{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-590727",
  "citation": "Res. 16628-2012 Sala Constitucional",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
  "title_es": "Constitucionalidad de la apertura a competencia del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo en el TLC CAFTA-DR",
  "title_en": "Constitutionality of Opening the Workers' Compensation Insurance Market under CAFTA-DR",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoció una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la Sección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del CAFTA-DR y el Transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, que abren a la competencia el mercado de seguros obligatorios de riesgos del trabajo a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. El accionante, un diputado, alegó violación de los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política, así como de tratados internacionales de derechos humanos, argumentando que la apertura con fines de lucro desnaturaliza el seguro social, vulnera los principios de universalidad, solidaridad, progresividad e irrenunciabilidad, y perjudica a los trabajadores. La Sala admitió la acción por tratarse de la defensa de intereses difusos de un grupo indeterminado de trabajadores. En su análisis, destacó que la seguridad social es un pilar fundamental del Estado Social de Derecho costarricense y que el artículo 73 constitucional establece un régimen diferenciado para los seguros contra riesgos profesionales, los cuales se rigen por disposiciones especiales y otorgan mayor libertad de configuración al legislador. El Tribunal determinó que la apertura del mercado no viola la Constitución ni los instrumentos internacionales, ya que no existe un mandato constitucional de monopolio estatal para estos seguros; el Estado puede optar por prestarlos en un régimen de competencia, manteniendo la tutela y regulación necesarias para garantizar los derechos de los trabajadores. La Sala subrayó que la conveniencia de la medida es una cuestión de oportunidad política que no le corresponde evaluar, y concluyó que las normas impugnadas son conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución, siempre que se interpreten en armonía con los principios de universalidad, suficiencia de la protección e irrenunciabilidad. Se declaró sin lugar la acción y se ordenó la interpretación conforme de la normativa.",
  "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber reviewed an unconstitutionality action against subparagraph b) of Article III.2 of Section H of Annex 12.9.2 of CAFTA-DR and Transitory III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, which open the mandatory workers' compensation insurance market to competition as of January 1, 2011. The plaintiff, a legislator, alleged violation of Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution and international human rights treaties, arguing that the for-profit opening distorts the social insurance nature, undermines the principles of universality, solidarity, progressivity, and non-waivability, and harms workers. The Chamber admitted the action as it defends diffuse interests of an indeterminate group of workers. In its analysis, it emphasized that social security is a fundamental pillar of Costa Rica's Social Rule of Law and that Article 73 of the Constitution establishes a differentiated regime for occupational risk insurance, which is governed by special provisions and grants broader legislative leeway. The Court held that opening the market does not violate the Constitution or international instruments, as there is no constitutional mandate for a state monopoly on this insurance; the State may choose to provide it under a competitive regime while maintaining the necessary oversight and regulation to protect workers' rights. The Chamber stressed that the measure's advisability is a political matter beyond its purview and concluded that the challenged norms are consistent with the Constitution, provided they are interpreted in harmony with the principles of universality, sufficiency of protection, and non-waivability. The action was denied, and the norms were ordered to be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional",
  "date": "28/11/2012",
  "year": "2012",
  "topic_ids": [],
  "primary_topic_id": null,
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "Riesgos del Trabajo",
    "seguro social",
    "principio de universalidad",
    "libertad de configuración del legislador",
    "intereses difusos",
    "irrenunciabilidad",
    "principio de progresividad",
    "Protocolo de San Salvador",
    "Convenio 102 OIT",
    "SUGESE"
  ],
  "article_citations": [
    {
      "law": "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, incluye reforma integral a la Ley N°",
      "article": "3",
      "doc_id": "norm-63749",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 8653",
      "article": "3",
      "doc_id": "norm-63749",
      "source": "metadata"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo",
    "CAFTA-DR",
    "TLC",
    "artículo 73 Constitución Política",
    "seguridad social",
    "monopolio INS",
    "apertura de seguros",
    "principio de universalidad",
    "libertad de configuración del legislador",
    "intereses difusos",
    "acción de inconstitucionalidad",
    "progresividad",
    "Protocolo de San Salvador",
    "Convenio 102 OIT"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "workers' compensation insurance",
    "CAFTA-DR",
    "free trade agreement",
    "Article 73 Political Constitution",
    "social security",
    "INS monopoly",
    "insurance liberalization",
    "principle of universality",
    "legislator's freedom of configuration",
    "diffuse interests",
    "unconstitutionality action",
    "progressivity",
    "Protocol of San Salvador",
    "ILO Convention 102"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Se acusa que estas normas infringen los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política, los artículos 7 y 48 constitucionales en relación con el artículo 9.2 del Protocolo de San Salvador y los numerales 2, 31 y Parte VI del Convenio No. 102 de la Convención de la OIT.\n\nA.- La seguridad social como un pilar fundamental de la sociedad y del Estado costarricense.- Cuestiones preliminares. Merece destacar desde el principio de esta sentencia, es que nadie niega la importancia que tiene la seguridad social en nuestro país y en el mundo. (...) En este sentido, se cumple lo anterior por la vocación y conciencia que tienen los actores políticos y sociales, en la prevención y tratamiento de las enfermedades, y asegurando espacios para la prestación médica y servicios médicos de alta valía cuando una persona saludable se precipita en una situación vulnerable por enfermedad.\n\n(...)\n\nC.- La libertad de configuración del legislador en los seguros de riesgos de trabajo. Ahora bien, el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política establece: \"Los seguros contra riesgos profesionales serán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales\". El constituyente originario, en el tema de los riesgos profesionales, dotó al legislador de mayor flexibilidad, pese a que este efectivamente considerado dentro de los seguros sociales, lo que se denota con el rompimiento del esquema financiero y regulatorio de los demás seguros sociales. (...) El punto al que esta Sala quiere arribar es el siguiente: el constituyente originario estableció un sistema para regular constitucionalmente los riesgos de trabajo para que puedan ser objeto de diversos diseños o estructuras jurídicas y prestacionales, basado en la libertad de configuración del legislador. (...) Precisamente, ello permitió, por una decisión legislativa, optar para que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros ejerciera esta actividad en régimen de monopolio, lo que implicó un rumbo diferente para los seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo a aquellas regulaciones de la Caja, y sin embargo, ello no lo hacía ni lo haría inconstitucional, como tampoco, una mayor apertura en la escogencia del Patrono, frente a una oferta mayor de operadores de los seguros de riesgos profesionales.\n\nSe desprende de lo anterior otras consecuencias importantes, en las que se pasa de una Institución en la cual operaba bajo un sistema de explotación de seguros monopolizado, consecuentemente un mercado fuertemente intervenido, y luego se optó por uno distinto de apertura, con una autoridad reguladora imparcial, con poderes adecuados, con protección legal y recursos financieros para ejercer sus funciones y poderes. Se previó así un órgano regulador que debe velar e impedir el perjuicio para el trabajador. (...) De tal manera, puede liberar ciertas actividades para que operen bajo la modalidad del mercado. Si una decisión de gobierno negociada por las partes en un Tratado, aprobada mediante mecanismos de participación ciudadana (referéndum), y agotado el procedimiento de ratificación, coloca a otro órgano del Estado para regular imparcialmente y sobre una base no discriminatoria la actividad comercial de los seguros, ello forma parte de una de las tantas opciones jurídicas que se tiene para legislar.",
  "excerpt_en": "It is alleged that these norms violate Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador, and Articles 2, 31, and Part VI of ILO Convention No. 102.\n\nA.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and State. — Preliminary questions. It should be emphasized from the outset that no one denies the importance of social security in our country and the world. (...) This is achieved through the commitment and awareness of political and social actors to the prevention and treatment of illnesses, ensuring spaces for medical care and high-value medical services when a healthy person falls into a vulnerable situation due to illness.\n\n(...)\n\nC.- The legislator's freedom of configuration in workers' compensation insurance. Now, paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution states: \"Insurance against occupational risks shall be exclusively at the expense of employers and shall be governed by special provisions.\" The original framers, on the subject of occupational risks, granted the legislator greater flexibility, even though this is effectively considered within social insurance, which is noted by the break from the financial and regulatory scheme of other social insurances. (...) The point this Chamber wishes to reach is the following: the original framers established a system to constitutionally regulate workers' risks so that they may be subject to diverse legal and benefit structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. (...) Precisely, this allowed, through a legislative decision, for the National Insurance Institute to carry out this activity under a monopoly regime, which implied a different path for mandatory workers' compensation insurance from those regulations of the Caja, and yet, this did not and would not make it unconstitutional, just as a greater openness in the employer's choice vis-à-vis a larger offer of occupational risk insurance operators would not be unconstitutional.\n\nThe foregoing yields other important consequences, moving from an institution that operated under a monopolized insurance exploitation system, hence a heavily intervened market, to a different one of openness, with an impartial regulatory authority with adequate powers, legal protection, and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. A regulatory body was thus envisioned to oversee and prevent harm to the worker. (...) In this way, certain activities may be liberalized to operate under a market modality. If a government decision negotiated by the parties in a Treaty, approved through mechanisms of citizen participation (referendum), and after exhausting the ratification procedure, places another State body to impartially regulate the commercial activity of insurance on a non-discriminatory basis, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Chamber denied the unconstitutionality action and ordered that the challenged norms be interpreted in harmony with the Political Constitution, without affecting the principles of universality, sufficiency, and non-waivability of workers' compensation insurance.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala declaró sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad y ordenó que las normas impugnadas se interpreten en armonía con la Constitución Política, sin afectar los principios de universalidad, suficiencia e irrenunciabilidad del seguro de riesgos del trabajo."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Artículo 73, párrafo 4, Constitución Política",
      "quote_en": "Insurance against occupational risks shall be exclusively at the expense of employers and shall be governed by special provisions.",
      "quote_es": "Los seguros contra riesgos profesionales serán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V.C",
      "quote_en": "The original framers established a system to constitutionally regulate workers' risks so that they may be subject to diverse legal and benefit structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration.",
      "quote_es": "El constituyente originario estableció un sistema para regular constitucionalmente los riesgos de trabajo para que puedan ser objeto de diversos diseños o estructuras jurídicas y prestacionales, basado en la libertad de configuración del legislador."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V.E",
      "quote_en": "The alleged economic impact of the State guarantee is not strictly a constitutional matter; it is exclusively the legislator's purview to establish the economic measures necessary to offset any presumed negative impact.",
      "quote_es": "No es un problema estrictamente de naturaleza constitucional el supuesto impacto económico de aquella garantía del Estado, sino que es de resorte exclusivo del legislador establecer las medidas económicas necesarias para compensar un presunto impacto negativo."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1272835",
      "citation": "Res. 28000-2024 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Constitutionality of solidarity contribution on Judicial Branch pensions",
      "title_es": "Constitucionalidad de la contribución solidaria sobre las pensiones del Poder Judicial",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "26/09/2024",
      "year": "2024"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-63749",
      "citation": "Ley 8653",
      "title_en": "Insurance Market Regulatory Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, incluye reforma integral a la Ley N°",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "22/07/2008",
      "year": "2008"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "pgr-20123",
      "citation": "C-145-2017",
      "title_en": "Workers' compensation policy for completed works without a permit",
      "title_es": "Póliza de riesgos del trabajo en obras terminadas sin permiso",
      "doc_type": "dictamen",
      "date": "23/06/2017",
      "year": "2017"
    }
  ],
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        "label": "Ley 8653  Transitorio III"
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  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-590727",
  "tier": 2,
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  "body_es_text": "*100177120007CO*\n\r\r\n\nExp: 10-017712-0007-CO \n\r\r\n\nRes. Nº 2012016628\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE \r\r\nJUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y treinta minutos del \r\r\nveintiocho de noviembre del dos mil doce.\n\r\r\n\n \r\r\nAcción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre 001]\r\r\n, mayor, \r\r\ncostarricense, en unión libre, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad \r\r\nnúmero [Valor 001], vecino de Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, en su calidad de \r\r\ndiputado de la Asamblea \r\r\nLegislativa para el período constitucional 2010-2014, contra el subinciso b) \r\r\ndel artículo III.2 de la sección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 \r\r\n“Servicios Financieros” del Tratado de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos, \r\r\nCentroamérica y República Dominicana, aprobado por ley número 8622 de \r\r\n21 de noviembre de 2007, así como el Transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora \r\r\ndel Mercado de Seguros, ley número 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008. \n\r\r\n\nResultando:\n\r\r\n\n 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las trece horas \r\r\nveinticinco minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de 2010, el accionante solicita \r\r\nque se declare la inconstitucionalidad del subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la \r\r\nsección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros” del \r\r\nTratado de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República \r\r\nDominicana, aprobado por ley número 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, \r\r\nasí como el Transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, \r\r\nley número 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008. Alega que tales disposiciones \r\r\nlesionan los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política que tutelan los \r\r\nseguros sociales y del principio de progresividad de los derechos \r\r\nfundamentales, consagrado en los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos \r\r\nHumanos, al tenor de los numerales 7 y 48 de la Carta Fundamental, por la \r\r\ninclusión del seguro solidario de riesgos de trabajo en obligaciones de \r\r\napertura comercial que implican la explotación mercantil y fines de lucro \r\r\nincompatibles con la naturaleza constitucional de ese seguro social. Asegura \r\r\nque la finalidad con tales disposiciones legales es convertir el seguro de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo en un servicio comercial que sería explotado por \r\r\nempresas diversas al INS, con una clara intención lucrativa, aspecto que, a \r\r\nsu parecer, infringe los principios constitucionales que protegen los seguros, \r\r\nen detrimento de las trabajadoras y trabajadores y de sus familias, al existir \r\r\nun riesgo contra el sistema de seguridad social. En su fundamento sobre la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de las normas que impugna, señala: “ (…) también \r\r\ndebilita y pone en peligro la plena aplicación del principio de \r\r\nuniversalidad del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social, al permitir \r\r\n(sic) operadores privados exploten mercantilmente el seguro de riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo, sin imponerles obligación alguna de atender por igual a \r\r\ntrabajadores y trabajadoras de todas las actividades laborales ni \r\r\nprohibición de seleccionar las actividades de bajo riesgo y alta \r\r\nrentabilidad. Todo esto atenta contra la efectiva realización del precepto \r\r\ncontenido en el artículo 201 del Código de Trabajo, lesionando por ende \r\r\npreceptos constitucionales establecidos en los artículos 73 y 74 de la \r\r\nCarta Magna, en relación con el artículo 9.2 del Protocolo de San \r\r\nSalvador”. (Lo destacado pertenece al texto de origen). Además afirma, que \r\r\nlas normas cuestionadas en la presente acción debilitan la tutela existente \r\r\npara las personas trabajadoras no aseguradas, al prevalecer, según su \r\r\nopinión, la competencia efectiva, en pro del régimen comercial y contra la \r\r\nprotección integral del sector laboral. En ese orden de ideas, considera el \r\r\nquebranto del principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales, \r\r\nporque el citado Tratado modifica la regulación normativa vigente del seguro \r\r\nde riesgos del trabajo de manera que reduce los beneficios actuales de las \r\r\npersonas trabajadoras, reforma que disminuye y desmejora las ventajas \r\r\nactuales obtenidas por las personas beneficiarias. Sintetiza que el seguro de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo constituye un derecho fundamental de carácter \r\r\nprestacional, donde el Estado tiene la obligación de cumplimiento \r\r\nprogresivo, aspecto que, en su criterio, debe circunscribirse “al respeto, \r\r\nprotección, garantía y promoción” de tales derechos y, a modo de \r\r\nilustración, cita la sentencia constitucional número 2007-1378. Concluye que \r\r\nlos instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, como el \r\r\nProtocolo de San Salvador, deben predominar sobre tratados comerciales \r\r\nen caso de incompatibilidad, sostiene que la circunstancia de que, la norma \r\r\nimpugnada esté incluida en un tratado internacional con rango superior a la \r\r\nley (TLC-EUCARD) no la exonera de su inconstitucionalidad por infracción \r\r\ndel principio de progresividad del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social. \r\r\nPor todo lo expuesto, solicita declarar con lugar la acción interpuesta.\n\r\r\n\n 2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover \r\r\nesta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala la lesión a intereses difusos o \r\r\nintereses de la colectividad en su conjunto, la que, a su vez, se traduce en \r\r\nuna lesión individual para cada uno de las y los habitantes de la República, \r\r\nporque los seguros sociales otorgan una protección básica a todas las \r\r\npersonas habitantes del país.\n\r\r\n\n 3.- Por resolución de las doce horas con doce minutos del siete de \r\r\nfebrero del dos mil once, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia \r\r\na la Procuraduría General de la República. \n\r\r\n\n 4.- La señora Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, en su condición de \r\r\nProcuradora General de la República rindió su informe. Señala que el seguro \r\r\nde riesgos de trabajo tiene algunas características que podrían permitir \r\r\ncatalogarlo como un seguro de responsabilidad civil del patrono, y otras que \r\r\npermitirían ubicarlo como un seguro social. En cuanto a lo primero, se \r\r\nsostiene que constituye un mecanismo para resguardar el patrimonio del \r\r\npatrono ante la eventualidad de un accidente o una enfermedad laboral que \r\r\nsuponga su obligación de indemnizar al trabajador. Por ello corre por cuenta \r\r\nexclusiva del patrono, y no como en los seguros sociales financiados de \r\r\nforma tripartita con la contribución de los trabajadores, patrono y el Estado. \r\r\nSe protege directamente al patrono, indirectamente al trabajador y su familia. \r\r\nAdemás señala que el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo se presume la \r\r\nresponsabilidad del patrono, derivada del ejercicio de su actividad lucrativa, \r\r\nmientras que en los seguros sociales, no es posible presumir la \r\r\nresponsabilidad específica de alguno de los agentes que intervienen. Para \r\r\nquienes se trata de un seguro social sostienen que está revestido de un \r\r\nevidente interés público, para proteger al trabajador (como miembro de la \r\r\nsociedad y sujeto activo en la producción económica) contra los infortunios \r\r\nderivados del ejercicio de su trabajo. Si no fuera así, dicen, no tendría \r\r\nexplicación alguna que en la mayoría de los países en que se ha establecido \r\r\nse implementen mecanismos para proteger a los trabajadores no asegurados. \r\r\nAl estar regulado por el constituyente en el artículo 73 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica, evidencia que no se trata de un simple seguro de responsabilidad \r\r\ncivil, sino de un seguro social, que aun cuando pueda regirse por \r\r\ndisposiciones especiales (valga decir, distintas a las de los otros seguros) no \r\r\npor ello deja de tener el carácter de seguro social. Las regulaciones básicas \r\r\nestán en el Código de Trabajo, concebida para regular un sistema \r\r\nmonopólico de seguros bajo el INS. Evidentemente, al entrar en vigencia el \r\r\nTratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y \r\r\nRepública Dominicana, y al cumplirse los plazos para la apertura del \r\r\nmercado de seguros, debe entenderse que ese monopolio quedó tácitamente \r\r\nderogado; sin embargo, existe una serie de normas no vinculadas \r\r\ndirectamente con la apertura del mercado, sino con las características del \r\r\nseguro, que aún se encuentran vigentes. El artículo 193 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo establece el principio de obligatoriedad del seguro, característica \r\r\nque refuerza su naturaleza de seguro social; el numeral 205 del mismo cuerpo \r\r\nnormativo dispone que el INS debe hacer liquidaciones anuales que incluyan \r\r\nla formación de las reservas técnicamente necesarias, los excedentes deben \r\r\npasar a formar parte de una reserva de reparto, donde se destinará 50% a \r\r\nfinanciar los programas que desarrolle el Consejo de Salud Ocupacional y el \r\r\notro 50% a incorporar mejoras al régimen. En él se concreta el principio de \r\r\nservicio al costo, por lo que mientras se mantenga vigente, el seguro contra \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo debe funcionar –al menos en su cobertura básica- sin \r\r\nfines de lucro. De igual manera señalan los numerales 221 y 231 la obligación \r\r\ndel INS de otorgar todas las prestaciones al trabajador no asegurado como \r\r\nsi le hubiesen correspondido haber estado asegurado, subrogándose el \r\r\nderecho de accionar contra el patrono por los gastos en que hubiese \r\r\nincurrido. El seguro establece la posibilidad de acudir a los tribunales para \r\r\ncobrar al patrono las sumas erogadas, más sus intereses. En esas \r\r\ndisposiciones se fundamenta el principio de universalidad. A nivel \r\r\nreglamentario, el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo se rige por el \r\r\n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros \r\r\nObligatorios”, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del \r\r\nSistema Financiero (CONASSIF), mediante el artículo 8, numeral 1, de la \r\r\nsesión 894-2010, del 10 de diciembre de 2010 (publicado en La Gaceta No. \r\r\n248 del 22 de diciembre de 2010). Define los requisitos mínimos de \r\r\nfuncionamiento de los seguros sociales (artículo 1°), y es aplicable a las \r\r\nentidades aseguradoras en las categorías de seguros generales, seguros \r\r\npersonales o mixtas (artículo 2). Se emitió con base en los artículos 25, 26, \r\r\n27 y el transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. En este \r\r\nsentido, la Superintendencia de Seguros otorgará autorización administrativa \r\r\npara el ejercicio de la actividad aseguradora en el ámbito del seguro contra \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo “… siempre y cuando cumplan los términos, las \r\r\ncondiciones y las especificaciones que se establecerán en el reglamento que \r\r\npara tal efecto dicte el Consejo Nacional, de acuerdo con la legislación \r\r\nnacional”. El Reglamento, en el artículo 8, prevé la posibilidad de ofrecer el \r\r\nseguro obligatorio con cualquier otro seguro voluntario (sin sujeción al \r\r\nservicio al costo), permitiendo mejor cobertura en caso de que el trabajador \r\r\ndemande al patrono por hecho u omisión de éste último que hayan motivado \r\r\nel accidente laboral. El artículo 15 del Reglamento dispone que la póliza \r\r\ndebe cubrir las prestaciones establecidas en el artículo 218 del Código de \r\r\nTrabajo y que los pagos de prestaciones económicas se regirán por el \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo y por el Reglamento General de Riesgos de Trabajo \r\r\nemitido por el Poder Ejecutivo. El artículo 20 contiene una disposición \r\r\ndonde el trabajor que no estuviese asegurado, el INS debe otorgarle las \r\r\nprestaciones, salvo aquellos casos en que el patrono tuviese vigente una \r\r\npóliza con cualquier otra entidad aseguradora y omitiera reportar al \r\r\ntrabajador, supuesto en el cual las prestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad \r\r\naseguradora que recibió la prima. La Procuraduría no estima que la apertura \r\r\ndel mercado de seguros sea en sí misma contraria a la Constitución. Señala a \r\r\nArgentina como un ejemplo donde operan organizaciones de esta naturaleza, \r\r\npero además expresa que la participación de empresas privadas dentro del \r\r\nsistema de seguridad social no es novedosa. Puntualiza a la Ley de \r\r\nProtección al Trabajador, el sistema de seguridad social en materia de \r\r\npensiones quedó conformado por cuatro pilares. Dentro de ese esquema \r\r\nexiste participación privada, bajo un régimen de competencia, con ánimo de \r\r\nlucro, sin que ello haya sido estimado, por sí mismo, como contrario a la \r\r\nConstitución Política. Las normas establecen que debe funcionar al costo, \r\r\nsin embargo, a juicio de la Procuraduría, la participación de empresas \r\r\nprivadas, con ánimo de lucro, en la comercialización del seguro contra \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo, no es contraria a la Constitución, siempre que se emita la \r\r\nnormativa de rango legal que tutele, como mínimo, los beneficios que se le \r\r\nhan otorgado hasta el momento a los trabajadores. No existe norma alguna, \r\r\nde rango constitucional, que establezca que el seguro contra riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo deba funcionar al costo, o sin fines de lucro. El propio artículo 73 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política remite a disposiciones especiales, lo que evidencia \r\r\nque existe cierta flexibilidad para definir el funcionamiento de ese seguro, \r\r\nsiempre que no implique una desmejora de los derechos de los trabajadores. \r\r\nEn el criterio del órgano asesor, el INS debe atender a los trabajadores no \r\r\nasegurados, lo que podría poner en peligro su competitividad, aun cuando el \r\r\n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguro \r\r\nObligatorios”, considera insuficiente para equilibrar las obligaciones de las \r\r\ndiferentes aseguradoras con respecto al INS y, en definitiva, para asegurar el \r\r\ncumplimiento del principio de universalidad. La inconstitucionalidad no está \r\r\nen las normas, sino en la ausencia de disposiciones legales que regule la \r\r\nmateria. El reglamento no puede variar el Código de Trabajo respecto de no \r\r\natender a los trabajadores no asegurados, por el principio de jerarquía \r\r\nnormativa; y porque el propio transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del \r\r\nMercado de Seguros establece que ese reglamento debe dictarse “de \r\r\nacuerdo con la legislación Nacional”. De no actuar así, iría en contra no \r\r\nsolamente del principio de universalidad, sino también del de progresividad, \r\r\npues podría ocurrir que la protección con que cuenta en la actualidad toda \r\r\nclase trabajadora del país se vea reducida a solamente una parte de ella. \r\r\nExiste una obligación de rango constitucional, de emitir una legislación social \r\r\nque tutele el principio de universalidad y de progresividad en beneficio de los \r\r\ntrabajadores del país. \n\r\r\n\n 5.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la \r\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 39, \r\r\n40 y 41 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 24, 25 y 28 de febrero de 2011.\n\r\r\n\n6.- Por escritos presentados por Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños y Lucía \r\r\nRamírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y \r\r\nJusticia en Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipalidad de San \r\r\nRamón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (estudiante), Marvin Rodríguez \r\r\nCordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño \r\r\nCastro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP) solicitaron, en sus \r\r\nrespectivas condiciones, a la Sala que les tuviera como coadyuvantes activos \r\r\nen la presente acción. De igual manera cuestionan las normas impugnadas en \r\r\nsus condiciones de trabajadores y ciudadanos beneficiarios y usuarios de los \r\r\nseguros sociales, por considerar que lesionan los principios constitucionales \r\r\nque protegen los seguros sociales, derivados de los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de \r\r\nla Carta Magna, afectando concretamente el seguro solidario de riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo. Indican que las normas impugnadas obligan a Costa Rica a permitir \r\r\nla explotación comercial lucrativa de este seguro social y solidario a partir \r\r\ndel 1 de enero de 2011. A su vez, la nota al pie de página número 21 del \r\r\nTratado (Capítulo 12) reconoce que esta obligación se refiere al seguro \r\r\nsocial de riesgos del trabajo contemplado en el párrafo cuarto del numeral 73 \r\r\nde la Constitución Política. La nota 29 refuerza lo anterior, al aclarar que el \r\r\nAnexo 12.9.2 no se aplicará a los seguros sociales consignados en los \r\r\npárrafos primero, segundo y tercero del artículo 73 de la Carta Magna y \r\r\nadministrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), pero \r\r\nexcluyendo los seguros sociales de riesgos del trabajo, a pesar de que estos \r\r\ntambién tienen rango constitucional y se rigen por los mismos principios. \r\r\nPor último, la nota 22 reafirma la afectación a los principios constitucionales \r\r\nque protegen al seguro social del riesgo del trabajo, ya que dispone que \r\r\nCosta Rica no tendrá que reformar sus regulaciones sobre este seguro \r\r\n(Código de Trabajo), siempre que dichas regulaciones “sean consistentes” \r\r\ncon las obligaciones del Anexo 12.9.2, a sabiendas de que la explotación \r\r\ncomercial con fines de lucro del seguro social y solidario de riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo es incompatible con la naturaleza y los principios en que se basa ese \r\r\nseguro e implica un retroceso en cuanto a los niveles de protección \r\r\nalcanzados por el país (afectación al principio de progresividad). Por otra \r\r\nparte, el Transitorio III de la “Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, \r\r\nincluye Reforma Integral a la Ley No. 12 de 30 de octubre de 1924”, Ley \r\r\nNo. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, publicada en el Alcance No. 30 de La \r\r\nGaceta No. 152 del 7 de agosto de 2008. Reitera la obligación contenida en \r\r\nel Tratado de Libre Comercio y tiene por finalidad implementar dicha \r\r\nobligación, al establecer que la Superintendencia de Pensiones deberá \r\r\notorgar “autorizaciones” para la explotación comercial del seguro social y \r\r\nsolidario de riesgos del trabajo, a partir del 1° de enero de 2011. En este \r\r\nsentido, dicha norma se encuentra afectada por los mismos vicios de \r\r\nconstitucionalidad. Coinciden con el diputado [Nombre 001] en cuanto a \r\r\nlos alcances de la acción, de los artículos 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política \r\r\ny se encuentra cubierto por los principios de \r\r\nsolidaridad, universalidad y servicio al costo. Si se permite su explotación \r\r\ncomercial con fines de lucro, estos principios resultarían seriamente \r\r\nafectados, lesionando los derechos de las personas trabajadoras que sufren \r\r\naccidentes y enfermedades laborales, siendo este la amenaza más grave que \r\r\nhan enfrentado las garantías sociales en los últimos años.\n\r\r\n\n 7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, en su condición de Presidente de la \r\r\nCámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio, presenta escrito \r\r\ncomo coadyuvante pasivo de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, con \r\r\nsuficientes facultades para intervenir en el proceso, señala aspectos generales \r\r\nde la competencia de la Sala, así como de los limitados efectos que tiene el \r\r\nderecho nacional sobre las obligaciones del derecho internacional público. \r\r\nSi el Estado se viera en la obligación de denunciar el Tratado, habría un \r\r\ndesconocimiento de la voluntad del soberano expresada en referéndum el 7 \r\r\nde octubre de 2007, la eliminación de la seguridad jurídica para los \r\r\nconsumidores, importadores, inversionistas y exportadores, y habría que \r\r\npronunciarse en su totalidad. Ahora bien, contrario a lo afirmado por el \r\r\naccionante, la Sala se ha pronunciado sobre la apertura de seguros de \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo en sentencias anteriores como la número 2007-9469. El \r\r\nrepresentante de la Asociación sostiene que el seguro obligatorio contra \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo no califica como, ni es, un seguro social según lo define el \r\r\nartículo 73 de la Constitución Política. En todo caso, destaca que la \r\r\nconveniencia o inconveniencia no es igual a la constitucionalidad o \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de una norma (sentencia 1994-7005), de ahí que \r\r\nconsidera que el accionante hace juicios de valor haciendo hincapié en la \r\r\ninconveniencia de las normas impugnadas. La omisión legislativa o \r\r\nadministrativa para dar eficacia a una norma no conlleva la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma misma, además señala que toda restricción \r\r\na la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos debe interpretarse \r\r\nrestrictivamente, lo que quedó entronizado en la sentencia No. 1992-3550. \r\r\nSeñala que si bien es claro que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo es \r\r\nmencionado en el artículo 73 de la Constitución, es imperativo que esta Sala \r\r\narmonice su existencia con la libertad individual que tienen todos los \r\r\nhabitantes de nuestro país (patronos y trabajadores por igual) de elegir entre \r\r\ndistintas entidades que ofrezcan cobertura con los riesgos del trabajo. \r\r\nConsidera que el seguro no forma parte de los seguros sociales, conforme \r\r\nson éstos definidos por la Constitución Política y, por ende, no se rige por \r\r\nlos mismos principios o disposiciones del párrafo tercero del artículo 73 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política. Argumenta que la apertura de los seguros de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo no violenta en forma alguna las prestaciones y \r\r\nprotecciones que dicho seguro provee a los ciudadanos, y el artículo 74 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política no impide que se modifique la forma de prestación \r\r\ndel seguro de riesgos de trabajo. Si bien acepta que los seguros contra \r\r\nriesgos profesionales se encuentran reconocidos constitucional-mente, son \r\r\nseguros sociales lo que exclusivamente protegen a los trabajadores contra \r\r\nlos riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás \r\r\ncontingencias que la ley determine, conforme administrados y gobernados \r\r\npor la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social mediante un sistema de \r\r\ncontribución tripartita. Para el coadyuvante deben cumplirse con una serie de \r\r\ncaracterísticas de estos seguros sociales que no tiene el seguro de riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo, en temas de cobertura, forma de financiación, al amparo de la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense de Seguro Social y los fondos no podrán ser transferidos ni \r\r\nempleados en finalidades distintas a las que motivaron su creación. Por \r\r\nvoluntad del constituyente se separó y diferenció esos seguros con el seguro \r\r\nde riesgo de trabajo, según quedó regulado por el artículo 1 de la Ley \r\r\nConstitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Si bien podría \r\r\nconsiderarse que forma parte del derecho a la seguridad social que \r\r\ncontribuye en la asistencia solidaria al trabajador, y de que existe un \r\r\nreconocimiento como tal, no implica que dicho seguro esté definido por el \r\r\nartículo 73 ni su párrafo 3° sea aplicable. La sentencia No. 2008-16964 \r\r\nestableció con claridad la delimitación que el seguro de riesgo de trabajo es \r\r\nun régimen que el constituyente estableció por separado y el cual se rige por \r\r\nreglas diferentes. Considera correcto que la Sala en la sentencia llegue a la \r\r\nconsideración que la protección que otorgan los seguros sociales y los \r\r\nseguros de riesgos de trabajo no es excluyente, en cuanto a la percepción de \r\r\nsus respectivos beneficios. Además de que coexisten en nuestro \r\r\nordenamiento dos sistemas, uno de seguridad social a cargo de la Caja, y \r\r\notro de seguro contra los riesgos profesionales a cargo del Instituto Nacional \r\r\nde Seguros, cuyas características y fuentes de financiamiento son distintas. \r\r\nAsí se delimita los seguros a cargo de la Caja y del INS. Cita jurisprudencia \r\r\nde la Sala y opiniones de la Procuraduría General de la República en la que \r\r\nseñalan que los seguros sociales son exclusivamente aquellos que proteger a \r\r\nlos trabajadores contra riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, \r\r\nmuerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine, conforme administrados \r\r\ny gobernados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social mediante un \r\r\nsistema de contribución tripartita. En ese sentido, la tesis del accionante de \r\r\nconsiderar al seguro de riesgo del trabajo como un seguro social regido por \r\r\nlos mismos principios establecidos en el artículo 73 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica es errónea. No cabe la tesis del accionante bajo ningún supuesto, \r\r\ndada la separación del sistema general y porque se rigen por disposiciones \r\r\nespeciales. La determinación de un potencial costo adicional o lucro estaría \r\r\nsujeta a las disposiciones especiales. Muchas de las manifestaciones del \r\r\naccionante son simples aseveraciones y opiniones personales que, al no estar \r\r\nfundamentadas en criterios doctrinales, sentencias relevantes, cambios \r\r\nnormativos, o cualquier otra justificación o fuente relevante, no expresan otra \r\r\ncosa más que el sentir personal del accionante hacia la apertura comercial. El \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo tiene incólumes las reglas sobre la prestación, \r\r\nuniversalidad, obligatoriedad y demás características del seguro de riesgos \r\r\ndel trabajo, incluyendo expresamente que los casos no asegurados seguirán \r\r\nsiendo atendidos por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. No hay \r\r\ndesnaturalización del seguro obligatorio de riesgos del trabajo. El núcleo \r\r\nfundamental del seguro de riesgos del trabajo, en lo que atañe a la protección \r\r\ndel trabajador, no sería variado por la apertura comercial o incluso por un \r\r\npotencial lucro, toda vez que éste no dejaría de ser universal, obligatorio y \r\r\nsolidario. Sigue siendo obligatorio, universal para todos los trabajadores que \r\r\ndeben ser asegurados por sus patronos, sería siendo solidario por cuanto \r\r\nserá pagada siempre por el patrono, los no asegurados serán atendidos por \r\r\nel INS. Por sentencia 1998-6450 la Sala analizó el artículo 236 del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo, para concluir que no es inconstitucional, sino que más bien su \r\r\ndesarrollo cumple con el mandato constitucional de desarrollar legislativa y \r\r\nreglamentariamente la garantía social del derecho al subsidio. El artículo 74 \r\r\nno garantiza la inmutabilidad de las normas, ya que todo desarrollo \r\r\nnormativo cumple con el mandato constitucional de regir el seguro mediante \r\r\ndisposiciones especiales, pero además, no implica renuncia, ni que no se \r\r\npueda ampliar o reducir. En desacuerdo con el accionante, señala que el \r\r\nalcance del derecho a la seguridad social es preeminentemente definido por \r\r\nel legislador. En este sentido, se apoya en la sentencia No. 1998-06450 en \r\r\ncuanto señala a la legitimidad democrática que le corresponde a la Asamblea \r\r\nLegislativa, a la que le compete detallar el contenido del derecho a la \r\r\nseguridad social. Por otra parte, el principio de progresividad, a la luz de la \r\r\njurisprudencia de la Sala, no se ha violentado, pues para ello se debe \r\r\nacreditar que la medida tomada implica una disminución en las prestaciones \r\r\nrecibidas por el ciudadano. El accionante supone por el mero hecho de \r\r\npermitir que otras entidades presenten el servicio de seguros de riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo, que la cobertura y calidad del mismo se verá deteriorada, pero sobre \r\r\nesto no hay evidencia alguna. Por el contrario, la apertura viene a garantizar \r\r\nel derecho de todo habitante a elegir entre varios operadores de seguros, de \r\r\nconformidad con el artículo 46 constitucional. Solicita declarar sin lugar la \r\r\nacción. \n\r\r\n\n 8.- \r\r\nFreddy Sandí Brenes, Secretario General de la Unión de Personal \r\r\ndel Instituto Nacional de Seguros (en adelante UPINS) se apersona como \r\r\ncoadyuvante. Alega en cuanto a la legitimación le viene dada por los fines \r\r\nencomendados a UPINS en sus estatutos, artículo 5, incisos b), d), g) y n), \r\r\nademás de la representación que le corresponde en nombre de los \r\r\ntrabajadores del INS en relación con los riesgos del trabajo. Sobre las \r\r\nconclusiones de la Procuraduría, recalca el hecho que ésta llega a la \r\r\nconclusión de que el seguro social de riesgos del trabajo realmente es un \r\r\nderecho y una garantía social. Aduce que la recomendación planteada por la \r\r\nProcuraduría, donde se propone que al no resultar las normas impugnadas \r\r\ninconstitucionales, debe promulgarse una legislación que garantice los \r\r\nprincipios de universalidad, solidaridad y progresividad. Sostiene que una \r\r\nlegislación de apertura que garantice esos principios llevaría a dos posible \r\r\nescenarios: a) una legislación sin aparente roce constitucional que produce \r\r\nen la práctica una situación real de desprotección hacia cierto sector y de \r\r\ndesventaja para el INS en materia de competencia y b) una legislación como \r\r\nla que propone la Procuraduría, podría ser violatoria de otros principios \r\r\nconstitucionales, relacionados con la libertad de comercio, consagrado en \r\r\nlos artículos 46 y 28 constitucionales, y competencia, llevándonos a la \r\r\ndiscusión filosófica en materia de Derechos Humanos, sobre si la solidaridad \r\r\nes posible imponerla en materia de comercio. Argumenta que las razones por \r\r\nlas cuales la normativa impugnada resulta inconstitucional se encuentra en el \r\r\nmodelo de Estado elegido por el constituyente, por lo que trae a colación si \r\r\nCosta Rica es un Estado Social de Derecho o un Estado Liberal de Derecho. \r\r\nDilucidar lo anterior es esencial si se toma en cuenta que la apertura de un \r\r\nseguro social contra riesgos del trabajo, que se constituye en un verdadero \r\r\nderecho fundamental de los trabajadores, exige un especial juicio de valor \r\r\nacerca de los principios que subyacen en nuestra Constitución. Costa Rica \r\r\nse ha formado hasta hoy como un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, \r\r\nregido entre otros por el principio cristiano de justicia social. Nuestros \r\r\nconstituyentes soñaron con un Estado Social de Derecho y esa es la \r\r\nfilosofía de nuestra Constitución Política y a través de la cual esta acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad será resuelta. La meta principal del Estado Social de \r\r\nDerecho en Costa Rica, es ser un Estado del Bienestar y esta finalidad está \r\r\nplasmada por el constituyente en el primer párrafo del artículo 50 \r\r\nconstitucional. Los constituyentes decidieron equilibrar las relaciones \r\r\nobrero-patronales, marcando en términos generales las siguientes garantías: \r\r\na) permitir que los trabajadores obtuvieran a través de los sindicatos \r\r\nbeneficios económicos, sociales y profesionales (artículo 60 constitucional), \r\r\nb) elevar a rango constitucional el derecho a concertar convenciones \r\r\ncolectivas, y otorgar rango de ley al contenido de esas negociaciones \r\r\n(artículo 62 constitucional), c) garantizar constitucionalmente el derecho de \r\r\nlos trabajadores despedidos sin justa causa a obtener una indemnización, \r\r\ncuando no están cubiertos por un seguro de desocupación. Dentro de este \r\r\nartículo puede interpretarse que se encuentra la cesantía, pero el artículo no \r\r\nestablece límite de tope, ni prohíbe ayuda en caso de despido justificado \r\r\n(artículo 63), d) El Estado se ha comprometido a tomar medidas de \r\r\nprotección contra la desocupación, reconociendo los enormes problemas \r\r\nque el desempleo desencadena en la vida de las personas y de sus familiares \r\r\ny dependientes (artículo 72), e) se establece un sistema de seguros que le \r\r\nasegure a la clase trabajadora el acceso a la salud independientemente del \r\r\nmonto de su salario, y a las mejores posibilidades de restaurarse para \r\r\ncontinuar laborando. Con ello se reconoce la importancia del trabajo como \r\r\nmedio de vida, y las terribles repercusiones que puede tener un accidente \r\r\nlaboral, en el que se pierda esa capacidad momentánea o permanentemente \r\r\n(artículo 73 constitucional), f) el constituyente incluye y de manera concreta \r\r\n“constitucionaliza” los derechos y beneficios, no enunciados anteriormente, \r\r\npero que se deriven del principio cristiano de justicia social y que indique la \r\r\nley (o las convenciones colectivas que tienen rango de ley (artículo 74). \r\r\nSobre la naturaleza jurídica del seguro de riesgos del trabajo y su contenido, \r\r\nalega que el hecho de que su contenido se de a través dé la ley no implica \r\r\nque puede variarse para desmejorarlo simplemente a través de un cambio \r\r\nlegislativo. El artículo 73 indica que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo “se \r\r\nregirá por leyes especiales”. Dentro del estudio de técnica legislativa en \r\r\nmateria de derechos humanos, ésta referencia a la ley para darle contenido a \r\r\nun derecho fundamental, se configura un error del constituyente, que en \r\r\ncierta forma “desconstitucionaliza” lo que pretende “constitucionalizar”. \r\r\nCiertamente, toda norma de rango constitucional tiene un desarrollo legal, lo \r\r\ncual es correcto, en el tanto esa legislación no violente los principios \r\r\nfundamentales o “el núcleo duro” de ese derecho. Del seguro social de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo lo constituyen al menos los siguientes principios: \r\r\nprincipio de universalidad, principio de solidaridad, principio de generalidad, \r\r\nprincipio de suficiencia, el principio de irrenunciabilidad y el servicio al \r\r\ncosto. El seguro social de riesgos del trabajo tiene rango constitucional y se \r\r\nencuentra también reconocido en la convención 102 de la OIT, aprobada en \r\r\nlo que interesa por Costa Rica y en el protocolo de San Salvador. Para la \r\r\nUnión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS), el Tratado de \r\r\nLibre Comercio, conocido como CAFTA, viene a convertirse en un \r\r\ninstrumento que desmantela el sistema de seguridad social costarricense. \r\r\nTanto la Sala Constitucional, la que ha determinado que los instrumentos de \r\r\nDerechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica tienen no solamente un valor \r\r\nsimilar a la Constitución Política, sino que, en la medida en que otorguen \r\r\nmayores derechos o garantías a las personas, prevalecen o predominan \r\r\nsobre la propia Constitución. En vista de la primacía de dichos instrumentos \r\r\nde Derechos Humanos sobre la misma Constitución, integran el Derecho de \r\r\nla Constitución y son parte del control de constitucionalidad del \r\r\nordenamiento jurídico. Con fundamento en dicho Convenio, el Estado de \r\r\nCosta Rica debe garantizar que todos los trabajadores del país estén \r\r\ncubiertos con un seguro contra accidentes del trabajo; situación que, en \r\r\nnuestro criterio, se vería incumplida por la selección de riesgo que podrían \r\r\nhacer las diferentes empresas del mercado asegurador. En cuanto a la \r\r\nincompatibilidad del principio de servicio al costo constitucional, con la \r\r\napertura de este tipo de seguro social dice que ésta se deriva directamente \r\r\ndel artículo 73 constitucional. Este principio es desarrollado a la vez por la \r\r\nlegislación laboral, estableciendo en esa normativa que en esta actividad, no \r\r\nexisten “utilidades” como tal, sino eventuales excedentes que deben ser \r\r\nreinvertidos, en porcentajes iguales a la mejora del mismo régimen, tales \r\r\ncomo financiar los programas para el desarrollo del Consejo de Salud \r\r\nOcupacional. Como indica el mismo accionante, el monto de excedentes \r\r\npara el 2010 ascendió a más de quince mil millones. Esa importante suma se \r\r\ninvierte en beneficio de los mismos trabajadores, pero si se abre a la \r\r\ncompetencia, se perdería para los trabajadores, pues se convertiría en \r\r\nutilidades de carácter privado. Si se regula haciendo una parte de estos \r\r\nexcedentes, utilidades y el resto bajo la obligación de reinvertirlo, sería \r\r\nigualmente inconstitucional por la desmejora en las condiciones y se \r\r\nviolentaría el principio de progresividad. Esta obligación de ofrecer el seguro \r\r\nal costo, consideramos que es incompatible con el principio de libertad de \r\r\nempresa y comercio, consagrado también en la Constitución Política en los \r\r\nartículos 46 y 28 constitucionales, por lo tanto, el seguro social de riesgos \r\r\ndel trabajo no puede jurídicamente abrirse a la libre competencia. Sobre la \r\r\nselección del riesgo, y la violación de los principios de universalidad y \r\r\nprogresividad constitucionales, afirma que ciertamente la cobertura solidaria \r\r\nde todas las categorías de trabajadores es posible porque el seguro se \r\r\nadministra bajo criterios sociales, y no mercantiles. Los ingresos por \r\r\nactividades más rentables coadyuvan en el financiamiento de las que son \r\r\nmenos rentables. Es de esperar que en una apertura del mercado del seguro \r\r\nde riesgos del trabajo las empresas privadas compitan por obtener las primas \r\r\nen las actividades más lucrativas y que presenten menos siniestralidad. Ello \r\r\ndejaría los riesgos menos atractivos, y con más accidentes estadísticamente \r\r\ncomprobados, de nuevo en manos del probablemente único oferente para \r\r\nese riesgo. Precisamente, la imposibilidad de “selección de riesgo”, funciona \r\r\ncomo el concepto fundamental que impide que un seguro social, que es \r\r\nsolidario, obligatorio y forzoso para los patronos, pueda operar como un \r\r\nseguro comercial en un mercado en competencia. El concepto de selección \r\r\nde riesgo en seguro, se opone radicalmente a la concepción de un seguro \r\r\nsocial como el de riesgos del trabajo, que tiene como fundamento el \r\r\naseguramiento de todo tipo de riesgos, sin diferenciar exposición o \r\r\npeligrosidad. Esto confirma la posición aquí sostenida en tanto lo aprobado \r\r\npor el Tratado de Libre Comercio es totalmente incompatible con los \r\r\nartículos 73 y 74 de nuestra Constitución Política y con el convenio 102 de \r\r\nla Organización Internacional del Trabajo. De conformidad con el artículo 74 \r\r\nconstitucional las garantías sociales son irrenunciables, siendo que el \r\r\nlegislador estableció la irrenunciabilidad de las garantías sociales, dicha \r\r\ncondición opera de suerte tal que: el trabajador no puede renunciar a ellas. \r\r\nTampoco puede el Estado permitir que en su legislación no se encuentra \r\r\ndisponibles estas garantías.\n\r\r\n\n9.- El señor Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, en su condición de ministro \r\r\na.í. de Comercio Exterior solicita se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo de la \r\r\nacción, con fundamento en la Ley de creación del ministerio, en cuanto le \r\r\ndota de la competencia para negociar y suscribir tratados y convenios \r\r\ninternacionales en materia de comercio e inversión, de igual manera por la \r\r\ndinámica institucional con los socios comerciales del Tratado de Libre \r\r\nComercio Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana. En \r\r\ncuanto a la legitimación del accionante se alega que la lesión trasciende una \r\r\nlesión individual a cualquier persona, es decir para la comunidad nacional en \r\r\nsu totalidad, por lo que se pretende ejercer una acción popular, que ha sido \r\r\nnegada por la Sala. Presupone su legitimación en la existencia de una acción \r\r\npopular, pues la acción se interpone en beneficio de todos los habitantes de \r\r\nla Nación ante una supuesta lesión de efectos generalizados, con lo cual se \r\r\nconfunde el concepto de interés difuso o colectividad con el de comunidad \r\r\nnacional. Además acusa que la acción tiene apreciaciones subjetivas y \r\r\nconjeturas personales con el propósito de apoyar y sustentar su tesis, \r\r\nconfunde los regímenes de la seguridad social costarricense extrapolando \r\r\nprincipios constitucionales y legales aplicables de un régimen de seguros a \r\r\notro, con lo que entremezcla convenientemente la naturaleza de cada uno con \r\r\nlas condiciones particulares de cada tipo de seguro. Se fuerza la \r\r\ninterpretación de normas para una confrontación e incongruencia del \r\r\nordenamiento nacional con el internacional a contrapelo del principio de \r\r\nplenitud hermenéutica y la seguridad jurídica, desconociendo los \r\r\ncompromisos internacionales en materia comercial y los principios generales \r\r\ndel derecho internacional. Los principios generales del derecho internacional \r\r\njunto con los tratados, convenciones y acuerdos internacionales, la \r\r\ncostumbre internacional, la jurisprudencia de los órganos y organizaciones \r\r\ninternacionales y la doctrina, se constituyen como fuentes válidas de derecho \r\r\nen el ordenamiento internacional. Los principios en mención, a parte de ser \r\r\npropios del derecho internacional, se constituyen como presupuestos \r\r\nbásicos de las normas que componen el ordenamiento jurídico internacional. \r\r\nPara la importancia de la acción debe señalarse, primeramente, aquel según el \r\r\ncual los tratados prevalecen sobre las leyes internas en el plano internacional; \r\r\nasí como el que prescribe que un Estado no puede invocar su propia \r\r\nlegislación para dejar de cumplir una obligación internacional. Las relaciones \r\r\nentre las partes de un tratado, las disposiciones de una Ley interna no \r\r\npueden prevalecer sobre la de un tratado (artículo 27 de la Convención de \r\r\nViena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, aprobada por Costa Rica mediante \r\r\nLey No. 7615 de 24 de julio de 1996). En el Derecho Internacional Público, \r\r\ndesde el momento en que un Estado asume obligaciones internacionales de \r\r\ncualquier naturaleza, debe cumplirlas de buena fe (artículo 26 de la \r\r\nmencionada Convención). Asimismo, los tribunales internacionales han \r\r\nsustentado que el Principio de la Primacía del derecho internacional sobre el \r\r\nderecho nacional prescribe que el derecho internacional no puede ser \r\r\nabrogado ni abolido por el derecho interno o estatal. El carácter jurídico de \r\r\nlas normas de derecho internacional es sumamente claro, a saber que la \r\r\nactuación estatal está necesariamente enmarcada en su obligaciones \r\r\ninternacionales, los derechos que la normativa internacional consagra son \r\r\nejecutables tanto a nivel internacional como a nivel estatal y los compromisos \r\r\nasumidos por los Estados frente a la comunidad de naciones son más que \r\r\nsimples declaraciones de principios o buenas intenciones, sino que \r\r\nmodifican el ordenamiento jurídico interno de las naciones. Por otra parte, \r\r\nestá el tema de la recepción y transformación del derecho internacional en el \r\r\nderecho nacional. En principio existen dos posibles mecanismos para que el \r\r\nderecho internacional sea válido conforme el derecho nacional de cada \r\r\nEstado. En el primero de ellos, el Estado requiere de un proceso previo de \r\r\nrecepción o incorporación (adoption) de las reglas consuetudinarias y otro \r\r\nde transformación de las reglas convencionales o emanadas de tratados. De \r\r\nmodo que, tratándose de las reglas universalmente reconocidas del derecho \r\r\ninternacional de estirpe consuetudinaria (costumbres internacionales), un \r\r\nEstado –al ingresar a la comunidad internacional- acepta, en principio, tales \r\r\nreglas o buena parte de ellas. A este proceso, basado en la práctica \r\r\nanglosajona de que el derecho internacional consuetudinario hace parte del \r\r\nderecho nacional (Internacional Law is part of the Law of the Land), se le \r\r\nllama recepción o incorporación. En el segundo mecanismo concerniente a \r\r\nlas reglas convencionales del derecho internacional – sea aquellas que \r\r\nprovienen de una tratado bilateral o multilateral- el proceso suele ser diferente \r\r\nal anterior. Así, para que tales normas puedan entrar a formar parte \r\r\nválidamente del derecho nacional, se requiere su previa transformación \r\r\nmediante el procedimiento previsto en el sistema constitucional de cada \r\r\nEstado. Este procedimiento consiste en que el jefe del Estado suscribe el \r\r\ntratado, el órgano deliberativo lo aprueba y finalmente el mismo jefe de \r\r\nEstado lo ratifica. En Costa Rica, los artículos 7, 48, 121 inciso 4) y 140 \r\r\ninciso 10) de la Constitución Política, regulan tanto los procedimientos \r\r\nrelativos al proceso de transformación de los tratados, convenios o \r\r\nacuerdos internacionales –denominaciones que para efectos del derecho \r\r\ninternacional son equivalentes- como la jerarquía de las normas \r\r\ninternacionales y nacionales en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense. El \r\r\nartículo 7 de la Constitución Política señala que los tratados o convenios \r\r\ninternacionales, como fuente normativa del ordenamiento jurídico \r\r\ncostarricense, ocupan una posición preponderante a la de la Ley común, lo \r\r\ncual conlleva a que ante la norma proveniente de un tratado o convenio \r\r\ninternacional, las normas internas de rango legal ceden su orden de prelación \r\r\ncomo fuentes normativas. En cuanto a la explicación académica de \r\r\nestablecer generaciones de derechos humanos (primera, segunda y tercera) \r\r\nha tenido consecuencias devastadoras, pues cada Nación ha categorizado o \r\r\nsectorizado los derechos según su visión propia, postergando para un futuro \r\r\nindefinido la realización de estos derechos al amparo en un concepto afín a \r\r\nesta teoría, que es el de “progresividad” o “desarrollo progresivo”, \r\r\nparadójicamente recogido en el mismo artículo 26 de la Convención \r\r\nAmericana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José), la que hace \r\r\ndepender esos derechos a los “recursos disponibles”, lo cual no puede \r\r\ninterpretarse de forma libertina porque retrasaría su efectividad, y violentaría \r\r\nlos principios generales del derecho internacional “Pacta Sunt Servanda” y \r\r\n“Bona FIDES”, y las resoluciones de los órganos jurisdiccionales \r\r\ninternacionales mencionados supra. Es importante que deba optarse por una \r\r\ninterpretación unificadora e integradora de todos los derechos, de modo que \r\r\nse asegure el cumplimiento de todos los compromisos adquiridos por el \r\r\nEstado, independientemente del origen y naturaleza de los mismos. En \r\r\ncuanto a la supuesta jerarquía de los tratados y convenios internacionales \r\r\nsobre materias distintas a los que exclusivamente abordan temas de derechos \r\r\nhumanos, no está demás señalar, que estos conforme al orden constitucional \r\r\ninterno, si bien una vez aprobados forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico \r\r\ncon sujeción a las normas constitucionales, no es posible afirmar que los \r\r\ncompromisos adquiridos por el país son de una menor jerarquía frente a \r\r\notros tratados y convenios internacionales o que, incluso, frente a la misma \r\r\nConstitución Política, dichos compromisos sean “letra muerta”, lo que \r\r\nequivaldría a eludir o incumplir obligaciones internacionales legítimamente \r\r\nadquiridas por el país. La Sala, con ocasión de la sentencia 2010-11352, ha \r\r\nreconocido necesario interpretar armónicamente la Carta Magna con la \r\r\ndoctrina de los derechos humanos proveniente de los instrumentos \r\r\ninternacionales. Además ha aceptado el deber de la Nación de modificar la \r\r\nConstitución Política, de forma excepcional en aquellos casos insalvables en \r\r\nlos que esta roce con las normas, principios, derechos y costumbres \r\r\nreconocidos por la comunidad internacional, independientemente incluso, de \r\r\nsi el país los ha incorporado o no al ordenamiento, de modo que esta sea \r\r\nconforme, congruente y concordante con dichas normas, principios, \r\r\nderechos y costumbres internacionales. No es posible aceptar el sinsentido \r\r\nde interpretar una posible prelación ficticia, jerarquización indebida o \r\r\nprogresividad ilícita de las normas, principios y derechos reconocidos por la \r\r\ncomunidad internacional, o bien, con base en dichos criterios, la ocurrencia \r\r\nde una discriminación fundada en otras obligaciones de derecho \r\r\ninternacional y nacional, sujeto al ordenamiento jurídico nacional. No resulta \r\r\naceptable toda tesis o doctrina que proponga o que sugiera que una \r\r\nviolación o trasgresión a un tratado, convenio o acuerdo internacional tenga \r\r\ncomo fundamento otro instrumento internacional, la misma Constitución \r\r\nPolítica o una Ley nacional, no pueda ser considerado una grosera \r\r\ninfracción y evidente falta al Derecho Internacional y al Derecho de la \r\r\nConstitución. Por otra parte, recopila la sentencia No. 2007-09469 de las \r\r\ndiez horas del 3 de julio de 2007, mediante la cual la Sala resolvió la consulta \r\r\nplanteada por varios diputados y el Defensor de los Habitantes, sobre la \r\r\nconstitucionalidad del tratado de Libre Comercio República \r\r\nDominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos (Ley No. 8622 del 21 de \r\r\nnoviembre de 2007). Hace alusión a la referencia sobre la finalidad del \r\r\nTratado, que no entraría a la conveniencia o no de la aprobación, así como \r\r\nlos aspectos económicos que envuelven al Tratado, sino a temas que \r\r\ngeneran dudas de constitucionalidad. La congruencia que guarda con las \r\r\npretensiones de los consultantes y lo resuelto, deja en evidencia la necesidad, \r\r\nen aplicación de las reglas de la hermenéutica jurídica, que la sentencia deba \r\r\nleerse como un todo siguiendo una interpretación jurídica razonable y \r\r\nproporcional al fin perseguido dentro del contexto socio-histórico de la \r\r\nconsulta y de los eventos posteriores de consulta popular (refrendo). De \r\r\nmanera que una lectura ligera que interprete de modo parcial y \r\r\ndescontextualizada de la realidad imperante el texto de marras, valga decir, \r\r\nsin tomar en consideración la naturaleza de los actos y hechos a que se \r\r\nrefiere y el conjunto del ordenamiento jurídico, es insuficiente para un \r\r\nadecuado entendimiento del mismo y de las normas sobre las que este trata, \r\r\nlo cual conllevaría indisolublemente a resultados interpretativos absurdos y \r\r\ncontradictorios. No es de recibo que existan omisiones en lo resuelto por la \r\r\nSala Constitucional. La resolución permitió que el proceso de consulta \r\r\npopular siguiera adelante, culminando con el histórico referéndum del año \r\r\n2007, harto conocido por todos; y la consecuente aprobación de los \r\r\ncompromisos internacionales adquiridos por Costa Rica. Con la aprobación \r\r\nmediante el proceso legislativo, o bien, mediante un referéndum, no sería \r\r\ncontraria a los principios constitucionales, sino una evidente contravención \r\r\na los principios generales del Derecho Internacional “Pacta Sunt Servanda” \r\r\ny “Bona fides”, lo cual expondría al país a posibles sanciones \r\r\ninternacionales. \n\r\r\n\nCosta Rica adquirió el compromiso internacional de modificar el modo en el \r\r\nque el Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, se prestaba en el país, lo anterior, sin \r\r\nalterar, modificar o contravenir los principios constitucionales que lo \r\r\nsustentan, los derechos que garantizan el mismo o la cobertura que brinda \r\r\neste seguro a los trabajadores costarricenses. En la Sección H: Costa Rica \r\r\ndel Anexo 12.9.2 Compromisos Específicos, del Capítulo Doce: Servicios \r\r\nFinancieros del CAFTA-DR, el país –en Materia de Servicios de Seguros- \r\r\nasumió la obligación de abrir a la competencia el mercado de seguros \r\r\nobligatorios –por dichos seguros se refiere al Seguro Obligatorio de \r\r\nVehículos y al Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo- a partir del 01 de \r\r\nenero de 2011. De acuerdo con la Sección Tercera denominada \r\r\n“Compromisos Graduales de Apertura del Mercado”, el inciso 2 transcribe \r\r\nel compromiso, así como la nota 20 del inciso 1, para el seguro contra \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo, y la nota 22 del inciso 1. Finalmente la nota 29 al inciso 2 \r\r\nde cita, con el claro afán de esclarecer cualquier confusión entre los tipos de \r\r\nseguros de la seguridad social del artículo 73 constitucional, aclaró que los \r\r\nseguros sociales contenidos en los párrafos 1°, 2° y 3° del artículo 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, administrados y prestados por la Caja Costarricense \r\r\nde Seguro Social, están excluidos de la aplicación del Anexo 12.9.2 referido \r\r\narriba, en el tanto que el seguro obligatorio de riesgo del trabajo \r\r\ncontemplado en el párrafo final del artículo 73 sí sería objeto de apertura \r\r\ncomercial. Para evitar posibles inconsistencias o inconformidades con la \r\r\nConstitución Política, el tratado enlista las reservas en un Anexo relativo y \r\r\nexclusivo a Medidas Disconformes. No se reservaron en el Anexo II sobre \r\r\nMedidas Disconformes, pues el compromiso de la apertura comercial del \r\r\nmercado de seguros, en general; y de los seguros obligatorios de riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo y de vehículos en particular, no contraviene ningún principio \r\r\nconstitucional o derecho fundamental ni desnaturaliza dichos seguros \r\r\nobligatorios. La apertura y posible prestación por parte de otras entidades \r\r\ndistintas al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, no contraviene su naturaleza de \r\r\nseguro componente de la seguridad social. La nota número 22 no obliga a \r\r\nCosta Rica a modificar las normas que regulan el seguro contra riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo, toda vez que siempre que dichas normas sean consistentes con las \r\r\nobligaciones asumidas en el CAFTA-DR. No es cierto que obliga al país a \r\r\n“…tratar el seguro de riesgos de trabajo como un servicio financiero más, \r\r\nun seguro comercial que pueda explotarse lucrativamente … la \r\r\nimplementación de esta obligación no es compatible con la plena vigencia \r\r\ny aplicación de los principios enunciados en el apartado anterior que \r\r\ndefinen y caracterizan la naturaleza social y solidario del seguro de \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo”. Tampoco es cierto que una inconsistencia la nota 22 \r\r\nobliga a que “ …debe resolverse a favor de la obligación de explotación \r\r\ncomercial impuesta en la norma impugnada, por tratarse de una norma \r\r\ncon rango superior a la ley nacional”, debido a que la comercialización del \r\r\nSeguro de Riesgos de Trabajo en el país en un mercado abierto a la \r\r\ncompetencia no excluye la aplicación y el respeto a los principios \r\r\nconstitucionales y solidarios que lo cobijan, dada su naturaleza especial y \r\r\ncomo seguro que forma parte del régimen de seguridad social costarricense. \r\r\nLas obligaciones internacionales adquiridas no regulan la forma o los medios \r\r\nen que el Estado deberá dar cumplimiento a dicho precepto internacional, \r\r\ntoda vez que en razón de la soberanía de los Estados y principios generales \r\r\ndel derecho internacional, éstos internamente están obligados por dicha \r\r\nnorma a adaptar o realizar las modificaciones necesarias en el ordenamiento \r\r\njurídico interno – sea como parte del proceso de incorporación o \r\r\ntransformación del derecho internacional- para recibir dichas normas \r\r\ninternacionales en el seno del ordenamiento nacional e intrínsecamente dar \r\r\nvigencia plena a los preceptos que dimanan de los tratados, convenios o \r\r\nacuerdos internacionales. El CAFTA-DR establece un compromiso \r\r\nprogramático concreto, a saber: la apertura en competencia del mercado de \r\r\nseguros obligatorios, específicamente el Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos y \r\r\nel Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo, a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. \r\r\nNo obstante, dicha norma internacional no establece la forma en que tal \r\r\nobligación se llevará a cabo. Es aquí donde la emisión de normas legales y \r\r\nreglamentarias, hacen su aparición. La inacción tendría como consecuencia \r\r\nprincipal el incumplimiento de la obligación adquirida, lo cual se configuraría \r\r\ncomo una trasgresión a la seguridad jurídica y a los principios generales del \r\r\nderecho internacional, abriendo la posibilidad de otros Estados Parte \r\r\nrecurran a paneles y arbitrajes internacionales que concluyan con la \r\r\nimposición de sanciones concretas al país. De ahí que las disposiciones \r\r\nlegales contrarias al tratado deben modificarse. Con el propósito de cumplir \r\r\ncon este y otros compromiso de apertura del mercado de seguros, se emitió \r\r\nla Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, Ley No. 8653 del 22 de julio de \r\r\n2008, la cual, de conformidad con su artículo 1 señala sus objetivos, se \r\r\ndesprende que la misma pretende articular efectivamente los compromisos \r\r\nadquiridos por Costa Rica en el CAFTA-DR, al establecer los derechos de \r\r\nlos asegurados o consumidores de servicios de seguros, los requisitos y las \r\r\nreglas mínimas de regulación del mercado y normas básicas requeridas para \r\r\nla operación de un mercado abierto y en competencia de seguros en el país. \r\r\n De ahí que se incluyó el Transitorio III, que reproduce la obligación \r\r\ninternacional del CAFTA-DR de apertura del mercado para seguros \r\r\nobligatorios de riesgos de trabajo y de vehículos, a partir del 1° de enero de \r\r\n2011, de conformidad con la autorización administrativa que la \r\r\nSuperintendencia General de Seguros otorgue con fundamento en el \r\r\nReglamento que al efecto emita el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del \r\r\nSistema Financiero. Se transcribe el mencionado Transitorio para concluir \r\r\nque reitera el plazo contenido en el Tratado, facultando al órgano del Estado \r\r\na que se crea en el artículo 25 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de \r\r\nSeguros, a extender como parte de sus funciones de supervisión y \r\r\ncompetencia técnica, la autorización administrativa con base en el reglamento \r\r\nque establezca los requisitos de funcionamiento de los seguros obligatorios \r\r\nen un mercado abierto y en competencia efectiva, el cual debe emitir el \r\r\nConsejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, órgano de \r\r\ndesconcentración máxima adscrito al Banco Central de Costa Rica, con \r\r\nfundamento en las competencia que las Leyes le otorgan. En este sentido, \r\r\nrepasa las actas de las sesiones de la Comisión Especial que conoció y \r\r\ndictaminó el Proyecto de Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, para \r\r\nconcluir que la naturaleza del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo, es \r\r\nun componente que atañe a la protección de la seguridad social de los \r\r\ntrabajadores, el cual en lo que interesa, según el artículo 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, crea los seguros contra riesgos profesionales que \r\r\nserán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones \r\r\nespeciales. No es un seguro comercial privado en sentido estricto, definido \r\r\ncomo un contrato mercantil, sino que se está en presencia de un seguro cuya \r\r\nregulación se encuentra desde la Constitución, dada su trascendencia dentro \r\r\nde la concepción de la justicia social y el reconocimiento del derecho a una \r\r\nsalud preventiva y curativa. Lo anterior, sin detrimento de que se pueda \r\r\nofrecer en el mercado bajo un esquema de competencia, aspecto que \r\r\nclaramente garantizaría para el consumidor y para el asegurado mayor \r\r\ndiversidad de opciones y mejores condiciones de cobertura y \r\r\naseguramiento. La Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros (conocida por \r\r\nconsulta de constitucionalidad por la Sala en sentencia No. 2008-10450), \r\r\nnorma de orden público e interés público, desarrolla los compromisos \r\r\nderivados del CAFTA-DR, al crear y establecer el marco para la \r\r\nautorización, la regulación, la supervisión y el funcionamiento de la actividad \r\r\naseguradora, reaseguradora, intermediación de seguros y servicios auxiliares. \r\r\nCrea las condiciones para el desarrollo del mercado asegurador y la \r\r\ncompetencia efectiva de las entidades participantes, además de modernizar y \r\r\nfortalecer al Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Que en cumplimiento de la \r\r\nnorma legal y con base en el compromiso internacional se emitió el \r\r\n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros \r\r\nObligatorios, que define los requisitos mínimos de funcionamiento del \r\r\nseguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y Seguro Obligatorio de Automóviles”, \r\r\naplicables a las entidades aseguradoras, en las categorías de seguros \r\r\ngenerales, seguros personales o mixtos. Existe el “Reglamento sobre \r\r\nautorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades \r\r\nsupervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros”. La invocación \r\r\nde inconstitucionalidad para incumplir con la apertura del mercado \r\r\nexpondría al país a un eventual panel de solución de controversias \r\r\nEstado-Estado, que traería consigo posibles sanciones por incumplimiento. \r\r\nSe podría enfrentar sanciones legales (como suspensión de beneficios, \r\r\nartículo 20.16 del CAFTA) y no legales, como el daño a la reputación de \r\r\nCosta Rica en el marco de procesos bilaterales y multilaterales de \r\r\nnegociación de acuerdos comerciales y de inversión. Lo anterior incluso \r\r\npodría darse ante una medida cautelar que suspenda la aplicación del \r\r\n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros \r\r\nObligatorios”. \n\r\r\n\nEl artículo 73 es producto de una manifiesta preocupación del constituyente \r\r\nde brindar y mantener una protección de rango superior a los trabajadores al \r\r\namparo del principio de no discriminación y de justicia social, la seguridad \r\r\nsocial se informa de los principios básicos de universalidad, obligatoriedad y \r\r\nsolidaridad social. Sentencias de la Sala Constitucional reconoce dos \r\r\nsistemas de seguros sociales, no excluyentes entre sí, que tienen como fin \r\r\nprimordial e imperativa proteger al trabajador. Uno contra los riesgos de \r\r\nenfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que \r\r\ndetermine la ley, y la otra contra riesgos profesionales, que corren por cuenta \r\r\nexclusiva y propia del patrono (sentencia 2008-016964). Hay varias \r\r\nconsecuencias de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, en lo primero, \r\r\nel tema del origen y características del régimen costarricense de seguridad \r\r\nsocial, con el reconocimiento del Derecho fundamental a la Seguridad \r\r\nSocial. En segundo lugar, se interpretó que existen unos principios del \r\r\nDerecho a la Seguridad Social ligados al Régimen de los Seguros Sociales \r\r\nde la CCSS, los cuales son los relacionados con la universalidad, \r\r\ngeneralidad, suficiencia de la protección y solidaridad social (sentencia \r\r\n2001-10546). En una tercera consecuencia en la vinculación del derecho a la \r\r\nsalud y la seguridad social, en cuanto se prescribe la administración de los \r\r\nseguros sociales a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (sentencia \r\r\n2007-17971). La cuarta consecuencia que más se destaca de la \r\r\njurisprudencia es la distinción que realiza entre la protección otorgada por \r\r\nlos seguros sociales y por los seguros de riesgos laborales o del trabajo, los \r\r\ncuales son expresiones distintas del derecho fundamental de la seguridad \r\r\nsocial y que se manifiestan en el ordenamiento jurídico en forma distinta a \r\r\ntravés de las diferentes normas que regulan los regímenes del sistema de \r\r\nseguridad social, sin que sean excluyentes entre sí. El sistema de seguros de \r\r\nriesgos laborales, aun cuando tiene algunas similitudes con el régimen de \r\r\nseguridad social administrado por la CCSS, es distinto a los servicios de \r\r\nseguridad social prestados por esa entidad autónoma de rango \r\r\nconstitucional, toda vez que no existe alguna prohibición legal o \r\r\nconstitucional, que impida la comercialización de los Seguros de Riesgos de \r\r\nTrabajo, dado que el régimen es en esencia distinto del de enfermedad, \r\r\ninvalidez, maternidad, vejez y muerte. Por esta razón, la apertura del mercado \r\r\nde seguros de riesgos del trabajo es conforme con el Derecho de la \r\r\nConstitución, toda vez que este seguro obligatorio continúa siendo tratado \r\r\npor el CAFTA-DR, como un seguro distinto de los seguros de la seguridad \r\r\nsocial de la CCSS sin que la naturaleza del mismo sea alterada. En cuanto al \r\r\nRégimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo o Riesgos \r\r\nProfesionales, como régimen de seguridad social persigue indemnizar al \r\r\ntrabajador por aquellos riesgos laborales que provoquen accidentes o \r\r\nenfermedades, con ocasión o a consecuencia del trabajo que desempeñan de \r\r\nmanera subordinada y remunerada. Actualmente, el régimen de riegos del \r\r\ntrabajo, está regulado infraconstitucionalmente en el Título Cuarto: De la \r\r\nProtección de los Trabajadores durante el Ejercicio del Trabajo del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo (artículo 193 a 331), la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros \r\r\ny en el Acuerdo SUGESE 04-10, “Reglamento de Requisitos de \r\r\nFuncionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios” aprobado por el Consejo \r\r\nNacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Si bien es una \r\r\nmanifestación del Derecho a la Seguridad Social, ello no demerita que, \r\r\ndoctrinariamente, como una manifestación de voluntad de las partes, se esté \r\r\nen presencia de un seguro comercial privado especial o sui géneris. Subyace \r\r\nel hecho histórico de que es un contrato mercantil reconocido en la Norma \r\r\nFundamental de la Nación y en los tratados y convenio de derechos \r\r\nhumanos, dada su trascendencia dentro de la concepción de la justicia social \r\r\ny el reconocimiento del derecho a una salud preventiva y curativa. Es un \r\r\nelemento innovador y adicional a la concepción tradicional del derecho de \r\r\nlos contratos mercantiles de seguros. El esquema de competencia no es \r\r\nincompatible con la Constitución, ni los instrumentos internacionales en \r\r\nmateria de derechos humanos prescriben o dan indicios de tal \r\r\ndisconformidad. En el informe se enuncian las similitudes y diferencias entre \r\r\nel Régimen de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás \r\r\ncontingencias administrado por la CCSS y del Régimen del Seguro \r\r\nObligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo o Riesgos Profesionales. También sobre \r\r\nlos principios de obligatoriedad, universalidad, solidaridad social e \r\r\nirrenunciabilidad que informan el Derecho Fundamental de la Seguridad \r\r\nSocial, debido a que ha sido transcrita gran parte de la jurisprudencia \r\r\nconstitucional que los desarrolla, no obstante, los mismos serán analizados \r\r\ndesde la perspectiva de tema del respeto al contenido esencial de ese \r\r\nderecho. \n\r\r\n\nConforme a los alegatos del accionante, el principio de obligatoriedad no se \r\r\nve afectado dado que no se ha adquirido ningún compromiso para variar o \r\r\nafectar este principio, toda vez que se reconoce en el mismo Tratado, como \r\r\nun principio constitucional que se debe respetar y observar. Las \r\r\ndisposiciones atinentes hacen del Seguro un seguro obligatorio. En este \r\r\nsentido sigue vigente el artículo 193 del Código de Trabajo que operativaza \r\r\nel principio, sin embargo no puede ser exclusivo del INS, sino que se \r\r\nasumió el compromiso de abrir a la competencia el mercado de seguros \r\r\nobligatorios a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. De forma que la referencia que \r\r\nhace el artículo al INS se debe entender genéricamente a los operadores \r\r\nautorizados por la SUGESE concordantemente con el “Reglamento sobre \r\r\nautorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades \r\r\nsupervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” emitidos por \r\r\nCONASSIF. La obligatoriedad está en el Código de Trabajo, el Reglamento \r\r\nGeneral de Riesgos del Trabajo (DE No. 13466-TSS) y el mencionado \r\r\nreglamento, así como las circulares y acuerdos de la Superintendencia \r\r\nGeneral de Seguros y la Norma Técnica emitida por cada entidad \r\r\naseguradora. \n\r\r\n\nEl principio de universalidad tampoco es modificado, desnaturalizado o \r\r\nafectado por el CAFTA-DR o por la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de \r\r\nSeguros. El tratado no supone en ninguna parte la existencia de un mercado \r\r\nc ompetitivo en que el Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo dejaría de cubrir a \r\r\ntodos los trabajadores, más bien presuponen las normas vigentes que con la \r\r\nefectiva apertura del mercado, los nuevos operadores privados de seguros \r\r\nde riesgos del trabajo tendrán la posibilidad de atraer a una mayor cantidad \r\r\nde patronos a contratar ese seguro, en virtud del deber que se deriva del \r\r\nprincipio de obligatoriedad. La disposición reglamentaria (artículo 5) prevé la \r\r\nobligación de la entidad aseguradora de cumplir con el tomador, el \r\r\nasegurado y beneficiarios definidos en la póliza de seguro, con las \r\r\nespecificaciones que la ley y normativa conexa disponen para los seguros \r\r\nobligatorios. Incluso, esta norma autoriza a las entidades aseguradoras que \r\r\noferten seguros obligatorios a suscribir los convenios o contratos necesarios \r\r\ncon la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social a efecto de coordinar los \r\r\naspectos operativos derivados de la atención médica brindada por esa \r\r\ninstitución. El reglamento obliga que la póliza cubra las prestaciones \r\r\nindicadas en el 218 del Código de Trabajo. Los escenarios hipotéticos \r\r\ndonde la apertura del mercado del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo afectará las \r\r\nfinanzas del INS, y en consecuencia, la atención de las personas no \r\r\naseguradas, pero señala lo afirmado por la Sala Segunda de la Corte \r\r\nSuprema de Justicia y de los Tribunales de Trabajo de que el trabajador no \r\r\nasegurado no se perjudica desde la perspectiva de la obligación solidaria, sin \r\r\nperjuicio de la acción judicial contra el patrono incumpliente. En todo caso, \r\r\nel Reglamento contempla esta situación, dado que sí el patrono tuviera una \r\r\npóliza de Riesgos del Trabajo con cualquier entidad aseguradora y omitiera \r\r\nreportar al trabajador, se les considerará como no asegurado y las \r\r\nprestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad aseguradora receptora de la prima. \r\r\nDestaca las facultades otorgadas por el reglamento en uso de la Ley de \r\r\nCobro Judicial de las certificaciones emitidas por las entidades establecidas, \r\r\nla autoridad competente de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o las \r\r\nemitidas por directores de las instituciones privadas. No hay atención \r\r\nilimitada en un sistema de monopolio del mercado de seguros, pues las \r\r\natenciones o prestaciones que contemplan las coberturas del seguro, se \r\r\nencuentran constreñidas a criterios fundamentales de razonabilidad, \r\r\nproporcionalidad y equidad basados en las necesidades y condiciones reales \r\r\nde los trabajadores.\n\r\r\n\nEl principio de solidaridad social plantea el deber de ayudar a quienes menos \r\r\ntienen a base de la contribución de todos, especialmente de los que más \r\r\ntienen. Los alegatos del recurrente de que la apertura del mercado del Seguro \r\r\nde Riesgos del Trabajo afecta el principio de universalidad y la solidaridad \r\r\nporque los trabajadores tendrán una protección desigual, tal argumento \r\r\ncarece de fundamento alguno. En este punto es relevante recordar que el \r\r\ndeber de aseguramiento de los trabajadores mediante el Seguro no le \r\r\ncorresponde al trabajador, sino al patrono. En este sentido, es una simpleza \r\r\nconcebir el funcionamiento de un mercado del Seguro de Riesgos de \r\r\nTrabajo abierto y en competencia, en el que los trabajadores se quedarán sin \r\r\nseguro, pues serán “rechazados” por lo operadores privados de las \r\r\nprestaciones de riesgos del trabajo, porque su salario no es “atractivo”, toda \r\r\nvez que no es el trabajador quien asume los costos económicos del seguro \r\r\nsino su patrono, de conformidad con el párrafo cuatro del artículo 73 \r\r\nconstitucional y las normas del Código de Trabajo. Para mayor detalle, \r\r\nnótese que, en realidad, la primera garantía para los trabajadores en relación \r\r\ncon este seguro es que el mismo es de carácter obligatorio y forzoso, \r\r\nindependientemente de las condiciones de trabajo y del salario devengado, \r\r\nde forma que el patrono siempre tiene la obligación de asegurar a sus \r\r\ntrabajadores. Debe hacerse una distinción entre la etapa inicial de \r\r\naseguramiento y la etapa de determinación de la cobertura del Seguro de \r\r\nRiesgos del Trabajo. En la primera todos los trabajadores, independiente de \r\r\nla actividad que realicen, deben ser asegurados por su patrono de \r\r\nconformidad con los principios de universalidad, igualdad y de no \r\r\ndiscriminación, para asegurar la solidaridad del régimen. Tampoco pueden \r\r\nlos proveedores privados o públicos de servicios de seguros, sobre una \r\r\nbase discriminatoria, negarse a brindar o prestar los servicios a los patronos \r\r\nque deseen contratar los servicios del Seguro con ellos, por la autorización \r\r\nobtenido por la SUGESE de conformidad con el Reglamento emitido por el \r\r\nCONASSIF, de modo que estos son técnicamente sostenibles y conforme \r\r\ncon la legislación nacional. Se desprende de lo anterior, que una entidad \r\r\naseguradora podría reservarse de contratar con un patrono-cliente cuando \r\r\néste no cumpla con los requisitos contenidos en la póliza autorizada por la \r\r\nentidad supervisora. En este sentido, no lleva razón el accionante cuando \r\r\nafirma que los operadores privados “se disputarán los segmentos rentables \r\r\ndel mercado”. El CAFTA-DR parte de la premisa de que en el mercado \r\r\ncompetitivo del Seguro las firmas aseguradoras que están autorizadas por \r\r\nparte del Estado conocen de antemano las reglas que regulan la competencia \r\r\ny protegen al consumidor. Es decir, no están autorizadas para brindar oferta \r\r\npública de seguros de riesgos del trabajo y hagan una selección de los \r\r\npatronos – clientes a los que desean vender los servicios de seguro de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo, además de las garantías establecidas en las leyes y \r\r\nnormas reglamentarias, no puede haber una discriminación en el \r\r\naseguramiento de los trabajadores, en virtud de que el mismo principio de \r\r\nuniversidad impone la obligación a las entidades aseguradoras de no \r\r\nseleccionar o discriminar a los trabajadores con base en su utilidades \r\r\npotenciales y niveles de riesgo. En cuanto a la segunda etapa, relativa a la \r\r\ndeterminación de la cobertura, se refiere al artículo 15 del Reglamento del \r\r\nCONASSIF, que parece desconocer el accionante, resolvió el tema del \r\r\ncontenido mínimo de las prestaciones del Seguro, pues prescribe que la \r\r\npóliza debe cubrir las prestaciones establecidas en el artículo 218 del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo, es decir, establece un mínimo de cobertura con fundamento en \r\r\nlas prestaciones básicas que establece la norma precitada. En la etapa de \r\r\ndeterminación de las tarifas por cobertura, sí se permite establecer \r\r\ncategorías de mayor o menor siniestralidad, tomando en cuenta, entre otros \r\r\nrubros, el salario devengado por los seguros de trabajadores y los tipos de \r\r\nactividades que realizan. Ello significa que mientras las coberturas básicas \r\r\nestán debidamente definidas por la Ley Laboral, las tarifas de esas \r\r\ncoberturas, son determinadas bajo las bases técnicas actuariales que \r\r\nsoportan la ecuación matemática del seguro, de conformidad con el artículo \r\r\n205 del Código de Trabajo. Esto es necesario para que el seguro sea viable y \r\r\nsostenible financieramente, y permita un tratamiento similar o a los iguales. \r\r\nLas coberturas básicas funcionaba desde antes del CAFTA-DR y cuando el \r\r\nINS tenía el monopolio de los seguros obligatorios. Las tarifas para cada \r\r\nentidad aseguradora son autorizadas por la SUGESE con el fin de que \r\r\ncumplan con los requerimientos y rigores técnico-actuariales y jurídicos, que \r\r\nexigen las disposiciones generales del régimen de suficiencia de capital y \r\r\nsolvencia, así como asegurar las provisiones técnicas suficientes para \r\r\ngarantizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de las entidades asociadas de \r\r\nsus contratos de seguros. Ello garantiza control sobre abusos y \r\r\ndiscriminaciones en la fijación de tarifas para las entidades aseguradoras, \r\r\nsino que además se cumpla con los mínimos de cobertura básica iguales \r\r\npara todos los trabajadores, con lo cual la cobertura mínima será la misma \r\r\npara todos los trabajadores. Así, los beneficios adicionales por concepto de \r\r\ncoberturas adicionales que se deriven de la relación contractual que tenga el \r\r\npatrono con la entidad aseguradora, y que corren por cuenta de éste, \r\r\nimplicarán, de forma directa, un mejoramiento en el trato y la atención al \r\r\ntrabajador, lo cual no atenta de ninguna manera contra el principio de \r\r\nuniversalidad o el de solidaridad. Sobre la irrenunciabilidad, los trabajadores \r\r\nprotegidos bajo este régimen no pueden renunciar a los derechos conferidos \r\r\npor el mismo, tal como lo prescribe dicha norma constitucional. Eso es que \r\r\nlos trabajadores no pueden, motu propio o por acción de un tercero, \r\r\nrenunciar a los derechos y beneficios que se otorgan con motivo del \r\r\nDerecho Fundamental a la Seguridad Social. El accionante no indica porqué \r\r\nse vulnera el principio, cuando el tratado no sugiere que los trabajadores \r\r\npueden renunciar al Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, por el contrario, en el \r\r\npreámbulo de la Sección H “Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en \r\r\nMateria de Servicios de Seguros”, se reafirma el respeto a la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica, y con ello al carácter irrenunciable de los derechos y beneficios del \r\r\nSeguro. \n\r\r\n\nEn cuanto a los principio constitucionales del Régimen de enfermedad, \r\r\ninvalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias administrado por \r\r\nla Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social que son extensivos al Régimen del \r\r\nSeguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, como son los principios de suficiencia que \r\r\nse encuentra vigente en el artículo 206 del Código de Trabajo donde se toma \r\r\nen cuenta tanto las necesidades del trabajador como el salario devengado \r\r\npor el trabajador. De hecho, así funcionaba en tiempos en que el INS tenía el \r\r\nmonopolio del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y continuará funcionando en \r\r\nlos mismos términos, hoy en día en un mercado abierto a la competencia. \r\r\nHace alusión también al principio de automaticidad de la protección, a lo que \r\r\nse refiera a la jurisprudencia de la Sala como un principio de la seguridad \r\r\nsocial que se traduce en “… una adecuada e inmediata protección en \r\r\nmateria de enfermedad, invalidez, vejez y muerte”. Haciendo una extensión \r\r\nde este principio al Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo, como parte del sistema \r\r\ngeneral de seguridad social, la cobertura de este seguro de naturaleza \r\r\nespecial debe ser inmediata y automática, en otras palabras obligatoria y \r\r\nuniversal. Esto ha funcionado así hasta ahora, donde los hospitales de la \r\r\nCaja o los centros privados de salud, deben dar una atención primaria a \r\r\nquien haya sufrido un accidente o enfermedad del trabajo. La misma \r\r\nprotección inmediata reciben los trabajadores no asegurados. En todo caso, \r\r\nlos artículos 20 y 21 del Reglamento viene a apoyar lo que dispone el \r\r\nnumeral 232 del Código de Trabajo.\n\r\r\n\nApunta adicionalmente las siguientes diferencias entre el Seguro de Riesgos \r\r\ndel Trabajo y los Seguros Sociales de la CCSS. En cuanto al sujeto que \r\r\nrealiza la prestación o brinda la cobertura, en cada una señala los respectivos \r\r\ncampos y coberturas institucionales, así como de los operadores \r\r\ncomerciales, para terminar con la indicación del accionante de que viola la \r\r\nConstitución Política. Además, el Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo es de \r\r\nexclusiva cuenta de los patronos y no sigue el esquema contributivo tripartito \r\r\nde los Seguros Sociales de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Es a \r\r\néstos últimos los que alcanza la prohibición de transferir ni emplear esos \r\r\nfondos a otras finalidades que las referentes a su cometido. Hay diferencias \r\r\nen cuanto al uso y destino de los fondos y reservas de los seguros sociales. \r\r\nLos fondos y reservas resultantes de la administración según el artículo 73 \r\r\nde la Carta Magna es para los servicios de seguridad social del Régimen de \r\r\nMaternidad, Invalidez y Muerte de la CCSS. La misma limitación no aplica \r\r\npara el Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo, no existe \r\r\nesa limitación constitucional sobre el destino de los fondos o reservas \r\r\nproducto de la comercialización del seguro. Incluso existe una distinción en \r\r\nel artículo 73 cuando se refiere a “seguros sociales” y los “seguros contra \r\r\nriesgo profesional”. Aunque no quiere decir que estos fondos queden sin \r\r\nregulación, pues ello se determina por la vía legal, pero esta es una muy \r\r\ndistinta a una constitucional. Por otra parte, señala la inexistencia de \r\r\nprincipios constitucionales o legales: el caso de los beneficios \r\r\nextraordinarios y el supuesto servicio al costo. En cuanto a lo primero señala \r\r\nque ni el CAFTA-DR o la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, no \r\r\naltera el artículo 242 del Código de Trabajo, ni los artículo 255 al 259, sobre \r\r\nla posibilidad de conmutación de rentas. Además el denominado “servicio al \r\r\ncosto” no es un principio de los seguros obligatorios, ni siquiera un \r\r\nprincipio constitucional del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social en \r\r\ngeneral, de modo que el accionante confunde y extrapola a partir de normas \r\r\ndel régimen de invalidez, vejez y muerte administrado por la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense de Seguro Social consecuencias indebidas para el Régimen \r\r\ndel Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo. No existe evidencia del principio \r\r\n“servicio al costo” a nivel constitucional, sino con el artículo 205 del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo, que establece que cualquier excedente que se produzca deberá \r\r\ndestinarse a constituir una reserva, para luego suponer y concluir \r\r\nerróneamente la existencia de un presunto principio constitucional. El \r\r\nartículo 73 constitucional no habla de ingresos, como intenta aducir el \r\r\naccionante y comete un error en el análisis de los argumentos presentados, \r\r\ntoda vez que el término que usó el constituyente fue el de “fondo”. Existe \r\r\nmás bien el artículo 28 de la Constitución que garantiza a todo ciudadano la \r\r\nlibertad como principio básico, y desarrollado por normas \r\r\ninfraconstitucionales como la ley, la que deberá determinar sus alcances e \r\r\nimponer restricciones que los concreticen y armonicen con el resto del \r\r\nbloque de constitucionalidad y de legalidad. Además, debe respetarse la \r\r\nobservancia de ser proporcionadas y racionales. En el caso del INS, según \r\r\nel artículo 205 del Código de Trabajo, debe hacer liquidación anuales, los \r\r\nexcedentes deben pasar a ser parte de una reserva de reparto, el 50%, a \r\r\nfinanciar los programas que desarrolle el Consejo de Salud Ocupacional y el \r\r\nresto a incorporar mejoras al Régimen. Del mismo modo, dice que el INS \r\r\ncomo entidad aseguradora, debe cumplir con los preceptos de los artículos \r\r\n13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, en materia de las \r\r\nprovisiones técnicas y reservas. De igual manera, las entidades señaladas en \r\r\nlos incisos a) y b) del artículo 7 de la Ley están obligadas a cumplir con los \r\r\nmandatos en materia de las provisiones técnicas, reservas e inversiones \r\r\ncontenidos en los numerales señalados. Pero el 205 del Código de Trabajo \r\r\nno les es aplicable. La Sala ya resolvió además el tema de “servicio al costo” \r\r\nen el voto 2007-9469, siendo que esta sentencia tiene tres principales \r\r\nconsecuencias: Primero, la posibilidad de imponer la obligación de brindar \r\r\nun servicio al costo estaría reservada a la Ley, es decir, no existe un \r\r\nprincipio constitucional que obligue a que los servicios de \r\r\ntelecomunicaciones, o en el caso del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo, a ser \r\r\nprestados “al costo”. Esa es una decisión que queda a criterio del legislador. \r\r\nEl CAFTA-DR tampoco trata el tema de que el seguro deba comercializarse \r\r\n“al costo”. En segundo lugar, la comercialización en un mercado \r\r\ncompetitivo no es excluyente de la aplicación de una política social en \r\r\nmateria del seguro de riesgos de trabajo. Cabe recordar el preámbulo de la \r\r\nSección H sobre “Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de \r\r\nServicios de Seguros”, donde el país reafirmó su compromiso de que el \r\r\nproceso de apertura en la prestación del seguro tiene que hacerse con \r\r\nfundamento en la Constitución Política, sus normas y principios. Pero para \r\r\ncumplir con estas normas y principios no es requisito que los servicios del \r\r\nSRT tengan que ser prestados “al costo”. Por último, la tercera \r\r\nconsecuencia es que no existe una disposición o principio constitucional que \r\r\ncompela a que los servicios del SRT se presten “al costo”. Sin embargo, lo \r\r\nque sí está garantizado a nivel constitucional es la libertad de los \r\r\nconsumidores a elegir el prestador de servicios que más les convenga a sus \r\r\nintereses (artículo 46 de la Constitución Política). La libertad de elegir no es \r\r\nincompatible con el compromiso adquirido por el país de “… lograr la \r\r\nuniversalidad y solidaridad de los servicios que se abran a la \r\r\ncompetencia”. El Tribunal Constitucional ha reconocido el principio o \r\r\nderecho al lucro razonable, es decir, que en el ejercicio de la libertad de \r\r\nempresa y de comercio debe existir proporcionalidad, razonabilidad y \r\r\nequidad en el lucro o beneficio obtenido. Finalmente, sobre la progresividad \r\r\ndel derecho internacional de los derechos fundamentales y el régimen de \r\r\nSeguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo. Debe tomarse en cuenta el \r\r\nprincipio del mínimo normativo (minimum minimorum) en cuanto postula \r\r\nque existe un compendio de normas, garantías, deberes y derechos mínimos \r\r\nlaborales y de la seguridad social que debe ser asegurados por el Estado, el \r\r\npatrono o los operadores de seguros, de forma que la contravención a éstos \r\r\nimporta una vulneración a los derechos fundamentales. Estos mínimos \r\r\nforman parte del contenido esencial del derecho a la seguridad social de los \r\r\nseguros de riesgos del trabajo, con lo cual el contenido esencial \r\r\ncomprenderá también como parte de su núcleo duro, las prestaciones \r\r\nmínimas o coberturas básicas del SRT reconocidas. Mientras el legislador \r\r\nno restrinja o limite el contenido esencial del derecho a la seguridad social de \r\r\nlos seguros de riesgos del trabajo, mediante la promulgación de las normas \r\r\njurídicas que limiten, hagan impracticable, dificulten más allá de lo razonable \r\r\no despojen a dicho derecho de la necesaria protección. Las normas bajo \r\r\nexamen no conllevan restricciones o límites que hagan impracticable el \r\r\nejercicio del derecho a la seguridad social, ni tampoco dificultan o lo \r\r\ndespojen de la necesaria protección para ser efectos en la sociedad. La \r\r\nescogencia que hizo el Estado resulta la más favorable para los trabajadores \r\r\ncubiertos por el seguro, toda vez que en lugar de restringir el derecho \r\r\nprotegido amplió la posibilidad de extender y mejorar la cobertura, pudiendo \r\r\nejercer el derecho de elección del proveedor conforme a sus intereses, en \r\r\nuna clara derivación de los principios “pro libertatis” y “\r\r\npro homine”, \r\r\nbeneficiando a todos los trabajadores de la Nación. Se argumenta también el \r\r\nlucro razonable, de manera que el núcleo duro de contenido, no se afecta \r\r\ncon que cambie el sujeto que presta el servicio o que se permita su \r\r\ncomercialización, no afecta los principios ni la esencia o fundamento \r\r\njurídico-filosófico del derecho de marras, de ahí que no exista ninguna \r\r\nlesión al principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales. El país \r\r\nya consolidó un sistema efectivo de protección y que no se ve desmejorado. \r\r\nNo estima que exista conflicto con el protocolo de San Salvador y el \r\r\nConvenio No. 102 de la OIT porque en ambos su regulación es separada. \r\r\nEl CAFTA-DR no reduce los beneficios con que hoy cuentan los \r\r\ntrabajadores, ni disminuye o desmejora las ventajas que en la actualidad han \r\r\nobtenido los beneficiarios del régimen del Seguro obligatorio de Riesgos de \r\r\nTrabajo. Por lo expuesto, pide declarar sin lugar la acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad. \n\r\r\n\n10.- Los señores y señoras Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette \r\r\nRuiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, \r\r\nJuan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, y Carmen Muñoz \r\r\nQ., todos integrantes de la fracción legislativa del Partido Acción Ciudadana \r\r\nse apersonan como coadyuvante. En este sentido, recalcan que el bloque de \r\r\nnormativa impugnada debe ser ampliado incluyendo la totalidad del \r\r\nReglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, aprobado por el CONASSIF, \r\r\nmediante artículo 8, numeral I, del acta de la sesión 894-2010. Lo anterior en \r\r\ntanto que el hoy impugnado transitorio III de la Ley 8653, ulteriormente le \r\r\nordenó al CONNASIF y a la SUGESE el reglamentar y regular un régimen \r\r\nde apertura total en la prestación del Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo, a \r\r\nmás tardar el primero de enero 2011, actuación administrativa que se \r\r\ncomputo a partir del 22 de diciembre del año pasado. Alega que el solo acto \r\r\nde promulgación de dicho reglamento, además de su contenido normativo \r\r\nesencial, implicó colocar dentro del comercio un bien o servicio público de \r\r\nrango constitucional que por lo mismo y por su propia naturaleza \r\r\nconceptual-funcional está totalmente fuera del comercio. Aduce que ya por \r\r\nla sola interpretación literal-gramatical se hace notar la inconstitucionalidad \r\r\nalegada, esto teniendo en cuenta que la normativa constitucional alegada \r\r\n(título V de la Constitución Política) goza de una redacción limpia, clara y \r\r\nprecisa, al tiempo que su ubicación en la parte dogmática del texto \r\r\nconstitucional resulta estratégico. Manifiestan que las premisas \r\r\ncorrespondientes son obvias e irrefutables, al igual que la única conclusión \r\r\nno falaz que se deriva del siguiente silogismo de rigor: Premisa 1: Funciones \r\r\nesenciales del Estado=Fuera del comercio. Premisa 2: Seguro de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo (RT) = Seguro Social que forma parte de la Seguridad Social. \r\r\nPremisa 3: Seguridad Social = función esencial del Estado a la luz del título \r\r\nV de la Constitución Política. Única conclusión no falaz: RT = servicio \r\r\npúblico fuera del comercio. Por lo tanto, la normativa impugnada es \r\r\ninconstitucional, incluyendo el reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. \r\r\nAsimismo se asegura que la gestión del seguro RT, más allá de ser un simple \r\r\nmonopolio a cargo del INS, en verdad se trata de una parte medular en la \r\r\nseguridad social, es decir, una función esencial del Estado. Lo anterior \r\r\nteniendo en cuenta que RT es un seguro social de rango constitucional \r\r\n(garantía social fundamental) para la población trabajadora habitante del \r\r\npaís. Además, los riesgos del trabajo, fueron desarrollados legislativamente \r\r\npor un código en materia laboral, siendo además blindados por el Convenio \r\r\n102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y también por medio de \r\r\njurisprudencia constitucional. En cuanto al tema de la universalidad del \r\r\nservicio público de riesgos del trabajo, incluyendo los casos no asegurados, \r\r\nsí podemos imaginar aseguradoras privadas recostándose en el Estado, así \r\r\ncomo un Estado boicoteado desde adentro para ser forzado a comprarle \r\r\nservicios hospitalarios al sector privado, lo cual sería inaudito. Se afirma \r\r\nexplícitamente que una nueva normativa reglamentaria que contamina el \r\r\nexitoso régimen social mediante la inserción de principios comerciales \r\r\nintrusos (por ejemplo selectividad del riesgo, o un reglamento estableciendo \r\r\ntopes ilegales a las prestaciones médico-sanitarias, de rehabilitación y en \r\r\ndinero vigentes) viene a la memoria el fondo mencionado de aquel voto \r\r\nconstitucional donde se le prohibía al Estado la realización de retrocesos \r\r\nlegislativos en materia de Derechos Humanos Laborales. Sería totalmente \r\r\ninconstitucional que la SUGESE se comporte como una Superintendencia de \r\r\nSeguros Sociales, recuérdese que la administración y reglamentación \r\r\ncompete exclusivamente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por \r\r\nmandato constitucional expreso. Promover la castración solapada del \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo o no hacer nada para impedirlo, equivale a retroceder en \r\r\nmateria de Derechos Humanos Laborales. Poco antes de la promulgación del \r\r\nreglamento impugnado, los coadyuvantes le hicieron ver a las autoridades del \r\r\nCONASSIF y de la SUGESE que era de interés público abordar \r\r\nasertivamente este debate, en función de la salud jurídica normativa en \r\r\nciernes (oficios JGC/097/10 y JGC/175/10). De hecho, advirtieron que de no \r\r\nhacerlo se desestabilizaría la institucionalidad y arriesgaría la paz social de la \r\r\nclase trabajadora costarricense. También se les advirtió que una conducta \r\r\nomisiva por el estilo incluso podría redundar en disminución, afectación o \r\r\nperjuicio del erario público y de la Administración Financiera del Estado. \r\r\nAlegan que tales distorsiones no fueron evitadas por estas autoridades \r\r\npúblicas a la hora de promulgar el Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. \r\r\nEl mismo DR-CAFTA, en su capítulo 16, subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la \r\r\nsección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 confirma la vigencia del Código \r\r\nde Trabajo y sus disposiciones legales tendientes a la demanialidad del \r\r\nservicio, por lo que la normativa impugnada podría estar derogada \r\r\ntácitamente a la luz del mismo capítulo 16 del CAFTA. En otras palabras, \r\r\nambos ordenamientos legales en aparente contradicción no lo están, debido \r\r\na que cada cual regula por su lado materias y principios distintos entre sí: un \r\r\nordenamiento de derecho público regula un tipo de seguro social obligatorio, \r\r\nforzoso y universal, mientras que el otro ordenamiento, que es de derecho \r\r\nprivado, se encarga de regular seguros comerciales voluntarios, renunciables \r\r\ny selectivos. En consecuencia, no hay identidad en el ámbito de regulación \r\r\n(material, temporal, espacial y personal). Mucho menos incompatibilidad \r\r\nsobre la misma materia. Por tanto no procede que SUGESE o CONASSIF \r\r\ntengan por tácitamente derogado el Código de Trabajo a luz del \r\r\nDR-CAFTA, ni siquiera parcialmente o en perjuicio de la competencia \r\r\nmaterial exclusiva y excluyente del servicio SSRT a favor del Estado por \r\r\nmedio del INS. Es decir, lo que está en discusión más que todo tiene que \r\r\nver con antinomias jurídicas irresueltas e incompatibilidades aparentes o \r\r\nparciales. Por último, los coadyuvantes expresan tener prohibido quebrantar \r\r\ncomo legisladores que son el principio fundamental de no regresión de los \r\r\nderechos humanos laborales (que es la aplicación práctica del principio \r\r\nconstitucional de progresividad de los derechos humanos) lo cual quedaría \r\r\nconsumado en caso de aprobar la legislación que de una u otra forma \r\r\ndesmejore derechos humanos laborales, por ejemplo aquellos recogidos en \r\r\nlos artículos 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, y 259 por el \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo. \n\r\r\n\n11.- Luis Chavarría Vega y Martha Elena Rodríguez González \r\r\n(UNDECA) alegan que les asiste razón para interponer la gestión de \r\r\ncoadyuvancia con el fin de sostener que la apertura comercial fomentará y \r\r\nproducirá una segmentación del mercado de seguros de trabajo, de suerte \r\r\nque le corresponderá al Instituto Nacional de Seguros y la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense de Seguros Social asumir los daños “colaterales” de la lógica \r\r\nde mercado, y en segundo lugar, en el carácter de representantes de las \r\r\npersonas trabajadoras, particularmente de la Caja y resto de la seguridad \r\r\ncostarricense, con un indiscutible interés legitimo de carácter colectivo, en \r\r\nprocurar la defensa del sistema de seguridad social, que es un mandato que \r\r\nse deriva del artículo 332 del Código de Trabajo. Sostiene que el seguro de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo forma parte integral e inescindible de la seguridad social, \r\r\nde conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 73 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica. No obstante, que el último párrafo de dicho artículo dispone que \r\r\nlos seguros contra riesgos de trabajo se regirán por disposiciones especiales \r\r\n–que los que administra la Caja también se rigen por ley especial-, esta \r\r\nredacción jamás podría justificar alguna interpretación que pretenda sostener \r\r\nque estos seguros no forman parte de la seguridad social, de la propia solera \r\r\nde nuestra Constitución. De ser válida alguna argumentación en este sentido, \r\r\nsimplemente, el constituyente no hubiera incluido su regulación en el texto \r\r\nconstitucional. Así las cosas, no se puede separar artificiosamente el último \r\r\npárrafo, del resto de las disposiciones de la misma norma constitucional. \r\r\nComo lo ha interpretado la Sala, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo integra \r\r\nsustantivamente el sistema de la seguridad social costarricense. Así lo \r\r\nprincipios comunes de la seguridad social, que informan el artículo 73 \r\r\nconstitucional, se aplican parejo para todas las modalidades de seguros \r\r\nsociales que expresamente contempla este numeral: que la situación muy \r\r\nparticular, más que todo de orden histórico, que la administración del seguro \r\r\nde riesgo de trabajo, se le haya atribuido a otra institución distinta de la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense de Seguro Social, en nada podría justificar que se pudiera \r\r\nentender que ese seguro quedó excluido de la aplicación de esos mismos \r\r\nprincipios. La apertura comercial tiene serias consecuencias con el principio \r\r\nde universalidad, cuya cobertura debe alcanzar hasta quienes no se \r\r\nencuentran asegurados; señala que la explotación mercantil, con una finalidad \r\r\negoísta de lucro, tendrá como inevitable consecuencia que el costo de \r\r\natención y otras prestaciones de la población no asegurada, tendrá que \r\r\nasumirla el Instituto Nacional de Seguros y la Caja Costarricense de Seguro \r\r\nSocial, que dispondrá de menos recursos para asumir estos gastos. Las \r\r\nempresas se enriquecen ilícitamente a costa de los recursos públicos de \r\r\naquellas instituciones que son patrimonio de la población costarricense. En \r\r\ncuanto al principio de la solidaridad donde la atención se basa por encima de \r\r\nlo devengado, es fundamental que la fuente de los ingresos que obtenga el \r\r\nsistema, no dependan de reglas de mercado que seleccionen, por nivel de \r\r\nriesgo, la población asegurable. Desafortunadamente, el esquema de apertura \r\r\ncomercial, en régimen de competencia, fomenta la segmentación del \r\r\nmercado, de los “consumidores, con serio impacto en la sostenibilidad \r\r\nfinanciera del régimen. En cuanto al principio de prestación suficiente o \r\r\nmínima donde la protección que se brinde, debe corresponder a las \r\r\nprestaciones, por lo menos, básicas médico-asistenciales, indistintamente de \r\r\nlas primas de aseguramiento o monto de los salarios de los trabajadores. \r\r\nCon el esquema se restringe las posibilidades que se le pueda garantizar a los \r\r\ntrabajadores, al menos, la calidad de las prestaciones que actualmente se \r\r\nestán suministrando. Sostienen que el Estado debe satisfacer el derecho \r\r\nfundamental a la prestación social. El reconocimiento que el seguro de riesgo \r\r\nde trabajo configura un derecho fundamental de prestación social, presupone \r\r\nla obligación estatal de satisfacerlo, lo cual no es posible sino bajo un \r\r\nesquema público, universal, incompatible, con cualquier modalidad de \r\r\nprivatización de la comercialización de ese seguro. Que la Sala ha señalado \r\r\nque el sistema de la seguridad social supone que los poderes públicos \r\r\nmantendrán un régimen público de seguridad social para todos los \r\r\nciudadanos en el más alto rango, lo cual viene a impedir cualquier modalidad \r\r\nde gestión y administración privada del seguro de riesgo de trabajo, con un \r\r\npropósito de lucro. La dignidad de los trabajadores también se lesiona, \r\r\nporque a consecuencia de esas nuevas reglas, dentro de las que el Instituto \r\r\nNacional de Seguros tendrá que ver como subsiste, la calidad de las \r\r\nprestaciones sufrirá un notable deterioro y los trabajadores no asegurados \r\r\nquedarán reducidos a una condición de segunda categoría. Consideran que \r\r\nexiste un desmantelamiento y derogatoria de la legislación laboral, la apertura \r\r\ncomercial del seguro de riesgo de trabajo, en un régimen de explotación \r\r\nmercantil, obliga a modificar el Código de Trabajo, en materia de riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo. En este sentido señalan la nota 22, que condiciona las regulaciones a \r\r\nlas obligaciones asumidas en el Tratado, incluyendo el Anexo, afirma que \r\r\nnuestra legislación laboral deviene inconsistente, incompatible con los \r\r\nprincipios de libertad de empresa y libre competencia, que están en la base \r\r\ndel esquema de comercialización y privatización de mercado de seguros. \r\r\nConsideran que se abandonarán las políticas públicas de promoción de la \r\r\nsalud de los trabajadores y prevención de accidentes y enfermedades \r\r\nprofesionales, además de las prestaciones pecuniarias, sanitarias y otras, \r\r\ntambién están las que buscan promocionar la salud y la prevención de \r\r\naccidentes y enfermedades laborales. Las utilidades que antes se ocupaban a \r\r\nlo anterior estarán ingresando a las cuentas de las aseguradoras privadas, y \r\r\nse quedarán sin fondos las políticas públicas en esta materia, lo que \r\r\naumentará accidentes y enfermedades del trabajo. Los seguros de riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo constituyen expresión de la doctrina social de la Iglesia, para lo cual \r\r\ncita el capítulo de los Derechos del Trabajo de Juan Pablo II, señalando que \r\r\nla Encíclica dispone que en casos de accidentes de trabajo los trabajadores \r\r\ndeben tener acceso a la asistencia sanitaria, incluso gratuitamente, lo que \r\r\nsería quebrantado, por las razones dadas y por disposición del Tratado de \r\r\nLibre Comercio. Pide declarar con lugar la acción. \n\r\r\n\n 12.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la \r\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a \r\r\nla Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta \r\r\nresolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia \r\r\nde este Tribunal.\n\r\r\n\n 13.- \r\r\nPor resolución de las diecisiete horas y dieciocho minutos del \r\r\ntreinta de marzo de dos mil once, dictada dentro de este expediente, fueron \r\r\nadmitidas varias gestiones de coadyuvancia a favor y en contra de la acción \r\r\nde inconstitucionalidad. \n\r\r\n\n 14.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.\n\r\r\n\n Redacta el Magistrado \r\r\nCastillo Víquez; y,\n\r\r\n\nConsiderando:\n\r\r\n\n I.- Sobre cuestiones preliminares y de las coadyuvancias.- \r\r\nMediante resolución de las diecisiete horas y dieciocho minutos del treinta de \r\r\nmarzo de dos mil once, dictada dentro de este expediente, fueron admitidas \r\r\nlas gestiones presentadas con la finalidad de coadyuvar en la acción, por \r\r\ndiversos interesados, con la finalidad de agregar sus argumentos al \r\r\nexpediente. Es necesario indicar que el auto menciona únicamente los \r\r\nnombres de las personas que se apersonan al proceso, sin embargo en su \r\r\nmayoría no lo hacen a título personal, sino en representación de personas \r\r\njurídicas y agrupaciones sociales, lo que, para mayor claridad, se señala a \r\r\ncontinuación la condición en que actúan y si lo hacen en representación de \r\r\nuna persona moral dentro de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. De esta \r\r\nforma, Mélida Cedeño Castro, portadora de la cédula de identidad número \r\r\n9-058-394, como Presidenta de la Asociación de Profesores de Segunda \r\r\nEnseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, portador la cédula de \r\r\nidentidad No. 6-155-443, como Secretario General del Sindicato de \r\r\nTrabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano \r\r\nEstrada, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 9-029-769, como Secretario \r\r\nGeneral del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada \r\r\n(SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, portador de la cédula de identidad \r\r\nNo. 1-967-546, autorizado por el Concejo de San Ramón, Alajuela, por \r\r\nAcuerdo No. 13 de la Sesión Ordinaria No. 71 del 15 de marzo de 2011; \r\r\nCarlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, portador de la cédula de identidad No. \r\r\n2-287-015, como Secretario General del Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, \r\r\nTécnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez \r\r\nSegura, portadora de la cédula de identidad No. 1-897-818, Secretaria \r\r\nGeneral Adjunta del Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares \r\r\ndel Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, \r\r\ncédula No. 3-222-901, miembro del Servicio, Paz y Justicia en Costa Rica \r\r\n(SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, portador de la cédula de \r\r\nidentidad número 1-1019-0231, en su condición personal y de estudiante; \r\r\nJosé A. Muñoz Fonseca, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-433-939, \r\r\nen su calidad de Presidente de la Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de \r\r\nComercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, portador de la cédula de identidad No. \r\r\n1-508-235, en su condición de Secretario General de la Unión de Personal \r\r\ndel Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, \r\r\nportador de la cédula de identidad número 1-791-100, en su condición de \r\r\nMinistro a.í. de Comercio Exterior; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette \r\r\nRuiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández \r\r\nCerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (y no Juan Carlos Méndez como \r\r\nerróneamente se indicó), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, \r\r\ntodos diputados de la fracción del Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis \r\r\nChavarría Vega, portador de la cédula No. 3-0158-0023, en su carácter \r\r\npersonal y de Secretario General de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la \r\r\nCaja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, \r\r\nportadora de la cédula de identidad No. 2-343-472 en su carácter personal y \r\r\nde Secretaria General Adjunta de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja \r\r\ny la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, portador de la \r\r\ncédula de identidad No. 1-457-390, por la Asociación Nacional de \r\r\nEmpleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). En consecuencia se corrige la \r\r\nresolución de las diecisiete horas dieciocho minutos del treinta de marzo de \r\r\ndos mil once, debiendo entenderse si no se indica lo contrario que actúan en \r\r\nrepresentación de las personas jurídicas señaladas. Por otra parte, se \r\r\ncorrige la señalada resolución, al no constar la gestión de la señora Ligia \r\r\nFallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez y Orlando \r\r\nRodríguez Vásquez, cuyos escritos no se encuentran en el expediente \r\r\nelectrónico, de manera que no se tiene a los mencionadas personas como \r\r\ncoadyuvantes en la presente acción. Por último, no se tiene como \r\r\ncoadyuvante al señor Mario Enrique Mora Badilla, dado que en el escrito se \r\r\nafirma interpuesto por el señor Mora Badilla, sin embargo no aparece su \r\r\nfirma, sino la del señor Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo. \n\r\r\n\nII.- Las reglas de legitimación en las acciones de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las \r\r\nacciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto \r\r\npendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en \r\r\nlos párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la \r\r\nnaturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se \r\r\nfundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad \r\r\nen su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la \r\r\nRepública, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la \r\r\nRepública o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de \r\r\nsus respectivas esferas competenciales. De acuerdo con el primero de los \r\r\nsupuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la \r\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de \r\r\naplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y \r\r\nsu consecuente empleo como asunto base. Dispone el texto en cuestión que \r\r\nprocede cuando \"por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual \r\r\nni directa\", es decir, cuando por esa misma naturaleza, la lesión sea \r\r\ncolectiva (antónimo de individual) e indirecta. Sería el caso de actos que \r\r\nlesionen los intereses de determinados grupos o corporaciones en cuanto \r\r\ntales, y no propiamente de sus miembros en forma directa. En segundo \r\r\nlugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de \"intereses difusos\r\r\n\"; \r\r\neste concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por \r\r\nparte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la \r\r\nsentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de \r\r\njulio de mil novecientos noventa y tres)\n\r\r\n\n\"… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más \r\r\ndifícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha \r\r\ndicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan \r\r\ndifusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad \r\r\nnacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos \r\r\nresulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas \r\r\ndeterminadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación \r\r\nderivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que \r\r\natañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de \r\r\nintereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o \r\r\nmenos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés \r\r\ny, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos \r\r\nigual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de \r\r\nintereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en \r\r\ndeterminadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es \r\r\ndecir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, \r\r\nya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una \r\r\ngeneralidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados \r\r\nen tal carácter\"\n\r\r\n\nEn síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad \r\r\npertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a \r\r\npartir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su \r\r\norigen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el \r\r\nconsumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra \r\r\ndifuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. \r\r\nEn estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos \r\r\nsectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá \r\r\nestar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. \r\r\nEsta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el \r\r\ncalificativo de \"difusos\", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio \r\r\ncultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del \r\r\ngasto público, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos \r\r\nprecisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera \r\r\ntradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en \r\r\nprincipio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos \r\r\nparticulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una \r\r\nregión o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en \r\r\ngrave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; \r\r\ndel mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos \r\r\npúblicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de \r\r\ntodos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de \r\r\nellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no \r\r\npasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación -como órgano \r\r\njurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin \r\r\nque pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser \r\r\nconsiderados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya \r\r\nreconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los \r\r\nalcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo \"Estado de derechos\", \r\r\nque -como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que \r\r\nlo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas \r\r\nsubyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de \r\r\nreconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la \r\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses \"que atañen a la \r\r\ncolectividad en su conjunto\", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en \r\r\nlas líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos \r\r\ndetentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República. \r\r\nNo se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala \r\r\nConstitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que \r\r\ntodo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a \r\r\ntoda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido \r\r\nensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa.\n\r\r\n\nIII.- Sobre la admisibilidad. Como lo ha establecido con \r\r\nanterioridad esta Sala en otros precedentes, la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional no reconoce una legitimación especial al diputado de la \r\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, sin embargo la deriva el accionante de lo dispuesto \r\r\npor el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción \r\r\nConstitucional, quien acciona como abogado y diputado, es decir, en su \r\r\ncondición personal y en su calidad de Diputado. En este sentido, el \r\r\ncuestionamiento que hace se refiere a los intereses difusos, es decir, en \r\r\ncuanto al alcance y reconocimiento del sistema de seguridad social para \r\r\ncierto tipo de trabajadores. El razonamiento del accionante se basa en que \r\r\ndicho sistema debe tener un alcance general y universal, efectivo o potencial, \r\r\ndonde acusa que las disposiciones impugnadas lesionan a cada uno y a \r\r\ntodos los habitantes de la República. No obstante lo señalado por el \r\r\naccionante, cabe indicar que la acción tiene cabida en favor de un grupo \r\r\nindeterminado de trabajadores cuyos derechos a aquél alcance y \r\r\nreconocimiento podrían ser lesionados, incluso aunque estuvieran bajo la \r\r\ncobertura de alguna póliza de riesgos de trabajo. En este sentido, lo que \r\r\nprocede es conocer de la acción, como en efecto se hace. \n\r\r\n\n IV.- Objeto de la impugnación. Se pide el examen de \r\r\nconstitucionalidad del sub inciso b) del artículo III.2, de la Sección H, del \r\r\nAnexo 12.9.2, del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros”, del Tratado de Libre \r\r\nComercio entre los Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República \r\r\nDominicana, que se ratificó por medio de la Ley No. 8622 de 21 de \r\r\nnoviembre de 2007, el que dispone:\n\r\r\n\n“III. Compromisos Graduales de Apertura del Mercado\n\r\r\n\n […]\n\r\r\n\n2.- Derecho de Establecimiento para Proveedores de Seguros\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n Costa Rica permitirá, sobre una base no discriminatoria, a \r\r\nlos proveedores de servicios de seguros de una Parte, a establecerse y \r\r\nefectivamente competir para suministrar directamente al consumidor \r\r\nservicios de seguros en su territorio, según se dispone a continuación:\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n(a) \r\r\ncualquiera y todas las líneas de seguros\r\r\n29\r\r\n (excepto el \r\r\nseguro obligatorio de vehículos y seguros contra riesgos \r\r\ndel trabajo), a más tardar el 1 de enero del 2008; y\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n29 Para mayor certeza, los servicios de seguridad social referidos en el \r\r\nprimer, segundo y tercer párrafos del artículo 73 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica de República de Costa Rica y suministrados por la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense del Seguro Social a partir de la fecha de la firma de este \r\r\nTratado, no estarán sujetos a ningún compromiso incluido en este Anexo.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n(b) cualquiera y todas las líneas de seguros, a más tardar el 1 \r\r\nde enero del 2011.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPara efectos de este compromiso Costa Rica deberá permitir a los \r\r\nproveedores de servicios de seguros establecerse a través de cualquier \r\r\nforma jurídica, según se establece en el Artículo 12.4(b). Se \r\r\nentenderá que Costa Rica podrá establecer requisitos prudenciales de \r\r\nsolvencia e integridad, que serán conformes con la práctica \r\r\ninternacional regulatoria comparable”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPor otra parte, se impugna también de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de \r\r\nSeguros, Ley No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, la siguiente disposición:\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n“TRANSITORIO III.- Apertura en la prestación de seguros \r\r\nobligatorios \n\r\r\n\nEl Estado mantendrá el monopolio de los seguros de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo y Seguro Obligatorio Automotor, administrados por el \r\r\nInstituto Nacional de Seguros, de conformidad con lo indicado en \r\r\nel título IV del Código de trabajo y la Ley de tránsito por vías \r\r\npúblicas terrestres, respectivamente.\n\r\r\n\nA partir del 1º de enero de 2011, la Superintendencia otorgará, \r\r\ncuando así lo soliciten, autorización administrativa para el \r\r\nejercicio de la actividad aseguradora en los ramos de Seguro \r\r\nObligatorio de Vehículos y del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo, a las entidades señaladas en los incisos a) y b) del \r\r\nartículo 7 de esta Ley, siempre y cuando cumplan los términos, \r\r\nlas condiciones y las especificaciones que se establecerán en el \r\r\nreglamento que para tal efecto dicte el Consejo Nacional, de \r\r\nacuerdo con la legislación nacional.\n\r\r\n\nSe acusa que estas normas infringen los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, los artículos 7 y 48 constitucionales en relación con el \r\r\nartículo 9.2 del Protocolo de San Salvador y los numerales 2, 31 y Parte VI \r\r\ndel Convenio No. 102 de la Convención de la OIT.\n\r\r\n\n V.- Sobre el fondo. \n\r\r\n\nA.- La seguridad social como un pilar fundamental de la \r\r\nsociedad y del Estado costarricense.- Cuestiones preliminares. Merece \r\r\ndestacar desde el principio de esta sentencia, es que nadie niega la \r\r\nimportancia que tiene la seguridad social en nuestro país y en el mundo. El \r\r\naccionante, la Procuraduría General de la República, las diferentes \r\r\norganizaciones sociales apersonadas al expediente, los diputados de la \r\r\nfracción del Partido Acción Ciudadana, el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, \r\r\ny otros, tienen un serio y firme acuerdo general sobre el valor de la seguridad \r\r\nsocial para nuestro país. En consonancia con lo anterior, agrega la Sala el \r\r\nevidente papel que la seguridad social desempeña en el desarrollo, en la paz \r\r\nsocial, en el bienestar individual y colectivo, en la ventaja que proporciona la \r\r\nexistencia para todos y cada uno de los habitantes de este país el acceso de \r\r\nuna cobertura y prestación adecuada (oportuna) de los seguros sociales. En \r\r\neste sentido, se cumple lo anterior por la vocación y conciencia que tienen \r\r\nlos actores políticos y sociales, en la prevención y tratamiento de las \r\r\nenfermedades, y asegurando espacios para la prestación médica y servicios \r\r\nmédicos de alta valía cuando una persona saludable se precipita en una \r\r\nsituación vulnerable por enfermedad. Ahora bien, las primeras \r\r\nmanifestaciones se encuentran en los diferentes desarrollos históricos de la \r\r\nseguridad social en Alemania, Inglaterra, Bélgica, entre otros países \r\r\neuropeos. Con ellas, se puede observar la certeza de crear un sistema de la \r\r\nseguridad social como un mecanismo de previsión social. Entre los filósofos \r\r\npolíticos y sociales, tiene una profunda lógica el pensamiento y las palabras \r\r\nde John Rawls cuando argumentó su teoría política del contrato social, una \r\r\ninteresante revelación ante su planteamiento de cuál sería la mejor forma de \r\r\norganización de un Estado, si se pudiera empezar de la nada. Invita al \r\r\noperador a un ejercicio mental hipotético que consistiría en privarse de todo \r\r\nprejuicio para crear una sociedad imaginaria. Así, la figura jurídica de la \r\r\nseguridad social tiene uno profundo raigambre político y constitucional. \r\r\nPropone responder a las exigencias sociales a partir de la supresión \r\r\nhipotética de toda condición personal e individual conocida, de manera que, \r\r\nel diseñador de la sociedad no debe saber a cuál estatus social, educativo, \r\r\npolítico, estilo de vida y sexo, que quisiera, o pudieran corresponderle una \r\r\nvez inserto en aquella sociedad hipotética. Como producto de este ejercicio \r\r\nmental, posiblemente arribaría a una elección bastante temperada y racional, \r\r\npara no quedar en desventaja, frente a la sociedad y aquellas instituciones \r\r\nque gobernarían, dado que en un esfuerzo de auto preservación de este \r\r\ndecisor calcularía que si quedara en el escalafón más humilde, lograría una \r\r\nmejor ración de la riqueza de todos a favor del bienestar general de todos. \r\r\nAunque a los inicios del Siglo XX en el mundo ya habían varios países con \r\r\nsistemas de seguridad social funcionando, incipientemente, pero logrando \r\r\nresultados, pareciera lógico, que hoy mirando al pasado, tal institución tiene \r\r\ncabida en la mente del constituyente originario, como también presente, que, \r\r\nde realizar esta supresión hipotética, lleva a crear un sistema universal de \r\r\nsalud que debe garantizar un tratamiento equitativo e igual a una gran \r\r\nmayoría, incluso a los más desaventajados, y con ello, no discriminar en el \r\r\nacceso y servicios por el origen que se tuviera (artículos 50 y 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política). El financiamiento, en consecuencia, se haría con la \r\r\nparticipación de los diferentes actores sociales, Estado, patrono y \r\r\ntrabajadores. Consecuencia de lo anterior, una primera impresión de este \r\r\nTribunal es que el problema de fondo señalado por el accionante no radica \r\r\nen un conflicto de nivel macro de los seguros sociales, sino de una parcela \r\r\nde ellos, porque la normativa constitucional reconoce este principio toral de \r\r\nla sociedad costarricense. Tan es así que el propio Gobierno de la República \r\r\nde Costa Rica se asegura de colocar en la Sección H: Compromisos \r\r\nEspecíficos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros, lo siguiente \r\r\nen el preámbulo:\n\r\r\n\n“[…] reafirmando su decisión de asegurar que el proceso de \r\r\napertura de su sector de servicios de seguros se base en su \r\r\nConstitución Política;\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nenfatizando que dicho proceso será en el beneficio del \r\r\nconsumidor y deberá alcanzarse gradualmente y sobre la base \r\r\nde regulación prudencial;\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nreconociendo su compromiso de modernizar el Instituto \r\r\nNacional de Seguros (INS) y el marco jurídico de Costa Rica \r\r\nen el sector de seguros;\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAsume a través de este Anexo los siguientes compromisos específicos \r\r\nsobre servicios de seguros”. \n\r\r\n\nEs importante señalar que ese cuidado en la aproximación y declaratoria no \r\r\nse tiene por parte de ninguno de los otros países miembros del Tratado de \r\r\nLibre Comercio entre República Dominicana, Centroamérica y los Estados \r\r\nUnidos de América. Lo anterior, quizá por el nivel de desarrollo del \r\r\nmonopolio existente en materia de seguros, pero además, porque \r\r\ntradicionalmente el Estado en Costa Rica ha mantenido un importante rol en \r\r\nactividades comerciales y de inversión social, es decir, es un país altamente \r\r\nregulado cuyos compromisos eran más complejos. Esta característica que \r\r\nse asume como un compromiso por el país se hace palpable en el punto II \r\r\nde la Sección H, donde de igual manera se consigna la obligación de \r\r\nestablecer una autoridad reguladora de seguros, que será independiente de \r\r\nlos proveedores de servicios de seguros y donde se declara que no \r\r\nresponderá a ellos. Debe mantenerse en una posición imparcial de los \r\r\nparticipantes del mercado, debiendo tener los poderes adecuados, \r\r\nprotección legal y recursos financieros para ejercer sus funciones y \r\r\npoderes, y manejar la información confidencial en forma apropiada. Esto \r\r\nserá retomado en la sentencia posteriormente. \n\r\r\n\nComo lo que se cuestiona en la acción es la regularidad constitucional \r\r\nde la norma del Tratado comercial y una de sus leyes de implementación, en \r\r\ncuanto permite la apertura de ciertos tipos de seguros, debemos puntualizar, \r\r\npor lo pronto, el alcance de esas normas, y si existe un problema de \r\r\ninterpretación del alcance de los seguros sociales contenidos en la \r\r\nConstitución Política. Un primer aspecto que debe despejarse es que al \r\r\nentrar en vigor el Tratado de Libre Comercio, no incluye los seguros sociales \r\r\nadministrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. El Tratado \r\r\npermite sobre una base no discriminatoria, cualquiera y todas las líneas de \r\r\nseguros, pero como se indicó, salva en una nota al pie de página lo siguiente: \n\r\r\n\n“Para mayor certeza, los servicios de seguridad social referidos en el \r\r\nprimer, segundo y tercer párrafos del artículo 73 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica de la República de Costa Rica y suministrados por la Caja \r\r\nCostarricense de Seguro Social a partir de la fecha de la firma de \r\r\neste Tratado, no estarán sujetos a ningún compromiso incluido en \r\r\neste Anexo”.\n\r\r\n\nDel reconocimiento anterior, está claro que la seguridad social amparada por \r\r\nla Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social queda excluida del Tratado, lo \r\r\nanterior, es importante para la interpretación del artículo 73 constitucional, \r\r\nporque con esto el legislador de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente selló en \r\r\nla norma un especial resultado. \n\r\r\n\nB.- La Seguridad Social es un bien social e instrumental que se \r\r\ncompone de recursos de la sociedad costarricense. En efecto por la \r\r\nregulación establecida por el constituyente en la Carta Fundamental, ha \r\r\npermitido a esta Sala Constitucional construir el Derecho a la Seguridad \r\r\nSocial, la que por su estructura no debe estar limitada únicamente a la tutela \r\r\ndel derecho a la Salud, sino que comprende muchas otras prestaciones, que \r\r\ntodas integradas, producen un valor constitucional de la sociedad \r\r\ncostarricense. Por citar una sentencia, debe indicarse que:\n\r\r\n\n“III.- Derecho a la seguridad social.-\n\r\r\n\nEl propósito del constituyente al diseñar el sistema de seguridad \r\r\nsocial en nuestro país fue garantizar a todos los ciudadanos que el \r\r\nEstado, a través de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, les \r\r\notorgaría al menos los servicios indispensables en caso de \r\r\nenfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez y muerte. El artículo 73 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política, interpretado armónicamente con el artículo \r\r\n50 idem, consagra el Derecho de la Seguridad Social. Este derecho \r\r\nsupone que los poderes públicos mantendrán un régimen público de \r\r\nseguridad social para todos los ciudadanos de manera que garantice \r\r\nla asistencia y brinde las prestaciones sociales suficientes ante \r\r\nsituaciones de necesidad para preservar la salud y la vida. El ámbito \r\r\nsubjetivo de aplicación del derecho de la seguridad social incorpora \r\r\nel principio de universalidad, pues se extiende a todos los \r\r\nciudadanos, con carácter de obligatoriedad. El ámbito objetivo parte \r\r\ndel principio de generalidad, en tanto protege situaciones de \r\r\nnecesidad, no en la medida en que éstas hayan sido previstas y \r\r\naseguradas con anterioridad, sino en tanto se produzcan \r\r\nefectivamente. Además, incorpora los principios de suficiencia de la \r\r\nprotección, según módulos cuantitativos y cualitativos y de \r\r\nautomaticidad protectora, lo que se traduce en la adecuada e \r\r\ninmediata protección en materia de enfermedad, invalidez, vejez y \r\r\nmuerte. \n\r\r\n\nLos artículos 50 y 73 de la Constitución Política, 11 de la \r\r\nDeclaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y 9 del \r\r\nPacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, \r\r\ninterpretados de manera armónica, establecen el derecho a la \r\r\nseguridad social en beneficio de todos los trabajadores, informado en \r\r\nlos principios de universalidad, generalidad, y suficiencia de la \r\r\nprotección. Evidentemente, la prestación de tales servicios está \r\r\ncondicionada a la existencia de algunos requisitos mínimos, pero \r\r\nbásicos y necesarios para la subsistencia del sistema, los que sin \r\r\nembargo, deben ser coherentes con los principios antes mencionados. \n\r\r\n\nEl derecho a la seguridad social es un derecho fundamental, \r\r\nreconocido por el Estado costarricense cuando el constituyente \r\r\nderivado incorporó en la Constitución Política de 1871, el capítulo de \r\r\nlas Garantías Sociales, que posteriormente fue confirmado en el \r\r\nproceso constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve. ...” \r\r\n(sentencia No. 2004-08013)\n\r\r\n\nAdemás, en otra oportunidad la Sala también ha indicado que: \n\r\r\n\n“IV.- El artículo 73 de nuestra Constitución Política establece la \r\r\nexistencia de los seguros sociales, los cuales se regulan por el sistema \r\r\nde contribución forzosa del Estado, patrono y trabajadores, con el fin \r\r\nde proteger a éstos contra los riesgos de enfermedad, maternidad, \r\r\ninvalidez, vejez y muerte. La Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, es \r\r\nla entidad autónoma encargada de administrar este tipo de seguros, \r\r\ncon la autonomía que le permite tener iniciativa propia para sus \r\r\ngestiones, así como para ejecutar sus tareas y dar cumplimiento a sus \r\r\nobligaciones legales, fijándose metas y los medios para cumplirlas. \r\r\nGarantiza de esta forma, el establecimiento de la seguridad social y \r\r\nsu naturaleza, decreta la finalidad de los seguros sociales y regula el \r\r\ndestino de los fondos respectivos. La seguridad social nació en \r\r\nprotección del trabajador y de su familia, como seres humanos que \r\r\nson, y se brinda desde su concepción hasta su muerte, procurando la \r\r\nsalud y ayudando en infortunios imprevistos como la incapacidad y la \r\r\nmuerte, así como en los estados de desprotección por su misma \r\r\ncondición como son los de vejez, pensión y jubilación.” (Sentencia \r\r\nNo. 1998-04636)\n\r\r\n\nLa doctrina que enuncia el anterior precedente se mantiene firme en cuanto \r\r\ninterpreta el artículo 73 constitucional, en consecuencia de lo dicho, la \r\r\nseguridad social es un eje fundamental, un axioma y un referente de la \r\r\nsociedad costarricense, una de las manifestaciones más importantes del \r\r\nEstado Social de Derecho, lo que significa un valor constitucional o bien \r\r\njurídicamente relevante que garantiza el bienestar social, la adecuada \r\r\ndistribución de la riqueza para lograr la estabilidad social del país y que le \r\r\nhace atractivo a la inversión nacional e internacional, y que como tal, se hace \r\r\nmediante la contribución tripartita del Estado, patrono, y trabajador. Así, las \r\r\npersonas puedan tener acceso a la seguridad social, a un régimen de \r\r\nprevisibilidad por invalidez, vejez y muerte, así como lo tendrá a la salud y a \r\r\nla prestación primordial de servicios de salud que el Estado a través de la \r\r\nCaja Costarricense de Seguro Social pone al servicio de la población, siendo \r\r\nuna de las mejores garantías en las aspiraciones individuales hacia una \r\r\nsociedad más equitativa. Son múltiples los estudios que colocan a nuestro \r\r\npaís dentro de las posiciones privilegiadas, no siendo un país desarrollado, \r\r\npero mantiene niveles de salubridad altos coincidentes con países europeos \r\r\nmás desarrollados que el nuestro. Como se indicó arriba, se logra poner en \r\r\nuna mejor posición a la persona menos aventajada en la sociedad, en una que \r\r\nle permite recibir prestaciones de salud como cualquier otra mejor aventajada \r\r\nen la sociedad, así como a la solidaridad social de caer la persona en \r\r\nsupuestos de vulnerabilidad social. En otras palabras, las asimetrías sociales \r\r\ny económicas no deben contar para la prestación de servicios, por cuanto el \r\r\nconstituyente originario garantiza jurídicamente la salud de la población \r\r\nmediante la creación institucional, es decir al encargar a la Caja Costarricense \r\r\nde Seguro Social para que vele por su entrega. Cabe señalar entonces, que el \r\r\nPoder Ejecutivo garantizó en el proceso de negociación, y fue consecuente \r\r\ncon el grado de autonomía administrativa y de gobierno de los seguros \r\r\nsociales, por encargo del constituyente a específicas prestaciones reservadas \r\r\na la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social en el Tratado de Libre Comercio \r\r\ntodo lo relacionado con el párrafo primero, segundo y tercero del artículo 73 \r\r\nde la Constitución Política. La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente previó la \r\r\nnecesidad de mantener incorporado en la Constitución Política de 1949, lo \r\r\nestablecido en la Constitución Política de 1871, reformada en 1943. Con \r\r\nello, reafirmó, en la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico la seguridad social \r\r\nestableciendo beneficiarios del sistema (trabajadores manuales e \r\r\nintelectuales), sus formas de financiamiento (contributivo forzoso para el \r\r\nEstado, patronos y trabajadores), y alcances (riesgos de enfermedad, \r\r\ninvalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley \r\r\ndetermine). Designó a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social como el ente \r\r\npúblico encargado de estas prestaciones, dotándolo de atribuciones \r\r\njurídicas y financieras, autonomía administrativa y de gobierno en los \r\r\nseguros sociales, para de igual manera, zanjar una barrera de protección a los \r\r\nrecursos y reservas de ese ente autónomo para prevenir futuros desvíos de \r\r\nese patrimonio de todos los beneficiarios. Pero, siempre dentro de la \r\r\nseguridad social, se regulan otros seguros con la particularidad de que \r\r\nrompen el anterior esquema financiero, de causas que generan las \r\r\nprestaciones y de regulaciones. Por ello, debe examinarse si admitiría \r\r\nexceptuar de esta normativa los seguros obligatorios de vehículos y los \r\r\nseguros obligatorios contra riesgos de trabajo, para regularlos por separado \r\r\nposteriormente a la entrada en vigencia, en oportunidad posterior al 1° de \r\r\nenero de 2011. En otras palabras, la posición asumida por el Gobierno \r\r\ncostarricense sería consistente con las obligaciones que le impone la \r\r\nConstitución Política, que efectivamente, como lo indica el Ministerio de \r\r\nComercio Exterior, lo es para el Gobierno de la República, pero que \r\r\nquedaron plasmadas en los compromisos asumidos ante los otros Estados \r\r\nmiembros del Tratado de Libre Comercio, y su implementación en la \r\r\nlegislación nacional. Consecuentemente, el meollo de la discusión que se \r\r\nplantea en la acción se focaliza en el párrafo cuarto del numeral en cuestión, \r\r\nde donde se reitera la discusión abordada desde el referéndum del Tratado \r\r\nde Libre Comercio y la agenda complementaria de leyes al mencionado \r\r\nTratado. En este sentido, el régimen de riesgos del trabajo participa de \r\r\nalgunas de las características definidas por el constituyente originario, al \r\r\nubicarla como parte del régimen de la seguridad social establecida desde la \r\r\ncúspide del ordenamiento jurídico, sin embargo, debe existir una \r\r\ninterpretación constitucional en su justa dimensión, especialmente frente al \r\r\ntema de los seguros sociales que protege de los riesgos de enfermedad, \r\r\ninvalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley \r\r\ndetermine, pero con distinciones en los seguros contra el riesgo profesional \r\r\no riesgo de los trabajadores. Ciertamente, los aspectos normativos de mayor \r\r\nrelevancia para la sociedad deben situarse en la Constitución Política para \r\r\nregular o proteger determinados derechos fundamentales, temas que son los \r\r\nmás esenciales en la Constitución Política con el fin de señalar el derrotero \r\r\npor donde debe desarrollarse la legislación ordinaria, incluidas las licencias \r\r\nque pudiera haber contemplado. Si bien lo anterior marca un determinado \r\r\nrumbo como decisión-país, también existen disposiciones que liberan esas \r\r\ndeterminaciones a una lectura propia de la ciencia política en un determinado \r\r\nmomento, cuya decisión pertenece a los órganos políticos del Estado. En el \r\r\ncaso de los seguros sociales que operan desde la Caja Costarricense de \r\r\nSeguro Social no existe duda que el propio constituyente originario reservó \r\r\nsu monopolio institucional, pero en lo segundo la textura de la norma fue \r\r\nmás abierta. \n\r\r\n\nA juicio de la Sala, cabe cuestionarse la idea originalmente concebida por la \r\r\nAsamblea Nacional Constituyente de dotar a la población de seguros \r\r\nsociales universales y de la prestación de servicios, si se ve modificado en \r\r\nperjuicio de los menos aventajados, con el cambio de marco jurídico –como \r\r\nacusa el accionante y los coadyuvantes- en el tanto que contradice esa \r\r\nuniversalidad por estar fundado en una apertura comercial que modifica el \r\r\nmonopolio de ciertos seguros, y que resulta contrario al a los convenios \r\r\ninternacionales de derechos humanos. La discusión es más \r\r\nfilosófica-política, que filosófica-jurídica. La anterior aseveración se verá \r\r\nmás abajo, para establecer si existe evidencia que eso sea así o que los \r\r\norganismos internacionales se decanten por un determinado modelo de \r\r\ndesarrollo de seguros sociales para alcanzar esos ideales. En ese sentido, \r\r\nsería poco el espacio jurídico que quedaría para un Tribunal Constitucional \r\r\no los propios órganos políticos del Estado al ratificar un cuerpo normativo \r\r\ninternacional. De ahí que, cabría preguntarse cuál es el papel que le \r\r\ncorresponde a la Sala, como Tribunal Constitucional. En este sentido, debe \r\r\ndefinirse si se puede cuestionar jurídicamente o es un tema que corresponde \r\r\na los cuerpos políticos del Estado. En cuanto a lo primero, cabe indicar que \r\r\nla Sala debe pronunciarse desde el punto de vista constitucional de las \r\r\nnormas, pero, en cuanto a lo segundo, a la competencia para decidir sobre la \r\r\nconveniencia o inconveniencia de un Tratado, ambas cuestiones deben ir en \r\r\nla misma línea con lo que la Sala dilucidó en el Tratado de Libre Comercio \r\r\ncon México. La Sala se ha decantado por sostener que no debe entrar a \r\r\nanalizar un tema político que escapa a la decisión judicial, aunque si está en \r\r\nsu competencia al resolver lo jurídico o decidir algún sentido particular a la \r\r\ninterpretación constitucional de una norma cuando algún derecho \r\r\nfundamental está en conflicto, pero establecer la oportunidad y conveniencia \r\r\nde la legislación, en sí, no es ni debe ser natural de la actividad jurisdiccional. \r\r\nLo importante que debe destacarse aquí es que en las relaciones \r\r\ninterorgánicas del Estado, el primero llamado en controlar la oportunidad y \r\r\nconveniencia de las negociaciones internacionales del Poder Ejecutivo en sus \r\r\nrelaciones internacionales en la forma de Tratados Internacionales es la \r\r\nAsamblea Legislativa. En este sentido, el control abstracto que tiene esta \r\r\nSala, sea a priori o a posteriori, dependerá de la actuación política como \r\r\nórgano constitucional que reside en la Asamblea Legislativa, y en el que se \r\r\nfunda en la toma de decisiones por la mayoría, mediante una lucha \r\r\ncompetitiva, pero donde la oportunidad y conveniencia de una norma es de \r\r\nresorte exclusivo de la Asamblea Legislativa. En todo caso, por sentencia \r\r\nNo. 1994-07005 se dice que:\n\r\r\n\n“Sin embargo, desde el punto que nos interesa señalar ahora, eso \r\r\nsignifica que el Estado, o más propiamente, los órganos que tienen a \r\r\nsu cargo competencias estrictamente políticas y de gestión, deben \r\r\nactuar siempre en función de estimular la producción y el más \r\r\nadecuado reparto de la riqueza. Ha de entenderse, pues, que el \r\r\nPoder Ejecutivo ha negociado este Tratado, teniendo como norte \r\r\nesos objetivos constitucionales. Y ha de entenderse, también, que el \r\r\nPoder Legislativo, al conocer el fondo del instrumento dicho, \r\r\nactuará de conformidad con los mismos objetivos. Por eso es que \r\r\npodemos concluir, en principio, que las ventajas o desventajas que \r\r\ntenga para algún sector el Tratado como tal, o algunas de sus \r\r\nprevisiones, discutidas y discutibles, no necesariamente entrañan un \r\r\naspecto de constitucionalidad, en el sentido que debe pronunciar la \r\r\nSala, pues radican en el nivel de la mera conveniencia u \r\r\noportunidad. Por ejemplo, algunos señalan que no obstante la \r\r\nbondad de este tipo de instrumentos comerciales, un país no \r\r\nderivaría ventajas inmediatas o en el corto plazo, si coinciden en él \r\r\nel viejo modelo (de sustitución de importaciones, de subsidios), y el \r\r\nnuevo modelo de apertura comercial. Por eso es que a este respecto, \r\r\nalgunos expertos estiman que México lleva ventaja a Costa Rica por \r\r\ncuanto sus aranceles han sido rebajados en grado mayor y mucho \r\r\ntiempo antes de que nuestro país se iniciara en ello. Pero aún así, \r\r\nsiguen diciendo, a Costa Rica le conviene el tratado, por cuanto se \r\r\nle abrirá un espectro de inversiones muy importantes, de \r\r\ntransferencia de tecnología y creación de empleos, que dinamizarán \r\r\nsu economía y, adicionalmente, porque le pondrá en un nivel de \r\r\nexigencia competitiva que necesita para adaptarse a una posible \r\r\nincorporación a los beneficios del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre \r\r\nMéxico, Estados Unidos de América y Canadá (NAFTA), como \r\r\naspiración casi inmediata del país, tal y como han expresado \r\r\nresponsables del Gobierno central. En otras palabras, el Tratado de \r\r\nLibre comercio con México se convierte en un escenario \r\r\nindispensable para pasar al siguiente, más complejo y ambicioso. \r\r\nDe toda suerte, la Sala advierte que esos aspectos giran en torno a \r\r\nlas políticas que están detrás de la filosofía del Tratado, pero no \r\r\ntienen la connotación constitucional a que la Sala debe circunscribir \r\r\nsu opinión.”\n\r\r\n\n C.- La libertad de configuración del legislador en los seguros de \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo. Ahora bien, el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política establece: \n\r\r\n\n“Los seguros contra riesgos profesionales serán de exclusiva cuenta \r\r\nde los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales”.\n\r\r\n\nEl constituyente originario, en el tema de los riesgos profesionales, dotó al \r\r\nlegislador de mayor flexibilidad, pese a que este efectivamente considerado \r\r\ndentro de los seguros sociales, lo que se denota con el rompimiento del \r\r\nesquema financiero y regulatorio de los demás seguros sociales. En este \r\r\nsentido, podría pensarse que una posible lectura integral del artículo 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política aconsejaría encargar a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro \r\r\nSocial de toda la seguridad social del país, pero evidentemente, la Asamblea \r\r\nNacional Constituyente diferenció esa posibilidad, porque, de lo contrario, lo \r\r\npudo haber determinado eliminando el párrafo final o incorporando ese \r\r\nencargo expresamente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Para probar \r\r\nlo anterior, se podría cuestionar si se pudo haber sostenido la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la creación y función monopolística del Instituto \r\r\nNacional de Seguros, en el tema de los seguros por riesgos profesionales. \r\r\nPero tal interpretación tampoco sería plausible, por el contrario, el legislador \r\r\ndelegó, por muchos años, la cobertura de la seguridad social en los riesgos \r\r\nde trabajo en otra institución autónoma, distinta a la Caja Costarricense de \r\r\nSeguro Social, configurada por el legislador ordinario, sin que tal \r\r\ninterpretación de la norma comprometiera su constitucionalidad, ni se \r\r\nadvirtiera irregularidad constitucional alguna, porque estaba en función de un \r\r\nsujeto de derecho público que actuaba en una doble capacidad, de derecho \r\r\npublico y privado. Lo anterior, lleva a este Tribunal a la posibilidad de \r\r\nencausar de un modo más flexible la interpretación del párrafo final del \r\r\nartículo 73 de la Constitución Política, siempre guardando armonía con todo \r\r\nel sistema, cuando se indica que los seguros “serán de exclusiva cuenta de \r\r\nlos patronos”, pues puede derivarse –lógicamente- una menor intensidad de \r\r\nla presencia del Estado, pero sin que lo anterior signifique ausencia total. Por \r\r\notra parte, el patrono sería el principal contribuyente, dado que es él quien \r\r\npor encargo el trabajador ejecuta la labor, y se le atribuye a él las \r\r\ncondiciones laborales que ofrece al trabajador, de manera que es el Patrono \r\r\nal que le corresponde velar y asumir por la seguridad de sus empleados, y al \r\r\nEstado, velar o fiscalizar el cumplimiento de esas obligaciones. En cuanto al \r\r\ntrabajador no recae obligación alguna más que las obligaciones contenidas \r\r\nen la ley laboral, porque obvio que esta decisión de la Asamblea Nacional \r\r\nConstituyente, coloca al trabajador como destinatario de la protección, es \r\r\ndecir, finalmente sería él el beneficiario de estos seguros. El constituyente \r\r\noriginario previó un esquema normativo más flexible, permitiendo una mayor \r\r\namplitud de acción para el legislador cuando señala “se regirán por \r\r\ndisposiciones especiales”, que como se indicó arriba, lo ejerció al encargar a \r\r\nun ente autónomo distinto a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social el \r\r\nestablecer, ofrecer y ejecutar los seguros de riesgo profesional. En este \r\r\npunto, se podría escoger entre la marcada presencia del Estado en la \r\r\nactividad económica y social propio de un Estado Social de Derecho, o la \r\r\nprevalencia de soluciones mediante un tejido económico a partir de modelos \r\r\nmercantiles puros o mixtos de mercado con la tutela del Estado, en lo que se \r\r\nrefiere a su entrega. El punto al que esta Sala quiere arribar es el siguiente: el \r\r\nconstituyente originario estableció un sistema para regular \r\r\nconstitucionalmente los riesgos de trabajo para que puedan ser objeto de \r\r\ndiversos diseños o estructuras jurídicas y prestacionales, basado en la \r\r\nlibertad de configuración del legislador. Lo anterior claramente como parte \r\r\nde la gran cantidad de actividades económicas productivas, así como los \r\r\nempleos y riesgos que pueden existir en cada uno de ellos. Precisamente, \r\r\nello permitió, por una decisión legislativa, optar para que el Instituto Nacional \r\r\nde Seguros ejerciera esta actividad en régimen de monopolio, lo que implicó \r\r\nun rumbo diferente para los seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo a \r\r\naquellas regulaciones de la Caja, y sin embargo, ello no lo hacía ni lo haría \r\r\ninconstitucional, como tampoco, una mayor apertura en la escogencia del \r\r\nPatrono, frente a una oferta mayor de operadores de los seguros de riesgos \r\r\nprofesionales. \n\r\r\n\nSe desprende de lo anterior otras consecuencias importantes, en las que se \r\r\npasa de una Institución en la cual operaba bajo un sistema de explotación de \r\r\nseguros monopolizado, consecuentemente un mercado fuertemente \r\r\nintervenido, y luego se optó por uno distinto de apertura, con una autoridad \r\r\nreguladora imparcial, con poderes adecuados, con protección legal y \r\r\nrecursos financieros para ejercer sus funciones y poderes. Se previó así un \r\r\nórgano regulador que debe velar e impedir el perjuicio para el trabajador. En \r\r\nconsecuencia, la tesis del accionante puede mantener una errónea \r\r\nconcepción de que el Estado desapareció por completo dentro del \r\r\nmencionado esquema patrono-trabajador-riesgos de trabajo. Está \r\r\nreconocido por el Derecho Público que el Estado, a través de una decisión \r\r\nlegislativa, puede declarar determinados servicios que se presten en régimen \r\r\nde monopolio, o se presten en un régimen de libre competencia, sin que ello \r\r\n–necesariamente- signifique detrimento en el servicio. De tal manera, puede \r\r\nliberar ciertas actividades para que operen bajo la modalidad del mercado. Si \r\r\nuna decisión de gobierno negociada por las partes en un Tratado, aprobada \r\r\nmediante mecanismos de participación ciudadana (referéndum), y agotado el \r\r\nprocedimiento de ratificación, coloca a otro órgano del Estado para regular \r\r\nimparcialmente y sobre una base no discriminatoria la actividad comercial de \r\r\nlos seguros, ello forma parte de una de las tantas opciones jurídicas que se \r\r\ntiene para legislar. En este sentido, la legitimidad de esta decisión se debe \r\r\ndecir que nace reforzada, porque la misma se origina en la reforma \r\r\nconstitucional que permite un auténtico ejercicio democrático directo que en \r\r\nel año 2002 pretendió dar participación ciudadana a las decisiones de \r\r\ngobierno, que culminó en una votación popular con carácter normativo. Eso \r\r\nen sí, tiene un peso especial, que en principio, debe ser acatado por los \r\r\nmecanismos e instituciones basadas en una democracia representantiva y \r\r\nmadura, por los distintos actores sociales y políticos (claro está, lo anterior, \r\r\nno excluye la posibilidad del ejercicio del control de constitucionalidad). \r\r\nDesde el punto de vista normativo, lo anterior tiene consecuencias naturales \r\r\nimportantes al tratarse de un convenio ratificado y por ser un instrumento \r\r\ninternacional, que implica cambiar el sistema jurídico que venía operando \r\r\ndesde hace muchos años en nuestro país, modificando automáticamente la \r\r\npostura jurídica de los órganos internos del Estado, en el momento en que \r\r\nentre en vigencia la normativa internacional. En este sentido, son \r\r\nobligaciones que vinculan a todos los poderes y funciones del Estado. Es \r\r\nimportante mencionar el artículo 1.4: Alcance de las Obligaciones que dice:\n\r\r\n\n“Las Partes garantizarán la adopción de todas las medidas \r\r\nnecesarias para hacer efectivas las disposiciones de este Tratado, \r\r\nincluida su observancia por parte de los gobiernos estatales, salvo \r\r\nque este Tratado disponga otra cosa”. \n\r\r\n\nDado que el régimen del seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo venía \r\r\noperando desde el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, el acuerdo internacional \r\r\nestablece la apertura por plazos del mercado de los seguros, incluido el \r\r\nseguro obligatorio de vehículos y de riesgos de trabajo. Lo cierto es que la \r\r\nmodernización del Instituto y la apertura del marco jurídico para romper el \r\r\nmonopolio fue un resultado directo de la aprobación del Tratado de Libre \r\r\nComercio, el cual fue analizado por la Sala Constitucional oportunamente. \r\r\nEn la consulta legislativa que se formuló en el trámite legislativo la Ley \r\r\nReguladora del Mercado de Valores, se consulta a la Sala sobre el siguiente \r\r\nproblema: \n\r\r\n\n“Violación de los artículos 50, 73 y 74 constitucionales: \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad por omisión legislativa de normar seguros \r\r\nsolidarios: refieren que esta omisión causará una desprotección \r\r\njurídica relevante para la Constitución en perjuicio de la población \r\r\nhabitante de Costa Rica, específicamente porque se conculca la \r\r\neficacia presente y futura del catálogo de las garantías sociales y \r\r\nderechos laborales fundamentales que en materia de seguros \r\r\nderivan del artículo 73 constitucional: obligatoriedad, \r\r\nuniversalidad, régimen forzoso, suministro de prestaciones aún a \r\r\nfavor de trabajadores no asegurados, inexistencia de tope de \r\r\nprestaciones, inmediatez y obligatoriedad del suministro de \r\r\nprestaciones al trabajador, posibilidad de otorgar beneficios \r\r\nextraordinarios en casos justificados, posibilidad de conmutación de \r\r\nrentas y sobretodo imposibilidad de contemplar utilidades en las \r\r\ntarifas del ente asegurador. De igual manera, aducen que los \r\r\nderechos y beneficios socio-laborales contemplados entre los \r\r\nartículos 50 y 73 constitucionales son irrenunciables y que su \r\r\nenumeración no excluye otros que se deriven del principio cristiano \r\r\nde justicia social, lo que implica que se está ante una norma \r\r\nconstitucional de cierre o de clausura del sistema de garantías \r\r\nsociales, que deja un portillo permanentemente abierto en función \r\r\nde habilitar la constitucionalización de toda aquella legislación \r\r\nsocial y laboral presente y futura. Alegan que la omisión de la \r\r\nregulación de los seguros solidarios va a generar una desprotección \r\r\nlaboral.”\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn este sentido, la Sala resolvió por sentencia No. 2008-10450 que:\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n“9.-\r\r\n Violación a los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica, por la omisión legislativa de establecer seguros sociales. \n\r\r\n\nSegún los diputados consultantes el proyecto de “Ley \r\r\nReguladora del Mercado de Seguros”, también es inconstitucional \r\r\npor omisión, en la medida en que no se contempla el establecimiento \r\r\nde los seguros sociales. Sobre el control de constitucionalidad por \r\r\nomisión se debe mencionar que este Tribunal Constitucional, desde la \r\r\nsentencia N°2005-05649 de las 14:39 hrs. de 11 de mayo de 2005 \r\r\n(dirigida contra la omisión legislativa de dictar la normativa \r\r\ninfraconstitucional relativa al proceso de referéndum) se ha \r\r\nreconocido la normatividad de todas las disposiciones \r\r\nconstitucionales, los alcances del principio de supremacía de la \r\r\nConstitución, así como la posibilidad de ser vulnerada por acción, o \r\r\npor la omisión de las autoridades públicas con poder normativo de \r\r\ndictar “una ley que desarrolle un contenido o cláusula \r\r\nconstitucional”. De ahí que el control de las omisiones \r\r\ninconstitucionales es precisamente el mayor alcance del \r\r\nreconocimiento de la Constitución como norma jurídica, exigible \r\r\nplenamente a la actuación de los poderes públicos, y el principio de \r\r\nsupremacía constitucional. Bajo esta perspectiva, si se analiza con \r\r\ndetenimiento los mandatos establecidos en los artículos 50, 73 y 74 \r\r\nde la Constitución Política a todas luces es evidente que “la \r\r\nadministración y el gobierno de los seguros sociales están a cargo de \r\r\nuna institución autónoma, denominada Caja Costarricense de Seguro \r\r\nSocial”. De ahí que en el proyecto de ley aludido la Sala no aprecia \r\r\nla existencia de alguna omisión inconstitucional que vulnere los \r\r\nderechos protegidos en los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica, razón por la cual se debe evacuar la consulta formulada en \r\r\nese sentido.”\n\r\r\n\nNo hay necesariamente pérdida de protección laboral para los trabajadores. \r\r\nSigue a lo anterior, que Costa Rica es libre e independiente, que como tal \r\r\nadquiere una obligación internacional que debe observar según el principio \r\r\nde derecho internacional pacta sunt servanda; en tal sentido, obligarse por \r\r\nun compromiso internacional con los diferentes países y obtener de éstos \r\r\nbeneficios comerciales, es lo que efectivamente se persigue de este tipo de \r\r\ninstrumentos. Por otra parte, como República democrática el parámetro y \r\r\ncentro de todo interés estatal es la persona humana, con base en dos pilares \r\r\nfundamentales, la primera es la antiquísima noción de la libertad, de manera \r\r\nque en ciertas áreas de la vida de las personas se encuentran exentas de \r\r\ncondicionamientos externos a la capacidad volitiva y cognitiva de la persona, \r\r\nde manera que la vida transcurra sin injerencias indebidas, siempre y cuando \r\r\nno se afecte la moral, o el orden público o que no perjudiquen a terceras \r\r\npersonas. Pero además, alrededor de esta libertad –en la base fundamental \r\r\nde la sociedad y el Estado- queda garantizada una institucionalidad \r\r\nestructurada para proteger al individuo en el ejercicio de esa libertad, así \r\r\ncomo a los valores sociales que el constituyente originario ha decidido \r\r\nproteger, que se derivarían de la protección del individuo frente a terceros. \r\r\nDe ahí que, pudiera decirse que existen las diferentes ramas de gobierno, \r\r\ncon pesos y contrapesos, diferentes instituciones que se diseñaron para \r\r\ncontrolarse entre sí, que controlan a otros, etc., pero que nacen con el fin de \r\r\ngarantizar un balance adecuado para garantizar los derechos fundamentales \r\r\ndel ser humano frente al Estado. Lo importante es que, únicamente la \r\r\nConstitución Política y en Ley puede interferir en esa libertad. Además, solo \r\r\nmediante una ley que cumpla con los principios democráticos, de \r\r\nproporcionalidad y razonabilidad, pueden limitar aquella libertad que posee \r\r\nel particular; la que garantiza la Constitución Política podría limitarse en el \r\r\ntanto la conducta particular pueda ser contraria a la moral, el orden público o \r\r\nque perjudique a tercero (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política). Con \r\r\nmayor razón, una norma que ha sido aprobada mediante el ejercicio de la \r\r\ndemocracia representativa, debe reputarse una norma legítima, mediante la \r\r\ndemocracia directa, como en el caso del Tratado de Libre Comercio, \r\r\naprobado por Ley de referéndum No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, \r\r\nmantiene una legitimación más estricta para las diferentes instituciones del \r\r\nEstado. Lo anterior significa que, sea la Constitución Política, un acuerdo \r\r\ninternacional, la ley u otra disposición normativa, el cumplimiento de los \r\r\ncometidos debe garantizarse, sin que sea válido, argumentar donde la norma \r\r\nno impone condiciones o pautas, establecerlas de modo antojadizo. Debe \r\r\nrecordarse que la misma Constitución Política debe asumirse como un \r\r\nmarco jurídico que permite al gobernante avanzar sus políticas, de acuerdo a \r\r\nlos tiempos que imperan, ajustando medidas o relajándolas, con miras al bien \r\r\nsocial. De ahí que no sería procedente establecer la constitucionalización de \r\r\ndisposiciones legislativas, como sostienen algunos coadyuvantes a partir de \r\r\nla reforma al Código de Trabajo mediante Ley 6727 de 9 de marzo de 1982, \r\r\nsi el mismo constituyente originario previó la flexibilidad normativa al \r\r\nestablecer su regulación por disposiciones especiales, es decir, específicas \r\r\nmediante las cuales la ley ordinaria podría ser modificada por otra ley, nada \r\r\nimpide que éstas las varíe por la materia y en el tiempo. \n\r\r\n\nPor lo pronto, el monopolio de los seguros obligatorios en favor del INS se \r\r\nrompe a partir de la aprobación por referéndum del TLC, lo que permite una \r\r\nmayor oferta de servicios nacional e internacional por parte de empresas de \r\r\nseguros de riesgos de trabajo. Está claro que la Asamblea Nacional \r\r\nConstituyente no dio el mismo tratamiento regulatorio a todos los seguros, \r\r\npor lo que rompe un aspecto primario de la seguridad social que había \r\r\nestablecido en el párrafo primero del numeral 73 indicado, de fuente tripartita \r\r\nde financiación de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, para dejar en \r\r\nlibertad al legislador la iniciativa de cómo materializar los seguros contra \r\r\nriesgos profesionales. La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente dejó la elección \r\r\nal legislador, el que, en efecto lo hizo al encargar al Instituto Nacional de \r\r\nSeguros, en un inicio los seguros sociales profesionales. Bajo el esquema \r\r\ndel constituyente originario, el seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo, \r\r\nestaría amparado por las decisiones que el legislador tomara bajo el \r\r\nconcepto “disposiciones especiales”, lo que significa que no solo diseñó \r\r\nesta cobertura con más holgura, sino lo debía hacer mediante normativa \r\r\nespecial (con suficiente potencia y resistencia), y que en esta materia recibió \r\r\nde un proceso de referéndum, como en efecto sucedió el día 7 de octubre \r\r\nde 2007. Aun cuando la actividad prestacional del seguro de riesgos de \r\r\ntrabajo fue encargada al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, como una actividad \r\r\nestatal monopólica, a favor de una institución del Estado, un cambio en la \r\r\nnormativa produjo un sistema más abierto hacia la economía de mercado \r\r\ncomo en otras áreas de la vida nacional, pero sujeto a limitaciones \r\r\nimportantes, que se derivan de la Constitución Política, como es una tutela \r\r\nestatal, un tratamiento en igualdad de condiciones, como también del \r\r\nTratado Libre Comercio que exige regulaciones no discriminatorias para \r\r\ntodos los agentes de comercio. En este sentido, está prohibido un \r\r\ntratamiento privilegiado de alguno de los oferentes del mercado de seguros. \r\r\nRetomando lo señalado arriba, es claro que el Estado a través de la \r\r\nlegislación puede escoger entre prestar los seguros de Riesgo de Trabajo en \r\r\nregímenes de monopolio o regímenes de competencia. En este sentido, el \r\r\nmonopolio lo puede ejercer el Estado o con la colaboración de personas \r\r\nfísicas o jurídicas de derecho privado, o participar en un escenario que \r\r\nbusca satisfacer las preferencias del mercado basado en un esquema libre de \r\r\nmercado. El tratamiento dado por el constituyente originario efectivamente \r\r\nse puede presentar en cualquier de los ámbitos, siendo este último el \r\r\nescogido en el mencionado referéndum. \n\r\r\n\nD.- Modalidades genéricas de contratación con empresas. \r\r\nAusencia de una norma prohibitiva.- El accionante argumenta que la \r\r\nConstitución Política contiene una prohibición para el Estado de autorizar a \r\r\nempresas privadas en actividades relacionadas con ciertos servicios \r\r\npúblicos, pero el argumento es débil. En realidad, ello está muy alejado de lo \r\r\nque ha ocurrido a lo largo de la historia del desarrollo del derecho \r\r\nadministrativo en cuanto a las concesiones y otras formas más complejas de \r\r\nla contratación administrativa. En este sentido, existen ciertas actividades de \r\r\nmarcado interés general, que por una decisión política del legislador (o \r\r\nconstituyente en su caso) asigna al Estado ese servicio o una posición \r\r\nestratégica en ella, pero a partir de ahí, se han derivado muchas figuras \r\r\ncontractuales para afrontar la prestación que exige, como la gestión \r\r\ninteresada para ciertas actividades públicas que no pueden salir de la \r\r\nadministración del Estado, o la concesión cuando encarga a sujetos físicos o \r\r\njurídicos privados una determinada prestación de servicios públicos. Como \r\r\nse indicó anteriormente, no se puede derivar del párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de \r\r\nla Constitución Política, una prohibición por la textura abierta de la norma \r\r\nque rompe con el esquema de los primeros tres párrafos del artículo \r\r\nmencionado, agregando un elemento condicional abierta a la norma \r\r\nconstitucional al establecer mayor libertad de configuración para el \r\r\nlegislador. Para el Tribunal cuando el Tratado de Libre Comercio exige a las \r\r\noperadoras de seguros una autorización por parte de una Autoridad \r\r\nReguladora, con toda claridad acoge una forma de tutela administrativa del \r\r\nEstado sobre particulares que pueden ejercer una libertad o derecho en el \r\r\nmercado, pero requieren del cumplimiento de requisitos ex ante, que deben \r\r\ncumplir todos los competidores en el mercado, sin discriminación o lo que \r\r\nes lo mismo, la existencia de normas igualmente aplicables a todos los \r\r\nagentes, lo que permite que la oferta responda a la demanda, pero de igual \r\r\nmanera, si no existiera oferta alguna, es claro que la entidad estatal no dejaría \r\r\nde operar, como en efecto lo hace. Los informes en la acción, los sendos \r\r\nescritos de los coadyuvantes interesados hacen alusión a las distintas \r\r\ncondiciones que deben cumplir las empresas que serían oferentes en el \r\r\nmercado de seguros obligatorios de riesgo de trabajo, en consecuencia, no \r\r\npuede decirse que el trabajador quedaría en desventaja, por cuanto estamos \r\r\nfrente a mínimos regulatorios (o núcleo duro del derecho fundamental) para \r\r\npoder obtener la autorización para competir en el mercado. El argumento \r\r\ndel accionante radica en que se pone en peligro la universalidad del derecho \r\r\nfundamental a la seguridad social, dado que no existen obligaciones \r\r\ncomprometidas a la atención universal de trabajadores por parte de empresas \r\r\nmercantiles, porque como empresas que buscan la retribución y el lucro, \r\r\npondrán en peligro el sistema de protección ideado por el constituyente \r\r\noriginario, el Código de Trabajo y el Protocolo de San Salvador, así como \r\r\ndel Convenio 102 de la OIT. Sin embargo dichas afirmaciones deben \r\r\ntomarse con sumo cuidado, dado que lejos de ser un asunto estrictamente \r\r\njurídico, incursiona en aspectos políticos de la decisión legislativa y de \r\r\nmedios para alcanzar determinados objetivos. En tal sentido, las \r\r\ndisposiciones internacionales deben ser normas que albergan espacio para \r\r\nlas distintas políticas nacionales de los Estados miembros, en el tanto dejan \r\r\nabierta los mecanismos para hacer efectivos los derechos, normalmente \r\r\nfrente a compromisos u obligaciones internacionales de resultados, pero sin \r\r\nser convenios internacionales de medios (como parece plantearlo el \r\r\naccionante). Dicho de otra manera, las disposiciones dejan los mecanismos \r\r\nde implementación a los países para que éstos adopten las medidas mínimas \r\r\nsegún el propio contexto social y económico. En este sentido, debe tomarse \r\r\nen cuenta que el Protocolo de San Salvador establece:\n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 1. Obligación de Adoptar Medidas\n\r\r\n\nLos Estados partes en el presente Protocolo Adicional a la \r\r\nConvención Americana sobre Derecho Humanos se comprometen a \r\r\nadoptar las medidas necesarias tanto de orden interno como \r\r\nmediante la cooperación entre los Estados, especialmente económica \r\r\ny técnica, hasta el máximo de los recursos disponibles y tomando \r\r\nen cuenta su grado de desarrollo, a fin de lograr progresivamente, \r\r\ny de conformidad con la legislación interna\r\r\n, la plena efectividad \r\r\nde los derechos que se reconocen en el presente Protocolo. \n\r\r\n\nArtículo 2. Obligación de Adoptar Disposiciones de Derecho \r\r\nInterno\n\r\r\n\nSi el ejercicio de los derechos establecidos en el presente \r\r\nProtocolo no estuviera ya garantizado por disposiciones \r\r\nlegislativas o de otro carácter, los Estados partes se comprometen a \r\r\nadoptar, con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las \r\r\ndisposiciones de este Protocolo, las medidas legislativas o de otro \r\r\ncarácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos tales derechos” \r\r\n(lo escrito en negrita no es del original).\n\r\r\n\nUna de las características que distinguen a los instrumentos de derechos \r\r\nhumanos de los demás tratados, es precisamente que su objeto es muy \r\r\ndistinto al resto del derecho internacional público, dado que en los primeros \r\r\nel fin y objetivo es el ser humano, en los demás, lo que las Altas Partes \r\r\ndecidan al pautar como objetivo en sus relaciones recíprocas, tratados \r\r\nlimítrofes, de extradición de fugitivos de la justicia, cooperación técnica y \r\r\ncientífica, etc. En los primeros, el compromiso internacional se dirige como \r\r\ntal al ser humano, y no en las concesiones recíprocas de interés de los \r\r\nEstados, y será él quien asume los compromisos para materializar los \r\r\nderechos humanos pactados y reconocidos a favor del ser humano. Sin \r\r\nembargo, los Tratados Internacionales –especialmente multilaterales- deben \r\r\nadoptar un lenguaje inclusivo para los diferentes sistemas jurídicos y \r\r\npolíticos de las partes que le permita profundizar el objetivo y fin pactado, a \r\r\npartir de las obligaciones libremente aceptadas y receptadas por sus \r\r\nordenamientos jurídicos. De ahí que, no podría afirmarse que un \r\r\ndeterminado tratado de derechos humanos impone un único esquema \r\r\njurídico para solucionar problemas en las respectivas jurisdicciones, de \r\r\nmanera que establece solo una forma para llevar a cabo los objetivos de la \r\r\nlegislación internacional, por el contrario, queda a disposición de cada parte \r\r\nllevarlo a cabo, localizando sus fortalezas, y ubicando los mayores esfuerzos \r\r\ny recursos una vez establecido el estado de cosas en su propia jurisdicción, \r\r\npara adoptar las medidas internas; significa que puede echar mano a las \r\r\nformas públicas, privadas o mixtas, para obtener resultados en dirección a \r\r\nlos compromisos adoptados a nivel internacional y en beneficio de sus \r\r\nhabitantes. Corolario de lo anterior, es que en una decisión estructural, nada \r\r\nobstaculizaría determinar otras formas de prestaciones del seguro de riesgos \r\r\nprofesionales, siempre que sean conformes a los convenios internacionales \r\r\nque regulan las relaciones comerciales del país y las de los derechos \r\r\nhumanos. Así, en el Protocolo de San Salvador establece en cuanto al \n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 9. Derecho a la Seguridad Social\n\r\r\n\n1. \r\r\nToda persona tiene derecho a la seguridad social que la proteja \r\r\ncontra las consecuencias de la vejez y de la incapacidad que la \r\r\nimposibilite física o mentalmente para obtener los medios para \r\r\nllevar una vida digna y decorosa. En caso de muerte del \r\r\nbeneficiario, las prestaciones de seguridad social serán aplicadas \r\r\na sus dependientes.\n\r\r\n\n2. \r\r\nCuando se trate de personas que se encuentran trabajando, el \r\r\nderecho a la seguridad social cubrirá al menos la atención \r\r\nmédica y el subsidio o jubilación\r\r\n en caso de accidentes de \r\r\ntrabajo o de enfermedad profesional y, cuando se trate de \r\r\nmujeres, licencia retribuida por maternidad antes y después del \r\r\nparto” (lo escrito en negrita no es del original).\n\r\r\n\nLo cierto es que la normativa internacional establece lo que la jerga de la \r\r\nseguridad social denomina en algunos de los documentos de la OIT el piso \r\r\nsocial o piso de protección social como un mínimo de obligaciones \r\r\nfundamentales que sí podrían ser justiciables, sí existen obligaciones \r\r\njurídicas no cumplidas y exigibles en forma doméstica, o agotada ésta, a \r\r\nnivel internacional. Por ello, es cierto que el seguro de riesgo del trabajo se \r\r\nconcibe para una relación laboral de dependencia o subordinación, en la que \r\r\ndebe garantizarse prestaciones médicas al trabajador en caso de accidente o \r\r\nenfermedad laboral. El Convenio 102 de la OIT atribuye al patrono la \r\r\nresponsabilidad por el entorno laboral de su empleado, y se encuentra \r\r\nconforme con el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 constitucional. Lo importante es \r\r\nque el Convenio 102 de la OIT contiene nueve ramas de la seguridad social, \r\r\ndonde establece normas mínimas para cada una de ellas, y enuncia \r\r\nprincipios para la sostenibilidad y buena gobernanza de dichos sistemas. \r\r\nEste convenio incluye una cláusula de flexibilidad de manera que al ratificar \r\r\nel Tratado, el Estado puede escoger por lo menos tres áreas de protección. \r\r\nDatos importantes surgen del Informe de la OIT [Conferencia Internacional \r\r\ndel Trabajo, 100 reunión, 2011 \"Seguridad Social para la justicia social y una \r\r\nglobalización equitativa\"] el cual indica, entre otras cosas:\n\r\r\n\n“185. Los regímenes de accidentes del trabajo que ofrecen \r\r\nprestaciones suelen estar organizados sobre una base contributiva; a \r\r\nveces constituyen un fondo separado y otras veces forman parte de \r\r\notras ramas de la seguridad social. Debido a este vínculo entre el \r\r\nriesgo y la prevención en el lugar de trabajo, en muchos países los \r\r\nregímenes de accidentes del trabajo están organizados en forma \r\r\nseparada de otros regímenes y se financian únicamente con \r\r\ncotizaciones de los empleadores. Las tasas de cotización suelen \r\r\ndiferenciarse de acuerdo con el nivel de riesgo del accidente o \r\r\nenfermedad en los diversos tipos de actividades económicas.” (pag. \r\r\n76);\n\r\r\n\nEl accionante alega que se debilita la posición de las personas no \r\r\naseguradas, para beneficio del régimen comercial y perjuicio del trabajador. \r\r\n Esto se traduce en un quebranto del principio de progresividad de los \r\r\nderechos sociales. Para que sea procedente este argumento debe acreditarse \r\r\nla regresividad con el cambio de régimen jurídico o que el mismo sea \r\r\nevidente, pero, ni los trabajos de la propia OIT avalan un único acercamiento \r\r\nal tema como pretende demostrar el accionante, cuando, por el contrario, \r\r\nson decisiones vinculadas con la libertad de configuración del legislador. En \r\r\neste sentido, el derecho internacional no aboga por implementar políticas \r\r\ninamovibles dentro de los esfuerzos nacionales para alcanzar los objetivos \r\r\ninternacionalmente tutelados, por el contrario, debe existir un espacio para la \r\r\nimplementación de las obligaciones internacionales, las que se quebrantarían \r\r\nsi los países no legislan o actúan en sus esfuerzos por mejorar las \r\r\nprestaciones protegidas internacionalmente. Como se ha indicado, se trata de \r\r\nun tema de oportunidad y conveniencia que no debe ocupar a la Sala \r\r\nConstitucional – en principio- no le corresponde resolver si la medida es \r\r\nmás o menos conveniente, dado que sería entrar en un campo de la \r\r\nespeculación y ausentes reglas claras para dilucidar los derechos \r\r\nfundamentales reclamados, que escapan al derecho de la Constitución \r\r\nPolítica. En este sentido, no toda medida nueva que se introduzca en el \r\r\nordenamiento jurídico es un asunto de resorte del juez constitucional, sino \r\r\nque corresponde al legislador valorar su oportunidad y conveniencia, así \r\r\ncomo su viabilidad constitucional. Como se expuso arriba, en primer lugar, \r\r\nno existe un mandato de monopolio o prohibición para que los seguros \r\r\nobligatorios de riesgos de trabajo operen fuera de las estructuras \r\r\ninstitucionales del Estado, corolario de lo anterior, éste puede servirse de \r\r\ndiferentes agentes privados para llevar a cabo las prestaciones necesarias, \r\r\nsean públicas o privadas. Extrapolar que este sistema implica un menoscabo \r\r\no una pérdida de derechos de los destinatarios de servicios, no obedece a la \r\r\nrealidad imperante de la contratación administrativa. \n\r\r\n\nE.- Jerarquía constitucional de los tratados internacionales y sus \r\r\nefectos en la legislación nacional.- El rango normativo del derecho \r\r\ninternacional como norma interna se ubica en la Constitución Política, de \r\r\nmanera que corresponde al constituyente originario o derivado decidir y \r\r\nprocurar el procedimiento de incorporación de ese derecho al ordenamiento \r\r\nnacional, como también resolver el problema de su jerarquía normativa. \r\r\nPreliminarmente, debe mencionarse que el derecho internacional después de \r\r\nsu incorporación al ordenamiento jurídico, mediante el procedimiento \r\r\nlegislativo de aprobación contenido en el artículo 121 inciso 4) de la \r\r\nConstitución Política, tiene efectos jurídicos. Un análisis de los sistemas \r\r\njurídicos de incorporación de la legislación internacional en el mundo \r\r\npermite diferenciar, a grosso modo, tres sistemas principales: aquellos \r\r\npaíses que exigen una doble aprobación parlamentaria, tanto para la \r\r\nratificación del tratado y luego de las disposiciones legislativas específicas \r\r\npara la incorporación del tratado internacional como disposiciones \r\r\ndomésticas, que opera en los países escandinavos. El siguiente, en los \r\r\npaíses donde solo basta la voluntad del Ejecutivo para comprometer \r\r\ninternacionalmente al país, pero que requerirán de la legislación nacional para \r\r\nque se adopte el derecho internacional, como en Inglaterra y los países que \r\r\nforman parte de la mancomunidad británica de naciones, y finalmente, \r\r\naquellos que con la aprobación parlamentaria a lo actuado por el Poder \r\r\nEjecutivo opera la incorporación de la normativa internacional cumplido el \r\r\nproceso de ratificación por el Estado, como en nuestro país. Existen de \r\r\nigual manera, otros problemas como la asignación de la jerarquía normativa \r\r\nde la legislación internacional que se incorpora al ordenamiento jurídico, \r\r\nsiendo que todas estas decisiones, lejos de resolverse en el ámbito del \r\r\nderecho internacional, su solución se radica en la organización primaria, \r\r\ndentro del dominio de cada Nación. En el caso de la incorporación, nuestro \r\r\npaís tiene el sistema que se ubicó en el último sistema, el más representativo, \r\r\nsiendo lo cierto que solo requiere de la aprobación o improbación legislativa \r\r\ndel tratado, en cuyo caso obtenido lo primero, si se procede a la ratificación, \r\r\nes suficiente para que opere la incorporación del derecho internacional con \r\r\npreeminencia a las demás disposiciones nacionales ordinarias. Lo anterior \r\r\ntiene esas consecuencias, gracias al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, \r\r\nque establece:\n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 7.- Los tratados públicos, los convenios \r\r\ninternacionales y los concordatos debidamente aprobados por la \r\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, tendrán desde su promulgación o desde el día \r\r\nque ellos designen, autoridad superior a las leyes. \n\r\r\n\nLos tratados públicos y los convenios internacionales \r\r\nreferentes a la integridad territorial o la organización política del \r\r\npaís, requerirán aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, por \r\r\nvotación no menor de las tres cuartas partes de la totalidad de sus \r\r\nmiembros, y la de los dos tercios de los miembros de una Asamblea \r\r\nConstituyente, convocada al efecto”.\n\r\r\n\nPero históricamente la negociación e incorporación de tratados no siempre \r\r\nfue receptado de esa manera por nuestra legislación, por el contrario, su \r\r\ntratamiento fue extremadamente cauteloso y receloso. No siempre los \r\r\nefectos del derecho internacional eran tan claros como podría interpretarse \r\r\nhoy en día. Así, la norma es el resultado de una reforma constitucional en \r\r\n1968, pues contaba con otra redacción, aislacionista y restrictiva para que \r\r\nlos funcionarios públicos pudieran celebrar tratados internacionales, de \r\r\nforma limitada la que era la siguiente:\n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 7°-- Ninguna autoridad puede celebrar pactos, tratados o \r\r\nconve­nios que se opongan a la soberanía e independencia de la \r\r\nRepública. Quien lo haga será juzgado por traición a la Patria.\n\r\r\n\nCualquier tratado o convención que tramite el Poder Ejecutivo, \r\r\nreferente a la integridad territorial o a la organización política del \r\r\npaís, requerirá la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, por \r\r\nvotación no menor de las tres cuarta partes de la totalidad de sus \r\r\nmiembros y la de los dos tercios de votos de una Asamblea \r\r\nConstituyente convocada al efecto”.\n\r\r\n\nUna lectura estricta del artículo trascrito da lugar a la impracticabilidad y el \r\r\ncontrasentido automático, impropio de un razonamiento constitucional con \r\r\nel derecho internacional público, fundamentado en un exacerbado \r\r\nsentimiento anti Federación Centroamericana, pero que desconocía un \r\r\nfundamento básico de la democracia representativa, precisamente los efectos \r\r\ndel ejercicio libre de la soberanía, en la voluntad libremente expresada (por \r\r\nlas mayorías parlamentarias que aprueban un compromiso adquirido por el \r\r\nPoder Ejecutivo), y que permite adquirir y conceder derechos y obligaciones \r\r\ninternacionales concertadas mutuamente o multilateralmente por diferentes \r\r\nEstados. La obligación internacional adquirida por un país en el derecho \r\r\ninternacional público implica certeza en la forma en que deben conducirse en \r\r\nel orden internacional, por cuanto adquiere derechos, como a su vez deberes \r\r\na otros, y viceversa. De de ahí que, nuestro país sufrió una importante \r\r\nreforma estructural en 1968 cuando modificó la jerarquía normativa del \r\r\nderecho internacional, dado que en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política \r\r\nestablecía originalmente aquella posición extrema, proteccionista, contra un \r\r\nPoder Ejecutivo fuerte, quizá una disposición que representaba ciertamente \r\r\nel temor del constituyente originario contra aquellos Poderes Ejecutivos \r\r\nhegemónicos propios de los países latinoamericanos. Pero, luego de un \r\r\nanálisis político y social concienzudo, mesurado, y vistas las cosas en una \r\r\nperspectiva para el beneficio del país, al regresar las aguas a su nivel normal \r\r\nluego de 1949, se optó por abrir el mecanismo pragmático de incorporación \r\r\ndel derecho internacional al ordenamiento jurídico. Precisamente, la \r\r\nexposición de motivos de la reforma legislativa operada mediante la Ley \r\r\n4123 de 29 de mayo de 1968, claramente describe los fines proteccionistas \r\r\ndel reformado artículo 7, de la siguiente manera:\n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 7.-\r\r\n En este artículo se consagró el criterio \r\r\nconservador de la mayoría de los constituyentes de 1949, que sentía \r\r\nuna profunda hostilidad hacia toda forma de acercamiento con los \r\r\npaíses centroamericanos. Dentro de ese celo nacionalista se fue \r\r\ndemasiado lejos, al señalar en el párrafo primero que se \r\r\nconsideraría traidor de la Patria, a quien celebrare “pactos, \r\r\ntratados o convenios que se opongan a la soberanía e \r\r\nindependencia de la República”. Todo tratado, pacto o convenio \r\r\nconstituyen una limitación de la soberanía o independencia de \r\r\ncualquier país. Si fuera a aplicarse dicho párrafo primero en forma \r\r\nestricta, todos los gobernantes que ha tenido el país desde 1949 en \r\r\nadelante, habrían de ser juzgados por tan grave delito. Creemos \r\r\nnosotros que dicho párrafo debe suprimirse, por peligroso”.\n\r\r\n\nEsa corrección, cierta y ajustada al derecho internacional, prevalece hoy en el \r\r\nartículo 7 de la Constitución Política. Razones históricas pesaron para \r\r\nproceder a dicha modificación, pues si se pretendía una integración \r\r\neconómica con centroamérica, ésta debía ser privilegiada por los beneficios \r\r\neconómicos y de desarrollo, lo que finalmente se solucionó a través de la \r\r\nubicación jerárquica del derecho internacional. En la discusión de la reforma \r\r\nconstitucional, se puede citar lo siguiente: \n\r\r\n\n“Si no se le da autoridad superior a los tratados y a los \r\r\nconcordatos sobre la ley ordinaria, tendremos la constante presencia \r\r\nde conflictos, de antónomias (sic) jurídicas que se llaman, de \r\r\nnormas que chocan, normas que disponen una cosa en contrario, y \r\r\nque nos obligarían constantemente a recurrir de la \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad o de la inaplicabilidad de una de estas normas \r\r\nante nuestros tribunales. Ello vendría a minar el mercado común \r\r\ncentroamericano, y nos podría en un mal predicado. Por eso es \r\r\nnecesario hacer esta innovación, dar este paso de colocar el tratato \r\r\n(sic), el convenio, el concordato en un status superior a la ley \r\r\nordinaria, para que la ley corriente quede subordinada a esta \r\r\nconcepción superior del tratato (sic). Esto es repito, un instituto \r\r\njurídico del derecho comunitario. Esta es una modificación del \r\r\ntradicional derecho de las formas corrientes de que cada norma rige \r\r\ndentro de su determinada área o esfera territorial, dentro de cierto \r\r\námbito en que se ejerce la soberanía por parte de un Estado, e \r\r\nirrumpe sobre los demás territorios, sobre las demás personas, sobre \r\r\nlas demás soberanías, imponiendo disposiciones, sin que se haya \r\r\nmermado el valor de cada uno de los países. Es una norma sana, es \r\r\nuna norma aconsejable y es la única solución que hay para evitar el \r\r\nconflicto del tratado con la norma corriente”.\n\r\r\n\nEn este sentido, el constituyente derivado optó por una solución práctica al \r\r\nproblema de las antinomias jurídicas, de manera que aprobado un tratado \r\r\ninternacional por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, ratificado por el Poder \r\r\nEjecutivo, éste se incorpora al derecho nacional con una posición \r\r\nprivilegiada dentro del ordenamiento jurídico. Esto es lógico, consecuente y \r\r\nclaramente menos erosivo para los objetivos propuestos por las Altas Partes, \r\r\nfrente a las obligaciones asumidas libremente, para tener el derecho \r\r\ninternacional incorporado con la potencia y resistencia suficiente para \r\r\nimponer los términos del Tratado y no ser modificado por legislación \r\r\nordinaria y reglamentaria que le contradiga o que esté en contradicción. La \r\r\nrazón está en la obligación de honrar los compromisos libremente adquiridos \r\r\npor los países contratantes de buena fe: principio pacta sunt servanda y de \r\r\nbona fides. Por otra parte, la reserva y declaraciones realizadas por la \r\r\ndelegación que firmó el Convenio de Viena sobre el Derecho de los \r\r\nTratados, dejó en claro el reconocimiento expreso del sentido del artículo \r\r\n27, de la importancia de que una parte no podría invocarse las disposiciones \r\r\nde su derecho interno, como la falta de legislación ordinaria, para incumplir \r\r\nun tratado. Lo dispuesto en la Constitución Política ya fue discutido arriba. \r\r\nDe ahí que, con razón, la Sala al examinar la inconstitucionalidad de un \r\r\ntratado internacional debe optar primero por una interpretación conforme al \r\r\nDerecho de la Constitución, según lo pauta el artículo 73 inciso e) de la Ley \r\r\nde la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de manera que “la declaratoria se hará \r\r\nsolamente para los efectos de que se interpreten y apliquen en armonía con \r\r\nla Constitución o, si su contradicción con ella resultare insalvable, se \r\r\nordene su desaplicación con efectos generales y se proceda a su \r\r\ndenuncia”. La interpretación conforme es preferible antes de proceder a la \r\r\ndenuncia de las obligaciones internacionales, o peor aún, a la comisión de \r\r\ninfracciones que conllevaría múltiples consecuencias, muchas de las cuales \r\r\npueden ir más allá de sanciones económicas, de prestigio y reconocimiento, \r\r\nincluso de participación en foros de cooperación y para recibir asistencia \r\r\ninternacional. De igual manera se pone de manifiesto, en forma inequívoca, el \r\r\nprincipio de supremacía de Derecho Internacional. Lo anterior supone que \r\r\nun tratado podría ser contrario a la Constitución Política, pero no cuando \r\r\ncontradice la legislación nacional ordinaria, que por su jerarquía, se vería \r\r\nmodificada tácita o expresamente por el Tratado, y la ley de implementación \r\r\n(en el caso de tratados non-self executing), el que expresamente debe señalar \r\r\nsi la legislación mantiene determinadas normas del ordenamiento jurídico \r\r\npese a la aprobación del Tratado.\n\r\r\n\nEl accionante menciona el quebrantamiento de diversos principios de la \r\r\nseguridad social, como el servicio al costo, universalidad, suficiencia de la \r\r\nprotección, automaticidad de la protección, beneficios extraordinarios e \r\r\nirrenunciabilidad. En realidad en algunos, lo que señala el accionante son \r\r\nalgunas de las disposiciones legales que rigen el riesgo de trabajo establecido \r\r\nen el Código de Trabajo, de manera que, no opera el principio alegado por el \r\r\naccionante y de los coadyuvantes, de que el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la \r\r\nConstitución Política establece un campo de atracción para los derechos \r\r\ncontemplados en el Código de Trabajo, y por ende, no pueden ser \r\r\nmodificados ni siquiera por ley. Sin embargo, visto prudencialmente, el \r\r\nlegislador tiene la competencia de asegurar la eficacia de muchos de estos \r\r\nprincipios mientras sean compatibles con las obligaciones internacionales, \r\r\naún bajo la liberalización del mercado de los seguros. En este sentido, una \r\r\nverdad de Perogrullo es que el Código de Trabajo debe ser interpretado \r\r\nconforme a la apertura del mercado, de manera que si en el artículo 205 del \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo establece al Instituto Nacional de Seguros como el ente \r\r\nadministrador del seguro, ello claramente fue modificado por el Tratado y la \r\r\nLeyes de implementación, para dar lugar a la SUGESE y sus competencias. \r\r\nPor ejemplo, el principio de servicio al costo que se reclama sería un \r\r\ncontrasentido con la operación de una actividad comercial, la cual estaría \r\r\ndentro de las competencias de SUGESE para establecer los mecanismos \r\r\nque permita obtener un lucro razonable. Pero, el fundamento constitucional \r\r\ndel Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo es compatible con el principio de \r\r\nuniversalidad, suficiencia de la protección o piso social del seguro, de la \r\r\nautomaticidad del Convenio 102 de la OIT, e irrenunciabilidad del artículo \r\r\n74 de la Constitución Política, lo que tampoco puede decir la Sala que son \r\r\ninfringidos. Debe destacarse que cuando los instrumentos internacionales se \r\r\nrefieren a un régimen básico, uno de protecciones fundamentales en los \r\r\nseguros sociales, significa el establecimiento de un régimen jurídico que \r\r\notorgue determinados derechos a las prestaciones médicas y de \r\r\nindemnización en casos de accidentes laborales y profesionales, \r\r\nindependientemente de quien lo preste. En este sentido, el Estado tiene un \r\r\npapel protagónico en diversos niveles: el primero al ser el moderador de la \r\r\nactividad comercial estableciendo condiciones y requisitos para la operación \r\r\nno discriminatoria entre los diferentes intervinientes en el mercado; y \r\r\nsegundo, significa que también deberá acordar las condiciones necesarias \r\r\npara que las prestaciones internacionalmente exigibles sigan siendo efectivas \r\r\nen su jurisdicción, incluso, siendo partícipe del mercado como se estableció \r\r\nen la Ley No. 8622, y que a su vez reforma la Ley No. 12 de 30 de octubre \r\r\nde 1924. El artículo 28 de la Ley No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, establece \r\r\nentre otras cosas, en el párrafo cuarto establece que: \n\r\r\n\n“… La Superintendencia regirá sus actividades por lo dispuesto en \r\r\nesta Ley, sus reglamentos y las demás leyes aplicables. Las normas \r\r\ngenerales y directrices dictadas por la Superintendencia, serán de \r\r\nobservancia obligatoria para las entidades y personas supervisadas.\n\r\r\n\nLa Superintendencia es un órgano operacionalmente independiente \r\r\ny responsable en el ejercicio de sus funciones; tiene suficientes \r\r\npoderes, protección legal y recursos financieros para ejecutar sus \r\r\nfunciones y ejercer sus poderes. Asimismo, debe adoptar una clara, \r\r\ntransparente y consistente regulación y supervisión, y debe emplear, \r\r\nentrenar y mantener un equipo de trabajo suficiente con altos \r\r\nestándares profesionales, quienes sigan los estándares apropiados de \r\r\nconfidencialidad”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPor otra parte, el artículo 29 del mismo cuerpo normativo establece:\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n“Objetivos y funciones de la Superintendencia General de Seguros\n\r\r\n\nLa Superintendencia tiene por objeto velar por la estabilidad y el \r\r\neficiente funcionamiento del mercado de seguros, así como entregar \r\r\nla más amplia información a los asegurados. Para ello, autorizará, \r\r\nregulará y supervisará a las personas, físicas o jurídicas, que \r\r\nintervengan en los actos o contratos relacionados con la actividad \r\r\naseguradora, reaseguradora, la oferta pública y la realización de \r\r\nnegocios de seguros.\n\r\r\n\n…\n\r\r\n\nAdicionalmente, le corresponderán las siguientes funciones:\n\r\r\n\na) \r\r\n…\n\r\r\n\nb) \r\r\n…\n\r\r\n\nj) \r\r\n Dictar las demás normas y directrices de carácter técnico u \r\r\noperativo.\n\r\r\n\nk) \r\r\n…\n\r\r\n\nq)”.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn esas funciones, en la actualidad el Instituto Nacional de Seguros continúa \r\r\nen funcionamiento en el Mercado de los Seguros, además de brindar los \r\r\nmismos servicios de seguros obligatorios, operando, para ventaja del \r\r\ntrabajador no asegurado, queda con una capacidad residual, así como la \r\r\ngarantía establecida de que la empresa privada contratada por un patrono, \r\r\ndebe asumir al trabajador aun cuando omitiera reportarlo, debe asumirlo \r\r\ncomo no asegurado. No hay en este sentido afectación al principio universal \r\r\nde protección del seguro de riesgos de trabajo, automaticidad de la \r\r\nprotección, suficiencia de la protección, entre otros. En este sentido, es \r\r\nimportante resaltar que el párrafo cuarto del artículo 1° de la mencionada \r\r\nLey No. 12 del 30 de octubre de 1924 establece:\n\r\r\n\n“En el desarrollo de la actividad aseguradora en el país, que incluye \r\r\nla administración de los seguros comerciales, la administración del \r\r\nSeguro de Riesgos del Trabajo y del Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos \r\r\nAutomotores, el INS contará con plena garantía del Estado”.\n\r\r\n\nSe pueden extraer varias conclusiones importantes de lo anterior, pues \r\r\naunado a lo establecido por el Tratado de Libre Comercio, en cuanto \r\r\ncontiene obligaciones exigibles de plazo vencido, las disposiciones legales \r\r\ncomo reglamentarias que se dictan, se hacen en honor a la ejecución de las \r\r\nobligaciones internacionales adquiridas por el país. Lo anterior es \r\r\nconsistente con el segundo nivel mencionado, en el tanto en que el Estado a \r\r\ntravés de su aseguradora prevé las medidas para garantizar aquel piso social \r\r\nnecesario para mantener los niveles de salud ocupacional como de un \r\r\nrégimen de riesgos de trabajo, está claramente en consonancia con el \r\r\nReglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, \r\r\naprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero \r\r\nmediante artículo 8, numeral I, del acta de la sesión 894-2010, celebrada el \r\r\n10 de diciembre del 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 del 22 de diciembre de 2010). \r\r\nEn este sentido, el mencionado Reglamento establece:\n\r\r\n\n“Artículo 20. Casos de trabajadores no asegurados\n\r\r\n\nSi el trabajador no estuviera asegurado contra los riesgos del \r\r\ntrabajo, de conformidad con el Código de Trabajo, el Instituto \r\r\nNacional de Seguros le otorgará todas las prestaciones que le \r\r\nhubiesen correspondido de haber estado asegurado, salvo aquellos \r\r\ncasos en que el patrono tuviera vigente una póliza de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo con cualquier entidad aseguradora y omitiera reportar al \r\r\ntrabajador para ser considerado dentro de la protección de seguro. \r\r\nEn esos casos, los trabajadores se considerarán como no asegurados \r\r\ny las prestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad aseguradora \r\r\nreceptora de la prima”. \n\r\r\n\nNo es un problema estrictamente de naturaleza constitucional el supuesto \r\r\nimpacto económico de aquella garantía del Estado, sino que es de resorte \r\r\nexclusivo del legislador establecer las medidas económicas necesarias para \r\r\ncompensar un presunto impacto negativo que pudiera tener la Institución, de \r\r\nmanera que ello actúa a favor de la población de trabajadores no cubierto \r\r\npor el Patrono contra los riesgos de trabajo, sea este privado o público. En \r\r\nel criterio de la Sala, el artículo refuerza la posición del trabajador, en vez de \r\r\ndebilitarlo, toda vez que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo no ha perdido su \r\r\ncarácter obligatorio, universal y forzoso como se pretende señalar en el \r\r\nescrito de interposición de la acción. Adicionalmente, la potestad \r\r\nreglamentaria de la SUGESE emana directamente del Tratado de Libre \r\r\nComercio, de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, entre otras \r\r\nnormas, de donde surge la obligación de tratar en forma no discriminatoria a \r\r\nlos diferentes actores del mercado, pero además, con la posibilidad de \r\r\nregular las materias que detecte sean necesarias de carácter técnico y \r\r\noperativo para un mejor servicio para los trabajadores que sufren un riesgo \r\r\nlaboral, lo que incluye interpretar las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo. \n\r\r\n\n VI.- Conclusión. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar la acción.\n\r\r\n\nPor tanto:\n\r\r\n\n Se declara sin lugar la acción. La magistrada Calzada Miranda da \r\r\nrazones diferentes sobre la legitimación de la condición del diputado \r\r\naccionante. La Magistrada Calzada y los Magistrados Armijo y Cruz, salvan \r\r\nel voto y declaran con lugar la acción con sus consecuencias.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n. \n\r\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\r\r\n\nPresidenta\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert \r\r\nArmijo S.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. Fernando \r\r\nCruz C.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nFernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate \r\r\nCh.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAcción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nVoto particular de la Magistrada Calzada Miranda y los Magistrados \r\r\nArmijo Sancho y Cruz Castro, con redacción del último\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nLos suscritos Magistrados salvamos el voto en esta acción y \r\r\nconsideramos que debe declararse con lugar, con sus consecuencias, \r\r\ncon fundamento en lo siguiente.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEl sub inciso b), del artículo III .2, de la Sección H, del Anexo 12.9.2, \r\r\ndel Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros”, del Tratado de Libre \r\r\nComercio entre Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República \r\r\nDominicana, ratificado por Costa Rica por medio de la ley n.° 8622 de \r\r\n21 de noviembre de 2007, y el transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del \r\r\nMercado de Seguros, aprobada por medio de la ley n.° 8653 de 22 de \r\r\njulio de 2008, en tanto disponen la apertura al mercado del seguro de \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo, presentan un roce constitucional. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEl accionante considera que dicha normativa: 1. Viola los principios \r\r\nconstitucionales que protegen los seguros sociales (arts. 50, 73 y 74) \r\r\npor desnaturalizarlo y convertirlo en un servicio comercial con ánimo \r\r\nde lucro. Indica que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo es un seguro \r\r\nsocial protegido constitucionalmente. Indica que la Sala \r\r\nConstitucional y los tratados internacionales han reconocido que este \r\r\nseguro integra el sistema de seguridad social (SCV 2008-16964, \r\r\nconvenio no.102 de OIT, protocolo de San Salvador art.9, ) y que el \r\r\nseguro de riesgos de trabajo integra el derecho fundamental a la \r\r\nseguridad social, que se rige por principios como obligatoriedad, \r\r\nservicio al costo, universalidad, irrenunciabilidad y otros. Lo cual es \r\r\nincompatible con equipararlo a un servicio financiero más. 2. Viola el \r\r\nprincipio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales: al reducir \r\r\nlos beneficios con lo que hoy ya cuentan los trabajadores, \r\r\ndisminuyendo y desmejorando las ventajas actuales. Actualmente \r\r\ntodos los ingresos deben destinarse a mejoras en beneficio de los \r\r\ntrabajadores. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAl respecto, los suscritos Magistrados consideramos que el accionante \r\r\nlleva razón en sus alegatos y que, el hecho de que el constituyente \r\r\nhaya incluido el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo dentro del Capítulo \r\r\nde Derechos y Garantías Sociales de la Constitución Política, \r\r\nevidencia que no se trata de un simple seguro de responsabilidad civil, \r\r\nsino de un seguro social, que aun cuando pueda regirse por \r\r\ndisposiciones especiales (valga decir, distintas a las de los otros \r\r\nseguros) no por ello deja de tener el carácter de seguro social.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nLas normas impugnadas, en tanto permiten la inclusión del seguro \r\r\ncontra riesgos del trabajo dentro de la apertura comercial prevista en \r\r\nel Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estado Unidos, Centroamérica y \r\r\nRepública Dominicana, son inconstitucionales\r\r\n; ello aunque se dicte \r\r\ncon posterioridad una ley que proteja los principios que rigen ese \r\r\nseguro (entre ellos el de universalidad y el de progresividad ) y regule \r\r\naspectos como lo concerniente a la atención de los trabajadores no \r\r\nasegurados, la forma de distribuir los costos de esa atención entre los \r\r\ndiferentes aseguradores, lo relativo al aseguramiento de actividades \r\r\npoco atractivas, lo relacionado con la prevención en materia de salud \r\r\nocupacional, entre otros.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEste tipo de seguro, por estar consagrado constitucionalmente en el \r\r\nart.73 (y a pesar de que allí no se dice que será administrado \r\r\nmonopólicamente por el INS), es un tipo de seguro social (y por lo \r\r\ntanto, sometido a ciertos principios en beneficio de los trabajadores), \r\r\nque por lo tanto, resulta incompatible con un sistema de apertura \r\r\ncomercial (competencia, lucro).\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nHistóricamente, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo data desde el año \r\r\n1868, en que el Padre Francisco Calvo había asociado a los artesanos \r\r\n(principalmente zapateros, panaderos y cuidadores de mulas) con el \r\r\nobjeto de establecer una Caja de Ahorros (véase la Gaceta del 9 de \r\r\nnoviembre de 1868), como una especie de socorro diferenciado para \r\r\nla clase trabajadora.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEste seguro tuvo su propia evolución. Antes de triunfar la teoría del \r\r\n\"riesgo social-laboral\", inicialmente se exigía la culpa del patrono \r\r\npara dar base a la responsabilidad, luego se pasó de la culpa romana \r\r\na la culpa contractual, o por la intervención de la prueba, es decir, no \r\r\nera el trabajador quién tenía que probar la culpa del patrono, sino que \r\r\nera éste el que debía demostrar que no había sido culpable ni \r\r\nnegligente, en la distribución y organización del trabajo. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn los inicios del siglo XX, se ubican los primeros intentos formales \r\r\npara brindar una verdadera protección a la clase trabajadora ante los \r\r\ninfortunios laborales . El 26 de junio de 1907 el entonces diputado \r\r\nEnrique Pinto Fernández presenta al Congreso un proyecto de ley de \r\r\naccidentes de trabajo constituido por 16 artículos. El 24 de mayo de \r\r\n1910, la diputación de la provincia de Heredia, encabezada por el Lic. \r\r\nAlfredo González Flores y apoyada por Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla y \r\r\nTranquilino Sáenz Rojas presentan al Congreso un proyecto de ley \r\r\npara crear la \"Caja de Previsión\" . El 16 de mayo de 1913, el \r\r\ndiputado Alberto Vargas Calvo, presenta otra propuesta de ley sobre \r\r\naccidentes del trabajo, con un total de 30 artículos. Por diferentes \r\r\ncircunstancias, ninguno de los proyectos anteriores tuvo la acogida \r\r\nnecesaria para llegar a convertirse en ley.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn abril de 1924 se suspende la discusión de la Ley de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo o la Ley de Reparación de Accidentes e inmediatamente se \r\r\ninicia la discusión del proyecto de ley para crear el Banco Nacional de \r\r\nSeguros, la cual culmina con la promulgación de la Ley N° 12 del 30 \r\r\nde Octubre de 1924, que da origen a esta Institución. Así, el Banco \r\r\nNacional de Seguros se encarga de la administración de los seguros, \r\r\ncuyo monopolio queda en manos del Estado Costarricense. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nConcluida la creación del Banco Nacional de Seguros, se continúa con \r\r\nla discusión del proyecto de ley para establecer la \"Ley de reparación \r\r\nde accidentes de trabajo\", discusión que concluye con la aprobación \r\r\nde la Ley N° 53 del 31 de enero de 1925, sobre reparación de \r\r\naccidentes y se dice \"el Instituto Nacional de Seguros va a \r\r\nadministrar el régimen de riesgos de trabajo\". El INS creó el \r\r\nDepartamento Obrero, como encargado de administrar esta Ley, el \r\r\ncual posteriormente se llamará Departamento de Riesgos del \r\r\nTrabajo. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEsta ley N° 53 cambia, tiene varias reformas y en el año de 1943 \r\r\ncuando se promulga el Código de Trabajo se incorpora dentro del \r\r\nCódigo de Trabajo la Ley sobre Reparación de Accidentes. En ese \r\r\nmomento, en 1943, ya existe la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. \r\r\nHabía sido creada en noviembre de 1941. De tal suerte que aquí se \r\r\nplantea una primera gran discusión. Si ahora que existe la Caja del \r\r\nSeguro Social, los riesgos del trabajo se los damos a la Caja o se los \r\r\ndejamos al INS. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nHay un mensaje muy interesante del Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón \r\r\nGuardia al Congreso, donde él señala, entre otras cosas, que dado \r\r\nque el Instituto Nacional de Seguros tiene 18 años de experiencia en el \r\r\nmanejo de los accidentes de trabajo, él considera prudente que ese \r\r\ncongreso mantenga los riesgos de trabajo en manos del Instituto \r\r\nNacional de Seguros y efectivamente se aprueba el Código de Trabajo \r\r\ny se mantiene la administración en manos del Instituto. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn 1949, cuando se promulga la Constitución Política vigente, se \r\r\ndebate, sobre el famoso artículo 73, la conveniencia o no de la \r\r\nadministración de los Riesgos del Trabajo en manos del Instituto. De \r\r\nnuevo se plantea la necesidad que los riesgos del trabajo estén en \r\r\nmanos de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. La Asamblea \r\r\nLegislativa, la Constituyente en este caso, que redacta esta \r\r\nConstitución Política, ratifica que el régimen de riesgos del trabajo \r\r\nsiga siendo diferenciado, como había sido hasta ese momento y \r\r\npermanezca en manos del Instituto Nacional de Seguros. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn 1961 cuando se modifica el artículo 177 de la Constitución Política \r\r\nmediante la Ley N°2738, la Asamblea Legislativa mantiene \r\r\nnuevamente la posición de que los Riesgos del Trabajo se continúen \r\r\nadministrando por parte del Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Esta \r\r\ncircunstancia no modifica la condición que constitucionalmente \r\r\ncorresponden a los seguros por riesgos de trabajo. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nEn 1982, cuando la Asamblea Legislativa aprueba la Ley N° 6727, que \r\r\nse refiere a la modificación del Título IV del Código de Trabajo, \r\r\nratifica de nuevo la conveniencia de que los Riesgos del Trabajo \r\r\ncontinúen siendo administrados por el INS, y realiza algunas \r\r\nmodificaciones: \n\r\r\n\n· \r\r\nSe amplía el concepto de Riesgos del Trabajo (Artículo 195). \n\r\r\n\n· \r\r\nEl seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo se declara obligatorio, \r\r\nuniversal y forzoso (Artículo 201). \n\r\r\n\n· \r\r\nAparece el concepto de Salud Ocupacional, ligado a promover y \r\r\nmantener el más alto nivel de bienestar físico, mental y social del \r\r\ntrabajador (Artículo 273). \n\r\r\n\n· \r\r\n En consonancia con la Constitución Política de Costa Rica \r\r\n(Artículo 66), se asigna un conjunto de responsabilidades al \r\r\npatrono, respecto al seguro, al riesgo y la prevención (Artículos \r\r\n214, 215 y 284). \n\r\r\n\n· \r\r\nAl trabajador se le otorgan beneficios (Artículos 218 y 221) \r\r\npero también obligaciones, según lo establecen los artículos 285 \r\r\ny 286 del citado Código. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nHoy en día, estábamos en presencia de un régimen de Seguridad \r\r\nSocial totalmente consolidado, a través de la administración que por \r\r\nmás de 70 años ha efectuado, con reservas financieras suficientes, \r\r\npara dar una atención como la que se viene brindando. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nComo se puede ver del extracto de las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional \r\r\nConstituyente, contrario a lo que se dice en el voto de mayoría, más \r\r\nbien la idea era unificar el seguro de riesgos del trabajo con CCSS y \r\r\nno que éste quedara al arbitrio del legislador para que en un futuro \r\r\nhubiera apertura comercial. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nØ \r\r\nEl diputado VOLIO JIMENEZ \r\r\n“existen varios principios \r\r\nque no pueden dejarse al margen de esta discusión, \r\r\nprincipios que luego pasó a enumerar. En primer lugar de \r\r\nbe ser una sola institución la que abarque todos los seguros. \r\r\nUno de los fracasos de los seguros sociales en algunos \r\r\npaíses -como Chile- se ha debido precisamente a la \r\r\nmultiplicación de Cajas. Los técnicos que vinieron a \r\r\nnuestro país recomendaron a este aspecto la unidad. En \r\r\nsegundo término, es sabido que el mayor número de \r\r\nasociados es lo que garantiza el éxito de los seguros sociales \r\r\n(…) Por otra parte, el Seguro Social, se basa en la \r\r\nmutualidad, es decir, en la cooperación de todos para \r\r\nlograr el bien del mayor número.” Acta No. 125.- \r\r\nCentésima vigésima quinta acta de la sesión celebrada por \r\r\nla Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas del \r\r\ndía ocho de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve.\n\r\r\n\nØ \r\r\nEl diputado VOLIO \r\r\n“desde el año 1924 se promulgó la Ley \r\r\nde Accidentes de Trabajo, encargándose al Banco de \r\r\nSeguros -institución esencialmente comercial- tomar bajo \r\r\nsu cargo ese riesgo. Una vez que nuestro seguro social se \r\r\nhaya fortalecido, entonces los seguros contra riesgos \r\r\nprofesionales deben adscribirse al Seguro Social. Por el \r\r\nmomento, la Caja no está en capacidad de asumir esos \r\r\nriesgos. Por lo tanto, lo lógico es dejar las cosas como están \r\r\nactualmente, esquivando el problema que se presenta para \r\r\nque se resuelva a su tiempo y con más detenimiento.” Acta \r\r\nNo. 126.- Centésima vigésima sexta acta de la sesión \r\r\ncelebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las \r\r\nquince horas día nueve de agosto de mil novecientos \r\r\ncuarenta y nueve.\n\r\r\n\nØ \r\r\nDiputado FACIO . “\r\r\nDespués del 8 de noviembre \r\r\ncontinuarán trabajando -como hasta ahora lo han hecho- la \r\r\nCaja del Seguro Social y el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. \r\r\nSi se dejan las cosas como están, nadie tiene por qué \r\r\nalarmarse. Sin embargo, queda abierta la posibilidad para \r\r\nque en el futuro se encuentre una solución adecuada al \r\r\nproblema de la unificación de los seguros sociales, después \r\r\nde maduros y reflexionado análisis y estudios de los \r\r\ndistintos aspectos del problema.” Acta No. 126.- Centésima \r\r\nvigésima sexta acta de la sesión celebrada por la \r\r\nAsamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas día \r\r\nnueve de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve.\n\r\r\n\nØ \r\r\nEl señor MONTEALEGRE manifestó que, según su \r\r\ncriterio, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros es un Banco \r\r\ncomercial. La Caja, en cambio, la considera como una \r\r\ninstitución de beneficencia, ya que no lucra en ninguna \r\r\nforma. Piensa que el único modo de resolver el problema \r\r\nde los seguros sociales, es creándole a la Caja las rentas \r\r\nnecesarias para que pueda realizar su cometido. De ahí \r\r\nque el problema se puede resolver acordando que una \r\r\nparte de las ganancias del Banco de Seguros pasarán a la \r\r\nCaja. (Acta No. 126.- Centésima vigésima sexta acta de la \r\r\nsesión celebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente \r\r\na las quince horas día nueve de agosto de mil novecientos \r\r\ncuarenta y nueve).\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nLos extractos anteriores evidencian la incorporación plena de los \r\r\nriesgos del trabajo a los seguros sociales. La propia naturaleza de \r\r\nestos riesgos permiten considerarles parte de los seguros sociales. \r\r\nLos riesgos del trabajo no son un anexo o agregado que pueda \r\r\ndesprenderse de la definición y las limitaciones constitucionales que \r\r\nimpone la norma fundamentl. La norma habla de los seguros sociales \r\r\nen sentido amplio, por esta razón no es admisible que se asuma que la \r\r\nmención a los seguros contra riesgos profesionales que se menciona \r\r\nen el último párrafo, no se integran dentro del concepto de los seguros \r\r\nsociales que define la constitución. La especialidad de las \r\r\ndisposiciones que rigen este tipo de seguro, no desconstitucionaliza el \r\r\nseguro de riesgos profesionales. La discusión en la constituyente \r\r\nnunca evidenció la pretensión reconocer un seguro de riesgos \r\r\nprofesionales con una condición jurídica y constitucionalmente \r\r\ndiferente a los seguros sociales a los que se refiere casualmente los \r\r\ntres primeros párrafos del artículo setenta y tres de la constitución. \r\r\n No hay razón para variar la naturaleza jurídico constitucional de \r\r\nestos seguros, porque se ubica en una norma que es la que le da esa \r\r\ncondición. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPor lo tanto, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo es un seguro social \r\r\nconsagrado constitucionalmente, regido por varios principios, que la \r\r\nlegislación de apertura comercial no protege y que tampoco puede \r\r\nproteger, pues una normativa de rango legal nunca será suficiente e \r\r\nidónea para hacer compatible la seguridad social con un sistema de \r\r\nmercado.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPor la naturaleza misma del seguro social de riesgos del trabajo, cuya \r\r\nrazón de ser es asegurar la indemnización del trabajador cuando con \r\r\nocasión o por consecuencia del trabajo que desempeña sufra un \r\r\naccidente o una enfermedad, y que funciona en nuestro país de modo \r\r\nobligatorio, universal y forzoso, resulta incompatible que opere bajo \r\r\nun esquema de mercado y bajo la ley de oferta y demanda. Todo ello \r\r\nlo tuvo en mente el Constituyente cuando decidió incluir este tipo de \r\r\nseguro dentro del capítulo de los seguros sociales, justamente porque \r\r\nfunciona como un seguro social y no como un seguro individual, sujeto \r\r\na la oferta y demanda. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nPor los argumentos expuestos, consideramos que esta acción debe \r\r\ndeclararse con lugar, con todas sus consecuencias, es decir, \r\r\nprocediendo a anularse las normas inconstitucionales del Tratado en \r\r\ncuestión.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\r\r\n\nMagistrada\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nGilberth Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C.\n\r\r\n\n Magistrado Magistrado\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nNota de la Magistrada Calzada. Razones diferentes sobre la \r\r\nlegitimación del accionante. El voto de mayoría define que a pesar que el \r\r\nseñor Villalta [Nombre 001] deriva su legitimación a partir de la defensa de \r\r\nintereses difusos, se le reconoce su legitimación para interponer la acción a \r\r\npartir de que debe entenderse que esta interposición la efectúa «en favor de \r\r\nun grupo indeterminado de trabajadores cuyos derechos (…) podrían ser \r\r\nlesionados (…) aunque estuvieran bajo la cobertura de alguna póliza de \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo» (sic); es decir, el voto de mayoría determina que la \r\r\nlegitimación del accionante proviene de esta defensa a favor de un grupo \r\r\nindeterminado de trabajadores, y no necesariamente de la defensa de los \r\r\nintereses difusos. Al respecto, considero que la legitimación del Diputado \r\r\naccionante sí proviene también de la defensa de intereses difusos. Tal como \r\r\nse señala en el considerando II de esta misma sentencia, los intereses difusos \r\r\nno deben ser confundidos con los intereses colectivos, al mismo tiempo que \r\r\ntampoco deben ser entendidos en términos tan amplios que se confundan \r\r\ncon los intereses de la comunidad nacional; en otras palabras, son intereses \r\r\ncuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, \r\r\n«pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social», razón por la \r\r\ncual «todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan \r\r\nla colectividad nacional», sin que se confunda con la posibilidad de que \r\r\n«cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de \r\r\ncualesquiera intereses». La precisión que intenta formular el criterio de \r\r\nmayoría, es que aún tratándose de la defensa de un grupo indeterminado de \r\r\ntrabajadores, ello no configura la existencia de un interés difuso que permita \r\r\notorgarle al accionante la legitimación prevista en el párrafo segundo del \r\r\nartículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Es mi criterio que en \r\r\nel caso bajo estudio sí se configura la presencia de ese interés difuso, el cual \r\r\nse fundamenta no sólo en la existencia de aquel grupo indeterminado de \r\r\ntrabajadores, sino también en que por el tema que se pretende regular, sí se \r\r\ntrata, en efecto, de una materia sobre la que sí existe un interés general de la \r\r\npoblación. Debe tenerse presente que tal como se indica en esta misma \r\r\nsentencia, la naturaleza del seguro de riesgos del trabajo implica que el \r\r\nmismo sea consustancial con el régimen de seguridad social por el que optó \r\r\nnuestro país al configurar el sistema de Estado Democrático y Social de \r\r\nDerecho. En este sentido, existe un interés de la colectividad en general, y no \r\r\nsólo de los trabajadores activos en este momento, sobre la existencia de una \r\r\ncobertura social ante los riesgos que pueda verse sometido un trabajador; es \r\r\nclaro que el primer interesado en estos casos será el trabajador –tanto por \r\r\nmotivos de salud como de ingresos propios-, pero no debe perderse de \r\r\nvista, que la configuración social de este tipo de seguro lo es porque en el \r\r\nmismo se ven involucradas otras personas además del trabajador en \r\r\nconcreto. Por una parte, está la familia directa del trabajador, quien obtiene \r\r\nbuena parte de sus posibilidades de subsistencia del trabajo que aquel \r\r\nrealiza; también se tiene la condición del mismo patrono, quien encuentra en \r\r\nel régimen de riesgos del trabajo, un sólido respaldo ante cualquier \r\r\ninfortunio, contribuyendo a cubrir con ello cualquier eventual \r\r\nresponsabilidad que pudiera irrogársele; y también se encuentra el propio \r\r\nEstado, quien a través de la existencia de este tipo de seguro, contribuye al \r\r\nbienestar social en los términos dichos, al mismo tiempo que garantiza que la \r\r\npersona afectada reciba la atención que requiere para que pueda \r\r\nreincorporarse de manera oportuna y efectiva a la vida laboral activa, y al \r\r\nmovimiento y dinamismo de la economía nacional con el menor de los \r\r\nperjuicios para los patronos, los trabajadores y sus familias. Adicionalmente, \r\r\na diferencia del criterio de mayoría que en forma reiterada rechaza la \r\r\nlegitimación del Diputado al no reconocerle una legitimación directa, la \r\r\nsuscrita considera que sí la ostentan en determinados supuestos. A mi juicio, \r\r\nlos Diputados que tienen ese carácter por la Nación de conformidad con lo \r\r\ndispuesto en el artículo 106 de la Constitución Política, por la naturaleza de \r\r\nsu cargo ostentan una representación de los intereses nacionales, que les da \r\r\nen principio una legitimación general para accionar esos intereses, aunque no \r\r\nnecesariamente para hacerlo en todos los casos en la acción de \r\r\ninconstitucionalidad, pero sí a la hora de calificar las circunstancias del \r\r\npárrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en \r\r\nparticular, la gestión de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su \r\r\nconjunto, y muy en particular cuando, precisamente, se trate de impugnar \r\r\nnormas que inciden directamente sobre una esfera de intereses que \r\r\ntrascienden por completo lo individual y son, por definición, intereses de la \r\r\ncolectividad que ellos representan, tal como se ha indicado líneas atrás. \r\r\nDesde luego que esta definición no implica admitir la existencia de una \r\r\nacción popular -no prevista en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- por \r\r\nparte de cualquier persona, ni tampoco permitir el libre acceso mediante la \r\r\nacción de inconstitucionalidad al titular de un interés por el sólo hecho de \r\r\nserlo y sin reunir los requisitos de admisibilidad legalmente establecidos. En \r\r\nconclusión, tomando en consideración la trascendencia del tema sobre los \r\r\nriesgos de trabajo y la representación que en términos generales sí ostenta un \r\r\nDiputado a la Asamblea Legislativa, considero que además de la \r\r\nlegitimación reconocida al accionante por el criterio de mayoría, debe \r\r\nreconocérsele también la legitimación señalada en el párrafo segundo del \r\r\nartículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n*100177120007CO*\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nEXPEDIENTE:\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n10-017712-0007-CO\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nPROCESO:\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \nACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n \r\r\n \nACCIONANTE:\n\r\r\n \r\r\n \r\r\n \n[Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA\n\r\r\n \n\r\r\n\r\r\n\n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE \r\r\nJUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y treinta y tres minutos del ocho \r\r\nde agosto del dos mil trece.\n\r\r\n\n Por motivo del doloroso fallecimiento Luis Paulino Mora Mora, \r\r\nnotifíquese la sentencia número 2012016628 de las dieciséis horas y treinta \r\r\nminutos del veintiocho de noviembre del dos mil doce, dictada en este \r\r\nasunto, sin su firma. El expediente se archivará en su momento. \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\n \n\r\r\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\r\r\n\nPresidente a.i\n\r\r\n\nSala Constitucional",
  "body_en_text": "*100177120007CO*\n\nExp: 10-017712-0007-CO\n\nRes. No. 2012016628\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of November, two thousand twelve.\n\nUnconstitutionality action brought by [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, in a common-law marriage, attorney, bearer of identity card number [Value 001], resident of Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, in his capacity as deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the 2010-2014 constitutional term, against subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the United States, Central America and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, approved by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008.\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours and twenty-five minutes on December twenty-first, two thousand ten, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the United States, Central America and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, approved by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, be declared, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008. He alleges that such provisions injure Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, which protect social insurance and the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, enshrined in International Human Rights Treaties, pursuant to numerals 7 and 48 of the Constitution, by including the solidarity occupational hazard insurance within commercial opening obligations that imply commercial exploitation and for-profit purposes incompatible with the constitutional nature of that social insurance. He asserts that the purpose of these legal provisions is to convert occupational hazard insurance into a commercial service that would be exploited by companies other than the INS, with a clear for-profit intent, an aspect that, in his view, infringes the constitutional principles that protect insurance, to the detriment of workers and their families, as there is a risk to the social security system. In his grounds regarding the unconstitutionality of the rules he challenges, he states: “(…) also weakens and endangers the full application of the principle of universality of the fundamental right to social security, by allowing private operators to commercially exploit occupational hazard insurance, without imposing on them any obligation to equally serve workers from all labor activities nor a prohibition on selecting low-risk and high-profitability activities. All of this threatens the effective realization of the precept contained in Article 201 of the Labor Code, thereby injuring constitutional precepts established in Articles 73 and 74 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador”. (The highlighting belongs to the original text). He also affirms that the rules questioned in this action weaken the existing protection for uninsured workers, as, in his opinion, effective competition prevails, favoring the commercial regime and against the comprehensive protection of the labor sector. In that line of thought, he considers the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights to be violated, because the cited Treaty modifies the current regulatory framework of occupational hazard insurance in a way that reduces the current benefits of workers, a reform that diminishes and worsens the current advantages obtained by the beneficiaries. He summarizes that occupational hazard insurance constitutes a fundamental right of a benefit-providing nature, where the State has the obligation of progressive fulfillment, an aspect that, in his opinion, must be limited “to the respect, protection, guarantee, and promotion” of such rights and, by way of illustration, cites constitutional judgment number 2007-1378. He concludes that international instruments on human rights, such as the Protocol of San Salvador, must prevail over commercial treaties in case of incompatibility, and maintains that the circumstance that the challenged norm is included in an international treaty with a rank superior to the law (CAFTA-DR) does not exempt it from its unconstitutionality for violation of the principle of progressivity of the fundamental right to social security. For all the foregoing, he requests that the action filed be granted.\n\n2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he points to the injury to diffuse interests or interests of the community as a whole, which, in turn, translates into an individual injury for each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic, because social insurance provides basic protection to all persons inhabiting the country.\n\n3.- By resolution of twelve hours and twelve minutes on February seventh, two thousand eleven, the action was admitted for processing, granting an audience to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.\n\n4.- Mrs. Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, submitted her report. She points out that occupational hazard insurance has some characteristics that could allow it to be classified as employer civil liability insurance, and others that would allow it to be situated as social insurance. Regarding the former, it is maintained that it constitutes a mechanism to protect the assets of the employer against the eventuality of an accident or an occupational disease that entails its obligation to indemnify the worker. For this reason, it is exclusively at the expense of the employer, and not as in tripartite-financed social insurance with the contribution of workers, employer, and the State. It directly protects the employer, indirectly the worker and his or her family. She also points out that occupational hazard insurance presumes the liability of the employer, derived from the exercise of its for-profit activity, while in social insurance, it is not possible to presume the specific liability of any of the intervening agents. For those who consider it social insurance, they maintain that it is vested with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against misfortunes derived from the exercise of his or her work. If it were not so, they say, it would have no explanation whatsoever that in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent power in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, it shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances), does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code, conceived to regulate a monopoly insurance system under the INS. Evidently, upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, and upon compliance with the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of rules not directly linked to the market opening, but with the characteristics of the insurance, that are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of compulsory nature of the insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as social insurance; numeral 205 of the same regulatory body provides that the INS must carry out annual settlements that include the formation of the technically necessary reserves, the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. This embodies the principle of service at cost, so as long as it remains in force, occupational hazard insurance must operate – at least in its basic coverage – on a not-for-profit basis. Likewise, numerals 221 and 231 point out the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if they would have corresponded to him or her had he or she been insured, subrogating the right to bring an action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the amounts disbursed, plus interest. These provisions underpin the principle of universality. At the regulatory level, occupational hazard insurance is governed by the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances,” approved by the National Council for the Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through article 8, numeral 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurance (article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (article 2). It was issued based on articles 25, 26, 27 and Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. In this regard, the Superintendency of Insurance will grant administrative authorization for the exercise of the insurance activity in the field of occupational hazard insurance “…provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that will be established in the regulation that the National Council issues for that purpose, in accordance with national legislation”. The Regulation, in article 8, foresees the possibility of offering compulsory insurance together with any other voluntary insurance (not subject to service at cost), allowing better coverage in the event that the worker sues the employer for an act or omission by the latter that gave rise to the occupational accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code and that payments of economic benefits will be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation of Occupational Hazards issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision whereby, for the worker who was not insured, the INS must grant the benefits, except in those cases where the employer had a valid policy with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, in which case the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity that received the premium. The Attorney General's Office does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is in itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies with the Worker Protection Law, the social security system regarding pensions was formed by four pillars. Within that scheme, there is private participation, under a competitive regime, for profit, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The rules establish that it must operate at cost, however, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, the participation of private companies, for profit, in the commercialization of occupational hazard insurance is not contrary to the Constitution, provided that a legal norm of legislative rank is issued that protects, at a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers up to now. There is no norm, of constitutional rank, that establishes that occupational hazard insurance must operate at cost, or without profit. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which shows that there is some flexibility to define the operation of that insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of workers' rights. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could endanger its competitiveness, even though the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances” is considered insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality is not in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions regulating the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code with respect to not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law itself establishes that this regulation must be issued “in accordance with National legislation”. Not acting in this way would go against not only the principle of universality, but also that of progressivity, since it could happen that the protection that the entire working class of the country currently enjoys is reduced to only a part of it. There is an obligation of constitutional rank to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.\n\n5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 39, 40, and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin, of February 24, 25, and 28, 2011.\n\n6.- By briefs presented by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipality of San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP) requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber consider them as active coadjuvants in this action. They likewise question the challenged norms in their capacities as workers and citizens, beneficiaries and users of social insurance, considering that they injure the constitutional principles protecting social insurance, derived from Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Constitution, specifically affecting the solidarity occupational hazard insurance. They indicate that the challenged norms obligate Costa Rica to allow the for-profit commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity insurance as of January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote number 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social insurance for occupational hazards contemplated in the fourth paragraph of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the foregoing, by clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 will not apply to the social insurance set forth in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Constitution and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), but excluding social insurance for occupational hazards, despite the fact that these also have constitutional rank and are governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the effect on the constitutional principles that protect social insurance for occupational hazards, since it provides that Costa Rica will not have to reform its regulations regarding this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations “are consistent” with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the commercial exploitation for profit of the social and solidarity insurance for occupational hazards is incompatible with the nature and the principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in terms of the levels of protection achieved by the country (affectation of the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the “Insurance Market Regulatory Law, includes a Comprehensive Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924”, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 of La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008. It reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and is intended to implement said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions must grant “authorizations” for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity occupational hazard insurance, as of January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same vices of constitutionality. They agree with Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of Articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and that it is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality, and service at cost. If its commercial exploitation for profit is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, injuring the rights of workers who suffer occupational accidents and illnesses, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.\n\n7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican - North American Chamber of Commerce, submits a brief as a passive coadjuvant in the unconstitutionality action, with sufficient powers to intervene in the process, pointing out general aspects of the jurisdiction of the Chamber, as well as the limited effects that national law has on the obligations of public international law. If the State were forced to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the sovereign's will expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors, and exporters, and a ruling on its entirety would be necessary. Now, contrary to what is affirmed by the plaintiff, the Chamber has ruled on the opening of occupational hazard insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that compulsory occupational hazard insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, social insurance as defined by Article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he emphasizes that convenience or inconvenience is not the same as the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the plaintiff makes value judgments emphasizing the inconvenience of the challenged norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give effect to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself. Moreover, he points out that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in Judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that occupational hazard insurance is mentioned in Article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country (employers and workers alike) have to choose among different entities that offer occupational hazard coverage. He considers that the insurance is not part of social insurance, as these are defined by the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of occupational hazard insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and Article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent modifying the form of providing occupational hazard insurance. While he accepts that insurance against occupational hazards is constitutionally recognized, they are social insurance that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of this social insurance must be met that occupational hazard insurance does not have, regarding coverage, form of financing, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the funds may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent power, these insurances were separated and differentiated from occupational hazard insurance, as was regulated by Article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. While it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to the solidarity assistance of the worker, and that there is recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by Article 73 nor that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that occupational hazard insurance is a regime that the constituent power established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers it correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection granted by social insurance and occupational hazard insurance is not exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. In addition, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security managed by the Fund, and another of occupational hazard insurance managed by the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances managed by the Fund and the INS are delimited. He cites case law of the Chamber and opinions of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in which they point out that social insurance is exclusively that which protects workers against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. In that sense, the plaintiff's thesis of considering occupational hazard insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The plaintiff's thesis is not valid under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to the special provisions. Many of the plaintiff's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions which, as they are not based on doctrinal criteria, relevant judgments, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, do not express anything other than the plaintiff's personal feeling toward commercial opening. The Labor Code keeps intact the rules regarding provision, universality, compulsory nature, and other characteristics of occupational hazard insurance, expressly including that uninsured cases will continue to be attended to by the National Insurance Institute. There is no denaturalization of compulsory occupational hazard insurance. The fundamental core of occupational hazard insurance, as it pertains to worker protection, would not be changed by commercial opening or even by potential profit, since it would not cease to be universal, compulsory, and solidarity-based. It remains compulsory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers, and would remain solidarity-based since it will always be paid by the employer, and the uninsured will be attended to by the INS. By judgment 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulatorily develop the social guarantee of the right to subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all normative development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern the insurance through special provisions, but also does not imply a waiver, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the plaintiff, he points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, he relies on Judgment No. 1998-06450 insofar as it points to the democratic legitimacy that corresponds to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's case law, has not been violated, since to that end it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The plaintiff assumes, by the mere fact of allowing other entities to present the occupational hazard insurance service, that coverage and quality thereof will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence of this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. He requests that the action be dismissed.\n\n8.- Freddy Sandí Brenes, Secretary General of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (hereinafter UPINS) appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his standing is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation corresponding to him on behalf of INS workers in relation to occupational hazards. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office, he emphasizes the fact that it reaches the conclusion that social occupational hazard insurance is truly a right and a social guarantee. He adduces that the recommendation put forward by the Attorney General's Office, proposing that since the challenged norms are not unconstitutional, legislation must be enacted to guarantee the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity.\n\nIt argues that an opening legislation guaranteeing these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces, in practice, a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and a disadvantage for the INS in terms of competition, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could violate other constitutional principles related to freedom of commerce, enshrined in constitutional Articles 46 and 28, and competition, leading us to the philosophical discussion in the area of Human Rights, regarding whether solidarity can be imposed in matters of commerce. It argues that the reasons why the challenged regulations are unconstitutional lie in the model of State chosen by the constituent power, therefore bringing up whether Costa Rica is a Social State under the Rule of Law or a Liberal State under the Rule of Law. Elucidating the above is essential considering that the opening of a social insurance against workplace risks, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, demands a special value judgment regarding the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been shaped to this day as a Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law, governed among others by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituent framers dreamed of a Social State under the Rule of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State under the Rule of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent power in the first paragraph of constitutional Article 50. The constituent framers decided to balance labor-management relations, broadly outlining the following guarantees: a) allowing workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (constitutional Article 60), b) elevating to constitutional rank the right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and granting the status of law to the content of those negotiations (constitutional Article 62), c) constitutionally guaranteeing the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, severance pay (cesantía) can be interpreted as being included, but the article establishes neither a ceiling limit nor prohibits aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of individuals and their family members and dependents (Article 72), e) an insurance system is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of their salary amount, and the best possibilities of restoring themselves to continue working. This recognizes the importance of work as a means of livelihood, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, in which that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (constitutional Article 73), f) the constituent power includes and specifically “constitutionalizes” the rights and benefits not previously stated, but which derive from the Christian principle of social justice and which are indicated by law (or by collective bargaining agreements that have the force of law (Article 74). Regarding the legal nature of workplace risk insurance and its content, it alleges that the fact that its content is provided through law does not imply that it can be varied to worsen it simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that workplace risk insurance “shall be governed by special laws.” Within the study of legislative technique in human rights matters, this reference to the law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes an error by the constituent power, which in a certain way “de-constitutionalizes” what it intends to “constitutionalize.” Certainly, every constitutional norm has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or “the hard core” of that right. The social insurance for workplace risks is constituted by at least the following principles: the principle of universality, the principle of solidarity, the principle of generality, the principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), and service at cost. The social insurance for workplace risks has constitutional rank and is also recognized in ILO Convention 102, approved insofar as relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to individuals, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutionality control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all workers in the country are covered by workplace accident insurance; a situation that, in our judgment, would be breached by the risk selection that different companies in the insurance market could make. Regarding the incompatibility of the constitutional principle of service at cost with the opening of this type of social insurance, it states that this derives directly from constitutional Article 73. This principle is developed simultaneously by labor legislation, establishing in those regulations that in this activity, there are no “profits” as such, but rather eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, towards the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council. As the same petitioner indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become private profits. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest them, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and would violate the principle of progressivity. This obligation to offer insurance at cost, we consider incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in constitutional Articles 46 and 28; therefore, the social insurance for workplace risks cannot legally be opened to free competition. On the matter of risk selection and the violation of the constitutional principles of universality and progressivity, it affirms that certainly, the mutually supportive coverage (cobertura solidaria) of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. The income from more profitable activities contributes to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the workplace risks insurance market, private companies will compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities that present lower loss ratios. This would leave less attractive risks, and those with statistically proven more accidents, again in the hands of probably the sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of “risk selection” functions as the fundamental concept that prevents a social insurance, which is mutually supportive, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating as a commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance is radically opposed to the conception of a social insurance like that for workplace risks, which is based on insuring all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or hazardousness. This confirms the position held here, in that what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization. In accordance with constitutional Article 74, social guarantees are inalienable (irrenunciables), and given that the legislator established the inalienability of social guarantees, said condition operates such that: the worker cannot waive them. Nor can the State allow that these guarantees are not available in its legislation.\n\n9.- Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as acting Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it endows him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment matters, likewise due to the institutional dynamics with the trade partners of the Free Trade Agreement: United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the petitioner's standing, it is alleged that the harm transcends an individual harm to any person, that is, for the entire national community, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes his standing on the existence of a popular action, for the action is brought for the benefit of all inhabitants of the Nation in the face of an alleged injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. It further accuses that the action contains subjective assessments and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis; it confuses Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating constitutional and legal principles applicable from one insurance regime to another, thus conveniently intermingling the nature of each with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced to create a confrontation and incongruity of the national legal system with the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic completeness and legal certainty, ignoring international trade commitments and general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with international treaties, conventions, and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international legal order. The principles in question, aside from being specific to international law, constitute basic premises of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it must be pointed out, firstly, the principle according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws on the international plane; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to fulfill an international obligation. In relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of domestic law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must fulfill them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Similarly, international tribunals have sustained that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal character of international law norms is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed by its international obligations; the rights enshrined in international regulations are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level; and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, rather they modify the domestic legal system of nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first one, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. So that, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of customary lineage (international customs), a State—upon joining the international community—accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning conventional rules of international law—be those coming from a bilateral or multilateral treaty—the process is usually different from the former. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4) and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures relating to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements—denominations that for international law purposes are equivalent—and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution states that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over ordinary Law, which entails that, faced with a norm from an international treaty or convention, domestic norms of legal rank yield their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, for each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing to an indefinite future the realization of these rights under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, which is that of “progressivity” or “progressive development,” paradoxically included in Article 26 itself of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on “available resources,” which cannot be interpreted licentiously because it would delay their effectiveness, and would violate the general principles of international law “Pacta Sunt Servanda” and “Bona Fides,” and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights must be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all commitments acquired by the State, regardless of their origin and nature. Regarding the alleged hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively addressing human rights issues, it is worth noting that, pursuant to the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions, or that, even, compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are “dead letter,” which would be equivalent to evading or failing to fulfill international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of ruling 2010-11352, has recognized the need to interpret the Magna Carta harmoniously with the doctrine of human rights emanating from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the Nation's duty to modify the Political Constitution, exceptionally, in those insurmountable cases where it conflicts with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them into its legal system or not, so that it is consistent, congruent, and concordant with said international norms, principles, rights, and customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelacy, undue hierarchy, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or, based on said criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. Any thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement has as its basis another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered other than a gross infringement and evident breach of International Law and the Law of the Constitution. Furthermore, it compiles ruling No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, by which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, regarding the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference regarding the purpose of the Treaty, which would not address the advisability or not of the approval, nor the economic aspects surrounding the Treaty, but rather issues generating doubts of constitutionality. The congruence with the claims of the consultants and what was resolved reveals the necessity, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, that the ruling must be read as a whole, following a legal interpretation reasonable and proportional to the purpose pursued within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So that a light reading that partially and decontextualizedly interprets the text in question from the prevailing reality, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the whole of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and of the norms it deals with, which would indissolubly lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is not acceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to continue, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, quite well known by all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but rather an evident contravention of the general principles of International Law “Pacta Sunt Servanda” and “Bona fides,” which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.\n\nCosta Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the way in which the Workplace Risk Insurance was provided in the country, the foregoing, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that support it, the rights that guarantee the same, or the coverage that this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of CAFTA-DR, the country—in the Area of Insurance Services—assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition—by said insurances, it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workplace Risk Insurance—starting January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called “Gradual Market Opening Commitments,” subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for workplace risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to subsection 2 quoted, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurances of constitutional Article 73, clarified that the social insurances contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, whereas the mandatory workplace risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or disagreements with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in a relative and exclusive Annex on Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, because the commitment of the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory workplace risk and vehicle insurances in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right, nor does it denature said mandatory insurances. The opening and possible provision by entities other than the Instituto Nacional de Seguros does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not oblige Costa Rica to modify the rules that regulate workplace risk insurance, provided that said rules are consistent with the obligations assumed under CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obliges the country to “…treat workplace risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be profitably exploited… the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the preceding section that define and characterize the social and mutually supportive nature of workplace risk insurance.” Nor is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obliges that “…must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, because it is a norm with a rank superior to national law,” because the commercialization of Workplace Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application and respect of the constitutional and mutually supportive principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as an insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or means by which the State must comply with said international precept, since by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, they are internally obliged by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the domestic legal system—be it as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law—to receive said international norms within the bosom of the national legal system and intrinsically give full force to the precepts emanating from the treaties, conventions, or international agreements. CAFTA-DR establishes a specific programmatic commitment, namely: the competitive opening of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workplace Risk Insurance, starting January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the way in which such an obligation will be carried out. It is here that the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as the main consequence the non-compliance with the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other State Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that would conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. With the purpose of complying with this and other insurance market opening commitments, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, was issued, which, in accordance with its Article 1 stating its objectives, it is clear that the same aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of insured parties or consumers of insurance services, the minimum requirements and rules for market regulation, and basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of CAFTA-DR for market opening for mandatory workplace risk and vehicle insurances, starting January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the General Superintendence of Insurance grants based on the Regulation issued for this purpose by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System. The mentioned Transitory is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the term contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to extend, as part of its supervision functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation that establishes the operational requirements for mandatory insurances in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, based on the competencies that the Laws grant it.\n\nIn this regard,  \nit reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that heard and  \nissued a report on the Insurance Market Regulatory Bill, to  \nconclude that the nature of the Mandatory Occupational Hazard Insurance is  \na component that concerns the protection of workers' social security,  \nwhich, in what is relevant, according to Article 73 of the  \nPolitical Constitution, creates insurance against occupational risks that  \nshall be exclusively at the expense of employers and shall be governed by special  \nprovisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined  \nas a mercantile contract; rather, we are in the presence of an insurance whose  \nregulation is found in the Constitution, given its importance within  \nthe conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to  \npreventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to the fact that it can be  \noffered in the market under a competitive scheme, an aspect that  \nclearly would guarantee for the consumer and for the insured greater  \ndiversity of options and better coverage and  \nunderwriting conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (reviewed by  \nconstitutional consultation by the Chamber in judgment No. 2008-10450),  \na rule of public order and public interest, develops the commitments  \nderived from CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the  \nauthorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of the insurance,  \nreinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity.  \nIt creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the  \neffective competition of participating entities, in addition to modernizing and  \nstrengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the  \nlegal rule and based on the international commitment, the  \n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros  \nObligatorios, which defines the minimum operating requirements for  \nOccupational Hazard Insurance and Mandatory Automobile Insurance,” was issued,  \napplicable to insurance entities in the categories of general  \ninsurance, personal insurance, or mixed insurance. The “Reglamento sobre  \nautorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades  \nsupervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” exists. The invocation  \nof unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening  \nwould expose the country to a potential State-State dispute settlement panel,  \nwhich would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance.  \nCosta Rica could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits,  \nArticle 20.16 of CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to the reputation of  \nCosta Rica in the framework of bilateral and multilateral processes of  \nnegotiation of trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even  \noccur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the  \n“Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros  \nObligatorios”. \n\nArticle 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent  \nto provide and maintain a protection of superior rank to workers under  \nthe protection of the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social  \nsecurity is informed by the basic principles of universality, mandatory nature, and  \nsocial solidarity. Judgments of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two  \nsocial insurance systems, not mutually exclusive, that have the primary  \nand imperative purpose of protecting the worker. One against the risks of  \nillness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that  \nthe law determines, and the other against occupational risks, which are at the exclusive  \nand own expense of the employer (judgment 2008-016964). There are several  \nconsequences of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; first,  \nthe issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security  \nregime, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social  \nSecurity. Secondly, it was interpreted that there are principles of the  \nRight to Social Security linked to the Social Insurance Regime  \nof the CCSS, which are those related to universality,  \ngenerality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (judgment  \n2001-10546). A third consequence is the linkage between the right to  \nhealth and social security, insofar as the administration of  \nsocial insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (judgment  \n2007-17971). The fourth consequence most highlighted from the  \njurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection granted by  \nsocial insurance and by occupational hazard or labor insurance, which  \nare different expressions of the fundamental right of social  \nsecurity and that manifest themselves in the legal system in a distinct way  \nthrough the different norms that regulate the regimes of the social  \nsecurity system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational hazard  \ninsurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social  \nsecurity regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social  \nsecurity services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional  \nrank, given that there is no legal or constitutional prohibition  \nthat prevents the commercialization of Occupational Hazard Insurance,  \nsince the regime is essentially distinct from that of illness,  \ndisability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the  \noccupational hazard insurance market is in accordance with the Law of the  \nConstitution, since this mandatory insurance continues to be treated  \nby CAFTA-DR as an insurance distinct from the social security insurances  \nof the CCSS without the nature of the same being altered. Regarding the  \nRegime of Mandatory Insurance for Occupational Hazards or Occupational  \nRisks, as a social security regime, it seeks to indemnify the  \nworker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or  \nillnesses, on the occasion of or as a consequence of the work they perform in a  \nsubordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational hazard  \nregime is regulated infra-constitutionally in Title Four: On the  \nProtection of Workers during the Exercise of Work of the Labor  \nCode (Article 193 to 331), the Insurance Market Regulatory Law,  \nand in the SUGESE Agreement 04-10, “Reglamento de Requisitos de  \nFuncionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios” approved by the Consejo  \nNacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a  \nmanifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not detract from the fact that,  \ndoctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, we are in  \nthe presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. The historical  \nfact underlies that it is a mercantile contract recognized in the Fundamental  \nNorm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions,  \ngiven its importance within the conception of social justice  \nand the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an  \ninnovative and additional element to the traditional conception of the law  \nof mercantile insurance contracts. The competition scheme is not  \nincompatible with the Constitution, nor do international instruments on  \nhuman rights prescribe or give indications of such  \nnon-conformity. The report states the similarities and differences between  \nthe Illness, Disability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other  \ncontingencies Regime administered by the CCSS and the Regime of Mandatory  \nInsurance for Occupational Hazards or Occupational Risks. Also concerning  \nthe principles of mandatory nature, universality, social solidarity, and  \nnon-waivability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social  \nSecurity, because much of the constitutional  \njurisprudence that develops them has been transcribed; however, these will be analyzed  \nfrom the perspective of the issue of respect for the essential content of that  \nright. \n\nAccording to the plaintiff's arguments, the principle of mandatory nature is not  \naffected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or  \naffect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as  \na constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The  \nrelevant provisions make the Insurance a mandatory insurance. In this  \nsense, Article 193 of the Labor Code, which operationalizes  \nthe principle, remains in force; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the  \ncommitment was assumed to open the mandatory insurance market  \nto competition starting on January 1, 2011. Thus, the reference that  \nthe article makes to the INS should be understood generically to mean the operators  \nauthorized by SUGESE in accordance with the “Reglamento sobre  \nautorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades  \nsupervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” issued by  \nCONASSIF. The mandatory nature is in the Labor Code, the General  \nRegulation of Occupational Hazards (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the aforementioned  \nregulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia  \nGeneral de Seguros and the Technical Standard issued by each insurance  \nentity. \n\nThe principle of universality is also not modified, denaturalized, or  \naffected by CAFTA-DR or by the Insurance Market Regulatory  \nLaw. The treaty does not assume anywhere the existence of a competitive  \nmarket in which Occupational Hazard Insurance would cease to cover  \nall workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the  \neffective market opening, new private occupational hazard insurance  \noperators will have the possibility of attracting a greater number  \nof employers to contract that insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the  \nprinciple of mandatory nature. The regulatory provision (Article 5) provides for the  \nobligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the  \ninsured, and beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the  \nspecifications that the law and related regulations provide for mandatory  \ninsurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that  \noffer mandatory insurance to subscribe to the necessary agreements or contracts  \nwith the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the  \noperational aspects derived from the medical attention provided by that  \ninstitution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits  \nindicated in Article 218 of the Labor Code. The hypothetical scenarios  \nwhere the opening of the Occupational Hazard Insurance market will affect the  \nfinances of the INS, and consequently, the care of non-insured  \npersons, but it points out what has been affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Corte  \nSuprema de Justicia and the Labor Courts that the non-insured  \nworker is not harmed from the perspective of the joint obligation, without  \nprejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case,  \nthe Regulation contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an  \nOccupational Hazard Insurance policy with any insurance entity and omitted  \nto report the worker, they will be considered as non-insured and the  \nbenefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium.  \nIt highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Law of  \nJudicial Collection of certifications issued by established entities,  \nthe competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those  \nissued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited  \nattention in an insurance market monopoly system, since the  \nattentions or benefits that the insurance coverages contemplate are  \nconstrained by fundamental criteria of reasonableness,  \nproportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions  \nof the workers.\n\nThe principle of social solidarity posits the duty to help those who have less  \nbased on the contribution of all, especially of those who have  \nmore. The appellant's arguments that the opening of the Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity  \nbecause workers will have unequal protection lack any foundation.  \nOn this point, it is relevant to remember that the  \nduty of insuring workers through Insurance does not  \ncorrespond to the worker, but to the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic  \nto conceive the functioning of an open and competitive Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance market, in which workers will be left without  \ninsurance, because they will be “rejected” by private operators of  \noccupational hazard benefits, because their salary is not “attractive,” since  \nit is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance  \nbut their employer, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 73  \nof the Constitution and the norms of the Labor Code. For greater detail,  \nnote that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation  \nto this insurance is that it is mandatory and compulsory,  \nregardless of the working conditions and the salary earned,  \nso that the employer always has the obligation to insure their  \nworkers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of  \nunderwriting and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of  \nthe activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in  \naccordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, \nto ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can  \nprivate or public insurance service providers, on a  \ndiscriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers  \nwho wish to contract Insurance services with them, due to the authorization  \nobtained from SUGESE in accordance with the Regulation issued by  \nCONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance  \nwith national legislation. It follows from the foregoing that an insurance  \nentity may reserve the right not to contract with an employer-client when  \nthe latter does not comply with the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the  \nsupervisory entity. In this sense, the plaintiff is incorrect when  \nthey state that private operators “will fight over the profitable segments  \nof the market.” CAFTA-DR starts from the premise that in the competitive  \nInsurance market, the insurance firms that are authorized by  \nthe State know in advance the rules that regulate competition  \nand protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to offer a public  \noffering of occupational hazard insurance and make a selection of  \nthe employers – clients to whom they wish to sell the occupational hazard  \ninsurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and  \nregulatory norms, there can be no discrimination in the  \nunderwriting of workers, by virtue of the fact that the same principle of  \nuniversality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to  \nselect or discriminate against workers based on their potential  \nearnings and risk levels. Regarding the second stage, relative to the  \ndetermination of coverage, it refers to Article 15 of the CONASSIF  \nRegulation, which the plaintiff seems to ignore, resolving the issue of the  \nminimum content of Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the  \npolicy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor  \nCode, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on  \nthe basic benefits established by the aforementioned norm. In the stage of  \ndetermining coverage rates, it is allowed to establish  \ncategories of greater or lesser claim frequency, taking into account, among other  \nitems, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of  \nactivities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages  \nare duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those  \ncoverages are determined under the technical actuarial bases that  \nsupport the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with Article  \n205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be viable and  \nfinancially sustainable, and to allow similar treatment to equals.  \nThe basic coverages functioned before CAFTA-DR and when the  \nINS had the monopoly on mandatory insurance. The rates for each  \ninsurance entity are authorized by SUGESE in order to  \ncomply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors that  \nthe general provisions of the capital sufficiency and  \nsolvency regime demand, as well as to ensure sufficient technical provisions to  \nguarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities from  \ntheir insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and  \ndiscrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities,  \nbut also that the minimum basic coverage, equal  \nfor all workers, is met, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same  \nfor all workers. Thus, the additional benefits by way of  \nadditional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the  \nemployer has with the insurance entity, and that are at the expense of the latter,  \nwill imply, directly, an improvement in the treatment and attention to the  \nworker, which in no way threatens the principle of  \nuniversality or that of solidarity. Regarding non-waivability, the workers  \nprotected under this regime cannot waive the rights conferred  \nby the same, as prescribed by said constitutional norm. That is,  \nworkers cannot, on their own initiative or through the action of a third party,  \nwaive the rights and benefits granted by reason of the  \nFundamental Right to Social Security. The plaintiff does not indicate why  \nthe principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers  \ncan waive Occupational Hazard Insurance; on the contrary, in the  \npreamble of Section H “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in  \nMatters of Insurance Services,” respect for the Political Constitution  \nis reaffirmed, and with it the non-waivable nature of the rights and benefits of the  \nInsurance. \n\nRegarding the constitutional principles of the Illness,  \nDisability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other contingencies Regime administered by  \nthe Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that are extensive to the Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance Regime, such as the principles of sufficiency that  \nis in force in Article 206 of the Labor Code where both the  \nneeds of the worker and the salary earned  \nby the worker are taken into account. In fact, it functioned this way in times when the INS had the  \nmonopoly of Occupational Hazard Insurance and will continue functioning in  \nthe same terms, today in a market open to competition.  \nIt also alludes to the principle of automaticity of protection, referring  \nto the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social  \nsecurity that translates into “… adequate and immediate protection in  \nmatters of illness, disability, old age, and death.” By extending  \nthis principle to Occupational Hazard Insurance, as part of the general  \nsocial security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special  \nnature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, mandatory and  \nuniversal. This has functioned this way until now, where the hospitals of the  \nCaja or private health centers must provide primary attention to  \nanyone who has suffered a work accident or illness. The same  \nimmediate protection is received by non-insured workers. In any case,  \nArticles 20 and 21 of the Regulation come to support what is provided in  \nnumeral 232 of the Labor Code.\n\nIt additionally points out the following differences between Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance and the Social Insurances of the CCSS. Regarding the subject that  \nperforms the service or provides the coverage, in each one it indicates the respective  \ninstitutional fields and coverages, as well as the commercial  \noperators, concluding with the plaintiff's indication that it violates the  \nPolitical Constitution. Furthermore, Occupational Hazard Insurance is at the  \nexclusive expense of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme  \nof the Social Insurances of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It is  \nto the latter that the prohibition of transferring or using those  \nfunds for purposes other than those referring to its mission applies. There are differences  \nregarding the use and destination of the funds and reserves of social insurance.  \nThe funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to Article 73  \nof the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity,  \nDisability, and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply  \nto the Mandatory Occupational Hazard Insurance Regime; there is no  \nconstitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves  \nresulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in  \nArticle 73 when it refers to “social insurance” and “insurance against  \noccupational risk.” Although this does not mean that these funds remain without  \nregulation, as this is determined by legal means, but this is a very  \ndifferent one from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of  \nconstitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary  \nbenefits and the supposed service at cost. Regarding the first, it points out  \nthat neither CAFTA-DR nor the Insurance Market Regulatory Law  \nalters Article 242 of the Labor Code, nor Articles 255 to 259, regarding  \nthe possibility of commutation of income. Furthermore, the so-called “service at  \ncost” is not a principle of mandatory insurance, nor even a  \nconstitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in  \ngeneral, so the plaintiff confuses and extrapolates, based on rules  \nof the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Caja  \nCostarricense de Seguro Social, undue consequences for the Occupational Hazard  \nInsurance Regime. There is no evidence of the  \n“service at cost” principle at the constitutional level, but rather with Article 205 of the Labor  \nCode, which establishes that any surplus produced must  \nbe destined to constitute a reserve, to then erroneously suppose and conclude  \nthe existence of a presumed constitutional principle.  \nArticle 73 of the Constitution does not speak of income, as the  \nplaintiff tries to argue, and makes an error in the analysis of the arguments presented,  \nsince the term the constituent used was “fund.” Rather, there  \nis Article 28 of the Constitution that guarantees to every citizen  \nfreedom as a basic principle, developed by infra-constitutional  \nnorms such as the law, which must determine its scope and  \nimpose restrictions that concretize and harmonize them with the rest of the  \nblock of constitutionality and legality. Moreover, the observance of being  \nproportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of the INS, according  \nto Article 205 of the Labor Code, it must carry out annual liquidations; the  \nsurpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, 50%, to  \nfinance the programs developed by the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional, and the  \nrest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. Similarly, it says that the INS,  \nas an insurance entity, must comply with the precepts of Articles  \n13, 14, and 15 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, regarding  \ntechnical provisions and reserves. Likewise, the entities indicated in  \nsubsections a) and b) of Article 7 of the Law are obligated to comply with the  \nmandates regarding technical provisions, reserves, and investments  \ncontained in the indicated numerals. But Article 205 of the Labor Code  \nis not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the “service at cost” issue  \nin vote 2007-9469, with this judgment having three main  \nconsequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide  \na service at cost would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no  \nconstitutional principle that forces telecommunications services, or in  \nthe case of Occupational Hazard Insurance, to be  \nprovided “at cost.” This is a decision that remains at the criterion of the legislator.  \nCAFTA-DR also does not address the issue that the insurance must be commercialized  \n“at cost.” Secondly, commercialization in a competitive  \nmarket is not exclusive of the application of a social policy in  \nthe matter of occupational hazard insurance. It is worth remembering the preamble of  \nSection H on “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of  \nInsurance Services,” where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the  \nopening process in the provision of insurance must be done based  \non the Political Constitution, its norms, and principles. But to  \ncomply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the services of the  \nORT be provided “at cost.” Finally, the third  \nconsequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that  \ncompels the ORT services to be provided “at cost.” However, what  \nis guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of  \nconsumers to choose the service provider that best suits their  \ninterests (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). The freedom to choose is not  \nincompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to “… achieve the  \nuniversality and solidarity of the services that are opened to  \ncompetition.” The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or  \nright to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of the freedom of  \nenterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and  \nequity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, concerning the progressiveness  \nof international fundamental rights law and the Mandatory  \nOccupational Hazard Insurance regime. The  \nminimum normative principle (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account as it postulates  \nthat there is a compendium of minimum labor and social security  \nnorms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the  \nemployer, or the insurance operators, so that contravention of these  \nimplies a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums  \nform part of the essential content of the right to social security of  \noccupational hazard insurance, whereby the essential content  \nwill also include, as part of its hard core, the minimum  \nbenefits or basic coverages of the recognized ORT. As long as the legislator  \ndoes not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of  \noccupational hazard insurance, through the enactment of legal  \nnorms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable,  \nor deprive said right of the necessary protection. The norms under  \nexamination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the  \nexercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or  \ndeprive it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The  \nchoice made by the State is the most favorable for workers  \ncovered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected  \nright, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, allowing  \nthe exercise of the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in  \na clear derivation of the principles “pro libertatis” and  \n“pro homine,” \nbenefiting all workers of the Nation.\n\nReasonable profit is also argued, such that the hard core of content is not affected by a change in the entity providing the service or by allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the legal-philosophical essence or foundation of the right in question, and therefore there is no violation of the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights. The country has already consolidated an effective protection system that is not diminished. It does not consider there to be a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and ILO Convention No. 102 because their regulation is separate in both. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently enjoy, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that beneficiaries of the mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance regime have obtained to date. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit.\n\n10.- Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative caucus of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadjuvants. In this regard, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations should be expanded to include the entirety of the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 Regulation, approved by CONASSIF through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing, insofar as the challenged Transitory Provision III of Law 8653, subsequently ordered CONASSIF and SUGESE to regulate a regime of full opening in the provision of Occupational Risks Social Insurance, no later than January 1, 2011, an administrative action that took effect as of December 22 of last year. They allege that the mere act of enacting said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, meant placing a public good or service of constitutional rank into commerce, which by its very conceptual-functional nature is entirely outside of commerce. They argue that the alleged unconstitutionality is already noticeable through literal-grammatical interpretation alone, considering that the constitutional provisions alleged (Title V of the Political Constitution) have a clean, clear, and precise wording, while their location in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They state that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the sole non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following rigorous syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State = Outside of commerce. Premise 2: Occupational Risk Insurance (RT) = Social Insurance that is part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Political Constitution. Sole non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside of commerce. Therefore, the challenged regulations are unconstitutional, including the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 regulation. It is also asserted that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly held by the INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing, considering that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, occupational risks were legislatively developed by a labor code, and are also shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization and by constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of the universality of the public occupational risks service, including uninsured cases, we can indeed imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State sabotaged from within to be forced to purchase hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly affirmed that a new regulatory framework that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and monetary benefits) brings to mind the foundational reasoning of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from making legislative regressions in matters of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave as a Superintendency of Social Insurances; it should be remembered that administration and regulation are the exclusive purview of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the veiled castration of the Labor Code, or doing nothing to prevent it, is tantamount to regressing in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the enactment of the challenged regulation, the coadjuvants made it known to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was in the public interest to proactively address this debate, for the sake of the legal and regulatory health in development (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failure to do so would destabilize the institutional framework and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that such an omissive conduct could even result in the diminution, affectation, or detriment of the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when enacting the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 Regulation. The DR-CAFTA itself, in its Chapter 16, subparagraph b) of Article III.2 of Section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Labor Code and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain nature (demanialidad) of the service, and thus the challenged regulations could be tacitly repealed in light of Chapter 16 of CAFTA itself. In other words, both legal systems, in apparent contradiction, are not, because each separately regulates different matters and principles: one public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less incompatibility regarding the same matter. Therefore, it is not proper for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Labor Code tacitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and exclusionary material jurisdiction over the SSRT service in favor of the State through the INS. That is, what is under discussion has more to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadjuvants state that, as legislators, they are prohibited from violating the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressivity of human rights), which would be consummated if legislation is approved that in one way or another worsens labor human rights, for example, those enshrined in Articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 of the Labor Code.\n\n11.- Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) allege that they have standing to file the coadjuvancy brief in order to maintain that commercial opening will foster and produce a segmentation of the occupational insurance market, so that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social will have to assume the “collateral” damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of working people, particularly of the Caja and the rest of Costa Rican social security, with an indisputable legitimate interest of a collective nature, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from Article 332 of the Labor Code. They maintain that occupational risk insurance forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. However, while the last paragraph of said article provides that insurance against occupational risks shall be governed by special provisions—and those administered by the Caja are also governed by a special law—this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances are not part of social security, from the very framework of our Constitution. If any argumentation in this sense were valid, the constituent assembly simply would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. Thus, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Chamber has interpreted, occupational risk insurance substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security that inform constitutional Article 73 apply equally to all modalities of social insurance expressly contemplated in this numeral: the very particular situation, mostly of a historical nature, that the administration of occupational risk insurance was attributed to an institution other than the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, can in no way justify the understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. Commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must reach even those who are not insured; they state that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which will have fewer resources to cover these expenses. Companies are illicitly enriched at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the patrimony of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity, where care is based above what is earned, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the scheme of commercial opening, in a competitive regime, fosters market segmentation of “consumers,” with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit, where the protection provided must correspond to at least basic medical-assistance benefits, regardless of insurance premiums or the amount of workers' wages. The scheme restricts the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of benefits currently being provided. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that occupational risk insurance constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is only possible under a public, universal scheme, incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. That the Chamber has indicated that the social security system implies that public authorities will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which comes to prevent any modality of private management and administration of occupational risk insurance with a profit motive. The dignity of workers is also injured, because as a consequence of these new rules, within which the Instituto Nacional de Seguros will have to see how it survives, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of occupational risk insurance, in a regime of commercial exploitation, forces the modification of the Labor Code in matters of occupational risks. In this sense, they point to note 22, which conditions regulations on the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, and affirm that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent, incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the commercialization and privatization scheme of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for the promotion of worker health and the prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, health, and other benefits, there are also those that seek to promote health and the prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses. The profits that were previously used for the above will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies in this area will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and illnesses. Occupational risk insurances constitute an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which they cite the chapter on the Rights of Labor by John Paul II, noting that the Encyclical provides that in cases of work accidents, workers must have access to health care, even free of charge, which would be violated, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. They request that the action be declared with merit.\n\n 12.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.\n\n 13.- By resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued within this file document, several coadjuvancy briefs for and against the unconstitutionality action were admitted.\n\n 14.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\n Drafter: Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\n I.- On preliminary questions and coadjuvancies.- By resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued within this file document, the briefs filed for the purpose of coadjuvating in the action by various interested parties were admitted, with the aim of adding their arguments to the file document. It is necessary to indicate that the order mentions only the names of the persons appearing in the proceeding; however, most do not do so in a personal capacity, but rather in representation of legal entities and social groups, which, for greater clarity, indicates below the capacity in which they act and whether they do so in representation of a legal person within the unconstitutionality action. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, holder of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, holder of identity card No. 6-155-443, as General Secretary of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, holder of identity card No. 9-029-769, as General Secretary of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada (SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, holder of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Concejo of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Agreement No. 13 of Ordinary Session No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, holder of identity card No. 2-287-015, as General Secretary of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, holder of identity card No. 1-897-818, Assistant General Secretary of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, ID No. 3-222-901, member of Servicio, Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, holder of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal condition and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, holder of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, holder of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his condition as General Secretary of the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, holder of identity card number 1-791-100, in his condition as Acting Minister of Foreign Trade; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the caucus of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis Chavarría Vega, holder of ID No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal capacity and as General Secretary of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, holder of identity card No. 2-343-472 in her personal capacity and as Assistant General Secretary of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, holder of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, is corrected, it being understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal entities. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the briefs of Mrs. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez are not on record, their writings not being found in the electronic file document, so the mentioned persons are not considered as coadjuvants in this action. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a coadjuvant, given that the brief is stated to have been filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, yet his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.\n\nII.- The rules of standing in unconstitutionality actions. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which could later allow the challenge of the applying act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it is applicable when \"by the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct harm,\" that is, when by that same nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not exactly their members directly. In second place, the possibility of turning to the defense of \"diffuse interests (intereses difusos)\" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this tribunal number 3750-93, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:\n\n\"… Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be, in our law—as this Chamber has already said—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, certain determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, arise whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that it is a matter of equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective—being common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such a character.\"\n\nIn summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under the protection of paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualification of \"diffuse,\" such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the territorial integrity of the country, and the good management of public expenditure, among others. In this regard, two precisions must be made: on the one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests (intereses difusos), since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; environmental damage does not only affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the good management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is nothing more than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being understood in any way that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights (difusos); the foregoing would imply an undesirable upheaval in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative \"State of rights,\" which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests \"that concern the community as a whole,\" it refers to the legal assets explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests with the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, that any person can come to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (popular action), but that every individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any attempt at an exhaustive enumeration.\n\nIII.- On admissibility. As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction does not recognize special standing for a deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the petitioner derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, acting as a lawyer and deputy, that is, in his personal condition and in his quality as a Deputy. In this sense, the questioning he makes refers to diffuse interests (intereses difusos), that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The petitioner's reasoning is based on the fact that said system must have a general and universal scope, actual or potential, accusing that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what was indicated by the petitioner, it should be noted that the action is proper in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of an occupational risk policy. In this sense, it is appropriate to hear the action, as is indeed done.\n\n IV.- Object of the challenge. Request is made for the constitutionality review of subparagraph b) of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 “Financial Services”, of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which was ratified through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, which provides:\n\n“III.\n\nGradual Market Opening Commitments\n\n[…]\n\n2.- Right of Establishment for Insurance Providers\n\nCosta Rica shall permit, on a non-discriminatory basis, the insurance service providers of a Party to establish themselves and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as provided below:\n\n(a) any and all lines of insurance29 (except compulsory vehicle insurance (seguro obligatorio de vehículos) and occupational hazard insurance (seguros contra riesgos del trabajo)), no later than January 1, 2008; and\n\n29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.\n\n(b) any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.\n\nFor purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall permit insurance service providers to establish themselves through any legal form, as set forth in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential solvency and integrity requirements, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice.”\n\nFurthermore, the following provision of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, is also challenged:\n\n“TRANSITORIO III.- Opening of the provision of compulsory insurance (seguros obligatorios)\n\nThe State shall maintain the monopoly over Occupational Hazard Insurance (Seguros de Riesgos del Trabajo) and Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio Automotor), administered by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in accordance with the provisions of Title IV of the Labor Code and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, respectively.\n\nAs of January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization to conduct insurance activity in the lines of Compulsory Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos) and Compulsory Occupational Hazard Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo) to the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications to be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council, in accordance with national legislation.\n\nThese norms are accused of infringing Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador, and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.\n\nV.- On the merits.\n\nA.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and the State.- Preliminary issues. It is worth highlighting from the beginning of this ruling that no one denies the importance that social security holds in our country and in the world. The petitioner, the Procuraduría General de la República, the various social organizations appearing in the case file, the deputies of the Partido Acción Ciudadana faction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, this Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, and in the advantage that the existence of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances provides for each and every inhabitant of this country. In this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled through the vocation and awareness that political and social actors have in the prevention and treatment of illnesses, and by ensuring spaces for medical provision and highly valuable medical services when a healthy person is plunged into a vulnerable situation due to illness. That said, the first manifestations are found in the various historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. Through them, the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism for social foresight can be observed. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of John Rawls have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what the best form of organizing a State would be, if one could start from nothing. He invites the operator to a hypothetical mental exercise consisting of divesting oneself of all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal figure of social security has a profound political and constitutional foundation. It proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, such that the designer of the society must not know which social, educational, or political status, lifestyle, or sex they might want, or might correspond to them once inserted into that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a fairly tempered and rational choice, so as not to be left at a disadvantage regarding the society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort at self-preservation, this decision-maker would calculate that if they were to end up on the lowest rung, they would secure a better share of the wealth of all for the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century, there were already several countries in the world with social security systems functioning—incipiently, but achieving results—it seems logical that, looking back today, such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as well as being present, such that, upon carrying out this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a great majority, including the most disadvantaged, and thereby not discriminate in access and services based on one’s origin (Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). The financing, consequently, would be carried out with the participation of the different social actors: the State, employers, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the substantive problem raised by the petitioner does not lie in a macro-level conflict regarding social insurances, but rather in a subset of them, because the constitutional norm recognizes this fundamental principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures it places in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica Regarding Insurance Services, the following in the preamble:\n\n“[…] reaffirming its decision to ensure that the opening process of its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution;\n\nemphasizing that said process shall benefit the consumer and must be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation;\n\nrecognizing its commitment to modernize the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and Costa Rica’s legal framework in the insurance sector;\n\nAssumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services.”\n\nIt is important to point out that such care in the wording and declaration is not present for any of the other member countries of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement. The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the existing monopoly in insurance matters, but also because the State in Costa Rica has traditionally maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which is assumed as a commitment by the country, becomes palpable in point II of Section H, where, in the same manner, the obligation is set forth to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of the insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must remain in an impartial position regarding market participants, having the adequate powers, legal protection, and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers, and manage confidential information appropriately. This will be revisited in the ruling later.\n\nSince what is questioned in the action is the constitutional regularity of the commercial Treaty norm and one of its implementing laws, insofar as it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must specify, for now, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpreting the scope of the social insurances contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be clarified is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurances administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. The Treaty permits, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of insurance, but as indicated, it saves the following in a footnote:\n\n“For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.”\n\nFrom the foregoing recognition, it is clear that the social security protected by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is excluded from the Treaty. The foregoing is important for the interpretation of constitutional Article 73, because with this, the legislator of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente sealed a special result into the norm.\n\nB.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good composed of the resources of Costa Rican society. Indeed, through the regulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter, this Constitutional Chamber has been able to construct the Right to Social Security, which, by its structure, should not be limited solely to the protection of the right to Health, but rather comprises many other benefits, which, all integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican society. To cite a ruling, it must be stated that:\n\n“III.- Right to social security.-\n\nThe purpose of the constituent in designing the social security system in our country was to guarantee to all citizens that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, would grant them at least the indispensable services in case of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. Article 73 of the Political Constitution, interpreted harmoniously with Article 50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right presupposes that the public powers shall maintain a public social security regime for all citizens that guarantees assistance and provides sufficient social benefits in situations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective scope of application of the right to social security incorporates the principle of universality, as it extends to all citizens, with a mandatory character. The objective scope starts from the principle of generality, in that it protects situations of need, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and insured beforehand, but rather as they effectively occur. Furthermore, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of protection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of protective automaticity, which translates into adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age, and death.\n\nArticles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, interpreted in a harmonious manner, establish the right to social security for the benefit of all workers, informed by the principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of protection. Evidently, the provision of such services is conditioned upon the existence of some minimum requirements, but ones that are basic and necessary for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be coherent with the aforementioned principles.\n\nThe right to social security is a fundamental right, recognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent incorporated the chapter on Social Guarantees into the Political Constitution of 1871, which was subsequently confirmed in the constituent process of nineteen hundred forty-nine. …” (Ruling No. 2004-08013)\n\nFurthermore, on another occasion, the Chamber has also indicated that:\n\n“IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the existence of social insurances, which are regulated by a system of mandatory contribution from the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect the latter against the risks of illness, maternity, disability, old age, and death. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is the autonomous entity charged with administering this type of insurance, with the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its operations, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its legal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them. It thus guarantees the establishment of social security and its nature, decrees the purpose of the social insurances, and regulates the destination of the respective funds. Social security was born for the protection of the worker and their family, as the human beings they are, and is provided from conception until death, seeking health and assisting in unforeseen misfortunes such as incapacity and death, as well as in states of vulnerability due to their very condition, such as those of old age, pension, and retirement.” (Ruling No. 1998-04636)\n\nThe doctrine enunciated in the preceding precedent remains firm insofar as it interprets constitutional Article 73. As a consequence of the foregoing, social security is a fundamental axis, an axiom, and a reference point for Costa Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the Social State of Law, which signifies a constitutional value or a legally relevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate distribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability—which makes it attractive to national and international investment—and which, as such, is achieved through the tripartite contribution of the State, employers, and workers. Thus, people can have access to social security, to a regime of predictability for disability, old age, and death, just as they shall have it to health and to the fundamental provision of health services that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, places at the service of the population, being one of the best guarantees in individual aspirations toward a more equitable society. There are multiple studies that place our country within privileged positions, not being a developed country, yet it maintains high levels of public health coinciding with European countries more developed than ours. As indicated above, it achieves placing the least advantaged person in society in a better position, one that allows them to receive health benefits just like any other more advantaged person in society, as well as to the social solidarity of a person falling into circumstances of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic asymmetries should not count for the provision of services, because the original constituent legally guarantees the health of the population through institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to ensure its delivery. It should be noted then that the Executive Branch guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of the social insurances, through the constituent’s delegation to specific benefits reserved to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in the Free Trade Agreement regarding everything related to the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente foresaw the need to maintain what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943, incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949. With this, it reaffirmed, at the apex of the legal system, social security by establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual workers), its forms of financing (mandatory contributory from the State, employers, and workers), and scope (risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine). It designated the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as the public entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal and financial attributions, administrative autonomy, and government over social insurances, in like manner to erect a protective barrier around the resources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of that patrimony belonging to all beneficiaries. But, always within social security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they break the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the benefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would be permissible to exempt the compulsory vehicle insurance (seguros obligatorios de vehículos) and the compulsory occupational hazard insurance (seguros obligatorios contra riesgos de trabajo) from this regulation, to regulate them separately after the entry into force, at a time subsequent to January 1, 2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican Government would be consistent with the obligations imposed upon it by the Political Constitution, which indeed, as the Ministry of Foreign Trade indicates, is the case for the Government of the Republic, but which were reflected in the commitments assumed before the other member States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in national legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion raised in the action focuses on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question, where the discussion addressed since the referendum on the Free Trade Agreement and the complementary legislative agenda to the mentioned Treaty is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational hazards regime shares some of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, being placed as part of the social security regime established from the apex of the legal system; however, there must exist a constitutional interpretation in its proper dimension, especially regarding the issue of social insurances that protect against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine, but with distinctions in the insurance against professional risk or occupational hazard of workers. Certainly, the normative aspects of greatest relevance to society must be situated in the Political Constitution to regulate or protect certain fundamental rights, themes that are the most essential in the Political Constitution for the purpose of pointing out the course along which ordinary legislation must develop, including the licenses that it may have contemplated. Although the foregoing marks a determined course as a country-decision, there also exist provisions that release those determinations to a reading proper to political science at a given moment, whose decision belongs to the political organs of the State. In the case of the social insurances that operate from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved its institutional monopoly, but in the second case, the texture of the norm was more open.\n\nIn the Chamber’s judgment, one may question the idea originally conceived by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente of endowing the population with universal social insurances and the provision of services, if it is seen as being modified to the detriment of the least advantaged, with the change of the legal framework—as the petitioner and the coadjuvants accuse—insofar as it contradicts that universality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the monopoly of certain insurances, and which proves contrary to international human rights conventions. The discussion is more philosophical-political than philosophical-legal. The foregoing assertion shall be examined further below, to establish whether there is evidence that this is so or that international organizations lean toward a specific model of social insurance development to achieve those ideals. In that sense, there would be little legal space left for a Constitutional Court or for the State’s own political organs when ratifying an international normative body. Hence, one might ask what role corresponds to this Chamber as a Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be defined whether it can be questioned legally or if it is a matter that corresponds to the political bodies of the State. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that this Chamber must rule from the constitutional standpoint on the norms, but, regarding the second, on the competence to decide on the advisability or inadvisability of a Treaty, both questions must be in the same line with what this Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. This Chamber has leaned toward holding that it must not enter into analyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within its competence when resolving the legal aspect or deciding some particular meaning for the constitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental right is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and advisability of legislation, in itself, is not and should not be natural to jurisdictional activity. What is important to highlight here is that in the inter-organic relations of the State, the first called upon to control the timeliness and advisability of the Executive Branch’s international negotiations in its international relations in the form of International Treaties is the Asamblea Legislativa. In this sense, the abstract control that this Chamber holds, whether a priori or a posteriori, shall depend on the political action of the constitutional organ that resides in the Asamblea Legislativa, and on which the making of decisions by the majority is founded, through a competitive struggle, but where the timeliness and advisability of a norm is the exclusive purview of the Asamblea Legislativa. In any case, Ruling No. 1994-07005 states that:\n\n“However, from the point of view that interests us now, this means that the State, or more properly, the organs responsible for strictly political and managerial competencies, must always act with the aim of stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the Executive Branch has negotiated this Treaty, bearing those constitutional objectives in mind. And it must also be understood that the Legislative Branch, upon reviewing the substance of said instrument, shall act in conformity with the same objectives. That is why we can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that the Treaty as such, or some of its provisions—discussed and debatable—may have for some sector, do not necessarily entail an aspect of constitutionality, in the sense that this Chamber must rule, because they lie at the level of mere advisability or timeliness. For example, some point out that despite the benefits of this type of commercial instruments, a country would not derive immediate or short-term advantages if it simultaneously embraces the old model (of import substitution, of subsidies) and the new model of commercial opening. That is why, in this regard, some experts believe that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica in that its tariffs have been lowered to a greater degree and long before our country began to do so. But even so, they continue, the treaty suits Costa Rica, because it will open a spectrum of very important investments, technology transfer, and job creation, which will invigorate its economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of competitive demand that it needs in order to adapt to a possible incorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement among Mexico, the United States of America, and Canada (NAFTA), as an almost immediate aspiration of the country, as those responsible within the central Government have expressed. In other words, the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario for moving on to the next, more complex and ambitious one. In any event, this Chamber warns that those aspects revolve around the policies that are behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not have the constitutional connotation to which this Chamber must confine its opinion.”\n\nC.- The legislator’s freedom of configuration in occupational hazard insurance (seguros de riesgos de trabajo). Now then, paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes:\n\n“Insurance against professional risks shall be at the exclusive expense of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions.”\n\nThe original constituent, on the subject of professional risks, endowed the legislator with greater flexibility, despite this effectively being considered within the social insurances, which is denoted by the breaking of the financial and regulatory scheme of the other social insurances. In this sense, one might think that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the Political Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with all the social security of the country, but evidently, the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it could have so determined by eliminating the final paragraph or by expressly incorporating that charge to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove the foregoing, one could question whether the unconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros could have been sustained regarding the topic of insurance for professional risks. But such an interpretation would not be plausible either; on the contrary, the legislator delegated, for many years, the coverage of social security in occupational hazards to another autonomous institution, distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such an interpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor was any constitutional irregularity noted, because it was a function of a public law subject that acted in a dual capacity, under public and private law.\n\nThe foregoing leads this Court to the possibility of channeling the interpretation of the final paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution in a more flexible manner, always maintaining harmony with the entire system, when it indicates that the insurance \"shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers,\" since a lesser intensity of the State's presence can logically be derived, but without this signifying total absence. On the other hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that it is on his behalf that the worker performs the labor, and the working conditions he offers the worker are attributed to him, such that it is the Employer who is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and the State for ensuring or supervising the fulfillment of those obligations. As for the worker, no obligation falls upon him other than the obligations contained in labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the National Constituent Assembly places the worker as the recipient of protection, that is, he would ultimately be the beneficiary of this insurance. The original constituent foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, permitting a broader scope of action for the legislator when it states \"shall be governed by special provisions,\" which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting an autonomous entity distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with establishing, offering, and executing occupational risk insurance. At this point, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in economic and social activity characteristic of a Social State of Law, or the prevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on pure commercial models or mixed market models with State oversight, regarding its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to reach is the following: the original constituent established a system to constitutionally regulate occupational risks so that they can be the subject of diverse legal and benefit-providing designs or structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing is clearly part of the large number of productive economic activities, as well as the jobs and risks that can exist in each of them. Precisely, this permitted, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly regime, which implied a different course for mandatory occupational risk insurance from the regulations of the Caja, and yet, this did not and would not make it unconstitutional, nor would greater openness in the Employer's choice, in the face of a greater offering of occupational risk insurance operators.\n\nOther important consequences derive from the foregoing, in which we move from an Institution that operated under a monopolized insurance exploitation system, consequently a heavily intervened market, and later opted for a different, open one, with an impartial regulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. A regulatory body was thus foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. Consequently, the claimant's thesis may maintain an erroneous conception that the State disappeared completely within the aforementioned employer-worker-occupational risk scheme. It is recognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative decision, can declare that certain services are provided under a monopoly regime, or are provided under a free competition regime, without this necessarily signifying a detriment to the service. In such a way, it can liberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality. If a government decision negotiated by the parties in a Treaty, approved through citizen participation mechanisms (referendum), and once the ratification procedure is exhausted, places another State body to regulate commercial insurance activity impartially and on a non-discriminatory basis, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this sense, it must be said that the legitimacy of this decision is reinforced from its origin, because it originates in the constitutional reform that permits an authentic direct democratic exercise that in the year 2002 sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote with normative character. That in itself has a special weight, which, in principle, must be obeyed by the mechanisms and institutions based on a mature representative democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional review). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences given that it is a ratified agreement and because it is an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal posture of the State's internal bodies, at the moment the international regulations enter into force. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:\n\n\"The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including their observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise.\"\n\nGiven that the mandatory occupational risk insurance regime had been operating from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the staggered opening of the insurance market, including mandatory vehicle and occupational risk insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in due course. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process for the Securities Market Regulatory Law, the Chamber is consulted on the following problem:\n\n\"Violation of Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Constitution: unconstitutionality due to legislative omission to regulate solidarity insurance: they refer that this omission will cause a legal lack of protection relevant to the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because the present and future efficacy of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in matters of insurance derive from Article 73 of the Constitution is violated: mandatory nature, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, nonexistence of a cap on benefits, immediacy and mandatory nature of the provision of benefits to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of rents and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the tariffs of the insuring entity. Likewise, they argue that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between Articles 50 and 73 of the Constitution are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others that derive from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that we are facing a constitutional closing or closure norm of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open door in terms of enabling the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of the regulation of solidarity insurance will generate a labor lack of protection.\"\n\nIn this sense, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:\n\n\"9.- Violation of Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.\n\nAccording to the consulting deputies, the draft \"Insurance Market Regulatory Law\" is also unconstitutional by omission, to the extent that the establishment of social insurance is not contemplated. Regarding the control of constitutionality by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Court, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 2:39 p.m. on May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue the infraconstitutional regulations related to the referendum process), has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of it being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue \"a law that develops a constitutional content or clause.\" Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that \"the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.\" Hence, in the aforementioned draft law, the Chamber does not appreciate the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, for which reason the consultation formulated in that sense must be resolved.\"\n\nThere is no necessary loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the foregoing that Costa Rica is free and independent, and that as such it acquires an international obligation that it must observe according to the international law principle pacta sunt servanda; in this sense, binding oneself by an international commitment with different countries and obtaining commercial benefits from them is what is effectively pursued by this type of instrument. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars. The first is the ancient notion of freedom, such that in certain areas of people's lives, they are exempt from external conditioning of the person's volitional and cognitive capacity, so that life proceeds without undue interference, as long as morality or public order are not affected or third parties are not harmed. But furthermore, around this freedom —in the fundamental base of society and the State— a structured institutional framework is guaranteed to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom, as well as the social values that the original constituent has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are born with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere with that freedom. Moreover, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality, and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited insofar as the particular conduct may be contrary to morality, public order, or harm a third party (Article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy must be presumed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, it maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different institutions of the State. The foregoing means that, be it the Political Constitution, an international agreement, the law, or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them arbitrarily. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance his policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to the social good. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Law 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent himself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation through special provisions, that is, specific provisions through which ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents these from being varied by matter and in time.\n\nFor the time being, the monopoly of mandatory insurance in favor of the INS is broken starting from the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater offering of national and international services by occupational risk insurance companies. It is clear that the National Constituent Assembly did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurance, thus breaking a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of the indicated Article 73, of tripartite financing source for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator at liberty with the initiative of how to materialize insurance against occupational risks. The National Constituent Assembly left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurance. Under the original constituent's scheme, mandatory occupational risk insurance would be covered by the decisions that the legislator made under the concept \"special provisions,\" which means that it not only designed this coverage with more leeway, but had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient power and resistance), and that in this matter it was received from a referendum process, as indeed happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit-providing activity of occupational risk insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a state monopoly activity, in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open towards the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, deriving from the Political Constitution, such as state oversight, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement that requires non-discriminatory regulations for all trade agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the insurance market offerors is prohibited. Returning to what was noted above, it is clear that the State, through legislation, can choose between providing Occupational Risk insurance under monopoly regimes or competition regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of physical or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent can effectively present itself in any of these spheres, the latter being the one chosen in the mentioned referendum.\n\nD.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.- The claimant argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, for which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent as the case may be) assigns to the State that service or a strategic position in it, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the provision it demands, such as interested management for certain public activities that cannot leave the State's administration, or concession when it entrusts private physical or legal subjects with a determined provision of public services. As indicated previously, a prohibition cannot be derived from the 4th paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding a conditional element open to the constitutional norm by establishing greater freedom of configuration for the legislator. For the Court, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it very clearly embraces a form of State administrative oversight over private parties who can exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require the fulfillment of ex ante requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination, or what is the same, the existence of norms equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but in the same way, if there were no supply at all, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as indeed it does. The reports in the action, the numerous briefs of the interested coadjuvants allude to the different conditions that the companies that would be offerors in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must meet; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be disadvantaged, because we are facing regulatory minimums (or hard core of the fundamental right) in order to obtain authorization to compete in the market. The claimant's argument lies in the fact that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no committed obligations for the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking retribution and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, such affirmations must be taken with extreme care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, it ventures into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In this sense, international provisions must be norms that harbor space for the different national policies of the member States, in as much as they leave open the mechanisms to make the rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of results, but without being international conventions of means (as the claimant seems to pose it). Put another way, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:\n\n\"Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures\n\nThe States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, to the maximum extent of available resources and taking into account their degree of development, in order to achieve progressively, and in accordance with domestic legislation, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol.\n\nArticle 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Legal Provisions\n\nIf the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, the legislative or other measures that may be necessary to make those rights effective\" (the bold text is not from the original).\n\nOne of the characteristics that distinguish human rights instruments from other treaties is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, in the others, what the High Parties decide to set as an objective in their reciprocal relations, boundary treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such to the human being, and not based on reciprocal concessions of interest to the States, and it will be he who assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties —especially multilateral ones— must adopt inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows them to deepen the agreed objective and end, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a given human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, such that it establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is at the disposal of each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and directing the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction is established, to adopt internal measures; it means that it can make use of public, private, or mixed forms, to obtain results in the direction of commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of benefits for occupational risk insurance, provided they conform to the international conventions that regulate the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the following:\n\n\"Article 9. Right to Social Security\n\n1. Everyone has the right to social security that protects them against the consequences of old age and disability that physically or mentally prevents them from obtaining the means to lead a dignified and decent life. In the event of the death of the beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to their dependents.\n\n2. In the case of persons who are working, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and subsidy or retirement pension in case of work accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth\" (the bold text is not from the original).\n\nThe truth is that international regulations establish what the social security jargon in some ILO documents calls the social floor or social protection floor as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there do exist unfulfilled legal obligations enforceable domestically, or once this is exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that occupational risk insurance is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in case of accident or occupational disease. ILO Convention 102 attributes responsibility to the employer for the work environment of his employee, and it conforms to the 4th paragraph of constitutional Article 73. The important thing is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, where it establishes minimum standards for each of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of said systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State can choose at least three areas of protection. Important data arise from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 \"Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization\"] which indicates, among other things:\n\n\"185. Employment injury schemes that provide benefits are often organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and sometimes they are part of other branches of social security. Because of this link between risk and prevention at the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely from employer contributions. Contribution rates are often differentiated according to the level of accident or disease risk in the various types of economic activities.\" (pg. 76);\n\nThe claimant alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, for the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressiveness of social rights. For this argument to be applicable, the regressiveness must be proven with the change of legal regime or it must be evident, but, even the ILO's own works do not endorse a single approach to the issue as the claimant seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, they are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, it is a matter of opportunity and convenience that must not occupy the Constitutional Chamber —in principle— it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which fall outside the law of the Political Constitution.\n\nIn this regard, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide; rather, it is up to the legislator to assess its timeliness and suitability, as well as its constitutional viability. As set forth above, first, there is no monopoly mandate or prohibition preventing mandatory occupational risk insurance from operating outside the institutional structures of the State; as a corollary, the State may use different private agents to carry out the necessary services, whether public or private. Extrapolating that this system implies a detriment to or loss of rights for service recipients does not reflect the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.\n\nE.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as domestic law is located in the Political Constitution, such that it is up to the original or derived constituent power to decide and ensure the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be noted that international law has legal effects after its incorporation into the legal system, through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation worldwide allows for a broad differentiation of three main systems: those countries that require double parliamentary approval, both for treaty ratification and subsequently for specific legislative provisions to incorporate the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in Scandinavian countries. Next, the system in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally bind the country, but which will require national legislation to adopt international law, as in England and the countries that form part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where, with parliamentary approval of the actions of the Executive Branch, the incorporation of international regulations takes effect upon completion of the ratification process by the State, as in our country. Similarly, there are other problems, such as assigning normative hierarchy to the international legislation incorporated into the legal system; all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, find their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. Regarding incorporation, our country has the system situated in the last category, the most representative one; it is true that it only requires legislative approval or disapproval of the treaty, in which case, if the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, this is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to take effect with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has these consequences thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:\n\n\"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their enactment or from the day they designate, authority superior to laws.\n\nPublic treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or political organization of the country shall require approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-fourths of its total membership, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose\".\n\nBut historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as they might be interpreted today. Thus, the rule is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it previously had a different, isolationist and restrictive wording, limiting public officials' ability to enter into international treaties, as follows:\n\n\"Article 7°-- No authority may enter into pacts, treaties or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Whoever does so shall be tried for treason against the Fatherland.\n\nAny treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to the territorial integrity or political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-fourths of its total membership and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for that purpose\".\n\nA strict reading of the transcribed article leads to impracticability and an automatic contradiction, improper of constitutional reasoning with public international law, grounded in an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which disregarded a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment undertaken by the Executive Branch), and which allows for acquiring and granting mutually or multilaterally agreed-upon international rights and obligations by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in how they must conduct themselves in the international order, insofar as it acquires rights, as well as duties towards others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent a significant structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the original constituent power's fear against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and viewing things from a perspective for the country's benefit, once the waters returned to their normal level after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement of the legislative reform operated through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, as follows:\n\n\"Article 7.-\n This article enshrined the conservative view of the majority of the 1949 constituents, who felt deep hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within this nationalistic zeal, it went too far, by stating in the first paragraph that anyone who entered into 'pacts, treaties or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact or convention constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty or independence of any country. If said first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the leaders the country has had since 1949 onwards would have to be tried for such a serious crime. We believe that said paragraph should be deleted, as it is dangerous\".\n\nThat correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in favor of proceeding with said modification, since if economic integration with Central America was sought, this had to be prioritized for its economic and development benefits, which was finally resolved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:\n\n\"If superior authority is not given to treaties and concordats over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of legal antinomies as they are called, of norms that clash, norms that provide the contrary, and that would constantly force us to appeal to the unconstitutionality or inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could put us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty, the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that ordinary law is subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty. This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of current forms whereby each norm governs within its determined area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and bursts upon the other territories, upon the other persons, upon the other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without the value of each country having been diminished. It is a sound norm, it is an advisable norm and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the ordinary norm\".\n\nIn this sense, the derived constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, such that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly, ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, regarding obligations freely assumed, to have international law incorporated with sufficient potency and resistance to impose the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary legislation and regulations that contradict it or are in contradiction. The reason lies in the obligation to honor commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and bona fides. On the other hand, the reservation and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the sense of Article 27, of the importance that a party could not invoke the provisions of its domestic law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. What is provided in the Political Constitution was already discussed above. Hence, with reason, the Chamber, when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation consistent with Constitutional Law, as dictated by Article 73, subsection e) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, such that \"the declaration shall be made only for the effects that they be interpreted and applied in harmony with the Constitution or, if its contradiction with it proves irremediable, its disapplication be ordered with general effects and its denunciation proceed\". Consistent interpretation is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse yet, to the commission of infractions that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, even participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Similarly, the principle of the supremacy of International Law is unequivocally manifested. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be tacitly or expressly modified by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly state if the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.\n\nThe claimant mentions the violation of various social security principles, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and inalienability. In reality, in some cases, what the claimant points out are some of the legal provisions governing occupational risk established in the Código de Trabajo, such that the principle alleged by the claimant and the coadjuvants does not operate—that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Código de Trabajo, and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law. However, viewed prudentially, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Código de Trabajo must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, such that if Article 205 of the Código de Trabajo establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing laws, to give way to SUGESE and its competencies. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would fall within the competencies of SUGESE to establish mechanisms that allow obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional basis of Occupational Risk Insurance is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of the insurance, the automaticity of Convention 102 of the ILO, and inalienability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which the Chamber cannot say are infringed either. It should be highlighted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurance, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of occupational and professional accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, by being the moderator of commercial activity setting conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different market participants; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally required benefits continue to be effective in its jurisdiction, including being a market participant as established in Law No. 8622, which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes among other things, in the fourth paragraph, that:\n\n\"… The Superintendency shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency shall be mandatory for supervised entities and persons.\n\nThe Superintendency is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers. Likewise, it must adopt clear, transparent, and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ, train, and maintain a sufficient work team with high professional standards, who follow the appropriate confidentiality standards\".\n\nOn the other hand, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:\n\n\"Objectives and functions of the Superintendencia General de Seguros\n\nThe Superintendency's purpose is to ensure the stability and efficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to provide the broadest information to policyholders. To this end, it shall authorize, regulate, and supervise individuals or legal entities that intervene in acts or contracts related to the insurance, reinsurance activity, the public offering, and the conduct of insurance business.\n…\nAdditionally, it shall have the following functions:\na)\n…\nb)\n…\nj)\n Issue other norms and directives of a technical or operational nature.\nk)\n…\nq)\".\n\nIn these functions, currently the Instituto Nacional de Seguros continues operating in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must cover the worker even if it omitted to report them, must cover them as uninsured. In this sense, there is no impact on the universal principle of protection of occupational risk insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, establishes:\n\n\"In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, INS shall have the full guarantee of the State\".\n\nSeveral important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, because coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, in that it contains enforceable obligations with expired deadlines, the legal and regulatory provisions issued are done in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, foresees measures to guarantee that social floor necessary to maintain occupational health levels and an occupational risk regime, it is clearly in line with the Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the aforementioned Reglamento establishes:\n\n\"Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers\n\nIf the worker was not insured against occupational risks, in accordance with the Código de Trabajo, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant them all the benefits they would have been entitled to had they been insured, except in those cases where the employer had an active Riesgos del Trabajo policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be borne by the insurance entity receiving the premium\".\n\nThe supposed economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a constitutional nature problem; rather, it is the exclusive purview of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate for a presumed negative impact the Institution might have, such that this acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against occupational risks, whether private or public. In the Chamber's view, the article reinforces the worker's position, rather than weakening it, since the occupational risk insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory character as is attempted to be pointed out in the writ filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, among other norms, from which arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating matters it detects as necessary of a technical and operational nature for better service for workers suffering an occupational risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Código de Trabajo.\n\nVI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing reasons, the action is declared without merit.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is declared without merit. Judge Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the claimant deputy's condition. Judge Calzada and Judges Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.\n\n.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert\nArmijo S.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. Fernando\nCruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate\nCh.\n\nAcción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712\n\nDissenting opinion of Judge Calzada Miranda and Judges Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro, with the latter drafting\n\nThe undersigned Judges dissent in this action and consider that it should be declared with merit, with its consequences, based on the following.\n\nSub-subsection b), of Article III .2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 \"Servicios Financieros\", of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, and Transitory Provision III of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, approved through Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, insofar as they provide for the market opening of occupational risk insurance, present a constitutional friction.\n\nThe claimant considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurance (Articles 50, 73 and 74) by denaturing it and converting it into a for-profit commercial service. He indicates that occupational risk insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance integrates the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, Convention No. 102 of the ILO, Protocol of San Salvador Art. 9, ) and that occupational risk insurance integrates the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, inalienability, and others. This is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violates the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently already have, diminishing and worsening current advantages. Currently all income must be allocated to improvements for the benefit of workers.\n\nIn this regard, the undersigned Judges consider that the claimant is correct in his allegations and that the fact that the constituent power included occupational risk insurance within the Chapter on Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution evidences that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of the other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance.\n\nThe challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of occupational risk insurance within the commercial opening foreseen in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, are unconstitutional; this even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them universality and progressivity) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the way to distribute the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.\n\nThis type of insurance, by being constitutionally enshrined in Article 73 (and despite the fact that it does not state there that it will be managed monopolistically by INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which therefore, is incompatible with a commercial opening system (competition, profit).\n\nHistorically, occupational risk insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated artisans (mainly shoemakers, bakers, and mule keepers) with the objective of establishing a Savings Bank (see the Gaceta of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated relief for the working class.\n\nThis insurance had its own evolution. Before the theory of \"social-occupational risk\" triumphed, initially the employer's fault was required to give rise to liability, then it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, meaning it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather it was the employer who had to demonstrate that they had not been guilty or negligent in the distribution and organization of work.\n\nIn the early 20th century, the first formal attempts to provide true protection to the working class against occupational misfortunes are located. On June 26, 1907, the then deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented to Congress a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles. On May 24, 1910, the deputation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the \"Caja de Previsión\". On May 16, 1913, deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another bill on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles. For different circumstances, none of the previous projects had the necessary reception to become law.\n\nIn April 1924, the discussion of the Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo or the Ley de Reparación de Accidentes was suspended and immediately the discussion of the bill to create the Banco Nacional de Seguros began, which culminated with the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gives rise to this Institution. Thus, the Banco Nacional de Seguros is in charge of the administration of insurances, whose monopoly remains in the hands of the Costa Rican State.\n\nOnce the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the \"Workplace Accident Compensation Law\" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is said that \"the National Insurance Institute is going to administer the occupational hazards (riesgos de trabajo) regime.\" The INS created the Workers' Department, tasked with administering this Law, which would later be called the Department of Occupational Hazards (Riesgos del Trabajo).\n\nThis Law No. 53 changed, underwent several reforms, and in 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) was enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation was incorporated into the Labor Code. At that time, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already existed. It had been created in November 1941. So, at this point, a first major discussion arises. Now that the Social Security Fund exists, should we give the occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS?\n\nThere is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute has 18 years of experience in handling workplace accidents, he deems it prudent for that congress to keep the occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute, and indeed the Labor Code is approved and the administration is kept in the hands of the Institute.\n\nIn 1949, when the current Political Constitution was promulgated, the convenience, or lack thereof, of the administration of Occupational Hazards in the hands of the Institute was debated, regarding the famous Article 73. Once again, the need for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund was raised. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafted this Political Constitution, ratified that the occupational hazards regime should remain differentiated, as it had been up to that moment, and remain in the hands of the National Insurance Institute.\n\nIn 1961, when Article 177 of the Political Constitution was amended through Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintained the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute. This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurance (seguros por riesgos de trabajo).\n\nIn 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approved Law No. 6727, which refers to the modification of Title IV of the Labor Code, it once again ratified the appropriateness of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and made some modifications:\n\n·   The concept of Occupational Hazards is broadened (Article 195).\n\n·   The Occupational Hazard Insurance (seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) is declared mandatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201).\n\n·   The concept of Occupational Health (Salud Ocupacional) appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273).\n\n·   In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer, regarding insurance, risk, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284).\n\n·   The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in Articles 285 and 286 of the aforementioned Code.\n\nToday, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security regime, through the administration it has carried out for more than 70 years, with sufficient financial reserves to provide the care it has been providing.\n\nAs can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, contrary to what is stated in the majority vote, the idea was rather to unify the occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for it to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.\n\nØ   Deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ\n    \"There are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles he then proceeded to enumerate. In the first place, it must be a single institution that covers all insurance. One of the failures of social insurance in some countries - like Chile - has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The technicians who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. In the second place, it is known that the greater number of members is what guarantees the success of social insurance (...) Furthermore, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number.\" Minute No. 125.- One hundred twenty-fifth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August eighth, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nØ   Deputy VOLIO\n    \"since 1924 the Law on Workplace Accidents was enacted, entrusting the Insurance Bank - an essentially commercial institution - to take charge of that risk. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then the insurance against professional risks (seguros contra riesgos profesionales) must be assigned to Social Security. For the moment, the Fund is not in a position to assume those risks. Therefore, the logical thing is to leave things as they currently are, avoiding the problem that arises so that it can be resolved in due time and with more care.\" Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nØ   Deputy FACIO.\n    \"After November 8th, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute will continue working - as they have done up to now. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution can be found to the problem of the unification of social insurance, after mature and considered analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem.\" Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nØ   Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, on the other hand, he considers a charitable institution, since it does not profit in any way. He thinks that the only way to solve the problem of social insurance is by creating the necessary revenues for the Fund so that it can carry out its mission. Hence, the problem can be solved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine).\n\nThe above excerpts evidence the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurance. The very nature of these risks allows them to be considered part of social insurance. Occupational hazards are not an annex or addendum that can be detached from the definition and constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurance in a broad sense; for this reason, it is not admissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional risks mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated within the concept of social insurance defined by the constitution. The specialty of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize the insurance against professional risks. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize an insurance against professional risks with a legally and constitutionally different condition from the social insurance to which the first three paragraphs of Article 73 of the constitution casually refer. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of this insurance, because it is located in a norm that is what gives it that condition.\n\nTherefore, the occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which the commercial opening legislation does not protect and which it cannot protect either, since a legal-rank regulation will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.\n\nDue to the very nature of the social insurance against occupational hazards, whose raison d'être is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work performed, they suffer an accident or an illness, and which operates in our country in a mandatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent had all of this in mind when it decided to include this type of insurance within the chapter on social insurance, precisely because it functions as social insurance and not as individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.\n\nBased on the arguments presented, we consider that this action must be declared with merit, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional norms of the Treaty in question.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nMagistrate\n\nGilberth Armijo S.                     Fernando Cruz C.\nMagistrate                            Magistrate\n\nNote from Magistrate Calzada. Different reasons regarding the claimant's standing. The majority vote determines that although Mr. Villalta [Name 001] derives his standing from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), his standing to file the action is recognized based on the understanding that this filing is made \"in favor of an undetermined group of workers whose rights (...) could be injured (...) even if they were under the coverage of an occupational hazard policy\" (sic); that is, the majority vote determines that the claimant's standing comes from this defense in favor of an undetermined group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests. In this regard, I consider that the standing of the claimant Deputy also comes from the defense of diffuse interests. As noted in recital (considerando) II of this same judgment, diffuse interests must not be confused with collective interests, while also they should not be understood in terms so broad that they are confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, \"but united based on a specific social need,\" which is why \"every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the national collectivity,\" without this being confused with the possibility that \"any person may appeal to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever.\" The precision that the majority criterion attempts to formulate is that even in the case of the defense of an undetermined group of workers, this does not configure the existence of a diffuse interest that allows granting the claimant the standing provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It is my criterion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that undetermined group of workers, but also on the fact that due to the subject matter intended to be regulated, it does indeed concern a matter on which there is a general interest of the population. It must be kept in mind that as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of occupational hazard insurance implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country when configuring the system of a Democratic and Social State of Law. In this sense, there is an interest of the community in general, and not only of the currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the risks to which a worker may be subjected; it is clear that the first interested party in these cases will be the worker – both for health and personal income reasons–, but it should not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance is because other people besides the specific worker are involved in it. On one hand, there is the direct family of the worker, who obtains a good part of their subsistence possibilities from the work performed by the latter; there is also the condition of the employer, who finds in the occupational hazards regime a solid backing against any misfortune, contributing thereby to cover any eventual liability that could be attributed to them; and there is also the State itself, which through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social well-being in the terms stated, while simultaneously guaranteeing that the affected person receives the attention required so that they can reintegrate in a timely and effective manner into active working life, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy with the least harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority criterion that repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing by not recognizing direct standing, the undersigned considers that they do hold it in certain circumstances. In my opinion, Deputies who hold that character for the Nation in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution, due to the nature of their position, hold a representation of national interests, which gives them, in principle, general standing to bring action on those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases in the action of unconstitutionality, but yes when qualifying the circumstances of paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in particular, the management of diffuse interests or those that pertain to the community as a whole, and very particularly when, precisely, it concerns challenging norms that directly impact a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the community they represent, as has been indicated in preceding lines. Naturally, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action - not provided for in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction - by any person, nor does it permit free access through the action of unconstitutionality to the holder of an interest just by virtue of being one and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into consideration the transcendence of the issue regarding occupational hazards and the representation that, in general terms, a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly does hold, I consider that in addition to the standing recognized to the claimant by the majority criterion, they must also be recognized the standing indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\n*100177120007CO*\n\nEXPEDIENTE:\n10-017712-0007-CO\n\nPROCESO:\nACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD\n\nACCIONANTE:\n[Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes on August eighth, two thousand thirteen.\n\nDue to the painful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, let judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, be notified without his signature. The case file will be archived in due course.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\nActing Presiding Judge\nConstitutional Chamber\n\nFor those who consider it a social insurance, they maintain that it is imbued with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against misfortunes arising from the exercise of their work. If it were not so, they say, there would be no explanation for the fact that in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, it demonstrates that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but rather a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), conceived to regulate a monopolistic insurance system under the INS. Evidently, with the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, and upon the expiration of the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of norms not directly linked to the market opening, but rather to the characteristics of the insurance, which are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of compulsory insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as social insurance; provision 205 of the same regulatory body provides that the INS must perform annual settlements that include the formation of technically necessary reserves; the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance programs developed by the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional) and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. In it, the principle of service at cost is realized, so while it remains in force, insurance against occupational hazards (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) must operate—at least in its basic coverage—without profit-making ends. Similarly, provisions 221 and 231 indicate the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if they would have been entitled to them had they been insured, subrogating the right to take action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the sums disbursed, plus interest. The principle of universality is based on these provisions. At the regulatory level, insurance against occupational hazards is governed by the \"Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios)\", approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through Article 8, provision 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurances (Article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (Article 2). It was issued based on Articles 25, 26, 27 and Transitory Provision III of the Law Regulating the Insurance Market (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros). In this regard, the Insurance Superintendency (Superintendencia de Seguros) will grant administrative authorization to engage in insurance activity in the field of insurance against occupational hazards \"… provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that will be established in the regulation that the National Council issues for that purpose, in accordance with national legislation\". The Regulation, in Article 8, provides for the possibility of offering the compulsory insurance together with any other voluntary insurance (not subject to service at cost), allowing better coverage in the event that the worker sues the employer for an act or omission of the latter that caused the workplace accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code and that the payments of economic benefits will be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation on Occupational Hazards (Reglamento General de Riesgos de Trabajo) issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision where, for an uninsured worker, the INS must grant the benefits, except in those cases where the employer had a policy in force with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, a scenario in which the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity that received the premium. The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is in itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies the Law on Worker Protection (Ley de Protección al Trabajador); the social security system regarding pensions was formed by four pillars. Within this scheme, there is private participation, under a competition regime, for profit, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The regulations establish that it must operate at cost; however, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, the participation of private companies, for profit, in the commercialization of insurance against occupational hazards, is not contrary to the Constitution, provided that regulations of legal rank are issued that protect, as a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers to date. There is no norm of constitutional rank that establishes that insurance against occupational hazards must operate at cost, or without profit-making ends. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which demonstrates that there is a certain flexibility to define the operation of this insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of workers' rights. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could jeopardize its competitiveness, even though the \"Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances\" considers it insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality lies not in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions that regulate the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code regarding not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because Transitory Provision III of the Law Regulating the Insurance Market itself establishes that this regulation must be issued \"in accordance with national legislation\". Failure to act in this way would go against not only the principle of universality, but also that of progressivity, as it could result in the protection currently enjoyed by the entire working class of the country being reduced to only a part of it. There is a constitutional obligation to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.\n\n        5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 39, 40, and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of the days February 24, 25, and 28, 2011.\n\n    6.- By writings submitted by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipalidad de San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP), they requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber admit them as active coadjuvants in the present action. They likewise challenge the contested norms in their capacities as workers and citizens, beneficiaries and users of social insurances, considering that they harm the constitutional principles that protect social insurances, derived from Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Magna Carta, specifically affecting the solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance. They indicate that the contested norms obligate Costa Rica to allow the lucrative commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity-based insurance as of January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social occupational hazards insurance contemplated in the fourth paragraph of provision 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the above, clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 will not apply to the social insurances set forth in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Magna Carta and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS), but excluding the social occupational hazards insurances, despite these also having constitutional rank and being governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the impact on the constitutional principles that protect social occupational hazards insurance, as it provides that Costa Rica will not have to reform its regulations on this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations \"are consistent\" with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the lucrative commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance is incompatible with the nature and principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in the levels of protection achieved by the country (impact on the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the \"Law Regulating the Insurance Market, Including Comprehensive Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924\", Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 to La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008, reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and aims to implement said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones) must grant \"authorizations\" for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance, as of January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same vices of constitutionality. They agree with the Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of Articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and it is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality, and service at cost. If its lucrative commercial exploitation is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, harming the rights of working people who suffer workplace accidents and illnesses, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.\n\n        7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican - North American Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio), submits a writing as a passive coadjuvant in the action of unconstitutionality, with sufficient faculties to intervene in the process; he points out general aspects of the Chamber's competence, as well as the limited effects that national law has on public international law obligations. If the State were forced to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the will of the sovereign expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors, and exporters, and it would have to be pronounced upon in its entirety. However, contrary to what was affirmed by the claimant, the Chamber has pronounced on the opening of occupational hazards insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that compulsory occupational hazards insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, a social insurance as defined by Article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he highlights that advisability or inadvisability is not equal to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the claimant makes value judgments emphasizing the inadvisability of the contested norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give efficacy to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself; he also notes that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that occupational hazards insurance is mentioned in Article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country (employers and workers alike) have to choose among different entities that offer coverage for occupational hazards. He considers that the insurance is not part of the social insurances, as these are defined by the Political Constitution, and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of occupational hazards insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and Article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent the modification of the form of providing occupational hazards insurance. While he accepts that insurances against occupational hazards are constitutionally recognized, social insurances are those that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of these social insurances must be met that occupational hazards insurance does not have, regarding coverage, financing method, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the funds cannot be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent, these insurances were separated and differentiated from occupational hazards insurance, as was regulated by Article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). Although it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to solidarity-based assistance to the worker, and that there is recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by Article 73 or that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that occupational hazards insurance is a regime that the constituent established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers it correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection provided by social insurances and occupational hazards insurances is not mutually exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. Furthermore, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security under the responsibility of the Fund, and another of insurance against occupational hazards under the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances under the responsibility of the Fund and the INS are delimited. He cites jurisprudence of the Chamber and opinions of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic indicating that social insurances are exclusively those that protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. In this sense, the claimant's thesis of considering occupational hazards insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The claimant's thesis is unfounded under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to special provisions. Many of the claimant's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions that, as they are not founded on doctrinal criteria, relevant judgments, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, express nothing more than the claimant's personal feeling toward commercial opening. The Labor Code retains intact the rules on the provision, universality, compulsory nature, and other characteristics of occupational hazards insurance, including expressly that uninsured cases will continue to be attended by the National Insurance Institute. There is no denaturation of compulsory occupational hazards insurance. The fundamental core of occupational hazards insurance, concerning the protection of the worker, would not be altered by commercial opening or even by a potential profit, given that it would not cease to be universal, compulsory, and solidarity-based. It remains compulsory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers; it would remain solidarity-based insofar as it will always be paid by the employer; the uninsured will be attended by the INS. By judgment 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulation-wise develop the social guarantee of the right to a subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all normative development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern the insurance through special provisions, but also, it does not imply renunciation, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the claimant, he points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, he relies on judgment No. 1998-06450 regarding the democratic legitimacy corresponding to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's jurisprudence, has not been violated, as for this to be the case, it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The claimant supposes that by the mere fact of allowing other entities to provide the service of occupational hazards insurance, the coverage and quality thereof will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence whatsoever of this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. He requests that the action be declared without merit.\n\n        8.- Freddy Sandí Brenes, General Secretary of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, hereinafter UPINS), appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his legitimacy is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation he holds on behalf of the workers of the INS in relation to occupational hazards. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office, he emphasizes the fact that it concludes that social occupational hazards insurance is truly a social right and guarantee. He adduces that the recommendation proposed by the Attorney General's Office, where it is proposed that since the contested norms are not unconstitutional, legislation must be enacted that guarantees the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity. He maintains that an opening legislation that guarantees these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces in practice a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and of disadvantage for the INS in competition matters, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could be violative of other constitutional principles related to freedom of trade, enshrined in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, and competition, bringing us to the philosophical discussion in the matter of Human Rights, regarding whether solidarity can be imposed in trade matters. He argues that the reasons why the contested regulations are unconstitutional lie in the model of State chosen by the constituent, for which he brings up whether Costa Rica is a Social State of Law or a Liberal State of Law. Clarifying the above is essential if one takes into account that the opening of a social insurance against occupational hazards, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, requires a special value judgment about the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been formed to date as a Social and Democratic State of Law, governed among other things by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituents dreamed of a Social State of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent in the first paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution. The constituents decided to balance worker-employer relations, outlining in general terms the following guarantees: a) allow workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (Article 60 of the Constitution), b) elevate to constitutional rank the right to agree on collective bargaining agreements, and grant the rank of law to the content of those negotiations (Article 62 of the Constitution), c) constitutionally guarantee the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, it can be interpreted that severance pay is included, but the article does not establish a cap limit, nor does it prohibit aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of people and their families and dependents (Article 72), e) a system of insurances is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of the amount of their salary, and the best possibilities of recovering to continue working. With this, the importance of work as a means of life is recognized, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, where that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (Article 73 of the Constitution), f) the constituent includes and in a concrete manner \"constitutionalizes\" the rights and benefits, not previously stated, but that derive from the Christian principle of social justice and that are indicated by law (or by collective bargaining agreements that have the rank of law) (Article 74). On the juridical nature of occupational hazards insurance and its content, he alleges that the fact that its content is provided through law does not imply that it can be varied to worsen it simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that occupational hazards insurance \"will be governed by special laws\". In the study of legislative technique in the matter of human rights, this reference to the law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes a mistake by the constituent, which in a certain way \"de-constitutionalizes\" what it intends to \"constitutionalize\".\n\nCertainly, every norm of constitutional rank has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or the \"hard core\" of that right. The social insurance for occupational risks is constituted by at least the following principles: principle of universality, principle of solidarity, principle of generality, principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), and service at cost. The social insurance for occupational risks has constitutional rank and is also recognized in Convention 102 of the ILO, approved as relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutional control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all workers in the country are covered by insurance against occupational accidents; a situation which, in our opinion, would be breached by the risk selection that the different companies in the insurance market could make. Regarding the incompatibility of the constitutional principle of service at cost with the opening of this type of social insurance, it states that this derives directly from Article 73 of the Constitution. This principle is developed at the same time by labor legislation, establishing in that regulation that in this activity, there are no \"profits\" as such, but rather eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, in the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council. As the petitioner himself indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become private profits. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest it, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and the principle of progressivity would be violated. We consider that this obligation to offer insurance at cost is incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution; therefore, the social insurance for occupational risks cannot legally be opened to free competition. Regarding risk selection and the violation of the constitutional principles of universality and progressivity, it affirms that certainly the solidary coverage of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. Income from more profitable activities contributes to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the occupational risk insurance market, private companies will compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities that present fewer claims. This would leave the less attractive risks, with more statistically proven accidents, once again in the hands of the probably sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of \"risk selection\" functions as the fundamental concept that prevents a social insurance, which is solidary, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating as a commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance is radically opposed to the conception of a social insurance like that for occupational risks, which is based on the insuring of all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or danger. This confirms the position held herein insofar as what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization. In accordance with Article 74 of the Constitution, social guarantees are inalienable, and given that the legislator established the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad) of social guarantees, said condition operates in such a way that the worker cannot renounce them. Nor can the State permit that in its legislation these guarantees are not available.\n\n**9.-** Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as acting Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered as a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it provides him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment, likewise due to the institutional dynamics with the trade partners of the Free Trade Agreement United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the petitioner's legal standing, it is alleged that the harm transcends an individual harm to any person, that is, for the national community in its entirety, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes his standing on the existence of a popular action, since the action is filed for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the Nation against an alleged injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. Furthermore, it accuses that the action has subjective appreciations and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis, confuses the Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating applicable constitutional and legal principles from one insurance regime to another, thereby conveniently intermingling the nature of each one with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced for a confrontation and inconsistency of the national order with the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic plenitude and legal certainty, ignoring international commercial commitments and the general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with treaties, international conventions and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international order. The principles in question, apart from being inherent to international law, constitute basic presuppositions of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it should be noted, firstly, that according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws at the international level; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to comply with an international obligation. In relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of a domestic Law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must comply with them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Likewise, international tribunals have held that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal nature of international law norms is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed within its international obligations, the rights that international regulations enshrine are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level, and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, but rather they modify the internal legal order of nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. Thus, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of a customary nature (international customs), a State – upon entering the international community – accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning the conventional rules of international law – that is, those that come from a bilateral or multilateral treaty – the process is usually different from the previous one. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided for in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4) and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures relating to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements – denominations that for the purposes of international law are equivalent – and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution indicates that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over that of common Law, which entails that in the presence of a norm from an international treaty or convention, domestic norms of legal rank yield their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, since each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing to an indefinite future the realization of these rights under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, which is that of \"progressivity\" or \"progressive development\", paradoxically enshrined in Article 26 itself of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on \"available resources\", which cannot be interpreted licentiously because it would delay their effectiveness and would violate the general principles of international law \"Pacta Sunt Servanda\" and \"Bona Fides\", and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all the commitments acquired by the State, regardless of the origin and nature of the same. Regarding the supposed hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively addressing human rights issues, it is not superfluous to point out that these, according to the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions or that, even, compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are \"dead letter\", which would be equivalent to evading or breaching international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of judgment 2010-11352, has recognized the need to interpret the Magna Carta harmoniously with the doctrine of human rights coming from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the duty of the Nation to modify the Political Constitution, exceptionally in those insurmountable cases where it clashes with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them or not into its legal order, so that it conforms, is congruent and concordant with said norms, principles, rights, and international customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelacy, improper hierarchization, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or, based on such criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. No thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement has as its basis another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered a gross infraction and evident lack to International Law and the Law of the Constitution, is acceptable. On the other hand, it compiles judgment No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, by which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, regarding the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference regarding the purpose of the Treaty, that it would not address the convenience or not of the approval, as well as the economic aspects that surround the Treaty, but rather issues that generate doubts of constitutionality. The congruence it maintains with the claims of the consultants and what was resolved, reveals the need, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, for the judgment to be read as a whole following a reasonable and proportional legal interpretation to the end pursued within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So much so that a light reading that partially and out-of-context of the prevailing reality interprets the text in question, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the set of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and of the norms it deals with, which would inevitably lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is unacceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to move forward, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, well known to all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but rather an evident contravention of the general principles of International Law \"Pacta Sunt Servanda\" and \"Bona fides\", which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.\n\nCosta Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the manner in which Occupational Risk Insurance was provided in the country, the foregoing, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that sustain it, the rights that guarantee it, or the coverage that this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of the CAFTA-DR, the country – in the Matter of Insurance Services – assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition – by said insurance it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance – as of January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called \"Gradual Market Opening Commitments\", subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for occupational risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to the cited subsection 2, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurance of Article 73 of the Constitution, clarified that the social insurances contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, while the mandatory occupational risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would indeed be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or disagreements with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in an Annex relating to and exclusive to Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, since the commitment to the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right nor does it denature said mandatory insurances. The opening and possible provision by other entities other than the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not obligate Costa Rica to modify the norms that regulate occupational risk insurance, provided that such norms are consistent with the obligations assumed in the CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obligates the country to \"...treat occupational risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be exploited lucratively... the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the preceding section that define and characterize the social and solidary nature of occupational risk insurance\". Nor is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obligates that \"...must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, as it is a norm with a rank superior to national law\", because the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application and respect for the constitutional and solidary principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or the means by which the State must comply with said international precept, given that by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, these are internally obligated by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the domestic legal order – whether as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law – to receive said international norms within the bosom of the national order and intrinsically give full validity to the precepts emanating from international treaties, conventions, or agreements. The CAFTA-DR establishes a concrete programmatic commitment, namely: the competitive opening of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance, as of January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the form in which such obligation shall be carried out. It is here where the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as its main consequence the non-fulfillment of the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and of the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other States Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. For the purpose of complying with this and other insurance market opening commitments, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law was issued, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, which, in accordance with its Article 1 indicating its objectives, it is inferred that it aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in the CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of the insured or consumers of insurance services, the minimum requirements and rules for market regulation, and basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of the CAFTA-DR to open the market for mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance, as of January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the General Superintendence of Insurance (Superintendencia General de Seguros) grants based on the Regulation that the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero) issues for that purpose. The mentioned Transitory is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the deadline contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to extend, as part of its supervisory functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation that establishes the operating requirements for mandatory insurances in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, a maximum deconcentrated body attached to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, based on the competences that the Laws grant it. In this sense, it reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that considered and reported on the Bill for the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to conclude that the nature of Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance is a component that concerns the protection of the social security of workers, which, as relevant, according to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, creates insurances against professional risks which shall be exclusively at the expense of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined as a commercial contract, but rather one is in the presence of an insurance whose regulation is found in the Constitution, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to it being able to be offered in the market under a competition scheme, an aspect that would clearly guarantee for the consumer and for the insured greater diversity of options and better coverage and insurance conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (heard in a constitutional consultation by the Chamber in judgment No.\n\n(2008-10450), a norm of public order and public interest, implements the commitments derived from the CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the authorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity. It creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the effective competition of participating entities, in addition to modernizing and strengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the legal norm and based on the international commitment, the \"Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, que define los requisitos mínimos de funcionamiento del seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y Seguro Obligatorio de Automóviles\" was issued, applicable to insurance entities, in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed insurance. There exists the \"Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros\". The invocation of unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening would expose the country to a potential State-State dispute resolution panel, which would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance. It could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits, article 20.16 of the CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to Costa Rica's reputation within the framework of bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes for trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even occur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the \"Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios\".\n\nArticle 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent power to provide and maintain a superior-ranked protection for workers under the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social security is informed by the basic principles of universality, compulsory nature, and social solidarity. Judgments of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two systems of social insurance, not mutually exclusive, whose primary and imperative purpose is to protect the worker. One against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, and the other against occupational risks, which are the exclusive and sole responsibility of the employer (judgment 2008-016964). There are several consequences of the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence; firstly, the issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security system, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social Security. Secondly, it was interpreted that there exist principles of the Right to Social Security linked to the Social Insurance Regime of the CCSS, which are those related to universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (judgment 2001-10546). In a third consequence, regarding the link between the right to health and social security, inasmuch as the administration of social insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (judgment 2007-17971). The fourth consequence that stands out most from the jurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection provided by social insurance and by occupational or work-risk insurance, which are distinct expressions of the fundamental right to social security and which are manifested in the legal system in a different form through the different norms regulating the regimes of the social security system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational risk insurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social security regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social security services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional rank, since there is no legal or constitutional prohibition that impedes the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance, given that the regime is in essence distinct from that of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the occupational risk insurance market is in accordance with Constitutional Law, since this compulsory insurance continues to be treated by the CAFTA-DR as an insurance distinct from the social security insurances of the CCSS without its nature being altered. Regarding the Compulsory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime, as a social security regime it aims to compensate the worker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or illnesses, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform in a subordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational risk regime is regulated at an infra-constitutional level in Title Four: On the Protection of Workers During the Exercise of Work of the Labor Code (article 193 to 331), the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, and in Acuerdo SUGESE 04-10, \"Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios\" approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a manifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not detract from the fact that, doctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, one is in the presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. Underlying this is the historical fact that it is a commercial contract recognized in the Fundamental Norm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an innovative and additional element to the traditional conception of commercial insurance contract law. The competition scheme is not incompatible with the Constitution, nor do international human rights instruments prescribe or give indications of such non-conformity. The report sets out the similarities and differences between the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the CCSS and the Compulsory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime. Also, regarding the principles of compulsory nature, universality, social solidarity, and irrevocability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social Security, because a large part of the constitutional jurisprudence that develops them has been transcribed; however, they will be analyzed from the perspective of the subject of respect for the essential content of this right.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff's arguments, the principle of compulsory nature is not affected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or affect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as a constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The relevant provisions make the Insurance a compulsory insurance. In this sense, article 193 of the Labor Code remains in force, which operationalizes the principle; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the commitment was assumed to open the compulsory insurance market to competition as of January 1, 2011. So that the reference made by the article to the INS should be understood generically to refer to the operators authorized by SUGESE, concordantly with the \"Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros\" issued by CONASSIF. The compulsory nature is in the Labor Code, the Reglamento General de Riesgos del Trabajo (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the aforementioned regulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia General de Seguros and the Norma Técnica issued by each insurance entity.\n\nThe principle of universality is also not modified, distorted, or affected by the CAFTA-DR or by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. The treaty does not suppose anywhere the existence of a competitive market in which the Occupational Risk Insurance would cease to cover all workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the effective market opening, the new private operators of occupational risk insurance will have the possibility of attracting a greater number of employers to contract this insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the principle of compulsory nature. The regulatory provision (article 5) provides for the obligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the insured, and beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the specifications that the law and related regulations provide for compulsory insurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that offer compulsory insurance to enter into the necessary agreements or contracts with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the operational aspects derived from the medical care provided by that institution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits indicated in article 218 of the Labor Code. The hypothetical scenarios where the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market will affect the finances of the INS, and consequently, the care of uninsured persons, but it points out what was affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts that the uninsured worker is not harmed from the perspective of the joint obligation, without prejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case, the Reglamento contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an Occupational Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, they will be considered as uninsured and the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium. It highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Ley de Cobro Judicial for certifications issued by established entities, the competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those issued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited care in a monopoly insurance market system, because the care or benefits that the insurance coverages contemplate are constrained by fundamental criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions of the workers.\n\nThe principle of social solidarity posits the duty to help those who have less based on the contribution of all, especially those who have more. The appellant's arguments that the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity because workers will have unequal protection, such an argument lacks any foundation. On this point, it is relevant to remember that the duty to insure workers through the Insurance does not fall on the worker, but on the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic to conceive the operation of an open and competitive Occupational Risk Insurance market, in which workers will be left without insurance, because they will be \"rejected\" by private operators of occupational risk benefits, because their salary is not \"attractive\", since it is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance but their employer, in accordance with paragraph four of Article 73 of the Constitution and the norms of the Labor Code. For further detail, it should be noted that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation to this insurance is that it is compulsory and mandatory in nature, independently of working conditions and the salary earned, so that the employer always has the obligation to insure their workers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of insuring and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Risk Insurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of the activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in accordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, to ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can private or public providers of insurance services, on a discriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers who wish to contract Insurance services with them, due to the authorization obtained by SUGESE in accordance with the Reglamento issued by CONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance with national legislation. It follows from the above that an insurance entity could reserve the right to contract with an employer-client when the latter does not meet the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the supervisory entity. In this sense, the plaintiff is incorrect when they claim that private operators \"will dispute the profitable market segments.\" The CAFTA-DR is based on the premise that in the competitive Insurance market, the insurance firms that are authorized by the State know in advance the rules that regulate competition and protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to provide a public offer of occupational risk insurance and make a selection of the employers – clients to whom they wish to sell occupational risk insurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and regulatory norms, there cannot be discrimination in the insuring of workers, by virtue of the fact that the same principle of universality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to select or discriminate against workers based on their potential profits and risk levels. As for the second stage, relating to the determination of coverage, it refers to article 15 of the CONASSIF Reglamento, which the plaintiff seems to ignore, and resolved the issue of the minimum content of Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the policy must cover the benefits established in article 218 of the Labor Code, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on the basic benefits that the aforementioned norm establishes. At the stage of determining rates for coverage, it is permitted to establish categories of higher or lower accident rates, taking into account, among other items, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of activities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages are duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those coverages are determined under the actuarial technical bases that support the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with article 205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be viable and financially sustainable, and to allow for similar treatment or treatment for equals. The basic coverages functioned before the CAFTA-DR and when the INS held the monopoly on compulsory insurance. The rates for each insurance entity are authorized by SUGESE so that they comply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors demanded by the general provisions of the capital adequacy and solvency regime, as well as ensuring sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities of their insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and discrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities, but also that the minimum basic coverages, equal for all workers, are met, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same for all workers. Thus, the additional benefits by way of additional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the employer has with the insurance entity, and which are at the employer's expense, will directly imply an improvement in the treatment and care of the worker, which does not in any way violate the principle of universality or that of solidarity. Regarding irrevocability, workers protected under this regime cannot renounce the rights conferred by it, as prescribed by this constitutional norm. This means that workers cannot, motu proprio or by the action of a third party, renounce the rights and benefits granted by reason of the Fundamental Right to Social Security. The plaintiff does not indicate why the principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers can renounce Occupational Risk Insurance; on the contrary, in the preamble of Section H \"Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros\", respect for the Political Constitution is reaffirmed, and with it the irrevocable nature of the rights and benefits of the Insurance.\n\nRegarding the constitutional principles of the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that are extensive to the Occupational Risk Insurance Regime, such as the principles of sufficiency that are in force in article 206 of the Labor Code where both the needs of the worker and the salary earned by the worker are taken into account. In fact, this is how it functioned in times when the INS held the monopoly on Occupational Risk Insurance and it will continue to function in the same terms, today in a market open to competition. It also alludes to the principle of automaticity of protection, referring to the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social security that translates into \"… an adequate and immediate protection in terms of illness, disability, old age, and death.\" Making an extension of this principle to Occupational Risk Insurance, as part of the general social security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special nature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, compulsory and universal. This has functioned this way until now, where hospitals of the Caja or private health centers must provide primary care to anyone who has suffered a work accident or illness. Uninsured workers receive the same immediate protection. In any case, articles 20 and 21 of the Reglamento come to support what is provided in numeral 232 of the Labor Code.\n\nThe report additionally notes the following differences between the Occupational Risk Insurance and the CCSS Social Insurances. Regarding the subject that provides the benefit or coverage, in each case it indicates the respective institutional fields and coverages, as well as those of the commercial operators, to conclude with the plaintiff's indication that it violates the Political Constitution. Furthermore, the Occupational Risk Insurance is the exclusive responsibility of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme of the Social Insurances of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It is the latter that the prohibition on transferring or using those funds for purposes other than those related to their mission applies to. There are differences regarding the use and destination of the social insurance funds and reserves. The funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to article 73 of the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity, Disability, and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply to the Compulsory Occupational Risk Insurance Regime; there is no such constitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves resulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in article 73 when it refers to \"social insurance\" and \"insurance against occupational risk.\" Although this does not mean that these funds are left without regulation, as this is determined through legal channels, but this is a very different matter from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of constitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary benefits and the supposed cost-based service. Regarding the first, it indicates that neither the CAFTA-DR nor the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros alters article 242 of the Labor Code, nor articles 255 to 259, on the possibility of commutation of incomes. Furthermore, the so-called \"cost-based service\" is not a principle of compulsory insurance, nor even a constitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in general, so that the plaintiff confuses and extrapolates from norms of the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social undue consequences for the Occupational Risk Insurance Regime. There is no evidence of the \"cost-based service\" principle at the constitutional level, but rather with article 205 of the Labor Code, which establishes that any surplus produced must be destined to constitute a reserve, to then suppose and erroneously conclude the existence of a presumed constitutional principle. Article 73 of the Constitution does not speak of income, as the plaintiff attempts to argue, and makes an error in the analysis of the arguments presented, since the term used by the constituent power was that of \"fund.\" There is rather article 28 of the Constitution that guarantees every citizen freedom as a basic principle, and developed by infra-constitutional norms such as the law, which shall determine its scope and impose restrictions that concretize and harmonize them with the rest of the block of constitutionality and legality. Furthermore, the observance of being proportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of the INS, according to article 205 of the Labor Code, it must make annual settlements, the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, 50%, to finance the programs developed by the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional and the rest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. In the same way, it says that the INS as an insurance entity must comply with the precepts of articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, in terms of technical provisions and reserves. Likewise, the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of article 7 of the Law are obliged to comply with the mandates in terms of technical provisions, reserves, and investments contained in the indicated numerals. But article 205 of the Labor Code is not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the issue of \"cost-based service\" in vote 2007-9469, with this judgment having three main consequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide a cost-based service would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no constitutional principle that obliges telecommunications services, or in the case of Occupational Risk Insurance, to be provided \"at cost.\" That is a decision that remains at the discretion of the legislator. The CAFTA-DR also does not deal with the issue that the insurance must be commercialized \"at cost.\" Secondly, commercialization in a competitive market is not exclusive of the application of a social policy regarding occupational risk insurance. It is worth recalling the preamble of Section H on \"Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros\", where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the opening process in the provision of insurance must be done based on the Political Constitution, its norms, and principles. But to comply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the SRT services must be provided \"at cost.\" Finally, the third consequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that compels that SRT services be provided \"at cost.\"\n\nHowever, what is guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of consumers to choose the service provider that best suits their interests (article 46 of the Constitución Política). The freedom to choose is not incompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to \"... achieve the universality and solidarity of services that are opened to competition.\" The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or right to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of freedom of enterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and equity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, regarding the progressiveness of international fundamental rights law and the Obligatory Workers' Compensation Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo) regime. The principle of the normative minimum (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account, as it postulates that there is a compendium of minimum labor and social security norms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the employer, or the insurance operators, such that contravention of these constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums form part of the essential content of the right to social security of the workers' compensation insurance, whereby the essential content will also comprise, as part of its hard core, the minimum benefits or basic coverages of the recognized SRT. As long as the legislator does not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of the workers' compensation insurance, through the enactment of legal norms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable, or deprive said right of the necessary protection. The norms under examination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the exercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or deprive it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The choice made by the State is the most favorable for the workers covered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected right, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, allowing the exercise of the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in a clear derivation of the principles \"pro libertatis\" and \"pro homine,\" benefiting all workers of the Nation. Reasonable profit is also argued, such that the hard core of content is not affected by a change in the entity providing the service or by allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the essence or legal-philosophical foundation of the right in question, hence there is no injury to the principle of progressiveness of fundamental rights. The country has already consolidated an effective protection system that is not seen as being diminished. It does not consider that there is a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and Convention No. 102 of the ILO because in both, its regulation is separate. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently have, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that the beneficiaries of the Obligatory Workers' Compensation Insurance regime have currently obtained. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the acción de inconstitucionalidad be dismissed.\n\n**10.-** The individuals Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative fraction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadyuvante. In this regard, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations must be expanded to include the entirety of Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, approved by CONASSIF, through article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing, given that the challenged Transitorio III of Ley 8653 subsequently ordered CONNASIF and SUGESE to regulate and govern a regime of total openness in the provision of Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo, no later than January first, two thousand eleven, an administrative action computed as of December twenty-second of last year. It alleges that the mere act of promulgating said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, meant placing into commerce a public good or service of constitutional rank that, for that very reason and by its own conceptual-functional nature, is entirely outside of commerce. It argues that the alleged unconstitutionality is evident by literal-grammatical interpretation alone, taking into account that the invoked constitutional regulations (Title V of the Constitución Política) have a clean, clear, and precise drafting, while their placement in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They declare that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the only non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following rigorous syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State=Outside of commerce. Premise 2: Riesgos del Trabajo (RT) insurance = Social insurance that forms part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Constitución Política. Only non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside of commerce. Therefore, the challenged norms are unconstitutional, including Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. It is also affirmed that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly managed by INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing considers that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (a fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, riesgos del trabajo were legislatively developed by a code in labor matters, and are also shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization and by constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of universality of the public service of riesgos del trabajo, including uninsured cases, we can imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State boycotted from within to be forced to buy hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly stated that a new regulatory norm that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and monetary benefits) brings to mind the substantive background of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from making legislative setbacks in the matter of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave like a Superintendency of Social Insurances; it should be remembered that administration and regulation are the exclusive competence of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the subterfuge castration of the Código de Trabajo, or doing nothing to prevent it, is equivalent to retreating in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the promulgation of the challenged regulation, the coadyuvantes pointed out to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was of public interest to assertively address this debate, in light of the budding regulatory legal health (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failing to do so would destabilize the institutionality and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that such an omissive conduct could even result in a decrease, affectation, or detriment to the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when promulgating Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. The DR-CAFTA itself, in its chapter 16, subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Anexo 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Código de Trabajo and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain nature of the service, such that the challenged norms could be tacitly repealed in light of chapter 16 of CAFTA itself. In other words, both legal systems that are in apparent contradiction are not so, because each regulates distinct matters and principles on its own side: a public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is of private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less is there incompatibility on the same matter. Therefore, it is not appropriate for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Código de Trabajo tacitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and excluding material competence of the SSRT service in favor of the State through INS. That is, what is under discussion, more than anything, has to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadyuvantes express that they are forbidden, as legislators, to break the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressiveness of human rights), which would be consummated in the event of approving legislation that in one way or another worsens labor human rights, for example those enshrined in articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 of the Código de Trabajo.\n\n**11.-** Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) claim they have grounds to file the coadyuvancia motion in order to maintain that the commercial opening will foster and produce a segmentation of the workers' compensation insurance market, such that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social will have to assume the \"collateral\" damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of workers, particularly of the Caja and the rest of Costa Rican social security, with an undisputed legitimate collective interest, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from article 332 of the Código de Trabajo. They maintain that the riesgos del trabajo insurance forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of the Constitución Política. Nevertheless, although the last paragraph of said article provides that riesgos de trabajo insurance will be governed by special provisions—just as those administered by the Caja are also governed by a special law—this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances are not part of social security, part of the very foundation of our Constitution. If any argument in this vein were valid, the constituent assembly simply would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. As such, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Sala has interpreted, the riesgos del trabajo insurance substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security, which inform constitutional article 73, apply equally for all the modalities of social insurances that this numeral expressly contemplates: the very particular situation, mainly of a historical order, that the administration of the riesgos de trabajo insurance was attributed to another institution distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in no way could justify an understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. The commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must extend even to those who are not insured; it points out that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which will have fewer resources to assume these expenses. Businesses illicitly enrich themselves at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the patrimony of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity, where care is based on need above earnings, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the commercial opening scheme, under a competition regime, fosters market segmentation of \"consumers,\" with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit, where the protection provided must correspond to at least basic medical-care benefits, regardless of insurance premiums or the amount of workers' wages. The scheme restricts the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of the benefits currently being provided. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that riesgos de trabajo insurance constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is only possible under a public, universal scheme that is incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. The Sala has indicated that the social security system assumes that the public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which prevents any modality of private management and administration of riesgos de trabajo insurance for profit. The dignity of workers is also injured because, as a consequence of these new rules, within which the Instituto Nacional de Seguros will have to see how it survives, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of riesgos de trabajo insurance, in a regime of commercial exploitation, forces modification of the Código de Trabajo regarding riesgos de trabajo. In this sense, they point out footnote 22, which conditions the regulations to the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, affirming that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent and incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the commercialization and privatization scheme of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for promoting workers' health and prevention of occupational accidents and diseases will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, healthcare, and other benefits, there are also those aimed at promoting health and preventing accidents and occupational diseases. The profits previously used for the above will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies in this area will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and diseases. Riesgos del trabajo insurance constitutes an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which they cite the chapter on Labor Rights by John Paul II, pointing out that the Encyclical provides that in cases of work accidents, workers must have access to healthcare, even free of charge, which would be breached, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. They request that the acción be granted.\n\n**12.-** The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Sala by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.\n\n**13.-** By resolution of seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued in this expediente, several motions for coadyuvancia in favor and against the acción de inconstitucionalidad were admitted.\n\n**14.-** The legal prescriptions have been followed in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- On preliminary questions and regarding the coadyuvancias.-** By resolution of seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued in this expediente, the motions presented by various interested parties for the purpose of coadyuvar in the acción were admitted, with the purpose of adding their arguments to the expediente. It is necessary to indicate that the order only mentions the names of the individuals appearing in the process; however, most of them are not doing so in a personal capacity, but rather representing legal persons and social groups, which, for greater clarity, is indicated below regarding the capacity in which they act and whether they do so representing a legal person within the acción de inconstitucionalidad. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, bearer of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, bearer of identity card No. 6-155-443, as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, bearer of identity card No. 9-029-769, as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada (SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, bearer of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Concejo of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Acuerdo No. 13 of Sesión Ordinaria No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, bearer of identity card No. 2-287-015, as Secretary General of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, bearer of identity card No. 1-897-818, Deputy Secretary General of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, identity card No. 3-222-901, member of Servicio, Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, bearer of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal capacity and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, bearer of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, bearer of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, bearer of identity card number 1-791-100, in his capacity as acting Minister of Comercio Exterior; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as was erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the fraction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis Chavarría Vega, bearer of identity card No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal capacity and as Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, bearer of identity card No. 2-343-472, in her personal capacity and as Deputy Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, bearer of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution of seventeen hours eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven is corrected, and it should be understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal persons. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the motion of Mrs. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez is not recorded, whose briefs are not in the electronic expediente; therefore, the mentioned persons are not considered coadyuvantes in the present acción. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a coadyuvante, given that the brief states it was filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, yet his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.\n\n**II.- The rules of standing (legitimación) in acciones de inconstitucionalidad.** Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of acciones de inconstitucionalidad, requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial forum in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the assumptions provided for in paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the impugnation of the applicatory act and its consequent use as a base matter.\n\nThe text in question provides that it is applicable when \"<i>by the nature of the matter, no individual and direct harm exists</i>\", that is, when by that same nature, the harm is collective (the antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of \"<i>diffuse interests (intereses difusos)</i>\" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by this Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this court, issued at fifteen hundred hours on the thirtieth of July, nineteen ninety-three)\n\n<div align=\"justify\" style=\"margin-left:10mm; margin-right:10mm; text-indent:10mm; margin-top:0.00mm; margin-bottom:0.00mm;\"><font face=\"Times New Roman\" size=\"4\"><span style=\" font-size:14pt\"><i>\"... Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be, under our law —as this Chamber has already stated— merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, specific identifiable or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, emerge, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is, therefore, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that they are the equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective —because they are common to a generality— and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity\"</i></span></font></div>\n\nIn summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (<i>diffuse</i>) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, it is clear that the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could bring under paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights that it has classified as \"diffuse,\" such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referenced goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not specific groups thereof; environmental damage does not affect only the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description inherent to its obligation —as a jurisdictional body— to limit itself to hearing the cases brought before it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable reversal in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative \"State of Rights,\" which —as in the case of the Costa Rican model— is based on the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) speaks of interests \"<i>that concern the community as a whole</i>,\" it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, that any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (actio popularis), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any effort of exhaustive enumeration.\n\n**III.- On admissibility.** As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) does not recognize special standing for a Deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the petitioner derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), acting as an attorney and Deputy, that is, in his personal capacity and in his capacity as Deputy. In this sense, the question he raises refers to diffuse interests, that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The petitioner's reasoning is based on the idea that said system must have a general and universal, effective or potential, scope, where he accuses that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what has been indicated by the petitioner, it should be noted that the action is admissible on behalf of an undetermined group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of some occupational risk insurance policy. In this sense, what is appropriate is to hear the action, as is indeed done. \n\n**        IV.- Object of the challenge.** The constitutional review of sub-paragraph b) of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 \"Financial Services,\" of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana), which was ratified through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, is requested, which provides:\n\n“**<i>III. Gradual Market Opening Commitments</i>**\n**<i> [...]</i>**\n**<i>2.- </u>Right of Establishment for Insurance Providers</u></i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i>           Costa Rica shall allow, on a non-discriminatory basis, the insurance service providers of a Party, to establish and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as provided below:</i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i>(a)</i>**<font face=\"Times New Roman\"><span style=\" font-size:7pt\">          </span></font> **<i>any and all lines of insurance</i>**<font face=\"Times New Roman\" size=\"5\"><span style=\" font-size:17pt\">**<i><sup>29</sup></i>**</span></font><font face=\"Times New Roman\" size=\"4\"> **<i> (except mandatory vehicle insurance and occupational risk insurance), no later than January 1, 2008; and</i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n<font face=\"Times New Roman\"><span style=\" font-size:12pt\">**<i>29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica (Constitución Política de República de Costa Rica) and supplied by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) as of the date of signature of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.</i>**</span></font>\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i>(b)</i>**<font face=\"Times New Roman\"><span style=\" font-size:7pt\"> </span></font> **<i> any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.</i>**\n**<i> </i>**\n**<i>For purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall allow insurance service providers to establish through any juridical form, as established in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential solvency and integrity requirements, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice</i>**”.\n\nFurthermore, the following provision of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros), Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, is also challenged:\n\n**<i>“TRANSITORY III.- Opening in the provision of mandatory insurance</i>**\n**<i>The State shall maintain the monopoly on Occupational Risk Insurance (Seguros de Riesgos del Trabajo) and Mandatory Automobile Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio Automotor), administered by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in accordance with what is indicated in Title IV of the Labor Code (Código de trabajo) and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres), respectively.</i>**\n**<i>As of January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization for the exercise of insurance activity in the lines of Mandatory Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos) and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo), to the entities indicated in sub-paragraphs a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications to be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council (Consejo Nacional), in accordance with national legislation.</i>**”\n\nIt is claimed that these norms infringe Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador (Protocolo de San Salvador), and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.\n\n**        V.- On the merits.** \n\n**A.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and State.-** Preliminary questions. It deserves to be highlighted from the beginning of this judgment that no one denies the importance of social security in our country and in the world. The petitioner, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), the various social organizations appearing in the case file, the Deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana) faction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior), and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, the Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, in the advantage provided by the existence for each and every one of the inhabitants of this country of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances. In this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled due to the vocation and awareness of political and social actors, in the prevention and treatment of illnesses, and ensuring spaces for medical care and high-value medical services when a healthy person plunges into a vulnerable situation due to illness. Now, the first manifestations are found in the different historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. With them, one can observe the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism of social security. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of <i>John Rawls</i> have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what the best form of organization of a State would be, if one could start from scratch. He invites the operator into a hypothetical mental exercise consisting of divesting oneself of all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal figure of social security has deep political and constitutional roots. He proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, so that the designer of society must not know what social, educational, political status, lifestyle, and sex they would desire, or could correspond to them once inserted in that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a fairly tempered and rational choice, so as not to be at a disadvantage in the face of society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort of self-preservation by this <i>decider</i>, they would calculate that if they ended up at the humblest echelon, they would achieve a better ration of everyone's wealth in favor of the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century in the world there were already several countries with social security systems functioning, incipiently, but achieving results, it seems logical, looking back today, that such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as well as in the present, and that, by carrying out this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a great majority, even to the most disadvantaged, and thereby, not discriminate in access and services based on one's origin (Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). The financing, consequently, would be done with the participation of the different social actors: State, employer, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the underlying problem indicated by the petitioner does not lie in a macro-level conflict of social insurances, but in a parcel thereof, because the constitutional norms recognize this core principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures to place in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica on Insurance Services, the following in the preamble:\n\n\"[...] <i>reaffirming its decision to ensure that the opening process of its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution</i>;\n\n<i> </i>\n\n<i>emphasizing that said process shall be for the benefit of the consumer and shall be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation;</i>\n\n<i> </i>\n\n<i>recognizing its commitment to modernize the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros, INS) and the legal framework of Costa Rica in the insurance sector;</i>\n\n<i> </i>\n\n<i>Assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services”.</i> \n\nIt is important to point out that this care in the approach and declaration is not held by any of the other member countries of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America (Tratado de Libre Comercio entre República Dominicana, Centroamérica y los Estados Unidos de América). The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the monopoly existing in insurance matters, but additionally, because the State in Costa Rica has traditionally maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which is assumed as a commitment by the country, becomes palpable in point II of Section H, where in the same way the obligation is recorded to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must maintain itself in an impartial position relative to the market participants, needing to have adequate powers, **legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers**, and manage confidential information appropriately. This will be taken up again in the judgment later. \n\nSince what is questioned in the action is the constitutional regularity of the commercial Treaty norm and one of its implementing laws, in that it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must point out, for the time being, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpretation of the scope of the social insurances contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be cleared up is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurances administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social).\n\nThe Treaty\npermits, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of\ninsurance, but as indicated, saves the following in a footnote:\n\n\"For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the\nfirst, second and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political\nConstitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja\nCostarricense de Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of\nthis Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in\nthis Annex.\"\n\nFrom the foregoing acknowledgment, it is clear that the social security protected by\nthe Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is excluded from the Treaty.\nThe foregoing is important for the interpretation of Article 73 of the Constitution,\nbecause with this, the legislator of the National Constituent Assembly sealed\na special result into the norm.\n\nB.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good that is\ncomposed of resources from Costa Rican society. Indeed, by the\nregulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter,\nit has allowed this Constitutional Chamber to construct the Right to Social\nSecurity, which by its structure must not be limited solely to the protection\nof the right to Health, but rather encompasses many other benefits that,\nall integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican\nsociety. To cite a ruling, it must be stated that:\n\n\"III.- Right to social security.-\nThe purpose of the constituent in designing the social security\nsystem in our country was to guarantee all citizens that the\nState, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, would\ngrant them at least the indispensable services in case of\nillness, disability, maternity, old age and death. Article 73 of\nthe Political Constitution, interpreted harmonically with Article\n50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right\nassumes that the public powers will maintain a public scheme of\nsocial security for all citizens in a way that guarantees\nassistance and provides sufficient social benefits in the face of\nsituations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective\nscope of application of the right to social security incorporates\nthe principle of universality, as it extends to all\ncitizens, with a mandatory nature. The objective scope departs\nfrom the principle of generality, insofar as it protects situations of\nneed, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and\ninsured in advance, but rather as they\neffectively occur. Furthermore, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of\nprotection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of\nprotective automaticity, which translates into adequate and\nimmediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age and\ndeath.\n\nArticles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the\nAmerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the\nInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,\ninterpreted harmonically, establish the right to\nsocial security for the benefit of all workers, informed by\nthe principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of\nprotection. Evidently, the provision of such services is\nconditioned on the existence of some minimum requirements, but\nbasic and necessary for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be coherent with the aforementioned principles.\n\nThe right to social security is a fundamental right,\nrecognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent\nincorporated into the Political Constitution of 1871, the chapter on\nSocial Guarantees, which was subsequently confirmed in the\nconstituent process of nineteen forty-nine. ...\"\n(ruling No. 2004-08013)\n\nFurthermore, on another occasion the Chamber has also indicated that:\n\n\"IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the\nexistence of social insurances, which are regulated by the system\nof forced contribution by the State, employer and workers, in order\nto protect the latter against the risks of illness, maternity,\ndisability, old age and death. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, is\nthe autonomous entity in charge of administering this type of insurance,\nwith the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its\nmanagements, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its\nlegal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them.\nIt guarantees in this way, the establishment of social security and\nits nature, decrees the purpose of social insurances and regulates the\ndestination of the respective funds. Social security was born in\nprotection of the worker and his family, as the human beings that they\nare, and is provided from his conception until his death, seeking\nhealth and helping in unforeseen misfortunes such as disability and\ndeath, as well as in states of vulnerability due to his very\ncondition such as those of old age, pension and retirement.\" (Ruling\nNo. 1998-04636)\n\nThe doctrine enunciated in the preceding precedent remains firm in how it\ninterprets Article 73 of the Constitution; consequently, from what has been said,\nsocial security is a fundamental axis, an axiom and a reference point of\nCosta Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the\nSocial State of Law, which means a constitutional value or legally\nrelevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate\ndistribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability and which\nmakes it attractive to national and international investment, and as such, is achieved\nthrough the tripartite contribution of the State, employer, and worker. Thus,\npersons may have access to social security, to a scheme of\npredictability for disability, old age and death, as well as to health and to\nthe primary provision of health services that the State, through the\nCaja Costarricense de Seguro Social, places at the service of the population, being\none of the best guarantees in individual aspirations towards a\nmore equitable society. Numerous studies place our\ncountry within privileged positions, not being a developed country,\nbut it maintains high levels of public health coinciding with European countries\nmore developed than ours. As indicated above, it achieves putting\nthe least advantaged person in society in a better position, one that\nallows him to receive health benefits like any other better advantaged\nin society, as well as social solidarity if the person falls into\nsituations of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic\nasymmetries should not count for the provision of services, since the\noriginal constituent legally guarantees the health of the population\nthrough institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Caja Costarricense\nde Seguro Social to oversee its delivery. It bears noting then, that the\nExecutive Power guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent\nwith the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of the social\ninsurances, by mandate of the constituent, specific benefits reserved\nto the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in the Free Trade Agreement\neverything related to the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 73\nof the Political Constitution. The National Constituent Assembly foresaw the\nneed to keep incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949, what\nwas established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943. With\nthis, it reaffirmed, at the summit of the legal order, social security\nby establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual\nworkers), its forms of financing (forced contributory for the\nState, employers and workers), and scope (risks of illness,\ndisability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law\ndetermines). It designated the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as the\npublic entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal\nand financial attributes, administrative and governmental autonomy in the\nsocial insurances, to likewise, erect a barrier of protection for the\nresources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of\nthat patrimony of all the beneficiaries. But, always within\nsocial security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they\nbreak the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the\nbenefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would admit\nexcepting from this regulation the mandatory vehicle insurances and the\nmandatory occupational risk insurances, to regulate them separately\nafter their entry into force, at an opportunity after January 1,\n2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican\nGovernment would be consistent with the obligations imposed by the\nPolitical Constitution, which effectively, as indicated by the Ministry of\nForeign Trade, is for the Government of the Republic, but which\nwere embodied in the commitments assumed before the other\nmember States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in\nnational legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion that is\nraised in the action is focused on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question,\nfrom where the discussion addressed since the referendum of the Free Trade\nAgreement and the complementary agenda of laws to the aforementioned\nAgreement is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational risks scheme participates in\nsome of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, by\nlocating it as part of the social security scheme established from the\nsummit of the legal order; nonetheless, a\nconstitutional interpretation in its proper dimension must exist, especially vis-à-vis the\nissue of social insurances that protects against the risks of illness,\ndisability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law\ndetermines, but with distinctions in the insurances against professional risk\nor workers' risk. Certainly, the normative aspects of greatest\nrelevance for society must be situated in the Political Constitution to\nregulate or protect certain fundamental rights, issues that are the\nmost essential in the Political Constitution in order to point out the course\nalong which ordinary legislation should develop, including the licenses\nthat it may have contemplated. While the foregoing marks a determined\ncourse as a country-decision, there also exist provisions that release those\ndeterminations to a reading proper to political science at a determined\nmoment, whose decision belongs to the political organs of the State. In the\ncase of the social insurances that operate from the Caja Costarricense de\nSeguro Social there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved\nits institutional monopoly, but in the second, the texture of the norm was\nmore open.\n\nIn the judgment of the Chamber, it is worth questioning the idea originally conceived by the\nNational Constituent Assembly of providing the population with universal social\ninsurances and the provision of services, if it is seen modified to the\ndetriment of the least advantaged, with the change of the legal framework –as\nthe plaintiff and coadjuvants accuse- insofar as it contradicts that\nuniversality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the\nmonopoly of certain insurances, and which is contrary to the international\nhuman rights conventions. The discussion is more\nphilosophical-political, than philosophical-juridical. The foregoing assertion will be seen\nbelow, to establish whether there is evidence that this is so or that\ninternational organizations opt for a particular model of\nsocial insurance development to achieve those ideals. In that sense,\nthe legal space that would remain for a Constitutional Court\nor the political organs of the State themselves when ratifying an international\nnormative body would be little. Hence, one could ask what is the role that\ncorresponds to the Chamber, as Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be\ndefined whether it can be questioned juridically or it is an issue that corresponds\nto the political bodies of the State. As to the first, it bears indicating that\nthe Chamber must pronounce from the constitutional point of view of the\nnorms, but, as to the second, regarding the competence to decide on the\nconvenience or inconvenience of a Treaty, both questions must go in the\nsame line with what the Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement\nwith Mexico. The Chamber has opted to maintain that it should not enter into\nanalyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within\nits competence when resolving the juridical or deciding a particular sense on the\nconstitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental\nright is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and convenience\nof the legislation, in itself, is not and should not be natural to jurisdictional activity.\nThe important thing to highlight here is that in the interorganic\nrelations of the State, the first called upon to control the timeliness and\nconvenience of the international negotiations of the Executive Power in its\ninternational relations in the form of International Treaties is the\nLegislative Assembly. In this sense, the abstract control that this\nChamber has, be it a priori or a posteriori, will depend on the political performance as a\nconstitutional organ residing in the Legislative Assembly, and in which\ndecision-making is founded on the majority, through a competitive\nstruggle, but where the timeliness and convenience of a norm is the\nexclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly. In any case, by ruling\nNo. 1994-07005 it is said that:\n\n\"Nevertheless, from the point of view that we are interested in pointing out now, that\nmeans that the State, or more properly, the organs that have\nstrictly political and management competences in their charge, must\nalways act in function of stimulating production and the most\nadequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the\nExecutive Power has negotiated this Treaty, having as a north\nthose constitutional objectives. And it must also be understood that the\nLegislative Power, upon considering the merits of said instrument,\nwill act in accordance with the same objectives. That is why\nwe can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that\nthe Treaty as such may have for any sector, or some of its\nforeseeable provisions, discussed and debatable, do not necessarily entail an\naspect of constitutionality, in the sense that the\nChamber must pronounce, for they lie at the level of mere convenience or\ntimeliness. For example, some point out that notwithstanding the\ngoodness of this type of commercial instruments, a country would not\nderive immediate or short-term advantages, if the\nold model (of import substitution, of subsidies), and the\nnew model of commercial opening coincide in it. That is why in this regard,\nsome experts estimate that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica because\nits tariffs have been reduced to a greater degree and much\nearlier than our country began in this. But even so,\nthey continue saying, the treaty is convenient for Costa Rica, because\na spectrum of very important investments, of\ntechnology transfer and job creation, will open up for it, which will dynamize\nits economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of\ncompetitive demand that it needs to adapt to a possible\nincorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement between\nMexico, the United States of America and Canada (NAFTA), as an\nalmost immediate aspiration of the country, just as\nofficials of the central Government have expressed. In other words, the Free Trade\nAgreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario\nfor moving on to the next one, more complex and ambitious.\nIn any case, the Chamber warns that these aspects revolve around\nthe policies that are behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not\nhave the constitutional connotation to which the Chamber must circumscribe\nits opinion.\"\n\nC.- The legislator's freedom of configuration in occupational\nrisk insurances. Now then, the 4th paragraph of Article 73 of the\nPolitical Constitution establishes:\n\n\"The insurances against professional risks shall be the exclusive account\nof the employers and shall be governed by special provisions.\"\n\nThe original constituent, on the issue of professional risks, provided the\nlegislator with greater flexibility, despite this being effectively considered\nwithin the social insurances, which is denoted by the breaking of the\nfinancial and regulatory scheme of the other social insurances. In this\nsense, one could think that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the\nPolitical Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro\nSocial with all the social security of the country, but evidently, the National\nConstituent Assembly differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it\ncould have determined it by eliminating the final paragraph or incorporating that\nmandate expressly to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove\nthe foregoing, one could question whether the\nunconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto\nNacional de Seguros, on the issue of professional risk insurances, could have been sustained.\nBut such an interpretation would also not be plausible; on the contrary, the legislator\ndelegated, for many years, the coverage of social security in occupational\nrisks to another autonomous institution, distinct from the Caja Costarricense de\nSeguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such\ninterpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor\nany constitutional irregularity being noticed, because it was in function of a\nsubject of public law that acted in a dual capacity, of public\nand private law. The foregoing leads this Tribunal to the possibility of\nchanneling in a more flexible way the interpretation of the final paragraph of\nArticle 73 of the Political Constitution, always maintaining harmony with the whole\nsystem, when it is indicated that the insurances \"shall be the exclusive account of\nthe employers\", because it can be derived –logically- a lesser intensity of\nthe State's presence, but without the foregoing signifying a total absence. On the\nother hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that he is the one\non whose assignment the worker performs the labor, and the working\nconditions he offers the worker are attributed to him, so that it is the Employer\nwho is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and to the\nState, ensuring or supervising the fulfillment of those obligations. As for the\nworker, no obligation falls upon him beyond the obligations contained\nin the labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the National\nConstituent Assembly places the worker as the recipient of the protection, that is\nto say, he would finally be the beneficiary of these insurances. The original\nconstituent foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, allowing a greater\nbreadth of action for the legislator when it states \"shall be governed by\nspecial provisions\", which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting\nan autonomous entity distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with\nestablishing, offering and executing professional risk insurances. At this\npoint, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in\neconomic and social activity, proper to a Social State of Law, or the\nprevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on\npure or mixed market models with the tutelage of the State, in what\nrefers to its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to arrive at is the following: the\noriginal constituent established a system to constitutionally regulate\noccupational risks so that they can be the object of\ndiverse legal and benefit designs or structures, based on the\nlegislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing clearly as part\nof the great quantity of productive economic activities, as well as the\njobs and risks that may exist in each of them. Precisely,\nthis allowed, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional\nde Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly scheme, which implied\na different course for the mandatory occupational risk insurances from\nthose regulations of the Caja, and nevertheless, this did not make it nor would make it\nunconstitutional, nor would a greater opening in the choice of the\nEmployer, in the face of a greater offer of professional risk insurance\noperators, be so.\n\nFrom the foregoing, other important consequences emerge, in which\none passes from an Institution in which it operated under a monopolized insurance\nexploitation system, consequently a strongly\nintervened market, and then opted for a different one of opening, with an impartial\nregulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and\nfinancial resources to exercise its functions and powers. Thus, a\nregulatory body was foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. In\nconsequence, the plaintiff's thesis may maintain an erroneous\nconception that the State disappeared completely within the\naforesaid employer-worker-occupational risks scheme. It is\nrecognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative\ndecision, can declare that certain services be provided under a\nmonopoly scheme, or be provided under a free competition scheme, without that\n–necessarily- signifying a detriment to the service. In such a way, it can\nliberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality.\n\nIf a government decision negotiated by the parties to a Treaty, approved through mechanisms of citizen participation (referendum), and having exhausted the ratification procedure, places another State organ to impartially regulate, on a non-discriminatory basis, the commercial activity of insurance, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this regard, the legitimacy of this decision must be said to be reinforced, because it originates from a constitutional amendment allowing an authentic direct democratic exercise that in 2002 sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote with normative character. That in itself carries a special weight, which in principle, must be observed by the mechanisms and institutions based on a representative and mature democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional review). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences as it is a ratified agreement and an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal stance of the internal organs of the State, at the moment the international regulation enters into force. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:\n\n\"*The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including its observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise*\".\n\nGiven that the mandatory occupational risk insurance regime had been operating through the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the phased opening of the insurance market, including mandatory vehicle and occupational risk insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was duly analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Chamber is consulted on the following problem:\n\n\"*Violation of constitutional articles 50, 73 and 74: unconstitutionality by legislative omission to regulate solidary insurance: they state that this omission will cause relevant legal unprotectedness for the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because it violates the present and future effectiveness of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in insurance matters derive from constitutional article 73: mandatory nature, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, non-existence of a benefit cap, immediacy and mandatory nature of benefit provision to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of annuities and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the insurer's rates. Likewise, they argue that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between constitutional articles 50 and 73 are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others derived from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that we are before a constitutional closing or closure norm of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open gateway to enable the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of regulation of solidary insurance will generate labor unprotectedness.*\"\n\nIn this regard, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:\n\n\"***9.- Violation of articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.** *\n\n*According to the consulting deputies, the draft \"Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros\" is also unconstitutional by omission, insofar as it does not contemplate the establishment of social insurance. Regarding constitutional review by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Tribunal, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 14:39 hrs. of May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue infraconstitutional regulations related to the referendum process) has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue \"a law that develops a constitutional content or clause.\" Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that \"the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social\". Hence, in the aforementioned draft law, the Chamber does not perceive the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, reason for which the consultation formulated in that sense must be dismissed.*\"\n\nThere is not necessarily a loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the foregoing, that Costa Rica is free and independent, that as such it acquires an international obligation that must be observed according to the principle of international law *pacta sunt servanda*; in that sense, binding itself by an international commitment with the different countries and obtaining commercial benefits from them, is what is effectively pursued by this type of instruments. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars, the first is the ancient notion of freedom, so that certain areas of people's lives are exempt from external conditioning of the person's volitional and cognitive capacity, so that life unfolds without undue interference, provided that morality or public order are not affected or that third persons are not harmed. But in addition, around this freedom –in the fundamental base of society and the State– an institutionality structured to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom is guaranteed, as well as the social values that the original constituent has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are born with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere in that freedom. Furthermore, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited insofar as the individual conduct may be contrary to morality, public order or harm a third party (article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy must be deemed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different State institutions. The foregoing means that, whether it is the Political Constitution, an international agreement, a law or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue, where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them arbitrarily. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance their policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to social welfare. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Law 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent itself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation by special provisions, that is, specific provisions through which ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents the latter from varying them by subject matter and over time.\n\nFor now, the monopoly of mandatory insurance in favor of INS is broken upon the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater national and international service offering by occupational risk insurance companies. It is clear that the National Constituent Assembly did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurances, therefore it breaks a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of numeral 73 indicated, of tripartite source of financing for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator free to initiate how to materialize professional risk insurance. The National Constituent Assembly left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurances. Under the original constituent's scheme, mandatory occupational risk insurance would be protected by the decisions that the legislator made under the concept \"*special provisions*\", which means that not only did it design this coverage with more leeway, but it had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient potency and resistance), and that in this matter it received from a referendum process, as indeed happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit activity of occupational risk insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a monopolistic state activity in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open to the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, which derive from the Political Constitution, such as state oversight, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement that requires non-discriminatory regulations for all commercial agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the bidders in the insurance market is prohibited. Returning to what was indicated above, it is clear that the State, through legislation, can choose between providing Occupational Risk insurance under monopoly regimes or competitive regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of natural or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent can effectively be presented in any of the spheres, the latter being the one chosen in the aforementioned referendum.\n\n**D.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.-** The plaintiff argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent, as applicable) assigns that service or a strategic position within it to the State, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the required provision, such as interested management for certain public activities that cannot leave the State administration, or the concession when it entrusts a specific provision of public services to private natural or legal persons. As previously indicated, a prohibition cannot be derived from paragraph 4 of article 73 of the Political Constitution due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding an open conditional element to the constitutional norm by establishing greater configuration freedom for the legislator. For the Tribunal, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it clearly embraces a form of administrative oversight of the State over individuals who may exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require compliance with *ex ante* requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination or, what is the same, the existence of rules equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but likewise, if no supply existed, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as indeed it does. The reports in the action, the extensive writings of the interested coadjuvants, allude to the different conditions that companies that would be bidders in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must meet; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be at a disadvantage, since we are facing regulatory minimums (or the hard core of the fundamental right) to be able to obtain the authorization to compete in the market. The plaintiff's argument lies in that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no obligations committed to the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking retribution and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, such statements must be taken with great care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, they venture into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In such sense, international provisions must be norms that harbor space for the different national policies of the Member States, insofar as they leave the mechanisms open to make the rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of result, but without being international conventions of means (as the plaintiff seems to pose it). Put another way, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:\n\n\"*Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures*\n\n*The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, ***to the maximum of the available resources and taking into account their degree of development***, ***in order to achieve progressively***, ***and in accordance with their domestic legislation***, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol.*\n\n*Article 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Law Provisions*\n\n***If the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions***, *the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to make those rights effective*\" (the text in bold is not from the original).\n\nOne of the characteristics that distinguish human rights instruments from other treaties, is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, in the others, whatever the High Contracting Parties decide to stipulate as a goal in their reciprocal relations, boundary treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such at the human being, and not at reciprocal concessions of interest to the States, and it will be the State which assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties –especially multilateral ones– must adopt inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows it to deepen the agreed objective and purpose, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a given human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, in a manner that establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is at the disposal of each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and targeting the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction is established, to adopt internal measures; it means that it can resort to public, private or mixed forms, to obtain results in the direction of the commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of providing professional risk insurance, provided they are in accordance with the international conventions that regulate the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the\n\n\"*Article 9. Right to Social Security*\n\n*1. Everyone has the right to social security that protects them against the consequences of old age and of disability that physically or mentally prevents them from obtaining the means to lead a dignified and decent life.*\n\nIn the event of the death of the beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to their dependents.\n\n2. When dealing with persons who are working, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and the subsidy or pension in cases of work-related accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth\" (the text in bold is not from the original).\n\nThe truth is that international regulations establish what the social security jargon in some ILO documents calls the social floor or social protection floor as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there are indeed legal obligations that are unfulfilled and enforceable domestically, or once that avenue is exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that work-risk insurance (seguro de riesgo del trabajo) is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in the event of an accident or occupational disease. ILO Convention 102 attributes to the employer the responsibility for the employee's work environment, and it is in conformity with paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Constitution. The important thing is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, establishing minimum standards for each of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of such systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State may choose at least three areas of protection. Important data emerge from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 \"Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization\"] which indicates, among other things:\n\n\"185. Employment injury benefit schemes are usually organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and at other times they form part of other branches of social security. Because of this link between risk and prevention in the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely by employer contributions. Contribution rates are often differentiated according to the level of risk of accident or disease in the various types of economic activities.\" (p. 76);\n\nThe claimant alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, to the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressivity of social rights. For this argument to be admissible, regression must be proven with the change in the legal regime or it must be evident, but neither the work of the ILO itself supports a single approach to the issue as the claimant seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, these are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate for implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, it is a matter of opportunity and convenience that should not concern the Sala Constitucional – in principle, it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which escape the law of the Political Constitution. In this sense, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide, but rather it is up to the legislator to assess its opportunity and convenience, as well as its constitutional viability. As set forth above, in the first place, there is no mandate of monopoly or prohibition for mandatory work-risk insurance (seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo) to operate outside the institutional structures of the State; a corollary of the foregoing is that the latter may avail itself of different private agents to carry out the necessary benefits, whether public or private. Extrapolating that this system implies a detriment or a loss of rights for the recipients of services does not reflect the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.\n\nE.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as an internal norm is situated in the Political Constitution, such that it is up to the original or derivative constituent power to decide and provide for the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be mentioned that international law, after its incorporation into the legal system through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, clause 4) of the Political Constitution, has legal effects. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation in the world allows for a broad differentiation of three main systems: those countries that require a double parliamentary approval, both for the ratification of the treaty and then for specific legislative provisions to incorporate the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in the Scandinavian countries. The next, in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally bind the country, but which will require national legislation for the international law to be adopted, as in England and the countries that are part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where with parliamentary approval of what the Executive Branch has done, the incorporation of international regulations operates once the ratification process by the State is completed, as in our country. There are likewise other problems, such as the assignment of normative hierarchy to the international legislation incorporated into the legal system, with all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, having their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. In the case of incorporation, our country has the system that fell into the last category, the most representative, the truth being that it only requires the legislative approval or rejection of the treaty, in which case, once the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, it is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to operate with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has these consequences, thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:\n\n\"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their promulgation or from the day they designate, authority superior to the laws.\n\nPublic treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of its total membership, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose.\"\n\nBut historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as might be interpreted today. Thus, the norm is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it previously had a different wording, isolationist and restrictive, so that public officials could celebrate international treaties in a limited way, which was the following:\n\n\"Article 7.-- No authority may enter into pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Whoever does so shall be tried for treason against the Fatherland.\n\nAny treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to territorial integrity or the political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of its total membership and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose.\"\n\nA strict reading of the transcribed article gives rise to impracticability and automatic contradiction, inappropriate for constitutional reasoning with public international law, based on an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which disregarded a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment acquired by the Executive Branch), and which allows for acquiring and granting international rights and obligations mutually or multilaterally agreed upon by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in the way they must conduct themselves in the international order, as it acquires rights, as well as duties to others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent an important structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the original constituent power's fear against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and seeing things from a perspective for the benefit of the country, once things returned to normal after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement for the legislative reform carried out through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, in the following manner:\n\n\"Article 7.- This article enshrined the conservative criterion of the majority of the constituents of 1949, who felt a profound hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within this nationalist zeal, things went too far, by stating in the first paragraph that anyone who entered into 'pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact, or convention constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty or independence of any country. If that first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the rulers the country has had from 1949 onward would have to be tried for such a serious crime. We believe that said paragraph should be suppressed, as it is dangerous.\"\n\nThat correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in to proceed with said modification, for if economic integration with Central America was sought, it had to be privileged for its economic and development benefits, which was finally resolved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:\n\n\"If superior authority is not given to treaties and concordats over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of what are called legal antinomies (sic), norms that clash, norms that provide one thing to the contrary, and that would constantly force us to resort to unconstitutionality or the inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could put us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty (sic), the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that ordinary law is subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty (sic). This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of ordinary forms whereby each norm governs within its specific area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and it bursts in upon other territories, upon other persons, upon other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without the value of each of the countries having been diminished. It is a healthy norm, it is an advisable norm, and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the ordinary norm.\"\n\nIn this sense, the derivative constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, such that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly and ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, in the face of freely assumed obligations, so as to have international law incorporated with sufficient potency and resistance to enforce the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary and regulatory legislation that contradicts it or is in contradiction. The reason lies in the obligation to honor commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and of bona fides. On the other hand, the reservation and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the meaning of Article 27, of the importance that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. What is provided in the Political Constitution was already discussed above. Hence, with reason, this Chamber (Sala), when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation in accordance with Constitutional Law, as governed by Article 73, clause e) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, such that \"the declaration shall be made only for the purposes of interpreting and applying them in harmony with the Constitution or, if their contradiction with it proves insurmountable, ordering their disapplication with general effects and proceeding to their denunciation.\" Interpretation in conformity is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse still, to committing infractions that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, even participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Equally, the principle of the supremacy of International Law is unequivocally manifested. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be modified tacitly or expressly by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly indicate whether the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.\n\nThe claimant mentions the violation of various principles of social security, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and non-waivability. In reality, in some cases, what the claimant points to are some of the legal provisions governing work risk (riesgo de trabajo) established in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), so that the principle alleged by the claimant and the coadjuvants, that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law, does not operate. However, prudently viewed, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, so that if Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing Laws, to give way to SUGESE and its competencies. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would be within the competencies of SUGESE to establish the mechanisms that allow for obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional foundation of Work-Risk Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo) is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of insurance, automaticity of ILO Convention 102, and non-waivability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, nor can this Chamber (Sala) say they are infringed. It should be noted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurance, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of work-related and occupational accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, by being the moderator of commercial activity establishing conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different participants in the market; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally enforceable benefits remain effective in its jurisdiction, even by being a participant in the market as established in Law No. 8622, and which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes, among other things, in the fourth paragraph, that:\n\n\"... The Superintendency (Superintendencia) shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency (Superintendencia) shall be of mandatory observance for the supervised entities and persons.\n\nThe Superintendency (Superintendencia) is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers.\n\nLikewise, it must adopt a clear,  \ntransparent and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ,  \ntrain and maintain a sufficient work team with high  \nprofessional standards, who follow the appropriate standards of  \nconfidentiality\".\n\nOn the other hand, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:\n\n\"*Objectives and functions of the General Superintendence of Insurance*\n\n*The Superintendence's purpose is to ensure the stability and the  \nefficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to deliver  \nthe broadest information to the insured. To this end, it shall authorize,  \nregulate and supervise the natural or legal persons that  \nintervene in the acts or contracts related to the insurance,  \nreinsurance activity, the public offering and the conduct of  \ninsurance business.*\n\n*…*\n\n*Additionally, it shall have the following functions:*\n\n*a) ...*\n\n*b) ...*\n\n*j) Issue the remaining technical or  \noperational norms and guidelines.*\n\n*k) ...*\n\n*q)*\".\n\nWithin those functions, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros currently continues to operate in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must assume the worker even if it omitted to report him, it must assume him as uninsured. In this sense, there is no impact on the universal principle of protection of the occupational hazards insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, states:\n\n\"*In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes  \nthe administration of commercial insurances, the administration of the  \nOccupational Hazards Insurance and the Mandatory Automobile Insurance,  \nthe INS shall have the full guarantee of the State*\".\n\nSeveral important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, since coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, as it contains enforceable obligations of expired term, the legal and regulatory provisions that are issued are done so in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, provides the measures to guarantee that necessary social floor to maintain the levels of occupational health and of an occupational hazards regime, is clearly in consonance with the Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances, approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the aforementioned Regulation establishes:\n\n\"*Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers*\n\n*If the worker were not insured against occupational hazards, in accordance with the Labor Code, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant him all the benefits that would have corresponded to him had he been insured, except for those cases in which the employer had a current Occupational Hazards policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium*\".\n\nThe alleged economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a problem of constitutional nature, but rather it is the exclusive purview of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate a presumed negative impact that the Institution could have, so that it acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against occupational hazards, be it private or public. In the Court's opinion, the Article reinforces the worker's position, instead of weakening it, since the occupational hazards insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory character as is intended to be pointed out in the brief filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, from the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, among other norms, whence arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating the matters it detects as necessary of a technical and operational nature for a better service for workers who suffer a workplace risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code.\n\nVI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing, the action is declared without merit.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe action is declared without merit. Magistrate Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the petitioning deputy. Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.\n\n.                \n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.  \nPresidenta\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M.                                                                                               Gilbert  \nArmijo S.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.                                                                                                                                            Fernando  \nCruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V.                                                                                                                                               Enrique Ulate  \nCh.\n\n**Acción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712**\n\n**<u>Dissenting opinion of Magistrate Calzada Miranda and Magistrates  \nArmijo Sancho and Cruz Castro, authored by the latter</u>**\n\n**The undersigned Magistrates dissent in this action and  \nconsider that it must be declared with merit, with its consequences,  \nbased on the following.**\n\n**Sub-paragraph b), of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2,  \nof Chapter 12 \"Financial Services\", of the Free Trade  \nAgreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican  \nRepublic, ratified by Costa Rica through law no. 8622 of  \nNovember 21, 2007, and Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory  \nLaw, approved through law no. 8653 of July 22,  \n2008, in that they provide for the opening to the market of the occupational  \nhazards insurance, present a constitutional friction.**\n\n**<u>The petitioner considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances (arts. 50, 73 and 74) by distorting it and converting it into a commercial service for profit. He indicates that the occupational hazards insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance forms part of the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, ILO convention no. 102, Protocol of San Salvador art. 9) and that the occupational hazards insurance forms part of the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, inalienability, and others. Which is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violate the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently already have, diminishing and worsening the current advantages. Currently, all income must be destined for improvements for the benefit of the workers.**\n\n**<u>In this regard</u>, the undersigned Magistrates consider that the petitioner is correct in his arguments and that, the fact that the constituent power included the insurance against occupational hazards within the Chapter of Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution, shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of the other insurances) does not therefore cease to have the character of a social insurance.**\n\n**The challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of the insurance against occupational hazards within the commercial opening provided for in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, *are unconstitutional*; this is so even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them that of universality and progressivity) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the way to distribute the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.**\n\n**This type of insurance, because it is constitutionally enshrined in art. 73 (and even though it is not stated there that it will be administered monopolistically by the INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which therefore, is incompatible with a system of commercial opening (competition, profit).**\n\n**Historically, the occupational hazards insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated craftsmen (mainly shoemakers, bakers and mule keepers) with the purpose of establishing a Savings Bank (see La Gaceta of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated relief for the working class.**\n\n**This insurance had its own evolution. Before the theory of \"social-labor risk\" triumphed, the fault of the employer was initially required to give basis to the liability, later it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, that is, it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather it was the latter who had to demonstrate that he had not been guilty nor negligent, in the distribution and organization of work.**\n\n**At the beginning of the 20th century, the first formal attempts are located to provide true protection to the working class against workplace misfortunes. On June 26, 1907, the then-deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles to Congress. On May 24, 1910, the delegation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the \"Caja de Previsión\". On May 16, 1913, Deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another proposed law on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles.**\n\nDue to various circumstances, none of the previous projects received the necessary support to become law.\n\nIn April 1924, the discussion of the Occupational Hazards Law (Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo) or the Accident Compensation Law (Ley de Reparación de Accidentes) was suspended, and the discussion of the bill to create the National Insurance Bank (Banco Nacional de Seguros) immediately began, culminating in the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gave rise to this Institution. Thus, the National Insurance Bank was entrusted with the administration of insurances, the monopoly of which remained in the hands of the Costa Rican State.\n\nOnce the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the \"Occupational Accident Compensation Law (Ley de reparación de accidentes de trabajo)\" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is stated that \"the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros, INS) shall administer the occupational hazard system.\" The INS created the Workers' Department (Departamento Obrero), tasked with administering this Law, which would later be called the Department of Occupational Hazards (Departamento de Riesgos del Trabajo).\n\nThis Law No. 53 changes, undergoes several reforms, and in 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation is incorporated into the Labor Code. At that time, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already exists. It had been created in November 1941. As such, a first major discussion arises here. Given that the Social Security Fund now exists, should we give the occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS.\n\nThere is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute (INS) has 18 years of experience in handling occupational accidents, he considers it prudent for that congress to keep the occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute (INS), and indeed the Labor Code is approved, and the administration remains in the hands of the Institute.\n\nIn 1949, when the current Political Constitution (Constitución Política) is enacted, the famous article 73 is debated, regarding the advisability or not of the administration of Occupational Hazards being in the hands of the Institute. The need for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund is once again raised. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafts this Political Constitution, ratifies that the occupational hazard system should remain differentiated, as it had been until that moment, and stay in the hands of the National Insurance Institute (INS).\n\nIn 1961, when article 177 of the Political Constitution is amended through Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintains the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute (INS). This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurances.\n\nIn 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approves Law No. 6727, which refers to the amendment of Title IV of the Labor Code, it again ratifies the advisability of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and makes some modifications:\n\n- The concept of Occupational Hazards is expanded (Article 195).\n- Occupational Hazard insurance is declared mandatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201).\n- The concept of Occupational Health (Salud Ocupacional) appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273).\n- In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer regarding insurance, hazard, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284).\n- The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in articles 285 and 286 of the aforementioned Code.\n\nToday, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security system, through the administration that for more than 70 years has been carried out, with sufficient financial reserves to provide the care that has been offered.\n\nAs can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly (Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), contrary to what is stated in the majority opinion, the idea was rather to unify occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for it to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.\n\n- Deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ \"there are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles that he then went on to list. First of all, there must be a single institution that encompasses all insurances. One of the failures of social insurances in some countries—like Chile—has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The experts who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. In the second place, it is known that the greater number of associates is what guarantees the success of social insurances (...) On the other hand, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number.\" Minutes No. 125.—One hundred twenty-fifth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the eighth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.\n\n- Deputy VOLIO \"since the year 1924, the Occupational Accident Law was promulgated, entrusting the Insurance Bank—an essentially commercial institution—to take on that hazard. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then professional hazard insurances must be assigned to the Social Insurance. For the moment, the Fund is not in a position to assume those hazards. Therefore, the logical step is to leave things as they currently are, sidestepping the problem that arises so it can be resolved in due time and with greater care.\" Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.\n\n- Deputy FACIO. \"After the 8th of November, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute (INS) will continue working—as they have done so far. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution can be found to the problem of unifying social insurances, after mature and reflective analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem.\" Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.\n\n- Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, in contrast, he considers a charitable institution since it does not profit in any way. He thinks the only way to solve the problem of social insurances is by creating for the Fund the necessary revenues so that it can fulfill its task. Hence, the problem can be resolved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine).\n\nThe preceding excerpts evidence the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurances. The very nature of these hazards allows them to be considered part of social insurances. Occupational hazards are not an annex or aggregate that can be detached from the definition and the constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurances in a broad sense; for this reason, it is inadmissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional hazards mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated into the concept of social insurances defined by the constitution. The specialty of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize professional hazard insurance. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize professional hazard insurance with a legal and constitutional status different from the social insurances casually referred to in the first three paragraphs of article seventy-three of the constitution. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of these insurances, because it is placed in a norm that is what gives it that status.\n\nTherefore, occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which commercial opening legislation does not protect and cannot protect, since a norm of legal rank will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.\n\nBy the very nature of occupational hazard social insurance, whose raison d'être is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform, they suffer an accident or illness, and which operates in our country in a mandatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent had all of this in mind when deciding to include this type of insurance within the chapter of social insurances, precisely because it functions as a social insurance and not as an individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.\n\nBased on the arguments presented, we consider that this action must be declared with merit, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional norms of the Treaty in question.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nMagistrate (Magistrada)\n\nGilberth Armijo S.                                                       Fernando Cruz C.\n  Magistrate (Magistrado)                                                    Magistrate (Magistrado)\n\nNote from Magistrate (Magistrada) Calzada. Different reasons regarding the standing (legitimación) of the plaintiff. The majority opinion defines that although Mr. Villalta [Nombre 001] derives his standing from the defense of diffuse interests, his standing to bring the action is recognized based on the understanding that this filing is made \"on behalf of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights (...) could be injured (...) even if they were under the coverage of an occupational hazard policy\" (sic); that is, the majority opinion determines that the plaintiff's standing comes from this defense on behalf of an indeterminate group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests.\n\nIn this regard, I consider that the standing (legitimación) of the petitioning Deputy (Diputado) does also arise from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). As noted in Considering II (Considerando II) of this same judgment, diffuse interests must not be confused with collective interests, nor should they be understood in such broad terms as to be confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, \"but united based on a determined social need,\" which is why \"any individual may act in defense of those goods that affect the national collectivity,\" without this being confused with the possibility that \"any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of any interests.\" The precision that the majority opinion attempts to formulate is that, even in the defense of an indeterminate group of workers, this does not constitute the existence of a diffuse interest that allows granting the petitioner the standing provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It is my opinion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that indeterminate group of workers, but also on the fact that the subject matter intended to be regulated does indeed concern a matter in which there is a general interest of the population. It should be borne in mind that, as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of occupational hazard insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country in configuring the system of a Democratic and Social State of Law (Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho). In this sense, there is an interest of the collectivity in general, and not only of the currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the risks a worker may be subjected to; it is clear that the first interested party in these cases will be the worker –both for reasons of health and personal income–, but it must not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance is so because other persons besides the specific worker are involved in it. On one hand, there is the worker's direct family, who obtains a good part of its subsistence possibilities from the work that person performs; there is also the condition of the employer (patrono) himself, who finds in the occupational hazard regime solid backing against any misfortune, thereby helping to cover any eventual liability that could be ascribed to him; and there is also the State (Estado) itself, which, through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social welfare in the stated terms, while ensuring that the affected person receives the care required to be able to rejoin active working life in a timely and effective manner, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy with the least possible harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority opinion that repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing by not recognizing a direct standing, the undersigned considers that they do hold it in certain circumstances. In my judgment, the Deputies who have that character by the Nation (Nación) in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), by the nature of their office hold a representation of national interests, which in principle gives them a general standing to act on those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases in the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), but it does when qualifying the circumstances of the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, particularly the management of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity as a whole, and very particularly when, precisely, it concerns challenging norms that directly affect a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the collectivity they represent, as indicated above. Of course, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action (acción popular) –not provided for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law– on the part of any person, nor does it permit free access through the action of unconstitutionality to the holder of an interest merely for being a holder and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into consideration the importance of the subject matter of occupational hazards and the general representation that a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) does hold, I consider that in addition to the standing recognized to the petitioner by the majority opinion, the standing indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law must also be recognized.\n\n \n\n \n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n*100177120007CO*\n\n \n\n| **EXPEDIENTE:** | **10-017712-0007-CO** |\n| --- | --- |\n| **PROCESO:** | **ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD** |\n| **ACCIONANTE:** | [Nombre 001] **FLOREZESTRADA** |\n\n \n\n**SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes of the eighth of August of two thousand thirteen.\n\n         Due to the painful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes of the twenty-eighth of November of two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, is to be notified without his signature. The case file (expediente) will be archived in due course.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nGilbert Armijo S.\n\nActing President (Presidente a.i)\n\nConstitutional Chamber\n\nSan José, at sixteen hours and thirty minutes on the\ntwenty-eighth of November, two thousand twelve.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality brought by [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, in a common-law marriage, attorney, bearer of identity card number [Value 001], resident of Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, in his capacity as deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the constitutional period 2010-2014, against sub-paragraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, approved by law number 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, law number 8653 of July 22, 2008.\n\n**Whereas:**\n\n**1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on December twenty-first, 2010, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality be declared of sub-paragraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, approved by law number 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, law number 8653 of July 22, 2008. He alleges that such provisions violate articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution that protect social insurances and the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, enshrined in International Human Rights Treaties, in accordance with numerals 7 and 48 of the Fundamental Charter, due to the inclusion of the solidarity workers' compensation insurance in commercial opening obligations that involve commercial exploitation and for-profit ends incompatible with the constitutional nature of that social insurance. He asserts that the purpose of these legal provisions is to convert the workers' compensation insurance into a commercial service that would be exploited by companies other than the INS, with a clear for-profit intention, an aspect which, in his opinion, infringes the constitutional principles that protect insurances, to the detriment of working men and women and their families, as there exists a risk against the social security system. In his reasoning on the unconstitutionality of the norms he challenges, he points out: *“(...) it also weakens and endangers the full application of the principle of universality of the fundamental right to social security, by allowing private operators (sic) to commercially exploit the workers' compensation insurance, **without imposing on them any obligation to attend equally to working men and women of all labor activities nor any prohibition on selecting low-risk and high-profitability activities.** All this undermines the effective realization of the precept contained in article 201 of the Labor Code, thereby violating constitutional precepts established in articles 73 and 74 of the Magna Carta, in relation to article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador”*. (The highlighting belongs to the original text). He further states that the norms challenged in this action weaken the existing protection for uninsured working persons, as effective competition prevails, according to his opinion, in favor of the commercial regime and against the comprehensive protection of the labor sector. In this line of thought, he considers the breach of the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, because the cited Treaty modifies the current normative regulation of workers' compensation insurance in a way that reduces the current benefits of working persons, a reform that diminishes and worsens the current advantages obtained by the beneficiary persons. He synthesizes that workers' compensation insurance constitutes a fundamental right of a prestational nature, where the State has the obligation of progressive compliance, an aspect that, in his view, must be circumscribed *“to the respect, protection, guarantee and promotion”* of such rights and, by way of illustration, he cites constitutional judgment number 2007-1378. He concludes that international instruments on human rights, such as the Protocol of San Salvador, must prevail over commercial treaties in case of incompatibility, and maintains that the circumstance that the challenged norm is included in an international treaty with a rank superior to law (TLC-EUCARD) does not exonerate it from its unconstitutionality for infringement of the principle of progressivity of the fundamental right to social security. For all the foregoing, he requests that the action filed be declared well-founded.\n\n**2.-** In order to substantiate his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he points to the injury to diffuse interests or interests of the community as a whole, which, in turn, translates into an individual injury for each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic, because social insurances grant basic protection to all persons inhabiting the country.\n\n**3.-** By order at twelve hours and twelve minutes on February seventh, two thousand eleven, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.\n\n**4.-** Mrs. Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, rendered her report. She points out that workers' compensation insurance has some characteristics that could allow it to be classified as an employer's civil liability insurance, and others that would allow it to be placed as a social insurance. Regarding the former, it is argued that it constitutes a mechanism to safeguard the employer's assets against the eventuality of a workplace accident or an occupational disease that entails his obligation to indemnify the worker. For this reason, it is borne exclusively by the employer, and not as in social insurances financed on a tripartite basis with the contribution of workers, employer and the State. The employer is directly protected, indirectly the worker and his family. She also points out that in workers' compensation insurance, the employer's liability is presumed, derived from the exercise of his lucrative activity, whereas in social insurances, it is not possible to presume the specific liability of any of the intervening agents. For those who consider it a social insurance, they maintain that it is vested with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against the misfortunes arising from the exercise of his work. If this were not so, they say, there would be no explanation as to why in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent in article 73 of the Political Constitution, it shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances), does not thereby cease to have the character of a social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code, conceived to regulate a monopolistic insurance system under the INS. Evidently, upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, and upon the expiration of the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of norms not directly linked to the market opening, but to the characteristics of the insurance, which are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of mandatory nature of the insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as a social insurance; numeral 205 of the same normative body provides that the INS must make annual settlements that include the formation of technically necessary reserves, and the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. The principle of service at cost is concretized herein, so as long as it remains in force, the workers' compensation insurance must operate—at least in its basic coverage—without for-profit ends. Likewise, numerals 221 and 231 point to the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if he had been entitled to them had he been insured, subrogating the right to bring action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the sums disbursed, plus their interest. The principle of universality is founded on these provisions. At the regulatory level, workers' compensation insurance is governed by the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances” (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios), approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through article 8, numeral 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurances (article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (article 2). It was issued based on articles 25, 26, 27 and transitory provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. In this sense, the Superintendency of Insurance will grant administrative authorization for the exercise of the insurance activity in the field of workers' compensation insurance “... *provided they comply with the terms, conditions and specifications that will be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council, in accordance with national legislation*”. The Regulation, in article 8, provides for the possibility of offering the mandatory insurance with any other voluntary insurance (without being subject to the service at cost principle), allowing better coverage in case the worker sues the employer for an act or omission of the latter that motivated the workplace accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in article 218 of the Labor Code and that payments of economic benefits shall be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation of Workplace Risks issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision where, for a worker who was not insured, the INS must grant him the benefits, except for those cases in which the employer had a policy in force with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, in which case the benefits shall be borne by the insurance entity that received the premium. The Office of the Attorney General does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies that under the Worker Protection Law, the social security system regarding pensions became composed of four pillars. Within that scheme, there is private participation, under a competition regime, with for-profit intent, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The norms establish that it must operate at cost, however, in the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General, the participation of private, for-profit companies, in the commercialization of workers' compensation insurance, is not contrary to the Constitution, as long as legislation of legal rank is issued that protects, at a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers up to this moment. There is no norm of constitutional rank that establishes that workers' compensation insurance must operate at cost, or without for-profit ends. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which shows that there exists a certain flexibility to define the operation of that insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of the rights of workers. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could endanger its competitiveness, even though the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances” (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguro Obligatorios) is considered insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality does not lie in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions regulating the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code with respect to not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because transitory provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law itself establishes that this regulation must be issued “*in accordance with National legislation*”. Failure to act in this way would be contrary not only to the principle of universality, but also to that of progressivity, since it could occur that the protection currently available to the entire working class of the country is reduced to only a part of it. There exists an obligation of constitutional rank to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.\n\n**5.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 39, 40 and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin, of the days 24, 25 and 28 of February 2011.\n\n**6.-** Through briefs presented by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Peace and Justice Service in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipality of San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP), they requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber consider them as active coadjuvants in the present action. Likewise, they challenge the contested norms in their conditions as workers and citizens who are beneficiaries and users of social insurances, considering that they violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances, derived from articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Magna Carta, specifically affecting the solidarity workers' compensation insurance. They indicate that the challenged norms oblige Costa Rica to permit the for-profit commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity insurance starting from January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote number 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social workers' compensation insurance contemplated in the fourth paragraph of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the foregoing, by clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 shall not apply to the social insurances set forth in the first, second and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Magna Carta and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), but excluding social workers' compensation insurance, despite the fact that these also have constitutional rank and are governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the impact on the constitutional principles that protect social workers' compensation insurance, since it provides that Costa Rica shall not have to reform its regulations on this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations “are consistent” with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the for-profit commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity workers' compensation insurance is incompatible with the nature and the principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in terms of the levels of protection achieved by the country (impact on the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the “Insurance Market Regulatory Law, includes Integral Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924”, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 to La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008. It reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and has the purpose of implementing said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions must grant “authorizations” for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity workers' compensation insurance, starting from January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same defects of constitutionality. They coincide with Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality and service at cost. If its for-profit commercial exploitation is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, injuring the rights of working persons who suffer workplace accidents and occupational diseases, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.\n\n**7.-** José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican – North American Chamber of Commerce, presents a brief as passive coadjuvant of the action of unconstitutionality, with sufficient powers to intervene in the process, pointing out general aspects of the Chamber's competence, as well as of the limited effects that national law has on obligations of public international law. If the State were to find itself obligated to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the will of the sovereign expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors and exporters, and it would have to rule on it in its entirety. Now, contrary to what is stated by the claimant, the Chamber has pronounced on the opening of workers' compensation insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that mandatory workers' compensation insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, a social insurance as defined by article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he highlights that advisability or inadvisability is not equivalent to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the claimant makes value judgments emphasizing the inadvisability of the challenged norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give efficacy to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself; in addition, he points out that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in Judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that workers' compensation insurance is mentioned in article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country have (employers and workers alike) to choose among different entities that offer coverage for workplace risks. He considers that the insurance does not form part of the social insurances, as these are defined by the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of workers' compensation insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent the modification of the form of providing workers' compensation insurance. While he accepts that workers' compensation insurance is constitutionally recognized, social insurances are those that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of these social insurances must be met that workers' compensation insurance does not have, in terms of coverage, form of financing, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and the funds may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent, these insurances were separated and differentiated from workers' compensation insurance, as was regulated by article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. While it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to the solidarity assistance to the worker, and that there is a recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by article 73 nor that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that workers' compensation insurance is a regime that the constituent established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection granted by social insurances and workers' compensation insurance is not exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. In addition, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security under the responsibility of the Fund, and another of workers' compensation insurance under the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances under the responsibility of the Fund and of the INS are delimited. He cites jurisprudence of the Chamber and opinions of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in which they point out that social insurances are exclusively those that protect workers against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system.\n\nIn that sense, the claimant's thesis of considering workplace risk insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The claimant's thesis is inadmissible under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to the special provisions. Many of the claimant's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions that, not being based on doctrinal criteria, relevant rulings, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, express nothing more than the claimant's personal feeling towards commercial opening. The Labor Code preserves intact the rules on the provision, universality, mandatory nature, and other characteristics of workplace risk insurance, expressly including that uninsured cases will continue to be attended by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). There is no denaturalization of mandatory workplace risk insurance. The fundamental core of workplace risk insurance, as it pertains to the protection of the worker, would not be altered by commercial opening or even by a potential profit, since it would not cease to be universal, mandatory, and solidarity-based. It remains mandatory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers, it would remain solidarity-based because it will always be paid by the employer, and the uninsured will be attended by the INS. By ruling 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulatorily develop the social guarantee of the right to a subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all regulatory development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern insurance through special provisions, but furthermore, it does not imply renunciation, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the claimant, it points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, it relies on ruling No. 1998-06450 insofar as it points to the democratic legitimacy corresponding to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's jurisprudence, has not been violated, since to demonstrate this, it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The claimant supposes that by the mere fact of allowing other entities to present workplace risk insurance services, its coverage and quality will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence whatsoever regarding this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. It requests that the action be declared without merit.\n\n**8.-** Freddy Sandí Brenes, Secretary General of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (hereinafter UPINS) appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his legal standing is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation that corresponds to him on behalf of the INS workers in relation to workplace risks. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), he emphasizes the fact that it reaches the conclusion that social workplace risk insurance is indeed a right and a social guarantee. He argues that the recommendation put forward by the Attorney General's Office, where it is proposed that since the challenged norms are not unconstitutional, legislation should be enacted that guarantees the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity. He maintains that an opening legislation that guarantees these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces, in practice, a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and a disadvantage for the INS in terms of competition, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could violate other constitutional principles related to freedom of commerce, enshrined in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, and competition, leading us to the philosophical discussion in the field of Human Rights about whether solidarity can be imposed in commerce. He argues that the reasons why the challenged regulations are unconstitutional are found in the model of State chosen by the constituent assembly, for which reason he raises whether Costa Rica is a Social State of Law or a Liberal State of Law. Elucidating the above is essential if one considers that the opening of a social insurance against workplace risks, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, demands a special value judgment about the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been formed until today as a Social and Democratic State of Law, governed, among other things, by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituent framers dreamed of a Social State of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent framers in the first paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution. The constituent framers decided to balance worker-employer relations, establishing in general terms the following guarantees: a) allowing workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (Article 60 of the Constitution), b) elevating to constitutional rank the right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and granting legal status to the content of those negotiations (Article 62 of the Constitution), c) constitutionally guaranteeing the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, it can be interpreted that severance pay is found, but the article does not establish a cap limit, nor does it prohibit aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of people and their families and dependents (Article 72), e) an insurance system is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of their salary amount, and the best possibilities of recovering to continue working. This recognizes the importance of work as a means of life, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, in which that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (Article 73 of the Constitution), f) the constituent includes and specifically \"constitutionalizes\" the rights and benefits not stated above, but that derive from the Christian principle of social justice and that are indicated by law (or collective bargaining agreements that have the force of law) (Article 74). Regarding the legal nature of workplace risk insurance and its content, he alleges that the fact that its content is given through law does not imply that it can be varied to make it worse simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that workplace risk insurance \"shall be governed by special laws.\" Within the study of legislative drafting technique in the field of human rights, this reference to law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes an error by the constituent framer, which in a certain way \"deconstitutionalizes\" what it intends to \"constitutionalize.\" Certainly, every norm of constitutional rank has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or the \"hard core\" of that right. The hard core of social workplace risk insurance is constituted by at least the following principles: principle of universality, principle of solidarity, principle of generality, principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability, and service at cost. Social workplace risk insurance has constitutional rank and is also recognized in Convention 102 of the ILO, approved in what is relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but that, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutionality control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all the country's workers are covered by insurance against workplace accidents; a situation that, in our opinion, would be unfulfilled due to the risk selection that different companies in the insurance market could carry out. Regarding the incompatibility of the principle of service at cost under the Constitution with the opening of this type of social insurance, he says that it derives directly from Article 73 of the Constitution. This principle is developed at the same time by labor legislation, establishing in that regulation that in this activity, there are no \"profits\" as such, but eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, to the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional). As the claimant himself indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become profits of a private nature. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest it, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and the principle of progressivity would be violated. This obligation to offer insurance at cost, we consider incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, therefore, social workplace risk insurance cannot legally be opened to free competition. Regarding risk selection and the violation of the principles of universality and progressivity under the Constitution, he affirms that certainly the solidarity-based coverage of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. Income from more profitable activities contribute to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the workplace risk insurance market, private companies compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities and those that present fewer claims. This would leave the least attractive risks, and those with more statistically proven accidents, once again in the hands of the probably sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of \"risk selection\" functions as the fundamental concept that prevents social insurance, which is solidarity-based, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating like commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance radically opposes the conception of social insurance like that for workplace risks, which is based on the insurance of all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or dangerousness. This confirms the position held here insofar as what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labor Organization. In accordance with Article 74 of the Constitution, social guarantees are inalienable, and since the legislator established the inalienability of social guarantees, said condition operates in such a way that: the worker cannot renounce them. Nor can the State allow that these guarantees are not available in its legislation.\n\n**9.-** Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as interim Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it endows him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment, likewise due to the institutional dynamic with the commercial partners of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the claimant's legal standing, it is alleged that the injury transcends an individual injury to any person, that is, for the national community in its entirety, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes its legal standing on the existence of a popular action, since the action is filed for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the Nation against a supposed injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. Furthermore, it accuses that the action contains subjective assessments and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis, confuses the Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating applicable constitutional and legal principles from one insurance regime to another, thereby conveniently intermingling the nature of each one with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced to create confrontation and inconsistency between the national legal system and the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic plenitude and legal certainty, ignoring international commercial commitments and the general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with international treaties, conventions, and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international legal system. The principles in question, apart from being inherent to international law, constitute basic premises of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it should be noted, firstly, that according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws at the international level; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to comply with an international obligation. In the relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of a domestic law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must comply with them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Likewise, international tribunals have held that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal nature of the norms of international law is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed by its international obligations, the rights that international regulations enshrine are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level, and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, but rather modify the internal legal system of the nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. So, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of customary lineage (international customs), a State - upon entering the international community - accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning conventional rules of international law - that is, those that come from a bilateral or multilateral treaty - the process is usually different from the previous one. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided for in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally, the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4), and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures related to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements - denominations that for the purposes of international law are equivalent - and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution indicates that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over that of common Law, which entails that when faced with a norm originating from an international treaty or convention, internal norms of legal rank cede their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, since each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing the realization of these rights to an indefinite future under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, that of \"progressivity\" or \"progressive development,\" paradoxically included in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on \"available resources,\" which cannot be interpreted in a libertine manner because it would delay their effectiveness and violate the general principles of international law \"Pacta Sunt Servanda\" and \"Bona Fides,\" and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all the commitments acquired by the State, regardless of their origin and nature. Regarding the supposed hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively dealing with human rights issues, it is worth noting that, under the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions or that, even compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are \"dead letter,\" which would be equivalent to evading or failing to comply with international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of ruling 2010-11352, has recognized it as necessary to harmoniously interpret the Magna Carta with the doctrine of human rights coming from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the Nation's duty to exceptionally modify the Political Constitution in those insurmountable cases where it clashes with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them into its legal system or not, so that it is compliant, congruent, and concordant with said norms, principles, rights, and international customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelation, undue hierarchization, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or else, based on such criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. No thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement is based on another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered a gross infraction and evident lack of International Law and the Law of the Constitution. On the other hand, it compiles ruling No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, through which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, on the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference on the purpose of the Treaty, which would not go into the convenience or not of the approval, as well as the economic aspects surrounding the Treaty, but rather to themes that generate doubts of constitutionality. The congruence it maintains with the pretensions of the consultants and what was resolved makes evident the need, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, for the ruling to be read as a whole following a reasonable and proportional legal interpretation to the pursued end within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So that a light reading that interprets the text in question partially and decontextualized from the prevailing reality, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the entirety of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and the norms it deals with, which would indissolubly lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is not acceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to continue, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, well known to all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but an evident contravention to the general principles of International Law \"Pacta Sunt Servanda\" and \"Bona fides,\" which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.\n\nCosta Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the manner in which Occupational Risk Insurance was provided in the country, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that support it, the rights it guarantees, or the coverage this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of CAFTA-DR, the country—in the Matter of Insurance Services—assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition—by said insurance it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance—as of January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called “Gradual Market Opening Commitments,” subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for occupational risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to the cited subsection 2, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurance of Article 73 of the Constitution, clarified that the social insurance contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, while the mandatory occupational risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would indeed be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or non-conformities with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in a relative Annex exclusive to Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, because the commitment to the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right nor does it denature said mandatory insurance. The opening and possible provision by entities other than the Instituto Nacional de Seguros does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not obligate Costa Rica to modify the norms regulating occupational risk insurance, provided that said norms are consistent with the obligations assumed in CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obligates the country to “…treat occupational risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be exploited for profit … the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the previous section that define and characterize the social and solidarity-based nature of occupational risk insurance.” Neither is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obligates that “…it must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, as it is a norm with a rank superior to national law,” because the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application of and respect for the constitutional and solidarity-based principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or the means by which the State must comply with said international precept, since by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, they are internally obligated by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the internal legal system—whether as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law—to receive said international norms within the national legal system and intrinsically give full validity to the precepts emanating from international treaties, conventions, or agreements. CAFTA-DR establishes a concrete programmatic commitment, namely: the opening to competition of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance, as of January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the manner in which such obligation shall be carried out. It is here where the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as its main consequence the non-compliance with the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other State Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. With the purpose of complying with this and other market-opening commitments for insurance, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, was issued, which, in accordance with its Article 1 indicating its objectives, shows that it aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of the insured or consumers of insurance services, the requirements and minimum rules for market regulation, and the basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory Provision III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of CAFTA-DR to open the market for mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance, as of January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the Superintendencia General de Seguros grants based on the Regulation issued for that purpose by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. The mentioned Transitory Provision is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the timeframe contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law to extend, as part of its supervisory functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation establishing the operational requirements for mandatory insurance in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, the highest deconcentrated body attached to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based on the competencies granted to it by the Laws. In this sense, it reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that reviewed and reported on the Bill for the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to conclude that the nature of Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance is a component pertaining to the protection of workers' social security, which, as relevant, according to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, creates insurance against professional risks that will be at the exclusive expense of the employers and will be governed by special provisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined as a commercial contract, but rather one is in the presence of insurance whose regulation is found in the Constitution itself, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to it being able to be offered in the market under a competition scheme, an aspect that would clearly guarantee for the consumer and the insured greater diversity of options and better coverage and insurance conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (reviewed for constitutionality by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 2008-10450), a norm of public order and public interest, develops the commitments derived from CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the authorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of the insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity. It creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the effective competition of the participating entities, in addition to modernizing and strengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the legal norm and based on the international commitment, the “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance, which defines the minimum operational requirements for Occupational Risk Insurance and Mandatory Automobile Insurance” was issued, applicable to insurance entities, in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed. There exists the “Regulation on authorizations, registrations, and operational requirements for entities supervised by the Superintendencia General de Seguros.” The invocation of unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening would expose the country to a potential State-State dispute settlement panel, which would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance. It could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits, Article 20.16 of CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to Costa Rica's reputation within the framework of bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes for trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even occur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance.”\n\nArticle 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent power to provide and maintain superior-rank protection for workers under the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social security is informed by the basic principles of universality, mandatory nature, and social solidarity. Rulings of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two systems of social insurance, not mutually exclusive, whose primary and imperative purpose is to protect the worker. One against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, and the other against professional risks, which are at the exclusive and own expense of the employer (ruling 2008-016964). There are several consequences of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; firstly, the issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security regime, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social Security. Secondly, it was interpreted that there exist principles of the Right to Social Security linked to the Regime of Social Insurance of the CCSS, which are those related to universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (ruling 2001-10546). A third consequence is the linkage of the right to health and social security, insofar as the administration of social insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (ruling 2007-17971). The fourth consequence most highlighted from the jurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection granted by social insurance and by occupational or work risk insurance, which are distinct expressions of the fundamental right of social security and which manifest in the legal system in a distinct form through the different norms regulating the regimes of the social security system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational risk insurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social security regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social security services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional rank, since there is no legal or constitutional prohibition preventing the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance, given that the regime is in essence distinct from that of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the occupational risk insurance market is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, since this mandatory insurance continues to be treated by CAFTA-DR as insurance distinct from the social security insurance of the CCSS without its nature being altered. Regarding the Mandatory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime, as a social security regime, it seeks to compensate the worker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or illnesses, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform in a subordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational risk regime is regulated at the infra-constitutional level in Title Four: On the Protection of Workers during the Exercise of Work of the Labor Code (Articles 193 to 331), the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, and in SUGESE Agreement 04-10, “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance” approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a manifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not diminish that, doctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, one is in the presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. The historical fact underlies that it is a commercial contract recognized in the Fundamental Norm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an innovative and additional element to the traditional conception of commercial insurance contract law. The competition scheme is not incompatible with the Constitution, nor do international instruments on human rights prescribe or give indications of such non-conformity. The report sets out the similarities and differences between the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the CCSS and the Mandatory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime. It also discusses the principles of mandatory nature, universality, social solidarity, and inalienability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social Security, since a large part of the constitutional jurisprudence developing them has been transcribed; however, they will be analyzed from the perspective of the issue of respect for the essential content of that right.\n\nAccording to the allegations of the claimant, the principle of mandatory nature is not affected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or affect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as a constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The pertinent provisions make the Insurance a mandatory insurance. In this sense, Article 193 of the Labor Code, which operationalizes the principle, remains in force; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the commitment was assumed to open the mandatory insurance market to competition as of January 1, 2011. Thus, the reference that the article makes to the INS must be understood generically as referring to the operators authorized by SUGESE concordantly with the “Regulation on authorizations, registrations, and operational requirements for entities supervised by the Superintendencia General de Seguros” issued by CONASSIF. The mandatory nature is found in the Labor Code, the General Regulation on Occupational Risks (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the mentioned regulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia General de Seguros and the Technical Norm issued by each insurance entity.\n\nThe principle of universality also is not modified, denatured, or affected by CAFTA-DR or by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. The treaty nowhere supposes the existence of a competitive market in which Occupational Risk Insurance would cease to cover all workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the effective market opening, the new private occupational risk insurance operators will have the possibility of attracting a greater number of employers to contract that insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the principle of mandatory nature. The regulatory provision (Article 5) provides for the obligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the insured, and the beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the specifications that the law and related regulations provide for mandatory insurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that offer mandatory insurance to sign the necessary agreements or contracts with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the operational aspects derived from the medical care provided by that institution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits indicated in Article 218 of the Labor Code. Hypothetical scenarios where the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market will affect the finances of the INS, and consequently, the care of uninsured persons, but it points out what has been affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts that the uninsured worker is not harmed from the perspective of joint and several obligation, without prejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case, the Regulation contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an Occupational Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, they will be considered as uninsured and the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium. It highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Judicial Collection Law for certifications issued by established entities, the competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those issued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited care in a monopoly insurance market system, since the care or benefits contemplated by the insurance coverages are constrained to fundamental criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions of the workers.\n\nThe principle of social solidarity proposes the duty to help those who have less based on the contribution of all, especially those who have more. The appellant's allegations that the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity because workers will have unequal protection, such an argument lacks any foundation. At this point, it is relevant to recall that the duty to insure workers through the Insurance does not fall on the worker, but on the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic to conceive the functioning of an open and competitive Occupational Risk Insurance market in which workers will be left without insurance, because they will be \"rejected\" by private operators of occupational risk benefits because their salary is not \"attractive,\" since it is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance but their employer, in accordance with paragraph four of constitutional Article 73 and the norms of the Labor Code. For greater detail, note that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation to this insurance is that it is of a mandatory and compulsory nature, regardless of the working conditions and the salary earned, so that the employer always has the obligation to insure their workers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of insurance contracting and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Risk Insurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of the activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in accordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, to ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can private or public insurance service providers, on a discriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers who wish to contract the Insurance services with them, due to the authorization obtained from SUGESE in accordance with the Regulation issued by CONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance with national legislation. It follows from the foregoing that an insurance entity could reserve the right to contract with an employer-client when the latter does not meet the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the supervisory entity. In this sense, the claimant is not correct when stating that private operators “will dispute the profitable segments of the market.” CAFTA-DR starts from the premise that in the competitive Insurance market, the insurance firms authorized by the State know in advance the rules that regulate competition and protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to make a public offering of occupational risk insurance and make a selection of employers—clients to whom they wish to sell occupational risk insurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and regulatory norms, there can be no discrimination in the insuring of workers, by virtue of the fact that the very principle of universality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to select or discriminate against workers based on their potential profitability and risk levels. Regarding the second stage, relating to the determination of coverage, it refers to Article 15 of the Regulation of CONASSIF, which the claimant seems to ignore, resolved the issue of the minimum content of the Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on the basic benefits established by the aforementioned norm. At the stage of determining rates for coverage, it is indeed permitted to establish categories of higher or lower loss ratios, taking into account, among other items, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of activities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages are duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those coverages are determined under the actuarial technical bases that support the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with Article 205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be financially viable and sustainable, and to allow similar treatment for equals. The basic coverages functioned before CAFTA-DR and when the INS held the monopoly on mandatory insurance. The rates for each insurance entity are authorized by SUGESE in order for them to comply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors demanded by the general provisions of the capital adequacy and solvency regime, as well as to ensure sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities from their insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and discrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities, but also ensures compliance with the minimum basic coverage equal for all workers, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same for all workers. Thus, additional benefits by way of additional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the employer has with the insurance entity, and which are at the employer's expense, will directly imply an improvement in the treatment and care of the worker, which in no way violates the principle of universality or that of solidarity.\n\nRegarding the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), workers protected under this regime cannot waive the rights conferred by it, as prescribed by said constitutional norm. This means that workers cannot, *motu proprio* or through the action of a third party, waive the rights and benefits granted by virtue of the Fundamental Right to Social Security. The claimant does not indicate why the principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers can waive the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo); on the contrary, in the preamble of Section H “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services,” respect for the Political Constitution is reaffirmed, and with it the inalienable (irrenunciable) nature of the rights and benefits of the Insurance.\n\nRegarding the constitutional principles of the Sickness, Disability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other contingencies Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) that are extensive to the Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo), such as the principles of sufficiency (suficiencia) that is in force in Article 206 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) where both the needs of the worker and the salary earned by the worker are taken into account. In fact, this is how it functioned in times when INS held the monopoly of the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo) and will continue to function in the same terms, today in a market open to competition. It also alludes to the principle of automaticity (automaticidad) of protection, referring to the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social security that translates into “… *an adequate and immediate protection in matters of sickness, disability, old age, and death*.” Extending this principle to the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo), as part of the general social security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special nature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, mandatory and universal. This has functioned this way until now, where the hospitals of the Fund (Caja) or private health centers must provide primary care to anyone who has suffered an occupational accident or disease. The same immediate protection is received by uninsured workers. In any case, Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulation support what is provided in numeral 232 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).\n\nIt additionally points out the following differences between the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) and the Social Insurances (Seguros Sociales) of the CCSS. Regarding the subject that provides the service or coverage, it points out in each case the respective institutional fields and coverages, as well as those of commercial operators, to conclude with the claimant's indication that it violates the Political Constitution. Furthermore, the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) is exclusively at the expense of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme of the Social Insurances (Seguros Sociales) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). It is the latter that are reached by the prohibition of transferring or using those funds for purposes other than those related to their mission. There are differences regarding the use and destination of the funds and reserves of social insurances (seguros sociales). The funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to Article 73 of the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity, Disability and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply to the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo); there is no such constitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves resulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in Article 73 when it refers to “social insurances (seguros sociales)” and “insurances against occupational risk (seguros contra riesgo profesional).” Although this does not mean that these funds remain unregulated, since this is determined by legal means, but this is a very different path from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of constitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary benefits and the supposed service at cost. Regarding the former, it points out that neither CAFTA-DR nor the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) alters Article 242 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), nor Articles 255 to 259, on the possibility of commuting annuities (conmutación de rentas). Furthermore, the so-called “service at cost” is not a principle of mandatory insurances, not even a constitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in general, such that the claimant confuses and extrapolates, from norms of the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), undue consequences for the Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo). There is no evidence of the principle “service at cost” at a constitutional level, but rather concerning Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes that any surplus produced must be used to constitute a reserve, to then erroneously suppose and conclude the existence of an alleged constitutional principle. Constitutional Article 73 does not speak of income, as the claimant attempts to argue, and commits an error in the analysis of the arguments presented, since the term used by the constituent was that of “fund.” Rather, Article 28 of the Constitution exists, which guarantees every citizen liberty as a basic principle, and developed by infra-constitutional norms such as the law, which must determine its scope and impose restrictions that make them concrete and harmonize with the rest of the block of constitutionality and legality. Furthermore, the observance of being proportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of INS, according to Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it must perform annual settlements; the surpluses must become part of a pay-as-you-go reserve, 50%, to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional) and the rest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. In the same way, it says that INS as an insurance entity must comply with the precepts of Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros), regarding technical provisions and reserves. Similarly, the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of the Law are obliged to comply with the mandates regarding technical provisions, reserves, and investments contained in the indicated numerals. But Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the issue of “service at cost” in vote 2007-9469, this ruling having three main consequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide a service at cost would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no constitutional principle that obliges telecommunications services, or in the case of Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo), to be provided “at cost.” This is a decision that remains at the discretion of the legislator. CAFTA-DR also does not address the issue that insurance must be commercialized “at cost.” Secondly, commercialization in a competitive market is not exclusive of the application of a social policy regarding occupational risks insurance. It is worth recalling the preamble of Section H on “*Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services*,” where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the opening process in the provision of insurance must be carried out based on the Political Constitution, its norms and principles. But to comply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the services of the SRT must be provided “at cost.” Finally, the third consequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that compels the services of the SRT to be provided “at cost.” However, what is guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of consumers to choose the service provider that best suits their interests (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). The freedom to choose is not incompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to “… *achieve universality and solidarity of the services that are opened to competition*.” The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or right to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of freedom of enterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and equity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, on the progressivity of international law of fundamental rights and the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen de Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo). The principle of the minimum normative standard (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account, which postulates that there exists a compendium of minimum labor and social security norms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the employer, or the insurance operators, such that contravention of these constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums form part of the essential content of the right to social security of occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo), whereby the essential content will also comprise, as part of its hard core, the minimum benefits or basic coverages of the SRT recognized. As long as the legislator does not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo), through the promulgation of legal norms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable, or strip said right of the necessary protection. The norms under examination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the exercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or strip it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The choice made by the State is the most favorable for workers covered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected right, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, being able to exercise the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in a clear derivation of the principles “*pro libertatis*” and “*pro homine*,” benefiting all workers of the Nation. Reasonable profit is also argued, in such a way that the hard core of content is not affected by changing the subject providing the service or allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the essence or legal-philosophical foundation of the right in question, hence there is no injury to the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights. The country already consolidated an effective system of protection that is not seen as diminished. It does not consider that there is a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and ILO Convention No. 102 because in both, their regulation is separate. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently have, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that beneficiaries of the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance regime (Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo) have currently obtained. For the foregoing, it requests that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit.\n\n**10.-** Messrs. and Mmes. Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative faction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadjuvant. In this sense, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations should be expanded to include the entirety of Regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, approved by CONASSIF, through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing insofar as the currently challenged Transitory III of Law 8653 subsequently ordered CONNASIF and SUGESE to regulate a regime of total opening in the provision of the Social Insurance of Occupational Risks (Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo), no later than January first, 2011, an administrative action that was computed starting from December 22 of last year. It alleges that the mere act of promulgating said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, implied placing into commerce a public good or service of constitutional rank that, for the same reason and by its own conceptual-functional nature, is entirely outside of commerce. It argues that the alleged unconstitutionality is noticeable by mere literal-grammatical interpretation, this taking into account that the alleged constitutional regulations (Title V of the Political Constitution) enjoy clean, clear, and precise wording, while their location in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They state that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the only non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following strict syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State = Outside commerce. Premise 2: Occupational Risks Insurance (RT) = Social Insurance (Seguro Social) that forms part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Political Constitution. Only non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside commerce. Therefore, the challenged regulations are unconstitutional, including regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. Likewise, it is affirmed that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly under the charge of INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing, taking into account that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, occupational risks were legislatively developed by a code in labor matters, being additionally shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labor Organization and also through constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of the universality of the public service of occupational risks, including uninsured cases, we can indeed imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State boycotted from within to be forced to buy hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly stated that a new regulatory norm that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and cash benefits) brings to memory the mentioned background of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from carrying out legislative reversals in matters of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave as a Superintendency of Social Insurances; remember that administration and regulation is exclusively the competence of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the veiled castration of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) or doing nothing to prevent it, is equivalent to regressing in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the promulgation of the challenged regulation, the coadjuvants made it known to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was of public interest to assertively address this debate, in light of the budding normative legal health (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failing to do so would destabilize the institutionality and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that an omissive conduct of that sort could even result in diminishment, affectation, or prejudice to the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when promulgating Regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. DR-CAFTA itself, in its chapter 16, subparagraph b) of Article III.2 of Section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain (demanialidad) of the service, so the challenged regulations could be implicitly repealed in light of the same chapter 16 of CAFTA. In other words, both legal systems in apparent contradiction are not so, because each regulates on its own matters and principles distinct from each other: a public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less incompatibility on the same matter. Therefore, it is not appropriate for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) implicitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and excluding material competence of the SSRT service in favor of the State through INS. That is to say, what is under discussion has more to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadjuvants express that as legislators, they are prohibited from breaking the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressivity of human rights), which would be consummated if legislation that in one way or another worsens labor human rights were approved, for example, those collected in Articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).\n\n**11.-** Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) allege that they have standing to file the coadjuvancy action in order to maintain that the commercial opening will promote and produce a segmentation of the occupational insurance market, such that the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social) will be responsible for assuming the “collateral” damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of working people, particularly of the Fund and the rest of Costa Rican security, with an indisputable legitimate collective interest, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from Article 332 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It maintains that occupational risks insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. However, that the last paragraph of said article provides that insurances against occupational risks will be governed by special provisions —those administered by the Fund (Caja) are also governed by a special law—, this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances do not form part of social security, of the very foundation of our Constitution. If any argumentation in this sense were valid, simply, the constituent would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. This being the case, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Chamber has interpreted, occupational risks insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security, which inform constitutional Article 73, apply equally to all modalities of social insurances that this numeral expressly contemplates: the very particular situation, mainly of a historical order, that the administration of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo) was attributed to another institution distinct from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), could in no way justify the understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. The commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must extend even to those who are not insured; it points out that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), which will have fewer resources to assume these expenses. Companies illicitly enrich themselves at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the heritage of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity where care is based above what is earned, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the scheme of commercial opening, under a competition regime, promotes the segmentation of the market of “consumers,” with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit where the protection provided must correspond to the benefits, at least basic medical-assistance, regardless of the insurance premiums or the amount of workers' salaries. With the scheme, the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of the benefits currently being provided are restricted. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo) constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is not possible except under a public, universal scheme, incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. That the Chamber has indicated that the social security system supposes that public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which comes to prevent any modality of private management and administration of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo), for profit. The dignity of workers is also injured, because as a consequence of these new rules, within which the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) will have to see how it subsists, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo), under a regime of commercial exploitation, obliges the modification of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) in matters of occupational risks. In this sense, they point out note 22, which conditions the regulations to the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, affirming that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent, incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the scheme of commercialization and privatization of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for promoting workers' health and preventing occupational accidents and diseases will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, health, and other benefits, there are also those that seek to promote health and the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. The profits that were previously used for the foregoing will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies on this matter will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and diseases. Occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo) constitute an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which it cites the chapter on the Rights of Labor by John Paul II, pointing out that the Encyclical provides that in cases of occupational accidents, workers must have access to health care, even free of charge, which would be broken, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. It requests that the action be declared with merit.\n\n12.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in clear principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.\n\n13.- By resolution issued at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, rendered within this case file, several joinder motions in favor of and against the unconstitutionality action were admitted.\n\n14.- The legal requirements have been fulfilled in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On preliminary matters and joinders.- By resolution issued at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, rendered within this case file, the motions presented by various interested parties were admitted for the purpose of joining in the action, with the aim of adding their arguments to the case file. It is necessary to indicate that the order only mentions the names of the individuals appearing in the proceeding; however, for the most part they do not do so in a personal capacity, but rather in representation of legal entities and social groups, which, for greater clarity, is indicated below regarding the capacity in which they act and whether they do so in representation of a moral person within the unconstitutionality action. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, holder of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Secondary Education Teachers' Association (Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza, APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, holder of identity card No. 6-155-443, as General Secretary of the Costa Rican Education Workers' Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense, SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, holder of identity card No. 9-029-769, as General Secretary of the Union of Public and Private Enterprise Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada, SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, holder of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Council of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Agreement No. 13 of Ordinary Session No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, holder of identity card No. 2-287-015, as General Secretary of the Union of Professionals, Technicians, and Similar Employees of Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, holder of identity card No. 1-897-818, Deputy General Secretary of the Union of Professionals, Technicians, and Similar Employees of Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, identity card No. 3-222-901, member of Service, Peace and Justice in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, holder of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal capacity and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, holder of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican – North American Chamber of Commerce; Freddy Sandí Brenes, holder of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Personnel Union of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, holder of identity card number 1-791-100, in his capacity as a.i. Minister of Foreign Trade; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as was erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC) fraction; Luis Chavarría Vega, holder of identity card No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal character and as General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, holder of identity card No. 2-343-472 in her personal character and as Deputy General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, holder of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the National Association of Public and Private Employees (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution of seventeen hours eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, is corrected, it being understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal entities. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the motion of Ms. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez is not on record, their briefs not being found in the electronic case file, such that the aforementioned persons are not considered joiners in the present action. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a joinder, given that the brief claims to be filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, however his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.\n\nII.- The standing rules in unconstitutionality actions. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, demanding the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial venue in which unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question states that it is appropriate when \"by the nature of the matter, no individual or direct harm exists\", that is, when by that very nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of specific groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of \"diffuse interests\" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this tribunal number 3750-93, issued at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three)\n\n\"... Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, determined or easily identifiable persons are identified, or personalized groups, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community in its entirety. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective – because they are common to a generality – and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such character.\"\n\nIn summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under the protection of paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the classification of \"diffuse\", such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two precisions must be made: on the one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not affect only the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or gravely endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of the public funds authorized in the Republic's Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is merely a simple description proper to its obligation – as a jurisdictional body – to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to be understood that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse interests; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the reaches of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative \"State of rights\", which – as in the case of the Costa Rican model – starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and do not therefore require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law speaks of interests \"that concern the community as a whole\", it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is therefore not a case of any person being able to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without any attempt at a exhaustive enumeration being valid in this field either.\n\nIII.- On admissibility. As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law does not recognize special standing for a deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the plaintiff derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, who acts as a lawyer and deputy, that is, in his personal condition and in his capacity as Deputy. In this sense, the questioning he makes refers to diffuse interests, that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The plaintiff's reasoning is based on the idea that said system must have a general and universal scope, effective or potential, wherein he accuses that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what the plaintiff indicates, it should be noted that the action has standing in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of a workers' compensation insurance (póliza de riesgos de trabajo) policy. In this sense, what is appropriate is to hear the action, as is indeed done.\n\nIV.- Object of the challenge. The examination of constitutionality is requested of subparagraph b) of article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 \"Financial Services\", of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which was ratified by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, which provides:\n\n\"III. Gradual Market Opening Commitments\n\n[...]\n\n2.- Right of Establishment for Insurance Suppliers\n\nCosta Rica shall permit, on a non-discriminatory basis, insurance service suppliers of a Party to establish and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as set forth below:\n\n\n(a) any and all lines of insurance29 (except mandatory vehicle insurance and workers' compensation insurance (seguros contra riesgos del trabajo)), no later than January 1, 2008; and\n\n(b) any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.\n\nFor purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall permit insurance service suppliers to establish through any legal form, as set out in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential requirements of solvency and integrity, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice.\"\n\n29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) as of the date of signature of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.\n\nFurthermore, the following provision is also challenged from the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008:\n\n\"TRANSITORIO III.- Opening in the provision of mandatory insurance\n\nThe State shall maintain the monopoly on Workers' Compensation Insurance (Riesgos del Trabajo) and Mandatory Automobile Insurance, administered by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in accordance with what is indicated in title IV of the Labor Code and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, respectively.\n\nStarting January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization for the exercise of insurance activity in the branches of Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workers' Compensation Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo), to the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that shall be established in the regulation that the National Council shall issue for such effect, in accordance with national legislation.\"\n\nIt is alleged that these norms infringe Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.\n\nV.- On the merits.\n\nA.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and the State.- Preliminary questions. It deserves to be highlighted from the beginning of this judgment that no one denies the importance that social security has in our country and in the world. The plaintiff, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the different social organizations appearing in the case file, the deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana) fraction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, the Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, in the advantage that the existence, for each and every one of the inhabitants of this country, of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances provides.\n\nIn this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled by the vocation and awareness that political and social actors have in the prevention and treatment of diseases, and by ensuring spaces for medical provision and high-value medical services when a healthy person is plunged into a situation of vulnerability due to illness. Now, the first manifestations are found in the different historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. With them, one can observe the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism of social welfare. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of *John Rawls* have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what would be the best form of organization for a State, if one could start from nothing. He invites the operator to a hypothetical mental exercise that would consist of shedding all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal concept of social security has a deep political and constitutional root. He proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, so that the designer of the society must not know which social, educational, political status, lifestyle, and sex they would want, or could correspond to them, once inserted into that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a quite tempered and rational choice, in order not to be at a disadvantage, in the face of society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort of self-preservation this *decider* would calculate that if they remained in the humblest rank, they would achieve a better portion of everyone's wealth in favor of the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century there were already several countries in the world with social security systems operating, incipiently, but achieving results, it seems logical, looking back today, that such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as it is also present that, by performing this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a vast majority, even to the most disadvantaged, and with it, not discriminate in access and services based on one's origin (articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). Financing, consequently, would be done with the participation of the different social actors, the State, employer, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the underlying problem indicated by the claimant does not lie in a conflict at the macro level of social insurance, but rather in a portion of it, because the constitutional norms recognize this foundational principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures that it places in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica on Insurance Services Matters, the following in the preamble:\n\n\"[…] *reaffirming its decision to ensure that the process of opening its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution*;\n\n*emphasizing that said process will be for the benefit of the consumer and must be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation*;\n\n*recognizing its commitment to modernize the National Insurance Institute (INS) and the Costa Rican legal framework in the insurance sector*;\n\n*Assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services*.\"\n\nIt is important to note that this care in the approach and declaration is not held by any of the other member countries of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America. The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the existing monopoly on insurance, but also because traditionally the State in Costa Rica has maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which the country assumes as a commitment, is palpable in point II of Section H, where the obligation is similarly set forth to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must maintain an impartial position from market participants, having to have adequate powers, **legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers**, and handle confidential information appropriately. This will be taken up in the ruling later on.\n\nAs what is challenged in the action is the constitutional regularity of the norm of the trade Agreement and one of its implementing laws, insofar as it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must specify, for now, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpretation of the scope of the social insurance contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be clarified is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurance administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The Agreement allows, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of insurance, but as indicated, it saves the following in a footnote:\n\n*\"For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund as of the date of signing this Agreement, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.\"*\n\nFrom the above recognition, it is clear that the social security protected by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund is excluded from the Agreement, the foregoing is important for the interpretation of constitutional article 73, because with this the legislator of the National Constituent Assembly sealed a special result in the norm.\n\n**B.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good that is composed of resources from Costa Rican society.** In effect, due to the regulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter, it has allowed this Constitutional Chamber to construct the Right to Social Security, which by its structure must not be limited solely to the protection of the right to Health, but rather comprises many other benefits, which all integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican society. To cite a ruling, it must be indicated that:\n\n\"**III.- Right to social security.-**\n*The purpose of the constituent in designing the social security system in our country was to guarantee all citizens that the State, through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, would grant them at least the indispensable services in case of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. Article 73 of the Political Constitution, interpreted harmoniously with article 50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right assumes that the public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens so that it guarantees assistance and provides sufficient social benefits in situations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective scope of application of the right to social security incorporates the principle of universality, as it extends to all citizens, with a compulsory nature. The objective scope is based on the principle of generality, insofar as it protects situations of need, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and insured in advance, but insofar as they effectively occur. Additionally, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of protection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of protective automaticity, which translates into adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age, and death.*\n\n*Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, interpreted harmonically, establish the right to social security for the benefit of all workers, based on the principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of protection. Evidently, the provision of such services is conditioned on the existence of some minimum, but basic and necessary requirements for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be consistent with the aforementioned principles.*\n\n*The right to social security is a fundamental right, recognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1871 the chapter of Social Guarantees, which was later confirmed in the constituent process of nineteen forty-nine. ...\"* (ruling No. 2004-08013)\n\nAdditionally, on another occasion, the Chamber has also indicated that:\n\n*\"IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the existence of social insurance, which are regulated by the system of forced contribution of the State, employer, and workers, with the purpose of protecting the latter against the risks of illness, maternity, disability, old age, and death. The Costa Rican Social Security Fund is the autonomous entity in charge of administering this type of insurance, with the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its management, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its legal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them. It guarantees in this way, the establishment of social security and its nature, decrees the purpose of social insurance, and regulates the destination of the respective funds. Social security was born in protection of the worker and their family, as the human beings they are, and is provided from conception until death, striving for health and helping in unforeseen misfortunes such as disability and death, as well as in states of helplessness due to its very condition, such as old age, pension, and retirement.\" (Ruling No. 1998-04636)*\n\nThe doctrine set forth in the above precedent remains firm in interpreting constitutional article 73, consequently from what has been said, social security is a fundamental axis, an axiom, and a reference point of Costa Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the Social State of Law, which means a constitutional value or legally relevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate distribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability and which makes it attractive to national and international investment, and which as such, is done through the tripartite contribution of the State, employer, and worker. Thus, people can have access to social security, to a regime of predictability for disability, old age, and death, just as they will have access to health and the primary provision of health services that the State, through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, places at the service of the population, being one of the best guarantees in individual aspirations towards a more equitable society. There are multiple studies that place our country within privileged positions, not being a developed country, but it maintains high levels of health consistent with European countries more developed than ours. As indicated above, it succeeds in putting the least advantaged person in society in a better position, in one that allows them to receive health benefits like any other more advantaged person in society, as well as access to social solidarity if the person falls into circumstances of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic asymmetries must not count for the provision of services, since the original constituent legally guarantees the health of the population through institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Costa Rican Social Security Fund to oversee its delivery. It is worth noting then, that the Executive Branch guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of social insurance, by mandate of the constituent to specific benefits reserved to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in the Free Trade Agreement, everything related to the first, second, and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Political Constitution. The National Constituent Assembly foresaw the need to keep incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949, what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943. With it, it reaffirmed, at the apex of the legal system, social security by establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual workers), its forms of financing (forced contributory for the State, employers, and workers), and scope (risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines). It designated the Costa Rican Social Security Fund as the public entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal and financial attributions, administrative and governmental autonomy in social insurance, in order to likewise settle a protection barrier to the resources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of that patrimony belonging to all beneficiaries. But, always within social security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they break the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the benefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would be permissible to exempt from this regulation the mandatory vehicle insurance and the mandatory occupational risk insurance, to regulate them separately after the entry into force, at a time after January 1, 2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican Government would be consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Political Constitution, which effectively, as the Ministry of Foreign Trade indicates, is for the Government of the Republic, but which were embodied in the commitments assumed before the other member States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in national legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion raised in the action is focused on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question, where the discussion addressed since the referendum on the Free Trade Agreement and the complementary legislative agenda to the mentioned Agreement is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational risk regime shares some of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, locating it as part of the social security regime established from the apex of the legal system, however, there must be a constitutional interpretation in its proper dimension, especially regarding the issue of social insurance that protects against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, but with distinctions in insurance against professional risk or workers' risk. Certainly, the most relevant normative aspects for society must be situated in the Political Constitution to regulate or protect certain fundamental rights, topics that are the most essential in the Political Constitution with the purpose of indicating the course along which ordinary legislation must develop, including the licenses that it may have contemplated. While the above marks a determined course as a country-decision, there are also provisions that release those determinations to an interpretation proper to political science at a given moment, whose decision belongs to the political bodies of the State. In the case of social insurance operating from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved its institutional monopoly, but in the latter, the texture of the norm was more open.\n\nIn the Chamber's opinion, it is worth questioning the idea originally conceived by the National Constituent Assembly of providing the population with universal social insurance and the provision of services, if it is seen modified to the detriment of the least advantaged, with the change in legal framework – as the claimant and coadjutants allege – insofar as it contradicts that universality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the monopoly of certain insurances, and which is contrary to international human rights conventions. The discussion is more philosophical-political than philosophical-legal. The above assertion will be seen below, to establish whether there is evidence that this is the case or that international organizations favor a particular social insurance development model to achieve those ideals. In that sense, there would be little legal space left for a Constitutional Court or the State's own political bodies when ratifying an international normative body. Hence, it is worth asking what role corresponds to the Chamber, as a Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be defined whether it can be legally challenged or if it is a matter that corresponds to the political bodies of the State. Regarding the former, it is worth indicating that the Chamber must rule from a constitutional point of view on the norms, but, regarding the latter, on the competence to decide on the advisability or inadvisability of a Treaty, both issues must follow the same line as what the Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. The Chamber has leaned towards maintaining that it must not enter into analyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within its competence when resolving the legal issue or deciding some particular meaning to the constitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental right is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and advisability of legislation, per se, is not and must not be natural to jurisdictional activity. What is important to highlight here is that in the inter-branch relations of the State, the first one called to control the timeliness and advisability of the Executive Branch's international negotiations in its international relations in the form of International Treaties is the Legislative Assembly. In this sense, the abstract control that this Chamber has, whether a priori or a posteriori, will depend on the political action as a constitutional body that resides in the Legislative Assembly, and on which decision-making is founded by the majority, through a competitive struggle, but where the timeliness and advisability of a norm is the exclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly. In any event, ruling No. 1994-07005 states that:\n\n\"*However, from the point that interests us now to point out, that means that the State, or more properly, the bodies that are charged with strictly political and management competences, must always act in order to stimulate production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the Executive Branch has negotiated this Agreement, having those constitutional objectives as its guide. And it must also be understood that the Legislative Branch, upon considering the substance of said instrument, will act in accordance with the same objectives. That is why we can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that the Agreement as such may have for some sector, or some of its provisions, discussed and debatable, do not necessarily entail an aspect of constitutionality, in the sense that the Chamber must rule, since they lie at the level of mere advisability or timeliness. For example, some point out that despite the goodness of this type of commercial instrument, a country would not derive immediate or short-term advantages, if the old model (of import substitution, of subsidies), and the new model of commercial opening coincide in it. That is why in this respect, some experts estimate that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica because its tariffs have been reduced to a greater degree and much earlier than our country began to do so.*\"\n\nBut even so, they continue to say that the treaty is beneficial for Costa Rica, because it will open up a spectrum of very important investments, technology transfer, and job creation, which will invigorate its economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of competitive demand that it needs to adapt to a possible incorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the United States of America, and Canada (NAFTA), as a nearly immediate aspiration of the country, as expressed by officials of the central Government. In other words, the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario for moving on to the next, more complex and ambitious one. In any case, the Chamber warns that these aspects revolve around the policies behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not have the constitutional connotation to which the Chamber must circumscribe its opinion.\"\n\n        **C.- The legislator's freedom of configuration regarding workers' compensation insurance.** Now then, paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes:\n\n*\"Insurance against occupational hazards (riesgos profesionales) shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions\".*\n\nThe original constituent assembly, on the subject of occupational hazards, endowed the legislator with greater flexibility, even though this is effectively considered within social security, which is denoted by the breaking of the financial and regulatory scheme of the other social security branches. In this sense, it could be thought that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the Political Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with all of the country's social security, but evidently, the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it could have determined it by eliminating the final paragraph or by expressly incorporating that mandate to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove the foregoing, one could question whether the unconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, regarding occupational hazard insurance, could have been sustained. But such an interpretation would not be plausible either; on the contrary, the legislator delegated, for many years, the coverage of social security for workers' compensation to another autonomous institution, different from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such an interpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor was any constitutional irregularity noted, because it was based on a subject of public law acting in a dual capacity, of public and private law. The foregoing leads this Tribunal to the possibility of channeling the interpretation of the final paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution in a more flexible way, always maintaining harmony with the whole system, when it indicates that the insurance \"*shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers*,\" since a lesser intensity of the State's presence can be derived—logically—, but without the foregoing signifying total absence. On the other hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that it is he on whose behalf the worker performs the labor, and the working conditions he offers to the worker are attributed to him, in such a way that it is the Employer who is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and the State, for ensuring or supervising compliance with these obligations. As for the worker, no obligation falls on him other than the obligations contained in the labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente places the worker as the recipient of the protection, that is, he would ultimately be the beneficiary of these insurances. The original constituent assembly foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, allowing a greater scope of action for the legislator when it indicates \"*shall be governed by special provisions*,\" which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting an autonomous entity other than the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with establishing, offering, and executing occupational hazard insurance. At this point, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in economic and social activity typical of a Social State of Law, or the prevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on pure or mixed market mercantile models with State tutelage, regarding its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to arrive at is the following: the original constituent assembly established a system to constitutionally regulate workers' compensation so that it can be the object of diverse legal and benefit-providing designs or structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing, clearly as part of the large number of productive economic activities, as well as the jobs and risks that may exist in each one of them. Precisely, this allowed, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly regime, which implied a different course for compulsory workers' compensation insurance from those regulations of the Caja, and nevertheless, this did not and would not make it unconstitutional, just as a greater opening in the choice of the Employer, faced with a greater supply of occupational hazard insurance operators, would not.\n\nOther important consequences are deduced from the foregoing, in which one passes from an Institution which operated under a monopolized insurance exploitation system, consequently a heavily intervened market, and then opted for a different one of opening, with an impartial regulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. A regulatory body was thus foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. Consequently, the plaintiff's thesis may maintain an erroneous conception that the State completely disappeared within the aforementioned employer-worker-workers' compensation scheme. It is recognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative decision, can declare certain services to be provided under a monopoly regime, or provided under a free competition regime, without this—necessarily—signifying detriment to the service. In such a way, it can liberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality. If a government decision negotiated by the parties in a Treaty, approved through citizen participation mechanisms (referendum), and after exhausting the ratification procedure, places another State body to impartially regulate and on a non-discriminatory basis the commercial activity of insurance, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this sense, it must be said that the legitimacy of this decision is reinforced because it originates in the constitutional reform that permits an authentic direct democratic exercise which, in the year 2002, sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote of a normative character. That in itself has a special weight, which, in principle, must be complied with by the mechanisms and institutions based on a representative and mature democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional control). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences as it involves a ratified agreement and being an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal stance of the internal organs of the State, at the moment the international regulations come into effect. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all the powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:\n\n\"*The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including their observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise*\".\n\nGiven that the compulsory workers' compensation insurance (seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo) regime had been operating through the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the phased opening of the insurance market, including compulsory vehicle and workers' compensation insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in due course. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Chamber was consulted on the following problem:\n\n*\"Violation of constitutional articles 50, 73 and 74: unconstitutionality due to legislative omission to regulate solidarity insurance: they refer that this omission will cause a relevant legal lack of protection for the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because the present and future efficacy of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in terms of insurance derive from constitutional article 73 is violated: obligatoriness, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, non-existence of a benefit cap, immediacy and obligatoriness of the provision of benefits to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of pensions and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the insurer's tariffs. Likewise, they allege that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between constitutional articles 50 and 73 are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others that derive from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that it is a constitutional closing norm or closure of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open gateway in order to enable the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of the regulation of solidarity insurance will generate a lack of labor protection.\"*\n\n \n\nIn this sense, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:\n\n \n\n*\"**9.-** **Violation of Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.** *\n\n*According to the consulting deputies, the \"Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros\" bill is also unconstitutional by omission, to the extent that the establishment of social insurance is not contemplated. Regarding constitutionality control by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Tribunal, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 14:39 hrs. of May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue the infraconstitutional regulations relating to the referendum process), has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue \"**a law that develops a constitutional content or clause.\"** Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that \"the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.\" Hence, in the aforementioned bill, the Chamber does not appreciate the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, reason for which the consultation made in that sense must be resolved.\"*\n\nThere is not necessarily a loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the above that Costa Rica is free and independent, that as such it acquires an international obligation that it must observe according to the international law principle *pacta sunt servanda*; in this sense, binding itself by an international commitment with the different countries and obtaining from them commercial benefits is what is effectively pursued with this type of instruments. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars, the first is the ancient notion of freedom, so that in certain areas of people's lives, they are exempt from external conditioning factors on the volitional and cognitive capacity of the person, so that life passes without undue interference, as long as morality or public order is not affected or third parties are not harmed. But furthermore, around this freedom—in the fundamental base of society and the State—an institutionality structured to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom is guaranteed, as well as the social values that the original constituent assembly has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are created with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere with that freedom. Furthermore, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited as long as the particular conduct may be contrary to morality, public order or may harm a third party (Article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy, must be deemed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different State institutions. The foregoing means that, be it the Political Constitution, an international agreement, the law or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue, where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them in a capricious manner. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance his policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to social welfare. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Ley 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent assembly itself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation through special provisions, that is, specific ones through which the ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents them from varying them by subject matter and over time.\n\nFor the time being, the monopoly of compulsory insurance in favor of INS is broken starting from the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater national and international supply of services by workers' compensation insurance companies. It is clear that the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurance, thereby breaking a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of the aforementioned numeral 73, of a tripartite source of financing for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator free initiative on how to materialize insurance against occupational hazards. The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurance. Under the original constituent assembly's scheme, compulsory workers' compensation insurance would be protected by the decisions the legislator made under the concept \"*special provisions*,\" which means that it not only designed this coverage with more leeway but had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient potency and resistance), and that in this matter it received it from a referendum process, as in effect happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit-providing activity of workers' compensation insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a monopolistic state activity, in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open towards the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, deriving from the Political Constitution, such as state tutelage, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement which requires non-discriminatory regulations for all trade agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the insurance market suppliers is prohibited. Returning to what was indicated above, it is clear that the State through legislation can choose between providing Workers' Compensation Insurance in monopoly regimes or competition regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of natural or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent assembly can effectively be presented in any of these areas, the latter being the one chosen in the aforementioned referendum.\n\n**D.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.-** The plaintiff argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent assembly in its case) assigns that service or a strategic position in it to the State, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the required provision, such as interested management (gestión interesada) for certain public activities that cannot leave the State's administration, or the concession when it entrusts private natural or legal persons with a determined public service provision. As indicated previously, a prohibition cannot be derived from paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding an open conditional element to the constitutional norm by establishing greater freedom of configuration for the legislator. For the Tribunal, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it very clearly embraces a form of administrative tutelage of the State over private individuals who may exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require the fulfillment of *ex ante* requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination or, what is the same, the existence of norms equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but in the same way, if there were no supply at all, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as in effect it does.\n\nThe reports in the action, the respective briefs of the interested coadjuvants, refer to the different conditions that companies that would be offerors in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must fulfill; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be at a disadvantage, since we are dealing with regulatory minimums (or the hard core of the fundamental right) in order to obtain authorization to compete in the market. The plaintiff's argument is that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no obligations committed to the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking remuneration and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, these assertions must be taken with great care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, they venture into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In this sense, international provisions must be norms that accommodate space for the different national policies of the Member States, insofar as they leave open the mechanisms to make rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of result, but without being international conventions of means (as the plaintiff seems to suggest). In other words, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this regard, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:\n\n\"Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures\n\nThe States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of available resources and taking into account their degree of development, in order to achieve progressively, and in accordance with their domestic legislation, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol.\"\n\n\"Article 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Legal Provisions\n\nIf the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to make those rights effective\" (the text in bold is not from the original).\n\nOne of the characteristics that distinguishes human rights instruments from other treaties is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, while in the others, it is what the High Contracting Parties decide to establish as an objective in their reciprocal relations, border treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such to the human being, and not to the reciprocal concessions of interest of the States, and it will be the State that assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties—especially multilateral ones—must adopt an inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows deepening the objective and end agreed upon, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a specific human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, such that it establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is left to each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and directing the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction has been established, in order to adopt internal measures; this means that it can resort to public, private, or mixed forms to obtain results in the direction of the commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that, in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of providing occupational hazard insurance (seguro de riesgos profesionales), provided they are in conformity with the international conventions regulating the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the\n\n\"Article 9. Right to Social Security\n\n1. Everyone shall have the right to social security protecting him from the consequences of old age and of disability which prevents him, physically or mentally, from securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. In the event of the death of a beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to his dependents.\n\n2. In the case of persons who are employed, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and subsidy or retirement in cases of work accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth\" (the text in bold is not from the original).\n\nThe truth is that international regulations establish what the jargon of social security calls, in some ILO documents, the social floor or social protection floor (piso social or piso de protección social) as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there do exist unfulfilled legal obligations that are demandable domestically, or, once exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo del trabajo) is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in case of an accident or occupational illness. ILO Convention 102 attributes responsibility to the employer for the work environment of their employee, and is in conformity with paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Constitution. What is important is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, where it establishes minimum standards for each one of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of such systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State can choose at least three areas of protection. Important data arise from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 \"Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization\"] which indicates, among other things:\n\n\"185. Employment injury schemes that provide benefits are usually organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and at other times form part of other social security branches. Due to this link between risk and prevention in the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely by employer contributions. Contribution rates are usually differentiated according to the level of accident or disease risk in the various types of economic activities.\" (p. 76);\n\nThe plaintiff alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, to the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressivity (principio de progresividad) of social rights. For this argument to be admissible, regressivity must be proven with the change of legal regime or it must be evident, but neither does the ILO's own work endorse a single approach to the issue as the plaintiff seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, these are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate for implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be a space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, this is a matter of opportunity and convenience that should not occupy the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)—in principle, it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering into a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which escape the law of the Political Constitution. In this sense, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide, but rather it corresponds to the legislator to assess its opportunity and convenience, as well as its constitutional viability. As stated above, firstly, there is no mandate of monopoly or prohibition for mandatory occupational risk insurance (seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo) to operate outside the institutional structures of the State; a corollary of the foregoing is that the State can use different private agents to carry out the necessary benefits, whether public or private. To extrapolate that this system implies a detriment or a loss of rights for the recipients of services does not correspond to the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.\n\nE.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as an internal norm is located in the Political Constitution, so that it corresponds to the original or derived constituent power to decide and procure the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be mentioned that international law, after its incorporation into the legal system, through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution, has legal effects. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation in the world allows differentiating, broadly speaking, three main systems: those countries that require a double parliamentary approval, both for the ratification of the treaty and subsequently for the specific legislative provisions for the incorporation of the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in the Scandinavian countries. Next, in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally commit the country, but which will require national legislation for the international law to be adopted, such as in England and the countries that form part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where, with parliamentary approval of what was acted upon by the Executive Branch, the incorporation of international regulations operates once the ratification process by the State is completed, as in our country. Likewise, other problems exist, such as the assignment of the normative hierarchy of the international legislation that is incorporated into the legal system, with all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, having their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. In the case of incorporation, our country has the system that was placed in the last category, the most representative, the truth being that it only requires the legislative approval or rejection of the treaty; in which case, if the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, it is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to operate with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has those consequences, thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:\n\n\"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their promulgation or from the day they designate, authority superior to the laws.\n\nPublic treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country shall require approval by the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of the total of its members, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose.\"\n\nBut historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as they might be interpreted today. Thus, the norm is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it had another wording, isolationist and restrictive, so that public officials could conclude international treaties in a limited way, which was the following:\n\n\"Article 7°-- No authority may conclude pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Anyone who does so shall be tried for treason to the Fatherland.\n\nAny treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of the total of its members and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for that purpose.\"\n\nA strict reading of the transcribed article gives rise to impracticability and automatic contradiction, improper of constitutional reasoning with public international law, based on an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which ignored a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment acquired by the Executive Branch), and that allows acquiring and granting mutually or multilaterally concerted international rights and obligations by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in the manner in which they must conduct themselves in the international order, as it acquires rights, as well as duties to others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent an important structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the fear of the original constituent power against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and seeing things in a perspective for the benefit of the country, when the waters returned to their normal level after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement of the legislative reform operated through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, in the following manner:\n\n\"Article 7.- This article enshrined the conservative criterion of the majority of the constituents of 1949, who felt a profound hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within that nationalist zeal, they went too far, by pointing out in the first paragraph that anyone who concluded 'pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact, or convention constitutes a limitation of the sovereignty or independence of any country. If said first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the rulers that the country has had from 1949 onwards would have to be tried for such a grave crime. We believe that said paragraph should be suppressed, as it is dangerous.\"\n\nThat correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in to proceed with said modification, because if economic integration with Central America was intended, it had to be privileged for the economic and development benefits, which was finally solved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:\n\n\"If treaties and concordats are not given superior authority over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of legal antinomies (sic) as they are called, of norms that clash, norms that provide contrary things, and that would constantly force us to resort to unconstitutionality or the inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could place us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty (sic), the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that the current law remains subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty (sic). This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of the common forms that each norm governs within its specific area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and it breaks into other territories, over other persons, over other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without having diminished the value of each of the countries. It is a healthy norm, it is an advisable norm, and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the current norm.\"\n\nIn this sense, the derived constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, so that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly and ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, in the face of freely assumed obligations, to have international law incorporated with the potency and sufficient resistance to impose the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary and regulatory legislation that contradicts it or is in contradiction with it. The reason lies in the obligation to honor the commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and bona fides.\n\nOn the other hand, the reservations and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the meaning of Article 27, of the importance that a party could not invoke the provisions of its domestic law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. The provisions of the Political Constitution were already discussed above. Hence, rightly, the Chamber, when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation in accordance with Constitutional Law, as provided by Article 73, subsection e) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, so that \"the declaration shall be made only for the purposes of interpreting and applying them in harmony with the Constitution or, if their contradiction with it proves irreconcilable, ordering their non-application with general effects and proceeding to their denunciation.\" Conforming interpretation is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse, to the commission of violations that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, including participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Likewise, the principle of supremacy of International Law is unequivocally demonstrated. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be tacitly or expressly modified by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly indicate whether the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.\n\nThe plaintiff mentions the violation of various social security principles, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and irrevocability. In reality, regarding some, what the plaintiff points out are some of the legal provisions governing work-related risk established in the Labor Code, so that the principle alleged by the plaintiff and the intervening parties, that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Labor Code, and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law, does not apply. However, viewed prudentially, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Labor Code must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, so that if Article 205 of the Labor Code establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing Laws, to give rise to SUGESE and its powers. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would be within the powers of SUGESE to establish the mechanisms that allow obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional foundation of Work-Related Risk Insurance is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of the insurance, the automaticity of ILO Convention 102, and the irrevocability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which the Chamber cannot say are violated either. It should be noted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurances, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of occupational and work-related accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, as the moderator of commercial activity by establishing conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different market participants; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally enforceable benefits continue to be effective in its jurisdiction, even by participating in the market as established in Law No. 8622, and which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes, among other things, in the fourth paragraph that:\n\n“… The Superintendency shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency shall be of mandatory observance for the supervised entities and persons.\n\nThe Superintendency is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers. Likewise, it must adopt clear, transparent, and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ, train, and maintain a sufficient work team with high professional standards, who follow the appropriate standards of confidentiality.”\n\nFurthermore, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:\n\n“Objectives and functions of the Superintendencia General de Seguros\n\nThe purpose of the Superintendency is to ensure the stability and efficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to provide the broadest information to the insured. To this end, it shall authorize, regulate, and supervise the natural or legal persons that intervene in the acts or contracts related to the insurance, reinsurance activity, public offering, and the conduct of insurance business.\n\n…\n\nAdditionally, the following functions shall correspond to it:\n\na) …\n\nb) …\n\nj) Issue other technical or operational norms and directives.\n\nk) …\n\nq).”\n\nIn these functions, at present, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros continues operating in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must assume the worker even if it omitted to report them, as an uninsured worker. In this sense, there is no affectation of the universal principle of protection of work-related risk insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this sense, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924 establishes:\n\n“In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State.”\n\nSeveral important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, because, coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, in that it contains enforceable obligations that are past due, the legal provisions and regulations that are issued are done in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, provides the measures to guarantee that necessary social floor to maintain occupational health levels and a work-related risk regime, is clearly in line with the Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the mentioned Regulation establishes:\n\n“Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers\n\nIf the worker is not insured against work-related risks, in accordance with the Labor Code, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant them all the benefits that would have corresponded to them had they been insured, except in those cases where the employer had a valid Work-Related Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium.”\n\nThe supposed economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a constitutional issue, but rather it is the exclusive province of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate for a presumed negative impact that the Institution could have, so that it acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against work-related risks, whether private or public. In the Chamber's opinion, the article reinforces the position of the worker, instead of weakening it, since the work-related risk insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory nature as is intended to be pointed out in the brief filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, from the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, among other norms, from which arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating the matters it detects are necessary of a technical and operational nature for better service for workers who suffer an occupational risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code.\n\n        VI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing reasons, the action is declared without merit.\n\nPor tanto:\n\n        The action is declared without merit. Magistrate Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the plaintiff deputy. Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.\n\n.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nPresident\n\nLuis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.\n\nErnesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate Ch.\n\nAcción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712\n\nVoto particular de la Magistrada Calzada Miranda y los Magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro, con redacción del último\n\nWe, the undersigned Magistrates, dissent in this action and consider that it should be declared with merit, with its consequences, based on the following.\n\nSub-subsection b), of Article III.2, of Section H, of Anexo 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 “Servicios Financieros”, of the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, and Transitory III of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, approved through Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, insofar as they provide for the market opening of work-related risk insurance, present a constitutional friction.\n\nThe plaintiff considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances (Arts. 50, 73, and 74) by denaturing it and converting it into a for-profit commercial service. He indicates that work-related risk insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance is part of the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, ILO Convention No. 102, Protocol of San Salvador Art. 9), and that work-related risk insurance is part of the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, irrevocability, and others. Which is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violate the principle of progressiveness of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently have, decreasing and worsening the current advantages. Currently all income must be allocated to improvements for the benefit of workers.\n\n**In This Regard**, the undersigned Magistrates consider that the claimant is correct in his arguments and that the fact that the constituent assembly included occupational hazard insurance (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) within the Chapter of Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution demonstrates that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but rather a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance.\n\nThe challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of occupational hazard insurance (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) within the commercial opening provided for in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, **are unconstitutional**; this is so even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them the principle of universality and that of progressiveness) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the manner of distributing the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.\n\nThis type of insurance, by being constitutionally enshrined in Article 73 (and despite the fact that it does not state there that it shall be administered monopolistically by the INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which, consequently, is incompatible with a system of commercial opening (competition, profit).\n\nHistorically, occupational hazard insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated artisans (mainly shoemakers, bakers, and mule tenders) with the object of establishing a Savings Bank (Caja de Ahorros) (see the Official Gazette of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated assistance for the working class.\n\nThis insurance underwent its own evolution. Before the theory of \"social-labor risk\" triumphed, the fault of the employer was initially required to establish liability, then it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, that is, it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather the latter who had to demonstrate that he had not been culpable or negligent in the distribution and organization of work.\n\nAt the beginning of the 20th century, the first formal attempts to provide true protection to the working class against labor misfortunes are located. On June 26, 1907, the then-deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented to Congress a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles. On May 24, 1910, the delegation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the \"Welfare Fund (Caja de Previsión)\". On May 16, 1913, Deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another legislative proposal on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles. Due to different circumstances, none of the previous projects received the necessary acceptance to become law.\n\nIn April 1924, the discussion of the Occupational Hazard Law (Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo) or the Accident Compensation Law (Ley de Reparación de Accidentes) was suspended, and discussion immediately began on the bill to create the National Insurance Bank (Banco Nacional de Seguros), which culminated with the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gave rise to this Institution. Thus, the National Insurance Bank took charge of the administration of insurances, the monopoly of which remains in the hands of the Costa Rican State.\n\nOnce the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the \"Law on compensation for workplace accidents (Ley de reparación de accidentes de trabajo)\" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is stated \"the National Insurance Institute is going to administer the occupational hazard regime (régimen de riesgos de trabajo)\". The INS created the Workers' Department (Departamento Obrero), as the entity responsible for administering this Law, which would later be called the Occupational Hazards Department (Departamento de Riesgos del Trabajo).\n\nThis Law No. 53 changes, undergoes several reforms, and in the year 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation is incorporated into the Labor Code. At that moment, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already exists. It had been created in November 1941. Such that here a first major discussion arises. If now that the Social Security Fund exists, should we give occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS.\n\nThere is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute has 18 years of experience in handling workplace accidents, he considers it prudent that this congress keep occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute, and indeed the Labor Code is approved and the administration is kept in the hands of the Institute.\n\nIn 1949, when the current Political Constitution was enacted, there was debate on the famous Article 73 regarding the convenience or not of the administration of Occupational Hazards in the hands of the Institute. Again, the need was raised for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafted this Political Constitution, ratified that the occupational hazard regime (régimen de riesgos del trabajo) should continue to be differentiated, as it had been until that moment, and remain in the hands of the National Insurance Institute.\n\nIn 1961, when Article 177 of the Political Constitution was modified by Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintained the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute. This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurances.\n\nIn 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approved Law No. 6727, which refers to the modification of Title IV of the Labor Code, it again ratified the advisability of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and made some modifications:\n\n·         The concept of Occupational Hazards is expanded (Article 195).\n\n·         Occupational Hazard insurance is declared obligatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201).\n\n·         The concept of Occupational Health appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273).\n\n·         In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer regarding the insurance, the risk, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284).\n\n·         The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in Articles 285 and 286 of the said Code.\n\nToday, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security regime, through the administration that for more than 70 years has been carried out, with sufficient financial reserves, to provide care such as that which has been provided.\n\nAs can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, contrary to what is stated in the majority vote, the idea was rather to unify occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for this to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.\n\nThe deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ \"there are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles that he then proceeded to enumerate. Firstly, it must be a single institution that encompasses all insurances. One of the failures of social insurances in some countries -such as Chile- has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The technicians who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. Secondly, it is known that the greater number of associates is what guarantees the success of social insurances (...) On the other hand, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number.\" Minute No. 125.- One hundred twenty-fifth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the eighth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nThe deputy VOLIO \"since the year 1924 the Law on Workplace Accidents was enacted, entrusting the Insurance Bank -an essentially commercial institution- to take charge of that risk. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then occupational hazard insurances should be assigned to the Social Insurance. For the moment, the Fund is not in a capacity to assume those risks. Therefore, the logical thing is to leave things as they are currently, avoiding the problem that arises so that it can be resolved in due time and with more thoroughness.\" Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nDeputy FACIO. \"After November 8th, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute will continue working -as they have done until now-. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution to the problem of the unification of social insurances can be found, after mature and thoughtful analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem.\" Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.\n\nMr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, on the other hand, he considers a charitable institution, since it does not profit in any way. He thinks that the only way to resolve the problem of social insurances is by creating for the Fund the necessary revenues so that it can fulfill its mission. Hence, the problem can be resolved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine).\n\nThe preceding excerpts demonstrate the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurances. The very nature of these hazards allows them to be considered part of social insurances. Occupational hazards are not an annex or aggregate that can be detached from the definition and the constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurances in a broad sense, for this reason it is not admissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional hazards mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated within the concept of social insurances that the constitution defines. The special nature of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize professional hazard insurance. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize a professional hazard insurance with a juridically and constitutionally different condition from the social insurances casually referred to in the first three paragraphs of Article seventy-three of the constitution. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of these insurances, because it is located in a norm that is what gives it that condition.\n\nTherefore, occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which commercial opening legislation does not protect and which it also cannot protect, since a norm of legal rank will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.\n\nBy the very nature of social occupational hazard insurance (seguro social de riesgos del trabajo), whose reason for being is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work he performs, he suffers an accident or an illness, and which functions in our country in an obligatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent Assembly had all of this in mind when it decided to include this type of insurance within the chapter on social insurances, precisely because it functions as a social insurance and not as an individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.\n\nFor the reasons set forth, we consider that this action must be granted, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional provisions of the Treaty in question.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\nMagistrada\n\nGilberth Armijo S.                                                                        Fernando Cruz C.\n  Magistrado                                                                                   Magistrado\n\nNote by Magistrada Calzada. Different reasons regarding the standing (legitimación) of the petitioner. The majority opinion defines that although Mr. Villalta [Name 001] derives his standing (legitimación) from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), his standing (legitimación) to file the action is recognized on the basis that it must be understood that he is filing it “in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights (...) could be harmed (...) even if they were under the coverage of a workplace hazard insurance policy” (sic); that is, the majority opinion determines that the petitioner's standing (legitimación) comes from this defense in favor of an indeterminate group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). In this regard, I believe that the petitioner Deputy's standing (legitimación) also derives from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). As noted in Considerando II of this same judgment, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) should not be confused with collective interests, nor should they be understood in such broad terms that they become confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, “but united by a specific social need,” which is why “any individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the national community,” without being confused with the possibility that “any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of just any interests.” The precision that the majority opinion attempts to formulate is that even in the case of the defense of an indeterminate group of workers, this does not constitute the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) that would grant the petitioner the standing (legitimación) provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. It is my opinion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest (interés difuso) is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that indeterminate group of workers, but also on the fact that, due to the subject matter intended to be regulated, it indeed concerns a matter in which a general interest of the population does exist. It must be kept in mind that, as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of workplace hazard insurance implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country when configuring the system of the Democratic and Social State of Law (Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho). In this sense, there exists an interest of the community in general, and not only of currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the hazards to which a worker may be subjected; it is clear that the primary interested party in these cases will be the worker –both for reasons of health and personal income–, but it must not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance exists because other people besides the specific worker are involved. On the one hand, there is the worker's direct family, who obtains a good part of their subsistence possibilities from the work that he performs; there is also the employer's own condition, who finds in the workplace hazard regime solid backing against any misfortune, thereby helping to cover any eventual liability that could be imposed upon them; and there is also the State itself, which, through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social welfare in the aforementioned terms, while at the same time guaranteeing that the affected person receives the care they require so that they can rejoin active working life, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy, in a timely and effective manner with the least harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority opinion which repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing (legitimación) by not recognizing direct standing (legitimación), the undersigned considers that they do possess it in certain cases. In my judgment, Deputies who hold that character by the Nation in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution, by the nature of their office, hold a representation of national interests, which gives them, in principle, a general standing (legitimación) to pursue those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases through the unconstitutionality action, but indeed when it comes to qualifying the circumstances of the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, in particular, the management of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole, and very particularly when it is precisely a matter of challenging provisions that directly impact a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the community they represent, as has been indicated above. Of course, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action (acción popular) -not provided for in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- by just any person, nor does it permit free access through the unconstitutionality action to the holder of an interest merely because they are such and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into account the importance of the subject of workplace hazards and the representation that a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly does generally hold, I believe that in addition to the standing (legitimación) recognized to the petitioner by the majority opinion, he must also be recognized the standing (legitimación) indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.\n\nAna Virginia Calzada M.\n\n*100177120007CO*\n\n| EXPEDIENTE: | 10-017712-0007-CO |\n| PROCESO: | ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD |\n| ACCIONANTE: | [Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA |\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes on August eighth, two thousand thirteen.\n\nDue to the sorrowful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, let judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, be notified without his signature. The case file (expediente) will be archived in due course.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\nPresidente a.i\nSala Constitucional"
}