{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1131875", "citation": "Res. 30399-2022 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Constitucionalidad de la autorización del MTSS para suspensión de contratos laborales", "title_en": "Constitutionality of MTSS authorization for labor contract suspension", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechazó una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 7 inciso c) de la Ley 9832, 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, y el Decreto 42248-MTSS, que regulan la suspensión temporal de contratos laborales y la reducción de jornadas. El accionante alegaba que estas normas vulneraban la libertad de contratación y de asociación al exigir la autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo y limitar los pactos individuales entre patrono y trabajador. La Sala consideró que la especificación de causas de suspensión y el requisito de autorización constituyen limitaciones razonables a la libertad contractual, en resguardo de los principios de justicia social y protección al trabajador. Estimó que la medida es conforme con el principio in dubio pro operario y no es irrazonable ni desproporcionada. Respecto a la alegada violación a la libertad de asociación y al artículo 121 inciso 7 constitucional, la acción fue rechazada de plano por falta de fundamentación suficiente. Dos magistrados salvaron parcialmente el voto, considerando que procedía prevenir al accionante para subsanar omisiones en su argumentación.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber rejected an unconstitutionality action against Article 7(c) of Law 9832, Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, and Decree 42248-MTSS, which regulate the temporary suspension of labor contracts and reduction of working hours. The plaintiff argued that these norms infringed freedom of contract and association by requiring authorization from the Ministry of Labor and limiting individual agreements between employer and worker. The Chamber held that the specification of causes for suspension and the authorization requirement constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, safeguarding social justice and worker protection principles. It found the measure consistent with the in dubio pro operario principle and neither unreasonable nor disproportionate. Regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and Article 121(7) of the Constitution, the action was dismissed outright for insufficient legal argument. Two justices issued a partial dissent, arguing that the plaintiff should have been granted an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in the pleading.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "21/12/2022", "year": "2022", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "libertad de contratación", "suspensión de contratos laborales", "Código de Trabajo", "in dubio pro operario", "justicia social", "autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo", "rechazo de plano", "voto salvado" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Código de Trabajo", "article": "74", "doc_id": "norm-8045", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 5089", "article": "74", "doc_id": "norm-8045", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código de Trabajo", "article": "75", "doc_id": "norm-8045", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 5089", "article": "75", "doc_id": "norm-8045", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "libertad de contratación", "suspensión de contratos", "Código de Trabajo", "Ley 9832", "Ministerio de Trabajo", "in dubio pro operario", "justicia social", "inconstitucionalidad", "rechazo de fondo", "rechazo de plano", "voto salvado", "pandemia", "reducción de jornadas", "autorización administrativa" ], "keywords_en": [ "freedom of contract", "suspension of contracts", "Labor Code", "Law 9832", "Ministry of Labor", "in dubio pro operario", "social justice", "unconstitutionality", "dismissal on merits", "summary dismissal", "dissenting opinion", "pandemic", "reduction of working hours", "administrative authorization" ], "excerpt_es": "CONSIDERANDO: [...] V.- SOBRE LA ALEGADA VIOLACIÓN A LA LIBERTAD DE CONTRATACIÓN. [...] En reiteradas ocasiones esta Sala ha señalado que la libertad de contratación no es ilimitada, sino que está sometida a las regulaciones legales, máxime cuando, como en este caso, tiene el objeto de proteger a la persona trabajadora [...] Por esto, se estima que la especificación de las causas de suspensión temporal de los contratos de trabajo, sin responsabilidad para las partes patronal y trabajadora, del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo [...] y el requerimiento de la autorización de la Inspección General de Trabajo, conforme al artículo 75 del mismo cuerpo normativo, constituyen limitaciones razonables a la libertad contractual, en resguardo de los principios de justicia social y protección al trabajador -contenidos en la Constitución Política-, cuya finalidad es garantizar los derechos laborales y evitar que se utilice la figura de la suspensión de la relación laboral para evadir el cumplimiento de las obligaciones patronales; por ejemplo, para encubrir el despido con responsabilidad patronal en perjuicio de la parte trabajadora, quien vería anulados sus ingresos sin el pago de sus derechos y prestaciones correspondientes.", "excerpt_en": "CONSIDERING: [...] V.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT. [...] This Chamber has repeatedly held that freedom of contract is not unlimited but subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, it aims to protect the worker [...] For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or workers, in Article 74 of the Labor Code [...] and the requirement of authorization from the General Labor Inspectorate, pursuant to Article 75 of the same legal body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection —enshrined in the Political Constitution— whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the figure of labor relationship suspension from being used to evade compliance with employer obligations; for example, to conceal dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the worker, who would see their income nullified without payment of corresponding rights and benefits.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Dismissed (partially on merits, partially summary)", "label_es": "Rechazada (parcialmente de fondo, parcialmente de plano)", "summary_en": "The unconstitutionality action was dismissed on the merits regarding the violation of freedom of contract, and summarily dismissed regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and Article 121(7) of the Constitution for lack of sufficient legal argument. Two justices issued a partial dissent.", "summary_es": "La acción de inconstitucionalidad fue rechazada por el fondo en cuanto a la violación a la libertad de contratación, y rechazada de plano en cuanto a la alegada violación a la libertad de asociación y al artículo 121 inciso 7 constitucional por falta de fundamentación. Dos magistrados salvaron parcialmente el voto." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the specification of the causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or the workers, in Article 74 of the Labor Code [...] and the requirement of authorization from the General Labor Inspectorate, pursuant to Article 75 of the same legal body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection", "quote_es": "la especificación de las causas de suspensión temporal de los contratos de trabajo, sin responsabilidad para las partes patronal y trabajadora, del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo [...] y el requerimiento de la autorización de la Inspección General de Trabajo, conforme al artículo 75 del mismo cuerpo normativo, constituyen limitaciones razonables a la libertad contractual, en resguardo de los principios de justicia social y protección al trabajador" }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the obligatory nature of requesting authorization from the General Labor Inspectorate, under penalty of sanction, in accordance with Articles 75 and 7(c) of Law 9832 challenged herein, is not unreasonable or disproportionate, but on the contrary, it is a measure that is consistent with the principles of social justice and in dubio pro operario", "quote_es": "la obligatoriedad de solicitar la autorización ante la Inspección General de Trabajo, bajo pena de sanción, conforme a los artículos 75 y 7, inciso c), de la Ley 9832 aquí impugnados, no resulta irrazonable ni desproporcionada, sino que, por el contrario, se trata de una medida que resulta conforme con los principios de justicia social y de in dubio pro operario" }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "the plaintiff did not expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of Article 9 of Law No. 9832, merely indicating the following [...] it is not proven that the unconstitutionality of Article 9 was expressly and formally invoked in the underlying proceeding", "quote_es": "la parte accionante no invocó expresamente la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 9 de la Ley n.° 9832, pues se limitó a indicar lo siguiente [...] no se acredita que en el proceso base se haya invocado, de manera expresa y formal, la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 9" }, { "context": "Voto Salvado Parcial", "quote_en": "We depart from the majority view of this Court and partially dissent in this matter, considering that the decision to dismiss certain aspects of this unconstitutionality action is premature. [...] it is unquestionably appropriate to prevent the plaintiff to remedy the detected omissions.", "quote_es": "Nos separamos del criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal y salvamos parcialmente el voto en este asunto, por considerar que la decisión de rechazar unos extremos de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad es prematura. [...] resulta de incuestionable aplicación la prevención al accionante para que remedie las omisiones detectadas." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1208434", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0007-1208434" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1131875", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0007-1208434" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "*220251680007CO*\n\r\r\n\nExp: 22-025168-0007-CO \n\r\r\n\nRes. Nº 2022030399\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta \r\r\nminutos del veintiuno de diciembre de dos mil veintidos .\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nAcción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por LUIS ÁNGEL SÁNCHEZ MONTERO, mayor, \r\r\nabogado, cédula de identidad n.° 108660710, vecino de Escazú, carné profesional n.° 8290, en su condición \r\r\nde apoderado especial judicial de [Nombre 001], cédula jurídica n.° [Valor 001]\r\r\n, y [Nombre 002]., cédula \r\r\njurídica n.° [Valor 002], contra \r\r\nlos artículos 7, inciso c), y 9 de la Ley “Reducción de jornadas de trabajo \r\r\nante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional” \r\r\nn.° 9832, publicada en el alcance n.° 56 de La Gaceta n.° 58 del 23 de marzo de 2020; los artículos 74 y 75 \r\r\ndel Código de Trabajo n.° 2 del 27 de agosto de 1943; y el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, denominado \r\r\n“Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados \r\r\ncon los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo”, publicado en el alcance n.° 53 de La Gaceta \r\r\nn.° 55 del 20 de marzo de 2020.\n\r\r\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\n1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 10:55 horas del 4 de noviembre de 2022, la parte \r\r\naccionante interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad contra las siguientes normas: \r\r\n1) La Ley “Autorización \r\r\nde reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional”, Decreto Legislativo n.° \r\r\n9832, publicado en el Alcance n.° 56 a La Gaceta n.° 58 del 23 de marzo de 2020, concretamente en sus \r\r\nartículos 7, inciso c) y 9. 2) \r\r\nAdicionalmente contra los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, que es ley \r\r\nnúmero 2 del 27 de agosto de 1943, en el tanto se entiende que (i) dichos artículos fueron indirectamente \r\r\nmodificados por la Ley n.° 9832 y, con independencia de esta ley, (ii) excluyen la posibilidad de un pacto o \r\r\nacuerdo individual y directo, entre patrono y trabajador, para suspender una relación laboral, en el tanto el \r\r\nartículo 75 refiere que la suspensión debe ser autorizada por el Ministerio de Trabajo. Dicho de otra forma, \r\r\nse deriva de estos artículos, una prohibición de que un patrono y un trabajador pacten, por sí solos, una \r\r\nsuspensión de una relación laboral, con plenos efectos jurídicos, de la misma forma que las partes sí pueden \r\r\niniciar o terminar una relación laboral, con el solo acuerdo, sin la aprobación del Ministerio de Trabajo. Lo \r\r\nanterior por derivarse de dicha normativa que cualquier acuerdo de suspensión de una relación laboral solo \r\r\npuede darse por las causales del artículo 74, que no incluyen la voluntad de ambas partes y que, según el \r\r\nartículo 75, debe además ser autorizada por el Ministerio de Trabajo (siempre). Además, por adición de la \r\r\nLey n.° 9832, se incluye ineludiblemente el procedimiento de autorización de parte del Ministerio de Trabajo \r\r\npara producirse una suspensión parcial de la relación laboral en la forma de reducción de jornadas. Más aun, \r\r\nse cuestiona la constitucionalidad por cuanto ese procedimiento de autorización incluye solamente la \r\r\nposibilidad de pactar en colectivos, y no en forma individual entre un patrono y un trabajador, y se agrega \r\r\nuna sanción para quien no siga este procedimiento (de pactos de suspensiones de contratos de trabajo en \r\r\ncolectivo y con autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo). 3)\r\r\n N°. 42248-MTSS, Reglamento para el \r\r\nprocedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) \r\r\ndel artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo del 20 de marzo de 2020, publicada en La Gaceta n.° 55, alcance n.° 53 \r\r\ndel 20 de marzo de 2020, que confirma lo anterior, o sea que un requisito de validez de un acuerdo bilateral de \r\r\nsuspensión de una relación laboral es la autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo, a partir de que no se incluye \r\r\nla posibilidad de que tal acuerdo se produzca válidamente sin intervención del Ministerio, de la misma forma \r\r\nque se deriva del artículo 75 del Código de Trabajo. Como resumen de su planteamiento, indica que, con la \r\r\npromulgación de la Ley n.° 9832, Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de \r\r\nemergencia nacional, se reguló la posibilidad de reducir jornadas y el salario de los trabajadores dentro del \r\r\ncontexto de la pandemia y la declaración de emergencia a causa de la pandemia producida por la Covid-19. \r\r\nEs diáfano que la “reducción de jornadas” regulada por esta Ley n.° 9832 es un tipo de “suspensión” de los \r\r\ncontratos de trabajo, pero con efectos reducidos (suspensión parcial de un contrato). La figura de la \r\r\nreducción de jornadas y la ley que la reguló, fueron ligadas y destinadas a complementar la normativa de los \r\r\nartículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, los cuales regulan en forma general la suspensión de las relaciones \r\r\nlaborales por causa justificada. Entonces, las limitaciones introducidas por dicha ley complementaron y son \r\r\nparte de la figura de la suspensión de las relaciones laborales, junto con los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo. El Ministerio de Trabajo emitió reglamentación variada (como el Decreto también cuestionado de \r\r\ninconstitucional n.° 42248-MTSS), así como criterios jurídicos complementarios que afirman que todo \r\r\nconvenio de suspensión de una relación laboral debe ser autorizado por el Ministerio de Trabajo, para ser \r\r\nválido. Todo esto derivado de los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo y de la Ley n.° 9832. Además, \r\r\npretende que se impongan sanciones a patronos por el solo hecho de pactar suspensiones en forma \r\r\nindividual con sus trabajadores. También, existen sentencias en apelación que dan por excluida la \r\r\nsuspensión de la relación laboral, en todas sus formas, del ámbito exclusivo de la voluntad privada. \r\r\nEntonces, se afirma que es producto de esta normativa de rango legal (artículos 74 y 75 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo más la Ley n.° 9832) todo lo siguiente: 1)\r\r\n un patrono y un trabajador sí pueden pactar libremente y \r\r\nen forma autosuficiente, sin intervención del Ministerio de Trabajo, el inicio y la terminación de una relación \r\r\nlaboral, pero no pueden acordar, de la misma manera, una suspensión de la relación laboral ni su especie, la \r\r\nreducción temporal de jornadas. Para lograr una suspensión con plenos efectos, se les impone seguir un \r\r\nprocedimiento de autorización ante el Ministerio de Trabajo como requisito de validez, donde resulta que, de \r\r\nquerer negociar, las partes solo pueden hacerlo en colectivos, no en forma individual, o entre patrono un \r\r\ntrabajador. O sea, si se presentara para autorizar un convenio de suspensión pactado entre un trabajador y \r\r\nun patrono, se rechazaría solo por el hecho de ser pactado entre un trabajador y su patrono. \r\r\n2) Las \r\r\nsuspensiones de la relación laboral y su especie (reducciones de jornada) siempre requieren de la \r\r\nparticipación y aprobación final del MTSS, como elemento de validez, aún si ambas partes están de acuerdo \r\r\nen aplicar la medida y dentro de la situación pandémica, en la cual poco hay que verificar sobre la \r\r\njustificación de la medida. Aun habiendo acuerdo entre ambos, se impone siempre una aprobación del \r\r\nministerio, como elemento de validez, lo cual les elimina la posibilidad de pactar cualquier tipo de suspensión \r\r\nde la relación laboral, o cambio en condiciones laborales, como la reducción de jornadas dentro de la \r\r\npandemia, solamente entre un trabajador y su patrono. Es claro que el ámbito de la autonomía de la voluntad \r\r\nse entendió limitada al excluir estos contratos, por vía de las normas que se cuestionan de \r\r\ninconstitucionales. 3) En todo caso, si un trabajador y un patrono, individualmente, buscan la aprobación \r\r\ndel ministerio de un acuerdo individual, se les niega, porque se impide que se hagan acuerdos individuales. \r\r\nNo se aprueban si no los acuerdos pactados en colectivos. Las partes no pueden llevar su acuerdo para \r\r\naprobación, sino que deben producirlo dentro del procedimiento, en donde se deben incluir a todos los \r\r\ntrabajadores. 4) Se entiende prohibido, ilegal y además se establecen sanciones, por pactar reducciones de \r\r\njornada en forma individual, o sea ente un patrono y un trabajador, sin el procedimiento de autorización, \r\r\nque, como se dijo, no es viable para contratos individuales. Esto no puede entenderse más que como una \r\r\nprohibición a la negociación individual laboral para este tipo de situaciones, o sea, para la adaptación del \r\r\ncontrato de trabajo a condiciones sobrevenidas con una suspensión temporal de sus efectos originarios. \r\r\nAsí pues, se restringe la libertad solo de estos contratos de suspensión individuales de trabajo, lo cual \r\r\nconlleva la limitación de las libertades de contratación más la libertad de asociación, esta última en sentido \r\r\nnegativo. 5) Si las partes de la relación laboral firmaron un contrato de suspensión fuera del control del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo, con o sin motivo, infringieron la ley y el patrono recibe una sanción por infracción a \r\r\nlas leyes laborales. Se agrega que el pactar acuerdos de suspensión en forma individual y sin intervención \r\r\ndel Ministerio de Trabajo es una violación a la legislación laboral que es perseguible y sancionable por el \r\r\nMinisterio. La sanción le cabe solo al patrono, aun cuando el trabajador también participó con su voluntad y \r\r\nsin importar que el acuerdo resulte justificado, razonable y proporcionado. 6) Se afirma la nulidad del \r\r\nacuerdo, per se, aun por la sola forma. Cualquier consideración sobre la sustancia, equilibrio o razonabilidad, \r\r\nes inocua. Esto detona la obligación del patrono de indemnizar al trabajador, aun sin haber servicios \r\r\nprestados de parte del trabajador y sin importar que el acuerdo haya sido de buena fe, con una justificación \r\r\nválida como es una economía en contracción debido a una pandemia y hasta con el acuerdo del trabajador, \r\r\npara beneficio de ambas partes. Se le carga solo al patrono el efecto de una nulidad automática, más un \r\r\nprocedimiento sancionatorio, como consecuencia del ejercicio de buena fe de un derecho fundamental que \r\r\nfinalmente pudo llevar a los mismos efectos que pretendía la legislación que le da base a las restricciones. \r\r\n7) \r\r\nUn juez no puede si quiera entrar a analizar si el acuerdo resultaba o no razonable o justificado conforme a \r\r\nlos fines de las leyes y la Constitución, porque la sola ausencia de la aprobación del ministerio detona su \r\r\nnulidad. Se deja por fuera el control de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de los jueces en función de la \r\r\npreponderancia irrazonable de las formas, aunque se pueda llegar directamente por acuerdo bilareral de las \r\r\npartes, al mismo fin previsto por la ley. Dentro del contexto de la pandemia el Ministerio de Trabajo no le ha \r\r\nagregado ningún valor al acuerdo de suspensión pactado entre las partes, por lo que la normativa cae en \r\r\nirrazonable y desproporcionada. No hay relación entre costo y beneficio/ razón y proporción, pero, aún con \r\r\ntodo esto, el juez no puede juzgar si el convenio consiguió los mismos fines propuestos sin lesión de \r\r\nningún otro derecho. De hecho, se verá en los casos que sirven de antecedente y se están juzgando en \r\r\nestos momentos, que no se cuestiona que las suspensiones sí eran justificadas y que sí hubo voluntad de \r\r\nlas partes en acordar la medida. 8) El Ministerio de Trabajo ha sostenido que, puesto en posición de \r\r\nextender o no la autorización no tiene competencia para profundizar en el contenido de los acuerdos de \r\r\nsuspensión o reducción de jornadas, siendo que el control que se establece por el Ministerio de Trabajo y \r\r\nSeguridad Social es meramente formal, para verificar que se siguió el procedimiento para la concurrencia \r\r\ncolectiva de voluntades. Entonces, el único objetivo de la regulación viene siendo reprimir la contratación \r\r\nindividual, para encausar esas suspensiones o reducciones de jornada, por la vía de negociación en \r\r\ncolectivos de trabajadores, dándole al ministerio un poder de control y represión que no es propio de un \r\r\nrégimen de libertad. En sentido contrario, el alcance de la legislación es apenas restringir la libertad \r\r\nindividual de contratación en el sector privado, para ese tipo de acuerdos (suspensiones y reducciones de \r\r\njornada), incluyendo la coerción del sistema en manos del MTSS como medio para lograr dicho fin. Pero no \r\r\nhay razón ni proporción. Dicho de otra forma, el único fin de restringir la voluntad de las partes y de \r\r\nsancionar, es el no seguir la vía colectiva para la negociación ante el ministerio, como se establece en el \r\r\nartículo 7 inciso c) de la Ley n.° 9832. No solo se limita la negociación individual en el ámbito dicho, sino que \r\r\nse agrega un mecanismo de represión grosero, convirtiéndose en actividad sancionable impropia para un \r\r\nsistema basado en la libertad. Particularmente en cuanto a este punto la ley n.° 9832, en su artículo 7 inciso \r\r\nc) establece como un hecho sancionable “no solicitar la autorización para la reducción de la jornada \r\r\nante la Inspección de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social”. \r\r\nLuego, el artículo 9 dispone \r\r\n“Adicionalmente a las multas establecidas en el artículo 7, la persona empleadora que incurra en alguna \r\r\nde las faltas establecidas en ese artículo tendrá la obligación de restituir a las personas trabajadoras en \r\r\nel goce de todos los derechos indebidamente afectados, con el pago de las diferencias salariales \r\r\ncorrespondientes. Queda a salvo el derecho de la persona trabajadora de acudir a la sede jurisdiccional \r\r\nrespectiva, para el cobro de los daños y perjuicios causados”. Esto implica no solo la posibilidad de recibir \r\r\nuna sanción, sino la de pagar derechos laborales e indemnizaciones por ejercer de buena fe dos derechos \r\r\nfundamentales (libertad de negociación laboral y libertad de asociación). 9)\r\r\n La Ley n.° 9832 que es \r\r\npromulgada dentro del contexto de la pandemia y es la que introduce y refuerza estas prohibiciones, más el \r\r\nprocedimiento sancionatorio por pactar un contrato de suspensión de una relación laboral en forma \r\r\nindividual y sin la autorización formal del Ministerio de Trabajo, contiene restricciones a la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación y libertad de asociación tan extremas, que solo podrían entenderse válidas, si hubiesen sido \r\r\npromulgadas dentro del contexto del artículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución Política, pero, aún así, \r\r\nresultarían inconstitucionales, no solo por el procedimiento legislativo utilizado, que fue el de una ley \r\r\nordinaria, sin una declaratoria de la calamidad o justificación mínima de la necesidad de afectar la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación laboral, sino porque fue promulgada con un carácter indefinido, sin limitación de plazo (hoy \r\r\nestá vigente) y para quedar incorporado indefinidamente en el ordenamiento jurídico para un tipo especial \r\r\nde contratos. De nuevo, además tenemos la falta de razón y proporción al suspender exclusivamente las \r\r\nlibertades contratación individual de patronos y trabajadores, en su carácter individual y en el ámbito \r\r\nprivado e imponer negociaciones en colectivos, solo para suspensiones, creando un régimen de excepción \r\r\ncon respecto del sistema de autonomía de voluntad que sigue vigente para el inicio y la terminación de las \r\r\nrelaciones laborales, que no requiere intervención ni autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo. En resumen, \r\r\nconforme a la Jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, estima que es claro que la libertad de contratación \r\r\nmás la libertad de asociación han permitido siempre y deben todavía permitir hoy que un patrono y un \r\r\ntrabajador, por sí solos, puedan acordar el inicio de una relación laboral, luego su modificación (con una \r\r\nsuspensión) o hasta la extinción de un contrato de trabajo, sin más límites que aquellos que imponen las \r\r\nleyes y la Constitución Política, los cuales solo refieren al respeto de ciertos mínimos bien identificados \r\r\n(salario, jornadas, vacaciones, aguinaldo, etc.). Pero, si se establecen estos límites, deben ser claros, \r\r\nrazonables y proporcionados, lo cual ahora no se cumple con la normativa señalada que representa un \r\r\nobstáculo para el ejercicio de estos derechos fundamentales. Históricamente y dentro del marco de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, patronos y trabajadores han sido libres de pactar válidamente suspensiones de \r\r\ncontratos de trabajo de las formas más variadas. No se les ha requerido contar con la aprobación del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo para que esos pactos sean válidos y eficaces, como tampoco se les ha compelido a \r\r\nunirse en colectivos de trabajadores para poder acceder a este tipo de convenios. No hay duda de que un \r\r\npatrono y un trabajador sí pueden iniciar la relación laboral y terminarla de común acuerdo, sin intervención \r\r\ndel Ministerio de Trabajo. Pero, sin razón ni proporción, resulta que las mismas partes ahora no tienen la \r\r\nposibilidad de pactar un acuerdo intermedio entre el inicio y la terminación, que sería la suspensión de los \r\r\nefectos de ese contrato, por un tiempo determinado, ante una causa justificada como la pandemia. Se les ha \r\r\nentendido sustraído del ámbito de su voluntad un pacto como este, sin sujeción a tiempo de la restricción, \r\r\nsin mayor razón y en contra de varios derechos fundamentales. Llevada la tesis a lo que termina siendo un \r\r\nabsurdo, si ese pacto de suspensión se varía por otro de efectos más graves, o sea de terminación de la \r\r\nrelación y recontratación con otras condiciones o la terminación definitiva sin la recontratación, entonces sí \r\r\nhabía sido legal y no requeriría del procedimiento ante el Ministerio de Trabajo ni la conducta sería sujeta a \r\r\nuna sanción, pero, como se trató apenas de una suspensión, resulta que no sería válido… Entonces, acá, el \r\r\nque ha podido terminar una relación de común acuerdo, no puede suspenderla de común acuerdo y sin \r\r\nintervención del Ministerio de Trabajo. Para agravar esta situación y llevarla hasta lo grosero, resulta que \r\r\neste tipo de conductas (un pacto de suspensión entre un patrono y un trabajador) están tan reprimidas que \r\r\nimplican la posibilidad de recibir sanciones, por infracciones a las leyes laborales y de seguridad social. Pero \r\r\nlas sanciones son para el patrono, con independencia de la buena fe de las dos partes, lo cual es además un \r\r\nsigno de represión discriminatorio. Y todo lo anterior sin importar que aquel contrato haya sido pactado de \r\r\nbuena fe, para alcanzar de una forma más rápida los mismos fines que persiguen las mismas leyes (preservar \r\r\nel empleo, paz social, solidaridad dentro de situaciones indiscutibles de fuerza mayor, y el equilibrio de las \r\r\nposiciones de las partes dentro de una relación laboral). Entonces, la normativa llegó al punto de sancionar \r\r\nel ejercicio de la libertad de contratación y libertad de asociación. Este régimen no se queda con la invalidez, \r\r\nsino que escaló hasta la actividad represiva del ejercicio de libertades públicas. Esta postura es reciente e \r\r\nimplica un cambio. En el ejercicio de sus derechos fundamentales, históricamente patronos y trabajadores \r\r\nhan pactado válidamente, por sí y entre sí, suspensiones de las relaciones laborales de las formas más \r\r\nvariadas, por ejemplo: un permiso sin goce de salario de días, meses o años; los años sabáticos y otras \r\r\nformas similares de acuerdos son suspensiones de las relaciones laborales que se vienen acordando y \r\r\nejecutando sin siquiera una comunicación de carácter informativa al Ministerio de Trabajo. También han \r\r\npactado modificaciones consentidas en los contratos de las formas más variadas y, para ello, no se requiere \r\r\npactar en colectivos ni la aprobación o siquiera el depósito o puesta en conocimiento de esos acuerdos en el \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo. La tesis se circunscribe o contextualiza a la pandemia y a la vigencia de la ley n.° 9832 \r\r\ny del reglamento n.° 42248-MTSS. Fue a partir de la pandemia cuando esta posición nació impulsada por el \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo, que se sabe fue quien diseñó el proyecto que terminó siendo la ley n.° 9832, que \r\r\nregula la reducción de jornadas y salario, lo cual no es más que otro tipo particular de suspensión de la \r\r\nrelación laboral. Esta última ley es la que contiene muy claro el régimen de represión y sanción, más la \r\r\nnulidad de estos pactos y la obligación de pagar salario por tiempo no laborado más reajustes de otros \r\r\nderechos conexos. A partir de esta ley, se escalaron los mismos efectos a la suspensión de la relación \r\r\nlaboral, las mismas restricciones, siendo hoy generales para cualquier tipo de suspensión. Hoy en día solo \r\r\nlos patronos están sufriendo los efectos de esta legislación, como se verá abajo, a través de demandas de \r\r\nmala fe de trabajadores quienes construyeron junto a los patronos estos acuerdos, sin negar su voluntad o \r\r\nla conveniencia de dichos pactos, los ejecutaron de buena fe, pero, ahora, quieren aprovechar una situación \r\r\nde aparente ventaja que les permite intentar un abuso del derecho a través del solo cuestionamiento del \r\r\nnegocio por la forma. Pero, también, los patronos se están viendo perseguidos por le Ministerio de Trabajo, \r\r\nhaciendo efectivo el régimen de represión y castigo, solamente por haber pactado un contrato de \r\r\nsuspensión de una relación laboral con una causa incuestionable, por haberlo ejecutado de acuerdo con lo \r\r\npactado, por haberlo cumplido, pero sin una autorización apenas formal. Por el texto de las leyes \r\r\ncuestionadas, los jueces de la República avalan esta postura, catalogando los pactos como ilegales, y es por \r\r\neso que acude a la Sala en resguardo de los derechos de sus representadas. Por lo anterior, estima que esta \r\r\nacción de inconstitucionalidad es la última medida y resulta necesaria para lograr la tutela de derechos de \r\r\nbase constitucional y finalmente lograr producir lo que el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política ofrece. Por \r\r\nmedio de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad requiere que se anule, o al menos, se interprete en forma \r\r\nconstitucional la normativa que reprime actividad que finalmente es el ejercicio razonable y de buena fe de \r\r\nlos derechos fundamentales. A partir de lo anterior, la parte accionante indica las normas y principios que \r\r\nconsidera infringidos, a saber: 1) Los artículos 24 y 28 de la Constitución Política que garantizan la \r\r\nlibertad de contratación, en el tanto se suprime y reprime irrazonable y desproporcionadamente la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación de un patrono y un trabajador para pactar una suspensión de un contrato de trabajo, sea en \r\r\nforma total o en alguna de sus especies, como la reducción de jornadas. Pero, además, porque se reprime y \r\r\nsanciona el pacto individual que no obtenga una autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo, sin importar que su \r\r\ncontenido sea razonable, proporcionado y finalmente justo. Se suprime y sanciona el ejercicio de la \r\r\nautonomía de la voluntad expresada en un contrato bilateral, que resultó un mecanismo razonable para \r\r\nalcanzar los mismos fines que dieron origen a la legislación que se cuestiona de inconstitucional. \r\r\n2) El \r\r\nartículo 25 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza la libertad de asociación\r\r\n, en el tanto se impone la \r\r\nasociación, al menos temporal, como requisito y único medio para pactar una reducción de jornadas, a la vez \r\r\nque se impide un pacto individual o bilateral y se sanciona. 3) El artículo 121, inciso 7)\r\r\n, que dispone que \r\r\nlas libertades públicas (incluyendo la de contratación en forma individual) solo pueden suspenderse por \r\r\nparte de la Asamblea Legislativa, pero hasta por un periodo de 30 días y de forma razonable y \r\r\nproporcionada. Respecto a la libertad de contratación laboral\r\r\n, el accionante manifiesta que el sistema de \r\r\nlibertad incluido en nuestra Constitución Política, en su especie de libertad de contratación, obliga a que los \r\r\nlímites a esta libertad sean específicamente dados de forma muy clara (lo que no se prohíbe, está permitido). \r\r\nEl Código de Trabajo es muestra de esto, contiene esos límites y utiliza construcciones lingüísticas \r\r\nespecíficas y claras, señalando las restricciones o delimitando el ámbito donde las partes pueden pactar \r\r\nlibremente (pacto libre entre partes por encima del salario mínimo, por debajo de la jornada máxima, por \r\r\nencima de las vacaciones mínimas, etc.). De esta forma, lo que no está limitado expresamente en las leyes es, \r\r\nentonces, jurídicamente viable de ser pactado en forma libre por las partes de una relación laboral. De la \r\r\nmisma forma en cuanto a las formalidades de un contrato: al no establecerse la ineludible necesidad de \r\r\nautorización de un contrato con la consecuencia de su invalidez, se entiende que el convenio es perfecto y \r\r\nválido, desde su nacimiento y sin mayor formalidad (véanse los artículos 24 y 25 del Código de Trabajo que \r\r\nno incluyen nada sobre aprobaciones del Ministerio). Los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo que \r\r\nregulan la suspensión de la relación laboral NO contienen una limitación a un pacto bilateral de suspensión \r\r\nde una relación laboral. La redacción de dichos artículos dentro del marco de la Constitución, no permite \r\r\nconcluir eso. Por eso no se cuestionan directamente sino en forma subsidiaria, a partir de la reforma \r\r\nintroducida por la Ley n.° 9832 y del reglamento n.° 42248-MTSS. Antes de la entrada en vigencia de esta ley \r\r\nel Código de Trabajo regulaba en los artículos 74 y 75 solamente la figura de la suspensión impuesta por el \r\r\npatrono, sin voluntad del trabajador, por lo que solo se acudía al ministerio para que sustituyera esa \r\r\nvoluntad (si no existía) y se impusiera una suspensión a aquellos trabajadores. Al no referirse a la \r\r\nsuspensión bilateral acordada por acuerdo, no la reprimía, sino, al contrario, lo dejaba abierto a pacto o \r\r\nacuerdo de voluntades y sin posterior aprobación, como se inicia y se terminan las relaciones laborales \r\r\ncuando hay acuerdo. O sea, las partes de una relación laboral pueden, de común acuerdo, iniciar, terminar y \r\r\nsuspender una relación laboral o cambiar sus condiciones. Esto bajo el principio de interpretación de que: \r\r\nquien puede lo más, puede lo menos. También, bajo el referido principio de que lo que no esté prohibido, es \r\r\njurídicamente posible y válido. Por ello históricamente se han dado todo tipo de pactos de suspensión entre \r\r\npartes, sin cuestionamiento alguno, como el caso de los permisos sin goce de salario o sabáticos, que son \r\r\nsuspensiones pactadas a diario bilateralmente y sin necesidad de intervención o aprobación de terceros. \r\r\nEsto deriva solo de los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, pero dentro del marco de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional. Lo regulado ahí entonces es la hipótesis de que no \r\r\nexista voluntad de los trabajadores en suspender una relación laboral, porque, si la hay, no existe necesidad \r\r\nde ir por una aprobación del ministerio para suspender un contrato, siendo que esa suspensión se puede \r\r\nacordar directamente entre las partes de la relación laboral. Ahora bien, puede afirmarse razonablemente que \r\r\nla Ley n.° 9832, promulgada específicamente dentro del contexto de la pandemia, que regula una especie de \r\r\nsuspensión (parcial en la reducción de jornadas), modificó el régimen legal aplicable a estos contratos, \r\r\nimpactando lo regulado en los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo y derivando hasta el decreto n.° \r\r\n42248-MTSS. De esta forma, la ley 9832 contiene los siguientes artículos que se citan de seguido, los cuales \r\r\nsí establecen restricciones a la libertad de contratación y sanciones por el ejercicio común de esta libertad \r\r\ncontractual, provocando un cambio drástico en el ordenamiento jurídico: “ARTÍCULO 7- Faltas y \r\r\nsanciones. Se sancionará con base en la tabla de sanciones establecida en el artículo 398 de la Ley 2, \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo, de 27 de agosto de 1943, tomando en cuenta la gravedad del hecho, sus \r\r\nconsecuencias, el número de faltas cometidas y la cantidad de personas trabajadoras que han sufrido los \r\r\nefectos de la infracción, a las personas empleadoras que incurran en alguna de las siguientes faltas: c) \r\r\nNo solicitar la autorización para la reducción de la jornada ante la Inspección de Trabajo del Ministerio \r\r\nde Trabajo y Seguridad Social”. “ARTÍCULO 9. Restitución de derechos. Adicionalmente a las multas \r\r\nestablecidas en el artículo 7, la persona empleadora que incurra en alguna de las faltas establecidas en \r\r\nese artículo tendrá la obligación de restituir a las personas trabajadoras en el goce de todos los derechos \r\r\nindebidamente afectados, con el pago de las diferencias salariales correspondientes”\r\r\n. Siendo esta ley \r\r\ncomplemento claro de los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo y un tipo o especie de la suspensión de \r\r\ncontratos, entendemos que puede interpretarse razonablemente que el legislador sí pudo querer limitar el \r\r\námbito de la voluntad de contratación privada de la forma en que se expuso, o sea, dando los siguientes \r\r\nefectos al sistema jurídico de contratación laboral de suspensiones de contratos laborales, siendo que, a \r\r\npartir de la vigencia de esta nueva ley, ocurre lo siguiente en el sistema de suspensiones de contratos de \r\r\ntrabajo incluidos en la ley n.° 9832 pero además influyó en la interpretación de los artículos 74 y 75 del \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo. Como quiera que sea, el resultado hoy de la integración de estos artículos a que se llega \r\r\ny se combate por inconstitucional es el siguiente: 1. Un patrono y un trabajador podrían y pueden pactar \r\r\nlibremente el inicio y hasta la terminación de una relación laboral a través de un contrato sin intervención del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo, pero ya no una suspensión de la relación laboral ni su especie (la reducción temporal \r\r\nde jornadas), sin seguir el procedimiento de autorización ante el Ministerio de Trabajo que, a su vez, obliga \r\r\nacudir a la negociación en colectivos. 2.\r\r\n Las suspensiones de la relación laboral y reducciones de jornada \r\r\nrequieren algo más: de la participación y aprobación final del MTSS como elementos de validez, aun dentro \r\r\nde una situación pandémica, en la cual poco había que verificar sobre la justificación de la medida y aun \r\r\ncuando los propios colaboradores estén conscientes y de acuerdo con las medidas y remedios y hasta \r\r\nresulte que se beneficien del acuerdo individual que se les propone. 3. En todo caso, si un trabajador y un \r\r\npatrono buscan la aprobación del Ministerio en un acuerdo individual, se les niega, porque se impide que se \r\r\nhagan acuerdos individuales o bilaterales. Solo son aprobables acuerdos colectivos o multilaterales, lo cual \r\r\nimplica la obligación de asociarse al menos temporalmente o hacerse representar en colectivos para negociar \r\r\nun contrato de suspensión como la reducción de jornadas y salarios. 4. \r\r\nEstá prohibido, es ilegal y además \r\r\nsancionable, pactar suspensiones y reducciones de jornada en forma individual, o sea entre un patrono y un \r\r\ntrabajador. Esto no puede entenderse más que como una prohibición a la negociación individual laboral. \r\r\n5. \r\r\nPero, además, se agregó que dicho acuerdo representa una violación a la legislación laboral que es \r\r\nperseguible y sancionable para el patrono, aun cuando el trabajador también participó con su voluntad y \r\r\nfuera parte del acuerdo. O sea, el acuerdo de voluntades es bilateral, pero la sanción se dirige a una de las \r\r\npartes. 6. Se entiende que se produce la nulidad del acuerdo, per se y por la sola forma. Esto detona la \r\r\nobligación del patrono de indemnizar al trabajador, pagándole el salario y demás derechos, aun sin haber \r\r\nservicios prestados de parte del trabajador y sin importar que el acuerdo haya sido de buena fe, con una \r\r\njustificación válida como es una economía en contracción debido a una pandemia y hasta con el acuerdo de \r\r\nlos trabajadores. Le carga solo al patrono todo el efecto de una nulidad automática, más un procedimiento \r\r\nsancionatorio que no incluye al trabajador, aunque haya concurrido con su voluntad. También se deriva que \r\r\nun juez no puede, ni siquiera entrar a analizar si el acuerdo resultaba o no razonable o justificado o si alcanzó \r\r\nlos fines propuestos en la exposición de motivos de la ley n.° 9832, porque la sola ausencia del \r\r\nprocedimiento detonó su nulidad, la obligación de reajuste y la sanción. Es la forma impuesta por la forma \r\r\nmisma. 7. El Ministerio de Trabajo revisa un acuerdo de este tipo, pero solo para confirmar requisitos \r\r\nformales, porque ha sostenido que no tiene competencia para profundizar en el contenido, siendo que el \r\r\ncontrol que se establece por el MTSS es solamente para verificar que se siguió el procedimiento para la \r\r\nconcurrencia colectiva de voluntades, porque la causa está más que justificada a tratarse de una pandemia. \r\r\nEntonces, el único objetivo palpable de la regulación viene siendo reprimir la contratación individual, para \r\r\nencausar esas reducciones de jornada, que son suspensiones, por la vía de la autorización imperativa, más la \r\r\nnegociación en colectivos de trabajadores. En sentido contrario, se desprende que el alcance de la \r\r\nlegislación es apenas restringir la libertad individual de contratación en el sector privado, para ese tipo de \r\r\nacuerdos (suspensiones y reducciones de jornada), incluyendo la coerción del MTSS como medio para \r\r\nlograr dicho fin. De esta misma forma, el único fin de sancionar, es el no seguir la vía colectiva para la \r\r\nnegociación y no optar por la autorización, aunque no se verifiquen daños o desequilibrios en los fines o \r\r\nefectos de los pactos. No solo se limita la negociación individual en el ámbito dicho, sino que se reprime, \r\r\nconvirtiéndose en actividad sancionable. Con toda su participación el Ministerio de Trabajo no le agrega \r\r\nningún valor al negocio jurídico de este tipo, por lo que la normativa cae claramente en irrazonable y \r\r\ndesproporcionada. Pero, aun más, se convierte en actividad represiva de libertades públicas, lo cual torna la \r\r\nnormativa especialmente contraria a la Constitución. Adiciona que, las restricciones a la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación y la libertad de asociación de la Ley n.° 9832 que es promulgada dentro del contexto de la \r\r\npandemia y es la que introdujo y refuerza estas restricciones, es de tal magnitud que podría solo entenderse \r\r\nconstitucionalmente válida si hubiese sido promulgada como una suspensión de garantías públicas y \r\r\nderechos fundamentales, dentro del contexto del artículo 121 inciso 7 de la Constitución Política, pero, aún \r\r\nasí, resulta inconstitucional, no solo por el procedimiento legislativo utilizado, sino porque fue promulgada \r\r\ncon un carácter indefinido, sin respetar el plazo de 30 días (hoy está vigente), pero también por la falta de \r\r\nrazón y proporción al suspender exclusivamente la libertad de contratación individual de patronos y \r\r\ntrabajadores, en su carácter individual y en el ámbito privado, sin justificación de la necesidad pública de \r\r\naquella extraordinaria restricción enfocada en un solo tipo de negocio (dejó por fuera la terminación y \r\r\nmodificaciones de condiciones de carácter indefinido). Tampoco guarda razón ni proporción limitar \r\r\nsolamente las suspensiones de las relaciones laborales, pero dejando abierta la posibilidad de despidos con \r\r\nresponsabilidad, terminaciones por mutuo acuerdo y otro tipo de cambios de condiciones de empleo. Como \r\r\npetitoria, indica que su propuesta y solicitud para la Sala Constitucional es para que se sirva disponer: 1) \r\r\nConfirmando que es conforme a la constitución un pacto entre un patrono y trabajador para suspender la \r\r\nrelación laboral ante una situación que lo amerita conforme a la ley y sin ulterior necesidad de aprobación \r\r\ndel Ministerio de Trabajo, la Sala Constitucional debe declarar inconstitucional los artículos 7 inciso c más el \r\r\n9 de la Ley “Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional”, \r\r\nDecreto Legislativo n.° 9832, publicado en el alcance n.° 56 a La Gaceta n.° 58, del 23 de marzo de 2020. Al \r\r\ndeclarar esta inconstitucionalidad, interpretaría constitucionalmente que los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo incluyendo el pacto individual, directo y autosuficiente de las partes como mecanismo de \r\r\ncontratación válido para este fin. Particularmente se interpretaría que la remisión a la autorización del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo de dichos artículos es bajo el entendido de que no exista acuerdo entre partes para \r\r\nsuspender la relación laboral. 2)\r\r\n Subsidiariamente, puede hacerse en el orden inverso: interpretando \r\r\nconstitucionalmente los artículos 74 y 75 incluyendo el pacto individual, directo y autosuficiente de las \r\r\npartes como mecanismo de contratación válido para pactar suspensiones de las relaciones laborales, \r\r\ninterpretando que la remisión a la autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo de dichos artículos es bajo el \r\r\nentendido de que no exista acuerdo entre partes para suspender la relación laboral, más declarando la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de los artículos 7 inciso c más el 9 de la ley n.° 9832 al establecer el procedimiento de \r\r\nautorización y en colectivos como único mecanismo para obtener la suspensión de una relación laboral y \r\r\nsanciones para quienes no sigan este único procedimiento. 3)\r\r\n Subsidiariamente también, debe interpretar \r\r\nconstitucionalmente dichos artículos (74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, más el 7 inciso c y 9 de la Ley n.° 9832) \r\r\nen el sentido de que dichas leyes y artículos no se refieren a ni excluyen la validez de pactos individuales, \r\r\ndirectos y privados, entre patronos y trabajadores, con los mismos efectos y fines que las leyes regulan. 4) \r\r\nAdicionalmente y también en forma subsidiaria, los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, que es Ley n.° 2 \r\r\ndel 27 de agosto de 1943, deberían ser declarados inconstitucionales por conexión, junto con los artículos 7 \r\r\ninciso c) y 9 de la Ley n.° 9832 en el tanto se entienda que (i) dichos artículos fueron indirectamente \r\r\nmodificados por la Ley n.° 9832 y (ii) todos excluyen ahora la posibilidad de un pacto o acuerdo individual y \r\r\ndirecto, entre patrono y trabajador, para suspender una relación laboral, y sin requerir la autorización del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo. 5) Finalmente, cualquiera que sea el caso, que se anule por conexión el reglamento n.° \r\r\n42248-MTSS, Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos \r\r\nrelacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo del 20 de marzo de 2020, publicada \r\r\nen La Gaceta n.° 55, alcance n.° 53, del 20 de marzo de 2020 que limita los derechos fundamentales indicados \r\r\ny en cuanto los limita, al disponer el procedimiento ahí establecido como único medio de obtener una \r\r\nsuspensión de la relación válida. \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\n2.- El accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional, toda vez que indica como asuntos pendientes de resolver ante los tribunales los siguientes \r\r\nexpedientes: 1) n.° \r\r\n[Valor 005], que es un proceso ordinario laboral que se tramita ante el Juzgado Civil y \r\r\nTrabajo del I Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste (Liberia), donde figura como parte actora Daysi \r\r\nMendoza Chaves y como demandada [Nombre 036]. Actualmente el asunto se encuentra ante el Tribunal de \r\r\nApelación Civil y Laboral de Liberia ante el recurso de apelación presentado \r\r\npor ambas partes. 2) n.° \r\r\n[Valor 007], proceso laboral interpuesto por \r\r\n[Nombre 007] contra \r\r\n[Nombre 015]., que \r\r\nse tramita ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del II Circuito Judicial de Alajuela (San Carlos). Se celebró audiencia el \r\r\n20 de octubre de 2022 y se está a la espera de la \r\r\nsentencia de primera instancia. 3) n.° [Valor 003], proceso de infracciones del Ministerio de Trabajo contra \r\r\n[Nombre 015]., que se tramita ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del II Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, donde se \r\r\ndenuncia la aplicación de suspensiones de contrato de trabajo sin la \r\r\nautorización del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Específicamente de la misma actora \r\r\n[Nombre 007] \r\r\ny de [Nombre 008]. La audiencia de juicio está programada para el 11 de noviembre de 2022. \r\r\n4) n.° \r\r\n[Valor 004], proceso ordinario laboral interpuesto por [Nombre 021] contra [Nombre 002]., que se tramita ante \r\r\nel Juzgado Civil y Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial \r\r\nde Guanacaste (Liberia). Debido a que la sociedad demandada interpuso recurso de apelación, actualmente \r\r\nse encuentra ante el Tribunal de Apelación Civil y Laboral de Liberia. Asimismo, el accionante aportó \r\r\ncertificaciones de los escritos mediante los cuales invocó la inconstitucionalidad en esos procesos \r\r\njudiciales.\n\r\r\n\n3.- Por resolución de las 16:27 horas del 14 de noviembre de 2022 se previno a la parte accionante lo \r\r\nsiguiente: “(…) conforme al artículo 4 de la Ley número 3245 del 3 de diciembre de 1963, agregar y \r\r\ncancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, \r\r\ncorrespondiente a la autenticación del escrito inicial, bajo el apercibimiento de no oír al omiso mientras \r\r\nno cumpla lo ordenado, sin retroacción de términos”.\n\r\r\n\n4.- Por escrito recibido mediante Gestión en Línea a las 11:37 horas del 16 de noviembre de 2022, la \r\r\nparte accionante aportó el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas por la suma de 275 colones, \r\r\ncorrespondiente a la autenticación del escrito inicial.\n\r\r\n\n5.- Por oficio del 6 de diciembre de 2022, dirigido al Juzgado Civil y Trabajo del Primer Circuito \r\r\nJudicial de Guanacaste, se solicitó constancia referente al estado procesal de los expedientes números \r\r\n[Valor 005] y [Valor 004].\n\r\r\n\n6.- Por oficio del 5 de diciembre de 2022, dirigido al Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito \r\r\nJudicial de Alajuela (San Carlos), se solicitó constancia referente al estado procesal de los expedientes \r\r\nnúmeros [Valor 006] y \r\r\n[Valor 003].\n\r\r\n\n7.- Por constancia remitida al correo electrónico autorizado de esta Sala el 6 de diciembre de 2022, la \r\r\ncoordinadora judicial del Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Carlos, hizo \r\r\nconstar lo siguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“LOURDES CORELLA ALVARADO, COORDINADORA JUDICIAL DEL \r\r\nJUZGADO DE TRABAJO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE \r\r\nALAJUELA, SAN CARLOS, HACE CONSTAR QUE: En este Despacho se \r\r\ntramita el EXPEDIENTE N° [Valor 007]\r\r\n, el cual es proceso ORDINARIO \r\r\nLABORAL establecido por KIMBERLY MARIA [Nombre 007], cédula \r\r\n0207780765 contra [Nombre 001], cédula jurídica 3101014194. Dicho \r\r\nexpediente se encuentra en FASE: CONCLUSIVA. Tiene sentencia Sin lugar \r\r\nN° 615-2022 \r\r\ndictada a las 15:31 horas del 10 de noviembre de 2022. Se encuentra \r\r\npendiente de resolver escrito de apelación y otro. EXPEDIENTE N° \r\r\n[Valor 003], el cual es proceso INFRACCIÓN A LAS LEYES establecido por \r\r\nMINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL contra \r\r\n[Nombre 001], cédula jurídica 3101014194. Dicho expediente se encuentra \r\r\nen FASE: \r\r\nCONCLUSIVA. Tiene sentencia Homologatoria N° 619-2022 dictada a las \r\r\n14:55 horas del 11 de noviembre de 2022.*/*/*/*/*/ Expido la presente \r\r\nconstancia en Ciudad Quesada, a solicitud de la Sala Constitucional, a las \r\r\ndiez horas veinticuatro minutos del siete de diciembre de dos mil veintidós”.\n\r\r\n\n8.- Por constancias del 8 de diciembre de 2022, dirigidas al correo electrónico autorizado de esta \r\r\nSala en esa misma fecha, el coordinador judicial del Juzgado Civil y Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de \r\r\nGuanacaste (Liberia) hizo constar lo siguiente: \n\r\r\n\n“Que en este Despacho se tramita el expediente N° EXPEDIENTE: \r\r\n20-000186-0942-LA -PROCESO: OR.S.PRI. PRESTAC. LABORALES PARTE \r\r\nACTORA: [Nombre 021], PARTE DEMANDADA: [Nombre 002]., Dicho \r\r\nproceso, tiene un \"estado\" de sentencia \r\r\ndictada de primera instancia, número 2022-000019, de las diez horas \r\r\nveintiséis minutos del diecisiete de enero de dos mil veintidós, contra la cual, \r\r\nmediante resolución de las ocho horas treinta y uno minutos del nueve de \r\r\nmarzo de dos mil veintidós, se admitió recurso de Apelación.- Al día de hoy, el \r\r\nexpediente se encuentra en alzada ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de este \r\r\nCircuito Judicial, para que sea resuelto en definitiva el citado recurso de \r\r\napelación”. \n\r\r\n\n“Que en este Despacho se tramita el expediente N° 21-000296-0942-LA \r\r\nproceso: OR.S.PRI. PRESTAC. LABORALES, ACTORA: DAYSI IRINA \r\r\nMENDOZA CHAVES, DEMANDADO: [Nombre 001], Dicho proceso, el estado \r\r\nes de sentencia de primera instancia dictada, número 2022-000140, de las \r\r\nquince horas cuarenta y uno \r\r\nminutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veintidós, contra la cual, mediante \r\r\nresolución de las siete horas veintinueve minutos del veinticuatro de mayo de \r\r\ndos mil veintidós, se admitió recurso de Apelación.- Al día de hoy, el \r\r\nexpediente se encuentra en alzada ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de este \r\r\nCircuito Judicial, para que se resuelva en definitiva el citado recurso de \r\r\napelación”.\n\r\r\n\n9.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por \r\r\nel fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su \r\r\nconocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de \r\r\njuicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión \r\r\nanterior igual o similar rechazada.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nRedacta el Magistrado Cruz Castro\r\r\n; y,\n\r\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\r\r\n\nI.- LEGITIMACIÓN. \r\r\nSe estima que la parte accionante goza de legitimación para promover esta \r\r\nacción de inconstitucionalidad, según el artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, al \r\r\ntener como asuntos previos los procesos que se tramitan en los expedientes números \r\r\n[Valor 005], que es un proceso ordinario laboral que se tramita ante el Juzgado Civil y Trabajo del Primer \r\r\nCircuito Judicial de Guanacaste (Liberia), incoado por Daysi Irina Mendoza Chaves contra [Nombre 036].; \r\r\n[Valor 006], que es proceso laboral incoado por Kimberly María \r\r\n[Nombre 007] contra \r\r\n[Nombre 036]. tramitado \r\r\nante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela (San Carlos); [Valor 003], proceso de \r\r\ninfracciones a las \r\r\nleyes de trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo contra [Nombre 015]., que se tramita ante el Juzgado de Trabajo \r\r\ndel Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, y [Valor 004] proceso ordinario laboral que se tramita ante el \r\r\nJuzgado Civil y Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste \r\r\n(Liberia) incoado por [Nombre 021] contra [Nombre 002]. La parte accionante invocó la inconstitucionalidad \r\r\nde los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, La Ley n.° 9832, artículo 7 inciso c), y en \r\r\ngeneral el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se \r\r\nestima vulnerado. Ahora bien, en cuanto al artículo 9 de la Ley n.° 9832, como se indica más adelante, su \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad no fue debidamente invocada.\n\r\r\n\nII.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. \r\r\nEl accionante interpone esta acción contra las siguientes normas: \n\r\r\n\n- \r\r\nArtículos 7, inciso c), y 9 de la Ley “Reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia \r\r\nnacional” n.° 9832, publicada en el alcance n.° 56 a la Gaceta n.° 58 del 23 de marzo de 2020, los cuales \r\r\ndisponen lo siguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“ARTÍCULO 7-Faltas y sanciones. Se sancionará con base en la tabla \r\r\nde sanciones establecida en el artículo 398 de la Ley 2, Código de \r\r\nTrabajo, de 27 de agosto de 1943, tomando en cuenta la gravedad del \r\r\nhecho, sus consecuencias, el número de faltas cometidas y la cantidad \r\r\nde personas trabajadoras que han sufrido los efectos de la infracción, \r\r\na las personas empleadoras que incurran en alguna de las siguientes \r\r\nfaltas:\n\r\r\n\na)(…)\n\r\r\n\nb)(…)\n\r\r\n\nc) No solicitar la autorización para la reducción de la jornada ante la \r\r\nInspección de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. \n\r\r\n\nd)(…)”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n“ARTÍCULO 9- Restitución de derechos. Adicionalmente a las multas \r\r\nestablecidas en el artículo 7, la persona empleadora que incurra en \r\r\nalguna de las faltas establecidas en ese artículo tendrá la obligación \r\r\nde restituir a las personas trabajadoras en el goce de todos los \r\r\nderechos indebidamente afectados, con el pago de las diferencias \r\r\nsalariales correspondientes.\n\r\r\n\nQueda salvo el derecho de la persona trabajadora de acudir a la sede \r\r\njurisdiccional respectiva, para el cobro de los daños y perjuicios \r\r\ncausados”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n- \r\r\nLos artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo n.° 2 del 27 de agosto de 1943:\n\r\r\n\n“ARTICULO 74.- \r\r\nSon causas de suspensión temporal de \r\r\nlos contratos de trabajo, sin responsabilidad para el \r\r\npatrono ni para los trabajadores:\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nLa falta de materia prima para llevar adelante los trabajos, siempre que no \r\r\nsea imputable al patrono;\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nLa fuerza mayor o el caso fortuito, cuando traiga como consecuencia \r\r\nnecesaria, inmediata y directa la suspensión del trabajo, y\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nLa muerte o la incapacidad del patrono, cuando tenga como consecuencia \r\r\nnecesaria, inmediata y directa la suspensión del trabajo.\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\nEn los dos primeros casos el Poder Ejecutivo podrá dictar medidas de \r\r\nemergencia que, sin lesionar los intereses patronales, den por \r\r\nresultado el alivio de la situación económica de los trabajadores”.\n\r\r\n\n“ARTICULO 75.- La suspensión temporal de los contratos de trabajo \r\r\nsurtirá efecto desde la conclusión del día en que ocurrió el hecho que \r\r\nle dio origen, siempre que se inicie ante la Inspección General de \r\r\nTrabajo o ante sus representantes debida y especialmente autorizados, \r\r\nla comprobación plena de la causa en que se funda, dentro de los tres \r\r\ndías posteriores al ya mencionado.\n\r\r\n\nEn los dos primeros casos previstos en el artículo anterior la prueba \r\r\ncorrerá a cargo del patrono y en el tercero a cargo de los familiares o \r\r\nsucesores de éste, y se hará por medio de todos los atestados e \r\r\ninvestigaciones que exijan las respectivas autoridades.\n\r\r\n\nSi la Inspección General de Trabajo o sus representantes llegaren al \r\r\nconvencimiento de que no existe la causa alegada, o de que la \r\r\nsuspensión es injustificada, declararán sin lugar la solicitud a efecto \r\r\nde que los trabajadores puedan ejercitar su facultad de dar por \r\r\nconcluidos sus contratos, con responsabilidad para el patrono”.\n\r\r\n\n- \r\r\nEl Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, denominado “Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión \r\r\ntemporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo”, publicado en el alcance n.° 53 de La Gaceta n.° 55 del 20 de marzo de 2020.\n\r\r\n\nIII.- AGRAVIOS. Las normas precitadas se impugnan en cuanto establecen que cualquier acuerdo de \r\r\nsuspensión de una relación laboral solo puede darse por las causales del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo, \r\r\nque no incluyen la voluntad de ambas partes y, según el artículo 75 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, debe \r\r\nser autorizado por el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Además, cuestiona la constitucionalidad del \r\r\nprocedimiento de autorización, dado que incluye solamente la posibilidad de pactar en colectivos, no así en \r\r\nforma individual entre un patrono y un trabajador, y se agrega una sanción para quien no siga este \r\r\nprocedimiento. Considera que esas disposiciones son contrarias a las libertades de contratación y de \r\r\nasociación, consagradas en los artículos 24, 25 y 28 de la Constitución Política; así como el artículo 121, \r\r\ninciso 7), constitucional, en cuanto a que las libertades públicas solo pueden suspenderse por parte de la \r\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, mediante un procedimiento específico, por un periodo de 30 días, de forma razonable \r\r\ny proporcionada. Así, en palabras de la parte accionante, considera que se infringen las siguientes normas y \r\r\nprincipios constitucionales:\n\r\r\n\n“1. Los Artículos 24 y 28 de la Constitución Política que garantizan la \r\r\nlibertad de contratación, en el tanto se suprime y reprime irrazonable y \r\r\ndesproporcionadamente la libertad de contratación de un patrono y un \r\r\ntrabajador para pactar una suspensión de un contrato de trabajo, sea en \r\r\nforma total o en alguna de sus especies, como la reducción de jornadas. Pero, \r\r\nademás, porque se reprime y sanciona el pacto individual que no obtenga \r\r\nuna autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo, sin importar que su contenido \r\r\nsea razonable, proporcionado y finalmente justo. Se suprime y sanciona el \r\r\nejercicio de la autonomía de la voluntad expresada en un contrato bilateral, \r\r\nque resultó un mecanismo razonable para alcanzar los mismos fines que \r\r\ndieron origen a la legislación que se cuestiona de inconstitucional. \n\r\r\n\n2. El Artículo 25 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza la libertad de \r\r\nasociación, en el tanto se impone la asociación, al menos temporal, como \r\r\nrequisito y único medio para pactar una reducción de jornadas, a la vez que \r\r\nse impide un pacto individual o bilateral y se sanciona.\n\r\r\n\n3. El Artículo 121, inciso 7 que dispone que las libertades públicas \r\r\n(incluyendo la de contratación en forma individual) solo\r\r\n pueden suspenderse \r\r\npor parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, mediante un procedimiento específico \r\r\nlegislativo, pero hasta por un periodo de 30 días y de forma razonable y \r\r\nproporcionada”. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nIV.- SOBRE EL LIBELO DE INVOCACIÓN EN LOS ASUNTOS PRINCIPALES Y LA \r\r\nINADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN EN CUANTO AL ARTÍCULO 9 DE LA LEY N.° 9832. \r\r\nEl artículo \r\r\n75, párrafo primero, in fine\r\r\n, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, para efectos de la \r\r\nadmisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental -como la presente-, la existencia de \r\r\nun asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de \r\r\namparo-, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. \r\r\nTales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple \r\r\ncumplimiento de los mismos, sino que se requiere, además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía \r\r\ntenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción \r\r\nsirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés lesionado dentro del asunto previo. \r\r\nA \r\r\ncontrario sensu, si no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo \r\r\nimpugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto. Es por lo anterior, que, \r\r\nde conformidad con los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes deben \r\r\nacreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron la inconstitucionalidad de las normas \r\r\nen el asunto base, a efecto de verificar su incidencia en tal asunto. En cuanto a los requisitos que debe \r\r\ncumplir el citado escrito de invocación, esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que: \n\r\r\n\n“(…) si bien, en la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, \r\r\nno se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es, que sí resulta \r\r\nnecesario que en el asunto base se invoque expresamente, la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la acción... y se \r\r\nindiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren \r\r\ninfringidas…”. (Sentencia No. 2014-000851 de las 14:30 hrs. del 22 \r\r\nde enero de 2014).” (Sentencia n.° 2017-007744 de las 9:15 horas del 24 \r\r\nde mayo de 2017).\n\r\r\n\nPor sentencia n.° 2022-5564 de las 9:00 horas del 9 de marzo de 2022, este Tribunal también señaló lo \r\r\nsiguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“(…) En este caso y relación con el contenido del artículo 17 referido \r\r\nal comiso, analizado el memorial en que se invocó la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma, el mismo resulta insuficiente. Se \r\r\nmencionan los posibles artículos constitucionales lesionados, pero no \r\r\nse indican las razones. Sobre todo, se echa de menos los alegatos \r\r\nreferidos al artículo 45 constitucional que es, precisamente, el \r\r\nderecho que se alega como lesionado en el escrito de interposición de \r\r\nla acción. Por último, en cuanto al artículo 20 referido, no es \r\r\nmencionado en el escrito de invocación, por lo que su \r\r\ncuestionamiento, carente del mínimo fundamento jurídico, es \r\r\ninadmisible.”\n\r\r\n\nAsimismo, este Tribunal ha resuelto que la invocación de inconstitucionalidad debe efectuarse en el \r\r\nasunto base de previo a la interposición de la acción (véanse, por ejemplo, los votos n.° 2016-009868 de las \r\r\n9:20 horas del 13 de julio de 2016 y n.° 2016-011291 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de agosto de 2016). \n\r\r\n\nEn el caso en estudio, la parte accionante fundamenta su legitimación para interponer esta acción \r\r\nen los asuntos base números [Valor 005]\r\r\n, [Valor 007], \r\r\n[Valor 003] y [Valor 004]\r\r\n. Así, aportó certificación \r\r\nnotarial de los escritos mediante los cuales invocó la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, el artículo 7, inciso c), de la Ley n.° 9832 \r\r\ny el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS. No obstante, a partir del estudio de las certificaciones de los libelos \r\r\nde invocación, constata este Tribunal que en estos la parte accionante no invocó expresamente la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad del artículo 9 de la Ley n.° 9832, pues se limitó a indicar lo siguiente (se transcribe la \r\r\ninvocatoria hecha dentro del proceso n.° [Valor 006]\r\r\n, por escrito de fecha 25 de octubre de 2022, que fue \r\r\nreplicada en los demás procesos base):\n\r\r\n\n“(…) Asunto de Constitucionalidad de los artículos 74 y 75, dentro \r\r\ndel contexto de la promulgación de la Ley 9832, así como de la \r\r\nreglamentación promulgada por el Ministerio de Trabajo, N° \r\r\n42248-MTSS.\n\r\r\n\nLa tesis planteada por la contraparte implica necesariamente la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la normativa anteriormente citada, queriendo \r\r\naprovechar de mala fe una cuestión formal que era conocida por la \r\r\nactora del proceso.\n\r\r\n\nEn resumen, la cuestión a resolver implica derivar de estas dos leyes y \r\r\ndel reglamento, que las partes de una relación laboral (i) sí son \r\r\nautosuficientes para pactar el inicio de la relación laboral, como de \r\r\nhecho lo fueron. Autosuficientes, o sea, sin necesidad de unirse con \r\r\notros colaboradores y sin intervención del Ministerio, se pudo iniciar \r\r\nesa relación laboral, a través de un contrato de trabajo. (ii) También \r\r\nhabrían sido autosuficientes para terminar la relación laboral, de \r\r\ncomún acuerdo, si así lo hubieran pactado. Osea, si en vez de una \r\r\nsuspensión hubieran pactado algo más grave como una terminación, \r\r\nla misma tesis no prosperaría. Entonces, no hay duda de que un \r\r\npatrono y un trabajador pueden iniciar la relación laboral y \r\r\nterminarla de común acuerdo, sin intervención del Ministerio de \r\r\nTrabajo. (iii) Pero resulta que acá se plantea que esas mismas partes \r\r\nno tenían la posibilidad de pactar por sí mismas un acuerdo \r\r\nintermedio, menos grave que la terminación, que sería la suspensión \r\r\nde los efectos de ese contrato, por un tiempo determinado, ante una \r\r\ncausa justificada. Se les entiende sustraído del ámbito de su voluntad \r\r\nun pacto como este, sin mayor razón y en contra de varios derechos \r\r\nfundamentales. Llevada la tesis a lo que termina siendo un absurdo, si \r\r\nel mismo pacto hubiese sido de terminación y no de suspensión habría \r\r\nsido legal, pero, como no se trató de una suspensión, resulta que \r\r\npodría no serlo… (el que puede lo más, debe poder lo menos). \n\r\r\n\nSi se profundiza un poco más, resulta que la contraparte propone que \r\r\nese solo requisito, que resulta en este caso puramente formal y no le \r\r\nhubiera agregado nada de valor a ese negocio, detona la nulidad del \r\r\npacto. Entonces, su tesis conlleva que la libertad de contratación tiene \r\r\nese límite y que ni siquiera ahora le es permitido al juzgador \r\r\nprofundizar si el contrato ha cumplido con la finalidad de la norma \r\r\n(preservación del contrato, equilibrio de las partes, adecuación a las \r\r\ncondiciones externas e imprevistos, etc.). Acá se nota que es una \r\r\nalegada prohibición o restricción de un tipo de pacto cuyo \r\r\nprocedimiento de aprobación no resulta de valor para nadie, por lo \r\r\nque tal prohibición tampoco es proporcionada ni razonable. \n\r\r\n\nAhora bien, si se profundiza un poco más en el análisis de este tema, \r\r\ntenemos dos situaciones que deben develarse: \n\r\r\n\n(i) \r\r\nEste tesis es reciente\r\r\n. Históricamente patronos y trabajadores \r\r\nhan pactado por sí y entre sí suspensiones de las relaciones laborales \r\r\nde las formas más variadas: un permiso sin goce de salario de días, \r\r\nmeses o años, los años sabáticos y otras formas similares de acuerdos \r\r\nson suspensiones de las relaciones laborales. También han pactado \r\r\nvariaciones consentidas en los contratos de las formas más variadas y, \r\r\npara ello, no se requiere la aprobación o ni siquiera el depósito o \r\r\npuesta en conocimiento de los contratos en el Ministerio de Trabajo.\n\r\r\n\n(ii) \r\r\nLa tesis se circunscribe o contextualiza a la Pandemia\r\r\n. Fue a \r\r\npartir de la Pandemia en que esta posición nació por parte del \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo. Pero este criterio fue alimentado por la \r\r\npromulgación de la ley 9832, que regula la reducción de jornadas y \r\r\nsalario, lo cual, no es más que otro tipo particular de suspensión de la \r\r\nrelación laboral. El género es la suspensión, la especie regulada es la \r\r\nsuspensión parcial de efectos de contrato, a partir de una reducción \r\r\nde jornadas y salario por un tiempo determinado y a causa de la \r\r\npandemia. \n\r\r\n\nEsta última ley podría contener alguna normativa que se interprete en \r\r\naquel sentido. Pero una interpretación así es inconstitucional\r\r\n. En \r\r\nresumidas cuentas:\n\r\r\n\nLa ley 9832 fue creada para sostener el empleo, como uno de sus \r\r\nprincipales fines, de igual forma o en la misma línea que se supone que \r\r\nlos artículos 74 y 75 fueron concebidos, por lo que puede entenderse \r\r\nque vino a complementarla y a ofrecerse esta variante de suspensiones \r\r\ncomo una alternativa que se regulaba de forma más precisa. No es que \r\r\ncon la ley nace la posibilidad porque siempre existió, sino apenas que \r\r\nse reguló en forma específica. Como en este caso que sirve de \r\r\nantecedente, se demuestra que el mismo fin pero con mejores medios y \r\r\nhasta resultados fue con o sin la Ley 9832 y apenas con el artículo 74 \r\r\ny 75 del Código de Trabajo la reducción de jornadas ya era \r\r\njurídicamente viable. A partir de la ley, se reguló de forma más \r\r\nespecífica con algunos efectos especiales. \n\r\r\n\nComo indicamos, históricamente y al amparo de la Constitución, \r\r\nPatronos y Trabajadores han pactado directa y libremente el inicio y \r\r\nla terminación de una relación laboral, sin acudir a más que el \r\r\nacuerdo de sus voluntades. De un contrato de trabajo NO se ha \r\r\nrequerido nunca autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo, sino, a lo \r\r\nsumo, el depósito o notificación apenas informativa, con efectos de \r\r\ntipo probatorio, pero nunca constitutivo o extintivo de derechos y \r\r\nobligaciones. Lo mismo con terminaciones por mutuo acuerdo. \r\r\nTambién los patronos y trabajadores han pactado todo tipo de \r\r\nconvenios intermedios, como suspensiones, los “permisos sin goce de \r\r\nsalario”, cambios de condiciones temporales y otro tipo de figuras \r\r\ncontractuales que encierran la suspensión temporal de efectos del \r\r\ncontrato de trabajo. Solo a partir de esta normativa recientemente \r\r\npromulgada es que tenemos ahora un criterio en el sentido de que no \r\r\nes legal acordar directamente una suspensión de la relación laboral \r\r\nni su especie, la reducción temporal de jornadas. Para tal efecto se ha \r\r\npretendido imponer seguir un procedimiento de autorización ante el \r\r\nMinisterio de trabajo y donde resulta que solo pueden negociar en \r\r\ncolectivos, no en forma individual y el trasfondo de lo que motiva la \r\r\nsuspensión (pandemia) ni siquiera se cuestiona. Entonces, el requisito \r\r\nque se plantea al Juzgado, de la autorización del Ministerio, también \r\r\nresultaría imposible en este caso, porque solo se puede negociar en \r\r\ncolectivos. Esto riñe directamente con la Constitución y no aporta \r\r\nalgún valor o mejora a las relaciones laborales cuando las partes, por \r\r\nsí mismas, pueden seguir pactando este tipo de acuerdos, sin \r\r\nintervención de terceros, de la forma en que se hizo, para un mutuo \r\r\nbeneficio dentro de una situación sin precedentes en la historia \r\r\nreciente del mundo. \n\r\r\n\nNo puede negarse que esto representa un cambio, una restricción de \r\r\nuna libertad pública y de derechos fundamentales que han sido \r\r\nespecíficamente cuestionados, como la libertad de contratación en el \r\r\námbito laboral. Esta tesis fue expuesta en las conclusiones y en la \r\r\ncontestación de la demanda. \n\r\r\n\nMas aún, la pretendida reforma al régimen de contratación y \r\r\nrestricción del ámbito de la voluntad de las partes, su encausamiento \r\r\nhacia negociaciones en colectivos como única alternativa, más el \r\r\nrégimen sancionatorio por cualquier desviación del procedimiento, \r\r\nvienen cargados de elementos ideológicos de control por el control \r\r\nmismo, represión y una exacerbada limitación a la posibilidad de las \r\r\npartes de disponer de sus propios asuntos o resolver sus propios \r\r\nconflictos, de adecuar sus acuerdos a circunstancias externas y \r\r\nfinalmente de ejercitar derechos que históricamente vienen siendo \r\r\nprotegidos y preservados, al amparo de la Constitución. En nuestro \r\r\nOrdenamiento Constitucional, un Juez no puede verse limitado de \r\r\nanalizar el equilibrio de prestaciones de las partes de un contrato \r\r\nlaboral que se modificó a causa de la suspensión acordada por las \r\r\nmismas partes que dieron inicio a la relación laboral. Si en este caso \r\r\nse hace, se notará que el resultado habría sido que estos contratos se \r\r\nhubieren aprobado sin más. Nótese que se ha llegado al extremo de \r\r\nafirmar además que el Ministerio de Trabajo no tiene competencia \r\r\npara profundizar en el contenido, siendo que el control que establece \r\r\npor el MTSS es solamente formal, para verificar que se siguió el \r\r\nprocedimiento para la concurrencia colectiva de voluntades o para \r\r\nverificar la situación de la empresa si no hay acuerdo de voluntades. \r\r\nLo anterior es lógico porque en una Pandemia como la que vivimos \r\r\nhabía poco que justificar sobre la causa de fuerza mayor que hacía \r\r\nnecesaria la suspensión. Entonces, el único objetivo palpable de la \r\r\ninterpretación restrictiva viene siendo reprimir la contratación \r\r\nindividual, para encausar esas reducciones de jornada, que son \r\r\nsuspensiones, por la vía de la negociación en colectivos de \r\r\ntrabajadores. En sentido contrario, el alcance de la legislación y esa \r\r\ninterpretación, según el defensor de la parte actora, es apenas \r\r\nrestringir la libertad individual de contratación en el sector privado, \r\r\npara ese tipo de acuerdos (suspensiones y reducciones de jornada), \r\r\nincluyendo la coerción del MTSS como medio para logar dicho fin. De \r\r\nesta misma forma, el único fin de sancionar la conducta calificada \r\r\ncomo ilegal, es el no seguir la vía colectiva para la negociación y la \r\r\nposterior autorización, como se establece en el artículo 7 inciso c) de \r\r\nla ley 9832.\n\r\r\n\nParticularmente la ley N.° 9832, en su artículo 7 inciso c) establece \r\r\ncomo un hecho sancionable “no solicitar la autorización para la \r\r\nreducción de la jornada ante la inspección de Trabajo del Ministerio \r\r\nde Trabajo y Seguridad Social”. \n\r\r\n\nEsto implica no solo la posibilidad de recibir una sanción, sino, en \r\r\nvirtud del recurso, la de pagar derechos laborales e indemnizaciones \r\r\npor ejercer dos derechos fundamentales (libertad de negociación \r\r\nlaboral y libertad de asociación, en sentido negativo o de no \r\r\nasociarse) en un contrato que se pactó y ejecutó de buena fe. \n\r\r\n\nLas restricciones a la libertad de contratación y la libertad de \r\r\nasociación de la ley N.° 9832 que fue promulgada dentro del contexto \r\r\nde la Pandemia y es la que introdujo y refuerza estas restricciones, \r\r\nsería de tal dimensión que podría solo entenderse constitucionalmente \r\r\nválida si hubiese sido promulgada dentro del contexto del artículo \r\r\n121 inciso 7 de la Constitución Política, que permite restringir \r\r\ngarantías constitucionales dentro de situaciones de calamidad, pero \r\r\naun así, resulta inconstitucional, no solo por el procedimiento \r\r\nlegislativo utilizado, sino porque fue promulgada con un carácter \r\r\nindefinido (hoy está vigente y su límite es de 30 días), pero también \r\r\npor la falta de razón y proporción al suspender exclusivamente la \r\r\nlibertad de contratación individual de patronos y trabajadores, en su \r\r\ncarácter individual y en el ámbito privado. \n\r\r\n\nEntonces, la discusión que se tiene entre manos, implica la posibilidad \r\r\nde aplicar normativa que resulta inconstitucional si se mantiene esta \r\r\nlínea de interpretación. Por esta razón, estamos accionando ante la \r\r\nSala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia con este asunto \r\r\ncomo antecedente para plantear la correspondiente Acción de \r\r\nInconstitucionalidad como una forma razonable de proteger los \r\r\nintereses y derechos de nuestra representada. \n\r\r\n\nDe la misma forma, pedimos al Juzgador que se sirva analizar lo \r\r\nanterior para eventualmente producir una consulta de \r\r\nconstitucionalidad sobre la validez de esta normativa. (…)”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nCon base lo anterior, no se acredita que en el proceso base se haya invocado, de manera expresa y \r\r\nformal, la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 9 de la Ley n.° 9832 aquí impugnado, como así lo exigen los \r\r\nnumerales 75 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, a fin de poder establecer, debidamente, el \r\r\ncarácter incidental de esta acción, por lo que la misma resulta inadmisible en cuanto a esa norma.\n\r\r\n\nV.- SOBRE LA ALEGADA VIOLACIÓN A LA LIBERTAD DE CONTRATACIÓN. \r\r\nEl accionante \r\r\nalega que las normas aquí impugnadas lesionan la libertad de contratación, literalmente estima lesionados: \r\r\n“1. Los Artículos 24 y 28 de la Constitución Política que garantizan la libertad de contratación, en el \r\r\ntanto se suprime y reprime irrazonable y desproporcionadamente la libertad de contratación de un \r\r\npatrono y un trabajador para pactar una suspensión de un contrato de trabajo, sea en forma total o en \r\r\nalguna de sus especies, como la reducción de jornadas. Pero, además, porque se reprime y sanciona el \r\r\npacto individual que no obtenga una autorización del Ministerio de Trabajo, sin importar que su \r\r\ncontenido sea razonable, proporcionado y finalmente justo. Se suprime y sanciona el ejercicio de la \r\r\nautonomía de la voluntad expresada en un contrato bilateral, que resultó un mecanismo razonable para \r\r\nalcanzar los mismos fines que dieron origen a la legislación que se cuestiona de inconstitucional”. \r\r\nEn \r\r\ncuanto a los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, alega que se deriva de dicha normativa que cualquier \r\r\nacuerdo de suspensión de una relación laboral solo puede darse por las causales del artículo 74, que no \r\r\nincluyen la voluntad de ambas partes, y que, según el artículo 75, siempre debe ser autorizada por el \r\r\nMinisterio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Respecto del artículo 7, inciso c), de la Ley n.° 9832, en el tanto la \r\r\nprimera establece una sanción si no se sigue el procedimiento respectivo ante la Inspección General de \r\r\nTrabajo y el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS en cuanto se reglamenta el procedimiento a seguir ante \r\r\ndicho órgano del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.\r\r\n \n\r\r\n\nPese a sus alegaciones, en cuanto a este aspecto, procede rechazar por el fondo esta acción, con \r\r\nbase en las siguientes consideraciones. En reiteradas ocasiones esta Sala ha señalado que la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación no es ilimitada, sino que está sometida a las regulaciones legales, máxime cuando, como en este \r\r\ncaso, tiene el objeto de proteger a la persona trabajadora (en este sentido, véanse los votos n.° 2013-12014 \r\r\nde las 14:30 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2013 y n.° 2017-016272 de las 11:30 horas del 11 de octubre de 2017, \r\r\nentre otros). Por esto, se estima que la especificación de las causas de suspensión temporal de los contratos \r\r\nde trabajo, sin responsabilidad para las partes patronal y trabajadora, del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo \r\r\n(sin omitir mencionar la existencia de otras causales de suspensión individual previstas en los artículos 78 y \r\r\n79, la huelga legal del 371 y el paro legal de 387, todos del Código de Trabajo, así como otros supuestos de \r\r\nsuspensión provisional por procedimientos disciplinarios previstos en la legislación) y el requerimiento de la \r\r\nautorización de la Inspección General de Trabajo, conforme al artículo 75 del mismo cuerpo normativo, \r\r\nconstituyen limitaciones razonables a la libertad contractual, en resguardo de los principios de justicia social \r\r\ny protección al trabajador -contenidos en la Constitución Política-, cuya finalidad es garantizar los derechos \r\r\nlaborales y evitar que se utilice la figura de la suspensión de la relación laboral para evadir el cumplimiento \r\r\nde las obligaciones patronales; por ejemplo, para encubrir el despido con responsabilidad patronal en \r\r\nperjuicio de la parte trabajadora, quien vería anulados sus ingresos sin el pago de sus derechos y \r\r\nprestaciones correspondientes. En este sentido, respecto al conflicto o colisión entre la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación y el principio in dubio pro\r\r\n operario, en la sentencia n.° 2007-015907 de las 18:57 horas del 31 \r\r\nde octubre de 2007, esta Sala dispuso lo siguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“(…) \r\r\n II.- Objeto de la impugnación. Aunque se \r\r\nimpugna únicamente el artículo 377 in fine del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo, para mayor claridad sobre el objeto de \r\r\nimpugnación, se transcribe en su integralidad la \r\r\nnorma resaltando el texto impugnado: \n\r\r\n\n “Artículo 377.- La huelga ilegal termina, sin responsabilidad para el \r\r\npatrono, con los contratos de trabajo celebrados por los huelguistas; quedan \r\r\na salvo las sanciones de orden represivo que en contra de éstos lleguen a \r\r\ndeclarar los Tribunales Comunes.\n\r\r\n\n Sin embargo, en los nuevos contratos que celebre el patrono, no podrán \r\r\nestipularse condiciones inferiores a las que, en cada caso, regían antes de \r\r\ndeclararse la huelga ilegal”.\n\r\r\n\n III.- Sobre el fondo. La parte accionante alega que la obligación contenida \r\r\nen la norma impugnada, que obliga al patrono a respetar las condiciones \r\r\nlaborales anteriores a la huelga ilegal, en caso de recontratación del \r\r\ntrabajador -a pesar de haberse roto el contrato de trabajo sin \r\r\nresponsabilidad patronal-, es violatorio de la libertad de contratación y del \r\r\nprincipio de buena fe. Por su parte la Procuraduría General de la República \r\r\ny los coadyuvantes pasivos estiman, por el contrario, que la norma impone \r\r\nuna limitación válida por razones de orden público a la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación, en resguardo de los principios de justicia social y protección al \r\r\ntrabajador- de contenido constitucional-, pues es evidente que el trabajador \r\r\ndespedido con motivo de una huelga ilegal estando desempleado y \r\r\ngeneralmente en un estado de extrema necesidad, no está en condiciones de \r\r\npoder negociar o concertar –de igual a igual y sin desventaja- un nuevo \r\r\ncontrato de trabajo, por lo que se impone su protección como parte más débil \r\r\nde la relación. Indudablemente nos encontramos en el caso, frente a una \r\r\naparente colisión de normas y principios constitucionales, por un lado, la \r\r\nlibertad de contratación y el principio de buena fe, y por otro, el principio de \r\r\njusticia social y el de indubio pro trabajador, todos de rango constitucional. \r\r\nEl dilema de cuáles intereses se deben proteger está resuelto y previsto en la \r\r\ndoctrina y jurisprudencia constitucional, concretamente la que se refiere a \r\r\nlas reglas de interpretación constitucional, que señala la obligación del juez \r\r\nconstitucional de interpretar la Constitución en forma armónica, como una \r\r\nunidad, en forma coordinada, como parte de un sistema jurídico totalmente \r\r\ncohesionado; es decir, las normas deben considerarse en su conjunto y no \r\r\nindividualmente (sentencia 2000-7730). No se trata entonces de escoger cuál \r\r\nprincipio le simpatiza más al juez constitucional, sino de extraer por medio de \r\r\nmétodos objetivos de interpretación e integración constitucionales el sentido \r\r\nque quiso darle el legislador constituyente al texto constitucional frente a \r\r\nuna situación concreta como la presente. Sobre este tema la jurisprudencia \r\r\nconstitucional ha reconocido que: \n\r\r\n\n “…La Constitución Política contiene una serie de valores de \r\r\nimportancia suprema para una nación, los cuales interactúan entre sí, y \r\r\nmuchas veces hacen difícil la labor del intérprete a la hora de resolver \r\r\nsituaciones compuestas, es decir, aquellas en que interviene más de un valor \r\r\na la vez. En este tipo de casos, es muy importante que el intérprete \r\r\nconstitucional pondere y procure equilibrar -cuando sea posible por las \r\r\ncircunstancias del caso-, los intereses en conflicto. La herramienta de la \r\r\nhermenéutica jurídica es muy útil también, para buscar la solución más justa \r\r\nen un determinado caso. No obstante, independientemente del método de \r\r\ninterpretación que se siga, es indispensable situarse dentro del contexto del \r\r\nmodelo ideológico que sigue la Constitución Política de un determinado país \r\r\na la hora de interpretar las normas, en nuestro caso, el de un país \r\r\ndemocrático de derecho. No puede nunca una interpretación divorciarse del \r\r\nmodelo ideológico, de tal forma que cualquier decisión que se tome deberá \r\r\nser compatible y acorde con el respeto a la libertad, acceso a la justicia, \r\r\ndignidad de la persona, y demás principios inspiradores de un sistema \r\r\npolítico de esta naturaleza…” (sentencia número 1996-06681)\n\r\r\n\n Es pues este un típico caso de competencia constitucional (artículo 3 de la \r\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) pues precisamente una de las \r\r\nfunciones esenciales del juez constitucional, es el descifrar aquellos espacios \r\r\nen blanco o bien aquellas colisiones de intereses, utilizando la interpretación \r\r\narmónica del texto constitucional. Para poder hacer eso, hay que tener claro, \r\r\nen primer término, si nuestra Constitución tiene una orientación ideológica \r\r\ndeterminada, pues con base en ésta el intérprete debe entender permeado \r\r\ntodo el sistema jurídico y político en el que está inserto. Así pues, no es lo \r\r\nmismo tener una Constitución liberal pura, que una Constitución socialmente \r\r\norientada. A este tipo de decisión, es a lo que doctrinariamente se denomina \r\r\ncomo la “decisión política fundamental”, que consiste en la elección que los \r\r\nconstituyentes hacen de un determinado sistema político y en consecuencia, \r\r\nde una determinada forma de gobierno bajo los cuales se regirá el \r\r\nconglomerado social.\n\r\r\n\n IV-.\r\r\n En el caso de nuestro país, no es necesario hacer esfuerzos para \r\r\ndeterminar cuál es la vocación ideológica actual de nuestro texto \r\r\nconstitucional, ya que es un tema no controvertido en la doctrina nacional, el \r\r\npaso que dio nuestra Constitución Política de una de orientación claramente \r\r\nliberal (1871) al de una conformadora de un estado social de derecho a \r\r\npartir de sus reformas en mil novecientos cuarenta y tres con la inclusión de \r\r\nlas garantías sociales y posteriormente con el nuevo texto constitucional \r\r\n–que toma como base el anterior- en mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve. A \r\r\npartir de allí resulta claro que en un estado social de derecho el Estado \r\r\nasume una particular forma de relación con los ciudadanos partiendo de una \r\r\nfunción equilibradota (sic) frente a las desigualdades sociales. En ese sentido \r\r\nestá obligado, políticamente tanto por medio de normas como de acciones \r\r\nconcretas, a ser proactivo en la generación de mecanismos de equidad social. \r\r\nLos derechos, especialmente los fundamentales (en general, incluidos los \r\r\nprestacionales), son vistos entonces no como un tema privado, sino de interés \r\r\npúblico para la vigencia de la ideología política. Precisamente algunos de \r\r\nlos valores orientadores de nuestro estado social de derecho son los de \r\r\njusticia social y solidaridad como medio para alcanzar la igualdad de \r\r\noportunidades. El cumplimiento del valor de justicia social, en un sistema \r\r\ncomo el nuestro va más allá de una simple declaración de igualdad de \r\r\nderechos, es necesario garantizar no sólo una igualdad general o jurídica de \r\r\nlas personas, sino también una igualdad real que se traduzca en crear y \r\r\npromover condiciones tales como: acceso a una buena educación, al trabajo \r\r\ny a servicios eficientes de salud, que permitan a todo individuo tener una \r\r\nigualdad de oportunidades para elegir y desarrollar las actividades a través \r\r\nde las cuales puedan satisfacer sus necesidades y así alcanzar su felicidad y \r\r\nbienestar. La protección al valor de justicia social implica también el \r\r\nreconocer y aceptar aquellas desigualdades legítimas que existen en la \r\r\nsociedad, siempre que de su existencia se derive un beneficio o compensación \r\r\npara los menos afortunados a través de la acción del Estado. No se trata \r\r\nentonces de eliminar las desigualdades legítimas, que se basan o son el \r\r\nproducto de las acciones libres y voluntarias de las personas que \r\r\ncontribuyan al aumento de los recursos sociales y a la creación de valor, es \r\r\ndecir en el trabajo individual, como tampoco, de tratar igual a quienes no lo \r\r\nson; sino más bien, de tomar en cuenta esas desigualdades para ayudar a las \r\r\npersonas más necesitadas, a fin de que tengan una oportunidad igual de \r\r\nacceso a las fuentes de producción de riqueza. En síntesis, el fin de este \r\r\nprecepto es tratar igual a todas las personas –en derechos- y de proporcionar \r\r\nuna auténtica igualdad de oportunidades, así la sociedad tendrá que dar \r\r\nmayor atención a quienes han nacido en las posiciones sociales menos \r\r\nfavorables. La idea es compensar las desventajas contingentes en dirección \r\r\nhacia la igualdad por medio de políticas públicas concretas y protecciones \r\r\nnormativas específicas.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nV-. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido en diversas \r\r\noportunidades que nuestro texto constitucional tiene una orientación propia \r\r\nde un estado social de derecho y que éste concepto se traduce en un valor \r\r\nrector del marco constitucional de actuación pública, que se traduce en \r\r\nobligaciones jurídicas concretas para el legislador. En ese sentido la \r\r\nsentencia 2005-17612 indicó: \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\n“V.- El Estado Social de Derecho como marco constitucional de actuación \r\r\npública. La Constitución Política, leída en forma conjunta y sistemática, \r\r\ndetermina la vigencia de un Estado Social de Derecho. Lo anterior implica \r\r\nque todas las actuaciones públicas, además de ser necesariamente conformes \r\r\ncon el ordenamiento vigente, deben estar dirigidas de manera eficiente y justa \r\r\na satisfacer las necesidades de los habitantes de la República, mediante una \r\r\nadecuada distribución de la riqueza y un equitativo acceso al bienestar \r\r\ngenerado por el desarrollo económico y técnico. Impone asimismo que en el \r\r\nseno de la sociedad, las cargas sean distribuidas entre los individuos de \r\r\nacuerdo con las capacidades de cada uno. El sistema económico diseñado \r\r\npor el constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve tiene como meta no \r\r\nsolamente el crecimiento de la producción y el empleo. En el marco de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, la economía tiene que ser un factor decisivo para el \r\r\nlogro de los objetivos del Estado Social de Derecho. Es claro, por ende, que \r\r\nla Carta vigente no es apenas un estatuto político, sino que también es uno \r\r\neconómico y uno social. Así, se desprende también que el sistema de derechos \r\r\nfundamentales establecido constitucionalmente no se encuentra basado en el \r\r\nindividualismo utilitarista, sino más bien en una concepción del hombre en el \r\r\nmarco de la sociedad en la que se desenvuelve. La Constitución Política \r\r\nparte de la noción de que el ser humano no puede desarrollarse \r\r\nintegralmente por sí solo, sino que para ello requiere de la participación de \r\r\ntodos los otros miembros de la sociedad. De hecho, para lograr una más \r\r\nhomogénea estratificación social, los individuos deben contribuir de acuerdo \r\r\ncon sus posibilidades, en beneficio de quienes menos poseen. Lo anterior es \r\r\nun derecho fundamental de las personas que ocupan los estratos inferiores, y \r\r\nun deber de todos, principalmente los más beneficiados por el sistema \r\r\neconómico. La riqueza en una sociedad no es producida apenas por quienes \r\r\nposeen los medios de producción, sino también por quienes contribuyen a \r\r\nella con su mano de obra, con su trabajo. En consecuencia, los beneficios \r\r\nproducidos por el mercado deben ser redireccionados a fin de que no \r\r\nredituen únicamente en favor de ciertos sectores sociales. Relacionado este \r\r\nprincipio con el de justicia social, positivizado en el ordinal 74 de la \r\r\nConstitución, según el cual las personas deben colaborar recíprocamente en \r\r\naras de preservar la dignidad humana de todos los miembros de la \r\r\ncomunidad, tenemos que el constituyente buscó fomentar una sociedad donde \r\r\nla solidaridad fuera la regla general de convivencia; donde la realización de \r\r\npequeños sacrificios en favor de grandes metas sociales estuviera por encima \r\r\nde los intereses individuales; es lo que normalmente se conoce como Estado \r\r\nSocial de Derecho. Podría así afirmarse que la solidaridad entre los \r\r\nmiembros de la colectividad es un principio de rango constitucional, que \r\r\nobliga al Estado a exigir más a quienes poseean (sic) mayores capacidades, \r\r\nde modo que por medio de la prestación de servicios sociales de educación, \r\r\nsalud, acceso a la vivienda, etc., propicie el crecimiento personal y social y \r\r\nevite la existencia de ciudadanos de primera categoría y de otros de segunda \r\r\no tercera categoría. Finalmente, se puede decir que la Constitución Política \r\r\nreconoce a favor de los individuos y grupos sociales una gama extensa y muy \r\r\nvariada de derechos, algunos de forma expresa, otros colegibles a partir de la \r\r\ncomprensión del sistema que forman sus normas y principios. Algunas de \r\r\nestas prerrogativas (sin importar si son individuales o colectivas) tienen un \r\r\ncarácter eminentemente social, al constituir derechos a la recepción de \r\r\ndeterminadas prestaciones por parte del Estado. Puede tratarse de bienes o \r\r\nde servicios, pero que en todo caso debe la Administración brindar debido al \r\r\nmandato (específico o genérico) contenido en la Ley Fundamental. Si se trata \r\r\nde una referencia general (vgr. protección a la madre y a los menores, cfr. \r\r\nartículo 51 constitucional), son los representantes de la soberanía popular, \r\r\nquienes a través de la Ley formal, desarrollarán estos preceptos imponiendo \r\r\nlas formas en que la Administración deberá actuar con la finalidad de \r\r\nhacerlos valer efectivamente, así como disponiendo de los recursos públicos \r\r\nnecesarios para ello. El hecho de que requieran de actuaciones de otros \r\r\nagentes para poder ser efectivamente realizados en nada les resta \r\r\nnormatividad, pero sí hace más compleja (en comparación con las libertades \r\r\npúblicas, por ejemplo) su puesta en operación, y más exhaustiva la labor del \r\r\ncontralor de constitucionalidad, al cual le cabrá discurrir respecto del grado \r\r\nde compromiso mostrado por el Estado al hacer valer las normas que \r\r\nreconozcan derechos sociales. Si el legislador no instituye los mecanismos \r\r\n-jurídicos y financieros- idóneos para realizarlas, su omisión podría \r\r\nsignificar una violación a la Constitución Política. Si emite las normas \r\r\nlegales y provee los recursos necesarios para hacer efectivo ese derecho y es \r\r\nla Administración la que evade su acatamiento, entonces esta última \r\r\nactuación estaría lesionando en forma refleja el derecho fundamental, \r\r\nmediante el incumplimiento de un deber legal.” (Ver en este mismo sentido las \r\r\nsentencias de esta Sala números 01441-92, 05125-93, 03338-99, \r\r\n2001-03825, entre otras)\n\r\r\n\n¿Significa esto que los derechos económicos le son indiferentes al legislador \r\r\nconstituyente o que son secundarios frente a otros valores?. Naturalmente \r\r\nque no, los derechos fundamentales en general, incluidos los económicos, no \r\r\nson ideas contrapuestas que impliquen necesariamente la restricción de uno \r\r\nde los derechos sociales para la efectiva realización de la justicia y la \r\r\nigualdad, o viceversa, son más bien parte de un sistema e incluso \r\r\ninterdependientes entre sí. La propia jurisprudencia constitucional ha \r\r\nreconocido esta unidad sistémica al señalar:\n\r\r\n\n“…Ante todo, debe hacerse una advertencia de carácter general: la de que la \r\r\nConstitución, o más aún, el derecho de la Constitución constituye una unidad \r\r\nsistemática de valores, principios y normas que, en consecuencia, deben ser \r\r\ninterpretados y aplicados no aisladamente sino con criterios y de manera \r\r\ntambién sistemáticos, en armonía unos con otros, los cuales resultan así, \r\r\nindivisibles e interdependientes; condiciones estas que resultan doblemente \r\r\nimportantes en cuanto estén involucrados en el caso derechos y libertades \r\r\nfundamentales, los cuales son, a su vez, interdependientes e indivisibles \r\r\ntambién …” (1992-03194)\n\r\r\n\n VI-.\r\r\n La doctrina también es coincidente en cuanto a que en un sistema \r\r\npolítico como el democrático en el que la libertad es la base de todo el \r\r\nsistema, todos los derechos son derechos de libertad, incluidos los derechos \r\r\nque aportan un componente igualitario, como los económicos, sociales y \r\r\nculturales, porque ese componente potencia y refuerza la libertad para todos. \r\r\nEn ese sentido los derechos fundamentales de cualquier tipo actúan en \r\r\nrealización integral de la libertad como autonomía, como superación de los \r\r\nobstáculos que hacen posible el desarrollo en todas las facetas de la \r\r\ncondición humana.\n\r\r\n\n VII-.\r\r\n Así las cosas, ¿cómo escogemos unos u otros intereses del mismo \r\r\nrango en caso de colisión frente a una situación jurídica concreta?. \r\r\nPareciera que volvemos sobre el mismo punto, pero no es así, pues las pautas \r\r\nnos la da el mismo texto constitucional, en nuestro caso el artículo 28 según \r\r\nse verá. Lo dicho hasta ahora confirma nada más que para el sistema \r\r\ndemocrático, todos los derechos derivan de la libertad, pero el peso que \r\r\nfrente a una determinada situación se de a unos u otros, depende del caso \r\r\nconcreto. Es decir no son derechos excluyentes o enemigos, de tal forma que \r\r\nno puedan o deban darse en una constitución socialmente orientada \r\r\nderechos económicos, por ejemplo, pero sí influye -no a nivel sistémico sino \r\r\nparticular-, la regulación que el legislador deba dar a una situación \r\r\nconcreta, en aplicación de la ideología política del sistema. El tema es claro, \r\r\ntanto en doctrina como en nuestro sistema -a partir de la redacción del \r\r\nartículo 28 Constitucional- que establece las limitaciones a la regulación de \r\r\nlos derechos fundamentales por razones de orden público, moral o protección \r\r\nde los derechos de terceros, es decir, en nuestro sistema, sí se pueden \r\r\nválidamente limitar derechos de libertad con ciertos parámetros definidos \r\r\nconstitucionalmente. Así, en la sentencia 3550-92 se considera:\n\r\r\n\n “F - Las Limitaciones Legítimas de la Libertad: \n\r\r\n\n XVII -\r\r\n Desde luego, los derechos y libertades fundamentales están sujetos a \r\r\ndeterminadas restricciones, las necesarias, pero nada más que las necesarias \r\r\na la vigencia de los valores democráticos y constitucionales. No obstante, \r\r\ncomo han dicho el Tribunal Europeo (caso The Sunday Times, pgr. 59) y la \r\r\nCorte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (OC-5/85, pgr. 46), para que \r\r\nuna restricción sea \"necesaria\" no es suficiente que sea \"útil\", \"razonable\" u \r\r\n\"oportuna\", sino que debe implicar la \"existencia de una necesidad social \r\r\nimperiosa\" que sustente la restricción. Por ello, para que las restricciones a \r\r\nla libertad sean lícitas constitucional e internacionalmente, \"deben estar \r\r\norientadas a satisfacer un interés público imperativo. Entre varias opciones \r\r\npara alcanzar ese objetivo debe escogerse aquella que restrinja en menor \r\r\nescala el derecho protegido... la restricción -por otra parte- debe ser \r\r\nproporcionada al interés que la justifica y ajustarse estrechamente al logro \r\r\nde ese legítimo objetivo\" (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos., \r\r\nOC-5/85, id.). \n\r\r\n\n Estos criterios de interpretación, que han mantenido también los grandes \r\r\ntribunales supremos o constitucionales -por ejemplo, los europeos, el de los \r\r\nEstados Unidos de América, el de la Argentina-, son una aplicación moderna \r\r\nde la vieja regla de las Partidas, según la cual: \n\r\r\n\n\"Cuando en pleito sobre libertad o servidumbre discorden los jueces, siendo \r\r\ntantos los que sentencien por la primera como los que sentencien por la \r\r\nsegunda, valdrá lo favorable a la libertad\" (Partida III, título 32, ley 18). \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\n XVIII.- Ello implica, por una parte, que la restricción debe ser imperiosa \r\r\nsocialmente y, por ende, excepcional, como tal de interpretación restrictiva, \r\r\nde manera que en caso de duda debe preferirse siempre la libertad; por la \r\r\notra, que la misma interpretación del \"bien común\" ha de hacerse en el \r\r\ncontexto del orden constitucional como un todo, de conformidad con su \r\r\nsistema de valores fundamentales -en Costa Rica, en resumen, los de la \r\r\ndemocracia, el Estado de derecho, la dignidad esencial del ser humano y el \r\r\n\"sistema de la libertad\"-. No fue por mero accidente que la Ley General de la \r\r\nAdministración Pública, cuyo sentido principista es evidente, definiera el \r\r\ninterés público como: \n\r\r\n\n\"la expresión de los intereses coincidentes de los administrados\" (art. 113.1); \n\r\r\n\nimponiendo, como criterios para su apreciación, \n\r\r\n\n\"los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia para la comunidad y el \r\r\nindividuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse la mera \r\r\nconveniencia\" (art. 113.3), \n\r\r\n\ny distinguiéndolo claramente del interés transitorio o subjetivo de la \r\r\nAdministración, valga decir, del de los administradores públicos (art. 113.2). \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nXIX.- En verdad, los conceptos de moral, de orden público o de la \r\r\nnecesaria protección de los derechos de terceros, como indeterminados, \r\r\nautorizan una cierta flexibilidad, pero que no implica en ningún caso \r\r\narbitrariedad y que está sujeta, como lo está la misma discrecionalidad, al \r\r\ncontralor jurisdiccional; contralor que, según lo han reconocido \r\r\ninvariablemente la jurisprudencia y la doctrina, tiene que ejercerse según \r\r\ncriterios de racionalidad y razonabilidad (artículos. 15 y 16 Ley General de \r\r\nla Administración Pública); flexibilidad, o discrecionalidad, pues, que en \r\r\nningún caso pueden implicar arbitrariedad. \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nXX.- El orden público, la moral y los derechos de terceros deben ser \r\r\ninterpretados y aplicados rigurosamente, sin licencias que permitan \r\r\nextenderlos más allá de su sentido específico; sentido que, a su vez, debe verse \r\r\nen armonía con el principio pro libertate, el cual, junto con el principio pro \r\r\nhomine, constituye el meollo de la doctrina de los derechos humanos: según \r\r\nel primero, debe interpretarse extensivamente todo lo que favorezca y \r\r\nrestrictivamente todo lo que limite la libertad; según el segundo, el derecho \r\r\ndebe interpretarse y aplicarse siempre de la manera que más favorezca al ser \r\r\nhumano. De acuerdo con ello, el orden público, la moral y los derechos de \r\r\nterceros que permiten, al menos a la ley, regular las acciones privadas tienen \r\r\nque interpretarse y aplicarse de tal manera que en el primer caso, se trate de \r\r\namenazas graves al orden público, entendido como la integridad y \r\r\nsupervivencia de los elementos fundamentales del Estado; o como \n\r\r\n\n\"el conjunto de principios que, por una parte, atañen a la organización del \r\r\nEstado y a su funcionamiento, y, por otra, concurren a la protección de los \r\r\nderechos del ser humano y de los intereses de la comunidad, en un justo \r\r\nequilibrio para hacer posible la paz y el bienestar de la convivencia social\" \r\r\n(Corte Plena, sesión extraordinaria del 26 de agosto de 1982); \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nXXI.- Por su parte, la moral no puede concebirse más que como el conjunto \r\r\nde principios y de creencias fundamentales vigentes en la sociedad, cuya \r\r\nviolación ofenda gravemente a la generalidad de los miembros de esa \r\r\nsociedad; y los derechos de terceros necesariamente tienen que jerarquizarse, \r\r\ntanto en sí mismos, como en su dimensión concreta, en el sentido de que sólo \r\r\nse justifica regular y eventualmente limitar la libertad para proteger derechos \r\r\nde igual o mayor rango, frente a amenazas de igual o mayor intensidad. Así, \r\r\nel sistema de la libertad costarricense, deja fuera del alcance de la ley -léase, \r\r\nde la acción del Estado- una esfera intangible de libertad, la cual no puede \r\r\nser tocada por ninguna autoridad, porque es el hombre, no la sociedad, \r\r\nquien tiene dignidad y consiguientes derechos y libertades fundamentales…”\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nVIII-. Hasta ahora queda claro que el legislador puede válidamente limitar \r\r\nderechos de libertad por razones de orden público, y que es más, está \r\r\nobligado a hacerlo cuando resulte necesario en su rol de equilibrador social \r\r\nque le impone la ideología propia de un estado social de derecho. También \r\r\nestá claro que las limitaciones que imponga no pueden vaciar el contenido \r\r\nesencial de derecho que se limita, sino únicamente reducir o limitar el \r\r\nejercicio de ese derecho y es este precisamente el punto central de esta \r\r\nacción. Si el párrafo in fine del artículo 377 al imponer la obligación al \r\r\npatrono de recontratar a un trabajador cuyo contrato se ha roto sin \r\r\nresponsabilidad patronal con ocasión de una huelga legal, en las mismas \r\r\ncondiciones que éste tenía, está o no dentro de los límites \r\r\nconstitucionalmente permitidos en el artículo 28. Es decir si el límite o \r\r\nregulación en cuestión impuesta a la libertad de contratación de las partes, \r\r\nes razonable para la prevalencia de una materia del interés público como lo \r\r\nes la protección del trabajador, o bien, si constituye una supresión ilegítima \r\r\nde ésta. Volviendo al punto inicial, está claro que el Estado costarricense \r\r\naún en un sistema basado en la libertad, tiene una función equilibradora o \r\r\nigualadora frente a las desigualdades y que en ese rol está obligada a \r\r\ncompensar esas desigualdades favoreciendo a la parte en desventaja. Si ello \r\r\nlo hace por una necesidad social imperiosa para resguardar el orden público \r\r\ny además lo hace en forma razonable y proporcionada, ello es \r\r\nconstitucionalmente legítimo. Así tenemos múltiples ejemplos en el propio \r\r\ntexto constitucional (vgr. las limitaciones a la intimidad del artículo 24 \r\r\nConstitucional) o bien a nivel legal como son todas las normas de \r\r\ndiscriminación positiva a favor de minorías (vgr. Ley a favor de los \r\r\ndiscapacitados número 7600) o bien tenemos a nivel legal normas \r\r\nespecíficas que reconocen la desigualdad de las partes, como resulta en la \r\r\nmateria en análisis, donde el derecho laboral parte de la premisa de que \r\r\nexiste una desigualdad entre patrono y trabajador que justifica la protección \r\r\nconstitucional y legal de éste último a efectos de equilibrar la relación. Así \r\r\npues, se admiten como legítimas, la inclusión de garantías laborales que \r\r\nimponen condiciones mínimas en la relación laboral- no sujetas a la libre \r\r\ncontratación de las partes- y en muchos casos irrenunciables, que se \r\r\nconvierten en imposiciones válidamente aceptadas. El salario mínimo, las \r\r\nvacaciones, las prestaciones laborales, el derecho a la seguridad social, el \r\r\nprincipio in dubio pro operario, la edad mínima para trabajar, para \r\r\nmencionar algunas, todas son condiciones obligatorias, razonables y legales \r\r\nen una relación laboral, tendentes a proteger a la parte más débil por \r\r\nrazones de interés público. Podría entonces decirse válidamente que el \r\r\nartículo 377 in fine va en la misma línea, y que por lo tanto, la restricción \r\r\nimpuesta a la libertad de contratación es justificada y razonable. Estima la \r\r\nSala a la luz de lo expuesto que, en los supuestos de recontratación de un \r\r\ntrabajador que fue despedido con motivo de su intervención en una huelga \r\r\nilegal, el legislador quiso paliar la situación de desventaja en que se \r\r\nencontrarían frente al patrono y evitar que éste se aprovechara de ella para \r\r\ncontratarlo en condiciones inferiores. La intención es meritoria, pero la \r\r\naplicación práctica como bien indica la Procuraduría -al citar doctrina \r\r\nnacional-, puede dar lugar a diversos problemas de interpretación. Como la \r\r\nintención de la norma parece referirse a la recontratación inmediata surgida \r\r\nluego de una huelga declarada ilegal, le correspondería al juez ordinario \r\r\ndeterminar -en cada caso concreto-, esos supuestos valorando, el respeto de \r\r\nlos derechos adquiridos por el trabajador, derivados del contrato o por el \r\r\ntranscurso del tiempo de conformidad con la ley. Esto con el fin de evitar que \r\r\nel patrono busque sacar provecho de la situación del trabajador con ocasión \r\r\nde su despido sin responsabilidad motivado por la declaratoria de ilegalidad \r\r\nde la huelga.\n\r\r\n\n IX-.\r\r\n Ahora bien, la Sala interpreta que el párrafo cuestionado en esta \r\r\nacción, se refiere a la recontratación inmediata y no a otro supuesto, ya que \r\r\nsi ha transcurrido ya un plazo razonable y luego se da una nueva \r\r\ncontratación, esta constituye una nueva relación laboral con todas sus \r\r\nconsecuencias, es decir, en las que el contenido del contrato está sujeto a la \r\r\nlibertad de contratación. La diferencia entre los dos supuestos estriba en que \r\r\nen el caso de la recontratación inmediata, la doctrina entiende que opera \r\r\nuna especie de suspensión del contrato laboral, y que al recontratar, el \r\r\npatrono ha declinado su facultad de declarar rescindido el vínculo \r\r\ncontractual. Si el patrono no utiliza su derecho para despedir a los \r\r\ntrabajadores y los readmite a su servicio, significa que aprueba o disculpa un \r\r\nhecho del trabajador, y por lo tanto, lo que opera es una continuación o \r\r\nprolongación del contrato anterior en toda su extensión. Para distinguir si \r\r\nestamos frente a una recontratación inmediata o no, hay que utilizar como \r\r\ncriterio las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia, para valorar aspectos tales \r\r\ncomo, el tipo de actividad, el tiempo, que en circunstancias razonables, \r\r\ntomaría hacer las gestiones administrativas de recontratación, si es una \r\r\nrecontratación de un solo trabajador o varios -como puede ser en éste último \r\r\nsupuesto el caso de los conflictos colectivos-, entre otras, apreciación que \r\r\ncorresponde hacer al juez del caso concreto. Naturalmente que frente a un \r\r\nnuevo contrato, con excepción de las garantías laborales establecidas en la \r\r\nConstitución y la Ley como piso mínimo de protección al trabajador, todos \r\r\nlos demás elementos del contrato se deben regir por la voluntad de las partes, \r\r\nderivada del derecho de libre contratación. En este último supuesto, no \r\r\npuede aplicarse válidamente el párrafo infine del artículo 377 cuestionado, \r\r\nsin que ello signifique una supresión del contenido esencial de ese derecho. \r\r\nEn efecto, en esas condiciones, al existir una recontratación, la norma \r\r\ncuestionada, no se limita a imponer una o algunas condiciones laborales a \r\r\nlas partes, sino la totalidad de las condiciones laborales a acordar, con lo \r\r\ncual elimina el derecho de ellas a escoger la sobrevivencia de alguna o \r\r\nalgunas de las condiciones del contrato. \n\r\r\n\n X-. La libertad de contratación como bien lo ha señalado la \r\r\njurisprudencia constitucional (sentencia 3495-92), incluye al menos:\n\r\r\n\na) La Libertad para elegir al co-contratante;\n\r\r\n\nb) La libertad en la escogencia del objeto mismo del contrato y, por ende, de \r\r\nla prestación principal que lo concreta;\n\r\r\n\nc) La libertad en la determinación del precio, contenido o valor económico \r\r\ndel contrato que se estipula como contraprestación;\n\r\r\n\nd) El equilibrio de las posiciones de ambas partes y entre sus mutuas \r\r\nprestaciones; equilibrio que reclama, a su vez, el respeto a los principios \r\r\nfundamentales de igualdad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, según los \r\r\ncuales la posición de las partes y el contenido y alcances de sus obligaciones \r\r\nrecíprocas han de ser razonablemente equivalentes entre sí, y además, \r\r\nproporcionadas a la naturaleza, objeto y fines del contrato, y, si bien esa \r\r\nlibertad no es irrestricta y el legislador puede imponer limitaciones válidas, \r\r\ncomo lo ha hecho con las garantías laborales por ser la materia de orden \r\r\npúblico (artículo 14 del Código de Trabajo), no resulta válido, por \r\r\ndesproporcionado, que suprima el contenido esencial –es decir total- del \r\r\nderecho de contratación tanto al trabajador como al patrono, imponiéndoles \r\r\nun contenido total determinado -en casos de recontrataciones no inmediatas \r\r\ncomo se explicó supra-, pues nuestro marco constitucional impone \r\r\nprecisamente al legislador como limitación en el ejercicio de sus potestades, \r\r\nel respeto al contenido esencial del derecho en cuestión. Precisamente en la \r\r\nsentencia 2771-03 la Sala incluso reconoce que ni siquiera el legislador \r\r\nconstituyente derivado puede suprimir legítimamente el contenido esencial \r\r\nde un derecho fundamental, de tal forma que menos podría hacerlo el \r\r\nlegislador ordinario. El Tribunal Constitucional español ha definido el \r\r\ncontenido esencial del derecho como “aquella parte del contenido de un \r\r\nderecho sin el cual éste pierde su peculiaridad, o, dicho de otro modo, lo que \r\r\nhace que sea reconocible como derecho perteneciente a un determinado tipo. \r\r\nEs también aquella parte del contenido que es ineludiblemente necesaria \r\r\npara que el derecho permita a su titular la satisfacción de aquellos intereses \r\r\npara cuya consecución el derecho se otorga… se rebasa o desconoce el \r\r\ncontenido esencial cuando el derecho queda sometido a situaciones que lo \r\r\nhacen impracticable o lo dificultan más allá de lo razonable o lo despojan de \r\r\nla necesaria protección” (Voto 8/4/81). Se trata en síntesis de reconocer un \r\r\nnúcleo en el contenido de los derechos fundamentales, de salvaguardar un \r\r\ncontenido mínimo, incluso frente a derechos o bienes constitucionalmente \r\r\nrelevantes. Así por ejemplo no puede concebirse el ejercicio de la libertad \r\r\nempresarial sin la posibilidad de obtener un lucro razonable; tampoco es \r\r\nposible, como se indicó, concebir la libertad de contratación sin posibilidad \r\r\nalguna de determinar el objeto del contrato (sentencia 3495-92). \r\r\nRelacionado con este derecho, en el supuesto señalado, se afectaría la \r\r\nlibertad empresarial, en cuanto la libertad de contratación es un vehículo \r\r\npor medio del cual se ejerce parte de la actividad empresarial, que incluye \r\r\nademás de la posibilidad de contratar como mecanismo para obtener el lucro \r\r\nrazonable en el intercambio de bienes y servicios, también la libertad de \r\r\norganizar la propia empresa.\n\r\r\n\n XI\r\r\n.- No estima la Sala que se viole la buena fe, porque no se pueda decir a \r\r\nciencia cierta, cual es la voluntad con la que se entra al contrato, pues \r\r\nmuchas veces tanto trabajador como el patrono quedan en una situación \r\r\ndifícil, luego de un período prolongado de huelga.\n\r\r\n\n XII.-\r\r\n En conclusión, el párrafo in fine del artículo 377 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo que dice: “Sin embargo, en los nuevos contratos que celebre el \r\r\npatrono, no podrán estipularse condiciones inferiores a las que, en cada \r\r\ncaso, regían antes de declararse la huelga ilegal”, no resulta \r\r\ninconstitucional en el tanto se aplique en el sentido indicado en los \r\r\nconsiderandos VIII, IX y X de esta sentencia, sea que en los contratos que \r\r\ncelebre el patrono, para realizar una contratación inmediata, luego del \r\r\ndespido de un trabajador como consecuencia de una huelga ilegal, no se \r\r\npodrán estipular condiciones inferiores a las que, en cada caso, regían antes \r\r\nde declararse la huelga illegal. (…)”. (El subrayado no corresponde al \r\r\noriginal).\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAsí, a partir de las consideraciones del voto precitado, esta Sala estima que, en cuanto el artículo 74 \r\r\nestablece causas específicas para la suspensión temporal del contrato laboral, sin responsabilidad para el \r\r\npatrono ni para los trabajadores, se trata de excepciones al principio de continuidad del contrato laboral \r\r\nreguladas en la legislación, a fin de evitar la afectación a la prestación del servicio y la consiguiente \r\r\nretribución salarial más allá de lo necesario, con el fin primordial de garantizar la protección especial de la \r\r\nparte trabajadora constitucionalmente consagrada. Asimismo, la obligatoriedad de solicitar la autorización \r\r\nante la Inspección General de Trabajo, bajo pena de sanción, conforme a los artículos 75 y 7, inciso c), de la \r\r\nLey 9832 aquí impugnados, no resulta irrazonable ni desproporcionada, sino que, por el contrario, se trata de \r\r\nuna medida que resulta conforme con los principios de justicia social y de in dubio pro operario, que \r\r\nconstituye una limitación legítima, necesaria, idónea y proporcionada a la libertad de contratación, a fin de \r\r\nverificar que se de una adecuada aplicación de dicha figura laboral y garantizar la protección de los derechos \r\r\nlaborales.\n\r\r\n\nEn cuanto al Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, se tiene que la parte accionante acusó su \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad sin especificar las normas de dicho reglamento que estima inconstitucionales, pues \r\r\nsegún se entiende de su argumentación, su disconformidad es en general con el requerimiento de la \r\r\nautorización de la suspensión por parte del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, cuyo procedimiento de \r\r\nsolicitud ese reglamento desarrolla. En ese entendido, con base en las consideraciones expuestas, dado que \r\r\nen criterio de esta Sala la exigencia de gestionar la solicitud de autorización ante la inspección de trabajo no \r\r\nconstituye una lesión a la libertad de contratación, lo procedente es rechazar por el fondo esta acción en \r\r\ncuanto a este aspecto.\n\r\r\n\nDe otra parte, en cuanto al artículo 7, inciso c), de la Ley n.° 9832, según el cual incumplimiento de \r\r\nseguir el procedimiento de autorización ante el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social constituye una falta \r\r\nsancionable, tampoco resulta una medida contraria a la libertad de contratación ni discriminatoria, como lo \r\r\nalega la parte accionante, quien reclama el hecho de que únicamente se sancione a la parte patronal por esa \r\r\nomisión, pese a que la parte trabajadora participe voluntariamente del acuerdo de suspender su relación \r\r\nlaboral. No obstante, es evidente que esa aparente desigualdad de trato, se debe a las condiciones de poder \r\r\nen que se encuentra la parte patronal respecto a la parte trabajadora, cuya protección se impone por ser la \r\r\nparte débil de la relación laboral. Así lo ha reconocido esta Sala, al indica que \r\r\n“(…) desde la introducción \r\r\ndel capítulo de las garantías sociales en la Constitución de mil ochocientos setenta y uno -y su \r\r\nconsolidación posterior en la constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve-, junto con la \r\r\npromulgación del Código de Trabajo en mil novecientos cuarenta y la organización de la \r\r\njurisdicción laboral, siempre se ha tenido en mente la especial protección del trabajador, considerado \r\r\ncomo la parte económicamente más débil de la relación laboral y de ahí la inserción de principios \r\r\nimportantes, como el \"pro operario\", el cual consiste en la aplicación por parte del juez del sentido más \r\r\nfavorable de la norma al trabajador, así como el principio de la irrenunciabilidad de los derechos \r\r\nsociales, desarrollado en el artículo 74 constitucional” (voto n.° 4448-96 de las 09:00 horas del 30 de \r\r\nagosto de 1996). En razón de lo anterior, también procede rechazar por el fondo esta acción respecto a este \r\r\naspecto.\n\r\r\n\nVI.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN EN CUANTO A LA ALEGADA \r\r\nVIOLACIÓN A LA LIBERTAD DE ASOCIACIÓN Y AL ARTÍCULO 121, INCISO 7, DE LA \r\r\nCONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. Tal y como se indicó en el considerando tercero de esta sentencia, el \r\r\naccionante estima que las normas aquí impugnadas son contrarias a los artículos 25 y 121, inciso 7), de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, en palabras del accionante:\n\r\r\n\n“ (…) 2. El Artículo 25 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza la libertad \r\r\nde asociación, en el tanto se impone la asociación, al menos temporal, como \r\r\nrequisito y único medio para pactar una reducción de jornadas, a la vez que \r\r\nse impide un pacto individual o bilateral y se sanciona.\n\r\r\n\n3. El Artículo 121, inciso 7 que dispone que las libertades públicas \r\r\n(incluyendo la de contratación en forma individual) solo\r\r\n pueden suspenderse \r\r\npor parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, mediante un procedimiento específico \r\r\nlegislativo, pero hasta por un periodo de 30 días y de forma razonable y \r\r\nproporcionada”. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn criterio de esta Sala, en cuanto a los precitados alegatos, esta acción carece de fundamentación \r\r\nsuficiente. En este sentido, en reiteradas ocasiones este Tribunal ha señalado que, para que se tenga por \r\r\nconfigurada la infracción y pueda declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma o acto impugnado, con la \r\r\nconsecuente anulación y expulsión del ordenamiento jurídico, quien promueva una acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad tiene la carga de demostrar cómo esa disposición infringe el Derecho de la Constitución \r\r\ny, además, debe indicar por qué debe estimarse la demanda. Esto es denominado por esta Sala como la carga \r\r\nde la argumentación, es decir, que “una norma que facialmente \r\r\n(sic) sea contraria a la Constitución, \r\r\nvuelca la carga de la argumentación a quienes sostengan que en realidad no hay conflicto entre esa \r\r\nnorma y la Constitución Política; lo contrario sucede si se acciona contra una norma que en primer \r\r\nexamen no parece contraria a la Constitución, en cuya hipótesis es el accionante el que debe avanzar \r\r\ncon los argumentos que convenzan acerca de la inconstitucionalidad” (véase la sentencia n.° 0184-95 de \r\r\nlas 16:30 horas del 10 de enero de 1995). En una sentencia posterior, esta Sala expuso, en cuanto a la falta de \r\r\nexposición de los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad en materia de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, lo \r\r\nsiguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“La acción de inconstitucionalidad se interpone con el argumento de \r\r\nque el Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado es nocivo, lesiona e infringe los \r\r\nderechos fundamentales a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente \r\r\nequilibrado, el derecho a la salud y a los compromisos \r\r\ninternacionales suscritos con el Protocolo de Kyoto. Pese a la \r\r\noportunidad otorgada a los accionantes, se confirma lo que indica la \r\r\nProcuraduría General de la República, de que no existe un análisis \r\r\nconcreto de las disposiciones del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado que se \r\r\nconsideran inconstitucionales, sino que el mismo se limita a \r\r\nestablecer discrepancias de forma genérica y en abstracto contra la \r\r\ntotalidad del Reglamento, más aún contra toda actividad que \r\r\ndesempeñan los ingenios Azucareros y Haciendas, pues sostienen que \r\r\ncausan inconvenientes en la calidad de vida y en la salud de los \r\r\nhabitantes circunvecinos, sin concretar qué argumentos de \r\r\nconstitucionalidad se deben tomar en cuenta en contra de cada una \r\r\nde las disposiciones o grupos del normas del Reglamento impugnado. \r\r\n[…] El párrafo primero del artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional establece la obligación de autenticar los escritos de \r\r\ninterposición de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, toda vez que se \r\r\nestima necesario que existan argumentos esgrimidos por un \r\r\nprofesional en Derecho, que no descarta este Tribunal responda a un \r\r\nserio estudio del fondo técnico y científico de una determinada \r\r\nmateria, dada la diversidad y universalidad de las normas del \r\r\nordenamiento jurídico. A diferencia de los procesos de garantías, es \r\r\ndecir, los recursos de hábeas corpus y de amparo, que los puede \r\r\ninterponer directamente cualquier interesado ante la jurisdicción \r\r\nconstitucional en defensa de sus derechos fundamentales, \r\r\ngeneralmente contra actos u omisiones que le lesionan en su esfera \r\r\nparticular (aunque no siempre como en los casos ambientales), en los \r\r\nprocesos de defensa de la Constitución Política (como la acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad), el legislador confió al abogado autenticante \r\r\nuna labor cuya exigencia es aún mayor, si se quiere más elaborada y \r\r\nexhaustiva que debe plasmar en el libelo de interposición en razón de \r\r\nsu oficio profesional, para demostrar al Tribunal la lesión a la norma \r\r\nconstitucional por parte de una norma de menor rango, socavando el \r\r\nprincipio de supremacía constitucional contenida en el artículo 10 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política. Precisamente la elaboración material y \r\r\nformal de la Ley, así como de las demás disposiciones secundarias, \r\r\nsuponen un proceso sumamente costoso para el Estado, en la que de \r\r\nmuchas maneras para su elaboración ha participado la sociedad civil \r\r\norganizada a favor o en contra, y cuyos procedimientos de formación, \r\r\naprobación y promulgación no debe analizarse a la ligera. En este \r\r\nsentido, debe reconocer esta Sala que existe un reducido espacio para \r\r\neste Tribunal para socorrer las ausencias manifiestas de los \r\r\nprofesionales en derecho que autentican los escritos en esta \r\r\njurisdicción constitucional, sin exponer la imparcialidad y análisis \r\r\nque se debe a cada una de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad.” \r\r\n(Sentencia n° 2012-05285 de 15:03 horas de 25 de abril de 2012).\n\r\r\n\nEl citado artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, en tal sentido, que en el \r\r\nescrito en que se interponga la acción se expongan “sus fundamentos en forma clara y precisa\r\r\n”. En \r\r\nsentencia n° 2013-016944 de las 14:30 horas del 18 de diciembre de 2013, esta Sala hizo expresa referencia a la \r\r\nexigencia de debida fundamentación del escrito de interposición –como requisito esencial de admisibilidad \r\r\nde la acción, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el mencionado ordinal- en los siguientes términos: \n\r\r\n\n“II.- INADMISIBILIDAD POR FALTA DE FUNDAMENTACIÓN.\r\r\n De \r\r\nconformidad con el artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional, en el escrito en que se interponga la acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad, se deberán exponer los fundamentos en forma \r\r\nclara y precisa, con cita concreta de las normas o principios que se \r\r\nconsideren infringidos. Dicho requisito no se traduce en una mera \r\r\nformalidad, sino en un requisito esencial de admisibilidad, pues en \r\r\nvirtud del principio pro sentencia –desarrollado en otras ocasiones \r\r\npor esta Sala- según el cual, los requisitos de admisibilidad deben \r\r\ninterpretarse en sentido favorable a la acción, además, el Derecho \r\r\nConstitucional es de orden público preferente y en garantía de su \r\r\nsupremacía y vigencia hay un interés público en virtud del cual los \r\r\nobstáculos para la admisión y resolución de fondo de una acción, \r\r\ndeben interpretarse y aplicarse restrictivamente. Así las cosas, todas \r\r\nlas normas procesales deben ser interpretadas y aplicadas de manera \r\r\ntal que se obtenga el dictado de la sentencia, lo anterior, no solo \r\r\nfacilita la administración de la justicia, sino que además, evita que se \r\r\nimpongan obstáculos para no alcanzarla (ver en igual sentido, las \r\r\nsentencias números 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 y \r\r\n2887-08). En consecuencia, la falta de fundamentación de la acción, \r\r\nimpide el dictado de una sentencia debidamente motivada y \r\r\ncongruente con lo pretendido. Asimismo, resulta improcedente que \r\r\nesta Sala se pronuncie por el fondo de normas cuestionadas en una \r\r\nacción, cuando el que acciona no fundamenta las razones por las \r\r\ncuales impugna, toda vez, que ello implicaría efectuar un control \r\r\nconstitucional en abstracto a manera de ejercicio académico, lo que \r\r\nno es compatible con la finalidad de un proceso de esta naturaleza.”\n\r\r\n\nFinalmente, de forma más reciente, en el voto n° 2020-000319 de las 12:15 horas del 8 de enero de \r\r\n2020, este Tribunal reiteró que:\n\r\r\n\n“(…) dado el formalismo dispuesto legalmente para los procesos de \r\r\ncontrol de constitucionalidad. la carga argumentativa en el trámite \r\r\nde una acción de inconstitucionalidad recae en el accionante, quien \r\r\ndebe explicar, sin ambages, la contradicción existente entre una \r\r\nnormativa infraconstitucional y el bloque de constitucionalidad, así \r\r\ncomo la legitimación que le asiste”.\r\r\n \n\r\r\n\n En el caso particular, el accionante impugna los artículos 74 y 75 del Código de Trabajo, 7, inciso c, y \r\r\n9 de la Ley n.° 9832 y, en general, el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, por considerar que son contrarios a \r\r\nla libertad de asociación y al artículo 121, inciso 7) de la Constitución Política. \n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nSin embargo, observa esta Sala que, en cuanto a la alegada violación al principio de libertad de \r\r\nasociación, a lo largo del escrito de interposición, el actor únicamente refiere que este se lesiona en su \r\r\nsentido negativo, toda vez que, según interpreta el accionante, para alcanzar la suspensión del contrato de \r\r\ntrabajo esto únicamente se permite de manera colectiva y no individual entre el patrono y el trabajador, en \r\r\neste sentido alega que “En todo caso, si un trabajador y un patrono buscan la aprobación del Ministerio \r\r\nen un acuerdo individual, se les niega, porque se impide que se hagan acuerdos individuales o \r\r\nbilaterales. Solo son aprobables acuerdos colectivos o multilaterales, lo cual implica la obligación de \r\r\nasociarse al menos temporalmente o hacerse representar en colectivos para negociar un contrato de \r\r\nsuspensión como la reducción de jornadas y salarios”. No obstante, observa esta Sala que el accionante \r\r\nno indica cuál norma de las impugnadas establece de manera expresa o tácita tal limitación ni tampoco \r\r\ndesarrolla el contenido de la libertad de asociación, a fin de relacionarlo o contraponerlo con lo establecido \r\r\nen las normas que pretende impugnar, lo que impide que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo de este \r\r\naspecto y emita una sentencia congruente con lo pretendido.\n\r\r\n\nDel mismo modo, el accionante alega que la Ley n.° 9832, que fue promulgada dentro \r\r\ndel contexto de la pandemia, contiene restricciones a la libertad de contratación y libertad de \r\r\nasociación tan extremas, que solo podrían entenderse válidas, si hubiesen sido promulgadas \r\r\nconforme a lo establecido en el artículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución Política. Este artículo \r\r\nconstitucional establece que corresponderá exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa “(…) 7) \r\r\nSuspender por votación no menor de los dos tercios de la totalidad de sus miembros, en \r\r\ncaso de evidente necesidad pública, los derechos y garantías individuales consignados en \r\r\nlos artículos 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 y 37 de esta Constitución. Esta suspensión podrá \r\r\nser de todos o de algunos derechos y garantías, para la totalidad o parte del territorio, y \r\r\nhasta treinta días; durante ella y respecto de las personas, el Poder Ejecutivo sólo podrá \r\r\nordenar su detención en establecimientos no destinados a reos comunes o decretar su \r\r\nconfinamiento en lugares habitados. Deberá también dar cuenta a la Asamblea en su \r\r\npróxima reunión de las medidas tomadas para salvar el orden público o mantener la \r\r\nseguridad del Estado. En ningún caso podrán suspenderse derechos o garantías \r\r\nindividuales no consignados en este inciso; (…)”. Al respecto, lo cierto es que no explica el \r\r\nactor de qué manera las normas aquí impugnadas constituyen una suspensión de los derechos y \r\r\ngarantías constitucionales en los términos previstos en el artículo constitucional precitado. El \r\r\naccionante se limita a reiterar que la Ley n.° 9832 limita los derechos a la libertad de \r\r\ncontratación y de asociación, pero únicamente impugnó los artículos 7, inciso c), y 9 de dicha \r\r\nLey -el cual no fue debidamente invocado en el asunto base, como se indicó en el considerando \r\r\nIII-, en cuanto disponen como una falta sujeta a sanción “[n]o solicitar la autorización para \r\r\nla reducción de la jornada ante la Inspección de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y \r\r\nSeguridad Social” y la restitución de derechos a la persona trabajadora, lo cual evidentemente \r\r\nno constituye una suspensión de las libertades fundamentales.\n\r\r\n\nCon base en lo anterior, no puede estimarse que esta acción esté debidamente fundamentada, en \r\r\ncuanto a la alegada violación a la libertad de asociación y el artículo 121, inciso 7), constitucional, conforme \r\r\nlo exige el artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Ahora bien, aunque se podría prevenir a la \r\r\nparte accionante que subsane el cumplimiento de este requisito, en el sub judice, dicho trámite se considera \r\r\nocioso, no solo porque supone volver a elaborar la acción, sino, también, porque el artículo 9, párrafo 1º, de \r\r\nla Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala para rechazar de plano cualquier gestión \r\r\n“manifiestamente improcedente o infundada”\r\r\n, como ocurre en este asunto. \n\r\r\n\nVII.- CONCLUSIÓN. \r\r\nCorolario de lo anterior, \r\r\nprocede rechazar por el fondo esta acción en cuanto \r\r\na la alegada violación a la libertad de contratación. En cuanto a lo demás, se dispone su rechazo de plano. El \r\r\nmagistrado Rueda Leal y la magistrada Garro Vargas salvan el voto y ordenan hacer la prevención del \r\r\nartículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.\n\r\r\n\nVIII.- VOTO SALVADO PARCIAL DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL Y DE LA MAGISTRADA \r\r\nGARRO VARGAS, con redacción de la última. \n\r\r\n\nNos separamos del criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal y salvamos parcialmente el voto en este asunto, \r\r\npor considerar que la decisión de rechazar unos extremos de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad es \r\r\nprematura. Es incuestionable que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso “\r\r\ninstaurado con el \r\r\npropósito de garantizar la supremacía de la Constitución Política frente a normas u otras disposiciones \r\r\nde carácter general y que por esa misma razón deben cumplirse un conjunto de formalidades, a los efectos \r\r\nde que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación”, como se ha señalado en la amplia \r\r\njurisprudencia de esta Sala. Sin embargo, es precisamente la propia ley la que ordena el tratamiento que debe \r\r\ndarse a las distintas formalidades y a su eventual incumplimiento. Así se extrae del texto del artículo 80 de la \r\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional que señala:\n\r\r\n\n “Artículo 80.- Si no se llenaren las formalidades a que se refieren los dos artículos anteriores, el Presidente de la Sala \r\r\nseñalará por resolución, cuáles son los requisitos omitidos y ordenará cumplirlos dentro de tercero día (…)”. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn este asunto, se propone rechazar de plano la acción en algunos aspectos ‒en cuanto a la alegada \r\r\nviolación a la libertad de asociación y la presunta infracción al artículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica‒. Sin embargo, la sentencia de la mayoría considera que la parte accionante no indica cuál norma de \r\r\nlas impugnadas establece de manera expresa o tácita tal limitación, ni tampoco desarrolla el contenido de la \r\r\nlibertad de asociación, a fin de relacionarlo o contraponerlo con lo establecido en las normas que pretende \r\r\nimpugnar. Desde nuestra perspectiva, en relación con dichos agravios, resulta de incuestionable aplicación \r\r\nla prevención al accionante para que remedie las omisiones detectadas. De igual forma, cabe señalar que \r\r\ntanto la interpretación de los artículos 78 y 79 como la del propio artículo 80 de la Ley que rige esta \r\r\njurisdicción debe ser amplia en beneficio de quienes acuden a esta Sala, de modo que el acceso a la justicia \r\r\nconstitucional no resulte innecesariamente limitado.\n\r\r\n\nIX.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE\r\r\n. Se previene a las partes que de haber \r\r\naportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional \r\r\nde carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, \r\r\nestos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la \r\r\nnotificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro \r\r\nde este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", \r\r\naprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el \r\r\nBoletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo \r\r\nSuperior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.\n\r\r\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\r\r\n\nSe rechaza por el fondo esta acción en cuanto a la alegada violación a la libertad de contratación. \r\r\nEn cuanto a lo demás, se rechaza de plano. El magistrado Rueda Leal y la magistrada Garro Vargas salvan \r\r\nparcialmente el voto y ordenan hacer la prevención del artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional, en lo referente a la supuesta infracción a la libertad de asociación y la presunta violación al \r\r\nartículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución Política.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \nFernando Cruz C.\n\r\r\n \nPresidente a.i\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nPaul Rueda L.\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \nJorge Araya G.\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nAnamari Garro V.\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \nAna María Picado B.\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nAracelly Pacheco S.\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \nJose Roberto Garita N.\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\r\r\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\r\r\n\n*BYCNRN8208W61*\n\r\r\n\n BYCNRN8208W61 \n\r\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 22-025168-0007-CO \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nTeléfonos: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Dirección: (Sabana \r\r\nSur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito \r\r\nCatedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6", "body_en_text": "*220251680007CO*\n\nExp: 22-025168-0007-CO\n\nRes. Nº 2022030399\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine thirty hours on the twenty-first of December of two thousand twenty-two.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality filed by LUIS ÁNGEL SÁNCHEZ MONTERO, of legal age, attorney, identification card no. 108660710, resident of Escazú, professional license no. 8290, in his capacity as special judicial representative of [Name 001], legal identification no. [Value 001], and [Name 002], legal identification no. [Value 002], against Articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of the Law \"Reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional\" no. 9832, published in supplement no. 56 to La Gaceta no. 58 of March 23, 2020; Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo no. 2 of August 27, 1943; and Decreto Ejecutivo no. 42248-MTSS, called \"Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo\", published in supplement no. 53 to La Gaceta no. 55 of March 20, 2020.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 10:55 hours on November 4, 2022, the petitioner files an action of unconstitutionality against the following rules: 1) The Law \"Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional\", Legislative Decree no. 9832, published in Supplement no. 56 to La Gaceta no. 58 of March 23, 2020, specifically its Articles 7, subsection c), and 9. 2) Additionally against Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, which is law number 2 of August 27, 1943, on the grounds that (i) said articles were indirectly modified by Law no. 9832 and, independent of this law, (ii) they exclude the possibility of an individual and direct pact or agreement, between employer and worker, to suspend an employment relationship, insofar as Article 75 states that the suspension must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor (Ministerio de Trabajo). Stated differently, a prohibition is derived from these articles that an employer and a worker may, by themselves, agree on a suspension of an employment relationship with full legal effects, in the same way that the parties can initiate or terminate an employment relationship by mere agreement, without the approval of the Ministry of Labor. The foregoing because it follows from said regulation that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur under the grounds of Article 74, which do not include the will of both parties, and that, according to Article 75, it must also be authorized by the Ministry of Labor (always). Furthermore, by addition of Law no. 9832, the authorization procedure by the Ministry of Labor is unavoidably included for a partial suspension of the employment relationship in the form of reduction of working hours. Moreover, its constitutionality is challenged because that authorization procedure includes only the possibility of collective bargaining, and not individually between an employer and a worker, and a sanction is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure (of collective agreements for the suspension of work contracts with authorization from the Ministry of Labor). 3) No. 42248-MTSS, Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo of March 20, 2020, published in La Gaceta no. 55, supplement no. 53 of March 20, 2020, which confirms the foregoing, that is, that a requirement for the validity of a bilateral agreement to suspend an employment relationship is the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, based on the fact that the possibility of such an agreement being validly produced without the Ministry's intervention is not included, in the same way it follows from Article 75 of the Código de Trabajo. As a summary of his argument, he indicates that, with the enactment of Law no. 9832, Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional, the possibility was regulated of reducing working hours and the salary of workers within the context of the pandemic and the declaration of emergency due to the pandemic caused by Covid-19. It is clear that the \"reduction of working hours\" regulated by this Law no. 9832 is a type of \"suspension\" of work contracts, but with reduced effects (partial suspension of a contract). The figure of the reduction of working hours and the law that regulated it were linked to and intended to complement the rules of Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, which generally regulate the suspension of employment relationships for justified cause. Therefore, the limitations introduced by said law complemented and are part of the figure of the suspension of employment relationships, together with Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo. The Ministry of Labor issued various regulations (such as the Decreto also challenged as unconstitutional, no. 42248-MTSS), as well as complementary legal opinions that affirm that any agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor to be valid. All of this derived from Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo and Law no. 9832. Furthermore, it intends that sanctions be imposed on employers for the mere act of agreeing to suspensions individually with their workers. Also, there are appellate rulings that find the suspension of the employment relationship, in all its forms, excluded from the exclusive domain of private will. Thus, it is affirmed that it is a product of this legal-ranking regulation (Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo plus Law no. 9832) all the following: 1) An employer and a worker can freely and self-sufficiently agree, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor, to the initiation and termination of an employment relationship, but they cannot agree, in the same manner, to a suspension of the employment relationship or its species, the temporary reduction of working hours. To achieve a suspension with full effects, they are required to follow an authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor as a requirement for validity, where it turns out that, if they wish to negotiate, the parties can only do so collectively, not individually, or between an employer and a worker. That is, if an agreement for suspension agreed between a worker and an employer were submitted for authorization, it would be rejected solely for the fact of being agreed between a worker and their employer. 2) Suspensions of the employment relationship and its species (reductions of working hours) always require the participation and final approval of the MTSS as an element of validity, even if both parties agree to apply the measure and within the pandemic situation, in which there is little to verify regarding the justification of the measure. Even with agreement between both, an approval from the ministry is always imposed as an element of validity, which eliminates the possibility for them to agree on any type of suspension of the employment relationship, or change in labor conditions, such as the reduction of working hours during the pandemic, solely between a worker and their employer. It is clear that the scope of autonomy of will (autonomía de la voluntad) was understood as limited by excluding these contracts, through the norms challenged as unconstitutional. 3) In any case, if a worker and an employer, individually, seek the ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied to them, because individual agreements are prevented from being made. Only agreements made collectively are approved. The parties cannot bring their agreement for approval, but rather must produce it within the procedure, where all workers must be included. 4) It is understood to be prohibited, illegal, and sanctions are also established, for agreeing to reductions of working hours individually, i.e., between an employer and a worker, without the authorization procedure, which, as stated, is not viable for individual contracts. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation for this type of situation, i.e., for the adaptation of the work contract to supervening conditions with a temporary suspension of its original effects. Thus, the freedom of only these individual work suspension contracts is restricted, which entails the limitation of the freedoms of contract plus the freedom of association, this latter in a negative sense. 5) If the parties to the employment relationship signed a suspension contract outside the control of the Ministry of Labor, with or without reason, they violated the law and the employer receives a sanction for violating labor laws. It is added that agreeing to suspension agreements individually and without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor is a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and sanctionable by the Ministry. The sanction applies only to the employer, even though the worker also participated voluntarily and regardless of whether the agreement is justified, reasonable, and proportionate. 6) The nullity of the agreement is affirmed, per se, even solely due to form. Any consideration regarding substance, balance, or reasonableness is innocuous. This triggers the employer's obligation to compensate the worker, even without services rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was in good faith, with a valid justification such as a contracting economy due to a pandemic, and even with the worker's agreement, for the benefit of both parties. Only the employer is charged with the effect of automatic nullity, plus a sanctioning procedure, as a consequence of the exercise in good faith of a fundamental right that ultimately could have led to the same effects intended by the legislation that forms the basis for the restrictions. 7) A judge cannot even analyze whether or not the agreement was reasonable or justified according to the purposes of the laws and the Constitution, because the mere absence of the ministry's approval triggers its nullity. The control of reasonableness and proportionality by judges based on the unreasonable preponderance of forms is left aside, even though the same end provided by the law could be directly reached by bilateral agreement of the parties. Within the context of the pandemic, the Ministry of Labor has not added any value to the suspension agreement agreed upon between the parties, for which reason the regulation becomes unreasonable and disproportionate. There is no relationship between cost and benefit / reason and proportion, but, even with all of this, the judge cannot judge whether the agreement achieved the same proposed ends without injury to any other right. In fact, it will be seen in the cases that serve as precedent and are currently being adjudicated, that it is not questioned that the suspensions were indeed justified and that there was willingness by the parties to agree to the measure. 8) The Ministry of Labor has maintained that, placed in the position of granting or not granting authorization, it has no competence to delve into the content of the suspension or reduction of working hours agreements, as the control established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) is merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed. Therefore, the sole objective of the regulation ends up being to repress individual contracting, in order to channel those suspensions or reductions of working hours through collective bargaining by workers, giving the ministry a power of control and repression that is not characteristic of a regime of freedom. Conversely, the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict the individual freedom of contract in the private sector for that type of agreements (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the system in the hands of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. But there is neither reason nor proportion. Stated differently, the only purpose of restricting the will of the parties and of sanctioning is not following the collective route for negotiation before the ministry, as established in Article 7 subsection c) of Law no. 9832. Not only is individual negotiation limited in the said sphere, but a gross mechanism of repression is added, turning it into a sanctionable activity unfit for a system based on freedom. Particularly on this point, Law no. 9832, in its Article 7 subsection c), establishes as a sanctionable act \"not requesting authorization for the reduction of the working hours before the Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security\". Then, Article 9 provides: \"In addition to the fines established in Article 7, the employer who incurs any of the violations established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the workers to the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences. The right of the worker to resort to the respective judicial venue for the collection of the damages and losses caused is reserved.\" This implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction, but also of paying labor rights and damages for exercising two fundamental rights in good faith (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association). 9) Law no. 9832, which is enacted within the context of the pandemic and is the one that introduces and reinforces these prohibitions, plus the sanctioning procedure for agreeing to a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship individually and without the formal authorization of the Ministry of Labor, contains restrictions on the freedom of contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be considered valid if they had been enacted within the context of Article 121 subsection 7) of the Constitución Política, but, even so, they would be unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used, which was that of an ordinary law, without a declaration of calamity or minimum justification for the need to affect the freedom of labor contracting, but also because it was enacted with an indefinite character, without time limitation (it is currently in force) and to be incorporated indefinitely into the legal system for a special type of contracts. Again, we also have the lack of reason and proportion in suspending exclusively the individual contracting freedoms of employers and workers, in their individual character and in the private sphere, and imposing collective negotiations, only for suspensions, creating an exceptional regime with respect to the system of autonomy of will that remains in force for the initiation and termination of employment relationships, which requires neither intervention nor authorization from the Ministry of Labor. In summary, according to the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, he considers it clear that the freedom of contract plus the freedom of association have always allowed, and must still allow today, for an employer and a worker, on their own, to agree to the initiation of an employment relationship, its subsequent modification (with a suspension), or even the termination of a work contract, with no more limits than those imposed by the laws and the Constitución Política, which only refer to the respect for certain well-identified minimums (salary, working hours, vacations, Christmas bonus, etc.). But, if these limits are established, they must be clear, reasonable, and proportionate, which is not now complied with by the indicated regulation, which represents an obstacle to the exercise of these fundamental rights. Historically and within the framework of the Constitución Política, employers and workers have been free to validly agree to suspensions of work contracts in the most varied forms. They have not been required to have the approval of the Ministry of Labor for those agreements to be valid and effective, nor have they been compelled to unite in groups of workers in order to access this type of agreements. There is no doubt that an employer and a worker can initiate the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. But, without reason or proportion, it turns out that the same parties now do not have the possibility of agreeing to an intermediate agreement between initiation and termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined period, due to a justified cause like the pandemic. An agreement like this has been understood to be removed from the scope of their will, without subjection to a time limit on the restriction, without greater reason, and against several fundamental rights. Taking the thesis to what ends up being an absurdity, if that suspension agreement were exchanged for another with more severe effects, i.e., termination of the relationship and rehiring under other conditions or definitive termination without rehiring, then it would have been legal and would not require the procedure before the Ministry of Labor nor would the conduct be subject to a sanction, but, as it was merely a suspension, it turns out that it would not be valid… Thus, here, the one who could terminate a relationship by mutual agreement cannot suspend it by mutual agreement without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. To aggravate this situation and take it to the extreme, it turns out that this type of conduct (a suspension agreement between an employer and a worker) is so repressed that it implies the possibility of receiving sanctions for violations of labor and social security laws. But the sanctions are for the employer, regardless of the good faith of both parties, which is also a discriminatory sign of repression. And all of the foregoing regardless of whether that contract was agreed to in good faith, to achieve in a faster manner the same ends pursued by the same laws (preserving employment, social peace, solidarity within indisputable situations of force majeure (fuerza mayor), and the balance of the positions of the parties within an employment relationship). Thus, the regulation reached the point of sanctioning the exercise of freedom of contract and freedom of association. This regime does not stop at invalidity but escalated to the repressive activity of the exercise of public freedoms. This stance is recent and implies a change. In the exercise of their fundamental rights, historically, employers and workers have validly agreed, by themselves and between themselves, to suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms, for example: an unpaid leave (permiso sin goce de salario) of days, months, or years; sabbatical years and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships that have been agreed upon and executed without even a communication of an informative nature to the Ministry of Labor. They have also agreed to consented modifications in contracts in the most varied forms and, for this, it is not required to agree collectively nor to have approval or even the deposit or notification of those agreements to the Ministry of Labor. The thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the pandemic and to the validity of Law no. 9832 and of the regulation no. 42248-MTSS. It was from the pandemic onwards when this position was born, driven by the Ministry of Labor, which is known to have been the one who designed the bill that ended up being Law no. 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and salary, which is nothing more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. This latter law is the one that very clearly contains the regime of repression and sanction, plus the nullity of these agreements and the obligation to pay salary for time not worked plus readjustments of other connected rights. As of this law, the same effects were escalated to the suspension of the employment relationship, the same restrictions, being today general for any type of suspension. Today, only employers are suffering the effects of this legislation, as will be seen below, through lawsuits in bad faith from workers who constructed these agreements together with the employers, without denying their will or the convenience of said agreements, executed them in good faith, but now wish to take advantage of a situation of apparent advantage that allows them to attempt an abuse of right through the mere questioning of the transaction by its form. But employers are also being pursued by the Ministry of Labor, enforcing the regime of repression and punishment, solely for having agreed to a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship with an unquestionable cause, for having executed it according to what was agreed, for having fulfilled it, but without a merely formal authorization. By the text of the challenged laws, the judges of the Republic endorse this stance, cataloging the agreements as illegal, and that is why he turns to the Chamber in protection of the rights of his represented parties. For the foregoing, he considers that this action of unconstitutionality is the last resort and is necessary to achieve the protection of rights of constitutional basis and ultimately manage to produce what Article 41 of the Constitución Política offers. Through this action of unconstitutionality, he requests that the regulation that represses activity that is ultimately the reasonable and good-faith exercise of fundamental rights be annulled, or at least interpreted in a constitutional manner. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner indicates the norms and principles he considers infringed, namely: 1) Articles 24 and 28 of the Constitución Política, which guarantee the freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree to a suspension of a work contract, whether totally or in any of its species, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But also, because it represses and sanctions the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract is suppressed and sanctioned, which was a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation challenged as unconstitutional. 2) Article 25 of the Constitución Política, which guarantees the freedom of association, insofar as association is imposed, at least temporarily, as a requirement and sole means to agree to a reduction of working hours, at the same time that an individual or bilateral pact is prevented and sanctioned. 3) Article 121, subsection 7), which provides that public freedoms (including that of contracting individually) can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner. Regarding the freedom of labor contracting, the petitioner states that the system of freedom included in our Constitución Política, in its species of freedom of contract, requires that the limits on this freedom be specifically given in a very clear manner (what is not prohibited is permitted). The Código de Trabajo is an example of this, it contains those limits and uses specific and clear linguistic constructions, indicating the restrictions or delimiting the sphere where the parties can freely agree (free agreement between parties above the minimum wage, below the maximum working hours, above minimum vacations, etc.). In this way, what is not expressly limited in the laws is, then, legally feasible to be freely agreed upon by the parties to an employment relationship. In the same manner regarding the formalities of a contract: as the unavoidable need for authorization of a contract with the consequence of its invalidity is not established, it is understood that the agreement is perfect and valid, from its inception and without further formality (see Articles 24 and 25 of the Código de Trabajo, which include nothing about approvals from the Ministry). Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, which regulate the suspension of the employment relationship, do NOT contain a limitation on a bilateral agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship. The wording of said articles within the framework of the Constitution does not allow that conclusion. That is why they are not challenged directly but rather subsidiarily, as of the reform introduced by Law no. 9832 and of regulation no. 42248-MTSS. Before the entry into force of this law, the Código de Trabajo regulated in Articles 74 and 75 only the figure of the suspension imposed by the employer, without the will of the worker, for which reason recourse was made to the ministry only to substitute that will (if it did not exist) and impose a suspension on those workers. By not referring to the bilateral suspension agreed upon by agreement, it did not repress it, but rather, on the contrary, left it open to pact or agreement of wills and without subsequent approval, just as employment relationships are initiated and terminated when there is agreement. That is, the parties to an employment relationship can, by mutual agreement, initiate, terminate, and suspend an employment relationship or change its conditions. This under the principle of interpretation that: whoever can do the more, can do the less. Also, under the aforementioned principle that what is not prohibited is legally possible and valid. Therefore, historically, all types of suspension agreements have been made between parties, without any questioning, such as the case of unpaid leaves or sabbaticals, which are suspensions agreed upon bilaterally on a daily basis and without the need for intervention or approval from third parties. This derives only from Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, but within the framework of the Constitución Política and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber. What is regulated there, then, is the hypothesis that the will of the workers does not exist to suspend an employment relationship, because, if it does, there is no need to go for an approval from the ministry to suspend a contract, as that suspension can be agreed directly between the parties to the employment relationship. Now, it can be reasonably affirmed that Law no. 9832, enacted specifically within the context of the pandemic, which regulates a species of suspension (partial, in the reduction of working hours), modified the legal regime applicable to these contracts, impacting what is regulated in Articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo and deriving down to the decree no. 42248-MTSS. In this way, Law 9832 contains the following articles, which are cited below, which do establish restrictions on the freedom of contract and sanctions for the common exercise of this contractual freedom, causing a drastic change in the legal system: \"ARTÍCULO 7- Faltas y sanciones.\n\nSanctions shall be imposed based on the table of sanctions established in article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), of August 27, 1943, taking into account the seriousness of the act, its consequences, the number of infractions committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the violation, on employers who incur any of the following infractions: c) Failing to request authorization for the reduction of the workday before the Labor Inspectorate (Inspección de Trabajo) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.” “ARTICLE 9. Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in article 7, the employer who incurs any of the infractions established in that article shall have the obligation to restore to the workers the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding wage differences.” This law being a clear complement to articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and a type or species of contract suspension, we understand that it can be reasonably interpreted that the legislator could have intended to limit the scope of private contracting will in the manner set forth, that is, giving the following effects to the legal system of labor contracting of labor contract suspensions, it being the case that, as of the effectiveness of this new law, the following occurs in the system of labor contract suspensions included in Law No. 9832 but also influenced the interpretation of articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code. Be that as it may, the result today of the integration of these articles that is reached and challenged as unconstitutional is the following: 1. An employer and a worker could and can freely agree on the commencement and even the termination of an employment relationship through a contract without intervention of the Ministry of Labor, but no longer a suspension of the employment relationship nor its species (the temporary reduction of workdays), without following the authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor which, in turn, requires resorting to collective negotiation. 2. Suspensions of the employment relationship and workday reductions require something more: the participation and final approval of the MTSS as elements of validity, even within a pandemic situation, in which there was little to verify regarding the justification of the measure and even when the employees themselves are aware of and in agreement with the measures and remedies and it even results that they benefit from the individual agreement proposed to them. 3. In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the Ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied to them, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented from being made. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate, at least temporarily, or to be represented in collectives to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of workdays and wages. 4. It is prohibited, illegal, and furthermore sanctionable, to agree on suspensions and workday reductions individually, that is, between an employer and a worker. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation. 5. But, in addition, it was added that said agreement represents a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and sanctionable for the employer, even when the worker also participated with their will and was part of the agreement. That is, the agreement of wills is bilateral, but the sanction is directed at one of the parties. 6. It is understood that the nullity of the agreement is produced, per se and by the mere form. This triggers the employer's obligation to compensate the worker, paying them the salary and other rights, even without services rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was made in good faith, with a valid justification such as an economy in contraction due to a pandemic, and even with the workers' agreement. The employer alone bears the entire effect of an automatic nullity, plus a sanctioning procedure that does not include the worker, even though they concurred with their will. It is also derived that a judge cannot even begin to analyze whether the agreement was reasonable or justified or whether it achieved the purposes proposed in the statement of motives of Law No. 9832, because the mere absence of the procedure triggered its nullity, the readjustment obligation, and the sanction. It is the form imposed by the form itself. 7. The Ministry of Labor reviews an agreement of this type, but only to confirm formal requirements, because it has maintained that it lacks competence to delve into the content, it being the case that the control established by the MTSS is only to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed, because the cause is more than justified as it concerns a pandemic. Thus, the only tangible objective of the regulation is to repress individual contracting, to channel those workday reductions, which are suspensions, through mandatory authorization, plus collective negotiation by workers. Conversely, it follows that the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict individual freedom of contracting in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and workday reductions), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve said end. In this same manner, the sole purpose of sanctioning is the failure to follow the collective route for negotiation and not opting for authorization, even if damages or imbalances in the purposes or effects of the agreements are not verified. Not only is individual negotiation limited in the said sphere, but it is repressed, becoming a sanctionable activity. With all its participation, the Ministry of Labor adds no value to the legal transaction of this type, whereby the regulation clearly falls into being unreasonable and disproportionate. But, even more, it becomes a repressive activity of public freedoms, which makes the regulation especially contrary to the Constitution. It adds that the restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association of Law No. 9832, which is enacted within the context of the pandemic and is what introduced and reinforces these restrictions, are of such magnitude that they could only be understood as constitutionally valid if they had been enacted as a suspension of public guarantees and fundamental rights, within the context of article 121, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, but, even so, it is unconstitutional, not only because of the legislative procedure used, but because it was enacted with an indefinite nature, without respecting the 30-day period (it is currently in force), but also because of the lack of reason and proportion in exclusively suspending the freedom of individual contracting of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere, without justification of the public necessity for that extraordinary restriction focused on a single type of transaction (leaving out termination and modifications of conditions of an indefinite nature). Nor does it have reason or proportion to limit only suspensions of labor relations, while leaving open the possibility of dismissals with liability, terminations by mutual agreement, and other types of changes in employment conditions. As a petition, it indicates that its proposal and request to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) is for it to please order: 1) Confirming that an agreement between an employer and worker to suspend the labor relationship before a situation that merits it according to the law and without further need for approval from the Ministry of Labor is in accordance with the constitution, the Constitutional Chamber must declare unconstitutional articles 7, subsection c, plus article 9 of the Law “Authorization for the reduction of workdays upon the declaration of national emergency” (Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional), Legislative Decree No. 9832, published in supplement No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58, of March 23, 2020. By declaring this unconstitutionality, it would constitutionally interpret that articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code include the individual, direct, and self-sufficient agreement of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism for this purpose. Particularly, it would be interpreted that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is under the understanding that no agreement exists between the parties to suspend the labor relationship. 2) Alternatively, it can be done in the reverse order: constitutionally interpreting articles 74 and 75 including the individual, direct, and self-sufficient agreement of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism for agreeing on suspensions of labor relationships, interpreting that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is under the understanding that no agreement exists between the parties to suspend the labor relationship, plus declaring the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsection c, plus article 9 of Law No. 9832 for establishing the authorization and collective procedure as the sole mechanism to obtain the suspension of a labor relationship and sanctions for those who do not follow this sole procedure. 3) Also alternatively, it must constitutionally interpret said articles (74 and 75 of the Labor Code, plus article 7, subsection c and article 9 of Law No. 9832) in the sense that said laws and articles do not refer to nor exclude the validity of individual, direct, and private agreements, between employers and workers, with the same effects and purposes that the laws regulate. 4) Additionally and also alternatively, articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, which is Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943, should be declared unconstitutional by connection, together with articles 7, subsection c) and article 9 of Law No. 9832 insofar as it is understood that (i) said articles were indirectly modified by Law No. 9832 and (ii) all now exclude the possibility of an individual and direct agreement or pact, between employer and worker, to suspend a labor relationship, and without requiring the authorization of the Ministry of Labor. 5) Finally, in any case, that regulation No. 42248-MTSS, Regulation for the procedure for the temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of article 74 of the Labor Code of March 20, 2020, published in La Gaceta No. 55, supplement No. 53, of March 20, 2020, which limits the indicated fundamental rights and insofar as it limits them, by establishing the procedure set forth therein as the sole means of obtaining a valid suspension of the relationship, be annulled by connection.\n\n2.- The petitioner bases their standing on article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), as they indicate the following cases as pending resolution before the courts: 1) No. [Value 005], which is an ordinary labor proceeding processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), where Daysi Mendoza Chaves appears as plaintiff and [Name 036] as defendant. The matter is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Court of Liberia due to the appeal filed by both parties. 2) No. [Value 007], labor proceeding filed by [Name 007] against [Name 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos). A hearing was held on October 20, 2022, and the first-instance judgment is awaited. 3) No. [Value 003], infractions proceeding by the Ministry of Labor against [Name 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, where the application of employment contract suspensions without the authorization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is reported. Specifically by the same plaintiff [Name 007] and by [Name 008]. The trial hearing is scheduled for November 11, 2022. 4) No. [Value 004], ordinary labor proceeding filed by [Name 021] against [Name 002]., processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia). Because the defendant company filed an appeal, it is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Court of Liberia. Likewise, the petitioner provided certifications of the writings by which they invoked unconstitutionality in those judicial proceedings.\n\n3.- By resolution of 4:27 p.m. on November 14, 2022, the petitioner was warned as follows: “(…) in accordance with article 4 of Law Number 3245 of December 3, 1963, add and cancel the stamp of the Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados) for the sum of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, under penalty of not hearing the defaulting party until they comply with what is ordered, without retroaction of terms.”\n\n4.- By brief received via Online Management (Gestión en Línea) at 11:37 a.m. on November 16, 2022, the petitioner provided the stamp of the Bar Association for the sum of 275 colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief.\n\n5.- By official letter of December 6, 2022, addressed to the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, certification was requested regarding the procedural status of case numbers [Value 005] and [Value 004].\n\n6.- By official letter of December 5, 2022, addressed to the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos), certification was requested regarding the procedural status of case numbers [Value 006] and [Value 003].\n\n7.- By certification sent to the authorized email address of this Chamber on December 6, 2022, the judicial coordinator of the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Carlos, certified the following:\n\n“LOURDES CORELLA ALVARADO, JUDICIAL COORDINATOR OF THE LABOR COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN CARLOS, HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT: CASE NO. [Value 007], which is an ORDINARY LABOR proceeding filed by KIMBERLY MARIA [Name 007], identification number 0207780765 against [Name 001], legal identification number 3101014194, is processed in this Office. Said case is in the: CONCLUSIVE PHASE. It has a Dismissal Judgment No. 615-2022 issued at 3:31 p.m. on November 10, 2022. It is pending resolution of an appeal brief and another. CASE NO. [Value 003], which is a LABOR LAW INFRACTIONS proceeding filed by the MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY against [Name 001], legal identification number 3101014194. Said case is in the: CONCLUSIVE PHASE. It has a Ratification Judgment No. 619-2022 issued at 2:55 p.m. on November 11, 2022.*/*/*/*/ I issue this certification in Ciudad Quesada, at the request of the Constitutional Chamber, at ten hours twenty-four minutes on December seven, two thousand twenty-two.”\n\n8.- By certifications of December 8, 2022, addressed to the authorized email address of this Chamber on that same date, the judicial coordinator of the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) certified the following:\n\n“That CASE NO. CASE: 20-000186-0942-LA -PROCEEDING: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS PLAINTIFF: [Name 021], DEFENDANT: [Name 002]., is processed in this Office. Said proceeding has a 'status' of first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000019, of ten hours twenty-six minutes on January seventeen, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution of eight hours thirty-one minutes on March nine, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the case is on appeal before the Appeals Court of this Judicial Circuit, for the cited appeal to be definitively resolved.”\n\n“That CASE NO. 21-000296-0942-LA, proceeding: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS, PLAINTIFF: DAYSI IRINA MENDOZA CHAVES, DEFENDANT: [Name 001], is processed in this Office. Said proceeding, the status is of first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000140, of fifteen hours forty-one minutes on April twenty, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution of seven hours twenty-nine minutes on May twenty-four, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the case is on appeal before the Appeals Court of this Judicial Circuit, for the cited appeal to be definitively resolved.”\n\n9.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that is manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Cruz Castro;\nand,\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI.- STANDING. It is deemed that the petitioner has standing to promote this unconstitutionality action, according to article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, having as prior matters the proceedings processed in case numbers [Value 005], which is an ordinary labor proceeding processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), initiated by Daysi Irina Mendoza Chaves against [Name 036].; [Value 006], which is a labor proceeding initiated by Kimberly María [Name 007] against [Name 036]. processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos); [Value 003], infractions against labor laws proceeding by the Ministry of Labor against [Name 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, and [Value 004] ordinary labor proceeding processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) initiated by [Name 021] against [Name 002]. The petitioner invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, Law No. 9832, article 7, subsection c), and in general Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed violated. However, regarding article 9 of Law No. 9832, as indicated below, its unconstitutionality was not duly invoked.\n\nII.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The petitioner files this action against the following norms:\n\n- Articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of the Law “Reduction of workdays upon the declaration of national emergency” (Reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional) No. 9832, published in supplement No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58 of March 23, 2020, which state the following:\n\n“ARTICLE 7-Infractions and sanctions. Sanctions shall be imposed based on the table of sanctions established in article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, taking into account the seriousness of the act, its consequences, the number of infractions committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the violation, on employers who incur any of the following infractions:\n\na)(…)\n\nb)(…)\n\nc) Failing to request authorization for the reduction of the workday before the Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\n\nd)(…)”.\n\n“ARTICLE 9- Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in article 7, the employer who incurs any of the infractions established in that article shall have the obligation to restore to the workers the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding wage differences.\n\nThe worker's right to resort to the respective jurisdictional venue for the collection of the damages caused is preserved”.\n\n- Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code No. 2 of August 27, 1943:\n\n“ARTICLE 74.- The following are causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or for the workers:\n\nThe lack of raw material to carry out the work, provided it is not attributable to the employer;\n\nForce majeure or fortuitous event, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work, and\n\nThe death or incapacity of the employer, when it has as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work.\n\nIn the first two cases, the Executive Branch may dictate emergency measures that, without harming the employers' interests, result in the alleviation of the workers' economic situation.”\n\n“ARTICLE 75.- The temporary suspension of employment contracts shall take effect from the conclusion of the day on which the event that gave rise to it occurred, provided that full verification of the cause on which it is based is initiated before the General Labor Inspectorate or before its duly and specially authorized representatives, within the three days following the aforementioned.\n\nIn the first two cases provided for in the previous article, the proof shall be the responsibility of the employer and in the third, the responsibility of their relatives or successors, and shall be made by means of all the attestations and investigations that the respective authorities require.\n\nIf the General Labor Inspectorate or its representatives become convinced that the alleged cause does not exist, or that the suspension is unjustified, they shall declare the application without merit so that the workers may exercise their power to terminate their contracts, with liability for the employer.”\n\n- Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, denominated “Regulation for the procedure for the temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of article 74 of the Labor Code” (Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo), published in supplement No. 53 of La Gaceta No. 55 of March 20, 2020.\n\nIII.- GRIEVANCES. The aforementioned norms are challenged insofar as they establish that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur based on the grounds of article 74 of the Labor Code, which do not include the will of both parties, and, according to article 75 of that same regulatory body, must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it questions the constitutionality of the authorization procedure, given that it includes only the possibility of making agreements collectively, not individually between an employer and a worker, and a sanction is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure. It considers that these provisions are contrary to the freedoms of contract and association, enshrined in articles 24, 25, and 28 of the Political Constitution; as well as article 121, subsection 7), constitutional, in that public freedoms can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific procedure, for a period of 30 days, in a reasonable and proportionate manner. Thus, in the words of the petitioner, it considers that the following constitutional norms and principles are infringed:\n\n“1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree on a suspension of an employment contract, whether totally or in one of its species, such as the reduction of workdays, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, furthermore, because the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which was a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same purposes that gave rise to the legislation challenged as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned.\n\n2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as association, at least temporary, is imposed as a requirement and sole means to agree on a reduction of workdays, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned.\n\n3. Article 121, subsection 7 which provides that public freedoms (including that of contracting individually) may only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner”.\n\nIV.- REGARDING THE INVOCATION BRIEF IN THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 9 OF LAW NO. 9832. Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action through the incidental route -such as the present one-, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo-, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal question, since mere compliance with them is not sufficient, but it is further required that the norm challenged through this route has a direct incidence on the matter serving as a basis, in such a way that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. Conversely, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on it. It is for the foregoing reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, petitioners must accredit and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its incidence on such matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited invocation brief must meet, this Chamber has indicated, repeatedly, that:\n\n“(…) although, in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, an extensive foundation is not required, the truth is that it is necessary that in the base matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms that are considered infringed be indicated…”. (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014).” (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).\n\nBy judgment No. 2022-5564 of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Court also indicated the following:\n\n“(…) In this case and regarding the content of article 17 referring to confiscation, having analyzed the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, the same is insufficient. The possible constitutional articles harmed are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the allegations referring to article 45 of the Constitution are missing, which is, precisely, the right alleged as harmed in the brief filing the action.\n\nFinally, with respect to the aforementioned Article 20, it is not mentioned in the invocation brief, and therefore its challenge, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.\"\n\nLikewise, this Tribunal has ruled that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base case prior to filing the action (see, for example, rulings no. 2016-009868 of 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016, and no. 2016-011291 of 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 2016).\n\nIn the case under study, the plaintiff bases its standing to file this action on base cases numbers [Value 005], [Value 007], [Value 003], and [Value 004]. Thus, it provided a notarial certification of the briefs by which it invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS. However, from the study of the certifications of the invocation briefs, this Tribunal verifies that in these, the plaintiff did not expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of Article 9 of Law No. 9832, as it merely indicated the following (the invocation made within proceeding no. [Value 006] is transcribed, by brief dated October 25, 2022, which was replicated in the other base proceedings):\n\n\"(...) Matter of Constitutionality of Articles 74 and 75, within the context of the promulgation of Law 9832, as well as the regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, No. 42248-MTSS.\n\nThe thesis put forward by the opposing party necessarily implies the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned regulations, seeking in bad faith to take advantage of a formal matter that was known to the plaintiff in the proceeding.\n\nIn summary, the matter to be resolved implies deriving from these two laws and the regulation, that the parties to an employment relationship (i) are indeed self-sufficient to agree on the start of the employment relationship, as in fact they were. Self-sufficient, meaning, without the need to join with other collaborators and without intervention from the Ministry, they were able to commence that employment relationship, through an employment contract. (ii) They would also have been self-sufficient to terminate the employment relationship, by mutual agreement, if they had so agreed. That is, if instead of a suspension they had agreed on something more serious such as a termination, the same thesis would not prosper. Therefore, there is no doubt that an employer and a worker can start the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. (iii) But it turns out that here it is proposed that those same parties did not have the possibility of agreeing by themselves on an intermediate agreement, less serious than termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a specific time, due to a justified cause. They are understood to have such an agreement removed from the scope of their will, without greater reason and against several fundamental rights. Taking the thesis to what ends up being an absurdity, if the same agreement had been for termination and not for suspension it would have been legal, but, since it was a suspension, it turns out that it might not be... (he who can do the more, must be able to do the less).\n\nIf one goes a little deeper, it turns out that the opposing party proposes that this sole requirement, which in this case is purely formal and would have added no value to that transaction whatsoever, triggers the nullity of the agreement. Thus, their thesis entails that freedom of contract has that limit and that the judge is not even now permitted to examine whether the contract has fulfilled the purpose of the norm (preservation of the contract, balance of the parties, adequacy to external conditions and unforeseen events, etc.). Here it is noticeable that it is an alleged prohibition or restriction of a type of agreement whose approval procedure is of no value to anyone, so such a prohibition is also neither proportionate nor reasonable.\n\nNow, if we delve a little deeper into the analysis of this issue, we have two situations that must be unveiled:\n\n(i) This thesis is recent. Historically, employers and workers have agreed by themselves and among themselves on suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms: unpaid leave for days, months, or years, sabbatical years, and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships. They have also agreed on consensual variations in contracts in the most varied forms, and for this, approval or even the deposit or notification of contracts to the Ministry of Labor is not required.\n\n(ii) The thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the Pandemic. It was from the Pandemic onward that this position arose on the part of the Ministry of Labor. But this criterion was fueled by the promulgation of Law 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and wages, which is no more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. The genus is suspension, the regulated species is the partial suspension of contract effects, based on a reduction of working hours and wages for a specific time and due to the pandemic.\n\nThis latter law could contain some regulation that is interpreted in that sense. But such an interpretation is unconstitutional. In short:\n\nLaw 9832 was created to sustain employment, as one of its main purposes, in the same way or along the same lines that Articles 74 and 75 were supposedly conceived, so it can be understood that it came to complement it and to offer this variant of suspensions as an alternative that was regulated more precisely. It is not that the possibility was born with the law because it always existed, but rather that it was just regulated in a specific way. As in this case that serves as background, it is demonstrated that the same end but with better means and even results was achieved with or without Law 9832 and merely with Article 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, the reduction of working hours was already legally viable. From the law onward, it was regulated more specifically with some special effects.\n\nAs we indicated, historically and under the protection of the Constitution, Employers and Workers have directly and freely agreed on the start and termination of an employment relationship, without resorting to more than the agreement of their wills. An employment contract has NEVER required authorization from the Ministry of Labor, but, at most, a merely informative deposit or notification, with evidentiary-type effects, but never constituting or extinguishing rights and obligations. The same applies to terminations by mutual agreement. Employers and workers have also agreed on all kinds of intermediate covenants, such as suspensions, \"unpaid leave,\" temporary changes of conditions, and other types of contractual figures that involve the temporary suspension of the effects of the employment contract. Only based on this recently promulgated regulation do we now have a criterion to the effect that it is not legal to directly agree on a suspension of the employment relationship, nor its species, the temporary reduction of working hours. For this purpose, they have sought to impose following an authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor, where it turns out that they can only negotiate in collectives, not individually, and the background of what motivates the suspension (pandemic) is not even questioned. So, the requirement proposed to the Court, of authorization from the Ministry, would also be impossible in this case, because negotiation can only be done in collectives. This directly conflicts with the Constitution and does not provide any value or improvement to employment relationships when the parties, by themselves, can continue agreeing on this type of agreement, without third-party intervention, in the way it was done, for mutual benefit within a situation unprecedented in recent world history.\n\nIt cannot be denied that this represents a change, a restriction of a public freedom and fundamental rights that have been specifically questioned, such as freedom of contract in the labor sphere. This thesis was set forth in the conclusions and in the response to the complaint.\n\nFurthermore, the purported reform to the contracting regime and restriction of the scope of the parties' will, its channeling towards collective negotiations as the only alternative, plus the punitive regime for any deviation from the procedure, are laden with ideological elements of control for the sake of control itself, repression, and an exacerbated limitation on the parties' ability to manage their own affairs or resolve their own conflicts, to adapt their agreements to external circumstances, and finally to exercise rights that have historically been protected and preserved, under the protection of the Constitution. In our Constitutional Order, a Judge cannot be limited from analyzing the balance of consideration between the parties of a labor contract that was modified due to the suspension agreed upon by the same parties who initiated the employment relationship. If this is done in this case, it will be noticed that the result would have been that these contracts would have been approved without further ado. Note that the extreme of also asserting that the Ministry of Labor lacks jurisdiction to delve into the content has been reached, given that the control established by the MTSS is merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed or to verify the company's situation if there is no agreement of wills. The foregoing is logical because in a Pandemic like the one we experienced, there was little to justify regarding the force majeure cause that made the suspension necessary. Thus, the only palpable objective of the restrictive interpretation is to repress individual contracting, to channel those reductions of working hours, which are suspensions, through the route of collective worker negotiations. Conversely, the scope of the legislation and that interpretation, according to the plaintiff's counsel, is merely to restrict individual freedom of contract in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. In this same way, the sole purpose of penalizing the conduct qualified as illegal, is the failure to follow the collective route for negotiation and subsequent authorization, as established in Article 7, subsection c) of Law 9832.\n\nSpecifically, Law No. 9832, in its Article 7, subsection c), establishes as a sanctionable act \"failing to request authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspection of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"\n\nThis implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction, but, by virtue of the recourse, that of paying labor rights and compensation for exercising two fundamental rights (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association, in its negative or non-association sense) in a contract that was agreed upon and executed in good faith.\n\nThe restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association in Law No. 9832, which was promulgated within the context of the Pandemic and is the one that introduced and reinforces these restrictions, would be of such dimension that it could only be understood as constitutionally valid if it had been promulgated within the context of Article 121, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, which allows restricting constitutional guarantees within public calamity situations, but even so, it results unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used, but also because it was promulgated with an indefinite character (it is currently in force and its limit is 30 days), but also due to the lack of reason and proportion in exclusively suspending the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere.\n\nTherefore, the discussion at hand implies the possibility of applying regulations that are unconstitutional if this line of interpretation is maintained. For this reason, we are taking action before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice with this matter as background to raise the corresponding Action of Unconstitutionality as a reasonable way to protect the interests and rights of our client.\n\nIn the same way, we ask the Judge to please analyze the foregoing to eventually produce a constitutionality consultation on the validity of this regulation. (...)\"\n\nBased on the foregoing, it is not proven that the unconstitutionality of Article 9 of Law No. 9832 challenged here was expressly and formally invoked in the base proceeding, as required by numerals 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in order to properly establish the incidental nature of this action, so it is inadmissible with respect to that norm.\n\nV.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff alleges that the norms challenged here harm freedom of contract, literally considering harmed: \"1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree on a suspension of an employment contract, whether totally or in any of its species, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, in addition, because the individual agreement that does not obtain the authorization of the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which proved to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation questioned as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned.\" Regarding Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, it alleges that it derives from said regulation that any suspension agreement of an employment relationship can only occur for the grounds of Article 74, which do not include the will of both parties, and that, according to Article 75, it must always be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, insofar as the former establishes a penalty if the respective procedure before the General Labor Inspection is not followed, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS insofar as it regulates the procedure to be followed before said body of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\n\nDespite its allegations, regarding this aspect, it is appropriate to reject this action on the merits, based on the following considerations. On repeated occasions, this Chamber has indicated that freedom of contract is not unlimited, but rather is subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, it has the purpose of protecting the worker (in this sense, see rulings no. 2013-12014 of 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013, and no. 2017-016272 of 11:30 a.m. on October 11, 2017, among others). For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer and worker parties, in Article 74 of the Labor Code (without omitting to mention the existence of other individual suspension grounds provided for in Articles 78 and 79, the legal strike in 371, and the legal lockout in 387, all of the Labor Code, as well as other cases of provisional suspension due to disciplinary procedures provided for in the legislation) and the requirement of authorization from the General Labor Inspection, in accordance with Article 75 of the same regulatory body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection -contained in the Political Constitution-, whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the figure of employment relationship suspension from being used to evade compliance with employer obligations; for example, to conceal dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the worker, who would see their income annulled without the payment of their corresponding rights and benefits. In this sense, regarding the conflict or collision between freedom of contract and the in dubio pro operario principle, in judgment no. 2007-015907 of 6:57 p.m. on October 31, 2007, this Chamber provided the following:\n\n\"(...) II.- Object of the challenge. Although only Article 377 in fine of the Labor Code is challenged, for greater clarity on the object of the challenge, the norm is transcribed in its entirety, highlighting the challenged text:\n\n\"Article 377.- The illegal strike terminates, without liability for the employer, the employment contracts entered into by the strikers; the repressive sanctions that the Common Courts may come to declare against them are preserved.\n\nHowever, in the new contracts entered into by the employer, conditions inferior to those which, in each case, were in force before the illegal strike was declared, may not be stipulated\".\n\nIII.- On the merits. The plaintiff alleges that the obligation contained in the challenged norm, which obliges the employer to respect the labor conditions prior to the illegal strike, in the event of rehiring the worker -despite the employment contract having been broken without employer liability-, violates freedom of contract and the principle of good faith. For their part, the Attorney General's Office and the passive coadjuvants consider, on the contrary, that the norm imposes a valid limitation for public order reasons on freedom of contract, safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection - of constitutional content -, as it is evident that the worker dismissed due to an illegal strike, being unemployed and generally in a state of extreme necessity, is not in a position to negotiate or arrange -on an equal footing and without disadvantage- a new employment contract, therefore their protection as the weaker party of the relationship is imposed. Undoubtedly, we find ourselves in a case of an apparent collision of constitutional norms and principles, on the one hand, freedom of contract and the principle of good faith, and on the other, the principle of social justice and that of in dubio pro operario, all of constitutional rank. The dilemma of which interests should be protected is resolved and provided for in constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence, specifically that which refers to the rules of constitutional interpretation, which indicates the obligation of the constitutional judge to interpret the Constitution harmoniously, as a unit, in a coordinated manner, as part of a totally cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered as a whole and not individually (judgment 2000-7730). It is not therefore a matter of choosing which principle the constitutional judge prefers, but of extracting, by means of objective methods of constitutional interpretation and integration, the meaning that the constituent legislator intended to give to the constitutional text in the face of a specific situation such as the present one. On this subject, constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that:\n\n\"...The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other, and often make the interpreter's work difficult when resolving composite situations, that is, those in which more than one value intervenes at a time. In this type of case, it is very important for the constitutional interpreter to weigh and try to balance -when possible due to the circumstances of the case-, the conflicting interests. The tool of legal hermeneutics is also very useful, to seek the most just solution in a determined case. However, regardless of the interpretation method followed, it is indispensable to situate oneself within the context of the ideological model that the Political Constitution of a determined country follows when interpreting the norms, in our case, that of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. An interpretation can never be divorced from the ideological model, such that any decision taken must be compatible and consistent with respect for freedom, access to justice, dignity of the person, and other guiding principles of a political system of this nature...\" (judgment number 1996-06681)\n\nThis is, therefore, a typical case of constitutional competence (Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) since precisely one of the essential functions of the constitutional judge is to decipher those blank spaces or those collisions of interests, using the harmonious interpretation of the constitutional text. To be able to do this, one must be clear, in the first place, on whether our Constitution has a determined ideological orientation, as based on it, the interpreter must understand the entire legal and political system in which it is inserted as permeated. Thus, having a pure liberal Constitution is not the same as having a socially oriented Constitution. This type of decision is what is doctrinally called the 'fundamental political decision,' which consists of the choice the constituents make for a determined political system and, consequently, for a determined form of government under which the social conglomerate will be governed.\n\nIV.- In the case of our country, it is not necessary to make efforts to determine what the current ideological vocation of our constitutional text is, since it is a non-controversial subject in national doctrine, the step our Political Constitution took from one of clearly liberal orientation (1871) to that of one shaping a social state governed by the rule of law starting from its reforms in nineteen forty-three with the inclusion of the social guarantees and later with the new constitutional text – which takes the previous one as a basis – in nineteen forty-nine. From then on, it is clear that in a social state governed by the rule of law, the State assumes a particular form of relationship with citizens based on a balancing function (sic) in the face of social inequalities. In that sense, it is politically obliged, both through norms and concrete actions, to be proactive in generating mechanisms for social equity. Rights, especially fundamental ones (in general, including welfare rights), are then seen not as a private matter, but of public interest for the validity of the political ideology. Precisely some of the guiding values of our social state governed by the rule of law are those of social justice and solidarity as a means to achieve equality of opportunities. The fulfillment of the value of social justice, in a system like ours, goes beyond a simple declaration of equality of rights; it is necessary to guarantee not only a general or legal equality of persons, but also a real equality that translates into creating and promoting conditions such as: access to good education, to work, and to efficient health services, which allow every individual to have an equality of opportunities to choose and develop the activities through which they can satisfy their needs and thus achieve their happiness and well-being. The protection of the value of social justice also implies recognizing and accepting those legitimate inequalities that exist in society, provided that from their existence a benefit or compensation for the less fortunate derives through the action of the State. It is not, then, about eliminating legitimate inequalities, which are based on or are the product of the free and voluntary actions of persons that contribute to the increase of social resources and the creation of value, that is, in individual work, nor about treating equally those who are not equal; but rather, about taking those inequalities into account to help the most needy people, so that they have an equal opportunity to access the sources of wealth production. In summary, the purpose of this precept is to treat all persons equally – in rights – and to provide an authentic equality of opportunities, thus society must give greater attention to those who have been born into less favorable social positions. The idea is to compensate for contingent disadvantages moving towards equality through concrete public policies and specific normative protections.\n\nV-. Constitutional jurisprudence has recognized on various occasions that our constitutional text has an orientation proper to a social state governed by the rule of law and that this concept translates into a guiding value of the constitutional framework of public action, which translates into concrete legal obligations for the legislator. In that sense, judgment 2005-17612 indicated:\n\n\"V.- The Social State of Law as a constitutional framework for public action. The Political Constitution, read jointly and systematically, determines the validity of a Social State of Law. The foregoing implies that all public actions, in addition to necessarily conforming to the current legal order, must be efficiently and justly directed at satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of the Republic, through an adequate distribution of wealth and equitable access to the well-being generated by economic and technical development. It also imposes that within society, burdens be distributed among individuals according to each one's capacities. The economic system designed by the constituent of nineteen forty-nine has as its goal not only the growth of production and employment. Within the framework of the Political Constitution, the economy must be a decisive factor for achieving the objectives of the Social State of Law. It is clear, therefore, that the current Charter is not merely a political statute, but rather it is also an economic and a social one. Thus, it also follows that the system of fundamental rights established constitutionally is not based on utilitarian individualism, but rather on a conception of man within the framework of the society in which he develops. The Political Constitution stems from the notion that the human being cannot develop integrally on his own, but rather requires the participation of all other members of society for this. In fact, to achieve a more homogeneous social stratification, individuals must contribute according to their possibilities, for the benefit of those who possess less. The foregoing is a fundamental right of persons occupying the lower strata, and a duty of all, mainly those most benefited by the economic system. Wealth in a society is not produced only by those who own the means of production, but also by those who contribute to it with their labor, with their work.\n\nConsequently, the benefits produced by the market must be redirected so that they do not yield returns solely in favor of certain social sectors. Relating this principle to that of social justice, enshrined in Article 74 of the Constitution, according to which individuals must collaborate reciprocally in order to preserve the human dignity of all members of the community, we have that the constituent sought to foster a society where solidarity was the general rule of coexistence; where the realization of small sacrifices in favor of great social goals was above individual interests; this is what is normally known as a Social State of Law. It could thus be affirmed that solidarity among the members of the community is a principle of constitutional rank, which obliges the State to demand more from those who possess greater capacities, so that through the provision of social services in education, health, access to housing, etc., it fosters personal and social growth and prevents the existence of first-class citizens and others of second or third class. Finally, it can be said that the Political Constitution recognizes in favor of individuals and social groups an extensive and highly varied range of rights, some expressly, others deducible from the understanding of the system formed by its norms and principles. Some of these prerogatives (regardless of whether they are individual or collective) have an eminently social character, as they constitute rights to the receipt of certain benefits from the State. These may be goods or services, but in any case, the Administration must provide them due to the mandate (specific or generic) contained in the Fundamental Law. If it is a general reference (e.g., protection of the mother and minors, cf. Article 51 of the Constitution), it is the representatives of popular sovereignty who, through formal Law, will develop these precepts by imposing the ways in which the Administration must act to make them effectively valid, as well as allocating the necessary public resources for this purpose. The fact that they require actions from other agents to be effectively realized in no way diminishes their normativity, but it does make their implementation more complex (compared to public freedoms, for example), and the work of the controller of constitutionality more exhaustive, who will have to deliberate on the degree of commitment shown by the State in enforcing the norms that recognize social rights. If the legislator does not institute the suitable mechanisms—legal and financial—to realize them, their omission could signify a violation of the Political Constitution. If they issue the legal norms and provide the necessary resources to make that right effective, and it is the Administration that evades compliance, then this latter action would be indirectly harming the fundamental right, through the non-fulfillment of a legal duty.\" (See in this same sense the judgments of this Chamber numbers 01441-92, 05125-93, 03338-99, 2001-03825, among others)\n\nDoes this mean that economic rights are indifferent to the constituent legislator or that they are secondary compared to other values? Naturally not, fundamental rights in general, including economic ones, are not opposed ideas that necessarily imply the restriction of one of the social rights for the effective realization of justice and equality, or vice versa; they are rather part of a system and even interdependent among themselves. Constitutional jurisprudence itself has recognized this systemic unity by stating:\n\n\"…First of all, a general warning must be made: that the Constitution, or more so, constitutional law constitutes a systemic unity of values, principles, and norms that, consequently, must be interpreted and applied not in isolation but with criteria and in a manner that is also systemic, in harmony with one another, which are thus indivisible and interdependent; conditions that are doubly important when fundamental rights and freedoms are involved in the case, which are, in turn, also interdependent and indivisible…\" (1992-03194)\n\nVI.-\nDoctrine is also in agreement that in a political system like the democratic one, where freedom is the basis of the entire system, all rights are rights of freedom, including rights that provide an egalitarian component, such as economic, social, and cultural rights, because that component enhances and reinforces freedom for all. In that sense, fundamental rights of any kind act in the integral realization of freedom as autonomy, as overcoming the obstacles that make development possible in all facets of the human condition.\n\nVII.-\nThis being the case, how do we choose one or another interest of the same rank in the event of a collision in a specific legal situation? It seems we return to the same point, but this is not so, since the guidelines are given to us by the constitutional text itself, in our case Article 28 as will be seen. What has been said so far merely confirms that, for the democratic system, all rights derive from freedom, but the weight given to one or another in a given situation depends on the specific case. That is to say, they are not exclusionary or enemy rights, such that economic rights, for example, cannot or should not exist in a socially oriented constitution, but it does influence—not at a systemic level but at a particular one—the regulation that the legislator must give to a specific situation, in application of the political ideology of the system. The issue is clear, both in doctrine and in our system, based on the wording of Article 28 of the Constitution, which establishes the limitations on the regulation of fundamental rights for reasons of public order, morality, or protection of the rights of third parties; that is, in our system, freedom rights can validly be limited with certain constitutionally defined parameters. Thus, in judgment 3550-92 it is considered:\n\n\"F - The Legitimate Limitations of Freedom:\n\nXVII -\nOf course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, those that are necessary, and nothing more than those necessary for the validity of democratic and constitutional values. However, as the European Court (The Sunday Times case, para. 59) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OC-5/85, para. 46) have said, for a restriction to be 'necessary' it is not enough that it is 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'opportune,' but it must imply the 'existence of an imperative social need' that supports the restriction. Therefore, for restrictions on freedom to be lawful constitutionally and internationally, 'they must be oriented toward satisfying an imperative public interest. Among various options for achieving that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen... the restriction—moreover—must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and closely adjusted to the achievement of that legitimate objective' (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-5/85, id.).\n\nThese criteria of interpretation, which have also been maintained by the great supreme or constitutional courts—for example, those of Europe, the United States of America, and Argentina—are a modern application of the old rule of the Partidas, according to which:\n\n'When in a suit over freedom or servitude the judges disagree, with as many sentencing for the former as those sentencing for the latter, that which favors freedom shall prevail' (Partida III, title 32, law 18).\n\nXVIII.- This implies, on one hand, that the restriction must be socially imperative and, therefore, exceptional, and as such subject to restrictive interpretation, so that in case of doubt, freedom must always prevail; on the other hand, that the interpretation of the 'common good' itself must be made in the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values—in Costa Rica, in summary, those of democracy, the rule of law, the essential dignity of the human being, and the 'system of freedom.' It was not by mere accident that the General Law of Public Administration, whose principled sense is evident, defined the public interest as:\n\n'the expression of the coinciding interests of the administered' (art. 113.1);\n\nimposing, as criteria for its assessment,\n\n'the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience cannot in any case be placed above' (art. 113.3),\n\nand distinguishing it clearly from the transitory or subjective interest of the Administration, that is to say, from that of the public administrators (art. 113.2).\n\nXIX.- In truth, the concepts of morality, public order, or the necessary protection of the rights of third parties, being indeterminate, authorize a certain flexibility, but this does not imply arbitrariness in any case and is subject, as discretion itself is, to jurisdictional control; a control that, as jurisprudence and doctrine have invariably recognized, must be exercised according to criteria of rationality and reasonableness (articles 15 and 16 General Law of Public Administration); flexibility, or discretion, then, which in no case can imply arbitrariness.\n\nXX.- Public order, morality, and the rights of third parties must be interpreted and applied rigorously, without licenses that allow extending them beyond their specific meaning; a meaning that, in turn, must be seen in harmony with the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the doctrine of human rights: according to the former, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted extensively, and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the latter, the law must be interpreted and applied always in the manner that most favors the human being. In accordance with this, public order, morality, and the rights of third parties that permit, at least to the law, the regulation of private actions must be interpreted and applied in such a way that, in the first case, it involves serious threats to public order, understood as the integrity and survival of the fundamental elements of the State; or as\n\n'the set of principles that, on one hand, relate to the organization of the State and its functioning, and, on the other, contribute to the protection of the rights of the human being and the interests of the community, in a just balance to make possible the peace and well-being of social coexistence' (Full Court, extraordinary session of August 26, 1982);\n\nXXI.- For its part, morality cannot be conceived other than as the set of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, the violation of which seriously offends the generality of the members of that society; and the rights of third parties necessarily must be ranked, both in themselves and in their concrete dimension, in the sense that it is only justified to regulate and eventually limit freedom to protect rights of equal or higher rank, against threats of equal or greater intensity. Thus, the Costa Rican system of freedom leaves beyond the reach of the law—read, the action of the State—an intangible sphere of freedom, which cannot be touched by any authority, because it is the person, not society, who has dignity and consequent fundamental rights and freedoms…\"\n\nVIII-. So far it is clear that the legislator can validly limit freedom rights for reasons of public order, and what is more, is obliged to do so when necessary in their role of social balancer imposed by the ideology of a social state of law. It is also clear that the limitations imposed cannot empty the essential content of the right being limited, but only reduce or limit the exercise of that right, and this is precisely the central point of this action. Whether the final paragraph of Article 377, by imposing the obligation on the employer to rehire a worker whose contract was broken without employer liability on the occasion of a legal strike, under the same conditions previously held, falls within the constitutionally permitted limits of Article 28. That is, whether the limit or regulation in question imposed on the freedom of contract of the parties is reasonable for the prevalence of a matter of public interest such as the protection of the worker, or whether it constitutes an illegitimate suppression thereof. Returning to the initial point, it is clear that the Costa Rican State, even in a system based on freedom, has a balancing or equalizing function against inequalities, and in that role it is obliged to compensate for those inequalities by favoring the disadvantaged party. If it does so out of an imperative social need to safeguard public order and, moreover, does so in a reasonable and proportionate manner, this is constitutionally legitimate. Thus, we have multiple examples in the constitutional text itself (e.g., the limitations on privacy in Article 24 of the Constitution) or at the legal level, such as all norms of positive discrimination in favor of minorities (e.g., Law in favor of persons with disabilities number 7600), or we have at the legal level specific norms that recognize the inequality of the parties, as is the case in the matter under analysis, where labor law is based on the premise that there is an inequality between employer and worker that justifies the constitutional and legal protection of the latter for the purpose of balancing the relationship. Thus, the inclusion of labor guarantees that impose minimum conditions in the labor relationship—not subject to the free contract of the parties—and in many cases non-waivable, which become validly accepted impositions, is admitted as legitimate. The minimum wage, vacations, labor benefits, the right to social security, the in dubio pro operario principle, the minimum working age, to name a few, are all mandatory, reasonable, and legal conditions in a labor relationship, aimed at protecting the weaker party for reasons of public interest. It could then be validly said that Article 377 in fine follows the same line, and that therefore, the restriction imposed on the freedom of contract is justified and reasonable. This Chamber considers in light of the foregoing that, in the cases of rehiring a worker who was dismissed due to their participation in an illegal strike, the legislator sought to alleviate the disadvantageous situation they would face vis-à-vis the employer and to prevent the employer from taking advantage of it to contract them under inferior conditions. The intention is meritorious, but the practical application, as the Attorney General's Office correctly indicates—citing national doctrine—can give rise to various problems of interpretation. Since the intention of the norm seems to refer to the immediate rehiring that arises after a strike declared illegal, it would fall to the ordinary judge to determine—in each specific case—those cases, assessing the respect for the worker's acquired rights, derived from the contract or from the passage of time in accordance with the law. This is in order to prevent the employer from seeking to take advantage of the worker's situation on occasion of their dismissal without liability motivated by the declaration of illegality of the strike.\n\nIX-.\nNow, this Chamber interprets that the paragraph challenged in this action refers to immediate rehiring and not to another situation, since if a reasonable period has already elapsed and a new contracting subsequently occurs, this constitutes a new labor relationship with all its consequences, that is, one in which the content of the contract is subject to the freedom of contract. The difference between the two situations lies in the fact that, in the case of immediate rehiring, the doctrine understands that a kind of suspension of the labor contract operates, and that by rehiring, the employer has declined their power to declare the contractual bond rescinded. If the employer does not use their right to dismiss the workers and readmits them to service, it means they approve or excuse the worker's action, and therefore, what operates is a continuation or prolongation of the previous contract in its entirety. To distinguish whether we are facing an immediate rehiring or not, one must use the rules of logic and experience as a criterion, to assess aspects such as the type of activity, the time that, under reasonable circumstances, it would take to carry out the administrative procedures for rehiring, whether it is a rehiring of a single worker or several—as may be the case in this latter situation in collective conflicts—among others, an assessment that falls to the judge in the specific case. Naturally, when faced with a new contract, with the exception of the labor guarantees established in the Constitution and the Law as a minimum floor of worker protection, all other elements of the contract must be governed by the will of the parties, derived from the right of free contract. In this last situation, the final paragraph of the challenged Article 377 cannot be validly applied, without this signifying a suppression of the essential content of that right. Indeed, under those conditions, when a rehiring exists, the challenged norm does not merely impose one or some labor conditions on the parties, but rather the totality of the labor conditions to be agreed upon, thereby eliminating their right to choose the survival of some or any of the conditions of the contract.\n\nX-. The freedom of contract, as constitutional jurisprudence has well indicated (judgment 3495-92), includes at least:\n\na) The Freedom to choose the co-contractor;\n\nb) The freedom to choose the object of the contract itself and, therefore, the principal provision that concretizes it;\n\nc) The freedom to determine the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as consideration;\n\nd) The balance of the positions of both parties and between their mutual provisions; a balance that requires, in turn, respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, according to which the position of the parties and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to each other, and also, proportional to the nature, object, and ends of the contract, and, although that freedom is not unrestricted and the legislator can impose valid limitations, as has been done with labor guarantees because the matter is one of public order (Article 14 of the Labor Code), it is not valid, for being disproportionate, to suppress the essential content—that is to say, the total content—of the right of contract for both the worker and the employer, imposing a determined total content on them—in cases of non-immediate rehiring as explained supra—since our constitutional framework precisely imposes on the legislator, as a limitation in the exercise of their powers, respect for the essential content of the right in question. Precisely in judgment 2771-03, this Chamber even recognizes that not even the derived constituent legislator can legitimately suppress the essential content of a fundamental right, such that even less could the ordinary legislator do so. The Spanish Constitutional Court has defined the essential content of a right as \"that part of the content of a right without which it loses its peculiarity, or, in other words, what makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a specific type. It is also that part of the content that is unavoidably necessary for the right to allow its holder the satisfaction of those interests for whose attainment the right is granted... the essential content is exceeded or disregarded when the right is subjected to situations that make it impracticable or hinder it beyond what is reasonable or strip it of the necessary protection\" (Vote 8/4/81). In summary, it is about recognizing a nucleus in the content of fundamental rights, safeguarding a minimum content, even against constitutionally relevant rights or goods. Thus, for example, the exercise of entrepreneurial freedom cannot be conceived without the possibility of obtaining a reasonable profit; nor is it possible, as indicated, to conceive the freedom of contract without any possibility of determining the object of the contract (judgment 3495-92). Related to this right, in the situation described, entrepreneurial freedom would be affected, insofar as the freedom of contract is a vehicle through which part of the business activity is exercised, which includes, in addition to the possibility of contracting as a mechanism for obtaining reasonable profit in the exchange of goods and services, also the freedom to organize one's own company.\n\nXI.- This Chamber does not consider that good faith is violated, because one cannot say with complete certainty what the will is with which one enters the contract, since often both worker and employer are left in a difficult situation, after a prolonged period of strike.\n\nXII.-\nIn conclusion, the final paragraph of Article 377 of the Labor Code that reads: \"Nevertheless, in the new contracts entered into by the employer, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, prevailed before the strike was declared illegal may not be stipulated,\" is not unconstitutional as long as it is applied in the sense indicated in considerandos VIII, IX, and X of this judgment, that is, that in the contracts entered into by the employer to effect an immediate contracting, after the dismissal of a worker as a consequence of an illegal strike, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, prevailed before the strike was declared illegal may not be stipulated. (…).\" (The underlining does not belong to the original).\n\nThus, based on the considerations of the aforementioned vote, this Chamber considers that, insofar as Article 74 establishes specific causes for the temporary suspension of the labor contract, without liability for the employer or for the workers, these are exceptions to the principle of continuity of the labor contract regulated in the legislation, in order to avoid affecting the provision of the service and the consequent salary compensation beyond what is necessary, with the primary purpose of guaranteeing the special protection of the working party constitutionally enshrined. Likewise, the mandatory nature of requesting authorization before the General Labor Inspectorate, under penalty of sanction, in accordance with Articles 75 and 7, subsection c), of Law 9832 challenged here, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, but rather, on the contrary, is a measure that conforms to the principles of social justice and in dubio pro operario, which constitutes a legitimate, necessary, suitable, and proportionate limitation on the freedom of contract, in order to verify that an adequate application of said labor figure occurs and to guarantee the protection of labor rights.\n\nRegarding Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, it is noted that the complainant party accused its unconstitutionality without specifying the norms of said regulation that it considers unconstitutional, since, as understood from its argumentation, its disagreement is in general with the requirement of authorization for the suspension by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the application procedure for which said regulation develops. In that understanding, based on the considerations set forth, given that in the opinion of this Chamber the requirement of managing the request for authorization before the labor inspectorate does not constitute an injury to the freedom of contract, the appropriate course is to reject this action on the merits as to this aspect.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, according to which the failure to follow the authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security constitutes a sanctionable fault, it is also not a measure contrary to the freedom of contract nor discriminatory, as alleged by the complainant party, who complains about the fact that only the employer is sanctioned for that omission, even though the working party voluntarily participates in the agreement to suspend their labor relationship. However, it is evident that this apparent inequality of treatment is due to the power conditions in which the employer finds themselves with respect to the working party, whose protection is imposed for being the weak party in the labor relationship. This Chamber has so recognized, by indicating that \"(…) since the introduction of the chapter on social guarantees in the Constitution of eighteen seventy-one—and its subsequent consolidation in the constituent assembly of nineteen forty-nine—together with the promulgation of the Labor Code in nineteen forty and the organization of the labor jurisdiction, the special protection of the worker has always been kept in mind, considered as the economically weaker party in the labor relationship, and hence the insertion of important principles, such as the 'pro operario' principle, which consists of the judge applying the most favorable sense of the norm to the worker, as well as the principle of the non-waivability of social rights, developed in Article 74 of the Constitution\" (vote No. 4448-96 of 09:00 hours on August 30, 1996). In light of the foregoing, it is also appropriate to reject this action on the merits as to this aspect.\n\nVI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ARTICLE 121, SUBSECTION 7, OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. As indicated in considerando three of this judgment, the complainant considers that the norms challenged here are contrary to Articles 25 and 121, subsection 7), of the Political Constitution, in the complainant's words:\n\n\"(…) 2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as it imposes association, at least temporarily, as a requirement and the sole means to agree upon a reduction of working hours, while preventing an individual or bilateral agreement and imposing sanctions.\n\n3. Article 121, subsection 7, which provides that public freedoms (including that of individual contract) can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of up to 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner.\"\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, regarding the aforementioned allegations, this action lacks sufficient legal grounds.\n\nIn this regard, this Court has repeatedly indicated that, for the infringement to be considered established and to be able to declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever brings an unconstitutionality action bears the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes Constitutional Law and, in addition, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is referred to by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, “a norm that on its face (sic) is contrary to the Constitution, shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that there is actually no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs if an action is brought against a norm that upon first examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the claimant who must advance the arguments that convince regarding the unconstitutionality” (see judgment no. 0184-95 of 4:30 p.m. on January 10, 1995). In a subsequent judgment, this Chamber stated the following, regarding the failure to set forth arguments of unconstitutionality in unconstitutionality actions:\n\n“The unconstitutionality action was filed with the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures, and infringes the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments entered into with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the claimants, it is confirmed, as indicated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional; rather, it is limited to setting forth generic and abstract discrepancies against the entirety of the Regulation (Reglamento), and furthermore against all activity carried out by sugar mills and estates, since they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of the surrounding inhabitants, without specifying which constitutionality arguments should be taken into account against each of the provisions or groups of norms of the challenged Regulation (Reglamento). […] The first paragraph of article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the obligation to authenticate the briefs filed for unconstitutionality actions, given that it is deemed necessary that there be arguments put forth by a legal professional, which this Court does not rule out should respond to a serious study of the technical and scientific background of a specific subject matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike guarantee proceedings, that is, habeas corpus and amparo remedies, which any interested party can file directly before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that harm them in their private sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the unconstitutionality action), the legislator entrusted to the authenticating attorney a task whose requirement is even greater, more elaborate and exhaustive if you will, which must be reflected in the filing brief by reason of their professional office, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal drafting of a Law, as well as other secondary provisions, entails an extremely costly process for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways, for or against it, and whose processes of formation, approval, and promulgation should not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest omissions of the legal professionals who authenticate the briefs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without exposing the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the unconstitutionality actions.” (Judgment no. 2012-05285 of 3:03 p.m. on April 25, 2012).\n\nThe cited article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) requires, in this sense, that the brief filing the action set forth “its grounds in a clear and precise manner”. In judgment no. 2013-016944 of 2:30 p.m. on December 18, 2013, this Chamber made express reference to the requirement of proper substantiation of the filing brief –as an essential admissibility requirement for the action, pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned article- in the following terms:\n\n“II.- INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION. Pursuant to article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the brief filing the unconstitutionality action must set forth the grounds in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the norms or principles considered infringed. Said requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but into an essential admissibility requirement, since by virtue of the pro sentencia principle –developed on other occasions by this Chamber- according to which, admissibility requirements must be interpreted favorably to the action, and furthermore, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and, in guarantee of its supremacy and validity, there is a public interest by virtue of which obstacles to the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural norms must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the issuance of the judgment is obtained; the foregoing not only facilitates the administration of justice but also prevents the imposition of obstacles to not achieving it (see in the same sense, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of substantiation of the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned and congruent judgment with what is sought. Likewise, it is improper for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms challenged in an action, when the claimant does not substantiate the reasons for which they challenge, given that this would imply carrying out an abstract constitutional review as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a proceeding of this nature.”\n\nFinally, more recently, in vote no. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020, this Court reiterated that:\n\n“(…) given the formalism legally provided for constitutional review proceedings, the argumentative burden in the processing of an unconstitutionality action falls upon the claimant, who must explain, unequivocally, the contradiction existing between an infra-constitutional regulation and the block of constitutionality, as well as the standing that assists them”.\n\nIn this particular case, the claimant challenges articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), 7, subsection c, and 9 of Law (Ley) No. 9832 and, in general, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 42248-MTSS, considering them contrary to the freedom of association and to article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nHowever, this Chamber observes that, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of freedom of association, throughout the filing brief, the claimant only states that it is injured in its negative sense, since, as interpreted by the claimant, to achieve the suspension of the employment contract this is only permitted collectively and not individually between the employer and the worker; in this sense, he alleges that “In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the approval of the Ministry in an individual agreement, it is denied, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate at least temporarily or to be represented in collectives to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and salaries.” However, this Chamber observes that the claimant does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does he develop the content of the freedom of association, in order to relate it or contrast it with what is established in the norms he intends to challenge, which prevents this Chamber from ruling on the merits of this aspect and issuing a judgment congruent with what is sought.\n\nSimilarly, the claimant alleges that Law (Ley) No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the pandemic, contains restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be understood as valid had they been enacted in accordance with the provisions of article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution. This constitutional article establishes that it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly “(…) 7) To suspend by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total membership thereof, in case of evident public necessity, the individual rights and guarantees enshrined in articles 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 37 of this Constitution. This suspension may apply to all or some rights and guarantees, for all or part of the territory, and for up to thirty days; during it and with respect to persons, the Executive Branch may only order their detention in establishments not intended for common prisoners or decree their confinement in inhabited places. It must also report to the Assembly in its next session on the measures taken to safeguard public order or maintain State security. In no case may individual rights or guarantees not listed in this subsection be suspended; (…)”. In this regard, the truth is that the claimant does not explain how the norms challenged here constitute a suspension of constitutional rights and guarantees under the terms provided for in the aforementioned constitutional article. The claimant merely reiterates that Law (Ley) No. 9832 limits the rights to freedom of contract and freedom of association, but only challenged articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of said Law (Ley) -which was not duly invoked in the underlying matter, as indicated in Considerando III-, insofar as they provide as a sanctionable offense “[n]ot requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security” and the restitution of rights to the worker, which evidently does not constitute a suspension of fundamental freedoms.\n\nBased on the foregoing, this action cannot be considered duly substantiated, regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and constitutional article 121, subsection 7), as required by article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Now then, although the claimant could be warned to remedy compliance with this requirement, in the sub judice, said proceeding is considered futile, not only because it would entail re-elaborating the action, but also because article 9, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to summarily dismiss any motion “manifestly improper or unfounded”, as occurs in this matter.\n\nVII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss this action on the merits with regard to the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, its summary dismissal is ordered. Judge Rueda Leal and Judge Garro Vargas dissent and order that the warning under article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) be issued.\n\nVIII.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL AND JUDGE GARRO VARGAS, drafted by the latter.\n\nWe depart from the majority opinion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, considering that the decision to dismiss certain aspects of this unconstitutionality action is premature. It is unquestionable that the unconstitutionality action is a proceeding “established with the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for this very reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge”, as has been indicated in the extensive case law of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and to their eventual non-compliance. This is extracted from the text of article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) which states:\n\n “Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which are the omitted requirements and shall order their fulfillment within three days (…)”.\n\nIn this matter, it is proposed to summarily dismiss the action in some aspects ‒regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and the presumed infringement of article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution‒. However, the majority judgment considers that the claimant does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does he develop the content of the freedom of association, in order to relate it or contrast it with what is established in the norms he intends to challenge. From our perspective, in relation to said grievances, the application of a warning to the claimant so that he remedies the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable. Similarly, it should be noted that the interpretation of articles 78 and 79, as well as of article 80 itself, of the Law (Ley) governing this jurisdiction, must be broad for the benefit of those who appeal to this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.\n\nIX.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the “Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch” (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThis action is dismissed on the merits with regard to the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, it is summarily dismissed. Judge Rueda Leal and Judge Garro Vargas partially dissent and order that the warning under article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) be issued, with regard to the alleged infringement of freedom of association and the presumed violation of article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nFernando Cruz C.\nActing President\n\nPaul Rueda L.\n\nJorge Araya G.\n\nAnamari Garro V.\n\nAna María Picado B.\n\nAracelly Pacheco S.\n\nJose Roberto Garita N.\n\nDigitally Signed Document\n-- Verification Code --\n*BYCNRN8208W61*\n BYCNRN8208W61\n\nCASE FILE NO. 22-025168-0007-CO\n\nTelephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6\n\nEven with an agreement between the two, an approval from the ministry is always required as an element of validity, which eliminates the possibility of them agreeing to any type of suspension of the employment relationship, or change in working conditions, such as the reduction of working hours within the pandemic, solely between a worker and their employer. It is clear that the scope of freedom of contract was understood to be limited by excluding these contracts, by way of the norms being challenged as unconstitutional. **3)** In any case, if a worker and an employer, individually, seek the ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied to them, because individual agreements are prevented from being made. Only agreements agreed upon collectively are approved. The parties cannot bring their agreement for approval, but rather must produce it within the procedure, in which all workers must be included. **4)** It is understood to be prohibited, illegal, and sanctions are also established, for agreeing to reductions of working hours individually, that is, between an employer and a worker, without the authorization procedure, which, as stated, is not viable for individual contracts. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation for this type of situation, that is, for the adaptation of the employment contract to supervening conditions with a temporary suspension of its original effects. Thus, the freedom of only these individual work suspension contracts is restricted, which entails the limitation of the freedoms of contracting plus the freedom of association, the latter in a negative sense. **5)** If the parties to the employment relationship signed a suspension contract outside the control of the Ministry of Labor, with or without cause, they violated the law and the employer receives a sanction for an infraction against labor laws. It is added that agreeing to suspension agreements individually and without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor is a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and sanctionable by the Ministry. The sanction applies only to the employer, even when the worker also participated voluntarily and regardless of whether the agreement was justified, reasonable, and proportionate. **6)** The nullity of the agreement is affirmed, per se, even due to form alone. Any consideration of substance, balance, or reasonableness is harmless. This triggers the employer's obligation to compensate the worker, even without services rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was made in good faith, with a valid justification such as a contracting economy due to a pandemic, and even with the worker's agreement, for the benefit of both parties. The effect of an automatic nullity is charged solely to the employer, plus a sanctioning procedure, as a consequence of the good faith exercise of a fundamental right that ultimately could have led to the same effects intended by the legislation that provides the basis for the restrictions. **7)** A judge cannot even begin to analyze whether or not the agreement was reasonable or justified according to the purposes of the laws and the Constitution, because the mere absence of the ministry's approval triggers its nullity. Thecontrol of reasonableness and proportionality by judges is left out due to the unreasonable preponderance of form, even though the same end foreseen by the law could be reached directly by a bilateral agreement of the parties. Within the context of the pandemic, the Ministry of Labor has not added any value to the suspension agreement agreed upon between the parties, making the regulations unreasonable and disproportionate. There is no relationship between cost and benefit / reason and proportion, but, even with all this, the judge cannot judge whether the agreement achieved the same proposed ends without injury to any other right. In fact, it will be seen in the cases that serve as precedent and are being judged at this moment, that it is not questioned that the suspensions were indeed justified and that there was indeed will from the parties to agree to the measure. **8)** The Ministry of Labor has maintained that, when placed in the position of extending or not the authorization, it lacks the competence to delve into the content of the suspension or working-hour reduction agreements, as the control established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed. Therefore, the sole objective of the regulation is to repress individual contracting, in order to channel these suspensions or reductions of working hours through the path of negotiation in worker collectives, giving the ministry a power of control and repression that is not proper to a regime of freedom. On the contrary, the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict the individual freedom of contracting in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the system in the hands of the MTSS as a means to achieve said end. But there is no reason or proportion. Stated differently, the sole purpose of restricting the will of the parties and of sanctioning is the failure to follow the collective path for negotiation before the ministry, as established in Article 7, subsection c) of Law No. 9832. Not only is individual negotiation limited in said sphere, but a gross mechanism of repression is added, converting it into a sanctionable activity improper for a system based on freedom. Particularly regarding this point, Law No. 9832, in its Article 7, subsection c) establishes as a sanctionable act *\"failing to request authorization for the reduction of the working day before the Labor Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"* Then, Article 9 provides *\"In addition to the fines established in Article 7, the employer who incurs any of the faults established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the workers to the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences. The right of the worker to appeal to the respective jurisdictional venue for the collection of the caused damages and losses is preserved.\"* This implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction, but also that of paying labor rights and compensation for exercising in good faith two fundamental rights (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association). **9)** Law No. 9832, which is enacted within the context of the pandemic and is the one that introduces and reinforces these prohibitions, plus the sanctioning procedure for agreeing to a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship individually and without the formal authorization of the Ministry of Labor, contains such extreme restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association that they could only be considered valid if they had been enacted within the context of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution, but, even so, they would be unconstitutional, not only because of the legislative procedure used, which was that of an ordinary law, without a declaration of calamity or minimal justification of the need to affect the freedom of labor contracting, but because it was enacted with an indefinite character, without a time limitation (it is currently in force) and to be incorporated indefinitely into the legal system for a special type of contract. Again, we also have the lack of reason and proportion by exclusively suspending the individual contracting freedoms of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere, and imposing collective negotiations, only for suspensions, creating a regime of exception with respect to the system of freedom of contract that remains in force for the beginning and termination of employment relationships, which does not require intervention or authorization from the Ministry of Labor. In summary, according to the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, it considers it clear that freedom of contract plus freedom of association have always permitted, and must still permit today, that an employer and a worker, by themselves alone, can agree to the commencement of an employment relationship, later its modification (with a suspension), or even the extinction of an employment contract, with no limits other than those imposed by the laws and the Political Constitution, which only refer to the respect of certain well-identified minimums (salary, working hours, vacations, Christmas bonus, etc.). But, if these limits are established, they must be clear, reasonable, and proportionate, which is currently not met by the indicated regulations that represent an obstacle to the exercise of these fundamental rights. Historically and within the framework of the Political Constitution, employers and workers have been free to validly agree to suspensions of employment contracts in the most varied forms. They have not been required to have the approval of the Ministry of Labor for those agreements to be valid and effective, nor have they been compelled to join in worker collectives in order to access this type of agreement. There is no doubt that an employer and a worker can indeed commence the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. But, without reason or proportion, it turns out that the same parties now do not have the possibility of agreeing to an intermediate agreement between commencement and termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined time, before a justified cause such as the pandemic. An agreement like this has been understood as subtracted from the sphere of their will, without subjection to a time limit on the restriction, without greater reason, and against several fundamental rights. Taken to what ends up being an absurdity, if that suspension agreement is replaced by another with more serious effects, that is, termination of the relationship and rehiring under other conditions, or definitive termination without rehiring, then it would have been legal and would not require the procedure before the Ministry of Labor, nor would the conduct be subject to a sanction, but, as it was merely a suspension, it turns out that it would not be valid… So, here, whoever could terminate a relationship by mutual agreement cannot suspend it by mutual agreement and without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. To aggravate this situation and carry it to the extreme, it turns out that this type of conduct (a suspension agreement between an employer and a worker) is so repressed that it implies the possibility of receiving sanctions, for infractions against labor and social security laws. But the sanctions are for the employer, regardless of the good faith of both parties, which is also a sign of discriminatory repression. And all of the foregoing without regard to the fact that said contract was agreed upon in good faith, to more quickly achieve the same ends pursued by the same laws (preserve employment, social peace, solidarity within unquestionable situations of force majeure, and the balance of the parties' positions within an employment relationship). Thus, the regulations reached the point of sanctioning the exercise of freedom of contract and freedom of association. This regime does not stop at invalidity, but rather escalated to the repressive activity of the exercise of public freedoms. This posture is recent and implies a change. In the exercise of their fundamental rights, historically, employers and workers have validly agreed, by themselves and among themselves, to suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms, for example: an unpaid leave of days, months, or years; sabbatical years and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships that have been agreed upon and executed without even a communication of an informative nature to the Ministry of Labor. They have also agreed to consensual modifications to contracts in the most varied forms and, for this, it is not required to agree collectively, nor is the approval, or even the deposit or disclosure of those agreements to the Ministry of Labor, required. The thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the pandemic and to the validity of Law No. 9832 and Decree No. 42248-MTSS. It was from the pandemic when this position was born, driven by the Ministry of Labor, which is known to have been the one that designed the bill that ended up being Law No. 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and salary, which is nothing more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. This latter law is the one that very clearly contains the regime of repression and sanction, plus the nullity of these agreements and the obligation to pay wages for time not worked plus readjustments of other related rights. Starting from this law, the same effects were escalated to the suspension of the employment relationship, the same restrictions, being today general for any type of suspension. Today, only employers are suffering the effects of this legislation, as will be seen below, through bad faith claims from workers who constructed these agreements together with the employers, without denying their will or the convenience of said agreements, executed them in good faith, but now want to take advantage of a situation of apparent advantage that allows them to attempt an abuse of right through the mere challenge of the transaction based on form. But, also, employers are being pursued by the Ministry of Labor, making effective the regime of repression and punishment, solely for having agreed to a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship with an unquestionable cause, for having executed it in accordance with what was agreed, for having fulfilled it, but without a merely formal authorization. By the text of the challenged laws, the judges of the Republic endorse this posture, cataloging the agreements as illegal, and it is for this reason that this action is brought before the Chamber in protection of the rights of its represented parties. For the foregoing, it considers that this action of unconstitutionality is the last measure and is necessary to achieve the protection of rights of constitutional basis and finally achieve what Article 41 of the Political Constitution offers. Through this action of unconstitutionality, it requests that the regulations that repress activity that is ultimately the reasonable and good faith exercise of fundamental rights be annulled, or at least, interpreted in a constitutional manner. Based on the foregoing, the complainant indicates the **norms and principles it considers infringed**, namely: **1) Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract**, inasmuch as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree to a suspension of an employment contract, whether in its complete form or in any of its species, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, furthermore, because the individual agreement that does not obtain an authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of freedom of contract expressed in a bilateral contract is suppressed and sanctioned, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation being challenged as unconstitutional. **2) Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association**, inasmuch as association, at least temporarily, is imposed as a requirement and sole means to agree to a reduction of working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned. **3) Article 121, subsection 7)**, which provides that public freedoms (including that of contracting individually) can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner. **Regarding freedom of labor contract**, the complainant states that the system of freedom included in our Political Constitution, in its species of freedom of contract, obliges that the limits to this freedom be specifically given in a very clear manner (what is not prohibited is permitted). The Labor Code is an example of this; it contains those limits and uses specific and clear linguistic constructions, indicating the restrictions or delimiting the scope where the parties can freely agree (free agreement between parties above the minimum wage, below the maximum working day, above the minimum vacations, etc.). In this way, what is not expressly limited in the laws is, therefore, legally viable to be freely agreed upon by the parties to an employment relationship. In the same way regarding the formalities of a contract: the ineluctable need for authorization of a contract with the consequence of its invalidity not being established, it is understood that the agreement is perfect and valid, from its inception and without further formality (see Articles 24 and 25 of the Labor Code which do not include anything about approvals from the Ministry). Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, which regulate the suspension of the employment relationship, do NOT contain a limitation on a bilateral agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship. The wording of said articles within the framework of the Constitution does not allow concluding that. Therefore, they are not challenged directly but rather subsidiarily, based on the reform introduced by Law No. 9832 and Decree No. 42248-MTSS. Before the entry into force of this law, the Labor Code regulated in Articles 74 and 75 only the figure of suspension imposed by the employer, without the worker's consent, so the ministry was only approached to substitute that consent (if it did not exist) and to impose a suspension on those workers. By not referring to the bilateral suspension agreed by agreement, it did not repress it, but, on the contrary, left it open to pact or agreement of wills and without subsequent approval, just as employment relationships are commenced and terminated when there is agreement. That is, the parties to an employment relationship can, by mutual agreement, commence, terminate, and suspend an employment relationship or change its conditions. This under the principle of interpretation that: whoever can do more, can do less. Also, under the referred principle that what is not prohibited is legally possible and valid. For this reason, historically, all types of suspension agreements between parties have occurred without any challenge, such as the case of unpaid leaves or sabbaticals, which are suspensions agreed upon bilaterally on a daily basis and without the need for intervention or approval from third parties. This derives only from Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, but within the framework of the Political Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber. What is regulated there, then, is the hypothesis that there is no will on the part of the workers to suspend an employment relationship, because, if there is, there is no need to seek an approval from the ministry to suspend a contract, given that this suspension can be agreed upon directly between the parties to the employment relationship. Now, it can reasonably be affirmed that Law No. 9832, enacted specifically within the context of the pandemic, which regulates a species of suspension (partial in the reduction of working hours), modified the legal regime applicable to these contracts, impacting what is regulated in Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code and deriving down to Decree No. 42248-MTSS. In this way, Law 9832 contains the following articles that are cited below, which do establish restrictions on freedom of contract and sanctions for the common exercise of this contractual freedom, causing a drastic change in the legal system: *\"ARTICLE 7- Faults and sanctions. It shall be sanctioned based on the table of sanctions established in Article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, taking into account the gravity of the act, its consequences, the number of faults committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the infraction, those employers who incur in any of the following faults: c) Failing to request authorization for the reduction of the working day before the Labor Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\" \"ARTICLE 9. Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in Article 7, the employer who incurs in any of the faults established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the workers to the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences.\"* This law being a clear complement to Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code and a type or species of the suspension of contracts, we understand that it can be reasonably interpreted that the legislator could indeed have wanted to limit the sphere of private contracting will in the manner that was set forth, that is, giving the following effects to the legal system of labor contracting for suspensions of labor contracts, given that, starting from the validity of this new law, the following occurs in the system of suspensions of employment contracts included in Law No. 9832 but also influenced the interpretation of Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code. Be that as it may, the result today of the integration of these articles that is arrived at and challenged as unconstitutional is the following: **1.** An employer and a worker could and can freely agree to the commencement and even the termination of an employment relationship through a contract without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor, but no longer a suspension of the employment relationship nor its species (the temporary reduction of working hours), without following the authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor which, in turn, obliges recourse to collective negotiation. **2.** Suspensions of the employment relationship and reductions of working hours require something more: the participation and final approval of the MTSS as elements of validity, even within a pandemic situation, in which there was little to verify regarding the justification of the measure and even when the collaborators themselves are aware and in agreement with the measures and remedies, and it even results that they benefit from the individual agreement proposed to them. **3.** In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the Ministry's approval on an individual agreement, it is denied to them, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented from being made. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate at least temporarily or to be represented in collectives to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and salaries. **4.** It is prohibited, illegal, and also sanctionable, to agree to suspensions and reductions of working hours individually, that is, between an employer and a worker. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation. **5.** But, furthermore, it was added that said agreement represents a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and sanctionable for the employer, even when the worker also participated voluntarily and was part of the agreement. That is, the agreement of wills is bilateral, but the sanction is directed at one of the parties. **6.** It is understood that the nullity of the agreement is produced, *per se* and due solely to form.\n\nThis triggers the employer's obligation to indemnify the worker, paying them wages and other rights, even without services rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was made in good faith, with a valid justification such as a contracting economy due to a pandemic, and even with the workers' agreement. The entire effect of automatic nullity falls solely on the employer, plus a sanctioning procedure that does not include the worker, even if they concurred with their will. It also follows that a judge cannot even begin to analyze whether the agreement was reasonable or justified or whether it achieved the ends proposed in the statement of motives of Law No. 9832, because the mere absence of the procedure triggered its nullity, the obligation to readjust, and the sanction. It is the form imposed by form itself. 7. The Ministry of Labor reviews an agreement of this type, but only to confirm formal requirements, because it has maintained that it lacks competence to delve into the content, as the control established by the MTSS is only to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed, because the cause is more than justified given it involves a pandemic. Therefore, the only palpable objective of the regulation is to repress individual contracting, to channel those reductions of working hours, which are suspensions, through the path of imperative authorization, plus negotiation in worker collectives. Conversely, it follows that the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict individual freedom of contract in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. In this same way, the sole purpose of sanctioning is the failure to follow the collective path for negotiation and the failure to opt for authorization, even if no damages or imbalances in the ends or effects of the pacts are verified. Not only is individual negotiation limited in said sphere, but it is repressed, becoming a sanctionable activity. With all its participation, the Ministry of Labor adds no value to the legal transaction of this type, so the regulation clearly falls into being unreasonable and disproportionate. But, even more, it becomes repressive activity of public freedoms, which makes the regulation particularly contrary to the Constitution. It adds that the restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association of Law No. 9832, which is enacted within the context of the pandemic and is the one that introduced and reinforces these restrictions, are of such magnitude that they could only be understood as constitutionally valid if it had been enacted as a suspension of public guarantees and fundamental rights, within the context of Article 121, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, but, even so, it is unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used, but because it was enacted with an indefinite nature, without respecting the 30-day period (it is currently in force), but also due to lack of reason and proportion in suspending exclusively the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere, without justification of the public need for that extraordinary restriction focused on a single type of transaction (it left out termination and indefinite modifications of conditions). Nor does it bear reason or proportion to limit only the suspensions of employment relationships, but leaving open the possibility of dismissals with responsibility, terminations by mutual agreement, and other types of changes in employment conditions. As petition, it indicates that its proposal and request to the Constitutional Chamber is that it deign to order: 1) Confirming that a pact between an employer and a worker to suspend the employment relationship in the face of a situation that merits it according to law, without further need for approval from the Ministry of Labor, is in accordance with the constitution, the Constitutional Chamber must declare unconstitutional Article 7, subsection c) and Article 9 of the Law \"Authorization for the reduction of working hours before the declaration of national emergency\", Legislative Decree No. 9832, published in scope No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58, of March 23, 2020. By declaring this unconstitutionality, it would constitutionally interpret that Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, including the individual, direct, and self-sufficient pact of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism for this purpose. Particularly, it would be interpreted that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is under the understanding that there is no agreement between the parties to suspend the employment relationship. 2) Subsidiarily, it can be done in the reverse order: constitutionally interpreting Articles 74 and 75, including the individual, direct, and self-sufficient pact of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism to agree on suspensions of employment relationships, interpreting that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is under the understanding that there is no agreement between the parties to suspend the employment relationship, plus declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 7, subsection c) and Article 9 of Law No. 9832 for establishing the authorization and collective procedure as the sole mechanism for obtaining the suspension of an employment relationship and sanctions for those who do not follow this sole procedure. 3) Also subsidiarily, it must constitutionally interpret said articles (74 and 75 of the Labor Code, plus 7, subsection c) and 9 of Law No. 9832) in the sense that said laws and articles do not refer to nor exclude the validity of individual, direct, and private pacts between employers and workers, with the same effects and purposes that the laws regulate. 4) Additionally and also in a subsidiary manner, Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, which is Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943, should be declared unconstitutional by connection, along with Article 7, subsection c) and Article 9 of Law No. 9832 insofar as it is understood that (i) said articles were indirectly modified by Law No. 9832 and (ii) all now exclude the possibility of an individual and direct pact or agreement between employer and worker to suspend an employment relationship, without requiring the authorization of the Ministry of Labor. 5) Finally, whatever the case may be, that Regulation No. 42248-MTSS, Regulation for the procedure for the temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of Article 74 of the Labor Code of March 20, 2020, published in La Gaceta No. 55, scope No. 53, of March 20, 2020, which limits the indicated fundamental rights and insofar as it limits them, by providing the procedure established therein as the sole means of obtaining a valid suspension of the relationship, be annulled by connection.\n\n2.- The claimant bases his standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since he indicates the following case files as matters pending resolution before the courts: 1) No. [Valor 005], which is an ordinary labor proceeding processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), where Daysi Mendoza Chaves appears as plaintiff and [Nombre 036] as defendant. The matter is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Tribunal of Liberia due to the appeal filed by both parties. 2) No. [Valor 007], labor proceeding filed by [Nombre 007] against [Nombre 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos). A hearing was held on October 20, 2022, and the first-instance judgment is pending. 3) No. [Valor 003], Ministry of Labor infractions proceeding against [Nombre 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, where the application of employment contract suspensions without the authorization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is denounced. Specifically, by the same plaintiff [Nombre 007] and by [Nombre 008]. The trial hearing is scheduled for November 11, 2022. 4) No. [Valor 004], ordinary labor proceeding filed by [Nombre 021] against [Nombre 002]., processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia). Because the defendant company filed an appeal, it is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Tribunal of Liberia. Likewise, the claimant provided certifications of the briefs through which he invoked unconstitutionality in those judicial proceedings.\n\n3.- By resolution at 4:27 p.m. on November 14, 2022, the claimant was warned as follows: \"(...) pursuant to Article 4 of Law Number 3245 of December 3, 1963, attach and cancel the Bar Association stamp for the sum of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, under warning that the defaulting party will not be heard until what is ordered is fulfilled, without retroaction of terms.\"\n\n4.- By brief received via Online Management at 11:37 a.m. on November 16, 2022, the claimant provided the Bar Association stamp for the sum of 275 colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief.\n\n5.- By official letter of December 6, 2022, addressed to the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, a certification was requested regarding the procedural status of case files numbers [Valor 005] and [Valor 004].\n\n6.- By official letter of December 5, 2022, addressed to the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos), a certification was requested regarding the procedural status of case files numbers [Valor 006] and [Valor 003].\n\n7.- By certification sent to the authorized email of this Chamber on December 6, 2022, the judicial coordinator of the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Carlos, certified the following:\n\n\"LOURDES CORELLA ALVARADO, JUDICIAL COORDINATOR OF THE LABOR COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN CARLOS, CERTIFIES THAT: In this Office, CASE FILE No. [Valor 007] is being processed, which is an ORDINARY LABOR proceeding filed by KIMBERLY MARIA [Nombre 007], identification number 0207780765 against [Nombre 001], legal identification number 3101014194. Said case file is in PHASE: CONCLUSIVE. It has judgment Unfounded No. 615-2022 issued at 3:31 p.m. on November 10, 2022. It is pending resolution of an appeal brief and another. CASE FILE No. [Valor 003], which is an INFRACTION TO THE LAWS proceeding filed by the MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY against [Nombre 001], legal identification number 3101014194. Said case file is in PHASE: CONCLUSIVE. It has Homologatory Judgment No. 619-2022 issued at 2:55 p.m. on November 11, 2022.*/*/*/*/*/ I issue this certification in Ciudad Quesada, at the request of the Constitutional Chamber, at ten hours twenty-four minutes on December seventh, two thousand twenty-two.\"\n\n8.- By certifications of December 8, 2022, addressed to the authorized email of this Chamber on that same date, the judicial coordinator of the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) certified the following:\n\n\"That in this Office, case file No. CASE FILE: 20-000186-0942-LA -PROCESS: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS, PLAINTIFF: [Nombre 021], DEFENDANT: [Nombre 002]., is being processed. Said process has a 'status' of first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000019, of ten hours twenty-six minutes on January seventeenth, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution of eight hours thirty-one minutes on March ninth, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the case file is on appeal before the Appeals Tribunal of this Judicial Circuit, for the cited appeal to be definitively resolved.\"\n\n\"That in this Office, case file No. 21-000296-0942-LA process: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS, PLAINTIFF: DAYSI IRINA MENDOZA CHAVES, DEFENDANT: [Nombre 001], is being processed. Said process, the status is of first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000140, of fifteen hours forty-one minutes on April twentieth, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution of seven hours twenty-nine minutes on May twenty-fourth, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the case file is on appeal before the Appeals Tribunal of this Judicial Circuit, for the cited appeal to be definitively resolved.\"\n\n9.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any action brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal or similar action that was rejected.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Cruz Castro; and,\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI.- STANDING. It is deemed that the claimant has standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, according to Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, having as prior matters the proceedings processed in case files numbers [Valor 005], which is an ordinary labor proceeding before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), filed by Daysi Irina Mendoza Chaves against [Nombre 036].; [Valor 006], which is a labor proceeding filed by Kimberly María [Nombre 007] against [Nombre 036]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos); [Valor 003], proceeding for infractions of labor laws by the Ministry of Labor against [Nombre 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela; and [Valor 004], ordinary labor proceeding before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) filed by [Nombre 021] against [Nombre 002]. The claimant invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, Law No. 9832, Article 7, subsection c), and in general the Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed violated. However, regarding Article 9 of Law No. 9832, as indicated below, its unconstitutionality was not duly invoked.\n\nII.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The claimant files this action against the following norms:\n\n- Article 7, subsection c), and Article 9 of the Law \"Reduction of working hours before the declaration of national emergency\" No. 9832, published in scope No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58 of March 23, 2020, which provide as follows:\n\n\"ARTICLE 7-Faults and sanctions. Employers who incur any of the following faults shall be sanctioned based on the sanctions table established in Article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, taking into account the seriousness of the act, its consequences, the number of faults committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the infraction:\n\na)(...)\n\nb)(...)\n\nc) Failing to request authorization for the reduction of the working hours before the Labor Inspection of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"\n\nd) (...)\".\n\n\"ARTICLE 9- Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in article 7, the employer who incurs any of the faults established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the workers to the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding wage differences.\nThe worker's right to resort to the respective jurisdictional venue for the collection of the damages caused remains unaffected\".\n\n- Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) No. 2 of August 27, 1943:\n\n\"ARTICLE 74.- The following are causes for the temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or for the workers:\na) The lack of raw materials to carry out the work, provided it is not attributable to the employer;\nb) Force majeure or fortuitous event, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work, and\nc) The death or incapacity of the employer, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work.\nIn the first two cases, the Executive Branch may issue emergency measures that, without harming the employers' interests, result in the relief of the workers' economic situation\".\n\n\"ARTICLE 75.- The temporary suspension of employment contracts shall take effect from the conclusion of the day on which the event that gave rise to it occurred, provided that full verification of the cause on which it is based is initiated before the General Labor Inspectorate (Inspección General de Trabajo) or before its duly and specially authorized representatives, within three days following the aforementioned.\nIn the first two cases provided for in the previous article, the proof shall be the responsibility of the employer, and in the third, the responsibility of his family members or successors, and it shall be done through all the attestations and investigations required by the respective authorities.\nIf the General Labor Inspectorate or its representatives become convinced that the alleged cause does not exist, or that the suspension is unjustified, they shall declare the application without merit so that the workers may exercise their power to terminate their contracts, with liability for the employer\".\n\n- Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 42248-MTSS, called \"Regulation for the procedure for the temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of article 74 of the Labor Code\", published in supplement No. 53 to La Gaceta No. 55 of March 20, 2020.\n\nIII.- GRIEVANCES. The aforementioned norms are challenged insofar as they establish that any agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship can only occur for the causes set out in article 74 of the Labor Code, which do not include the will of both parties and, according to article 75 of that same regulatory body, must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it questions the constitutionality of the authorization procedure, given that it includes only the possibility of collective agreements, but not individually between an employer and a worker, and a sanction is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure. It considers that these provisions are contrary to the freedoms of contract and association, enshrined in articles 24, 25, and 28 of the Political Constitution; as well as article 121, subsection 7), constitutional, insofar as public freedoms can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific procedure, for a period of 30 days, in a reasonable and proportionate manner. Thus, in the words of the claimant, it considers that the following constitutional norms and principles are infringed:\n\n\"1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree to a suspension of an employment contract, whether totally or in one of its types, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, furthermore, because any individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract is suppressed and sanctioned, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation whose constitutionality is being questioned.\n2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as association, at least temporary, is imposed as a requirement and the only means to agree to a reduction in working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned.\n3. Article 121, subsection 7) which provides that public freedoms (including that of individual contracting) can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner\".\n\nIV.- REGARDING THE MOTION OF INVOCATION IN THE PRINCIPAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 9 OF LAW NO. 9832. Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) requires, for the purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route -like the present one-, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered to be harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, since simple compliance with them is not enough, but it is also required that the norm challenged through this route has a direct incidence on the matter serving as the basis, such that the decision in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion of the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the claimants must accredit and provide a literal certification of the motion in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its incidence on that matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited motion of invocation must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that:\n\n\"(...) although an extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary that in the base matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms considered infringed be indicated...\". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014).\" (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).\n\nBy judgment No. 2022-5564 of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Tribunal also stated the following:\n\n\"(...) In this case and in relation to the content of article 17 referring to confiscation, having analyzed the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it is insufficient. The possible constitutional articles violated are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the allegations referring to article 45 of the Constitution are lacking, which is precisely the right alleged to be harmed in the brief of filing of the action. Finally, regarding the referred article 20, it is not mentioned in the motion of invocation, so its challenge, lacking minimal legal basis, is inadmissible.\"\n\nLikewise, this Tribunal has resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, votes No. 2016-009868 of 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016, and No. 2016-011291 of 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 2016).\n\nIn the case under study, the claimant bases their legal standing to file this action on the base matters numbers [Valor 005], [Valor 007], [Valor 003], and [Valor 004]. Thus, they provided a notarial certification of the motions through which they invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS. However, from the study of the certifications of the invocation briefs, this Tribunal verifies that in these the claimant did not expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of article 9 of Law No. 9832, as they merely indicated the following (the invocation made within process No. [Valor 006], by motion dated October 25, 2022, is transcribed, which was replicated in the other base processes):\n\n\"(...) Constitutionality Issue concerning articles 74 and 75, within the context of the enactment of Law 9832, as well as the regulation enacted by the Ministry of Labor, No. 42248-MTSS.\nThe thesis proposed by the opposing party necessarily implies the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned regulations, seeking in bad faith to take advantage of a formal matter that was known to the plaintiff in the process.\nIn summary, the issue to be resolved involves deriving from these two laws and the regulation that the parties to an employment relationship (i) are indeed self-sufficient to agree on the commencement of the employment relationship, as they indeed were. Self-sufficient, that is, without needing to join with other collaborators and without intervention from the Ministry, that employment relationship could be initiated through an employment contract. (ii) They would also have been self-sufficient to end the employment relationship by mutual agreement, if they had so agreed. That is, if instead of a suspension they had agreed on something more serious like a termination, the same thesis would not prosper. Then, there is no doubt that an employer and a worker can start the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. (iii) But it turns out that it is proposed here that these same parties did not have the possibility to agree by themselves on an intermediate agreement, less serious than termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined time, in the face of a justifiable cause. An agreement such as this is understood to be removed from the scope of their will, without further reason and against several fundamental rights. Taking the thesis to what ends up being an absurdity, if the same agreement had been for termination and not for suspension, it would have been legal, but since it was not a suspension, it turns out that it might not be... (he who can do the more, must be able to do the less).\nIf we delve a little deeper, it turns out that the opposing party proposes that this sole requirement, which is purely formal in this case and would not have added any value to that transaction, triggers the nullity of the agreement. Thus, their thesis entails that freedom of contract has that limit and that the judge is not even allowed now to examine whether the contract has fulfilled the purpose of the norm (preservation of the contract, balance of the parties, adaptation to external conditions and unforeseen events, etc.). Here it is noted that it is an alleged prohibition or restriction of a type of agreement whose approval procedure holds no value for anyone, so such a prohibition is neither proportionate nor reasonable.\nNow, if we delve a little deeper into the analysis of this topic, we have two situations that must be unveiled:\n(i) This thesis is recent. Historically, employers and workers have agreed among themselves on suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied ways: unpaid leave for days, months, or years, sabbatical years, and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships. They have also agreed on consented variations in contracts in the most varied ways and, for this, the approval or even the deposit or notification of the contracts to the Ministry of Labor is not required.\n(ii) This thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the Pandemic. It was from the Pandemic onwards that this position was born on the part of the Ministry of Labor. But this criterion was fed by the enactment of Law 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and salary, which is nothing more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. The genre is the suspension, the regulated species is the partial suspension of the contract's effects, based on a reduction of working hours and salary for a determined time and due to the pandemic.\nThis latter law could contain some regulation that is interpreted in that sense. But such an interpretation is unconstitutional. In short:\nLaw 9832 was created to sustain employment, as one of its main goals, just as or in the same line that articles 74 and 75 were supposedly conceived, so it can be understood that it came to complement it and to offer this variant of suspensions as an alternative that was regulated more precisely. It is not that the possibility was born with the law, because it always existed, but rather that it was only specifically regulated. As in this case serving as background, it is demonstrated that the same end, but with better means and even results, was achieved with or without Law 9832 and merely with article 74 and 75 of the Labor Code; the reduction of working hours was already legally viable. From the law onwards, it was regulated more specifically with some special effects.\n\nAs we have indicated, historically and under the protection of the Constitution, Employers and Workers have directly and freely agreed upon the commencement and termination of an employment relationship, resorting to nothing more than the agreement of their wills. A work contract has NEVER required authorization from the Ministry of Labor, but rather, at most, a deposit or notification that is merely informative, with evidentiary effects, but never constitutive or extinguishing of rights and obligations. The same applies to terminations by mutual agreement. Likewise, employers and workers have agreed upon all types of intermediate arrangements, such as suspensions, \"leaves without pay,\" changes in temporary conditions, and other types of contractual figures that entail the temporary suspension of the effects of the work contract. It is only based on this recently enacted regulation that we now have a criterion to the effect that it is not legal to directly agree upon a suspension of the employment relationship, nor its subspecies, the temporary reduction of working hours. For this purpose, an attempt has been made to impose a procedure for authorization before the Ministry of Labor, and **it turns out that they can only negotiate collectively, not individually, and the background of what motivates the suspension (pandemic) is not even questioned.** Therefore, the requirement posed to the Court, regarding the authorization of the Ministry, would also be impossible in this case, because it can only be negotiated collectively. This directly conflicts with the Constitution and does not contribute any value or improvement to labor relations when the parties, by themselves, can continue to agree on this type of arrangement, without intervention from third parties, in the way it was done, for mutual benefit within an unprecedented situation in the recent history of the world.\n\n**It cannot be denied that this represents a change, a restriction of a public liberty and fundamental rights that have been specifically challenged, such as freedom of contract in the labor sphere. This thesis was set forth in the conclusions and in the response to the complaint.**\n\nMoreover, the intended reform to the contracting regime and restriction of the scope of the parties' will, its channeling towards collective negotiations as the only alternative, plus the sanctioning regime for any deviation from the procedure, are loaded with ideological elements of control for control's sake, repression, and an exacerbated limitation on the parties' ability to manage their own affairs or resolve their own conflicts, to adapt their agreements to external circumstances, and finally to exercise rights that have historically been protected and preserved, under the protection of the Constitution. In our Constitutional Order, a Judge cannot be limited from analyzing the balance of benefits between the parties of a labor contract that was modified due to the suspension agreed upon by the very same parties who initiated the employment relationship. If this is done in this case, it will be noted that the result would have been that these contracts would have been approved without further ado. Note that the extreme has been reached of also affirming that the Ministry of Labor lacks the competence to delve into the content, given that the control established by the MTSS is merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed or to verify the company's situation if there is no agreement of wills. The foregoing is logical because in a Pandemic such as the one we are experiencing, there was little to justify about the force majeure cause that made the suspension necessary. Therefore, the only palpable objective of the restrictive interpretation is to repress individual contracting, in order to channel those working-hour reductions, which are suspensions, through the path of collective negotiation by workers. Conversely, the scope of the legislation and that interpretation, according to the counsel for the plaintiff, is merely to restrict individual freedom of contract in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and working-hour reductions), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. In this same way, the sole purpose of sanctioning the conduct classified as illegal is the failure to follow the collective path for negotiation and subsequent authorization, as established in Article 7, subsection c) of Law 9832.\n\nParticularly, Law No. 9832, in its Article 7, subsection c), establishes as a punishable act \"not requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspection of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"\n\nThis implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction but, by virtue of the appeal, also paying labor rights and indemnifications for exercising two fundamental rights (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association, in its negative sense or the right not to associate) under a contract that was agreed upon and executed in good faith.\n\nThe restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association under Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the Pandemic and is the one that introduced and reinforces these restrictions, would be of such a dimension that it could only be understood as constitutionally valid if it had been enacted within the context of Article 121, subsection 7, of the Political Constitution, which allows the restriction of constitutional guarantees in situations of calamity, but even so, it is unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used but because it was enacted with an indefinite character (it is currently in force and its limit is 30 days), and also due to the lack of reason and proportionality in suspending exclusively the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere.\n\nTherefore, the discussion at hand implies the possibility of applying regulations that are unconstitutional if this line of interpretation is maintained. **For this reason, we are filing an action before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice with this matter as a precedent to raise the corresponding Action of Unconstitutionality as a reasonable way to protect the interests and rights of our client.**\n\n**Likewise, we request that the Judge analyze the foregoing to potentially raise a constitutional query on the validity of this regulation.** (...)”.\n\nBased on the foregoing, it is not proven that in the underlying process, the unconstitutionality of Article 9 of Law No. 9832 challenged here was expressly and formally invoked, as required by numerals 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in order to duly establish the incidental nature of this action; therefore, it is inadmissible with respect to that norm.\n\n**V.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.** The petitioner alleges that the norms challenged herein violate freedom of contract, literally estimating the following as violated: “*1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree upon a suspension of a work contract, whether in whole or in any of its subspecies, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, furthermore, because the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation being challenged as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned.*” Regarding Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, he alleges that it derives from said regulations that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur for the grounds under Article 74, which do not include the will of both parties, and that, according to Article 75, it must always be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, insofar as the former establishes a sanction if the respective procedure before the General Labor Inspection is not followed, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS insofar as the procedure to be followed before said body of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is regulated.\n\nDespite his allegations, as to this aspect, this action must be dismissed on its merits, based on the following considerations. On repeated occasions, this Chamber has indicated that freedom of contract is not unlimited but is subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, its purpose is to protect the working person (in this regard, see votes No. 2013-12014 of 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013, and No. 2017-016272 of 11:30 a.m. on October 11, 2017, among others). For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for temporary suspension of labor contracts, without liability for the employer and worker, under Article 74 of the Labor Code (without omitting to mention the existence of other causes for individual suspension provided for in Articles 78 and 79, the legal strike of 371, and the legal lockout of 387, all of the Labor Code, as well as other cases of provisional suspension due to disciplinary procedures provided for in the legislation) and the requirement for authorization from the General Labor Inspection, pursuant to Article 75 of the same regulatory body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, in safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection—contained in the Political Constitution—whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the figure of the suspension of the employment relationship from being used to evade compliance with employer obligations; for example, to conceal a dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the worker, who would see their income nullified without the payment of their corresponding rights and benefits. In this regard, regarding the conflict or collision between freedom of contract and the principle *in dubio pro operario*, in judgment No. 2007-015907 of 6:57 p.m. on October 31, 2007, this Chamber ordered the following:\n\n“(...) **II.-** Subject matter of the challenge. Although only Article 377 *in fine* of the Labor Code is challenged, for greater clarity on the subject matter of the challenge, the norm is transcribed in its entirety, highlighting the challenged text:\n\n“Article 377.- The illegal strike terminates, without liability for the employer, the work contracts entered into by the strikers; the repressive sanctions that the Ordinary Courts may declare against them are preserved.\n\nHowever, in the new contracts that the employer enters into, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, were in effect before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated.”\n\nIII.- On the merits. The petitioner alleges that the obligation contained in the challenged norm, which obliges the employer to respect the labor conditions prior to the illegal strike, in the event of rehiring the worker—despite the work contract having been broken without employer liability—violates freedom of contract and the principle of good faith. For their part, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic and the passive coadjuvants consider, conversely, that the norm imposes a valid limitation for reasons of public order on freedom of contract, in safeguarding the principles of social justice and worker protection—of constitutional content—since it is evident that the worker dismissed due to an illegal strike, being unemployed and generally in a state of extreme need, is not in a position to negotiate or agree—on equal terms and without disadvantage—a new work contract, which is why their protection as the weaker party in the relationship is necessary. Undoubtedly, we find ourselves in this case facing an apparent collision of constitutional norms and principles: on the one hand, freedom of contract and the principle of good faith, and on the other, the principle of social justice and that of *in dubio pro* worker, all of constitutional rank. The dilemma of which interests must be protected is resolved and provided for in constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence, specifically that which refers to the rules of constitutional interpretation, which indicates the obligation of the constitutional judge to interpret the Constitution harmoniously, as a unit, in a coordinated manner, as part of a totally cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered as a whole and not individually (judgment 2000-7730). It is not a matter, then, of choosing which principle the constitutional judge finds most appealing, but of extracting, through objective methods of constitutional interpretation and integration, the meaning that the constituent legislator intended to give to the constitutional text in light of a specific situation such as the present one. On this topic, constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that:\n\n“...The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other, and often make the interpreter's task difficult when resolving complex situations, that is, those in which more than one value intervenes at a time. In this type of case, it is very important that the constitutional interpreter weighs and seeks to balance—when possible given the circumstances of the case—the interests in conflict. The tool of juridical hermeneutics is also very useful for seeking the most just solution in a given case. However, regardless of the method of interpretation followed, it is essential to situate oneself within the context of the ideological model that the Political Constitution of a given country follows when interpreting the norms; in our case, that of a democratic country under the rule of law. An interpretation can never be divorced from the ideological model, such that any decision made must be compatible and consistent with respect for freedom, access to justice, human dignity, and other guiding principles of a political system of this nature...” (judgment number 1996-06681)\n\nThis is, then, a typical case of constitutional jurisdiction (article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), since precisely one of the essential functions of the constitutional judge is to decipher those blank spaces or those collisions of interests, using the harmonious interpretation of the constitutional text. In order to do that, one must be clear, in the first place, whether our Constitution has a specific ideological orientation, because based on this, the interpreter must understand the entire legal and political system in which it is embedded as permeated. Thus, having a purely liberal Constitution is not the same as having a socially oriented Constitution. This type of decision is what is doctrinally called the \"fundamental political decision,\" which consists of the choice that the constituents make of a specific political system and, consequently, of a specific form of government under which the social conglomerate will be governed.\n\n**IV-.** In the case of our country, it is not necessary to make efforts to determine the current ideological vocation of our constitutional text, since it is a non-controversial topic in national doctrine, the step our Political Constitution took from one of clearly liberal orientation (1871) to one forming a social state of law starting with its reforms in nineteen hundred forty-three with the inclusion of social guarantees and later with the new constitutional text—which takes the previous one as a base—in nineteen hundred forty-nine. From there, it is clear that in a social state of law, the State assumes a particular form of relationship with citizens based on a balancing function (sic) in the face of social inequalities. In that sense, it is obliged, politically, both through norms and concrete actions, to be proactive in generating mechanisms of social equity. Rights, especially fundamental ones (in general, including those pertaining to benefits), are seen, then, not as a private matter, but as a matter of public interest for the validity of the political ideology. Precisely some of the guiding values of our social state of law are those of social justice and solidarity as a means to achieve equality of opportunities. The fulfillment of the value of social justice, in a system like ours, goes beyond a simple declaration of equality of rights; it is necessary to guarantee not only a general or juridical equality of persons but also a real equality that translates into creating and promoting conditions such as: access to good education, to work, and to efficient health services, which allow every individual to have equality of opportunities to choose and develop the activities through which they can satisfy their needs and thus achieve their happiness and well-being. The protection of the value of social justice also implies recognizing and accepting those legitimate inequalities that exist in society, provided that their existence results in a benefit or compensation for the less fortunate through State action. It is not, then, about eliminating legitimate inequalities, which are based on or are the product of the free and voluntary actions of people that contribute to the increase of social resources and the creation of value, that is, in individual work, nor about treating equally those who are not; but rather, taking those inequalities into account to help the most needy, so they have an equal opportunity to access the sources of wealth production. In short, the purpose of this precept is to treat all people equally—in rights—and to provide authentic equality of opportunities; thus, society will have to pay greater attention to those who have been born in the least favorable social positions. The idea is to compensate for contingent disadvantages towards equality through specific public policies and specific normative protections.\n\n**V-.** Constitutional jurisprudence has recognized on various occasions that our constitutional text has an orientation characteristic of a social state of law and that this concept translates into a guiding value of the constitutional framework of public action, which translates into concrete legal obligations for the legislator. In that sense, judgment 2005-17612 indicated:\n\n**“V.-** The Social State of Law as a constitutional framework for public action. The Political Constitution, read jointly and systematically, determines the validity of a Social State of Law.\n\nThe foregoing implies that all public actions, in addition to necessarily conforming to the legal system in force, must be efficiently and justly directed at satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of the Republic, through an adequate distribution of wealth and equitable access to the well-being generated by economic and technical development. It also imposes that within society, burdens be distributed among individuals according to each one’s capacities. The economic system designed by the constitutional framers of nineteen forty-nine has as its goal not only the growth of production and employment. Within the framework of the Political Constitution, the economy must be a decisive factor for achieving the objectives of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho). It is clear, therefore, that the current Charter is not merely a political statute, but also an economic and a social one. Thus, it also follows that the system of fundamental rights established constitutionally is not based on utilitarian individualism, but rather on a conception of man within the framework of the society in which he develops. The Political Constitution starts from the notion that the human being cannot develop fully by himself, but rather requires the participation of all other members of society. In fact, to achieve a more homogeneous social stratification, individuals must contribute according to their means, for the benefit of those who possess less. The foregoing is a fundamental right of persons occupying the lower strata, and a duty of all, principally those most benefited by the economic system. Wealth in a society is not produced solely by those who own the means of production, but also by those who contribute to it with their labor, with their work. Consequently, the benefits produced by the market must be redirected so that they do not yield returns solely in favor of certain social sectors. Relating this principle to that of social justice, positivized in Article 74 of the Constitution, according to which persons must collaborate reciprocally in order to preserve the human dignity of all members of the community, we have that the constitutional framers sought to promote a society where solidarity was the general rule of coexistence; where the realization of small sacrifices in favor of great social goals was above individual interests; this is what is normally known as the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho). It could thus be affirmed that solidarity among the members of the community is a principle of constitutional rank, which obliges the State to demand more from those who possess greater capacities, so that through the provision of social services of education, health, access to housing, etc., it fosters personal and social growth and avoids the existence of first-class citizens and others of second or third class. Finally, it can be said that the Political Constitution recognizes in favor of individuals and social groups an extensive and very varied range of rights, some expressly, others collectible from understanding the system formed by its norms and principles. Some of these prerogatives (regardless of whether they are individual or collective) have an eminently social character, as they constitute rights to the receipt of certain benefits from the State. These may be goods or services, but in any case the Administration must provide them due to the mandate (specific or generic) contained in the Fundamental Law. If it is a general reference (e.g., protection of the mother and minors, cf. Article 51 of the Constitution), it is the representatives of popular sovereignty who, through formal Law, will develop these precepts by imposing the ways in which the Administration must act for the purpose of making them effectively enforceable, as well as providing the public resources necessary for this. The fact that they require actions from other agents to be effectively realized in no way detracts from their normativity, but it does make their implementation more complex (compared to public liberties, for example), and the work of the constitutional controller more exhaustive, who will have to deliberate on the degree of commitment shown by the State in enforcing the norms that recognize social rights. If the legislator does not institute the suitable mechanisms—legal and financial—to realize them, his omission could signify a violation of the Political Constitution. If he issues the legal norms and provides the necessary resources to make that right effective and it is the Administration that evades compliance, then this latter action would be indirectly injuring the fundamental right, through the breach of a legal duty.” (See in this same sense the rulings of this Chamber numbers 01441-92, 05125-93, 03338-99, 2001-03825, among others)\n\nDoes this mean that economic rights are irrelevant to the constitutional legislator or that they are secondary compared to other values? Naturally not. Fundamental rights in general, including economic ones, are not opposing ideas that necessarily imply the restriction of one of the social rights for the effective realization of justice and equality, or vice versa; they are rather part of a system and even interdependent among themselves. Constitutional jurisprudence itself has recognized this systemic unity by stating:\n\n“…First of all, a general warning must be made: that the Constitution, or even more, the law of the Constitution constitutes a systematic unity of values, principles and norms that, consequently, must be interpreted and applied not in isolation but with systematic criteria and in a systematic manner, in harmony with one another, which thus result indivisible and interdependent; conditions which are doubly important when fundamental rights and liberties are involved in the case, which are, in turn, also interdependent and indivisible…” (1992-03194)\n\nVI-. The doctrine also coincides in that in a political system like the democratic one, in which liberty is the basis of the entire system, all rights are liberty rights, including rights that contribute an egalitarian component, such as economic, social, and cultural rights, because that component strengthens and reinforces liberty for all. In that sense, fundamental rights of any type act in the integral realization of liberty as autonomy, as the overcoming of obstacles that make possible development in all facets of the human condition.\n\nVII-. This being the case, how do we choose one or another interest of the same rank in the event of a collision in a specific legal situation? It seems we return to the same point, but it is not so, because the guidelines are given to us by the constitutional text itself, in our case Article 28, as will be seen. What has been said so far confirms nothing more than for the democratic system, all rights derive from liberty, but the weight given to one or the other in a given situation depends on the specific case. That is to say, they are not mutually exclusive or antagonistic rights, such that economic rights, for example, cannot or should not exist in a socially oriented constitution, but it does influence—not at the systemic level but at the particular level—the regulation that the legislator must give to a specific situation, in application of the political ideology of the system. The issue is clear, both in doctrine and in our system—based on the wording of Article 28 of the Constitution—which establishes the limitations on the regulation of fundamental rights for reasons of public order, morality, or protection of the rights of third parties. That is, in our system, liberty rights can be validly limited with certain constitutionally defined parameters. Thus, in ruling 3550-92 it is considered:\n\n“F - The Legitimate Limitations of Liberty:\n\nXVII - Of course, fundamental rights and liberties are subject to certain restrictions, those necessary, but nothing more than those necessary for the validity of democratic and constitutional values. However, as the European Court (The Sunday Times case, para. 59) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OC-5/85, para. 46) have stated, for a restriction to be ‘necessary’ it is not sufficient that it be ‘useful,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘opportune,’ but it must imply the ‘existence of a pressing social need’ that supports the restriction. Therefore, for restrictions on liberty to be constitutionally and internationally lawful, they ‘must be aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options for achieving that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen... the restriction—in addition—must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate objective.’ (Inter-American Court of Human Rights., OC-5/85, id.).\n\nThese criteria of interpretation, which have also been upheld by the great supreme or constitutional courts—for example, the European ones, that of the United States of America, that of Argentina—are a modern application of the old rule of the Partidas, according to which:\n\n‘When in a lawsuit about liberty or servitude the judges disagree, with as many ruling for the former as ruling for the latter, that which is favorable to liberty shall prevail’ (Partida III, Title 32, Law 18).\n\nXVIII.- This implies, on one hand, that the restriction must be socially imperative and, therefore, exceptional, and as such subject to restrictive interpretation, so that in case of doubt liberty must always be preferred; on the other hand, that the very interpretation of the ‘common good’ must be done in the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values—in Costa Rica, in summary, those of democracy, the rule of law, the essential dignity of the human being, and the ‘system of liberty’. It was not by mere accident that the General Law of Public Administration, whose principled sense is evident, defined the public interest as:\n\n‘the expression of the coinciding interests of the administered’ (Art. 113.1);\n\nimposing, as criteria for its appreciation,\n\n‘the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience cannot in any case be given precedence’ (Art. 113.3),\n\nand clearly distinguishing it from the transitory or subjective interest of the Administration, that is, from that of the public administrators (Art. 113.2).\n\nXIX.- In truth, the concepts of morality, public order, or the necessary protection of third-party rights, as indeterminate concepts, authorize a certain flexibility, but one that in no case implies arbitrariness and which is subject, as is discretion itself, to jurisdictional control; a control which, as jurisprudence and doctrine have invariably recognized, must be exercised according to criteria of rationality and reasonableness (Articles 15 and 16 of the General Law of Public Administration); flexibility, or discretion, then, which in no case can imply arbitrariness.\n\nXX.- Public order, morality, and the rights of third parties must be interpreted and applied rigorously, without license to extend them beyond their specific meaning; a meaning which, in turn, must be seen in harmony with the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the doctrine of human rights: according to the former, everything that favors liberty must be interpreted extensively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the latter, the law must be interpreted and applied always in the way that most favors the human being. In accordance with this, public order, morality, and the rights of third parties that permit, at least to the law, the regulation of private actions must be interpreted and applied in such a way that in the first case, it concerns grave threats to public order, understood as the integrity and survival of the fundamental elements of the State; or as\n\n‘the set of principles that, on one hand, pertain to the organization of the State and its functioning, and, on the other, contribute to the protection of the rights of the human being and the interests of the community, in a just balance to make possible the peace and well-being of social coexistence’ (Full Court, extraordinary session of August 26, 1982);\n\nXXI.- For its part, morality cannot be conceived as more than the set of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, whose violation seriously offends the generality of the members of that society; and the rights of third parties necessarily must be ranked, both in themselves and in their specific dimension, in the sense that it is only justified to regulate and eventually limit liberty to protect rights of equal or higher rank, against threats of equal or greater intensity. Thus, the Costa Rican system of liberty leaves outside the reach of the law—read, of the State’s action—an intangible sphere of liberty, which cannot be touched by any authority, because it is man, not society, who has dignity and consequent fundamental rights and liberties…”\n\nVIII-. Until now it is clear that the legislator can validly limit liberty rights for reasons of public order, and what is more, he is obliged to do so when it is necessary in his role as social balancer imposed by the ideology inherent in a Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho). It is also clear that the limitations imposed cannot empty the essential content of the right being limited, but can only reduce or limit the exercise of that right, and this is precisely the central point of this action. Whether the final paragraph of Article 377, by imposing the obligation on the employer to rehire a worker whose contract has been broken without employer liability on the occasion of a legal strike, under the same conditions he previously had, is or is not within the limits constitutionally permitted by Article 28. That is, whether the limit or regulation in question imposed on the parties' freedom of contract (libertad de contratación) is reasonable for the prevalence of a matter of public interest such as the protection of the worker, or whether, on the other hand, it constitutes an illegitimate suppression of it. Returning to the initial point, it is clear that the Costa Rican State, even in a system based on liberty, has a balancing or equalizing function in the face of inequalities, and that in this role it is obliged to compensate for those inequalities by favoring the disadvantaged party. If it does this out of a pressing social need to safeguard public order and furthermore does it in a reasonable and proportionate manner, this is constitutionally legitimate. Thus we have multiple examples in the constitutional text itself (e.g., the limitations on privacy in Article 24 of the Constitution) or at the legal level, such as all the norms of affirmative action in favor of minorities (e.g., Law in favor of the disabled number 7600) or we have at the legal level specific norms that recognize the inequality of the parties, as is the case in the matter under analysis, where labor law starts from the premise that an inequality exists between employer and worker that justifies the constitutional and legal protection of the latter for the purpose of balancing the relationship. Thus then, the inclusion of labor guarantees that impose minimum conditions in the employment relationship—not subject to the free contract of the parties—and in many cases non-waivable, which become validly accepted impositions, are admitted as legitimate. The minimum wage, vacations, labor benefits, the right to social security, the in dubio pro operario principle, the minimum working age, to mention a few, all are obligatory, reasonable, and legal conditions in an employment relationship, tending to protect the weaker party for reasons of public interest. It could then be validly said that the final part of Article 377 goes along the same line, and that therefore, the restriction imposed on freedom of contract is justified and reasonable. The Chamber considers, in light of the foregoing, that in the cases of rehiring a worker who was dismissed due to their participation in an illegal strike, the legislator wished to alleviate the situation of disadvantage in which they would find themselves vis-à-vis the employer and to prevent the employer from taking advantage of it to hire them under inferior conditions. The intention is meritorious, but practical application, as the Procuraduría rightly indicates—by citing national doctrine—can give rise to various problems of interpretation. Since the intention of the norm seems to refer to the immediate rehiring occurring after a strike declared illegal, it would fall to the ordinary judge to determine—in each specific case—those scenarios by evaluating respect for the worker’s acquired rights, derived from the contract or by the passage of time in accordance with the law. This is in order to prevent the employer from seeking to take advantage of the worker’s situation on the occasion of their dismissal without liability prompted by the declaration of illegality of the strike.\n\nIX-. Now then, the Chamber interprets that the paragraph challenged in this action refers to immediate rehiring and not to any other scenario, since if a reasonable period has already elapsed and a new hiring subsequently occurs, this constitutes a new employment relationship with all its consequences, that is, in which the content of the contract is subject to freedom of contract. The difference between the two scenarios lies in the fact that in the case of immediate rehiring, the doctrine understands that a kind of suspension of the employment contract operates, and that upon rehiring, the employer has declined his power to declare the contractual bond rescinded. If the employer does not use his right to dismiss the workers and readmits them to his service, it means he approves or excuses an act of the worker, and therefore, what operates is a continuation or extension of the previous contract in its entirety. To distinguish whether we are facing an immediate rehiring or not, the rules of logic and experience must be used as criteria, to evaluate aspects such as the type of activity, the time that, under reasonable circumstances, the administrative procedures for rehiring would take, whether it is a rehiring of a single worker or several—as may be the case in the latter scenario of collective conflicts—among others, an assessment that falls to the judge in the specific case. Naturally, when faced with a new contract, with the exception of the labor guarantees established in the Constitution and the Law as a minimum floor of worker protection, all other elements of the contract must be governed by the will of the parties, derived from the right of free contract. In this last scenario, the final paragraph of the challenged Article 377 cannot be validly applied, as that would mean a suppression of the essential content of that right.\n\nIndeed, under those conditions, when a rehiring occurs, the challenged rule does not merely impose one or a few working conditions on the parties, but rather the totality of the working conditions to be agreed upon, thereby eliminating their right to choose the survival of one or some of the conditions of the contract.\n\nX-. Freedom of contract, as constitutional jurisprudence has rightly pointed out (sentencia 3495-92), includes at least:\na) Freedom to choose the co-contractor;\nb) Freedom in choosing the very object of the contract and, therefore, the main performance that embodies it;\nc) Freedom in determining the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as consideration;\nd) The equilibrium of the positions of both parties and between their mutual performances; an equilibrium that demands, in turn, respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, according to which the position of the parties and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to each other, and also proportionate to the nature, object, and purposes of the contract; and, although that freedom is not unrestricted and the legislator may impose valid limitations, as has been done with labor guarantees since the matter is of public order (Article 14 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)), it is not valid, because it is disproportionate, for the legislator to suppress the essential content—that is, the total content—of the right to contract for both the worker and the employer, imposing a determined total content upon them—in cases of non-immediate rehirings as explained supra—since our constitutional framework imposes precisely upon the legislator, as a limitation in the exercise of its powers, respect for the essential content (contenido esencial) of the right in question. Precisely in sentencia 2771-03, the Chamber even recognizes that not even the derived constituent legislator can legitimately suppress the essential content of a fundamental right; thus, the ordinary legislator could do so even less. The Spanish Constitutional Court has defined the essential content of a right as \"that part of the content of a right without which it loses its peculiarity, or, put another way, that which makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a specific type. It is also that part of the content that is unavoidably necessary for the right to permit its holder the satisfaction of those interests for whose achievement the right is granted… the essential content is exceeded or disregarded when the right is subjected to situations that make it impracticable or hinder it beyond what is reasonable or strip it of the necessary protection\" (Voto 8/4/81). In summary, it is a matter of recognizing a core in the content of fundamental rights, of safeguarding a minimum content, even against constitutionally relevant rights or assets. Thus, for example, the exercise of business freedom cannot be conceived without the possibility of obtaining a reasonable profit; nor is it possible, as indicated, to conceive freedom of contract without any possibility of determining the object of the contract (sentencia 3495-92). Related to this right, in the indicated case, business freedom would be affected, insofar as freedom of contract is a vehicle through which part of the business activity is exercised, which includes, besides the possibility of contracting as a mechanism to obtain reasonable profit in the exchange of goods and services, also the freedom to organize one's own company.\n\nXI.- The Chamber does not consider good faith to be violated, because one cannot say with any certainty what intention the parties had when entering into the contract, since often both the worker and the employer find themselves in a difficult situation after a prolonged period of strike.\n\nXII.- In conclusion, the final paragraph of Article 377 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) which states: \"However, in the new contracts that the employer enters into, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, were in effect before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated,\" is not unconstitutional as long as it is applied in the sense indicated in recitals (considerandos) VIII, IX, and X of this judgment, meaning that in the contracts the employer enters into for an immediate hiring, following the dismissal of a worker as a consequence of an illegal strike, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, were in effect before the illegal strike was declared, may not be stipulated. (…)”. (The underlining does not belong to the original).\n\nThus, based on the considerations of the aforementioned vote, this Chamber considers that, insofar as Article 74 establishes specific causes for the temporary suspension of the employment contract, without liability for the employer or the workers, these are exceptions to the principle of continuity of the employment contract regulated in legislation, in order to avoid affecting the provision of service and the consequent wage compensation beyond what is necessary, with the primary goal of guaranteeing the special protection of the working party constitutionally enshrined. Likewise, the obligation to request authorization from the General Labor Inspectorate (Inspección General de Trabajo), under penalty of sanction, in accordance with Articles 75 and 7, subsection c), of Law 9832 challenged here, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, but rather, on the contrary, it is a measure that is consistent with the principles of social justice and in dubio pro operario, which constitutes a legitimate, necessary, suitable, and proportional limitation to freedom of contract, in order to verify the proper application of said labor figure and guarantee the protection of labor rights.\n\nRegarding Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS (Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS), it is noted that the claimant alleged its unconstitutionality without specifying the norms of that regulation that he considers unconstitutional, since, as understood from his arguments, his disagreement is generally with the requirement of authorization for the suspension by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), the application procedure for which that regulation develops. In that understanding, based on the considerations set forth, given that in the opinion of this Chamber the requirement to process the authorization request before the labor inspectorate does not constitute a violation of freedom of contract, it is appropriate to reject this action on the merits regarding this aspect.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, according to which failure to follow the authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security constitutes a punishable offense, this is also not a measure contrary to freedom of contract or discriminatory, as alleged by the claimant, who complains about the fact that only the employer is sanctioned for this omission, despite the fact that the worker voluntarily participates in the agreement to suspend their employment relationship. However, it is evident that this apparent unequal treatment is due to the conditions of power in which the employer finds itself with respect to the worker, whose protection is required as the weaker party in the employment relationship. This Chamber has recognized this, stating that \"(…) since the introduction of the chapter on social guarantees in the Constitution of eighteen seventy-one—and its subsequent consolidation in the constituent assembly of nineteen forty-nine—together with the promulgation of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) in nineteen forty and the organization of the labor jurisdiction, the special protection of the worker, considered as the economically weaker party of the employment relationship, has always been kept in mind, and hence the insertion of important principles, such as 'pro operario,' which consists of the judge applying the most favorable sense of the norm to the worker, as well as the principle of the inalienability of social rights, developed in constitutional Article 74\" (voto n.° 4448-96 of 09:00 hours on August 30, 1996). Due to the foregoing, it is also appropriate to reject this action on the merits regarding this aspect.\n\nVI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ARTICLE 121, SUBSECTION 7, OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. As indicated in recital (considerando) three of this judgment, the claimant considers that the norms challenged here are contrary to Articles 25 and 121, subsection 7), of the Political Constitution; in the claimant's words:\n\n\" (…) 2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as association is imposed, at least temporarily, as a requirement and the only means to agree on a reduction of working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned.\n\n3. Article 121, subsection 7, which provides that public freedoms (including individual freedom of contract) may be suspended only by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportional manner\".\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, regarding the aforementioned allegations, this action lacks sufficient grounds. In this sense, this Court has repeatedly pointed out that, for the infringement to be considered established and for it to declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever promotes an action of unconstitutionality has the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the Law of the Constitution and, furthermore, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is referred to by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, meaning that \"a norm that facially (sic) is contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that there is in fact no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs when an action is brought against a norm that upon first examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the claimant who must put forward arguments that convince about the unconstitutionality\" (see judgment n.° 0184-95 of 16:30 hours on January 10, 1995). In a later judgment, this Chamber stated the following regarding the lack of presentation of arguments of unconstitutionality in matters of unconstitutionality actions:\n\n\"The action of unconstitutionality is filed with the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures, and infringes the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments subscribed to with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the claimants, it is confirmed what the General Attorney's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) indicates, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional, but rather it is limited to establishing generic and abstract discrepancies against the entirety of the Regulation, even more against all activity carried out by Sugar Mills and Estates, since they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of the surrounding inhabitants, without specifying what constitutional arguments should be taken into account against each of the provisions or groups of norms of the challenged Regulation. […] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the obligation to authenticate the writs for filing unconstitutionality actions, since it is considered necessary that there be arguments put forth by a legal professional, which does not rule out that this Court responds to a serious study of the technical and scientific substance of a given matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike guarantee processes, that is, habeas corpus and amparo remedies, which any interested party can directly file before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that injure them in their private sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in processes for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the unconstitutionality action), the legislator entrusted to the authenticating attorney a task whose requirement is even greater, more elaborate and exhaustive if you will, which must be embodied in the filing brief by reason of their professional duty, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal elaboration of the Law, as well as of the other secondary provisions, involves an extremely costly process for the State, in which, in many ways, organized civil society has participated for or against its elaboration, and whose formation, approval, and promulgation procedures must not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest absences of the legal professionals who authenticate the writs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without exposing the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the unconstitutionality actions.\"\n(Judgment n° 2012-05285 of 15:03 hours on April 25, 2012).\n\nThe cited Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) requires, in that sense, that the writing in which the action is filed set out \"its grounds in a clear and precise manner\". In judgment n° 2013-016944 of 14:30 hours on December 18, 2013, this Chamber made express reference to the requirement of proper grounds for the filing brief—as an essential admissibility requirement for the action, pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned article—in the following terms:\n\n“II.- INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO LACK OF GROUNDS. In accordance with Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in the writing in which the unconstitutionality action is filed, the grounds must be set out in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the norms or principles that are considered infringed. Said requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but into an essential admissibility requirement, since by virtue of the pro sentencia principle—developed on other occasions by this Chamber—according to which admissibility requirements must be interpreted favorably to the action, moreover, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and, in guarantee of its supremacy and validity, there is a public interest by virtue of which obstacles to the admission and decision on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural rules must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the rendering of judgment is obtained; this not only facilitates the administration of justice but also prevents imposing obstacles to not reaching it (see in the same sense, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08, and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of grounds for the action prevents the rendering of a duly reasoned and consistent judgment with what was sought. Likewise, it is inappropriate for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms challenged in an action when the claimant does not provide the reasons for the challenge, since this would imply carrying out an abstract constitutional review as a kind of academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a process of this nature.”\n\nFinally, more recently, in voto n° 2020-000319 of 12:15 hours on January 8, 2020, this Court reiterated that:\n\n\"(…) given the formalism legally established for constitutional review processes, the argumentative burden in the processing of an unconstitutionality action falls on the claimant, who must explain, without equivocation, the contradiction existing between an infra-constitutional regulation and the constitutional framework, as well as the standing that assists them\".\n\nIn the particular case, the claimant challenges Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), 7, subsection c, and 9 of Law No. 9832 and, in general, Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS (Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS), considering them contrary to freedom of association and Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nHowever, this Chamber observes that, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of freedom of association, throughout the filing brief, the claimant only mentions that this is injured in its negative sense, since, according to the claimant's interpretation, to achieve the suspension of the employment contract this is only permitted collectively and not individually between the employer and the worker; in this sense, the claimant alleges that \"In any event, if a worker and an employer seek the approval of the Ministry in an individual agreement, it is denied because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented.\"\n\n\"Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate, at least temporarily, or to be represented in collectives to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and salaries.\" However, this Chamber observes that the petitioner does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does he develop the content of the freedom of association, in order to relate it to or contrast it with what is established in the norms he intends to challenge, which prevents this Chamber from ruling on the substance of this aspect and issuing a judgment consistent with what is sought.\n\n

Similarly, the petitioner alleges that Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the pandemic, contains restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be understood as valid if they had been enacted in accordance with the provisions of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution. This constitutional article establishes that it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly \"(...) 7) To suspend, by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total membership, in cases of evident public necessity, the individual rights and guarantees enshrined in Articles 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 37 of this Constitution. This suspension may be of all or some of the rights and guarantees, for all or part of the territory, and for up to thirty days; during it and with respect to persons, the Executive Branch may only order their detention in establishments not intended for common criminals or decree their confinement in inhabited places. It must also report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the measures taken to safeguard public order or maintain the security of the State. In no case may individual rights or guarantees not listed in this subsection be suspended; (...)\" In this regard, the truth is that the petitioner does not explain in what way the norms challenged here constitute a suspension of constitutional rights and guarantees in the terms provided for in the aforementioned constitutional article. The petitioner limits himself to reiterating that Law No. 9832 limits the rights to freedom of contract and freedom of association, but he only challenged Articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of said Law - the latter of which was not properly invoked in the underlying matter, as indicated in Considering III -, insofar as they provide that \"[n]ot requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security\" and the restitution of rights to the worker constitute a fault subject to sanction, which evidently does not constitute a suspension of fundamental freedoms.

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Based on the foregoing, this action cannot be considered duly substantiated, with respect to the alleged violation of freedom of association and Article 121, subsection 7), constitutional, as required by Article 78 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. Now, although the petitioner could be warned to remedy the compliance with this requirement, in the sub judice, said procedure is considered idle, not only because it entails redrafting the action, but also because Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright any motion \"manifestly improper or unfounded\", as occurs in this matter.
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VII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject on the merits this action with respect to the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, its outright rejection is ordered. Magistrate Rueda Leal and Magistrate Garro Vargas deliver a dissenting opinion and order the warning of Article 80 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction.
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VIII.- PARTIAL DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL AND MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS, with the writing of the latter.
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We depart from the majority criterion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, considering that the decision to reject certain aspects of this action of unconstitutionality is premature. It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a process \"established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of a general nature, and for that same reason a set of formalities must be complied with, so that the Chamber can validly hear the substance of the challenge\", as has been stated in the ample jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment that must be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. This is drawn from the text of Article 80 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states:
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\"Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall specify, by resolution, which requirements have been omitted and shall order them to be fulfilled within three days (...) \".
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In this matter, the proposal is to reject outright the action on some aspects —regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and the presumed infringement of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution—. However, the majority judgment considers that the petitioner does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does he develop the content of freedom of association, in order to relate it to or contrast it with what is established in the norms he intends to challenge. From our perspective, regarding these grievances, the warning to the petitioner to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable. Likewise, it should be noted that the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79, as well as Article 80 itself, of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad to the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.
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IX.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device, or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.
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POR TANTO:
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This action is rejected on the merits regarding the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, it is rejected outright.
\n\nMagistrate Rueda Leal and Magistrate Garro Vargas partially dissent and order that the prevention set forth in Article 80 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction be made, with regard to the alleged infringement of the freedom of association and the presumed violation of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\n| | | |\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n| | ![graphic]()Fernando Cruz C.Presidente a.i | |\n| ![graphic]()Paul Rueda L. | | ![graphic]()Jorge Araya G. |\n| ![graphic]()Anamari Garro V. | | ![graphic]() |\n\nThe signatories of this resolution are Ana María Picado B., Aracelly Pacheco S., and Jose Roberto Garita N.\n\nDocument Digitally Signed\n-- Verification code --\n*BYCNRN8208W61*\nBYCNRN8208W61\nEXPEDIENTE N° 22-025168-0007-CO\n\nPhones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482).\n\n**II.- SUBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The petitioner brings this action against the following norms:\n\n- Articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of the Law “Reduction of working hours in the event of a national emergency declaration (Reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional)” No. 9832, published in supplement No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58 of March 23, 2020, which provide as follows:\n\n*“ARTICLE 7-Offenses and sanctions. Employers who incur any of the following offenses shall be sanctioned based on the table of sanctions established in article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), of August 27, 1943, taking into account the seriousness of the act, its consequences, the number of offenses committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the infraction:*\n\n*a)(…)*\n\n*b)(…)*\n\n*c) Failure to request authorization for the reduction of working hours from the Labor Inspection Office (Inspección de Trabajo) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.*\n\n*d)(…)”*\n\n*“ARTICLE 9- Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in article 7, the employer who incurs any of the offenses set forth in that article shall have the obligation to restore to the workers the full enjoyment of all unduly affected rights, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences.*\n\n*The worker’s right to resort to the respective jurisdictional venue, for the collection of the damages caused, is preserved”.*\n\n- Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) No. 2 of August 27, 1943:\n\n“***ARTICLE 74.-** The following are causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or for the workers:*\n\na. *The lack of raw material to carry out the work, provided that it is not attributable to the employer;*\n\nb. *Force majeure or fortuitous event, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work, and*\n\nc. *The death or incapacity of the employer, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work.*\n\n*In the first two cases, the Executive Branch may dictate emergency measures that, without injuring the employer’s interests, result in the relief of the economic situation of the workers”.*\n\n*“ARTICLE 75.- The temporary suspension of employment contracts shall take effect from the end of the day on which the event that gave rise to it occurred, provided that the full verification of the cause on which it is based is initiated before the General Labor Inspection Office (Inspección General de Trabajo) or before its duly and specially authorized representatives, within the three days following the aforementioned day.*\n\n*In the first two cases provided for in the previous article, the proof shall be at the employer’s expense and in the third case at the expense of the latter’s relatives or successors, and shall be made by means of all the attestations and investigations that the respective authorities require.*\n\n*If the General Labor Inspection Office or its representatives become convinced that the alleged cause does not exist, or that the suspension is unjustified, they shall declare the request without grounds so that the workers may exercise their right to terminate their contracts, with liability for the employer”.*\n\n- Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, called “Regulation for the temporary suspension procedure of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of article 74 of the Labor Code (Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo)”, published in supplement No. 53 of La Gaceta No. 55 of March 20, 2020.\n\n**III.- GRIEVANCES.** The aforementioned norms are challenged insofar as they establish that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur due to the causes of article 74 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which do not include the will of both parties, and, according to article 75 of that same regulatory body, must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In addition, it questions the constitutionality of the authorization procedure, given that it includes only the possibility of bargaining collectively, and not individually between an employer and a worker, and a sanction is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure.\n\nIt considers that those provisions are contrary to the freedoms of contract and of association, enshrined in articles 24, 25 and 28 of the Political Constitution; as well as article 121, subsection 7), constitutional, in that public freedoms may only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific procedure, for a period of 30 days, in a reasonable and proportionate manner. Thus, in the words of the claimant, it considers that the following constitutional norms and principles are infringed:\n\n\"1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, in that the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree to a suspension of an employment contract, whether in full or in some of its forms, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, moreover, because the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation being challenged as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned.\n\n2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, in that association is imposed, at least temporarily, as a requirement and the sole means to agree to a reduction of working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned.\n\n3. Article 121, subsection 7, which provides that public freedoms (including the freedom of contract individually) may only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner.\"\n\n**IV.- ON THE WRIT OF INVOCATION IN THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 9 OF LAW NO. 9832.** The first paragraph, *in fine*, of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for the purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental channel – as the present one – the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts – including habeas corpus or amparo – or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, since mere compliance with them is not sufficient, but it is also required that the norm challenged through this channel have a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, in such a way that the decision in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right or interest within the prior matter. *A contrario sensu*, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for the foregoing reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the claimants must prove and provide a literal certification of the writ in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited writ of invocation must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that:\n\n\"(…) *although, in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, extensive reasoning is not required, it is true that it is necessary that in the base matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms considered infringed be indicated…\". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014).* \" (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).\n\nBy judgment No. 2022-5564 of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Tribunal also indicated the following:\n\n\"*(…) In this case and in relation to the content of article 17 referring to seizure, upon analyzing the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it is insufficient. The possible violated constitutional articles are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referring to constitutional article 45 are missed, which is, precisely, the right claimed as injured in the writ of filing of the action. Finally, regarding article 20 referred to, it is not mentioned in the writ of invocation, so its challenge, lacking minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.\"*\n\nLikewise, this Tribunal has resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, decisions No. 2016-009868 of 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016, and No. 2016-011291 of 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 2016).\n\nIn the case under study, the claimant bases its standing to file this action on the base matters numbers [Value 005], [Value 007], [Value 003], and [Value 004]. Thus, it provided notarial certification of the writs through which it invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS. However, from the study of the certifications of the writs of invocation, this Tribunal verifies that in these, the claimant did not expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of article 9 of Law No. 9832, as it merely indicated the following (the invocation made within process No. [Value 006] is transcribed, by writ dated October 25, 2022, which was replicated in the other base processes):\n\n\"*(…) **Matter of Constitutionality of articles 74 and 75, within the context of the enactment of Law 9832, as well as the regulation enacted by the Ministry of Labor,** No. 42248-MTSS.*\n\n*The thesis raised by the counterparty necessarily implies the unconstitutionality of the previously cited regulations, seeking in bad faith to take advantage of a formal issue that was known to the plaintiff in the process.*\n\n*In summary, the question to be resolved involves deriving from these two laws and the regulation that the parties to an employment relationship (i) are indeed self-sufficient to agree on the commencement of the employment relationship, as they in fact were. Self-sufficient, that is, without needing to join with other collaborators and without intervention from the Ministry, they were able to commence that employment relationship, through an employment contract. (ii) They would also have been self-sufficient to terminate the employment relationship, by mutual agreement, if they had so agreed. That is, if instead of a suspension they had agreed to something more serious such as a termination, the same thesis would not prosper. Thus, there is no doubt that an employer and a worker can commence the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. (iii) But it turns out that here it is proposed that these same parties did not have the possibility of agreeing by themselves on an intermediate agreement, less serious than termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined time, due to a justified cause. They are understood to be removed from the scope of their will regarding an agreement such as this, without further reason and against several fundamental rights. Taking the thesis to what ends up being an absurdity, if the same agreement had been for termination and not for suspension it would have been legal, but, since it was a suspension, it turns out that it might not be… (he who can do more, must be able to do less).*\n\n*If we delve a little deeper, it turns out that the counterparty proposes that this sole requirement, which in this case turns out to be purely formal and would not have added any value to that transaction, triggers the nullity of the agreement. Thus, their thesis entails that freedom of contract has that limit and that the judge is not even now allowed to delve into whether the contract has fulfilled the purpose of the norm (preservation of the contract, balance of the parties, adaptation to external conditions and unforeseen events, etc.). Here it is noted that it is an alleged prohibition or restriction of a type of agreement whose approval procedure is of no value to anyone, so such prohibition is also neither proportionate nor reasonable.*\n\n*Now, if we delve a little deeper into the analysis of this issue, we have two situations that must be unveiled:*\n\n*(i) **This thesis is recent.** Historically, employers and workers have agreed by and between themselves on suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms: unpaid leave of days, months or years, sabbatical years and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships. They have also agreed upon consensual variations in contracts in the most varied forms and, for that, the approval or even the deposit or notification of the contracts to the Ministry of Labor is not required.*\n\n*(ii) **The thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the Pandemic.** It was from the Pandemic onwards that this position was born on the part of the Ministry of Labor. But this criterion was fed by the enactment of law 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and salary, which is nothing more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. The genus is suspension, the regulated species is the partial suspension of the contract's effects, from a reduction of working hours and salary for a determined time and due to the pandemic.*\n\n***This last law could contain some norm that is interpreted in that sense*** *. **But such an interpretation is unconstitutional.** In short:*\n\n*Law 9832 was created to sustain employment, as one of its main purposes, in the same manner or along the same lines as articles 74 and 75 were supposedly conceived, so it can be understood that it came to complement it and to offer this variant of suspensions as an alternative that was regulated more precisely. It is not that with the law the possibility was born because it always existed, but rather that it was regulated in a specific form. As in this case that serves as a precedent, it is demonstrated that the same end but with better means and even results was achieved with or without Law 9832 and merely with article 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, the reduction of working hours was already legally viable. From the law onwards, it was regulated more specifically with some special effects.*\n\n*As we indicated, historically and under the protection of the Constitution, Employers and Workers have agreed directly and freely on the commencement and termination of an employment relationship, without resorting to more than the agreement of their wills. Authorization from the Ministry of Labor has NEVER been required for an employment contract, but, at most, the deposit or notification that is merely informative, with effects of a probative nature, but never constitutive or extintive of rights and obligations. The same with terminations by mutual agreement. Employers and workers have also agreed upon all types of intermediate agreements, such as suspensions, \"unpaid leave,\" temporary changes of conditions and other types of contractual figures that entail the temporary suspension of the effects of the employment contract. Only from this recently enacted regulation do we now have a criterion in the sense that it is not legal to directly agree upon a suspension of the employment relationship nor its species, the temporary reduction of working hours.*\"\n\nTo that end, an attempt has been made to impose a procedure of authorization before the Ministry of Labor and where it turns out that they can only negotiate collectively, not individually, and the underlying reason for the suspension (pandemic) is not even questioned. Therefore, the requirement presented to the Court, of authorization from the Ministry, would also be impossible in this case, because negotiation can only be done collectively. This directly clashes with the Constitution and does not provide any value or improvement to labor relations when the parties, by themselves, can continue agreeing to these types of agreements, without intervention from third parties, in the way it was done, for mutual benefit within an unprecedented situation in recent world history.\n\nIt cannot be denied that this represents a change, a restriction of a public freedom and of fundamental rights that have been specifically questioned, such as freedom of contract in the labor sphere. This thesis was set forth in the conclusions and in the response to the lawsuit.\n\nMoreover, the intended reform to the contracting regime and restriction of the scope of the parties' will, its channeling towards collective negotiations as the only alternative, plus the sanctioning regime for any deviation from the procedure, are loaded with ideological elements of control for control's sake, repression, and an exacerbated limitation on the possibility of the parties to manage their own affairs or resolve their own conflicts, to adapt their agreements to external circumstances, and finally to exercise rights that have historically been protected and preserved, under the shelter of the Constitution. In our Constitutional Order, a Judge cannot be limited from analyzing the balance of benefits of the parties to a labor contract that was modified due to the suspension agreed upon by the same parties who initiated the labor relationship. If this analysis is done in this case, it will be noted that the result would have been that these contracts would have been approved without further issue. Note that the extreme has been reached of also affirming that the Ministry of Labor does not have the competence to delve into the content, given that the control established by the MTSS is merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed or to verify the company's situation if there is no agreement of wills. The foregoing is logical because in a Pandemic like the one we are experiencing, there was little to justify regarding the force majeure cause that made the suspension necessary. Therefore, the only palpable objective of the restrictive interpretation is to repress individual contracting, to channel those working-day reductions, which are suspensions, through the route of collective worker negotiation. Conversely, according to the defender of the plaintiff, the scope of the legislation and that interpretation is merely to restrict individual freedom of contract in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and working-day reductions), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve said end. In this same way, the sole purpose of sanctioning the conduct classified as illegal is for not following the collective route for negotiation and subsequent authorization, as established in Article 7, subsection c) of Law 9832.\n\nParticularly, Law No. 9832, in its Article 7, subsection c) establishes as a sanctionable act \"not requesting authorization for the reduction of the working day before the Labor Inspection of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"\n\nThis implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction, but also, by virtue of the appeal, that of paying labor rights and compensation for exercising two fundamental rights (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association, in a negative sense or the right not to associate) in a contract that was agreed upon and executed in good faith.\n\nThe restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association of Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the Pandemic and is the one that introduced and reinforces these restrictions, would be of such a dimension that it could only be understood as constitutionally valid if it had been enacted within the context of Article 121, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, which allows restricting constitutional guarantees within situations of calamity, but even so, it is unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used, but because it was enacted with an indefinite character (today it is in force and its limit is 30 days), but also due to the lack of reason and proportion in suspending exclusively the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere.\n\nTherefore, the discussion at hand implies the possibility of applying regulations that are unconstitutional if this line of interpretation is maintained. For this reason, we are taking action before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice with this matter as a background to raise the corresponding Action of Unconstitutionality as a reasonable way to protect the interests and rights of our represented party.\n\nIn the same way, we ask the Judge to please analyze the foregoing to eventually produce a consultation of constitutionality regarding the validity of these regulations. (…)”.\n\nBased on the foregoing, it is not proven that in the underlying proceeding, the unconstitutionality of Article 9 of Law No. 9832 challenged here was invoked, expressly and formally, as required by numerals 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in order to be able to duly establish the incidental nature of this action, and therefore, it is inadmissible with respect to that norm.\n\n**V.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.** The plaintiff alleges that the norms challenged here injure freedom of contract, literally considering the following injured: “*1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree upon a suspension of an employment contract is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed, whether in total form or in one of its types, such as the reduction of working days. But, furthermore, because the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation being questioned as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned.*” Regarding Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, he alleges that it derives from said regulations that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur due to the causes listed in Article 74, which do not include the will of both parties, and that, according to Article 75, it must always be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, insofar as the former establishes a sanction if the respective procedure before the General Labor Inspection is not followed, and Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS insofar as it regulates the procedure to be followed before said body of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\n\nDespite his allegations, as for this aspect, this action should be rejected on its merits, based on the following considerations. On repeated occasions, this Chamber has indicated that freedom of contract is not unlimited, but rather is subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, its purpose is to protect the worker (in this regard, see votes No. 2013-12014 at 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013, and No. 2017-016272 at 11:30 a.m. on October 11, 2017, among others). For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for the temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer and worker parties, in Article 74 of the Labor Code (without omitting to mention the existence of other causes for individual suspension provided for in Articles 78 and 79, the legal strike of 371 and the legal lock-out of 387, all of the Labor Code, as well as other cases of provisional suspension through disciplinary procedures provided for in the legislation) and the requirement of authorization from the General Labor Inspection, in accordance with Article 75 of the same regulatory body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, in safeguard of the principles of social justice and protection of the worker -contained in the Political Constitution-, whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the use of the figure of suspension of the employment relationship to evade the fulfillment of employer obligations; for example, to conceal dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the worker, who would see their income annulled without the payment of their corresponding rights and benefits. In this sense, regarding the conflict or collision between freedom of contract and the principle *in dubio pro* *operario*, in judgment No. 2007-015907 at 6:57 p.m. on October 31, 2007, this Chamber ordered the following:\n\n“*(…) **II.-** Object of the challenge. Although only Article 377 in fine of the Labor Code is challenged, for greater clarity on the object of the challenge, the norm is transcribed in its entirety, highlighting the challenged text:*\n\n*“Article 377.- An illegal strike terminates the employment contracts entered into by the strikers, without liability for the employer; the repressive sanctions that the Common Courts may declare against them are preserved without prejudice.”*\n\n*However, in new contracts entered into by the employer, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, were in effect before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated.*\n\n*III.- On the merits. The plaintiff alleges that the obligation contained in the challenged norm, which obliges the employer to respect the labor conditions prior to the illegal strike, in the event of rehiring the worker -despite the employment contract having been broken without employer liability-, violates freedom of contract and the principle of good faith. For their part, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the passive coadjuvants consider, on the contrary, that the norm imposes a valid limitation for reasons of public order on freedom of contract, in safeguard of the principles of social justice and protection of the worker -of constitutional content-, since it is evident that the worker dismissed due to an illegal strike, being unemployed and generally in a state of extreme need, is not in a position to negotiate or agree upon -on equal terms and without disadvantage- a new employment contract, and therefore their protection as the weaker party of the relationship is imperative. We undoubtedly find ourselves, in this case, facing an apparent collision of constitutional norms and principles, on one hand, freedom of contract and the principle of good faith, and on the other, the principle of social justice and that of in dubio pro worker, all of constitutional rank. The dilemma of which interests must be protected is resolved and provided for in constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence, specifically that which refers to the rules of constitutional interpretation, which indicates the obligation of the constitutional judge to interpret the Constitution harmoniously, as a unit, in a coordinated manner, as part of a fully cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered in their entirety and not individually (judgment 2000-7730). It is not, then, about choosing which principle the constitutional judge likes more, but about extracting, through objective methods of constitutional interpretation and integration, the meaning that the constitutional legislator wanted to give to the constitutional text in the face of a concrete situation like the present one. On this subject, constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that:*\n\n*“…The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other, and often make the interpreter's task difficult when resolving compound situations, that is, those in which more than one value is involved at the same time. In these types of cases, it is very important for the constitutional interpreter to weigh and try to balance -when possible given the circumstances of the case- the conflicting interests. The tool of legal hermeneutics is also very useful, to seek the fairest solution in a particular case. However, regardless of the method of interpretation followed, it is essential to situate oneself within the context of the ideological model followed by the Political Constitution of a particular country when interpreting norms, in our case, that of a democratic state of law. An interpretation can never be divorced from the ideological model, such that any decision made must be compatible and consistent with respect for freedom, access to justice, the dignity of the person, and other inspiring principles of a political system of this nature…” (judgment number 1996-06681)*\n\n*This is, therefore, a typical case of constitutional competence (Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) since precisely one of the essential functions of the constitutional judge is to decipher those blank spaces or well those collisions of interests, using the harmonious interpretation of the constitutional text. In order to do that, one must be clear, first of all, whether our Constitution has a determined ideological orientation, since based on this the interpreter must understand the entire legal and political system in which they are inserted as permeated. Thus, it is not the same to have a pure liberal Constitution as a socially oriented Constitution. This type of decision is what is doctrinally called the \"fundamental political decision,\" which consists of the choice that the constituents make of a particular political system and, consequently, of a particular form of government under which the social conglomerate will be governed.*\n\n***IV-.** In the case of our country, it is not necessary to make efforts to determine what the current ideological vocation of our constitutional text is, since it is an uncontroversial topic in national doctrine, the step that our Political Constitution took from one of a clearly liberal orientation (1871) to that of one forming a social state of law as of its reforms in nineteen forty-three with the inclusion of social guarantees and later with the new constitutional text –which takes the previous one as a basis- in nineteen forty-nine. From there, it is clear that in a social state of law, the State assumes a particular form of relationship with citizens based on a balancing function (sic) in the face of social inequalities. In that sense, it is obligated, politically, both through norms and concrete actions, to be proactive in the generation of mechanisms for social equity.*\"\n\nRights, especially fundamental rights (in general, including social welfare rights), are thus seen not as a private matter, but as a matter of public interest for the effectiveness of the political ideology. Precisely, some of the guiding values of our social state under the rule of law (estado social de derecho) are social justice and solidarity as a means to achieve equality of opportunity. The fulfillment of the value of social justice, in a system like ours, goes beyond a simple declaration of equality of rights; it is necessary to guarantee not only a general or legal equality of persons, but also a real equality that translates into creating and promoting conditions such as: access to a good education, to work, and to efficient health services, which allow every individual to have an equality of opportunity to choose and develop the activities through which they can satisfy their needs and thus achieve their happiness and well-being. The protection of the value of social justice also implies recognizing and accepting those legitimate inequalities that exist in society, provided that their existence yields a benefit or compensation for the less fortunate through the action of the State. It is not, then, about eliminating legitimate inequalities, which are based on or are the product of the free and voluntary actions of individuals that contribute to the increase of social resources and the creation of value, that is, in individual work, nor about treating equally those who are not equal; but rather, about taking those inequalities into account to help the most needy, so that they have an equal opportunity to access the sources of wealth production. In summary, the purpose of this precept is to treat all persons equally—in rights—and to provide a genuine equality of opportunity; thus, society must pay greater attention to those who have been born into the least favorable social positions. The idea is to compensate for contingent disadvantages toward equality through specific public policies and specific normative protections.\n\n**V.-** Constitutional jurisprudence has recognized on various occasions that our constitutional text has an orientation characteristic of a social state under the rule of law (estado social de derecho) and that this concept translates into a guiding value of the constitutional framework for public action, which translates into concrete legal obligations for the legislator. In that sense, judgment 2005-17612 stated:\n\n**“V.-** The Social State Under the Rule of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) as a constitutional framework for public action. The Political Constitution, read jointly and systematically, determines the validity of a Social State Under the Rule of Law. The foregoing implies that all public actions, in addition to necessarily conforming to the legal order in force, must be directed efficiently and justly to satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of the Republic, through an adequate distribution of wealth and equitable access to the well-being generated by economic and technical development. It also imposes that within society, burdens be distributed among individuals according to each one's capabilities. The economic system designed by the constitutional framers of nineteen forty-nine has as its goal not only the growth of production and employment. Within the framework of the Political Constitution, the economy must be a decisive factor for achieving the objectives of the Social State Under the Rule of Law. It is clear, therefore, that the current Charter is not merely a political statute, but is also an economic and a social one. Thus, it also follows that the system of fundamental rights established constitutionally is not based on utilitarian individualism, but rather on a conception of the human being within the framework of the society in which they develop. The Political Constitution starts from the notion that the human being cannot develop integrally by themselves, but rather requires the participation of all other members of society to do so. In fact, to achieve a more homogeneous social stratification, individuals must contribute according to their means, for the benefit of those who have less. The foregoing is a fundamental right of the persons occupying the lower strata, and a duty for all, principally those most benefited by the economic system. Wealth in a society is not produced solely by those who possess the means of production, but also by those who contribute to it with their labor, with their work. Consequently, the benefits produced by the market must be redirected so they do not redound solely in favor of certain social sectors. Relating this principle to that of social justice, made positive in Article 74 of the Constitution, according to which persons must collaborate reciprocally for the sake of preserving the human dignity of all members of the community, we have that the constitutional framers sought to foster a society where solidarity was the general rule of coexistence; where the realization of small sacrifices in favor of great social goals stood above individual interests; this is what is normally known as a Social State Under the Rule of Law. One could thus affirm that solidarity among the members of the community is a principle of constitutional rank, which obliges the State to demand more from those who possess (sic) greater capabilities, so that through the provision of social services of education, health, access to housing, etc., it fosters personal and social growth and avoids the existence of first-category citizens and others of second or third category. Finally, it can be said that the Political Constitution recognizes in favor of individuals and social groups an extensive and very varied range of rights, some expressly, others deducible from the understanding of the system formed by its norms and principles. Some of these prerogatives (regardless of whether they are individual or collective) have an eminently social character, constituting rights to the receipt of certain benefits from the State. These may be goods or services, but in any case the Administration must provide them due to the mandate (specific or generic) contained in the Fundamental Law. If it is a general reference (e.g., protection of the mother and minors, cf. Article 51 of the Constitution), it is the representatives of popular sovereignty who, through formal Law, will develop these precepts, imposing the ways in which the Administration must act in order to make them effectively enforceable, as well as allocating the public resources necessary for this. The fact that they require actions by other agents to be effectively realized in no way detracts from their normativity, but does make their implementation more complex (in comparison with public freedoms, for example), and makes the task of the constitutionality controller more exhaustive, who must deliberate regarding the degree of commitment shown by the State in enforcing the norms that recognize social rights. If the legislator does not establish the suitable mechanisms—legal and financial—to realize them, their omission could signify a violation of the Political Constitution. If they issue the legal norms and provide the necessary resources to make that right effective and it is the Administration that evades compliance, then this latter action would be indirectly injuring the fundamental right, through the breach of a legal duty.” (See in this same sense judgments of this Chamber numbers 01441-92, 05125-93, 03338-99, 2001-03825, among others)\n\nDoes this mean that economic rights are a matter of indifference to the constitutional legislator or that they are secondary compared to other values? Naturally not; fundamental rights in general, including economic ones, are not opposing ideas that necessarily imply the restriction of one of the social rights for the effective realization of justice and equality, or vice versa; they are rather part of a system and even interdependent among themselves. Constitutional jurisprudence itself has recognized this systemic unity by stating:\n\n“…First of all, a general warning must be made: that the Constitution, or moreover, the law of the Constitution constitutes a systematic unity of values, principles, and norms that, consequently, must be interpreted and applied not in isolation but with criteria and in a manner that is also systematic, in harmony with one another, which thus result indivisible and interdependent; conditions that are doubly important when fundamental rights and freedoms are involved in the case, which are, in turn, also interdependent and indivisible…” (1992-03194)\n\n**VI.-** Doctrine also coincides in that, in a political system like the democratic one, in which freedom is the basis of the entire system, all rights are rights of freedom, including the rights that provide an egalitarian component, such as economic, social, and cultural rights, because that component potentiates and reinforces freedom for all. In that sense, fundamental rights of any type act in the integral realization of freedom as autonomy, as the overcoming of obstacles that make development possible in all facets of the human condition.\n\n**VII.-** That being the case, how do we choose some interests of the same rank over others in the event of a collision in a specific legal situation? It seems we return to the same point, but this is not so, because the guidelines are given to us by the constitutional text itself, in our case Article 28, as will be seen. What has been said up to now only confirms that for the democratic system, all rights derive from freedom, but the weight given to some or others in a given situation depends on the specific case. That is, they are not mutually exclusive rights or enemies, such that economic rights, for example, cannot or should not exist in a socially oriented constitution, but it does influence—not at a systemic level but particular—the regulation that the legislator must give to a specific situation, in application of the political ideology of the system. The issue is clear, both in doctrine and in our system—from the wording of Article 28 of the Constitution—which establishes the limitations on the regulation of fundamental rights for reasons of public order, morality, or the protection of the rights of third parties; that is, in our system, freedom rights can validly be limited with certain constitutionally defined parameters. Thus, in judgment 3550-92 it is considered:\n\n“F - The Legitimate Limitations of Freedom:\n\n**XVII -** Of course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, those necessary, but nothing more than those necessary for the effectiveness of democratic and constitutional values. However, as the European Court (case The Sunday Times, para. 59) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OC-5/85, para. 46) have said, for a restriction to be \"necessary\" it is not sufficient that it be \"useful,\" \"reasonable,\" or \"opportune\"; rather, it must imply the \"existence of a pressing social need\" that supports the restriction. Therefore, for restrictions on freedom to be lawful constitutionally and internationally, \"they must be aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options to achieve that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser extent must be chosen... the restriction—moreover—must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate objective\" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights., OC-5/85, id.).\n\nThese criteria of interpretation, which have also been maintained by the great supreme or constitutional courts—for example, the European ones, that of the United States of America, that of Argentina—are a modern application of the old rule of the Partidas, according to which:\n\n\"When in a lawsuit over freedom or servitude the judges disagree, with as many judging for the former as for the latter, that which favors freedom shall prevail\" (Partida III, title 32, law 18).\n\n**XVIII.**- This implies, on the one hand, that the restriction must be socially imperative and, therefore, exceptional, and as such subject to restrictive interpretation, so that in case of doubt, freedom must always be preferred; on the other, that the very interpretation of the \"common good\" must be done in the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values—in Costa Rica, in summary, those of democracy, the rule of law (Estado de derecho), the essential dignity of the human being, and the \"system of freedom.\" It was not by mere accident that the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), whose principle-based nature is evident, defined the public interest as:\n\n\"the expression of the coinciding interests of the administered persons\" (Art. 113.1);\n\nimposing, as criteria for its assessment,\n\n\"the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience can in no case be placed before\" (Art. 113.3),\n\nand clearly distinguishing it from the transitory or subjective interest of the Administration, that is to say, from that of the public administrators (Art. 113.2).\n\n**XIX.-** In truth, the concepts of morality, public order, or the necessary protection of the rights of third parties, as indeterminate, authorize a certain flexibility, but one that does not imply arbitrariness in any case and that is subject, as discretion itself is, to jurisdictional control; a control which, as jurisprudence and doctrine have invariably recognized, must be exercised according to criteria of rationality and reasonableness (Articles 15 and 16 General Law of Public Administration); flexibility, or discretion, therefore, that can in no case imply arbitrariness.\n\n**XX.-** Public order, morality, and the rights of third parties must be interpreted and applied rigorously, without licenses that allow extending them beyond their specific meaning; a meaning that, in turn, must be seen in harmony with the principle pro libertate, which, together with the principle pro homine, constitutes the core of the human rights doctrine: according to the first, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted expansively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the way that most favors the human being.\n\nIn accordance with this, public order, morality, and the rights of third parties that allow, at least the law, to regulate private actions must be interpreted and applied in such a way that in the first case, it concerns serious threats to public order, understood as the integrity and survival of the fundamental elements of the State; or as\n\n\"the set of principles that, on one hand, pertain to the organization of the State and its functioning, and, on the other, contribute to the protection of the rights of the human being and the interests of the community, in a just equilibrium to make possible peace and the well-being of social coexistence\" (Corte Plena, extraordinary session of August 26, 1982);\n\n XXI.- For its part, morality can only be conceived as the set of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, whose violation gravely offends the generality of the members of that society; and the rights of third parties necessarily must be prioritized, both in themselves and in their concrete dimension, in the sense that regulating and eventually limiting freedom is only justified to protect rights of equal or greater rank, against threats of equal or greater intensity. Thus, the Costa Rican system of liberty leaves outside the reach of the law—read, of State action—an intangible sphere of freedom, which cannot be touched by any authority, because it is the human being, not society, who possesses dignity and consequent fundamental rights and freedoms…\"\n\n VIII.- Up to now, it is clear that the legislator can validly limit freedom rights for reasons of public order, and what is more, is obligated to do so when necessary in its role of social balancer imposed by the ideology proper to a social state of law. It is also clear that the limitations imposed cannot empty the essential content of the right being limited, but only reduce or limit the exercise of that right, and this is precisely the central point of this action. Whether the final paragraph of Article 377, by imposing on the employer the obligation to rehire a worker whose contract has been broken without employer liability on the occasion of a legal strike, under the same conditions that the worker had, is or is not within the constitutionally permitted limits of Article 28. That is, whether the limit or regulation in question imposed on the freedom to contract of the parties is reasonable for the prevalence of a matter of public interest such as the protection of the worker, or, whether it constitutes an illegitimate suppression of it. Returning to the initial point, it is clear that the Costa Rican State, even in a system based on freedom, has a balancing or equalizing function in the face of inequalities and that in this role it is obligated to compensate those inequalities by favoring the disadvantaged party. If it does so due to an imperative social need to safeguard public order and also does so in a reasonable and proportionate manner, it is constitutionally legitimate. Thus we have multiple examples in the constitutional text itself (e.g., the limitations on intimacy in Article 24 of the Constitution) or at the legal level, such as all the norms of positive discrimination in favor of minorities (e.g., Law 7600 in favor of persons with disabilities) or we have at the legal level specific norms that recognize the inequality of the parties, as occurs in the matter under analysis, where labor law starts from the premise that an inequality exists between employer and worker that justifies the constitutional and legal protection of the latter in order to balance the relationship. Thus, the inclusion of labor guarantees that impose minimum conditions in the labor relationship—not subject to the free contract of the parties—and in many cases unwaivable, which become validly accepted impositions, are admitted as legitimate. The minimum wage, vacations, labor benefits, the right to social security, the in dubio pro operario principle, the minimum working age, to mention a few, are all mandatory, reasonable, and legal conditions in a labor relationship, aimed at protecting the weaker party for reasons of public interest. It could then be validly said that the final paragraph of Article 377 follows the same line, and that therefore, the restriction imposed on the freedom to contract is justified and reasonable. The Chamber considers, in light of the foregoing, that in the cases of rehiring a worker who was dismissed due to their involvement in an illegal strike, the legislator sought to mitigate the situation of disadvantage in which they would find themselves before the employer and to prevent the employer from taking advantage of it to hire them under inferior conditions. The intention is meritorious, but the practical application, as the Procuraduría rightly indicates—citing national doctrine—can give rise to various interpretation problems. Since the intention of the norm appears to refer to the immediate rehiring arising after a strike declared illegal, it will be up to the ordinary judge to determine—in each specific case—those situations, evaluating the respect for the rights acquired by the worker, derived from the contract or by the passage of time in accordance with the law. This is in order to prevent the employer from seeking to profit from the worker's situation on the occasion of their dismissal without liability motivated by the declaration of illegality of the strike.\n\n IX.- Now then, the Chamber interprets that the paragraph challenged in this action refers to immediate rehiring and not to another scenario, since if a reasonable period has already elapsed and a new hiring subsequently occurs, this constitutes a new labor relationship with all its consequences, that is, one in which the content of the contract is subject to freedom to contract. The difference between the two scenarios lies in the fact that in the case of immediate rehiring, the doctrine understands that a type of suspension of the labor contract operates, and that by rehiring, the employer has declined its power to declare the contractual bond rescinded. If the employer does not use its right to dismiss the workers and readmits them to its service, it means it approves or excuses an act of the worker, and therefore, what operates is a continuation or extension of the previous contract in all its extent. To distinguish whether we are facing an immediate rehiring or not, one must use as criteria the rules of logic and experience, to evaluate aspects such as the type of activity, the time that, under reasonable circumstances, it would take to carry out the administrative procedures for rehiring, whether it is a rehiring of a single worker or several—as may be the case in the latter scenario for collective conflicts—, among others, an assessment that falls to the judge of the specific case to make. Naturally, in the face of a new contract, with the exception of the labor guarantees established in the Constitution and the Law as a minimum floor of protection for the worker, all other elements of the contract must be governed by the will of the parties, derived from the right of free contract. In this last scenario, the final paragraph of the challenged Article 377 cannot be validly applied, without this signifying a suppression of the essential content of that right. Indeed, under those conditions, when a rehiring exists, the challenged norm is not limited to imposing one or some labor conditions on the parties, but the totality of the labor conditions to be agreed upon, thereby eliminating their right to choose the survival of some or some of the contract's conditions.\n\n X-. Freedom to contract, as constitutional jurisprudence has well pointed out (judgment 3495-92), includes at least:\n\na) The Freedom to choose the co-contracting party;\n\nb) The freedom in the choice of the very object of the contract and, therefore, of the principal provision that specifies it;\n\nc) The freedom in the determination of the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as counter-performance;\n\nd) The equilibrium of the positions of both parties and between their mutual performances; an equilibrium that demands, in turn, respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, according to which the position of the parties and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to each other, and furthermore, proportionate to the nature, object, and purposes of the contract, and, while that freedom is not unrestricted and the legislator can impose valid limitations, as it has done with labor guarantees because the matter is of public order (Article 14 of the Labor Code), it is not valid, for being disproportionate, for it to suppress the essential content—that is, total—of the right to contract for both the worker and the employer, imposing upon them a determined total content—in cases of non-immediate rehirings as explained supra—, because our constitutional framework imposes precisely on the legislator, as a limitation in the exercise of its powers, respect for the essential content of the right in question. Precisely in judgment 2771-03, the Chamber even recognizes that not even the derived constituent legislator can legitimately suppress the essential content of a fundamental right, in such a way that the ordinary legislator could do so even less. The Spanish Constitutional Court has defined the essential content of the right as \"that part of the content of a right without which it loses its peculiarity, or, in other words, what makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a determined type. It is also that part of the content that is inescapably necessary for the right to allow its holder the satisfaction of those interests for whose attainment the right is granted… the essential content is exceeded or disregarded when the right is subjected to situations that make it impracticable or hinder it beyond what is reasonable or strip it of the necessary protection\" (Voto 8/4/81). In summary, it is a matter of recognizing a core in the content of fundamental rights, of safeguarding a minimum content, even against constitutionally relevant rights or goods. Thus, for example, the exercise of business freedom cannot be conceived without the possibility of obtaining reasonable profit; neither is it possible, as indicated, to conceive of freedom to contract without any possibility of determining the object of the contract (judgment 3495-92). Related to this right, in the indicated scenario, business freedom would be affected, insofar as freedom to contract is a vehicle through which part of business activity is exercised, which includes not only the possibility of contracting as a mechanism to obtain reasonable profit in the exchange of goods and services, but also the freedom to organize the company itself.\n\n XI.- The Chamber does not consider that good faith is violated, because one cannot say with certainty what the will is with which the contract is entered into, since many times both the worker and the employer are left in a difficult situation after a prolonged period of strike.\n\n XII.- In conclusion, the final paragraph of Article 377 of the Labor Code that states: \"However, in the new contracts that the employer enters into, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, governed before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated,\" is not unconstitutional insofar as it is applied in the sense indicated in recitals VIII, IX, and X of this judgment, namely that in the contracts entered into by the employer, to carry out an immediate hiring, after the dismissal of a worker as a consequence of an illegal strike, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, governed before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated. (…). (The underlining does not correspond to the original).\n\nThus, based on the considerations of the aforementioned vote, this Chamber considers that, insofar as Article 74 establishes specific causes for the temporary suspension of the labor contract, without liability for the employer or for the workers, these are exceptions to the principle of continuity of the labor contract regulated in the legislation, in order to avoid affecting the provision of the service and the consequent salary remuneration beyond what is necessary, with the primary goal of guaranteeing the special protection of the working party constitutionally enshrined. Likewise, the mandatory nature of requesting authorization before the Inspección General de Trabajo, under penalty of sanction, in accordance with Articles 75 and 7, subsection c), of the challenged Law 9832, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, but rather, on the contrary, it is a measure that is consistent with the principles of social justice and in dubio pro operario, which constitutes a legitimate, necessary, suitable, and proportionate limitation to freedom to contract, in order to verify the adequate application of that labor figure and guarantee the protection of labor rights.\n\nRegarding Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 42248-MTSS, it is noted that the plaintiff alleged its unconstitutionality without specifying the norms of said regulation that it considers unconstitutional, since as understood from its argument, its disagreement is in general with the requirement of authorization of the suspension by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, whose application procedure that regulation develops. In that understanding, based on the considerations set forth, given that in this Chamber's opinion the requirement to process the request for authorization before the labor inspection does not constitute an injury to freedom to contract, the appropriate course is to reject this action on the merits regarding this aspect.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Ley n.° 9832, according to which failure to follow the authorization procedure before the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social constitutes a sanctionable offense, it is also not a measure contrary to freedom to contract or discriminatory, as alleged by the plaintiff, who complains about the fact that only the employer is sanctioned for that omission, even though the working party voluntarily participates in the agreement to suspend their labor relationship. However, it is evident that this apparent inequality of treatment is due to the conditions of power in which the employer finds itself with respect to the working party, whose protection is imposed because it is the weaker party in the labor relationship. This Chamber has so recognized, stating that \"(…) since the introduction of the chapter on social guarantees in the Constitution of eighteen seventy-one—and its subsequent consolidation in the constituent assembly of nineteen forty-nine—, together with the promulgation of the Labor Code in nineteen forty and the organization of the labor jurisdiction, the special protection of the worker has always been kept in mind, considered as the economically weaker party of the labor relationship and hence the insertion of important principles, such as 'pro operario', which consists in the application by the judge of the most favorable sense of the norm to the worker, as well as the principle of unwaivability of social rights, developed in Article 74 of the Constitution\" (voto n.° 4448-96 of 09:00 hours on August 30, 1996).\n\nFor the above reasons, this action must also be dismissed on the merits with respect to this aspect.\n\n**VI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ARTICLE 121, SECTION 7, OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** As indicated in the third whereas clause of this judgment, the petitioner considers that the rules challenged here are contrary to Articles 25 and 121, section 7), of the Political Constitution, in the petitioner's words:\n\n*\"(...) 2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as association, at least temporarily, is imposed as a requirement and the sole means to agree on a reduction of working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and penalized.*\n\n*3. Article 121, section 7 which provides that public freedoms (including the freedom to contract individually) only can be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner.\"*\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, regarding the aforementioned allegations, this action lacks sufficient grounding. In this regard, this Court has repeatedly indicated that, for the infringement to be considered established and to be able to declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever brings an unconstitutionality action bears the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the Law of the Constitution and, furthermore, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is referred to by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, that \"*a rule that facially* (sic) *is contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that there is in fact no conflict between that rule and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs if an action is brought against a rule that upon first examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the petitioner who must advance arguments that convince regarding the unconstitutionality*\" (see judgment no. 0184-95 of 4:30 p.m. on January 10, 1995). In a later judgment, this Chamber stated, regarding the lack of exposition of unconstitutionality arguments in matters of unconstitutionality actions, the following:\n\n*\"The unconstitutionality action is filed with the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures, and infringes upon the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments signed with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the petitioners, it is confirmed what the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic indicates, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree considered unconstitutional, but rather it is limited to establishing generic and abstract discrepancies against the entirety of the Regulation, moreover against all activity carried out by Sugar Mills and Estates, since they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of the surrounding inhabitants, without specifying which constitutionality arguments should be taken into account against each of the provisions or groups of rules of the challenged Regulation. [...] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the obligation to authenticate the briefs filing unconstitutionality actions, since it is deemed necessary that there exist arguments put forth by a legal professional, which this Court does not rule out corresponds to a serious study of the technical and scientific background of a given matter, given the diversity and universality of the rules of the legal system. Unlike guarantee proceedings, that is, habeas corpus and amparo remedies, which can be filed directly by any interested party before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that harm their particular sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the unconstitutionality action), the legislator entrusted the authenticating attorney with a task whose demand is even greater, if one wishes, more elaborate and exhaustive, which must be reflected in the filing brief by reason of their professional office, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional rule by a rule of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal elaboration of the Law, as well as of other secondary provisions, involves an extremely costly process for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways for or against its elaboration, and whose formation, approval, and promulgation procedures should not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest absences of the legal professionals who authenticate the briefs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without jeopardizing the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the unconstitutionality actions.\"* (Judgment no. 2012-05285 of 3:03 p.m. on April 25, 2012).\n\nThe cited Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, in that sense, that the brief filing the action sets forth \"*its grounds in a clear and precise manner*\". In judgment no. 2013-016944 of 2:30 p.m. on December 18, 2013, this Chamber made express reference to the requirement of due grounding of the filing brief –as an essential admissibility requirement of the action, pursuant to the provisions of the mentioned article– in the following terms:\n\n\"**II.- INADMISSIBILITY FOR LACK OF GROUNDING.** *Pursuant to Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the brief filing the unconstitutionality action shall set forth the grounds in a clear and precise manner, with a concrete citation of the rules or principles considered infringed. Said requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but rather an essential admissibility requirement, since by virtue of the pro sententia principle –developed on other occasions by this Chamber– according to which, admissibility requirements must be interpreted in a sense favorable to the action, furthermore, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and in guarantee of its supremacy and validity there is a public interest by virtue of which obstacles to the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural rules must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the issuance of the judgment is obtained; the foregoing, not only facilitates the administration of justice, but also avoids the imposition of obstacles to not achieving it (see in the same sense, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of grounding of the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned judgment that is congruent with what is sought. Likewise, it is improper for this Chamber to rule on the merits of rules questioned in an action, when the party filing the action does not ground the reasons for which they challenge, since that would imply carrying out an abstract constitutional review as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a process of this nature.*\"\n\nFinally, more recently, in vote no. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020, this Court reiterated that:\n\n\"*(...)* *given the formalism legally provided for in constitutional review processes, the argumentative burden in the processing of an unconstitutionality action falls on the petitioner, who must explain, without ambiguity, the existing contradiction between a sub-constitutional regulation and the constitutionality block, as well as the standing that assists them*\".\n\nIn the specific case, the petitioner challenges Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, 7, section c, and 9 of Law No. 9832 and, in general, Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, considering them contrary to the freedom of association and Article 121, section 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nHowever, this Chamber observes that, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of freedom of association, throughout the filing brief, the petitioner only refers to it being harmed in its negative sense, since, as interpreted by the petitioner, to achieve the suspension of the employment contract this is only permitted collectively and not individually between the employer and the worker, in this sense he alleges that *\"In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the Ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate, at least temporarily, or to be represented in groups to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and wages.\"* However, this Chamber observes that the petitioner does not indicate which of the challenged rules establishes, expressly or tacitly, such a limitation, nor does he develop the content of the freedom of association, in order to relate it or contrast it with what is established in the rules he intends to challenge, which prevents this Chamber from ruling on the merits of this aspect and issuing a judgment congruent with what is sought.\n\nSimilarly, the petitioner alleges that Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the pandemic, contains restrictions on the freedom to contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be understood as valid if they had been enacted in accordance with the provisions of Article 121, section 7) of the Political Constitution. This constitutional article establishes that it shall be the exclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly *\"(...) 7) To suspend, by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total membership, in case of evident public necessity, the individual rights and guarantees enshrined in Articles 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 37 of this Constitution. This suspension may be of all or some rights and guarantees, for the whole or part of the territory, and for up to thirty days; during it and regarding the persons, the Executive Branch may only order their detention in establishments not intended for common criminals or decree their confinement in inhabited places. It shall also report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the measures taken to preserve public order or maintain State security. In no case may individual rights or guarantees not enshrined in this section be suspended; (...)”*. In this regard, the truth is that the petitioner does not explain how the rules challenged here constitute a suspension of constitutional rights and guarantees under the terms provided in the aforementioned constitutional article. The petitioner limits himself to reiterating that Law No. 9832 limits the rights to freedom of contract and freedom of association, but he only challenged Articles 7, section c), and 9 of said Law –the latter of which was not duly invoked in the base matter, as indicated in whereas clause III–, insofar as they provide as an offense subject to sanction \"[n]*ot requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security\"* and the restitution of rights to the worker, which evidently does not constitute a suspension of fundamental freedoms.\n\nBased on the foregoing, it cannot be considered that this action is duly grounded, regarding the alleged violation of the freedom of association and Article 121, section 7), constitutional, as required by Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Now then, although the petitioner could be warned to remedy the compliance with this requirement, in the *sub judice* case, said procedure is considered futile, not only because it would entail rewriting the action, but also because Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to summarily reject any motion \"*manifestly improper or unfounded*\", as occurs in this matter.\n\n**VII.- CONCLUSION.** As a corollary to the foregoing, it is proper to dismiss this action on the merits regarding the alleged violation of the freedom to contract. As for the rest, its summary rejection is ordered. Magistrate Rueda Leal and Magistrate Garro Vargas dissent and order that the prevention of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction be made.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe action is dismissed on the merits regarding the alleged violation of the freedom to contract. As for the rest, it is summarily rejected.\n\nMagistrate Rueda Leal and Magistrate Garro Vargas partially dissent from the vote and order that the prevention set forth in Article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional be made, regarding the alleged infringement of freedom of association and the presumed violation of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nCO01/23\n\nFREEDOM OF CONTRACT. “…This Chamber has repeatedly stated that freedom of contract is not unlimited, but is subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, its purpose is to protect the worker (in this regard, see votes no. 2013-12014 of 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013, and no. 2017-016272 of 11:30 a.m. on October 11, 2017, among others). For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or the worker, in Article 74 of the Labor Code (without omitting to mention the existence of other individual suspension grounds provided for in Articles 78 and 79, the legal strike in Article 371 and the legal lockout in Article 387, all of the Labor Code, as well as other cases of provisional suspension for disciplinary procedures provided for in legislation) and the requirement for authorization from the General Labor Inspectorate, in accordance with Article 75 of the same regulatory body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, in safeguard of the principles of social justice and worker protection – contained in the Political Constitution – whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the use of the figure of suspension of the employment relationship to evade compliance with employer obligations; for example, to conceal a dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the worker, who would see their income annulled without payment of their corresponding rights and benefits…”\n\nCO01/23\n\nARTICLE 75 OF THE LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL. “…Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental procedure – as in this case – the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts – including habeas corpus or amparo – or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route, in which this unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered to be injured. These requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since mere compliance with them is not enough, but it is also required that the challenged norm through this means has a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that what is decided in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right or interest within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the claimants must prove and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter…” CO01/23\n\nVIII.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL AND MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS, drafted by the latter.\n\nWe dissent from the majority criterion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, considering that the decision to dismiss certain aspects of this action of unconstitutionality is premature. It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a proceeding “established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution over norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for this very reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge,” as has been stated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. Thus it is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which states:\n\n“Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements have been omitted and shall order compliance within three days (…)”.\n\nIn this matter, it is proposed to dismiss the action outright in some aspects – regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and the presumed infringement of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution. However, the majority judgment considers that the claimant does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does it develop the content of freedom of association, in order to relate it or contrast it with what is established in the norms it seeks to challenge. From our perspective, in relation to these grievances, the prevention ordering the claimant to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable. Likewise, it should be noted that the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79, as well as that of Article 80 itself, of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad for the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.\n\nCO01/23\n\nVIII.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL AND MAGISTRATE GARRO VARGAS, drafted by the latter.\n\nWe dissent from the majority criterion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, considering that the decision to dismiss certain aspects of this action of unconstitutionality is premature. It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a proceeding “established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution over norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for this very reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge,” as has been stated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. Thus it is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which states:\n\n“Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements have been omitted and shall order compliance within three days (…)”.\n\nIn this matter, it is proposed to dismiss the action outright in some aspects – regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and the presumed infringement of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution. However, the majority judgment considers that the claimant does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does it develop the content of freedom of association, in order to relate it or contrast it with what is established in the norms it seeks to challenge. From our perspective, in relation to these grievances, the prevention ordering the claimant to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable. Likewise, it should be noted that the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79, as well as that of Article 80 itself, of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad for the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.\n\nCO01/23\n\nSan José, at nine-thirty in the morning on the twenty-first of December, two thousand twenty-two.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality brought by LUIS ÁNGEL SÁNCHEZ MONTERO, of legal age, attorney, identity card no. 108660710, resident of Escazú, professional license no. 8290, in his capacity as special judicial representative of [Name 001], legal identification no. [Value 001], and [Name 002]., legal identification no. [Value 002], against **articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of the Law “Reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional” no. 9832, published in supplement no. 56 to La Gaceta no. 58 of March 23, 2020; articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo no. 2 of August 27, 1943; and Decreto Ejecutivo no. 42248-MTSS, entitled “Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo”, published in supplement no. 53 to La Gaceta no. 55 of March 20, 2020**.\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 10:55 a.m. on November 4, 2022, the plaintiff files an action of unconstitutionality against the following norms: **1)** Law “Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional”, Decreto Legislativo no. 9832, published in Supplement no. 56 to La Gaceta no. 58 of March 23, 2020, specifically its articles 7, subsection c) and 9. **2)** Additionally, against articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, which is law number 2 of August 27, 1943, insofar as it is understood that (i) said articles were indirectly modified by Law no. 9832 and, regardless of this law, (ii) they exclude the possibility of an individual and direct pact or agreement, between employer and worker, to suspend an employment relationship, as article 75 states that the suspension must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor. Stated differently, a prohibition is derived from these articles against an employer and a worker agreeing, by themselves, to a suspension of an employment relationship, with full legal effects, in the same way that the parties can indeed initiate or terminate an employment relationship, by mere agreement, without the approval of the Ministry of Labor. The foregoing is derived from said regulations in that any agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship can only occur based on the grounds of article 74, which do not include the will of both parties and which, according to article 75, must also be authorized by the Ministry of Labor (always). Furthermore, by the addition of Law no. 9832, the authorization procedure by the Ministry of Labor is unavoidably included for a partial suspension of the employment relationship in the form of a reduction in working hours. Moreover, its constitutionality is questioned since that authorization procedure includes only the possibility of agreeing collectively, and not individually between an employer and a worker, and a penalty is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure (agreements for the suspension of employment contracts collectively and with the authorization of the Ministry of Labor). **3)** No. 42248-MTSS, Reglamento para el procedimiento de suspensión temporal de contratos de trabajo en casos relacionados con los incisos a) y b) del artículo 74 del Código de Trabajo of March 20, 2020, published in La Gaceta no. 55, supplement no. 53 of March 20, 2020, which confirms the foregoing, that is, that a requirement for the validity of a bilateral agreement to suspend an employment relationship is the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, based on the fact that the possibility of such an agreement occurring validly without the Ministry's intervention is not included, in the same manner as derived from article 75 of the Código de Trabajo. As a summary of his argument, he indicates that, with the enactment of Law no. 9832, Autorización de reducción de jornadas de trabajo ante la declaratoria de emergencia nacional, the possibility of reducing the working hours and salary of workers was regulated within the context of the pandemic and the declaration of emergency due to the pandemic caused by Covid-19. It is clear that the “reduction of working hours” regulated by this Law no. 9832 is a type of “suspension” of employment contracts, but with reduced effects (partial suspension of a contract). The figure of the reduction of working hours and the law that regulated it were linked and intended to complement the regulations of articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo, which generally regulate the suspension of employment relationships for justified cause. Thus, the limitations introduced by said law complemented and are part of the figure of the suspension of employment relationships, together with articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo. The Ministry of Labor issued various regulations (such as the Decreto also challenged as unconstitutional, no. 42248-MTSS), as well as complementary legal criteria stating that any agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor to be valid. All of this derives from articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo and from Law no. 9832. Additionally, it seeks to impose sanctions on employers for the mere act of agreeing to suspensions individually with their workers. There are also appellate rulings that exclude the suspension of the employment relationship, in all its forms, from the exclusive scope of private will. Therefore, it is asserted that all of the following is a product of this legal-rank regulation (articles 74 and 75 of the Código de Trabajo plus Law no. 9832): **1)** An employer and a worker can freely and self-sufficiently agree, without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor, to the beginning and termination of an employment relationship, but they cannot agree, in the same manner, to a suspension of the employment relationship nor its subtype, the temporary reduction of working hours. To achieve a suspension with full effects, they are required to follow an authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor as a requirement for validity, where it turns out that, if they wish to negotiate, the parties can only do so in collectives, not individually, or between an employer and a worker. That is, if an agreement for suspension agreed upon between a worker and an employer were submitted for authorization, it would be rejected solely because it was agreed upon between a worker and their employer. **2)** The suspensions of the employment relationship and their subtype (reductions of working hours) always require the participation and final approval of the MTSS, as an element of validity, even if both parties agree to apply the measure and within the pandemic situation, in which there is little to verify regarding the justification of the measure. Even with an agreement between both, an approval from the ministry is always imposed as an element of validity, which eliminates the possibility for them to agree to any type of suspension of the employment relationship, or change in working conditions, such as the reduction of working hours within the pandemic, solely between a worker and their employer. It is clear that the scope of the autonomy of will was understood as limited by excluding these contracts, by way of the norms challenged as unconstitutional. **3)** In any case, if a worker and an employer, individually, seek the ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied to them, because individual agreements are prevented from being made. They are not approved unless they are agreements reached collectively. The parties cannot bring their agreement for approval, but rather must produce it within the procedure, in which all workers must be included. **4)** It is understood as prohibited, illegal, and sanctions are also established, for agreeing to reductions in working hours individually, that is, between an employer and a worker, without the authorization procedure, which, as stated, is not viable for individual contracts. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation for this type of situation, that is, for the adaptation of the employment contract to supervening conditions through a temporary suspension of its original effects. Thus, the freedom only of these individual work suspension contracts is restricted, which entails the limitation of the freedoms of contracting plus the freedom of association, the latter in a negative sense. **5)** If the parties to the employment relationship signed a suspension contract outside the control of the Ministry of Labor, with or without cause, they violated the law and the employer receives a sanction for violating labor laws. It is added that agreeing to suspension agreements individually and without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor is a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and punishable by the Ministry. The sanction applies only to the employer, even when the worker also participated with their will and regardless of whether the agreement is justified, reasonable, and proportional. **6)** The nullity of the agreement is asserted, per se, even on the basis of form alone. Any consideration of substance, balance, or reasonableness is irrelevant. This triggers the employer's obligation to compensate the worker, even without services rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was in good faith, with valid justification such as a contracting economy due to a pandemic, and even with the worker's agreement, for the benefit of both parties. The effect of automatic nullity is charged solely to the employer, plus a sanctioning procedure, as a consequence of the good-faith exercise of a fundamental right that could ultimately lead to the same effects sought by the legislation giving basis to the restrictions. **7)** A judge cannot even analyze whether the agreement was reasonable or justified in accordance with the purposes of the laws and the Constitution, because the mere absence of the ministry's approval triggers its nullity. Judicial control of reasonableness and proportionality is left out in favor of the unreasonable preponderance of form, even though the same end provided for by law can be reached directly by bilateral agreement of the parties. Within the context of the pandemic, the Ministry of Labor has added no value to the suspension agreement reached between the parties, for which reason the regulation becomes unreasonable and disproportionate. There is no relationship between cost and benefit / reason and proportion, but, even with all of this, the judge cannot rule on whether the agreement achieved the same proposed ends without harming any other right. In fact, it will be seen in the cases serving as background and currently being adjudicated, that it is not questioned that the suspensions were indeed justified and that there was the will of the parties to agree to the measure. **8)** The Ministry of Labor has maintained that, when placed in the position of granting or not granting authorization, it lacks competence to delve into the content of the suspension or reduction of working hours agreements, with the control established by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security being merely formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed. Therefore, the sole objective of the regulation becomes repressing individual contracting, in order to channel those suspensions or reductions of working hours through collective negotiation by workers, giving the ministry a power of control and repression that is not characteristic of a system based on freedom. In the opposite sense, the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict individual freedom of contracting in the private sector, for that type of agreement (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the system in the hands of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. But there is neither reason nor proportion. Stated another way, the sole purpose of restricting the will of the parties and of sanctioning is failing to follow the collective path for negotiation before the ministry, as established in article 7, subsection c) of Law no. 9832. Not only is individual negotiation limited in said area, but a crude mechanism of repression is added, making it a sanctionable activity inappropriate for a system based on freedom. Particularly regarding this point, Law no. 9832, in its article 7, subsection c), establishes as a punishable act *“not requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Inspección de Trabajo of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social”*. Then, article 9 provides *“Additionally to the fines established in article 7, the employing person who incurs any of the faults established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the working persons to the enjoyment of all the rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences. The right of the working person to resort to the respective jurisdictional venue is preserved, for the collection of the damages caused”*. This implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction but that of paying labor rights and compensation for exercising two fundamental rights in good faith (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association). **9)** Law no. 9832, which is enacted within the context of the pandemic and is what introduces and reinforces these prohibitions, plus the sanctioning procedure for agreeing to a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship individually and without the formal authorization of the Ministry of Labor, contains restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be understood as valid if they had been enacted within the context of article 121, subsection 7) of the Constitución Política, but, even so, they would be unconstitutional, not only due to the legislative procedure used, which was that of an ordinary law, without a declaration of calamity or minimal justification for the need to affect the freedom of labor contracting, but also because it was enacted with an indefinite character, without a time limitation (it is currently in force) and to be incorporated indefinitely into the legal system for a special type of contract. Again, we also have the lack of reason and proportion by exclusively suspending the freedoms of individual contracting of employers and workers, in their individual character and in the private sphere, and imposing collective negotiations, only for suspensions, creating an exceptional regime with respect to the system of autonomy of will that remains in force for the beginning and termination of employment relationships, which requires neither intervention nor authorization from the Ministry of Labor. In summary, according to the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, he deems it clear that freedom of contract plus freedom of association have always permitted and should still permit today that an employer and a worker, by themselves, can agree on the beginning of an employment relationship, its subsequent modification (with a suspension), or even the termination of an employment contract, with no limits other than those imposed by the laws and the Constitución Política, which only refer to the respect for certain well-identified minimums (salary, working hours, vacations, Christmas bonus, etc.). But, if these limits are established, they must be clear, reasonable, and proportional, which is not currently met by the indicated regulations, which represent an obstacle to the exercise of these fundamental rights. Historically and within the framework of the Constitución Política, employers and workers have been free to validly agree to suspensions of employment contracts in the most varied forms. They have not been required to have the approval of the Ministry of Labor for those pacts to be valid and effective, nor have they been compelled to join together as worker collectives to access these types of agreements. There is no doubt that an employer and a worker can indeed begin the employment relationship and terminate it by mutual agreement, without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. But, without reason or proportion, it turns out that the same parties now do not have the possibility of agreeing to an intermediate agreement between inception and termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined time, in the face of a justified cause like the pandemic. A pact such as this has been understood as removed from the scope of their will, without the restriction being subject to a time limit, without greater reason, and against several fundamental rights. Taken to its absurd conclusion, if that suspension agreement is replaced by another with more severe effects, that is, the termination of the relationship and rehiring with other conditions, or definitive termination without rehiring, then it would indeed have been legal and would not require the procedure before the Ministry of Labor, nor would the conduct be subject to a sanction, but, because it was merely a suspension, it turns out that it would not be valid… Thus, here, he who could terminate a relationship by mutual agreement cannot suspend it by mutual agreement without the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. To aggravate this situation and take it to the extreme, it turns out that these types of conduct (a suspension agreement between an employer and a worker) are so repressed that they imply the possibility of receiving sanctions for infractions of labor and social security laws. But the sanctions are for the employer, regardless of the good faith of both parties, which is also a sign of discriminatory repression. And all the foregoing regardless of whether that contract was agreed upon in good faith, to more quickly achieve the same ends pursued by the same laws (preserving employment, social peace, solidarity within indisputable force majeure situations, and the balance of the parties' positions within an employment relationship). Therefore, the regulation reached the point of sanctioning the exercise of freedom of contract and freedom of association. This regime does not stop at invalidity, but rather escalated to the repressive activity against the exercise of public freedoms. This position is recent and implies a change. In the exercise of their fundamental rights, historically employers and workers have validly agreed, by themselves and between themselves, to suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms, for example: leave without pay for days, months, or years; sabbaticals and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships that have been agreed upon and executed without even informative notice to the Ministry of Labor. They have also agreed to consensual modifications of contracts in the most varied forms and, for this, it is not required to agree collectively or to have the approval, or even the deposit or notification, of those agreements with the Ministry of Labor. The thesis is limited or contextualized to the pandemic and to the validity of Law no. 9832 and the regulation no. 42248-MTSS. It was from the pandemic onwards that this position arose, driven by the Ministry of Labor, which is known to have designed the bill that ended up becoming Law no. 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and salary, which is nothing more than another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. It is this latter law that very clearly contains the regime of repression and sanction, plus the nullity of these pacts and the obligation to pay salary for time not worked plus adjustments to other related rights. Starting from this law, the same effects and the same restrictions were escalated to the suspension of the employment relationship, being general today for any type of suspension. Currently, only employers are suffering the effects of this legislation, as will be seen below, through bad-faith lawsuits from workers who constructed these agreements together with the employers, without denying their will or the suitability of said pacts, executed them in good faith, but, now, wish to take advantage of a situation of apparent advantage that allows them to attempt an abuse of right through the mere questioning of the transaction based on its form. But, also, employers find themselves being pursued by the Ministry of Labor, enforcing the regime of repression and punishment, solely for having entered into a contract for the suspension of an employment relationship with an unquestionable cause, for having executed it according to what was agreed, for having fulfilled it, but without a merely formal authorization. Based on the text of the challenged laws, the judges of the Republic endorse this position, classifying the pacts as illegal, and that is why he comes to the Chamber in protection of the rights of his represented parties. For the foregoing reasons, he considers that this action of unconstitutionality is the last resort and is necessary to achieve the protection of constitutionally based rights and finally achieve what article 41 of the Constitución Política offers. Through this action of unconstitutionality, he requests that the regulation that represses activity which is ultimately the reasonable and good-faith exercise of fundamental rights be annulled, or at least, interpreted in a constitutional manner. Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff indicates the **norms and principles that he considers violated**, namely: **1) Articles 24 and 28 of the Constitución Política, which guarantee freedom of contract**, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree to a suspension of an employment contract, whether totally or in any of its subtypes, such as the reduction of working hours, is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, additionally, because the individual pact that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportional, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract, which resulted in a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation challenged as unconstitutional, is suppressed and sanctioned. **2) Article 25 of the Constitución Política, which guarantees freedom of association**, insofar as association, at least temporarily, is imposed as a requirement and the sole means to agree to a reduction in working hours, while an individual or bilateral pact is prevented and sanctioned.\n\n3) Article 121, subsection 7), which provides that public freedoms (including the freedom to contract individually) may only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportionate manner. Regarding the freedom of labor contracting, the petitioner states that the system of freedom included in our Political Constitution, specifically the freedom to contract, requires that limits to this freedom be specifically given in a very clear manner (what is not prohibited is permitted). The Labor Code is an example of this; it contains these limits and uses specific and clear linguistic constructions, indicating the restrictions or delimiting the area where the parties may freely agree (free agreement between parties above the minimum wage, below the maximum working day, above the minimum vacation, etc.). In this way, what is not expressly limited in the laws is, then, legally viable to be freely agreed upon by the parties to an employment relationship. The same applies to the formalities of a contract: as the unavoidable need for authorization of a contract with the consequence of its invalidity is not established, it is understood that the agreement is perfect and valid from its inception and without further formality (see Articles 24 and 25 of the Labor Code, which do not include anything about Ministry approvals). Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, which regulate the suspension of the employment relationship, do NOT contain a limitation on a bilateral agreement to suspend an employment relationship. The wording of said articles, within the framework of the Constitution, does not allow for such a conclusion. That is why they are not directly questioned, but rather in a subsidiary manner, based on the reform introduced by Law No. 9832 and regulation No. 42248-MTSS. Before the entry into force of this law, the Labor Code regulated in Articles 74 and 75 only the figure of suspension imposed by the employer, without the will of the worker, so recourse was made to the ministry only to substitute that will (if it did not exist) and impose a suspension on those workers. By not referring to the bilateral suspension agreed upon by agreement, it did not repress it, but, on the contrary, left it open to agreement or mutual consent without subsequent approval, just as employment relationships begin and end when there is agreement. That is, the parties to an employment relationship may, by mutual agreement, begin, terminate, and suspend an employment relationship or change its conditions. This is under the principle of interpretation that: whoever can do the more, can do the less. Also, under the aforementioned principle that what is not prohibited is legally possible and valid. For this reason, historically, all types of suspension agreements between parties have occurred without any questioning, such as the case of unpaid leave or sabbaticals, which are suspensions agreed upon daily bilaterally and without the need for intervention or approval from third parties. This derives only from Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, but within the framework of the Political Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber. What is regulated there, then, is the hypothesis that the will of the workers to suspend an employment relationship does not exist, because, if it does, there is no need to go for ministry approval to suspend a contract, as that suspension can be agreed upon directly between the parties to the employment relationship. That said, it can reasonably be affirmed that Law No. 9832, enacted specifically within the context of the pandemic, which regulates a type of suspension (partial suspension in the reduction of working hours), modified the legal regime applicable to these contracts, impacting what is regulated in Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code and deriving down to Decree No. 42248-MTSS. In this way, Law 9832 contains the following articles, cited below, which do establish restrictions on the freedom to contract and penalties for the common exercise of this contractual freedom, causing a drastic change in the legal system: \"ARTICLE 7- Infractions and penalties. Employers who incur any of the following infractions shall be penalized based on the penalty table established in Article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, taking into account the severity of the act, its consequences, the number of infractions committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the infraction: c) Failure to request authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security\". \"ARTICLE 9. Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in Article 7, the employer who incurs any of the infractions established in that article shall have the obligation to restore the workers to the enjoyment of all improperly affected rights, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences\". As this law is a clear complement to Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code and a type or species of contract suspension, we understand that it can reasonably be interpreted that the legislator did want to limit the scope of private contracting will in the manner set forth, that is, giving the following effects to the legal system of labor contracting for suspensions of employment contracts, with the result that, from the effective date of this new law, the following occurs in the system of suspensions of employment contracts included in Law No. 9832, but it also influenced the interpretation of Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code. In any case, the result today of the integration of these articles, which is reached and challenged as unconstitutional, is the following: 1. An employer and a worker could and can freely agree on the beginning and even the termination of an employment relationship through a contract without intervention from the Ministry of Labor, but no longer a suspension of the employment relationship or its subtype (the temporary reduction of working hours), without following the authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor, which, in turn, obligates recourse to collective bargaining. 2. Suspensions of the employment relationship and reductions of working hours require something more: the participation and final approval of the MTSS as elements of validity, even within a pandemic situation, in which there was little to verify about the justification of the measure and even when the employees themselves are aware of and in agreement with the measures and remedies, and it may even result that they benefit from the individual agreement proposed to them. 3. In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the Ministry's approval of an individual agreement, they are denied, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented from being made. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate, at least temporarily, or be represented in collectives to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and wages. 4. It is prohibited, it is illegal, and furthermore punishable to agree on suspensions and reductions of working hours individually, that is, between an employer and a worker. This cannot be understood as anything other than a prohibition on individual labor negotiation. 5. But, additionally, it was added that said agreement represents a violation of labor legislation that is prosecutable and punishable for the employer, even when the worker also participated with their will and was part of the agreement. That is, the meeting of wills is bilateral, but the penalty is directed at one of the parties. 6. It is understood that the nullity of the agreement is produced, per se and solely due to the form. This triggers the employer's obligation to compensate the worker, paying their salary and other rights, even without services having been rendered by the worker and regardless of whether the agreement was in good faith, with a valid justification such as a contracting economy due to a pandemic and even with the agreement of the workers. The entire effect of an automatic nullity is borne solely by the employer, plus a sanctioning procedure that does not include the worker, even though they concurred with their will. It also follows that a judge cannot even analyze whether the agreement was reasonable or justified or whether it achieved the purposes proposed in the statement of motives of Law No. 9832, because the mere absence of the procedure triggered its nullity, the readjustment obligation, and the penalty. It is the form imposed by the form itself. 7. The Ministry of Labor reviews an agreement of this type, but only to confirm formal requirements, because it has maintained that it lacks competence to delve into the content, as the control established by the MTSS is only to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed, because the cause is more than justified given that it is a pandemic. Therefore, the only palpable objective of the regulation is to repress individual contracting, to channel those reductions of working hours, which are suspensions, through the path of mandatory authorization, plus negotiation in worker collectives. Conversely, it follows that the scope of the legislation is merely to restrict individual freedom to contract in the private sector for that type of agreement (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. In the same way, the sole purpose of sanctioning is the failure to follow the collective path for negotiation and not opting for authorization, even if no damages or imbalances in the purposes or effects of the agreements are verified. Not only is individual negotiation limited in the said area but it is repressed, becoming a punishable activity. With all its participation, the Ministry of Labor adds no value to this type of legal transaction, meaning the regulation clearly falls into being unreasonable and disproportionate. But, even more, it becomes a repressive activity of public freedoms, which makes the regulation especially contrary to the Constitution. He adds that the restrictions on freedom to contract and freedom of association from Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the pandemic and is what introduced and reinforces these restrictions, are of such magnitude that they could only be understood as constitutionally valid if they had been enacted as a suspension of public guarantees and fundamental rights within the context of Article 121, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, but even so, it is unconstitutional, not only because of the legislative procedure used, but because it was enacted with an indefinite character, without respecting the 30-day period (it is still in force today), but also due to the lack of reason and proportion in exclusively suspending the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual character and in the private sphere, without justification of the public need for that extraordinary restriction focused on a single type of business (it left out the termination and indefinite modifications of conditions). Nor is there any reason or proportion in limiting only the suspensions of employment relationships but leaving open the possibility of dismissals with responsibility, terminations by mutual agreement, and other types of changes in employment conditions. As a petition, he indicates that his proposal and request for the Constitutional Chamber is to serve to order: 1) Confirming that an agreement between an employer and worker to suspend the employment relationship in the face of a situation that merits it according to the law and without the subsequent need for approval from the Ministry of Labor is in conformity with the constitution, the Constitutional Chamber must declare unconstitutional Articles 7, subsection c, plus Article 9 of the Law \"Authorization for the reduction of working hours following the declaration of national emergency,\" Legislative Decree No. 9832, published in Supplement No. 56 to La Gaceta No. 58, of March 23, 2020. By declaring this unconstitutionality, it would constitutionally interpret that Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code include the individual, direct, and self-sufficient agreement of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism for this purpose. Particularly, it would interpret that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is on the understanding that there is no agreement between the parties to suspend the employment relationship. 2) Alternatively, it can be done in the reverse order: constitutionally interpreting Articles 74 and 75 to include the individual, direct, and self-sufficient agreement of the parties as a valid contracting mechanism to agree on suspensions of employment relationships, interpreting that the referral to the authorization of the Ministry of Labor in said articles is on the understanding that there is no agreement between the parties to suspend the employment relationship, plus declaring the unconstitutionality of Articles 7, subsection c, and Article 9 of Law No. 9832 by establishing the authorization procedure and in collectives as the only mechanism to obtain the suspension of an employment relationship and penalties for those who do not follow this sole procedure. 3) Also alternatively, it must constitutionally interpret said articles (74 and 75 of the Labor Code, plus 7, subsection c, and 9 of Law No. 9832) in the sense that said laws and articles do not refer to nor exclude the validity of individual, direct, and private agreements between employers and workers, with the same effects and purposes that the laws regulate. 4) Additionally and also in a subsidiary manner, Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, which is Law No. 2 of August 27, 1943, should be declared unconstitutional by connection, along with Articles 7, subsection c) and 9 of Law No. 9832 insofar as it is understood that (i) said articles were indirectly modified by Law No. 9832 and (ii) all now exclude the possibility of an individual and direct agreement or arrangement between employer and worker to suspend an employment relationship, without requiring the authorization of the Ministry of Labor. 5) Finally, in any case, that regulation No. 42248-MTSS, Regulation for the procedure for temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of Article 74 of the Labor Code of March 20, 2020, published in La Gaceta No. 55, Supplement No. 53, of March 20, 2020, which limits the indicated fundamental rights and insofar as it limits them, be annulled by connection, by providing that the procedure established therein is the only means of obtaining a valid suspension of the relationship.\n\n2.- The petitioner bases his standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, given that he indicates the following case files as matters pending resolution before the courts: 1) No. [Valor 005], which is an ordinary labor proceeding processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), where Daysi Mendoza Chaves appears as plaintiff and [Nombre 036] as defendant. The matter is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Court of Liberia pending the appeal filed by both parties. 2) No. [Valor 007], a labor proceeding filed by [Nombre 007] against [Nombre 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the II Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos). A hearing was held on October 20, 2022, and the first-instance judgment is awaited. 3) No. [Valor 003], an infraction proceeding by the Ministry of Labor against [Nombre 015]., processed before the Labor Court of the II Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, where the application of suspensions of employment contracts without the authorization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is denounced. Specifically concerning the same plaintiff [Nombre 007] and [Nombre 008]. The trial hearing is scheduled for November 11, 2022. 4) No. [Valor 004], an ordinary labor proceeding filed by [Nombre 021] against [Nombre 002]., processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia). Because the defendant company filed an appeal, it is currently before the Civil and Labor Appeals Court of Liberia. Likewise, the petitioner provided certifications of the briefs through which he invoked unconstitutionality in those judicial processes.\n\n3.- By ruling at 4:27 p.m. on November 14, 2022, the petitioner was admonished as follows: \"(...) pursuant to Article 4 of Law Number 3245 of December 3, 1963, add and cancel the stamp of the Bar Association for the sum of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, under the warning of not hearing the defaulting party until the order is complied with, without retroaction of terms\".\n\n4.- By brief received via Gestión en Línea at 11:37 a.m. on November 16, 2022, the petitioner provided the stamp of the Bar Association for the sum of 275 colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief.\n\n5.- By official letter of December 6, 2022, addressed to the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, a certificate was requested regarding the procedural status of case files numbers [Valor 005] and [Valor 004].\n\n6.- By official letter of December 5, 2022, addressed to the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos), a certificate was requested regarding the procedural status of case files numbers [Valor 006] and [Valor 003].\n\n7.- By a certificate sent to this Chamber's authorized email on December 6, 2022, the judicial coordinator of the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Carlos, certified the following:\n\n\"LOURDES CORELLA ALVARADO, JUDICIAL COORDINATOR OF THE LABOR COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN CARLOS, CERTIFIES THAT: This Office processes FILE No. [Valor 007], which is an ORDINARY LABOR proceeding filed by KIMBERLY MARIA [Nombre 007], identity card 0207780765 against [Nombre 001], legal identity card 3101014194. Said file is in the: CONCLUSIVE PHASE. It has ruling Dismissed No. 615-2022 issued at 3:31 p.m. on November 10, 2022. An appeal brief and another are pending resolution. FILE No. [Valor 003], which is an INFRACTION TO LAWS proceeding filed by MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY against [Nombre 001], legal identity card 3101014194. Said file is in the: CONCLUSIVE PHASE.\n\nIt has Homologatory Judgment No. 619-2022 issued at 14:55 on November 11, 2022.*/*/*/*/*/ I issue this certification in Ciudad Quesada, at the request of the Constitutional Chamber, at ten twenty-four hours on December seven, two thousand twenty-two.”\n\n**8.-** By certifications dated December 8, 2022, sent to the authorized email address of this Chamber on that same date, the judicial coordinator of the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) certified the following:\n\n“That in this Office, file No. FILE: 20-000186-0942-LA -PROCESS: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS PLAINTIFF: [Name 021], DEFENDANT: [Name 002], is being processed. Said process has a 'status' of a first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000019, at ten twenty-six hours on January seventeen, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution at eight thirty-one hours on March nine, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the file is on appeal before the Court of Appeals of this Judicial Circuit, for the aforementioned appeal to be definitively resolved.”\n\n“That in this Office, file No. 21-000296-0942-LA process: OR.S.PRI. LABOR BENEFITS, PLAINTIFF: DAYSI IRINA MENDOZA CHAVES, DEFENDANT: [Name 001], is being processed. Said process, the status is a first-instance judgment issued, number 2022-000140, at fifteen forty-one hours on April twenty, two thousand twenty-two, against which, by resolution at seven twenty-nine hours on May twenty-four, two thousand twenty-two, an Appeal was admitted.- As of today, the file is on appeal before the Court of Appeals of this Judicial Circuit, for the aforementioned appeal to be definitively resolved.”\n\n**9.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its filing, any action brought before it that is manifestly improper, or when it considers there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal or similar action that was rejected.\n\nJudge Cruz Castro writes; and,\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**I.- STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN).** The plaintiff is considered to have standing (legitimación) to bring this unconstitutionality action, according to Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, having as prior matters the processes processed in files numbers [Value 005], which is an ordinary labor process processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia), brought by Daysi Irina Mendoza Chaves against [Name 036]; [Value 006], which is a labor process brought by Kimberly María [Name 007] against [Name 036], processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Carlos); [Value 003], a process for infractions of labor laws by the Ministry of Labor against [Name 015], processed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, and [Value 004], an ordinary labor process processed before the Civil and Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste (Liberia) brought by [Name 021] against [Name 002]. The plaintiff invoked the unconstitutionality of Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), Law No. 9832, Article 7 subsection c), and generally the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 42248-MTSS, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered violated. However, regarding Article 9 of Law No. 9832, as indicated below, its unconstitutionality was not duly invoked.\n\n**II.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION (OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN).** The plaintiff files this action against the following norms:\n\n- Articles 7, subsection c), and 9 of Law \"Reduction of working hours upon the declaration of a national emergency\" No. 9832, published in supplement No. 56 to Gazette No. 58 of March 23, 2020, which provide as follows:\n\n\"ARTICLE 7- Faults and sanctions. Employers who incur in any of the following faults shall be sanctioned based on the penalty table established in article 398 of Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, taking into account the severity of the act, its consequences, the number of faults committed, and the number of workers who have suffered the effects of the infraction:\n\na)(…)\n\nb)(…)\n\nc) Not requesting authorization for the reduction of working hours from the Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\n\nd)(…).”\n\n\"ARTICLE 9- Restitution of rights. In addition to the fines established in article 7, the employer who incurs in any of the faults established in that article shall have the obligation to restore to the workers the enjoyment of all rights unduly affected, with the payment of the corresponding salary differences.\n\nThe worker's right to resort to the respective jurisdictional venue for the collection of the damages caused is preserved.”\n\n- Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code No. 2 of August 27, 1943:\n\n\"ARTICLE 74.- The following are causes for temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer or the workers:\n\na) The lack of raw material to carry out the work, provided it is not attributable to the employer;\n\nb) Force majeure or fortuitous event, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work, and\n\nc) The death or incapacity of the employer, when it brings as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work.\n\nIn the first two cases, the Executive Branch may issue emergency measures that, without harming the employers' interests, result in the relief of the workers' economic situation.”\n\n\"ARTICLE 75.- The temporary suspension of employment contracts shall take effect from the end of the day on which the event that gave rise to it occurred, provided that full verification of the cause on which it is based is initiated before the General Labor Inspectorate or before its duly and specially authorized representatives, within the three days following the aforementioned.\n\nIn the first two cases provided for in the preceding article, the proof shall be the responsibility of the employer, and in the third, the responsibility of the employer's relatives or successors, and it shall be done by means of all the testimonies and investigations required by the respective authorities.\n\nIf the General Labor Inspectorate or its representatives come to the conviction that the alleged cause does not exist, or that the suspension is unjustified, they shall declare the request without merit so that the workers may exercise their power to terminate their contracts, with liability for the employer.”\n\n- Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 42248-MTSS, called \"Regulation for the procedure for the temporary suspension of employment contracts in cases related to subsections a) and b) of article 74 of the Labor Code\", published in supplement No. 53 of La Gaceta No. 55 of March 20, 2020.\n\n**III.- GRIEVANCES (AGRAVIOS).** The aforementioned norms are challenged insofar as they establish that any agreement for the suspension of an employment relationship can only occur for the causes in Article 74 of the Labor Code, which do not include the will of both parties and, according to Article 75 of that same normative body, must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it questions the constitutionality of the authorization procedure, given that it includes only the possibility of collective agreements, but not individual ones between an employer and a worker, and a sanction is added for anyone who does not follow this procedure. It considers that these provisions are contrary to the freedoms of contract and association, enshrined in Articles 24, 25, and 28 of the Political Constitution; as well as constitutional Article 121, subsection 7), in that public freedoms can only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific procedure, for a period of 30 days, in a reasonable and proportional manner. Thus, in the words of the plaintiff, it considers that the following constitutional norms and principles are infringed:\n\n\"1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution, which guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree upon a suspension of an employment contract, whether in full or in some of its forms, such as the reduction of working hours, is irrationally and disproportionately suppressed and repressed. But, furthermore, because the individual agreement that does not obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportional, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract is suppressed and sanctioned, which was a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same purposes that gave rise to the legislation whose unconstitutionality is being challenged.\n\n2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, insofar as association, at least temporarily, is imposed as a requirement and the sole means to agree upon a reduction of working hours, while an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned.\n\n3. Article 121, subsection 7, which provides that public freedoms (including individual freedom of contract) may only be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportional manner.”\n\n**IV.- ON THE WRIT OF INVOCATION IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 9 OF LAW NO. 9832.** Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action by the incidental route - like the present one - the existence of a main proceeding pending resolution, either before the courts – including habeas corpus or amparo – or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since simple compliance with them is not enough, but it is also required that the norm challenged through this route has a direct impact on the proceeding serving as the basis, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured within the prior proceeding. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base proceeding and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, plaintiffs must certify and provide a literal certification of the writ in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base proceeding, in order to verify its impact on that proceeding. Regarding the requirements that the cited writ of invocation must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly stated that:\n\n\"(…) although an extensive argumentation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary that the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly invoked in the base proceeding… and that the constitutional norms considered infringed be indicated…”. (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 14:30 hrs. on January 22, 2014).\" (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 hours on May 24, 2017).\n\nBy Judgment No. 2022-5564 of 9:00 hours on March 9, 2022, this Court also stated the following:\n\n\"(…) In this case and in relation to the content of article 17 referring to confiscation, having analyzed the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it is insufficient. The possible constitutional articles injured are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the allegations referring to constitutional article 45 are missing, which is precisely the right alleged as injured in the writ of filing of the action. Finally, regarding the referred article 20, it is not mentioned in the writ of invocation, so its questioning, lacking minimal legal basis, is inadmissible.”\n\nLikewise, this Court has resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base proceeding prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, votes No. 2016-009868 of 9:20 hours on July 13, 2016, and No. 2016-011291 of 10:40 hours on August 10, 2016).\n\nIn the case under study, the plaintiff bases their standing to file this action on base case numbers [Valor 005], [Valor 007], [Valor 003], and [Valor 004]. Thus, they provided a notarial certification of the briefs through which they invoked the unconstitutionality of articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, and Decreto Ejecutivo No. 42248-MTSS. However, from the study of the certifications of the invocation briefs, this Court finds that in these, the plaintiff did not expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of article 9 of Law No. 9832, as they limited themselves to stating the following (the invocation made within process No. [Valor 006] is transcribed, by brief dated October 25, 2022, which was replicated in the other base processes):\n\n\"(…) **Matter of Constitutionality of articles 74 and 75, within the context of the enactment of Law 9832, as well as the regulation enacted by the Ministry of Labor, No. 42248-MTSS.**\nThe thesis put forward by the opposing party necessarily implies the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned regulations, attempting in bad faith to take advantage of a formal issue that was known to the plaintiff in the process.\nIn summary, the issue to be resolved implies deriving from these two laws and the regulation, that the parties to an employment relationship (i) are self-sufficient to agree on the start of the employment relationship, as they indeed were. Self-sufficient, that is, without the need to join with other collaborators and without intervention from the Ministry, it was possible to start that employment relationship, through an employment contract. (ii) They would also have been self-sufficient to end the employment relationship, by mutual agreement, if they had so agreed. That is, if instead of a suspension, they had agreed to something more serious like a termination, the same thesis would not prosper. Therefore, there is no doubt that an employer and a worker can begin the employment relationship and end it by mutual agreement, without intervention from the Ministry of Labor. (iii) But it turns out that here it is argued that these same parties did not have the possibility of agreeing by themselves to an intermediate agreement, less serious than termination, which would be the suspension of the effects of that contract, for a determined time, due to a justified cause. An agreement like this is understood to be removed from the scope of their will, without further reason and against several fundamental rights. Taking the thesis to what ends up being an absurdity, if the same agreement had been for termination and not suspension, it would have been legal, but, because it was not a suspension, it turns out that it might not be... (he who can do the more, must be able to do the less).\nIf one delves a little deeper, it turns out that the opposing party proposes that this single requirement, which in this case is purely formal and would not have added any value to that transaction, triggers the nullity of the agreement. Therefore, their thesis entails that freedom of contract has that limit and that the judge is not even now allowed to examine whether the contract has fulfilled the purpose of the norm (preservation of the contract, balance of the parties, adaptation to external conditions and unforeseen events, etc.). Here it is noted that it is an alleged prohibition or restriction of a type of agreement whose approval procedure is of no value to anyone, so such a prohibition is also neither proportionate nor reasonable.\nNow, if we delve a little deeper into the analysis of this issue, we have two situations that must be revealed:\n(i) **This thesis is recent**. Historically, employers and workers have agreed by themselves and between themselves on suspensions of employment relationships in the most varied forms: unpaid leave for days, months, or years, sabbaticals, and other similar forms of agreements are suspensions of employment relationships. They have also agreed on consensual variations in contracts in the most varied forms and, for this, approval or even the deposit or disclosure of the contracts to the Ministry of Labor is not required.\n(ii) **The thesis is circumscribed or contextualized to the Pandemic**. It was from the Pandemic that this position emerged from the Ministry of Labor. But this criterion was fueled by the enactment of Law 9832, which regulates the reduction of working hours and wages, which is, no more and no less, another particular type of suspension of the employment relationship. The genus is the suspension, the regulated species is the partial suspension of contract effects, arising from a reduction of working hours and wages for a determined time and due to the pandemic.\n**This last law could contain some regulation that is interpreted in that sense**. **But such an interpretation is unconstitutional**. In short:\nLaw 9832 was created to sustain employment, as one of its main purposes, in the same way or along the same lines that articles 74 and 75 are supposed to have been conceived, so it can be understood that it came to complement it and to offer this variant of suspensions as an alternative that was regulated more precisely. It is not that the possibility is born with the law because it always existed, but only that it was regulated in a specific form. As in this case that serves as precedent, it is demonstrated that the same purpose but with better means and even results was achieved with or without Law 9832 and just with article 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, the reduction of working hours was already legally viable. Following the law, it was regulated more specifically with some special effects.\nAs we indicated, historically and under the protection of the Constitution, Employers and Workers have directly and freely agreed on the start and termination of an employment relationship, without resorting to anything more than the agreement of their wills. An employment contract has NEVER required authorization from the Ministry of Labor, but, at most, a deposit or notification merely informative, with evidentiary-type effects, but never constitutive or extintive of rights and obligations. The same with terminations by mutual agreement. Employers and workers have also agreed on all types of intermediate agreements, such as suspensions, \"unpaid leave,\" changes in temporary conditions, and other types of contractual figures that involve the temporary suspension of the effects of the employment contract. Only based on this recently enacted regulation do we now have a criterion in the sense that it is not legal to directly agree on a suspension of the employment relationship nor its species, the temporary reduction of working hours. For this purpose, it has been attempted to impose following an authorization procedure before the Ministry of Labor, and **where it turns out that they can only negotiate in collectives, not individually, and the background of what motivates the suspension (pandemic) is not even questioned**. Then, the requirement presented to the Court, of the Ministry's authorization, would also be impossible in this case, because it can only be negotiated in collectives. This directly clashes with the Constitution and does not bring any value or improvement to employment relationships when the parties, by themselves, can continue to agree on these types of agreements, without third-party intervention, in the way it was done, for mutual benefit within a situation without precedent in recent world history.\n**It cannot be denied that this represents a change, a restriction of a public freedom and fundamental rights that have been specifically questioned, such as freedom of contract in the labor sphere. This thesis was set forth in the conclusions and in the response to the claim.**\nMoreover, the intended reform to the contracting regime and restriction of the scope of the parties' will, its channeling towards collective negotiations as the only alternative, plus the sanctioning regime for any deviation from the procedure, come loaded with ideological elements of control for the sake of control itself, repression, and an exacerbated limitation on the parties' ability to manage their own affairs or resolve their own conflicts, to adapt their agreements to external circumstances, and finally to exercise rights that have historically been protected and preserved, under the protection of the Constitution. In our Constitutional Order, a Judge cannot be limited from analyzing the balance of obligations of the parties to an employment contract that was modified because of the suspension agreed upon by the same parties who initiated the employment relationship. If this is done in this case, it will be noted that the result would have been that these contracts would have been approved without further ado. It is noted that the extreme has been reached of also affirming that the Ministry of Labor lacks competence to delve into the content, as the control established by the MTSS is only formal, to verify that the procedure for the collective concurrence of wills was followed or to verify the company's situation if there is no agreement of wills. The foregoing is logical because in a Pandemic like the one we experienced, there was little to justify about the force majeure cause that made the suspension necessary. Then, the only palpable objective of the restrictive interpretation comes to be repressing individual contracting, to channel those reductions of working hours, which are suspensions, through the path of collective negotiation among workers. Conversely, the scope of the legislation and that interpretation, according to the plaintiff's defender, is merely to restrict individual freedom of contract in the private sector, for those types of agreements (suspensions and reductions of working hours), including the coercion of the MTSS as a means to achieve that end. In this same way, the only purpose of sanctioning the conduct classified as illegal is the failure to follow the collective path for negotiation and subsequent authorization, as established in article 7, subsection c) of Law 9832.\nParticularly Law No. 9832, in its article 7, subsection c), establishes as a punishable act \"failing to request authorization for the reduction of working hours before the Labor Inspection of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.\"\nThis implies not only the possibility of receiving a sanction, but, by virtue of the appeal, that of paying labor rights and indemnities for exercising two fundamental rights (freedom of labor negotiation and freedom of association, in a negative sense or the right not to associate) in a contract that was agreed upon and executed in good faith.\nThe restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association of Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the Pandemic and is the one that introduced and reinforces these restrictions, would be of such dimension that it could only be understood as constitutionally valid if it had been enacted within the context of article 121, subsection 7, of the Political Constitution, which allows restricting constitutional guarantees within situations of calamity, but even so, it is unconstitutional, not only because of the legislative procedure used, but because it was enacted with an indefinite character (it is currently in force and its limit is 30 days), but also due to the lack of reason and proportion in exclusively suspending the individual freedom of contract of employers and workers, in their individual capacity and in the private sphere.\nTherefore, the discussion at hand implies the possibility of applying regulations that are unconstitutional if this line of interpretation is maintained. **For this reason, we are approaching the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice with this matter as background to raise the corresponding Action of Unconstitutionality as a reasonable way to protect the interests and rights of our represented party.**\nIn the same way, **we request the Judge to kindly analyze the foregoing to eventually produce a constitutional query on the validity of this regulation.** (...).\"\n\nBased on the foregoing, it is not accredited that in the base process the unconstitutionality of article 9 of Law No. 9832 challenged here was expressly and formally invoked, as required by numerals 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in order to be able to duly establish the incidental nature of this action, therefore it is inadmissible with respect to that norm.\n\n**V.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.** The plaintiff alleges that the norms challenged here injure freedom of contract, literally estimating the following as injured: \"*1. Articles 24 and 28 of the Political Constitution that guarantee freedom of contract, insofar as the freedom of contract of an employer and a worker to agree upon a suspension of an employment contract is unreasonably and disproportionately suppressed and repressed, whether totally or in any of its species, such as the reduction of working hours. But, also, because the individual agreement that does not obtain an authorization from the Ministry of Labor is repressed and sanctioned, regardless of whether its content is reasonable, proportionate, and ultimately fair. The exercise of the autonomy of will expressed in a bilateral contract is suppressed and sanctioned, which turned out to be a reasonable mechanism to achieve the same ends that gave rise to the legislation that is challenged as unconstitutional*.\" Regarding articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, they allege that it derives from said regulation that any agreement to suspend an employment relationship can only occur for the causes in article 74, which do not include the will of both parties, and that, according to article 75, it must always be authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. With respect to article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, insofar as the former establishes a sanction if the respective procedure before the General Labor Inspection is not followed, and Decreto Ejecutivo No. 42248-MTSS, insofar as the procedure to be followed before said body of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is regulated.\n\nDespite their allegations, regarding this aspect, it is appropriate to reject this action on the merits, based on the following considerations. On repeated occasions this Chamber has indicated that freedom of contract is not unlimited, but is subject to legal regulations, especially when, as in this case, its purpose is to protect the working person (in this sense, see votes No. 2013-12014 of 2:30 p.m. on September 11, 2013 and No. 2017-016272 of 11:30 a.m. on October 11, 2017, among others). For this reason, it is considered that the specification of the causes for the temporary suspension of employment contracts, without liability for the employer and worker parties, in article 74 of the Labor Code (without omitting to mention the existence of other causes for individual suspension provided for in articles 78 and 79, the legal strike of 371 and the legal lockout of 387, all of the Labor Code, as well as other cases of provisional suspension for disciplinary procedures provided for in the legislation) and the requirement for authorization from the General Labor Inspection, in accordance with article 75 of the same regulatory body, constitute reasonable limitations on contractual freedom, in safeguard of the principles of social justice and worker protection -contained in the Political Constitution-, whose purpose is to guarantee labor rights and prevent the figure of suspension of the employment relationship from being used to evade compliance with employer obligations; for example, to cover up dismissal with employer liability to the detriment of the working party, who would see their income annulled without payment of their corresponding rights and benefits. In this sense, regarding the conflict or collision between freedom of contract and the principle *in dubio pro operario*, in judgment No. 2007-015907 of 6:57 p.m. on October 31, 2007, this Chamber ordered the following:\n\n\"(…) **II.-** Object of the challenge. Although only article 377 in fine of the Labor Code is challenged, for greater clarity on the object of challenge, the norm is transcribed in its entirety, highlighting the challenged text:\n \"Article 377.- The illegal strike ends, without liability for the employer, the employment contracts entered into by the strikers; the repressive sanctions that the Common Courts may declare against them are preserved.\n However, in the new contracts entered into by the employer, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, were in force before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated.\"\n III.- On the merits.\n\nThe plaintiff alleges that the obligation contained in the challenged norm, which obliges the employer to respect the labor conditions prior to the illegal strike in the event of rehiring the worker—despite the employment contract having been broken without employer liability—is a violation of freedom of contract and the principle of good faith. For their part, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and the passive coadjuvants consider, on the contrary, that the norm imposes a valid limitation on freedom of contract for reasons of public order, in safeguarding the principles of social justice and protection of the worker—of constitutional content—since it is evident that a worker dismissed due to an illegal strike, being unemployed and generally in a state of extreme necessity, is not in a position to negotiate or agree upon—on equal terms and without disadvantage—a new employment contract, which makes their protection as the weaker party in the relationship imperative. Undoubtedly, we are faced in this case with an apparent collision of constitutional norms and principles: on one hand, freedom of contract and the principle of good faith, and on the other, the principle of social justice and the principle of in dubio pro operario, all of constitutional rank. The dilemma of which interests must be protected is resolved and foreseen in constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence, specifically that which refers to the rules of constitutional interpretation, which indicates the obligation of the constitutional judge to interpret the Constitution in a harmonious manner, as a unity, in a coordinated form, as part of a completely cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered in their entirety and not individually (judgment 2000-7730). It is not, then, a matter of choosing which principle the constitutional judge prefers, but rather of extracting, through objective methods of constitutional interpretation and integration, the meaning that the constituent legislator intended to give to the constitutional text in the face of a concrete situation such as the present one. On this topic, constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that:\n\n “…The Political Constitution contains a series of values of supreme importance for a nation, which interact with each other, and often make the task of the interpreter difficult when resolving compound situations, that is, those in which more than one value intervenes at the same time. In these types of cases, it is very important that the constitutional interpreter weighs and seeks to balance—when possible by the circumstances of the case—the interests in conflict. The tool of legal hermeneutics is also very useful for seeking the most just solution in a given case. Nevertheless, regardless of the method of interpretation followed, it is essential to situate oneself within the context of the ideological model that the Political Constitution of a given country follows when interpreting the norms; in our case, that of a democratic country under the rule of law. An interpretation can never be divorced from the ideological model, so that any decision taken must be compatible and consistent with respect for freedom, access to justice, the dignity of the person, and other inspiring principles of a political system of this nature…” (judgment number 1996-06681)\n\n This is, then, a typical case of constitutional jurisdiction (Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since precisely one of the essential functions of the constitutional judge is to decipher those blank spaces or those collisions of interests, using the harmonious interpretation of the constitutional text. To be able to do that, it must be clear, in the first place, whether our Constitution has a determined ideological orientation, for based on this, the interpreter must understand the entire legal and political system in which they are inserted to be permeated. Thus, it is not the same to have a pure liberal Constitution as a socially oriented Constitution. This type of decision is what is doctrinally called the “fundamental political decision”, which consists of the choice that the constituents make of a determined political system and, consequently, of a determined form of government under which the social conglomerate will be governed.\n\n IV-. In the case of our country, no efforts are necessary to determine the current ideological vocation of our constitutional text, since the step our Political Constitution took from one of clearly liberal orientation (1871) to one forming a social state under the rule of law, beginning with its reforms in nineteen hundred and forty-three with the inclusion of social guarantees and later with the new constitutional text—which takes the previous one as its basis—in nineteen hundred and forty-nine, is an uncontroversial topic in national doctrine. From that point on, it is clear that in a social state under the rule of law, the State assumes a particular form of relationship with citizens, based on a balancing function in the face of social inequalities. In that sense, it is obligated, politically, both through norms and concrete actions, to be proactive in the generation of mechanisms of social equity. Rights, especially fundamental ones (in general, including those of a prestational nature), are then seen not as a private matter, but as one of public interest for the validity of the political ideology. Precisely, some of the guiding values of our social state under the rule of law are those of social justice and solidarity as a means to achieve equality of opportunity. The fulfillment of the value of social justice in a system like ours goes beyond a simple declaration of equality of rights; it is necessary to guarantee not only a general or legal equality of persons, but also a real equality that translates into creating and promoting conditions such as: access to a good education, to work, and to efficient health services, which allow every individual to have an equality of opportunities to choose and develop the activities through which they can satisfy their needs and thus achieve their happiness and well-being. The protection of the value of social justice also implies recognizing and accepting those legitimate inequalities that exist in society, provided that their existence yields a benefit or compensation for the less fortunate through the action of the State. It is not, then, about eliminating legitimate inequalities, which are based on or are the product of the free and voluntary actions of people that contribute to the increase of social resources and the creation of value, that is, in individual work, nor about treating equally those who are not equal; but rather, about taking those inequalities into account to help the most needy persons, so that they have an equal opportunity of access to the sources of wealth production. In synthesis, the purpose of this precept is to treat all persons equally—in rights—and to provide an authentic equality of opportunities; thus, society will have to give greater attention to those who have been born in the least favorable social positions. The idea is to compensate contingent disadvantages in the direction of equality through concrete public policies and specific normative protections.\n\n V-. Constitutional jurisprudence has recognized on various occasions that our constitutional text has an orientation characteristic of a social state under the rule of law and that this concept translates into a guiding value of the constitutional framework for public action, which translates into concrete legal obligations for the legislator. In that sense, judgment 2005-17612 indicated:\n\n “V.- The Social State under the Rule of Law as a constitutional framework for public action. The Political Constitution, read in a joint and systematic manner, determines the validity of a Social State under the Rule of Law. The foregoing implies that all public actions, in addition to being necessarily in accordance with the current legal order, must be directed in an efficient and just manner to satisfy the needs of the inhabitants of the Republic, through an adequate distribution of wealth and equitable access to the well-being generated by economic and technical development. It also imposes that within society, burdens be distributed among individuals according to the capacities of each one. The economic system designed by the constituent of nineteen hundred and forty-nine has as its goal not only the growth of production and employment. Within the framework of the Political Constitution, the economy must be a decisive factor for the achievement of the objectives of the Social State under the Rule of Law. It is clear, therefore, that the current Charter is not merely a political statute, but is also an economic and a social one. Thus, it also follows that the system of fundamental rights established constitutionally is not based on utilitarian individualism, but rather on a conception of man within the framework of the society in which he develops. The Political Constitution starts from the notion that the human being cannot develop integrally by himself alone, but rather requires the participation of all the other members of society. In fact, to achieve a more homogeneous social stratification, individuals must contribute according to their possibilities, for the benefit of those who possess less. The foregoing is a fundamental right of the persons who occupy the lower strata, and a duty of all, principally those most benefited by the economic system. Wealth in a society is not produced solely by those who possess the means of production, but also by those who contribute to it with their labor, with their work. Consequently, the benefits produced by the market must be redirected so that they do not yield returns solely in favor of certain social sectors. Relating this principle to that of social justice, positivized in Article 74 of the Constitution, according to which persons must collaborate reciprocally for the sake of preserving the human dignity of all members of the community, we have that the constituent sought to foster a society where solidarity was the general rule of coexistence; where the realization of small sacrifices in favor of great social goals was above individual interests; this is what is normally known as the Social State under the Rule of Law. It could thus be affirmed that solidarity among the members of the community is a principle of constitutional rank, which obliges the State to demand more from those who possess greater capacities, so that through the provision of social services of education, health, access to housing, etc., it fosters personal and social growth and avoids the existence of first-class citizens and others of second or third class. Finally, it can be said that the Political Constitution recognizes in favor of individuals and social groups an extensive and very varied range of rights, some expressly, others deducible from the understanding of the system formed by its norms and principles. Some of these prerogatives (regardless of whether they are individual or collective) have an eminently social character, constituting rights to the receipt of determined benefits from the State. These may be goods or services, but in any case, the Administration must provide them due to the mandate (specific or generic) contained in the Fundamental Law. If it concerns a general reference (e.g., protection of the mother and minors, cf. Article 51 of the Constitution), it is the representatives of popular sovereignty who, through formal Law, will develop these precepts, imposing the forms in which the Administration must act with the purpose of making them effectively enforced, as well as allocating the necessary public resources for it. The fact that they require actions from other agents to be effectively realized in no way diminishes their normativity, but does make their operation more complex (in comparison with public liberties, for example), and makes the work of the constitutionality controller more exhaustive, as they must deliberate on the degree of commitment shown by the State in enforcing the norms that recognize social rights. If the legislator does not institute the suitable mechanisms—legal and financial—to realize them, their omission could signify a violation of the Political Constitution. If they issue the legal norms and provide the necessary resources to make that right effective and it is the Administration that evades its compliance, then this latter action would be reflexively injuring the fundamental right, through the non-fulfillment of a legal duty.” (See, in this same sense, judgments of this Chamber numbers 01441-92, 05125-93, 03338-99, 2001-03825, among others)\n\n¿Does this mean that economic rights are indifferent to the constituent legislator or that they are secondary compared to other values? Naturally not; fundamental rights in general, including economic ones, are not opposing ideas that necessarily imply the restriction of one set of social rights for the effective realization of justice and equality, or vice versa. They are, rather, part of a system and even interdependent among themselves. Constitutional jurisprudence itself has recognized this systemic unity when stating:\n\n“…First of all, a general warning must be made: that the Constitution, or rather, the law of the Constitution, constitutes a systematic unity of values, principles, and norms that, consequently, must be interpreted and applied not in isolation but with systematic criteria and in a systematic manner, in harmony with one another, which thus results in them being indivisible and interdependent; conditions that are doubly important when fundamental rights and freedoms are involved in the case, which are, in turn, also interdependent and indivisible…” (1992-03194)\n\n VI-. The doctrine is also coincident in that, in a political system like the democratic one, in which freedom is the basis of the entire system, all rights are rights of freedom, including the rights that contribute an egalitarian component, such as economic, social, and cultural rights, because that component empowers and reinforces freedom for all. In that sense, fundamental rights of any type act in the integral realization of freedom as autonomy, as the overcoming of obstacles that make development in all facets of the human condition possible.\n\n VII-. This being the case, how do we choose some interests over others of the same rank in the event of a collision in the face of a concrete legal situation? It seems we return to the same point, but it is not so, for the guidelines are given to us by the constitutional text itself, in our case, Article 28, as will be seen. What has been said so far only confirms that for the democratic system, all rights derive from freedom, but the weight given to one or another in the face of a determined situation depends on the concrete case. That is, they are not excluding or inimical rights, such that economic rights cannot or should not exist in a socially oriented constitution, for example, but it does influence—not on a systemic level but on a particular one—the regulation that the legislator must give to a concrete situation, in application of the political ideology of the system. The topic is clear, both in doctrine and in our system—based on the wording of Article 28 of the Constitution—which establishes the limitations to the regulation of fundamental rights for reasons of public order, morality, or protection of the rights of third parties; that is, in our system, liberty rights can validly be limited with certain constitutionally defined parameters. Thus, in judgment 3550-92 it is considered:\n\n “F - The Legitimate Limitations of Freedom:\n\n XVII - Of course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, those necessary, but nothing more than those necessary, for the validity of democratic and constitutional values. Nevertheless, as the European Court (case The Sunday Times, par. 59) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OC-5/85, par. 46) have said, for a restriction to be \"necessary,\" it is not sufficient that it be \"useful,\" \"reasonable,\" or \"opportune\"; rather, it must imply the \"existence of an imperative social need\" that sustains the restriction. Therefore, for restrictions on freedom to be licit constitutionally and internationally, \"they must be oriented to satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options for achieving that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser extent must be chosen... the restriction—on the other hand—must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and must closely adjust to the achievement of that legitimate objective\" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-5/85, id.).\n\n These criteria of interpretation, which the great supreme or constitutional courts have also maintained—for example, the European ones, that of the United States of America, that of Argentina—are a modern application of the old rule of the Partidas, according to which:\n\n\"Cuando en pleito sobre libertad o servidumbre discorden los jueces, siendo tantos los que sentencien por la primera como los que sentencien por la segunda, valdrá lo favorable a la libertad\" (Partida III, título 32, ley 18).\n\n XVIII.- This implies, on one hand, that the restriction must be socially imperative and, therefore, exceptional, and as such, subject to restrictive interpretation, so that in case of doubt, freedom must always be preferred; on the other hand, that the very interpretation of the \"common good\" must be done in the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values—in Costa Rica, in summary, those of democracy, the rule of law, the essential dignity of the human being, and the \"system of freedom.\" It was not by mere accident that the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), whose principist sense is evident, defined public interest as:\n\n\"the expression of the coinciding interests of the administered\" (art. 113.1);\n\nimposing, as criteria for its appreciation,\n\n\"the values of legal security and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience cannot in any case be placed before\" (art. 113.3),\n\nand clearly distinguishing it from the transitory or subjective interest of the Administration, that is, from that of the public administrators (art. 113.2).\n\n XIX.- In truth, the concepts of morality, public order, or the necessary protection of the rights of third parties, as indeterminate ones, authorize a certain flexibility, but which does not in any case imply arbitrariness and which is subject, as discretion itself is, to jurisdictional control; a control that, as jurisprudence and doctrine have invariably recognized, must be exercised according to criteria of rationality and reasonableness (Articles 15 and 16, General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública); flexibility, or discretion, then, which in no case can imply arbitrariness.\n\n**XX.-** Public order (orden público), morality, and the rights of third parties must be interpreted and applied rigorously, without licenses that allow them to be extended beyond their specific meaning; a meaning that, in turn, must be seen in harmony with the *pro libertate* principle, which, together with the *pro homine* principle, constitutes the core of the doctrine of human rights: according to the first, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted extensively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being. Accordingly, the public order, morality, and the rights of third parties that allow, at least to the law, the regulation of private actions must be interpreted and applied in such a way that in the first case, it involves serious threats to public order, understood as the integrity and survival of the fundamental elements of the State; or as \"the set of principles that, on the one hand, concern the organization of the State and its functioning, and, on the other, contribute to the protection of the rights of the human being and the interests of the community, in a just balance to make peace and the well-being of social coexistence possible\" (Corte Plena, extraordinary session of August 26, 1982);\n\n**XXI.-** For its part, morality cannot be conceived other than as the set of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, whose violation gravely offends the generality of the members of that society; and the rights of third parties necessarily must be prioritized, both in themselves and in their concrete dimension, in the sense that it is only justified to regulate and eventually limit freedom to protect rights of equal or higher rank, against threats of equal or greater intensity. Thus, the Costa Rican system of liberty leaves outside the reach of the law—read, the action of the State—an intangible sphere of freedom, which cannot be touched by any authority, because it is the person, not society, who has dignity and consequent fundamental rights and freedoms...\"\n\n**VIII-.** It is now clear that the legislator can validly limit freedom rights for reasons of public order (orden público), and what is more, is obligated to do so when necessary in its role of social balancer imposed by the ideology inherent to a social state of law. It is also clear that the limitations imposed cannot empty the essential content (contenido esencial) of the right being limited, but only reduce or limit the exercise of that right, and this is precisely the central point of this action. Whether the final paragraph of Article 377, by imposing on the employer the obligation to rehire a worker whose contract has been broken without employer liability on the occasion of a legal strike, under the same conditions that the worker had, falls or not within the constitutionally permitted limits in Article 28. That is, whether the limit or regulation in question imposed on the parties' freedom of contract (libertad de contratación) is reasonable for the prevalence of a matter of public interest such as the protection of the worker, or whether it constitutes an illegitimate suppression of it. **Returning to the initial point, it is clear that the Costa Rican State, even in a freedom-based system, has a balancing or equalizing function in the face of inequalities and that in this role it is obligated to compensate for those inequalities by favoring the disadvantaged party. If it does so out of an imperative social necessity to safeguard public order and moreover does so in a reasonable and proportionate manner, it is constitutionally legitimate. Thus, we have multiple examples in the constitutional text itself (e.g., the limitations on privacy in Article 24 of the Constitution) or at the legal level, such as all the norms of positive discrimination in favor of minorities (e.g., Law No. 7600 in favor of persons with disabilities), or we have at the legal level specific norms that recognize the inequality of the parties, as occurs in the matter under analysis, where labor law is based on the premise that an inequality exists between employer and worker that justifies the constitutional and legal protection of the latter for the purpose of balancing the relationship. Thus, the inclusion of labor guarantees that impose minimum conditions in the labor relationship—not subject to the free contract of the parties—and in many cases non-waivable, which become validly accepted impositions, is admitted as legitimate. The minimum wage, vacations, labor benefits, the right to social security, the *in dubio pro operario* principle, the minimum age for working, to name a few, are all mandatory, reasonable, and legal conditions in a labor relationship, aimed at protecting the weaker party for reasons of public interest.** It could then validly be said that Article 377 in fine goes along the same line, and that therefore, the restriction imposed on the freedom of contract is justified and reasonable. The Chamber considers, in light of the foregoing, that in the cases of rehiring a worker who was dismissed due to their participation in an illegal strike, the legislator sought to alleviate the disadvantageous situation in which they would find themselves vis-à-vis the employer and prevent the latter from taking advantage of it to hire them under inferior conditions. The intention is meritorious, but the practical application, as the Procuraduría rightly indicates—citing national doctrine—can give rise to various interpretation problems. Since the intention of the norm seems to refer to the immediate rehiring arising after a strike declared illegal, it would be the task of the ordinary judge to determine—in each specific case—those scenarios, assessing the respect for the rights acquired by the worker, derived from the contract or by the passage of time in accordance with the law. This is in order to prevent the employer from seeking to take advantage of the worker's situation on the occasion of their dismissal without liability, motivated by the declaration of the strike's illegality.\n\n**IX-.** Now then, the Chamber interprets that the paragraph questioned in this action refers to immediate rehiring and not to any other scenario, because if a reasonable period has already elapsed and then a new hiring occurs, this constitutes a new labor relationship with all its consequences, that is, one in which the content of the contract is subject to the freedom of contract. The difference between the two scenarios lies in the fact that in the case of immediate rehiring, doctrine understands that a kind of suspension of the labor contract operates, and that upon rehiring, the employer has declined its power to declare the contractual bond rescinded. If the employer does not use its right to dismiss the workers and readmits them to its service, it means that it approves or excuses an act of the worker, and therefore, what operates is a continuation or prolongation of the previous contract in all its extension. To distinguish whether we are facing an immediate rehiring or not, the rules of logic and experience must be used as criteria to assess aspects such as the type of activity, the time that, under reasonable circumstances, it would take to carry out the administrative steps for rehiring, whether it is a rehiring of a single worker or several—as may be the case in the latter scenario of collective conflicts—among others, an assessment that is the responsibility of the judge of the specific case. Naturally, faced with a new contract, with the exception of the labor guarantees established in the Constitution and the Law as a minimum floor of protection for the worker, all other elements of the contract must be governed by the will of the parties, derived from the right of free contract. In this latter scenario, the final paragraph of the questioned Article 377 cannot be validly applied, without that signifying a suppression of the essential content of that right. Indeed, under those conditions, when a rehiring exists, the norm in question does not merely impose one or some labor conditions on the parties, but the totality of the labor conditions to be agreed upon, thereby eliminating their right to choose the survival of one or some of the contract's conditions.\n\n**X-.** The freedom of contract, as constitutional jurisprudence has well indicated (judgment 3495-92), includes at least:\n\na) The freedom to choose the co-contractor;\n\nb) The freedom in the choice of the very object of the contract and, therefore, of the main provision that realizes it;\n\nc) The freedom in the determination of the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as consideration;\n\nd) The equilibrium of the positions of both parties and between their mutual provisions; an equilibrium that demands, in turn, respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, according to which the position of the parties and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to each other, and additionally, proportional to the nature, object, and purposes of the contract; and, although that freedom is not unrestricted and the legislator can impose valid limitations, as it has done with labor guarantees because the matter is one of public order (Article 14 of the Labor Code), it is not valid, because it is disproportionate, to suppress the essential content—that is, the total content—of the right of contract for both the worker and the employer, imposing a determined total content upon them—in cases of non-immediate rehiring as explained supra—since our constitutional framework precisely imposes on the legislator, as a limitation in the exercise of its powers, respect for the essential content of the right in question. Precisely in judgment 2771-03, the Chamber even recognizes that not even the derived constituent legislator can legitimately suppress the essential content of a fundamental right, such that even less could the ordinary legislator do so. The Spanish Constitutional Court has defined the essential content of a right as \"that part of the content of a right without which it loses its peculiarity, or, stated another way, what makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a determined type. It is also that part of the content that is inevitably necessary for the right to allow its holder the satisfaction of those interests for whose attainment the right is granted... the essential content is exceeded or disregarded when the right is subjected to situations that make it impracticable or hinder it beyond what is reasonable or strip it of the necessary protection\" (Voto 8/4/81). In short, it involves recognizing a core in the content of fundamental rights, safeguarding a minimum content, even against constitutionally relevant rights or assets. Thus, for example, the exercise of business freedom cannot be conceived without the possibility of obtaining reasonable profit; nor is it possible, as indicated, to conceive of the freedom of contract without any possibility of determining the object of the contract (judgment 3495-92). Related to this right, in the indicated scenario, business freedom would be affected, insofar as the freedom of contract is a vehicle through which part of the business activity is exercised, which includes, in addition to the possibility of contracting as a mechanism to obtain reasonable profit in the exchange of goods and services, also the freedom to organize one's own company.\n\n**XI.-** The Chamber does not consider that good faith is violated, because it cannot be said with certainty what the will is with which one enters the contract, since often both worker and employer are left in a difficult situation after a prolonged period of strike.\n\n**XII.-** In conclusion, the final paragraph of Article 377 of the Labor Code which reads: \"However, in the new contracts that the employer enters into, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, governed before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated,\" is not unconstitutional as long as it is applied in the sense indicated in Considerandos VIII, IX, and X of this judgment, namely that in contracts entered into by the employer, for an immediate hiring, after the dismissal of a worker as a consequence of an illegal strike, conditions inferior to those that, in each case, governed before the illegal strike was declared may not be stipulated. (...).\" (The underlining does not correspond to the original).\n\nThus, based on the considerations of the aforementioned vote, this Chamber considers that, insofar as Article 74 establishes specific causes for the temporary suspension of the labor contract, without liability for the employer or for the workers, these are exceptions to the principle of continuity of the labor contract regulated in the legislation, in order to avoid the impact on the provision of service and the consequent salary compensation beyond what is necessary, with the primary purpose of guaranteeing the constitutionally enshrined special protection of the worker. Likewise, the mandatory nature of requesting authorization before the Inspección General de Trabajo, under penalty of sanction, in accordance with Articles 75 and 7, subsection c), of Law 9832 challenged herein, is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate; rather, on the contrary, it is a measure that is in accordance with the principles of social justice and *in dubio pro operario*, constituting a legitimate, necessary, suitable, and proportional limitation to the freedom of contract, in order to verify that an adequate application of said labor figure occurs and to guarantee the protection of labor rights.\n\nRegarding Decreto Ejecutivo No. 42248-MTSS, the claimant accused its unconstitutionality without specifying which norms of said regulation they consider unconstitutional, since, as understood from their argument, their disagreement is in general with the requirement of authorization for the suspension by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, whose application procedure that regulation develops. In that understanding, based on the considerations set forth, given that in the opinion of this Chamber, the requirement to process the authorization request before the labor inspectorate does not constitute an injury to the freedom of contract, the appropriate course is to reject this action on the merits regarding this aspect.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding Article 7, subsection c), of Law No. 9832, according to which failure to follow the authorization procedure before the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social constitutes a punishable offense, this also does not constitute a measure contrary to the freedom of contract nor discriminatory, as alleged by the claimant, who complains about the fact that only the employer is sanctioned for that omission, even though the worker voluntarily participates in the agreement to suspend their labor relationship. However, it is evident that this apparent inequality of treatment is due to the conditions of power in which the employer finds itself vis-à-vis the worker, whose protection is imposed for being the weaker party of the labor relationship. This has been recognized by this Chamber, when it indicated that \"(...) since the introduction of the chapter on social guarantees in the Constitution of eighteen seventy-one—and its subsequent consolidation in the constituent assembly of nineteen forty-nine—, together with the promulgation of the Labor Code in nineteen forty and the organization of the labor jurisdiction, the special protection of the worker has always been kept in mind, considered as the economically weaker party of the labor relationship, and hence the insertion of important principles, such as the 'pro operario', which consists of the judge's application of the norm's most favorable meaning to the worker, as well as the principle of the inalienability of social rights, developed in Article 74 of the Constitution\" (vote No. 4448-96 of 09:00 hours on August 30, 1996). For the foregoing reasons, it is also appropriate to reject this action on the merits regarding this aspect.\n\n**VI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ARTICLE 121, SUBSECTION 7, OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** As indicated in Considerando III of this judgment, the claimant considers that the norms challenged herein are contrary to Articles 25 and 121, subsection 7), of the Political Constitution, in the claimant's words: \"(...) 2. Article 25 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of association (libertad de asociación), insofar as association is imposed, at least temporarily, as a requirement and the sole means to agree on a reduction of working hours, while at the same time an individual or bilateral agreement is prevented and sanctioned. 3. Article 121, subsection 7, which provides that public freedoms (including that of contracting individually) can *only* be suspended by the Legislative Assembly, through a specific legislative procedure, but only for a period of 30 days and in a reasonable and proportional manner.\"\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, regarding the aforementioned allegations, this action lacks sufficient foundation. In this sense, on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that, for the infringement to be considered established and for it to be able to declare the unconstitutionality of the norm or act challenged, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever promotes an unconstitutionality action has the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the Law of the Constitution and, additionally, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is termed by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, that \"a norm that facially (sic) is contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that there is actually no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs if action is taken against a norm that on first examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the claimant who must advance the arguments that convince about the unconstitutionality\" (see judgment No. 0184-95 of 4:30 p.m. on January 10, 1995).\n\nIn a later judgment, this Chamber stated, regarding the failure to set forth the arguments of unconstitutionality in matters of actions of unconstitutionality, the following:\n\n\"The action of unconstitutionality is filed with the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures, and infringes upon the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments undertaken with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the petitioners, it is confirmed what the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) indicates, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional, but rather it is limited to establishing discrepancies in a generic and abstract manner against the entirety of the Regulation, and even more so against all activity carried out by Sugar Mills and Haciendas, since they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of the surrounding inhabitants, without specifying which arguments of constitutionality must be taken into account against each one of the provisions or groups of norms of the challenged Regulation. [...] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the obligation to authenticate the briefs filing actions of unconstitutionality, since it is deemed necessary that there exist arguments put forth by a legal professional, which this Court does not rule out corresponds to a serious study of the technical and scientific merits of a given matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike guarantee proceedings, that is, habeas corpus and amparo remedies, which any interested party can file directly before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that injure them in their private sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the action of unconstitutionality), the legislator entrusted the authenticating attorney with a task whose requirement is even greater, one might say more elaborate and exhaustive, which must be embodied in the filing brief by reason of their professional office, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal preparation of the Law, as well as of other secondary provisions, entails a highly costly process for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways, for or against, and whose formation, approval, and promulgation procedures must not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest absences of the legal professionals who authenticate briefs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without compromising the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the actions of unconstitutionality.\"\n(Judgment No. 2012-05285 of 3:03 p.m. on April 25, 2012).\n\nThe cited Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, in this regard, that in the brief filing the action, \"its grounds be set forth clearly and precisely\". In Judgment No. 2013-016944 of 2:30 p.m. on December 18, 2013, this Chamber made express reference to the requirement of proper substantiation of the filing brief – as an essential requirement for the admissibility of the action, pursuant to the provisions of the mentioned article – in the following terms:\n\n\"II.- INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION. Pursuant to Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality, the grounds must be set forth clearly and precisely, with specific citation of the norms or principles that are considered infringed. This requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but into an essential requirement of admissibility, since by virtue of the pro sententia principle – developed on other occasions by this Chamber – according to which admissibility requirements must be interpreted favorably to the action, furthermore, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and in guarantee of its supremacy and validity there is a public interest by virtue of which the obstacles for the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural norms must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the issuance of the judgment is obtained; the foregoing not only facilitates the administration of justice but also prevents the imposition of obstacles to not achieving it (see in the same vein, Judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of substantiation of the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned judgment congruent with what is sought. Likewise, it is improper for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms challenged in an action when the plaintiff does not substantiate the reasons for which they challenge them, since this would imply carrying out an abstract constitutional review as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a proceeding of this nature.\"\n\nFinally, more recently, in Vote No. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020, this Court reiterated that:\n\n\"(...) given the formalism legally provided for constitutional review proceedings, the argumentative burden in the processing of an action of unconstitutionality falls on the plaintiff, who must explain, without ambiguity, the contradiction between an infra-constitutional norm and the block of constitutionality, as well as the legitimate interest (legitimación) that assists them.\"\n\nIn the particular case, the plaintiff challenges Articles 74 and 75 of the Labor Code, 7(c) and 9 of Law No. 9832, and, in general, Executive Decree No. 42248-MTSS, considering them contrary to freedom of association and Article 121(7) of the Political Constitution.\n\nHowever, this Chamber notes that, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of freedom of association, throughout the filing brief, the plaintiff only refers to this being injured in its negative sense, since, as interpreted by the plaintiff, to achieve the suspension of the employment contract, this is only permitted collectively and not individually between the employer and the worker; in this sense, it is alleged that \"In any case, if a worker and an employer seek the Ministry's approval of an individual agreement, it is denied, because individual or bilateral agreements are prevented. Only collective or multilateral agreements are approvable, which implies the obligation to associate, at least temporarily, or be represented in groups to negotiate a suspension contract such as the reduction of working hours and salaries.\" However, this Chamber notes that the plaintiff does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does it develop the content of freedom of association in order to relate or contrast it with what is established in the norms it intends to challenge, which prevents this Chamber from ruling on the merits of this aspect and issuing a judgment congruent with what is sought.\n\nLikewise, the plaintiff alleges that Law No. 9832, which was enacted within the context of the pandemic, contains restrictions on freedom of contract and freedom of association so extreme that they could only be understood as valid if they had been enacted in accordance with what is established in Article 121(7) of the Political Constitution. This constitutional article establishes that it shall correspond exclusively to the Legislative Assembly \"(...) 7) To suspend by vote of no less than two-thirds of the totality of its members, in the event of evident public necessity, the individual rights and guarantees enshrined in Articles 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, and 37 of this Constitution. This suspension may be of all or some rights and guarantees, for all or part of the territory, and for up to thirty days; during it and regarding persons, the Executive Branch may only order their detention in establishments not intended for common criminals or decree their confinement in inhabited places. It must also report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the measures taken to save public order or maintain State security. In no case may individual rights or guarantees not enshrined in this subsection be suspended; (...)\". In this regard, the truth is that the plaintiff does not explain how the norms challenged here constitute a suspension of constitutional rights and guarantees in the terms provided for in the aforementioned constitutional article. The plaintiff merely reiterates that Law No. 9832 limits the rights to freedom of contract and association but only challenged Articles 7(c) and 9 of said Law – which was not duly invoked in the underlying case, as indicated in Considering III – insofar as they provide as a punishable offense \"[n]ot requesting authorization for the reduction of the working day before the Labor Inspectorate (Inspección de Trabajo) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security\" and the restitution of rights to the worker, which evidently does not constitute a suspension of fundamental freedoms.\n\nBased on the foregoing, this action cannot be considered duly substantiated regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and Article 121(7) of the Constitution, as required by Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Now, although the plaintiff could be instructed (prevenir) to remedy compliance with this requirement, in the sub judice matter, such proceeding is considered moot, not only because it would entail redrafting the action but also because Article 9(1) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to summarily reject (rechazar de plano) any motion that is \"manifestly improper or unfounded\", as is the case in this matter.\n\nVII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the foregoing, this action is rejected on the merits with regard to the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, its summary rejection (rechazo de plano) is ordered. Judge (Magistrado) Rueda Leal and Judge (Magistrada) Garro Vargas dissent (salvan el voto) and order that the instruction (prevención) of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction be given.\n\nVIII.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE (MAGISTRADO) RUEDA LEAL AND JUDGE (MAGISTRADA) GARRO VARGAS, with drafting by the latter.\nWe separate from the majority opinion of this Court and partially dissent (salvamos parcialmente el voto) in this matter, considering that the decision to reject some aspects of this action of unconstitutionality is premature. It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a proceeding \"established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of a general nature and for that same reason a set of formalities must be complied with, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge\", as has been stated in the ample jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment that must be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. This is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states:\n\n    \"Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate, by resolution, which are the omitted requirements and shall order their fulfillment within three days (...)\".\n\nIn this matter, it is proposed to summarily reject the action in some aspects – regarding the alleged violation of freedom of association and the alleged infringement of Article 121(7) of the Political Constitution. However, the majority judgment considers that the plaintiff does not indicate which of the challenged norms expressly or tacitly establishes such a limitation, nor does it develop the content of freedom of association in order to relate or contrast it with what is established in the norms it intends to challenge. From our perspective, in relation to said grievances, the instruction (prevención) to the plaintiff to remedy the detected omissions is of unquestionable application. Likewise, it is worth noting that the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79 as well as Article 80 itself of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad for the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.\n\nIX.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are instructed that if they have provided any physical paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in Session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in Session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThis action is rejected on the merits with regard to the alleged violation of freedom of contract. As for the rest, it is summarily rejected.\n\nMagistrate Rueda Leal and Magistrate Garro Vargas partially dissent and order that the prevention set forth in Article 80 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction be made, with regard to the alleged infringement of the freedom of association and the presumed violation of Article 121, subsection 7) of the Political Constitution.\n\n| | | |\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n| | ![graphic]()Fernando Cruz C.Presidente a.i | |\n| ![graphic]()Paul Rueda L. | | ![graphic]()Jorge Araya G. |\n| ![graphic]()Anamari Garro V. | | ![graphic]() |\n\nThe signatories of this resolution are Ana María Picado B., Aracelly Pacheco S., and Jose Roberto Garita N.\n\nDocument Digitally Signed\n-- Verification code --\n*BYCNRN8208W61*\nBYCNRN8208W61\nEXPEDIENTE N° 22-025168-0007-CO\n\nPhones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482).\n\nFax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6" }