{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-420665", "citation": "Res. 11696-2008 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de reglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente sobre contaminación visual", "title_en": "Executive Branch's failure to issue regulations for Article 71 of the Environmental Law on visual pollution", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoció un recurso de amparo presentado por un grupo de ciudadanos contra el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía por la omisión de reglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (Ley 7554), vigente desde 1995, que ordena al Poder Ejecutivo dictar medidas para prevenir la contaminación visual. Los recurrentes argumentaron que, tras trece años, la falta de normas reglamentarias dejaba sin contenido el derecho al paisaje derivado de los artículos 50 y 89 de la Constitución Política. El Ministro admitió la omisión, pero alegó que el tema no estaba desatendido porque existían criterios de la Procuraduría General de la República y jurisprudencia constitucional, y que se trabajaba en un proyecto de reglamento y en un proyecto de ley. La Sala, reiterando su jurisprudencia sobre la obligación del Ejecutivo de reglamentar cuando la ley expresamente lo impone, verificó que la Ley 7554 establece un mandato claro en su artículo 71 y un plazo de tres meses en su artículo 117, ampliamente superado. Declaró con lugar el recurso y ordenó al Poder Ejecutivo reglamentar el artículo 71 en el plazo de dos meses.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber heard an amparo action filed by a group of citizens against the Minister of Environment and Energy for the failure to issue regulations under Article 71 of the Environmental Organic Law (Law 7554), in force since 1995, which orders the Executive Branch to adopt measures to prevent visual pollution. The petitioners argued that, after thirteen years, the lack of regulatory standards emptied the right to landscape protection derived from Articles 50 and 89 of the Constitution. The Minister admitted the omission but argued that the matter was not unaddressed because opinions from the Attorney General's Office and constitutional case law existed, and a draft regulation and a bill were in progress. The Chamber, reiterating its case law on the mandatory nature of regulatory power when expressly imposed by statute, verified that Law 7554 establishes a clear mandate in Article 71 and a three-month deadline in Article 117, long since expired. It granted the amparo and ordered the Executive Branch to issue regulations for Article 71 within two months.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2008", "year": "2008", "topic_ids": [ "landscape-protection", "procedural-environmental" ], "primary_topic_id": "landscape-protection", "es_concept_hints": [ "contaminación visual", "recurso de amparo", "potestad reglamentaria", "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente 7554", "omisión reglamentaria", "derecho al paisaje", "principio de legalidad" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 71", "law": "Ley 7554" }, { "article": "Art. 117", "law": "Ley 7554" }, { "article": "Art. 11", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 194", "law": "Constitución Política" } ], "keywords_es": [ "recurso de amparo", "contaminación visual", "paisaje", "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente", "omisión reglamentaria", "Poder Ejecutivo", "potestad reglamentaria", "Ley 7554", "artículo 71", "artículo 117", "Sala Constitucional", "derecho al paisaje" ], "keywords_en": [ "amparo action", "visual pollution", "landscape", "Environmental Organic Law", "regulatory omission", "Executive Branch", "regulatory power", "Law 7554", "Article 71", "Article 117", "Constitutional Chamber", "right to landscape" ], "excerpt_es": "IV.- Del análisis del caso este Tribunal verifica que la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente fue publicada en la Gaceta número 215 del trece de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, de manera que, el Poder Ejecutivo desde hace trece años tenía la obligación legal de conformidad con los artículos 11 y 194 de la Constitución Política de regular el contenido del artículo 71 de la ley 7554, referente a la contaminación visual. De lo expuesto, y de conformidad con el artículo 49 párrafo segundo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional mismo que establece: \"Si el amparo hubiere sido establecido para que una autoridad reglamente, cumpla o ejecute lo que una ley u otra disposición normativa ordena, dicha autoridad tendrá dos meses para cumplir con la prevención\"; lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso por la omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de reglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente número 7554 publicada en la Gaceta número 215 del trece de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco.", "excerpt_en": "IV.- Upon analysis of the case, this Court verifies that the Environmental Organic Law was published in Gazette number 215 on November 13, 1995, so that the Executive Branch for thirteen years had the legal obligation, in accordance with Articles 11 and 194 of the Constitution, to regulate the content of Article 71 of Law 7554 concerning visual pollution. Based on the foregoing, and in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 49 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which states: \"If the amparo has been established so that an authority regulates, complies with, or executes what a law or other normative provision orders, said authority shall have two months to comply with the order\"; the appropriate action is to grant the amparo for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate Article 71 of the Environmental Organic Law number 7554 published in Gazette number 215 on November 13, 1995.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber granted the amparo action and ordered the Executive Branch to issue regulations for Article 71 of Law 7554 within two months.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional declaró con lugar el recurso de amparo y ordenó al Poder Ejecutivo reglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley 7554 en el plazo de dos meses." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando I", "quote_en": "As a matter of principle, it can be stated that the regulatory power, the competence assigned to the Executive Branch to develop the law (executive regulation), is not a power-duty in itself, since it will depend on the content of the law itself whether it is obliged to develop some of its principles... However, the case is different when the legislator expressly imposes on the law the duty to regulate it. Here, the exercise of that competence becomes inescapable for the Executive Branch.", "quote_es": "Como tesis de principio, puede afirmarse que la potestad reglamentaria, esa competencia que se le asigna al Poder Ejecutivo de desarrollar la ley (reglamento ejecutivo) no es un poder- deber en sí mismo, puesto que dependerá del contenido de la propia ley, el que aquél se vea obligado a desarrollar algunos de sus principios... Sin embargo, distinto es el caso en el cual el legislador expresamente le impone en la ley el deber de reglamentarla. Aquí se hace inescapable para el Poder Ejecutivo el ejercicio de esa competencia." }, { "context": "Considerando I", "quote_en": "When a law needs to be regulated, the Executive Branch must use reasonable deadlines, all in order not to harm the interests of third parties, and to fulfill its obligation to regulate matters that... are inherent to the social function of the State.", "quote_es": "Cuando se requiere reglamentar una ley, el Poder Ejecutivo debe utilizar plazos razonables, todo con el fin de no perjudicar intereses de terceros, y cumplir con su obligación de regular materias que... son propias de la función social del Estado." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "Upon analysis of the case, this Court verifies that the Environmental Organic Law was published... on November 13, 1995, so that the Executive Branch for thirteen years had the legal obligation, in accordance with Articles 11 and 194 of the Constitution, to regulate the content of Article 71 of Law 7554 concerning visual pollution.", "quote_es": "Del análisis del caso este Tribunal verifica que la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente fue publicada... el trece de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, de manera que, el Poder Ejecutivo desde hace trece años tenía la obligación legal de conformidad con los artículos 11 y 194 de la Constitución Política de regular el contenido del artículo 71 de la ley 7554, referente a la contaminación visual." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-27738", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7554 Art. 71" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-420665", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-38533", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "* 080068240007CO * \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n* 080068240007CO * \n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 08-006824-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2008-011696 \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA\r\nCORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas y veintinueve minutos del\r\nveinticinco de julio del dos mil ocho. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nRecurso de amparo presentado por Adriana Valerio Madrigal, cédula de identidad\r\nnúmero 4-196-879, Alberto Solís Madrigal, cédula de identidad número 3-429-970,\r\nAlejandra Esquivel Ugalde, cédula de identidad número 4-198-728, Alejandro González\r\nBarquero, cédula de identidad número 3-412-573, Alexis Salas Rodríguez, cédula\r\nde identidad número 2-640-529, Alonso Durán Vargas, cédula de identidad número\r\n4-194-562, Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez, cédula de identidad número 2-365-227,\r\nArianna Suárez Villegas, cédula de identidad número 1-1275- 684, Aymara Lezama\r\nCáceres, cédula de identidad número 8-078-419, Benjamín Pavlotzky, documento de\r\nidentificación número 103200026000, Christian Lezama F., cédula de identidad\r\nnúmero 1-1270-960, Cindy Montero Serrano, cédula de identidad número\r\n1-1335-384, Georgeanella Flores Muñoz, cédula de identidad número 1-1341-218,\r\nIsbak Vargas Pandolfi, cédula de identidad número 1-1302-155, Juan Gabriel\r\nSolano Moya, cédula de identidad número 2-646-886, Karla Chacón Miranda, cédula\r\nde identidad número 1-1361-442, Marcela Villegas Portuguez, cédula de identidad\r\nnúmero 1-1306-550, Nahuel Flores Bianchi, cédula de identidad número 6-370-382,\r\nRonny Villalobos Chacón, cédula de identidad número 1-1311-980 y\r\nStephanie Rivers Baltodano, cédula de identidad número 1-1396-536, contra \r\nel Ministro de Ambiente y Energía. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n Resultando: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las diez horas\r\ncincuenta y dos minutos del dos de mayo del dos mil ocho el recurrente presenta\r\nrecurso de amparo contra el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía. Manifiestan\r\nque el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, define la\r\ncontaminación visual como las acciones, obras o instalaciones que sobrepasen,\r\nen perjuicio temporal o permanente del paisaje, los límites máximos admisibles\r\npor las normas técnicas establecidas o que se emitan en el futuro; resulta que\r\ntrece años después, aún no se han establecido normas técnicas, reglamentarias, \r\nque entren a regular lo que es la contaminación al paisaje natural, el urbano o\r\nel rural. Que a la fecha las palabras contaminación visual o protección al\r\npaisaje están en varios cuerpos normativos, pero sin que existan parámetros\r\ndefinidos o conceptualizaciones, sobre lo que sería o debería ser la\r\ncontaminación visual, dejando sin contenido el derecho al paisaje que emana de\r\nla norma 50 en relación con el 89 de la Constitución Política. Solicitan se\r\ndeclare con lugar el recurso. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- Informa Roberto Dobles Mora, Ministro de Ambiente y Energía (folio 12) que\r\nde conformidad con el informe otorgado por la Dirección General de Calidad\r\nAmbiental establece que efectivamente el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del\r\nAmbiente contempla el tema de la contaminación visual y la define como\r\nlas acciones, obras o instalaciones que sobrepasen, en perjuicio temporal o\r\npermanente del paisaje los límites máximos admisibles por las normas y técnicas\r\nestablecidas o que se emitan en el futuro. Establece que el Poder Ejecutivo\r\ndictará las medidas adecuadas y promoverá su ejecución mediante los\r\norganismos, los entes públicos y las municipalidades, para prevenir este tipo\r\nde contaminación. Que si bien es cierto la LOA está vigente desde octubre\r\nde mil novecientos noventa y cinco, la misma no fue reglamentada íntegramente.\r\nEl Poder Ejecutivo ha reglamentado algunas de las materias contenidas en\r\nlas norma de forma independiente, en diversos instrumentos jurídicos\r\n(reglamentos) esto se debe sobre todo a la complejidad y diversidad que cada\r\ntema tiene. Puede tomarse como ejemplo de normativa emitida el Reglamento de\r\nEvaluación y Clasificación de Cuerpos de Agua Superficiales, # 33903 MINAES\r\npara reglamentar el artículo 67 de la LOA, el Reglamento de Setena #\r\n31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC para reglamentar el artículo los artículo 83\r\ny siguientes de la LOA. En el caso específico de la contaminación visual en su\r\nmomento se consideró oportuno regular el tema a través de una Ley y fue\r\nasí como desde el año dos mil tres se presentó el proyecto que hoy tiene el\r\nnúmero15122 el cuál fue promovido por la Diputada Aida Faingezicht. Sin\r\nembargo, por considerar también que el asunto no puede depender\r\nindefinidamente de la aprobación de una ley, el MINAE se encuentra\r\ntrabajando en el diseño del reglamento específico para la regulación del tema\r\nde contaminación visual, el cuál se encuentra en proceso de diseño y según lo\r\nestablecido en la Ley General de Administración Pública y la misma LAO, luego\r\nde la redacción del texto final se requiere iniciar todo el proceso de consulta\r\nque permita una aplicación de los principios de participación y consulta\r\nestablecidos. El reglamento que se está diseñando contempla apartados\r\nespecíficos para la regulación de por ejemplo: instalación de publicidad\r\nexterior visual, condiciones para la instalación de vallas y otras formas de\r\npublicidad exterior visual. Hace referencia al proyecto de ley que existe en la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa tramitado bajo el expediente número 15.122, además\r\ndel dictamen emitido por la Procuraduría General de la República,\r\nC-351-2006. Aduce que si bien es cierto no existe una reglamentación\r\nespecífica para el numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, el tema de\r\ncontaminación visual no se encuentra acéfalo. Solicita se declare sin lugar el\r\nrecurso. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- En los procedimientos seguidos se ha observado las prescripciones legales.\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nRedacta la Magistrada Salazar Cambronero; y, \n\r\n\r\n\n Considerando: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nI.- Esta Sala en cuanto a la omisión de reglamentar una ley por parte del Poder\r\nEjecutivo estableció en sentencia número 8418-97 de las 15:42 horas del diez de\r\ndiciembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete: \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n\"I.- Alega el recurrente que debido a la omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de\r\nreglamentar todo lo concerniente al funcionamiento y organización de las\r\nOficinas de Salud Ocupacional, se está impidiendo el funcionamiento de estas\r\ncomisiones, lo que causa un grave perjuicio al sector laboral. Según\r\ndisposición del artículo 300 del código de Trabajo, reformado por Ley 6727 del\r\n24 de marzo de 1982, se deben establecer vía reglamento los requisitos de\r\nformación profesional que deben tener las personas encargadas del Consejo de\r\nSalud Ocupacional: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"Artículo\r\n300.- Toda empresa que ocupe, permanentemente, más de cincuenta trabajadores\r\nestá obligada a mantener una oficina o departamento de salud ocupacional.\r\nReglamentariamente y en consulta con el Consejo de Salud Ocupacional, se\r\nestablecerán los requisitos de formación profesional que deben tener las\r\npersonas encargadas de tal oficina o departamento, para lo cual se tomará en\r\ncuenta el número de trabajadores de la empresa, la actividad a la cual se\r\ndedica y la existencia de recursos humanos especializados en salud ocupacional\r\nen el mercado de trabajo.\" \n\r\n\r\n\nNo obstante\r\nque la ley estableció la necesidad de reglamentar esta materia, desde 1982 no\r\nse ha procedido de conformidad, sino que más bien, tal y como informa el\r\nMinistro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, se iniciaron los trámite\r\ncorrespondientes a la reglamentación, precisamente a raíz de la interposición\r\nde este amparo (ver folios 16 y 19). \n\r\n\r\n\nAsimismo en\r\nsentencia número 1463-90 de las a las catorce horas con treinta minutos del día\r\ntreinta de octubre de mil novecientos noventa, al resolver una acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad contra la omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de reglamentar la\r\nLey para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público, Ley 6955 de 24 de febrero\r\nde 1984, señaló: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"Como\r\ntesis de principio, puede afirmarse que la potestad reglamentaria, esa competencia\r\nque se le asigna al Poder Ejecutivo de desarrollar la ley (reglamento\r\nejecutivo) no es un poder- deber en sí mismo, puesto que dependerá del\r\ncontenido de la propia ley, el que aquél se vea obligado a desarrollar algunos\r\nde sus principios, pues correspondiendo al Ejecutivo aplicar o velar por que la\r\nley se aplique, en tanto sea necesario para ello decidirá su reglamentación. Es\r\ndecir, la reglamentación se otorga al Ejecutivo como un instrumento que\r\nfacilita el ejercicio de administrar. Sin embargo, distinto es el caso en el\r\ncual el legislador expresamente le impone en la ley el deber de reglamentarla.\r\nAquí se hace inescapable para el Poder Ejecutivo el ejercicio de esa\r\ncompetencia. Dentro del ilimitado espacio de la legislación, aquí el destinatario\r\nde un deber hacer es el Poder Ejecutivo y, como tal, queda sujeto a la orden\r\ncontenida en la Ley. Desaparece para él toda discrecionalidad, pues la norma\r\nlegal regló su actuación, de modo que el ejercicio de la competencia se hace\r\ninevitable. En el tanto se haya apartado de lo ordenado, en ese tanto hay una\r\ninfracción constitucional, pues como se sabe, el Poder Ejecutivo tiene una\r\ndoble sumisión al estar sujeto a la Constitución y a la Ley. No es dable\r\nentender, como ya se ha intentado, que, derivada la potestad reglamentaria de\r\nla Constitución Política, el legislador tiene vedado el regular la oportunidad\r\nde su ejercicio. Es constitucionalmente válido que, en determinadas\r\ncircunstancias, así lo disponga sin posibilidad de evasión para el\r\nadministrador, pues de hacerlo, sería con las consecuencias que a su vez tiene\r\nprevisto el ordenamiento jurídico. Es más, es pública y notoria una costumbre\r\nconstitucional en ese sentido (Vid. Artículo 68 de Ley No. 7092 de 21 de abril\r\nde 1988 y Reglamento según Decreto Ejecutivo No. 18445-H de 9 de setiembre de\r\n1988). Además, en el presente caso, el mandato de la ley también incluye la\r\nintegración de comisiones de evaluación y terminar ese trabajo en un\r\ndeterminado plazo, como forma de preparar legislación u otros actos normativos\r\ntendentes a mejorar el funcionamiento o la eficiencia de la administración\r\npública, con motivos claramente macro económicos y de política general.... V.-\r\nDe lo expuesto queda claro que la falta de una reglamentación comprensiva\r\nobedece a que el Poder Ejecutivo siguió una conducta distinta a la mandada por\r\nel legislador, y prefirió reglamentar parcialmente o proponer nueva legislación\r\ncon el fin de satisfacer parecidos propósitos a los de la Ley No. 6955 de\r\nrepetida cita. Y, por ahí, la disyuntiva es si hay un cumplimiento distinto al\r\nprevisto, pero cumplimiento al fin, o si por el contrario el incumplimiento se\r\nmantiene a pesar de los decretos é iniciativas de ley que se indican como\r\nexcusa para no haber actuado conforme al mandato concreto del legislador. En\r\nopinión de esta Sala, el Poder Ejecutivo ha sido omiso y esa omisión entraña\r\nuna violación a sus deberes constitucionalmente señalados. Por una parte, el\r\nartículo 11 constitucional ha sido violado en el tanto en que en él se consagra\r\nel deber de legalidad de la administración pública y por virtud de su texto el\r\nPoder Ejecutivo no puede negarse a cumplir un mandato contenido en una ley\r\ndebidamente promulgada, ya que si no estaba de acuerdo con su texto, pudo\r\nejercer el veto que le reserva la misma Constitución Política como una\r\natribución propia y específica al caso en estudio. Además, al asumir funciones,\r\ny obligarse a cumplir las leyes, por el juramento Constitucional (artículo 194)\r\nel Presidente de la República y el Ministro respectivo no pueden,\r\nposteriormente, bajo argumentos de ninguna especie, desaplicarlas sin que haya\r\nposibilidad de enmienda, lo que se prevé en la actual Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional, con la acción de inconstitucionalidad....\" . \n\r\n\r\n\n Cuando\r\nse requiere reglamentar una ley, el Poder Ejecutivo debe utilizar plazos\r\nrazonables, todo con el fin de no perjudicar intereses de terceros, y cumplir\r\ncon su obligación de regular materias que -como la laboral- son propias de la\r\nfunción social del Estado. No se justifica en lo absoluto, y más bien resulta\r\nabusivo, que el Estado, en un plazo de quince años aún no haya procedido a\r\nrealizar la reglamentación requerida por una ley, sea cual sea el objeto de su\r\nregulación, pues si el legislador al crear la ley consideró necesaria su\r\nreglamentación, y ello fue aprobado por el Poder Ejecutivo, éste debe proceder\r\ncomo la misma ley preveé, de lo contrario estaría incumpliendo una obligación\r\nque él mismo aceptó adquirir. Así las cosas, lo procedente es declarar con\r\nlugar el recurso y conceder al Poder Ejecutivo el plazo de un mes para que\r\ncumpla con la reglamentación requerida por el artículo 300 del Código de\r\nTrabajo\". \n\r\n\r\n\n II.-\r\nEn el caso concreto acusan los accionantes la omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de\r\nreglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, la cuál entro en\r\nvigencia desde el año mil novecientos noventa y cinco. Por su parte el Ministro\r\nde Ambiente y Energía admite que el tema de la contaminación visual\r\nefectivamente no ha sido regulado, sin embargo, descarta que éste acéfalo, ya\r\nque, existen criterios de la Procuraduría General de la República y sentencias\r\nde la propia Sala Constitucional que desarrollan ese concepto. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- Al respecto tenemos que la Ley Orgánica del\r\nAmbiente dispone lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nARTICULO 71.- Contaminación visual: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSe considerarán contaminación visual, las\r\nacciones, obras o instalaciones que sobrepasen, en perjuicio temporal o\r\npermanente del paisaje, los límites máximos admisibles por las normas técnicas\r\nestablecidas o que se emitan en el futuro. El Poder Ejecutivo dictará las\r\nmedidas adecuadas y promoverá su ejecución mediante los organismos, los entes\r\npúblicos y las municipalidades, para prevenir este tipo de contaminación. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nARTICULO 117.- Reglamento: El Poder Ejecutivo reglamentará las disposiciones\r\ncontenidas en esta ley dentro del plazo de tres meses, contados a partir de la\r\nvigencia de esta ley. \n\r\n\r\n\nAsimismo se\r\nconstata que la 7554 entró en vigencia el trece de noviembre de mil novecientos\r\nnoventa y cinco y fue publicada en la Gaceta número 215. \n\r\n\r\n\n IV.-\r\nDel análisis del caso este Tribunal verifica que la Ley Orgánica del\r\nAmbiente fue publicada en la Gaceta número 215 del trece de noviembre de\r\nmil novecientos noventa y cinco, de manera que, el Poder Ejecutivo desde hace\r\ntrece años tenía la obligación legal de conformidad con los artículos 11 y 194\r\nde la Constitución Política de regular el contenido del artículo 71 de la ley\r\n7554, referente a la contaminación visual. De lo expuesto, y de conformidad con\r\nel artículo 49 párrafo segundo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional mismo que establece: \"Si el amparo hubiere sido establecido\r\npara que una autoridad reglamente, cumpla o ejecute lo que una ley u otra\r\ndisposición normativa ordena, dicha autoridad tendrá dos meses para cumplir con\r\nla prevención\"; lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso por\r\nla omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de reglamentar el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica\r\ndel Ambiente número 7554 publicada en la Gaceta número 215 del trece de noviembre\r\nde mil novecientos noventa y cinco. Se concede al Poder Ejecutivo el plazo de\r\ndos meses a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia, para que proceda a la\r\nreglamentación del artículo 71 de la Ley 7554. \n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto: \n\r\n\r\n\nSe declara con\r\nlugar el recurso por la omisión del Poder Ejecutivo de reglamentar el artículo\r\n71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente número 7554 publicada en la Gaceta número\r\n215 del trece de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco. De\r\nconformidad con el artículo 49 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se\r\nconcede al Poder Ejecutivo el plazo de dos meses contados a partir de la\r\nnotificación de ésta resolución para que proceda a la reglamentación del\r\nartículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Se condena al Estado al pago de\r\nlas costas, los daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a\r\nesta declaratoria, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo\r\ncontencioso administrativo. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M. \n\r\n\r\n\nPresidenta a.i. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Adrián\r\nVargas B.\r\n Gilbert\r\nArmijo S. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Fernando\r\nCruz C.\r\n Gastón\r\nCertad M. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Marta\r\nMaría Vinocour F.\r\n Roxana\r\nSalazar C.", "body_en_text": "* 080068240007CO *\n\nExp: 08-006824-0007-CO\n\nRes. Nº 2008-011696\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at eleven hours and twenty-nine minutes of the twenty-fifth of July of two thousand eight.\n\nAmparo action filed by Adriana Valerio Madrigal, identity card number 4-196-879, Alberto Solís Madrigal, identity card number 3-429-970, Alejandra Esquivel Ugalde, identity card number 4-198-728, Alejandro González Barquero, identity card number 3-412-573, Alexis Salas Rodríguez, identity card number 2-640-529, Alonso Durán Vargas, identity card number 4-194-562, Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez, identity card number 2-365-227, Arianna Suárez Villegas, identity card number 1-1275- 684, Aymara Lezama Cáceres, identity card number 8-078-419, Benjamín Pavlotzky, identification document number 103200026000, Christian Lezama F., identity card number 1-1270-960, Cindy Montero Serrano, identity card number 1-1335-384, Georgeanella Flores Muñoz, identity card number 1-1341-218, Isbak Vargas Pandolfi, identity card number 1-1302-155, Juan Gabriel Solano Moya, identity card number 2-646-886, Karla Chacón Miranda, identity card number 1-1361-442, Marcela Villegas Portuguez, identity card number 1-1306-550, Nahuel Flores Bianchi, identity card number 6-370-382, Ronny Villalobos Chacón, identity card number 1-1311-980 and Stephanie Rivers Baltodano, identity card number 1-1396-536, against the Minister of Environment and Energy.\n\nResultando:\n\n1.- By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and fifty-two minutes of the second of May of two thousand eight, the petitioner files an amparo action against the Minister of Environment and Energy. They state that Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente defines visual pollution (contaminación visual) as the actions, works, or installations that exceed, in temporary or permanent detriment to the landscape (paisaje), the maximum permissible limits set by the technical standards established or to be issued in the future; it turns out that thirteen years later, technical, regulatory standards have still not been established to regulate visual pollution to the natural, urban, or rural landscape. That to date the words visual pollution or landscape protection appear in various regulatory bodies, but without defined parameters or conceptualizations as to what visual pollution would be or should be, leaving without content the right to landscape that emanates from norm 50 in relation to 89 of the Political Constitution. They request that the action be granted.\n\n2.- Roberto Dobles Mora, Minister of Environment and Energy, reports (folio 12) that according to the report provided by the Dirección General de Calidad Ambiental, it establishes that indeed Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente contemplates the subject of visual pollution and defines it as the actions, works, or installations that exceed, in temporary or permanent detriment to the landscape, the maximum permissible limits set by the standards and techniques established or to be issued in the future. It establishes that the Executive Branch will dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution. That while it is true the LOA has been in effect since October of nineteen ninety-five, it was not fully regulated. The Executive Branch has regulated some of the matters contained in the norm independently, in diverse legal instruments (regulations) this is primarily due to the complexity and diversity that each topic has. One can take as an example of issued regulations the Reglamento de Evaluación y Clasificación de Cuerpos de Agua Superficiales, # 33903 MINAES to regulate Article 67 of the LOA, the Reglamento de Setena # 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC to regulate Article 83 and following of the LOA. In the specific case of visual pollution, at the time it was considered appropriate to regulate the matter through a Law, and it was thus that since the year two thousand three the project that today has the number 15122 was presented, which was promoted by Deputy Aida Faingezicht. However, considering also that the matter cannot depend indefinitely on the approval of a law, the MINAE is working on the design of the specific regulation for the regulation of the issue of visual pollution, which is in the design process and according to the provisions of the Ley General de Administración Pública and the LOA itself, after the drafting of the final text, the entire consultation process must be initiated to allow an application of the established principles of participation and consultation. The regulation being designed contemplates specific sections for the regulation of, for example: installation of outdoor visual advertising, conditions for the installation of billboards (vallas) and other forms of outdoor visual advertising. It refers to the bill that exists in the Legislative Assembly processed under file number 15.122, in addition to the opinion issued by the Procuraduría General de la República, C-351-2006. It argues that while it is true there is no specific regulation for numeral 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the subject of visual pollution is not headless.\n\n3.- In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Judge Salazar Cambronero; and,\n\nConsiderando:\n\nI.- This Chamber, regarding the omission to regulate a law by the Executive Branch, established in judgment number 8418-97 of 15:42 hours of the tenth of December of nineteen ninety-seven:\n\n\"I.- The petitioner alleges that due to the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate everything concerning the functioning and organization of the Occupational Health Offices, the functioning of these commissions is being impeded, which causes serious harm to the labor sector. According to the provision of Article 300 of the Labor Code, amended by Law 6727 of March 24, 1982, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of the Occupational Health Council must have must be established via regulation:\n\n\"Article 300.- Every company that permanently employs more than fifty workers is obliged to maintain an occupational health office or department. The professional training requirements that the persons in charge of such office or department must have shall be established by regulation and in consultation with the Occupational Health Council, for which the number of workers of the company, the activity to which it is dedicated, and the existence of specialized human resources in occupational health in the labor market shall be taken into account.\"\n\nNotwithstanding that the law established the need to regulate this matter, it has not been proceeded in accordance since 1982, but rather, just as the Minister of Labor and Social Security informs, the corresponding procedures for the regulation were initiated precisely as a result of the filing of this amparo (see folios 16 and 19).\n\nLikewise, in judgment number 1463-90 at fourteen hours and thirty minutes of the thirtieth day of October of nineteen ninety, when resolving an unconstitutionality action against the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate the Ley para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público, Law 6955 of February 24, 1984, it stated:\n\n\"As a principle thesis, it can be affirmed that the regulatory power, that competence assigned to the Executive Branch to develop the law (executive regulation) is not a power-duty in itself, since it will depend on the content of the law itself, whether it finds itself obligated to develop some of its principles, because corresponding to the Executive to apply or ensure that the law is applied, it will decide its regulation as long as it is necessary to do so. That is, regulation is granted to the Executive as an instrument that facilitates the exercise of administering. However, the case is different when the legislator expressly imposes upon it in the law the duty to regulate it. Here it becomes inescapable for the Executive Branch to exercise that competence. Within the unlimited space of legislation, here the recipient of a duty to act is the Executive Branch and, as such, it remains subject to the order contained in the Law. All discretion disappears for it, because the legal norm regulated its action, so that the exercise of the competence becomes inevitable. To the extent that it has deviated from what was ordered, to that extent there is a constitutional infraction, since, as is known, the Executive Branch has a double submission in being subject to the Constitution and the Law. It is not possible to understand, as has already been attempted, that, because the regulatory power derives from the Political Constitution, the legislator is barred from regulating the opportunity for its exercise. It is constitutionally valid that, in certain circumstances, it so provides without the possibility of evasion for the administrator, because if it does so, it would be with the consequences that the legal system has in turn foreseen. Furthermore, a constitutional custom in that sense is public and notorious (See Article 68 of Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and Regulation according to Executive Decree No. 18445-H of September 9, 1988). Moreover, in the present case, the mandate of the law also includes the integration of evaluation commissions and concluding that work within a certain timeframe, as a way of preparing legislation or other normative acts aimed at improving the functioning or efficiency of public administration, with clearly macroeconomic and general policy motives.... V.- From the foregoing, it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive regulation is due to the fact that the Executive Branch followed a conduct different from that ordered by the legislator, and preferred to partially regulate or propose new legislation in order to satisfy similar purposes to those of Law No. 6955 repeatedly cited. And, thereby, the dilemma is whether there is a compliance different from the one foreseen, but compliance in the end, or if, on the contrary, the non-compliance persists despite the decrees and legislative initiatives that are indicated as an excuse for not having acted in accordance with the specific mandate of the legislator. In the opinion of this Chamber, the Executive Branch has been negligent and that negligence entails a violation of its constitutionally established duties. On one hand, Article 11 of the Constitution has been violated insofar as it enshrines the duty of legality of the public administration, and by virtue of its text, the Executive Branch cannot refuse to comply with a mandate contained in a duly enacted law, since if it did not agree with its text, it could exercise the veto that the very Political Constitution reserves for it as its own and specific attribution to the case under study. Additionally, upon assuming functions, and binding themselves to comply with the laws, by the Constitutional oath (Article 194), the President of the Republic and the respective Minister cannot, subsequently, under arguments of any kind, disapply them without the possibility of amendment, which is provided for in the current Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, with the unconstitutionality action....\".\n\nWhen it is required to regulate a law, the Executive Branch must use reasonable timeframes, all with the aim of not harming the interests of third parties, and to comply with its obligation to regulate matters that -like labor matters- are inherent to the social function of the State. It is absolutely not justified, and indeed proves abusive, that the State, within a period of fifteen years, has still not proceeded to carry out the regulation required by a law, whatever the object of its regulation may be, because if the legislator, upon creating the law, considered its regulation necessary, and that was approved by the Executive Branch, it must proceed as the law itself provides, otherwise it would be failing to comply with an obligation that it itself agreed to assume. Such being the case, the appropriate course is to declare the action granted and to grant the Executive Branch a period of one month to comply with the regulation required by Article 300 of the Labor Code\".\n\nII.- In the specific case, the petitioners accuse the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, which entered into force in the year nineteen ninety-five. For its part, the Minister of Environment and Energy admits that the issue of visual pollution has indeed not been regulated, however, it rules out that it is headless, since there are criteria from the Procuraduría General de la República and judgments of the Constitutional Chamber itself that develop that concept.\n\nIII.- In this regard, we have that the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente provides the following:\n\nARTÍCULO 71.- Visual pollution:\n\nActions, works, or installations that exceed, in temporary or permanent detriment to the landscape, the maximum permissible limits set by the technical standards established or to be issued in the future shall be considered visual pollution. The Executive Branch will dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution.\n\nARTÍCULO 117.- Regulation: The Executive Branch shall regulate the provisions contained in this law within a period of three months, counted from the effective date of this law.\n\nLikewise, it is verified that 7554 entered into force on the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five and was published in Gaceta number 215.\n\nIV.- From the analysis of the case, this Court verifies that the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente was published in Gaceta number 215 of the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five, so that the Executive Branch has had, for thirteen years, the legal obligation in accordance with Articles 11 and 194 of the Political Constitution to regulate the content of Article 71 of Law 7554, referring to visual pollution. From the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 49, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which establishes: \"If the amparo has been established for an authority to regulate, comply with, or execute what a law or other normative provision orders, said authority shall have two months to comply with the prevention\"; the appropriate course is to grant the action for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente number 7554 published in Gaceta number 215 of the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five. The Executive Branch is granted a period of two months from the notification of this judgment to proceed with the regulation of Article 71 of Law 7554.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is granted for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente number 7554 published in Gaceta number 215 of the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five. In accordance with Article 49 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the Executive Branch is granted a period of two months counted from the notification of this resolution to proceed with the regulation of Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. The State is condemned to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which shall be liquidated in the enforcement of the judgment in the contentious-administrative proceedings.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\nPresidenta a.i.\n\nAdrián Vargas B.\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\nFernando Cruz C.\nGastón Certad M.\n\nMarta María Vinocour F.\nRoxana Salazar C.\n\nRequests that the recourse be declared without merit.\n\n**3.-** In the procedures followed, the legal requirements have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Salazar Cambronero**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.-** This Chamber, regarding the omission to regulate a law by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), established in judgment number 8418-97 of 15:42 hours on December tenth, nineteen ninety-seven:\n\n*\"I.- The appellant alleges that due to the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate everything concerning the operation and organization of the Occupational Health Offices, the functioning of these commissions is being prevented, which causes serious harm to the labor sector. According to the provision of article 300 of the Labor Code, reformed by Law 6727 of March 24, 1982, the professional training requirements for the persons in charge of the Occupational Health Council must be established via regulation:*\n\n*\"Article 300.- Every company that permanently employs more than fifty workers is obliged to maintain an occupational health office or department. By regulation and in consultation with the Occupational Health Council, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of such office or department must have shall be established, for which the number of workers of the company, the activity to which it is dedicated, and the existence of specialized human resources in occupational health in the labor market shall be taken into account.\"*\n\n*Notwithstanding that the law established the need to regulate this matter, since 1982 it has not been carried out accordingly, but rather, as reported by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, the corresponding procedures for the regulation were initiated precisely as a result of the filing of this amparo (see folios 16 and 19).*\n\n*Likewise, in judgment number 1463-90 of fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October thirtieth, nineteen ninety, when resolving an action of unconstitutionality against the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate the Law for the Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector, Law 6955 of February 24, 1984, it stated:*\n\n*\"As a matter of principle, it can be affirmed that the regulatory power, that competence assigned to the Executive Branch to develop the law (executive decree), is not a power-duty in itself, since it will depend on the content of the law itself, whether the former is obliged to develop some of its principles, because corresponding to the Executive to apply or ensure that the law is applied, insofar as it is necessary for this, it will decide its regulation. That is, regulation is granted to the Executive as an instrument that facilitates the exercise of administering. However, different is the case in which the legislator expressly imposes on it in the law the duty to regulate it. Here, the exercise of that competence becomes inescapable for the Executive Branch. Within the unlimited space of legislation, here the addressee of a duty to do is the Executive Branch and, as such, is subject to the order contained in the Law. All discretion disappears for it, because the legal norm regulated its action, so that the exercise of the competence becomes inevitable. To the extent that it has deviated from what was ordered, to that extent there is a constitutional infraction, because as is known, the Executive Branch has a double submission being subject to the Constitution and the Law. It is not feasible to understand, as has already been attempted, that, derived from the Political Constitution, the regulatory power, the legislator is barred from regulating the timing of its exercise. It is constitutionally valid that, in certain circumstances, it so provides without possibility of evasion for the administrator, because doing so would be with the consequences that the legal system in turn provides for. Moreover, a constitutional custom in that sense is public and notorious (Vid. Article 68 of Law No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and Regulation according to Executive Decree No. 18445-H of September 9, 1988). Furthermore, in the present case, the mandate of the law also includes the integration of evaluation commissions and finishing that work within a determined period, as a way of preparing legislation or other normative acts aimed at improving the functioning or efficiency of the public administration, with clearly macroeconomic and general policy reasons.... V.- From the foregoing it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive regulation is due to the fact that the Executive Branch followed a conduct different from that mandated by the legislator, and preferred to regulate partially or propose new legislation in order to satisfy similar purposes to those of Law No. 6955 of repeated citation. And, there, the dilemma is whether there is a compliance different from the one foreseen, but compliance in the end, or if on the contrary the non-compliance persists despite the decrees and law initiatives that are indicated as an excuse for not having acted in accordance with the concrete mandate of the legislator. In the opinion of this Chamber, the Executive Branch has been negligent and that omission entails a violation of its constitutionally designated duties. On one hand, article 11 of the Constitution has been violated to the extent that it enshrines the duty of legality of the public administration and by virtue of its text the Executive Branch cannot refuse to comply with a mandate contained in a duly promulgated law, since if it did not agree with its text, it could have exercised the veto reserved to it by the same Political Constitution as an attribution proper and specific to the case under study. Furthermore, by assuming functions, and obliging themselves to comply with the laws, by the Constitutional oath (article 194) the President of the Republic and the respective Minister cannot, subsequently, under arguments of any kind, disapply them without possibility of amendment, which is foreseen in the current Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, with the action of unconstitutionality....\"*\n\n*When a law needs to be regulated, the Executive Branch must use reasonable timeframes, all in order not to harm the interests of third parties, and to comply with its obligation to regulate matters that -like labor- are proper to the social function of the State. It is absolutely unjustified, and rather seems abusive, that the State, within a period of fifteen years, has not yet proceeded to carry out the regulation required by a law, whatever the object of its regulation, because if the legislator, when creating the law, considered its regulation necessary, and this was approved by the Executive Branch, the latter must proceed as the law itself foresees, otherwise it would be breaching an obligation that it itself agreed to acquire. This being the case, the proper course is to declare the recourse with merit and grant the Executive Branch a period of one month so that it complies with the regulation required by article 300 of the Labor Code\".*\n\n**II.-** In the specific case, the claimants accuse the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate article 71 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), which entered into force in the year nineteen ninety-five. For his part, the Minister of Environment and Energy admits that the issue of visual contamination has indeed not been regulated; however, he rules out that it is unaddressed, since there are criteria from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and judgments from the Constitutional Chamber itself that develop that concept.\n\n**III.-** In this regard, the Organic Law of the Environment provides the following:\n\nARTICLE 71.- Visual contamination:\n\nActions, works, or facilities that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum limits admissible by the technical standards established or issued in the future shall be considered visual contamination. The Executive Branch shall dictate the adequate measures and shall promote their execution through the organisms, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of contamination.\n\nARTICLE 117.- Regulation: The Executive Branch shall regulate the provisions contained in this law within a period of three months, counted from the effective date of this law.\n\nLikewise, it is verified that Law 7554 entered into force on November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five and was published in La Gaceta number 215.\n\n**IV.-** From the analysis of the case, this Court verifies that the Organic Law of the Environment was published in La Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five, so that, the Executive Branch, for thirteen years, had the legal obligation in accordance with articles 11 and 194 of the Political Constitution to regulate the content of article 71 of Law 7554, concerning visual contamination. Based on the foregoing, and in accordance with article 49, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which establishes: \"If the amparo (recourse) has been established so that an authority regulates, complies with, or executes what a law or other normative provision orders, said authority shall have two months to comply with the prevention\"; the proper course is to declare the recourse with merit for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate article 71 of the Organic Law of the Environment number 7554, published in La Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five. The Executive Branch is granted a period of two months from the notification of this judgment, to proceed with the regulation of article 71 of Law 7554.\n\n**Therefore:**\n\nThe recourse is declared with merit for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate article 71 of the Organic Law of the Environment number 7554, published in La Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five. In accordance with article 49 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the Executive Branch is granted a period of two months counted from the notification of this resolution to proceed with the regulation of article 71 of the Organic Law of the Environment. The State is condemned to the payment of costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which shall be liquidated in the execution of the judgment of the contentious-administrative proceeding.\n\n**Ana Virginia Calzada M.**\n\n**Acting Presidenta (Presidenta a.i.)**\n\n**Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.**\n\n**Fernando Cruz C. Gastón Certad M.**\n\n**I.-** This Chamber, regarding the omission to regulate a law by the Executive Branch, established in judgment number 8418-97 of 15:42 hours on December ten, nineteen ninety-seven:\n\n*\"I.- The petitioner alleges that due to the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate everything concerning the operation and organization of the Occupational Health Offices (Oficinas de Salud Ocupacional), the functioning of these commissions is being impeded, which causes serious harm to the labor sector. According to the provision of Article 300 of the Labor Code, amended by Ley 6727 of March 24, 1982, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional) must meet are to be established via regulation:*\n\n*\"Article 300.- Every company that permanently employs more than fifty workers is obligated to maintain an occupational health office or department. By regulation and in consultation with the Occupational Health Council, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of such office or department must have shall be established, for which the number of workers of the company, the activity to which it is dedicated, and the existence of specialized human resources in occupational health in the labor market shall be taken into account.\"*\n\n*Notwithstanding that the law established the need to regulate this matter, since 1982 it has not been proceeded in accordance, but rather, as reported by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, the corresponding procedures for the regulation were initiated precisely as a result of the filing of this amparo (see folios 16 and 19).*\n\nLikewise, in judgment number 1463-90 of fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October thirty, nineteen ninety, when resolving an unconstitutionality action against the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate the Law for the Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector, Ley 6955 of February 24, 1984, it stated:\n\n*\"As a thesis of principle, it can be affirmed that the regulatory power, that competence assigned to the Executive Branch to develop the law (executive decree) is not a power-duty in and of itself, since it will depend on the content of the law itself, whether the former is obligated to develop some of its principles, because it being the responsibility of the Executive to apply or ensure that the law is applied, insofar as it is necessary for this, it will decide on its regulation. That is to say, regulation is granted to the Executive as an instrument that facilitates the exercise of administration. However, different is the case in which the legislator expressly imposes on it in the law the duty to regulate it. Here, the exercise of that competence becomes inescapable for the Executive Branch. Within the unlimited space of legislation, here the recipient of a duty to do is the Executive Branch and, as such, it is subject to the order contained in the Law. All discretion disappears for it, because the legal norm regulated its action, so that the exercise of the competence becomes inevitable. Insofar as it has departed from what was ordered, in that respect there is a constitutional infraction, because as is known, the Executive Branch has a double submission by being subject to the Constitution and to the Law. It is not permissible to understand, as has been attempted, that, since the regulatory power is derived from the Political Constitution, the legislator is barred from regulating the timeliness of its exercise. It is constitutionally valid that, in certain circumstances, it so provides without possibility of evasion for the administrator, because in doing so, it would be with the consequences that the legal system in turn has foreseen. Moreover, it is public and notorious a constitutional custom in that sense (See Article 68 of Ley No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and Regulation according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 18445-H of September 9, 1988). Furthermore, in the present case, the mandate of the law also includes the integration of evaluation commissions and finishing that work within a determined timeframe, as a way of preparing legislation or other normative acts aimed at improving the functioning or efficiency of the public administration, with clearly macroeconomic and general policy motives.... V.- From the foregoing, it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive regulation is due to the fact that the Executive Branch followed a conduct different from that mandated by the legislator, and preferred to regulate partially or propose new legislation in order to satisfy purposes similar to those of Ley No. 6955 of repeated citation. And, thereby, the dilemma is whether there is a compliance different from that foreseen, but compliance after all, or if, on the contrary, the non-compliance persists despite the decrees and legislative initiatives that are indicated as an excuse for not having acted in accordance with the concrete mandate of the legislator.*\"\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, the Executive Branch has been negligent and that negligence entails a violation of its constitutionally designated duties. On one hand, Article 11 of the Constitution has been violated insofar as it enshrines the duty of legality of the public administration and by virtue of its text the Executive Branch cannot refuse to comply with a mandate contained in a duly enacted law, since if it did not agree with its text, it could have exercised the veto that the same Political Constitution reserves for it as a specific power proper to the case under consideration. Furthermore, upon assuming functions, and binding themselves to comply with the laws, through the Constitutional oath (Article 194) the President of the Republic and the respective Minister cannot subsequently, under arguments of any kind, disapply them without the possibility of amendment, which is provided for in the current Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), through the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad)....\" .\n\nWhen it is required to regulate a law, the Executive Branch must use reasonable timeframes, all with the aim of not harming third-party interests, and to comply with its obligation to regulate matters that—such as labor—are intrinsic to the social function of the State. It is absolutely unjustified, and rather constitutes an abuse, that the State, within a period of fifteen years, has still not proceeded to carry out the regulation required by a law, whatever the object of its regulation may be, because if the legislator, when creating the law, considered its regulation necessary, and this was approved by the Executive Branch, the latter must proceed as the same law provides, otherwise it would be failing to comply with an obligation that it itself agreed to acquire. As matters stand, the appropriate course is to declare the appeal (recurso) with merit and grant the Executive Branch a period of one month to comply with the regulation required by Article 300 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)\".\n\nII.- In the specific case, the petitioners accuse the Executive Branch of the omission of regulating Article 71 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), which entered into force in the year nineteen ninety-five. For his part, the Minister of Environment and Energy admits that the issue of visual pollution (contaminación visual) has indeed not been regulated, however, he dismisses that it is leaderless, since there are criteria from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and rulings from this same Constitutional Chamber that develop that concept.\n\nIII.- In this regard, we have that the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) provides the following:\n\nARTICLE 71.- Visual pollution (Contaminación visual):\n\nActions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum admissible limits established by technical standards or those to be issued in the future, shall be considered visual pollution (contaminación visual). The Executive Branch shall dictate the appropriate measures and shall promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution (contaminación).\n\nARTICLE 117.- Regulation (Reglamento): The Executive Branch shall regulate the provisions contained in this law within a period of three months, counted from the effective date of this law.\n\nLikewise, it is verified that Law 7554 entered into force on the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five and was published in La Gaceta number 215.\n\nIV.- From the analysis of the case, this Court verifies that the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) was published in La Gaceta number 215 of the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five, such that, the Executive Branch has had for thirteen years the legal obligation, in accordance with Articles 11 and 194 of the Political Constitution, to regulate the content of Article 71 of Law 7554, concerning visual pollution (contaminación visual). Based on the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 49, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which establishes: \"If the amparo (recurso de amparo) has been filed so that an authority regulates, complies with, or executes what a law or other normative provision orders, said authority shall have two months to comply with the requirement\"; the appropriate course is to declare the appeal (recurso) with merit for the omission of the Executive Branch to regulate Article 71 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) number 7554 published in La Gaceta number 215 of the thirteenth of November of nineteen ninety-five. The Executive Branch is granted a period of two months from the notification of this judgment, to proceed with the regulation of Article 71 of Law 7554.\"\n\nResultando:\n\n1.- By a document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours fifty-two minutes on May second, two thousand eight, the petitioner files an amparo action against the Minister of Environment and Energy. They state that Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente defines visual pollution as actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum admissible limits established by technical standards or those issued in the future; it turns out that thirteen years later, technical, regulatory standards have still not been established to regulate what constitutes pollution of the natural, urban, or rural landscape. That to date, the words visual pollution or landscape protection appear in several regulatory bodies, but without defined parameters or conceptualizations regarding what visual pollution would or should be, leaving without content the right to the landscape that emanates from norm 50 in relation to 89 of the Constitución Política. They request that the action be granted.\n\n2.- Roberto Dobles Mora, Minister of Environment and Energy, reports (folio 12) that in accordance with the report provided by the Dirección General de Calidad Ambiental, it is established that Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente indeed contemplates the issue of visual pollution and defines it as the actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum admissible limits by the established standards and techniques or those issued in the future. It establishes that the Poder Ejecutivo will dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution. That although it is true the LOA has been in effect since October of nineteen ninety-five, it was not fully regulated. The Poder Ejecutivo has regulated some of the matters contained in the norm independently, in various legal instruments (regulations), this is due above all to the complexity and diversity that each topic has. As an example of issued regulations, one can take the Reglamento de Evaluación y Clasificación de Cuerpos de Agua Superficiales, # 33903 MINAES to regulate Article 67 of the LOA, the Reglamento de Setena # 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC to regulate Articles 83 and following of the LOA. In the specific case of visual pollution, at the time it was considered opportune to regulate the matter through a Law, and it was thus that since the year two thousand three, the bill that today has number 15122 was presented, which was promoted by Deputy Aida Faingezicht. However, also considering that the matter cannot depend indefinitely on the approval of a law, the MINAE is currently working on the design of the specific regulation for regulating the issue of visual pollution, which is in the design process and according to the provisions of the Ley General de Administración Pública and the LOA itself, after the drafting of the final text, the entire consultation process must be initiated to allow for the application of the established principles of participation and consultation. The regulation being designed includes specific sections for the regulation of, for example: installation of outdoor visual advertising, conditions for the installation of billboards and other forms of outdoor visual advertising. It references the bill that exists in the Asamblea Legislativa processed under expediente number 15.122, in addition to the opinion issued by the Procuraduría General de la República, C-351-2006. He argues that although it is true that there is no specific regulation for numeral 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the issue of visual pollution is not headless. He requests that the action be dismissed.\n\n3.- In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Salazar Cambronero; and,\n\nConsiderando:\n\nI.- This Chamber, regarding the omission to regulate a law by the Poder Ejecutivo, established in judgment number 8418-97 of 15:42 hours on December tenth, nineteen ninety-seven:\n\n\"I.- The petitioner alleges that due to the omission of the Poder Ejecutivo to regulate everything concerning the operation and organization of the Occupational Health Offices, the functioning of these commissions is being prevented, which causes serious harm to the labor sector. According to the provision of Article 300 of the Labor Code, reformed by Ley 6727 of March 24, 1982, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional must have are to be established via regulation:\n\n\"Article 300.- Every company that permanently employs more than fifty workers is obligated to maintain an occupational health office or department. By regulation and in consultation with the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional, the professional training requirements that the persons in charge of such office or department must have will be established, for which the number of workers in the company, the activity to which it is dedicated, and the existence of specialized human resources in occupational health in the labor market will be taken into account.\"\n\nNotwithstanding that the law established the need to regulate this matter, since 1982 it has not been proceeded with accordingly, but rather, as informed by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, the corresponding procedures for the regulation were initiated precisely as a result of the filing of this amparo (see folios 16 and 19).\n\nLikewise, in judgment number 1463-90 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the thirtieth day of October, nineteen ninety, when resolving an unconstitutionality action against the omission of the Poder Ejecutivo to regulate the Ley para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público, Ley 6955 of February 24, 1984, it stated:\n\n\"As a matter of principle, it can be affirmed that the regulatory power, that competence assigned to the Poder Ejecutivo to develop the law (executive regulation) is not a power-duty in itself, since it will depend on the content of the law itself, whether it is obligated to develop some of its principles, for corresponding to the Executive to apply or ensure that the law is applied, insofar as it is necessary for this, it will decide its regulation. That is, the regulatory power is granted to the Executive as an instrument that facilitates the exercise of administration. However, different is the case in which the legislator expressly imposes on it in the law the duty to regulate it. Here it becomes inescapable for the Poder Ejecutivo to exercise that competence. Within the unlimited space of legislation, here the recipient of a duty to act is the Poder Ejecutivo and, as such, it is subject to the order contained in the Law. All discretion disappears for it, because the legal norm regulated its action, so that the exercise of the competence becomes inevitable. Insofar as it has departed from what was ordered, to that extent there is a constitutional infraction, since as is known, the Poder Ejecutivo has a double submission being subject to the Constitution and the Law. It is not possible to understand, as has been attempted, that, derived the regulatory power from the Constitución Política, the legislator is prohibited from regulating the opportunity of its exercise. It is constitutionally valid that, in certain circumstances, it so provides without possibility of evasion for the administrator, for doing so would carry the consequences that the legal system in turn provides. Moreover, a constitutional custom in that sense is public and notorious (See Article 68 of Ley No. 7092 of April 21, 1988 and Regulation according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 18445-H of September 9, 1988). Furthermore, in the present case, the mandate of the law also includes the integration of evaluation commissions and finishing that work within a determined period, as a way of preparing legislation or other normative acts aimed at improving the functioning or efficiency of the public administration, with clearly macroeconomic and general policy motives.... V.- From the foregoing it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive regulation is due to the fact that the Poder Ejecutivo followed a conduct different from that mandated by the legislator, and preferred to regulate partially or propose new legislation in order to satisfy similar purposes to those of Law No. 6955 of repeated citation. And, thereby, the dilemma is whether there is a compliance different from the one foreseen, but compliance in the end, or if on the contrary the non-compliance persists despite the decrees and legislative initiatives indicated as an excuse for not having acted in accordance with the specific mandate of the legislator. In the opinion of this Chamber, the Poder Ejecutivo has been neglectful and that omission entails a violation of its constitutionally designated duties. On one hand, Article 11 of the Constitution has been violated insofar as it enshrines the duty of legality of the public administration and by virtue of its text the Poder Ejecutivo cannot refuse to comply with a mandate contained in a duly enacted law, since if it did not agree with its text, it could have exercised the veto reserved to it by the Constitución Política itself as an attribution proper and specific to the case under study. Furthermore, upon assuming functions, and obligating themselves to comply with the laws, by Constitutional oath (Article 194) the President of the Republic and the respective Minister cannot, subsequently, under arguments of any kind, disapply them without the possibility of amendment, which is provided for in the current Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, with the unconstitutionality action....\".\n\nWhen it is required to regulate a law, the Poder Ejecutivo must use reasonable periods, all with the aim of not harming third-party interests, and comply with its obligation to regulate matters that -like labor matters- are inherent to the social function of the State. It is not justified in the slightest, and rather is abusive, that the State, within a period of fifteen years, has still not proceeded to carry out the regulation required by a law, whatever the object of its regulation may be, for if the legislator, upon creating the law, considered its regulation necessary, and this was approved by the Poder Ejecutivo, the latter must proceed as the law itself provides, otherwise it would be failing to comply with an obligation that it itself accepted to acquire. That being the case, it is proper to grant the action and grant the Poder Ejecutivo a period of one month to comply with the regulation required by Article 300 of the Labor Code\".\n\nII.- In the specific case, the plaintiffs accuse the omission of the Poder Ejecutivo to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, which came into effect since the year nineteen ninety-five. For his part, the Minister of Environment and Energy admits that the issue of visual pollution has indeed not been regulated; however, he rules out that it is headless, since there are opinions from the Procuraduría General de la República and judgments from the Constitutional Chamber itself that develop that concept.\n\nIII.- In this regard, we have that the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente provides the following:\n\nARTÍCULO 71.- Visual pollution:\n\nActions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum admissible limits established by technical standards or those issued in the future, shall be considered visual pollution. The Poder Ejecutivo shall dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution.\n\nARTÍCULO 117.- Regulation: The Poder Ejecutivo shall regulate the provisions contained in this law within a period of three months, counted from the effective date of this law.\n\nIt is also verified that 7554 came into effect on November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five and was published in Gaceta number 215.\n\nIV.- From the analysis of the case, this Tribunal verifies that the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente was published in Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five, such that the Poder Ejecutivo, for thirteen years, had the legal obligation in accordance with Articles 11 and 194 of the Constitución Política to regulate the content of Article 71 of Law 7554, concerning visual pollution. From the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 49, second paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which establishes: \"If the amparo has been established so that an authority regulates, complies with, or executes what a law or other normative provision orders, said authority shall have two months to comply with the prevention\"; it is proper to grant the action due to the omission of the Poder Ejecutivo to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente number 7554 published in Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five. The Poder Ejecutivo is granted a period of two months from the notification of this judgment, to proceed with the regulation of Article 71 of Law 7554.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is granted due to the omission of the Poder Ejecutivo to regulate Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente number 7554 published in Gaceta number 215 of November thirteenth, nineteen ninety-five. In accordance with Article 49 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the Poder Ejecutivo is granted a period of two months counted from the notification of this resolution to proceed with the regulation of Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. The State is condemned to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which shall be liquidated in the execution of judgment of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta a.i.\n\nAdrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Gastón Certad M.\n\nMarta María Vinocour F. Roxana Salazar C." }