{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-447511", "citation": "Res. 04955-2009 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Constitucionalidad de la conducción bajo influencia del alcohol como delito de peligro concreto", "title_en": "Constitutionality of driving under the influence as a concrete-danger offense", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, que sanciona con prisión de uno a tres años la conducción con una concentración de alcohol en sangre superior a 0,75 gramos por litro. El accionante, imputado por ese delito, alegaba violación a los principios de lesividad, debido proceso, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y propiedad privada. La Sala determina que las conductas tipificadas son de peligro concreto y protegen bienes jurídicos colectivos e individuales como la seguridad común, el orden público y la vida, por lo que no infringen el artículo 28 constitucional. La pena de prisión se considera proporcionada, especialmente porque la ley permite sustituirla por trabajo de utilidad pública. Los argumentos sobre debido proceso y múltiples sanciones son rechazados: el primero por ser un problema de aplicación y no de la norma, y el segundo porque las sanciones adicionales no están previstas en el artículo impugnado. La acción contra otros artículos de la Ley de Tránsito se rechaza de plano por no haberse invocado en el asunto base.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber rejects a constitutional challenge against Article 254 bis, paragraph four of the Penal Code, which punishes driving with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.75 grams per liter with one to three years in prison. The petitioner, charged under that provision, alleged violations of the principles of harmfulness, due process, reasonableness, proportionality, and private property. The Chamber finds that the criminalized conduct creates concrete danger and protects collective and individual legal interests such as public safety, public order, and life, and therefore does not violate Article 28 of the Constitution. The prison sentence is deemed proportionate, especially since the law permits its substitution with community service. Arguments regarding due process and multiple sanctions are dismissed: the former is a matter of enforcement, not the norm itself, and the latter because additional sanctions are not contained in the challenged article. The action against other articles of the Traffic Law is summarily rejected for not having been raised in the underlying case.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "24/03/2009", "year": "2009", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "bien jurídico tutelado", "delitos de peligro concreto", "principio de lesividad", "principio de proporcionalidad", "alcoholemia", "non bis in idem", "debido proceso" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331,", "article": "all", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8696", "article": "all", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "conducción temeraria", "alcoholemia", "principio de lesividad", "delitos de peligro concreto", "razonabilidad", "proporcionalidad", "debido proceso", "Código Penal", "Ley de Tránsito" ], "keywords_en": [ "constitutional challenge", "reckless driving", "blood alcohol test", "harmfulness principle", "concrete-danger offenses", "reasonableness", "proportionality", "due process", "Penal Code", "Traffic Law" ], "excerpt_es": "En la norma que se analiza, las conductas tipificadas son de peligro concreto, en tanto, se ha demostrado fehacientemente que las mismas producen resultados lesivos de bienes jurídicos considerados de gran valor para la sociedad. Los tipos penales descritos (...) constituyen acciones pluriofensivas, esto es, que ponen en peligro, según sea el caso, diversos bienes jurídicos tales como la seguridad común, el orden público, la propiedad, la integridad física, la salud y la vida. Se trata de bienes cuya protección resulta legítima al amparo de lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política...", "excerpt_en": "The conduct criminalized in the provision under review constitutes concrete-danger offenses, as it has been demonstrably shown that such conduct produces harmful results for legal interests considered of great value to society. The described criminal types (...) constitute multi-offensive actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as public safety, public order, property, physical integrity, health, and life. The protection of these interests is legitimate under Article 28 of the Constitution...", "outcome": { "label_en": "Dismissed", "label_es": "Rechazada", "summary_en": "The Chamber summarily dismissed the action against most articles of the Traffic Law and dismissed on the merits the action against Article 254 bis, paragraph four of the Penal Code, holding that criminalizing driving under the influence does not violate the Constitution.", "summary_es": "La Sala rechaza de plano la acción contra la mayoría de los artículos de la Ley de Tránsito y rechaza por el fondo la acción contra el artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, declarando que la tipificación de la conducción bajo influencia del alcohol no infringe la Constitución." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "The conduct provided for in Article 254 bis of the Penal Code is itself risky or dangerous to property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Moreover, it seriously affects public order and common safety.", "quote_es": "Las conductas previstas en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal, en sí mismas resultan riesgosas o peligrosas para la propiedad, la salud, integridad y vida de las personas. Además, se trata de conductas que afectan gravemente el orden público y la seguridad común." }, { "context": "Considerando III (cita de sentencia previa)", "quote_en": "The use of prison sentences as a deterrent for the aforementioned conduct is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that such conduct creates for legal interests considered most valuable by society.", "quote_es": "El hecho de que se utilice la pena de prisión como disuasora de las conductas referidas, no resulta en sí mismo desproporcionado, dado el altísimo peligro que las mencionadas conductas generan para los bienes jurídicos considerados de mayor valor para la sociedad." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "If in a specific case there has been an infringement of the elements that make up due process, it is a problem not of the challenged norms but of their application by the authorities, which is not reviewable through this means.", "quote_es": "Si en el caso concreto, se ha dado alguna infracción a los elementos que integran el debido proceso, es un problema que no es de las normas impugnadas, sino de su aplicación por parte de las autoridades, lo cual, no es controlable en esta vía." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-137120", "citation": "Res. 01009-2010 Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José", "title_en": "Non-application of vehicle forfeiture in reckless driving offense due to disproportionality", "title_es": "Inaplicación del comiso de vehículo en delito de conducción temeraria por desproporcionalidad", "doc_type": "court_decision", "date": "31/08/2010", "year": "2010" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-499036", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-499036" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-447511", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-499036" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "* 090007880007CO * \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n* 090007880007CO * \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 09-000788-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2009004955 \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA\r\nCORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cincuenta y dos\r\nminutos del veinticuatro de marzo del dos mil nueve. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Acción\r\nde inconstitucionalidad promovida por Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, mayor,\r\nsoltero, en unión de hecho, empresario, de nacionalidad alemana, cédula de\r\nresidencia número 704-133739-001483, vecina de Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste;\r\ncontra los artículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso\r\ne), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del\r\ndos mil ocho y 254 bis del Código Penal. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nResultando: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las ocho horas cuarenta\r\ny seis minutos del veintiuno de enero del dos mil nueve, el accionante solicita\r\nque se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 129 inciso e), 107\r\ninciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número\r\n8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho y 254 bis del Código Penal.\r\nComo motivos de inconstitucionalidad señala: a) inexistencia de lesión a bien\r\njurídico tutelado; b) violación al debido proceso; c) violación a los\r\nprincipios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad; d) violación\r\nal derecho de propiedad privada. a) Inexistencia de lesión a\r\nbien jurídico tutelado: En primer lugar, señala el accionante que la pena\r\nde cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una acción antijurídica\r\ntipificada como delito, razón por la cual, dicha pena, para quien conduzca bajo\r\nlos efectos del licor, resulta desproporcionada y no tutela un bien jurídico\r\nválido. Diferente sería el caso de si bajo los efectos del licor se ocasiona un\r\naccidente, muerte o lesiones de una persona, donde el bien jurídico lesionado\r\nes la vida o la integridad física y ya existe una pena debidamente tipificada\r\nen el Código Penal. Existen otras formas de represión y prevención menos\r\ngravosas para este tipo de conductas que el Estado puede exigir y no constituye\r\nel único camino a seguir, por lo que no se cumple con el principio de la\r\naplicación de la cárcel como último recurso. Por ejemplo, la instauración de\r\nprogramas de educación y cultura para las nuevas generaciones, programas de\r\nrehabilitación, trabajo comunitario, multas económicas, el quitar placas,\r\nprogramas de certificación de buenas prácticas de conducción, programas de\r\nrehabilitación, etc. Es decir, existe una clara violación al artículo 28\r\nconstitucional, por cuanto no basta, como lo señala la jurisprudencia, con que\r\nuna conducta encaje en un tipo penal sino que es esencial que se produzca una\r\nlesión significativa al bien jurídico tutelado. b) Violación al debido\r\nproceso: Antes de la promulgación de la nueva Ley de Tránsito, el\r\nconducir bajo los efectos del alcohol traía como consecuencia una multa y\r\nsanción administrativa. En cambio, con la entrada en vigencia y la tipificación\r\nde la conducta de conducir bajo los efectos del alcohol como delito, se\r\nconvierte al conductor en un imputado y en consecuencia, con una serie de\r\ngarantías y derechos constitucionales obviados del todo en la ley y su\r\naplicación. La Sala ha sido reiterada en su jurisprudencia al establecer que a\r\nnadie se le podrá imponer una sanción sin que a través de un procedimiento en\r\nque se respete el derecho de defensa se haya demostrado su culpabilidad. Así,\r\nel derecho de defensa en general comprende una serie de principios, entre los\r\ncuales están, el principio de intimación, el principio de imputación, el derecho\r\nde audiencia, el derecho de defensa en sí, el principio de inocencia y el\r\nderecho de defensa técnica y más importante aún la garantía constitucional del\r\nartículo 36 de la Constitución Política de que “en materia penal nadie está\r\nobligado a declarar contra sí mismo…” mucho menos a producir prueba en su\r\ncontra. Todos esos principios son violentados con la tipificación como delito\r\nde la conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, pues en la reforma a la ley y\r\nmás aún en la práctica, no existen garantes encargados de vigilar que se puedan\r\ncumplir con estas garantías y derechos constitucionales. Tanto en la reforma\r\nintroducida por la Ley como en la aplicación de ésta por las autoridades, no se\r\nadvierte a los detenidos y que están presuntamente bajo los efectos del alcohol\r\nrespecto a su derecho constitucional de no producir prueba en su propia contra,\r\nde no declarar ante las autoridades y de ser asistido en todo momento por un\r\ndefensor, a pesar de esto la ley autoriza a que se les practique la\r\nalcoholemia. Así las cosas, la ley no da un procedimiento para garantizar el\r\nderecho de defensa del imputado ni establece garantes que puedan dar protección\r\na estos derechos. c) Violación a los principios constitucionales de\r\nrazonabilidad y proporcionalidad: Las reformas introducidas en la Ley\r\nimpugnada transgreden absolutamente los principios de razonabilidad y\r\nproporcionalidad. Cuando se detiene a un conductor conduciendo bajo los efectos\r\ndel alcohol, se producen las siguientes sanciones: multa económica,\r\npérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo\r\ndeterminado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de\r\ntransporte, grúas y depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y\r\neventualmente, cárcel. En tales términos, definitivamente no existe\r\nproporcionalidad en el nuevo tipo penal introducido por la Ley. La Ley se está\r\ntransformando en algo total y completamente arbitrario e inquisitorio, lejos\r\ndel sistema democrático y de derecho en que se vive. Hay otros medios menos\r\ngravosos para alcanzar el fin que pretende la nueva Ley y ante la posibilidad\r\nde sanciones menos gravosas no procede la imposición de la sanción más gravosa\r\nsegún las normas y principios ya indicados. Adicionalmente, en la reforma\r\nintroducida a la Ley de Tránsito y cuya inconstitucionalidad se alega, se está\r\njuzgando y sancionando más de una vez y con penas distintas (multa, comiso,\r\ninhabilitación) por el mismo hecho a una misma persona lo que transgrede el\r\nprecepto constitucional de que nadie puede ser juzgado dos veces por el mismo\r\nhecho y el tipo penal está yendo más allá de este hecho, violentando dicho\r\nprincipio. Es decir, la nueva ley permite que se impongan hasta nueve sanciones\r\npor un mismo hecho. Vale además indicar que la existencia de estas otras\r\nsanciones demuestra la contravención al principio de tipicidad, pues existen al\r\nmenos 8 sanciones menos gravosas que la cárcel para esa conducta, pero aún así,\r\nla norma sanciona con pena de cárcel. En otro orden de ideas, en cuanto a la\r\nmulta económica, ésta resulta confiscatoria, quebrantando también los\r\nprincipios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que deberá ser en cada\r\ncaso concreto que se deba analizar la posibilidad económica de cada\r\nadministrado. La Ley en general establece e impone multas que resultan\r\nconfiscatorias, resultan desproporcionadas e irracionales y que en algunos\r\ncasos va más allá de la posibilidad económica de los administrados\r\nestableciendo multas de más de un salario base, es decir, más de lo que una\r\npersona común gana en un mes, lo que resulta desproporcional. Por último, la\r\nfalta de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las penas impuestas con la reforma\r\ncuya inconstitucionalidad se alega, queda en evidencia cuando por ejemplo, se\r\nimpone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada que por no contar con la\r\nrevisión técnica al día, siendo a todas luces la segunda conducta más grave que\r\nla primera. Como éste, hay un sinnúmero de ejemplos en la ley de cita. d)\r\nViolación al derecho de propiedad privada: La propiedad privada es inviolable\r\ny a nadie puede privarse de la suya, si no es por interés público legalmente\r\ncomprobado, previa indemnización conforme a la ley. El decomiso y posterior\r\ncomiso del carro en el caso concreto, resulta total y completamente\r\ninconstitucional. Al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y no\r\nexistencia de un bien jurídico tutelado, no existe una causa de justificación\r\npor parte del Estado para poder decomisar y posteriormente efectuar el comiso\r\ndel vehículo a favor del Estado y privar de la propiedad privada al\r\nadministrado. Asimismo, resulta desproporcional e injustificado, que al\r\nconductor se le inhabilite para la conducción, se le sancione con multas,\r\neventualmente con cárcel y a pesar de eso, se efectúe el comiso del bien, que\r\nen muchas ocasiones incluso pertenece a un tercero. Bastaría con dejar al\r\ninfractor sin posibilidad de circulación en caso de transgredir una norma\r\nadministrativa de conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, o remover las\r\nplacas, o la multa impuesta, o una combinación de éstas, pero nunca al comiso\r\ndel vehículo a favor del Estado ante un potencial delito que su significancia\r\ntampoco justifica tal actuar pues resulta violatorio del derecho constitucional\r\na la propiedad privada. Además, resulta confiscatorio por cuanto excede esos\r\nparámetros e impone multas por cuido del carro y transporte de grúas. Aparte de\r\nesta situación, expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra el deterioro y\r\ndaños que menoscaben su patrimonio. Señala el accionante que actualmente figura\r\ncomo imputado en una causa judicial seguida en la Fiscalía de Cañas, tramitada\r\ncon el número de expediente 08-200005-413-PE, la cual se encuentra pendiente de\r\nresolver. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- Por resolución de las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del nueve de febrero\r\ndel dos mil nueve, se previno al accionante: fundamentar en forma clara y\r\nprecisa, con cita concreta de las normas o principios que se consideran\r\ninfringidos, las razones por las cuales considera que los artículos 129 inciso\r\ne), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144\r\ncuestionados, son inconstitucionales; aportar certificación literal del escrito\r\ndonde invocó la inconstitucionalidad de esas normas en el asunto base pendiente\r\nde resolver; aportar siete juegos de copias más de toda la documentación presentada\r\n(seis para los Magistrados de la Sala y una para la Procuraduría General de la\r\nRepública) así como las necesarias para las partes contrarias que figuren en el\r\nasunto base, si las hubiere y el timbre del Colegio de Abogados por la suma de\r\ndoscientos cincuenta colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito\r\ninicial. (folio 47 frente) \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- Por escrito presentado a las trece horas veinticinco minutos del dieciséis\r\nde febrero del dos mil ocho, el accionante se apersona a cumplir con lo\r\nprevenido (folios 49 a 53), señalando lo siguiente: El artículo 254 bis del\r\nCódigo Penal transgrede el artículo 28 de la Constitución, dado que conducir\r\nbajo las influencias del alcohol no transgrede ningún bien jurídico tutelado ni\r\nperjudica a terceros. Si se llegara a perjudicar a terceros, ya existen normas\r\nque sancionan la conducta, tales como lesiones culposas, homicidio culposo,\r\nentre otros. Es decir, no se está en presencia de una conducta que tenga que\r\npenalizarse y le corresponde al Estado realizarlo hasta que sea la última\r\nopción o como última ratio si hay necesidad de hacerlo y en la actualidad no\r\nexiste agotamiento por parte del Estado de todos los medios para poder alcanzar\r\nel fin. Adicionalmente a esto, dicha norma, en conjunto con la normativa del 130\r\ninciso a) (antes 129), 141 (antes 140), 139 inciso c) (antes 138), 144 (antes\r\n143), transgrede los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y\r\nproporcionalidad. Las sanciones que se aplican: multa de un setenta y cinco por\r\nciento del salario base, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para\r\nconducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del\r\nvehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas y depósito del vehículo,\r\nimposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente cárcel. Es decir, la conducta\r\nque no lesiona ningún bien jurídico y por lo tanto no es penalizable, además de\r\neso, tiene una serie de sanciones que violentan los principios\r\nconstitucionales. En la reforma introducida a la Ley de Tránsito y cuya\r\ninconstitucionalidad se alega, se está juzgando y sancionando más de una vez y\r\ncon penas distintas (multa, comiso, inhabilitación) por el mismo hecho a una\r\nmisma persona, lo que transgrede el precepto constitucional de que nadie puede\r\nser juzgado dos veces por el mismo hecho. Es decir, la nueva Ley permite que se\r\nimpongan hasta 9 sanciones por un mismo hecho. Vale además indicar que la\r\nexistencia de estas otras sanciones demuestra la contravención al principio de\r\ntipicidad, pues existen al menos ocho sanciones menos gravosas que la cárcel\r\npara esa conducta, pero aún así, la norma sanciona con pena de cárcel. En otro\r\norden de ideas, en cuanto a la multa económica, ésta resulta confiscatoria,\r\nquebrantando también los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda\r\nvez que deberá ser en cada caso concreto que se deba analizar la posibilidad\r\neconómica de cada administrado, violentando el artículo 40 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica. La ley establece e impone multas que resultan confiscatorias,\r\ndesproporcionadas e irracionales y que en algunos casos va más allá de la\r\nposibilidad económica de los administrados, estableciendo multas de más de un\r\nsalario base, es decir, más de lo que una persona común gana en un mes lo que\r\nresulta desproporcional. Las reformas introducidas a la Ley\r\nde Tránsito y donde se tipifica la conducta de conducir bajo los efectos del\r\nlicor, transgreden dichos principios y no existe un procedimiento que garantice\r\nel derecho de defensa a la hora de practicar la alcoholemia. El sistema en la\r\npráctica no garantiza los principios fundamentales del debido proceso y del\r\nderecho de defensa y no hay advertencia de que el imputado pueda o no\r\nabstenerse de practicarse la alcoholemia ni la manipulación que se le pueda dar\r\na este tipo de prueba. Con esto se quiere decir, que debe establecerse un\r\nprocedimiento bajo el cual se pueda garantizar el derecho de defensa de los\r\nimputados, llámese asistencia técnica, advertencia de derechos constitucionales\r\ny garantes de esta situación, a no producir prueba en su contra, entre otros.\r\nCuando se practica la alcoholemia no existe un garante que pueda dar fe de la\r\nadvertencia de tales derechos, toda vez que quienes practican dichas pruebas\r\nson los oficiales de tránsito y siendo que ahora se está en presencia de un\r\ndelito, aún así deben de respetarse y garantizarse dichos derechos y la ley ni\r\nel sistema prevén dicha situación. Aún cuando un imputado pueda negarse al\r\nsometimiento del examen de la alcoholemia y obligársele a tal, no existen\r\ngarantes de los derechos constitucionales y básicamente del artículo 36\r\nconstitucional, por lo que consideran que la norma del artículo 107 es\r\ninconstitucional. La propiedad privada es inviolable y aún cuando se conduzca\r\nbajo los efectos del licor, no existe justificación por parte del Estado para\r\npoder decomisar el vehículo y ser objeto de una serie de daños por el solo\r\nhecho de tenerlo en un depósito de vehículos con la exposición de las\r\ninclemencias del tiempo y la manipulación de éste por parte de terceras\r\npersonas. El decomiso y posterior comiso del carro en el caso concreto, resulta\r\ntotal y completamente inconstitucional. Al no existir delito, por el criterio\r\nde no lesividad y no existencia de un bien jurídico tutelado, no existe una\r\ncausa de justificación por parte del Estado para poder decomisar y posteriormente\r\nefectuar el comiso del vehículo a favor del Estado y privar de la propiedad\r\nprivada al administrado. Asimismo, resulta desproporcional e injustificado que\r\nal conductor se le inhabilite para la conducción, se le sancione con multas,\r\neventualmente con cárcel y a pesar de eso, se efectúe el comiso del bien, que\r\nen muchas ocasiones incluso pertenece a un tercero. Basta para comprender la\r\nfalta de razonabilidad y la desproporcionalidad de esta medida. Bastaría con\r\ndejar al infractor sin posibilidad de circulación en caso de transgredir una\r\nnorma administrativa de conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, a remover las\r\nplacas, o la multa impuesta o una combinación de estas, pero nunca al comiso\r\ndel vehículo a favor del Estado, ante un potencial delito que su significancia\r\ntampoco justifica tal actuar pues resulta violatorio del derecho constitucional\r\na la propiedad privada. Además, resulta confiscatorio por cuanto excede esos\r\nparámetros e impone multas por cuido del carro y transporte de grúas. Aparte de\r\nesta situación expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra deterioro y\r\ndaños que menoscaben su patrimonio. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n4.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala\r\na rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su\r\npresentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte\r\nser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de\r\njuicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o\r\nreproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRedacta el Magistrado Vargas Benavides; y, \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- Sobre la admisibilidad. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es\r\nadmisible únicamente en relación con lo dispuesto en el artículo 254 bis\r\npárrafo cuarto del Código Penal, dado que conforme puede apreciarse a folio 29\r\ndel expediente, la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto base\r\npendiente de resolver, se hizo en cuanto a esa norma y no en cuanto a las\r\ndemás. El artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional\r\nestablece como requisito de admisibilidad, la existencia de un asunto base\r\npendiente de resolver, donde se hubiere invocado la inconstitucionalidad, como\r\nmedio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado.\r\nAsimismo, el artículo 79 de la misma Ley establece que el escrito de\r\ninterposición de la acción debe ser presentado junto con certificación literal\r\ndel escrito donde se invocó la inconstitucionalidad en el asunto principal. En\r\nel caso que se analiza, el asunto base lo constituye la causa seguida contra el\r\naccionante en la Fiscalía de Cañas, por el delito de “Infracción a la Ley de\r\nTránsito”, tramitada con el número de expediente 08-200005-413-PE y se constata\r\nque se invocó la inconstitucionalidad al señalar a folio 29 frente: “Adicionalmente\r\na lo anterior, a mi criterio el delito tipificado en la nueva ley roza con los\r\nprincipios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y más aún resulta confiscatorio y\r\nuna violación a la propiedad privada, otro de los derechos constitucionales que\r\nostentamos los costarricenses al decomisar el vehículo y negarse a su\r\ndevolución inmediata al propietario registral.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nII.- Objeto de la acción. El artículo 254 bis del Código Penal\r\nseñala: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 254 bis.- Se impondrá pena de prisión de\r\nuno (1) a tres (3) años y la inhabilitación para conducir vehículos de todo\r\ntipo, de uno (1) a cinco (5) años, a quien conduzca en las vías públicas en\r\ncarreras ilícitas, concursos de velocidad ilegales o piques contra uno o varios\r\nvehículos, contra reloj o cualquier otra modalidad. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSi el conductor se encuentra bajo alguna de las\r\ncondiciones indicadas en el párrafo anterior y las señaladas en los incisos a)\r\ny b) del artículo 107 de la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, N.°\r\n7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, y sus reformas, se impondrá pena de prisión de\r\ndos (2) a seis (6) años y, además, se le inhabilitará para conducir todo tipo\r\nde vehículos de dos (2) a diez (10) años. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSe impondrá pena de prisión de uno (1) a tres (3)\r\naños, a quien conduzca un vehículo automotor a una velocidad superior a ciento\r\ncincuenta (150) kilómetros por hora. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSe impondrá prisión de uno (1) a tres (3)\r\naños, a quien conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas, cuando la\r\nconcentración de alcohol en la sangre sea mayor a cero coma setenta y cinco\r\n(0,75), gramos de alcohol por cada litro de sangre. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nAl conductor reincidente se le impondrá una pena\r\nde prisión de dos (2) a ocho (8) años. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nCuando se imponga una pena de prisión de tres (3)\r\naños o menos, el tribunal podrá sustituir la pena privativa de libertad por una\r\nmedida alternativa de prestación de servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser\r\ndesde doscientas (200) horas hasta novecientas cincuenta (950) horas de\r\nservicio, en los lugares y la forma señalados en el artículo 71 ter de la Ley\r\nde tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, N.° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, y\r\nsus reformas.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Como\r\nprimer motivo, el accionante aduce que la norma impugnada es contraria al\r\nprincipio de ofensividad, dado que no existe un bien jurídico que proteger. A\r\nsu juicio, la pena de cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una\r\nacción antijurídica tipificada como delito, por lo que considera que imponer\r\ndicha pena para quien conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, resulta\r\ndesproporcionado, en virtud de que no se tutela ningún bien jurídico válido,\r\npues no se produce afectación a la vida o integridad física. Señala que\r\nexisten medidas o sanciones menos gravosas que podrían aplicarse. Como\r\nsegundo aspecto, afirma el accionante que la reforma realizada a la Ley de\r\nTránsito, en cuanto a la conducción en estado de ebriedad tipificada como\r\ndelito, infringe los principios de intimación, imputación, inocencia, derecho\r\nde audiencia, derecho de defensa en sí, derecho a la defensa técnica y la\r\ngarantía constitucional de que en materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar\r\ncontra sí mismo y mucho menos a producir prueba en su contra. Esto por cuanto,\r\nno existen encargados de vigilar que se cumpla con estas garantías y derechos\r\nconstitucionales, pues no se advierte a los detenidos que están presuntamente\r\nbajo los efectos del alcohol, respecto de su derecho constitucional de no\r\nproducir prueba en su contra, de no declarar ante las autoridades y de ser\r\nasistido en todo momento por un defensor. Afirma que a pesar de eso, la ley\r\npermite que se les practique la alcoholemia. Como tercer tema, el accionante\r\nplantea que la norma impugnada infringe los principios de razonabilidad y\r\nproporcionalidad porque al incurrir en la conducta prevista en la norma\r\ncuestionada, se producen multiplicidad de sanciones: multa económica, pérdida o\r\ndecomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado,\r\ndecomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte,\r\ngrúas, depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente,\r\ncárcel. Afirma que esto además vulnera el principio de non bis in idem. En\r\ncuanto a la multa económica afirma que la misma es confiscatoria porque no se\r\nvalora la posibilidad económica de cada administrado. Agrega que la\r\ndesproporcionalidad se constata al observar que se impone una pena mayor por\r\ntener una luz quemada que por no contar con la revisión técnica al día. \r\nPor último, aduce violación al derecho de propiedad privada, dado que se\r\ndecomisa el vehículo, lo cual estima inconstitucional, pues al no existir\r\ndelito, por la falta de protección a un bien jurídico, no hay justificación por\r\nparte del Estado. Se expone al administrado a que su propiedad sea dañada y\r\nsufra un deterioro. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- Sobre el bien jurídico tutelado en la norma\r\nimpugnada. Refiere el\r\naccionante que la cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una acción\r\nantijurídica tipificada como delito, por lo que considera que imponer dicha\r\npena para quien conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, resulta desproporcionado\r\nen virtud de que la norma no tutela ningún bien jurídico. Señala que existen\r\nmedidas o sanciones menos gravosas que podrían aplicarse. Este Tribunal\r\nya se pronunció en relación con el tema de la tutela de bienes jurídicos en la\r\nnorma impugnada y la razonabilidad de la utilización de la prisión como\r\nsanción: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“IV.- Sobre la protección a bienes jurídicos en\r\nla norma impugnada. Si bien es cierto, toda conducta penalizada ha de tener\r\ncomo objetivo la protección de un bien jurídico determinado, el legislador\r\ntiene la facultad de diseñar las normas penales conforme considere se adaptan\r\nmejor a la naturaleza del bien que se pretende tutelar y de acuerdo con los\r\nfines que le ha asignado a la pena y al derecho penal en general, los cuales\r\npueden ser no sólo retributivos, sino también preventivos -ya de prevención\r\ngeneral positiva o negativa-, resocializadores, etc. La doctrina dominante ha\r\ndistinguido entre delitos de lesión y de peligro, atendiendo a la distinta intensidad\r\ndel ataque al bien jurídico. En los delitos de lesión se exige para la\r\ntipicidad del hecho la producción de la lesión del bien jurídico o del objeto\r\nque lo representa, mientras que en los de peligro no se exige ese efecto,\r\nproduciéndose un adelantamiento de la protección del bien a fases anteriores a\r\nla de su efectivo menoscabo o lesión. La delimitación entre una y otra clase de\r\ndelitos puede ofrecer dificultad frente a figuras delictivas concretas. Así, en\r\nlos delitos en los que se tutelan bienes colectivos como la salud pública, la\r\nseguridad del tráfico, etc., si se considera la afectación que las conductas\r\nsuponen para el bien jurídico colectivo, pueden tenerse como delitos de lesión;\r\nsin embargo, frente a los bienes jurídicos individuales, sólo suponen un\r\npeligro. La diferenciación entre los delitos de peligro abstracto y delitos de\r\npeligro concreto tampoco es fácil en algunos casos, ya que en ambos se requiere\r\nun desvalor de acción, mientras que sólo los delitos de peligro concreto exigen\r\nun verdadero desvalor del resultado, que consiste precisamente en esa concreta\r\npuesta en peligro. Según la opinión doctrinal mayoritaria, los delitos de\r\npeligro abstracto sancionan la puesta en práctica de una conducta reputada\r\ngeneralmente peligrosa, sin necesidad de que se haga efectivo un peligro para\r\nel bien jurídico protegido. Se busca castigar la peligrosidad misma de la\r\nconducta, sin entrar a evaluar la capacidad de lesión o la real puesta en\r\npeligro de los bienes jurídicos tutelados. En ellos se determina la\r\npeligrosidad de la conducta típica a través de una generalización legal basada\r\nen la consideración de que determinados comportamientos son generalmente\r\npeligrosos para el objeto típico y, en definitiva, para el bien jurídico. El\r\nlegislador selecciona formas de comportamiento típicamente peligrosas para el\r\nbien jurídico correspondiente, sin que deba establecerse en cada caso\r\nparticular la concreta puesta en peligro del objeto de la acción o del bien\r\njurídico protegido en la norma. No se exige una efectiva puesta en peligro\r\n–juzgada ex post- para el objeto de la acción o el bien jurídico protegido,\r\naunque sí que la realización de ese comportamiento suponga –desde una\r\nperspectiva ex ante- un riesgo de producción de una concreta puesta en peligro\r\no de la lesión del bien jurídico. La doctrina ha encontrado dificultades en\r\ndeterminar si los delitos de peligro abstracto implican un verdadero contenido\r\nde antijuridicidad material y se discute si son violatorios o no de los\r\nprincipios de culpabilidad y lesividad. La Sala Constitucional, por su\r\nparte, ha determinado que no todos los tipos penales de peligro abstracto son\r\ninconstitucionales (Al respecto, pueden consultarse las sentencias 2805-96, que\r\nse pronunció en relación con los artículos que regulan la portación ilícita de\r\narmas; 1792-99 en relación con la tenencia de instrumentos de falsificación y\r\nasociación ilícita; 4673-03 sobre los delitos de la Ley de Migración y\r\nExtranjería y 218-06 sobre los delitos de la Ley sobre Estupefacientes,\r\nSustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de\r\nCapitales y Actividades Conexas). En los delitos de peligro concreto, en\r\ncambio, el peligro para el bien jurídico sí constituye un elemento expreso del\r\ntipo, de modo que para considerar consumado el delito, el juez ha de comprobar\r\nla producción de un peligro real para un objeto de la acción, ligado\r\ncausalmente y objetivamente imputable a ésta. Por lo tanto, al igual que en los\r\ndelitos de lesión, debe crearse, si bien no un resultado, sí un “peligro de\r\nresultado concreto” en cuanto sea un riesgo de lesión adecuado y no permitido,\r\nque requiere como presupuestos que el objeto de la acción haya entrado en el\r\námbito operativo de quien lo pone en peligro y, luego que el comportamiento\r\nhaya creado un peligro próximo de lesión de ese objeto de la acción. En la\r\nnorma que se analiza, las conductas tipificadas son de peligro concreto, en\r\ntanto, se ha demostrado fehacientemente que las mismas producen resultados\r\nlesivos de bienes jurídicos considerados de gran valor para la sociedad. Los\r\ntipos penales descritos (conducción en las vías públicas en carreras ilícitas,\r\nconcursos de velocidad ilegales o piques contra uno o varios vehículos, contra\r\nreloj o cualquier otra modalidad; conducción de un vehículo automotor a una\r\nvelocidad superior a ciento cincuenta kilómetros por hora; conducción bajo la\r\ninfluencia de bebidas alcohólicas, cuando la concentración de alcohol en la\r\nsangre sea mayor a cero coma setenta y cinco gramos de alcohol por cada litro\r\nde sangre) constituyen acciones pluriofensivas, esto es, que ponen en peligro,\r\nsegún sea el caso, diversos bienes jurídicos tales como la seguridad común, el\r\norden público, la propiedad, la integridad física, la salud y la vida. Se trata\r\nde bienes cuya protección resulta legítima al amparo de lo dispuesto en el\r\nartículo 28 de la Constitución Política, que establece la posibilidad de\r\nrestringir aquellas conductas que lesionen los derechos de terceros, la moral o\r\nel orden público: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Cuando las acciones privadas trascienden al que\r\nlas ejecuta y comprometen el bien común (orden o moral pública o causan daño a\r\ntercero) son regulables por el Estado y aun prohibidas por éste, siempre y\r\ncuando haya motivos para ello y la regulación pase el examen de razonabilidad\r\nque exige el debido proceso sustantivo. Así, el individuo tiene que aceptar\r\naquellas restricciones de su libertad de acción que el legislador establece\r\npara la promoción de la convivencia social dentro de los límites de lo\r\nexigible, siempre que se mantenga la independencia de la persona. La libertad\r\nes restringible, eso sí en virtud de razones suficientes desde la óptica\r\nconstitucional. Lo anterior conduce al principio de libertad negativa, que, en\r\ntanto principio, no otorga una permisión definitiva de hacer u omitir lo que se\r\nquiera en la medida en que razones suficientes, -derechos de terceros, la moral\r\no el orden públicos- no justifiquen una restricción de la libertad negativa.\r\nCon ello, el principio de la libertad negativa puede tomar en cuenta la\r\nvinculación del individuo con la comunidad. Partimos entonces de la premisa de\r\nque al Estado le está vedado interferir en el ámbito de la libertad particular,\r\nsalvo que de por medio se encuentre el orden público, la moral o los derechos\r\nde terceros, en cuyo caso, la regulación estatal resultaría posible, por medio\r\nde una ley formal. La restricción eso sí debe ser únicamente la necesaria para\r\nlograr el fin propuesto, de acuerdo con los principios de razonabilidad y\r\nproporcionalidad, parámetros de constitucionalidad según la reiterada\r\njurisprudencia de este Tribunal. El proyecto de ley consultado, que establece\r\nla obligatoriedad del uso del cinturón de seguridad, entraña una cuestión\r\ninherente al bien común (entendido como bien público en general), y constituye\r\npor tanto, una conducta susceptible de regulación legal, que a juicio de la\r\nSala es compatible con el Derecho de la Constitución […] Mantener el orden y la\r\nseguridad en las vías incide directamente en dos aspectos fundamentales de la\r\nvida en sociedad, como lo son la salud y la vida de quienes las utilizan. La\r\nley número 7331 tiene como objeto regular la circulación de vehículos, personas\r\ny semovientes, por las vías terrestres de la nación, así como todo lo relativo\r\na la seguridad vial (artículo 1), tanto de peatones como de conductores y acompañantes,\r\nlo que denota la existencia de un nexo indisoluble entre la ordenación para el\r\nuso de las vías públicas y la seguridad de quienes transiten por ellas, que\r\njustifica plenamente la intervención del Estado en la materia.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n(Sentencia 2004-01603-04 de las nueve horas\r\ntreinta minutos del diecisiete de febrero del dos mil cuatro) \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nLas conductas previstas en el artículo 254 bis del\r\nCódigo Penal, en sí mismas resultan riesgosas o peligrosas para la propiedad,\r\nla salud, integridad y vida de las personas. Además, se trata de conductas que\r\nafectan gravemente el orden público y la seguridad común. A mayor abundamiento,\r\nal consultar la Exposición de Motivos del expediente legislativo 16.496 (folios\r\n2 a 45) que dio origen a la Ley 8696, se encuentran suficientes razones\r\nde interés público que legitiman la intervención del Estado en la regulación de\r\ndeterminadas conductas que se estiman dañosas para la colectividad y para los\r\nindividuos en particular: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Las muertes y lesiones por accidentes de tránsito\r\nson un problema para la salud pública y el desarrollo de los países, tal y como\r\nlo señala categóricamente el Informe Mundial sobre Prevención de los\r\nTraumatismos Causados por el Tránsito, presentado en el año 2004 por la\r\nOrganización Mundial de la Salud. El informe revela que 1.2 millones de\r\npersonas mueren al año por accidentes de tránsito. De estos 20 a 50 millones\r\nsufren lesiones o quedan incapacitados, produciendo el 2.1% del total de\r\nmuertes a nivel global. Las proyecciones realizadas señalan que los accidentes de\r\ntránsito se incrementarán y que para el año 2020, ocuparán el tercer lugar como\r\nprincipal causa de morbilidad y mortalidad, lo cual resulta alarmante. Cada\r\nvíctima de un accidente de tránsito representa para la sociedad y para las\r\nfamilias un alto costo social y económico. En el ámbito mundial la cifra es\r\ncercana a los 518 miles de millones de dólares y para América Latina está\r\nimpactando más de 1.5% del producto interno bruto. Costa Rica no es ajena a esa\r\nproblemática mundial, siendo los accidentes de tránsito la primera causa de\r\nmuertes violentas; por varios factores, entre los cuales se encuentran los\r\naltos niveles de agresividad y estrés, manifestados en conductas y hábitos\r\ntemerarios que reproducen día con día los usuarios del sistema de tránsito […]\r\nPara establecer los factores de riesgo asociados a la ocurrencia de estas\r\nmuertes, se utilizó la base de datos de muertes “in situ” por accidentes de\r\ntránsito en período de seis años (2000-2005) obteniéndose los siguientes\r\nresultados: a.- El 28.77%, 636 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible\r\ncausa del accidente de tránsito, el exceso de velocidad […] b.- El 18.09%, 400\r\npersonas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa del accidente de\r\ntránsito, la imprudencia del peatón […] c.- El 16.92%,374 personas fallecidas\r\nse le atribuye como posible causa estar bajo los efectos del alcohol […] d.- El\r\n12.71%, 281 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa la\r\nimprudencia del conductor […] e.- El 9.45%, 209 personas fallecidas se le\r\natribuye como posible causa el adelantamiento indebido […] f.- El 6.06%, 134\r\npersonas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa la imprudencia del\r\nciclista […] g.- El 4.30%, 95 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible\r\ncausa la falla mecánica […] h.- El restante 3.70%, 82 personas fallecidas se le\r\natribuye como posible causa otros factores […].” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn cuanto a la ingesta alcohólica y su relación\r\ncon los accidentes de tránsito, se señala: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“[…] los accidentes de tránsito están relacionados\r\ncon el consumo de alcohol como una de las principales causas de mortalidad y\r\nmorbilidad evitable. Diversos estudios han determinado que concentraciones de\r\nalcohol en sangre superiores a 0,5 g/l se correlacionan con un riesgo lineal de\r\ntener un accidente de tránsito y presentar lesiones de mayor gravedad. El\r\nalcohol produce una depresión no selectiva del sistema nervioso central,\r\ndeteriorando la función psicomotora, la percepción sensorial (vista y oído),\r\nmodifica el comportamiento de la persona, etc. En general, los efectos del alcohol\r\nson directamente proporcionales a su concentración en la sangre: a mayor\r\nconcentración mayor deterioro. Está perfectamente demostrado que el alcohol\r\ndeteriora marcadamente la función psicomotora y la capacidad para conducir con\r\nseguridad. Mientras la tendencia en los países desarrollados en relación a los\r\nfallecidos producto de la conducción con alcohol viene a la baja, en las\r\nnaciones latinoamericanas vecinas e incluso en el ámbito nacional está en\r\nfranco aumento, de ahí que también se propone un incremento en el monto de la\r\nmulta actual, como una forma de inhibir al conductor a cometer esta clase de\r\nreacciones violentas. De la base de datos de muertes “in situ” en seis años de\r\ndatos, se obtuvo que de un total de 2.211 fallecidos, el 16.92%, es decir 374\r\nmuertos, se le atribuye como posible causa del accidente la presencia del\r\nalcohol.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn relación con los conductores que sobrepasan los\r\nlímites de velocidad, se sostiene: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“En los últimos años, hemos visto como ha\r\nproliferado en las calles de San José la práctica de un mortal “pasatiempo”.\r\nConductores irresponsables, generalmente jóvenes, ponen a prueba sus máquinas y\r\ndestreza al volante en plena vía pública en una actitud que abiertamente\r\namenaza su integridad física y la de terceros. Esta situación ha provocado ya,\r\nmuchos accidentes y pérdidas de vidas de inocentes peatones que transitan\r\ndesprotegidos ante la imprudencia de estos conductores. Las regulaciones que\r\nexisten son insuficientes para evitar estas demostraciones o “piques”, por lo\r\nque la labor deberá ser de creación de las normas aplicables para solucionar de\r\nforma permanente esta problemática.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nDe lo expuesto, se concluye, entonces, que las\r\nconductas previstas en la norma impugnada sí lesionan bienes jurídicos\r\nindividuales y, sociales y desde ese punto de vista, no infringen el principio\r\nde lesividad previsto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Sobre la razonabilidad de la\r\nnorma impugnada. Estima\r\nel accionante que el Estado no puede interferir en la esfera de vida de las personas,\r\nmás allá de lo razonable. Esto es, que la prohibición penal debe ser necesaria,\r\nidónea y proporcional. Aduce que en el caso de la norma cuestionada, la\r\nprohibición no es necesaria porque no tutela ningún bien jurídico concreto, no\r\nes idónea porque la cárcel no es el mejor medio de protección, pues se trata de\r\nun medio infrahumano para solucionar problemas, que crea más violencia y\r\ndesocializa; y, en cuanto a la proporcionalidad, como los hechos tipificados\r\ncomo conducción temeraria, no tutelan bien jurídico alguno, resulta\r\ndesproporcionado imponer una pena cuando con una sanción disciplinaria se\r\npodría evitar que se cause daño a terceros y además ya existen otros tipos\r\npenales en leyes vigentes que protegen los daños reales causados. Conforme se\r\nindicó, las conductas previstas en la norma impugnada sí afectan o ponen en\r\npeligro bienes jurídicos altamente valiosos para la sociedad y para los\r\nindividuos en particular. La conducción temeraria en nuestro país constituye la\r\nprincipal causa de muertes violentas. El manejo en estado de\r\nebriedad, la alta velocidad y la realización de carreras o “piques” en las vías\r\npúblicas, son conductas realmente reprochables que reflejan un gran desprecio\r\npor la propia vida y la vida de los demás. Denotan un grave problema cultural y\r\nuna pérdida de los valores que deben regir la vida social, tales como el\r\nrespeto a los demás, la solidaridad, la cortesía, el altruismo. El Estado\r\nno sólo se encuentra legitimado para prohibir y sancionar tales conductas, de\r\nconformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política,\r\nsino que tiene la obligación de intervenir para tutelar los bienes jurídicos\r\nque resultan lesionados o puestos en peligro, dado que quienes no realizan esas\r\nacciones, no tienen por qué sufrir las consecuencias del actuar dañoso de los\r\ndemás y merecen la protección estatal. El hecho de que se utilice la pena\r\nde prisión como disuasora de las conductas referidas, no resulta en sí mismo\r\ndesproporcionado, dado el altísimo peligro que las mencionadas conductas\r\ngeneran para los bienes jurídicos considerados de mayor valor para la sociedad.\r\nAdemás, puede observarse que el legislador establece sanciones alternativas que\r\nposibilitan el aplicar la prisión como último recurso y sólo por el tiempo\r\nmínimo indispensable, de conformidad con los parámetros que establece el\r\nartículo 71 del Código Penal.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n(Sentencia 2004-09 de las catorce horas cuarenta\r\nminutos del once de febrero del dos mil nueve) \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nCon base en lo expuesto en la resolución\r\nparcialmente transcrita, se rechaza por el fondo la acción en cuanto a ese\r\nextremo. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Inexistencia de lesión al debido proceso. Afirma el accionante que la reforma\r\nrealizada a la Ley de Tránsito, en cuanto a la conducción en estado de ebriedad\r\ntipificada como delito, infringe los principios de intimación, imputación,\r\ninocencia, derecho de audiencia, derecho de defensa en sí, derecho a la defensa\r\ntécnica y la garantía constitucional de que en materia penal nadie está\r\nobligado a declarar contra sí mismo y mucho menos, a producir prueba en su\r\ncontra. Esto por cuanto, no existen garantes encargados de vigilar que se\r\ncumpla con estas garantías y derechos constitucionales, pues no se advierte a\r\nlos detenidos que están presuntamente bajo los efectos del alcohol, respecto de\r\nsu derecho constitucional de no producir prueba en su contra, de no declarar\r\nante las autoridades y de ser asistido en todo momento por un defensor. Afirma\r\nque a pesar de eso, la Ley permite que se practique la alcoholemia al imputado.\r\nSobre el particular, debe señalarse que para la investigación y juzgamiento de\r\nlos delitos introducidos por la reforma a la Ley de Tránsito, particularmente\r\nel previsto en el artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, sea, la\r\nconducción en estado de ebriedad, deben respetarse los principios, derechos y\r\ngarantías que componen el debido proceso, previstos tanto en la Constitución\r\nPolítica, como en los diversos instrumentos de derecho internacional aplicables\r\nen Costa Rica, el Código Procesal Penal y la misma jurisprudencia de esta Sala.\r\nEl ejercicio del derecho de defensa debe respetarse plenamente por parte de\r\ntodas las autoridades públicas y ha de reconocerse desde el momento en que una\r\npersona tiene la condición de imputado, sea, desde que es señalado como posible\r\nautor de un hecho punible o partícipe en él, mediante cualquier acto de la\r\ninvestigación o del procedimiento (artículo 81 del Código Procesal Penal). El\r\nartículo 12 del Código Procesal Penal establece que es inviolable la defensa de\r\ncualquiera de las partes en el procedimiento. Asimismo, el artículo 93 del\r\nmismo Código señala que antes de que el imputado declare sobre los hechos, se\r\nle requerirá el nombramiento de un abogado para que lo asista. Si el imputado\r\nno escoge un defensor de su confianza, el Estado le proveerá un defensor\r\npúblico para que ejerza la defensa técnica. En cuanto a los elementos de\r\nprueba, éstos solo tendrán valor si han sido obtenidos por un medio lícito e\r\nincorporados conforme al procedimiento que establece el Código Procesal Penal\r\n(artículo 181 del Código Procesal Penal). Si en el caso concreto, se ha dado\r\nalguna infracción a los elementos que integran el debido proceso, es un\r\nproblema que no es de las normas impugnadas, sino de su aplicación por parte de\r\nlas autoridades, lo cual, no es controlable en esta vía. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Inexistencia de violación a los principios de\r\nrazonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Argumenta el accionante que en virtud de las reformas a la Ley de Tránsito,\r\nse transgreden los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad porque se\r\nproducen las sanciones de: multa económica, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia,\r\ninhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas,\r\ndecomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas, depósito del\r\nvehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente, cárcel. Además,\r\nestima que se vulnera el principio de non bis in idem. En cuanto a la multa\r\neconómica afirma que la misma es confiscatoria porque no se valora la\r\nposibilidad económica de cada administrado. Agrega que la desproporcionalidad\r\nse constata al observar que se impone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada\r\nque por no contar con la revisión técnica al día. Al respecto, debe señalarse\r\nque la única sanción prevista en la norma impugnada es la de uno a tres años de\r\nprisión, la cual puede ser sustituida por una medida alternativa de prestación\r\nde servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser de doscientas hasta novecientas\r\ncincuenta horas de servicio. Las sanciones de multa e inhabilitación no están\r\nprevistas en la norma impugnada. Los demás aspectos señalados por el accionante\r\nson consecuencias derivadas del delito, pero no constituyen en sí mismos una\r\npena y, en todo caso, no están previstos en la norma impugnada. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Sobre la violación al derecho de propiedad\r\nprivada. Afirma el\r\naccionante que el comiso del vehículo que se conduce en estado de ebriedad es\r\ninconstitucional, pues al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y\r\nno existencia de bien jurídico tutelado, no hay justificación por parte del\r\nEstado. Se expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra un deterioro y daños\r\nque menoscaban su patrimonio. De una lectura de la norma impugnada se constata\r\nque la misma no hace ninguna referencia al comiso del vehículo, pues en\r\nrealidad esta es una consecuencia del delito que está contenida en otras\r\nnormas, tales como el artículo 110 del Código Penal y 465 del Código Procesal\r\nPenal. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Conclusión. Con base en las consideraciones expuestas,\r\nse rechaza de plano la acción en relación con los artículos 29 inciso e), 107\r\ninciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número\r\n8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho. En cuanto al artículo 254\r\nbis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, se rechaza por el fondo la acción. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción en cuanto a los\r\nartículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136,\r\n141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho.\r\nEn cuanto al artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, se rechaza por\r\nel fondo la acción. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nAdrián Vargas B. \n\r\n\r\n\nPresidente a.i. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Luis\r\nPaulino Mora M.\r\n Gilbert\r\nArmijo S. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Ernesto\r\nJinesta L.\r\n Fernando\r\nCruz C. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Rosa\r\nMaría Abdelnour G.\r\n Roxana\r\nSalazar C. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos:\r\n2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica:\r\nwww.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional", "body_en_text": "* 090007880007CO *\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* 090007880007CO *\n\n\n\nExp: 09-000788-0007-CO\nRes. No. 2009004955\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-two minutes of March twenty-fourth, two thousand nine.\n\nUnconstitutionality action brought by Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, of legal age, single, in a common-law union, businessman, of German nationality, residency card number 704-133739-001483, resident of Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste; against articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Penal Code.\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- By document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours forty-six minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand nine, the petitioner requests that articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Penal Code be declared unconstitutional. As grounds for unconstitutionality, he indicates: a) non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest; b) violation of due process; c) violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality; d) violation of the right to private property. a) Non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest: Firstly, the petitioner indicates that imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why said penalty, for someone who drives under the influence of alcohol, is disproportionate and does not protect a valid legal interest. The case would be different if, under the influence of alcohol, an accident is caused, or the death or injuries of a person, where the legal interest harmed is life or physical integrity and a penalty duly defined in the Penal Code already exists. There are other, less burdensome forms of repression and prevention for this type of conduct that the State can demand and it does not constitute the only path to follow, such that the principle of applying imprisonment as a last resort is not fulfilled. For example, the establishment of education and culture programs for new generations, rehabilitation programs, community work, financial fines, removing license plates, certification programs for good driving practices, rehabilitation programs, etc. That is, there is a clear violation of Article 28 of the Constitution, since it is not enough, as jurisprudence indicates, for a conduct to fit into a criminal type; rather, it is essential that a significant harm to the protected legal interest is produced. b) Violation of due process: Before the enactment of the new Ley de Tránsito (Traffic Law), driving under the influence of alcohol resulted in a fine and an administrative sanction. In contrast, with the entry into force and the classification of the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, the driver becomes an accused person and, consequently, is subject to a series of constitutional guarantees and rights entirely ignored in the law and its application. The Chamber has been consistent in its jurisprudence in establishing that no one can be subject to a sanction without his guilt having been demonstrated through a procedure in which the right of defense is respected. Thus, the right of defense in general comprises a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification, the principle of imputation, the right to be heard, the right of defense itself, the principle of innocence, and the right to technical defense, and even more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that “in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself…” much less to produce evidence against himself. All these principles are violated by classifying driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, since in the reform to the law, and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights can be fulfilled. Both in the reform introduced by the Law and in its application by the authorities, detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney, despite which the law authorizes that a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) be administered to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the right of defense of the accused nor does it establish guarantors who can provide protection for these rights. c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are produced: financial fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal type introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something totally and completely arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic and rule-of-law system in which we live. There are other less burdensome means to achieve the end pursued by the new Law, and given the possibility of less burdensome sanctions, the imposition of the most burdensome sanction does not proceed according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, whose unconstitutionality is alleged, a single person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, forfeiture (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal type is going beyond this act, violating said principle. That is, the new law allows up to nine sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth indicating that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of typicality, since there are at least 8 sanctions less burdensome than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the rule sanctions with imprisonment. In another vein, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic capacity of each individual (administrado) must be analyzed in each specific case. The Law generally establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic capacity of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform whose unconstitutionality is alleged is evident when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection, with the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. As with this, there are countless examples in the law cited. d) Violation of the right to private property: Private property is inviolable, and no one can be deprived of his own except for a legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since no crime exists, due to the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause for justification by the State to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite that, the forfeiture of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would be sufficient to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in case of transgressing an administrative rule for driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or impose a fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and towing transportation. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to his property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish his assets. The petitioner indicates that he currently appears as an accused in a judicial case pending in the Fiscalía (Prosecutor's Office) of Cañas, processed under case file number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.\n\n\n\n2.- By resolution of sixteen hours twenty minutes of February ninth, two thousand nine, the petitioner was warned: to substantiate in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the rules or principles considered infringed, the reasons why he considers that the challenged articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 are unconstitutional; to provide a literal certification of the document where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those rules in the pending base matter; to provide seven sets of copies plus all of the documentation presented (six for the Magistrates of the Chamber and one for the Procuraduría General de la República) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties appearing in the base matter, if any, and the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados (Bar Association) for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial document. (folio 47 front)\n\n\n\n3.- By document presented at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes of February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the petitioner appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), indicating the following: Article 254 bis of the Penal Code transgresses Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not transgress any protected legal interest nor harm third parties. If third parties were to be harmed, there are already rules that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, we are not in the presence of a conduct that needs to be penalized, and it is up to the State to do so only as a last option, or as a last resort (última ratio), if there is a need to do so, and currently there is no exhaustion by the State of all means to achieve the end. Additionally to this, said rule, together with the regulations of 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), transgresses the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions that are applied: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that harms no legal interest and is therefore not punishable, in addition to that, has a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, whose unconstitutionality is alleged, a single person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, forfeiture, disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth indicating that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of typicality, since there are at least eight sanctions less burdensome than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the rule sanctions with imprisonment. In another vein, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic capacity of each individual must be analyzed in each specific case, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic capacity of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, where the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol is classified, transgress said principles and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system in practice does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the accused may or may not abstain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor any safeguard regarding the manipulation that could be given to this type of evidence. By this, it is meant that a procedure must be established under which the right of defense of the accused can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, the right not to produce evidence against oneself, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer these tests are traffic officers (oficiales de tránsito), and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, these rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and neither the law nor the system provides for this situation. Even when an accused person could refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test examination and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of constitutional rights and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider that the rule in Article 107 is unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when one drives under the influence of alcohol, there is no justification by the State to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages simply by keeping it in a vehicle depot, exposed to the elements and handling by third parties. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since no crime exists, due to the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause for justification by the State to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite that, the forfeiture of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. This is sufficient to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would be sufficient to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in case of transgressing an administrative rule for driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or to impose a fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and towing transportation. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to his property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish his assets.\n\n\n\n4.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar petition that was rejected.\n\n\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Vargas Benavides; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On admissibility. The unconstitutionality action is admissible only in relation to the provisions of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code, given that, as can be seen at folio 29 of the file, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the pending base matter was made with respect to that rule and not with respect to the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as a requirement for admissibility the existence of a pending base matter, where unconstitutionality was invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the document filing the action must be presented together with a literal certification of the document where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the main matter. In the case under analysis, the base matter is the case being pursued against the petitioner in the Fiscalía of Cañas for the crime of “Violation of the Ley de Tránsito,” processed under case file number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is confirmed that unconstitutionality was invoked by stating at folio 29 front: “Additionally to the above, in my opinion, the crime defined in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and even more so is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner.”\n\n\n\nII.- Object of the action. Article 254 bis of the Penal Code states:\n\n\n\n“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification from driving vehicles of all types for one (1) to five (5) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests, or drag races (piques) against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.\n\n\n\nIf the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those outlined in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331 (Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, No. 7331), of April 13, 1993, and its amendments, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and moreover, the person shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.\n\n\n\nA prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.\n\n\n\nA prison term of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.\n\n\n\nA recidivist driver shall be imposed a prison sentence of two (2) to eight (8) years.\n\n\n\nWhen a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence for an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública), which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in Article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its amendments.”\n\nAs a first ground, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule is contrary to the principle of harmfulness (ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest to protect. In his judgment, imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is protected, since no harm is produced to life or physical integrity. He indicates that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. As a second aspect, the petitioner states that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving while intoxicated classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notification, imputation, innocence, right to be heard, right of defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against himself, much less to produce evidence against himself. This, because there are no persons responsible for ensuring compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, since detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the law permits the breathalyzer test to be administered to them. As a third issue, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule infringes the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because, upon incurring the conduct provided for in the questioned rule, a multiplicity of sanctions is produced: a financial fine, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. He states that this also violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is confirmed by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is seized, which he considers unconstitutional, since no crime exists, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest, there is no justification by the State. The individual is exposed to his property being damaged and suffering deterioration.\n\nIII.- On the legal interest protected in the challenged rule. The petitioner states that imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that the rule does not protect any legal interest. He indicates that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. This Tribunal has already ruled in relation to the issue of the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule and the reasonableness of using imprisonment as a sanction:\n\n\n\n“IV.- On the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must have as its objective the protection of a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal rules as he considers they best adapt to the nature of the interest sought to be protected and in accordance with the purposes he has assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which can be not only retributive, but also preventive – whether general positive or negative prevention –, resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of harm (lesión) and crimes of endangerment (peligro), based on the different intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of harm, the production of harm to the legal interest or to the object that represents it is required for the typicality of the act, while in endangerment crimes, that effect is not required, producing an advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or harm. The delineation between one class of crime and another can present difficulty in the face of specific criminal figures. Thus, in crimes where collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., are protected, if the impact that the conduct entails for the collective legal interest is considered, they can be seen as crimes of harm; however, in relation to individual legal interests, they only represent a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract endangerment (peligro abstracto) and crimes of concrete endangerment (peligro concreto) is also not easy in some cases, since in both, a wrongfulness of action is required, while only crimes of concrete endangerment require a true wrongfulness of the result, which consists precisely in that concrete creation of danger. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract endangerment sanction the execution of a conduct generally considered dangerous, without the need for an effective danger to the protected legal interest to occur. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for harm or the actual creation of danger to the protected legal interests. In these, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior that are typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without the need to establish in each particular case the concrete creation of danger to the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the rule. An effective creation of danger – judged ex post – for the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is required that the performance of that behavior implies – from an ex ante perspective – a risk of producing a concrete creation of danger or harm to the legal interest. The doctrine has encountered difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract endangerment imply a true content of material wrongfulness, and it is debated whether they are violative or not of the principles of culpability and harmfulness (lesividad). The Constitutional Chamber, for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract endangerment are unconstitutional (In this regard, resolutions 2805-96 can be consulted, which ruled in relation to the articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 in relation to the possession of forgery instruments and criminal association (asociación ilícita); 4673-03 on crimes under the Ley de Migración y Extranjería (Immigration and Aliens Law); and 218-06 on crimes under the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de Capitales y Actividades Conexas (Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Money Laundering, and Related Activities).\n\nIn crimes of concrete danger, in contrast, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the offense, so that in order to consider the crime consummated, the judge must verify the production of a real danger to an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, as in crimes of injury, there must be created, if not a result, a “danger of concrete result” insofar as it constitutes an adequate and non-permitted risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operative scope of the person who endangers it and, subsequently, that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the provision under analysis, the criminalized conducts are of concrete danger, given that it has been reliably demonstrated that they produce injurious results to legal interests considered of great value to society. The criminal offenses described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races against one or more vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as public safety (seguridad común), public order, property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those conducts that injure the rights of third parties, morals, or public order:\n\n“When private actions transcend the person who performs them and compromise the common good (public order or morals or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are grounds for doing so and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on his freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is enforceable, provided that the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, however, by virtue of sufficient reasons from a constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative liberty, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wishes to the extent that sufficient reasons – rights of third parties, morals, or public order – do not justify a restriction of negative liberty. With this, the principle of negative liberty can take into account the individual’s connection to the community. We therefore depart from the premise that the State is forbidden from interfering in the sphere of private liberty, except where public order, morals, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, by means of a formal law. The restriction, however, must be only that which is necessary to achieve the proposed end, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal. The consulted bill, which establishes the mandatory use of seat belts, involves a matter inherent to the common good (understood as the general public good), and therefore constitutes a conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with Constitutional Law […] Maintaining order and safety on roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 has the purpose of regulating the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), for pedestrians as well as drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the State's intervention in the matter.”\n\n(Judgment 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes of February seventeen, two thousand four)\n\nThe conducts provided for in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are, in themselves, risky or dangerous for property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Furthermore, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and public safety (seguridad común). Moreover, upon consulting the Statement of Reasons (Exposición de Motivos) of legislative file 16.496 (folios 2 to 45) which gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the State's intervention in regulating certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:\n\n“Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically indicated by the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die annually from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or become disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. Projections indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and for families. Worldwide, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America, it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, traffic accidents being the first cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless conduct and habits reproduced daily by users of the transit system […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, obtaining the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident to excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident to pedestrian imprudence […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to driver imprudence […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to improper passing […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to cyclist imprudence […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to mechanical failure […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to other factors […].”\n\nRegarding alcohol consumption and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is noted:\n\n“[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of avoidable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations above 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and presenting more severe injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding deaths resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally it is clearly increasing, hence an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit the driver from committing this type of violent reactions. From the 'in situ' death database over six years of data, it was obtained that of a total of 2,211 deceased persons, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, is attributed as a possible cause of the accident to the presence of alcohol.”\n\nIn relation to drivers who exceed speed limits, it is held:\n\n“In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and driving skill on the open public road in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and loss of life of innocent pedestrians who transit unprotected before the recklessness of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task should be the creation of applicable norms to permanently solve this problem.”\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is concluded, then, that the conducts provided for in the challenged provision do injure individual and social legal interests and, from that point of view, do not infringe the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.\n\nV.- On the reasonableness of the challenged provision. The claimant considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of people's lives beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the challenged provision, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any concrete legal interest, it is not suitable because prison is not the best means of protection, as it is a subhuman means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, regarding proportionality, since the acts criminalized as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties and, moreover, there already exist other criminal offenses in current laws that protect the real damages caused. As indicated, the conducts provided for in the challenged provision do affect or endanger highly valuable legal interests for society and for individuals in particular. Reckless driving (conducción temeraria) in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Driving while intoxicated, high speed, and engaging in races or 'drag races' (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible conducts that reflect a great contempt for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, and altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are injured or endangered, given that those who do not perform these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful acts of others and deserve state protection. The fact that the prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the referred conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that said conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. Furthermore, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply imprisonment as a last resort and only for the minimum indispensable time, in accordance with the parameters established in article 71 of the Penal Code.”\n\n(Judgment 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes of February eleven, two thousand nine)\n\nBased on the arguments set forth in the partially transcribed resolution, the action is rejected on the merits regarding that point.\n\nIV.- Non-existence of injury to due process (debido proceso). The claimant states that the reform made to the Transit Law (Ley de Tránsito), regarding driving while intoxicated classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notice, imputation, innocence, right to a hearing, right to a defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against oneself, much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no guarantors charged with ensuring compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, since detainees who are allegedly under the effects of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make a statement before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the Law allows the blood alcohol test (alcoholemia) to be performed on the accused. On this matter, it must be noted that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the reform to the Transit Law, particularly the one provided for in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, that is, driving while intoxicated, the principles, rights, and guarantees that comprise due process (debido proceso), provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and the very jurisprudence of this Chamber, must be respected. The exercise of the right of defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused, that is, from when they are identified as a possible perpetrator of a punishable act or participant in it, through any act of investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the procedure is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code indicates that before the accused makes a statement about the facts, they shall be required to appoint a lawyer to assist them. If the accused does not choose a defense attorney of their confidence, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise technical defense. As for elements of evidence, they will only have value if they have been obtained by a lawful means and incorporated in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If in the specific case, any infringement of the elements that comprise due process has occurred, it is a problem that is not attributable to the challenged norms but to their application by the authorities, which is not reviewable through this channel.\n\nV.- Non-existence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The claimant argues that by virtue of the reforms to the Transit Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the sanctions of: economic fine, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a determined period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation expenses, towing, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment, are produced. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of non bis in idem is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each administered party is not assessed. He adds that disproportionality is verified by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date vehicle inspection. In this regard, it must be noted that the only sanction provided for in the challenged provision is imprisonment from one to three years, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of providing public utility service that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged provision. The other aspects indicated by the claimant are consequences derived from the crime, but do not in themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged provision.\n\nVI.- On the violation of the right to private property. The claimant states that the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since in the absence of a crime, according to the criteria of non-harmfulness and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The administered party is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that impair their patrimony. From a reading of the challenged provision, it is verified that the same makes no reference to the seizure of the vehicle, since in reality this is a consequence of the crime contained in other norms, such as article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nVII.- Conclusion. Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright (de plano) in relation to articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\nTherefore (Por tanto):\n\nThe action is rejected outright (de plano) regarding articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\n\n\n\n\nAdrián Vargas B.\n\nActing President (Presidente a.i.)\n\n\n\n\n\n Luis\nPaulino Mora M.\n Gilbert\nArmijo S.\n\n\n\n\n\n Ernesto\nJinesta L.\n Fernando\nCruz C.\n\n\n\n\n\n Rosa\nMaría Abdelnour G.\n Roxana\nSalazar C.\n\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO\n\n\n\nTelephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. E-mail address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional\n\nThus,\nthe right of defense in general comprises a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification (principio de intimación), the principle of imputation (principio de imputación), the right to be heard (derecho de audiencia), the right of defense itself (derecho de defensa en sí), the principle of innocence (principio de inocencia), and the right to technical defense (derecho de defensa técnica), and even more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that “in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself…” much less to produce evidence against himself. All of these principles are violated by the criminalization of driving under the influence of alcohol, since in the reform of the law and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for ensuring that these guarantees and constitutional rights can be fulfilled. Both in the reform introduced by the Law and in its application by the authorities, detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney; despite this, the law authorizes that a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) be administered to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the defendant’s right of defense, nor does it establish guarantors who can protect these rights. c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is detained for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are imposed: financial fine, loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal offense introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something totally and completely arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic system and the rule of law in which we live. There are other less burdensome means to achieve the aim sought by the new Law, and given the possibility of less burdensome sanctions, the imposition of the most burdensome sanction is not appropriate according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, a single person is being tried and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, confiscation, disqualification) for the same act, which violates the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal offense goes beyond this fact, violating said principle. That is to say, the new law allows for up to nine sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), as there are at least 8 sanctions less burdensome than prison for that conduct, yet still, the rule punishes with imprisonment. In another line of thought, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic possibility of each individual must be analyzed in each specific case. The Law generally establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and that in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary (salario base), that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform whose unconstitutionality is alleged is evident when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having a current vehicle inspection (revisión técnica), the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. There are countless examples like this in the cited law. d) Violation of the right to private property: Private property is inviolable and no one may be deprived of their own, except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure and subsequent confiscation of the car in this specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since there is no crime, based on the criterion of no harm (no lesividad) and the nonexistence of a protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado), there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State and deprive the individual of their private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, eventually with prison, and despite that, the confiscation of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of circulation in the event of violating an administrative rule on driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or the fine imposed, or a combination of these, but never confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State in the face of a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Moreover, it is confiscatory because it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to their property suffering deterioration and damage that diminish their assets. The petitioner states that he is currently charged in a judicial case before the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas (Fiscalía de Cañas), processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.\n\n2.- By resolution at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on February ninth, two thousand nine, the petitioner was warned: to substantiate clearly and precisely, with specific citation of the rules or principles considered infringed, the reasons why Articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 challenged are considered unconstitutional; to provide a literal certification of the brief where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those rules in the underlying case (asunto base) pending resolution; to provide seven sets of copies plus all the documentation submitted (six for the Justices of the Chamber and one for the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República)) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties in the underlying case, if any, and the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados) stamp for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief. (folio 47 front)\n\n3.- By brief submitted at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the petitioner appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), stating the following: Article 254 bis of the Penal Code violates Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not harm any protected legal interest or harm third parties. If third parties were harmed, there are already rules that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, we are not in the presence of conduct that must be criminalized, and it is up to the State to do so only as a last option or as a last resort (última ratio) if there is a need to do so, and currently there is no exhaustion by the State of all means to achieve the end. Additionally, this rule, together with the regulations of Article 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), violates the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions that are applied: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary (salario base), loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that does not harm any legal interest and therefore is not punishable, additionally has a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, a single person is being tried and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, confiscation, disqualification) for the same act, which violates the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows for up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), as there are at least eight sanctions less burdensome than prison for that conduct, yet still, the rule punishes with imprisonment. In another line of thought, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual must be analyzed, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and that in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Traffic Law, where the conduct of driving under the influence of liquor is criminalized, violate said principles, and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system in practice does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the defendant may or may not refrain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor about the potential manipulation of this type of evidence. This means that a procedure must be established under which the defendants' right of defense can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, not to produce evidence against themselves, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer said tests are traffic officers, and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, those rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and the law nor the system foresee this situation. Even if a defendant may refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of constitutional rights and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider the rule of Article 107 to be unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when driving under the influence of liquor, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages just for having it in a vehicle depot with exposure to inclement weather and handling by third parties. The seizure and subsequent confiscation of the car in this specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since there is no crime, based on the criterion of no harm (no lesividad) and the nonexistence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State and deprive the individual of their private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, eventually with prison, and despite that, the confiscation of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. This suffices to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of circulation in the event of violating an administrative rule on driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or the fine imposed, or a combination of these, but never confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State in the face of a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Moreover, it is confiscatory because it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to their property suffering deterioration and damage that diminish their assets.\n\n4.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that turns out to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar petition that was rejected.\n\nDrafted by Justice Vargas Benavides; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On admissibility. The action of unconstitutionality is admissible only in relation to the provisions of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code, since, as can be seen at folio 29 of the file, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the underlying case pending resolution was made regarding that rule and not regarding the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as an admissibility requirement the existence of an underlying case pending resolution, where the unconstitutionality was invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the brief filing the action must be submitted together with a literal certification of the brief where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the main case. In the case under analysis, the underlying case is constituted by the cause being pursued against the petitioner in the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, for the crime of \"Violation of the Traffic Law (Infracción a la Ley de Tránsito),\" processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is verified that the unconstitutionality was invoked when stating at folio 29 front: “Additionally to the above, in my opinion the crime typified in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and furthermore is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner.”\n\nII.- Object of the action. Article 254 bis of the Penal Code states:\n\n“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification from driving vehicles of all types, for one (1) to five (5) years, shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed competitions, or drag races against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.\n\nIf the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Traffic Law by Public Land Routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and additionally, they shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.\n\nA prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed greater than one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.\n\nA prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.\n\nA repeat offender shall be sentenced to prison for two (2) to eight (8) years.\n\nWhen a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública), which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in Article 71 ter of the Traffic Law by Public Land Routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms.”\n\nAs the first ground, the petitioner alleges that the challenged rule is contrary to the principle of offensiveness (principio de ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest to protect. In his judgment, prison is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an anti-juridical action typified as a crime, so he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of liquor is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is protected, as no impact on life or physical integrity occurs. He points out that less burdensome measures or sanctions exist that could be applied. As a second point, the petitioner asserts that the reform made to the Traffic Law, regarding driving while intoxicated typified as a crime, violates the principles of notification (principio de intimación), imputation (principio de imputación), innocence (principio de inocencia), right to be heard (derecho de audiencia), right of defense itself (derecho de defensa en sí), right to technical defense (derecho a la defensa técnica), and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against themselves and much less to produce evidence against themselves. This is because there are no persons in charge of ensuring that these guarantees and constitutional rights are fulfilled, since detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He asserts that despite this, the law allows a breathalyzer test to be administered to them. As a third issue, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because, when engaging in the conduct provided for in the questioned rule, a multiplicity of sanctions is produced: a financial fine, loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. He asserts that this further violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is verified when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having a current vehicle inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is confiscated, which he deems unconstitutional, since in the absence of a crime, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to their property being damaged and suffering deterioration.\n\nIII.- On the protected legal interest in the challenged rule. The petitioner states that prison is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an anti-juridical action typified as a crime, so he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of liquor is disproportionate by virtue of the fact that the rule does not protect any legal interest. He points out that less burdensome measures or sanctions exist that could be applied. This Court has already ruled on the issue of the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule and the reasonableness of the use of imprisonment as a sanction:\n\n“IV.- On the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must have as its objective the protection of a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal laws as they consider best adapted to the nature of the interest sought to be protected and in accordance with the objectives assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which may be not only retributive but also preventive—whether of a positive or negative general prevention—resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of injury and crimes of danger, according to the differing intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of injury, the production of the injury to the legal interest or the object representing it is required for the typicality of the act, whereas in crimes of danger, that effect is not required, producing an advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or injury. The delimitation between one class of crimes and another can be difficult when facing specific criminal types. Thus, in crimes where collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., are protected, if one considers the impact that the conduct implies for the collective legal interest, they may be considered crimes of injury; however, in relation to individual legal interests, they only imply a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract danger and concrete danger is also not easy in some cases, since both require an action deemed wrongful, whereas only concrete danger crimes require a true result deemed wrongful, which consists precisely of that specific endangering. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract danger sanction the implementation of conduct generally reputed to be dangerous, without the need for a danger to the protected legal interest to materialize. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for injury or the actual endangering of the protected legal interests. In them, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without needing to establish in each specific case the concrete endangering of the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the rule. An effective endangering—judged ex post—for the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is required that the performance of that behavior implies—from an ex ante perspective—a risk of producing a concrete endangering or injury to the legal interest. Doctrine has found difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract danger imply a true content of material anti-juridicity, and it is debated whether they violate the principles of culpability and offensiveness or not. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract danger are unconstitutional (In this regard, rulings 2805-96, which ruled on articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 regarding possession of counterfeiting instruments and criminal association; 4673-03 on crimes in the Migration and Aliens Law; and 218-06 on crimes in the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Unauthorized Drugs, Legitimization of Capital and Related Activities may be consulted). In concrete danger crimes, in contrast, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the criminal type, so in order to consider the crime consummated, the judge must verify the production of a real danger for an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, as in crimes of injury, if not a result, a ‘danger of a concrete result’ must be created, insofar as it is an adequate and non-permitted risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operational sphere of the person who endangers it, and then that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the rule under analysis, the criminalized conduct is of concrete danger, insofar as it has been conclusively demonstrated that it produces harmful results to legal interests considered of great value to society.\n\nThe criminal offenses described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races (piques) against one or more vehicles, against the clock or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as common security, public order, property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those behaviors that harm the rights of third parties, morals, or public order:\n\n“When private actions transcend the person who executes them and compromise the common good (public order or morals or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are reasons for it and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on their freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is demandable, provided the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, indeed, by virtue of sufficient reasons from the constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative freedom, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wants to the extent that sufficient reasons—rights of third parties, morals, or public order—do not justify a restriction of negative freedom. With this, the principle of negative freedom can take into account the individual's connection with the community. We start, then, from the premise that the State is forbidden from interfering in the sphere of private freedom, unless public order, morals, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, by means of a formal law. The restriction, however, must only be what is necessary to achieve the intended purpose, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court. The consulted bill, which establishes the mandatory use of the seatbelt, entails a question inherent to the common good (understood as the general public good), and therefore constitutes conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with the Law of the Constitution […] Maintaining order and safety on the roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 aims to regulate the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), both for pedestrians and for drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between the regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the intervention of the State in the matter.”\n\n(Sentencia 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes on February seventeen, two thousand four)\n\nThe conducts provided for in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are in themselves risky or dangerous for the property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Moreover, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and common security. Furthermore, upon consulting the Statement of Motives (Exposición de Motivos) of legislative file 16.496 (folios 2 to 45), which gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the intervention of the State in the regulation of certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:\n\n“Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically stated in the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die each year from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or become disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. The projections made indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and for families. Globally, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, with traffic accidents being the first cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless behaviors and habits that users of the traffic system reproduce day after day […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, yielding the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, pedestrian imprudence […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, driver imprudence […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, improper passing (adelantamiento indebido) […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, cyclist imprudence […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, mechanical failure […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, other factors […].”\n\nRegarding alcohol intake and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is stated:\n\n“[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of preventable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations above 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and sustaining more serious injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding fatalities resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally it is clearly increasing, hence an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit the driver from committing this type of violent reaction. From the database of 'in situ' deaths over six years of data, it was obtained that of a total of 2,211 fatalities, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, are attributed as a possible cause of the accident the presence of alcohol.”\n\nIn relation to drivers who exceed speed limits, it is maintained:\n\n“In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and skill behind the wheel on the public thoroughfare in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and losses of innocent pedestrians' lives who travel unprotected before the imprudence of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task must be to create applicable rules to permanently solve this problem.”\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is concluded, therefore, that the conducts provided for in the challenged rule do harm individual and social legal interests, and from that point of view, they do not violate the principle of offensiveness (lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.\n\n**V.- On the reasonableness of the challenged rule.** The plaintiff considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of life of persons beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the challenged rule, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any specific legal interest, it is not suitable because prison is not the best means of protection, as it is an inhuman means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, as to proportionality, since the acts classified as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties, and, furthermore, other criminal offenses already exist in current laws that protect the real damages caused. As indicated, the conducts provided for in the challenged rule do affect or endanger highly valuable legal interests for society and for individuals in particular. Reckless driving (conducción temeraria) in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Drunk driving, high speed, and the holding of races or \"drag races\" (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible behaviors that reflect a great contempt for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are harmed or endangered, given that those who do not perform these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful actions of others and deserve state protection. The fact that the prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the referred conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that the mentioned conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. In addition, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply prison as a last resort and only for the minimum indispensable time, in accordance with the parameters established by article 71 of the Penal Code.”\n\n(Sentencia 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes on February eleven, two thousand nine)\n\nBased on what is set forth in the partially transcribed resolution, the action is rejected on the merits regarding that point.\n\n**IV.- Nonexistence of injury to due process.** The plaintiff affirms that the amendment made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, right to a hearing, right to defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against themselves, much less to produce evidence against themselves. This is because there are no guarantors charged with overseeing compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, as detainees who are presumably under the effects of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He affirms that despite this, the Law allows a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be administered to the accused (imputado). In this regard, it must be pointed out that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the amendment to the Ley de Tránsito, particularly that provided for in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, i.e., driving under the influence of alcohol, the principles, rights, and guarantees that comprise due process must be respected, as provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and the very jurisprudence of this Chamber. The exercise of the right to defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused (imputado), i.e., from when they are identified as a possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it, through any act of the investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the procedure is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code indicates that before the accused (imputado) testifies about the facts, they shall be required to appoint a lawyer to assist them. If the accused (imputado) does not choose a defense attorney of their own choosing, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise the technical defense. As for the elements of proof, they shall only have value if they have been obtained by a lawful means and incorporated according to the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If, in the specific case, any violation of the elements that comprise due process has occurred, it is a problem that does not stem from the challenged rules, but from their application by the authorities, which is not controllable through this avenue.\n\n**V.- Nonexistence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The plaintiff argues that by virtue of the amendments to the Ley de Tránsito, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions are produced: economic fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, jail. In addition, he considers that the non bis in idem principle is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each administered person is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is verified by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light bulb than for not having the technical inspection (revisión técnica) up to date. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the only penalty provided for in the challenged rule is one to three years of prison, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública) that may be from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged rule. The other aspects pointed out by the plaintiff are consequences derived from the crime, but they do not themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged rule.\n\n**VI.- On the violation of the right to private property.** The plaintiff affirms that the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since, as there is no crime, according to the criterion of no offensiveness (no lesividad) and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The administered person is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that impair their patrimony. From a reading of the challenged rule, it is verified that it makes no reference to the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle, for in reality this is a consequence of the crime that is contained in other rules, such as article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n**VII.- Conclusion.** Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright (de plano) in relation to articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\n**Por tanto:**\n\nThe action is rejected outright (de plano) regarding articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\n\n\nAdrián Vargas B.\nActing President\n\n\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.\n\n\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.\n\n\n\nRosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.\n\n\n\n**EXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO**\n\n\n\nTelephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. E-mail address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW MATTERS\",\n \"resultado\": \"Jurisdictional conflict unfounded\",\n \"despachoOrden\": \"8\",\n \"despacho\": \"Sala Constitucional\",\n \"esResolucionEstructural\": \"0\",\n \"esResolucionOral\": \"0\",\n \"esResolucionRelevante\": \"1\",\n \"fecha\": \"2009-03-24\",\n \"tipoDocumento\": \"EXT\",\n \"esCriterioUnificador\": \"0\",\n \"tipoContenido\": \"Majority vote\",\n \"sourceName\": \"Documentos\",\n \"formatoDocumento\": \"ESCRITO\",\n \"tipoResolucion\": \"De Fondo\",\n \"tipoInformacion\": \"Resolución Judicial\",\n \"html\": \"04955-09.  RECKLESS DRIVING. 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SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA\\r\\nCORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cincuenta y dos\\r\\nminutos del veinticuatro de marzo del dos mil nueve.

\n\n**CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-two minutes on the twenty-fourth of March, two thousand nine.**\n\nAction of unconstitutionality brought by Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, of legal age, single, in a common-law union, businessman, of German nationality, residence card number 704-133739-001483, resident of Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste; against articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Criminal Code.\n\n**Whereas (Resultando):**\n\n**1.-** By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours forty-six minutes on January twenty-first, two thousand nine, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Criminal Code be declared. As grounds for unconstitutionality, he indicates: a) non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado); b) violation of due process; c) violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality; d) violation of the right to private property. a) Non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest: Firstly, the claimant points out that a prison sentence is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why such a penalty, for driving under the influence of alcohol, is disproportionate and does not protect a valid legal interest. The case would be different if, under the influence of alcohol, an accident, death, or injury to a person were caused, where the legal interest harmed is life or physical integrity, and a duly classified penalty already exists in the Criminal Code. There are other, less onerous forms of repression and prevention for this type of conduct that the State can demand, and it does not constitute the only path to follow, so the principle of applying imprisonment as a last resort is not satisfied. For example, the establishment of education and cultural programs for new generations, rehabilitation programs, community work, economic fines, removing license plates, certification programs for good driving practices, rehabilitation programs, etc. That is, there is a clear violation of Article 28 of the Constitution, insofar as it is not sufficient, as jurisprudence indicates, for conduct to fit within a criminal type (tipo penal); it is essential that significant harm to the protected legal interest be produced. b) Violation of due process: Before the enactment of the new Traffic Law, driving under the influence of alcohol resulted in a fine and administrative sanction. In contrast, with the entry into force and the classification of the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, the driver becomes an accused person (imputado) and, consequently, with a series of constitutional guarantees and rights entirely ignored in the law and its application. The Chamber has been consistent in its jurisprudence in establishing that no one may be subject to a sanction without their guilt having been proven through a procedure that respects the right of defense. Thus, the right of defense in general encompasses a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification (principio de intimación), the principle of imputation (principio de imputación), the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the principle of innocence, the right to technical defense, and more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that \"in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against themselves...\" much less to produce evidence against themselves. All these principles are violated by the classification as a crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, since in the reform to the law and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for monitoring that these constitutional guarantees and rights can be fulfilled. Neither in the reform introduced by the Law nor in its application by the authorities are detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney; despite this, the law authorizes the administration of a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the right of defense of the accused nor establish guarantors who can protect these rights. c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is detained for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are produced: economic fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a determined period, seizure of license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage expenses, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal type introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something completely and utterly arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic and rule-of-law system in which we live. There are other, less onerous means to achieve the end sought by the new Law, and given the possibility of less onerous sanctions, the imposition of the most onerous sanction is not appropriate according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is being alleged, the same person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, seizure (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one may be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal type is going beyond this fact, violating said principle. That is, the new law allows for up to nine sanctions to be imposed for the same act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), since there are at least 8 sanctions less onerous than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the norm sanctions with a prison sentence. In another order of ideas, regarding the economic fine, this is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual subject to administration (administrado) is analyzed. The Law, in general, establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of individuals subject to administration, establishing fines of more than one base salary (salario base), that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform, the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, is evidenced when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burnt-out light than for not having a current vehicle technical inspection, the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. Like this one, there are countless examples in the cited law. d) Violation of the right to private property: Private property is inviolable, and no one may be deprived of theirs, except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure (decomiso) and subsequent forfeiture (comiso) of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. In the absence of a crime, according to the criterion of no harmfulness (no lesividad) and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause of justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual subject to administration of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite this, the forfeiture of the property is effected, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in the event of transgressing an administrative norm on driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or the imposed fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it is violative of the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for vehicle care and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual subject to administration to their property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish their assets. The claimant indicates that he currently appears as an accused (imputado) in a judicial cause pending before the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.\n\n**2.-** By resolution issued at sixteen hours twenty minutes on February ninth, two thousand nine, the claimant was warned to: substantiate in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the norms or principles deemed infringed, the reasons why he considers that the challenged articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 are unconstitutional; provide a literal certification of the brief where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those norms in the base matter (asunto base) pending resolution; provide seven additional sets of copies of all the documentation presented (six for the Justices of the Chamber and one for the Procuraduría General de la República) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties appearing in the base matter, if any, and the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief. (folio 47 front)\n\n**3.-** By brief presented at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the claimant appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), stating the following: Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code transgresses Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not transgress any protected legal interest nor harm third parties. If third parties were to be harmed, there are already norms that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, it is not a case of conduct that must be criminalized, and it falls to the State to do so only as a last option or as a last resort (última ratio) if there is a need, and currently, the State has not exhausted all means to achieve the end. Additionally, this norm, together with the provisions of 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), transgresses the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions applied are: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a determined period, seizure of license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage expenses, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that harms no legal interest and therefore is not punishable has, in addition, a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is being alleged, the same person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, seizure (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one may be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows for up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for the same act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity, since there are at least eight sanctions less onerous than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the norm sanctions with a prison sentence. In another order of ideas, regarding the economic fine, this is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual subject to administration is analyzed, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of individuals subject to administration, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Traffic Law, where the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol is classified, transgress these principles, and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system, in practice, does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the accused may or may not abstain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor regarding the manipulation that this type of evidence could be subjected to. By this it is meant that a procedure must be established under which the right of defense of accused persons can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, the right not to produce evidence against oneself, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer said tests are traffic officers, and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, those rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and neither the law nor the system provide for said situation. Even when an accused person can refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of the constitutional rights, and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider the norm of Article 107 to be unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when driving under the influence of alcohol, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages simply by keeping it in a vehicle depot, with exposure to inclement weather and manipulation by third parties. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture (comiso) of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. In the absence of a crime, according to the criterion of no harmfulness and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause of justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual subject to administration of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite this, the forfeiture of the property is effected, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It is enough to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in the event of transgressing an administrative norm on driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or the imposed fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it is violative of the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for vehicle care and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual subject to administration to their property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish their assets.\n\n**4.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition presented for its review that proves to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical, or similar rejected petition.\n\nDrafted by Justice Vargas Benavides; and,\n\n**Considering (Considerando):**\n\n**I.- On admissibility.** The action of unconstitutionality is admissible only in relation to the provision of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, given that, as can be seen at folio 29 of the expediente, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the base matter pending resolution was made regarding that norm and not regarding the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as a requirement for admissibility the existence of a base matter pending resolution, where the unconstitutionality had been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the brief filing the action must be presented together with a literal certification of the brief where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the principal matter. In the case under analysis, the base matter is the cause being pursued against the claimant in the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, for the crime of \"Violation of the Traffic Law,\" processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is verified that the unconstitutionality was invoked when pointing out at folio 29 front: *\"In addition to the above, in my opinion, the crime classified in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and moreover is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner.\"*\n\n**II.- Object of the action.** Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code states:\n\n*“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving vehicles of all types, of one (1) to five (5) years, shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illicit races, illegal speed contests, or drag races (piques) against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.*\n\n*If the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Law of Traffic on public land routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and, in addition, they shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.*\n\nA prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.\n\nPrison of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.\n\nA repeat offender shall be sentenced to a prison term of two (2) to eight (8) years.\n\nWhen a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of public utility service, which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the locations and manner set forth in article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its amendments.\"\n\nAs a first argument, the claimant alleges that the challenged norm is contrary to the principle of offensiveness (ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest (bien jurídico) to protect. In his view, jail is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, and therefore he considers that imposing such a penalty for anyone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is being safeguarded, since there is no impact on life or physical integrity. He notes that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. As a second point, the claimant asserts that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes upon the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obligated to testify against oneself and much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no personnel charged with ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights are complied with, as detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the law allows a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be performed on them. As a third issue, the claimant argues that the challenged norm infringes the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because incurring the conduct set forth in the questioned norm results in a multiplicity of sanctions: a financial fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a specific period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, jail. He asserts that this also violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the financial capacity of each individual subject to the administration is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light bulb than for not having an up-to-date vehicle inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is confiscated, which he considers unconstitutional, since, in the absence of a crime, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest (bien jurídico), there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to his property being damaged and suffering deterioration.\n\nIII.- Regarding the legal interest (bien jurídico) protected in the challenged norm. The claimant states that jail is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, and he therefore considers that imposing such a penalty for anyone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that the norm does not protect any legal interest. He notes that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. This Court has already ruled on the issue of the protection of legal interests (bienes jurídicos) in the challenged norm and the reasonableness of using prison as a sanction:\n\n\"IV.- Regarding the protection of legal interests (bienes jurídicos) in the challenged norm. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must aim to protect a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal norms as deemed best adapted to the nature of the interest intended to be protected and in accordance with the purposes assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which can be not only retributive but also preventive—whether for general positive or negative prevention—, resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of injury (lesión) and crimes of danger (peligro), based on the differing intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of injury, the materialization of the injury to the legal interest or the object representing it is required for the criminality of the act, whereas in crimes of danger, this effect is not required, resulting in the advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or injury. The delimitation between one class of crime and another can present difficulties when faced with specific criminal figures. Thus, in crimes protecting collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., if one considers the impact the conduct has on the collective legal interest, they may be considered crimes of injury; however, with respect to individual legal interests, they only represent a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract danger (peligro abstracto) and crimes of concrete danger (peligro concreto) is also not easy in some cases, since both require a disvalue of action, while only crimes of concrete danger require a true disvalue of result, which consists precisely in that concrete creation of danger. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract danger penalize the execution of a conduct generally reputed to be dangerous, without the need for a danger to the protected legal interest to actually materialize. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for injury or the actual creation of danger to the protected legal interests. In these crimes, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior that are typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without the need to establish in each particular case the concrete endangerment of the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the norm. An effective endangerment—judged ex post—of the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is necessary that carrying out this behavior implies—from an ex ante perspective—a risk of producing a concrete endangerment or injury to the legal interest. Doctrine has found difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract danger imply a true content of material unlawfulness, and it is debated whether they violate the principles of culpability and harmfulness (lesividad) or not. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract danger are unconstitutional (In this regard, see rulings 2805-96, which ruled on the articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 regarding the possession of counterfeiting instruments and illicit association; 4673-03 on crimes under the Ley de Migración y Extranjería; and 218-06 on crimes under the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de Capitales y Actividades Conexas). In crimes of concrete danger, on the other hand, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the criminal type, so that for the crime to be considered consummated, the judge must verify the creation of a real danger for an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, just as in crimes of injury, it must create, if not a result, a 'danger of concrete result' insofar as it is an adequate and impermissible risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operational sphere of the person endangering it and, subsequently, that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the norm under analysis, the criminalized conducts are of concrete danger (peligro concreto), insofar as it has been reliably demonstrated that they produce injurious results to legal interests (bienes jurídicos) considered of great value to society. The criminal types described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive (pluriofensivas) actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as public safety (seguridad común), public order (orden público), property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those conducts that injure the rights of third parties, morality, or public order:\n\n\"When private actions transcend the person who executes them and compromise the common good (public order or morality or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are reasons for doing so and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on his freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is demandable, provided the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, by virtue of sufficient reasons from a constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative liberty, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wants insofar as sufficient reasons—rights of third parties, public morality or order—do not justify a restriction of negative liberty. Thereby, the principle of negative liberty can take into account the individual's link to the community. We start, then, from the premise that the State is forbidden to interfere in the sphere of private liberty, unless public order, morality, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, through a formal law. The restriction, however, must be only what is necessary to achieve the proposed end, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court. The legislative bill consulted, which establishes the mandatory use of seat belts, entails a matter inherent to the common good (understood as the public good in general), and constitutes, therefore, a conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with the Law of the Constitution […] Maintaining order and safety on the roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 aims to regulate the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), for both pedestrians and drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between the regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the intervention of the State in this matter.\"\n\n(Ruling 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes of February seventeenth, two thousand four)\n\nThe conducts set forth in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are, in themselves, risky or dangerous for the property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Furthermore, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and public safety (seguridad común). To further elaborate, upon consulting the Statement of Motives for legislative file 16.496 (pages 2 to 45) that gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the State's intervention in the regulation of certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:\n\n\"Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically stated by the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die each year from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or are disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. Projections indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and families. Globally, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America, it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, with traffic accidents being the leading cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless behaviors and habits that are reproduced day after day by users of the traffic system […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, obtaining the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, pedestrian imprudence (imprudencia del peatón) […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, driver imprudence (imprudencia del conductor) […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, improper passing (adelantamiento indebido) […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, cyclist imprudence (imprudencia del ciclista) […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, mechanical failure (falla mecánica) […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, other factors […].\"\n\nRegarding alcohol intake and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is stated:\n\n\"[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of preventable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations exceeding 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and presenting more serious injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding fatalities resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally, it is clearly on the rise; hence, an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit drivers from committing this type of violent reaction. From the database of 'in situ' deaths over six years of data, it was found that of a total of 2,211 fatalities, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, were attributed to the presence of alcohol as a possible cause of the accident.\"\n\nRegarding drivers who exceed speed limits, it is stated:\n\n\"In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and driving skills on the public thoroughfare in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and loss of life for innocent pedestrians who travel unprotected against the imprudence of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task must be the creation of applicable norms to permanently solve this problem.\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is concluded, then, that the conducts set forth in the challenged norm do indeed injure individual and social legal interests (bienes jurídicos) and, from that point of view, do not infringe upon the principle of harmfulness (lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.\n\nV.- Regarding the reasonableness of the challenged norm. The claimant considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of people's lives beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the questioned norm, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any concrete legal interest (bien jurídico), it is not suitable because jail is not the best means of protection, as it is an inhumane means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, regarding proportionality, since the acts classified as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties, and furthermore, there already exist other criminal types in current laws that protect the actual damages caused. As indicated, the conducts set forth in the challenged norm do affect or endanger legal interests (bienes jurídicos) that are highly valuable to society and to individuals in particular. Reckless driving in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Driving while intoxicated (estado de ebriedad), high speed, and holding races or 'drag races' (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible conducts that reflect a great disregard for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, and altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are injured or endangered, given that those who do not carry out these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful actions of others and deserve state protection. The fact that a prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the aforementioned conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that said conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. Furthermore, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply prison as a last resort and only for the minimum essential time, in accordance with the parameters established in article 71 of the Penal Code.\"\n\n(Ruling 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes of February eleventh, two thousand nine)\n\nBased on what was set forth in the partially transcribed ruling, the action is rejected on the merits regarding this point.\n\nIV.- Non-existence of injury to due process. The claimant asserts that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes upon the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obligated to testify against oneself and much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no guarantors charged with ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights are complied with, as detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the Law permits a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be performed on the accused (imputado). On this matter, it must be noted that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the reform to the Ley de Tránsito, particularly the one set forth in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, i.e., driving while intoxicated (estado de ebriedad), the principles, rights, and guarantees that make up due process must be respected, as provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and the jurisprudence of this Chamber itself. The exercise of the right of defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused (imputado), that is, from the time they are identified as the possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it, through any act of the investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the proceeding is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code states that before the accused (imputado) makes a statement about the facts, they shall be required to appoint an attorney to assist them. If the accused does not choose a defense attorney of their own choosing, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise the technical defense. As for evidentiary elements, these shall only have value if they have been obtained through a lawful means and incorporated in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).\n\nIf, in the specific case, there has been some infringement of the elements that comprise due process, it is a problem that does not stem from the challenged norms, but from their application by the authorities, which is not reviewable through this channel.\n\n**V.- Nonexistence of a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The claimant argues that by virtue of the amendments to the Traffic Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions are imposed: economic fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, towing, vehicle storage fees, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of *non bis in idem* is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he states it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burnt-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection. In this regard, it must be noted that the only penalty provided for in the challenged norm is one to three years of imprisonment, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública) that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of a fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged norm. The other aspects pointed out by the claimant are consequences derived from the crime, but do not themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged norm.\n\n**VI.- Regarding the violation of the right to private property.** The claimant states that the confiscation of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since, in the absence of a crime, based on the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a legally protected interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that undermine their estate. A reading of the challenged norm confirms that it makes no reference to the confiscation of the vehicle, as this is actually a consequence of the crime that is contained in other norms, such as Article 110 of the Criminal Code and Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\n**VII.- Conclusion.** Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright in relation to Articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law Number 8696 of December 17, 2008. Regarding Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\n**Por tanto:**\n\nThe action is rejected outright with respect to Articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law Number 8696 of December 17, 2008. Regarding Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.\n\nAdrián Vargas B.\n\nPresidente a.i.\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.\n\nRosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.\n\n**EXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO**\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional" }