{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-569858", "citation": "Res. 17737-2012 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Constitucionalidad del saneamiento de la falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal", "title_en": "Constitutionality of curing failure to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal matters", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional examina si los artículos 120 inciso 4) y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo son contrarios a los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política. La consulta proviene de un tribunal que debía aplicar el artículo 120 inciso 4), el cual dispone que si en la fase oral y pública se detecta la falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, el defecto se tiene por subsanado. La Sala recuerda su jurisprudencia previa: el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es, por regla general, facultativo para el administrado, salvo las excepciones constitucionales previstas en los artículos 173 (materia municipal) y 182 (contratación administrativa). Sin embargo, razona que la Constitución establece la obligación de agotar la vía administrativa en esos casos, pero no regula la forma en que debe acreditarse dentro del proceso judicial. Por tanto, el legislador puede válidamente ordenar en qué fase procesal se hace valer ese requisito, en aras de armonizar los derechos al debido proceso y a la tutela judicial efectiva. Si la administración, pudiendo alegar la falta de agotamiento al inicio del proceso, no lo hace, y el juez tramitador tampoco lo advierte, no puede luego pretender que el administrado cargue con las consecuencias de esa omisión cuando el proceso ya está avanzado. La Sala declara que las normas consultadas no son inconstitucionales, con una disidencia parcial.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber examines whether articles 120(4) and 31(1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code contravene articles 173 and 182 of the Constitution. The referral arises from a court required to apply article 120(4), which provides that if the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is discovered during the oral and public phase, the defect shall be deemed cured. The Chamber recalls its prior case law: exhaustion of administrative remedies is, as a general rule, optional for the individual, save for the constitutional exceptions set forth in articles 173 (municipal matters) and 182 (administrative procurement). However, it reasons that the Constitution mandates exhaustion in those cases but does not regulate how such exhaustion must be demonstrated within the judicial process. Therefore, the legislature may validly determine the procedural stage at which that requirement can be raised, in order to balance the rights to due process and effective judicial protection. If the administration, having the opportunity to raise lack of exhaustion at the outset of the proceedings, fails to do so, and the case-management judge likewise does not detect it, the administration cannot later force the individual to bear the consequences of that omission when the proceedings are already advanced. The Chamber declares the challenged provisions constitutional, with a partial dissent.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "12/12/2012", "year": "2012", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "tutela judicial efectiva", "consulta judicial", "jerarquía impropia", "justicia pronta y cumplida", "preclusión" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo", "article": "31", "doc_id": "norm-57436", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8508", "article": "31", "doc_id": "norm-57436", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo", "article": "120", "doc_id": "norm-57436", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8508", "article": "120", "doc_id": "norm-57436", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "consulta judicial", "tutela judicial efectiva", "justicia pronta y cumplida", "proceso contencioso administrativo", "jerarquía impropia", "materia municipal" ], "keywords_en": [ "exhaustion of administrative remedies", "judicial referral", "effective judicial protection", "prompt and complete justice", "contentious administrative process", "improper hierarchy", "municipal matters" ], "excerpt_es": "No obstante que en la sentencia citada se reconoce la existencia del agotamiento de la vía administrativa como una exigencia en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, la Sala estima que el razonamiento del Tribunal consultante es equívoco al darle a las normas constitucionales y jurisprudencia citada un alcance que no tienen. Ciertamente la Constitución establece el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, pero no regula la forma en que ese agotamiento debe ser acreditado dentro del proceso judicial. La naturaleza del instituto por lógica exige que sea al inicio del mismo que el agotamiento sea alegado y exigido por la administración. Dado que el proceso es una secuencia lógica de acciones, el legislador bien puede ordenar en qué fase del procedimiento, de acuerdo a la naturaleza del instituto, hace cumplir una determinada exigencia, especialmente tomando en cuenta que en él coexisten varias normas constitucionales igualmente relevantes, que deben ser armonizadas para garantizar el debido proceso y la tutela judicial efectiva de las personas. En ese sentido, el principio de prontitud de la justicia y de tutela judicial efectiva, exigen que en este caso, si teniendo la parte interesada la oportunidad de alegar la falta de agotamiento de la vía al inicio del proceso, no lo hizo, esa etapa haya recluido a favor del administrado.", "excerpt_en": "Notwithstanding that the cited judgment recognizes the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies in municipal and procurement matters, the Chamber considers the referring court's reasoning to be mistaken in attributing to the constitutional provisions and case law a scope they do not have. The Constitution indeed establishes the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies in municipal and procurement matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be proven within the judicial process. The nature of the institution logically requires that the exhaustion be raised and demanded by the administration at the outset of the proceedings. Given that the process is a logical sequence of actions, the legislature may well order at which procedural stage a given requirement is to be enforced, in accordance with the nature of the institution, especially taking into account that several equally relevant constitutional norms coexist therein and must be harmonized to guarantee due process and the effective judicial protection of individuals. In that sense, the principles of prompt justice and effective judicial protection require that, in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to raise the lack of exhaustion at the beginning of the proceedings and failed to do so, that stage must be deemed to have precluded in favor of the individual.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied (Referral resolved)", "label_es": "Sin lugar (Consulta evacuada)", "summary_en": "The Chamber declares that articles 120(4) and 31(1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code are not unconstitutional, with a partial dissent.", "summary_es": "La Sala declara que los artículos 120 inciso 4) y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo no son inconstitucionales, con una disidencia parcial." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "The Constitution indeed establishes the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies in municipal and procurement matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be proven within the judicial process.", "quote_es": "Ciertamente la Constitución establece el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, pero no regula la forma en que ese agotamiento debe ser acreditado dentro del proceso judicial." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "To hold that the exhaustion of remedies can be openly raised at any phase of the process, even at the trial stage, would place this institution above essential fundamental rights such as celerity and prompt and complete justice.", "quote_es": "Determinar que el agotamiento de la vía puede ser alegado abiertamente en cualquier fase del proceso, aún en la etapa de juicio, es poner este instituto por encima de derechos fundamentales esenciales como el de celeridad y justicia pronta y cumplida." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-337671", "citation": "Res. 03669-2006 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Exhaustion of administrative remedies as optional requirement", "title_es": "Agotamiento de la vía administrativa como requisito facultativo", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "15/03/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-473953", "citation": "Res. 09928-2010 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Unconstitutionality of referring public-employment nullity actions to the labor courts", "title_es": "Inconstitucionalidad de la remisión de nulidades de actos administrativos de empleo público a la vía laboral", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "09/06/2010", "year": "2010" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0004-935879", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0004-935879" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-897929", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-897929" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-569858", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0004-935879", "sen-1-0034-897929" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Exp: \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nExp: \n\r\n\r\n\nVoto Nº 2012-17737\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE\r\nLA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas veintiún minutos\r\ndel doce de diciembre de dos mil doce.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Consulta Judicial facultativa\r\nformulada por el TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA\r\nSECCIÓN OCTAVA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO DE SAN JOSE, ANEXO, sobre si los\r\nartículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo, son contrarios a los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nResultando\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1-. Por resolución de las catorce horas\r\ndel veintiséis de Julio del año en curso, dictada en el expediente [...], el\r\nTribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Octava,\r\nsolicitó a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad de los\r\nartículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo. Señala que esta Sala en la sentencia 2005-06866 había definido\r\nque la jerarquía impropia bicéfala en material municipal, es de origen\r\nconstitucional, razón por la cual ellos estiman hace obligatorio, sin excepción\r\nalguna, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en la materia. Estiman que el\r\nlegislador, al promulgar la ley número 8508, en los artículos consultados, optó\r\npor establecer una excepción contra legem. Señalan que en el caso que sirve de\r\nbase a la consulta -proceso en material municipal-, el juez tramitador, no\r\nadvirtió de oficio que no se había agotado la vía administrativa, ni consta que\r\nel vicio fuera alegado por la parte demandada, por lo que el único juez que\r\npodía sanear el procedimiento no lo hizo y ellos, los jueces de la etapa oral y\r\npública no tienen otra opción mas que celebrar el debate, aplicando una norma,\r\nque estiman inconstitucional porque da por saneado la falta de agotamiento de\r\nla vía administrativa al señalar: “Artículo 120 inciso 4. Si, en la fase oral y\r\npública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto”. Esta norma aplicada a\r\nmateria municipal, a su criterio, viene a dejar sin contenido esencial los\r\nartículos 173 y 182, para los cuales el constituyente sí previó el agotamiento\r\nprevio como requisito para acceder a la vía jurisdiccional. Estiman que el\r\nmismo vicio se presenta en el caso del artículo 31 inciso 1) del mismo Código\r\nen material de contratación administrativa.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.- Emplazadas las partes en la\r\nresolución de las catorce horas del veintiséis de julio del año en curso, y\r\ndebidamente notificadas, no constan en el expediente escritos de\r\napersonamiento, ni argumentaciones.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- Por resolución de las once horas del\r\nveintiuno de agosto del dos mil doce, la Presidencia de la Sala dio curso a la\r\nconsulta, confiriendo audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República. La\r\nProcuraduría en su respuesta señala que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa\r\nes un instituto procesal propio del proceso contencioso administrativo cuyo\r\nfundamento descansa en la potestad de auto tutela propia de la Administración\r\nPública. Añade que dicho instituto consiste, básicamente, en la obligación de\r\nagotar los recursos administrativos que el ordenamiento establece contra los\r\nactos administrativos como requisito de admisibilidad de las demandas contra\r\nestos en sede judicial. Establece que la configuración del instituto procesal\r\ndel agotamiento de la vía administrativa, cae en el ámbito de la\r\ndiscrecionalidad legislativa, y que tal y como lo ha reconocido la Sala\r\nConstitucional en su jurisprudencia, sentencia número 3669-2006 de las quince\r\nhoras del quince de marzo del dos mil seis el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa es obligatoria en la material regulada en los artículos\r\nconstitucionales 173 y 184, es decir en materia municipal y de contratación\r\nadministrativa, por disposición expresa del constituyente, por lo que estima\r\nque la norma consultada es inconstitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n4-. En la substanciación del proceso se\r\nha observado las prescripciones legales.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRedacta el\r\nMagistrado Mora Mora; y,\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI-.ADMISIBILIDAD. El artículo 102 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisión de las\r\nconsultas judiciales, disposición de la que se desprenden elementos que\r\ncondicionan su procedencia: a) que la misma sea formulada por un juez; b) que\r\nexistan “dudas fundadas” sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta\r\nu omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar en un caso sometido al conocimiento del\r\njuzgador o tribunal y, c) que en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o\r\njuzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad.\r\nEstos presupuestos fueron analizados por este Tribunal Constitucional en la\r\nSentencia No. 1617-1997 de las catorce horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del\r\ndiecisiete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, oportunidad en la que\r\nse expuso, lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“(…) A. Que la formule un «juez»,\r\ntérmino genérico que –desde luego– se aplica tanto a los juzgadores\r\nunipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario\r\nprecisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder\r\njurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales\r\nadministrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los\r\nasuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es\r\nque se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una\r\nsentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b)\r\nque el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente\r\nhabilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución\r\nque sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio\r\na un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nB. Que existan «dudas fundadas» sobre\r\nla constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar\r\no juzgar. Esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y\r\nponderado. Además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya\r\nconstitucionalidad la Sala ya se haya pronunciado. Ello es así no sólo porque\r\naceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las\r\nresoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas\r\ncircunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. Pero subráyese, por\r\nsu relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva\r\nde aquellos pronunciamientos en que la Sala haya validado expresamente la\r\nadecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros\r\nconstitucionales. En consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen\r\nexplícito de constitucionalidad (en vía de acción o consulta), no sería viable\r\nun nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de\r\nun acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque\r\n–en este caso– siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya\r\nno en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. A la inversa, el\r\nhecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente\r\n(quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir\r\ndudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquellos se\r\nfundamenten. Y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nC. Que exista un caso sometido al\r\nconocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. Al igual que en la acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero\r\nafán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución\r\ndel llamado «asunto previo» o «principal». Finalmente,\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nD. Que, en ese asunto previo, deba\r\naplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda\r\nde constitucionalidad, aspecto que –por su relevancia para el caso– resulta\r\nconveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión «deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse\r\nel acto, conducta u omisión», conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y\r\ntotalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que «pueda aplicarse\r\nla norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión». La consulta judicial no\r\nprocede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que\r\n–como se explicó arriba– esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los\r\nrecursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o\r\ndoctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar\r\nenfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o\r\nal juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de\r\nconstitucionalidad (…).” (El destacado no forma parte del original).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n En\r\nel caso en examen, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda,\r\nSección Octava, plantea sus dudas en relación con la constitucionalidad\r\nde los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo en relación con los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica. No obstante, en el caso del artículo 31 inciso 1), la consulta debe\r\nrechazarse porque no se da el supuesto de incidentalidad que exige que la norma\r\ncuestionada sea aplicable al caso que origina la consulta. Como bien señala el\r\nTribunal, el proceso que sirve de base a la consulta es de material municipal,\r\ny la norma citada se refiere parcialmente a materia de contratación\r\nadministrativa, de tal forma que no se da uno de los supuestos de admisibilidad\r\nque exige la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en su artículo 102 citado.\r\nEn consecuencia se rechaza parcialmente la consulta formulada en cuanto a esta\r\nnorma y su relación con el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política y\r\nse admite por cumplir las exigencias formales, la que se refiere al artículo\r\n120 inciso 4) citada y del 31 1) sólo en cuanto a su relación con la materia\r\nmunicipal.\n\r\n\r\n\n II.-NORMAS\r\nCONSULTADAS. \r\nSeñala el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo\r\nvigente:\n\r\n\r\n\n “1) La sentencia\r\ndeclarará la inadmisibilidad, total o parcial, de la pretensión en los casos\r\nsiguientes:\n\r\n\r\n\n(...)\n\r\n\r\n\n4) Si, en la fase oral y\r\npública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto”.\n\r\n\r\n\n Por\r\nsu parte, el artículo 31 inciso 1) señala:\n\r\n\r\n\n1) “El agotamiento de la\r\nvía administrativa será facultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos\r\n173 y 182 de la Constitución Política.”\n\r\n\r\n\n III.-ANÁLISIS\r\nDE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Es correcto afirmar que la constitucionalidad del agotamiento de\r\nla vía administrativa fue analizado por esta Sala en las\r\nsentencias 3669-2006 y 9928-2010, en las cuales se determinó que, salvo\r\nlas excepciones contenidas en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, referidos por su orden a las materias municipal y de contratación\r\nadministrativa, exigir el agotamiento previo de la vía administrativa como\r\ncondición para acceder la vía jurisdiccional, resulta contrario a la\r\nConstitución Política. \n\r\n\r\n\nEn lo que interesa se\r\nindicó:\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\"IV.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO DE\r\nLA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA: PRIVILEGIO INJUSTIFICADOFORMAL DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES\r\nPÚBLICAS. En\r\nla concepción clásica del Derecho Administrativo sustancial y formal, las\r\nadministraciones públicas, en cuanto procuran y atienden los intereses públicos\r\no la satisfacción de las necesidades colectivas, deben estar provistas de una\r\nserie de prerrogativas extraordinarias. Así, en el ámbito del Derecho Procesal\r\nAdministrativo, tradicionalmente, se admitió como un privilegio de carácter\r\nformal el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa o la vía gubernativa\r\nprevia, esto es, que los administrados que se estiman lesionados o\r\nagraviados por un acto administrativo deben, de previo a acudir a la\r\njurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, agotar todos los recursos\r\nadministrativos ordinarios procedentes contra el mismo en sede administrativa.\r\nConsecuentemente, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se convierte en un\r\nrequisito de admisibilidad del proceso contencioso administrativo en su versión\r\nobjetiva o revisora clásica y tradicional. En la base de este instituto subyace\r\nla denominada prerrogativa del auto tutela declarativa y ejecutiva de las\r\nadministraciones públicas, la cual ha encontrado sustento, al propio tiempo, en\r\nprincipios tales como los de eficacia, eficiencia y buena administración.\n\r\n\r\n\nLa auto tutela declarativa significa\r\nque los entes públicos pueden, por sí y ante sí, sin necesidad de acudir ante\r\nun juez, imponerle obligaciones a los administrados o bien suprimirles o\r\nmodificarles sus situaciones jurídicas sustanciales –llámense derechos\r\nsubjetivos o intereses legítimos-. La obligación legislativa ineludible del\r\nadministrado de ejercer o plantear todos los recursos administrativos\r\nordinarios contra un acto administrativo antes de acudir ante el juez\r\ncontencioso-administrativo, constituye una manifestación específica de la auto\r\ntutela declarativa de las administraciones públicas, puesto que, el legislador\r\nespera que la propia administración pública pueda defender el acto\r\nadministrativo impugnado o bien anularlo o modificarlo, evitándole tener que\r\ncomparecer ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. De esta forma, en\r\nla vía administrativa la administración pública se convierte, al mismo tiempo,\r\nen juez y parte, puesto que, debe atender las solicitudes o pedimentos\r\nformulados por los administrados y resolver los recursos administrativos\r\nordinarios que procedan contra el acto final que ella misma dicte. Como se ve,\r\nla autotutela es un concepto diametralmente opuesto al que impera en el resto\r\nde las ramas jurídicas, en las que opera la heterotutela, esto es, la ejercida\r\npor un tercero supra partes con las garantías constitucionales de\r\nimparcialidad, independencia y objetividad, como lo es un órgano jurisdiccional.\r\nAsí, a modo de ejemplo, en el ámbito del Derecho Privado un particular puede\r\nimponerle una obligación o afectar las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de\r\notro, única y exclusivamente, si ello surge de forma consensuada a través de la\r\naplicación del principio de la autonomía de la voluntad (artículo 28 de la\r\nConstitución Política) o de la intervención de un juez (artículo 41 de la\r\nConstitución Política). No obstante, los principios rectores de la organización\r\ny función administrativa de la eficiencia y eficacia, plasmados en la propia\r\nConstitución Política (artículos 140, inciso 8°, y 191), deben entenderse, en\r\ntodo momento y bajo cualquier circunstancia, subordinados a los derechos\r\nfundamentales y deben ceder ante éstos, puesto que, constituyen el fundamento y\r\nla base de entero ordenamiento jurídico. Modernamente las administraciones\r\npúblicas deben ser concebidas y entendidas como un sujeto de Derecho más del\r\nordenamiento jurídico, de modo que resulta repugnante para el Derecho de la\r\nConstitución la asimetría o desigualdad crónica que campea en el ámbito de la\r\njurisdicción contencioso-administrativa entre el administrado o el ciudadano y\r\nel respectivo ente público.\n\r\n\r\n\nEl reconocimiento y otorgamiento\r\nlegislativo de una serie de prerrogativas formales o adjetivas a los entes\r\npúblicos en el orden jurisdiccional contencioso-administrativo no tiene\r\njustificación objetiva y razonable si su función administrativa, de acuerdo con\r\nel parámetro constitucional (artículos 33 y 49 de la Constitución Política)\r\ndebe ser objeto de un control de legalidad plenario y universal, sin fisuras o\r\nreductos exentos y, sobre todo, si son creados y puestos en funcionamiento para\r\nservir o atender las necesidades de los ciudadanos o administrados –\r\norganizaciones serviciales-.\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL CARÁCTER\r\nPRECEPTIVO DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA. Actualmente, sobre todo a la luz de\r\nlos principios de la supremacía de la Constitución y de la vinculación más\r\nfuerte de los derechos fundamentales, así como de su eficacia expansiva y\r\nprogresiva e interpretación más favorable, se entiende que el carácter\r\nobligatorio o preceptivo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa riñe con el\r\nderecho fundamental de los administrados a obtener una justicia pronta y\r\ncumplida ex artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política (tutela judicial\r\nefectiva) y con el principio de igualdad, puesto que, sólo en el proceso\r\ncontencioso-administrativo –y no así en el resto de las jurisdicciones- se le\r\nobliga al justiciable, antes de acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, agotar todos\r\nlos recursos administrativos ordinarios procedentes. La infracción al derecho\r\nfundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida deviene de los siguientes\r\naspectos: a) Normalmente, cuando el administrado interpone los recursos\r\nordinarios de revocatoria, apelación o de reposición –entendido este último\r\ncomo el recurso horizontal que cabe contra los actos del jerarca o superior\r\njerárquico supremo-, no logra que el propio órgano o su superior lo modifique o\r\nanule, de modo que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es como sacar agua\r\nde un pozo seco, al no lograrse obtener nada de la interposición de los\r\nrecursos, transformándose así en una pesada carga o especie de vía crucis para\r\nel administrado; b) es sabido que el procedimiento administrativo y su etapa\r\nrecursiva o de revisión, suele prolongarse más allá de los plazos legales y de\r\nlo que puede concebirse como un plazo razonable, con lo cual se prolonga\r\nindefinidamente, incluso por años, el acceso a la tutela judicial efectiva, sin\r\ntener posibilidad de hacerlo inmediatamente y cuando lo estime oportuno; c) la\r\nsumatoria del plazo necesario para agotar la vía administrativa con el\r\nrequerido por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, provoca que los\r\nadministrados obtengan una justicia tardía, la cual, eventualmente, puede\r\ntransformarse –según su prolongación y las circunstancias particulares de los\r\nadministrados justiciables- en una denegación de justicia; lo anterior\r\nconstituye una clara y evidente ventaja relativa para los entes públicos de la\r\ncual, en ocasiones, se prevalen, puesto que, el administrado o ciudadano pasa\r\n–por su condición ordinaria de persona física- y la administración pública\r\npermanece prolongadamente en el tiempo. En lo que atañe a la vulneración del\r\nprincipio de igualdad, debe indicarse que el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía\r\nadministrativa, derivado del privilegio de la autotutela declarativa, expone al\r\njusticiable que litiga contra una administración pública a una situación\r\ndiscriminatoria, puesto que, no existe un motivo objetivo y razonable para\r\nsometerlo a ese requisito obligatorio, a diferencia del resto de los ordenes\r\njurisdiccionales. Debe tenerse en consideración que, incluso, la libertad de\r\nconfiguración o discrecionalidad legislativa al diseñar los diversos procesos,\r\ntiene como límite infranqueable el principio de igualdad. Lo anterior, queda\r\nreforzado si se considera que las administraciones públicas son un sujeto de\r\nDerecho más que no tienen por qué gozar de tales privilegios o prerrogativas y\r\nque el eje central en una administración prestacional o en un Estado Social y\r\nDemocrático de Derecho lo es la persona, esto es, el usuario o consumidor de\r\nlos bienes y servicios públicos. En esencia, los intereses públicos y la\r\nsatisfacción de las necesidades colectivas no pueden tenerse como cláusulas de\r\napoderamiento para enervar los derechos fundamentales de los administrados o,\r\nsencillamente, como el altar para ser sacrificados.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- ADECUACIÓN DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA\r\nVÍA ADMINISTRATIVA AL PARÁMETRO CONSTITUCIONAL: CARÁCTER FACULTATIVO U OPTATIVO\r\nPARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La interpretación más favorable a la eficacia expansiva y\r\nprogresiva de los derechos fundamentales de los administrados a una justicia\r\npronta y cumplida y a la igualdad, impone replantearse cualitativamente el\r\ncarácter obligatorio del agotamiento de la vía administrativa impuesto por el\r\nlegislador. En efecto, debe entenderse que el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa debe quedar a la libérrima elección del administrado, de modo\r\nque sea éste quien, después de efectuar un juicio de probabilidad acerca del\r\néxito eventual de su gestión en sede administrativa, decida si interpone o no\r\nlos recursos administrativos procedentes. Es de esperar que las posibilidades\r\ndel administrado se refuercen cuando se trata de los denominados “tribunales\r\nadministrativos” (v. gr. Tribunal Ambiental, Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo,\r\nTribunal Aduanero Nacional, Tribunal del Servicio Civil, Tribunal de Carrera\r\nDocente, Tribunal Registral Administrativo, Tribunal de Transportes, etc.), puesto\r\nque, como los mismos han sido constituidos, casi de forma usual, como órganos\r\ndesconcentrados en grado máximo, se obtiene una mayor garantía de especialidad\r\ntécnica, imparcialidad y objetividad, al difuminarse la relación de jerarquía y\r\ndiluirse cualquier criterio político. La idea del carácter facultativo del\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa, no es ajena o extraña al ordenamiento\r\njurídico infraconstitucional, la propia Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción\r\nContencioso-Administrativa establece cuatro supuestos en que resulta optativa.\r\nAsí, el artículo 32 exceptúa del recurso de reposición el acto presunto por\r\nsilencio negativo cuando emana del jerarca, los actos no manifestados por\r\nescrito –tácitos- y los reglamentos. El artículo 87, en tratándose del proceso\r\nespecial de separación de directores de las entidades descentralizadas,\r\nestablece que no es necesario plantear el recurso previo de reposición. Por su\r\nparte el artículo 357 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública estatuye\r\nque no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para impugnar las vías de\r\nhecho. Por último, la propia Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su\r\nartículo 31 indica que no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para acudir\r\nal proceso de amparo. Cabe aclarar y advertir, aunque no es objeto de la\r\npresente consulta judicial, por su trascendental importancia que el plazo de\r\ncaducidad de la acción –cualquiera que este sea-, cuando el administrado opta\r\npor no agotar la vía administrativa, empezará a correr a partir de la notificación\r\ndel acto final no impugnado. En suma, el carácter electivo de la vía\r\nadministrativa, resulta absolutamente congruente con los derechos fundamentales\r\nde los administrados de acceso a la jurisdicción, a una justicia pronta y\r\ncumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), a la igualdad (artículo 33\r\nde la Constitución Política) y a controlar la legalidad de la función\r\nadministrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política). Ahora bien, debe\r\nresaltarse que tan constitucional es que el administrado opte por acudir\r\ndirectamente a la vía jurisdiccional, sin agotar la vía administrativa, como\r\ncuando elige hacerlo.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO IMPUESTO\r\nPOR EL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL. El constituyente originario estableció varias hipótesis en\r\nque el agotamiento de la vía administrativa resulta preceptivo, al entender que\r\nel órgano o instancia que revisa o fiscaliza un acto administrativo determinado\r\nes una garantía de acierto, celeridad y economía para el administrado. En tales\r\ncircunstancias, se encuentran los numerales 173 respecto de los acuerdos\r\nmunicipales, en cuanto el párrafo 2°, de ese numeral establece que si no es\r\nrevocado o reformado el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán\r\nal Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva\r\ndefinitivamente y 184 en cuanto le reserva a la Contraloría General de la\r\nRepública la jerarquía impropia de los actos administrativos dictados en\r\nmateria de contratación administrativa. En estos dos supuestos, al existir\r\nnorma constitucional que le brinda cobertura al agotamiento preceptivo de la\r\nvía administrativa no puede estimarse que sea inconstitucional ese presupuesto\r\nobligatorio de admisibilidad de un proceso contencioso-administrativo.\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO:\r\nPRIVILEGIO FORMAL INJUSTIFICADO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS. Otro de los privilegios formales de\r\nlas administraciones públicas en el proceso contencioso-administrativo lo\r\nconstituye la figura dogmática y legislativa del acto tácitamente consentido\r\nque tiene una lógica irrefutable en relación con el agotamiento preceptivo de\r\nla vía administrativa. Si el agotamiento de la vía administrativa –sustentado\r\nen el privilegio de la autotutela declarativa- es un requisito de admisibilidad\r\nde carácter obligatorio, consecuentemente, si el administrado no ejerce en\r\ntiempo y forma los recursos administrativos procedentes, el legislador presume,\r\na partir de la conducta omisa del administrado, que ha consentido tácitamente\r\nel acto administrativo al no recurrirlo en los plazos y por los medios\r\ndispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico. Ese instituto procesal infringe\r\nfrontalmente el derecho fundamental de los administrados de acceder a la\r\njurisdicción (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), puesto que, le impide\r\nperpetuamente, discutir el asunto ante la jurisdicción dispuesta por el\r\nconstituyente para ejercer el control de legalidad de la función administrativa\r\n(artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), simplemente, por no haber ejercido e\r\ninterpuesto los recursos administrativos procedentes.Consecuentemente, si la\r\nadecuación del agotamiento de la vía administrativa al parámetro constitucional\r\nimpone estimarla como facultativa u optativa para el administrado, la figura\r\ndel acto consentido debe ser reputada como inconstitucional en cuanto supone de\r\nforma implícita que debe cumplirse obligatoriamente con tal recaudo.\n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- NORMAS CONEXAS. El artículo 89 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional preceptúa que la sentencia que declare la\r\ninconstitucionalidad de una norma o ley, declarará también la de los demás\r\npreceptos de ella cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o\r\nconsecuencia. Ese numeral, por lo dispuesto en el propio artículo 108 ibidem,\r\nresulta aplicable supletoriamente a las consultas judiciales. Por lo expuesto,\r\neste Tribunal Constitucional estima que por conexión con las normas\r\nconsultadas, también resultan inconstitucionales las siguientes de la Ley\r\nReguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa: a) La frase del\r\nartículo 18, párrafo 1° de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción\n\r\n\r\n\nContencioso Administrativa en cuanto\r\nestablece “(…) que no sean susceptibles de ulterior recurso en vía\r\nadministrativa (…)”; b) el inciso d) del párrafo 1° del artículo 41 de ese\r\ncuerpo normativo en cuanto dispone “d) Que no está agotada la vía\r\nadministrativa”; c) El párrafo 3° del artículo 33 de esa ley al preceptuar“3.\r\nLa falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa dará lugar a su alegación, por\r\nvía de defensa previa, si el Tribunal no apreciare el defecto en la oportunidad\r\nprevista en el artículo 41”; d) la frase final del párrafo 4° del artículo 33\r\nal señalar “(…) por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y\r\nforma”; e) el inciso c) del artículo 50 de la ley referida al indicar “c) La\r\nfalta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa”.\n\r\n\r\n\n No\r\nobstante que en la sentencia citada se reconoce la existencia del agotamiento\r\nde la vía administrativa como una exigencia en materia municipal y de\r\ncontratación administrativa, la Sala estima que el razonamiento del Tribunal\r\nconsultante es equívoco al darle a las normas constitucionales y jurisprudencia\r\ncitada un alcance que no tienen. Ciertamente la Constitución establece el\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal y de contratación\r\nadministrativa, pero no regula la forma en que ese agotamiento debe ser\r\nacreditado dentro del proceso judicial. La naturaleza del instituto por\r\nlógica exige que sea al inicio del mismo que el agotamiento sea alegado y\r\nexigido por la administración. Dado que el proceso es una secuencia lógica de\r\nacciones, el legislador bien puede ordenar en qué fase del procedimiento, de\r\nacuerdo a la naturaleza del instituto, hace cumplir una determinada\r\nexigencia, especialmente tomando en cuenta que en él coexisten varias normas\r\nconstitucionales igualmente relevantes, que deben ser armonizadas para\r\ngarantizar el debido proceso y la tutela judicial efectiva de las personas. En\r\nese sentido, el principio de prontitud de la justicia y de tutela judicial\r\nefectiva, exigen que en este caso, si teniendo la parte interesada la\r\noportunidad de alegar la falta de agotamiento de la vía al inicio\r\ndel proceso, no lo hizo, esa etapa haya recluido a favor del administrado. Si\r\nse trata de resguardar el principio de autotutela y la oportunidad de corregir\r\nun acto nulo o que pueda generar responsabilidad al Estado, la administración\r\npuede corregirlo en cualquier tiempo. En el caso concreto la administración\r\ntuvo la oportunidad plena de alegar el vicio oportunamente y no lo hizo y si\r\nbien es cierto, le corresponde al juez de la etapa intermedia sanear el\r\nproceso, si tampoco lo hizo, teniendo la parte la posibilidad de invocar el\r\ndefecto, no puede decirse que se dejó en indefensión a la administración, ni\r\nque el administrado deba cargar con las omisiones de ambos. Si tomamos el\r\ncaso del derecho a apelar por ejemplo -derecho derivado del debido\r\nproceso-, no podría alegarse que ese derecho le asiste a la parte en forma\r\nabierta en todas las etapas del mismo, sino que es el legislador quien,\r\natendiendo a su naturaleza, determina el tiempo, modo y plazo de\r\nejercerse, derecho que declinado por la parte interesada, puede precluir la\r\netapa, dependiendo del proceso que se trate. Se trata en definitiva de una\r\nordenación del proceso, que como se indicó contiene varios derechos\r\nconstitucionales que equilibrar y armonizar. Determinar que el agotamiento de\r\nla vía puede ser alegado abiertamente en cualquier fase del proceso, aún en la\r\netapa de juicio, es poner este instituto por encima de derechos\r\nfundamentales esenciales como el de celeridad y justicia pronta y cumplida.\r\nConforme lo ha señalado la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (8549-2002), es un\r\nimperativo constitucional que tanto los procedimientos administrativos como\r\njudiciales, sean, prontos, oportunos y cumplidos en aras de valores\r\nconstitucionales trascendentales como la seguridad y la certeza jurídicas de\r\nlos que son merecidos acreedores todos los administrados. Como bien señala la\r\nsentencia citada, por lo anterior, los procedimientos administrativos se\r\nencuentran informados por una serie de principios de profunda raigambre\r\nconstitucional, tales como los de prontitud y oportunidad (artículo 41 de la\r\nConstitución Política), más conocido como de celeridad o rapidez (artículos\r\n225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración\r\nPública), eficacia y eficiencia (artículos 140, inciso 8, de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, 4°, 225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la\r\nAdministración Pública), simplicidad y economía procedimentales (artículo 269,\r\npárrafo 1°, ibidem), que le imponen a los entes públicos la obligación\r\nimperativa de substanciarlos dentro de un plazo razonable y sin dilaciones\r\nindebidas, es decir, sin retardos graves e injustificados para evitar la\r\nfrustración, la eventual extinción o la lesión grave de las situaciones\r\njurídicas sustanciales invocadas por los administrados por el transcurso de un\r\ntiempo excesivo e irrazonable. “El privilegio sustancial y posicional de las\r\nadministraciones públicas, denominado autotutela declarativa y que, a la\r\npostre, constituye una pesada carga para los administrados, no debe invertirse\r\ny ser aprovechado por éstas para causarle una lesión antijurídica al\r\nadministrado con la prolongación innecesaria de los procedimientos\r\nadministrativos.” Los mismos argumentos son válidos para los procesos\r\njudiciales, de tal forma que no tiene sentido que teniendo la administración la\r\nposibilidad -con conocimiento de las pretensiones de los accionantes-, de por\r\nun lado haber alegado el vicio de falta de agotamiento de la vía al inicio del\r\nproceso, o bien por otro, de revertir el acto si así lo estima, en ejercicio\r\ndel principio de autotutela, no hiciera ninguno, y que ante su inercia y la del\r\njuez tramitador, se anteponga el interés de la administración a la del administrado,\r\ncuando se ha avanzado ya en el proceso para el inicio de la fase de juicio. El\r\nadministrado no tiene porqué sufrir la inercia de la administración, o de la\r\nadministración de justicia en perjuicio de su derecho constitucional a una\r\njusticia pronta y cumplida y de su derecho a ser efectivamente tutelado,\r\nespecialmente tomando en cuenta que en esta materia, la administración goza de\r\nuna ventaja –por disposición constitucional-, frente al administrado, la que no\r\nsupo invocar o defender oportunamente. \n\r\n\r\n\n VI.-\r\nCOROLARIO. En suma,\r\nesta Sala interpreta que los artículos 120 inciso 4) Y 31 1) del Código\r\nProcesal Contencioso Administrativo, este último en su relación con el 173 de\r\nla Constitución Política, no son contrarios a la Constitución Política, en\r\ncuanto lo que hacen es regular la forma y momento procesal en que se puede\r\nhacer valer el agotamiento referido en las normas constitucionales. Los\r\nMagistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez dan razones diferentes en cuanto\r\na la constitucionalidad del artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo y el Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara\r\ninconstitucional el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo.\n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO\n\r\n\r\n\nSe rechaza de plano la\r\nconsulta en cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo en relación con el 182 de la Constitución Política. Se evacua la\r\nconsulta formulada en el sentido de que no son contrarios a la Constitución\r\nPolítica, los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso Administrativo, éste último en su relación con el 173 de la\r\nConstitución Política. Los Magistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez dan\r\nrazones diferentes. El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara\r\ninconstitucional el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\r\n\r\n\nPresidente a.i.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. \r\nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando\r\nCastillo V.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nPaul Rueda L. José\r\nPaulino Hernández G.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nRAZONES DIFERENTES DE LOS MAGISTRADOS\r\nJINESTA LOBO Y HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLos Magistrados Jinesta\r\nLobo y Hernández Gutiérrez, dan razones diferentes en cuanto a la\r\nconstitucionalidad del artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo.Ciertamente el artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código\r\nProcesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 28 de abril de 2006,\r\ndispuso, literalmente, lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Si, en la fase oral y\r\npública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto”\n\r\n\r\n\nPor virtud de lo resuelto\r\npor esta Sala Constitucional en el Voto No. 3669-06 y el numeral 31, párrafo\r\n1°, la regla o principio constitucional es que el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa sea facultativo u optativo, por virtud de los derechos\r\nfundamentales y humanos que le asisten al administrado justiciable que sostiene\r\nuna controversia con una administración pública. Consecuentemente, el ordinal\r\n120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo tiene,\r\nprecisamente, sentido, únicamente, para los supuestos excepcionales en que el\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa es preceptivo. Ese numeral no tiene\r\nsentido y aplicación para el resto de las hipótesis ordinarias en que el\r\nagotamiento es facultativo u optativo. El fin de introducir un precepto de tal\r\nnaturaleza en la legislación adjetiva, obedece a claras razones de\r\nconstitucionalidad que son las siguientes:\n\r\n\r\n\na. El agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa no es un derecho de las administraciones públicas, sino un\r\nprivilegio o prerrogativa que vulnera el principio y derecho a la igualdad.\n\r\n\r\n\nb. Por aplicación de los principios\r\nconstitucionales de seguridad y certeza jurídica, las administraciones públicas\r\nbien pueden –cuando sea excepcionalmente preceptivo el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa- aducir como defensa previa, tal privilegio. Así lo confirma el\r\nartículo 66, párrafo 1°, inciso c), del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo que habilita a los representantes de los poderes\r\npúblicos demandados para alegar como defensa previa la “Falta de agotamiento de\r\nla vía administrativa, cuando proceda”. Consecuentemente, la administración\r\npública demandada tiene una oportunidad procesal para aducir tal defensa,\r\nsiendo que si no la aprovecha debe soportar las consecuencias de su propia\r\nincuria y de su representante. De otra parte, el nuevo modelo de justicia\r\nadministrativa introdujo la figura del “Juez tramitador” encargado de sanear el\r\nproceso durante la audiencia preliminar (artículo 90, párrafo 1°, inciso a, del\r\nCódigo Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), siendo que durante tal etapa se\r\ndeben advertir todos los defectos del proceso e, incluso, debe resolverse la\r\ndefensa previa del artículo 66, párrafo 1°, inciso c), del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo, para que la parte interesada pueda subsanar\r\ncualquier defecto sobre el particular (artículo 92 del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo). En definitiva, por aplicación de los principios\r\nconstitucionales de la seguridad y certeza jurídicas, existe un momento\r\nprocesal específico para aducir la falta de agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa en los casos en que sea preceptiva, de lo contrario opera la\r\nfigura de la preclusión que tiene pleno sustento en los principios\r\nconstitucionales ya indicados.\n\r\n\r\n\nc. El derecho a la tutela judicial\r\nefectiva o justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 constitucional) y a\r\ncontrolar la legalidad de todas las formas de manifestación de la función\r\nadministrativa (artículo 49 constitucional), a quien asiste es al\r\nadministrado justiciable, quién, si la administración pública demanda omitió\r\nplantear la defensa previa del agotamiento preceptivo y si el juez tramitador\r\nno advirtió tal defecto, no debe soportar las consecuencias de la conducta\r\nomisa tanto del ente público demandado como del juez tramitador.\n\r\n\r\n\nd. La falta de agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa como instrumento para enervar el conocimiento por el fondo de la\r\ncuestión, es una figura eminentemente formal que debe ceder ante las exigencias\r\nde la justicia material que asiste al justiciable que la impetra ante los\r\nestrados judiciales, en aras de conocer y resolver el mérito y buscar una\r\nsolución definitiva a la controversia, sea de la regla constitucional de la “in\r\ndubio pro accione”, implícitamente contenida en el artículo 41 constitucional. \n\r\n\r\n\nPor las razones expuestas\r\nestimamos que el artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso-Administrativo resulta conforme con el parámetro de\r\nconstitucionalidad.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nErnesto Jinesta\r\nL. \r\n \r\nJosé Paulino Hernández G.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nVOTO SALVADO\r\nDEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA\n\r\n\r\n\nEl suscrito\r\nMagistrado Rueda Leal me separo parcialmente de la decisión de mayoría pues\r\nestimo que la consulta se debe evacuar en el sentido que es inconstitucional el\r\nartículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Debo\r\naclarar que comparto la apreciación que se hace en el voto de mayoría, en el\r\nsentido de rechazar de plano la consulta en cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1) del\r\nCódigo Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en relación con el 182 de la\r\nConstitución Política, ya que efectivamente no se da el supuesto de\r\nincidentalidad que exige que la norma cuestionada sea aplicable al caso que\r\norigina la consulta. Como lo informa el Tribunal consultante, el proceso que\r\nsirve de base a la consulta es de materia municipal, y en vista que el ordinal\r\n31 inciso l) citado se refiere parcialmente a materia de contratación\r\nadministrativa, no se daría uno de los supuestos de admisibilidad que exige la\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional para conocer sobre la constitucionalidad\r\nde esa norma. Empero, respecto de la duda de constitucionalidad planteada por\r\nel órgano consultante relacionada con el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código\r\nProcesal Contencioso Administrativo, sí considero que debe emitirse un pronunciamiento\r\nde fondo en el siguiente sentido: \n\r\n\r\n\nPrimero,\r\nconsidero que el Texto Constitucional claramente establece en su numeral 173\r\nque, en materia municipal, se debe agotar la vía administrativa ante el\r\n“Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva\r\ndefinitivamente”. Es decir, que previo a interponer cualquier proceso o gestión\r\nde carácter jurisdiccional, el acto administrativo impugnado debe atravesar un\r\núltimo filtro ante el órgano jerarca impropio bifásico en materia municipal que\r\nseñala el propio ordinal 173 de la Constitución y, en consecuencia, agotar la\r\nvía administrativa por medio de esa instancia. Bajo esa inteligencia, llevan\r\nrazón los consultantes en el sentido que el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa en materia municipal es de origen constitucional, por ello\r\nestimo que el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo sí atenta directamente contra la Constitución, toda vez que a\r\npartir de esta norma se permite tener por subsanado el defecto de no haber\r\nagotado previamente la vía administrativa en materia municipal, a pesar del\r\nmandamiento expreso dispuesto en la Constitución en el sentido que este tipo de\r\nagotamiento es obligatorio y preceptivo. Como se dijo en sentencia número […] por parte de esta Sala: “Debe advertirse que la\r\núnica jerarquía impropia bifásica que el propio constituyente originario\r\nadmitió, tanto que se ocupó de regularla de forma expresa en el propio texto\r\nconstitucional –lo que confirma su carácter excepcionalísimo-, es la del\r\nartículo 173, párrafo 2°, de la Constitución Política, al señalar que la\r\nrevisión y fiscalización de los acuerdos de los Concejos Municipales estará a\r\ncargo del “(…) Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley (…)”\r\n–Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo-“. Ergo, por el carácter especial que\r\ndispone la propia Constitución respecto a este tipo de agotamiento de la vía en\r\nmateria municipal, estimo que el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso Administrativo sí es inconstitucional. Segundo, el órgano o\r\ninstancia administrativa que revisa finalmente el acto impugnado en materia\r\nmunicipal, se constituye en una garantía de acierto, celeridad, economía,\r\nimparcialidad, independencia y objetividad para el administrado, debido a que\r\ndicha labor es encomendada a un jerarca impropio, diferente de la instancia\r\ndonde se dictó el acto administrativo cuestionado, de ahí que el Constituyente\r\nOriginario haya estimado oportuno agotar la vía administrativa en materia\r\nmunicipal, gracias a las garantías que implica acudir a una instancia\r\nindependiente de la que dictó el acto. \n\r\n\r\n\nTercero, esta\r\npropia Sala, en sentencia número 3669-2006 de las 15:00 horas del 15 de marzo\r\nde 2006, estableció lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“VII.-\r\nAGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO IMPUESTO POR EL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL. El constituyente\r\noriginario estableció varias hipótesis en que el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa resulta preceptivo, al entender que el órgano o instancia que\r\nrevisa o fiscaliza un acto administrativo determinado es una garantía de\r\nacierto, celeridad y economía para el administrado. En tales circunstancias, se\r\nencuentran los numerales 173 respecto de los acuerdos municipales, en cuanto el\r\npárrafo 2°, de ese numeral establece que si no es revocado o reformado el\r\nacuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente\r\ndel Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente y 184\r\nen cuanto le reserva a la Contraloría General de la República la jerarquía\r\nimpropia de los actos administrativos dictados en materia de contratación\r\nadministrativa. En estos dos supuestos, al existir norma constitucional que le\r\nbrinda cobertura al agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa no puede\r\nestimarse que sea inconstitucional ese presupuesto obligatorio de admisibilidad\r\nde un proceso contencioso-administrativo”\n\r\n\r\n\nDe modo que\r\ndesconocer un pronunciamiento tan claro como ese, devendría en una situación\r\ngeneradora de inseguridad jurídica, al obviar el carácter preceptivo que ya han\r\nseñalado los precedentes de este Tribunal en el tema del agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa en materia municipal. \n\r\n\r\n\nCuarto, no\r\ncomparto la tesis de la mayoría de la Sala expuesta en el sub lite, en el\r\nsentido que la naturaleza del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, en materia\r\nmunicipal, por lógica exige que su falta de cumplimiento se invoque al inicio\r\ndel proceso judicial, y que por ello también es lógico que el legislador pueda\r\nordenar en qué fase del proceso judicial se debe invocar esa falta de\r\nagotamiento. Ello por cuanto al ser preceptivo ese agotamiento en temas\r\nmunicipales (por disposición directa de la Constitución), este puede invocarse\r\nen cualquier momento en que alguna de las partes se percate de ello. Tampoco es\r\ncierto que si teniendo la parte interesada la oportunidad de alegar la falta de\r\nagotamiento de la vía (en materia municipal) al inicio del proceso, no lo hizo,\r\nse deba considerar que esa etapa haya precluido, ya que como se explicó supra,\r\nel Texto Constitucional dispone que ese agotamiento es preceptivo, de modo que\r\nno podría prelucir, aun cuando lo disponga el legislador, so pena de incurrir\r\nen un vicio de inconstitucionalidad. Así las cosas, considero que\r\n–concretamente- el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo sí atenta directamente contra la Carta Fundamental, al tener por\r\nsubsanado un defecto que la propia Constitución exige como preceptivo, es\r\ndecir, que es obligatorio cumplir. En cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1)\r\nconsultado, no encuentro que exista algún choque de constitucionalidad, pues\r\nprecisamente indica que “El agotamiento de la vía administrativa será\r\nfacultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos 173 y 182 de la\r\nConstitución Política”; contrario sensu, el agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa para los casos contemplados en el artículo 173 de la\r\nConstitución es preceptivo, tal como se ha venido sosteniendo en este voto\r\ndisidente y como lo ha explicado la Sala en sus precedentes. \n\r\n\r\n\nErgo, el problema de\r\nconstitucionalidad surge a partir de lo estipulado en el artículo 120 inciso 4)\r\ndel Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y, por ello, considero que se\r\ndebió haber evacuado la consulta en el sentido que esa norma resulta\r\ninconstitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nPaul Rueda\r\nLeal\n\r\n\r\n\nMagistrado", "body_en_text": "Exp: Voto Nº 2012-17737\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours twenty-one minutes on the twelfth of December of two thousand twelve.\n\nDiscretionary judicial consultation filed by the CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, EIGHTH SECTION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE, ANNEX, regarding whether articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code are contrary to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution.\n\nResultando\n\n1-. By resolution of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of July of the current year, issued in case file [...], the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Eighth Section, requested that this Chamber rule on the constitutionality of articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code. It states that this Chamber, in judgment 2005-06866, had defined that the improper two-headed hierarchy in municipal matters is of constitutional origin, which is why they believe it makes the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) mandatory in that matter, without any exception. They believe that the legislator, upon enacting law number 8508, in the articles under consultation, chose to establish an exception contra legem. They indicate that in the case serving as the basis for the consultation—a proceeding in municipal matters—the processing judge did not note sua sponte that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, nor is it evident that the defect was alleged by the defendant; therefore, the only judge who could have rectified the procedure did not do so, and they, the judges of the oral and public phase, have no option but to hold the debate, applying a rule they consider unconstitutional because it deems the lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies rectified by stating: \"Article 120 subsection 4. If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed rectified.\" This rule applied to municipal matters, in their view, strips articles 173 and 182 of their essential content, for which the framers did provide prior exhaustion as a requirement to access the judicial path. They believe the same defect is present in the case of article 31 subsection 1) of the same Code concerning administrative contracting matters.\n\n2.- All parties having been summoned in the resolution of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of July of the current year, and duly notified, no filings of appearance or arguments appear in the case file.\n\n3.- By resolution of eleven hours on the twenty-first of August of two thousand twelve, the Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República). The Office of the Attorney General states in its response that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a procedural institute specific to the contentious administrative process whose foundation rests on the power of self-protection (auto tutela) inherent to the Public Administration. It adds that this institute basically consists of the obligation to exhaust the administrative remedies that the legal system establishes against administrative acts as a prerequisite for the admissibility of lawsuits against them in court. It establishes that the configuration of the procedural institute of exhaustion of administrative remedies falls within the scope of legislative discretion, and that, as this Constitutional Chamber has recognized in its case law, judgment number 3669-2006 of fifteen hours on the fifteenth of March of two thousand six, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory in matters governed by constitutional articles 173 and 184, that is, in municipal and administrative contracting matters, by express provision of the framers; therefore, it considers the rule under consultation to be unconstitutional.\n\n4-. In the processing of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,\n\nConsiderando\n\nI.- ADMISSIBILITY. Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations, a provision from which elements emerge that condition its origin: a) that it be filed by a judge; b) that there be \"well-founded doubts\" regarding the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or adjudicated in a case submitted to the cognizance of the judge or tribunal; and c) that in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be adjudicated. These prerequisites were analyzed by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 1617-1997 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the seventeenth of March of nineteen ninety-seven, at which time the following was stated:\n\n\"(...) A. That it be filed by a «judge», a generic term that—of course—applies both to single-member judges and to collegial tribunals, and concerning which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations filed by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is facing the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and b) that the judge must be, at the time of filing the consultation, duly empowered to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).\n\nB. That there be «well-founded doubts» regarding the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or adjudicated. This means the questioning must be reasonable and considered. It also implies it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would mean disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under such circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it must be emphasized, due to its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those rulings in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a rule has previously passed explicit constitutional scrutiny (by way of an action or consultation), a new challenge on the same point would not be viable, but it could be regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same rule, particularly because—in this case—there is always the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the rule itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps through an amparo or habeas corpus proceeding) does not mean there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the rule itself upon which they are based. And, under this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.\n\nC. That there be a case submitted to the cognizance of the judge or tribunal. As in the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest; rather, it must be relevant to the decision or resolution of the so-called «prior» or «principal» matter. Finally,\n\nD. That, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be adjudicated, an aspect that—due to its relevance for the case—is appropriate to clarify. Indeed, the expression «the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be adjudicated» carries a very defined current meaning and is completely different from if the law spoke in terms of «the rule may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be adjudicated». The judicial consultation is not available upon the mere eventuality that those circumstances may occur, since—as explained above—this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the rule or the adjudication of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality (...).\" (The emphasis is not part of the original).\n\nIn the case under review, the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Eighth Section, raises its doubts regarding the constitutionality of articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code in relation to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution. However, in the case of article 31 subsection 1), the consultation must be rejected because the incidental requirement that the challenged rule be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation is not met. As the Court correctly notes, the proceeding serving as the basis for the consultation concerns municipal matters, and the cited rule refers partially to administrative contracting matters, such that one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in its cited article 102 is not present. Consequently, the filed consultation is partially rejected regarding this rule and its relation to article 182 of the Political Constitution, and it is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, as it relates to the cited article 120 subsection 4) and to article 31 subsection 1) only regarding its relation to municipal matters.\n\nII.- RULES UNDER CONSULTATION. Article 120 subsection 4) of the current Contentious Administrative Procedural Code states:\n\n\"1) The judgment shall declare the inadmissibility, in whole or in part, of the claim in the following cases:\n\n(...)\n\n4) If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed rectified.\"\n\nFor its part, article 31 subsection 1) states:\n\n1) \"The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution.\"\n\nIII.- CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS. It is correct to affirm that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, referring respectively to municipal and administrative contracting matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the judicial path is contrary to the Political Constitution.\n\nRegarding what is relevant, it was stated:\n\n\"IV.- PRECEPTIVE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. In the classic conception of substantial and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they seek and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be vested with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, traditionally, the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies or the prior gubernative path was admitted as a formal privilege, that is, that those administered who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies available against it at the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a prerequisite for the admissibility of the contentious administrative process in its classic and traditional objective or reviewing version. At the basis of this institute lies the so-called prerogative of declarative and executive self-protection of public administrations, which in turn has found support in principles such as effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.\n\nDeclarative self-protection means that public entities can, by and for themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on those administered or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations—whether called subjective rights or legitimate interests. The unavoidable legislative obligation of the administered party to file or raise all ordinary administrative remedies against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declarative self-protection of public administrations, since the legislator expects that the public administration itself may defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, sparing it from having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative venue, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must address the requests or petitions filed by those administered and resolve the ordinary administrative remedies that may be available against the final act it itself issues. As can be seen, self-protection is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, where heterotutela (heteroprotection) operates, that is, protection exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of party autonomy (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or through the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function, efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield before them, since they constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as another legal subject within the legal system, so that the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the administered or citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to Constitutional Law.\n\nThe legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, in accordance with the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to plenary and universal legality review, without fissures or exempt redoubts, and, above all, if they are created and set in motion to serve or meet the needs of citizens or those administered—service-oriented organizations (organizaciones serviciales)—.\n\nV.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRECEPTIVE NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and more favorable interpretation, it is understood that the mandatory or preceptive nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies clashes with the fundamental right of those administered to obtain prompt and complete justice under articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative process—and not in the other jurisdictions—is the person seeking justice obligated, before resorting to the judicial path, to exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies available. The infringement on the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the administered party files ordinary remedies of revocation, appeal, or reconsideration—the latter understood as the horizontal remedy available against the acts of the supreme hierarchical head or superior—they do not succeed in having the body itself or its superior modify or annul it, such that exhausting administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, obtaining nothing from filing the remedies, thus transforming it into a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the administered party; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its recourse or review phase often extend beyond legal deadlines and what may be conceived as a reasonable period, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed appropriate; c) the sum of the time needed to exhaust administrative remedies together with that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes the administered parties to obtain tardy justice, which, eventually, may transform—depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the administered parties seeking justice—into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities from which they sometimes benefit, since the administered party or citizen passes—by their ordinary condition as an individual—and the public administration remains prolonged over time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declarative self-protection, exposes the person seeking justice who litigates against a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to that mandatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be considered that even the freedom of legislative configuration or discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if it is considered that public administrations are just another legal subject that should not enjoy such privileges or prerogatives and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic Rule of Law State is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be taken as empowering clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of those administered or, simply, as an altar for them to be sacrificed.\n\nVI.- ADAPTATION OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: OPTIONAL OR ELECTIVE NATURE FOR THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. The most favorable interpretation of the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of those administered to prompt and complete justice and to equality requires a qualitative rethinking of the mandatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the administered party, so that it is the latter who, after making a probability judgment about the eventual success of their action at the administrative venue, decides whether or not to file the available administrative remedies. It is to be expected that the possibilities of the administered party are reinforced when dealing with so-called \"administrative tribunals\" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental), Tax Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), National Customs Tribunal (Tribunal Aduanero Nacional), Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), Teaching Career Tribunal (Tribunal de Carrera Docente), Administrative Registry Tribunal (Tribunal Registral Administrativo), Transport Tribunal (Tribunal de Transportes), etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as highly deconcentrated bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship fades and any political criterion dissolves. The idea of the optional nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or foreign to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction itself establishes four scenarios where it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts the presumed act due to negative silence when it emanates from the hierarchical head, acts not manifested in writing—tacit—, and regulations from the remedy of reconsideration. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior remedy of reconsideration. For its part, article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions. Finally, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to an amparo proceeding. It is necessary to clarify and warn, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action—whatever it may be—when the administered party chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the unchallenged final act. In sum, the elective nature of the administrative path is absolutely consistent with the fundamental rights of those administered to access jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to review the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). That said, it must be highlighted that it is equally constitutional for the administered party to choose to go directly to the judicial path, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.\n\nVII.- PRECEPTIVE EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original framers established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is preceptive, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the administered party. In such circumstances are numerals 173, regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or challenged agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background documents will pass to a Court dependent on the Judicial Branch as indicated by law for it to resolve definitively, and 184, insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic the improper hierarchy of administrative acts issued in administrative contracting matters. In these two scenarios, since a constitutional rule provides coverage for the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies, that mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be considered unconstitutional.\n\nVIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative process is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies—sustained by the privilege of declarative self-protection—is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not timely and formally exercise the available administrative remedies, the legislator presumes, from the omitted conduct of the administered party, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not challenging it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system. This procedural institute is a direct violation of the fundamental right of those administered to access jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction provided by the framers to exercise legality review of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply because they did not exercise and file the available administrative remedies. Consequently, if the adaptation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter compels considering it optional or elective for the administered party, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes such a requirement must be mandatorily fulfilled.\n\nIX.- RELATED RULES. Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction directs that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a rule or law shall also declare that of the other provisions thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. That numeral, by virtue of article 108 ibidem, is applicable suppletorily to judicial consultations. For the foregoing reasons, this Constitutional Court considers that by connection with the rules under consultation, the following articles of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of article 18, paragraph 1° of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes \"(...) that are not susceptible to further remedy through administrative channels (...)\"; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1° of article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides \"d) That administrative remedies have not been exhausted\"; c) Paragraph 3° of article 33 of that law by providing \"3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its assertion by way of preliminary defense, if the Court does not perceive the defect at the stage foreseen in article 41\"; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4° of article 33 by stating \"(...) for not having been challenged administratively in a timely and proper manner\"; e) subsection c) of article 50 of the referenced law by indicating \"c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies\".\n\nHowever, although the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a requirement in municipal and administrative contracting matters, the Chamber considers the reasoning of the consulting Court to be erroneous in giving the cited constitutional rules and case law a scope they do not have. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal and administrative contracting matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be credited within the judicial process.\n\nThe nature of this legal mechanism (instituto) by logic requires that the claim of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía) be raised and demanded by the administration at the very beginning of the process. Given that the process is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator may well order at which phase of the proceeding, according to the nature of the mechanism, a certain requirement must be enforced, especially taking into account that several equally relevant constitutional norms coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process (debido proceso) and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) for individuals. In this sense, the principles of prompt justice and effective judicial protection require that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the start of the process and did not do so, that procedural stage has precluded (precluido) in favor of the administered party. If the aim is to safeguard the principle of administrative self-protection (autotutela) and the opportunity to correct a void act or one that may generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to timely allege the defect and did not do so, and while it is true that it is the responsibility of the judge in the intermediate stage to purge the process, if neither did so, even though the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the administered party must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be argued that this right assists the party openly at all stages of the same, but rather it is the legislator who, attending to its nature, determines the time, mode, and deadline for its exercise, a right which, if waived by the interested party, may cause the stage to be precluded, depending on the process in question. Ultimately, this is a matter of procedural ordering, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights to balance and harmonize. Determining that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies can be alleged openly at any phase of the process, even at the trial stage, is to place this legal mechanism above essential fundamental rights such as celerity and prompt and complete justice. As the jurisprudence (jurisprudencia) of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal security (seguridad jurídica) and legal certainty (certeza jurídica), of which all administered parties are deserving recipients. As the cited judgment correctly indicates, for the foregoing reason, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as celerity or speed (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), effectiveness and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to conduct them within a reasonable timeframe and without undue delays, i.e., without serious and unjustified delays to avoid the frustration, eventual extinction, or serious injury of the substantial legal situations invoked by the administered parties due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) and which, ultimately, constitutes a heavy burden for the administered parties, should not be inverted and used by them to cause an unlawful injury to the administered party through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial processes, such that it makes no sense that, when the administration had the possibility—with knowledge of the claimants' pretensions—of having, on one hand, alleged the defect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the process, or, on the other hand, reversed the act if it so deemed, in exercise of the principle of self-protection, it did neither, and that, in the face of its inaction and that of the processing judge, the interest of the administration is placed before that of the administered party, when the process has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The administered party has no reason to suffer the inaction of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially considering that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the administered party, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.\n\nVI.- COROLLARY. In sum, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the latter in its relation with Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution, in that what they do is regulate the form and procedural moment in which the exhaustion of remedies referred to in the constitutional norms can be enforced. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and Magistrate Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto) and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code unconstitutional.\n\nTHEREFORE (POR TANTO)\n\nThe consultation is summarily rejected (se rechaza de plano) regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution. The consultation formulated is evacuated in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the latter in its relation with Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Magistrate Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code unconstitutional.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\nActing President (Presidente a.i.)\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M.\nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDIFFERENT REASONS OF MAGISTRATES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ\n\nMagistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Indeed, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally stated the following:\n\n\"If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect shall be considered cured (subsanado)\"\n\nBy virtue of what was resolved by this Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 3669-06 and subsection 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is optional or voluntary, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the administered litigant who maintains a controversy with a public administration. Consequently, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code has meaning, precisely, only for the exceptional cases in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. This article has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses where exhaustion is optional or voluntary. The purpose of introducing a precept of this nature into the procedural legislation is based on clear constitutional reasons, which are the following:\n\na. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a right of public administrations, but a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality.\n\nb. By application of the constitutional principles of legal security and legal certainty, public administrations may well—when the exhaustion of administrative remedies is exceptionally mandatory—put forward such a privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the \"Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, when applicable.\" Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to put forward such a defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own negligence and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the \"Processing Judge\" (Juez tramitador) responsible for purging (sanear) the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), and during that stage, all defects of the process must be noticed, and the preliminary defense under Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code must even be resolved, so that the interested party can cure any defect on this particular point (Article 92 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code). In short, by application of the constitutional principles of legal security and legal certainty, there is a specific procedural moment to raise the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in cases where it is mandatory; otherwise, the figure of preclusion (preclusión) operates, which has full support in the constitutional principles already indicated.\n\nc. The right to effective judicial protection or prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) assists the administered litigant, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the processing judge did not notice such a defect, must not bear the consequences of the negligent conduct of both the sued public entity and the processing judge.\n\nd. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an instrument to prevent knowledge of the case on its merits is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of material justice that assist the litigant who seeks it before the courts of law, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and seeking a definitive solution to the controversy, that is, the constitutional rule of \"in dubio pro accione,\" implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the reasons stated, we consider that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is in accordance with the standard of constitutionality.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.\nJosé Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA\n\nThe undersigned Magistrate Rueda Leal partially separates myself from the majority decision because I consider that the consultation should be evacuated in the sense that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the assessment made in the majority vote, in the sense of summarily rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since indeed the requirement of incidentality, which requires that the challenged norm be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation, is not met. As the consulting Court informs, the process that serves as the basis for the consultation is of municipal matter, and given that the cited Article 31, subsection 1) refers partially to matters of administrative contracting, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction to hear a case regarding the constitutionality of that norm would not be met. However, regarding the question of constitutionality raised by the consulting body related to Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, I do believe a ruling on the merits should be issued in the following sense:\n\nFirst, I consider that the Constitutional Text clearly establishes in its section 173 that, in municipal matters, the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be completed before the \"Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively.\" That is, prior to filing any jurisdictional process or action, the challenged administrative act must pass through a final filter before the improper biphasic hierarchical body in municipal matters indicated by section 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust administrative remedies through that instance. Under this understanding, the consulting parties are correct in the sense that the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; for this reason, I consider that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code does directly violate the Constitution, since by virtue of this norm, the defect of not having previously exhausted administrative remedies in municipal matters is allowed to be considered cured, despite the express mandate established in the Constitution in the sense that this type of exhaustion is mandatory and imperative. As stated in judgment number [...] by this Chamber: \"It must be noted that the only improper biphasic hierarchy that the original constituent power itself admitted, so much so that it took the trouble to regulate it expressly in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its highly exceptional character—, is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Political Constitution, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils shall be the responsibility of the '(…) Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)' –the Contentious-Administrative Court-.\" Ergo, due to the special character that the Constitution itself provides regarding this type of exhaustion of remedies in municipal matters, I consider that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the administrative body or instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the administered party, because said task is entrusted to an improper hierarchical superior, different from the instance where the questioned administrative act was issued, hence the Original Constituent Power considered it appropriate to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent of the one that issued the act.\n\nThird, this very Chamber, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 15:00 hours on March 15, 2006, established the following:\n\n\"VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the administered party. In such circumstances, sections 173 regarding municipal agreements are found, insofar as paragraph 2 of that section establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or modified, the records shall be forwarded to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively, and 184 insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, given the existence of a constitutional norm that provides coverage for mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered that this mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative process is unconstitutional.\"\n\nThus, disregarding such a clear pronouncement would result in a situation generating legal insecurity, by ignoring the mandatory nature that the precedents of this Court have already indicated on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters.\n\nFourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters, by logic, requires that its non-compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order at which phase of the judicial process this failure of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, since this exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any moment when one of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust remedies (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, it should be considered that that stage has been precluded, since as explained supra, the Constitutional Text establishes that this exhaustion is mandatory, and therefore it could not be precluded, even if the legislator so provides, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Thus, I consider that—specifically—Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code does directly violate the Fundamental Charter, by considering a defect cured that the Constitution itself requires as mandatory, i.e., that must be complied with. Regarding the consulted Article 31, subsection 1), I find no conflict with the Constitution, because it precisely indicates that \"The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except for what is provided in Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution\"; contrario sensu, the exhaustion of administrative remedies for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been maintained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.\n\nErgo, the problem of constitutionality arises from what is stipulated in Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and, therefore, I consider that the consultation should have been evacuated in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.\n\nPaul Rueda Leal\nMagistrate\n\nHe adds that said institute consists, basically, of the obligation to exhaust the administrative remedies (recursos administrativos) that the legal system establishes against administrative acts as a prerequisite for the admissibility of claims against them in judicial proceedings. He establishes that the configuration of the procedural institute of exhaustion of administrative remedies falls within the scope of legislative discretion, and that, as recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in its jurisprudence, judgment number 3669-2006 of fifteen hours on March fifteen, two thousand six, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory in matters regulated by constitutional articles 173 and 184, that is, in municipal and administrative contracting matters, by express provision of the constituent power, for which reason he considers the consulted norm to be unconstitutional.\n\n**4-.** In the substantiation of the process, the legal prescriptions have been observed.\n\nDrafted by **Magistrate Mora Mora**;\n\n**Considering**\n\n**I-. ADMISSIBILITY.** Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations (consultas judiciales), a provision from which elements that condition its origin can be deduced: a) that it is formulated by a judge; b) that \"founded doubts\" exist regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged in a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and, c) that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These prerequisites were analyzed by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 1617-1997 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on March seventeen, nineteen ninety-seven, an occasion on which the following was stated:\n\n\"(…) A. That it be formulated by a 'judge' (juez), a generic term that –of course– applies to both single-member judges and collegiate courts, and regarding which it is unnecessary to clarify more than: a) that it must be authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the rendering of a judgment or arbitral award, vested with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a ruling that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).\n\nB. That 'founded doubts' exist about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and balanced. Furthermore, it implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would mean disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the adequacy of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to the constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed the explicit examination of constitutionality (by way of an action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because –in this case– the possibility of a constitutional breach always exists, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.\n\nC. That a case exists submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. Just as in an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or out of mere academic interest, but it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'principal' matter. Finally,\n\nD. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance for the case– is convenient to clarify. In effect, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' carries a very defined present meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm might be applied or the act, conduct, or omission might be judged.' The judicial consultation does not proceed before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judging of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for him (…).\" (The emphasis is not part of the original).\n\nIn the case under examination, the Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Court, Eighth Section, raises its doubts regarding the constitutionality of articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution. However, in the case of article 31, subsection 1), the consultation must be rejected because the assumption of incidentality that requires the questioned norm to be applicable to the case originating the consultation is not present. As the Court well points out, the process serving as the basis for the consultation concerns municipal matters, and the cited norm partially refers to matters of administrative contracting, such that one of the prerequisites for admissibility required by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in its cited article 102 is not met. Consequently, the consultation formulated is partially rejected regarding this norm and its relation to article 182 of the Political Constitution, and it is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, regarding the cited article 120, subsection 4) and article 31, subsection 1) only insofar as it relates to municipal matters.\n\n**II.- CONSULTED NORMS.** Article 120, subsection 4) of the current Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states:\n\n\"1) The judgment will declare the inadmissibility, total or partial, of the claim (pretensión) in the following cases:\n\n(...)\n\n4) If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect will be deemed to have been cured.\"\n\nFor its part, article 31, subsection 1) states:\n\n1) \"The exhaustion of administrative remedies will be optional, except for what is provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution.\"\n\n**III.- CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS.** It is correct to affirm that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, referring respectively to municipal and administrative contracting matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the judicial route is contrary to the Political Constitution.\n\nIn that which is relevant, it was indicated:\n\n**\"IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** In the classic conception of substantial and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they procure and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be provided with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the prior governmental route, was traditionally admitted as a formal privilege; that is, that individuals (administrados) who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies (recursos administrativos) admissible against it in the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a prerequisite for the admissibility of the contentious-administrative process in its classic and traditional objective or reviewing version. At the base of this institute lies the so-called prerogative of declaratory and executive self-tutelage (auto tutela) of public administrations, which has found support, at the same time, in principles such as those of effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.\n\nThe declaratory self-tutelage means that public entities can, by themselves and before themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on individuals or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations –be they subjective rights or legitimate interests–. The inescapable legislative obligation of the individual to exercise or raise all ordinary administrative remedies against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-tutelage of public administrations, since the legislator expects that the public administration itself can defend the impugned administrative act or annul or modify it, avoiding having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative route, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions formulated by the individuals and resolve the ordinary administrative remedies that proceed against the final act that it itself issues. As can be seen, self-tutelage is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, in which heterotutelage operates, that is, that exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, as is a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, a private individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of freedom of contract (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or from the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function of efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, to be subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield before them, since they constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as one more subject of Law within the legal system, so that it is repugnant to Constitutional Law to have the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the individual or citizen and the respective public entity.\n\nThe legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, according to the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to full and universal control of legality, without fissures or exempt redoubts, and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or individuals –service organizations–.\n\n**V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY CHARACTER OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.** Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the mandatory or prescriptive character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of individuals to obtain prompt and complete justice ex articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection, tutela judicial efectiva) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative process –and not so in the rest of the jurisdictions– is the litigant obliged, before resorting to the judicial route, to exhaust all admissible ordinary administrative remedies. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the individual files the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria), appeal (apelación), or review (reposición) –the latter understood as the horizontal remedy admissible against acts of the highest authority or supreme hierarchical superior–, they do not achieve that the body itself or its superior modifies or annuls it, so that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, achieving nothing from filing the remedies, thus transforming itself into a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the individual; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appellate or review stage usually extends beyond legal deadlines and what can be conceived as a reasonable timeframe, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without having the possibility of doing so immediately and when one deems it opportune; c) the sum of the period necessary to exhaust administrative remedies plus that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes individuals to obtain tardy justice, which, eventually, can transform –depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the individual litigants– into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities of which they, on occasions, take advantage, since the individual or citizen passes –due to their ordinary condition as a natural person– and the public administration remains for a prolonged time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to that obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that even the freedom of configuration or legislative discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if it is considered that public administrations are one more subject of Law that has no reason to enjoy such privileges or prerogatives, and that the central axis in a welfare administration or in a Social and Democratic State of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be considered as empowerment clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of individuals or, simply, as the altar on which to sacrifice them.\n\n**VI.- ADAPTATION OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: OPTIONAL OR ELECTIVE CHARACTER FOR THE INDIVIDUAL.** The most favorable interpretation to the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of individuals to prompt and complete justice and to equality compels a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. In effect, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the individual, so that it is the latter who, after making a probability judgment about the potential success of their action in the administrative venue, decides whether or not to file the available administrative remedies. It is to be expected that the individual's possibilities are reinforced when it concerns so-called \"administrative tribunals\" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal, Tax Administrative Tribunal, National Customs Tribunal, Civil Service Tribunal, Teaching Career Tribunal, Administrative Registry Tribunal, Transport Tribunal, etc.), since, as they have been constituted, almost usually, as highly decentralized (desconcentrados) bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchy relationship dissipates and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the optional character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or strange to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Contencioso-Administrativa Jurisdiction itself establishes four cases in which it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts from the review remedy (reposición) the implied act by negative silence when it emanates from the highest authority, acts not expressed in writing –implied–, and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior remedy of review. For its part, article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge acts of trespass (vías de hecho). Finally, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo process. It is necessary to clarify and warn, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action (plazo de caducidad) –whatever that may be–, when the individual opts not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the unchallenged final act. In sum, the elective character of the administrative route is absolutely congruent with the fundamental rights of individuals of access to jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to control the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). However, it must be highlighted that it is just as constitutional for the individual to choose to go directly to the judicial route, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.\n\n**VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT.** The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the individual. In such circumstances, numerals 173 are found regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the records will pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law to resolve definitively; and 184 insofar as it reserves for the General Comptroller of the Republic the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, since a constitutional norm exists that provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered unconstitutional for this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative process.\n\n**VIII.- IMPLIEDLY CONSENTED ACT (ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO): UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative process is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the impliedly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies –supported by the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage– is a mandatory prerequisite for admissibility, consequently, if the individual does not exercise the appropriate administrative remedies in time and form, the legislator presumes, from the individual's passive conduct, that they have impliedly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system. That procedural institute frontally infringes upon the fundamental right of individuals to access the jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent power to exercise control of legality over the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply for not having exercised and filed the appropriate administrative remedies. Consequently, if the adaptation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter compels considering it optional or elective for the individual, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly supposes that such requirement must be compulsorily fulfilled.\n\n**IX.- CONNECTED NORMS.** Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction prescribes that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law will also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. That numeral, by what is provided in article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations.\n\nFor the reasons stated,\nthis Constitutional Court finds that, by connection with the consulted norms, the following provisions of the Law Regulating the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law Regulating the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in the administrative process (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that body of law insofar as it provides “d) That the administrative process has not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law when it prescribes “3. The failure to exhaust the administrative process will give rise to its allegation, by way of a preliminary defense, if the Court does not appreciate the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it indicates “(…) for not having been administratively appealed in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referred law when it indicates “c) The failure to exhaust the administrative process.”\n\nNotwithstanding that the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of the administrative process as a requirement in municipal and administrative contracting matters, the Chamber finds that the reasoning of the consulting Court is mistaken in giving the constitutional norms and cited jurisprudence a scope they do not possess. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal and administrative contracting matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be proven within the judicial process. The nature of the legal institution logically demands that the exhaustion be alleged and required by the administration at the beginning of the process. Given that the process is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator can indeed order at what phase of the procedure, according to the nature of the institution, a specific requirement is enforced, especially considering that several equally relevant constitutional norms coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process (debido proceso) and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) for individuals. In this sense, the principle of prompt justice and effective judicial protection requires that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust the administrative process at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage has closed (recluido) in favor of the individual. If it is a matter of safeguarding the principle of self-protection (autotutela) and the opportunity to correct a null act or one that could generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to raise the procedural defect in a timely manner and did not do so, and while it is true that the judge in the intermediate stage is responsible for purging the process of defects, if the judge also did not do so, even though the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the individual must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be alleged that this right assists the party openly in all stages thereof, but rather it is the legislator who, taking into account its nature, determines the time, mode, and term for exercising it, a right that, if declined by the interested party, can cause the stage to preclude, depending on the process in question. It is, ultimately, a matter of the ordering of the process, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights that must be balanced and harmonized. To determine that the exhaustion of the administrative process can be alleged openly at any phase of the process, even at the trial stage, is to place this institution above essential fundamental rights such as celerity and prompt and complete justice. As the jurisprudence of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete in the interest of transcendent constitutional values such as legal security and certainty (seguridad y certeza jurídicas), to which all individuals are rightfully entitled. As the cited judgment rightly points out, for this reason, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and opportunity (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as celerity or speed (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), efficacy and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to substantiate them within a reasonable period and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified delays to avoid the frustration, eventual extinction, or serious harm to the substantial legal situations invoked by individuals due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) and which, ultimately, constitutes a heavy burden for individuals, should not be inverted and exploited by them to cause an unlawful injury to the individual through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial processes, such that it makes no sense that, with the administration having the possibility—knowing the claims of the plaintiffs—to, on one hand, have alleged the defect of failure to exhaust the administrative process at the beginning of the process, or, on the other hand, to reverse the act if it so deems, in exercise of the principle of self-protection, it does neither, and that, in the face of its inertia and that of the handling judge, the interest of the administration is placed before that of the individual when the process has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The individual has no reason to suffer the inertia of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially considering that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the individual, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.\n\nVI.- COROLLARY. In summary, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution, insofar as what they do is regulate the procedural form and moment in which the exhaustion referred to in the constitutional norms can be asserted. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, and Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code unconstitutional.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe consultation is summarily rejected in relation to Article 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code concerning Article 182 of the Political Constitution. The consultation is resolved in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code unconstitutional.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\nActing President\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDIFFERENT REASONS OF MAGISTRATES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ\n\nMagistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code. Certainly, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally provided the following:\n\n“If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust the administrative process, the defect shall be deemed cured”\n\nBy virtue of what was decided by this Constitutional Chamber in Voto No. 3669-06 and Article 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of the administrative process is optional or voluntary, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the individual litigant who has a dispute with a public administration. Consequently, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is, precisely, only meaningful for the exceptional cases where the exhaustion of the administrative process is mandatory. This numeral has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses where exhaustion is optional or voluntary. The purpose of introducing such a precept into the procedural legislation is due to clear reasons of constitutionality, which are the following:\n\na. The exhaustion of the administrative process is not a right of public administrations, but rather a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality.\n\nb. By application of the constitutional principles of legal security and certainty, public administrations can indeed—when the exhaustion of the administrative process is exceptionally mandatory—raise this privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the “Failure to exhaust the administrative process, when appropriate.” Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to raise such a defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own negligence and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the “Handling Judge” (Juez tramitador) responsible for purging the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code), and during this stage, all defects of the process must be noted, and the preliminary defense of Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code must even be resolved, so that the interested party can cure any defect in this regard (Article 92 of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code). Ultimately, by application of the constitutional principles of legal security and certainty, there is a specific procedural moment to raise the failure to exhaust the administrative process in cases where it is mandatory, otherwise the figure of preclusion (preclusión) applies, which has full support in the aforementioned constitutional principles.\n\nc. The right to effective judicial protection or prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) belongs to the individual litigant, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the handling judge did not note such defect, should not bear the consequences of the omission of both the sued public entity and the handling judge.\n\nd. The failure to exhaust the administrative process as an instrument to prevent the case from being heard on its merits is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of material justice that assist the litigant who seeks it before the courts, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and finding a definitive solution to the dispute, under the constitutional rule of \"in dubio pro accione,\" implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the reasons stated, we find that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is in conformity with the constitutional standard.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. José Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA\n\nThe undersigned Magistrate Rueda Leal partially separate from the majority decision because I find that the consultation should be resolved in the sense that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the assessment made in the majority vote, in the sense of summarily rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since, indeed, the requirement of incidentality—which demands that the questioned norm be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation—is not met. As the consulting Court reports, the process serving as the basis for the consultation is a municipal matter, and considering that the cited Article 31, subsection l) partially refers to administrative contracting matters, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction for hearing the constitutionality of that norm would not be present. However, regarding the doubt of constitutionality raised by the consulting body concerning Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, I do believe a ruling on the merits should be issued in the following sense:\n\nFirst, I consider that the Constitutional Text clearly establishes in its Article 173 that, in municipal matters, the administrative process must be exhausted before the “Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively.” That is, prior to filing any process or jurisdictional action, the challenged administrative act must pass through a final filter before the two-phase improper hierarchical body (jerarca impropio bifásico) in municipal matters indicated by Article 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust the administrative process through that instance. Under this understanding, the consultants are correct that the exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; therefore, I find that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code does directly violate the Constitution, since this norm allows the defect of not having previously exhausted the administrative process in municipal matters to be deemed cured, despite the express mandate provided in the Constitution that this type of exhaustion is obligatory and mandatory. As stated in judgment number […] issued by this Chamber: “It must be noted that the only two-phase improper hierarchy that the original constituent power itself admitted, to such an extent that it expressly regulated it in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its highly exceptional character—is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Political Constitution, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils shall be the responsibility of ‘(…) the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)‘—the Administrative-Contentious Court—.“ Ergo, given the special character that the Constitution itself provides for this type of exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal matters, I find that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the administrative body or instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the individual, because this task is entrusted to an improper hierarchical superior, different from the instance where the questioned administrative act was issued; hence, the Original Constituent Power deemed it appropriate to exhaust the administrative process in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent of the one that issued the act.\n\nThird, this Chamber itself, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 3:00 p.m. on March 15, 2006, established the following:\n\n“VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of the administrative process is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the individual. In such circumstances, Articles 173, regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2 of that article establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the case file shall be sent to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively, and 184, insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic the improper hierarchy (jerarquía impropia) of administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, since there is a constitutional norm that provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of the administrative process, it cannot be considered that this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of an administrative-contentious process is unconstitutional.”\n\nThus, disregarding such a clear pronouncement would result in a situation that generates legal uncertainty (inseguridad jurídica), by ignoring the mandatory nature already indicated by this Court’s precedents on the subject of exhausting the administrative process in municipal matters.\n\nFourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite matter, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of the administrative process, in municipal matters, logically demands that its lack of compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order at what phase of the judicial process this lack of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, since this exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any moment when one of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust the administrative process (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage should be considered to have precluded (precluido), since, as explained above, the Constitutional Text provides that this exhaustion is mandatory, so it could not preclude, even if the legislator so orders, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Thus, I consider that—specifically—Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code does directly violate the Fundamental Charter, by deeming cured a defect that the Constitution itself demands as mandatory, that is, which it is obligatory to comply with. Regarding the consulted Article 31, subsection 1), I do not find any clash of constitutionality, since it precisely indicates that “The exhaustion of the administrative process shall be optional, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution”; conversely, the exhaustion of the administrative process for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been sustained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.\n\nErgo, the constitutionality issue arises from the stipulation in Article 120(4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and, for that reason, I believe the consultation should have been resolved in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.\n\nPaul Rueda Leal\nMagistrate\n\nAs the Court correctly notes, the proceeding giving rise to this consultation is of a municipal nature, and the cited provision refers partially to matters of government procurement (contratación administrativa); therefore, one of the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, cited above, is not met. Consequently, the consultation is partially rejected as it relates to this provision and its relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política, and is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, as it relates to Article 120, subsection 4) cited above and to Article 31, subsection 1) only as far as its relation to municipal matters.\n\nII. PROVISIONS CONSULTED.\nArticle 120, subsection 4) of the current Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states:\n\n“1) The judgment shall declare the inadmissibility, in whole or in part, of the claim in the following cases:\n\n(...)\n\n4) If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that the administrative remedies (vía administrativa) have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed cured.”\n\nFor its part, Article 31, subsection 1) states:\n\n1) “The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política.”\n\nIII. CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS.\nIt is correct to state that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política, referring respectively to municipal and government procurement matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the jurisdictional channel is contrary to the Constitución Política.\n\nIn what is relevant, it was stated:\n\n\"IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.\nIn the classical conception of substantive and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they seek and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be endowed with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies or the prior governmental channel was traditionally admitted as a formal privilege; that is, that persons under administration (administrados) who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, before resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals available against said act within the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes an admissibility requirement for the contentious-administrative proceeding in its classical and traditional objective or reviewing version. Underlying this institution is the so-called prerogative of declaratory and executive self-tutelage (auto tutela) of public administrations, which has found support, at the same time, in principles such as those of effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.\n\nDeclaratory self-tutelage means that public entities can, by themselves and for themselves, without the need to resort to a judge, impose obligations on persons under administration or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations—be they subjective rights or legitimate interests. The inescapable legislative obligation of the person under administration to exercise or file all ordinary administrative appeals against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-tutelage of public administrations, since the legislature expects the public administration itself to either defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, thus avoiding the need to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative channel, the public administration becomes, simultaneously, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions made by the persons under administration and resolve the ordinary administrative appeals that proceed against the final act it itself issues. As can be seen, self-tutelage is a concept diametrically opposed to the one prevailing in the rest of the legal branches, in which hetero-tutelage operates, that is, that exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) (Article 28 of the Constitución Política) or through the intervention of a judge (Article 41 of the Constitución Política). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function of efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Constitución Política itself (Articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinate to fundamental rights and must yield to them, since these constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as one more subject of law within the legal system, such that the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the person under administration or the citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to the Law of the Constitution.\n\nThe legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, according to the constitutional parameter (Articles 33 and 49 of the Constitución Política), must be subject to full and universal legality control, without fissures or exempt enclosures, and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or persons under administration—service organizations.\n\nV.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.\nCurrently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the strongest binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the obligatory or mandatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of persons under administration to obtain prompt and complete justice under Articles 41 and 49 of the Constitución Política (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative proceeding—and not in the rest of the jurisdictions—is the litigant obliged, before resorting to the jurisdictional channel, to exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals available. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the person under administration files the ordinary appeals for revocation, appeal, or reconsideration—the latter understood as the horizontal appeal available against the acts of the highest authority or supreme hierarchical superior—they do not succeed in getting the body itself or its superior to modify or annul it, so that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, achieving nothing from the filing of appeals, thus becoming a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the person under administration; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appeal or review stage usually extend beyond the legal deadlines and beyond what can be conceived as a reasonable time, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed appropriate; c) the sum of the time required to exhaust administrative remedies with the time required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes persons under administration to obtain tardy justice, which can eventually transform—depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the litigating persons under administration—into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities which they sometimes exploit, since the person under administration or citizen passes—due to their ordinary condition as a natural person—and the public administration remains for a prolonged time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be noted that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to this obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that even the legislature's freedom of configuration or discretion in designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if one considers that public administrations are one more subject of law that should not enjoy such privileges or prerogatives and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be seen as empowerment clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of persons under administration or, simply, as the altar upon which they are to be sacrificed.\n\nVI.- ADAPTING THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: FACULTATIVE OR OPTIONAL NATURE FOR THE PERSON UNDER ADMINISTRATION.\nThe most favorable interpretation of the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of persons under administration to prompt and complete justice and to equality requires a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislature. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the person under administration, so that it is they who, after making a probability judgment about the eventual success of their action in the administrative venue, decide whether or not to file the available administrative appeals. It is to be expected that the person's possibilities are strengthened when dealing with so-called “administrative tribunals” (e.g., Tribunal Ambiental, Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, Tribunal del Servicio Civil, Tribunal de Carrera Docente, Tribunal Registral Administrativo, Tribunal de Transportes, etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as highly decentralized bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship is blurred and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the facultative nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or strange to the sub-constitutional legal system; the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa itself establishes four cases in which it is optional. Thus, Article 32 exempts from the appeal for reconsideration the act presumed due to negative silence when it emanates from the highest authority, acts not manifested in writing—tacit—and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special proceeding for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior appeal for reconsideration. For its part, Article 357 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions. Finally, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional itself, in its Article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo proceeding. It is worth clarifying and warning, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action—whatever it may be—when the person under administration chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the final, unchallenged act. In summary, the elective nature of administrative remedies is absolutely consistent with the fundamental rights of persons under administration of access to the jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), to equality (Article 33 of the Constitución Política), and to control the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitución Política). However, it must be highlighted that it is just as constitutional for the person under administration to choose to go directly to the jurisdictional channel, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.\n\nVII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT.\nThe original constituent established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the person under administration. In such circumstances are found numeral 173 regarding municipal agreements, in that paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background records shall pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates for it to resolve definitively, and 184 in that it reserves to the Contraloría General de la República the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of government procurement (contratación administrativa). In these two cases, since a constitutional provision covers the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be deemed unconstitutional.\n\nVIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.\nAnother of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative proceeding is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies—sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage—is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the person under administration does not exercise in a timely and proper manner the available administrative appeals, the legislator presumes, based on the omitted conduct of the person under administration, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the time limits and through the means established by the legal system. This procedural institute frontally infringes upon the fundamental right of persons under administration to access the jurisdiction (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent to exercise control over the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitución Política), simply because they did not exercise and file the available administrative remedies. Consequently, if adapting the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter requires considering it as facultative or optional for the person under administration, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes that this requirement must be mandatorily fulfilled.\n\nIX.- RELATED PROVISIONS.\nArticle 89 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a provision or law shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. This numeral, by what is provided in Article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations. For the reasons stated, this Constitutional Court considers that, by connection with the provisions consulted, the following provisions of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1° of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in the administrative channel (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1° of Article 41 of that regulatory body insofar as it provides “d) That the administrative remedies have not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3° of Article 33 of that law in providing “3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its allegation, by way of preliminary defense, if the Court does not note the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4° of Article 33 in stating “(…) for not having been administratively appealed in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referenced law in indicating “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”\n\nNotwithstanding that the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a requirement in municipal and government procurement (contratación administrativa) matters, the Chamber considers that the reasoning of the consulting Court is mistaken in giving the cited constitutional provisions and case law a scope they do not have. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal and government procurement matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which this exhaustion must be accredited within the judicial proceeding. The nature of the institution logically requires that the exhaustion be alleged and demanded by the administration at the beginning of the proceeding. Given that the proceeding is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator can indeed order at which phase of the procedure, according to the nature of the institution, a specific requirement is enforced, especially taking into account that several equally relevant constitutional provisions coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process and effective judicial protection for individuals. In this sense, the principle of prompt justice and effective judicial protection requires that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the proceeding and did not do so, that stage has concluded in favor of the person under administration. If the purpose is to safeguard the principle of self-tutelage and the opportunity to correct a null act or one that could generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to allege the defect in a timely manner and did not do so, and while it is true that it is the responsibility of the judge at the intermediate stage to cleanse the proceeding, if he also did not do so, and the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the person under administration must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be alleged that this right assists the party openly at all stages of the proceeding, but rather it is the legislator who, attending to its nature, determines the time, manner, and deadline for its exercise, a right which, if waived by the interested party, can cause that stage to conclude, depending on the proceeding in question. It is, in short, a matter of the ordering of the proceeding, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights that must be balanced and harmonized. Determining that the exhaustion of administrative remedies can be alleged openly at any phase of the proceeding, even at the trial stage, is to place this institution above essential fundamental rights such as that of speed and prompt and complete justice. As the case law of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal security and certainty, of which all persons under administration are worthy recipients. As the cited judgment correctly notes, therefore, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), better known as speed or rapidity (Articles 225, paragraph 1°, and 269, paragraph 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), effectiveness and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Constitución Política, 4°, 225, paragraph 1°, and 269, paragraph 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1°, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to process them within a reasonable time and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified delays to avoid frustration, the eventual extinction, or the serious injury of the substantial legal situations invoked by the persons under administration due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-tutelage, which ultimately constitutes a heavy burden for persons under administration, must not be inverted and exploited by these to cause anti-juridical harm to the person under administration through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial proceedings, such that it makes no sense that the administration, having the possibility—with knowledge of the claimants' claims—on the one hand to have alleged the defect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the proceeding, or on the other hand, to reverse the act if it deems it so, in exercise of the principle of self-tutelage, did neither, and that, given its inertia and that of the processing judge, the interest of the administration should be placed above that of the person under administration, when the proceeding has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The person under administration has no reason to suffer the inertia of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially taking into account that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the person under administration, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.\n\nVI.- COROLLARY.\nIn summary, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Constitución Política, are not contrary to the Constitución Política, insofar as what they do is regulate the form and procedural moment in which the exhaustion referred to in the constitutional provisions can be asserted. Justices Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4°, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, and Justice Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo unconstitutional.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe consultation is summarily rejected with regard to Article 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política. The consultation filed is answered in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Constitución Política, are not contrary to the Constitución Política. Justices Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Justice Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo unconstitutional.\n\n

\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\nPresidente a.i.\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. \nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C. \nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L. \nJosé Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDISSENTING REASONS OF JUDGES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ\n\nJudges Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo. Certainly, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally provided the following:\n\n\"If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect shall be deemed corrected\"\n\nBy virtue of what was resolved by this Constitutional Chamber in Voto No. 3669-06 and numeral 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is facultative or optional, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the justiciable citizen who sustains a controversy with a public administration. Consequently, ordinal 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo has, precisely, meaning, only for the exceptional cases in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory (preceptivo). That numeral has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses in which exhaustion is facultative or optional. The purpose of introducing a precept of such nature in the adjective legislation is due to clear reasons of constitutionality, which are the following:\n\na. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a right of public administrations, but a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality.\nb. By application of the constitutional principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and legal security (certeza jurídica), public administrations may well—when exhaustion of administrative remedies is exceptionally mandatory—allege such privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the \"Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, when applicable.\" Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to allege such defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own neglect and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the \"Case Management Judge\" (Juez tramitador) charged with purging the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), and during that stage, all defects of the process must be noticed and, even, the preliminary defense of Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo must be resolved, so that the interested party can correct any defect on the matter (Article 92 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). In short, by application of the constitutional principles of legal certainty and legal security, there is a specific procedural moment to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in cases where it is mandatory; otherwise, the figure of preclusion operates, which has full support in the aforementioned constitutional principles.\nc. The right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) or swift and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) assists the justiciable citizen, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the Case Management Judge did not notice such defect, must not bear the consequences of the omitted conduct of both the sued public entity and the Case Management Judge.\nd. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an instrument to prevent hearing the merits of the matter is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of substantive justice (justicia material) that assist the justiciable who petitions for it before the judicial courts, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and seeking a definitive solution to the controversy, that is, the constitutional rule of \"in dubio pro accione,\" implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the reasons stated, we consider that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo is in accordance with the constitutionality parameter.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. \nJosé Paulino Hernández G.\n\nDISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA\n\nThe undersigned Judge Rueda Leal partially separates from the majority decision because I consider that the consultation must be resolved in the sense that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the appreciation made in the majority vote, in the sense of flatly rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, section 1, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política, since the assumption of incidentality that requires the challenged norm to be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation indeed does not occur. As reported by the consulting Court, the process that serves as the basis for the consultation is of municipal matter, and given that the cited ordinal 31, section l), partially refers to matters of administrative contracting, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to hear about the constitutionality of that norm would not be met. However, regarding the doubt of constitutionality raised by the consulting body related to Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, I do consider that a substantive ruling must be issued in the following sense:\n\nFirst, I consider that the constitutional text clearly establishes in its numeral 173 that, in municipal matters, administrative remedies must be exhausted before the \"Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively.\" That is, prior to filing any process or jurisdictional action, the challenged administrative act must pass a last filter before the improper two-phase hierarch body in municipal matters indicated by ordinal 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust administrative remedies through that instance. Under that understanding, the consultants are right in the sense that the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; therefore, I consider that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo does directly attack the Constitution, since based on this norm, the defect of not having previously exhausted administrative remedies in municipal matters is allowed to be deemed corrected, despite the express mandate provided in the Constitution in the sense that this type of exhaustion is obligatory and mandatory. As was said in judgment number [...] by this Chamber: \"It must be warned that the only improper two-phase hierarchy that the original constituent admitted, to the point of regulating it expressly in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its exceptionally exceptional character—is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Constitución Política, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils will be in charge of the '(…) Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)'—Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo—\". Ergo, due to the special character that the Constitution itself provides regarding this type of exhaustion of remedies in municipal matters, I consider that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the body or administrative instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the citizen, because said task is entrusted to an improper hierarch, different from the instance where the challenged administrative act was issued; hence, the original constituent deemed it appropriate to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent from the one that issued the act.\n\nThird, this very Chamber, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 3:00 p.m. on March 15, 2006, established the following:\n\n\"VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the citizen. In such circumstances, numerals 173 regarding municipal agreements are found, since paragraph 2 of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background files will pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law to resolve definitively, and 184 in that it reserves to the Contraloría General de la República the improper hierarchy of administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, as there is a constitutional norm that provides coverage to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered that this obligatory requirement of admissibility for a contentious-administrative process is unconstitutional\"\n\nThus, to disregard a pronouncement as clear as that one would result in a situation generating legal uncertainty (inseguridad jurídica), by ignoring the mandatory character that the precedents of this Court have already indicated on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters.\n\nFourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in municipal matters, logically demands that its lack of compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order in which phase of the judicial process that lack of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, as that exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any time that any of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party, having the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust remedies (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage should be considered precluded, since as explained supra, the constitutional text provides that this exhaustion is mandatory, so it could not preclude, even if the legislator provides for it, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Such being the case, I consider that —specifically— Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo does directly attack the Carta Fundamental, by deeming corrected a defect that the Constitution itself demands as mandatory, that is, that it is obligatory to fulfill. Regarding the consulted Article 31, section 1, I find no clash of constitutionality, as it precisely indicates that \"The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be facultative, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política\"; contrario sensu, the exhaustion of administrative remedies for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been maintained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.\n\nErgo, the problem of constitutionality arises from what is stipulated in Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and, for this reason, I consider that the consultation should have been resolved in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.\n\nPaul Rueda Leal\nJudge" }