{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-508179", "citation": "Res. 01655-2011 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Subsanación de la garantía de participación en contratación administrativa", "title_en": "Remedying insufficient bid bonds in public procurement", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (Decreto Ejecutivo 33411-H), que permite subsanar la garantía de participación cuando es insuficiente en plazo o monto por menos del 80% de lo exigido en el cartel. El accionante alegaba exceso de potestad reglamentaria y violación del artículo 182 constitucional, argumentando que la garantía es un elemento sustancial de la oferta y no puede subsanarse. La Sala determina que, con las reformas a la Ley 7494 (Leyes 8511 y 8701), específicamente el artículo 42 inciso j), el legislador habilitó expresamente la subsanación de estos defectos, por lo que el reglamento no excede sus límites. Además, la Sala señala un cambio jurisprudencial hacia una interpretación más flexible de los principios de la contratación administrativa, reconociendo que el formalismo debe ceder ante la eficiencia y el interés público. El conflicto subyacente en el caso base era de legalidad ordinaria (aplicación temporal de normas), no de constitucionalidad.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber rejects the unconstitutionality challenge against Article 38 of the Regulation of the Public Procurement Law (Executive Decree 33411-H), which allows remedying an insufficient bid bond when the deficiency in term or amount is less than 80% of the tender requirement. The plaintiff argued excess of regulatory authority and violation of Article 182 of the Constitution, claiming the bid bond is a substantive element of the offer and cannot be remedied. The Chamber finds that with the reforms to Law 7494 (Laws 8511 and 8701), specifically Article 42, subsection j), the legislature expressly authorized the remedy of such defects, so the regulation does not overstep its bounds. Additionally, the Chamber notes a jurisprudential shift toward a more flexible interpretation of public procurement principles, recognizing that formalism must yield to efficiency and the public interest. The underlying dispute in the base case involved ordinary legality (temporal application of norms), not constitutionality.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "09/02/2011", "year": "2011", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "garantía de participación", "subsanación", "potestad reglamentaria", "licitación pública", "cartel o pliego de condiciones", "principio de eficiencia", "antiformalismo" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "38", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "article": "38", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "garantía de participación", "subsanación", "potestad reglamentaria", "contratación administrativa", "artículo 182 Constitución Política", "licitación pública", "principio de eficiencia" ], "keywords_en": [ "unconstitutionality action", "bid bond", "remedy", "regulatory authority", "public procurement", "Article 182 Constitution", "public bidding", "efficiency principle" ], "excerpt_es": "Ciertamente la Sala en el precedente citado desarrolló la tesis de la inconstitucionalidad sobre el anterior Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo 25038-H del 7 de marzo de 1996, dado que no existía una norma legal que autorizara la subsanación de la garantía de participación. Pero, dado que han operado reformas a la Ley 7494, la potestad reglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo y la norma reglamentaria que se analiza se encuentra al amparo de las disposiciones de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa y sus reformas. La enmienda al artículo 42 citado por Ley No. 8511, que en su inciso j) regula la subsanación de defectos de las ofertas, y el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H de los veintisiete días de septiembre de 2006, evidencian un perfecta sincronización, toda vez que ambos tienen fecha de rige a partir del 4 de enero de 2007. Precisamente de la simple lectura es posible inferir que la normativa legal vigente remite al desarrollo reglamentario, en cumplimiento de los rangos fijados por la ley, por lo que, en el criterio de esta Sala, la disposición impugnada no es producto del exceso de la potestad reglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo, y por consecuencia debe declararse sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad.", "excerpt_en": "Indeed, the Chamber in the cited precedent developed the thesis of unconstitutionality regarding the previous Public Procurement Regulation, Executive Decree 25038-H of March 7, 1996, given that there was no legal norm authorizing the correction of the bid bond. But, since reforms to Law 7494 have been enacted, the regulatory authority of the Executive and the regulatory norm under analysis are sheltered by the provisions of the Public Procurement Law and its reforms. The amendment to Article 42 cited by Law No. 8511, which regulates the correction of bid defects in subsection j), and Executive Decree No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006, show perfect synchronization, since both became effective on January 4, 2007. From a simple reading it is evident that the current legal framework remits to regulatory development, in compliance with the ranges set by law, therefore, in the Chamber's view, the challenged provision is not a product of excess regulatory authority by the Executive, and consequently the unconstitutionality action must be dismissed.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The unconstitutionality action against Article 38 of the Public Procurement Law Regulation is dismissed.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV.-A", "quote_en": "the challenged provision is not a product of excess regulatory authority by the Executive", "quote_es": "la disposición impugnada no es producto del exceso de la potestad reglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo" }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "administrative procurement procedures are the shadow (form) that must inevitably follow the body (substance) that are the aims and purposes of the administrative contract to satisfy the general interest", "quote_es": "los procedimientos administrativos de contratación son la sombra (forma) que debe seguir, irremisiblemente, al cuerpo (sustancia) que son los fines y propósitos del contrato administrativo de satisfacer el interés general" }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the conflict relates more to the manner of interpreting the Public Procurement Law by the Comptroller General's Office in the role of safeguarding the public treasury, than to a discussion proper to the unconstitutionality action", "quote_es": "el conflicto se refiere más a la forma de interpretar la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa por la Contraloría General de la República en función de tutela de la hacienda pública, que a una discusión propia de la acción de inconstitucionalidad" } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-38533", "citation": "Ley 7135", "title_en": "Constitutional Jurisdiction Law", "title_es": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "doc_type": "law", "date": "11/10/1989", "year": "1989" }, { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "norm-871", "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)", "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution", "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "doc_type": "constitution", "date": "07/11/1949", "year": "1949" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-38533", "citation": "Ley 7135", "title_en": "Constitutional Jurisdiction Law", "title_es": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "doc_type": "law", "date": "11/10/1989", "year": "1989" }, { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "norm-871", "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)", "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution", "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "doc_type": "constitution", "date": "07/11/1949", "year": "1949" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1186631", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-1186631" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-508179", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-38533", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-58314", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "27/09/2006" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-1186631" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Exp: 08-006164-0007-CO\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2011001655\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE\r\nJUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y nueve minutos del nueve de febrero del\r\ndos mil once.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Acción de\r\nInconstitucionalidad planteada por SAMUEL RABINOVICH DYNER, representante\r\nlegal de la compañía Centrocel Inc S.A; contra el artículo 38 del\r\nReglamento General de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo número\r\n33411-H de septiembre de 2006. Intervienen en el proceso ANA LORENA BRENES\r\nESQUIVEL, en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República, MANUEL\r\nDE LA FUENTE FERNÁNDEZ, en representación de Roy Alpha S.A y de Conduktiva S.\r\nA. como coadyuvante pasivo y ROCIO AGUILAR MONTOYA en representación de\r\nla Contraloría General de la República.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nResultando:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Por\r\nescrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las once horas y veintitrés\r\nminutos del dieciocho de abril del dos mil ocho, el accionante\r\nsolicita se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 38 del\r\nReglamento General de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo número\r\n33411-H del 27 de septiembre de 2006. Alega el accionante que el artículo\r\nimpugnado incurre en un exceso de potestad reglamentaria, en el tanto permite\r\nsubsanar e incluso modificar la garantía de participación, la cual es un\r\nelemento substancial de la oferta, por cuanto permite ampliar o modificar el\r\nplazo de su vigencia en caso de que ésta haya sido rendida en forma\r\ninsuficiente en tiempo y monto. Esta disposición se extralimita y viola la\r\nlegislación, debido a que la forma, modo, monto, momento y plazo de la garantía\r\nde la oferta, se regulan en normas de rango legal. Debido al carácter que\r\nreviste la garantía, al ser un soporte de la seriedad de la oferta e incluso un\r\npresupuesto de la misma, ya que la invalidez de ésta acarrea la invalidez de la\r\noferta ante la Administración, a la vez que del mantenimiento de la garantía\r\ndependerá la ulterior validez de la oferta debe ser considerada como un\r\nelemento esencial de la oferta. Asimismo,\r\nesta norma viola el fundamento constitucional de la contratación administrativa\r\ncontenido en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, el cual tiene como\r\nprincipios rectores la eficiencia en la contratación y la igualdad en las\r\ncondiciones de la participación licitatoria. Siguiendo este mismo orden de\r\nideas, esta misma Sala ha dicho que la subsanación de requisitos substanciales\r\nen el procedimiento licitatorio, resulta violatorio de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, si con ello se vulneran los principios generales derivados del artículo\r\n182 constitucional. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta\r\nacción de inconstitucionalidad, señala que existe un recurso de amparo que se\r\ntramita en el expediente número 07- 009913-0007-CO en el cual, mediante resolución \r\n2007-017111 se confirió plazo de quince días hábiles para interponer la\r\npresente acción de inconstitucionalidad.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- Por resolución de las quince horas y cincuenta minutos del veintiuno de\r\nabril de dos mil ocho (visible a folio 11) se le dio curso a la presente acción\r\nde inconstitucionalidad y se le confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General de\r\nla República. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n4.- La Procuradora General de la República, mediante libelo presentado en la\r\nSecretaría de la Sala a las quince horas y cuarenta minutos del trece de mayo\r\ndel dos mil ocho, rindió el informe de ley. En primer término considera que al\r\nser la acción un remedio incidental que sirve como medio para amparar el\r\nderecho o interés que se considera lesionado en un asunto pendiente de resolver\r\ny al tener por lo tanto, influencia directa en ese asunto base, se debe\r\nanalizar el asunto principal que da origen a la presente acción, para poder\r\ndeterminar si la interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un medio\r\nidóneo para la defensa de los derechos lesionados. Siguiendo este mismo orden\r\nde ideas, cabe mencionar que la norma impugnada corresponde al Reglamento de la\r\nContratación Administrativa, el cual entró a regir a partir del 4 de\r\nenero de 2007. El artículo 227 del Reglamento expresamente indicó que entraba a\r\nregir desde esa fecha. Si bien es cierto que el Decreto Ejecutivo 33411 es de\r\nfecha de 27 de septiembre de 2006, ello no implica que dicho Decreto y más\r\nespecíficamente el artículo 38, hayan entrado en vigencia a partir de la fecha\r\nde publicación en la Gaceta N. 210 de 2 de noviembre de 2006. Igualmente, no\r\nexiste disposición alguna en el Reglamento que dé base para considerar que el\r\ncitado artículo 38 regía en relación con las ofertas presentadas antes del 4 de\r\nenero de 2007, ergo, respecto de las garantías de participación presentadas\r\nantes de la fecha anteriormente mencionada. Por tal motivo, la norma impugnada\r\nno puede regir la contratación realizada por el Instituto Costarricense de\r\nElectricidad a través de la licitación pública N. 2006-LI-000059-PROV, la cual\r\ninicia con anterioridad a la vigencia del actual reglamento, por lo tanto se\r\nregía por el Decreto Ejecutivo N.25038 de 6 de marzo de 1996, anterior\r\nReglamento de Contratación Administrativa. La resolución R-DCA-255-2007 del 22\r\nde junio de 2007, en razón de la cual se plantea el recurso de amparo, se\r\nrefiere expresamente al artículo 37.8 del anterior Reglamento. En ese momento\r\nconsideró la Contraloría que la presentación de una garantía de participación\r\npor parte de la empresa apelante, con una vigencia no menor en dos días de la\r\nrequerida en el cartel, no era motivo para descalificar la oferta, sin\r\nconsiderar el hecho de que fue subsanada por el apelante antes de que venciera\r\nla garantía. Por tal motivo, la Contraloría consideró que procedía el recurso\r\nde apelación contra el acto de adjudicación. Resolver en contrario, consideró\r\nel Órgano Contralor, sería ir en contra de los principios de razonabilidad,\r\nconservación de los actos, el de eficiencia administrativa y el de interés\r\npúblico. La referencia que hace la Contraloría de la reforma a la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa y su Reglamento, no busca la aplicación del\r\nartículo impugnado, sino hacer ver la idoneidad de resolver con base en el\r\nprincipio de eficiencia y no sobre el principio formalista. Debido a que lo\r\nresuelto por la Contraloría no se ampara en el artículo 38, objeto de\r\nimpugnación de la presente acción, sino en los principios antiformalista y de\r\neficiencia administrativa, se concluye que la interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad\r\nno constituye un medio idóneo para defender los derechos del accionante en el\r\nRecurso de Amparo tramitado en el expediente 079913-0007-CO. Como segundo\r\npunto, considera que es menester hacer un análisis de los principios de\r\neficacia y eficiencia en la contratación administrativa en relación con el caso\r\nobjeto de análisis. Así las cosas, el Estado y su Administración están sujetos\r\nno sólo al bloque de legalidad, sino también a la eficacia, la que se\r\nmaterializa en el cumplimiento efectivo y satisfactorio de los intereses\r\ngenerales, base misma de la Administración Pública. El artículo 11 de la\r\nConstitución Política es base de este marco de principios, en donde se le exige\r\nal aparato institucional, no sólo apegarse al ordenamiento jurídico, sino que\r\nel resultado de actuar genere resultados que satisfagan de la mejor forma\r\nposible los intereses generales. Asimismo, la Sala Constitucional se ha\r\npronunciado con respecto al tema de la siguiente forma: “(…) La eficacia\r\nimplica obtener los mejores resultados con el mayor ahorro de costos o el uso\r\nracional de los recursos humanos, materiales, tecnológicos y financieros…” La\r\neficacia y eficiencia no actúan únicamente como parámetros de medición de la\r\nactuación final estatal, sino que involucran la actuación instrumental,\r\ndirigida al logro de los fines públicos. En consecuencia, dichos principios\r\ncubren a la actividad de contratación administrativa. La contratación como\r\nactividad de carácter instrumental, está orientada a la obtención de bienes y\r\nservicios necesarios para el cumplimiento de la actividad administrativa\r\nsustantiva. Por tal motivo, la contratación administrativa no puede verse como\r\nun fin en sí misma. Así lo entendió el legislador al crear la ley 7494, en\r\ndonde la contratación administrativa se somete no sólo al principio de\r\nlegalidad, igualdad, publicidad, sino también a los principios de eficacia y\r\nantiformalismo. Esta orientación normativa que respalda un sistema liberado de\r\nataduras en exceso formales, reconoce la necesidad de neutralizar el formalismo\r\ninnecesario, permitiendo subsanar las irregularidades no sustanciales y\r\ncentrando el análisis sobre los aspectos de fondo de cada oferta. En el mismo\r\nsentido se deben permitir las aclaraciones y las subsanaciones de deficiencias\r\nque vulneren el principio de igualdad. Ese carácter antiformal no autoriza\r\ndesconocer los principios fundamentales de la contratación administrativa,\r\ntales como la libertad de concurrencia, la publicidad y la igualdad. A estos\r\nprincipios se les debe de sumar la transparencia del proceso. El accionante\r\nalega que el citado artículo 38 del Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa\r\nvigente permite subsanar defectos graves de elementos substanciales, lo que\r\nobliga a analizar el papel de las garantías de participación en la contratación\r\nadministrativa. El accionante se manifiesta disconforme con lo actuado por la\r\nContraloría General de la República al resolver un recurso de amparo contra un\r\nacto de adjudicación emitido por el I.C.E. que le favorecía. La anulación de\r\nese acto por parte de la Contraloría, desconoce supuestamente los principios\r\nextraíbles en la materia del artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, ya que\r\nconsidera que el artículo 38 del Reglamento permite subsanar y modificar un\r\nelemento que a su juicio es substancial de la oferta y que, en su criterio,\r\nconstituye el presupuestos de la oferta, sin el cual no puede válidamente\r\nlegitimarse la misma. Cabe resaltar el hecho de que cada ordenamiento determina\r\ncuáles son los elementos esenciales del contrato, por lo tanto, cuáles\r\nelementos cuya presencia pueden quedar bajo la valoración de la\r\nAdministración contratante. Sin embargo, la garantía, al igual que en otros\r\nordenamientos es una cláusula accesoria que no es indispensable para la\r\nexistencia del contrato y que estará presente en la medida en que el derecho\r\npositivo así lo exija como medio para probar la seriedad de la oferta. Este\r\ncarácter accesorio se reafirma con la reforma introducida la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa en su artículo 33, en donde le permite a la\r\nAdministración decidir si solicita o no a los oferentes la presentación de una\r\ngarantía de participación. Sostiene el accionante que dado el papel que\r\ndesempeña la garantía de participación en la oferta, no es susceptible de\r\nmodificación y que los defectos que presente no pueden ser subsanados. El\r\ntérmino “garantía de participación” aparece en nuestra normativa legal con la\r\nley 5901 de 20 de abril de 1976. Esta ley se limitaba a establecer los\r\nporcentajes de la garantía sin requisitos adicionales. Estos requisitos serán\r\nimplementados no por la ley, sino por vía reglamentaria. Este reglamento sería\r\nel contenido en el Decreto 7576 de 1977, el cual consagra el principio del\r\nformalismo, el cual le da a la garantía un carácter valorativo con respecto\r\na la oferta. A su vez, precisa el objeto de la garantía y la solemniza. Esa\r\nconceptualización que da el Reglamento de 1977 genera la consideración de que\r\nsus efectos no pueden ser subsanados. Sin embargo desde 1985 se modifica a fin\r\nde reconocer la posibilidad de adjudicar ofertas que cumplan con todos los\r\nrequisitos del cartel. La Ley de Contratación Administrativa derogó las\r\ndisposiciones de la Ley 1279, cuyo texto original exigía la existencia de la\r\ngarantía de participación en toda contratación administrativa. Disponía que la\r\ngarantía sería el elemento que legitimaría a la oferta, frase que sería\r\neliminada por la Sala Constitucional en la resolución 998-98 de las 11:30 hrs.\r\nEse texto original ya autorizaba que una vez que fuere admitida la garantía, se\r\nsolicitaría por parte de la Administración, la corrección de los defectos\r\nformales subsanables. Posteriormente el Reglamento en su artículo 33 busca\r\natenuar la rigurosidad de la solicitud de garantía de participación,\r\nlimitándolo únicamente para las licitaciones públicas y las de registro,\r\nmientras que para otros procedimientos de contratación era facultativa. De tal\r\nforma, al no tener un carácter imperativo la exigencia de la garantía, no puede\r\ndársele un tratamiento de formalidad substancial, en donde la total ausencia\r\ntenga como efecto jurídico la nulidad del contrato, sino ésta se reservaría\r\nexclusivamente para los casos en que el cartel así lo solicite. Por lo tanto,\r\nes en ese carácter objetivo que el legislador le da a la garantía, que puede\r\nfundamentase su naturaleza accesoria y no substancial. Aunado a lo anterior, y\r\ncomo elemento de mayor trascendencia, debe mencionarse que la Constitución\r\nPolítica no regula ni exige la observancia de la garantía de participación.\r\nResulta así, que la garantía de participación así como la posible subsanación o\r\nno de sus defectos, es irrelevante para la Constitución, los más que podría\r\nacarrear interés, es que la regulación que se le de al tema por medio de normas\r\ninfraconstitucionales, no violente los principios de la contratación\r\nadministrativa presentes en la Constitución. Se reafirma el hecho de que desde\r\nla aparición en nuestro ordenamiento de la garantía de participación, su\r\ntratamiento ha sido desde la vertiente de normas reglamentarias y no legales.\r\nPor consecuencia, es posible que el Reglamento permite la subsanación de\r\ndefectos cuando se den los supuestos de hecho mencionados en el artículo 38\r\ncitado, ya que ni la legislación, ni la Constitución regulan el tema, por tanto\r\nno es reserva de ley y el tratamiento del tema vía reglamento es acorde con el\r\nordenamiento jurídico y no contraviene principios constitucionales en materia\r\nadministrativa. Por lo tanto, con base en todos los argumentos planteados\r\nsupra, considera la Procuraduría General de la República que la presenta acción\r\nes inadmisible e improcedente, por lo que recomienda rechazarla. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n5.- Por memorial presentado en la secretaría de la\r\nSala Constitucional a las catorce horas y trece minutos del tres de junio del\r\n2008, Manuel de la Fuente Fernández, mayor, cédula de identidad 2-392-698- en\r\nrepresentación de Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima y de Conductiva S.A. solicita que\r\nse le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo de conformidad con el artículo 83 de la Ley\r\nde la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Para tal efecto, manifiesta que Roy\r\nAlpha Sociedad Anónima posee interés en la resolución de la presente acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad, toda vez que es parte interesada en la licitación pública\r\nnúmero 2006-LI- 000059-PROV promovida por el Instituto Costarricense de\r\nElectricidad, según consta en el expediente adjunto en la presente acción. Con\r\nrespecto a la legitimación de Conduktiva, ésta es una empresa que contrata con\r\nla Administración Pública equipo de iluminación y posee interés directo en que\r\nse mantenga la vigencia de la norma impugnada. Esta empresa coloca en el\r\nmercado nacional equipo producido por Roy Alpha, de forma tal que, del éxito de\r\nesta empresa en su contratación con el ICE, se desprende una buena imagen para\r\nConduktiva hacia otros clientes del sector público. Con respecto a los\r\nargumentos de fondo, afirma compartir el criterio de la Procuraduría General de\r\nla República en el tanto considera que la presente acción no es el mecanismo\r\nmás oportuno para la defensa de los derechos del accionante en el recurso de\r\namparo que se tramita bajo el expediente 079913-0007-CO. Alega que de\r\nconformidad con el artículo 15 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\na todo funcionario se le reconoce un margen de discrecionalidad, de forma tal\r\nque tenga la posibilidad de tomar decisiones que se oriente a la satisfacción\r\ndel interés público con base en criterios razonables. Como resultado, ante la\r\npresencia de imperfecciones que no pongan en peligro elementos fundamentales\r\ndel contrato o que desmejoren el régimen de garantías que se exige, resulta\r\nlógico y satisfactorio para el interés público, que se procede a su corrección.\r\nPrecisamente, la norma cuestionada tiende la protección de ese razonamiento,\r\nque protege a fin de cuentas los principios de eficacia y eficiencia, que rigen\r\nen materia administrativa, de forma tal, que no podría considerarse\r\ninconstitucional. Por otra parte, si todo funcionario público está llamado a la\r\nsatisfacción del interés público, no puede considerarse, de ninguna forma, que\r\nel ampliar las causas de invalidez de una contratación y eliminar sus remedios\r\nprocesales que no contravienen los principios fundamentales responde a la\r\nobtención de ese interés general. La norma impugnada, es un mecanismo de\r\nsaneamiento de errores no substanciales que le permite a la Administración\r\nPública, alcanzar la satisfacción de intereses generales. Por lo tanto, según\r\nlo expuesto anteriormente solicita que se declare sin lugar la presente acción.\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n6.- Por medio de escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las diez\r\nhoras y veintiséis minutos del veinte de febrero del dos mil nueve, la\r\nContraloría General de la República, bajo la representación de ROCÍO AGUILAR\r\nMONTOYA en su condición de Contralora General de la República, solicita se le\r\ntenga como parte en el presente asunto al ser la autoridad recurrida en el\r\nrecurso de amparo que sirve como juicio base para la acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad. Esto de conformidad con el artículo 81 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional, a pesar de que la Contraloría no fue notificada de\r\nla interposición de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, ni se le otorgó\r\naudiencia a fin de conocer su criterio en la resolución que dio curso al\r\npresente asunto. Para tal efecto manifiesta que, existe un problema de\r\nlegitimación en la presente acción que hace que la tramitación de la misma no\r\ngenere incidencia directa en el asunto base, es decir, no es un medio razonable\r\npara la tutela de los derechos fundamentales supuestamente violados objeto del\r\nrecurso de amparo. Esto por cuanto el artículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa, no se aplicó en el asunto base de esta acción, lo\r\ncual hace que la resolución del presente asunto no tenga incidencia alguna en\r\nal recurso de amparo que sirvió como asunto previo para la presente acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad. Sobre este mismo punto, la Contraloría en la resolución\r\nR-DCA-255-2007 de las 9:15 horas del 22 de junio de 2007, señaló que la\r\ndiscusión que giraba en torno de la insuficiencia de la garantía de\r\nparticipación de la oferta de la empresa apelante, sería resuelta con base en\r\nla normativa vigente en ese momento y puntualmente en atención de los\r\nprincipios de eficiencia, antiformalismo, conservación de los actos y principio\r\nde interés público. Cabe destacar que le mención hecha a las reformas hechas a\r\nla legislación de la contratación administrativa, tenía un fin ilustrativo y no\r\nresolutivo. Con respecto al tema de fondo propiamente dicho, el accionante\r\nataca básicamente dos aspecto de la norma: el presunto exceso en el contenido\r\nde la potestad reglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo y la subsanación de la\r\ngarantía de participación. En torno al primer punto, señala que ese supuesto\r\nexceso en la potestad reglamentaria por parte del Poder Ejecutivo,\r\nimplicaría un desbordamiento de los preceptos legales que desarrolla la ley.\r\nTal planteamiento es incorrecto por cuanto es la misma ley de la Contratación\r\nAdministrativa en su artículo 42 que permite la subsanación de los defectos en\r\nel plazo y monto de la garantía de participación, siempre que los mismos satisfagan\r\nun porcentaje mínimo. Por tal motivo, la norma impugnada lo que viene es a\r\nreiterar los criterios que desarrolla la legislación, por lo que tal exceso no\r\nexiste. Con respecto al segundo punto (la subsanación de la garantía de\r\nparticipación de la oferta) señala que el accionante hace suyas las\r\nconsideraciones que mantuvo la Sala Constitucional hace más de once años, con\r\nrespecto a la solemnidad de la garantía de participación dentro del sistema de\r\ncontratación y el carácter elemental de la garantía en la oferta. Dichas\r\nconsideraciones estuvieron basadas en construcciones teóricas que terminaron\r\ncediendo ante una realidad de demostraba problemas serios de carácter práctico.\r\nPor tal motivo, el legislador realizó una reforma legal que introdujo cambios\r\nen el tratamiento de la garantía de participación, estableciendo el carácter\r\nfacultativo de la misma en los casos en que así lo determinara el cartel de\r\nlicitación. Así, se consagra una visión distinta de la garantía de\r\nparticipación en cuanto a su relevancia dentro del sistema de contratación,\r\nreconociendo sus alcances como un elemento que viene a complementar a la\r\noferta, aunque se le despoja de su carácter sacramental y esencial. La supuesta\r\nviolación de los principios de la contratación administrativa que alega el\r\naccionante, a criterio de la Contraloría General de la República, no existen,\r\nya que la subsanación de los posible vicios de la garantía de participación\r\npermitida a nivel legal y reglamentario, son una clara manifestación de los\r\nprincipios de eficacia y eficiencia administrativas, resultado de una visión de\r\nla contratación administrativa como medio y no como fin en sí misma. Esto\r\nimplica que la actuación de la Administración Pública, en cuanto al diseño y\r\nejecución de procesos de compra, debe sujetarse al interés público, y no éste a\r\naquéllos. Por lo tanto, con base en todas las consideraciones expuestas supra,\r\nconsidera la Contraloría que esta acción es inadmisible desde el punto de vital\r\nformal e improcedente desde el punto de vista del fondo, ergo, solicita se\r\ndeclare sin lugar. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n7.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley\r\nde la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 091, 092 y\r\n093 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 13, 14 y 15 de mayo de dos mil ocho\r\n(folio 35). \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n8.- Por resolución de las dieciséis horas diez minutos\r\ndel cuatro de junio de dos mil ocho, la Sala reserva para el momento procesal\r\noportuno la solicitud de coadyuvancia presentada por el representante de\r\nConductiva, Sociedad Anónima y de Roy Alpha, Sociedad Anónima. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 9.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos\r\n10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad\r\nque otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada\r\nesta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia\r\nde este Tribunal.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n10.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las\r\nprescripciones de ley.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,\n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- Sobre cuestiones preliminares: Debe resolver primero esta Sala, la\r\nsolicitud de la Contraloría General de la República en cuanto alega que al ser\r\nparte en el asunto principal, no se le otorgó audiencia de la demanda de\r\ninconstitucionalidad. Ahora bien, por resolución de las quince horas\r\ncincuenta minutos del veintiuno de abril de dos mil ocho, la presidencia de\r\nesta Sala dio curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por\r\nCentrocel. Inc. Sociedad Anónima contra el artículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley\r\nde Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H del 27 de\r\nseptiembre de 2006, otorgándole audiencia únicamente a la Procuraduría General\r\nde la República. Sin embargo, el artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional establece que si estuvieran cumplidos los requisitos de\r\nadmisibilidad de la acción, se conferirá no sólo audiencia a la Procuraduría\r\nsino a la contraparte que figure en el asunto principal, que es el recurso de\r\namparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO que le sirve de base a la acción, y en el cual la\r\nContraloría General de la República figura como parte recurrida. En\r\nconsecuencia de lo anterior, dado lo dispuesto por el artículo 81 de la Ley que\r\nrige esta jurisdicción, lo procedente es tener como parte en la presente acción\r\na la Contraloría General de la República. Por otra parte, habiendo presentado\r\ndentro de los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso de la\r\ninterposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en el Boletín Judicial No.\r\n091 del 13 de mayo de 2008, se admite como coadyuvante de la acción a Roy Alpha\r\nSociedad Anónima y de Conductiva S.A., en cuanto alega que la norma impugnada\r\nes un mecanismo de saneamiento de errores no substanciales a favor de la\r\nAdministración Pública para alcanzar intereses generales. Se advierte que por\r\nlos efectos de la coadyuvancia, al no ser el coadyuvante parte principal del\r\nproceso, no resultará directamente perjudicado o beneficiado por la sentencia,\r\nes decir, la eficacia de la sentencia no alcanza al coadyuvante de manera\r\ndirecta e inmediata, ni le afecta cosa juzgada, no le alcanzan tampoco los\r\nefectos inmediatos de ejecución de la sentencia, pues a través de la\r\ncoadyuvancia no se podrá obligar a la autoridad jurisdiccional a dictar una\r\nresolución a su favor, por no haber sido parte principal en el proceso, lo que\r\nsi puede afectarle, pero no por su condición de coadyuvante, sino como a\r\ncualquiera, es el efecto erga omnes del pronunciamiento. La sentencia en\r\nmateria constitucional, no beneficia particularmente a nadie, ni siquiera al\r\nactor; es en el juicio previo donde esto puede ser reconocido.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nII.- Sobre la legitimación para interponer\r\nla demanda de inconstitucionalidad. El párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional establece que para interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad\r\nresulta necesario contar con un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los\r\ntribunales, inclusive de habeas corpus o de amparo, en que se invoque la\r\ninconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que\r\nse considera lesionado. En el caso que nos ocupa, el asunto base es el\r\nrecurso de amparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO, dentro del cual se dictó la resolución\r\ninterlocutoria No. 2004-017111 de las nueve horas cuarenta y tres minutos del\r\nveintitrés de noviembre de dos mil siete, con ella la Sala suspendió la\r\ntramitación del recurso de amparo y le otorgó a la empresa recurrente el plazo\r\nde quince días para la interposición de la demanda de inconstitucionalidad\r\ncontra el artículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación, bajo el apercibimiento\r\nde no hacerlo, se procedería a archivar el expediente. De conformidad con lo\r\nanterior, la empresa recurrente presentó en tiempo el proceso el 18 de abril de\r\n2008, por lo que procede conocer del asunto de la siguiente manera, amén de que\r\nal admitirse el amparo, la acción sí tendría incidencia en este proceso\r\nconstitucional de garantías. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- Objeto de la acción. La disposición bajo estudio corresponde al\r\nartículo 38 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411-H\r\npublicado en La Gaceta No. 210 del 2 de noviembre de 2006, por el cual\r\npor resolución de este Tribunal, se suspendió el recurso de amparo para que se\r\ninterpusiera esta demanda, y se analizara la constitucionalidad de la\r\ndisposición. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 38.- Garantía de participación insuficiente. La garantía de participación insuficiente\r\nen plazo o en monto, podrá subsanarse por el oferente o a petición de la\r\nAdministración, cuando tales extremos no se hayan ofrecido por menos del 80% de\r\nlo fijado en el cartel. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn caso de adjudicaciones parciales,\r\npodrán considerarse ofertas cuyas garantías de participación no cubran el\r\ncitado 80% en relación con el monto ofertado siempre que se abarque el\r\nmonto a adjudicar”.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nLo que esta Sala debe determinar es la constitucionalidad de la norma\r\nimpugnada, en el tanto que establece la posibilidad de subsanar una garantía de\r\nparticipación defectuosa en el plazo o en el monto, bajo condicionales\r\nporcentuales. En tal sentido, si la garantía de participación cubre el ochenta\r\npor ciento o más de lo fijado en la oferta o el cartel, en tal medida la\r\ninsuficiencia puede ser remediada. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Sobre el fondo. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nA.- Planteamiento del problema. Se acusa el exceso de la potestad\r\nreglamentaria en la obligación del Poder Ejecutivo de desarrollar, interpretar\r\ny ejecutar leyes. El inciso 3) del artículo 140 constitucional establece en el\r\nPresidente de la República y el respectivo Ministro de Gobierno sancionar y\r\npromulgar las leyes, reglamentarlas, ejecutarlas y velar por su exacto cumplimiento;\r\nlas disposiciones reglamentarias que nacen al amparo de una disposición legal\r\ndebe sujetarse al marco conceptual de ésta. El principio de legalidad\r\nestablecido en el artículo 11 constitucional establece que los actos y\r\nconductas de la Administración Pública deben estar previamente habilitadas en\r\nuna disposición escrita. El principio de legalidad establece que la\r\nactuación administrativa debe estar fundada en las leyes del ordenamiento\r\njurídico, lo que le permitiría al Poder Ejecutivo actuar con estrictos límites\r\ninterpretándolas y desarrollándolas, sin embargo no le es permitido\r\ncontradecirlas. Bajo esta concepción toda disposición reglamentaria debe\r\najustarse a las normas jerárquicas de las cuales depende. En lo particular para\r\nexaminar el artículo impugnado debe analizarse las reformas a la Ley No. 7494\r\noperadas mediante Leyes 8511 de 16 de mayo de 2006 y 8701 del 13 de enero de\r\n2009, en cuanto establecen:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 33.- Garantía de participación. La administración estará facultada para\r\nsolicitar, a los oferentes, una garantía de participación entre un uno por\r\nciento (1%) y un cinco por ciento (5%) del monto de la propuesta, el cual se\r\ndefinirá en el respectivo cartel o pliego de condiciones, de acuerdo con la\r\ncomplejidad del contrato. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn los casos en que la\r\nadministración decida no solicitar la garantía de participación y un\r\noferente retire su propuesta, se procederá conforme a lo previsto en los\r\nartículos 99 y 100 de esta Ley”. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 42.- Estructura mínima. El procedimiento de licitación pública se\r\ndesarrollará reglamentariamente, y se respetarán los siguientes criterios\r\nmínimos: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\na)…\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n…\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nj) La posibilidad de subsanar los defectos\r\nde las ofertas en el plazo que indique el Reglamento de esta Ley siempre y\r\ncuando con ello no se conceda una ventaja indebida, en relación con los demás\r\noferentes. Podrán ser objeto de subsanación, el plazo de vigencia de la oferta,\r\nasí como el plazo de vigencia y el monto de la garantía de participación,\r\ncuando tales extremos no se hayan ofrecido por menos del ochenta por ciento\r\n(80%) de lo fijado en el cartel. Los demás extremos de la garantía de\r\nparticipación podrán ser objeto de subsanación, conforme lo que disponga el\r\nReglamento.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nn)…”\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPero antes de las mencionadas reformas, esta Sala definió en la sentencia\r\nNo. 1998-0998, la garantía de participación de la siguiente forma:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Téngase en cuenta que la forma, modo,\r\nmonto, momento y plazo para presentar la garantía están regulados por las\r\nnormas positivas de la contratación específica, según las especificaciones del\r\ncartel, en tanto su objeto, finalidad o razón de ser, es asegurar o afianzar el\r\nmantenimiento de la oferta durante el plazo estipulado en el pliego de\r\ncondiciones. Esta garantía avala la solemnidad de la oferta, y como tal,\r\nconstituye una seña precontractual destinada a asegurar la celebración del\r\ncontrato o su no cumplimiento, como medida cautelar de la responsabilidad del\r\noferente. La garantía de participación constituye el presupuesto de la oferta,\r\nde manera tal, que sin la primera no puede válidamente legitimarse la oferta\r\nante la administración, a la vez que del mantenimiento de la garantía\r\ndepende la validez de la oferta“.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nCiertamente la Sala en el precedente citado desarrolló la tesis de la\r\ninconstitucionalidad sobre el anterior Reglamento de la Contratación\r\nAdministrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo 25038-H del 7 de marzo de 1996, dado que no\r\nexistía una norma legal que autorizara la subsanación de la garantía de\r\nparticipación. Pero, dado que han operado reformas a la Ley 7494, la potestad\r\nreglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo y la norma reglamentaria que se analiza se\r\nencuentra al amparo de las disposiciones de la Ley de la Contratación\r\nAdministrativa y sus reformas. La enmienda al artículo 42 citado por Ley No.\r\n8511, que en su inciso j) regula la subsanación de defectos de las ofertas, y\r\nel Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H de los veintisiete días de septiembre de 2006,\r\nevidencian un perfecta sincronización, toda vez que ambos tienen fecha de rige\r\na partir del 4 de enero de 2007. Precisamente de la simple lectura es posible\r\ninferir que la normativa legal vigente remite al desarrollo reglamentario, en\r\ncumplimiento de los rangos fijados por la ley, por lo que, en el criterio de\r\nesta Sala, la disposición impugnada no es producto del exceso de la potestad\r\nreglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo, y por consecuencia debe declararse sin lugar\r\nla acción de inconstitucionalidad. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nB.- El problema que se plantea en esta jurisdicción\r\nconstitucional es de otra naturaleza. El Transitorio de la Ley No. 8511\r\nestablece que “Los procedimientos de contratación iniciados antes de la\r\nvigencia de esta reforma parcial de la Ley No. 7494 se concluirán conforme a\r\nlas disposiciones vigentes en el momento en que se adopte la decisión de\r\niniciar el concurso”. La Contraloría General de la República indica que no\r\nse aplicó la normativa vigente (aunque no indica la fecha de la decisión de dar\r\ninicio a la contratación por parte de la Administración licitante en el asunto\r\nque origina el recurso de amparo) y afirma que no rige la licitación, pues la\r\ndecisión administrativa de promover el concurso fue anterior a las reformas\r\nvigentes actualmente, y cuando se resolvió se hizo conforme a “… los\r\nprincipios de razonabilidad, de conservación de los actos, el de eficiencia\r\nadministrativa y del interés público… ”. Consecuentemente, según señala la\r\nContraloría General de la República, en el criterio de la Sala lo que existe en\r\nel asunto base de la acción es un aparente conflicto temporal de las normas\r\naplicables al caso, dado que conforme a la disposición transitoria citada se\r\naplicaría la normativa anterior a los reformas legales operadas a la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa, aunque, como acepta la Contraloría, solo se aplicó\r\nprincipios de la Contratación Administrativa con lo que llegó a una solución similar\r\nal resolverse el recurso de apelación contra el acto adjudicatario, que se\r\nanaliza en el asunto base. Además señala la Contraloría, para los efectos del\r\nanálisis en este asunto, que han operado cambios jurisprudenciales de la Sala\r\nConstitucional en el tema de contrataciones administrativas, que deberán\r\nanalizarse. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nUna oferta que no cumpliera cabalmente con los\r\nporcentajes de la garantía de participación definidos en el cartel o pliego de\r\ncondiciones, y la normativa aplicable en cuestión, con anterioridad a las\r\nreformas a la Ley No. 7494, debía excluirse del concurso. No escapa a esta Sala\r\nque al fijar la Ley No. 7494 el porcentaje de la garantía de participación,\r\ncomo un elemento obligatorio de la contratación administrativa, pudieran\r\nexistir errores materiales, lo cual, precisamente, es el punto determinante de\r\ndilución de esta Sala, porque de ahí radica que en el asunto base se pueda\r\nresolver determinando que existe o no infracción al principio de legalidad, lo\r\ncual según se explica arriba está sujeto a una interpretación, no a la norma\r\nimpugnada. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Continúa sobre el fondo de la\r\ndiscusión planteada y la vía del recurso de amparo.- La jurisprudencia de la Sala, sobre temas de la\r\nContratación Administrativa ha venido modificando anteriores posiciones jurídicas\r\nrespecto de la sentencia No. 1998-00998, en el tanto que el artículo 182\r\nconstitucional debe interpretarse más flexiblemente. Aunque, en ella se\r\nmantiene vigente aspectos de cosa juzgada, como las declaratorias de\r\ninconstitucionalidad realizadas al amparo de lo establecido en ella, es\r\nimportante destacar que las decisiones de esta jurisdicción pueden modificar su\r\ndoctrina, especialmente si se deben ajustar a una nueva realidad social,\r\nnacional y al interés público. Bajo esta línea de pensamiento, mediante\r\nsentencia No. 2005-13910 de esta Sala, se destacó que la regla general en la\r\nContratación Administrativa no sería la licitación pública y solo\r\nexcepcionalmente las otras formas de contratación reguladas en la ley, como se\r\nhabía sostenido con anterioridad, sino que:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“…, encuentra ahora la Sala con mejores\r\nelementos de juicio, que esta es una forma incorrecta de entender e interpretar\r\nel artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, no solo en apego a la doctrina\r\nestablecida por ella, sino con el propio fundamento brindado líneas antes en la\r\npropia sentencia número 5947-98 en donde se ensayó una sistematización más\r\nacorde con el sentido y fines del texto constitucional como se demuestra con la\r\nsiguiente cita:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“II.- DE LOS ANTECEDENTES JURISPRUDENCIALES DE LA\r\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL EN MATERIA DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. Esta Sala\r\nse ha manifestado respecto de la contratación administrativa, el contenido del\r\nartículo 182 de la Constitución Política y los principios constitucionales que\r\nde esta norma se derivan (en este sentido, las sentencias número 2101-91, de\r\nlas ocho horas cuarenta minutos del dieciocho de octubre de mil novecientos\r\nnoventa y uno, 2341-91, de las nueve horas del ocho de noviembre de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y uno, 1490-92, de las dieciséis horas nueve minutos del\r\ntres de junio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, 2864-92, de las quince horas\r\ndel nueve de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos, 2202-93, de las quince\r\nhoras treinta y nueve del veintiuno de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres,\r\n2633-93, de las dieciséis horas tres minutos del nueve de junio de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y tres, 078-7-94, de las quince veintiuno de ocho de\r\nfebrero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, 3348-95, de las ocho horas treinta\r\nminutos del veintiocho de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, y 1205-96,\r\nde las nueve horas del quince de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y seis, entre\r\notras). En todas estas oportunidades se señaló que la contratación del Estado\r\ndebe verificarse mediante el procedimiento de la licitación, por constituir el\r\nmedio idóneo para la selección del cocontratante con la Administración, en aras\r\nde proteger el interés público, concretamente en lo que respecta al control de\r\nla hacienda pública, al promover una sana administración de los fondos\r\npúblicos, en virtud de los principios de publicidad, igualdad y libre\r\nconcurrencia -entre otros- que orientan el concurso. Más recientemente, en\r\nsentencia número 0998-98, de las once horas treinta minutos del dieciséis de\r\nfebrero del año en curso, se concretaron estos principios bajo las siguientes\r\nconsideraciones:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\"primero: en el artículo 182 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, se enuncia la primera obligación constitucional en materia de\r\ncontratación administrativa, en virtud del cual, toda contratación que celebre\r\nel Estado debe tramitarse por medio del procedimiento de la licitación;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nsegundo: que el constituyente optó por el procedimiento de\r\nla licitación, por considerarlo el mecanismo más apto para el control de la\r\nhacienda pública y del correcto uso de los recursos financieros del Estado, con\r\nla finalidad de promover una sana administración de los fondos públicos;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\ntercero: la licitación constituye el medio idóneo para la\r\nselección del cocontratante de la Administración, por ser un procedimiento de\r\ngarantía del interés público, cuya publicidad garantiza una efectiva\r\nparticipación de todos los interesados, para que la Administración seleccione\r\nla mejor opción para la satisfacción del interés público;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\ncuarto: por licitación debe entenderse el mecanismo, modalidad,\r\nmedio o conjunto de principios a los que debe sujetarse el Estado -en el\r\nsentido más amplio-, para poder realizar su actividad de contratación, por\r\ncuanto en ella se dan cumplimiento los principios constitucionales que informan\r\nla contratación administrativa: libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre\r\ntodos los potenciales oferentes, publicidad, legalidad o transparencia de los\r\nprocedimientos, seguridad jurídica, formalismo de los procedimientos\r\nlicitatorios, equilibrio de intereses, principio de buena fe, mutualidad del\r\ncontrato, y control de los procedimientos a cargo y en última realizado\r\ndirectamente por la Contraloría General de la República;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nquinto: del principio \"toda contratación\r\nadministrativa se hará por el procedimiento de la licitación\", contenida\r\nen el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, derivan con rango\r\nconstitucional, todos los principios de derecho público que informan la\r\ncontratación administrativa, en la medida en que resulten razonables y\r\nproporcionados a los fines que se persiguen;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nsexto: el sistema de contratación administrativa está\r\nconformado por los principios constitucionales que emanan de la propia\r\nConstitución, y como complemento, por el sistema de control ejercido\r\ndirectamente por el órgano constitucional encargado y vigilancia de la hacienda\r\npública, -Contraloría General de la República, según se dispone en los\r\nartículos 183 y 184 constitucionales-, que se establece como garantía de la\r\ncorrecta utilización de los fondos públicos en aras de la satisfacción del\r\ninterés público.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nsétimo: la obligación constitucional que deriva del\r\nartículo 182 de la Carta Fundamental comprende toda la actividad contractual\r\ndel Estado; por lo que no puede distinguirse para exceptuarse en el tipo de\r\ncontrato a realizar -de servicios, ejecución de obras, ventas o arrendamientos\r\nde bienes, compras- o en razón de la materia de que se trate;\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\noctavo: el constituyente definió que el procedimiento más\r\napto para realizar la contratación administrativa sería la licitación pública,\r\ny reservó la licitación privada únicamente para las contrataciones cuantitativa\r\ny cualitativamente menores.\"\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEs esta tesis recién transcrita la que a\r\njuicio de la Sala que debe prevalecer, de modo tal que se entienda que si bien,\r\nen efecto la licitación pública, resulta ser un medio favorecido por el\r\nConstituyente, ello no implica la necesidad jurídica de excluir que -de forma\r\nigualmente ordinaria- pueda acudirse a las demás modalidades de licitación\r\nestablecidas, las cuales, también forman parte del conjunto de modos normales\r\nde contratación administrativa amparados por el artículo 182 Constitucional,\r\naún cuando por su propia dinámica conlleven una atenuación -que resulta ser\r\nconstitucionalmente válida- de los principios constitucionales que informan la\r\ncontratación administrativa”.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nDe igual manera, la Contraloría General de la República apunta a este\r\ncambio de criterio de la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia No. 2004-14421, y\r\nen la que con mayor precisión se hace necesario destacar dos aspectos\r\nimportantes: a) se trata de una sentencia que materializa aún más la\r\nflexibilidad –en general de los institutos de la contratación administrativa-\r\ncomo una forma para conseguir los fines perseguidos por la Administración\r\nPública y el interés general; y b) el fundamento normativo para llegar a dicha\r\nconclusión es el mismo que nos ocuparía, el artículo 4 de la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa. De esta forma, en la sentencia citada se\r\nindicó que:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“Bajo esta inteligencia, todos los\r\nrequisitos formales dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico para asegurar la\r\nregularidad o validez en los procedimientos de contratación, el acto de\r\nadjudicación y el contrato administrativo mismo, deben, también, procurar la\r\npronta satisfacción del interés general a través de la efectiva construcción de\r\nlas obras públicas y la prestación de los servicios públicos, consecuentemente\r\nno pueden transformarse en instrumentos para retardar la prestación eficiente y\r\neficaz de los servicios públicos y, sobre todo, su adaptación, a las nuevas\r\nnecesidades socio-económicas y tecnológicas de la colectividad. Sobre este particular, el artículo 4°,\r\npárrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa al enunciar el\r\n“Principio de eficiencia” estatuye que “(…) En todas las etapas de los\r\nprocedimientos de contratación, prevalecerá el contenido sobre la forma. Los\r\nactos y las actuaciones de las partes se interpretarán de forma que se\r\nfavorezca su conservación y se facilite adoptar la decisión final, en\r\ncondiciones favorables para el interés general (…)”. Síguese de lo\r\nanterior que las formas propias de los procedimientos de la contratación\r\nadministrativa así como los recaudos de carácter adjetivo que establece el\r\nordenamiento jurídico para la validez y eficacia de un contrato administrativo\r\ndeben interpretarse de forma flexible en aras del fin de todo contrato\r\nadministrativo, sin descuidar, claro está, la sanidad y corrección en la forma\r\nen que son invertidos los fondos públicos. Desde esta perspectiva, los\r\nprocedimientos administrativos de contratación son la sombra (forma) que debe\r\nseguir, irremisiblemente, al cuerpo (sustancia) que son los fines y propósitos\r\ndel contrato administrativo de satisfacer el interés general y, desde luego,\r\nprocurar por el uso racional, debido y correcto de los fondos públicos”. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn tal sentido, el artículo 4 que se cita efectivamente corresponde a\r\nla norma anterior a la reforma operada por la Ley No. 8511, relacionado con el\r\nprincipio de eficiencia, el cual, es claro que esta Sala debe tomar en cuenta\r\npara determinar la procedencia de lo resuelto por la Contraloría General de la\r\nRepública. Por la discusión en el asunto base, corresponde a esta Sala\r\npronunciarse en otra vía, según lo dispuesto por el inciso b) del artículo 73\r\nde la ley que rige esta jurisdicción, pues aunque proceda la acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad contra los actos subjetivos de la autoridad pública, ello\r\nocurre cuando no sean susceptibles del recurso de amparo o de habeas corpus, y\r\nprecisamente, el párrafo último del artículo 29 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional, admite esta posibilidad, dado que en esta vía “procederá no\r\nsolo contra los actos arbitrarios, sino también contra las actuaciones u\r\nomisiones fundadas en normas erróneamente interpretadas o indebidamente\r\naplicadas”, lo cual deberá determinarse en el asunto base. En tal sentido,\r\nel conflicto se refiere más a la forma de interpretar la Ley de la Contratación\r\nAdministrativa por la Contraloría General de la República en función de tutela\r\nde la hacienda pública, que a una discusión propia de la acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad, concretamente cuando se trata de determinar la aplicación\r\nde normas legales o reglamentarias, que es un tema de legalidad\r\nordinaria. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n V.-\r\nConclusión.- Por todo lo\r\nexpuesto, la acción de inconstitucionalidad debe declararse sin lugar.\n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto:\n\r\n\r\n\n Se\r\ndeclara sin lugar la acción. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\r\n\r\n\nPresidenta \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Luis\r\nPaulino Mora\r\nM. Fernando\r\nCruz C.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Fernando\r\nCastillo\r\nV. \r\nRoxana Salazar C.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Rosa\r\nM. Abdelnour\r\nG. \r\nJorge Araya G.", "body_en_text": "Exp: 08-006164-0007-CO\n\nRes. No. 2011001655\n\n \n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and nine minutes on the ninth of February, two thousand eleven.\n\n \n\n Action of Unconstitutionality filed by SAMUEL RABINOVICH DYNER, legal representative of the company Centrocel Inc S.A; against Article 38 of the General Regulation on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa), Decreto Ejecutivo number 33411-H of September 2006. Participating in the process are ANA LORENA BRENES ESQUIVEL, representing the Procuraduría General de la República, MANUEL DE LA FUENTE FERNÁNDEZ, representing Roy Alpha S.A and Conduktiva S.A. as passive coadjuvant, and ROCIO AGUILAR MONTOYA representing the Contraloría General de la República.\n\n \n\nWhereas:\n\n \n\n1.- By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eleven hours and twenty-three minutes on the eighteenth of April, two thousand eight, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 38 of the General Regulation on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa), Decreto Ejecutivo number 33411-H of September 27, 2006, be declared. The plaintiff alleges that the contested article incurs in an excess of regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), insofar as it allows correcting and even modifying the bid bond (garantía de participación), which is a substantial element of the tender, because it allows extending or modifying the term of its validity in the event that it has been rendered insufficiently in time and amount. This provision overreaches and violates the law, because the form, manner, amount, time, and term of the bid bond are regulated in legal-rank norms. Due to the nature of the bond, as a guarantee of the seriousness of the tender and even a prerequisite thereof, since its invalidity entails the invalidity of the tender before the Administration, and since the subsequent validity of the tender depends on maintaining the bond, it must be considered an essential element of the tender. Likewise, this norm violates the constitutional basis of administrative procurement contained in Article 182 of the Constitución Política, which has as guiding principles efficiency in procurement and equality in the conditions of participation in the bidding process. Following this same line of reasoning, this same Chamber has stated that the correction (subsanación) of substantial requirements in the bidding procedure violates the Constitución Política, if it thereby violates the general principles derived from Article 182 of the Constitution.\n\n \n\n \n\n2.- In order to substantiate his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he indicates that there is a recurso de amparo being processed in expediente number 07-009913-0007-CO in which, by resolution 2007-017111, a period of fifteen business days was granted to file this action of unconstitutionality.\n\n \n\n \n\n3.- By resolution at fifteen hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-first of April, two thousand eight (visible on folio 11), this action of unconstitutionality was given course and a hearing was granted to the Procuraduría General de la República.\n\n \n\n \n\n4.- The Procuradora General de la República, by means of a brief presented in the Secretariat of the Chamber at fifteen hours and forty minutes on the thirteenth of May, two thousand eight, rendered the report required by law. In the first place, she considers that since the action is an incidental remedy that serves as a means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in a pending matter, and therefore has a direct influence on that base matter, the main matter giving rise to this action must be analyzed in order to determine whether the filing of the action of unconstitutionality is a suitable means for the defense of the harmed rights. Following this same line of reasoning, it is worth mentioning that the contested norm corresponds to the Regulation on Administrative Procurement, which came into effect as of January 4, 2007. Article 227 of the Regulation expressly indicated that it came into effect from that date. While it is true that Decreto Ejecutivo 33411 is dated September 27, 2006, this does not imply that said Decree, and more specifically Article 38, came into force from the date of its publication in Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006. Likewise, there is no provision whatsoever in the Regulation that provides a basis for considering that the aforementioned Article 38 applied to tenders submitted before January 4, 2007, ergo, regarding bid bonds (garantías de participación) submitted before the aforementioned date. For this reason, the contested norm cannot govern the procurement carried out by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad through public tender (licitación pública) No. 2006-LI-000059-PROV, which began prior to the validity of the current regulation, and therefore was governed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25038 of March 6, 1996, the previous Regulation on Administrative Procurement. Resolution R-DCA-255-2007 of June 22, 2007, on the basis of which the recurso de amparo was filed, expressly refers to Article 37.8 of the previous Regulation. At that time, the Contraloría considered that the presentation of a bid bond (garantía de participación) by the appealing company, with a validity of no less than two days than required in the tender specifications (cartel), was not a reason to disqualify the tender, regardless of the fact that it was corrected (subsanada) by the appellant before the bond expired. For this reason, the Contraloría considered that the recurso de apelación against the award act was admissible. To rule otherwise, the Contraloría Body considered, would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, conservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest. The reference made by the Contraloría to the reform of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its Regulation is not intended to apply the contested article, but rather to show the suitability of deciding based on the principle of efficiency and not on a formalistic principle. Because the decision of the Contraloría is not based on Article 38, the object of the challenge in this action, but rather on the anti-formalist and administrative efficiency principles, it is concluded that the filing of the action of unconstitutionality does not constitute a suitable means to defend the plaintiff's rights in the recurso de amparo processed in expediente 079913-0007-CO. As a second point, she considers it necessary to make an analysis of the principles of efficacy and efficiency in administrative procurement in relation to the case under analysis. Thus, the State and its Administration are subject not only to the block of legality, but also to efficacy, which materializes in the effective and satisfactory fulfillment of general interests, the very basis of the Public Administration. Article 11 of the Constitución Política is the basis of this framework of principles, where the institutional apparatus is required not only to adhere to the legal order, but also that the result of its actions generate results that best satisfy the general interests. Likewise, the Constitutional Chamber has pronounced on the subject as follows: \"(...) Efficacy implies obtaining the best results with the greatest cost savings or the rational use of human, material, technological, and financial resources...\". Efficacy and efficiency do not act solely as parameters for measuring the final state action, but also involve instrumental action directed at achieving public purposes. Consequently, these principles cover the activity of administrative procurement. Procurement, as an instrumental activity, is aimed at obtaining the goods and services necessary to fulfill substantive administrative activity. For this reason, administrative procurement cannot be seen as an end in itself. This is how the legislator understood it when creating Law 7494, where administrative procurement is subject not only to the principles of legality, equality, and publicity, but also to the principles of efficacy and anti-formalism. This normative orientation, which supports a system freed from excessively formal ties, recognizes the need to neutralize unnecessary formalism, allowing non-substantial irregularities to be corrected (subsanar) and focusing the analysis on the substantive aspects of each tender. In the same sense, clarifications and corrections (subsanaciones) of deficiencies that violate the principle of equality must be permitted. This anti-formal nature does not authorize ignoring the fundamental principles of administrative procurement, such as freedom of participation, publicity, and equality. To these principles, the transparency of the process must be added. The plaintiff alleges that the aforementioned Article 38 of the current Regulation on Administrative Procurement allows correcting serious defects in substantial elements, forcing an analysis of the role of bid bonds (garantías de participación) in administrative procurement. The plaintiff disagrees with the actions of the Contraloría General de la República when resolving a recurso de amparo against an award act issued by the I.C.E. that favored him. The annulment of that act by the Contraloría supposedly disregards the principles extractable in the matter from Article 182 of the Constitución Política, since he considers that Article 38 of the Regulation allows correcting and modifying an element that in his judgment is substantial to the tender and that, in his opinion, constitutes a prerequisite of the tender, without which it cannot be validly legitimized. It is worth highlighting the fact that each legal system determines what the essential elements of the contract are, therefore, which elements may be subject to the assessment of the contracting Administration. However, the bond, as in other systems, is an accessory clause that is not indispensable for the existence of the contract and will be present to the extent that positive law requires it as a means to prove the seriousness of the tender. This accessory nature is reaffirmed by the reform introduced to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa in its Article 33, where it allows the Administration to decide whether or not to request a bid bond (garantía de participación) from bidders. The plaintiff maintains that, given the role played by the bid bond (garantía de participación) in the tender, it is not subject to modification and that the defects it presents cannot be corrected (subsanados). The term \"bid bond\" (garantía de participación) appears in our legal norms with Law 5901 of April 20, 1976. This law was limited to establishing the percentages of the bond without additional requirements. These requirements will be implemented not by law, but by regulatory means. This regulation would be the one contained in Decree 7576 of 1977, which enshrines the principle of formalism, giving the bond an evaluative nature with respect to the tender. In turn, it specifies the object of the bond and formalizes it. That conceptualization provided by the 1977 Regulation generates the consideration that its effects cannot be corrected (subsanados). However, since 1985 it is modified to recognize the possibility of awarding tenders that meet all the requirements of the tender specifications (cartel). The Ley de Contratación Administrativa repealed the provisions of Law 1279, whose original text required the existence of the bid bond (garantía de participación) in all administrative procurement. It provided that the bond would be the element that legitimized the tender, a phrase that would be eliminated by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 998-98 at 11:30 hrs. That original text already authorized that, once the bond was admitted, the Administration would request the correction of remediable formal defects. Subsequently, the Regulation in its Article 33 seeks to attenuate the strictness of the request for a bid bond (garantía de participación), limiting it only to public tenders (licitaciones públicas) and registration tenders, while for other procurement procedures it was optional. In such a way, since the bond requirement does not have an imperative nature, it cannot be treated as a substantial formality, where its total absence would have the legal effect of nullity of the contract, rather this would be reserved exclusively for cases where the tender specifications (cartel) so request. Therefore, it is in this objective character that the legislator gives to the bond, that its accessory and non-substantial nature can be based. Added to the above, and as a matter of greater significance, it must be mentioned that the Constitución Política neither regulates nor requires the observance of the bid bond (garantía de participación). It thus turns out that the bid bond (garantía de participación), as well as the possible correction or not of its defects, is irrelevant to the Constitution. The most that could be of interest is that the regulation given to the subject by means of infra-constitutional norms does not violate the principles of administrative procurement present in the Constitution. The fact is reaffirmed that since the appearance in our legal system of the bid bond (garantía de participación), its treatment has been from the perspective of regulatory norms and not legal ones. Consequently, it is possible that the Regulation allows the correction (subsanación) of defects when the factual assumptions mentioned in the aforementioned Article 38 occur, since neither the legislation nor the Constitution regulate the subject, therefore it is not a matter reserved to law, and the treatment of the subject by regulation is in accordance with the legal order and does not contravene constitutional principles in administrative matters. Therefore, based on all the arguments set forth above, the Procuraduría General de la República considers that this action is inadmissible and improper, therefore it recommends rejecting it.\n\n \n\n \n\n5.- By a memorial presented in the secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fourteen hours and thirteen minutes on the third of June, 2008, Manuel de la Fuente Fernández, of legal age, identity card 2-392-698, representing Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conductiva S.A., requests to be considered as a passive coadjuvant in accordance with Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. To this end, he states that Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima has an interest in the resolution of this action of unconstitutionality, since it is an interested party in public tender (licitación pública) number 2006-LI-000059-PROV promoted by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, as recorded in the expediente attached to this action. Regarding the standing of Conduktiva, it is a company that contracts lighting equipment with the Public Administration and has a direct interest in maintaining the validity of the contested norm. This company places equipment produced by Roy Alpha in the national market, so that the success of that company in its contracting with the ICE produces a good image for Conduktiva towards other public sector clients. Regarding the substantive arguments, he states he shares the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República insofar as it considers that this action is not the most opportune mechanism for defending the plaintiff's rights in the recurso de amparo being processed under expediente 079913-0007-CO. He alleges that in accordance with Article 15 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, every public official is recognized a margin of discretion, so that they have the possibility of making decisions aimed at satisfying the public interest based on reasonable criteria. As a result, in the presence of imperfections that do not endanger fundamental elements of the contract or deteriorate the required guarantee regime, it is logical and satisfactory for the public interest to proceed with its correction. Precisely, the questioned norm tends to protect that reasoning, which ultimately protects the principles of efficacy and efficiency that govern administrative matters, in such a way that it could not be considered unconstitutional. On the other hand, if every public official is called upon to satisfy the public interest, it cannot be considered, in any way, that expanding the causes of invalidity of a procurement and eliminating its procedural remedies that do not contravene fundamental principles responds to the achievement of that general interest. The contested norm is a mechanism for curing non-substantial errors that allows the Public Administration to achieve the satisfaction of general interests. Therefore, based on the foregoing, he requests that this action be dismissed.\n\n \n\n \n\n6.- By means of a brief presented in the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and twenty-six minutes on the twentieth of February, two thousand nine, the Contraloría General de la República, under the representation of ROCÍO AGUILAR MONTOYA in her capacity as Contralora General de la República, requests to be considered as a party in this matter as it is the authority challenged in the recurso de amparo that serves as the base proceeding for the action of unconstitutionality. This, in accordance with Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, despite the fact that the Contraloría was not notified of the filing of this action of unconstitutionality, nor was a hearing granted to it to hear its opinion in the resolution that gave course to this matter. To this end, it states that there is a standing problem in this action that means the processing of it does not generate direct incidence in the base matter, that is, it is not a reasonable means for the protection of the fundamental rights supposedly violated, the object of the recurso de amparo. This is because Article 38 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa was not applied in the base matter of this action, which means the resolution of this matter has no incidence whatsoever in the recurso de amparo that served as the prior matter for this action of unconstitutionality. On this same point, the Contraloría in resolution R-DCA-255-2007 at 9:15 hours on June 22, 2007, indicated that the discussion regarding the insufficiency of the bid bond (garantía de participación) of the appealing company’s tender would be resolved based on the norms in force at that time and specifically in accordance with the principles of efficiency, anti-formalism, conservation of acts, and principle of public interest. It should be noted that the mention made of the reforms to the administrative procurement legislation had an illustrative and not a decisive purpose. With respect to the substantive issue itself, the plaintiff basically attacks two aspects of the norm: the alleged excess in the content of the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) of the Poder Ejecutivo and the correction (subsanación) of the bid bond (garantía de participación). Regarding the first point, it points out that this alleged excess in regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) by the Poder Ejecutivo would imply an overflow of the legal precepts that the law develops. Such an approach is incorrect because it is the Ley de Contratación Administrativa itself in its Article 42 that allows the correction (subsanación) of defects in the term and amount of the bid bond (garantía de participación), provided that they satisfy a minimum percentage. For this reason, the contested norm merely reiterates the criteria developed by the legislation, so such an excess does not exist. Regarding the second point (the correction (subsanación) of the bid bond (garantía de participación) of the tender), it points out that the plaintiff adopts the considerations held by the Constitutional Chamber more than eleven years ago regarding the solemnity of the bid bond (garantía de participación) within the procurement system and the fundamental nature of the bond in the tender. Those considerations were based on theoretical constructions that ended up yielding to a reality that demonstrated serious practical problems. For this reason, the legislator carried out a legal reform that introduced changes in the treatment of the bid bond (garantía de participación), establishing its optional nature in cases where the bidding specifications (cartel de licitación) so determines. Thus, a different vision of the bid bond (garantía de participación) is enshrined regarding its relevance within the procurement system, recognizing its scope as an element that complements the tender, although it is stripped of its sacramental and essential nature. The alleged violation of the principles of administrative procurement alleged by the plaintiff, in the opinion of the Contraloría General de la República, does not exist, since the correction (subsanación) of possible defects in the bid bond (garantía de participación) permitted at the legal and regulatory level is a clear manifestation of the principles of administrative efficacy and efficiency, the result of a vision of administrative procurement as a means and not as an end in itself. This implies that the actions of the Public Administration, regarding the design and execution of procurement processes, must be subject to the public interest, and not the latter to the former. Therefore, based on all the considerations set forth above, the Contraloría considers that this action is inadmissible from a formal standpoint and improper from a substantive standpoint, ergo, it requests that it be dismissed.\n\n \n\n \n\n7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 091, 092, and 093 of the Boletín Judicial, of the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May, two thousand eight (folio 35).\n\n \n\n \n\n8.- By resolution at sixteen hours and ten minutes on the fourth of June, two thousand eight, the Chamber reserves for the opportune procedural moment the request for coadjuvancy filed by the representative of Conductiva, Sociedad Anónima, and Roy Alpha, Sociedad Anónima.\n\n \n\n \n\n 9.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently founded on evident principles and norms, as well as on the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.\n\n \n\n \n\n10.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the procedures.\n\n \n\n Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,\n\n \n\nConsidering:\n\n \n\nI.- On preliminary questions: This Chamber must first resolve the request of the Contraloría General de la República alleging that, being a party in the main matter, it was not granted a hearing on the unconstitutionality claim. Now, by resolution at fifteen hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-first of April, two thousand eight, the presidency of this Chamber gave course to the action of unconstitutionality filed by Centrocel. Inc. Sociedad Anónima against Article 38 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006, granting a hearing only to the Procuraduría General de la República. However, Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that if the admissibility requirements of the action were met, a hearing will be granted not only to the Procuraduría but also to the counterparty appearing in the main matter, which is the recurso de amparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO that serves as the basis for the action, and in which the Contraloría General de la República appears as the respondent party. As a consequence of the foregoing, given the provisions of Article 81 of the Law governing this jurisdiction, the appropriate course is to consider the Contraloría General de la República as a party in this action. On the other hand, having filed within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice of the filing of the action of unconstitutionality in the Boletín Judicial No. 091 of May 13, 2008, Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conductiva S.A. are admitted as coadjuvants to the action, insofar as they allege that the contested norm is a mechanism for curing non-substantial errors in favor of the Public Administration to achieve general interests. It is noted that due to the effects of coadjuvancy, since the coadjuvant is not a principal party to the process, it will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment. That is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjuvant directly and immediately, nor does res judicata affect it, nor do the immediate effects of the execution of the judgment reach it, because through coadjuvancy the jurisdictional authority cannot be compelled to issue a resolution in its favor, as it was not a principal party in the process. What can affect it, but not due to its status as coadjuvant but as anyone, is the erga omnes effect of the pronouncement. The judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the plaintiff; it is in the prior proceeding where this can be recognized.\n\n \n\n \n\nII.- On standing to file the claim of unconstitutionality. The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that in order to file an action of unconstitutionality, it is necessary to have a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. In the case at hand, the base matter is the recurso de amparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO, within which the interlocutory resolution No. 2004-017111 was issued at nine hours and forty-three minutes on the twenty-third of November, two thousand seven. With it, the Chamber suspended the processing of the recurso de amparo and granted the appealing company a period of fifteen days to file the claim of unconstitutionality against Article 38 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación, under the warning that if it did not do so, the expediente would be archived. In accordance with the foregoing, the appealing company filed the process on time on April 18, 2008, so it is proper to hear the matter in the following manner, besides which, if the amparo were admitted, the action would indeed have incidence in this constitutional guarantees process.\n\n \n\n \n\nIII.- Object of the action. The provision under study corresponds to Article 38 of the Regulation to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411-H published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006, by which, by resolution of this Tribunal, the recurso de amparo was suspended so that this claim could be filed and the constitutionality of the provision could be analyzed.\n\n \n\n \n\n\"Article 38.- Insufficient bid bond (Garantía de participación). An insufficient bid bond in term or amount may be corrected (subsanarse) by the bidder or at the request of the Administration, when such aspects have not been offered for less than 80% of what was established in the tender specifications (cartel).\n\nIn the case of partial awards, offers whose participation bonds do not cover the aforementioned 80% in relation to the amount offered may be considered provided that the amount to be awarded is covered.\"\n\nWhat this Chamber must determine is the constitutionality of the challenged rule, insofar as it establishes the possibility of correcting a defective participation bond in terms of duration or amount, under percentage conditions. In this sense, if the participation bond covers eighty percent or more of what is set in the offer or the tender specifications (cartel), the insufficiency can be remedied to that extent.\n\nIV.- On the merits.\n\nA.- Statement of the problem. The excess of regulatory power in the obligation of the Executive Branch to develop, interpret, and execute laws is challenged. Subsection 3) of Article 140 of the Constitution establishes that the President of the Republic and the respective Government Minister shall sanction and promulgate laws, regulate them, execute them, and ensure their exact compliance; the regulatory provisions born under the protection of a legal provision must conform to the conceptual framework of the latter. The principle of legality established in Article 11 of the Constitution establishes that the acts and conduct of the Public Administration must be previously enabled by a written provision. The principle of legality establishes that administrative action must be based on the laws of the legal system, which would allow the Executive Branch to act with strict limits by interpreting and developing them; however, it is not permitted to contradict them. Under this conception, every regulatory provision must adjust to the hierarchical norms on which it depends. Particularly, to examine the challenged article, the reforms to Law No. 7494 implemented through Laws 8511 of May 16, 2006, and 8701 of January 13, 2009, must be analyzed, as they establish:\n\n\"Article 33.- Participation bond (garantía de participación). The administration shall be empowered to request, from the offerors, a participation bond (garantía de participación) between one percent (1%) and five percent (5%) of the amount of the proposal, which shall be defined in the respective tender specifications (cartel) or bidding terms, according to the complexity of the contract.\n\nIn cases where the administration decides not to request the participation bond (garantía de participación) and an offeror withdraws its proposal, the procedure shall be in accordance with the provisions of Articles 99 and 100 of this Law.\"\n\n\"Article 42.- Minimum structure. The public bidding (licitación pública) procedure shall be developed by regulation, and the following minimum criteria shall be respected:\n\na)…\n\n…\n\nj) The possibility of correcting defects in the offers within the term indicated by the Regulation of this Law, provided that this does not grant an undue advantage over the other offerors. The validity period of the offer may be subject to correction, as well as the validity period and the amount of the participation bond (garantía de participación), when such aspects have not been offered for less than eighty percent (80%) of what is established in the tender specifications (cartel). The other aspects of the participation bond (garantía de participación) may be subject to correction, in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.\n\nn)…\"\n\nBut before the aforementioned reforms, this Chamber defined, in judgment No. 1998-0998, the participation bond (garantía de participación) as follows:\n\n\"Bear in mind that the form, mode, amount, moment, and term for presenting the bond are regulated by the positive norms of the specific contracting, according to the specifications of the tender specifications (cartel), insofar as its object, purpose, or reason for being is to ensure or secure the maintenance of the offer during the term stipulated in the bidding terms. This bond guarantees the solemnity of the offer, and as such, constitutes a pre-contractual earnest money intended to ensure the conclusion of the contract or its non-compliance, as a precautionary measure of the offeror's liability. The participation bond (garantía de participación) constitutes the prerequisite of the offer, in such a way that without the former, the offer cannot be validly legitimized before the administration, just as the validity of the offer depends on the maintenance of the bond.\"\n\nCertainly, the Chamber in the cited precedent developed the thesis of unconstitutionality regarding the former Regulation of Administrative Contracting, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 25038-H of March 7, 1996, given that there was no legal norm authorizing the correction of the participation bond (garantía de participación). However, given that reforms to Law 7494 have occurred, the regulatory power of the Executive Branch and the regulatory norm under analysis are covered by the provisions of the Administrative Contracting Law and its reforms. The amendment to Article 42 cited by Law No. 8511, which in its subsection j) regulates the correction of defects in offers, and Decree No. 33411-H of the twenty-seventh day of September 2006, show perfect synchronization, since both have an effective date starting January 4, 2007. Precisely from a simple reading, it is possible to infer that the current legal norms refer to regulatory development, in compliance with the ranges established by law; therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the challenged provision is not the product of an excess of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, and consequently, the action of unconstitutionality must be declared without merit.\n\nB.- The problem raised in this constitutional jurisdiction is of a different nature. The Transitory Provision of Law No. 8511 establishes that \"Contracting procedures initiated before the effective date of this partial reform of Law No. 7494 shall be concluded in accordance with the provisions in force at the time the decision to initiate the tender (concurso) is made.\" The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) indicates that the applicable norm was not applied (although it does not indicate the date of the decision to initiate the contracting by the bidding Administration in the matter originating the amparo appeal) and affirms that the bidding is not governed by the reform, since the administrative decision to promote the tender (concurso) was prior to the currently effective reforms, and when it was resolved, it was done in accordance with \"… the principles of reasonableness, conservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest…\". Consequently, according to what the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) points out, in the Chamber's opinion, what exists in the underlying matter of the action is an apparent temporal conflict of the norms applicable to the case, given that according to the cited transitory provision, the norms prior to the legal reforms to the Administrative Contracting Law would apply, although, as the Comptroller's Office accepts, only principles of Administrative Contracting were applied, with which it reached a solution similar to resolving the appeal against the award act, which is analyzed in the underlying matter. Furthermore, the Comptroller's Office points out, for the purposes of the analysis in this matter, that there have been jurisprudential changes by the Constitutional Chamber on the subject of administrative contracting, which must be analyzed.\n\nAn offer that did not fully comply with the percentages of the participation bond (garantía de participación) defined in the tender specifications (cartel) or bidding terms, and the applicable norms in question, prior to the reforms to Law No. 7494, had to be excluded from the tender (concurso). It does not escape this Chamber that when Law No. 7494 established the percentage of the participation bond (garantía de participación) as a mandatory element of administrative contracting, material errors could exist, which is precisely the determining point of elucidation for this Chamber, because from there lies that in the underlying matter it can be resolved by determining whether or not there is a violation of the principle of legality, which, as explained above, is subject to interpretation, not to the challenged norm.\n\nV.- Continues on the merits of the discussion raised and the avenue of the amparo appeal.- The Chamber's jurisprudence on matters of Administrative Contracting has been modifying previous legal positions regarding judgment No. 1998-00998, insofar as Article 182 of the Constitution must be interpreted more flexibly. Although res judicata aspects remain in effect, such as the declarations of unconstitutionality made under its protection, it is important to highlight that the decisions of this jurisdiction can modify their doctrine, especially if they must adjust to a new social and national reality and the public interest. Under this line of thought, through judgment No. 2005-13910 of this Chamber, it was emphasized that the general rule in Administrative Contracting would not be public bidding (licitación pública) and only exceptionally the other forms of contracting regulated by law, as had been previously held, but rather that:\n\n\"…, the Chamber now finds with better elements of judgment, that this is an incorrect way of understanding and interpreting Article 182 of the Political Constitution, not only in adherence to the doctrine established by it, but with the very foundation provided lines earlier in judgment number 5947-98 itself, where a systematization more in line with the meaning and purposes of the constitutional text was tested, as demonstrated by the following quote:\n\n\"II.- OF THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING. This Chamber has pronounced on administrative contracting, the content of Article 182 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles derived from this norm (in this sense, judgments number 2101-91, at eight hours forty minutes on October eighteenth, nineteen ninety-one, 2341-91, at nine hours on November eighth, nineteen ninety-one, 1490-92, at sixteen hours nine minutes on June third, nineteen ninety-two, 2864-92, at fifteen hours on September ninth, nineteen ninety-two, 2202-93, at fifteen hours thirty-nine on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, 2633-93, at sixteen hours three minutes on June ninth, nineteen ninety-three, 078-7-94, at fifteen twenty-one on February eighth, nineteen ninety-four, 3348-95, at eight hours thirty minutes on June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, and 1205-96, at nine hours on March fifteenth, nineteen ninety-six, among others). In all these opportunities, it was indicated that State contracting must be verified through the bidding (licitación) procedure, as it constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor with the Administration, in order to protect the public interest, specifically regarding the control of public finances, by promoting sound administration of public funds, by virtue of the principles of publicity, equality, and free concurrence -among others- that guide the tender (concurso). More recently, in judgment number 0998-98, at eleven hours thirty minutes on February sixteenth of the current year, these principles were specified under the following considerations:\n\n\"first: in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, the first constitutional obligation in matters of administrative contracting is stated, by virtue of which, all contracting carried out by the State must be processed through the bidding (licitación) procedure;\n\nsecond: that the constituent chose the bidding (licitación) procedure, considering it the most suitable mechanism for the control of public finances and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds;\n\nthird: bidding (licitación) constitutes the ideal means for the selection of the Administration's co-contractor, as it is a procedure that guarantees the public interest, whose publicity ensures effective participation of all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for satisfying the public interest;\n\nfourth: by bidding (licitación), one must understand the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State -in the broadest sense- must subject itself in order to carry out its contracting activity, since through it, the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting are fulfilled: free concurrence, equality of treatment among all potential offerors, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of bidding procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of the procedures, ultimately carried out directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República);\n\nfifth: from the principle \"all administrative contracting shall be carried out through the bidding (licitación) procedure\", contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, derive, with constitutional rank, all the principles of public law that inform administrative contracting, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportionate to the aims pursued;\n\nsixth: the administrative contracting system is composed of the constitutional principles emanating from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body responsible for and overseeing public finances, -the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), as provided in Articles 183 and 184 of the Constitution-, established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds in pursuit of satisfying the public interest;\n\nseventh: the constitutional obligation derived from Article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all contractual activity of the State; therefore, no distinction can be made to exempt based on the type of contract to be performed -services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases- or by reason of the subject matter involved;\n\neighth: the constituent established that the most suitable procedure for carrying out administrative contracting would be public bidding (licitación pública), and reserved private bidding (licitación privada) only for quantitatively and qualitatively minor contracts.\"\n\nIt is this recently transcribed thesis that, in the judgment of the Chamber, should prevail, in such a way that it be understood that although, indeed, public bidding (licitación pública) proves to be a means favored by the Constituent, this does not imply the legal necessity of excluding -in an equally ordinary manner- recourse to the other bidding modalities established, which also form part of the set of normal modes of administrative contracting protected by Article 182 of the Constitution, even though by their own dynamics they entail an attenuation -which is constitutionally valid- of the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting.\"\n\nSimilarly, the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) points to this change in criteria by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No. 2004-14421, and in which, with greater precision, it is necessary to highlight two important aspects: a) it is a judgment that further materializes flexibility –in general, of the institutes of administrative contracting– as a way to achieve the aims pursued by the Public Administration and the general interest; and b) the normative basis for reaching said conclusion is the same one that would concern us, Article 4 of the Administrative Contracting Law. Thus, in the cited judgment, it was indicated that:\n\n\"Under this understanding, all formal requirements established by the legal system to ensure the regularity or validity of contracting procedures, the award act, and the administrative contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services; consequently, they cannot be transformed into instruments to delay the efficient and effective provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community. On this matter, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Administrative Contracting Law, when setting forth the \"Principle of efficiency,\" statutes that \"(...) In all stages of the contracting procedures, substance shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a way that favors their conservation and facilitates adopting the final decision, under conditions favorable to the general interest (...)\". It follows from the foregoing that the forms inherent to the administrative contracting procedures, as well as the adjective requirements established by the legal system for the validity and effectiveness of an administrative contract, must be interpreted flexibly for the sake of the purpose of every administrative contract, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the way public funds are invested. From this perspective, the administrative contracting procedures are the shadow (form) that must irremissibly follow the body (substance), which are the ends and purposes of the administrative contract to satisfy the general interest and, of course, to ensure the rational, due, and correct use of public funds.\"\n\nIn this regard, the cited Article 4 indeed corresponds to the norm prior to the reform implemented by Law No. 8511, related to the principle of efficiency, which this Chamber must clearly take into account to determine the appropriateness of what was resolved by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). Due to the discussion in the underlying matter, this Chamber must rule through another avenue, in accordance with subsection b) of Article 73 of the law governing this jurisdiction, since even if the action of unconstitutionality proceeds against subjective acts of public authority, this occurs when they are not susceptible to amparo or habeas corpus appeal, and precisely, the last paragraph of Article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction admits this possibility, given that through this avenue it \"shall proceed not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms,\" which must be determined in the underlying matter. In this sense, the conflict refers more to the manner of interpreting the Administrative Contracting Law by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) in the function of safeguarding public finances, than to a discussion specific to the action of unconstitutionality, particularly when it comes to determining the application of legal or regulatory norms, which is a matter of ordinary legality.\n\nV.- Conclusion.- For all the foregoing, the action of unconstitutionality must be declared without merit.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is declared without merit.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V. Roxana Salazar C.\n\nRosa M. Abdelnour G. Jorge Araya G.\n\nLikewise, this rule violates the constitutional foundation of administrative procurement contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, which has as its guiding principles efficiency in procurement and equality in the conditions of bidding participation. Following this same line of thought, this same Chamber has stated that the correction of substantial requirements in the bidding procedure is a violation of the Political Constitution, if it thereby infringes upon the general principles derived from constitutional Article 182.\n\n**2.-** In order to substantiate the legal standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he points out that there is an amparo remedy being processed under case file number 07-009913-0007-CO in which, by resolution 2007-017111, a period of fifteen business days was granted to file the present unconstitutionality action.\n\n**3.-** By a resolution issued at fifteen hours and fifty minutes on April twenty-first, two thousand eight (visible on folio 11), this unconstitutionality action was admitted for processing and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República).\n\n**4.-** The Attorney General of the Republic, through a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at fifteen hours and forty minutes on May thirteenth, two thousand eight, submitted the report required by law. Firstly, she considers that since the action is an incidental remedy that serves as a means to protect the right or interest considered injured in a pending matter and, therefore, has direct influence on that base matter, the main matter giving rise to this action must be analyzed in order to determine whether the filing of the unconstitutionality action is a suitable means for the defense of the injured rights. Following this same line of thought, it is worth mentioning that the challenged rule corresponds to the Administrative Procurement Regulations (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), which came into effect as of January 4, 2007. Article 227 of said Regulations expressly indicated that it came into effect as of that date. While it is true that Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 33411 is dated September 27, 2006, this does not imply that said Decree, and more specifically Article 38, came into force as of the date of publication in Gazette (Gaceta) No. 210 of November 2, 2006. Similarly, there is no provision in the Regulations that provides a basis for considering that the cited Article 38 governed in relation to bids submitted before January 4, 2007; ergo, regarding participation guarantees submitted before the aforementioned date. For this reason, the challenged rule cannot govern the procurement conducted by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE) through public bidding No. 2006-LI-000059-PROV, which began prior to the effectiveness of the current regulations; therefore, it was governed by Executive Decree No. 25038 of March 6, 1996, the former Administrative Procurement Regulations. Resolution R-DCA-255-2007 of June 22, 2007, by reason of which the amparo remedy is filed, expressly refers to Article 37.8 of the former Regulations. At that time, the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría) considered that the presentation of a participation guarantee by the appellant company, with a validity period no less than two days shorter than required in the bidding terms (cartel), was not grounds for disqualifying the bid, without considering the fact that it was corrected by the appellant before the guarantee expired. For this reason, the Comptroller's Office considered that the appeal against the award act was admissible. To resolve otherwise, the Comptroller Body considered, would be contrary to the principles of reasonableness, preservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest. The Comptroller’s reference to the reform of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its Regulations does not seek the application of the challenged article, but rather to demonstrate the suitability of resolving based on the principle of efficiency and not on the formalistic principle. Because the Comptroller's decision is not based on Article 38, the object of challenge in this action, but on the anti-formalist and administrative efficiency principles, it is concluded that the filing of the unconstitutionality action does not constitute a suitable means to defend the petitioner's rights in the Amparo Remedy processed under case file 079913-0007-CO. As a second point, she considers that it is necessary to analyze the principles of effectiveness (eficacia) and efficiency (eficiencia) in administrative procurement in relation to the case under analysis. Thus, the State and its Administration are subject not only to the rule of law (bloque de legalidad) but also to effectiveness, which materializes in the effective and satisfactory fulfillment of general interests, the very foundation of Public Administration. Article 11 of the Political Constitution is the basis of this framework of principles, where the institutional apparatus is required not only to adhere to the legal order, but also for the result of its actions to generate outcomes that satisfy general interests in the best possible way. Likewise, the Constitutional Chamber has ruled on this matter as follows: \"(…) Effectiveness implies obtaining the best results with the greatest cost savings or the rational use of human, material, technological, and financial resources…\" Effectiveness and efficiency do not act solely as parameters for measuring final state action, but also involve instrumental action, aimed at achieving public ends. Consequently, these principles cover the activity of administrative procurement. Procurement, as an activity of an instrumental nature, is oriented towards obtaining the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of substantive administrative activity. For this reason, administrative procurement cannot be seen as an end in itself. The legislator understood this when creating Law 7494, where administrative procurement is subject not only to the principle of legality, equality, and publicity, but also to the principles of effectiveness and anti-formalism. This normative orientation, which supports a system freed from excessively formal ties, recognizes the need to neutralize unnecessary formalism, allowing the correction of non-substantial irregularities and focusing the analysis on the substantive aspects of each bid. In the same vein, clarifications and the correction of deficiencies that do not violate the principle of equality must be permitted. This anti-formal nature does not authorize disregarding the fundamental principles of administrative procurement, such as freedom of participation (libertad de concurrencia), publicity, and equality. To these principles, the transparency of the process must be added. The petitioner alleges that cited Article 38 of the current Administrative Procurement Regulations allows for the correction of serious defects in substantial elements, which obligates an analysis of the role of participation guarantees in administrative procurement. The petitioner expresses disagreement with the actions of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in resolving an amparo remedy against an award act issued by the I.C.E. that favored him. The annulment of that act by the Comptroller's Office supposedly disregards the principles extractable in this matter from Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since he considers that Article 38 of the Regulations allows for the correction and modification of an element that, in his judgment, is substantial to the bid and which, in his opinion, constitutes the prerequisites of the bid, without which it cannot be validly legitimized. It is worth highlighting the fact that each legal order determines which are the essential elements of the contract; therefore, which elements whose presence may be subject to the assessment of the contracting Administration. However, the guarantee, as in other legal orders, is an accessory clause that is not indispensable for the existence of the contract and which will be present to the extent that positive law requires it as a means to prove the seriousness of the bid. This accessory nature is reaffirmed by the reform introduced to the Administrative Procurement Law in its Article 33, which allows the Administration to decide whether or not to require bidders to submit a participation guarantee. The petitioner maintains that given the role played by the participation guarantee in the bid, it is not susceptible to modification and that any defects it presents cannot be corrected. The term “participation guarantee” (garantía de participación) appeared in our legal regulations with Law 5901 of April 20, 1976. This law was limited to establishing the percentages of the guarantee without additional requirements. These requirements would be implemented not by law, but through regulatory channels. These regulations would be contained in Decree 7576 of 1977, which enshrines the principle of formalism, giving the guarantee a value-based character with respect to the bid. In turn, it specifies the object of the guarantee and formalizes it. This conceptualization provided by the 1977 Regulations generates the consideration that its effects cannot be corrected. However, since 1985, it has been modified to recognize the possibility of awarding bids that meet all the requirements of the bidding terms. The Administrative Procurement Law repealed the provisions of Law 1279, whose original text required the existence of a participation guarantee in all administrative procurement. It stipulated that the guarantee would be the element that would legitimize the bid—a phrase that would be eliminated by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 998-98 at 11:30 hrs. That original text already authorized that once the guarantee was admitted, the Administration would request the correction of correctable formal defects. Subsequently, the Regulations, in their Article 33, sought to mitigate the rigidity of the participation guarantee requirement, limiting it solely to public biddings and registry biddings, while for other procurement procedures it was optional. In this way, as the guarantee requirement does not have an imperative character, it cannot be given the treatment of a substantial formality, where its total absence would have the legal effect of nullity of the contract. Rather, this would be reserved exclusively for cases where the bidding terms so request. Therefore, it is in this objective character that the legislator gives to the guarantee that its accessory and non-substantial nature can be founded. In addition to the foregoing, and as an element of greater significance, it must be mentioned that the Political Constitution neither regulates nor requires the observance of the participation guarantee. Thus, it turns out that the participation guarantee, as well as the possible correction or non-correction of its defects, is irrelevant to the Constitution. At most, what could be of interest is that the regulation given to the matter by means of infra-constitutional norms does not violate the principles of administrative procurement present in the Constitution. The fact is reaffirmed that since the appearance of the participation guarantee in our legal order, its treatment has been from the perspective of regulatory and not legal norms. Consequently, it is possible for the Regulations to allow the correction of defects when the factual assumptions mentioned in cited Article 38 occur, since neither the legislation nor the Constitution regulates the matter; therefore, it is not a matter reserved for law and treatment of the matter via regulation is in accordance with the legal order and does not contravene constitutional principles in administrative matters. Therefore, based on all the arguments set forth above, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic considers that the present action is inadmissible and unfounded, and therefore recommends rejecting it.\n\n5.- By a brief filed with the secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fourteen hours and thirteen minutes on June third, 2008, Manuel de la Fuente Fernández, of legal age, identity card number 2-392-698, representing Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conductiva S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). To that end, he states that Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima has an interest in the resolution of this unconstitutionality action, as it is an interested party in public bidding number 2006-LI-000059-PROV promoted by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, as evidenced in the file attached to this action. Regarding Conduktiva’s legal standing, this is a company that contracts lighting equipment with the Public Administration and has a direct interest in maintaining the validity of the challenged rule. This company places equipment produced by Roy Alpha on the national market, such that the success of this company in its procurement with the ICE results in a good image for Conduktiva with other public sector clients. With respect to the substantive arguments, he affirms sharing the criterion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic insofar as he considers the present action is not the most opportune mechanism for the defense of the petitioner's rights in the amparo remedy being processed under case file 079913-0007-CO. He alleges that in accordance with Article 15 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), every public official is recognized a margin of discretion, in such a way that he has the possibility of making decisions oriented towards satisfying the public interest based on reasonable criteria. As a result, in the presence of imperfections that do not endanger fundamental elements of the contract or diminish the required guarantee regime, it is logical and satisfactory for the public interest to proceed with their correction. Precisely, the questioned rule tends towards the protection of that reasoning, which ultimately protects the principles of effectiveness and efficiency that govern in administrative matters, in such a way that it could not be considered unconstitutional. On the other hand, if every public official is called upon to satisfy the public interest, it cannot be considered, in any way, that broadening the causes for invalidating a procurement and eliminating its procedural remedies that do not contravene fundamental principles responds to obtaining that general interest. The challenged rule is a mechanism for curing non-substantial errors that allows Public Administration to achieve the satisfaction of general interests. Therefore, according to the foregoing, he requests that the present action be declared without merit.\n\n**6.-** By means of a written submission filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and twenty-six minutes on February twentieth, two thousand nine, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, represented by ROCÍO AGUILAR MONTOYA in her capacity as Comptroller General of the Republic, requests to be considered a party to this matter as it is the authority challenged in the amparo remedy serving as the base trial for the unconstitutionality action. This is in accordance with Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, despite the fact that the Comptroller's Office was not notified of the filing of this unconstitutionality action, nor was it granted a hearing to learn its opinion in the resolution that admitted this matter for processing. To this end, it states that there is a problem of legal standing in this action that means its processing does not generate a direct impact on the base matter, meaning it is not a reasonable means for the protection of the fundamental rights allegedly violated, which are the object of the amparo remedy. This is because Article 38 of the Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law was not applied in the base matter of this action, which means the resolution of this matter has no impact whatsoever on the amparo remedy that served as the prior matter for this unconstitutionality action. On this same point, the Comptroller's Office, in resolution R-DCA-255-2007 at 9:15 hours on June 22, 2007, indicated that the discussion revolving around the insufficiency of the participation guarantee for the bid of the appellant company would be resolved based on the regulations in force at that time and specifically in consideration of the principles of efficiency, anti-formalism, preservation of acts, and the principle of public interest. It should be noted that the mention made of the reforms made to the administrative procurement legislation had an illustrative and not a decisive purpose. Regarding the substantive matter itself, the petitioner essentially attacks two aspects of the rule: the alleged excess in the content of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch and the correction of the participation guarantee. Regarding the first point, it points out that this alleged excess in the regulatory power on the part of the Executive Branch would imply an overstepping of the legal precepts that the law develops. Such an approach is incorrect because it is the Administrative Procurement Law itself, in its Article 42, that allows the correction of defects in the term and amount of the participation guarantee, provided that they satisfy a minimum percentage. For this reason, the challenged rule merely reiterates the criteria developed by the legislation, so such an excess does not exist. Regarding the second point (the correction of the bid's participation guarantee), it points out that the petitioner adopts the considerations that the Constitutional Chamber held over eleven years ago concerning the formalization (solemnidad) of the participation guarantee within the procurement system and the elementary nature of the guarantee in the bid. These considerations were based on theoretical constructions that ended up yielding to a reality that demonstrated serious problems of a practical nature. For this reason, the legislator carried out a legal reform that introduced changes in the treatment of the participation guarantee, establishing its optional nature in cases where the bidding terms so determine. Thus, a different vision of the participation guarantee is enshrined regarding its relevance within the procurement system, recognizing its scope as an element that complements the bid, although it is stripped of its sacramental and essential character. The alleged violation of the principles of administrative procurement that the petitioner claims, in the opinion of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, does not exist, since the correction of possible defects in the participation guarantee, permitted at a legal and regulatory level, is a clear manifestation of the principles of administrative effectiveness and efficiency, the result of a vision of administrative procurement as a means and not as an end in itself. This implies that the actions of the Public Administration, regarding the design and execution of purchasing processes, must be subject to the public interest, and not the latter to the former. Therefore, based on all the considerations set forth above, the Comptroller's Office considers that this action is inadmissible from a formal standpoint and unfounded from a substantive standpoint; ergo, it requests that it be declared without merit.\n\n**7.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 091, 092, and 093 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on May 13, 14, and 15, two thousand eight (folio 35).\n\n**8.-** By a resolution at sixteen hours ten minutes on June fourth, two thousand eight, the Chamber reserves for the opportune procedural moment the request for coadjuvancy filed by the representative of Conductiva, Sociedad Anónima and Roy Alpha, Sociedad Anónima.\n\n**9.-** The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.\n\n**10.-** The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- On preliminary issues:** This Chamber must first resolve the request of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic insofar as it claims that, being a party to the main matter, it was not granted a hearing regarding the unconstitutionality claim. Now, by resolution at fifteen hours fifty minutes on April twenty-first, two thousand eight, the presidency of this Chamber admitted for processing the unconstitutionality action filed by Centrocel. Inc. Sociedad Anónima against Article 38 of the Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law, Executive Decree No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006, granting a hearing solely to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. However, Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes that if the admissibility requirements of the action are met, a hearing shall be granted not only to the Attorney General's Office but also to the counterpart appearing in the main matter, which is the amparo remedy No. 07-009913-0007-CO serving as the basis for the action, and in which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic appears as the appealed party. Consequently, given the provisions of Article 81 of the Law governing this jurisdiction, the appropriate course is to recognize the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic as a party in this action. On the other hand, having filed within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice of the filing of the unconstitutionality action, in Judicial Bulletin No. 091 of May 13, 2008, Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conductiva S.A. are admitted as coadjuvants of the action, insofar as they allege that the challenged rule is a mechanism for curing non-substantial errors in favor of the Public Administration to achieve general interests. It is noted that due to the effects of coadjuvancy, as the coadjuvant is not a principal party to the process, it will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment; that is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjuvant directly and immediately, nor does res judicata affect it, nor do the immediate effects of the enforcement of the judgment reach it. Through coadjuvancy, the jurisdictional authority cannot be obliged to issue a resolution in their favor, for not having been a principal party in the process. What can affect them, but not by their condition as coadjuvant but as anyone, is the erga omnes effect of the decision. A judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the claimant; it is in the prior trial where this can be recognized.\n\n**II.- On the legal standing to file the unconstitutionality claim.** The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes that to file an unconstitutionality action, it is necessary to have a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured. In the case at hand, the base matter is the amparo remedy No. 07-009913-0007-CO, within which interlocutory resolution No. 2004-017111 was issued at nine hours forty-three minutes on November twenty-third, two thousand seven. With that resolution, the Chamber suspended the processing of the amparo remedy and granted the appellant company a period of fifteen days to file the unconstitutionality claim against Article 38 of the Regulations to the Procurement Law, with the warning that failure to do so would result in the case file being archived. In accordance with the foregoing, the appellant company timely filed the process on April 18, 2008, so it is appropriate to hear the matter in the following manner, besides the fact that upon admission of the amparo, the action would indeed have an impact on this constitutional proceedings of guarantees.\n\n**III.- Object of the action.** The provision under study corresponds to Article 38 of the Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law No. 33411-H published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006, by which order of this Court, the amparo remedy was suspended so that this claim could be filed, and the constitutionality of the provision could be analyzed.\n\n\"***Article 38.-** Insufficient participation guarantee. An insufficient participation guarantee in term or amount may be corrected by the bidder or at the request of the Administration, when such terms have not been offered for less than 80% of what is set forth in the bidding terms.*\"\n\nIn the event of partial awards, bids whose participation guarantees (garantías de participación) do not cover the aforementioned 80% in relation to the bid amount may be considered, provided that the amount to be awarded is covered.”\n\nWhat this Chamber must determine is the constitutionality of the challenged provision, insofar as it establishes the possibility of correcting a defective participation guarantee in terms of duration or amount, under percentage-based conditions. In this sense, if the participation guarantee covers eighty percent or more of the amount set forth in the bid or the tender specifications (cartel), the insufficiency may be remedied to that extent.\n\n**IV.- On the merits.**\n\n**A.- Statement of the problem.** The excess of regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) in the obligation of the Executive Branch to develop, interpret, and execute laws is challenged. Subsection 3) of Article 140 of the Constitution establishes that the President of the Republic and the respective Government Minister shall sanction and promulgate laws, regulate them, execute them, and ensure their exact compliance; regulatory provisions (disposiciones reglamentarias) born under the protection of a legal provision must adhere to its conceptual framework. The principle of legality (principio de legalidad) established in Article 11 of the Constitution provides that the acts and conduct of the Public Administration must be previously authorized by a written provision. The principle of legality establishes that administrative action must be based on the laws of the legal system, which would allow the Executive Branch to act within strict limits by interpreting and developing them; however, it is not permitted to contradict them. Under this concept, every regulatory provision must conform to the hierarchical norms upon which it depends. Specifically, to examine the challenged article, the reforms to Law No. 7494 enacted by Laws 8511 of May 16, 2006, and 8701 of January 13, 2009, must be analyzed, as they establish:\n\n***“Article 33.- Participation guarantee.** The administration shall be empowered to request from bidders a participation guarantee (garantía de participación) of between one percent (1%) and five percent (5%) of the proposal amount, which shall be defined in the respective tender specifications (cartel) or set of conditions, according to the complexity of the contract.*\n\n*In cases where the administration decides not to request the participation guarantee and a bidder withdraws its proposal, the provisions of Articles 99 and 100 of this Law shall be followed.”*\n\n***“Article 42.- Minimum structure.** The public bidding procedure shall be developed by regulation, and the following minimum criteria shall be respected:*\n\n*a)…*\n\n*…*\n\n*j) The possibility of correcting defects in bids within the period indicated by the Regulation to this Law, provided that this does not grant an undue advantage in relation to the other bidders. The following may be subject to correction: the bid validity period, as well as the validity period and the amount of the participation guarantee, when such items have not been offered for less than eighty percent (80%) of what was set forth in the tender specifications (cartel). The other items of the participation guarantee may be subject to correction, in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.*\n\n*n)…”*\n\nBut before the aforementioned reforms, this Chamber defined the participation guarantee in Judgment No. 1998-0998 as follows:\n\n“Bear in mind that the form, mode, amount, time, and period for submitting the guarantee are regulated by the positive norms of the specific contracting, according to the specifications of the tender specifications (cartel), insofar as its object, purpose, or reason for being is to ensure or guarantee the maintenance of the bid during the period stipulated in the set of conditions. This guarantee supports the solemnity of the bid, and as such, constitutes pre-contractual earnest money intended to ensure the execution of the contract or its non-fulfillment, as a precautionary measure regarding the bidder's liability. The participation guarantee constitutes the prerequisite of the bid, in such a way that without the former, the bid cannot be validly legitimized before the administration, while the validity of the bid depends on the maintenance of the guarantee.\"\n\nCertainly, in the cited precedent, the Chamber developed the thesis of unconstitutionality regarding the previous Regulation of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa), Executive Decree 25038-H of March 7, 1996, given that there was no legal norm authorizing the correction of the participation guarantee. But, since reforms to Law 7494 have taken effect, the regulatory power of the Executive Branch and the regulatory norm under analysis are protected by the provisions of the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) and its reforms. The amendment to Article 42, cited by Law No. 8511, which in its subsection j) regulates the correction of defects in bids, and Executive Decree No. 33411-H of the twenty-seventh day of September 2006, demonstrate perfect synchronization, since both have an effective date starting January 4, 2007. Precisely from a simple reading, it is possible to infer that the current legal regulations refer to regulatory development, in compliance with the ranges set by law; therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the challenged provision is not a product of the excess of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, and consequently, the unconstitutionality action must be dismissed without merit.\n\n**B.-** The problem raised in this constitutional jurisdiction is of another nature. The Transitory Provision of Law No. 8511 establishes that “*Contracting procedures initiated before the entry into force of this partial reform of Law No. 7494 shall be concluded in accordance with the provisions in force at the time the decision to initiate the tender is adopted*”. The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) indicates that the regulations in force were not applied (although it does not indicate the date of the decision to initiate the contracting by the tendering Administration in the matter that gives rise to the amparo appeal) and affirms that the tender is not governed, because the administrative decision to promote the tender was prior to the currently effective reforms, and when it was resolved, it was done in accordance with “*… the principles of reasonableness, conservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest…*”. Consequently, according to the Comptroller General of the Republic, in the opinion of the Chamber, what exists in the underlying matter of the action is an apparent temporal conflict of the rules applicable to the case, given that according to the cited transitory provision, the regulations prior to the legal reforms enacted to the Law on Administrative Contracting would apply, although, as the Comptroller acknowledges, only principles of Administrative Contracting were applied, thereby reaching a solution similar to when the appeal against the award act, which is analyzed in the underlying matter, was resolved. Moreover, the Comptroller points out, for the purposes of analysis in this matter, that jurisprudential changes by the Constitutional Chamber on issues of administrative contracting have taken place, which must be analyzed.\n\nA bid that did not fully comply with the percentages of the participation guarantee defined in the tender specifications (cartel) or set of conditions, and the applicable regulations in question, prior to the reforms to Law No. 7494, had to be excluded from the tender. It does not escape this Chamber that when Law No. 7494 set the percentage of the participation guarantee as a mandatory element of administrative contracting, material errors could exist, which, precisely, is the determining point of elucidation for this Chamber, because therein lies the possibility of resolving the underlying matter by determining whether or not there is an infringement of the principle of legality, which, as explained above, is subject to interpretation, not to the challenged norm.\n\n**V.- Continues on the merits of the discussion raised and the avenue of the amparo appeal.-** The Chamber's jurisprudence on issues of Administrative Contracting has been modifying previous legal positions with respect to Judgment No. 1998-00998, insofar as Article 182 of the Constitution must be interpreted more flexibly. Although aspects of res judicata remain in force therein, such as the declarations of unconstitutionality made under the protection of what is established in it, it is important to highlight that the decisions of this jurisdiction can modify their doctrine, especially if they must adjust to a new social, national reality and to the public interest. Following this line of thought, through Judgment No. 2005-13910 of this Chamber, it was emphasized that the general rule in Administrative Contracting would not be public bidding, and only exceptionally the other forms of contracting regulated by law, as had been previously held, but rather that:\n\n“*…, the Chamber now finds, with better elements of judgment, that this is an incorrect way of understanding and interpreting Article 182 of the Political Constitution, not only in adherence to the doctrine established by it, but with the very foundation provided lines before in Judgment number 5947-98 itself, where a systematization more in accordance with the meaning and purposes of the constitutional text was attempted, as demonstrated by the following quote:*\n\n***“**II.- OF THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING**. This Chamber has ruled regarding administrative contracting, the content of Article 182 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles derived from this norm (in this sense, Judgments number 2101-91, of eight hours forty minutes on October eighteenth, nineteen ninety-one; 2341-91, of nine hours on November eighth, nineteen ninety-one; 1490-92, of sixteen hours nine minutes on June third, nineteen ninety-two; 2864-92, of fifteen hours on September ninth, nineteen ninety-two; 2202-93, of fifteen hours thirty-nine on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three; 2633-93, of sixteen hours three minutes on June ninth, nineteen ninety-three; 078-7-94, of fifteen twenty-one on February eighth, nineteen ninety-four; 3348-95, of eight hours thirty minutes on June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five; and 1205-96, of nine hours on March fifteenth, nineteen ninety-six, among others). On all these occasions, it was stated that State contracting must be verified through the bidding procedure, as it constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor with the Administration, in order to protect the public interest, specifically regarding the control of the public treasury, by promoting sound administration of public funds, by virtue of the principles of publicity, equality, and free competition -among others- that guide the tender. More recently, in Judgment number 0998-98, of eleven hours thirty minutes on February sixteenth of the current year, these principles were concretized under the following considerations:*\n\n***first:** in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, the first constitutional obligation regarding administrative contracting is enunciated, by virtue of which, all contracting carried out by the State must be processed through the bidding procedure;*\n\n***second:** the constituent power opted for the bidding procedure, considering it the most suitable mechanism for controlling the public treasury and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds;*\n\n***third:** bidding constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor of the Administration, as it is a procedure guaranteeing the public interest, whose publicity guarantees effective participation by all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for satisfying the public interest;*\n\n***fourth:** by bidding, one must understand the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State -in the broadest sense- must subject itself to carry out its contracting activity, since therein the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting are fulfilled: free competition, equal treatment among all potential bidders, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of bidding procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of the procedures, ultimately carried out directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic;*\n\n***fifth:** from the principle \"all administrative contracting shall be carried out by the bidding procedure\", contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, all principles of public law that inform administrative contracting derive with constitutional rank, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportional to the ends pursued;*\n\n***sixth: the administrative contracting system is formed by the constitutional principles that emanate from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body charged with the oversight of the public treasury, -the Comptroller General of the Republic, as provided in Articles 183 and 184 of the Constitution-, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the satisfaction of the public interest.** *\n\n***seventh:** the constitutional obligation deriving from Article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all contractual activity of the State; therefore, no distinction can be made to exempt the type of contract to be executed -services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases- or based on the subject matter involved;*\n\n***eighth:** the constituent power defined that the most suitable procedure for carrying out administrative contracting would be public bidding, and reserved private bidding only for quantitatively and qualitatively minor contracts.\"*\n\n*It is this recently transcribed thesis that, in the judgment of the Chamber, must prevail, in such a way that it is understood that although public bidding indeed turns out to be a means favored by the Constituent Power, this does not imply the legal need to exclude the possibility that -in an equally ordinary manner- one may resort to the other established bidding modalities, which also form part of the set of normal modes of administrative contracting protected by Article 182 of the Constitution, even though by their own dynamic they entail an attenuation -which turns out to be constitutionally valid- of the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting.”*\n\nSimilarly, the Comptroller General of the Republic points to this change in criteria by the Constitutional Chamber in Judgment No. 2004-14421, and in which, with greater precision, it is necessary to highlight two important aspects: a) it is a judgment that materializes even further the flexibility –in general, of the institutions of administrative contracting– as a way to achieve the ends pursued by the Public Administration and the general interest; and b) the normative foundation for reaching that conclusion is the same one that would concern us, Article 4 of the Law on Administrative Contracting. Thus, the cited judgment stated that:\n\n“Under this understanding, all formal requirements established by the legal system to ensure regularity or validity in contracting procedures, the award act, and the administrative contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services; consequently, they cannot become instruments to delay the efficient and effective provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community. In this regard, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Law on Administrative Contracting, when enunciating the “Principle of efficiency”, stipulates that “(…) In all stages of contracting procedures, substance shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a way that favors their preservation and facilitates the adoption of the final decision, under conditions favorable to the general interest (…)”. It follows from the foregoing that the forms inherent to administrative contracting procedures, as well as the procedural requirements established by the legal system for the validity and effectiveness of an administrative contract, must be interpreted flexibly in pursuit of the goal of every administrative contract, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the manner in which public funds are invested. From this perspective, administrative contracting procedures are the shadow (form) that must inevitably follow the body (substance), which are the aims and purposes of the administrative contract to satisfy the general interest and, of course, to ensure the rational, due, and correct use of public funds.”\n\nIn this sense, the cited Article 4 indeed corresponds to the norm prior to the reform enacted by Law No. 8511, related to the principle of efficiency, which this Chamber must clearly take into account to determine the appropriateness of what was resolved by the Comptroller General of the Republic. Due to the discussion in the underlying matter, it falls to this Chamber to rule via another avenue, as provided by subsection b) of Article 73 of the law governing this jurisdiction, because even though the action of unconstitutionality against subjective acts of public authority is appropriate, this occurs when they are not susceptible to an amparo or habeas corpus appeal, and precisely, the last paragraph of Article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) admits this possibility, given that in this avenue “*it shall proceed not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms*”, which must be determined in the underlying matter.\n\nIn this regard, the conflict refers more to the manner of interpreting the Public Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) in its role of safeguarding public finances (tutela de la hacienda pública), than to a discussion inherent to the action of unconstitutionality, specifically when it comes to determining the application of legal or regulatory provisions, which is a matter of ordinary legality. 

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        V.-\nConclusion.- For all the foregoing reasons, the action of unconstitutionality must be declared without merit.

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Por tanto:

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            Se\ndeclara sin lugar la acción. 

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Ana Virginia Calzada M.

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Presidenta

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            Luis\nPaulino Mora\nM.                                                                                                                   Fernando\nCruz C.

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            Fernando\nCastillo\nV.                                                                                                                                       \nRoxana Salazar C.

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            Rosa\nM. Abdelnour\nG.                                                                                                                                   Jorge Araya G.

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\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**“Article 42.- Minimum structure.** The public bidding procedure shall be developed by regulation, and the following minimum criteria shall be respected:\n\na)…\n\n…\n\nj) The possibility of correcting defects in the bids within the period indicated by the Regulation of this Law provided that this does not grant an undue advantage in relation to the other bidders. The validity period of the bid may be subject to correction, as well as the validity period and the amount of the bid bond (garantía de participación), when such aspects have not been offered for less than eighty percent (80%) of what is established in the tender specifications (cartel). The other aspects of the bid bond (garantía de participación) may be subject to correction, in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.\n\nn)…”\n\nBut before the aforementioned reforms, this Chamber defined the bid bond (garantía de participación) in judgment No. 1998-0998 as follows:\n\n“Keep in mind that the form, manner, amount, time, and period for submitting the bond are regulated by the positive rules of the specific contracting, according to the specifications of the tender specifications (cartel), insofar as its object, purpose, or raison d'être is to ensure or guarantee the maintenance of the bid during the period stipulated in the bidding terms (pliego de condiciones). This bond guarantees the solemnity of the bid, and as such, constitutes a pre-contractual deposit intended to ensure the execution of the contract or its non-compliance, as a precautionary measure of the bidder's responsibility. The bid bond (garantía de participación) constitutes the prerequisite of the bid, in such a way that without the former, the bid cannot be validly legitimized before the administration, while the validity of the bid depends on the maintenance of the bond.”\n\nCertainly, in the cited precedent, the Chamber developed the thesis of unconstitutionality regarding the previous Regulation of Administrative Contracting, Decreto Ejecutivo 25038-H of March 7, 1996, given that no legal rule authorized the correction of the bid bond (garantía de participación). But, given that reforms to Ley 7494 have taken place, the regulatory power of the Executive Branch and the regulatory rule under analysis are under the protection of the provisions of the Law of Administrative Contracting and its reforms. The amendment to article 42 cited by Ley No. 8511, which in its subsection j) regulates the correction of defects in bids, and Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H of the twenty-seventh day of September 2006, evidence a perfect synchronization, since both have an effective date starting from January 4, 2007. Precisely from a simple reading, it is possible to infer that the current legal regulations refer to regulatory development, in compliance with the ranges set by law, so in the opinion of this Chamber, the challenged provision is not the product of an excess of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, and consequently, the action of unconstitutionality must be declared without merit.\n\n**B.-** The problem raised in this constitutional jurisdiction is of another nature. The Transitory Provision of Ley No. 8511 establishes that “*Contracting procedures initiated before the entry into force of this partial reform of Ley No. 7494 shall be concluded in accordance with the provisions in force at the time the decision to initiate the tender is adopted*”. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic indicates that the applicable regulations were not applied (although it does not indicate the date of the decision to initiate the contracting by the procuring Administration in the matter giving rise to the amparo appeal) and affirms that the bidding is not governed, since the administrative decision to promote the tender was prior to the currently effective reforms, and when it was decided, it was done in accordance with “*… the principles of reasonableness, conservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest…*”. Consequently, as indicated by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, in the Chamber's opinion, what exists in the underlying matter of the action is an apparent temporal conflict of the rules applicable to the case, given that according to the cited transitory provision, the regulations prior to the legal reforms made to the Law of Administrative Contracting would apply, although, as the Office of the Comptroller accepts, only principles of Administrative Contracting were applied, thereby reaching a similar solution when deciding the appeal against the award act, which is analyzed in the underlying matter. Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller points out, for the purposes of analysis in this matter, that jurisprudential changes by the Constitutional Chamber on the subject of administrative contracting have taken place, which must be analyzed.\n\nA bid that did not fully comply with the percentages of the bid bond (garantía de participación) defined in the tender specifications (cartel) or bidding terms (pliego de condiciones), and the applicable regulations in question, prior to the reforms to Ley No. 7494, had to be excluded from the tender. It does not escape this Chamber that when Ley No. 7494 set the percentage of the bid bond (garantía de participación) as a mandatory element of administrative contracting, material errors could exist, which, precisely, is the determining point of elucidation for this Chamber, because from there lies the fact that in the underlying matter, it can be resolved by determining whether or not there is an infraction of the principle of legality, which, as explained above, is subject to an interpretation, not to the challenged rule.\n\n**V.- Continues on the merits of the discussion raised and the route of the amparo appeal.-** The jurisprudence of the Chamber on the subjects of Administrative Contracting has been modifying previous legal positions regarding judgment No. 1998-00998, to the extent that article 182 of the Constitution must be interpreted more flexibly. Although aspects of res judicata remain in effect therein, such as the declarations of unconstitutionality made under the protection of what is established therein, it is important to highlight that the decisions of this jurisdiction can modify its doctrine, especially if they must adjust to a new social and national reality and to the public interest. Under this line of thought, through judgment No. 2005-13910 of this Chamber, it was emphasized that the general rule in Administrative Contracting would not be the public bidding and only exceptionally the other forms of contracting regulated by law, as had previously been held, but rather:\n\n“*…, the Chamber now finds with better elements of judgment that this is an incorrect way of understanding and interpreting article 182 of the Political Constitution, not only in adherence to the doctrine established by it, but with the very foundation provided lines above in judgment number 5947-98 itself where a systematization more in line with the sense and ends of the constitutional text was attempted, as demonstrated by the following quote:*\n\n*“**II.- OF THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING.** This Chamber has ruled regarding administrative contracting, the content of article 182 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles derived from this rule (in this sense, judgments number 2101-91, of eight hours forty minutes on October eighteenth, nineteen ninety-one, 2341-91, of nine hours on November eighth, nineteen ninety-one, 1490-92, of sixteen hours nine minutes on June third, nineteen ninety-two, 2864-92, of fifteen hours on September ninth, nineteen ninety-two, 2202-93, of fifteen hours thirty-nine on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, 2633-93, of sixteen hours three minutes on June ninth, nineteen ninety-three, 078-7-94, of fifteen twenty-one on February eighth, nineteen ninety-four, 3348-95, of eight hours thirty minutes on June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, and 1205-96, of nine hours on March fifteenth, nineteen ninety-six, among others). In all these opportunities, it was noted that State contracting must be verified through the bidding procedure, as it constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor with the Administration, in order to protect the public interest, concretely with respect to the control of the public treasury (hacienda pública), by promoting sound administration of public funds, by virtue of the principles of publicity, equality, and free competition -among others- that guide the tender. More recently, in judgment number 0998-98, of eleven hours thirty minutes on February sixteenth of the current year, these principles were concretized under the following considerations:*\n\n* **“first:** article 182 of the Political Constitution enunciates the first constitutional obligation in matters of administrative contracting, by virtue of which, all contracting carried out by the State must be processed through the bidding procedure;*\n* **second:** the constituent chose the bidding procedure, considering it the most suitable mechanism for controlling the public treasury (hacienda pública) and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds;*\n* **third:** bidding constitutes the ideal means for the selection of the Administration's co-contractor, as it is a procedure guaranteeing the public interest, whose publicity guarantees effective participation of all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for satisfying the public interest;*\n* **fourth:** bidding must be understood as the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State -in the broadest sense- must subject itself in order to carry out its contracting activity, since in it, the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting are fulfilled: free competition, equal treatment among all potential bidders, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of bidding procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of procedures by and ultimately carried out directly by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic;*\n* **fifth:** from the principle \"all administrative contracting shall be done through the bidding procedure\", contained in article 182 of the Political Constitution, all the principles of public law that inform administrative contracting derive with constitutional rank, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportionate to the ends pursued;*\n* **sixth:** **the administrative contracting system is formed by the constitutional principles emanating from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body in charge of and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública) - the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, as provided in articles 183 and 184 of the Constitution -, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the sake of satisfying the public interest.***\n* **seventh:** the constitutional obligation deriving from article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all of the State's contractual activity; therefore, no distinction can be made to exempt based on the type of contract to be performed - services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases - or based on the subject matter involved;*\n* **eighth:** the constituent defined that the most suitable procedure for carrying out administrative contracting would be the public bidding, and reserved private bidding only for quantitatively and qualitatively lesser contracts.\"*\n\n*It is this recently transcribed thesis that, in the judgment of the Chamber, must prevail, in such a way that it is understood that although public bidding indeed proves to be a means favored by the Constituent, this does not imply the legal necessity of excluding the possibility of resorting -in an equally ordinary manner- to the other established bidding modalities, which also form part of the set of normal modes of administrative contracting protected by article 182 of the Constitution, even though by their own dynamics they entail an attenuation -which proves to be constitutionally valid- of the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting.”*\n\nSimilarly, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic points to this change in criterion of the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No. 2004-14421, and in which it is necessary to more precisely highlight two important aspects: a) it is a judgment that further materializes the flexibility –in general of the institutes of administrative contracting– as a way to achieve the ends pursued by the Public Administration and the general interest; and b) the normative foundation for reaching said conclusion is the same one that would occupy us, article 4 of the Law of Administrative Contracting. Thus, in the cited judgment, it was indicated that:\n\n“*Under this understanding, all formal requirements provided by the legal system to ensure the regularity or validity in contracting procedures, the award act, and the administrative contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services. Consequently, they cannot be transformed into instruments for delaying the efficient and effective provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community.* *On this point, article 4, paragraph 2, of the Law of Administrative Contracting, when enunciating the \"Principle of efficiency,\" states that \"(…) In all stages of the contracting procedures, content shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a manner that favors their conservation and facilitates adopting the final decision, under favorable conditions for the general interest (…)”* *It follows from the above that the forms characteristic of administrative contracting procedures as well as the procedural requirements that the legal system establishes for the validity and effectiveness of an administrative contract must be interpreted flexibly for the sake of the purpose of every administrative contract, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the manner in which public funds are invested. From this perspective, the administrative contracting procedures are the shadow (form) that must inevitably follow the body (substance) which are the ends and purposes of the administrative contract of satisfying the general interest and, of course, ensuring the rational, due, and correct use of public funds.”*\n\nIn this sense, article 4 cited effectively corresponds to the rule prior to the reform made by Ley No. 8511, related to the principle of efficiency, which, it is clear that this Chamber must take into account to determine the appropriateness of what was resolved by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Due to the discussion in the underlying matter, it falls to this Chamber to rule through another route, according to the provisions of subsection b) of article 73 of the law governing this jurisdiction, because even though the action of unconstitutionality is appropriate against subjective acts of the public authority, this occurs when they are not susceptible to an amparo or habeas corpus appeal, and precisely, the last paragraph of article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction admits this possibility, given that in this route “*it shall proceed not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied rules*”, which must be determined in the underlying matter. In this sense, the conflict refers more to the manner of interpreting the Law of Administrative Contracting by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in its function of protecting the public treasury (hacienda pública), than to a discussion proper to the action of unconstitutionality, specifically when it involves determining the application of legal or regulatory rules, which is a matter of ordinary legality.\n\n**V.- Conclusion.-** For all the foregoing, the action of unconstitutionality must be declared without merit.”\n\nArticle 38 of the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement. 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Exp: 08-006164-0007-CO\\r\\n

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Res. Nº 2011001655

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CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF\\r\\nJUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and nine minutes on the ninth of February of\\r\\ntwo thousand eleven.

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   Unconstitutionality Action filed by SAMUEL RABINOVICH DYNER, legal representative of the company Centrocel Inc S.A.; against Article 38 of the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement, Executive Decree number 33411-H of September 2006. Appearing in the proceedings are ANA LORENA BRENES ESQUIVEL, representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, MANUEL DE LA FUENTE FERNÁNDEZ, representing Roy Alpha S.A. and Conduktiva S.A. as passive coadjuvant, and ROCÍO AGUILAR MONTOYA representing the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.

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Whereas:

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1.- By a writing received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eleven hours and twenty-three minutes on the eighteenth of April of two thousand eight, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 38 of the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement, Executive Decree number 33411-H of September 27, 2006, be declared. The petitioner alleges that the challenged article incurs in an excess of regulatory power, insofar as it allows for the curing and even modification of the participation bond (garantía de participación), which is a substantial element of the bid, because it permits extending or modifying its validity period in the event that it has been rendered insufficiently in time and amount. This provision overreaches and violates the legislation, because the form, manner, amount, moment, and term of the bid bond are regulated in norms of legal rank. Due to the nature of the bond, being a support for the seriousness of the bid and even a prerequisite thereof, since its invalidity entails the invalidity of the bid before the Administration, and since the subsequent validity of the bid will depend on the maintenance of the bond, it must be considered an essential element of the bid. Likewise, this norm violates the constitutional foundation of administrative procurement contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, which has as guiding principles efficiency in procurement and equality in the conditions of bidding participation. Following this same line of reasoning, this same Chamber has stated that the curing of substantial requirements in the bidding procedure is a violation of the Political Constitution if it thereby infringes the general principles derived from Article 182 of the Constitution.

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2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he indicates that there is an amparo (amparo) appeal being processed in case file number 07-009913-0007-CO in which, by means of resolution 2007-017111, a period of fifteen business days was granted to file the present unconstitutionality action.

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3.- By resolution of fifteen hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-first of April of two thousand eight (visible on folio 11), the present unconstitutionality action was admitted and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic was granted a hearing.

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4.- The Attorney General of the Republic, by means of a brief submitted to the Secretariat of the Chamber at fifteen hours and forty minutes on the thirteenth of May of two thousand eight, rendered the report required by law. Firstly, she considers that since the action is an incidental remedy that serves as a means to protect the right or interest that is considered harmed in a matter pending resolution, and since it therefore has a direct influence on that underlying matter, the main matter giving rise to the present action must be analyzed in order to determine whether the filing of the unconstitutionality action is a suitable means for the defense of the harmed rights. Following this same line of reasoning, it is worth mentioning that the challenged norm belongs to the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, which entered into force as of January 4, 2007. Article 227 of the Regulation expressly indicated that it would enter into force as of that date. While it is true that Executive Decree 33411 is dated September 27, 2006, that does not imply that said Decree, and more specifically Article 38, entered into force as of the date of publication in Gazette No. 210 of November 2, 2006. Likewise, there is no provision whatsoever in the Regulation that provides a basis for considering that the cited Article 38 was in force in relation to bids submitted before January 4, 2007, ergo, with respect to participation bonds presented before the aforementioned date. For that reason, the challenged norm cannot govern the procurement carried out by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) through public bidding process No. 2006-LI-000059-PROV, which began prior to the entry into force of the current regulation, and was therefore governed by Executive Decree No. 25038 of March 6, 1996, the previous Regulation of Administrative Procurement. Resolution R-DCA-255-2007 of June 22, 2007, on the basis of which the amparo appeal is filed, expressly refers to Article 37.8 of the previous Regulation. At that time, the Comptroller General's Office considered that the submission of a participation bond by the appellant company, with a validity period no less than two days shorter than that required in the tender specifications (cartel), was not grounds for disqualifying the bid, without considering the fact that it was cured by the appellant before the bond expired. For that reason, the Comptroller General's Office considered that the appeal against the act of award was appropriate. Resolving otherwise, the Oversight Body considered, would run counter to the principles of reasonableness, preservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest. The reference made by the Comptroller General's Office to the reform of the Administrative Procurement Law and its Regulation does not seek the application of the challenged article, but rather to demonstrate the suitability of resolving based on the principle of efficiency and not on the formalistic principle. Because what was resolved by the Comptroller General's Office is not based on Article 38, the object of challenge in the present action, but on the anti-formalist and administrative efficiency principles, it is concluded that the filing of the unconstitutionality action does not constitute a suitable means to defend the petitioner's rights in the amparo appeal processed in case file 079913-0007-CO. As a second point, she considers that it is necessary to analyze the principles of effectiveness and efficiency in administrative procurement in relation to the case under analysis. Thus, the State and its Administration are subject not only to the principle of legality, but also to effectiveness, which materializes in the effective and satisfactory fulfillment of general interests, the very basis of the Public Administration. Article 11 of the Political Constitution is the basis of this framework of principles, where the institutional apparatus is required not only to adhere to the legal system, but also to ensure that the result of its actions generates outcomes that best satisfy the general interests. Likewise, the Constitutional Chamber has ruled on this topic as follows: \"(…) Efficiency implies obtaining the best results with the greatest cost savings or the rational use of human, material, technological, and financial resources…\" Effectiveness and efficiency do not act solely as parameters for measuring final state action, but also involve instrumental action, aimed at achieving public purposes. Consequently, these principles cover administrative procurement activity. Procurement, as an activity of an instrumental nature, is oriented toward obtaining the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of substantive administrative activity. For this reason, administrative procurement cannot be seen as an end in itself. This was understood by the legislator when creating Law 7494, where administrative procurement is subject not only to the principle of legality, equality, and publicity, but also to the principles of efficiency and anti-formalism. This normative orientation, which supports a system freed from excessively formal constraints, recognizes the need to neutralize unnecessary formalism, allowing for the curing of non-substantial irregularities and focusing the analysis on the substantive aspects of each bid. In the same sense, clarifications and the curing of deficiencies that would violate the principle of equality must be permitted. This anti-formalist character does not authorize disregarding the fundamental principles of administrative procurement, such as freedom of competition, publicity, and equality. To these principles must be added the transparency of the process. The petitioner alleges that the cited Article 38 of the current Regulation of Administrative Procurement allows the curing of serious defects in substantial elements, which necessitates an analysis of the role of participation bonds in administrative procurement. The petitioner expresses disagreement with the action taken by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in resolving an amparo appeal against an act of award issued by the I.C.E. that favored him. The annulment of that act by the Comptroller General's Office allegedly disregards the principles extractable in the matter from Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since he considers that Article 38 of the Regulation allows for the curing and modification of an element that in his judgment is a substantial element of the bid and that, in his view, constitutes the prerequisite of the bid, without which it cannot be validly legitimized. It is worth highlighting the fact that each legal system determines what the essential elements of the contract are, and therefore, which elements may remain subject to the assessment of the contracting Administration. However, the bond, as in other legal systems, is an accessory clause that is not indispensable for the existence of the contract and will be present to the extent that positive law so requires as a means to prove the seriousness of the bid. This accessory character is reaffirmed by the reform introduced to the Administrative Procurement Law in its Article 33, which allows the Administration to decide whether or not to require bidders to submit a participation bond. The petitioner maintains that given the role played by the participation bond in the bid, it is not susceptible to modification and that any defects it presents cannot be cured. The term \"participation bond\" appears in our legal norms with Law 5901 of April 20, 1976. This law was limited to establishing the percentages of the bond without additional requirements. These requirements would be implemented not by law, but by regulatory means. This regulation would be the one contained in Decree 7576 of 1977, which enshrines the principle of formalism, which gives the bond an evaluative character with respect to the bid. In turn, it specifies the object of the bond and formalizes it. That conceptualization provided by the 1977 Regulation gives rise to the consideration that its effects cannot be cured. However, since 1985 it has been modified in order to recognize the possibility of awarding bids that meet all the requirements of the tender specifications. The Administrative Procurement Law repealed the provisions of Law 1279, whose original text required the existence of a participation bond in all administrative procurement. It provided that the bond would be the element that would legitimize the bid, a phrase that would be eliminated by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution 998-98 of 11:30 hrs. That original text already authorized that once the bond was accepted, the Administration would request the correction of curable formal defects. Subsequently, the Regulation in its Article 33 seeks to attenuate the rigor of the requirement for a participation bond, limiting it only to public bidding processes and pre-qualification registry (registro) processes, while for other procurement procedures it was optional. In this way, since the requirement for the bond is not mandatory in nature, it cannot be treated as a substantial formality, where its total absence would have the legal effect of nullifying the contract; rather, this would be reserved exclusively for cases where the tender specifications so require. Therefore, it is in this objective character that the legislator gives to the bond that its accessory and non-substantial nature can be based. Added to the above, and as an element of greater importance, it must be mentioned that the Political Constitution does not regulate or require compliance with the participation bond. It follows, then, that the participation bond, as well as the possible curing or not of its defects, is irrelevant to the Constitution; at most, what could be of interest is that the regulation given to the topic through infra-constitutional norms does not violate the principles of administrative procurement present in the Constitution. The fact is reaffirmed that since the appearance of the participation bond in our legal system, its treatment has been from the standpoint of regulatory and not legal norms. Consequently, it is possible for the Regulation to allow the curing of defects when the factual scenarios mentioned in the cited Article 38 occur, since neither the legislation nor the Constitution regulates the topic; therefore, it is not a matter reserved for law, and the treatment of the topic by regulation is consistent with the legal system and does not contravene constitutional principles in administrative matters. Therefore, based on all the arguments set forth above, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic considers that the present action is inadmissible and improper, and therefore recommends rejecting it.

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5.- By means of a brief filed with the secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fourteen hours and thirteen minutes on the third of June of 2008, Manuel de la Fuente Fernández, of legal age, identity card 2-392-698, representing Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conduktiva S.A., requests that he be recognized as a passive coadjuvant in accordance with Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. To that end, he states that Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima has an interest in the resolution of the present unconstitutionality action, as it is an interested party in the public bidding process number 2006-LI-000059-PROV promoted by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, as evidenced in the file attached to the present action. Regarding the standing of Conduktiva, it is a company that contracts with the Public Administration for lighting equipment and has a direct interest in maintaining the validity of the challenged norm. This company places on the national market equipment produced by Roy Alpha, in such a way that, from the success of this company in its procurement with the ICE, a good image results for Conduktiva with other public sector clients. With respect to the substantive arguments, he affirms that he shares the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic insofar as it considers that the present action is not the most appropriate mechanism for the defense of the petitioner's rights in the amparo appeal being processed under case file 079913-0007-CO. He alleges that in accordance with Article 15 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), every public official is recognized a margin of discretion, such that they have the possibility of making decisions oriented toward the satisfaction of the public interest based on reasonable criteria. As a result, in the presence of imperfections that do not endanger fundamental elements of the contract or degrade the required regime of guarantees, it is logical and satisfactory for the public interest that their correction proceeds. Precisely, the questioned norm tends to protect that reasoning, which ultimately protects the principles of effectiveness and efficiency that govern administrative matters, in such a way that it could not be considered unconstitutional. On the other hand, if every public official is called to the satisfaction of the public interest, it cannot be considered, in any way, that expanding the causes of invalidity of a procurement and eliminating its procedural remedies that do not contravene fundamental principles serves the attainment of that general interest. The challenged norm is a cleansing mechanism for non-substantial errors that allows the Public Administration to achieve the satisfaction of general interests. Therefore, based on the foregoing, he requests that the present action be dismissed.

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6.- By means of a writing filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and twenty-six minutes on the twentieth of February of two thousand nine, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, under the representation of ROCÍO AGUILAR MONTOYA in her capacity as Comptroller General of the Republic, requests to be recognized as a party in the present matter, as it is the respondent authority in the amparo appeal that serves as the underlying proceeding for the unconstitutionality action. This is in accordance with Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, despite the fact that the Comptroller General's Office was not notified of the filing of this unconstitutionality action, nor was it granted a hearing to learn its opinion in the resolution that admitted the present matter. To that end, it states that there is a problem of standing in the present action that means the processing of the action does not have a direct impact on the underlying matter, that is, it is not a reasonable means for the protection of the fundamental rights allegedly violated that are the object of the amparo appeal. This is because Article 38 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law was not applied in the matter underlying this action, which means that the resolution of the present matter has no impact whatsoever on the amparo appeal that served as the prior matter for this unconstitutionality action. On this same point, the Comptroller General's Office, in resolution R-DCA-255-2007 of 9:15 hours on June 22, 2007, indicated that the discussion revolving around the insufficiency of the participation bond of the appellant company's bid would be resolved based on the regulations in force at that time and specifically in consideration of the principles of efficiency, anti-formalism, preservation of acts, and the principle of public interest. It should be noted that the mention made of the reforms carried out on the administrative procurement legislation had an illustrative and not a decisive purpose. With respect to the substantive issue itself, the petitioner essentially attacks two aspects of the norm: the alleged excess in the regulatory power content of the Executive Branch and the curing of the participation bond. Regarding the first point, it indicates that this alleged excess in regulatory power by the Executive Branch would imply an overflow of the legal precepts developed by the law. Such an assertion is incorrect because it is the Administrative Procurement Law itself, in its Article 42, that allows the curing of defects in the term and amount of the participation bond, provided that they satisfy a minimum percentage. For this reason, the challenged norm simply reiterates the criteria developed by the legislation, so such excess does not exist. With respect to the second point (the curing of the bid participation bond), it indicates that the petitioner adopts the considerations that the Constitutional Chamber maintained more than eleven years ago, regarding the formality of the participation bond within the procurement system and the elemental character of the bond in the bid. Those considerations were based on theoretical constructs that ultimately gave way to a reality that demonstrated serious practical problems. For that reason, the legislator implemented a legal reform that introduced changes in the treatment of the participation bond, establishing its optional nature in cases where the tender specifications so determined.\n\nThus, a different vision of the participation bond (garantía de participación) is enshrined regarding its relevance within the procurement system, recognizing its scope as an element that complements the bid (oferta), although it is stripped of its sacramental and essential character. The alleged violation of the principles of administrative procurement claimed by the petitioner, in the opinion of the Contraloría General de la República, does not exist, since the correction (subsanación) of possible defects in the participation bond permitted at the legal and regulatory level is a clear manifestation of the principles of administrative efficiency and effectiveness, the result of a vision of administrative procurement as a means and not as an end in itself. This implies that the actions of the Public Administration, regarding the design and execution of purchasing processes, must be subject to the public interest, and not the latter to the former. Therefore, based on all the considerations set forth above, the Contraloría considers this action inadmissible from a strictly formal standpoint and unfounded from a substantive standpoint, ergo, it requests that it be declared without merit (sin lugar).\n\n7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 091, 092, and 093 of the Boletín Judicial, of the days 13, 14, and 15 of May of two thousand eight (folio 35).\n\n8.- By resolution of sixteen hours and ten minutes on the fourth of June of two thousand eight, the Chamber reserves for the appropriate procedural stage the request for joinder (coadyuvancia) filed by the representative of Conductiva, Sociedad Anónima and Roy Alpha, Sociedad Anónima.\n\n9.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.\n\n10.- The prescriptions of the law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On preliminary matters: This Chamber must first resolve the request of the Contraloría General de la República, which alleges that as a party to the principal matter, it was not granted a hearing on the unconstitutionality claim. Now, by resolution of fifteen hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-first of April of two thousand eight, the presidency of this Chamber admitted the unconstitutionality action filed by Centrocel. Inc. Sociedad Anónima against Article 38 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006, granting a hearing only to the Procuraduría General de la República. However, Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that if the admissibility requirements for the action are met, a hearing shall be granted not only to the Procuraduría but also to the counterparty appearing in the principal matter, which is the recurso de amparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO that serves as the basis for the action, and in which the Contraloría General de la República appears as the respondent party (parte recurrida). As a consequence of the foregoing, given the provisions of Article 81 of the Law governing this jurisdiction, the appropriate course is to consider the Contraloría General de la República as a party to this action. On the other hand, having been filed within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice of the filing of the unconstitutionality action, in Boletín Judicial No. 091 of May 13, 2008, Roy Alpha Sociedad Anónima and Conductiva S.A. are admitted as coadjuvants (coadyuvante) to the action, insofar as they allege that the challenged rule is a mechanism for curing non-substantial errors in favor of the Public Administration to achieve general interests. It is noted that due to the effects of joinder, as the coadjuvant is not a principal party to the proceeding, they will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment; that is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjuvant directly and immediately, nor does it affect them as res judicata (cosa juzgada), nor do the immediate effects of the judgment's execution reach them, since through joinder the jurisdictional authority cannot be compelled to issue a resolution in their favor, having not been a principal party in the proceeding. What can affect them, however, not by their condition as coadjuvant but like anyone else, is the erga omnes effect of the ruling. A judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the petitioner; this can only be recognized in the prior trial.\n\nII.- On standing to file the unconstitutionality claim. The first paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that to file an unconstitutionality action, it is necessary to have a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered to have been harmed. In the case at hand, the base matter is the recurso de amparo No. 07-009913-0007-CO, within which interlocutory resolution No. 2004-017111 was issued at nine hours forty-three minutes on the twenty-third of November of two thousand seven. With it, the Chamber suspended the processing of the recurso de amparo and granted the petitioning company a period of fifteen days to file the unconstitutionality claim against Article 38 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación, under the warning that if it failed to do so, the file (expediente) would be archived. In accordance with the foregoing, the petitioning company timely filed the proceeding on April 18, 2008; therefore, it is appropriate to hear the matter in the following manner, besides the fact that upon admitting the amparo, the action would indeed have an impact on this constitutional warranty proceeding.\n\nIII.- Object of the action. The provision under study corresponds to Article 38 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411-H published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006, by which, through a resolution of this Court, the recurso de amparo was suspended so that this claim could be filed, and the constitutionality of the provision could be analyzed.\n\n“Article 38.- Insufficient participation bond. An insufficient participation bond in terms of term or amount may be corrected (subsanada) by the bidder (oferente) or at the request of the Administration, when such aspects have not been offered for less than 80% of what was stipulated in the bid specifications (cartel).\n\nIn the case of partial awards, bids whose participation bonds do not cover the aforementioned 80% in relation to the amount bid may be considered, provided that the amount to be awarded is covered.”\n\nWhat this Chamber must determine is the constitutionality of the challenged rule, insofar as it establishes the possibility of correcting a defective participation bond in terms of term or amount, under percentage-based conditions. In this sense, if the participation bond covers eighty percent or more of what was stipulated in the bid or the bid specifications, the insufficiency can be remedied to that extent.\n\nIV.- On the merits.\n\nA.- Statement of the problem. The excess of regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) in the obligation of the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) to develop, interpret, and execute laws is challenged. Subsection 3) of Article 140 of the Constitution establishes that the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of Government shall sanction and promulgate laws, regulate them, execute them, and ensure their exact compliance; regulatory provisions born under the protection of a legal provision must be subject to its conceptual framework. The principle of legality established in Article 11 of the Constitution establishes that the acts and conducts of the Public Administration must be previously authorized by a written provision. The principle of legality establishes that administrative action must be based on the laws of the legal system, which would allow the Executive Branch to act within strict limits interpreting and developing them; however, it is not permitted to contradict them. Under this conception, every regulatory provision must conform to the hierarchical norms on which it depends. In particular, to examine the challenged article, the reforms to Law No. 7494 enacted through Laws 8511 of May 16, 2006, and 8701 of January 13, 2009, must be analyzed, insofar as they establish:\n\n“Article 33.- Participation bond. The administration shall be empowered to request, from the bidders, a participation bond between one percent (1%) and five percent (5%) of the amount of the proposal, which shall be defined in the respective bid specifications (cartel) or conditions sheet (pliego de condiciones), according to the complexity of the contract.\n\nIn cases where the administration decides not to request the participation bond and a bidder withdraws its proposal, the procedure shall be in accordance with the provisions of Articles 99 and 100 of this Law.”\n\n“Article 42.- Minimum structure. The public bidding process (licitación pública) shall be developed through regulations, and the following minimum criteria shall be respected:\n\na)…\n\n\nj) The possibility of correcting (subsanar) defects in bids within the term indicated by the Regulations of this Law as long as this does not grant an undue advantage in relation to the other bidders. The validity period of the bid, as well as the validity period and the amount of the participation bond, may be subject to correction, when such aspects have not been offered for less than eighty percent (80%) of what was stipulated in the bid specifications (cartel). The other aspects of the participation bond may be subject to correction, in accordance with what the Regulations provide.\n\nn)…”\n\nBut before the aforementioned reforms, this Chamber defined the participation bond in judgment No. 1998-0998, in the following manner:\n\n“Bear in mind that the form, manner, amount, moment, and term for presenting the bond are regulated by the positive norms of the specific procurement, according to the specifications of the bid specifications, insofar as its object, purpose, or reason for being is to ensure or guarantee the maintenance of the bid during the term stipulated in the conditions sheet (pliego de condiciones). This bond guarantees the solemnity of the bid, and as such, constitutes a pre-contractual earnest money (seña precontractual) intended to ensure the execution of the contract or its non-compliance, as a precautionary measure for the bidder's liability. The participation bond constitutes the prerequisite of the bid, in such a way that without the former, the bid cannot be validly legitimized before the administration, while at the same time the validity of the bid depends on the maintenance of the bond.”\n\nCertainly, in the cited precedent, the Chamber developed the thesis of unconstitutionality regarding the previous Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo 25038-H of March 7, 1996, given that there was no legal norm authorizing the correction (subsanación) of the participation bond. But, since reforms to Law 7494 have occurred, the regulatory power of the Executive Branch and the regulatory norm being analyzed are under the protection of the provisions of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa and its reforms. The amendment to Article 42 cited by Law No. 8511, which in its subsection j) regulates the correction of defects in bids, and Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H of the twenty-seventh day of September 2006, demonstrate perfect synchronization, since both have an effective date starting January 4, 2007. Precisely, from a simple reading, it is possible to infer that the current legal norms refer to regulatory development, in compliance with the ranges established by law. Therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the challenged provision is not the product of an excess of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, and consequently, the unconstitutionality action must be declared without merit (sin lugar).\n\nB.- The problem raised in this constitutional jurisdiction is of a different nature. The Transitory Provision of Law No. 8511 establishes that “Procurement proceedings initiated before the effective date of this partial reform of Law No. 7494 shall be concluded in accordance with the provisions in force at the time the decision to initiate the competition is adopted”. The Contraloría General de la República indicates that the applicable regulations were not applied (although it does not indicate the date of the decision to initiate the procurement by the contracting Administration in the matter giving rise to the recurso de amparo) and states that the bidding process is not governed, because the administrative decision to promote the competition was prior to the reforms currently in force, and when it was resolved, it was done in accordance with “… the principles of reasonableness, conservation of acts, administrative efficiency, and public interest…”. Consequently, according to the Contraloría General de la República, in the Chamber's opinion, what exists in the base matter of the action is an apparent temporal conflict of the rules applicable to the case, given that according to the cited transitory provision, the regulations prior to the legal reforms to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa would apply, although, as the Contraloría accepts, only principles of Administrative Procurement were applied, thereby reaching a similar solution when resolving the appeal (recurso de apelación) against the award act (acto adjudicatario), which is analyzed in the base matter. Furthermore, the Contraloría points out, for the purposes of the analysis in this matter, that jurisprudential changes by the Constitutional Chamber on the subject of administrative procurement have occurred, which must be analyzed.\n\nA bid that did not fully comply with the participation bond percentages defined in the bid specifications (cartel) or conditions sheet (pliego de condiciones), and the applicable regulations in question, prior to the reforms to Law No. 7494, had to be excluded from the competition. It does not escape this Chamber that when Law No. 7494 set the percentage of the participation bond, as a mandatory element of administrative procurement, material errors could exist. This, precisely, is the determining point for this Chamber's deliberation, because it is from this that the base matter can be resolved by determining whether or not there is an infraction of the principle of legality, which, as explained above, is subject to an interpretation, not to the challenged norm.\n\nV.- Continues on the merits of the discussion raised and the avenue of the recurso de amparo.- This Chamber's jurisprudence on Administrative Procurement matters has been modifying previous legal positions with respect to judgment No. 1998-00998, insofar as Article 182 of the Constitution must be interpreted more flexibly. Although aspects of res judicata remain in force, such as the declarations of unconstitutionality made under the protection of what was established in it, it is important to highlight that the decisions of this jurisdiction can modify their doctrine, especially if they must adjust to a new social and national reality and to the public interest. Under this line of thought, through judgment No. 2005-13910 of this Chamber, it was highlighted that the general rule in Administrative Procurement would not be public bidding (licitación pública) and only exceptionally the other forms of procurement regulated in the law, as had been previously held, but rather:\n\n“… the Chamber now finds, with better elements of judgment, that this is an incorrect way of understanding and interpreting Article 182 of the Political Constitution, not only in adherence to the doctrine established by it, but with the very foundation provided lines earlier in judgment number 5947-98 itself, where a systematization more in line with the meaning and purposes of the constitutional text was attempted, as demonstrated by the following quote:\n\n‘II.- ON THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT. This Chamber has pronounced on administrative procurement, the content of Article 182 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles derived from this rule (in this sense, judgments number 2101-91, at eight hours forty minutes on the eighteenth of October, nineteen ninety-one; 2341-91, at nine hours on the eighth of November, nineteen ninety-one; 1490-92, at sixteen hours nine minutes on the third of June, nineteen ninety-two; 2864-92, at fifteen hours on the ninth of September, nineteen ninety-two; 2202-93, at fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on the twenty-first of May, nineteen ninety-three; 2633-93, at sixteen hours three minutes on the ninth of June, nineteen ninety-three; 078-7-94, at fifteen twenty-one hours on the eighth of February, nineteen ninety-four; 3348-95, at eight hours thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of June, nineteen ninety-five; and 1205-96, at nine hours on the fifteenth of March, nineteen ninety-six, among others). On all these occasions, it was stated that State procurement must be conducted through the bidding procedure (licitación), as it constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor with the Administration, in the interest of protecting the public interest, specifically regarding the control of the public treasury (hacienda pública), by promoting sound administration of public funds, by virtue of the principles of publicity, equality, and free competition – among others – that guide the competition.’\"\n\nMore recently, in judgment number 0998-98, at eleven hours thirty minutes on the sixteenth of February of the current year, these principles were concretized under the following considerations:\n\n**first:** Article 182 of the Political Constitution enunciates the first constitutional obligation regarding government procurement (contratación administrativa), by virtue of which all procurement entered into by the State must be processed through the procedure of public tender (licitación);\n\n**second:** the constituent opted for the public tender (licitación) procedure, considering it the mechanism most suitable for the control of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds;\n\n**third:** public tender (licitación) constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor of the Administration, as it is a procedure that guarantees the public interest, the publicity of which guarantees effective participation of all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for satisfying the public interest;\n\n**fourth:** public tender (licitación) must be understood as the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State—in the broadest sense—must subject itself in order to carry out its procurement activity, since through it the constitutional principles that inform government procurement are fulfilled: free competition, equal treatment among all potential bidders, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of tender procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of the procedures in charge of and ultimately directly conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República);\n\n**fifth:** from the principle \"all government procurement shall be done by the procedure of public tender (licitación)\", contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, all principles of public law that inform government procurement derive with constitutional rank, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportional to the purposes pursued;\n\n**sixth:** **the government procurement system is composed of the constitutional principles that emanate from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body charged with oversight and vigilance of the public treasury (hacienda pública)—Contraloría General de la República, as provided in constitutional Articles 183 and 184—which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the satisfaction of the public interest.**\n\n**seventh:** the constitutional obligation that derives from Article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all contractual activity of the State; therefore, no distinction can be made to exempt any type of contract to be performed—services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases—or by reason of the subject matter in question;\n\n**eighth:** the constituent defined that the most suitable procedure for carrying out government procurement would be the public tender (licitación pública), and reserved the private tender (licitación privada) only for quantitatively and qualitatively lesser procurements.\"\n\nIt is this recently transcribed thesis that, in the judgment of the Chamber (Sala), must prevail, in such a way that it is understood that, while the public tender is indeed a means favored by the Constituent, this does not imply the legal necessity of excluding the possibility—equally ordinarily—of resorting to the other established modalities of tender (licitación), which also form part of the set of normal modes of government procurement protected by Constitutional Article 182, even if by their own dynamic they entail an attenuation—which proves to be constitutionally valid—of the constitutional principles that inform government procurement.\"\n\nIn a similar vein, the Contraloría General de la República points to this change in criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment No. 2004-14421, in which it is necessary to highlight two more precisely important aspects: a) it is a judgment that further materializes flexibility—in general, of the institutes of government procurement (contratación administrativa)—as a way to achieve the ends pursued by the Public Administration and the general interest; and b) the normative basis for reaching said conclusion is the same one that would concern us, Article 4 of the Government Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa). In this manner, in the cited judgment it was indicated that:\n\n\"Under this understanding, all formal requirements established by the legal system to ensure the regularity or validity of procurement procedures, the award decision, and the administrative contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services; consequently, they cannot become instruments to delay the efficient and effective provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community. On this particular matter, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Government Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), in enunciating the 'Principle of Efficiency,' mandates that '(…) In all stages of the procurement procedures, content shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a way that favors their preservation and facilitates adopting the final decision, under conditions favorable to the general interest (…)'. It follows from the foregoing that the procedural forms of government procurement as well as the adjective requirements established by the legal system for the validity and effectiveness of an administrative contract must be interpreted flexibly in order to achieve the purpose of all administrative contracts, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the way public funds are invested. From this perspective, administrative procurement procedures are the shadow (form) that must inevitably follow the body (substance), which are the ends and purposes of the administrative contract to satisfy the general interest and, of course, to ensure the rational, due, and correct use of public funds.\"\n\nIn this regard, the cited Article 4 indeed corresponds to the provision prior to the reform enacted by Law 8511 (Ley No. 8511), related to the principle of efficiency, which, it is clear, this Chamber must take into account to determine the appropriateness of what was resolved by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). Due to the discussion in the underlying matter, it falls to this Chamber to rule in a different avenue, according to the provisions of subsection b) of Article 73 of the law governing this jurisdiction, since although the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) lies against subjective acts of the public authority, this occurs when they are not subject to the appeal of amparo or habeas corpus, and precisely, the last paragraph of Article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) admits this possibility, given that in this avenue \"it shall lie not only against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms,\" which must be determined in the underlying matter. In this regard, the conflict refers more to the manner of interpreting the Government Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in its role of protecting the public treasury (hacienda pública), than to a discussion proper to the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), specifically when it concerns determining the application of legal or regulatory provisions, which is a matter of ordinary legality.\n\n**V.- Conclusion.-** For all the foregoing, the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) must be declared without merit.\n\n**Therefore:**\n\nThe action is declared without merit.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresident\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V. Roxana Salazar C.\n\nRosa M. Abdelnour G. Jorge Araya G." }