{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-655085", "citation": "Res. 00336-2016 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Rechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra educación religiosa", "title_en": "Unconstitutionality action against religious education flatly rejected", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el artículo 210 del Código de Educación, los artículos 3 inciso b) y 13 inciso i) de la Ley Fundamental de Educación, y el apartado 1 del Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, normas que el accionante consideraba contrarias al principio de neutralidad religiosa y a los derechos de libre desarrollo de la personalidad, igualdad y dignidad humana. El accionante, abogado Yashín Castrillo Fernández, había solicitado a la Vice Ministra Académica del MEP anular esas disposiciones, y citó esa gestión como asunto base. La Sala determinó que dicha solicitud administrativa no constituía un asunto pendiente de resolver en los términos del artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que no existía una situación concreta ni un procedimiento administrativo en fase de agotamiento de la vía. Por tanto, la acción no era un medio razonable para amparar el derecho invocado, lo que condujo a su rechazo de plano sin examen de fondo. La decisión reafirma la naturaleza incidental de la acción de inconstitucionalidad y excluye las acciones populares en el sistema costarricense.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejected an unconstitutionality action brought against Article 210 of the Education Code, Articles 3(b) and 13(i) of the Fundamental Education Law, and Section 1 of the Descriptive Manual of Teaching Specialties. The plaintiff, attorney Yashín Castrillo Fernández, argued that these provisions violated the principle of religious neutrality and the rights to free development of personality, equality, and human dignity. He had previously asked the Vice Minister of Education to annul the norms and cited that request as the underlying matter. The Chamber held that a mere administrative request, without a concrete situation or an exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies procedure, does not satisfy the requirement of a “pending matter” under Article 75(1) of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. Consequently, the action did not constitute a reasonable means to protect the alleged right and was flatly rejected. The ruling underscores that unconstitutionality proceedings in Costa Rica are incidental, not popular actions, and must be anchored in a real case or controversy.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "13/01/2016", "year": "2016", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "rechazo de plano", "asunto pendiente", "medio razonable", "acción popular", "vía incidental", "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "artículo 75 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Código de Educación", "article": "210", "doc_id": "norm-31486", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 181", "article": "210", "doc_id": "norm-31486", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "rechazo de plano", "artículo 75 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "asunto pendiente", "medio razonable", "educación religiosa", "neutralidad religiosa", "acción popular", "Sala Constitucional", "vía incidental" ], "keywords_en": [ "unconstitutionality action", "flat rejection", "Article 75 Constitutional Jurisdiction Law", "pending matter", "reasonable means", "religious education", "religious neutrality", "popular action", "Constitutional Chamber", "incidental action" ], "excerpt_es": "El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. En virtud de lo expuesto, el asunto que el actor cita, no puede ser considerado como asunto base para esta acción, por cuanto no existe una situación concreta que resolver, ni se trata de un procedimiento administrativo y, mucho menos, que se encuentre en fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado.", "excerpt_en": "The Court considers that not any petition or request can serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a concrete right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since otherwise it would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system. By virtue of the foregoing, the matter cited by the plaintiff cannot be considered a base matter for this action, because there is no concrete situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative proceeding, much less one that is in the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies phase. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right allegedly violated.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Inadmissible", "label_es": "Inadmisible", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejected the action for failing to meet the requirement of a pending matter that constitutes a reasonable means to protect the violated right.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano la acción por no cumplir con el requisito de un asunto pendiente de resolver que constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho lesionado." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando II", "quote_en": "The Court considers that not any petition or request can serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a concrete right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since otherwise it would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system.", "quote_es": "El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico." }, { "context": "Considerando II", "quote_en": "Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right allegedly violated.", "quote_es": "En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-82278", "citation": "Res. 01319-1997 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Right of every minor to appeal adverse criminal decisions", "title_es": "Derecho de todo menor a recurrir decisiones penales adversas", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "04/03/1997", "year": "1997" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-655085", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "*150166480007CO*\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n*150166480007CO*\n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 15-016648-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2016000336\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve\r\nhoras cuarenta y cinco minutos del trece de enero de dos mil dieciseis .\n\r\n\r\n\n Acción de inconstitucionalidad\r\ninterpuesta por YASHíN CASTRILLO FERNáNDEZ, cédula de identidad No.\r\n1-612-575, abogado; contra el artículo 210 del Código de Educación; los\r\nartículos 3, inciso b), y 13, inciso i), de la Ley Fundamental de Educación y\r\nel Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, código No. 072000, apartado 1 . \n\r\n\r\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n 1.-\r\nPor escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 10:52 hrs. de 6 de\r\nnoviembre de 2015, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad\r\nde los artículos 3, inciso b), y 13, inciso i), de la Ley Fundamental de\r\nEducación y el Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, código No.\r\n072000, apartado 1. por ser contrarios al principio de neutralidad religiosa y\r\nlos derechos fundamentales de libre desarrollo de la personalidad, igualdad y\r\ndignidad de la persona humana. Como asunto pendiente de resolución cita nota\r\nenviada el 26 de octubre de 2015 a la Vice Ministra Académica del Ministerio de\r\nEducación Pública en la que solicitó se anulen y se dejen sin efecto jurídico\r\nlas normas impugnadas. Añade que el objeto de la acción es que se declare que\r\nla obligatoriedad de la materia de religión, impartida en el I y II ciclo de\r\nEducación General Básica y el objetivo de la educación en la escuela primaria\r\nde cultivar y desarrollar los sentimientos y valores religiosos violan los\r\nprincipios ya mencionados. Precisa que tanto la libertad religiosa como la\r\ndignidad humana, en el plano del respeto a las diferentes creencias, son\r\nvalores superiores de nuestro ordenamiento y principios rectores del sistema\r\npolítico y la paz social que no pueden verse alterados mediante la sujeción o\r\nimposición en la educación a la religión oficial del Estado. La intención del\r\nconstituyente del cuarenta y nueve, continúa, de desvincular la religión de la\r\neducación, se comprueba al constatar su tratamiento en diferentes apartados\r\npermaneciendo cada uno de ellos separado del otro. Agrega que ese trato\r\ndiferente permite concluir que, a pesar del carácter confesional del Estado costarricense,\r\nel constituyente optó por el principio de libertad religiosa, respetando el\r\nderecho de los educandos a ser formados en cultos y creencias religiosas\r\ndistintas a la oficial. Indica que pluriculturidad -artículo primero de la\r\nConstitución Política- no se compagina con las normas impugnadas, en tanto\r\nconstituyen una restricción irrazonable a la esfera de la libertad religiosa de\r\nlos estudiantes que por este medio ven negado su derecho de acceder al\r\nconocimiento de otras creencias religiosas. Aprecia que no le corresponde al\r\nEstado la enseñanza de la religión oficial ni de ninguna otra; por lo que la\r\nimposición estatal, a través de la educación primaria y secundaria pública de\r\nla religión católica, o cualquier otra creencia, viola los principios de dignidad\r\nhumana y libertad. Manifiesta que la neutralidad religiosa es el ámbito\r\neducativo responde a los compromisos adquiridos en esta materia por nuestro\r\npaís: artículos 12, párrafo 1, y 26 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos\r\nHumanos; artículo 5, párrafo 1, inciso a), de la Convención Relativa a la Lucha\r\nContra las Discriminaciones en la Esfera de la Enseñanza; artículo 13,\r\npárrafo1, del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y\r\nCulturales; artículo 29, párrafo 1, incisos a), b) y d), de la Convención\r\nsobre los Derechos del Niño; artículo 13, párrafo 2, del “Protocolo de\r\nSan Salvador”; y artículo 22, párrafo 4, de la Convención Iberoamericana de los\r\nDerechos de los Jóvenes. Señala que las normas internacionales citadas solo pueden\r\ncumplirse en la educación pública a partir de una educación laica, la cual, por\r\nsu naturaleza, garantiza plenamente el respeto, la aceptación, la comprensión y\r\nla tolerancia entre los diversos grupos religiosos. Solicita se declare con\r\nlugar la presente acción y se declaren contrarios al principio de neutralidad\r\nreligiosa y los derechos fundamentales de dignidad de persona humana, igualdad,\r\ny libre desarrollo de la personalidad, las normas impugnadas; se elimine el\r\ndesarrollo de los valores religiosos y cultivo de sentimientos religiosos de\r\nlos objetivos de la educación primaria costarricense; y se declare\r\ninconstitucional la enseñanza de la educación religiosa en el sistema educativo\r\npúblico, sea esta la oficial o cualquier otra .\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.-\r\nEl artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional\r\nfaculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento,\r\nincluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su\r\nconocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere\r\nque existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de\r\nla simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar\r\nrechazada.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Redacta\r\nel Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,\n\r\n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- SOBRE LOS\r\nPRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD Y LEGITIMACIóN DE LA ACCIóN DE\r\nINCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma\r\nreiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con\r\ndeterminadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se\r\npronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad\r\npara las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas.\r\nEn el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de\r\nresolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de\r\namparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta\r\nvía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada,\r\ncomo medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el\r\nasunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa\r\n–no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la\r\nnaturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la\r\ndefensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y\r\nc) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el\r\nContralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el\r\nDefensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia del asunto pendiente de\r\nresolver, establecida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 la Ley que rige\r\nesta Jurisdicción, esta Sala ha explicado que, en tal supuesto, la acción\r\nde inconstitucionalidad se constituye o configura como:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“(...) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o\r\npopular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un\r\nasunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el\r\nprocedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía\r\nconstitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio\r\nrazonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal,\r\nde manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o\r\nnegativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se\r\nmanifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas\r\nen dicho asunto (...) ”. (Sentencia No. 4190-95 de las\r\n11:33 hrs. de 28 de julio de 1995; lo destacado no corresponde al original). \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Asimismo,\r\nen la sentencia No. 1319-1997 de las 14:51 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 1997, se\r\nconsideró lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“(…) El artículo 75 de la Ley de\r\nla Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para\r\ninterponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto\r\npendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir\r\nentre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con\r\nel objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión\r\ndel accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la\r\njurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la\r\njurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el\r\ncontrol de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho\r\nde acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un \"asunto\r\nprevio\" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la\r\nley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no\r\ndistorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales\r\ndel Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es\r\nenteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones. Por esta causa, es que la acción\r\nde inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como\r\nmedio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera\r\nlesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como\r\nmedio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del\r\nasunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las\r\nactuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración\r\nparticular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para\r\ninterponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de\r\nresolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio\r\nrazonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (…)” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n II.-\r\nINADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIóN POR NO SER MEDIO RAZONABLE.- Como se destacó supra , el artículo 75,\r\npárrafo primero, in fine , de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional exige, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental, como la presente, un asunto\r\npendiente de resolver, en que la inconstitucionalidad invocada sea medio\r\nrazonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. En el\r\npresente caso, el accionante cita como asunto base la gestión dirigida a la\r\nVice Ministra de Académica del Ministerio de Educación Pública, recibida el 26\r\nde octubre de 2015, en la que se presenta “ante su Autoridad a solicitar se\r\nanule y deje sin efecto ” las normas impugnadas. El Tribunal aprecia que no\r\ncualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo\r\naquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea\r\nsusceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario\r\nimplicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro\r\nordenamiento jurídico. En virtud de lo expuesto, el asunto que el actor cita,\r\nno puede ser considerado como asunto base para esta acción, por cuanto no\r\nexiste una situación concreta que resolver, ni se trata de un procedimiento\r\nadministrativo y, mucho menos, que se encuentre en fase de agotamiento de la\r\nvía administrativa. En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no\r\nconstituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera\r\nlesionado. De lo anterior la Sala estima que no se cumplen los presupuestos de\r\nadmisibilidad del artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional y, por ende, lo que procede es el rechazo de plano de la acción .\n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\r\n\r\n\n Se rechaza de plano la\r\nacción. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\r\n \nPresidente\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nFernando Cruz C.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nFernando Castillo V.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nNancy Hernández L.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nJose Paulino Hernández G.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nYerma Campos C.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\r\n\r\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\r\n\r\n\n*L8C8NF47IQCA61*\n\r\n\r\n\n L8C8NF47IQCA61 \n\r\n\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 15-016648-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos:\r\n2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica:\r\nwww.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21,\r\navenidas 8 y 6", "body_en_text": "*150166480007CO*\n\n\n*150166480007CO*\n\nExp: 15-016648-0007-CO\n\nRes. Nº 2016000336\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours forty-five minutes of the thirteenth of January of two thousand sixteen.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by YASHíN CASTRILLO FERNáNDEZ, identity card No. 1-612-575, attorney; against Article 210 of the Education Code; Articles 3, subsection b), and 13, subsection i), of the Fundamental Law of Education and the Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, code No. 072000, section 1.\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n1.-\nBy brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 10:52 hrs. on November 6, 2015, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality be declared of Articles 3, subsection b), and 13, subsection i), of the Fundamental Law of Education and the Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, code No. 072000, section 1. for being contrary to the principle of religious neutrality and the fundamental rights of free development of the personality, equality and dignity of the human person. As a matter pending resolution (asunto pendiente de resolución), he cites a note sent on October 26, 2015 to the Vice Minister of Academic Affairs of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) in which he requested that the challenged norms be annulled and left without legal effect. He adds that the object of the action is to declare that the mandatory nature of the subject of religion, taught in the I and II cycle of General Basic Education and the objective of education in primary school to cultivate and develop religious feelings and values violate the aforementioned principles. He specifies that both religious freedom and human dignity, in terms of respect for different beliefs, are superior values of our legal system and guiding principles of the political system and social peace that cannot be altered through subjection or imposition in education to the official religion of the State. The intention of the forty-nine constituent, he continues, to separate religion from education, is verified by observing its treatment in different sections, each one remaining separate from the other. He adds that this different treatment leads to the conclusion that, despite the confessional nature of the Costa Rican State, the constituent opted for the principle of religious freedom, respecting the right of students to be educated in religious cults and beliefs different from the official one. He indicates that pluriculturality —Article 1 of the Political Constitution— is not compatible with the challenged norms, as they constitute an unreasonable restriction on the sphere of religious freedom of students who, through this means, have their right to access knowledge of other religious beliefs denied. He considers that it is not the State's role to teach the official religion or any other; therefore, the state imposition, through public primary and secondary education, of the Catholic religion, or any other belief, violates the principles of human dignity and freedom. He states that religious neutrality in the educational sphere responds to the commitments undertaken in this matter by our country: Articles 12, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 5, paragraph 1, subsection a), of the Convention against Discrimination in Education; Article 13, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 29, paragraph 1, subsections a), b) and d), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 13, paragraph 2, of the “Protocol of San Salvador”; and Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth. He points out that the cited international norms can only be fulfilled in public education through a secular education, which, by its nature, fully guarantees respect, acceptance, understanding and tolerance among the diverse religious groups. He requests that the present action be granted and that the challenged norms be declared contrary to the principle of religious neutrality and the fundamental rights of dignity of the human person, equality, and free development of the personality; that the development of religious values and the cultivation of religious feelings be eliminated from the objectives of Costa Rican primary education; and that the teaching of religious education in the public educational system, whether the official one or any other, be declared unconstitutional.\n\n2.-\nArticle 9 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright (rechazar de plano) or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted to its knowledge that is manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar rejected petition.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND LEGITIMATION OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the requirements of admissibility (presupuestos de admisibilidad) for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution (asunto pendiente de resolver), whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo remedies– or in an administrative one –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required– in the following circumstances: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, no individual and direct injury exists; b) when it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:\n\n“(…) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required –whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue– in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that proceeding pending resolution, since it expresses an opinion on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter (…)”. (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).\n\nLikewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:\n\n“(…) Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as one of the requirements for filing the action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the claimant's petition as the last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel of the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a \"prior matter\" that motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function –special–, and not to distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because, as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence –the prior matter– as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the claimant should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed injured. (…)”\n\nII.-\nINADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.- As highlighted supra, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental avenue, such as the present one, a matter pending resolution (asunto pendiente de resolver), in which the invoked unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the claimant cites as the base matter (asunto base) the petition addressed to the Vice Minister of Academic Affairs of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which he appears “before your Authority to request that the challenged norms be annulled and left without effect.” The Court considers that not just any petition or request can serve as a base matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the questioned norm, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system. By virtue of the foregoing, the matter cited by the plaintiff cannot be considered a base matter for this action, given that there is no specific situation to resolve, nor does it constitute an administrative procedure and, much less, one that is in the stage of exhausting the administrative avenue. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. From the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the admissibility requirements of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction are not met and, therefore, the outright rejection (rechazo de plano) of the action is in order.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe action is rejected outright (se rechaza de plano).\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.\nPresidente\n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nNancy Hernández L.\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\nJose Paulino Hernández G.\n\nYerma Campos C.\n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n*L8C8NF47IQCA61*\n\nL8C8NF47IQCA61\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 15-016648-0007-CO\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6\n\nof July 28, 1995; the highlighted portion does not correspond to the original). \n\nLikewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 2:51 p.m. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:\n\n“(…) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an unconstitutionality action, the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, as it constitutes the connecting point that must exist between the proceeding in which the rule alleged to be unconstitutional is applied, the object of the constitutional process, and the basis that legitimizes the plaintiff’s claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the review of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a ‘prior matter’ that has given rise to that discrepancy or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, in order to maintain the —special— jurisdictional function, and not distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which this Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence —of the prior matter— as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the plaintiff should not be analyzed solely within the context of the prior matter, but rather immersed in the constitutional legal framework governing this Chamber’s proceedings. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved; rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest deemed injured. (…)”\n\n**II.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.-** As highlighted *supra*, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action through the incidental channel, like the present one, a pending matter to be resolved, in which the unconstitutionality invoked is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the plaintiff cites as the underlying matter the request addressed to the Vice Minister of Academics of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which he “appears before your Authority to request that the challenged rules be annulled and rendered without effect.” The Tribunal notes that not just any proceeding or request can serve as the underlying matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the rule being challenged, since the opposite would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system. By virtue of the foregoing, the matter that the plaintiff cites cannot be considered an underlying matter for this action, because there is no specific situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. From the above, the Chamber considers that the admissibility prerequisites of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional are not met and, therefore, the outright rejection of the action is in order.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe action is rejected outright.\n\n| | ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_1.PNG)\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\nPresidente | |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_2.PNG)\n\nFernando Cruz C. | | ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_3.JPG)\n\nFernando Castillo V. |\n| ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_4.JPG)\n\nNancy Hernández L. | | ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_5.JPG)\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A. |\n| ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_6.JPG)\n\nJose Paulino Hernández G. | | ![graphic](file:///C:\\Users\\VGRANA~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\HTM7B86_7.JPG)\n\nYerma Campos C. |\n\nDigitally Signed Document\n\n-- Verification Code --\n\n*L8C8NF47IQCA61*\n\nL8C8NF47IQCA61\n\n**EXPEDIENTE N° 15-016648-0007-CO**\n\nTelephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6\n\n\"...The Court finds that not just any administrative step (gestión) or request may serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action (acción popular), which is not admissible in our legal system.\"\n\nIn light of the foregoing, the matter cited by the petitioner cannot be considered as a base matter for this action, since there is no concrete situation to be resolved, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies…”\n\n**CONSIDERANDO:**\n\n**I.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, prevent this Chamber from ruling on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue—including hábeas corpus or amparo remedies—or in an administrative venue—in the procedure for exhausting this route—, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate direct action—a base matter is not required—in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the unconstitutionality action is constituted or configured as:\n\n“(...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust administrative remedies— to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that, **the action constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said proceeding pending resolution**, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter (...).” (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. on July 28, 1995; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).\n\nLikewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:\n\n\"(...) Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes as one of the requirements for filing an unconstitutionality action, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as a last procedural remedy in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to preventing the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discrepancy or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function—special—, and not to distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as an integral part of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence—of the prior matter—as a reasonable means of protecting the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the petitioner should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a question of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest estimated to be injured. (...)\"\n\n**II.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.-** As highlighted *supra*, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law requires, for the purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action via the incidental route, such as the present one, a matter pending resolution, in which the invoked unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the petitioner cites as a base matter the filing addressed to the Vice Minister of Academic Affairs of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which it is presented “before your Authority to request that the contested norms be annulled and rendered without effect”. The Court appreciates that not just any filing or request can be a base matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the norm being questioned, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system. In light of the foregoing, the matter cited by the petitioner cannot be considered as a base matter for this action, since there is no concrete situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the admissibility requirements of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law are not met, and, therefore, what proceeds is the outright rejection of the action.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe action is rejected outright.\n\n| | | |\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n| | Ernesto Jinesta L. President | |\n| Fernando Cruz C. | | Fernando Castillo V. |\n| Nancy Hernández L. | | Luis Fdo.\n\n

\n \n \n \n \n

graphic\n

\n

Jose Paulino Hernández G.

\n \n \n

 

\n \n \n

graphic\n

\n

Yerma Campos C.

\n \n \n\n\n\n\n

 

\n\n

 

\n\n

Digitally Signed Document

\n\n

-- Verification code --

\n\n

*L8C8NF47IQCA61*

\n\n

 L8C8NF47IQCA61

\n\n

EXPEDIENTE N° 15-016648-0007-CO

\n\n

 

\n\n
\n\n
\n\n

Telephones:\n2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Email address:\nwww.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Supreme Court of Justice Building,\nSan José, Catedral District, González Lahmann neighborhood, streets 19 and 21,\navenues 8 and 6

\n\n
\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n" }