047 señala que los bienes serán entregados a los tribunales de justicia, pero no precisa o indica cuál es el despacho competente para esto. Añade que tal competencia jurisdiccional no puede ser establecida por el citado reglamento. \n\nIII.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Debe reiterarse lo ya indicado en el considerando I de esta resolución, en el sentido que la consulta judicial no debe darse en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que, por el contrario, lo consultado debe ser efectivamente relevante para la decisión o resolución del respectivo asunto principal o juicio previo, en razón del carácter puramente incidental de este proceso de control de constitucionalidad. De allí, que el juzgado “debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma... que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad”. \n\nEn el sub judice, del estudio del expediente 21-000775-0680-FC, se puede verificar que la Municipalidad de Pococí comunicó al Juzgado de una posible contravención a lo dispuesto en el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico y, por ende, le hizo formal traslado del licor decomisado (véase, al efecto, oficio PA-1007-2021 del 22 de noviembre de 2021 y acta de decomiso de las 9:24 horas del 19 de noviembre de 2021). \n\nDe esta forma, la presente consulta judicial se relaciona, en el fondo, con la debida comprensión sobre el contenido y alcances del citado artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047). En cuyo caso, debe indicarse que tal artículo ya fue objeto de análisis por parte de la Comisión de Asuntos Penales del Poder Judicial (oficio n.° CAP-013-14 del 1 de abril de 2014) quien concluyó -en lo que interesa- que: \n\n“Se solicita el criterio de esta Comisión acerca de la consulta del Licenciado Garnier Vargas Barboza, Juez coordinador del Juzgado Contravencional de Tarrazú, Dota y León Cortés, quien expresa que según la Ley de Regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico número 9047, la conducta prevista en el artículo 21 corresponde conocerla a la Municipalidad, mientras que las bebidas decomisadas deben ser entregadas a los tribunales de justicia. \n\nLa Ley en cuestión señala lo siguiente: \n\nARTÍCULO 21.- Sanciones relativas a la venta ilegal. Quien comercialice bebidas con contenido alcohólico, sin contar con una licencia vigente y expedida por la municipalidad respectiva, recibirá una sanción de entre treinta y sesenta días multa, sin perjuicio del decomiso de los productos, los cuales serán entregados por el ente a los tribunales de justicia.” \n\nEl Licenciado Vargas Barboza manifiesta que según lo dispuesto en la ley, el proceso se realiza en sede administrativa a fin de imponer la sanción correspondiente, pero simultáneamente se realiza la entrega de las bebidas decomisadas a favor de los tribunales de justicia lo que implica un grave problema, en tanto estos bienes no forman parte de ningún procedimiento judicial, y la ley tampoco señala la oficina del Poder Judicial a la que deben entregarse, ni el destino que debe dársele a los mismos. \n\nLa Comisión de Asuntos Penales no comparte la interpretación que hace el consultante acerca del artículo 21 de la referida Ley 9047, por las razones que se dirán a continuación. \n\nCon respecto a la naturaleza de las sanciones, es preciso hacer ver que si bien la Ley en estudio ubica dentro de su Capítulo IV titulado “Sanciones Administrativas” una serie de sanciones, no todas ellas son de naturaleza administrativa, sino que incluye también de carácter penal, esto a pesar del título dado al capítulo por el legislador ordinario, pero que de ninguna manera puede condicionar la naturaleza de las sanciones. \n\nLos artículos 15; 16; 17; 20 y 23 de la Ley en estudio establecen sanciones de carácter administrativo. Algunas de ellas disponen el pago de un monto de dinero, y otras afectan la licencia para el expendio de bebidas alcohólicas y la operación de este tipo de establecimientos. En estos casos, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 25, corresponde a las municipalidades del país velar por el cumplimiento de la ley, y a su alcalde resolver en primera instancia este tipo de asuntos una vez cumplido el procedimiento administrativo pertinente. \n\nSin embargo, lo establecido en los artículos 19 y 21 (éste último en el que basa su consulta el Licenciado Vargas Barboza), no son sanciones administrativas sino contravenciones. Esto en razón del carácter penal de la pena que conllevan éstas últimas por voluntad expresa del legislador, cuando tipificó las conductas descritas en aquellos tipos penales creados en la Ley especial número 9074. \n\nLos artículos en cuestión dicen lo siguiente. \n\nARTÍCULO 19.- Sanciones relativas a la venta en vías públicas y sitios públicos. Quien venda bebidas con contenido alcohólico en las vías públicas y sitios públicos, casas de habitación y en aquellos otros lugares donde se desarrollan actividades deportivas, mientras se efectúa el espectáculo, recibirán sanción de entre diez y treinta días multa. \n\nARTÍCULO 21.- Sanciones relativas a la venta ilegal. Quien comercialice bebidas con contenido alcohólico, sin contar con una licencia vigente y expedida por la municipalidad respectiva, recibirá una sanción de entre treinta y sesenta días multa, sin perjuicio del decomiso de los productos, los cuales serán entregados por el ente a los tribunales de justicia. \n\nLa naturaleza de la sanción es de carácter penal de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 50 inciso 1) y 53 del Código Penal. Ahí se indica que cuando se impone la pena de días multa, que es la indicada en los artículos 19 y 21 de la Ley en estudio, esta debe ser determinada por el juez, lo mismo que cuando en algunos casos su incumplimiento pueda convertirse en un día de prisión por cada día de multa (cfr. artículos 53, 54, 55 y 56 del Código Penal). \n\nPor otra parte, además de la naturaleza de la sanción como criterio para determinar el carácter penal del tipo previsto en el artículo 21, también está la disposición del legislador que establece la posibilidad del comiso. En efecto, según lo señalado en el artículo 110 del Código Penal, el delito produce la pérdida a favor del Estado, de los instrumentos con los que se cometió, consecuencia que es la señalada también en el artículo 21 de Ley 9074, cuando ordena el decomiso de las bebidas alcohólicas y su entrega a los tribunales de justicia. \n\nEn consecuencia de lo expuesto y de las normas referidas, puede afirmarse que al ser materia penal -contravencional- las conductas tipificadas en los artículos 19 y 21 de la Ley 9047, sólo pueden ser conocidas dentro de un proceso penal tramitado conforme a lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal. Esto en razón de que los artículos 35, 39 y 153 de la Constitución Política disponen que una persona sólo se puede ser juzgada y condenada por los tribunales establecidos por la Constitución, mientras que el Código Procesal, en su artículo 3, indica que la ley penal corresponde aplicarla a los tribunales ordinarios instituidos conforme a la Carta Magna. \n\nComo complemento de lo anterior, el artículo 117 inciso 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, señala que corresponde a los juzgados contravencionales conocer de toda clase de contravenciones y de las simples infracciones previstas en leyes especiales, excepto las de carácter laboral. \n\nAnte el panorama descrito, esta Comisión concluye que los tipos previstos en los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley de Regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico número 9047, corresponde conocerlos al juez contravencional, así como recibir la evidencia y disponer de ella conforme a derecho. Lo anterior en tanto la sanción a imponer constituye una pena, y según nuestro ordenamiento jurídico solo los jueces penales, contravencionales en este caso, tienen la competencia para tramitar este tipo de procesos con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal. \n\nLa Comisión de Asuntos Penales acordó recomendar al Consejo Superior, muy respetuosamente, considere la emisión de una circular sobre lo acordado por esta Comisión.”\n\nTal oficio fue conocido, a su vez, por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.° 033 - 2014 del 10 de abril de 2014, artículo LXXVI, en la que se acordó: “Autorizar la emisión de una circular con lo acordado por la citada Comisión”. Como consecuencia, la Secretaría General de la Corte publicó la circular 101-2014 del 9 de mayo de ese mismo año, con el siguiente contenido: \n\n“CIRCULAR Nº 101-2014\n\nAsunto: Tramitación de los procesos previstos en los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley de “Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico, número 9047”.-\n\nA LOS DESPACHOS JUDICIALES DEL PAÍS\n\nSE LES HACE SABER QUE:\n\nEl Consejo Superior en sesión N° 33-14, celebrada el 10 de abril de 2014, artículo LXXVI, a solicitud de la Comisión de la Jurisdicción Penal, acordó comunicarles que los tipos penales previstos en los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley de “Regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico”, número 9047, al ser materia penal-contravencional solo pueden ser conocidas dentro de un proceso penal- contravencional tramitado conforme a lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal. \n\nLo anterior en razón de que los artículos 35, 39 y 153 de la Constitución Política disponen que una persona sólo puede ser juzgada y condenada por los tribunales establecidos por la Constitución, mientras que el Código Procesal, en su artículo 3, indica que la ley penal corresponde aplicarla a los tribunales ordinarios instituidos conforme a la Carta Magna. \n\nComo complemento de lo anterior, debe considerarse que el artículo 117 inciso 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial señala que corresponde a los Juzgados Contravencionales conocer de toda clase de contravenciones y de las simples infracciones previstas en leyes especiales, excepto las de carácter laboral. \n\nLo establecido en los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley 9047, no tiene el carácter de sanciones administrativas, sino de contravenciones. Esto en razón del carácter de la pena que conllevan éstas últimas, por disposición expresa del legislador cuando tipificó las conductas descritas en esos tipos penales. \n\nLa naturaleza de la sanción es de carácter penal, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 50 inciso 1) y 53 del Código Penal. Donde se indica que cuando se impone la pena de días multa esta debe ser determinada por el Juez, lo mismo sucede cuando en algunos casos su incumplimiento puede convertirse en un día de prisión por cada día de multa (v.gr. artículos 53, 54, 55 y 56 del Código Penal). \n\nSegún lo expuesto, los tipos previstos en los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley de Regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico número 9047, corresponde conocerlos al Juez Contravencional, así como recibir la evidencia y disponer de ella conforme a derecho. Lo anterior en tanto la sanción a imponer constituye una pena, y según nuestro ordenamiento jurídico solo los jueces penales, contravencionales en este caso, tienen la competencia para tramitar este tipo de procesos con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal.”\n\nAsí las cosas, se constata que ha sido el propio Poder Judicial el que ha concluido que el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047) tipifica una contravención, cuyo conocimiento corresponde justamente a los respectivos juzgados contravencionales, conforme lo dispuesto en el artículo 117, inciso 2, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el Código Procesal Penal. Juzgados a los que corresponde determinar -previa observancia del debido proceso- no solo si se configuró la respectiva contravención, sino que sus eventuales consecuencias, incluido lo referente al destino de los bienes decomisados. \n\nDe hecho, cabe observar que la Procuraduría General de la República llegó a similar conclusión, como así se puede constatar de la lectura del dictamen C-298-2014 del 22 setiembre de 2014, en el que se indicó -en lo que interesa-: \n\n \n\n“Los numerales 19 y 21 de la Ley No. 9047 disponen sanciones de días multa, en los siguientes términos:\n\nARTÍCULO 19.- Sanciones relativas a la venta en vías públicas y sitios públicos\n\nQuien venda bebidas con contenido alcohólico en las vías públicas y sitios públicos, casas de habitación y en aquellos otros lugares donde se desarrollan actividades deportivas, mientras se efectúa el espectáculo, recibirán sanción de entre diez y treinta días multa.\n\nARTÍCULO 21.- Sanciones relativas a la venta ilegal\n\nQuien comercialice bebidas con contenido alcohólico, sin contar con una licencia vigente y expedida por la municipalidad respectiva, recibirá una sanción de entre treinta y sesenta días multa, sin perjuicio del decomiso de los productos, los cuales serán entregados por el ente a los tribunales de justicia.\n\nComo indicamos en páginas que preceden, estas normas se encuentran vigentes y resultan plenamente aplicables.\n\nLa municipalidad consultante plantea una serie de cuestionamientos en relación a la aplicación de la norma, referidos a que la Ley No, 9047 no define el concepto de día multa, ni establece los parámetros para la aplicación de la norma en sede administrativa.\n\nEstos aspectos nos llevan a examinar la naturaleza de la sanción de días multa, a efecto de determinar a quién corresponde la competencia para la aplicación de dicha sanción.\n\nPara los efectos indicados, recurriremos a la interpretación armónica del ordenamiento jurídico, y echaremos mano de la rama del Derecho Penal.\n\nEn el caso de día multa, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 53 del Código Penal, es posible afirmar que estamos en presencia de una sanción de naturaleza penal:\n\n“Multa.\n\nArtículo 53. —La pena de multa obliga a la persona condenada a pagar una suma de dinero a la institución que la ley designe, dentro de los quince días posteriores a la firmeza de la sentencia.\n\nCuando se imponga la pena de días multa, el juez, en sentencia motivada, fijará en primer término el número de días multa que deberá cubrir la persona condenada, dentro de los límites señalados para cada delito, según la gravedad del hecho, las circunstancias de modo, tiempo y lugar así como las características propias del autor, directamente relacionadas con la conducta delictiva. Esta pena no podrá exceder de trescientos sesenta días multa.\n\nEn dicha sentencia, en forma motivada, el juez deberá determinar la suma de dinero correspondiente a cada día multa, conforme a la situación económica de la persona condenada, tomando en cuenta su nivel de vida, todos sus ingresos diarios y los gastos razonables para atender tanto sus necesidades como las de su familia. Cada día multa no podrá exceder de un cincuenta por ciento (50%) del ingreso diario del sentenciado. El fiscal o el juez en su caso, con la colaboración de la Oficina de Trabajo Social del Poder Judicial deben realizar las indagaciones necesarias para determinar la verdadera situación económica del imputado y sus posibilidades de pago. (Así reformado por el inciso b) del artículo 1 de la Ley N° 8250 de 2 de mayo del 2002)”. (Lo resaltado no es del original)\n\nDel artículo trascrito, resulta posible deducir que el día multa es una sanción cuya aplicación está y debe estarlo, de manera restrictiva dentro del ámbito de competencia del juez, que por sus facultades otorgadas por ley, tiene la potestad de llevar a cabo este tipo de procedimientos.\n\nAdicional a esto, dispone que la imposición de esta sanción debe darse bajo sentencia motivada, fijando el número de días multa que deberá cubrir la persona infractora, todo esto en concordancia con la gravedad del hecho.\n\nBajo este contexto, es posible afirmar que la sanción de días multa se sale del ámbito de las sanciones administrativas, y pasa a ser un asunto que, por su naturaleza, debe ser atendido a nivel jurisdiccional, es decir por un juez.\n\nLo anterior, encuentra su razón de ser en una división de funciones, esto es, que hay materias cuyo conocimiento se encuentra restringido y reservado a ser conocido por ciertos órganos que resultan ser los únicos competentes, consecuentemente, el ente municipal no podría aplicar los numerales 19 y 21 de comentario.\n\nVeamos, que con las normas que aquí nos ocupa, se penan dos conductas: en primer lugar a quien venda bebidas con contenido alcohólico en las vías públicas, casas de habitación y en aquellos otros lugares donde sean desarrolladas actividades deportivas mientras se efectúa el espectáculo, y seguidamente, a quien comercialice bebidas con contenido alcohólico sin contar con una licencia vigente y expedida por la municipalidad respetiva, (artículos 19 y 21 respectivamente, de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico, No. 9047).\n\nAmbas acciones se encuentran sancionadas con días multa, que como indicamos, es una sanción de naturaleza penal, y por ende, corresponde al Juez Penal, la valoración en cada caso, de las conductas reprochadas, a efecto de determinar si se ha configurado la conducta ilegitima, y la imposición de la sanción de días multa conforme a la valoración de los hechos.\n\nLos aspectos dichos se escapan del ámbito administrativo municipal, y corresponde a competencias propias del Juez.\n\nAhora bien, si bien es cierto que los numerales 19 y 21 de la ley número 9047 se encuentran comprendidos en la sección IV de la ley, cuyo capitulo lleva el título de sanciones administrativas, se considera que debe realizarse un una interpretación armónica e integral del ordenamiento jurídico, conforme a las reglas del Código Civil, en concreto el numeral 10, que dispone:\n\n“Artículo 10\n\n Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas.”\n\nConforme al numeral referido, y de una revisión e interpretación conjunta e integral del ordenamiento jurídico, nos lleva a afirmar, que se trata de sanciones que deben ser conocidas dentro del ámbito de la jurisdicción penal, de suerte que, no corresponde a la autoridad administrativa su imposición.\n\nDe ahí que, de los artículos 19 y 21 de comentario, se debe entender que corresponde a las municipalidades informar de la trasgresión cometida a las autoridades competentes, esto es a la autoridad jurisdiccional, a efecto de que se inicie el proceso respectivo y se determine la pertinencia o no de la aplicación de la sanción prevista.\n\nSobre este aspecto, este Órgano Asesor señaló, si bien refiriéndose a la regulación de venta de licores anterior, lo siguiente:\n\n“(…) Resulta pertinente apuntar que a las municipalidades, en atención a las competencias que le han sido otorgadas relacionadas con la fiscalización de la correcta aplicación de la normativa que tiene que ver con el funcionamiento de establecimientos de venta de licor y el uso adecuado de las patentes lo que le corresponde, es denunciar ante las autoridades respectivas\n\nEn tal sentido, las corporaciones municipales no sólo deben velar por su cumplimiento, sino que resultan ser las competentes para INTERPONER LAS CORRESPONDIENTES ACCIONES ANTE LA AUTORIDAD JUDICIAL, con el objeto de que se apliquen las sanciones previstas en el cuerpo normativo de referencia. (C-008-97 de 16 de enero de 1997. El subrayado no es del original). \n\nConforme a lo dicho, los artículos 19 y 21 de comentario regulan sanciones que deben ser conocidas dentro del ámbito de la jurisdicción penal, de suerte que, no corresponde a la autoridad administrativa su imposición.\n\nIV. CONCLUSIONES\n\nConforme a lo expuesto, este Órgano Asesor concluye, lo siguiente:\n\n1. Los artículos 19 y 21 de la ley No. 9047 se encuentran vigentes y por ende son aplicables.\n\n2. La sanción de día multa es de naturaleza penal.\n\n3. Se estima, en una interpretación armónica e integral del ordenamiento jurídico, que las sanciones previstas en los numerales 19 y 21 de la Ley No. 9047 deben ser conocidas en sede jurisdiccional, correspondiendo a los entes municipales realizar la denuncia ante la autoridad respectiva.”\n\n \n\nComo corolario de lo anterior, se constata que el hecho que las municipalidades trasladen a los respectivos juzgados contravencionales el conocimiento de posibles infracciones al artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047), para que dichos órganos jurisdiccionales conozcan y resuelvan de tales asuntos conforme a procedimiento previsto en el Código Procesal Penal, lejos de suponer una infracción a los principios constitucionales de legalidad, división de poderes, reserva de ley o el derecho de defensa, lo que procura, precisamente, es garantizar plenamente a los eventuales imputados el que se respete el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, por parte del órgano jurisdiccional competente para conocer de la posible comisión de una infracción de naturaleza penal -tipificada por el legislador en el referido artículo 21-, así como de sus consecuencias -comprendido lo referente, específicamente, al destino que debe darse el licor decomisado- conforme lo dispuesto por la normativa aplicable, incluido el Código Penal y el Código Procesal Penal. Por ende, no se constatan los reproches formulados por la jueza consultante, conforme a una adecuada interpretación y aplicación del artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico.\n\nIV.- Por lo demás, en lo referente específicamente al numeral 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí, es claro que este ordinal debe interpretarse y aplicarse de consuno con el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico. Incluso, también debe integrarse con lo dispuesto en el artículo 54 de ese mismo reglamento, que establece expresamente que: \n\n“Artículo 54.- Las sanciones contenidas en los artículos 19 y 21 de la Ley N° 9047 deberán ser tramitadas para su aplicación ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente.” \n\nPor ende, debe reiterarse -nuevamente- que el que se disponga el traslado al respectivo juzgado contravencional del conocimiento de una posible infracción al artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047), resulta plenamente acorde con la interpretación que el propio Poder Judicial ha realizado de tal disposición normativa. Asimismo, que el artículo 53 establezca que “las autoridades de policía mediante el levantamiento de un parte policial podrán realizar su decomiso, el cual deberá ser remitido ante el Juzgado Contravencional competente para que determine la procedencia de su destrucción”, no puede interpretarse -como parece entender la jueza consultante- que imponga al juez la obligación ineludible de disponer la destrucción de los bienes decomisados, sino que tan solo establece -en atención a lo ya previsto en el artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico- que debe remitirse al órgano jurisdiccional competente el licor decomisado, para que sea este el que “determine” -sea, decida o resuelva- si procede o no la destrucción de los bienes, previa determinación de si se ha configurado o no una contravención. Evidentemente, será finalmente el órgano jurisdiccional competente el que deberá resolver, en el caso concreto, sobre el destino del licor decomisado, conforme lo dispuesto al efecto de la normativa aplicable. \n\nV.- Por último, debe aclararse a la jueza consultante que no le corresponde a esta Sala delimitar su competencia, ni indicarle qué debe resolver en el caso concreto sometido a su conocimiento, ni -en particular- sobre la forma en que debe disponerse del licor decomisado. Este Tribunal ha aclarado que:\n\n“(…) que las consultas facultativas que promuevan los jueces de la República deben ser en relación con... las normas o actos que deban aplicar, pero no se trata de que en esta jurisdicción se le indique qué norma debe aplicar al caso sometido a su conocimiento…” (voto n.° 2775-97 de las 15:33 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997).\n\nMientras que, en el voto n.° 2013-010828 de las 15:00 horas del 14 de agosto de 2013, esta Sala señaló lo que sigue: \n\n“(…) en reiteradas ocasiones este Tribunal ha indicado que las consultas judiciales que promuevan los jueces deben formularse en relación con las normas o actos que deban aplicar, pero no en relación con el caso concreto”.\n\nVI.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario, es claro que las normas consultadas no son inconstitucionales, en los términos en que esta consulta ha sido formulada. \n\nVII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.\n\nPor tanto:\n\n Se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que las normas consultadas no son inconstitucionales. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPresidente\n\n \n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\n \n\nPaul Rueda L.\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\n \n\nJorge Araya G.\n\nAnamari Garro V.\n\n \n\nJose Roberto Garita N.\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n PMHIUGRMX5M61 \n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 22-006958-0007-CO \n\n \n\nTeléfonos: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Dirección: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6", "body_en_text": "Document Review\n\n\n\nCase File: 22-006958-0007-CO\n\nResolution No. 2022008735\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours fifty-five minutes on the twentieth of April, two thousand twenty-two.\n\nOptional judicial consultation (consulta judicial facultativa) filed by the CONTRAVENTIONAL AND TRAFFIC COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE ATLANTIC ZONE, by means of a resolution at 2:00 p.m. on February 16, 2022, issued within case file number 21-000775-0680-FC, which is a proceeding for violation of the Liquor Law.\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- Through a document received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 1:25 p.m. on March 30, 2022, and based on articles 8, subsection 1), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; 2, subsection b); 3, 13, 102, and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the consulting office requests this Chamber to rule on the constitutionality of article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content in the Canton of Pococí (Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí), as well as article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content, Law No. 9047, in order to determine whether they are consistent with the constitutional principles of legality, division of powers, legal reserve in matters of determining jurisdictional competence, and the right of defense. In relation to the right of defense, it states that article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content in the canton of Pococí establishes that the Contraventional Court must resolve on the destruction of some seized goods (bienes decomisados), without this same body being the one that hears the procedure that may lead to establishing the sanction of destruction of the seized goods. In this sense, the regulation indicates that the contraventional judge must resolve on the destruction of the seized goods without any basis in a norm that establishes that sanction and without a prior procedure that guarantees, in the judicial venue (sede judicial), the person from whom the goods were seized the possibility of defending themselves to avoid that destruction. Meanwhile, in the administrative venue (sede administrativa), a procedure is followed against the accused to impose administrative sanctions on them. In this, the right of defense is guaranteed regarding the possible fine to be imposed as an administrative sanction, but not regarding the sanction of destruction that a contraventional judge could order on the seized goods, which is based on the facts being discussed in the administrative venue. It states that what is consistent with the principle of defense is that the person from whom goods are seized and upon whom a fine sanction may be imposed may, in the same process, exercise their right of defense to avoid the imposition of both sanctions, and not as established by the regulation and indicated by the Law, which involves two processes, one to hear the administrative sanction of a fine (administrative venue) and another to resolve on the destruction of the seized goods (judicial venue). The consulting judge considers that the principle of legality may also be violated, as it involves a regulatory norm (norma reglamentaria) that establishes a sanction not contained in the law, as the only sanctioning consequence. Article 21 of Law No. 9047 does not state that the only consequence that the seizure of the products can have is their destruction. There are other alternatives, such as forfeiture (comiso) in favor of the State or return to the accused. However, article 53 of the cited regulation provides as the only possibility, the referral of the goods to the Contraventional Court so that it resolves on their destruction, preventing it from issuing a different resolution, as permitted by the Law on the Regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content. This could violate the principle of legality and the hierarchy of norms. In sanctioning matters, the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) exists, and a regulation can never regulate a matter in a manner different from or contrary to the law that serves as its basis. In this case, the Regulation limits the sanction to be imposed, determining that it be the most grievous one, when the Law establishes nothing in that regard. Even the appropriateness of forfeiture is questionable, since article 110 of the Penal Code speaks of forfeiture being a consequence of a crime, not of an administrative infraction. Furthermore, article 490 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) states that seized objects, not subject to forfeiture, restitution, or embargo, may be returned to the person from whom they were confiscated. The consulting judge considers that a violation of the principle of division of powers and the principle of the natural judge (juez natural) may occur, since article 21 of Law No. 9047 states that the goods will be delivered to the courts of justice, without indicating the competent office for this. The Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes competence for judicial authorities, without specifically indicating which office is responsible for resolving this. The appropriate course would be for the competence to be defined in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as it is a special norm that regulates jurisdictional organization, or for the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Beverages with alcoholic content, No. 9047 itself, to have established that competence, which, because it is a competence assigned to a branch of the Republic, is subject to legal reserve. By regulatory means (article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content in the Canton of Pococí), jurisdictional competences could not be established.\n\n2.- Articles 9 and 106 of the Law of this Chamber empower the Chamber to address the consultation at any time, when it considers that it is sufficiently answered by simply referring to its jurisprudence and precedents.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS.- Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations, a provision from which some fundamental and conditioning elements for its admissibility emerge: that it be formulated by a judge; that there exist \"founded doubts\" (dudas fundadas) about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or judged; that there exist a case pending before the judge or court; and that in that preliminary matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These prerequisites have been repeatedly analyzed by this Court. Thus, developing those elements, in ruling No. 01617-97, at 2:54 p.m. on March 17, 1997, it stated:\n\n\"A. That it be formulated by a 'judge,' a generic term that -of course- applies to both single-judge courts and collegiate tribunals, and on which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators in the context of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitration award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must be, at the time of formulating the consultation, duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental nature).\n\nB. That there exist 'founded doubts' about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and measured. Furthermore, it implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the adequacy of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional review (via action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because -in this case- there is always the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been endorsed previously (perhaps via amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.\n\nC. That there exist a case pending before the judge or court. As with the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation is never made in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'preliminary matter' or 'principal matter.' Finally,\n\nD. That, in that preliminary matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that -due to its relevance for the case- is convenient to clarify. Indeed, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' carries a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be judged.' The judicial consultation is not appropriate before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since -as explained above- this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality on their part.\"\n\nLikewise, article 104 of the same Law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within three days, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended until the Chamber has addressed the consultation.\n\nII.- OBJECT OF THE CONSULTATION. The consulting judge files an optional judicial consultation regarding article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content (Law No. 9047) in that it establishes:\n\n\"ARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale\n\nAnyone who commercializes beverages with alcoholic content, without having a valid license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\"\n\nAs well as regarding article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content in the Canton of Pococí, which provides:\n\n\"Article 53.- When any condition associated with the sale and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content without having previously obtained the respective operating license occurs, or the consumption of beverages on public roads; the police authorities, by means of issuing a police report, may carry out their seizure, which must be referred to the competent Contraventional Court (Juzgado Contravencional) to determine the appropriateness of their destruction. The Municipality must simultaneously process the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions.\"\n\nThe consulting judge asserts that the cited article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content of the canton of Pococí establishes that the contraventional court must resolve on the destruction of some seized goods, even though no legal norm establishes such a sanction and without a prior procedure in the judicial venue that guarantees the person from whom the goods were seized the possibility of defending themselves. While, in parallel, in the administrative venue, a procedure is followed against the same person to impose an administrative sanction on them, in which the possibility of defending themselves to avoid being fined is guaranteed, but not regarding the sanction of destruction that a contraventional judge could order on the seized goods. It alleges that this infringes the right of defense. It also argues that an infringement of the principles of legality, hierarchy of norms, and legal reserve could be configured, insofar as it is a regulatory norm that establishes a sanction (the destruction of the seized liquor) that is not contained in the law. It maintains that article 21 of Law No. 9047 does not establish that the only consequence for the seized goods is their destruction, since, in fact, there are other alternatives, such as forfeiture in favor of the State or return to the accused, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Finally, it alleges that a violation of the principle of division of powers and the principle of the natural judge could occur, since article 21 of Law No. 9047 states that the goods will be delivered to the courts of justice, but does not specify or indicate which is the competent office for this. It adds that such jurisdictional competence cannot be established by the cited regulation.\n\nIII.- ON THE MERITS. It must be reiterated what was already indicated in considering I of this resolution, in the sense that the judicial consultation must not be made in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but, on the contrary, what is consulted must be effectively relevant for the decision or resolution of the respective principal matter or preliminary trial, by reason of the purely incidental nature of this constitutional review process. Hence, the court \"must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm... that raises a doubt of constitutionality on their part.\"\n\nIn the sub judice, from the study of case file 21-000775-0680-FC, it can be verified that the Municipality of Pococí notified the Court of a possible contravention of the provisions of article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content and, therefore, formally transferred the seized liquor to it (see, for this purpose, official letter PA-1007-2021 of November 22, 2021, and seizure report at 9:24 a.m. on November 19, 2021).\n\nThus, the present judicial consultation relates, in essence, to the proper understanding of the content and scope of the cited article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content (Law No. 9047). In which case, it must be noted that this article was already the subject of analysis by the Criminal Affairs Committee of the Judicial Branch (Comisión de Asuntos Penales del Poder Judicial) (official letter No. CAP-013-14 of April 1, 2014) which concluded -in what is relevant- that:\n\n\"The opinion of this Committee is requested regarding the consultation of Licenciado Garnier Vargas Barboza, Coordinating Judge of the Contraventional Court of Tarrazú, Dota and León Cortés, who states that according to the Law on the Regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content number 9047, the conduct provided for in article 21 corresponds to be heard by the Municipality, while the seized beverages must be delivered to the courts of justice.\n\nThe Law in question states the following:\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale. Anyone who commercializes beverages with alcoholic content, without having a valid license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine, without prejudice to the seizure of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\"\n\nLicenciado Vargas Barboza states that according to the provisions of the law, the process is carried out in the administrative venue in order to impose the corresponding sanction, but simultaneously the delivery of the seized beverages is made to the courts of justice, which implies a serious problem, insofar as these goods are not part of any judicial proceeding, and the law also does not indicate the office of the Judicial Branch to which they must be delivered, nor the destination that must be given to them.\n\nThe Criminal Affairs Committee does not share the interpretation made by the consultant regarding article 21 of the referenced Law 9047, for the reasons that will be stated below.\n\nRegarding the nature of the sanctions, it must be pointed out that although the Law under study places within its Chapter IV titled 'Administrative Sanctions' a series of sanctions, not all of them are of an administrative nature, but it also includes some of a criminal nature, this despite the title given to the chapter by the ordinary legislator, which can in no way condition the nature of the sanctions.\n\nArticles 15; 16; 17; 20 and 23 of the Law under study establish sanctions of an administrative nature. Some of them provide for the payment of a sum of money, and others affect the license for the sale of alcoholic beverages and the operation of this type of establishment. In these cases, according to the provisions of article 25, it corresponds to the country's municipalities to ensure compliance with the law, and to their mayor to resolve in the first instance this type of matter once the pertinent administrative procedure has been completed.\n\nHowever, the provisions of articles 19 and 21 (the latter on which Licenciado Vargas Barboza bases his consultation), are not administrative sanctions but contraventions (contravenciones). This is due to the criminal nature of the penalty they carry, by the express will of the legislator, when it typified the conducts described in those criminal types created in special Law number 9074.\n\nThe articles in question state the following.\n\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions relating to sale on public roads and public places. Whoever sells beverages with alcoholic content on public roads and public places, dwelling houses, and in those other places where sports activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty days fine.\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale. Anyone who commercializes beverages with alcoholic content, without having a valid license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine, without prejudice to the seizure of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is of a criminal nature in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Penal Code. It is indicated there that when the penalty of days fine is imposed, which is the penalty indicated in articles 19 and 21 of the Law under study, it must be determined by the judge, as well as when in some cases its non-compliance may be converted into one day of imprisonment for each day fine (cf. articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Penal Code).\n\nOn the other hand, in addition to the nature of the sanction as a criterion for determining the criminal nature of the type provided for in article 21, there is also the legislator's provision that establishes the possibility of forfeiture. Indeed, according to the provisions of article 110 of the Penal Code, the crime produces the loss, in favor of the State, of the instruments with which it was committed, a consequence that is also indicated in article 21 of Law 9074, when it orders the seizure of the alcoholic beverages and their delivery to the courts of justice.\n\nAs a consequence of the foregoing and the referenced norms, it can be affirmed that as the conducts typified in articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047 are criminal - contraventional matters, they can only be heard within a criminal process processed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. This is because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person can only be tried and condemned by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Procedural Code, in its article 3, indicates that criminal law corresponds to be applied by the ordinary courts instituted in accordance with the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch indicates that it corresponds to the contraventional courts to hear all kinds of contraventions and simple infractions provided for in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nGiven the described scenario, this Committee concludes that the types provided for in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on the Regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content number 9047, correspond to be heard by the contraventional judge, as well as to receive the evidence and dispose of it in accordance with the law. The foregoing since the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty, and according to our legal system only criminal judges, contraventional judges in this case, have the competence to process this type of proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe Criminal Affairs Committee agreed to recommend to the Superior Council, very respectfully, to consider the issuance of a circular on what was agreed by this Committee.\"\n\nThis official letter was known, in turn, by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 033 - 2014 of April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, in which it was agreed: \"Authorize the issuance of a circular with what was agreed by the cited Committee.\" As a consequence, the General Secretariat of the Court published circular 101-2014 of May 9 of that same year, with the following content:\n\n\"CIRCULAR No. 101-2014\n\nSubject: Processing of proceedings provided for in articles 19 and 21 of the law on 'Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content, number 9047'.-\n\nTO THE JUDICIAL OFFICES OF THE COUNTRY\n\nBE IT KNOWN THAT:\n\nThe Superior Council in session No. 33-14, held on April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, at the request of the Criminal Jurisdiction Committee, agreed to inform you that the criminal types provided for in articles 19 and 21 of the law on 'Regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content,' number 9047, being criminal-contraventional matters can only be heard within a criminal-contraventional process processed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe foregoing because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person can only be tried and condemned by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Procedural Code, in its article 3, indicates that criminal law corresponds to be applied by the ordinary courts instituted in accordance with the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, it should be considered that article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch indicates that it corresponds to the Contraventional Courts to hear all kinds of contraventions and simple infractions provided for in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nThe provisions of articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047 do not have the character of administrative sanctions, but of contraventions. This is due to the character of the penalty they carry, by express provision of the legislator when it typified the conducts described in those criminal types.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is of a criminal nature, in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Penal Code. Where it is indicated that when the penalty of days fine is imposed, it must be determined by the Judge, the same occurs when in some cases its non-compliance may be converted into one day of imprisonment for each day fine (e.g., articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Penal Code).\n\nAccording to the foregoing, the types provided for in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on the Regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content number 9047, correspond to be heard by the Contraventional Judge, as well as to receive the evidence and dispose of it in accordance with the law. The foregoing since the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty, and according to our legal system only criminal judges, contraventional judges in this case, have the competence to process this type of proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.\"\n\nThus, it is confirmed that it has been the Judicial Branch itself that has concluded that article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content (Law No. 9047) typifies a contravention, the hearing of which corresponds precisely to the respective contraventional courts, in accordance with the provisions of article 117, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Criminal Procedure Code. Courts to which it corresponds to determine -after prior observance of due process- not only whether the respective contravention was configured, but also its eventual consequences, including what pertains to the disposition of the seized goods.\n\nIn fact, it should be noted that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic reached a similar conclusion, as can be verified from the reading of opinion C-298-2014 of September 22, 2014, in which it was indicated -in what is relevant-:\n\n\"Numerals 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 provide for sanctions of days fine, in the following terms:\n\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions relating to sale on public roads and public places\n\nWhoever sells beverages with alcoholic content on public roads and public places, dwelling houses, and in those other places where sports activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty days fine.\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale\n\nAnyone who commercializes beverages with alcoholic content, without having a valid license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine, without prejudice to the seizure of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nAs we indicated in the preceding pages, these norms are in force and are fully applicable.\n\nThe consulting municipality raises a series of questions in relation to the application of the norm, referring to the fact that Law No. 9047 does not define the concept of day fine (día multa), nor does it establish the parameters for the application of the norm in the administrative venue.\n\nThese aspects lead us to examine the nature of the sanction of days fine, in order to determine who has the competence for the application of said sanction.\n\nFor the indicated purposes, we will resort to the harmonious interpretation of the legal system, and will draw upon the branch of Criminal Law.\n\nIn the case of day fine, in accordance with the provisions of article 53 of the Penal Code, it is possible to affirm that we are in the presence of a sanction of a criminal nature:\n\n\"Fine.\n\nArticle 53. —The penalty of a fine obligates the convicted person to pay a sum of money to the institution designated by law, within fifteen days after the finality of the judgment.\n\nWhen the penalty of days fine is imposed, the judge, in a reasoned judgment, shall first determine the number of days fine that the convicted person must cover, within the limits indicated for each crime, according to the gravity of the act, the circumstances of manner, time and place, as well as the author's own characteristics, directly related to the criminal conduct. This penalty may not exceed three hundred sixty days fine.\n\nIn said judgment, in a reasoned manner, the judge must determine the sum of money corresponding to each day fine, according to the economic situation of the convicted person, taking into account their standard of living, all their daily income, and reasonable expenses to meet both their needs and those of their family. Each day fine may not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the daily income of the sentenced person. The prosecutor or the judge, as appropriate, with the collaboration of the Social Work Office of the Judicial Branch must carry out the necessary inquiries to determine the true economic situation of the accused and their ability to pay. (As amended by subsection b) of article 1 of Law No. 8250 of May 2, 2002)\".\n\n(The highlighted text is not from the original)\n\nFrom the transcribed article, it is possible to deduce that the day-fine (día multa) is a sanction whose application is and must be, restrictively, within the scope of the judge's competence, who, by the powers granted by law, has the authority to carry out this type of procedure.\n\nIn addition to this, it provides that the imposition of this sanction must be done under a reasoned judgment, fixing the number of day-fines (días multa) that the offender must pay, all in accordance with the seriousness of the act.\n\nIn this context, it is possible to affirm that the sanction of day-fines (días multa) falls outside the scope of administrative sanctions, and becomes a matter that, by its nature, must be addressed at the jurisdictional level, that is, by a judge.\n\nThe foregoing finds its rationale in a division of functions, that is, that there are matters whose cognizance is restricted and reserved to be heard by certain bodies that are the only competent ones; consequently, the municipal entity could not apply numerals 19 and 21 under discussion.\n\nLet us see that the norms at issue here penalize two conducts: first, anyone who sells alcoholic beverages on public roads (vías públicas), in dwelling houses (casas de habitación) and in those other places where sporting activities are held while the event is taking place, and secondly, anyone who markets alcoholic beverages without a current license issued by the respective municipality (Articles 19 and 21 respectively, of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages, No. 9047).\n\nBoth actions are sanctioned with day-fines (días multa), which, as we indicated, is a sanction of a criminal nature, and therefore, it is for the Criminal Judge to assess, in each case, the reproached conduct, in order to determine whether the illegitimate conduct has been configured, and the imposition of the sanction of day-fines (días multa) according to the assessment of the facts.\n\nThe aspects mentioned escape the municipal administrative sphere, and correspond to the judge's own competences.\n\nNow, while it is true that numerals 19 and 21 of Law number 9047 are included in Section IV of the law, whose chapter bears the title of administrative sanctions, it is considered that a harmonious and integral interpretation of the legal system must be carried out, in accordance with the rules of the Civil Code, specifically numeral 10, which provides:\n\n\"Article 10\n\n The norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.\"\n\nIn accordance with the referenced numeral, and from a joint and integral review and interpretation of the legal system, it leads us to affirm that these are sanctions that must be heard within the criminal jurisdiction, so that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nHence, from Articles 19 and 21 under discussion, it must be understood that it is the responsibility of the municipalities to inform the competent authorities, that is, the jurisdictional authority, of the transgression committed, so that the respective process may be initiated and the pertinence or not of the application of the provided sanction may be determined.\n\nOn this aspect, this Advisory Body pointed out, albeit referring to the previous regulation of liquor sales, the following:\n\n\"(…) It is pertinent to note that the municipalities, in attention to the competences that have been granted to them related to the supervision of the correct application of the regulations concerning the operation of liquor-selling establishments and the proper use of licenses (patentes), what corresponds to them is to report to the respective authorities.\n\nIn this sense, the municipal corporations must not only ensure their compliance, but they are also the competent ones to FILE THE CORRESPONDING ACTIONS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, in order that the sanctions provided for in the normative body of reference be applied. (C-008-97 of January 16, 1997. The underline is not from the original).\n\nIn accordance with the above, Articles 19 and 21 under discussion regulate sanctions that must be heard within the criminal jurisdiction, so that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nIV. CONCLUSIONS\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, this Advisory Body concludes the following:\n\n1. Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 are in force and therefore applicable.\n\n2. The day-fine (día multa) sanction is of a criminal nature.\n\n3. It is considered, in a harmonious and integral interpretation of the legal system, that the sanctions provided for in numerals 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be heard in the jurisdictional venue, and it is the responsibility of the municipal entities to file the complaint before the respective authority.\"\n\n \n\nAs a corollary to the foregoing, it is verified that the fact that the municipalities transfer knowledge of possible infractions of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047) to the respective contraventional courts (juzgados contravencionales), so that said jurisdictional bodies hear and resolve such matters in accordance with the procedure provided in the Criminal Procedural Code, far from implying an infringement of the constitutional principles of legality, division of powers, legal reservation, or the right of defense, what it seeks, precisely, is to fully guarantee to potential defendants the respect for due process and the right of defense, by the competent jurisdictional body to hear the possible commission of an infraction of a criminal nature - classified by the legislator in the referenced Article 21 -, as well as its consequences - including what refers, specifically, to the fate that must be given to the seized liquor - in accordance with the provisions of applicable regulations, including the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural Code. Therefore, the reproaches made by the consulting judge are not verified, in accordance with an adequate interpretation and application of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages.\n\nIV.- Furthermore, specifically regarding numeral 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and marketing of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí, it is clear that this ordinal must be interpreted and applied in conjunction with Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages. Indeed, it must also be integrated with the provisions of Article 54 of that same regulation, which expressly establishes that:\n\n\"Article 54.- The sanctions contained in Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be processed for their application before the competent Contraventional Court.\"\n\nTherefore, it must be reiterated - once again - that ordering the transfer to the respective contraventional court of knowledge of a possible infraction of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047), is fully in accordance with the interpretation that the Judicial Branch itself has made of such normative provision. Likewise, that Article 53 establishes that \"police authorities, by drawing up a police report, may carry out its seizure (decomiso), which must be sent to the competent Contraventional Court so that it may determine the appropriateness of its destruction,\" cannot be interpreted - as the consulting judge seems to understand - as imposing on the judge the unavoidable obligation to order the destruction of the seized goods, but rather only establishes - in attention to what is already provided for in Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages - that the seized liquor must be sent to the competent jurisdictional body, so that it is the one that \"determines\" - that is, decides or resolves - whether the destruction of the goods is appropriate or not, after determining whether or not a contravention has been configured. Evidently, it will ultimately be the competent jurisdictional body that must resolve, in the specific case, the fate of the seized liquor, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable regulations to that effect.\n\nV.- Finally, it must be clarified to the consulting judge that it is not for this Chamber to delimit her competence, nor to indicate to her what she must resolve in the specific case submitted for her knowledge, nor - in particular - on the way in which the seized liquor must be disposed of. This Court has clarified that:\n\n\"(…) that facultative consultations promoted by judges of the Republic must be in relation to... the norms or acts they must apply, but it is not a matter of this jurisdiction indicating to them which norm to apply to the case submitted for their knowledge…\" (ruling (voto) No. 2775-97 of 3:33 p.m. on May 20, 1997).\n\nMeanwhile, in ruling (voto) No. 2013-010828 of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 2013, this Chamber stated the following:\n\n\"(…) on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case.\"\n\nVI.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary, it is clear that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional, in the terms in which this consultation has been formulated.\n\nVII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE. The parties are forewarned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or device produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the \"Regulation on Electronic Expediente before the Judicial Branch,\" approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.\n\nTherefore:\n\n The consultation is resolved in the sense that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPresidente\n\n \n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\n \n\nPaul Rueda L.\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\n \n\nJorge Araya G.\n\nAnamari Garro V.\n\n \n\nJose Roberto Garita N.\n\n \n\n \n\nDigitally Signed Document\n\n-- Verifier Code --\n\n\n\n PMHIUGRMX5M61 \n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 22-006958-0007-CO \n\n \n\nTelephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.South of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6\n\nWhat would be appropriate is for the competence to be defined in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) as it is a special law that regulates jurisdictional organization or for the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages itself, No. 9047, to have established that competence, which, being a competence assigned to a branch of the Republic, is reserved to law. The regulatory route (Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí) could not establish jurisdictional competences.\n\n**2.-** Articles 9 and 106 of the Law of this Chamber empower it to evacuate the consultation at any time, when it considers that it is sufficiently answered by simply referring to its jurisprudence and precedents.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\n **I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS.-** Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the preconditions for the admission of judicial consultations, a provision from which some conditioning and fundamental elements for its viability emerge: that it is formulated by a judge; that there exist \"well-founded doubts\" (*dudas fundadas*) about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; that there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and that in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. Such preconditions have been repeatedly analyzed by this Tribunal. Thus, developing those elements, in ruling No. 01617-97, of 14:54 hours of March 17, 1997, it stated:\n\n*\"A. That it is formulated by a 'judge', a generic term that -of course- applies to both single judges and collegiate courts, and about which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must be, at the time of formulating the consultation, duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental nature).*\n\n*B. That there exist 'well-founded doubts' about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and considered. It also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be highlighted, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the rule, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a rule has previously passed the explicit examination of constitutionality (by way of acción de inconstitucionalidad or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so with respect to an act, conduct, or omission based on the same rule, particularly because -in this case- there is always the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the rule itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the rule itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.*\n\n*C. That there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. As with the acción de inconstitucionalidad, the judicial consultation is never given in the void or out of mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'principal' matter. Finally,*\n\n*D. That, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that -due to its relevance for the case- it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'must apply the rule or judge the act, conduct, or omission', connotes a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'may apply the rule or judge the act, conduct, or omission'. The judicial consultation is not viable before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since -as explained above- this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a mere academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the rule or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality in him.\"*\n\n \n\n Likewise, Article 104 of the same Law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within three days, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended, until such time as the Chamber has evacuated the consultation.\n\n**II.- PURPOSE OF THE CONSULTATION.** The consulting judge formulates an optional judicial consultation regarding Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047) in that it establishes:\n\n\"***ARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale***\n\n*Anyone who commercializes alcoholic beverages, without having a valid license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction (sanción) of between thirty and sixty days' fine (días multa), without prejudice to the confiscation (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.*\"\n\nAs well as regarding Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí, which provides:\n\n\"*Article 53.-When any condition associated with the sale and commercialization of alcoholic beverages occurs without previously having the respective operating license, or the consumption of beverages on public roads; the police authorities may, by issuing a police report, carry out their confiscation (decomiso), which must be referred to the competent Contraventional Court (Juzgado Contravencional) to determine the appropriateness of their destruction.*\n\nThe Municipality must simultaneously process the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions.\" \n\nThe consulting judge asserts that the cited Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages of the canton of Pococí establishes that the contraventional court must decide on the destruction of seized goods, even though there is no legal norm that establishes such a sanction and without a prior procedure in a judicial venue that guarantees the person from whom the goods were seized the possibility to defend themselves. Meanwhile, in parallel, in an administrative venue, a procedure is followed against the same person to impose an administrative sanction, in which the possibility to defend themselves is indeed guaranteed to avoid being fined, but not regarding the sanction of destruction that a contraventional judge could order on the seized goods. She alleges that this infringes the right of defense. She also argues that an infringement of the principles of legality, hierarchy of norms, and legislative reservation could arise, insofar as it is a regulatory norm that establishes a sanction (the destruction of the seized liquor) that is not contained in the law. She maintains that Article 21 of Law No. 9047 does not establish that the sole consequence for seized goods is their destruction, since, in fact, other alternatives exist, such as confiscation (comiso) in favor of the State or return to the accused, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Finally, she alleges that a violation of the principle of separation of powers and the principle of the natural judge could occur, since Article 21 of Law No. 9047 indicates that the goods will be delivered to the courts of justice, but does not specify or indicate which office is competent for this. She adds that such jurisdictional competence cannot be established by the cited regulation.\n\n**III.- ON THE MERITS.** It must be reiterated what was already indicated in Considerando I of this resolution, in the sense that the judicial consultation must not occur in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather, on the contrary, the matter consulted must be effectively relevant for the decision or resolution of the respective main case or prior proceeding, by reason of the purely incidental nature of this constitutional review process. Hence, the court \"*must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm... that raises a doubt of constitutionality*\".\n\nIn the *sub judice*, from the study of case file 21-000775-0680-FC, it can be verified that the Municipality of Pococí notified the Court of a possible contravention to the provisions of Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages and, therefore, formally transferred the seized liquor to it (see, to this effect, official communication PA-1007-2021 of November 22, 2021, and the seizure record of 9:24 a.m. on November 19, 2021).\n\nThus, the present judicial consultation relates, at its core, to the proper understanding of the content and scope of the cited Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047). In which case, it must be noted that said article was already the subject of analysis by the Criminal Affairs Commission of the Judicial Branch (official communication No. CAP-013-14 of April 1, 2014), which concluded—as relevant—that:\n\n\"The criterion of this Commission is requested regarding the consultation of Licenciado Garnier Vargas Barboza, Coordinating Judge of the Contraventional Court of Tarrazú, Dota, and León Cortés, who expresses that according to the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages number 9047, the conduct foreseen in Article 21 falls to the Municipality to hear, while the seized beverages must be delivered to the courts of justice.\nThe Law in question states the following:\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions related to illegal sale. Whoever commercializes alcoholic beverages, without having a current license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\"\nLicenciado Vargas Barboza states that according to the provisions of the law, the process is carried out in an administrative venue to impose the corresponding sanction, but simultaneously the delivery of the seized beverages is made to the courts of justice, which implies a serious problem, as these goods are not part of any judicial procedure, and the law also does not indicate the Judicial Branch office to which they must be delivered, nor the destination to be given to them.\nThe Criminal Affairs Commission does not share the interpretation made by the consultant regarding Article 21 of the referenced Law 9047, for the reasons that will be stated below.\nRegarding the nature of the sanctions, it is necessary to note that although the Law under study places within its Chapter IV titled 'Administrative Sanctions' a series of sanctions, not all of them are of an administrative nature, but it also includes those of a criminal nature, this despite the title given to the chapter by the ordinary legislator, which in no way can condition the nature of the sanctions.\nArticles 15; 16; 17; 20, and 23 of the Law under study establish sanctions of an administrative nature. Some of them provide for the payment of a sum of money, and others affect the license for the sale of alcoholic beverages and the operation of this type of establishment. In these cases, according to the provisions of Article 25, it corresponds to the municipalities of the country to ensure compliance with the law, and to their mayor to resolve this type of matter in the first instance once the pertinent administrative procedure has been completed.\nHowever, the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 (the latter on which Licenciado Vargas Barboza bases his consultation) are not administrative sanctions but rather contraventions. This is by reason of the criminal nature of the penalty (pena) that these latter carry by the express will of the legislator, when it defined the conducts described in those criminal types created in the special Law number 9074.\nThe articles in question state the following.\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions related to sales on public thoroughfares and public places. Whoever sells alcoholic beverages on public thoroughfares and public places, in dwelling houses, and in those other places where sporting activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty days fine (días multa).\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions related to illegal sale. Whoever commercializes alcoholic beverages, without having a current license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days fine (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is criminal in nature in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Penal Code. There it indicates that when the penalty of fine-days (días multa) is imposed, which is the one indicated in articles 19 and 21 of the Law under study, it must be determined by the judge, just as in some cases its non-compliance may be converted into one day of imprisonment for each fine-day (cfr. articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Penal Code).\n\nFurthermore, in addition to the nature of the sanction as a criterion for determining the criminal nature of the offense provided in article 21, there is also the legislator's provision establishing the possibility of confiscation (comiso). Indeed, according to article 110 of the Penal Code, the crime produces the loss, in favor of the State, of the instruments with which it was committed, a consequence that is also indicated in article 21 of Law 9074, when it orders the seizure of alcoholic beverages and their delivery to the courts of justice.\n\nConsequently, from the foregoing and the cited provisions, it can be affirmed that since the conducts criminalized in articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047 are criminal matters -contraventions-, they can only be heard within a criminal process conducted in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person may only be tried and convicted by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Procedural Code, in its article 3, indicates that criminal law falls to the ordinary courts instituted pursuant to the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch indicates that the Contraventional Courts (Juzgados Contravencionales) have jurisdiction to hear all types of contraventions and the minor infractions provided for in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nGiven the described scenario, this Commission concludes that the offenses provided in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages number 9047 are to be heard by the contraventional judge, who must also receive the evidence and dispose of it according to law. The foregoing insofar as the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty (pena), and according to our legal system only criminal judges, contraventional judges in this case, have jurisdiction to process such cases in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe Commission on Criminal Matters agreed to respectfully recommend that the Superior Council consider issuing a circular on what was agreed by this Commission.”\n\nThis communication was, in turn, reviewed by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 033 - 2014 of April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, in which it was agreed: “Authorize the issuance of a circular with what was agreed by the aforementioned Commission.” As a consequence, the General Secretariat of the Court published circular 101-2014 of May 9 of that same year, with the following content:\n\n“CIRCULAR No. 101-2014\n\nSubject: Processing of proceedings provided for in articles 19 and 21 of the law on “Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages, number 9047”.-\n\nTO THE JUDICIAL OFFICES OF THE COUNTRY\n\nBE IT KNOWN THAT:\n\nThe Superior Council in session No. 33-14, held on April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, at the request of the Criminal Jurisdiction Commission, agreed to inform you that the criminal offenses provided in articles 19 and 21 of the law on “Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages,” number 9047, being a criminal-contraventional matter, can only be heard within a criminal-contraventional process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe foregoing is because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person may only be tried and convicted by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Procedural Code, in its article 3, indicates that criminal law falls to the ordinary courts instituted pursuant to the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, it must be considered that article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch indicates that the Contraventional Courts have jurisdiction to hear all types of contraventions and the minor infractions provided for in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nWhat is established in articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047 does not have the character of administrative sanctions, but rather of contraventions. This is due to the nature of the penalty (pena) that these latter entail, by express provision of the legislator when criminalizing the conducts described in those criminal offenses.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is criminal in nature, in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Penal Code. Where it indicates that when the penalty of fine-days is imposed, it must be determined by the Judge, just as happens when in some cases its non-compliance may be converted into one day of imprisonment for each fine-day (e.g., articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Penal Code).\n\nAccording to the foregoing, the offenses provided in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on Regulation and Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages number 9047 are to be heard by the Contraventional Judge, who must also receive the evidence and dispose of it according to law.\n\nThe foregoing because the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty, and according to our legal system only criminal judges, contravention judges in this case, have the jurisdiction to process this type of case in accordance with the provisions of the Código Procesal Penal.\"\n\nThus, it is confirmed that the Judicial Branch itself has concluded that Article 21 of the Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico (Ley n.° 9047) criminalizes a contravention, the cognizance of which corresponds precisely to the respective contravention courts, as provided for in Article 117, subsection 2, of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and the Código Procesal Penal. Courts that must determine—after due process (debido proceso)—not only whether the respective contravention occurred, but also its eventual consequences, including matters relating to the destination of the seized goods.\n\nIn fact, it is worth noting that the Procuraduría General de la República reached a similar conclusion, as can be verified from reading legal opinion C-298-2014 of September 22, 2014, in which it was indicated—as relevant:\n\n\"Sections 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 provide for sanctions of fine-days (días multa), in the following terms:\n\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions relating to sales on public roads and public places\n\nWhoever sells alcoholic beverages on public roads and public places, dwellings, and in those other places where sporting activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty fine-days (días multa).\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sales\n\nWhoever markets alcoholic beverages without a valid license issued by the respective municipality shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty fine-days (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nAs we indicated on preceding pages, these provisions are in force and are fully applicable.\n\nThe consulting municipality raises a series of questions regarding the application of the provision, concerning that Law No. 9047 does not define the concept of fine-day (día multa), nor does it establish the parameters for applying the provision in administrative proceedings (sede administrativa).\n\nThese aspects lead us to examine the nature of the fine-day (día multa) sanction, in order to determine who has the jurisdiction to impose said sanction.\n\nFor the stated purposes, we will resort to the harmonious interpretation of the legal system and will draw upon the branch of Criminal Law.\n\nIn the case of fine-day (día multa), according to the provisions of Article 53 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), it is possible to affirm that we are in the presence of a sanction of a criminal nature:\n\n'Fine.\n\nArticle 53. —The penalty of a fine obligates the convicted person to pay a sum of money to the institution designated by law, within the fifteen days following the firmness of the judgment.\n\nWhen the penalty of fine-days (días multa) is imposed, the judge, in a reasoned judgment, shall first determine the number of fine-days (días multa) that the convicted person must cover, within the limits set for each crime, according to the gravity of the act, the circumstances of manner, time, and place, as well as the author's own characteristics directly related to the criminal conduct. This penalty may not exceed three hundred sixty fine-days (días multa).\n\nIn said judgment, in a reasoned manner, the judge shall determine the sum of money corresponding to each fine-day (día multa), according to the economic situation of the convicted person, taking into account their standard of living, all their daily income, and the reasonable expenses to attend to both their needs and those of their family. Each fine-day (día multa) may not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the sentenced person's daily income.\n\nThe prosecutor or the judge, as applicable, with the collaboration of the Social Work Office of the Judicial Branch, must conduct the necessary inquiries to determine the true economic situation of the accused and their payment possibilities. (As amended by subsection b) of article 1 of Law No. 8250 of May 2, 2002).” (The highlighting is not from the original)\n\nFrom the transcribed article, it is possible to deduce that the day-fine (día multa) is a penalty whose application is, and must be, restrictively within the scope of the judge's competence, who, by their powers granted by law, has the authority to carry out this type of procedure.\n\nIn addition to this, it provides that the imposition of this penalty must be given under a reasoned judgment, fixing the number of day-fines (días multa) that the offending person must cover, all in accordance with the seriousness of the act.\n\nUnder this context, it is possible to affirm that the penalty of day-fines (días multa) falls outside the scope of administrative penalties and becomes a matter that, by its nature, must be addressed at the jurisdictional level, that is, by a judge.\n\nThe foregoing finds its reason for being in a division of functions, that is, there are matters whose knowledge is restricted and reserved to be heard by certain bodies that are the only competent ones; consequently, the municipal entity could not apply articles 19 and 21 under discussion.\n\nLet us see that the norms that concern us here punish two conducts: first, whoever sells alcoholic beverages on public roads, in dwelling houses, and in those other places where sports activities are carried out while the event takes place, and next, whoever commercializes alcoholic beverages without having a current license issued by the respective municipality (articles 19 and 21 respectively, of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages, No. 9047).\n\nBoth actions are punishable by day-fines (días multa), which, as we indicated, is a penalty of a criminal nature, and therefore, it corresponds to the Criminal Judge to assess, in each case, the reproached conducts, in order to determine whether the illegitimate conduct has been configured, and the imposition of the penalty of day-fines (días multa) according to the assessment of the facts.\n\nThe aforementioned aspects fall outside the municipal administrative sphere and correspond to the judge’s own competencies.\n\nNow, while it is true that articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 are included in Section IV of the law, whose chapter bears the title of administrative penalties, it is considered that a harmonious and integral interpretation of the legal system must be carried out, in accordance with the rules of the Civil Code, specifically article 10, which provides:\n\n“Article 10\n\nThe norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to the spirit and purpose of them.”\n\nIn accordance with the referred article, and from a joint and integral review and interpretation of the legal system, it leads us to affirm that these are penalties that must be heard within the scope of criminal jurisdiction, so that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nHence, from articles 19 and 21 under discussion, it must be understood that it is the responsibility of the municipalities to inform the competent authorities, that is, the jurisdictional authority, of the transgression committed, so that the respective process can be initiated and the pertinence or not of the application of the foreseen penalty can be determined.\n\nOn this aspect, this Advisory Body pointed out, albeit referring to the previous regulation of liquor sales, the following:\n\n“(...) It is pertinent to note that the municipalities, in attention to the competencies granted to them related to the oversight of the correct application of the regulations concerning the operation of liquor sales establishments and the proper use of licenses, is responsible for reporting to the respective authorities\n\nIn this sense, the municipal corporations must not only ensure its compliance, but are also the competent ones to FILE THE CORRESPONDING ACTIONS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, in order for the penalties provided in the referenced normative body to be applied. (C-008-97 of January 16, 1997. The underlining is not from the original).\n\nAccording to what has been said, articles 19 and 21 under discussion regulate penalties that must be heard within the scope of criminal jurisdiction, so that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nIV. CONCLUSIONS\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, this Advisory Body concludes the following:\n\n1. Articles 19 and 21 of Law No.\n\n9047 are in force and therefore applicable.\n\n2. The penalty of a daily fine is criminal in nature.\n\n3. It is estimated, in a harmonious and comprehensive interpretation of the legal system, that the penalties provided for in sections 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be heard in the judicial venue, with the municipal entities being responsible for filing the complaint before the respective authority.”\n\nAs a corollary to the foregoing, it is confirmed that the fact that the municipalities transfer the hearing of possible violations of Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico, Law No. 9047) to the respective contraventional courts, so that said judicial bodies hear and resolve such matters in accordance with the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), far from representing a violation of the constitutional principles of legality, separation of powers, legal reserve, or the right of defense, what it seeks, precisely, is to fully guarantee to the potential defendants that due process and the right of defense are respected, by the judicial body competent to hear the possible commission of a criminal infraction —classified by the legislator in the aforementioned Article 21— as well as its consequences —including what specifically pertains to the destination that must be given to the confiscated liquor— in accordance with the provisions of the applicable regulations, including the Penal Code (Código Penal) and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the objections raised by the consulting judge are not substantiated, in accordance with an adequate interpretation and application of Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages.\n\nIV.- Furthermore, with specific reference to section 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí (Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí), it is clear that this section must be interpreted and applied in conjunction with Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages. It must also be integrated with the provisions of Article 54 of that same regulation, which expressly states that:\n\n\"Article 54.- The penalties contained in Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be processed for their application before the competent Contraventional Court (Juzgado Contravencional).\"\n\nTherefore, it must be reiterated —again— that ordering the transfer of the hearing of a possible violation of Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047) to the respective contraventional court is fully consistent with the interpretation that the Judicial Branch itself has made of said normative provision. Likewise, that Article 53 establishes that \"the police authorities, by issuing a police report, may carry out its confiscation, which must be sent to the competent Contraventional Court to determine the appropriateness of its destruction,\" cannot be interpreted —as the consulting judge seems to understand— as imposing on the judge the unavoidable obligation to order the destruction of the confiscated goods, but rather it only establishes —in consideration of what is already provided in Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages— that the confiscated liquor must be sent to the competent judicial body, so that it is the latter that \"determines\" —that is, decides or resolves— whether or not the destruction of the goods is appropriate, after first determining whether or not a contravention has been configured. Evidently, it will ultimately be the competent judicial body that must resolve, in the specific case, the destination of the confiscated liquor, in accordance with the provisions to that effect in the applicable regulations.\n\nV.- Finally, it must be clarified to the consulting judge that it is not for this Chamber to delimit her competence, nor to tell her what she must resolve in the specific case submitted to her knowledge, nor —in particular— regarding the manner in which the confiscated liquor must be disposed of. This Court has clarified that:\n\n\"(…) that the facultative consultations promoted by the judges of the Republic must be in relation to... the norms or acts that they must apply, but it is not a matter of indicating in this jurisdiction which norm must be applied to the case brought to their knowledge…\" (vote No. 2775-97 of 15:33 on May 20, 1997).\n\nMeanwhile, in vote No. 2013-010828 of 15:00 on August 14, 2013, this Chamber stated the following:\n\n\"(…) on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that the judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case.\"\n\nVI.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary, it is clear that the norms consulted are not unconstitutional, in the terms in which this consultation has been formulated.\n\nVII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.\n\nOtherwise, all material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe consultation is resolved in the sense that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n|   | | |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 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)\n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPresidente\n\n|   | | |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n|   | ![Image]()\n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\n|   |   | 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)\n\nPaul Rueda L. |\n| ![Image](\n\n**LUIS ANDRÉS SANABRIA VARGAS**\n\n**Provisional analysis of the technical study for the regulation of the Rodeo riverbed, land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), and earthworks (movimientos de tierra) for a residential subdivision (fraccionamiento) of 92 lots.**\n\n**1.0 Introduction**\n\nThe request for the analysis is attended to, as well as the documents provided by Mr. Luis Andrés Sanabria Vargas, owner of the farm to be developed. For this purpose, a review of the contents presented in the file is made, as well as a field visit by the undersigned professional, to determine the feasibility of granting the respective environmental feasibilities (viabilidades ambientales) of the INTA 92 lot residential subdivision (fraccionamiento) with earthworks (movimientos de tierra) and land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo).\n\nThe documents presented are as follows:\n\n- Cadastral map No. C-0030300-2010.\n- Land-use capacity map, scale 1:7500.\n- Slope map.\n- Geological map, scale 1: 10000.\n- Geomorphological map, scale 1:10000.\n- Soils map, scale 1:7500.\n- Use and forest cover map (mapa de uso y cobertura boscosa), scale 1:3000.\n- Hydrography and springs (nacientes), scale 1:3000.\n- Water system design, scale 1:3000.\n- Topographic map, scale 1:2000.\n- Critical areas map (geological faults), scale 1:3000.\n- Cadastral map and projected development, scale 1:3000.\n- Two photographs of each of the springs (nacientes) located.\n- Aerial photographs.\n- Legal owners' resolutions.\n- Inventory of forest plantations.\n- Registry property study: Citation C-196823-2010 and C-0372542-2007.\n- Environmental commitments (DJCA forms).\n- Land-use capacity classification form.\n- Study of springs (nacientes) and water network by AP.\n- Main access project to the subdivision (fraccionamiento) by INCO.\n- Authorization from AyA for the use of the spring (naciente) that supplies the project.\n- Report of water availability for human consumption of the spring (naciente) on the farm.\n- MINAE resolutions confirming the boundaries of the Protected Area.\n- Forest inventory and management plan for the removal of forest cover (cobertura boscosa).\n\n**2.0** **Field inspection** carried out on May 28, 2012, with the undersigned being accompanied by Messrs. Luis Andrés Sanabria (owner), Randall González (Surveying Engineer from COTA S.A.), Fabián Barrios (Topographer from COTA S.A.), and Carlos Eduardo Rojas Salazar (Forestry Engineer).\n\nThe visit began at 9:00 AM, ending at 1:00 PM. During this visit, the farm's boundaries were physically toured, the established property boundaries were identified, marking the boundary lines shown on the cadastral map; the georeferencing of the springs (nacientes) located in the field, the development area, and the forested areas was carried out. The location and boundary of the Térraba-Sierpe Wetland were also identified, and the protected and forest areas to be preserved within the farm were determined.\n\n**3.0** **General data of the property for the INTA Subdivision (Fraccionamiento)**\n\n- The farm is located in the district of Palmar, canton of Osa, and province of Puntarenas.\n- Cadastral Map No. C-0030300-2010.\n- The farm is registered under the Real Property of the property of the province of Puntarenas, under the Folio Real system, Matrícula number 13878-000.\n- Total area according to map: 44,63,21.33 m²\n- Effective area to be developed: 3,71,31.95 m²\n- Development of 92 lots, ranging between 253 m² and 260 m², 10 road segments, and 4 park/dedication areas.\n\n**4.0** **Physical environment**\n\n**4.1** **Geological analysis** The farm is located in the so-called \"El Rodeo\" area, in the district of Palmar, canton of Osa. In general, the area is geologically made up of:\n\n- **Brass formation (Br)** Basalts, andesitic-dacitic lavas, agglomerates, tuffs, ignimbrites, and epiclastic rocks.\n- **Alluvial deposits (Q-al)** Characterized by irregular intercalations of gravels, blocks, sands, silts, and clays.\n\nIn the area to be developed, there are **two geological faults** that are located symmetrically on the banks of the Rodeo River, classified as normal and dextral inverse faults, duly dimensioned cartographically and with a respective protection zone of 25 meters, which are detailed in the regulations.\n\nImportant to highlight in this respect, is that the entire development area and the existing road access to the area are located in the middle of the aforementioned geological faults. But given that to date they have not presented associated seismic activity and are not active, the risk factor is minimized for the future development.\n\n**4.2** **Geomorphology** The farm is located in an area of tectonic origin, where geoforms of fluvial origin, denudational origin on volcanic rocks, and alluvial fans on the right bank of the Rodeo River are described.\n\nThe development will be located in the \"Alluvial Fan\" geoform where currently the soil use corresponds to grasslands and low-density trees.\n\nSalazar A.

\"\"

Jorge Araya G.

\"\"

Anamari Garro V.

\"\"

Jose Roberto Garita N.

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EXPEDIENTE N° 22-006958-0007-CO

Teléfonos: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Dirección: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6

\",\n \"links\": [],\n \"next_actions\": [\n \"Full document text is in the 'content' field\",\n \"Structured metadata in 'metadata' (and 'api_hits' for the raw API response)\"\n ],\n \"api_hits\": {\n \"anno\": \"2022\",\n \"claseAsunto\": \"Consulta judicial\",\n \"contenidosInteres\": [\n {\n \"doc\": {\n \"redactor\": \"Fernando Castillo Víquez\",\n \"numeroDocumentoPadre\": \"sen-1-0007-1084112\",\n \"anno\": \"2022\",\n \"expediente\": \"220069580007CO\",\n \"hora\": \"09:55\",\n \"esProtegida\": \"0\",\n \"esCambioCriterio\": \"0\",\n \"TemasYSubtemas\": [\n {\n \"id\": 1,\n \"nombre\": \"COMERCIO\",\n \"Subtemas\": [\n {\n \"id\": 1,\n \"nombre\": \"NO APLICA\"\n }\n ]\n }\n ],\n \"sentenciasRelacionadas\": \"sen-1-0007-83201\",\n \"normasNombreYArticulo\": \"Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico||21\",\n \"controlCons\": \"Sentencia desestim\n\n**ARTICLE 102 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION LAW.** \"…Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for judicial consultations, a provision from which several conditioning and fundamental elements for its appropriateness can be inferred: that it be submitted by a judge; that there exist \"well-founded doubts\" about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or adjudicated; that there is a case pending before the judge or court; and that, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission giving rise to the doubt of constitutionality must be adjudicated…\"\n\nCO06/22\n\n**ARTICLE 104 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION LAW.** \"…Article 104 of the same Law requires that the judicial consultation be submitted in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within three days, and that the processing of the case be suspended until the Chamber has resolved the consultation…\"\n\nCO06/22\n\nDescriptor: Comercio. Decomiso de productos y su destrucción y multa.\nExpediente: 22-006958-0007-CO\nSentencia: 008735-22 of 20 April 2022\nTipo de asunto: Consulta Judicial\nNorma impugnada: Artículo 53 del Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el cantón de Pococí and artículo 21 de la Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico No. 9047.\nParte dispositiva: The consultation is resolved in the sense that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional.\n\nCO08/22\n\nIn sanctioning matters, the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) exists, and a regulation can never regulate a matter differently or in a manner contrary to the law that serves as its basis. In this case, the Regulation limits the sanction to be imposed, determining that it be the most severe, when the Law establishes nothing in that regard. Even the propriety of confiscation (comiso) is questionable, since Article 110 of the Criminal Code states that confiscation is a consequence of a crime, not of an administrative infraction. Furthermore, Article 490 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that seized objects, not subject to confiscation, restitution, or embargo, may be returned to the person from whom they were seized. The consulting judge considers that a violation of the principle of separation of powers and the principle of the natural judge could occur, since Article 21 of Law No. 9047 indicates that the goods shall be delivered to the courts of Justice, without indicating the competent office for this. The Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes a competence for judicial authorities, without specifically indicating which office is responsible for resolving it. The proper course would be for the competence to be defined in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as it is a special norm that regulates jurisdictional organization, or for the same Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Beverages with Alcoholic Content, No. 9047, to have established that competence, which, being a competence assigned to a branch of the Republic, is subject to legal reserve (reserva de ley). By regulatory means (Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of beverages with alcoholic content in the Canton of Pococí), jurisdictional competences could not be established.\n\n\n\n\n\n**2.-** Articles 9 and 106 of the Law of this Court empower the Chamber to resolve the consultation at any time, when it considers that it is sufficiently answered by simply referring to its jurisprudence and precedents.\n\nRedacta el Magistrado **Castillo Víquez**; y,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS.-** Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the prerequisites for admitting judicial consultations, a provision from which some conditioning and fundamental elements for its propriety emerge: that it is formulated by a judge; that there exist \"well-founded doubts\" regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; that there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These prerequisites have been analyzed repeatedly by this Tribunal. Thus, developing those elements, in judgment No. 01617-97, of 14:54 hours of March 17, 1997, it stated:\n\n\"A. That it be formulated by a 'judge', a generic term that -of course- applies to both single judges and collegiate tribunals, and about which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is facing the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuing of a judgment or arbitration award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).\n\nB. That there exist 'well-founded doubts' regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and considered. It also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional review (by way of action or consultation), a new challenge on the same point would not be viable, but it could be regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because -in this case- there always exists the possibility of a constitutional violation, not in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist regarding the constitutionality of the very norm on which they are based. And, under this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.\n\nC. That there exists a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. As with the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but rather it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior matter' or 'main matter'. Finally,\n\nD. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that -due to its relevance for the case- it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'must be applied the norm or judged the act, conduct, or omission', carries a very defined current meaning and is totally distinct from if the law spoke in terms of 'may be applied the norm or judged the act, conduct, or omission'. The judicial consultation does not proceed before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since -as explained above- this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judging of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality.\"\n\n\n\nLikewise, Article 104 of the same Law requires that the judicial consultation be formulated in a reasoned resolution, that the parties be summoned within three days, and that the processing of the proceeding be suspended, until the Chamber has resolved the consultation.\n\n**II.- OBJECT OF THE CONSULTATION.**\n\nThe consulting judge formulates a discretionary judicial consultation regarding Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico, Law No. 9047) insofar as it establishes:\n\n“***ARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale***\n\n*Whoever commercializes alcoholic beverages without a current license issued by the respective municipality shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days' fine (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.*”\n\nAs well as regarding Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages in the Canton of Pococí, which provides:\n\n“*Article 53.- When any condition associated with the sale and commercialization of alcoholic beverages occurs without having previously obtained the respective operating license, or the consumption of beverages on public roads occurs; the police authorities, by drawing up a police report (parte policial), may carry out their seizure, which must be remitted to the competent Contraventional Court (Juzgado Contravencional) to determine the appropriateness of their destruction. The Municipality must simultaneously process the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions.*”\n\nThe consulting judge asserts that the cited Article 53 of the Regulation on the regulation and commercialization of alcoholic beverages of the canton of Pococí establishes that the Contraventional Court must resolve on the destruction of seized goods, even though there is no legal norm establishing such a sanction and without a prior procedure in the judicial venue that guarantees the person from whom the goods were seized the possibility of defending themselves. Meanwhile, in parallel, in the administrative venue, a procedure is being followed against the same person to impose an administrative sanction, in which they are indeed guaranteed the possibility of defending themselves to avoid being fined, but not regarding the destruction sanction that a Contraventional Judge could order on the seized goods. She alleges that this infringes the right of defense. She also argues that an infringement of the principles of legality, hierarchy of norms, and legal reserve (reserva de ley) could be configured, insofar as it is a regulatory norm that establishes a sanction (the destruction of the seized liquor) that is not contained in the law. She maintains that Article 21 of Law No. 9047 does not establish that the only consequence for seized goods is their destruction, as, in fact, other alternatives exist, such as forfeiture (comiso) in favor of the State or return to the accused, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). Finally, she alleges that a violation of the principle of separation of powers and the principle of the natural judge could occur, since Article 21 of Law No. 9047 indicates that the goods shall be delivered to the courts of justice, but does not specify or indicate which office is competent for this. She adds that such jurisdictional competence cannot be established by the cited regulation.\n\n**III.- ON THE MERITS.** It must be reiterated what was already indicated in Considerando I of this resolution, in the sense that the judicial consultation must not occur in a vacuum or from mere academic interest, but rather, on the contrary, the matter consulted must be effectively relevant to the decision or resolution of the respective main matter or prior judgment, by reason of the purely incidental nature of this constitutional review process. Hence, the court \"*must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm... that raises a doubt of constitutionality*\".\n\nIn the *sub judice* case, from the study of case file 21-000775-0680-FC, it can be verified that the Municipality of Pococí communicated to the Court a possible contravention of the provisions of Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages and, therefore, formally transferred the seized liquor to it (see, to that effect, official communication PA-1007-2021 of November 22, 2021, and the seizure record of 9:24 a.m. on November 19, 2021).\n\nIn this way, the present judicial consultation relates, in substance, to the proper understanding of the content and scope of the cited Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047). In which case, it must be indicated that such article was already the subject of analysis by the Criminal Affairs Commission of the Judicial Branch (Comisión de Asuntos Penales del Poder Judicial) (official communication No. CAP-013-14 of April 1, 2014), which concluded—in what is relevant—that:\n\n“*The opinion of this Commission is requested regarding the consultation of Licenciado Garnier Vargas Barboza, Coordinating Judge of the Contraventional Court of Tarrazú, Dota y León Cortés, who states that according to the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages number 9047, the conduct provided for in Article 21 corresponds to the Municipality to hear, while the seized beverages must be delivered to the courts of justice.*\n\n*The Law in question states the following:*\n\n*ARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sale. Whoever commercializes alcoholic beverages without a current license issued by the respective municipality shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty days' fine, without prejudice to the seizure of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.”*\n\n*Licenciado Vargas Barboza states that according to the provisions of the law, the process is carried out in the administrative venue in order to impose the corresponding sanction, but simultaneously the delivery of the seized beverages is made to the courts of justice, which implies a serious problem, as these goods do not form part of any judicial procedure, and the law also does not indicate the Judicial Branch office to which they must be delivered, nor the destination that must be given to them.*\n\n*The Criminal Affairs Commission does not share the interpretation that the consultant makes of Article 21 of the referred Law 9047, for the reasons that will be stated below.*\n\n*Regarding the nature of the sanctions, it is necessary to point out that although the Law under study places within its Chapter IV entitled “Administrative Sanctions” a series of sanctions, not all of them are of an administrative nature, but rather it also includes those of a criminal nature, this despite the title given to the chapter by the ordinary legislator, which can in no way condition the nature of the sanctions.*\n\n*Articles 15; 16; 17; 20 and 23 of the Law under study establish sanctions of an administrative nature. Some of them provide for the payment of a sum of money, and others affect the license for the sale of alcoholic beverages and the operation of this type of establishment. In these cases, according to the provisions of Article 25, it is the responsibility of the country's municipalities to ensure compliance with the law, and its mayor to resolve this type of matter in the first instance once the pertinent administrative procedure has been completed.*\n\n*However, what is established in articles 19 and 21 (the latter on which Licenciado Vargas Barboza bases his consultation), are not administrative sanctions but rather contraventions.*\n\nThis is due to the criminal nature of the penalty that the latter carry by express will of the legislator, when it criminalized the conducts described in those criminal types created in the special Law number 9074.\n\nThe articles in question read as follows.\n\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions relating to sales on public roads and public places. Anyone who sells alcoholic beverages on public roads and in public places, private homes, and in those other places where sports activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty day-fines (días multa).\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sales. Anyone who commercializes alcoholic beverages, without having a current license issued by the respective municipality, shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty day-fines (días multa), without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is criminal in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Criminal Code. It is indicated therein that when the penalty of day-fines (días multa) is imposed, which is the one indicated in articles 19 and 21 of the Law under study, this must be determined by the judge, just as when in some cases its non-compliance can be converted into one day of imprisonment (día de prisión) for each day-fine (día de multa) (cf. articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Criminal Code).\n\nOn the other hand, in addition to the nature of the sanction as a criterion for determining the criminal character of the type provided in article 21, there is also the legislator's provision that establishes the possibility of confiscation (comiso). Indeed, as indicated in article 110 of the Criminal Code, the crime produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed, a consequence that is also indicated in article 21 of Law 9074, when it orders the seizure (decomiso) of alcoholic beverages and their delivery to the courts of justice.\n\nAs a consequence of the foregoing and the referred norms, it can be affirmed that, being criminal matter - contraventional (contravencional) - the conducts criminalized in articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047, they can only be heard within a criminal process processed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person can only be tried and convicted by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Code of Procedure, in its article 3, indicates that the criminal law is to be applied by the ordinary courts instituted in accordance with the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states that the Contraventional Courts (Juzgados Contravencionales) are responsible for hearing all kinds of contraventions (contravenciones) and simple infractions provided in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nGiven the described scenario, this Commission concludes that the types provided in articles 19 and 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages number 9047, are to be heard by the contraventional judge, as well as to receive the evidence and dispose of it according to law. The foregoing inasmuch as the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty, and according to our legal system only criminal judges, contraventional in this case, have the competence to process this type of process in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe Commission on Criminal Matters agreed to recommend to the Superior Council, very respectfully, to consider the issuance of a circular regarding what was agreed by this Commission.\"\n\nSuch official communication was, in turn, heard by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 033 - 2014 of April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, in which it was agreed: \"Authorize the issuance of a circular with what was agreed by the aforementioned Commission.\" As a consequence, the General Secretariat of the Court published circular 101-2014 of May 9 of that same year, with the following content:\n\n\"CIRCULAR No. 101-2014\n\nSubject: Processing of the processes provided in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on \"Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages, number 9047\".-\n\nTO THE JUDICIAL OFFICES OF THE COUNTRY\n\nBE ADVISED THAT:\n\nThe Superior Council in session No. 33-14, held on April 10, 2014, article LXXVI, at the request of the Commission on Criminal Jurisdiction, agreed to inform you that the criminal types provided in articles 19 and 21 of the Law on \"Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages,\" number 9047, being criminal-contraventional (penal-contravencional) matter, can only be heard within a criminal-contraventional process processed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe foregoing is because articles 35, 39 and 153 of the Political Constitution provide that a person can only be tried and convicted by the courts established by the Constitution, while the Code of Procedure, in its article 3, indicates that the criminal law is to be applied by the ordinary courts instituted in accordance with the Magna Carta.\n\nAs a complement to the foregoing, it must be considered that article 117 subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states that the Contraventional Courts (Juzgados Contravencionales) are responsible for hearing all kinds of contraventions (contravenciones) and simple infractions provided in special laws, except those of a labor nature.\n\nThe provisions in articles 19 and 21 of Law 9047 do not have the character of administrative sanctions, but rather of contraventions (contravenciones).\n\nThis is due to the nature of the penalty that the latter carry, by express provision of the legislator when defining the conduct described in those criminal types.\n\nThe nature of the sanction is criminal in character, in accordance with the provisions of articles 50 subsection 1) and 53 of the Penal Code. It indicates that when the penalty of fine-days (días multa) is imposed, it must be determined by the Judge, likewise when in some cases its non-compliance may be converted into one day of imprisonment for each day of fine (e.g., articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the Penal Code).\n\nBased on the foregoing, the offenses provided for in articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Ley 9047) are to be heard by the Contravention Judge, who must also receive the evidence and dispose of it according to law. The foregoing insofar as the sanction to be imposed constitutes a penalty, and according to our legal system only criminal judges, or contravention judges in this case, have jurisdiction to process this type of proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.”\n\nThus, it is verified that the Judicial Branch itself has concluded that Article 21 of the Law on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047) defines a contravention, the cognizance of which corresponds precisely to the respective contravention courts, as provided in Article 117, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Criminal Procedure Code. These courts are responsible for determining — after due process has been observed — not only whether the respective contravention occurred, but also its eventual consequences, including matters relating to the destination of the seized goods (bienes decomisados).\n\nIn fact, it should be noted that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) reached a similar conclusion, as can be verified from reading Opinion C-298-2014 of September 22, 2014, in which it indicated — as relevant:\n\n“Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 provide for sanctions of fine-days, in the following terms:\n\nARTICLE 19.- Sanctions relating to sales on public thoroughfares and in public places\n\nAny person who sells alcoholic beverages on public thoroughfares and in public places, residential homes, and in those other places where sports activities take place, while the event is being held, shall receive a sanction of between ten and thirty fine-days.\n\nARTICLE 21.- Sanctions relating to illegal sales\n\nAny person who commercializes alcoholic beverages without a valid license issued by the respective municipality shall receive a sanction of between thirty and sixty fine-days, without prejudice to the seizure (decomiso) of the products, which shall be delivered by the entity to the courts of justice.\n\nAs we indicated in the preceding pages, these rules are in force and are fully applicable.\n\nThe consulting municipality raises a series of questions regarding the application of the rule, referring to the fact that Law No. 9047 does not define the concept of fine-day, nor does it establish the parameters for the application of the rule in an administrative venue.\n\nThese aspects lead us to examine the nature of the fine-day sanction, in order to determine who has jurisdiction over the application of said sanction.\n\nFor the indicated purposes, we will resort to a harmonious interpretation of the legal system, and we will make use of the branch of Criminal Law.\n\nIn the case of fine-day, pursuant to the provisions of Article 53 of the Penal Code, it is possible to affirm that we are in the presence of a sanction of a criminal nature:\n\n“Fine.\n\nArticle 53. — The penalty of a fine obligates the convicted person to pay a sum of money to the institution designated by law, within the fifteen days following the finalization of the sentence.\n\nWhen the penalty of fine-days is imposed, the judge, in a reasoned sentence, shall first determine the number of fine-days that the convicted person must pay, within the limits indicated for each crime, according to the seriousness of the act, the circumstances of mode, time, and place, as well as the author's own characteristics, directly related to the criminal conduct. This penalty may not exceed three hundred sixty fine-days.\n\nIn said sentence, in a reasoned manner, the judge shall determine the sum of money corresponding to each fine-day, in accordance with the economic situation of the convicted person, taking into account their standard of living, all their daily income, and the reasonable expenses to meet both their needs and those of their family. Each fine-day may not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the sentenced person's daily income.\n\nThe prosecutor or the judge, as applicable, with the collaboration of the Social Work Office of the Judicial Branch, must carry out the necessary inquiries to determine the true economic situation of the accused and their ability to pay. (Thus amended by subsection b) of article 1 of Law No. 8250 of May 2, 2002)”. (The highlighting is not from the original)\n\nFrom the transcribed article, it is possible to deduce that the day-fine (día multa) is a sanction whose application is and must be restrictively within the sphere of competence of the judge, who, by their faculties granted by law, has the authority to carry out this type of procedure.\n\nIn addition to this, it provides that the imposition of this sanction must be delivered under a reasoned judgment (sentencia motivada), setting the number of day-fines (días multa) that the offending person must cover, all in accordance with the seriousness of the act.\n\nUnder this context, it is possible to affirm that the sanction of day-fines (días multa) falls outside the scope of administrative sanctions, and becomes a matter that, by its nature, must be addressed at the jurisdictional level, that is, by a judge.\n\nThe foregoing finds its rationale in a division of functions, that is, that there are matters whose cognizance is restricted and reserved to be heard by certain bodies that are the only competent ones; consequently, the municipal entity could not apply articles 19 and 21 under discussion.\n\nLet us see that the norms at hand penalize two conducts: firstly, anyone who sells alcoholic beverages on public roads, in dwelling houses, and in those other places where sports activities are carried out while the event is taking place, and secondly, anyone who markets alcoholic beverages without a current license issued by the respective municipality (articles 19 and 21 respectively, of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages, No. 9047).\n\nBoth actions are sanctioned with day-fines (días multa), which, as we indicated, is a sanction of a criminal nature, and therefore, it corresponds to the Criminal Judge to assess, in each case, the reproached conduct, in order to determine whether the unlawful conduct has been configured, and to impose the sanction of day-fines (días multa) according to the assessment of the facts.\n\nThe aforementioned aspects fall outside the municipal administrative sphere and correspond to the judge's own competencies.\n\nNow, although it is true that articles 19 and 21 of Law number 9047 are included in Section IV of the law, whose chapter bears the title of administrative sanctions, it is considered that a harmonious and integral interpretation of the legal system must be carried out, in accordance with the rules of the Civil Code, specifically article 10, which provides:\n\n\"Article 10\n\nThe norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.\"\n\nPursuant to the referred article, and from a joint and integral review and interpretation of the legal system, this leads us to affirm that these are sanctions that must be heard within the scope of the criminal jurisdiction, such that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nHence, from articles 19 and 21 under discussion, it must be understood that it corresponds to the municipalities to inform the competent authorities, that is, the jurisdictional authority, of the transgression committed, in order for the respective process to be initiated and for the pertinence or not of the application of the provided sanction to be determined.\n\nOn this aspect, this Advisory Body (Órgano Asesor) indicated, albeit referring to the prior regulation of liquor sales, the following:\n\n\"(…) It is pertinent to point out that the municipalities, in attention to the competences that have been granted to them related to the oversight of the correct application of the regulations concerning the operation of liquor sales establishments and the proper use of licenses, what corresponds to them, is to report to the respective authorities\n\nIn this sense, the municipal corporations must not only ensure their compliance, but they are also the competent ones to FILE THE CORRESPONDING ACTIONS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, in order for the sanctions provided in the normative body of reference to be applied. (C-008-97 of January 16, 1997. The underlining is not from the original).\n\nAccording to the foregoing, articles 19 and 21 under discussion regulate sanctions that must be heard within the scope of the criminal jurisdiction, such that their imposition does not correspond to the administrative authority.\n\nIV. CONCLUSIONS\n\nAccording to the foregoing, this Advisory Body (Órgano Asesor) concludes the following:\n\n1. Articles 19 and 21 of Law No.\n\n9047 are in force and therefore applicable.

2.                   The penalty of a daily fine (día multa) is of a criminal nature.

3.                   It is considered, in a harmonious and comprehensive interpretation of the legal system, that the penalties provided for in numerals 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be heard in the jurisdictional venue, with the municipal entities being responsible for filing the complaint (denuncia) before the respective authority.”

 

As a corollary of the foregoing, it is verified that the fact that the municipalities refer knowledge of possible infractions of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Ley de Regulación y Comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico) (Law No. 9047) to the respective contraventional courts (juzgados contravencionales), so that said jurisdictional bodies may hear and resolve such matters in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), far from constituting an infraction of the constitutional principles of legality, separation of powers (división de poderes), legal reservation (reserva de ley), or the right to defense, seeks, precisely, to fully guarantee to the eventual accused that due process and the right to defense are respected, by the jurisdictional body competent to hear the possible commission of an infraction of a criminal nature - classified by the legislator in the aforementioned Article 21 -, as well as its consequences - including specifically what pertains to the destination that must be given to the seized liquor (licor decomisado) - as provided by the applicable regulations, including the Criminal Code (Código Penal) and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the reproaches formulated by the consulting judge, in accordance with an adequate interpretation and application of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages, are not verified.

IV.- Furthermore, regarding specifically numeral 53 of the Regulation on the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages in the Canton of Pococí (Reglamento sobre la regulación y comercialización de bebidas con contenido alcohólico en el Cantón de Pococí), it is clear that this ordinal must be interpreted and applied in conjunction with Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages. Indeed, it must also be integrated with the provisions of Article 54 of that same regulation, which expressly states that:

“Article 54.- The penalties contained in Articles 19 and 21 of Law No. 9047 must be processed for their application before the competent Contraventional Court (Juzgado Contravencional).”

Therefore, it must be reiterated - once again - that ordering the referral to the respective contraventional court of the knowledge of a possible infraction of Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages (Law No. 9047), is fully in accordance with the interpretation that the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) itself has made of said normative provision. Likewise, the fact that Article 53 establishes that “police authorities may, by issuing a police report (parte policial), carry out its seizure (decomiso), which must be remitted to the competent Contraventional Court for it to determine the appropriateness of its destruction”, cannot be interpreted - as the consulting judge seems to understand - as imposing on the judge the unavoidable obligation to order the destruction of the seized goods, but rather that it only establishes - in light of what is already provided for in Article 21 of the Law for the Regulation and Commercialization of Alcoholic Beverages - that the seized liquor must be remitted to the competent jurisdictional body, so that it is the latter that “determines” - that is, decides or resolves - whether the destruction of the goods is appropriate or not, after determining whether a contravention has or has not been configured. Evidently, it will ultimately be the competent jurisdictional body that must resolve, in the specific case, the destination of the seized liquor, as provided for by the applicable regulations to that effect.

V.- Lastly, it must be clarified to the consulting judge that it is not for this Chamber to define her jurisdiction, nor to indicate to her what she must resolve in the specific case submitted to her knowledge, nor - in particular - regarding the manner in which the seized liquor must be disposed of. This Tribunal has clarified that:

“(…) that the optional consultations (consultas facultativas) promoted by the judges of the Republic must be in relation to... the norms or acts that they must apply, but it is not a matter of this jurisdiction indicating to them which norm they must apply to the case submitted to their knowledge…” (Vote No. 2775-97 of 15:33 hours on May 20, 1997).

Whereas, in Vote No. 2013-010828 of 15:00 hours on August 14, 2013, this Chamber stated the following: 

“(…) on repeated occasions this Tribunal has indicated that the judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts that they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case”.

VI.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary, it is clear that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional, in the terms in which this consultation has been formulated.

VII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE (EXPEDIENTE). The parties are cautioned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

\n\nOtherwise, all material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe consultation is resolved in the sense that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional.\n\n

\"\"

Luis Fdo.

\n\nSalazar A.

 

\"\"

Jorge Araya G.

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Anamari Garro V.

 

\"\"

Jose Roberto Garita N.

 

 

Digitally Signed Document

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CASE FILE N° 22-006958-0007-CO

 

Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Reception for matters of vulnerable groups: Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6

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