{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-547424", "citation": "Res. 10571-2012 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Inadmisibilidad de acción directa contra norma presupuestaria atípica que crea Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare", "title_en": "Direct Action Against Atypical Budgetary Norm Creating Pacuare Forest Reserve Deemed Inadmissible", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta de forma directa contra el artículo 26 de la Ley de Presupuesto N° 7018, que creó la Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare. Los accionantes, poseedores de terrenos boscosos, alegaban que la norma es atípica por haber sido incluida en una ley de presupuesto sin relación con su contenido y que su aplicación retroactiva viola el artículo 34 constitucional, impidiéndoles inscribir la propiedad a su nombre. La Sala reitera que las denominadas normas presupuestarias atípicas no constituyen un interés difuso o colectivo que permita la acción directa; se requiere un asunto base pendiente donde se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparo. Como los accionantes no acreditaron la existencia de tal asunto previo ni adjuntaron la certificación exigida por los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la Sala declara inadmisible la acción por falta de legitimación.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber summarily rejects a direct action of unconstitutionality against Article 26 of Budget Law No. 7018, which created the Pacuare Forest Reserve. Petitioners, possessors of forested lands, argued the norm is atypical because it was tucked into a budget law, and that its retroactive application violates Article 34 of the Constitution, preventing them from registering the property. The Chamber reiterates that challenges to atypical budget norms do not involve diffuse or collective interests; a prior pending case is required. Since petitioners failed to demonstrate any such pending proceeding and did not provide the required certification, the Chamber dismisses the action for lack of standing.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "08/08/2012", "year": "2012", "topic_ids": [ "procedural-environmental" ], "primary_topic_id": "procedural-environmental", "es_concept_hints": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "norma presupuestaria atípica", "legitimación", "intereses difusos", "asunto base", "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Presupuesto 1986 (ordinario y extraordinario)(Ver Fe de Erratas en La", "article": "26", "doc_id": "norm-36522", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7018", "article": "26", "doc_id": "norm-36522", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "norma presupuestaria atípica", "Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare", "Ley de Presupuesto 7018", "legitimación", "intereses difusos", "asunto base", "Sala Constitucional", "inadmisibilidad", "posesión forestal" ], "keywords_en": [ "unconstitutionality action", "atypical budget norm", "Pacuare Forest Reserve", "Budget Law 7018", "standing", "diffuse interests", "base case", "Constitutional Chamber", "inadmissibility", "forest possession" ], "excerpt_es": "III.- SOBRE LA CARENCIA DE LEGITIMACIÓN. En el caso bajo estudio, los accionantes acuden a la Sala de forma directa, con el objeto de impugnar el ARTÍCULO 26 DE LA LEY DE PRESUPUESTO NÚMERO 7018 DEL 20 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1986, que crea La Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare, al considerar que es una norma atípica… De conformidad con lo indicado en el considerando II de esta sentencia, para la impugnación de las denominadas normas presupuestarias atípicas, se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolución, es decir, de un asunto base, por no tratarse de intereses difusos o colectivos... por no estar el asunto planteado dentro de las excepciones que establece el artículo 75 de la citada ley, y no estimar la Sala que el interés de eliminar las normas atípicas del Presupuesto Nacional, sea un interés difuso o colectivo, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para interponer la acción.", "excerpt_en": "III.- ON THE LACK OF STANDING. In the case at hand, the petitioners come directly to this Chamber to challenge ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NO. 7018 OF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Pacuare River Forest Reserve, deeming it an atypical norm… According to Considerando II of this decision, challenges to so-called atypical budget norms require a pending matter, i.e., a base case, because they do not concern diffuse or collective interests… since the matter does not fall within the exceptions under Article 75 of said law, and this Chamber does not deem the interest in eliminating atypical norms from the National Budget to be a diffuse or collective interest, the petitioners lack standing to bring the action.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Inadmissible", "label_es": "Inadmisible", "summary_en": "The Chamber summarily dismisses the unconstitutionality action against the budget norm creating the Pacuare Forest Reserve due to lack of standing.", "summary_es": "La Sala rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra la norma presupuestaria que creó la Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare por falta de legitimación de los accionantes." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando I", "quote_en": "the requirement of a prior pending matter is not merely formal, since the mere existence of a base case or the simple invocation of unconstitutionality is not enough; it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed.", "quote_es": "la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un requisito meramente formal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado." }, { "context": "Considerando II", "quote_en": "this Chamber does not deem the interest in eliminating the pernicious atypical norms from the National Budget to be a diffuse or collective interest.", "quote_es": "no considerar esta Sala que el interés de eliminar las nefastas normas atípicas del Presupuesto Nacional, sea un interés difuso o colectivo." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1236187", "citation": "Res. 00362-2024 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Equating ex-presidents' pensions to legislators' salaries via budget law is unconstitutional", "title_es": "Equiparación de pensiones de expresidentes a salarios de diputados vía ley de presupuesto es inconstitucional", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "10/01/2024", "year": "2024" } ], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1236187", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-547424", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0007-1236187" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "#/ \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 12-000798-0007-CO Res. Nº 2012010571 \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA\r\nCONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas\r\ntreinta minutos del ocho de agosto de dos mil doce. Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida \r\npor [J.S.C] , mayor, casado dos\r\nveces, pensionado, cédula de identidad número[…] , vecino de Siquirres, en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de [F.S.C] ,\r\nmayor, casado, pensionado, cédula\r\nnúmero[…], contra el ARTÍCULO 26 DE LA LEY\r\nDE PRESUPUESTO NÚMERO 7018 DEL 20 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1986, que crea La Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare. \n\r\n\r\n\nResultando: \n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de\r\nla Sala a las trece horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del veinte de enero de dos\r\nmil doce, el accionante solicita que se declare \r\nla inconstitucionalidad del \r\nARTÍCULO 26 DE LA \r\nLEY DE \n\r\n\r\n\nPRESUPUESTO NÚMERO 7018 DEL 20 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1986, que crea La \r\nReserva Forestal Río Pacuare. \r\nManifiesta el accionante \r\nque él y su representado son actuales y legítimos poseedores\r\nde un área de 319 hectáreas 3331 metros,\r\nterreno de bosque, localizados en el Distrito Battan,\r\nCantón Matina de la Provincia de Limón. Indica\r\nque esa finca es parte de la finca propiedad \r\ndel Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, Folio Real Número 21258-000, la\r\ncual fue \n\r\n\r\n\nadquirida por el entonces Instituto de Tierras y Colonización el 20 de\r\ndiciembre de 1977. Indica que por el acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del IDA, número 63\r\nde la Sesión\r\n016-06, se autoriza el traspaso a su nombre y a nombre de su representado. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nManifiesta\r\nque no se ha podido realizar el traspaso por cuanto se le indica que dichas\r\npropiedades se encuentran bajo la afectación de la Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare, lo cual violenta el artículo 34 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, por aplicársele retroactivamente la ley. Indica que la Sala\r\nConstitucional y la Procuraduría General de la República han establecido que,\r\nsi se demuestra la posesión decenal por parte del poseedor antes de la creación\r\nforestal, no existe prohibición para su titular de inscribir la propiedad.\r\nAsimismo argumenta que la Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare\r\nfue creada en la Ley de Presupuesto Número 7018, siendo una norma atípica, y\r\nremite al voto constitucional número\r\n4790-1993 y al dictamen de la Procuraduría Número C-006-91. Explica el\r\naccionante que la instauración de dicha\r\nReserva Forestal no cumplió con los procedimientos legales, ya que no tenía\r\nrelación alguna con la Ley de Presupuesto Número 7018 y debió crearse conforme a lo \r\ndispuesto para las \r\nleyes comunes. Solicita \r\nque se declare \r\nla inconstitucionalidad del artículo\r\n26 de la Ley de Presupuesto Número 7018. \n\r\n\r\n\n2.- Los accionantes no se\r\nrefieren a la legitimación que tienen para interponer la acción, en los\r\ntérminos que señala el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. \n\r\n\r\n\n3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde \r\nsu presentación, cualquier gestión\r\nque se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente\r\nimprocedente, o cuando considere que\r\nexisten elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la\r\nsimple reiteración o reproducción de una\r\ngestión anterior igual o similar rechazada. \n\r\n\r\n\n4.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.\r\nRedacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y, \n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nI.- SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA \r\nACCIÓN. La acción \r\nde inconstitucionalidad es \r\nun proceso con determinadas\r\nformalidades, que deben ser satisfechas a efecto de que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación.\r\nEn ese sentido, el artículo 75 de la \r\nLey de la \r\nJurisdicción Constitucional, establece \r\nlos presupuestos de admisibilidad\r\nde la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En \r\nprimer término, se exige la existencia\r\nde un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial, o bien, en el procedimiento para agotar de la vía administrativa, en que se\r\nhaya invocado la inconstitucionalidad\r\ncomo medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera\r\nlesionado. En el párrafo segundo y tercero, \r\nla ley establece de manera\r\nexcepcional, presupuestos en los que no\r\nse exige el asunto previo, cuando por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista una\r\nlesión individual y directa, o se trate\r\nde la defensa de intereses difusos o\r\ncolectivos, o bien cuando es formulada en forma directa por el\r\nContralor General de la República, el\r\nProcurador General de la República, el\r\nFiscal General de la República y el Defensor \r\nde los Habitantes. Ahora bien, en\r\ncuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala mediante sentencia número 04190-95, de las once\r\nhoras treinta y tres minutos del veintiocho\r\nde julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, señaló lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n³ («)En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza\r\nincidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir\r\nque se requiere de la existencia de un\r\nasunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en\r\nel procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía\r\nconstitucional, pero de tal manera que,\r\nla acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado\r\nlesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal\r\nConstitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de\r\nresolver, por cuanto se manifiesta\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nsobre la\r\nconstitucionalidad de las normas que\r\ndeberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la\r\nlegislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos\r\nsegundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley\r\nde la Jurisdicción Constitucional-´ \n\r\n\r\n\nAsí las\r\ncosas, la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un\r\nrequisito meramente formal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de \r\nun asunto base, \r\nni con la \r\nsimple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un\r\nmedio razonable para amparar el derecho \r\no interés que se considera lesionado. \r\nEsto quiere decir, que la normativa impugnada debe ser aplicable en el\r\nasunto base. (Ver en igual sentido las sentencias números 01668-90, 04085-93,\r\n00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95,\r\n04190-95, 00791-96). Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser\r\ncumplidas, a saber, la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y \r\nprincipios constitucionales que se consideren \r\ninfringidos, la autenticación por\r\nabogado del escrito en el que se plantea la acción, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), así como\r\nla certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la\r\ninconstitucionalidad de las normas en\r\nel asunto base, requisitos todos que en caso de no ser cumplidos por los accionantes, podrían ser prevenidos por la\r\nPresidencia de la Sala. \n\r\n\r\n\nII.- SOBRE LA IMPUGNACIÓN DE NORMAS PRESUPUESTARIAS ATÍPICAS. Esta\r\nSala con anterioridad se ha referido a la legitimación para la interposición de acciones de inconstitucionalidad\r\ncontra las denominadas normas presupuestarias\r\natípicas, así por medio de la resolución\r\nNo. 01775-90 de las 17:15 horas del 4 de diciembre de 1990, reiterada en\r\nmúltiples ocasiones, dispuso: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n³III.- Se\r\npodría argumentar entonces, que le asiste al accionante, la misma legitimación que a cualquier costarricense, y aún\r\nen ese supuesto, la acción debe rechazarse,\r\nal no considerar esta Sala que el\r\ninterés de eliminar las nefastas normas atípicas del Presupuesto Nacional, sea\r\nun interés difuso o colectivo. Sin entrar en definiciones, sobre las cuales ni\r\nsiquiera existe consenso en doctrina , podemos afirmar que aún cuando es reprochable que\r\nla Asamblea Legislativa en forma\r\nreiterada, persista ±con sus prácticas\r\nviciadas-, en burlar la voluntad del \n\r\n\r\n\nlegislador constituyente reflejada en los artículos 121 incisos 1 y 11 en relación \n\r\n\r\n\ncon las\r\nnormas 123 a 128, y 176 a 180, a sabiendas del consenso jurisdiccional que\r\nexiste sobre la inconstitucionalidad de la inclusión de normas generales no presupuestarias en el Presupuesto Nacional, el\r\nlegitimar la acción directa en este supuesto\r\nequivaldría prácticamente a tener que autorizarla también contra toda la demás legislación ordinaria aprobada con\r\nvicios inconstitucionales, aún cuando esos roces sean de otra índole, siendo ese interés\r\n±aunque loable-, demasiado vago o amplio como para constituir por sí mismo un\r\ninterés difuso, o colectivo. Distinto es el caso de algunos de los intereses relacionados con el medio ambiente, la defensa de valores\r\nhistóricos, o electorales por ejemplo, que sí constituyen intereses difusos\r\npropiamente dichos, siendo necesaria y\r\njustificable la acción directa para su protección. En esas circunstancias, y\r\npor no encuadrar el interés con que se actúa dentro de las excepciones\r\nprevistas en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 citado, la Sala estima que no esta legitimada la acción directa contra este tipo de normas, razón suficiente para\r\nrechazar la acción incoada en su contra´ \n\r\n\r\n\n(«) \n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- SOBRE LA CARENCIA DE LEGITIMACIÓN. En el caso bajo estudio, los\r\naccionantes acuden a la Sala de forma\r\ndirecta, con el objeto de impugnar el\r\nARTÍCULO 26 DE LA LEY DE PRESUPUESTO NÚMERO 7018\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nDEL 20 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1986, que crea La Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare, al considerar que es una norma atípica, y que para su promulgación no\r\nse cumplió con los procedimientos legales establecidos ya que su contenido no\r\ntenía relación alguna con la Ley de Presupuesto Número 7018, por lo que en su\r\ncriterio debió dictarse entonces conforme lo dispuesto para las leyes comunes.\r\nDe conformidad con lo indicado en el\r\nconsiderando II de esta sentencia, para la impugnación de las denominadas\r\nnormas presupuestarias atípicas, se requiere de la existencia de un asunto\r\npendiente de resolución, es decir, de un asunto base, por no tratarse de intereses difusos o colectivos. Siguiendo con lo\r\nanterior, en el escrito de interposición de la acción no se indica en ningún\r\nmomento la existencia de algún asunto pendiente de resolución en la vía\r\nadministrativa o jurisdiccional, donde se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o\r\ninterés que se considera lesionado, ni tampoco se adjuntó la certificación\r\nliteral del libelo en que se hubiese invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la\r\nnorma en el asunto principal, todo ello conforme lo indicado en los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional. En ese sentido, lo que refieren únicamente los\r\naccionantes es la negativa de las autoridades del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario de inscribir terrenos a su nombre en razón de la\r\nexistencia de la reserva forestal, situación que denota un interés particular,\r\nes decir la existencia de una lesión individual y directa, y no de\r\nintereses difusos o colectivos en la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de la\r\nnormativa impugnada. En virtud de lo\r\nanterior, por no estar el asunto planteado dentro de las excepciones que\r\nestablece el artículo 75 de la citada ley, y no estimar la Sala que el interés\r\nde eliminar las normas atípicas del Presupuesto Nacional, sea un interés difuso\r\no colectivo, los accionantes carecen de\r\nlegitimación para interponer la acción. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- \r\nCONCLUSIÓN. La acción \r\nresulta inadmisible, por \r\ncarecer los \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\naccionantes de\r\nlegitimación.\n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto:\n\r\n\r\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\r\n\r\n\nPresidenta\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLuis\r\nPaulino Mora M. Ernesto\r\nJinesta L.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando\r\nCastillo V.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nPaul Rueda L. Teresita\r\nRodríguez A.", "body_en_text": "Exp: 12-000798-0007-CO Res. No. 2012010571\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at two thirty p.m. on August eighth, two thousand twelve. Action of unconstitutionality brought by [J.S.C], of legal age, married twice, retired, identity card number […], resident of Siquirres, in his personal capacity and as unlimited general proxy of [F.S.C], of legal age, married, retired, identity card number […], against ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NUMBER 7018 OF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare).\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at one fifty-nine p.m. on January twentieth, two thousand twelve, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NUMBER 7018 OF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve, be declared. The claimant states that he and his represented party are current and legitimate possessors of an area of 319 hectares, 3331 meters, of forest land, located in Battan District, Matina Canton of the Province of Limón. He indicates that this farm is part of the farm owned by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, Real Folio Number 21258-000, which was acquired by the then Instituto de Tierras y Colonización on December 20, 1977. He indicates that by agreement of the Board of Directors of the IDA, number 63 of Session 016-06, the transfer to his name and the name of his represented party is authorized.\n\nHe states that the transfer could not be completed because he is told that said properties are under the encumbrance of the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve, which violates Article 34 of the Political Constitution, by applying the law retroactively. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) have established that, if the possessor demonstrates decennial possession before the forest creation, there is no prohibition for its holder to register the property. He also argues that the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve was created in Budget Law Number 7018, being an atypical norm, and refers to constitutional vote number 4790-1993 and to the Attorney General's Office opinion C-006-91. The claimant explains that the establishment of said Forest Reserve did not comply with legal procedures, since it had no relation whatsoever with Budget Law Number 7018 and should have been created in accordance with the provisions for ordinary laws. He requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 26 of Budget Law Number 7018 be declared.\n\n2.- The claimants do not refer to the legal standing they have to file the action, in the terms set forth in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).\n\n3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject a petition outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any proceeding brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected proceeding.\n\n4.- The procedures have complied with the prescriptions of law. Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. The action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. In this sense, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. First, it requires the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, whether in the judicial venue, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative venue, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, on an exceptional basis, prerequisites where the prior matter is not required, when by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Now, regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, at eleven thirty-three a.m. on July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:\n\n“(...) First, it is an incidental proceeding, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative venue— is required to access the constitutional venue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on said process pending resolution, because it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only exceptionally does the legislation allow direct access to this venue —prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction—”\n\nThus, the requirement of a prior matter pending resolution is not a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of a base matter or the simple invocation of unconstitutionality is not enough; it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged regulation must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulation, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles that are considered infringed, the authentication by an attorney of the brief in which the action is filed, the accreditation of the conditions of legal standing (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, all requirements that, if not fulfilled by the claimants, could be subject to prevention by the Presidency of the Chamber.\n\nII.- ON THE CHALLENGE OF ATYPICAL BUDGETARY NORMS. This Chamber has previously referred to the legal standing for filing actions of unconstitutionality against so-called atypical budgetary norms, thus through Resolution No. 01775-90 of 5:15 p.m. on December 4, 1990, reiterated on multiple occasions, it ruled:\n\n“III.- It could then be argued that the claimant has the same legal standing as any Costa Rican, and even in that assumption, the action must be rejected, as this Chamber does not consider that the interest in eliminating the harmful atypical norms of the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest. Without entering into definitions, upon which there is not even consensus in doctrine, we can affirm that even if it is reprehensible that the Legislative Assembly repeatedly persists—with its flawed practices—in circumventing the will of the constituent legislator reflected in Articles 121 subsections 1 and 11 in relation to norms 123 to 128, and 176 to 180, knowing of the jurisdictional consensus that exists on the unconstitutionality of the inclusion of non-budgetary general norms in the National Budget, legitimizing the direct action in this case would practically be equivalent to having to also authorize it against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional flaws, even when those conflicts are of another nature, that interest being —though laudable— too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest. Different is the case of some interests related to the environment, the defense of historical values, or electoral matters, for example, which do constitute properly diffuse interests, making direct action necessary and justifiable for their protection. In these circumstances, and because the interest with which one acts does not fit within the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of cited Article 75, the Chamber deems that direct action against this type of norms is not legitimized, sufficient reason to reject the action filed against them.”\n\n(...)\n\nIII.- ON THE LACK OF LEGAL STANDING. In the case under study, the claimants come directly to the Chamber, with the purpose of challenging ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NUMBER 7018 OF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve, considering that it is an atypical norm, and that for its enactment the established legal procedures were not complied with since its content had no relation whatsoever with Budget Law Number 7018, therefore in their opinion it should have been enacted in accordance with the provisions for ordinary laws. In accordance with what is stated in considering II of this judgment, for the challenge of so-called atypical budgetary norms, the existence of a matter pending resolution is required, that is, a base matter, as it does not involve diffuse or collective interests. Following the above, in the brief filing the action, the existence of any matter pending resolution in the administrative or jurisdictional venue is not indicated at any time, where the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured, nor was the literal certification of the pleading in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked in the main matter attached, all in accordance with what is indicated in Articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. In that sense, what the claimants only refer to is the refusal by the authorities of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to register land in their name due to the existence of the forest reserve, a situation that denotes a particular interest, that is, the existence of an individual and direct injury, and not diffuse or collective interests in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged regulation. By virtue of the foregoing, because the matter raised is not within the exceptions established in Article 75 of the cited law, and the Chamber does not estimate that the interest in eliminating atypical norms from the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest, the claimants lack legal standing to file the action.\n\nIV.- CONCLUSION. The action is inadmissible, as the claimants lack legal standing.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe action is rejected outright.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. Teresita Rodríguez A.\n\n3.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal or similar petition that was rejected.\n\n4.- The procedures have complied with the prescriptions of law. Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. The action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied in order for the Chamber to validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the prerequisites for admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. In the first term, the existence of a prior pending matter to be resolved is required, either in judicial proceedings, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, on an exceptional basis, prerequisites in which the prior matter is not required, when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Now, regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, at eleven hours thirty-three minutes on the twenty-eighth of July of nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:\n\n³ («) In the first term, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved—either before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route—is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on said pending process to be resolved, since it manifests itself\n\non the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route—prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—´\n\nThus, the requirement of a prior pending matter to be resolved does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality, because it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged regulation must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulation, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, the authentication of the brief in which the action is filed by a lawyer, the accreditation of standing conditions (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, all requirements that, if not fulfilled by the claimants, could be mandated by the Presidency of the Chamber.\n\nII.- ON THE CHALLENGE TO ATYPICAL BUDGETARY NORMS. This Chamber has previously referred to the standing for the filing of actions of unconstitutionality against the so-called atypical budgetary norms (normas presupuestarias atípicas), thus by means of Resolution No. 01775-90 of 17:15 hours on December 4, 1990, reiterated on multiple occasions, it ordered:\n\n³III.- One could argue, then, that the claimant has the same standing as any Costa Rican, and even in that scenario, the action must be rejected, as this Chamber does not consider that the interest in eliminating the harmful atypical norms of the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest. Without entering into definitions, on which there is not even consensus in doctrine, we can affirm that even though it is reprehensible that the Legislative Assembly, in a repeated manner, persists ±with its vitiated practices—in evading the will of the\n\nconstituent legislator reflected in Articles 121 subparagraphs 1 and 11 in relation\n\nwith norms 123 to 128, and 176 to 180, knowing full well the jurisdictional consensus that exists regarding the unconstitutionality of including general non-budgetary norms in the National Budget, legitimizing the direct action in this scenario would practically equate to having to also authorize it against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional vices, even when those conflicts are of a different nature, that interest being ±though laudable—too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest. Different is the case of some of the interests related to the environment, the defense of historical values, or electoral matters, for example, which do constitute properly defined diffuse interests, direct action being necessary and justifiable for their protection. In these circumstances, and because the interest with which one acts does not fit within the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of the cited Article 75, the Chamber deems that the direct action is not legitimized against this type of norms, sufficient reason to reject the action brought against them´\n\n(«)\n\nIII.- ON THE LACK OF STANDING. In the case under study, the claimants come to the Chamber directly, with the purpose of challenging ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NUMBER 7018\n\nOF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare), considering it to be an atypical norm, and that the established legal procedures were not followed for its enactment since its content had no relation whatsoever to Budget Law Number 7018, so in their opinion, it should have been issued then according to what is provided for common laws. In accordance with what is indicated in considering II of this judgment, for the challenge to the so-called atypical budgetary norms, the existence of a pending matter for resolution is required, that is, a base matter, as it does not involve diffuse or collective interests. Following the above, in the brief filing the action, the existence of any pending matter for resolution in the administrative or jurisdictional route is not indicated at any time, where the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured, nor was the literal certification of the petition in which the unconstitutionality of the norm in the main matter was invoked attached, all according to what is indicated in Articles 75 and 79 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. In that sense, what the claimants solely refer to is the refusal of the authorities of the Institute of Agrarian Development to register lands in their name due to the existence of the forest reserve, a situation denoting a particular interest, that is, the existence of an individual and direct injury, and not of diffuse or collective interests in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged regulation. By virtue of the foregoing, because the matter raised does not fall within the exceptions established by Article 75 of the cited law, and the Chamber does not deem that the interest in eliminating the atypical norms of the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest, the claimants lack standing to file the action.\n\nIV.- CONCLUSION. The action is inadmissible, as the claimants lack standing.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is summarily dismissed.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. Teresita Rodríguez A.\n\nThe plaintiff states that the transfer could not be completed because they are told that said properties are affected by the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal Río Pacuare), which violates Article 34 of the Political Constitution, by applying the law retroactively. They indicate that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) have established that, if decennial possession by the possessor before the creation of the forest reserve is proven, there is no prohibition for its owner to register the property. They also argue that the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve was created in Budget Law Number 7018, being an atypical norm, and refer to constitutional vote number 4790-1993 and to the Attorney General's Opinion Number C-006-91. The plaintiff explains that the establishment of said Forest Reserve did not comply with legal procedures, since it had no relation whatsoever to Budget Law Number 7018 and should have been created in accordance with the provisions for ordinary laws. They request that the unconstitutionality of Article 26 of Budget Law Number 7018 be declared.\n\n2.- The plaintiffs do not refer to the standing they have to file the action, in the terms indicated by Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).\n\n3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.\n\n4.- The legal prescriptions have been complied with in the proceedings. Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. The action of unconstitutionality is a process with determined formalities, which must be satisfied in order for the Chamber to validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for the action of unconstitutionality. Firstly, the existence of a prior pending matter to be resolved is required, whether in a judicial proceeding, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, exceptionally, requirements under which a prior matter is not required, when due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Now then, regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, by means of judgment number 04190-95, at eleven thirty-three hours on July twenty-eight, nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:\n\n³ (“)First of all, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route—is required in order to access the constitutional jurisdiction, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) has a positive or negative impact on said pending process to be resolved, given that it manifests\n\nregarding the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this jurisdiction—requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction—’\n\nThus, the requirement of a prior pending matter to be resolved does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since it is not enough with the sole existence of a base matter, nor with the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, as it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged regulations must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by a lawyer of the brief in which the action is filed, the accreditation of standing conditions (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, all requirements which, if not fulfilled by the plaintiffs, could be indicated as pending by the Presidency of the Chamber.\n\nII.- ON THE CHALLENGE OF ATYPICAL BUDGETARY NORMS. This Chamber has previously referred to standing for the filing of actions of unconstitutionality against the so-called atypical budgetary norms, thus by means of resolution No. 01775-90 at 17:15 hours on December 4, 1990, reiterated on multiple occasions, it ordered:\n\n“III.- One could argue then, that the plaintiff has the same standing as any Costa Rican, and even under that assumption, the action must be rejected, as this Chamber does not consider that the interest in eliminating the nefarious atypical norms of the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest. Without entering into definitions, on which there is not even consensus in doctrine, we can affirm that even though it is reprehensible that the Legislative Assembly repeatedly persists—with its vitiated practices—in circumventing the will of the\n\nconstituent legislator reflected in Articles 121 subsections 1 and 11 in relation\n\nwith norms 123 to 128, and 176 to 180, knowingly of the jurisdictional consensus that exists regarding the unconstitutionality of including general non-budgetary norms in the National Budget, legitimizing direct action under this assumption would practically equate to having to also authorize it against all other ordinary legislation approved with unconstitutional vices, even when those conflicts are of another nature, that interest being—though laudable—too vague or broad to constitute by itself a diffuse or collective interest. Different is the case of some of the interests related to the environment, the defense of historical values, or electoral matters for example, which do constitute diffuse interests properly speaking, with direct action being necessary and justifiable for their protection. In those circumstances, and because the interest under which one acts does not fit within the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of the cited Article 75, the Chamber considers that direct action against this type of norms does not have standing, sufficient reason to reject the action filed against them’\n\n(“)\n\nIII.- ON THE LACK OF STANDING. In the case under study, the plaintiffs come before the Chamber directly, with the purpose of challenging ARTICLE 26 OF BUDGET LAW NUMBER 7018\n\nOF DECEMBER 20, 1986, which creates the Río Pacuare Forest Reserve, considering that it is an atypical norm, and that for its promulgation the established legal procedures were not followed since its content had no relation whatsoever to Budget Law Number 7018, for which reason, in their opinion, it should have been enacted then in accordance with the provisions for ordinary laws. In accordance with what was indicated in Considering II of this judgment, for the challenge of the so-called atypical budgetary norms, the existence of a pending matter for resolution is required, that is, a base matter, as these do not concern diffuse or collective interests. Following the above, in the brief filing the action, at no time is the existence of any pending matter for resolution in administrative or jurisdictional proceedings indicated, where the unconstitutionality of the norm had been invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured, nor was the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norm had been invoked in the main matter attached, all in accordance with what is indicated in Articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. In that sense, what the plaintiffs solely refer to is the refusal of the authorities of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) to register lands in their name due to the existence of the forest reserve, a situation that denotes a particular interest, that is, the existence of an individual and direct injury, and not of diffuse or collective interests in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations. By virtue of the foregoing, because the matter raised does not fall within the exceptions established in Article 75 of the cited law, and the Chamber does not consider that the interest in eliminating the atypical norms of the National Budget is a diffuse or collective interest, the plaintiffs lack standing to file the action.\n\nIV.- CONCLUSION. The action is inadmissible, because the claimants lack standing.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is dismissed outright.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. Teresita Rodríguez A." }