{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-635678", "citation": "Res. 02260-2015 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Inadmisibilidad de acción contra Decreto Ley 65 de 1888", "title_en": "Inadmissibility of action against Decree Law 65 of 1888", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el Decreto Ley 65 de 1888, que declaró inalienable una franja de dos kilómetros a cada lado de la cordillera de Barva desde el Cerro Zurquí, en la zona de Concordia. El accionante, propietario de un inmueble afectado por esta limitación, alegó vulneración del derecho de propiedad (art. 45 constitucional) porque el decreto carecía de precisión cartográfica y vaciaba el contenido de su derecho. La Sala declara inadmisible la acción por tres razones: (1) no se invocó la inconstitucionalidad en el proceso base contencioso administrativo como medio razonable; (2) falta de fundamentación clara y precisa sobre cómo el decreto vacía el contenido esencial del derecho de propiedad; y (3) el objeto de la pretensión constituye un conflicto de mera legalidad —determinar límites físicos y aplicabilidad del decreto al caso concreto— ajeno a la competencia constitucional. La Sala enfatiza que la acción de inconstitucionalidad no atiende lesiones individuales sino el interés general de conformidad de las normas con la Constitución.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejects the unconstitutionality action filed against Decree Law 65 of 1888, which declared a two-kilometer strip on each side of the Barva mountain range from Cerro Zurquí in the Concordia area as inalienable. The petitioner, owner of a property affected by this restriction, claimed a violation of the right to property (Art. 45 Constitution) because the decree lacked cartographic precision and hollowed out his right. The Chamber declares the action inadmissible for three reasons: (1) the unconstitutionality was not raised in the underlying administrative contentious proceeding as a reasonable means; (2) lack of clear and precise legal argument on how the decree empties the essential content of the property right; and (3) the claim's object is a mere legality dispute—determining physical boundaries and applicability of the decree to the specific case—outside constitutional jurisdiction. The Chamber emphasizes that an unconstitutionality action does not address individual harm but the general interest of conformity of norms with the Constitution.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "18/02/2015", "year": "2015", "topic_ids": [ "property-and-titling" ], "primary_topic_id": "property-and-titling", "es_concept_hints": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "presupuestos de admisibilidad", "medio razonable", "inadmisibilidad", "conflicto de mera legalidad", "Decreto Ley 65 de 1888", "inalienabilidad", "derecho de propiedad" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Declaración de inalienables de las montañas fuente de agua para Heredia y Alajuela", "article": "all", "doc_id": "norm-6647", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "Decreto Ley 65 de 1888", "inalienabilidad", "Cerro Concordia", "derecho de propiedad", "artículo 45 constitucional", "inadmisibilidad", "medio razonable", "Sala Constitucional", "presupuestos de admisibilidad", "conflicto de mera legalidad" ], "keywords_en": [ "unconstitutionality action", "Decree Law 65 of 1888", "inalienability", "Cerro Concordia", "property right", "Article 45 Constitution", "inadmissibility", "reasonable means", "Constitutional Chamber", "admissibility requirements", "mere legality dispute" ], "excerpt_es": "el objeto de una acción de inconstitucionalidad no es atender una lesión individual que pueda alegar el actor, por el contrario, tiene como objeto un interés general de que los actos sujetos al derecho público y las normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico, sean conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución.\n\nla falta de fundamentación de la acción, impide el dictado de una sentencia debidamente motivada y congruente con lo pretendido.\n\nno basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado.", "excerpt_en": "the object of an unconstitutionality action is not to address an individual harm that the plaintiff may allege; on the contrary, its object is the general interest that acts subject to public law and the norms that make up the legal system conform to Constitutional Law.\n\nthe lack of legal argument in the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned and coherent ruling with what is sought.\n\nThe mere existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, since it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Inadmissible", "label_es": "Inadmisible", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejects the unconstitutionality action due to lack of reasonable means, lack of legal argument, and for being a mere legality dispute.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad por falta de medio razonable, falta de fundamentación y por constituir un conflicto de mera legalidad." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "the object of an unconstitutionality action is not to address an individual harm that the plaintiff may allege; on the contrary, its object is the general interest that acts subject to public law and the norms that make up the legal system conform to Constitutional Law.", "quote_es": "el objeto de una acción de inconstitucionalidad no es atender una lesión individual que pueda alegar el actor, por el contrario, tiene como objeto un interés general de que los actos sujetos al derecho público y las normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico, sean conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "the lack of legal argument in the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned and coherent ruling with what is sought.", "quote_es": "la falta de fundamentación de la acción, impide el dictado de una sentencia debidamente motivada y congruente con lo pretendido." }, { "context": "Considerando I", "quote_en": "The mere existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, since it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed.", "quote_es": "no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-635678", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "*150007690007CO*\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n*150007690007CO*\n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 15-000769-0007-CO\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2015002260\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA\r\nCORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cinco minutos del\r\ndieciocho de febrero de dos mil quince.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nAcción de inconstitucionalidad\r\npromovida por MANUEL BRICEÑO LÓPEZ, mayor, abogado, divorciado, portador\r\nde la cédula de identidad número 6-227-485, representante legal de [NOMBRE\r\n01], mayor, soltero, empresario, cédula [VALOR 01], vecino de San Rafael de\r\nHeredia; contra EL DECRETO LEY 65 DE 1888. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nResultando:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría\r\nde la Sala a las 16:12 horas del 19 de enero del 2015, la accionante\r\nsolicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ley Número 65 de\r\n1888. Alega que la norma roza el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, que\r\nes una disposición de derecho fundamental y por ello la Sala la debe expulsarla\r\ndel ordenamiento. Aduce que su representado es propietario de la finca\r\ninscrita en el partido de Heredia, folio real número 194494. Esa finca según\r\nestudio histórico de la misma, data desde mucho tiempo ante del año 1888, pues\r\nsegún estudios realizados en el Registro Nacional, al tomo 439, folio 509,\r\nasiento 1, se indicaba que la finca origen era número 19518. Por una serie de\r\nrefundiciones de fincas y segregaciones, nació la finca número [valor 02] que\r\nle perteneció a [nombre 02], quien vendió a [nombre 03]y\r\néste vendió la finca a su representado [nombre 04], la cual se inscribió con la\r\nmatrícula 194494-000. Esa finca se encuentra ubicada en [NOMBRE 02]. Como se\r\ndetermina del historial indicado y pruebas aportadas, la finca fue adquirida\r\ntanto directa como indirectamente de sus antiguos dueños y propietarios, desde\r\nantes de 1888. Mediante Decreto Legislativo número LXV\r\ndel 30 de julio de 1888, de declaró como inalienable una zona de terreno de dos\r\nkilómetros de ancho a uno y a otro lado de las montañas de Barva\r\ndesde el Cerro Zurquí, lo que se conoce como\r\nConcordia, ya sea propiedad municipal o nacional. Indica que ese decreto con una delimitación posterior afectó la finca de su\r\nrepresentado, que además, esa tierra tiene el origen de las aguas que abastecen\r\na Heredia y Alajuela, por lo que se encuentra afectada por las supuestas\r\nlimitaciones indicadas en ese Decreto. Actualmente, la posesión de su\r\nrepresentado ha sido perturbada por personeros del MINAE,\r\nlo que constituye un despojo de su derecho de posesión y titularidad del bien,\r\nya que esos personeros aducen que su representado no puede utilizar esa\r\npropiedad, edificar, no disponer absolutamente nada sobre la misma porque está\r\nafectada por el Decreto mencionado, lo que a su juicio a cercenado los\r\natributos del dominio por parte de su representado sobre dicho inmueble. Alega\r\nque la norma impugnada no estableció en su artículo 2, la declaratoria de Área\r\nSilvestre, sino que declaró como inalienable esos terrenos para un fin público.\r\nPese a esa declaratoria de ser un bien inalienable, el Decreto Ley no\r\ntenía los estudios técnicos para determinar los aspectos legales, Geográficos o\r\ncartográficos de la extensión de esas limitaciones, lo cual a todas luces\r\nresulta escueto e impreciso. No existía un mapa que describiera la zona\r\ninalienable o afectada a las limitaciones, pues lo único que existía en\r\nese momento era un mapa elaborado por un agrimensor de nombre [NOMBRE 03]que data de 1888. Posteriormente, cuando se creó el\r\nInstituto Geográfico Nacional, éste fue quien elaboró un mapa básico a escala\r\n1:50-00 el cual en la hoja cartográfica denomina a Barva\r\nhoja 3346 II, en sus ediciones 1-2-3, pero no aparece\r\nningún cerro o elevación con el nombre de Concordia, por lo que a juicio del accionante el Decreto impugnado carece de elementos\r\ntécnicos que dieran claridad y exactitud a las limitaciones exactas del\r\nDecreto sobre las fincas, careciendo con ello de sentido claro, unívoco,\r\ncientífico y preciso tal como lo establece el artículo 16 de la Ley General de\r\nla Administración Pública. Esa situación fue corregida posteriormente en el oficio\r\nnúmero N07-540 del 9 de abril del 2007 firmado por el Director del Instituto\r\nGeográfico Nacional, en el cual indican sobre la posición de la hoja de Barva y el citado plano 14154, el Cerro Concordia\r\ncorresponde al Cerro Guararí (coordenadas 522.00 entre\r\n234000-235000 en la hoja Barva, Escala 1:50.000), con\r\nbase en ello, se hizo la delimitación de la zona que afecta el Decreto aludido,\r\ny por tanto se determinó que el inmueble de su representado sí se encuentra o\r\nse ubica dentro de la zona afectada por el Decreto LXV-1888,\r\nplano que también carece de los estudios técnicos y científicos que no se\r\najustan tampoco al contexto geográfico del país. Manifiesta que con la\r\nafectación ya indicada, la propiedad de su patrocinado perdió los atributos\r\nfundamentales de la propiedad por habérsele afectado con las limitaciones de\r\nese decreto, no pudiendo disponer, ni utilizar los recursos naturaleza de su\r\nfundo. Reitera que ese decreto no contó con un plano o mapa que indicara con la\r\ndebida precisión, cual era el área de afectación. Fue con posterioridad, que se\r\nhizo un mapa, pero el mismo fue impreciso pues no se determinó ningún cerro de\r\nConcordia. Con base en esa limitación su presentado no puede hacer\r\nabsolutamente nada dentro de su propiedad solo mantener la posesión hasta que\r\nle sea cancelado su derecho, es decir, que en teoría solo le quedó la\r\nnuda propiedad o bien, el derecho de cobrarle al Estado la finca, pues\r\nmaterialmente produjo el despojo de su propiedad. Sostiene que el limitar\r\nel derecho de propiedad contenido en el artículo 45 constitucional y el 21 de\r\nla Convención de los derechos humanos, resulta desproporcionado y confiscatorio\r\npues se ha vaciado su derecho. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- A efecto de fundamentar la\r\nlegitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el\r\nactor señala que ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo se tramita\r\nel proceso de conocimiento número [VALOR 03], de su representado en\r\ncontra del Estado. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el\r\nfondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión\r\nque se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente,\r\no cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla,\r\no que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior\r\nigual o similar rechazada.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRedacta el Magistrado Armijo\r\nSancho; y,\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES\r\nDE ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con\r\ndeterminadas formalidades, que deben ser satisfechas a efecto de que la Sala\r\npueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación. En ese sentido, el\r\nartículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, establece los\r\npresupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En \r\nprimer término, se exige la existencia de un asunto previo pendiente de\r\nresolver, sea en vía judicial, o bien, en el procedimiento para agotar de\r\nla vía administrativa, en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad\r\ncomo medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera\r\nlesionado. En el párrafo segundo y tercero, la ley establece de\r\nmanera excepcional, presupuestos en los que no se exige el asunto\r\nprevio, cuando por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista una lesión individual y\r\ndirecta, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o\r\nbien cuando es formulada en forma directa por el Contralor General de la\r\nRepública, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la\r\nRepública y el Defensor de los Habitantes. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la exigencia\r\nde un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala mediante sentencia número\r\n04190-95, de las once horas treinta y tres minutos del veintiocho de julio de\r\nmil novecientos noventa y cinco, señaló lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“(…)En primer término, se trata de un\r\nproceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo\r\nque se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de\r\nresolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar\r\nla vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal\r\nmanera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho\r\nconsiderado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el\r\nTribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso\r\npendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de\r\nlas normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por\r\nexcepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía\r\n-presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional-”\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nAsí las cosas, la exigencia de un\r\nasunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un requisito meramente\r\nformal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con\r\nla simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además,\r\nque la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se\r\nconsidera lesionado. Esto quiere decir, que la normativa impugnada debe ser\r\naplicable en el asunto base. (Ver en igual sentido las sentencias números\r\n01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95,\r\n00791-96). Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben\r\nser cumplidas, a saber, la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada,\r\ndebidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y principios\r\nconstitucionales que se consideren infringidos, la autenticación por abogado\r\ndel escrito en el que se plantea la acción, la acreditación de las\r\ncondiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), así como la\r\ncertificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad\r\nde las normas en el asunto base, requisitos que en caso de no ser cumplidos por\r\nlos accionantes, pueden ser prevenidos por la\r\nPresidencia de la Sala. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nII.- INADMISIBILIDAD\r\nDE LA ACCIÓN POR NO CONSTITUIR MEDIO RAZONABLE. En reiteradas ocasiones, esta\r\nSala ha expresado que el proceso de acción es principalmente, de carácter\r\nincidental, por lo que se requiere que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver\r\nen vía administrativa o judicial, dentro del cual se haya invocado la\r\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma como medio razonable para amparar el derecho\r\nque se considera lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión\r\nmeramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento de los mismos, se\r\nrequiere además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía tenga una\r\nincidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo\r\nresuelto en la acción sirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho\r\nlesionado dentro del asunto previo. Si por el contrario, no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto\r\nbase y lo impugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se\r\npronuncie al respecto. En por lo anterior, que de conformidad con el artículo\r\n75 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes\r\ndeben acreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron\r\nla inconstitucionalidad de las normas, en el asunto base, a efecto de verificar\r\nla incidencia de la acción en el asunto base. Para el caso que nos ocupa,\r\na efecto de fundamentar su legitimación para actuar, el accionante\r\nseñaló que ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo se tramita el proceso de\r\nconocimiento número [VALOR 03], de su representado en contra del Estado,\r\ndentro del cual se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma. Sin\r\nembargo, de la certificación aportada por el propio accionante, \r\nno se constata la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma aquí\r\nimpugnada, pues en el escrito de presentado por el accionante\r\nante el citado Tribunal con fecha 10 de noviembre del 2014, el actor indicó\r\nque: “[…]Pido se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la del (sic) decreto\r\naludido. Todo con el fin de cumplir lo dispuesto en el artículo 175 (sic) de la\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. […]” De lo anteriormente\r\ncitado, se desprende, que el accionante no\r\ninvocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma como tal, pues ni siquiera \r\nidentificó la norma sobre la cual pretende invocar la inconstitucionalidad. Asimismo,\r\nse observa, que el actor tampoco indicó -en forma expresa- las normas \r\nconstitucionales que considera infringidas. En otras palabras, el actor\r\nsolicitó al Tribunal que se declarara la inconstitucionalidad del “decreto\r\naludido” sin indicar porqué, ni citar las normas impugnadas, \r\núnicamente, como un mero trámite o simple formalidad para plantear\r\nla acción y no como una verdadera invocatoria para acreditar la incidencia de\r\nla acción en el asunto base. Al respecto, si bien, en la\r\ninvocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, no se exige un extenso\r\ndesarrollo del tema, lo cierto es, que sí resulta necesario que se invoque\r\nexpresamente, la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la acción y que\r\n–al menos- se indiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren\r\ninfringidas; aspectos que no se constatan en la certificación\r\naportada por el accionante como supuesta invocatoria\r\nde inconstitucionalidad. Así las cosas, al no haberse\r\ninvocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma en el asunto base, la acción\r\nno constituye un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera\r\nlesionado, pues no basta con la existencia de un asunto base, sino que además,\r\ndebe invocarse la inconstitucionalidad dentro de éste, a fin de establecer el\r\ncarácter incidental de la acción, por lo que en consecuencia la acción\r\nresulta inadmisible. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- INADMISIBILIDAD\r\nPOR FALTA DE FUNDAMENTACIÓN. De conformidad con el artículo 78 de\r\nla Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en el escrito en que se interponga la\r\nacción de inconstitucionalidad, se deberán exponer los fundamentos en\r\nforma clara y precisa, con cita concreta de las normas o principios que se\r\nconsideren infringidos. Dicho requisito no se traduce en una mera formalidad,\r\nsino en un requisito esencial de admisibilidad, pues en virtud del principio\r\npro sentencia –desarrollado en otras ocasiones por esta Sala- los requisitos de\r\nadmisibilidad deben interpretarse en sentido favorable a la acción, además, el\r\nDerecho Constitucional es de orden público preferente y en garantía de su\r\nsupremacía y vigencia hay un interés público en virtud del cual los\r\nobstáculos para la admisión y resolución de fondo de una acción, deben\r\ninterpretarse y aplicarse restrictivamente. Así las cosas, todas las normas\r\nprocesales deben ser interpretadas y aplicadas de manera tal que se obtenga el\r\ndictado de la sentencia, lo anterior, no solo facilita la administración de la\r\njusticia, sino que además, evita que se impongan obstáculos para no\r\nalcanzarla (ver en igual sentido, las sentencias números 93-5175, 3041-97,\r\n01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 y 2887-08). En consecuencia, la falta de fundamentación de la acción, impide el dictado de una\r\nsentencia debidamente motivada y congruente con lo pretendido. Asimismo,\r\nresulta improcedente que esta Sala se pronuncie por el fondo de normas\r\ncuestionadas en una acción, cuando el que acciona no fundamenta las razones por\r\nlas cuales impugna, toda vez, que ello implicaría efectuar un control\r\nconstitucional en abstracto a manera de ejercicio académico, lo que no es\r\ncompatible con la finalidad de un proceso de esta naturaleza. En el caso\r\nparticular, el accionante impugna el Decreto Ley\r\nnúmero 65 de 1888, por considerarlo contrario al derecho de\r\npropiedad, consagrado en el artículo 45 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica. No obstante, observa esta Sala que para ello, el actor no fundamentó\r\nen forma clara y precisa la acción, toda vez, que en el escrito de\r\ninterposición de la acción no efectuó una exposición clara y \r\nconcreta de los motivos por los cuales estima que la norma resulta\r\ncontraria al Derecho de la Constitución. Al respecto, cabe aclarar que si bien\r\nel actor indicó que la norma impugnada es contraria al derecho\r\nconstitucional de propiedad privada, reconocido en el Artículo 45 de la\r\nConstitución Política; lo cierto es que no ofreció un\r\ndesarrollo de ese precepto constitucional con el fin de relacionarlo y\r\ncontraponerlo con la norma, a efecto de aportar a esta Sala los elementos\r\nde juicio necesarios para establecer o acreditar de qué forma la\r\nnorma impugnada vacía el contenido esencial del derecho fundamental que se\r\nconsidera vulnerado. En ese sentido, el promovente, \r\núnicamente, citó el derecho y las normas constitucionales que estima lesionados, pero sin hacer un desarrollo de los\r\nmismos. Ahora bien, ante la deficiencia apuntada en cuanto a la fundamentación de la acción, resulta inútil practicar\r\nla prevención a que hace referencia el artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional, toda vez, que ello implicaría obligar al accionante\r\na rehacer la acción, por lo que es más razonable rechazarla de plano, para que\r\nsi a bien lo tiene el accionante formule una nueva\r\nacción en cumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos en los artículos 73 a 79 de la citada ley. En\r\nvirtud de lo anterior y al ser la fundamentación un\r\nrequisito esencial para que un proceso de esta naturaleza resulte admisible, su\r\nincumplimiento en este caso, provoca el rechazo de la acción.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- INADMISIBILIDAD\r\nDE LA ACCIÓN EN RAZÓN DEL OBJETO. El accionante solicita que se\r\ndeclare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ley número 65 de 1888, por\r\nconsiderar que es violatorio al derecho de propiedad, porque asegura que\r\nla finca existía con anterioridad a la emisión del decreto ley, y por otra\r\nparte, el mapa con que cuenta dicho decreto es impreciso en cuanto a los\r\nlímites de la afectación, porque no determina con certeza cuál es Cerro\r\nConcordia a que hace referencia el decreto impugnado. Asimismo, el actor alega\r\nque la posesión de su representado sobre la finca de su propiedad se ha visto\r\nperturbada por personeros del MINAE, lo que\r\nconstituye un despojo de su propiedad, pues éstos aducen que su cliente no\r\npodía utilizar la propiedad porque se encuentra dentro de la delimitación de\r\nterreno declarada inalienable. En primer término, considera este\r\nTribunal, que lo alegado por el actor, es un conflicto de mera legalidad, cuyo\r\nconocimiento y resolución corresponde al juez que conoce el\r\ncaso concreto, pues si bien el actor invoca el derecho de propiedad de su\r\nrepresentado, lo cierto es, que en sus alegatos, solo cuestiona la supuesta\r\nfalta de precisión de los límites de la declaratoria de inalienabilidad, así\r\ncomo la aplicabilidad de la norma en su caso concreto, lo que claramente\r\nconstituye un problema de hecho y no derecho. En otras palabras el actor\r\npretende que esta Sala determine físicamente, cuáles son los límites de la\r\ndeclaratoria, si el terreno del accionante se ubica\r\ndentro de ellos, y si el decreto le es aplicable o no según la fecha de\r\nexistencia de la propiedad, sin embargo, esos son aspectos de mera\r\nlegalidad, que no corresponde a esta Sala conocer no solo por ser\r\najenos al ámbito de su competencia, sino además, implicaría la invasión\r\nde competencias propias de otros órganos. En segundo término, tampoco\r\ncorresponde a esta Sala conocer, a través de un proceso de acción, las\r\nactuaciones concretas de los personeros del MINAE\r\ndentro de la finca del accionante, toda vez, que el\r\nobjeto de una acción de inconstitucionalidad no es atender una lesión\r\nindividual que pueda alegar el actor, por el contrario, tiene como objeto un\r\ninterés general de que los actos sujetos al derecho público y las normas que\r\nintegran el ordenamiento jurídico, sean conformes con el Derecho de la\r\nConstitución. Como consecuencia de ello, la acción resulta inadmisible en\r\ncuanto a este extremo. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- CONCLUSIÓN. En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción\r\nresulta inadmisible en razón del objeto de impugnación, por falta de fundamentación y por no constituir medio razonable para\r\namparar el derecho. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n VI.-\r\n NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL . En reiterados pronunciamientos he salvado el voto,\r\ncuando sin prevenir al accionante el cumplimiento de\r\nlos requisitos dispuestos en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se\r\nrechaza la acción sin dar cumplimiento a lo establecido en el numeral 80 de la\r\nmisma Ley. Sin embargo, en el sub exámine,\r\nconsidero innecesario la prevención que ahí se dispone, por los argumentos\r\ndados en los considerandos II\r\ny IV de esta sentencia. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción. El\r\nMagistrado Rueda Leal pone nota. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \nGilbert\r\n Armijo S. \n\r\n \nPresidente\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \nFernando Cruz C.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \nFernando Castillo V.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \nPaul Rueda L.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \nRonald\r\n Salazar Murillo", "body_en_text": "*150007690007CO*\n\n*150007690007CO*\n\nExp: 15-000769-0007-CO\n\nRes. Nº 2015002260\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours five minutes on the eighteenth of February two thousand fifteen.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality brought by MANUEL BRICEÑO LÓPEZ, of legal age, attorney, divorced, holder of identity card number 6-227-485, legal representative of [NOMBRE 01], of legal age, single, businessman, ID [VALOR 01], resident of San Rafael de Heredia; against DECREE LAW 65 OF 1888.\n\nConsidering:\n\n1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 16:12 hours on January 19, 2015, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Decree Law Number 65 of 1888 be declared. He alleges that the norm touches upon Article 45 of the Political Constitution, which is a provision of fundamental law, and therefore the Chamber must expel it from the legal system. He argues that his represented party is the owner of the property registered in the Heredia registry, real folio number 194494. That property, according to a historical study of the same, dates from long before the year 1888, since according to studies conducted in the National Registry, at volume 439, folio 509, entry 1, it was indicated that the original property was number 19518. Through a series of property consolidations and segregations, property number [valor 02] was created, which belonged to [nombre 02], who sold it to [nombre 03] and the latter sold the property to his represented party [nombre 04], which was registered under registry number 194494-000. That property is located in [NOMBRE 02]. As determined from the indicated history and evidence provided, the property was acquired both directly and indirectly from its former owners and proprietors, from before 1888. By Legislative Decree number LXV of July 30, 1888, a zone of land two kilometers wide on one side and the other of the Barva mountains from Cerro Zurquí, what is known as Concordia, whether municipal or national property, was declared as inalienable. He indicates that this decree with a subsequent demarcation affected the property of his represented party, and that, furthermore, this land is the source of the waters that supply Heredia and Alajuela, so it is affected by the supposed limitations indicated in that Decree. Currently, the possession of his represented party has been disturbed by officials of MINAE, which constitutes a dispossession of his right of possession and ownership of the property, since these officials argue that his represented party cannot use that property, build on it, or dispose of absolutely anything on it because it is affected by the mentioned Decree, which in his opinion has curtailed the attributes of ownership of his represented party over said real estate. He alleges that the challenged norm did not establish in its article 2 the declaration of a Wilderness Area, but rather declared those lands inalienable for a public purpose. Despite this declaration of being an inalienable property, the Decree Law did not have the technical studies to determine the legal, geographical, or cartographic aspects of the extent of those limitations, which is clearly concise and imprecise. A map did not exist that described the inalienable zone or the zone affected by the limitations, since the only thing that existed at that time was a map prepared by a surveyor named [NOMBRE 03] dating from 1888. Subsequently, when the Instituto Geográfico Nacional was created, it was this entity that prepared a basic map at a scale of 1:50,000 which in the cartographic sheet names Barva sheet 3346 II, in its editions 1-2-3, but no hill or elevation with the name Concordia appears, so in the plaintiff's opinion the challenged Decree lacks the technical elements that would give clarity and exactness to the exact limitations of the Decree over the properties, thereby lacking a clear, unambiguous, scientific, and precise meaning as established by Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration. That situation was corrected later in official letter number N07-540 of April 9, 2007, signed by the Director of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, in which they indicate regarding the position of the Barva sheet and the cited map 14154, Cerro Concordia corresponds to Cerro Guararí (coordinates 522.00 between 234000-235000 on the Barva sheet, Scale 1:50,000), based on that, the delimitation of the zone affected by the alluded Decree was made, and therefore it was determined that the real estate of his represented party is indeed located within the zone affected by Decree LXV-1888, a map that also lacks the technical and scientific studies which also do not conform to the geographical context of the country. He states that with the indicated restriction, the property of his client lost the fundamental attributes of property for having been affected by the limitations of that decree, unable to dispose of or use the natural resources of his estate. He reiterates that this decree did not have a map or chart that indicated with due precision what the affected area was. It was subsequently that a map was made, but it was imprecise as no Cerro Concordia was determined. Based on that limitation, his represented party cannot do absolutely anything within his property, only maintain possession until his right is extinguished, that is, theoretically only bare ownership remained or, rather, the right to charge the State for the property, since it materially produced the dispossession of his property. He maintains that limiting the right of property contained in Article 45 of the Constitution and Article 21 of the Convention on Human Rights, is disproportionate and confiscatory as his right has been emptied.\n\n2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff points out that proceeding number [VALOR 03], by his represented party against the State, is being processed before the Administrative Litigation Court.\n\n3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar, rejected petition.\n\nMagistrate Armijo Sancho writes the opinion; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. The action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the requirements for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. First, it requires the existence of a prior pending matter to be resolved, either through judicial channels, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law exceptionally establishes requirements in which the prior matter is not required, when by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Now, regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, of eleven hours thirty-three minutes on the twenty-eighth of July nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:\n\n\"(…) First, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel— to be able to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending process to be resolved, insofar as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and it is only exceptionally that the legislation allows direct access to this channel —requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction—\"\n\nThus, the requirement of a prior pending matter to be resolved does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality, as it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged norm must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged norm, duly substantiated, with a concrete citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, the authentication by an attorney of the brief in which the action is filed, the accreditation of the standing conditions (powers of attorney and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, requirements that, if not met by the plaintiffs, may be the subject of a request for correction by the Presidency of the Chamber.\n\nII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT CONSTITUTING A REASONABLE MEANS. On repeated occasions, this Chamber has expressed that the action process is, primarily, of an incidental nature, and therefore it is required that there exists a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial channel, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, as the simple fulfillment thereof is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this channel have a direct incidence on the matter serving as a base, so that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right within the prior matter. If, on the contrary, there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for the foregoing that, in accordance with Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must demonstrate and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms, in the base matter, in order to verify the incidence of the action on the base matter. In the case before us, to substantiate his standing to act, the plaintiff indicated that proceeding number [VALOR 03], by his represented party against the State, is being processed before the Administrative Litigation Court, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked. However, from the certification provided by the plaintiff himself, the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm challenged here is not verified, since in the brief presented by the plaintiff before the cited Court dated November 10, 2014, the plaintiff indicated that: \"[…]I request that the unconstitutionality of the (sic) alluded decree be declared. All this in order to comply with the provisions of article 175 (sic) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. […]\" From the foregoing citation, it follows that the plaintiff did not invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm as such, as he did not even identify the norm on which he intends to invoke the unconstitutionality. Likewise, it is observed that the plaintiff also did not indicate —expressly— the constitutional norms he considers infringed. In other words, the plaintiff requested that the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the \"alluded decree\" without indicating why, nor citing the challenged norms, solely as a mere procedural step or simple formality to file the action and not as a true invocation to prove the incidence of the action on the base matter. In this regard, although the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm does not require an extensive development of the issue, the truth is that it is necessary to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action and —at least— indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed; aspects that are not verified in the certification provided by the plaintiff as a supposed invocation of unconstitutionality. Thus, since the unconstitutionality of the norm was not invoked in the base matter, the action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, as the existence of a base matter is not enough, but rather the unconstitutionality must be invoked within it, in order to establish the incidental nature of the action; consequently, the action is inadmissible.\n\nIII.- INADMISSIBILITY FOR LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION. In accordance with Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality must set forth the grounds in a clear and precise manner, with a concrete citation of the norms or principles considered infringed. This requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but rather an essential requirement for admissibility, since by virtue of the pro-judgment principle —developed on other occasions by this Chamber— the admissibility requirements must be interpreted in a sense favorable to the action; moreover, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and, to guarantee its supremacy and validity, there is a public interest by virtue of which the obstacles to the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural norms must be interpreted and applied in such a way that a judgment is rendered; the foregoing not only facilitates the administration of justice, but also avoids the imposition of obstacles to not achieving it (see in the same sense, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of substantiation of the action prevents the issuance of a duly reasoned judgment that is congruent with what is sought. Likewise, it is improper for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms challenged in an action when the plaintiff does not substantiate the reasons for his challenge, since this would imply conducting a constitutional review in the abstract as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a process of this nature. In the particular case, the plaintiff challenges Decree Law number 65 of 1888, considering it contrary to the right of property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution. However, this Chamber observes that for this purpose, the plaintiff did not substantiate the action in a clear and precise manner, since the brief interposing the action did not set forth a clear and concrete exposition of the reasons why he considers the norm violates the Law of the Constitution. In this regard, it should be clarified that although the plaintiff indicated that the challenged norm is contrary to the constitutional right to private property, recognized in Article 45 of the Political Constitution; the truth is that he did not offer a development of that constitutional precept in order to relate and contrast it with the norm, for the purpose of providing this Chamber with the elements of judgment necessary to establish or prove how the challenged norm empties the essential content of the fundamental right considered violated. In that sense, the petitioner merely cited the right and the constitutional norms he considers injured, but without developing them. Now, given the deficiency noted regarding the substantiation of the action, it is useless to issue the request for correction referred to in Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since this would imply forcing the plaintiff to redo the action, and therefore it is more reasonable to reject it outright, so that if the plaintiff sees fit, he may file a new action in compliance with the requirements established in Articles 73 to 79 of the cited law. By virtue of the foregoing and since substantiation is an essential requirement for a process of this nature to be admissible, its non-compliance in this case causes the rejection of the action.\n\nIV.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION BY REASON OF THE OBJECT. The plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Decree Law number 65 of 1888 be declared, considering it violates the right of property, because he claims the property existed prior to the issuance of the decree law, and on the other hand, the map accompanying said decree is imprecise regarding the limits of the restriction, because it does not determine with certainty which is the Cerro Concordia referred to in the challenged decree. Likewise, the petitioner alleges that the possession of his represented party over his property has been disturbed by officials of MINAE, which constitutes a dispossession of his property, as they argue that his client could not use the property because it is within the area of land declared inalienable. First, this Tribunal considers that what is alleged by the plaintiff is a conflict of mere legality, whose knowledge and resolution corresponds to the judge hearing the specific case, because although the plaintiff invokes the right of property of his represented party, the truth is that, in his arguments, he only questions the supposed lack of precision of the limits of the inalienability declaration, as well as the applicability of the norm in his specific case, which clearly constitutes a question of fact and not of law. In other words, the plaintiff intends for this Chamber to physically determine what the limits of the declaration are, whether the plaintiff's land is located within them, and whether the decree is applicable to him or not according to the date the property came into existence; however, these are aspects of mere legality, which it is not for this Chamber to hear, not only because they are outside the scope of its competence, but also because it would imply invading the competencies of other bodies. Second, it is also not for this Chamber to hear, through an action process, the specific actions of MINAE officials within the plaintiff's property, since the object of an action of unconstitutionality is not to address an individual injury that the plaintiff may allege; on the contrary, its object is a general interest that the acts subject to public law and the norms that make up the legal system are in conformity with the Law of the Constitution. As a consequence, the action is inadmissible regarding this point.\n\nV.- CONCLUSION. By virtue of the foregoing, the action is inadmissible by reason of the object of the challenge, for lack of substantiation, and for not constituting a reasonable means to protect the right.\n\nVI.- NOTE FROM MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL. In repeated pronouncements I have dissented, when without requiring the plaintiff to correct the fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the action is rejected without complying with the provisions of numeral 80 of the same Law. However, in the case under examination, I consider the correction request established therein unnecessary, for the arguments given in considerandos II and IV of this judgment.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal makes a note.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\nPresident\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L.\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\nRonald Salazar Murillo\n\nHe alleges that the norm encroaches upon Article 45 of the Political Constitution, which is a fundamental right provision and therefore the Chamber must expel it from the legal order. He argues that his client is the owner of the farm (finca) registered in the Heredia registry, real folio number 194494. That farm (finca), according to a historical study thereof, dates back long before the year 1888, since according to studies carried out in the National Registry, at volume 439, folio 509, entry 1, it was indicated that the original farm (finca) was number 19518. Through a series of farm (finca) consolidations (refundiciones) and segregations, farm (finca) number [valor 02] was created, which belonged to [nombre 02], who sold to [nombre 03] and the latter sold the farm (finca) to his client [nombre 04], which was registered under matriculation number 194494-000. That farm (finca) is located in [NOMBRE 02]. As determined from the indicated history and evidence provided, the farm (finca) was acquired both directly and indirectly from its former owners and proprietors, from before 1888. By Legislative Decree number LXV of July 30, 1888, a zone of land two kilometers wide on either side of the Barva mountains from Cerro Zurquí, known as Concordia, whether municipal or national property, was declared inalienable. He indicates that this decree, with a subsequent delimitation, affected his client's farm (finca); moreover, that this land contains the source (origen) of the waters that supply Heredia and Alajuela, and therefore it is affected by the supposed limitations indicated in that Decree. Currently, his client's possession has been disturbed by officials of MINAE, which constitutes a dispossession of his right of possession and ownership of the property, since those officials argue that his client cannot use that property, build, or dispose of absolutely anything on it because it is affected by the mentioned Decree, which in his opinion has curtailed the attributes of ownership held by his client over said real estate. He alleges that the challenged norm did not establish, in its Article 2, the declaration of a Protected Wilderness Area (Área Silvestre), but rather declared those lands inalienable for a public purpose. Despite this declaration of being an inalienable asset, the Decree-Law did not have the technical studies to determine the legal, geographic, or cartographic aspects of the extent of those limitations, which is clearly meager and imprecise. There was no map describing the inalienable zone or the area affected by the limitations, since the only thing that existed at that time was a map prepared by a surveyor named [NOMBRE 03] dating from 1888. Subsequently, when the National Geographic Institute (IGN) was created, it was the one that prepared a basic map at a scale of 1:50,000, which on the cartographic sheet names Barva sheet 3346 II, in its editions 1-2-3, but no hill or elevation with the name Concordia appears; therefore, in the opinion of the petitioner (accionante), the challenged Decree lacks technical elements that would provide clarity and exactness regarding the precise limitations of the Decree on the farms (fincas), thereby lacking clear, unambiguous, scientific, and precise meaning as established in Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration. That situation was subsequently corrected in official communication number N07-540 of April 9, 2007, signed by the Director of the National Geographic Institute (IGN), in which they indicate regarding the position of the Barva sheet and the cited map 14154, that Cerro Concordia corresponds to Cerro Guararí (coordinates 522.00 between 234000-235000 on the Barva sheet, Scale 1:50,000); based on this, the delimitation of the zone affected by the alluded Decree was made, and therefore it was determined that his client's real estate is indeed located within the zone affected by Decree LXV-1888, a map which also lacks the technical and scientific studies and does not conform either to the geographic context of the country. He states that with the already indicated affectation, his client's property lost the fundamental attributes of property due to having been affected by the limitations of that decree, not being able to dispose of, nor use, the natural resources of his land (fundo). He reiterates that this decree did not have a plan or map that indicated, with due precision, what the affected area was. It was subsequently that a map was made, but it was imprecise because no Concordia hill was determined. Based on that limitation, his client cannot do absolutely anything within his property except maintain possession until his right is extinguished; that is to say, that in theory, only bare ownership (nuda propiedad) remained to him, or rather, the right to charge the State for the farm (finca), since it materially produced the dispossession of his property. He maintains that limiting the right of property contained in constitutional Article 45 and Article 21 of the Convention on Human Rights is disproportionate and confiscatory, since his right has been emptied of content. \n\n**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the petitioner points out that the declaratory proceeding number [VALOR 03], by his client against the State, is being processed before the Administrative-Contentious Tribunal.\n\n**3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject a motion outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of an earlier equal or similar rejected petition.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Armijo Sancho**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION.** The action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. In the first term, the existence of a prior matter pending resolution is required, whether in judicial proceedings, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, exceptionally, prerequisites in which the prior matter is not required, when by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Now, regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, at eleven hours and thirty-three minutes on July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:\n\n\"(…) In the first term, it is a proceeding of incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel- to be able to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending process, because it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation allows direct access to this channel -prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction-\"\n\nThus, the requirement of a prior matter pending resolution does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of a base matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, because it is further required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged norm must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same vein judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged norm, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, the authentication by a lawyer of the brief in which the action is filed, the accreditation of standing conditions (powers of attorney and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, requirements which, if not fulfilled by the petitioners (accionantes), may be addressed by a prevention order from the Presidency of the Chamber.\n\n**II.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE MEANS.** On repeated occasions, this Chamber has expressed that the action proceeding is mainly of an incidental nature, and therefore requires that there is a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal question, since simply fulfilling them is not enough; it is further required that the norm challenged through this channel has a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that the decision in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right within the prior matter. If, on the contrary, there is no direct connection (conexidad) between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for the foregoing that, in accordance with Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the petitioners (accionantes) must accredit and provide literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify the incidence of the action on the base matter. In the case at hand, to substantiate his standing to act, the petitioner (accionante) stated that the declaratory proceeding number [VALOR 03], by his client against the State, is being processed before the Administrative-Contentious Tribunal, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked. However, from the certification provided by the petitioner (accionante) himself, the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm challenged here is not verified, since in the brief submitted by the petitioner (accionante) before the cited Tribunal on November 10, 2014, the petitioner indicated that: \"[…] I request that the unconstitutionality of the (sic) alluded decree be declared. All in order to comply with the provisions of Article 175 (sic) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. […]\" From the foregoing citation, it is evident that the petitioner (accionante) did not invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm as such, since he did not even identify the norm on which he intends to invoke unconstitutionality. Likewise, it is observed that the petitioner also did not expressly indicate the constitutional norms he considers infringed. In other words, the petitioner asked the Tribunal to declare the unconstitutionality of the \"alluded decree\" without indicating why, nor citing the challenged norms, solely as a mere procedure or simple formality to file the action and not as a true invocation to accredit the incidence of the action on the base matter. In this regard, although a lengthy development of the issue is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action and to –at least– indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed; aspects that are not verified in the certification provided by the petitioner (accionante) as a supposed invocation of unconstitutionality. Thus, the unconstitutionality of the norm not having been invoked in the base matter, the action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, because the existence of a base matter is not sufficient; rather, unconstitutionality must be invoked within it in order to establish the incidental nature of the action, and consequently the action is inadmissible.\n\n**III.- INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION (FUNDAMENTACIÓN).** In accordance with Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the brief filing the action of unconstitutionality must set forth the grounds clearly and precisely, with specific citation of the norms or principles considered infringed. This requirement does not translate into a mere formality, but into an essential requirement of admissibility, since by virtue of the pro sentencia principle –developed on other occasions by this Chamber– admissibility requirements must be interpreted in a manner favorable to the action; moreover, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and, in guarantee of its supremacy and validity, there is a public interest by virtue of which obstacles to the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural norms must be interpreted and applied in such a way that a judgment is delivered; the foregoing not only facilitates the administration of justice but also avoids the imposition of obstacles to prevent reaching it (see in the same vein, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08 and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of substantiation (fundamentación) of the action prevents the delivery of a duly reasoned judgment congruent with what is sought. Likewise, it is improper for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms challenged in an action when the petitioner does not substantiate the reasons for which they impugn, since this would imply conducting an abstract constitutional review as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a process of this nature. In this particular case, the petitioner (accionante) challenges Decree Law number 65 of 1888, considering it contrary to the right of property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution. However, this Chamber observes that, for this purpose, the petitioner did not clearly and precisely substantiate the action, since in the filing brief he did not make a clear and specific exposition of the reasons why he considers that the norm is contrary to the Law of the Constitution. In this regard, it should be clarified that although the petitioner indicated that the challenged norm is contrary to the constitutional right of private property, recognized in Article 45 of the Political Constitution, the truth is that he did not offer a development of that constitutional precept in order to relate it and contrast it with the norm, in order to provide this Chamber with the necessary elements of judgment to establish or accredit in what way the challenged norm empties the essential content of the fundamental right considered violated. In that sense, the promoter (promovente) only cited the right and the constitutional norms he considers injured, but without developing them. Now, given the noted deficiency regarding the substantiation (fundamentación) of the action, it is useless to issue the prevention order referred to in Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since this would imply obliging the petitioner (accionante) to redo the action, and therefore it is more reasonable to reject it outright, so that if the petitioner (accionante) deems it appropriate, he may file a new action in compliance with the requirements established in Articles 73 to 79 of the cited law. By virtue of the foregoing, and since substantiation (fundamentación) is an essential requirement for a process of this nature to be admissible, its non-compliance in this case causes the rejection of the action.\n\n**IV.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION BY REASON OF ITS OBJECT.** The petitioner (accionante) requests that the unconstitutionality of Decree Law number 65 of 1888 be declared, considering that it violates the right of property, because he asserts that the farm (finca) existed prior to the issuance of the decree law, and on the other hand, the map on which said decree relies is imprecise regarding the limits of the affectation, because it does not determine with certainty which is Cerro Concordia referred to in the challenged decree. Likewise, the petitioner alleges that his client's possession of his farm (finca) has been disturbed by officials of MINAE, which constitutes a dispossession of his property, since they argue that his client could not use the property because it is within the land delimitation declared inalienable. In the first term, this Tribunal considers that what is alleged by the petitioner is a conflict of mere legality, whose knowledge and resolution corresponds to the judge hearing the specific case, since although the petitioner invokes his client's right of property, the truth is that, in his arguments, he only questions the supposed lack of precision of the limits of the declaration of inalienability, as well as the applicability of the norm to his specific case, which clearly constitutes a question of fact and not of law. In other words, the petitioner seeks for this Chamber to physically determine what the limits of the declaration are, whether the petitioner's (accionante) land is located within them, and whether the decree is applicable to him or not according to the date of the property's existence; however, these are aspects of mere legality, which it is not for this Chamber to hear, not only because they are outside the scope of its competence, but also because it would imply the invasion of the competences of other bodies. In the second term, it is also not for this Chamber to hear, through an action proceeding, the specific actions of MINAE officials within the petitioner's (accionante) farm (finca), since the object of an action of unconstitutionality is not to address an individual injury that the petitioner may allege; on the contrary, its object is a general interest that acts subject to public law and the norms that make up the legal order conform to the Law of the Constitution. As a consequence, the action is inadmissible regarding this point.\n\n**V.- CONCLUSION.** By virtue of the above, the action is inadmissible by reason of the object of the challenge, due to lack of substantiation (fundamentación), and because it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right.\n\n**VI.- NOTE BY MAGISTRATE RUEDA LEAL.** In repeated pronouncements, I have dissented when, without ordering the petitioner (accionante) by prevention to fulfill the requirements established in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the action is rejected without complying with the provisions of Article 80 of the same Law. However, in the sub exámine, I consider the prevention order established therein unnecessary, due to the arguments given in considerandos II and IV of this judgment.\n\n**Therefore:**\n\nThe action is rejected outright. Magistrate Rueda Leal sets forth a note.\n\n

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I.- FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. The acción de inconstitucionalidad is a process with specific formalities that must be satisfied for the Chamber to validly hear the merits of the challenge. In this regard, Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the requirements for admissibility of an acción de inconstitucionalidad. First, there must be a prior pending matter to be resolved, either in judicial proceedings or in the process to exhaust administrative remedies, in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law exceptionally establishes requirements where no prior matter is required, when by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Contralor General de la República, the Procurador General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Now, with respect to the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, of eleven hours thirty-three minutes on July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:

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“(…) First, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that a pending matter to be resolved is required—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route—to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the resolution by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on that pending process to be resolved, as it rules on the constitutionality of the rules to be applied in that matter; and only exceptionally does legislation allow direct access to this avenue —requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—”

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Thus, the requirement for a prior pending matter to be resolved is not a merely formal requirement, as the mere existence of a base matter and the simple invocation of unconstitutionality are insufficient; it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. This means that the challenged regulations must be applicable to the base matter. (See similarly judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Furthermore, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit identification of the challenged regulations, duly reasoned, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by a lawyer of the filing pleading, accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers of attorney and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the filing in which the unconstitutionality of the rules was invoked in the base matter, requirements which, if not fulfilled by the plaintiffs, may be warned by the Presidency of the Chamber.

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II.- INADMISSIBILITY (INADMISIBILIDAD) OF THE ACTION FOR NOT CONSTITUTING A REASONABLE MEANS.\n\nOn repeated occasions, this Chamber has stated that the amparo action (acción) process is primarily incidental in nature, which requires that there be a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial proceeding, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. These requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, since simple compliance with them is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue has a direct impact on the underlying matter, such that the ruling in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right within the prior proceeding. If, on the contrary, there is no direct connection (conexidad) between the subject of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to issue a pronouncement on the matter. It follows, therefore, that in accordance with Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the petitioners (accionantes) must prove and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying matter, for the purpose of verifying the impact of the action on the underlying matter. In the case at hand, in order to substantiate his standing to act, the petitioner (accionante) indicated that ordinary proceeding number [VALOR 03] is being processed before the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) on behalf of his client against the State, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked. However, from the certification provided by the petitioner (accionante) himself, the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm challenged here is not confirmed, because in the brief filed by the petitioner (accionante) before the aforementioned Court on November 10, 2014, the appellant indicated that: “ […] I request that the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned (sic) decree be declared. All in compliance with the provisions of Article 175 (sic) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). […] ” From the foregoing quote, it is clear that the petitioner (accionante) did not invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm as such, since he did not even identify the norm on which he intends to invoke unconstitutionality. Likewise, it is observed that the appellant also did not expressly indicate the constitutional norms he considers infringed. In other words, the appellant requested the Court to declare the unconstitutionality of the “aforementioned decree” without indicating why, nor citing the challenged norms, only as a mere procedure or simple formality to file the action and not as a true invocation to prove the impact of the action on the underlying matter. In this regard, although an extensive development of the subject is not required when invoking the unconstitutionality of the norm, it is true that it is necessary to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action and to –at least– indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed; aspects not confirmed in the certification provided by the petitioner (accionante) as the supposed invocation of unconstitutionality. Thus, since the unconstitutionality of the norm was not invoked in the underlying matter, the action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, as the existence of an underlying matter is not sufficient; rather, unconstitutionality must also be invoked within it, to establish the incidental nature of the action, and consequently the action is inadmissible.\n\nIII.- INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO LACK OF LEGAL GROUNDS (FUNDAMENTACIÓN). In accordance with Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the brief filing the unconstitutionality action must set forth the grounds in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the norms or principles considered infringed. This requirement does not constitute a mere formality, but an essential admissibility requirement, since by virtue of the pro sentencia principle –developed on other occasions by this Chamber– the admissibility requirements must be interpreted favorably to the action; furthermore, Constitutional Law is of preferential public order and in guarantee of its supremacy and validity there is a public interest by virtue of which obstacles to the admission and resolution on the merits of an action must be interpreted and applied restrictively. Thus, all procedural norms must be interpreted and applied in such a way as to obtain the rendering of the judgment; the foregoing not only facilitates the administration of justice but also avoids the imposition of obstacles to not achieving it (see in the same sense, judgments numbers 93-5175, 3041-97, 01-06, 2874-06, 1622-08, and 2887-08). Consequently, the lack of legal grounds (fundamentación) for the action prevents the rendering of a duly reasoned and congruent judgment with what is sought. Likewise, it is inappropriate for this Chamber to rule on the merits of norms questioned in an action when the filing party does not substantiate the reasons for the challenge, since this would imply carrying out an abstract constitutional review as an academic exercise, which is not compatible with the purpose of a process of this nature. In the particular case, the petitioner (accionante) challenges Decree-Law (Decreto Ley) number 65 of 1888, considering it contrary to the right to property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). However, this Chamber observes that the appellant did not ground the action in a clear and precise manner, considering that in the action-filing brief he did not make a clear and specific exposition of the reasons why he believes the norm is contrary to the Constitution's Law. In this regard, it must be clarified that although the appellant indicated that the challenged norm is contrary to the constitutional right of private property, recognized in Article 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); the truth is that he did not offer a development of that constitutional precept in order to relate it and contrast it with the norm, for the purpose of providing this Chamber with the necessary elements of judgment to establish or prove how the challenged norm empties the essential content of the fundamental right considered violated. In that sense, the promoter (promovente) only cited the right and the constitutional norms that he considers injured, but without developing them. Now then, given the deficiency noted regarding the legal grounds (fundamentación) of the action, it is useless to carry out the preliminary order (prevención) referred to in Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since this would imply forcing the petitioner (accionante) to redo the action; therefore, it is more reasonable to reject it outright (rechazarla de plano), so that if the petitioner (accionante) deems it appropriate, he may file a new action in compliance with the requirements established in Articles 73 to 79 of the cited law. By virtue of the foregoing, and since legal grounds (fundamentación) is an essential requirement for a process of this nature to be admissible, its non-compliance in this case causes the rejection of the action.\n\nIV.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION BASED ON THE SUBJECT MATTER. The petitioner (accionante) requests that the unconstitutionality of Decree-Law (Decreto Ley) number 65 of 1888 be declared, considering it violates the right to property, because he asserts that the farm existed prior to the issuance of the decree-law, and on the other hand, the map accompanying said decree is imprecise regarding the limits of the affectation, because it does not determine with certainty which is Cerro Concordia referred to in the challenged decree. Likewise, the appellant claims that his client’s possession of his property has been disturbed by officials of MINAE, which constitutes a dispossession of his property, as they claim that his client could not use the property because it is within the land delimitation declared inalienable. In the first place, this Court considers that what is alleged by the appellant is a mere legality conflict, the knowledge and resolution of which corresponds to the judge hearing the specific case, because even though the appellant invokes his client’s right to property, the truth is that in his arguments he only questions the supposed lack of precision of the limits of the inalienability declaration, as well as the applicability of the norm to his specific case, which clearly constitutes a problem of fact and not of law. In other words, the appellant seeks for this Chamber to physically determine what the limits of the declaration are, whether the petitioner’s (accionante) land is located within them, and whether the decree is applicable to him or not according to the date of the property’s existence; however, these are aspects of mere legality which this Chamber cannot hear, not only because they are outside its scope of competence, but also because it would imply the invasion of competencies belonging to other bodies. In the second place, it is also not for this Chamber to hear, through an amparo action (acción) process, the specific actions of MINAE officials within the petitioner’s (accionante) farm, since the purpose of an unconstitutionality action is not to address an individual injury that the appellant may allege; on the contrary, it is aimed at the general interest that acts subject to public law and the norms that make up the legal system conform to the Constitution's Law. As a consequence, the action is inadmissible in this respect.\n\nV.- CONCLUSION. By virtue of the foregoing, the action is inadmissible based on the subject matter of challenge, due to lack of legal grounds (fundamentación), and for not constituting a reasonable means to protect the right.\n\nVI.- NOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL. In repeated pronouncements, I have dissented when, without ordering the petitioner (accionante) to comply with the requirements established in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the action is rejected without complying with the provisions of Article 80 of the same Law. However, in the present case (sub exámine), I consider the preliminary order (prevención) provided for therein unnecessary, due to the arguments given in considerandos II and IV of this judgment.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is rejected outright (Se rechaza de plano). Judge Rueda Leal adds a note.\n\n| | | |\n|---|---|---|\n| | | |\n| | Gilbert Armijo S. | |\n| | President | |\n| | | |\n| Ernesto Jinesta L. | | Fernando Cruz C. |\n| | | |\n| Fernando Castillo V. | | Paul Rueda L. |\n| | | |\n| Luis Fdo. Salazar A. | | Ronald Salazar Murillo |" }