{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-659758", "citation": "Res. 07688-2015 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Zonas Francas — Inexistencia de vicio por falta de consulta a municipalidades sobre beneficios fiscales", "title_en": "Free Trade Zones — No Constitutional Violation in Failing to Consult Municipalities on Tax Benefits", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano y declaró sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Belén contra los incisos d), g) y h) del artículo 20, el artículo 20 bis y los transitorios I y II de la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas (Ley 7210 y sus reformas). El accionante alegó que dichas normas eximían a las empresas del régimen del pago de impuestos municipales (bienes inmuebles y patentes) sin haber consultado previamente a las municipalidades, vulnerando así su autonomía y el artículo 190 constitucional. La Sala determinó que los impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y traspasos son de naturaleza nacional (no municipal), por lo que la acción debía rechazarse respecto de ellos. En cuanto al artículo 20 bis (introducido por Ley 7830), estimó que no crea nuevas exoneraciones ni extiende plazos, sino que establece condiciones para el otorgamiento del régimen. Respecto de los transitorios I y II de la Ley 8794, el Tribunal adoptó la interpretación de que su finalidad es adecuar la normativa nacional a los compromisos con la OMC, limitando los incentivos —no prorrogándolos—, por lo que no afectan los intereses municipales y no era necesaria la consulta. La acción se declaró sin lugar en todos sus extremos.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber dismissed and rejected the unconstitutionality action brought by the Mayor of the Municipality of Belén against sections d), g), and h) of Article 20, Article 20 bis, and Transitory Provisions I and II of the Free Trade Zone Regime Law (Law 7210 as amended). The petitioner argued that those provisions exempted free trade zone companies from paying municipal taxes (property tax and business license tax) without prior consultation with the municipalities, violating their autonomy under Article 190 of the Constitution. The Chamber held that property and transfer taxes are national, not municipal, in nature, so the action was rejected on that ground. Regarding Article 20 bis (added by Law 7830), it found that it does not create new exemptions or extend time limits; it merely establishes conditions for granting the regime. As for Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794, the Court adopted the interpretation that their purpose is to align domestic legislation with WTO commitments by limiting—not extending—the incentives. Therefore, they do not affect municipal interests and no consultation was required. The action was dismissed in its entirety.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "27/05/2015", "year": "2015", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "zonas francas", "exoneración", "consulta a municipalidades", "autonomía municipal", "impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles", "patente municipal", "artículo 190 constitucional", "OMC" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas", "article": "20", "doc_id": "norm-11593", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7210", "article": "20", "doc_id": "norm-11593", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reforma a la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas N.° 7210", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-67099", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8794", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-67099", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reforma a la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas N.° 7210", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-67099", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8794", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-67099", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "zonas francas", "exoneración de impuestos municipales", "consulta a municipalidades", "autonomía municipal", "artículo 190 constitucional", "impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles", "patente municipal", "Ley 7210", "OMC", "beneficios fiscales" ], "keywords_en": [ "free trade zones", "municipal tax exemption", "municipal consultation", "municipal autonomy", "Article 190 constitutional", "property tax", "business license tax", "Law 7210", "WTO", "tax benefits" ], "excerpt_es": "Conclusión: De todo lo expuesto, se concluye, en primer lugar, que la acción -en cuanto se dirige contra la falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales respecto de exoneraciones de los impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y de traspaso de bienes inmuebles- debe rechazarse de plano por tratarse de impuestos de incuestionable carácter nacional.- En segundo lugar, debe declararse sin lugar el reclamo por falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales por parte del artículo 20 bis agregado a la Ley 7210, por Ley 7830 del 22 de setiembre de 1998.- Por último, el reclamo debe también declararse sin lugar al entenderse que los transitorios I y II de la Ley 8794 no lesionan el artículo 190 Constitucional, ya que el plazo establecido para las empresas que se describen, no se suma al plazo de exoneración original de diez años autorizado por el artículo 20 de la Ley 7210, interpretación ésta que responde a la idea de que este tribunal debe esforzarse, en lo posible, para encontrar una solución, dentro del parámetro constitucional, que resuelva el conflicto con el menor esfuerzo derogatorio y distorsionador del ordenamiento y de las expectativas creadas al seno de la sociedad.", "excerpt_en": "Conclusion: From all the above, it is concluded, first, that the action—insofar as it is directed against the lack of compliance with constitutional formalities regarding exemptions from property and real estate transfer taxes—must be dismissed outright because these are unquestionably national taxes. Second, the claim regarding the lack of compliance with constitutional formalities by Article 20 bis added to Law 7210 by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, must be denied. Finally, the claim must also be denied as it is understood that Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 do not violate Article 190 of the Constitution, since the time limit established for the described companies is not added to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210. This interpretation responds to the idea that this court must strive, as far as possible, to find a solution within constitutional parameters that resolves the conflict with the least derogatory and distorting effect on the legal order and the expectations created within society.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The unconstitutionality action is denied regarding Article 20 bis and Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794, and dismissed outright regarding property and transfer taxes, as no constitutional violation exists.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 20 bis y los transitorios I y II de la Ley 8794, y se rechaza de plano en lo relativo a los impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y traspasos, por no existir vicio de inconstitucionalidad." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "There is therefore no impact on the Municipality's interests beyond the restrictions already contained in Law 7210, because what changed were the conditions for applying the regime in certain cases.", "quote_es": "No existe entonces ninguna afectación de los intereses de la Municipalidad, más allá del alcance de las restricciones ya recogidas en la Ley 7210, porque lo que varió fueron las condiciones para la aplicación del régimen en ciertos casos." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "The petitioner's interpretation does not align with the meaning of the provision, since—as explained—what was issued are rules directed to the competent authority and that govern the exercise of its power to issue new granting agreements for the development of new projects or new stages in some cases where their importance warrants it.", "quote_es": "la interpretación del accionante no se apega al sentido de la norma, puesto que -como se explicó- lo emitido son reglas dirigidas al ente competente y que ordenan el ejercicio de su potestad de emisión de nuevos acuerdos de otorgamiento para el desarrollo de proyectos nuevos o nuevas etapas en algunos casos que por su importancia lo ameriten." }, { "context": "Considerando XI", "quote_en": "The transitory provisions are not aimed at nor may be used to extend exemption periods—and therefore there is no harm to municipal autonomy or the duty to consult these entities.", "quote_es": "los transitorios no están dirigidos ni pueden usarse para prorrogar los plazos de exoneración y -por ende- no hay lesión de la autonomía municipal ni del deber de consulta a estos entes." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-982230", "citation": "Res. 00385-2020 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III", "title_en": "Exemption from real estate tax for free-zone company reclassified as processing industry", "title_es": "Exoneración del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles a empresa de zona franca trasladada a categoría de industria procesadora", "doc_type": "court_decision", "date": "29/06/2020", "year": "2020" }, { "id": "norm-11593", "citation": "Ley 7210", "title_en": "Free Zone Regime Law", "title_es": "Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas", "doc_type": "law", "date": "23/11/1990", "year": "1990" }, { "id": "norm-67099", "citation": "Ley 8794", "title_en": "Amendment to the Free Zone Regime Law No. 7210", "title_es": "Reforma a la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas N.° 7210", "doc_type": "law", "date": "12/01/2010", "year": "2010" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-290476", "citation": "", "title_en": "Application of the real estate tax exemption to free zone companies", "title_es": "Aplicación de la exoneración del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles a empresas de zona franca", "doc_type": "court_decision", "date": "", "year": "" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-982230", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "" }, { "target_id": "norm-11593", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7210 Art. 20" }, { "target_id": "norm-67099", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8794 Transitorio I" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-659758", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-982230" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Exp: 12-009520-0007-CO \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nExp: 12-009520-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº 2015007688\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL\r\nDE LA CORTE SUPREMA\r\nDE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cero minutos del veintisiete de mayo\r\nde dos mil quince.\n\r\n\r\n\n Acción de inconstitucionalidad\r\npromovida por HORACIO ALVARADO BOGANTES, mayor, soltero,\r\nportador de la cédula de identidad número 0401240551, vecino de La Ribera de Belén, en su\r\ncondición de Alcalde de la\r\n Municipalidad de Belén, en contra de los incisos d), g) y h)\r\ndel artículo 20 de la Ley\r\nde Régimen de Zonas Francas; ley número 7210; artículo 20 bis agregado por Ley\r\n7830 del 22 de setiembre de 1998 y los transitorios I y II de la Ley número 8794 del doce de\r\nenero de 2010. Intervienen en el proceso Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, mayor,\r\ncasada, abogada, vecina de Curridabat, cédula \r\n.4-127-782\r\nen su condición de Procuradora General de la República; Fernando\r\nOcampo Sánchez mayor cédula de identidad número 1-191-100, en su condición de Ministro\r\na.i. de Comercio Exterior; Jorge Sequeira Picado mayor, cédula de identidad\r\n1-576-012 en su calidad de Gerente\r\nGeneral de la Promotora\r\nde Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica; Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, en\r\nsu condición de \r\nVicepresidenta con facultades \r\nde apoderada generalísima \r\nsin límite de suma \r\nde la Asociación \r\n Cámara \r\nde Industriales de \r\nCosta Rica; Víctor\r\nManuel Ruiz Pacheco, en su \r\ncondición de Primer Vicepresidente y \r\nrepresentante legal de la Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa\r\nRica; Mónica Segnini Acosta, en su\r\ncondición de Presidenta \r\ncon facultades de \r\napoderado generalísimo sin \r\nlímite de suma de la Asociación\r\n Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica; Jorge Brenes\r\nRamírez, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo\r\nsin límite de suma de la\r\n Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa\r\nRica y Humberto Pacheco \r\nAlpízar, en su \r\ncondición de Presidente \r\ny representante legal \r\nde la Asociación\r\n Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio. \n\r\n\r\n\n Resultando:\n\r\n\r\n\n 1.- El\r\nrecurrente acude a solicitar la inconstitucionalidad de los incisos d), g) y h)\r\ndel artículo 20 de la Ley\r\nde Régimen de Zonas Francas; ley número 7210; el artículo 20 bis agregado por\r\nLey 7830 del 22 de setiembre de 1998 y los transitorios I y II de la Ley número 8794 del doce de\r\nenero de 2010, pues entiende que son contrarias a los artículos 121 inciso 13,\r\n169 y 170, 175 y 190 de la Constitución Política, al entender que en su\r\naprobación no se consideró el criterio de las Municipalidades del país. Se\r\nexplica que las leyes discutidas vinieron a modificar la ley número 7210 de\r\nZonas Francas (en adelante ley 7210) en varios aspectos pero, en lo que\r\ninteresa para la acción planteada, en el tema de los beneficios fiscales para\r\nlas empresas favorecidas en ese régimen.- En concreto se reclama que una de las\r\nmotivaciones para la modificación mediante la ley 8794, fue la necesidad de\r\nadaptarse a los acuerdos suscritos sobre Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias\r\nde la OMC, el\r\ncual obliga a eliminar los incentivos ligados a las exportaciones en cuanto a\r\nla industria procesadora en un plazo de ocho años prorrogables, por lo que los\r\nnuevos inversionista o los que se encontraran gozando del sistema podría\r\ndisfrutar de las exenciones de la ley, incluido el no pago de patente e\r\nimpuesto territorial, hasta que se cumplan los años previstos en el Acuerdo\r\nindicado o en las prórrogas que se logren.- En consonancia con lo\r\nanterior, en la ley se incluyó un\r\ntransitorio I y II, los cuales se impugnan en esta acción, en los cuales se\r\namplia el plazo previsto inicialmente en 10 años de exención y se subsume en un\r\nnuevo plazo de 8 años a partir de la suscripción del citado acuerdo por Costa\r\nRica y con la posibilidad de prolongarse a través del tiempo según las\r\nprórrogas que procedan.- Se afirma que el último plazo venció en el 2007 sin\r\nembargo mediante el mecanismo de prórroga se permitió seguir manteniendo la\r\nexoneración hasta final del 2013 y con un período final de eliminación gradual\r\nde dos años hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2015.- Afirma que en relación con la\r\npotestad tributaria y autonomía municipal la exención de los incisos g) y h)\r\ndebe entenderse recogido en establecido en el artículo 121 inciso 13 respecto\r\nde que es a las Municipalidades con exclusividad a quienes les corresponde\r\ndeterminar los elementos del tributo, por ser éstas quienes deben proponer los\r\nproyectos para la creación de tales gravámenes. De lo expuesto es claro que la Asamblea no puede, de\r\nmanera unilateral, arrogarse la competencia para crear y otorgar exenciones a\r\ntravés de leyes ordinarias respecto de tributos municipales. Se afirma que la Sala, al tratar de conjugar\r\nesta potestad con la de la\r\n Asamblea, para regular casos de interés nacional que toquen\r\ntemas locales, ha señalado que la Constitución resuelve el problema con el\r\nestablecimiento de la consulta a las Municipalidades de los proyectos sobre\r\nesta materia. Así las cosas, resulta claro las leyes impugnadas fueran en lo\r\npertinente iniciativa de la\r\n Municipalidad o bien que se les hubiera consultado su texto,\r\nya que la ley 7830 que permite a COMEX extenderle a las empresas los beneficios\r\ny plazos de exoneración de impuestos municipales y la ley 8794 su transitorio\r\nextiende el plazo de la exoneración de manera general y sujeta a las prórrogas\r\nrespecto del cumplimiento de las obligaciones con la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio. Por lo anterior, era requerido cumplir con la debida consulta a\r\nlas Municipalidades, lo cual no se dio. \r\nEn virtud de lo expuesto solicita que se anulen las reformas a la Ley de zonas Francas que\r\nmantienen vigentes los incentivos contenidos en esa legislación, concretamente\r\nlos incisos d) y h) del artículo 20 de la ley 7210 que exonera a las empresas\r\nacogidas a ese régimen del pago de impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles.\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.-\r\nEl trámite de esta acción se suspendió el 20 de marzo de 2013, de conformidad\r\ncon el artículo 84 de la Ley\r\nde la\r\n Jurisdicción Constitucional, mientras se resolvía una gestión\r\nsimilar presentada con anterioridad y que fue declarada sin lugar el 25 de\r\nsetiembre de 2013.- \n\r\n\r\n\n3.- Por\r\nresolución de las diecisiete horas dieciocho minutos del 3 de abril de 2014 se\r\ndio curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad y confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General\r\nde la República\r\ny al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior.\n\r\n\r\n\n 4.- En\r\nescrito del 7 de mayo de 2014 se apersona Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, mayor,\r\ncasada, abogada, vecina de Curridabat, cédula \r\nen su condición de Procuradora General de la República,\r\nresponde a la audiencia conferida y señala que el reclamo del recurrente se\r\ndirige a lograr que la Sala\r\ndeclare la inconstitucionalidad de las normas discutidas que reglan exenciones\r\na empresas que funcionan en zonas francas e indica que el eje de su\r\nargumentación es la falta de consulta de tales decisiones legislativas a las\r\ncorporaciones municipales al tratarse de reglas que eximen de impuestos\r\nmunicipales a tales empresas. El órgano asesor señala que debe hacerse un\r\nanálisis de cuales son los impuestos eximidos para determinar primero si son\r\nmunicipales o no y luego verificar la existencia de la consulta a los entes\r\nmunicipales.- El producto de esa labor arroja la conclusión de que las\r\nexenciones contra las que se reclama, no todas son de impuestos municipales y\r\nen concreto no lo son el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles ni tampoco el pago de\r\ntimbres por concepto de traspasos, de modo que respecto de la exención de tales\r\nimpuestos, no se configura ninguna lesión a la autonomía municipal ni a la\r\npotestad tributaria de dichos entes. Agrega que de cualquier forma, la ley 7210\r\nen su tramitación sí incluyó la consulta\r\nrespectiva a la\r\n Municipalidades respecto de su texto.- Por otra parte, existe\r\nen el artículo 20 inciso h) de la citada Ley una exoneración del pago de\r\npatentes municipales, de manera que respecto de ese impuesto sí cabe analizar\r\nsi se cumplió o no el requisito, siendo que, para comenzar, el texto original\r\nde la ley, sí fue consultado tal y como se acaba de indicar.- Por otra parte,\r\nen cuanto a los transitorios I y II de la ley 8794 contra los que se reclama,\r\nse afirma que debe valorarse el hecho de que dicha ley no fue consultada a las\r\nMunicipalidades aún cuando las exenciones de la ley y en particular la relacionada con las\r\npatentes municipales fue prorrogada en dichos transitorios.- Señala la Procuraduría\r\nque debe prestarse atención al hecho de que el plazo no es un elemento esencial\r\ndel tributo ni del hecho exento por lo que bien puede afirmarse que la prórroga\r\ndel plazo para el disfrute de los incentivos discutidos no debía ajustarse al\r\nprocedimiento de consulta del 190 Constitucional. Finalmente se indica que la\r\nley 7830 no es inconstitucional pues no es en ella que se crean las exenciones\r\ncontra las que se reclama.- \n\r\n\r\n\n 5.- Fernando\r\nOcampo Sánchez mayor cédula de identidad número 1-191-100, en su condición de\r\nMinistro a.i. de Comercio Exterior y Jorge Sequeira Picado mayor, cédula de\r\nidentidad 1-576-012 en su calidad de \r\nGerente General de la\r\n Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica, se apersonan a contestar la audiencia\r\nconferida y exponen su criterio sobre la acción planteada.- En primer término\r\nobjetan la legitimación del accionante pues consideran que no ha demostrado que\r\nse esté en el caso de inexistencia de lesión individual y directa ni tampoco se\r\ndemuestra la presencia de intereses difusos, pues tan solo se hace referencia a\r\nla posible lesión de intereses que el Concejo considera relevante. En cuanto al fondo, se señala que la\r\nsituación jurídica creada por la ley de zonas francas es altamente compleja y\r\nen ella participan varios órganos que velan porque la concesión de los\r\nbeneficios que se otorgan a las empresas corresponda a los mejores intereses\r\ndel país. De ese modo, no existe un derecho automático al régimen sino que\r\nexiste un margen de discrecionalidad. Por otra parte, ya en cuanto a los\r\nincentivos, ello están efectivamente regulados en el inciso 20 de la ley\r\n7210, en incluyen exención de tributos\r\nmunicipales por lo que, de acuerdo a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional,\r\ntales normas deben haberse consultado a dichas entidades autónomas, lo cual\r\nefectivamente se hizo como se aprecia del expediente legislativo. También\r\nrelacionado con esto, es bueno recordar que los intereses locales no privan por\r\nencima de los nacionales sino que se da una coexistencia, como en el caso de\r\nlas zonas francas. Con ello debería quedar claro que no tiene razón la\r\naccionante al reclamar la falta de competencia de la Asamblea para emitir este\r\ntipo de legislación de fomento incluyendo en ella incentivos de distintos\r\ntipos. También es importante enmarcar la acción aclarando que existe una clara\r\ndiferencia entre tributos nacionales con destino municipal y los tributos\r\npropiamente municipales, que la Sala Constitucional ha definido como los que son\r\nproducto de una iniciativa municipal. En este punto resulta importante destacar\r\nque precisamente el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, antiguamente conocido como\r\nimpuesto territorial no ha dejado de ser un impuesto nacional, respecto del\r\ncual lo único en que las Municipalidades participan es en su recaudación y\r\nbeneficio. También como parte del marco de análisis de esta acción debe\r\nsubrayarse que la principal característica del régimen de zonas francas lo es\r\nla actividad de fomento, tema en el que intereses nacionales y locales deben\r\nconverger por recibir beneficios ambas partes la local y el gobierno nacional.-\r\nEn concreto se puede demostrar con números los beneficios de la operación de\r\nlas zonas francas pues, por ejemplo, han tenido una participación cercana al\r\ncincuenta por ciento de las exportaciones totales, y su valor en 2012 fue de\r\npoco menos de seis mil millones de dólares con un crecimiento de 4,7 por\r\nciento, mayor al 4,3 de las exportaciones totales de bienes. Igualmente esta\r\nriqueza se distribuye si vemos el aumento en los puestos de trabajo que\r\nalcanzan prácticamente los 70 mil puesto de trabajo, es decir 17 mil puesto más\r\nque en 2008 y con un salario promedio que es 1, 7 veces mayor que el promedio\r\ndel salario privado nacional. También se aprecia la importancia del proyecto\r\ncuando se ven los encadenamientos que se producen que han hecho que se compren\r\nbienes y servicios nacionales por 2 mil millones de dólares. Frente a ello debe\r\nanalizarse cuáles son los beneficios para las empresas que han sido\r\ncuestionados por la accionante: en primer lugar el impuesto sobre bienes\r\ninmuebles que tal y como lo ha señalado la Sala (6589-2006) es un impuesto nacional. En\r\nsegundo lugar el impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles que no solo fue\r\ncreado como un impuesto nacional por su ley sino que ni siquiera tiene relación\r\ncon las Municipalidades respecto de los beneficios o administración. Afirma el\r\nrecurrente que probablemente se quiso rescatar el timbre municipal que se cobra\r\nen los traspasos de bienes inmuebles, pero este es también un impuesto nacional\r\nestablecido en el Código Municipal, y del cual las Municipalidades son\r\nbeneficiarias en similares condiciones que el impuesto de bienes inmuebles.\r\nTambién tiene naturaleza de gravamen nacional el tributo mencionado en la\r\nexención del inciso g) del artículo 20 impugnado, es decir aquella que exime de\r\npago a los tributos que graven las utilidades. Finalmente el inciso h) sí\r\nmenciona tributos y patente municipales, pero en este punto vale recordar que\r\npara el caso sí se dio la consulta obligatoria que se ha exigido. El segundo aparte de la acción reclama contra\r\nla ley 7830 pero se debe observar que más dicha ley estableció una delimitación\r\ny restricción mayor en el otorgamiento de los beneficios para empresas en\r\nrégimen de zonas francas y no contiene ampliación o extensión de plazos como\r\nerróneamente se señala. En efecto en dicha ley se modificó para incluir un tema\r\nelativo a montos mínimos de inversión pues antes no había mínimos; se\r\nincrementaron los controles en el régimen de zonas francas: por ejemplo,\r\nprotección del medio ambiente, control aduanero; obligación de dar tratamiento\r\na desperdicios y subproductos, restricciones para otorgamiento de beneficios en\r\nel caso de empresas administradoras de parque industrial para cerrar portillos\r\ncon la instalación de empresas nacionales, que aprovecharan indirectamente de\r\ntales beneficios; se ampliaron los informes a cargo de las empresas de zona\r\nfranca en relación con sus operaciones; se eliminó el beneficio de desgravación\r\ndel artículo 20 para empresas comercializadoras; se establecen mayores controles para las\r\nempresas administradoras de parque industrial; como se dijo se establecieron\r\nmayores restricciones específicas para otorgar el régimen, en concreto con el\r\n20 bis impugnado, que leído correctamente más bien vio a limitar la posibilidad\r\nde prolongar el régimen para las empresas, pues debe tenerse en cuenta que se\r\npaso de un sistema de prolongación ilimitado a uno en donde se imponían\r\ncondiciones objetivas y claras, para considerar (no para otorgar\r\nautomáticamente) un nuevo período de beneficio; también se creó una mayor\r\nexigencia de inversión dentro y fuera del parque; se delimitó también el\r\nporcentaje máximo de ventas en el mercado local. En resumen, como puede verse\r\nno existe ninguna afectación de competencias municipales.- En cuanto a la\r\nley 8794, debe dejarse claro que ninguno de los transitorios\r\nimpugnados prorroga los incentivos establecidos. El antecedente de esta ley es\r\nmuy específico y es el relacionado con los compromisos de Costa Rica con la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio y en particular los ligados a la actividad exportadora otorgados a\r\nlas empresas manufactureras. Esto se cumplió con dicha ley al eliminar los\r\nsubsidios prohibidos otorgados a las empresas de manufactura, respetando las\r\nsituaciones consolidadas que ya tienen operaciones.- En la exposición de\r\nmotivos se indica claramente es adecuar la normativa interna. Los transitorios\r\nse incorporaron para aclarar que una vez que se venzan las prorrogas concedidas\r\na Costa Rica por la OMC,\r\ncesarán y quedarán sin efecto los beneficios establecidos en el artículo 20\r\npara empresas procesadoras y el Estado costarricense no otorgará más dichos\r\nincentivos a las empresas que ingresen en el régimen. Asimismo, el transitorio\r\nIV dice que las empresas de la categoría especificada, que hayan ingresado al\r\nrégimen antes del vencimiento del plazo establecido y se encuentren en las\r\ncondiciones señaladas se le respetarán las condiciones señaladas en dicho\r\ninciso y los plazos establecidos en el acuerdo ejecutivo de otorgamiento.- El\r\nobjetivo de los transitorios es restringir el plazo de otorgamiento de los\r\nincentivos prohibidos por la OMC\r\ny en ningún caso se puede interpretar que los prorrogan. Incluso tal\r\ncondicionamiento se incluye en los acuerdos de otorgamiento y en los contratos\r\nde operaciones, de manera que es claro que la ley citada no modificó ni creó\r\nexoneraciones de impuestos impuesto municipales. Como resultado es importante\r\nhacer énfasis en que la ley 8794 no modificó ni varió ningún elemento del hecho\r\nexento creado regularmente en su momento en la ley 7210. Los transitorios se\r\nencargan más bien de dimensionar los efectos de una norma creada antes, (ley\r\n7210) a raíz de la necesidad de cumplir obligaciones de carácter internacional.\r\nFue la ley original la que creo la dispensa por lo que, por todo lo dicho la\r\nacción debe declararse sin lugar.-\n\r\n\r\n\n 6.-\r\nMartha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, en su \r\ncondición de Vicepresidenta con \r\nfacultades de apoderada \r\ngeneralísima sin límite de \r\nsuma de la Asociación \r\n Cámara de Industriales \r\nde Costa Rica; Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, en \r\nsu condición de Primer\r\nVicepresidente y representante legal de la Asociación Cámara\r\nde Comercio de Costa Rica y Mónica Segnini Acosta, en su condición de \r\nPresidenta con facultades \r\nde apoderado generalísimo \r\nsin límite de suma de la Asociación Cámara\r\nde Exportadores de Costa Rica, presentan por separado sus escritos de\r\ncoadyuvancia con textos virtualmente similares y en donde señala que el régimen\r\nde zonas francas resulta de enorme importancia para el país, pues se trata de\r\nuna actividad de fomento que estimula la realización de nuevas inversiones en\r\nel país. Resulta lógico entender que las empresas internacionales que ingresan\r\nal país requieren y buscan empresas nacionales para que colaboren en sus tareas\r\ny así se reproducen una serie de ventajas que hacen que la economía crezca y es\r\nobvio también que cualquier intento de atacar el régimen de zonas francas\r\nresulta también detrimento de la industria nacional que por ello tiene el deber\r\nde aportar a la defensa de la ley.- En cuanto al reclamo particular se señala\r\nque el accionante carece de legitimación pues el reclamo posee un carácter abstracto y no coincide con las excepciones\r\nestablecidas en la ley y con la naturaleza incidental de la acción, pero\r\ntambién puede acusarse que no está suficientemente fundamentada.- Agrega, ya en\r\ncuanto al fondo, que los incentivos creados por la ley en cuestión satisfacen\r\nintereses de carácter nacional y así, los beneficios tributarios que se ofrecen\r\ncomprenden exoneraciones de impuestos nacionales y no municipales, pero además\r\ndebe indicarse que ni siquiera todos los impuestos en los que participan las\r\nmunicipalidades tienen ese carácter como lo ha señalado la Sala Constitucional\r\nrespecto del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles.- Solo queda entonces la exención\r\na la patente municipal que fue consultada a los gobiernos municipales como\r\nseñala la\r\n Procuraduría en su informe. Respecto de la ley 7830 afirma la\r\ncoadyuvante que nunca tuvo como objetivo prorrogar o extender el plazo de\r\nbeneficios fiscales o de otro tipo, sino que se establecieron más controles al\r\nrégimen, como puede verse de los artículos 13, 14,2, 16, 19.d entre otros y se\r\nampliaron los requisitos para el otorgamiento de régimen de zonas francas.\r\nSobre la ley 8794, se reclaman sus transitorios respecto de los cuales la\r\naccionante incurre en una errónea interpretación, pues al analizar la ley\r\ncuestionada se ve que se tuvo por objeto adecuar la ley a los requerimientos de\r\nla\r\n Organización Mundial de Comercio en particular en el caso de\r\nempresas de manufactura que exportan.- \r\nAsí, los transitorios no conllevan una extensión o prórroga de plazos o\r\nbeneficios, pues más bien el objetivo de los transitorios es restringir el\r\nplazo de otorgamiento de incentivos prohibidos por la OMC, de modo que es claro que\r\nlos plazos siguen siendo los de la ley y en particular los del artículo 20.\r\nComo complemento de la anterior afirmación vale señalar que en la práctica el\r\nPoder Ejecutivo otorga los beneficios con apego a lo establecido en dicho\r\nartículo como se puede observar de los acuerdos ejecutivos que usualmente se\r\nemiten.- Por esa razón, no se afectaron competencias municipales y por tanto no\r\nexistía obligación de consulta como lo indica la Procuraduría y\r\nademás cabe indicar la jurisprudencia constitucional en relación con la\r\ninexistencia de obligación de consultar nuevamente proyectos de ley que\r\ncontemplen modificaciones a una norma previamente consultada según se aprecia\r\nen la sentencia 2008-15760.\n\r\n\r\n\n 7.-\r\nJorge Brenes Ramírez, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de\r\napoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la Asociación de\r\nEmpresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica, también acude como coadyuvante a favor\r\nde la constitucionalidad de norma y señala que existe un claro interés de su\r\nagrupación y que el accionante en cambio no cumple con los requisitos legales\r\nal existir serias contradicciones en su fundamentación.- En cuanto al fondo, se\r\nhace una descripción del funcionamiento de las zonas francas y se hace énfasis\r\nen la necesidad de un acuerdo por parte del órgano competente de la\r\n Administración. También, por otro lado, aborda el tema de las\r\npotestades municipales y la consulta del artículo 190 y concluye que no existe\r\nen realidad ninguna obligación de consulta, pero que se atienen a lo resuelto\r\npor la Sala en\r\nel sentido de que se aplica dicha regla a pesar de no ser expresamente\r\nestablecida para ellas.- De cualquier forma, se indica, las exoneraciones\r\nfueron consultadas como proyecto a las Municipalidades incluida la de Belén.\r\nAgrega que, en concreto sobre los reclamos de la acción debe desmentirse el\r\nreferido a la disminución y afectación de ingresos municipales pues\r\nhistóricamente la\r\n Municipalidad de Belén cerró con superávit prespuestario en\r\nlos últimos años por lo que no podría señalarse que le hace falta dinero si mas\r\nbien no gasta todo el que recauda y presenta diferencias a su favor de más de\r\n5000 millones de colones. En cuanto al tema de la necesidad de consulta debe\r\niniciarse señalando que no todos los impuestos que se reclaman son municipales\r\nsino solamente el denominado patente municipal, pues los demás, y especialmente\r\nel impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles es nacional como lo tiene dicho la Sala Constitucional.-\r\nSimilar situación se da con respecto al impuesto al traspaso de bienes\r\ninmuebles pues no está destinado siquiera a las Municipalidades.- Se reclama\r\nque el artículo 20 bis de la Ley\r\nincluido por la ley 7830 tampoco fue consultado, pero basta leerlo para que\r\nresulte claro que se trata de un artículo más bien restrictivo para impedir que\r\nuna empresa vuelva a recibir los beneficios por un mismo proyecto y además no\r\nse toca ninguno de los elementos del tributo ni de la exoneración.- Finalmente,\r\nsobre los transitorios de la Ley\r\n8794 se enfatiza que el accionante parte de una errónea interpretación de su\r\ntexto y por ello debería ser una cuestión de legalidad.- Sin embargo, se afirma\r\nque la correcta lectura de ellos es que vienen a disminuir los plazos de los\r\nbeneficios del régimen y así se hace reserva de los derechos adquiridos de\r\nbuena fe. No hay prórrogas sino más\r\nbien, como se puede ver de los textos de los acuerdos ejecutivos de\r\nautorización, el contrato dice que los\r\nbeneficios serán limitados según o dispone la OMC. Si bien el artículo\r\nhabla de prórrogas lo hace respecto del ajuste de la legislación costarricense\r\npero no implica en automático una prórroga. Por último si la Sala decide declarar la\r\nlimitación de los beneficios del inciso h) del artículo 20, se pide que tome en\r\ncuenta los derechos adquiridos al amparo de la ley al estarse claramente en\r\nfrente de situaciones consolidadas.-\n\r\n\r\n\n 8.-\r\nHumberto Pacheco Alpízar, en su condición de Presidente y representante \r\nlegal de la Asociación Cámara\r\nCostarricense Norteamericana de Comercio, presenta también un escrito de\r\ncoadyuvancia en dentro del que expone el criterio de la asociación que representa\r\nen relación con la acción presentada. Comienza por definir los conceptos de\r\npoder tributario e impuesto nacional para concluir que en general las\r\nexenciones reclamadas son de naturaleza nacional y no afectan la autonomía\r\nmunicipal.- Respecto de ésta última, señala que efectivamente permite que\r\nexista una exclusividad en la iniciativa de creación y modificación de\r\nimpuestos pero, según la jurisprudencia de la Sala ello puede solventarse por parte de la Asamblea a través del\r\nmecanismo de consulta. Expuesto lo anterior entra a analizar los argumentos del\r\naccionante y señala que le falta legitimación activa y en cuanto al fondo\r\nindica que debe dejarse claro que la ley 7210 de zonas francas sí fue\r\nconsultada a las Municipalidades en su momento y con ello queda eliminada\r\ncualquier duda. En cuanto a la ley 7830 explica que dicha normativa no modificó\r\nla naturaleza del tributo ni su exoneración pues los plazos quedaron igual y\r\nmás bien se restringieron las posibilidades en la ley para otorgar nuevos\r\nproyectos a empresas ya beneficiarias. Por su parte, respecto de los\r\ntransitorios de la ley 8794, se dice que en general no era necesaria la\r\nconsulta al no haberse cambiado las condiciones y la exoneración. Se afirma que\r\nexiste una errónea interpretación de la normativa pues no puede entenderse que\r\nexista una prórroga a los incentivos, ya que más se tuvo como finalidad adecuar\r\nlas condiciones nacionales a los compromisos con la Organización Mundial\r\nde Comercio. Por ello, el objetivo de los transitorios es más bien restringir\r\nel plazo del otorgamiento de incentivos y no se puede entender prorrogados\r\nrazón por la cual los transitorios deben\r\ninterpretarse de forma acorde a lo dispuesto en los acuerdos de la O. M. C.\n\r\n\r\n\n 9.- Los\r\nedictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\n Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 91, 92 y\r\n93 del Boletín judicial, de los días\r\n14, 15 y 16 de mayo del 2014.\n\r\n\r\n\n 10.- El\r\n6 de junio de 2014 el expediente fue turnado a la Magistrada Hernández\r\nLópez para su estudio y resolución.-\n\r\n\r\n\n 11.- El\r\n17 de marzo de 2015 se acoge la inhibitoria presentada por la Magistrada Hernández\r\nLópez para conocer este asunto y se nombra en su lugar al Magistrado Jorge\r\nAraya García\n\r\n\r\n\n13.- Se\r\nprescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\n Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al\r\nestimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas\r\nevidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.\n\r\n\r\n\n 14.-\r\nEn los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley\n\r\n\r\n\n Redacta el Magistrado Araya García;\r\ny,\n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando:\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- Sobre los\r\naspectos formales y la legitimación para la presentación de esta acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad. En esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, las partes\r\ninvolucradas han planteado objeciones, tanto respecto de la legitimación del\r\naccionante como por la falta de cumplimiento de la debida fundamentación del\r\nreclamo.- En relación al primer punto, existe una línea jurisprudencial\r\nconteste respecto de la posibilidad de que el Alcalde Municipal, con la\r\nautorización del Concejo Municipal, active la vía de control de\r\nconstitucionalidad con el fin de proteger derechos de los munícipes de su\r\ncantón. Ese es precisamente el caso en donde la documentación permite concluir\r\nque el Alcalde ha sido instruido por el Concejo Municipal para incoar esta\r\nacción a favor del cobro de tributos cuyo producto reciben y destinan para la\r\ngestión municipal.- Desde tal perspectiva, el reclamo encuentra su ajuste en el\r\npárrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Constitución\r\n Política, excepción hecha de algunos de los tributos que han\r\nsido incluidos dentro del reclamo pero cuestionamiento debe rechazarse de\r\nplano. Por lo demás, el escrito de presentación de la acción resulta ser\r\nsuficientemente explícito en cuanto a la manera en que las normas legales\r\nlesionan las competencias que la Constitución\r\n Política otorga a las Municipalidades. Por ello la acción\r\ndebe admitirse y conocerse en relación con el fondo de lo planteado.\n\r\n\r\n\nII.- Sobre las\r\nnormas objeto de la impugnación. Las\r\nnormas jurídicas de las que se pide una declaración de inconstitucionalidad son\r\nlas siguientes:\n\r\n\r\n\nA) el artículo 20 bis de la Ley 7210 de Zonas Francas, que\r\nfue agregado mediante ley 7830 de 22 de setiembre de 1998 exclusivamente por falta de cumplimiento de la consulta a las\r\nMunicipalidades exigida en el artículo 190 Constitucional. El texto de dicho artículo reza: \n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 20 bis.-\n\r\n\r\n\nNo se otorgará el Régimen de Zonas Francas a personas físicas ni\r\njurídicas para operar ni desarrollar una empresa o proyecto de inversión ya\r\nbeneficiado de los incentivos del Régimen, aunque haya sido al amparo de una\r\npersona física o jurídica distinta, salvo que se demuestre que es un proyecto\r\nnuevo o, en casos excepcionales, cuando la naturaleza y magnitud de las\r\ninversiones adicionales lo justifiquen; todo a juicio del Ministerio de\r\nComercio Exterior y de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el reglamento de esta\r\nley.”\n\r\n\r\n\nB) También se\r\nreclama la nulidad de los transitorios I y II de la Ley número 8794 de 12 de enero\r\ndel 2010 por entenderse que en su\r\ntrámite de aprobación legislativa se omitió también la consulta necesaria a las\r\nmunicipalidades. Tales normas señalan textualmente:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Transitorio I.-\n\r\n\r\n\nLos incentivos de los\r\nincisos b), d), f), g), h) y i) del artículo 20 de la Ley de régimen de zonas\r\nfrancas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre de 1990, y sus reformas, se continuarán\r\ndisfrutando por parte de las empresas indicadas en el inciso a) del artículo 17\r\nde dicha Ley, hasta la fecha en que venza para Costa Rica el plazo previsto en\r\nel párrafo 4 del artículo 27 del Acuerdo sobre subvenciones y medidas\r\ncompensatorias que forma parte del Acta final en que se incorporan los\r\nresultados de la Ronda\r\n Uruguay de negociaciones comerciales multilaterales, aprobada\r\nmediante la Ley N.°\r\n7475, de 20 de diciembre de 1994, incluidas las prórrogas aprobadas por el\r\nComité de Subsidios y Medidas Compensatorias de la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio y en tanto Costa Rica sea elegible y obtenga dichas prórrogas,\r\nmomento en el cual cesarán y se dejarán sin efecto los beneficios. A más tardar\r\na partir de la misma fecha en que venza el plazo antes indicado, los demás\r\nincentivos aplicables a las empresas beneficiarias del régimen de zonas francas\r\ndeberán haberse adecuado en lo pertinente, respecto de las empresas indicadas\r\nen el inciso a) del artículo 17 de la\r\n Ley de régimen de zonas francas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre\r\nde 1990, a\r\nlas disposiciones del mencionado Acuerdo sobre subvenciones y medidas\r\ncompensatorias, conforme a las disposiciones reglamentarias que para el efecto\r\ndictará el Poder Ejecutivo.”\n\r\n\r\n\n“Transitorio II.-\n\r\n\r\n\n Lo dispuesto en\r\nel transitorio 1 modifica en lo pertinente el alcance y los plazos de las\r\nexoneraciones y los incentivos previstos en el artículo 20 de la Ley de régimen de zonas\r\nfrancas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre de 1990, en cuanto a las empresas\r\nindicadas en el inciso a) del artículo 17 de la citada Ley y debe entenderse incorporado\r\na los respectivos acuerdos de otorgamiento del régimen de zonas francas, sin\r\nperjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, si en algún caso existen.”\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- Breve encuadre del\r\nrégimen de zonas francas dentro del entorno económico productivo a nivel\r\nnacional.- De previo a exponer sus razonamientos estrictamente jurídicos, este\r\ntribunal considera apropiado reproducir algunos de los datos aportados a este\r\nexpediente por algunos intervinientes, en relación con el aporte a la economía\r\nnacional de las empresas que operan en régimen de zona franca, lo anterior con\r\nel fin de dar mayor solidez a la tesis de que en esta materia están de por\r\nmedio cuestiones que tienen trascendencia nacional y exceden el ámbito de los\r\nintereses y servicios locales. Con base en el informe titulado “Balance de las\r\nZonas Francas: beneficio neto del régimen para Costa Rica” elaborado en abril\r\nde 2015, se tiene que las empresas en este régimen ascendieron en el año 2013 a 297 y por su medio el\r\npaís conforma más de la mitad de las exportaciones entre 2009 y 2013. También\r\npuede atribuirse a este régimen una diversificación de los productos\r\nexportables con menor concentración en productos agrícolas una ampliación de\r\nlos destinos de las exportaciones, lo cual resulta ser una ventaja indudable en\r\nlos casos de crisis económicas como las que recientemente han afectado algunas\r\nzonas del globo.-\n\r\n\r\n\nPor otra parte, en materia de\r\ntrabajo se tiene que el nivel de empleo bruto generado por las empresas en Zona\r\nFranca creció en 2013 en un promedio de 8,7, superior al 5,7 a nivel nacional y\r\nalcanzó poco más de 75 mil empleos directos. Se indica que los salarios pagados\r\nen las empresas en régimen de zona franca son en promedio 73 por ciento mas\r\naltos que los que paga el resto del sector privado costarricense. \n\r\n\r\n\nTambién se destaca la deriva\r\nde las ventajas que produce el régimen hacia otros sectores que se ven\r\nindirectamente beneficiados, gracias a los denominados encadenamientos\r\nproductivos respecto de lo cuales el informe indica que han crecido a una tasa\r\nde un 13, 5 por ciento y que en el 2013 se alcanzó una cifra de 1,547 millones\r\nde dólares, siendo los más beneficiados con este dinero el sector de empresas\r\nnacionales que prestan servicios a los beneficiarios del régimen.\n\r\n\r\n\nFinalmente, y por ser\r\nrelevante para lo que aquí se discute, resulta interesante repetir los datos\r\nque aporta el informe mencionado en relación con un instrumento de medición\r\ndenominado Beneficio País Neto (BPN) que se construye mediante la\r\ncuantificación, primero del Beneficio País (BP) que surge de sumar los\r\ndiferenciales generados por el régimen en salarios, en cargas sociales; en\r\nimpuestos asociados a empleo, en gasto nacional en compra de bienes y\r\nservicios; y los cambios en inversión acumulada de las empresas, para luego\r\nrestar a dicho Beneficio país (BP) el\r\ncosto de las exoneraciones reconocidas a las empresas en régimen de Zona Franca\r\nrespecto los impuesto de renta; impuesto a la importanción; impuesto a las\r\npropiedades; impuestos municipales; impuestos de ventas en compras locales y gastos de la administración del régimen.- \n\r\n\r\n\nComo se indicó, dicha\r\noperación de restar los costos de exoneraciones produce el denominado beneficio\r\nPaís neto (BPN) que viene a ser lo que el país ganó de forma neta con el\r\nrégimen, y se indica que para el período de 2012-2013 el BPN fue de 3,316\r\nmillones de dólares en promedio; esto representa que por cada dólar que el país\r\ninvirtió en el régimen para atraer empresas, se generaron para la economía\r\ncostarricense 7, 4 dólares de beneficio neto. En esta línea, el informe cierra\r\ncon un dato claro y contundente: esa cifra de 3,316 millones de dólares de\r\n(BPN) Beneficio País neto, equivale, para el período 2012-2013 estudiado, a un\r\n7,1 por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto, \r\nque para efectos prácticos, resulta equivalente a lo que el país\r\ninvierte anualmente en educación pública.\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Delimitación\r\ndel objeto de la acción y de los alcances de esta decisión. Sobre el objeto de esta\r\nacción, el accionante señala en su petitoria:\n\r\n\r\n\n“En virtud de todo\r\nlo expuesto solicitamos a esa Honorable Sala Constitucional anular por\r\ninconstitucionales las reformas a la\r\n Ley de Zonas Francas que mantienen vigentes los\r\nincentivos contenidos en esa legislación, concretamente de los incisos d)\r\ny h) del artículo 20 de la Ley\r\n7210, que exoneran a las empresas acogidas a ese régimen, del pago de impuesto\r\nsobre bienes inmuebles, del traspaso de bienes inmuebles, del pago de todo\r\ntributo y particular del impuesto de patente municipal, por medio de las leyes\r\n7830 de 22 de setiembre de 1998 y la\r\n Ley 8794, de 12 de enero de 2010.” (el destacado en\r\nletra cursiva no pertenece al original)\n\r\n\r\n\nDicha petitoria se\r\nfundamenta en que tales reformas legales no cumplieron con requisitos\r\nesenciales del procedimiento legislativo y concretamente se echa de menos la\r\nfalta de consulta a las Municipalidades del país. En sus propias palabras:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Así las cosas, si durante la\r\ntramitación de los proyectos que dieron origen a las leyes 7830 de 22 de\r\nsetiembre de 1998 por la cual se adiciona el artículo 20 bis que sirve de fundamento\r\na COMEX para extender los plazos de exoneración, como la ley 8794, de 12 de\r\nenero de 2010 que extiende los plazos y amplía el número de empresas\r\nbeneficiarias, no se dio audiencia a las Municipalidades para que se refirieran\r\na las implicaciones de dichos proyectos, las actuales leyes resultan en\r\ninconstitucionales y así debe declararse con las respectivas consecuencias\r\nlegales.”\n\r\n\r\n\nLos extractos anteriores\r\nsirven a este Tribunal para decantar el objeto de la acción y los motivos de\r\ninconstitucionalidad tal y como se resume de seguido:\n\r\n\r\n\na) se acusa la\r\ninvalidez del trámite legislativo de la\r\n Ley 7830 de 22 de setiembre de 1998 (en adelante\r\nindicada como “ley 7830”)\r\nque entre otras normas introdujo el actual artículo 20 bis en la Ley de Zonas Francas número\r\n7210. De esa norma específica (el artículo 20 bis) se indica que, a pesar de\r\ndesmejorar fuentes de ingresos municipales, no fue consultada a las\r\nMunicipalidades del país como lo exige el artículo 190 Constitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\nb) se acusa\r\ntambién la invalidez del trámite\r\nlegislativo de la Ley\r\n8794, de 12 de enero de 2010 (identificada en lo que sigue como “Ley 8794”) la cual introdujo, entre otras normas sobre el tema\r\nde la zonas francas, los Transitorios I y II. De Tales normas (los transitorios\r\nI y II) se alega que disponen una prórroga del plazo de exoneraciones de los\r\nimpuestos municipales para las empresas beneficiarias del régimen de zona\r\nfranca, pero el proyecto de ley no fue consultado a las Municipalidades como lo\r\nimpone el numeral 190 de la Carta Fundamental.\n\r\n\r\n\n V.- Rechazo de la acción en cuanto a al impuesto\r\nsobre bienes inmuebles y al impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles.- Como se\r\nviene de explicarse, el accionante acude en su calidad de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Belén\r\ne instruido por el Concejo Municipal de dicho cantón con el fin de defender los\r\nintereses de su comunidad frente a normas legislativas que dicen afectarles en\r\nlos términos específicos arriba indicados, es decir en cuanto se trata de\r\nimponer prórrogas a las exoneraciones de tributos municipales sin cumplir con\r\nel trámite de consulta del artículo 190 Constitucional.- Ahora bien, la\r\nlegitimación del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\n Constitucional en que se apoya el accionante no le alcanza\r\npara cuestionar todos los tributos exonerados mediante la ley número 7210 de\r\nZonas Francas, sino solamente para defender sus intereses respecto de los tributos\r\nde carácter municipal, vale decir los que han surgido a la vida jurídica\r\npor la iniciativa municipal en los términos del artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución\r\n Política. De ese modo, debe rechazarse en primer lugar la\r\nobjeción por falta de consulta en cuanto se dirige contra el impuesto sobre\r\nbienes inmuebles establecido en la ley número 7509 del 9 de mayo de 1995 y sus\r\nreformas, el cual -como lo indica la Procuraduría- \r\nposee un carácter nacional por haber sido emitido a través de una ley\r\nordinaria, aún cuando la competencia tributaria para su administración y la\r\ndefinición del destino de los fondos le corresponda a las corporaciones\r\nmunicipales.- Este punto fue precisado con claridad por esta Sala en la\r\nsentencia número 2011-003075 que indicó:\n\r\n\r\n\nA.- Sobre la jurisprudencia\r\nrelacionada con el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Uno de los aspectos\r\nque debe dirimir esta Sala está resuelto en la jurisprudencia de la Sala, al haberse determinado\r\nla naturaleza del impuesto, es decir, si es un gravamen municipal o\r\nnacional. Lo anterior tiene consecuencias para el enfoque de los reclamos\r\nplanteados por la\r\n Municipalidad de Escazú. Los precedentes de esta Sala han\r\nreiterado que se trata de un impuesto nacional con destino municipal, y que, si\r\nbien se reconoce la iniciativa tributaria a las municipalidades, no es posible\r\nentender exclusividad en esta materia que limite la libertad de configuración\r\ncuando la iniciativa la ejerza el legislador. En este sentido, el Estado puede\r\nmediante impuestos nacionales dotar de recursos extraordinarios a las\r\nMunicipalidades del país con el importante objetivo de financiarlas. De este\r\nmodo, se ha indicado que: \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Discrecionalidad municipal en relación con\r\ntributos nacionales. A juicio de la y los consultantes, resulta\r\ninconstitucional que las municipalidades puedan disponer de extremos\r\nrelacionados con el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, que es un tributo\r\nnacional, no local. En efecto, la\r\n Ley del Impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, número 7509 de nueve\r\nde mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, establece un impuesto nacional, a\r\nfavor de las municipalidades, los cuales respecto de dicho tributo, tienen la\r\ncalidad de beneficiarios y de administración tributaria. Así lo entendió esta\r\nSala en sentencia número 3930-95, de las quince horas veintisiete minutos del\r\ndieciocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, en la cual dispuso que:\r\n\"Lo expresado en el considerando anterior, no debe provocar la falsa\r\nconclusión, que solamente son constitucionales los tributos municipales que se\r\noriginen en una iniciativa del gobierno local. La jurisprudencia lo que ha\r\nseñalado, claramente, es que existen servicios públicos que por su naturaleza,\r\nno pueden ser más que municipales y que se involucran en la definición que da\r\nel artículo 169 de la Constitución Política al señalar que «La\r\nadministración de los intereses y servicios locales de cada cantón, estará a\r\ncargo del Gobierno Municipal.» Si esos intereses y servicios requieren del pago\r\nde impuestos y contribuciones de los munícipes de la jurisdicción territorial\r\ncorrespondiente, entonces la iniciativa tributaria sólo puede ser municipal,\r\nproducto de la potestad tributaria del gobierno local y es la que se define en\r\nla jurisprudencia antes comentada. Pero ello no quiere decir que el legislador\r\nno pueda dotar a las Municipalidades de recursos extraordinarios mediante un\r\nimpuesto general a distribuir, como en el caso del impuesto territorial;\r\nmediante un impuesto regional, que beneficie un determinado número de gobiernos\r\nlocales; o bien, mediante un impuesto especial que grave determinadas\r\nactividades, como resulta ser la exportación de banano, a distribuir entre los\r\ncantones productores. En estos casos la iniciativa de la formulación de la ley\r\ntributaria es la ordinaria, puesto que aquí no se trata de la autorización de\r\nun tributo de naturaleza municipal, sino la creación de uno diverso, en el que\r\nresulta, que el o los destinatarios o beneficiarios, serán uno o varios\r\ngobiernos locales, como en el caso del impuesto creado en el artículo 36 del\r\nCódigo de Minería, o en el impuesto sobre la venta de licores. En este caso, el\r\ntributo será municipal por su destino, pero su origen es la ley común, por\r\ntratarse de recursos extraordinarios y beneficiosos para las comunidades. En\r\nsíntesis, la potestad impositiva municipal, que es la que se origina en la\r\ncreación del tributo por el gobierno local para que sea autorizado por la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\nno obsta para que el legislador pueda, extraordinariamente y por los trámites\r\nde la ley común, conceder rentas y recursos económicos distintos, de carácter\r\nnacionales, en cuyo caso, el proyecto de ley respectivo, no deberá originarse\r\nnecesariamente en la iniciativa municipal, aunque los beneficiarios del tributo\r\nsean los propios gobiernos locales. En este último caso, la recaudación,\r\ndisposición, administración y liquidación, corresponde a las Municipalidades\r\ndestinatarias de los tributos.\" En relación con sus cuestionamientos, es\r\nclaro que carecen de razón los y la consultante. Que el impuesto sobre bienes\r\ninmuebles sea un tributo nacional se refiere a que la iniciativa para su\r\ncreación y aprobación sea una decisión central, adoptada por el Estado y no por\r\nlos gobiernos locales. Obedece a una intención del Estado de incrementar las\r\nrentas municipales a efecto de facilitar la adecuada prestación de los\r\nservicios públicos locales a partir de la gravación de un hecho generador como\r\nes la propiedad sobre bienes inmuebles, reconocido y regulado por el\r\nordenamiento nacional y no por el municipal. No obstante, pese a dicha\r\ncaracterística, en la especie no se está dando una delegación de competencias\r\npropias de la Asamblea\r\n Legislativa. Así sería si se permitiera a los gobiernos\r\nlocales eliminar el tributo o modificarlo en cualquiera de los elementos\r\nregulados por la Ley\r\n7509. Lo que se autoriza a las municipalidades es a condonar los intereses,\r\nrecargos y multas producto del incumplimiento en el pago de dicho tributo por\r\nparte de los contribuyentes del cantón respectivo. Es decir, se autoriza a\r\ncondonar sumas líquidas a favor de cada municipalidad y no las obligaciones de\r\ncontribución impuestas por la Ley. Tratándose de entes beneficiarios del\r\nreferido impuesto, la iniciativa resulta plenamente válida, una vez que se\r\npermite a las corporaciones condonar los extremos mencionados, únicamente para\r\naquellos contribuyentes que cancelen la totalidad de su adeudo, contando con la\r\nautorización \"marco\" de la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\na partir, precisamente, de este proyecto de ley. No se contraviene así la\r\ncompetencia exclusiva dada al Parlamento por el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución\r\n Política. Se trata de una manifestación válida de la\r\ndiscrecionalidad del legislador, que en este caso actúa para salvaguardar los\r\nintereses de los propios gobiernos locales y -consecuentemente- los de toda la\r\ncomunidad. (sentencia No. 2006-06589).\n\r\n\r\n\nSe\r\ntrata de normativa creada por legislación común, no por la iniciativa\r\nmunicipal, sino por una decisión del Estado central y, en este sentido, no se\r\nle permitiría a las municipalidades eliminar o modificar dicho tributo. Sin\r\nembargo, es claro que el constituyente estableció límites al legislador al\r\notorgarle a las Municipalidades autonomía administrativa y de gobierno, lo que\r\na su vez se instituye como una garantía para los munícipes, pero de existir\r\nconflictos con intereses nacionales esta situación deberá ser dilucidada por\r\nesta Sala, como sucede con la normativa impugnada.”\n\r\n\r\n\nSe concluye que no podría el\r\naccionante venir a reclamar la defensa de competencias municipales de\r\nparticipación en la configuración de tributos, respecto de un impuesto de\r\nincuestionable carácter nacional como lo es el citado impuesto sobre bienes\r\ninmuebles.- Los mismos razonamientos cabe hacer en relación con lo que el\r\naccionante identifica como impuesto de traspaso de bienes inmuebles y que, como\r\ntambién lo precisa el órgano asesor, parece referirse más bien al timbre\r\nmunicipal que debe pagarse como parte de la carga tributaria de algunas\r\noperaciones inscribibles en el Registro Público y que aparece regulado en el\r\nartículo 84 del Código Municipal, por lo que posee también un indudable carácter\r\nnacional.- En resumen, respecto de estos\r\ndos tributos recién citados, la acción planteada debe rechazarse de plano.-\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Otras\r\nprecisiones sobre los temas sometidos a decisión dentro esta acción.- También en\r\napego a lo pedido por el accionante y reseñado supra, cabe dejar aclarado que\r\neste pronunciamiento no entra a contrastar la validez general del régimen de\r\nincentivos o el plazo de diez años para ellos, prescrito en dicha ley pues\r\ntales temas no han sido cuestionados, e igualmente se descarta cualquier\r\nexamen del procedimiento legislativo seguido en su momento para la promulgación\r\nde la Ley de\r\nZonas Francas número 7210, respecto de la cual –según lo informa el órgano\r\nasesor- se constata además la efectiva\r\nrealización en su momento de la consulta a las Municipalidades del país y en\r\nespecífico la realizada a la\r\n Municipalidad del Cantón de Belén, según se aprecia al folio 366 del expediente\r\nlegislativo 10562 que dio origen a la\r\n Ley 7210.- \n\r\n\r\n\nDe ese modo, el examen del\r\nreclamo contra la emisión de las leyes 7830 de 22 de setiembre de 1998 y la Ley 8794, de 12 de enero de\r\n2010 se hará bajo el siguiente orden:\n\r\n\r\n\n1) verificación\r\nde que el texto del artículo 20 bis de la 7830 de 22 de setiembre de 1998 y el\r\nde los Transitorios I y II y la\r\n Ley 8794, de 12 de enero de 2010 realmente contienen\r\nmodificaciones en materia tributaria municipal como afirma el recurrente y;\n\r\n\r\n\n2) en caso\r\nafirmativo, confirmar y descartar el cumplimiento de la consulta a las\r\nentidades municipales.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- En relación\r\ncon el reclamo contra la Ley\r\n7830.- Como se explicó, el reclamo\r\ndel accionante se concreta en que el proyecto de ley que dio origen a esta ley\r\nno fue consultado a las Municipalidades a pesar de que el proyecto contenía el\r\nartículo 20 bis que afecta el erario municipal al permitirse a las autoridades\r\nadministrativas competentes extender el plazo de la exoneración de los tributos\r\nmunicipales.- Dice el texto de dicho\r\nartículo:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 20 bis.-\n\r\n\r\n\nNo se otorgará el Régimen de Zonas Francas a personas físicas ni\r\njurídicas para operar ni desarrollar una empresa o proyecto de inversión ya\r\nbeneficiado de los incentivos del Régimen, aunque haya sido al amparo de una\r\npersona física o jurídica distinta, salvo que se demuestre que es un proyecto\r\nnuevo o, en casos excepcionales, cuando la naturaleza y magnitud de las\r\ninversiones adicionales lo justifiquen; todo a juicio del Ministerio de\r\nComercio Exterior y de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el reglamento de esta\r\nley.”\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nObserva\r\neste Tribunal que contrario a lo que señala el accionante, no existe en él\r\nninguna disposición nueva o diferente que haya sido agregada al régimen vigente\r\nde exoneraciones, ni tampoco respecto de su plazo.- Por el contrario, tanto el\r\ntexto original como su reforma se agotan en regulaciones sobre el conjunto de\r\nsujetos que pueden ser beneficiados y la reforma inserta en el artículo 20 bis\r\nen particular comienza estableciendo una prohibición para cualquier empresa o\r\nproyecto de inversión para recibir los incentivos del régimen de zonas francas\r\nsi ya ha sido beneficiario del mismo.- \r\nLuego, se incluyen las excepciones a la regla anterior y en ese punto es\r\ndonde el accionante entiende que se ha autorizado una extensión de las\r\nexoneraciones a tributos municipales; sin embargo, para este Tribunal, la\r\ninterpretación del accionante no se apega al sentido de la norma, puesto que\r\n-como se explicó- lo emitido son reglas dirigidas al ente competente y que\r\nordenan el ejercicio de su potestad de emisión de nuevos acuerdos de\r\notorgamiento para el desarrollo de proyectos nuevos o nuevas etapas en algunos\r\ncasos que por su importancia lo ameriten.- \r\nSe trata entonces de una facultad de la administración pero no dirigida\r\na ampliar plazos de exoneraciones, sino precisar un conjunto de reglas de\r\nselección de personas físicas o jurídicas autorizadas para operar en régimen de\r\nzona franca. Claro está que nuevos proyectos por nuevas empresas o bien nuevos\r\nplanes de desarrollo autorizados excepcionalmente a una empresa que ya ha\r\ntenido incentivos, posibilitan disfrutar\r\nde todas las ventajas de la zona franca, pero eso es lo que ocurre normalmente\r\nsegún la dinámica de la ley original, cuya finalidad es lograr que personas\r\ninviertan en la zonas francas.- Se trata precisamente de una facultad que –como\r\nun todo- el legislador dejó en su momento en manos de las autoridades\r\nadministrativas y ahora lo que se ha hecho es un ajuste en las reglas que dará\r\npor resultado un acuerdo de otorgamiento del régimen y junto con él un derecho de disfrutar de beneficios fijados\r\nde antemano fijados en la ley 7210 en cuanto a monto y plazo. No existe entonces ninguna afectación de los\r\nintereses de la\r\n Municipalidad, más allá del alcance de las restricciones ya\r\nrecogidas en la Ley\r\n7210, porque lo que varió fueron las condiciones para la aplicación del régimen\r\nen ciertos casos.- En fin, no podría aceptarse la lógica del accionante en este\r\ncaso, pues su razonamiento nos llevaría a tener que admitir que cualquier\r\ncambio legislativo que modifique requisitos para que una persona acceda al\r\nrégimen de zona franca, tendrían que ser consultados con las Municipalidades\r\npor incidir eventualmente en sus intereses al resultar posible la existencia de\r\nuna mayor cantidad de exonerados. Para la Sala, los intereses de las Municipalidades en\r\ndicho sentido ya fueron tomados en consideración en la formulación de la Ley 7210, y cubren de sobra el\r\npunto porque esa ley, con su carácter general y abstracto hace que sea posible\r\nque un universo indeterminado de personas puedan acceder al régimen de zona\r\nfranca, y disfrutar de los beneficios fiscales que allí se establecieron según\r\ncumplan los requisitos. Por todo ello, no hay ninguna afectación de\r\ncompetencias municipales en el texto del artículo 20 bis que fue agregado a la\r\nley 7210 por la Ley\r\n7830, y –por lo mismo, no resultaba necesario en este caso el trámite de\r\nconsulta a las Municipalidades del país.-\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.-\r\nEn relación con el reclamo contra los transitorios I y II de la\r\n Ley número 8794 de 12 de enero del 2010. Como se explicó\r\nmás arriba, el reclamo contra estas dos normas jurídicas se\r\nconcreta en que el trámite de su aprobación en la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nomitió la consulta necesaria a las municipalidades, a pesar de que en ellos se\r\ndispone una prórroga de los plazos de exoneración de tributos municipales para las\r\nempresas beneficiarias del régimen de zonas francas.- Resulta importante repasar el texto de tales\r\ndisposiciones.- \n\r\n\r\n\n“Transitorio I.-\n\r\n\r\n\nLos incentivos de los incisos b), d), f), g), h) y\r\nI) del artículo 20 de la Ley\r\nde régimen de zonas francas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre de 1990, y sus reformas,\r\nse continuarán disfrutando por parte de las empresas indicadas en el inciso a)\r\ndel artículo 17 de dicha Ley, hasta la fecha en que venza para Costa Rica el\r\nplazo previsto en el párrafo 4 del artículo 27 del Acuerdo sobre subvenciones y\r\nmedidas compensatorias que forma parte del Acta final en que se incorporan los\r\nresultados de la Ronda\r\n Uruguay de negociaciones comerciales multilaterales, aprobada\r\nmediante la Ley N.°\r\n7475, de 20 de diciembre de 1994, incluidas las prórrogas aprobadas por el\r\nComité de Subsidios y Medidas Compensatorias de la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio y en tanto Costa Rica sea elegible y obtenga dichas prórrogas,\r\nmomento en el cual cesarán y se dejarán sin efecto los beneficios. A más tardar\r\na partir de la misma fecha en que venza el plazo antes indicado, los demás\r\nincentivos aplicables a las empresas beneficiarias del régimen de zonas francas\r\ndeberán haberse adecuado en lo pertinente, respecto de las empresas indicadas\r\nen el inciso a) del artículo 17 de la\r\n Ley de régimen de zonas francas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre\r\nde 1990, a\r\nlas disposiciones del mencionado Acuerdo sobre subvenciones y medidas\r\ncompensatorias, conforme a las disposiciones reglamentarias que para el efecto\r\ndictará el Poder Ejecutivo.”\n\r\n\r\n\n“Transitorio II.-\n\r\n\r\n\n Lo dispuesto en\r\nel transitorio 1 modifica en lo pertinente el alcance y los plazos de las\r\nexoneraciones y los incentivos previstos en el artículo 20 de la Ley de régimen de zonas\r\nfrancas, N.° 7210, de 23 de noviembre de 1990, en cuanto a las empresas\r\nindicadas en el inciso a) del artículo 17 de la citada Ley, y debe entenderse\r\nincorporado a los respectivos acuerdos de otorgamiento del régimen de zonas\r\nfrancas, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, si en algún caso\r\nexisten.”\n\r\n\r\n\nEn relación con dichas normas dice el accionante en su reclamo:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Sin embargo, una de las principales motivaciones del\r\nPoder ejecutivo en promover la modificación a la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas desde abril del año\r\n2009, era el de cumplir los compromisos asumidos por el País en el Acuerdo\r\nsuscrito sobre Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias de la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio (OMC). Dicho acuerdo obliga a eliminar los incentivos ligados a\r\nlas exportaciones en cuanto a la industria procesadora, en un plazo de ocho (8)\r\naños prorrogables, por lo que los nuevos inversionistas o los que se\r\nencontraran gozando del sistema, podrían continuar disfrutando de las\r\nexenciones previstas en la ley, incluidos el pago de Patente Municipal e\r\nimpuesto territorial, hasta tanto se cumplan los años previstos en el Acuerdo\r\nindicado o Costa Rica mantenga la posibilidad de obtener nuevas prórrogas del\r\nplazo inicial.- El objetivo final es iniciar los preparativos para el fin de\r\nlas exenciones relativas a las subvenciones a la exportación. (…)”\n\r\n\r\n\nY luego, más adelante explica que: \n\r\n\r\n\n“De acuerdo a los transitorios transcritos, el plazo\r\nprevisto inicialmente de diez años se subsume en un nuevo plazo de 8 años a\r\npartir de la suscripción del acuerdo por parte de Costa Rica y con la\r\nposibilidad además de prolongarse a través del tiempo según Costa Rica acceda\r\nal a las prórrogas previstas en dicho acuerdo. El último plazo venció en el\r\n2007, No obstante, en julio de 2007, El consejo General del Comité de\r\nsubvenciones y Medidas compensatorias adoptó la decisión de proseguir los\r\nprocedimientos de prórroga del período de transición para la eliminación de los\r\nprogramas de subvenciones a la exportación de algunos países en desarrollo.-\r\nCosta Rica figura dentro de los países beneficiarios de dicho acuerdo de\r\nprórroga.- La decisión permite al Comité de Subvenciones seguir concediendo\r\nprórrogas al período de transición hasta el final de 2013, con un período final de eliminación gradual de dos años, que\r\nfinalizará no más tarde del 31 de diciembre de 2015.”\n\r\n\r\n\n En resumidas cuentas, el accionante parece entender que los plazos\r\nde la exoneración del pago de impuestos municipales que disfrutan las empresas\r\nbeneficiarias del régimen de zona franca, se han prorrogado, y que a los diez años recogidos en la ley se le deben sumar\r\nahora los 8 años de plazo que se otorgó en el Acuerdo sobre Subvenciones y\r\nMedidas Compensatorias de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), y también la ampliación de tal plazo que eventualmente obtenga\r\nCosta Rica y que actualmente llegan hasta el 2015.- El resultado final de estos transitorios\r\nsería entonces que las Municipalidades deben soportar las\r\nexoneraciones de impuestos municipales de la ley 7210, más allá de los diez años establecidos en el artículo\r\n20 de dicha ley, razón por la que debieron ser consultadas de manera previa a\r\nsu aprobación, tal y como lo señala el texto del artículo 190 Constitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n IX.- De otro lado observa la Sala que frente al mismo\r\ntexto jurídico, en las\r\nrespuestas del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, de la Promotora de Comercio\r\nExterior, así como de la\r\n Asociación de empresas de Zona Franca de Costa Rica –todas\r\nellas protagonistas e implicadas directas en la aplicación de la ley- se\r\nrealiza una interpretación diametralmente opuesta a la del accionante y que, de\r\nser acogida por la Sala,\r\nharía que esta acción deba desestimarse por no haberse modificado la situación\r\nrespecto de los intereses de las entidades municipales. Tal interpretación\r\nsostiene que, efectivamente, los transitorios arriba transcritos tienen como\r\nfinalidad ajustar el ordenamiento costarricense a los compromisos que el país\r\nadquirió al seno de la Organización Mundial de Comercio y que precisamente\r\npor ello, buscan eliminar\r\nde manera general. las exoneraciones a las empresas que se dedican a ciertas\r\nactividades.- Se afirma que la correcta comprensión de los transitorios no puede producir nunca una prórroga de los plazos\r\nsi más bien se trata de ajustar a las empresas a las condiciones\r\nde no exoneración exigidas en el convenio internacional, por lo que cuando los\r\ntextos disponen que las exoneraciones “…se continuarán\r\ndisfrutando por parte de las empresas indicadas en el inciso a) del artículo 17\r\nde dicha Ley, hasta la fecha en que venza para Costa Rica el plazo previsto en\r\nel artículo…incluidas las prórrogas…” debe entenderse\r\nque más bien se trata de una reducción o restricción del beneficio, el cual\r\nno será ya por todo el plazo de 10 años, como lo\r\nordenaba la ley, sino que solo llegará hasta la fecha final que se defina a\r\ntravés de los mecanismos establecidos en los acuerdos respectivos de la Organización Mundial\r\nde Comercio, todo lo anterior \"sin perjuicio de los\r\nderechos adquiridos de buena fe si en algún caso existen\", tal y como\r\nlo indica expresamente el cuestionado Transitorio II de la Ley 8794. \n\r\n\r\n\nX.- El\r\ntribunal se encuentra así con la particularidad de que el propio texto\r\nnormativo así como la exposición de motivos del proyecto original -que ha sido revisado- resultan inútiles para\r\nevacuar la duda de si la regla contenida en los transitorios discutidos\r\nprorrogó o no en el tiempo las exoneraciones con perjuicio de los ingresos al\r\nerario de las Municipales en cuyo territorio operan empresas en régimen de zona\r\nfranca.- El tema resulta clave en tanto y en cuanto está en juego la utilidad\r\nde esta acción, es decir, su carácter de medio razonable para la defensa de los\r\nderechos e intereses de la accionante, los cuales conforman la razón de ser de\r\nsu reclamo por la falta de cumplimiento de la formalidad de consulta a las\r\nMunicipalidades.\n\r\n\r\n\nXI.- Frente\r\na tal predicado, este Tribunal entiende que la justicia constitucional y la\r\nprotección de las normas y principios constitucionales por una parte, así como\r\nel amparo de todos los intereses comprometidos en este caso resultan mejor\r\nservidos si se acoge la interpretación que tanto el Ministerio de Comercio\r\nExterior como la Promotora\r\nde Comercio y las distintas asociaciones de interesados hacen del contenido\r\nnormativo de los textos discutidos y al respecto se recalca el hecho de que, como señalan los interesados, los textos de los transitorios en cuestión no emplean en ninguna\r\nparte el concepto de “prórroga” o cualquier otro similar para describir la\r\nsituación en la que han de quedar las exoneraciones. Dicho vocablo solo se\r\nemplea para referirse a las actuaciones del Comité de\r\nSubsidios y Medidas Compensatorias de la Organización Mundial\r\ndel Comercio y claramente se\r\nrefiere a la ampliación del plazo de ajuste que esa organización ha fijado. Además de lo\r\nanterior, la\r\n Sala entiende que esta lectura de las normas\r\nresulta más acorde con todas\r\nlas finalidades involucradas, es decir, en cuanto equilibra el estímulo para la atracción de\r\ninversiones que ha buscado el país mediante el mecanismo de zona franca y su\r\nrégimen de exención, frente a los intereses municipales y su innegable necesidad de obtener beneficios\r\ndirectos a través del pago de impuestos que hacen las empresas que operan en su\r\nterritorio.- Ello se logra si los transitorios se entienden en el sentido de que los\r\nplazos de las exoneraciones de las empresas específicamente incluidas en ellos no\r\nse adicionan al plazo de exoneración original de diez años autorizado por el\r\nartículo 20 de la Ley\r\n7210, con lo cual, no existe la prórroga de plazos de exoneración que\r\nha denunciado y resiente el accionante y menos aún la afectación de sus\r\nintereses municipales, que han quedado sin alteración alguna frente a lo que ya\r\nestá regulado en el citado artículo 20 de la Ley 7210.- Corolario de lo dicho, los\r\ntransitorios no están dirigidos ni pueden usarse para prorrogar los plazos de\r\nexoneración y -por ende- no hay lesión de la autonomía municipal ni del deber\r\nde consulta a estos entes.\n\r\n\r\n\nXII.- Conclusión: De todo\r\nlo expuesto, se concluye, en primer lugar, que la acción -en cuanto se dirige\r\ncontra la falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales respecto de\r\nexoneraciones de los impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y de traspaso de bienes\r\ninmuebles- debe rechazarse de plano por tratarse de impuestos de incuestionable\r\ncarácter nacional.- En segundo lugar, debe declararse sin lugar el reclamo por\r\nfalta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales por parte del artículo\r\n20 bis agregado a la Ley\r\n7210, por Ley 7830 del 22 de setiembre de 1998.- Por último, el reclamo debe\r\ntambién declararse sin lugar al entenderse que los transitorios I y II de la Ley 8794 no lesionan el\r\nartículo 190 Constitucional, ya que el plazo establecido para las empresas que\r\nse describen, no se suma al plazo de exoneración original de diez años\r\nautorizado por el artículo 20 de la\r\n Ley 7210, interpretación ésta que responde a la idea de que\r\neste tribunal debe esforzarse, en lo posible, para encontrar una solución,\r\ndentro del parámetro constitucional, que resuelva el conflicto con el menor\r\nesfuerzo derogatorio y distorsionador del ordenamiento y de las expectativas\r\ncreadas al seno de la sociedad.\n\r\n\r\n\nXIII.- Razones\r\ndiferentes del Magistrado Castillo Víquez\n\r\n\r\n\nEn lo que atañe al\r\nvicio por la no consulta a las\r\nmunicipalidades, concluyo que este no se ha producido. No cabe duda que\r\nla consulta constitucional constituye una limitación a la potestad de legislar.\r\nEn algunos casos la agrava, artículos 97 y 167 de la Constitución\r\n Política –cuando el criterio del Tribunal Supremo de\r\nElecciones y el de la\r\n Corte Suprema Justicia es negativo a la iniciativa\r\nparlamentaria, en otro la suspende de forma temporal para el proyecto de ley en\r\ncuestión, seis meses antes y cuatro después de la celebración de una elección\r\npopular - cuando también el criterio del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones es\r\nnegativo-, y en otros debe realizarse para evitar un vicio de\r\ninconstitucionalidad que afectaría a toda la Ley – a las Universidades del Estado –artículo 88\r\nde la\r\n Constitución Política-, al Banco Central de Costa Rica\r\n–numeral 121 inciso 17 dela Carta Fundamental- y a las instituciones autónomas\r\n-190 del Código Político-.\n\r\n\r\n\nEn lo referente a\r\nestas últimas, conviene recordar que fue la fracción Social Demócrata la que presentó, como parte\r\ndel título relativo a las instituciones autónomas, la siguiente norma: “(…) No\r\npodrá discutirse en la\r\n Asamblea legislativa ningún proyecto de ley relativo a\r\nmaterias encomendadas a una Institución Autónoma, sin que la respectiva\r\nInstitución haya rendido dictamen al respecto. Dicho dictamen deberá incluirse\r\ny publicarse, obligatoriamente, como uno de los considerandos de la ley que se\r\napruebe”. (A.A.C.: tomo III; pág. 465). Nótese que ya no se propone lo\r\nrelativo a la mayoría calificada para la\r\naprobación del proyecto de ley donde exista criterio negativo de la Institución.\r\n Suponemos que las votaciones adversas de la Asamblea Nacional\r\nConstituyente en los casos de la\r\n Universidad y el Organismo Técnico encargado de determinar la\r\nunidad monetaria disuadieron a los miembros de la fracción Social Demócrata de\r\npresentar esa iniciativa.\n\r\n\r\n\nLas razones de\r\nesta normativa las ofrece Facio Brenes al indicar que: “(…) mediante él lo\r\nque se busca es obligar el cuerpo esencialmente político que es el Congreso, a\r\nescuchar la voz de las instituciones autónomas en aquellos asuntos que las\r\nafectan”. (A.A.C.N.: tomo III; p. 467).\n\r\n\r\n\nLos motivos por\r\nlas cuales este artículo no fue aprobado en la forma propuesta fueron:\n\r\n\r\n\n“Los\r\nrepresentantes Arroyo, Vargas, Fernández y Esquivel se manifestaron en\r\ndesacuerdo. El primero expresó que no\r\nera posible continuar restándole atribuciones a la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\nobligándola a consultar todas las instituciones autónomas del estado. La Asamblea integra de su\r\nseno, distintas comisiones que tiene la obligación de consultar y documentarse\r\nen la debida forma respecto a asuntos que le son encomendados. Si se presenta un proyecto de ley relacionado\r\ncon una institución autónoma es lógico que se consultará a esos organismos. El\r\nsegundo indicó que la moción en debate introduce un nuevo sistema, ya que si\r\nuna institución autónoma no rinde el dictamen respectivo, la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nno podrá conocer el proyecto de ley. El tercero manifestó, que no votará\r\nninguna moción que venga en detrimento de las facultades de la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\nla máxima representación del pueblo en nuestro sistema político, obligándola\r\nhasta incluir en los considerandos de la ley que se apruebe, el Dictamen de la Institución\r\n Autónoma” (A.A.N.C.: tomo III; p.473).\n\r\n\r\n\nA raíz de ello el\r\nrepresentante Chacón Jinesta sugirió una nueva redacción:\n\r\n\r\n\n“para la discusión\r\ny aprobación de proyectos relativos a una institución Autónoma, la Asamblea Legislativa\r\ndeberá oír la opinión de aquella” (A.A.N.C.: tomo III, p. 473).\n\r\n\r\n\nEl Diputado Facio\r\nBrenes a nombre de su compañero decidió retirar la moción y en definitiva se\r\nvotó la propuesta del diputado Chacón Jinesta.\n\r\n\r\n\nDe la anterior\r\ndiscusión queda claro que quienes redactaron la Constitución\r\n Política actual tenían bien claro que la consulta\r\nconstitucional limita la potestad de \r\nlegislar, y que la obligación de la consulta estaba dirigida, en este\r\ncaso, única y exclusivamente a aquellos entes que tienen la naturaleza jurídica\r\nde institución autónoma, no así aquellos que tienen la naturaleza jurídica de\r\ncorporación, tal y como ocurre con los entes descentralizados por región.\n\r\n\r\n\nEs bien sabido que\r\nla doctrina establece una clara diferencia entre la institución y la\r\ncorporación. En efecto, en el caso de la primera hay un ente instituidor, por\r\nlo general el Estado, quien crea el ente; él proporciona los recursos o, por lo\r\nmenos, la fuente para su financiamiento, tiene injerencia en el nombramiento de\r\nlas máximas autoridades del ente instituido. En el supuesto de la segunda, es\r\npor iniciativa de sus miembros que se crea el ente, aunque, en muchos casos, es\r\nnecesario la emisión de un acto del Estado, verbigracia: la creación de un\r\ncolegio profesional; son sus miembros\r\nquienes, por lo general, financian el ente y, por último, son ellos, a través\r\nde la Asamblea\r\n General o los munípices quienes eligen las máximas\r\nautoridades de los órganos de dirección. \r\nLas instituciones autónomas, en nuestro medio, responden a la primera\r\nnaturaleza; mientras que las municipalidades, a la segunda; de ahí el acierto\r\ndel Constituyente en la terminología que utiliza. Desde esta perspectiva, las\r\nmunicipalidades no pueden ser equiparadas a las instituciones autónomas.\n\r\n\r\n\nPor otra parte,\r\ndado el grado de autonomía que el Derecho de la Constitución\r\nle otorga a las municipalidades –autonomía política en la administración de los\r\ninterés y servicios locales del cantón (artículo 169)-, el legislativo, en el\r\nuso de la potestad de legislar, tiene importantes limitaciones, toda vez que no\r\npuede asignar el ejercicio de una competencia municipal a otro ente u órgano\r\ndiferente, tampoco puede adoptar normas legales que se alejen o contradigan el\r\ncarácter democrático de la organización municipal. Estamos, pues, frente a\r\nmateria no disponible para el Poder Legislativo en el ejercicio de la potestad\r\nde legislar, aunque sí en el ejercicio de la potestad constituyente –actuando\r\ncomo poder reformador-. Se trata de un contenido constitucional el cual no\r\npuede ser regulado por el Poder Legislativo en el ejercicio de la potestad de\r\nlegislar. Lo anterior constituye una garantía para las corporaciones\r\nmunicipales, al igual que lo constituyó para las instituciones autónomas hasta\r\nque les fue suprimida su autonomía en materia de gobierno –mediante Ley n.°\r\n4123 de 31 de mayo de 1968-, en el sentido de que la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\nen el ejercicio de la potestad de legislar, no puede afectar las materias que\r\nel Derecho de la\r\n Constitución (valores, principios y normas) le atribuye a los\r\nentes de base corporativa de forma exclusiva y excluyente. Si bien ambas\r\ngozaron del mismo grado de autonomía, lo cierto del caso es que el\r\nConstituyente sólo estableció la consulta constitucional para los proyectos de\r\nley relativos a las instituciones\r\nautónomas, y no para los proyectos relativos a las municipalidades.\n\r\n\r\n\nPor último, queda\r\nclaro del texto constitucional que el régimen municipal está regulado en el\r\ntítulo XII; mientras que el de las instituciones autónomas lo está en el título\r\nXIV, de ahí que se trate de regímenes jurídicos constitucionales diferentes,\r\npor lo que no resulta procedente el aplicar las normas que han sido diseñadas\r\npara uno al otro. \n\r\n\r\n\nEn resumen, la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nno está obligada a consultar a las municipalidades los proyectos de ley\r\nrelativos a éstas. De ahí que el vicio que invoca el accionante no existe como\r\ntal.\n\r\n\r\n\nDesde mi perspectiva,\r\nla cuestión de inconstitucionalidad está residenciada en otro ámbito, y es si la Asamblea Legislativa\r\npuede o no crear una exoneración de un impuesto municipal, pues ello lesionaría la potestad tributaria y\r\nautonomía municipal que el Derecho de la Constitución\r\nle reconoce a las corporaciones municipales. Así las cosas, la cuestión es si\r\nla exención de los impuestos municipales que se hace en la norma legal\r\nimpugnada lesiona o no lo establecido en\r\nel artículo 121 inciso 13; numeral que reconoce de forma expresa a favor de las\r\nMunicipalidades la exclusividad para determinar los elementos del tributo\r\nmunicipal, por ser estas quienes deben proponer los proyectos para la creación\r\nde tales gravámenes. Como regla de principio, se puede sostener que la Asamblea no tiene\r\ncompetencia, de manera unilateral, para crear y otorgar exenciones a través de\r\nleyes ordinarias respecto de los tributos municipales. Dicha iniciativa solo\r\npuede tener origen en el Concejo; al Parlamento lo único que le corresponde es\r\naprobar o improbar, incluso es tan exclusiva la potestad de creación y\r\nexoneración a favor de las municipalidades, que los miembros de la Cámara carecen de la\r\npotestad de enmienda; su competencia se limita a remover un obstáculo para que\r\nel acto de creación o exoneración pueda surgir a la vida jurídica. Hay que\r\ntener presente que de la\r\nlectura de las normas constitucionales y de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal\r\nConstitucional, se puede deducir que existen, entre otros, dos tipos de\r\nimpuestos en nuestro medio: los nacionales y los municipales. Los primeros son\r\naquellos creados por la\r\n Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de la potestad\r\ntributaria1 que posee\r\nel Estado, la cual se expresa a través de la potestad de legislar, que pueden\r\ntener un destino específico2,\r\naunque necesariamente lo que se recaude a causa de ellos tiene que ingresar a la Caja Única ( artículo 185 de la Carta Fundamental)3, o un determinado destinatario diferente\r\ndel Estado, entre ellos, los gobiernos locales4 y que recaen sobre hechos, actos, bienes,\r\nservicios, actividades, rendimientos y gastos realizados en el ámbito nacional.\r\nLos segundos, en cambio, son aquellos creados por el Concejo5, en el ejercicio de una potestad\r\ntributaria derivada6,\r\nque requiere de una ulterior autorización de la Asamblea Legislativa, cuyo\r\núnico destinatario es el gobierno local, \r\ncuyo destino obligado es el sufragar los gastos que demanda la\r\nprestación de los servicios locales y que recaen sobre hechos, actos, bienes,\r\nservicios, actividades, rendimientos y gastos realizados o vinculados al ámbito\r\nlocal. Ahora bien, lo anterior no es óbice para que la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nautorice al gobierno local, mediante una norma legal habilitante, para que\r\naplique una exoneración de los impuestos municipales, siempre y cuando medie el\r\nacuerdo respectivo del Concejo; lo que no es admisible, desde mi punto de\r\nvista, es que la\r\n Asamblea Legislativa exima o exonere un impuesto cuya\r\ncompetencia es –en relación con la definición de los elementos estructurales\r\ndel tributo- del Concejo.\n\r\n\r\n\nNo obstante lo dicho, debemos aclarar que la regla anterior\r\nno es absoluta, ya que tiene excepciones. En efecto, cuando la Asamblea Legislativa\r\naprueba un tratado internacional que establece una exoneración de impuestos, es\r\nclaro que en estos casos también se entienden exonerados los municipales. Así\r\nlo ha entendido este Tribunal en la sentencia 2007-009469, en la que expresó lo\r\nsiguiente: “Es evidente que nuestro Estado se compromete en un acuerdo\r\ncomercial a cumplir con ciertas obligaciones, con ello también compromete todos\r\nlos niveles del Gobierno, incluyendo la administración local”. La anterior\r\npostura es una consecuencia lógica de lo que dispone el numeral 29 de la Convención de\r\nViena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, donde se expresa, de forma categórica,\r\nlo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n“[…]\n\r\n\r\n\n29. Ambito\r\nterritorial de los tratados. Un tratado será obligatorio para cada una de las\r\npartes por lo que respecta a la totalidad de su territorio, salvo que una\r\nintención diferente se desprenda de él o conste de otro modo”.\n\r\n\r\n\nOtro caso es cuando el Estado, en aras de la satisfacción\r\nobjetiva de los intereses nacionales, promueve una política pública en la que\r\nresulta necesario la exoneración de los impuestos municipales mediante una Ley\r\nde la República.\r\n En este supuesto, tampoco se requiere que la exoneración\r\ntenga origen en el Concejo, por la elemental razón de que, eventualmente, un\r\ninterés local podría dar al traste con la satisfacción efectiva de un interés\r\nnacional. Estamos ante una situación típica donde el interés local cede ante el\r\ninterés nacional. En el caso del régimen de zonas francas, no cabe duda que\r\neste ha sido un esquema atractivo de promoción de la inversión extranjera, lo\r\nque se ha traducido en enormes beneficios a favor de la población\r\ncostarricense, en especial el aumento de nuestra exportaciones, concretamente\r\nde productos no tradicionales a mercados tanto tradicionales como no\r\ntradicionales, del empleo directo e indirecto, de la inversión en zonas de\r\nmenor desarrollo relativo y de proyectos de expansión productiva. Ergo, por las razones anteriores, concluyo que\r\nno hay el vicio de inconstitucionalidad alegado.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nPor\r\ntanto:\n\r\n\r\n\n Se rechaza de plano la acción\r\nen cuanto reclama la falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales en\r\nel establecimiento de exoneraciones de los Impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y\r\nel impuesto sobre traspasos de bienes inmuebles. Se declara sin lugar la acción\r\nplanteada contra el artículo 20 bis de la Ley 7210 de 23 de noviembre de 1990 agregado por la Ley 7830 del 22 de setiembre\r\nde 1998. Asimismo, se declara sin lugar la acción contra los Transitorios I y\r\nII de la Ley 8794\r\nde 12 de enero de 2010, por entenderse que ellos no son inconstitucionales.\r\nComuníquese este pronunciamiento a los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo.\r\nReséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese\r\níntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese. El Magistrado Castillo Víquez\r\nda razones diferentes. Los Magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro ponen nota. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nGilbert Armijo\r\n S.\n\r\n \nPresidente\n\r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nFernando Cruz C.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nFernando Castillo V.\n\r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nPaul Rueda L.\n\r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \nJorge\r\n Araya G.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nExp. 12-009520\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nNota de los magistrados Cruz Castro y Armijo Sancho, con\r\nredacción del primero. Sobre los cuestionamientos de las zonas francas y la\r\njusticia global. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLa preocupación de quienes plantearon esta objeción de\r\nconstitucionalidad, es legítima, sin embargo, como bien se expresa en el texto\r\ndel voto unánime, existe una interpretación errónea de parte del recurrente\r\nrespecto de los plazos de vigencia de las exoneraciones y la consulta a las\r\ncorporaciones municipales. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLas zonas francas suscitan variados cuestionamientos, porque el\r\nEstado desarrolla una política de exoneraciones para poder atraer inversiones;\r\nes una necesidad impuesta por la globalización. Las sociedades con poco\r\ndesarrollo económico, como las centroamericanas, con poca incidencia en\r\nlos bloques de poder en el ámbito internacional, tienen que competir por los\r\nfondos de inversión foránea, especialmente las transnacionales,\r\nofreciendo ventajas de las que no disfrutan el común de los ciudadanos o las\r\nempresas que no cumplen las exigencias del régimen de zona franca. Estos\r\nregímenes de privilegio, suscitan interrogantes, variadas inquietudes sobre la\r\njusticia global, la equidad en las relaciones económicas internacionales, pero\r\nestos interrogantes no se convierten en objeciones de inconstitucionalidad,\r\nquizás porque la injusticia globalizada provocada por un capitalismo que\r\nalgunos juzgan “salvaje”, escapa al limitado alcance de la constitucionalidad\r\nnacional, la estructura jurídica de la Constitución no impone límites a las reglas y\r\nprincipios que rigen las relaciones económicas internacionales. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nLa necesidad imperiosa de atraer inversiones, exige una respuesta\r\nestructural para competir por los fondos de inversión privados. Algunos\r\ninterrogantes que surgen con estos regímenes de privilegio evidencian graves\r\ninjusticias, pero pocas veces pueden convertirse en una inconstitucionalidad.\r\nLa esfera de las relaciones económicas internacionales casi siempre es ajena al\r\ntema de constitucionalidad. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nA pesar de estas limitaciones estructurales que crean\r\ndesigualdades ajenas al control de constitucionalidad, en algunos casos el\r\nderecho a la igualdad y la equidad, podría surgir, tratando de establecer si la\r\nzona franca crea un privilegio constitucionalmente inadmisible, es una\r\ndiscusión excepcional que puede surgir respecto de una política de atracción de\r\ninversiones, sin embargo, estas no son las objeciones que se plantean en esta\r\nacción. Podría ser que el régimen de exoneraciones de las zonas francas se\r\nconvierta en un privilegio estructural, como se mencionó, sin embargo, esa\r\ncondición no permite inferir que haya una violación al principio de igualdad y\r\nequidad frente a los ciudadanos y empresas que no alcanzan los requisitos\r\nexigidos en los regímenes de zonas francas. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEl régimen de exoneraciones bien podría tener un plazo\r\ndesproporcionado e irrazonable, extremo que sí podría discutirse\r\nconstitucionalmente. Tampoco sería admisible que la exoneración se conceda\r\nmediante reglamento y no mediante un acto legislativo, porque en esta\r\nmateria es relevante el respeto al principio de reserva de ley. Ninguna de\r\nestas objeciones se plantea en este asunto. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEn principio, el régimen de zonas francas es un componente de la\r\npolítica económica y fiscal que no podría ser, forzosamente, inconstitucional,\r\na pesar de los privilegios que se otorgan a algunos actores económicos. Estas\r\nexcepciones han sido moneda de curso legal en historia económica de Costa Rica,\r\ndesde los tiempos en que se admitía el contrato-ley. A pesar de las posibles\r\ninjusticias de los regímenes de privilegio, esa valoración no alcanza para\r\nconsiderarlas inconstitucionales; las reglas de la globalización, inalcanzables\r\npara la jurisdicción constitucional, requieren regímenes tributarios\r\nprivilegiados. Estas zonas de excepción tributaria, se deben resolver dentro de\r\nla esfera política, que enfrenta demasiados condicionantes; hay que evaluar la\r\nconveniencia de estos regímenes de exoneración, tomando en cuenta elementos tan\r\nimportantes como los encadenamientos con la economía local y la creación de\r\nempleo. Las contradicciones insalvables del desarrollo económico, se atenúan\r\ncon los regímenes de zonas francas, pero los interrogantes sobre el desarrollo\r\nhumano y la equidad en las relaciones económicas internacionales, siguen\r\nvigentes. No todas las injusticias se dilucidan en la instancia constitucional.\r\nPuede que existen injusticias, pero la jurisdicción constitucional es incapaz\r\nde conjurar la injusticia que alcanza dimensiones planetarias. Bien decía\r\nHélder Cámara: “hoy no basta pensar que existe injusticia entre individuo e\r\nindividuo, entre grupos y grupos, sino entre naciones y naciones y naciones,\r\nentre mundo y mundo…” (Ver del autor, “Para llegar a tiempo”-Ed. Sígueme-\r\nEspaña-1972-p. 36). La justicia constitucional no alcanza la injusticia\r\nplanetaria, eso se refleja en el diseño y los efectos de los regímenes de\r\nprivilegio tributario. Hay problemas de alcance global que resultan intocables\r\npara la justicia constitucional, tal como ocurre con algunas normas que rigen\r\nlos tratados de libre comercio. La responsabilidad para evitar estos excesos,\r\nqueda bajo el exclusivo control de los actores, determinando su conveniencia,\r\nlos beneficios que se obtienen y la justicia de su vigencia. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nRaras veces la instancia constitucional puede incidir en las\r\nraíces de la dependencia económica global, las raíces de la hegemonía del\r\ncapital transnacional, dominado por grupos económicos que ostentan un gran\r\npoder político y económico, poder que no encuentra frontera muy clara en el\r\norden constitucional local. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nFernando Cruz C. Gilbert\r\nArmijo S.\n\r\n\r\n\nMagistrado Magistrado\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n1 Véase las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional\r\nn.°s. 6455-94, 5398-94 y 1341-93\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n2 Véase las sentencias n°s. 4528-99 y 4529-99 del Tribunal\r\nConstitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3 Véase la sentencia n.° 4529-99 del Tribunal\r\nConstitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n4 Véase, entre otras, las sentencias n°s. 3930-95,\r\n4785-93, 4072-95, 4268-95, 6935-93, 687-96 y 467-99.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n5 En la sentencia n.° 467-99 el Tribunal Constitucional\r\nseñaló lo siguiente: “‘IX).- PODER Y COMPETENCIA TRIBUTARIAS MUNICIPALES.-\r\nHemos dicho anteriormente, que el tributo que deben pagar las empresas\r\nextractoras de canteras y tajos, con ser un impuesto de carácter nacional que\r\ntiene como beneficiarias a las Municipalidades, es constitucionalmente\r\ncompatible con los principios y normas que regulan lo que podríamos llamar el\r\nDerecho Tributario Municipal. Este concepto ha sido elaborado por la Sala en la sentencia No.\r\n4785-93 de las ocho horas treinta minutos del treinta de setiembre de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y tres, considerando VII, al expresar lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n‘VII.- Resta analizar lo que atañe a la figura del\r\n\"agente recaudador\" término que es el que utiliza la acción. La\r\ndoctrina más importante en la materia, en forma generalizada, ha señalado que\r\nel \"PODER TRIBUTARIO\" \r\n-potestad tributaria, potestad impositiva, poder de imposición, entre\r\notros- consiste en \"... la facultad\r\nde aplicar contribuciones (o establecer exenciones)...\"; con otras\r\npalabras, \"...el poder de sancionar normas jurídicas de las cuales derive\r\no pueda derivar, a cargo de determinados individuos o de determinadas\r\ncategorías de personas, la obligación de pagar un tributo...\".\r\nParalelamente al \"PODER TRIBUTARIO\", se reconoce, también, la\r\nfacultad de ejercitarlo en el plano material, a lo cual se denomina la\r\n\"COMPETENCIA TRIBUTARIA\", de modo tal que ambas potestades pueden\r\ncoincidir en un mismo órgano, pero no de manera obligatoria, pues se manifiestan\r\nen esferas diferentes. En efecto,\r\npueden existir órganos dotados de competencia tributaria y carentes de poder\r\ntributario. El poder de gravar, como se apuntó, es inherente al Estado y no\r\npuede ser suprimido, delegado, ni cedido; mas el poder de hacerlo efectivo, en\r\nel plano material, puede transferirse y otorgarse a entes paraestatales o\r\nprivados. Las diferencias entre ambos conceptos han sido puestas de manifiesto,\r\nen nuestro medio, al establecerse la separación entre el sujeto activo de la\r\npotestad tributaria y el sujeto activo de la obligación del tributo. De lo\r\nanteriormente expuesto se concluye, que lo que puede transferirse, según vimos,\r\nes la llamada competencia tributaria, o sea, el derecho a hacer efectiva la\r\nprestación’. \n\r\n\r\n\nEn consecuencia, resulta más que evidente que las\r\nmunicipalidades, según lo ha venido expresando la jurisprudencia de esta Sala,\r\nestán constitucionalmente dotadas de Poder Tributario y para el caso\r\nconcreto del impuesto creado en el artículo 36 del Código de Minería, de Competencia\r\nTributaria; es decir, del poder para hacer efectivo ese tributo en el plano\r\nmaterial...\". (Lo que está entre negritas no corresponde al original).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n6 La Sala Constitución ha señalado que las\r\nmunicipalidades tienen un poder tributario originario, voto n. 687-96, tesis\r\nque no compartimos por lo que a continuación se indica. Al no existir en\r\nnuestro país un fenómeno de descentralización política, tal y como sucede en\r\nlos Estados Federales, en España, con las Comunidades Autonómicas, o en Italia,\r\ncon las Regiones y, en Gran Bretaña, con\r\nla decisión del Gobierno Laborista, a cuya cabeza esta el señor Tony Blair, de\r\nreabrir los parlamentos de Edimburgo y Gales, sino de descentralización\r\nadministrativa, en sus diversas modalidades \r\n(por región y por servicio), resulta impropio expresar que los gobiernos\r\nlocales en Costa Rica gozan de una potestad tributaria originaria. Esta solo es\r\nposible en los casos que hemos indicado, donde los poderes legislativos locales\r\npueden crear impuestos sin que se dé una labor de control por parte del\r\ngobierno nacional, bastando para su validez y eficacia únicamente el respeto de\r\nla distribución de competencias nacionales y locales o regionales que están en la Constitución\r\n Política y, en el caso de Gran Bretaña que carece de constitución\r\nescrita, en el instrumento jurídico pertinente.", "body_en_text": "Exp: 12-009520-0007-CO\n\nExp: 12-009520-0007-CO\nRes. No. 2015007688\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours zero minutes on the twenty-seventh of May, two thousand fifteen.\n\nAction of unconstitutionality filed by HORACIO ALVARADO BOGANTES, of legal age, single, bearer of identity card number 0401240551, resident of La Ribera de Belén, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Belén, against subsections d), g), and h) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law; Law number 7210; Article 20 bis added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Transitory Provisions I and II of Law number 8794 of January twelve, 2010. Appearing in the proceedings are Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Curridabat, identity card .4-127-782, in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic; Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, of legal age, identity card number 1-191-100, in his capacity as Acting Minister of Foreign Trade; Jorge Sequeira Picado, of legal age, identity card 1-576-012, in his capacity as General Manager of the Foreign Trade Promoter of Costa Rica (Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica); Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, in her capacity as Vice President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Industriales de Costa Rica); Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, in his capacity as First Vice President and legal representative of the Association Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica); Mónica Segnini Acosta, in her capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association Chamber of Exporters of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica); Jorge Brenes Ramírez, in his capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association of Free Zone Companies of Costa Rica (Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica), and Humberto Pacheco Alpízar, in his capacity as President and legal representative of the Costa Rican-North American Chamber of Commerce Association (Asociación Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio).\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- The petitioner seeks to have declared unconstitutional subsections d), g), and h) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law; Law number 7210; Article 20 bis added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Transitory Provisions I and II of Law number 8794 of January twelve, 2010, as he understands they are contrary to Articles 121 subsection 13, 169, 170, 175, and 190 of the Political Constitution, understanding that their approval did not consider the opinion of the country's Municipalities. It is explained that the laws discussed came to modify Law number 7210 on Free Zones (hereinafter Law 7210) in several aspects but, in what is relevant to the filed action, regarding the issue of tax benefits for companies favored under that regime. Specifically, it is claimed that one of the motivations for the amendment through Law 8794 was the need to adapt to the agreements signed on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO, which obligates the elimination of incentives linked to exports for the processing industry within a period of eight years, extendable, so that new investors or those already enjoying the system could benefit from the exemptions of the law, including the non-payment of business licenses (patentes) and territorial tax (impuesto territorial), until the years provided for in the indicated Agreement or in the extensions achieved are completed. In line with the above, the law included Transitory Provisions I and II, which are challenged in this action, in which the period initially foreseen at 10 years of exemption is extended and subsumed into a new period of 8 years from the signing of the cited agreement by Costa Rica, and with the possibility of being prolonged over time according to the extensions that may proceed. It is affirmed that the last period expired in 2007, however, through the extension mechanism, it was allowed to continue maintaining the exemption until the end of 2013, with a final phase-out period of two years until December 31, 2015. It affirms that in relation to municipal taxing power (potestad tributaria) and autonomy, the exemption of subsections g) and h) must be understood as encompassed by the provisions of Article 121 subsection 13, in that it is exclusively up to the Municipalities to determine the elements of the tax, as they are the ones who must propose the projects for the creation of such levies. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Assembly cannot unilaterally arrogate the competence to create and grant exemptions through ordinary laws regarding municipal taxes. It is affirmed that the Chamber, when trying to reconcile this power with that of the Assembly, to regulate cases of national interest that touch upon local issues, has indicated that the Constitution resolves the problem by establishing the requirement to consult the Municipalities on projects on this matter. Thus, it is clear that the challenged laws should have been, in the relevant part, an initiative of the Municipality, or that their text should have been consulted, since Law 7830 allows COMEX to extend to companies the benefits and exemption periods from municipal taxes, and Law 8794, through its Transitory Provisions, extends the exemption period generally and subject to extensions regarding compliance with obligations to the World Trade Organization. Therefore, it was required to comply with the due consultation of the Municipalities, which did not occur. By virtue of the foregoing, it requests that the amendments to the Free Zone Law that keep the incentives contained in that legislation in force be annulled, specifically subsections d) and h) of Article 20 of Law 7210, which exempts companies under that regime from the payment of tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles).\n\n2.- The processing of this action was suspended on March 20, 2013, in accordance with Article 84 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), while a similar petition filed previously was resolved, which was declared without merit on September 25, 2013.\n\n3.- By resolution of seventeen hours eighteen minutes on April 3, 2014, this action of unconstitutionality was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.\n\n4.- In a brief dated May 7, 2014, Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Curridabat, identity card , in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, appears, responds to the hearing granted, and indicates that the petitioner's claim is aimed at having the Chamber declare the unconstitutionality of the discussed rules that govern exemptions for companies operating in free zones, and indicates that the core of his argument is the lack of consultation of such legislative decisions with the municipal corporations, given that they are rules that exempt such companies from municipal taxes. The advisory body indicates that an analysis must be made of which taxes are exempted to determine first if they are municipal or not, and then verify the existence of consultation with the municipal entities. The product of that work yields the conclusion that the exemptions against which the claim is made are not all for municipal taxes, and specifically, the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) and the payment of stamps (timbres) for transfer purposes are not, so that regarding the exemption of such taxes, no injury to municipal autonomy or to the taxing power of said entities is configured. It adds that, in any case, Law 7210, during its processing, did include the respective consultation of the Municipalities on its text. On the other hand, Article 20 subsection h) of the cited Law contains an exemption from the payment of municipal business licenses (patentes municipales), so regarding that tax it is appropriate to analyze whether the requirement was met or not, with the fact that, to begin with, the original text of the law was indeed consulted, as just indicated. On the other hand, regarding Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 against which the claim is made, it is affirmed that it must be assessed that said law was not consulted with the Municipalities, even though the exemptions of the law, particularly the one related to municipal business licenses (patentes municipales), were extended in said Transitory Provisions. The Attorney General's Office points out that attention must be paid to the fact that the period is not an essential element of the tax or of the exempt event, so it can well be affirmed that the extension of the period for the enjoyment of the discussed incentives did not have to conform to the consultation procedure of Article 190 of the Constitution. Finally, it is indicated that Law 7830 is not unconstitutional because it is not in that law that the exemptions against which the claim is made are created.\n\n5.- Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, of legal age, identity card number 1-191-100, in his capacity as Acting Minister of Foreign Trade, and Jorge Sequeira Picado, of legal age, identity card 1-576-012, in his capacity as General Manager of the Foreign Trade Promoter of Costa Rica (Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica), appear to answer the hearing granted and present their opinion on the filed action. Firstly, they object to the petitioner's standing (legitimación), as they consider that he has not demonstrated that this is a case of the nonexistence of individual and direct injury, nor is the presence of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) demonstrated, as only reference is made to the possible injury of interests that the Council deems relevant. As to the merits, it is pointed out that the legal situation created by the free zone law is highly complex and involves several bodies that ensure that the granting of benefits to companies corresponds to the best interests of the country. Thus, there is no automatic right to the regime, but rather a margin of discretion exists. On the other hand, regarding the incentives, they are effectively regulated in subsection 20 of Law 7210, and include exemption from municipal taxes, so that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, such rules must have been consulted with said autonomous entities, which was effectively done, as seen in the legislative record. Also related to this, it is worth remembering that local interests do not prevail over national ones but rather a coexistence occurs, as in the case of free zones. With this, it should be clear that the petitioner is wrong in claiming a lack of competence of the Assembly to issue this type of development legislation, including in it incentives of different types. It is also important to frame the action by clarifying that there is a clear difference between national taxes designated for municipal purposes and properly municipal taxes, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as those that are the product of a municipal initiative. At this point, it is important to highlight that precisely the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), formerly known as territorial tax (impuesto territorial), has not ceased to be a national tax, in which the only participation of the Municipalities is in its collection and benefit. Also, as part of the analytical framework for this action, it should be emphasized that the main characteristic of the free zone regime is development promotion activity (actividad de fomento), a topic in which national and local interests must converge because both parties, the local and the national government, receive benefits. Specifically, the benefits of the operation of free zones can be demonstrated with numbers, as, for example, they have had a participation close to fifty percent of total exports, and their value in 2012 was just under six billion dollars, with a growth of 4.7 percent, higher than the 4.3 percent growth of total goods exports. Likewise, this wealth is distributed if we look at the increase in jobs, which reach practically 70 thousand jobs, that is, 17 thousand more jobs than in 2008, and with an average salary that is 1.7 times higher than the average national private salary. The importance of the project is also seen when looking at the supply chains (encadenamientos) that are produced, which have led to the purchase of national goods and services worth 2 billion dollars. In light of this, the benefits for the companies that have been questioned by the petitioner must be analyzed: firstly, the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), which, as the Chamber has indicated (6589-2006), is a national tax. Secondly, the tax on the transfer of real property (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles), which was not only created as a national tax by its law but also has no relation to the Municipalities regarding benefits or administration. The petitioner likely intended to refer to the municipal stamp (timbre municipal) charged on real property transfers, but this is also a national tax established in the Municipal Code, of which the Municipalities are beneficiaries under similar conditions as the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). Also having the nature of a national levy is the tax mentioned in the exemption of the challenged subsection g) of Article 20, that is, the one that exempts from payment the taxes levied on profits. Finally, subsection h) does mention municipal taxes and business licenses (patentes municipales), but at this point, it is worth remembering that in this case, the mandatory consultation that has been required did indeed take place. The second part of the action claims against Law 7830, but it must be observed that said law established a greater delimitation and restriction in granting benefits for companies under the free zone regime and does not contain an extension or extension of terms as erroneously indicated. Indeed, in said law, an amendment was made to include a topic relative to minimum investment amounts because previously there were no minimums; controls in the free zone regime were increased: for example, environmental protection, customs control; the obligation to treat waste and by-products; restrictions on granting benefits in the case of industrial park managing companies to close loopholes with the installation of national companies that would indirectly take advantage of such benefits; reports required from free zone companies regarding their operations were expanded; the tariff reduction benefit of Article 20 for trading companies was eliminated; greater controls are established for industrial park managing companies; as stated, greater specific restrictions were established for granting the regime, specifically with the challenged Article 20 bis, which, correctly read, rather sought to limit the possibility of extending the regime for companies, as it must be considered that it moved from a system of unlimited extension to one where objective and clear conditions were imposed to consider (not to automatically grant) a new benefit period; a greater investment requirement was also created both inside and outside the park; the maximum percentage of sales in the local market was also defined. In summary, as can be seen, there is no affectation of municipal competencies. Regarding Law 8794, it must be made clear that none of the challenged Transitory Provisions extend the established incentives. The background of this law is very specific and related to Costa Rica's commitments to the World Trade Organization, and particularly those linked to export activity granted to manufacturing companies. This was complied with by said law by eliminating the prohibited subsidies granted to manufacturing companies, respecting the consolidated situations that already have operations. The statement of motives clearly indicates the purpose is to adapt the domestic regulations. The Transitory Provisions were incorporated to clarify that once the extensions granted to Costa Rica by the WTO expire, the benefits established in Article 20 for processing companies will cease and be rendered without effect, and the Costa Rican State will not grant such incentives to companies entering the regime. Likewise, Transitory Provision IV says that companies of the specified category that have entered the regime before the expiration of the established period and are in the indicated conditions will have the conditions set forth in said subsection and the periods established in the executive agreement of granting respected. The objective of the Transitory Provisions is to restrict the period for granting incentives prohibited by the WTO, and in no case can it be interpreted that they extend them. Even such conditioning is included in the granting agreements and in the operation contracts, so it is clear that the cited law did not modify or create exemptions from municipal taxes. As a result, it is important to emphasize that Law 8794 did not modify or vary any element of the exempt event regularly created at the time in Law 7210. The Transitory Provisions rather serve to dimension the effects of a norm created earlier (Law 7210) due to the need to comply with international obligations. It was the original law that created the exemption, so, for all that has been stated, the action should be declared without merit.\n\n6.- Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, in her capacity as Vice President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Industriales de Costa Rica); Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, in his capacity as First Vice President and legal representative of the Association Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica), and Mónica Segnini Acosta, in her capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association Chamber of Exporters of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica), separately submit their joinder briefs with virtually similar texts, stating that the free zone regime is of enormous importance for the country, as it is a development promotion activity (actividad de fomento) that stimulates new investments in the country. It is logical to understand that international companies entering the country require and seek national companies to collaborate in their tasks, and thus a series of advantages are reproduced that make the economy grow. It is also obvious that any attempt to attack the free zone regime also results in a detriment to national industry, which therefore has the duty to contribute to the defense of the law. Regarding the specific claim, it is pointed out that the petitioner lacks standing (legitimación), as the claim possesses an abstract nature and does not coincide with the exceptions established in the law and with the incidental nature of the action, but it can also be argued that it is not sufficiently substantiated. It adds, already regarding the merits, that the incentives created by the law in question satisfy interests of a national character, and thus, the tax benefits offered include exemptions from national and not municipal taxes, but moreover, it must be indicated that not even all taxes in which the municipalities participate have that character, as the Constitutional Chamber has pointed out regarding the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). Only the exemption from the municipal business license (patente municipal) remains, which was consulted with the municipal governments as the Attorney General's Office indicates in its report. Regarding Law 7830, the joinder party affirms that it never had the objective of extending or prolonging the period of tax or other benefits, but rather more controls were established on the regime, as can be seen from Articles 13, 14.2, 16, 19.d, among others, and the requirements for granting the free zone regime were expanded. Regarding Law 8794, its Transitory Provisions are challenged, and the petitioner incurs in an erroneous interpretation, as analyzing the questioned law shows that its purpose was to adapt the law to the requirements of the World Trade Organization, particularly in the case of manufacturing companies that export. Thus, the Transitory Provisions do not entail an extension or extension of periods or benefits, as the objective of the Transitory Provisions is rather to restrict the period for granting incentives prohibited by the WTO, so it is clear that the periods remain those of the law, particularly those of Article 20. As a complement to the previous assertion, it is worth noting that in practice, the Executive Branch grants the benefits in compliance with the provisions of said article, as can be observed from the executive agreements that are usually issued. For this reason, municipal competencies were not affected, and therefore there was no obligation of consultation, as the Attorney General's Office indicates, and furthermore, the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the non-existence of an obligation to re-consult bills that contemplate modifications to a previously consulted norm, as seen in ruling 2008-15760, should be noted.\n\n7.- Jorge Brenes Ramírez, in his capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the Association of Free Zone Companies of Costa Rica (Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica), also appears as a joinder party in favor of the constitutionality of the norm and indicates that there is a clear interest on the part of his group, and that the petitioner, on the other hand, does not meet the legal requirements, as there are serious contradictions in his substantiation. As to the merits, a description of the operation of free zones is made, and emphasis is placed on the need for an agreement by the competent body of the Administration. Also, on the other hand, it addresses the topic of municipal powers and the consultation of Article 190, concluding that there is actually no obligation of consultation, but that they abide by what has been resolved by the Chamber in the sense that this rule applies despite not being expressly established for them. In any case, it is indicated, the exemptions were consulted as a bill with the Municipalities, including the one in Belén. It adds that, specifically regarding the claims of the action, the one referring to the decrease and affectation of municipal revenues must be denied, as historically the Municipality of Belén closed with a budget surplus in recent years, so it could not be argued that it lacks money, if rather it does not spend all it collects and presents differences in its favor of more than 5,000 million colones. Regarding the issue of the need for consultation, it must first be noted that not all the taxes claimed are municipal, but only the so-called municipal business license (patente municipal), since the others, and especially the tax on real property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), are national, as the Constitutional Chamber has stated. A similar situation occurs with respect to the tax on the transfer of real property (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles), as it is not even destined for the Municipalities. It is claimed that Article 20 bis of the Law included by Law 7830 was also not consulted, but a simple reading is enough to make it clear that it is rather a restrictive article to prevent a company from receiving the benefits again for a single project, and furthermore, none of the elements of the tax or the exemption are touched upon. Finally, regarding the Transitory Provisions of Law 8794, it is emphasized that the petitioner starts from an erroneous interpretation of its text, and therefore it should be a matter of legality. However, it is affirmed that the correct reading of them is that they come to decrease the periods of the regime's benefits, and thus the rights acquired in good faith are reserved. There are no extensions, but rather, as can be seen from the texts of the executive authorization agreements, the contract states that the benefits will be limited as provided by the WTO. Even though the article speaks of extensions, it does so in reference to the adjustment of Costa Rican legislation, but it does not automatically imply an extension. Lastly, if the Chamber decides to declare the limitation of the benefits of subsection h) of Article 20, it is requested that the rights acquired under the law be taken into account, as this clearly involves consolidated situations (situaciones consolidadas).\n\n8.- Humberto Pacheco Alpízar, in his capacity as President and legal representative of the Costa Rican-North American Chamber of Commerce Association (Asociación Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio), also submits a joinder brief in which he sets forth the opinion of the association he represents in relation to the filed action. He begins by defining the concepts of taxing power (poder tributario) and national tax, to conclude that in general, the challenged exemptions are of a national nature and do not affect municipal autonomy. Regarding the latter, he points out that it indeed allows for exclusivity in the initiative for the creation and modification of taxes, but according to the Chamber's jurisprudence, this can be resolved by the Assembly through the consultation mechanism. Having stated the foregoing, he proceeds to analyze the petitioner's arguments and points out that he lacks active standing (legitimación activa), and as to the merits, he indicates that it must be made clear that Law 7210 on free zones was indeed consulted with the Municipalities at the time, and with that, any doubt is eliminated. Regarding Law 7830, he explains that said regulation did not modify the nature of the tax or its exemption, as the periods remained the same, and rather the possibilities in the law for granting new projects to companies already benefiting were restricted. For its part, regarding the Transitory Provisions of Law 8794, it is said that in general, consultation was not necessary as the conditions and the exemption were not changed. It is affirmed that there is an erroneous interpretation of the regulations, as it cannot be understood that there is an extension of the incentives, since their purpose was rather to adapt national conditions to the commitments with the World Trade Organization. Therefore, the objective of the Transitory Provisions is rather to restrict the period for granting incentives, and they cannot be understood as extended, which is why the Transitory Provisions must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the WTO agreements.\n\n9.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 91, 92, and 93 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín judicial), on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of May, 2014.\n\n10.- On June 6, 2014, the case file was assigned to Magistrate Hernández López for study and resolution.\n\n11.- On March 17, 2015, the recusal (inhibitoria) presented by Magistrate Hernández López to hear this matter was accepted, and Magistrate Jorge Araya García was appointed in her place.\n\n13.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the authority granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.\n\n14.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Araya García;\nand,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On the formal aspects and standing (legitimación) for the filing of this action of unconstitutionality. In this action of unconstitutionality, the involved parties have raised objections, both regarding the petitioner's standing (legitimación) and the lack of compliance with the due substantiation of the claim. In relation to the first point, there is a consistent jurisprudential line regarding the possibility that the Municipal Mayor, with the authorization of the Municipal Council, may activate the constitutional review pathway in order to protect the rights of the citizens of his canton.\n\nThat is precisely the case where the documentation allows the conclusion that the Mayor has been instructed by the Municipal Council to bring this action in favor of the collection of taxes whose proceeds they receive and allocate for municipal management.- From that perspective, the claim finds its fit in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Political Constitution, with the exception of some of the taxes that have been included within the claim, but the challenge must be flatly rejected. Otherwise, the filing brief for the action proves to be sufficiently explicit as to the manner in which the legal norms infringe upon the competencies that the Political Constitution grants to the Municipalities. For this reason, the action must be admitted and heard in relation to the merits of what has been raised.\n\nII.- On the norms subject to the challenge. The legal norms for which a declaration of unconstitutionality is requested are the following:\n\nA) Article 20 bis of the Ley 7210 de Zonas Francas, which was added through Ley 7830 of September 22, 1998, exclusively for lack of compliance with the consultation of the Municipalities required in Article 190 of the Constitution. The text of said article reads:\n\n“Article 20 bis.-\n\nThe Free Trade Zone Regime shall not be granted to natural or legal persons to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the incentives of the Regime, even if it was under the protection of a different natural or legal person, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments justify it; all at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of this law.”\n\nB) The nullity of Transitory Provisions I and II of Ley número 8794 of January 12, 2010, is also claimed on the understanding that in its legislative approval procedure, the necessary consultation of the municipalities was also omitted. Such norms textually state:\n\n“Transitory Provision I.-\n\nThe incentives of subsections b), d), f), g), h) and i) of Article 20 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its reforms, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the period provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which forms part of the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, approved by Ley No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains such extensions, at which time the benefits shall cease and be rendered without effect. No later than the same date on which the aforementioned period expires, the other incentives applicable to the companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime must have been adapted, in pertinent part, with respect to the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the mentioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch shall issue for this purpose.”\n\n“Transitory Provision II.-\n\nThe provisions of Transitory Provision 1 modify, in pertinent part, the scope and the terms of the exemptions and incentives provided for in Article 20 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the cited Law, and must be understood as incorporated into the respective agreements granting the free trade zone regime, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, if any exist in any case.”\n\nIII.- Brief framework of the free trade zone regime within the national productive economic environment.- Before setting forth its strictly legal reasoning, this court considers it appropriate to reproduce some of the data provided to this file by some intervening parties, in relation to the contribution to the national economy of the companies operating under the free trade zone regime, the foregoing with the purpose of giving greater solidity to the thesis that in this matter, issues of national significance are at stake and exceed the scope of local interests and services. Based on the report titled “Balance of the Free Trade Zones: net benefit of the regime for Costa Rica” prepared in April 2015, it is found that the companies under this regime amounted to 297 in 2013 and through them the country forms more than half of the exports between 2009 and 2013. A diversification of exportable products with less concentration on agricultural products and an expansion of the destinations of exports can also be attributed to this regime, which is an undoubted advantage in cases of economic crises such as those that have recently affected some areas of the globe.-\n\nOn the other hand, in terms of employment, it is found that the level of gross employment generated by the companies in the Free Trade Zone grew in 2013 by an average of 8.7, higher than the 5.7 at the national level, and reached just over 75 thousand direct jobs. It is indicated that the wages paid in companies under the free trade zone regime are on average 73 percent higher than those paid by the rest of the Costa Rican private sector.\n\nAlso noteworthy is the spillover of the advantages produced by the regime towards other sectors that are indirectly benefited, thanks to the so-called productive linkages, regarding which the report indicates that they have grown at a rate of 13.5 percent and that in 2013 a figure of 1,547 million dollars was reached, the most benefited with this money being the sector of national companies that provide services to the beneficiaries of the regime.\n\nFinally, and as it is relevant for what is discussed here, it is interesting to repeat the data provided by the mentioned report in relation to a measurement instrument called Net Country Benefit (Beneficio País Neto, BPN) which is constructed through the quantification, first of the Country Benefit (Beneficio País, BP) that arises from adding the differentials generated by the regime in wages, in social charges; in taxes associated with employment, in national spending on the purchase of goods and services; and the changes in accumulated investment of the companies, to then subtract from said Country Benefit (BP) the cost of the exemptions recognized for companies under the Free Trade Zone regime regarding income tax; import tax; property tax; municipal taxes; sales taxes on local purchases and regime administration expenses.-\n\nAs indicated, said operation of subtracting the costs of exemptions produces the so-called Net Country Benefit (BPN), which becomes what the country earned in net terms with the regime, and it is indicated that for the 2012-2013 period the BPN was 3,316 million dollars on average; this represents that for every dollar the country invested in the regime to attract companies, 7.4 dollars of net benefit were generated for the Costa Rican economy. In this line, the report closes with a clear and powerful piece of data: that figure of 3,316 million dollars of (BPN) Net Country Benefit, is equivalent, for the 2012-2013 period studied, to 7.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, which for practical purposes, is equivalent to what the country invests annually in public education.\n\nIV.- Delimitation of the object of the action and the scope of this decision. On the object of this action, the plaintiff states in his petition:\n\n“By virtue of all the foregoing, we request this Honorable Constitutional Chamber to annul as unconstitutional the reforms to the Ley de Zonas Francas that keep the incentives contained in that legislation in force, specifically subsections d) and h) of Article 20 of Ley 7210, which exempt companies covered by that regime from the payment of tax on real estate, on the transfer of real estate, from the payment of all taxes and particularly the municipal patent tax, through Leyes 7830 of September 22, 1998 and Ley 8794, of January 12, 2010.” (the emphasis in italics does not belong to the original)\n\nSaid petition is based on the fact that such legal reforms did not comply with essential requirements of the legislative procedure and, specifically, the lack of consultation with the country's Municipalities is noted as missing. In his own words:\n\n“Thus, if during the processing of the bills that gave rise to Leyes 7830 of September 22, 1998, by which Article 20 bis is added, serving as the basis for COMEX to extend the exemption periods, and Ley 8794, of January 12, 2010, which extends the periods and expands the number of beneficiary companies, the Municipalities were not given a hearing to comment on the implications of said bills, the current laws are unconstitutional and must be declared as such with the respective legal consequences.”\n\nThe preceding extracts serve this Court to distill the object of the action and the grounds for unconstitutionality as summarized below:\n\na) The invalidity of the legislative procedure of Ley 7830 of September 22, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Ley 7830”) that, among other norms, introduced the current Article 20 bis into the Ley de Zonas Francas number 7210. Of that specific norm (Article 20 bis) it is indicated that, despite impairing sources of municipal income, it was not consulted with the country's Municipalities as required by Article 190 of the Constitution.\n\nb) The invalidity of the legislative procedure of Ley 8794, of January 12, 2010 (identified in what follows as “Ley 8794”) is also challenged, which introduced, among other norms on the subject of free trade zones, Transitory Provisions I and II. Of such norms (Transitory Provisions I and II) it is alleged that they provide for an extension of the period of exemptions from municipal taxes for companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime, but the bill was not consulted with the Municipalities as mandated by Article 190 of the Fundamental Charter.\n\nV.- Rejection of the action regarding the tax on real estate and the tax on the transfer of real estate.- As just explained, the plaintiff appears in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Belén and instructed by the Municipal Council of that canton in order to defend the interests of his community against legislative norms that are said to affect them in the specific terms indicated above, that is, inasmuch as it concerns imposing extensions to the exemptions of municipal taxes without complying with the consultation procedure of Article 190 of the Constitution.- However, the standing granted by the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional on which the plaintiff relies is not sufficient to question all the taxes exempted through Ley número 7210 de Zonas Francas, but only to defend his interests regarding taxes of a municipal nature, that is, those that have arisen in the legal sphere through municipal initiative in the terms of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution. Thus, the objection for lack of consultation must be rejected, in the first place, insofar as it is directed against the tax on real estate established in Ley número 7509 of May 9, 1995, and its reforms, which – as indicated by the Attorney General's Office – has a national character for having been issued through an ordinary law, even though the tax competence for its administration and the definition of the destination of the funds corresponds to the municipal corporations.- This point was clarified with precision by this Chamber in judgment number 2011-003075 which indicated:\n\nA.- On the jurisprudence related to the tax on real estate. One of the aspects this Chamber must settle has been resolved in the Chamber's jurisprudence, having determined the nature of the tax, that is, whether it is a municipal or national levy. The foregoing has consequences for the focus of the claims raised by the Municipalidad de Escazú. The precedents of this Chamber have reiterated that it is a national tax with a municipal destination, and that, although tax initiative is recognized for the municipalities, it is not possible to understand exclusivity in this matter that limits the freedom of configuration when the initiative is exercised by the legislator. In this sense, the State may, through national taxes, provide extraordinary resources to the Municipalities of the country with the important objective of financing them. In this way, it has been indicated that:\n\nVII.- Municipal discretion in relation to national taxes. In the opinion of the consulting parties, it is unconstitutional for municipalities to be able to dispose of aspects related to the tax on real estate, which is a national, not local, tax. Indeed, the Ley del Impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, number 7509 of May ninth, nineteen ninety-five, establishes a national tax, in favor of municipalities, which, regarding said levy, have the status of beneficiaries and tax administration. This was understood by this Chamber in judgment number 3930-95, of fifteen hours twenty-seven minutes of July eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five, in which it ruled that: \"What has been expressed in the preceding recital should not lead to the false conclusion that only municipal taxes originating from a local government initiative are constitutional. The jurisprudence has clearly pointed out that there are public services that, by their nature, cannot be other than municipal and that are involved in the definition given by Article 169 of the Political Constitution when stating that 'The administration of local interests and services of each canton shall be in charge of the Municipal Government.' If those interests and services require the payment of taxes and contributions from the residents of the corresponding territorial jurisdiction, then the tax initiative can only be municipal, a product of the taxing power of the local government and it is the one defined in the jurisprudence previously commented upon. But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax; through a regional tax that benefits a certain number of local governments; or, through a special tax that levies certain activities, such as the export of bananas, to be distributed among the producing cantons. In these cases, the initiative for the formulation of the tax law is ordinary, since this does not concern the authorization of a tax of a municipal nature, but the creation of a different one, in which the addressee or addressees or beneficiaries will be one or several local governments, as in the case of the tax created in Article 36 of the Mining Code, or in the tax on the sale of liquor. In this case, the tax will be municipal by its destination, but its origin is common law, as it concerns extraordinary and beneficial resources for the communities. In summary, the municipal taxing power, which originates in the creation of the tax by the local government for authorization by the Asamblea Legislativa, does not prevent the legislator from being able, extraordinarily and through the procedures of common law, to grant different rents and economic resources, of a national nature, in which case, the respective bill should not necessarily originate in municipal initiative, even if the beneficiaries of the tax are the local governments themselves. In this last case, the collection, disposition, administration, and settlement correspond to the Municipalities that are the recipients of the taxes.\" In relation to their questions, it is clear that the consulting parties are incorrect. That the tax on real estate is a national tax refers to the fact that the initiative for its creation and approval is a central decision, adopted by the State and not by local governments. It obeys an intention of the State to increase municipal revenues in order to facilitate the adequate provision of local public services based on the levying of a taxable event such as property ownership over real estate, recognized and regulated by the national legal order and not by the municipal one. However, despite said characteristic, in this specific case there is no delegation of the Asamblea Legislativa's own competencies. This would be the case if local governments were allowed to eliminate the tax or modify it in any of the elements regulated by Ley 7509. What is authorized to the municipalities is to waive interests, surcharges, and fines resulting from non-compliance in the payment of said tax by the taxpayers of the respective canton. That is, it authorizes the waiver of liquid sums in favor of each municipality and not the contribution obligations imposed by the Law. As they are entities benefiting from the referred tax, the initiative is fully valid, since it allows the corporations to waive the mentioned items, only for those taxpayers who pay their entire debt, having the \"framework\" authorization of the Asamblea Legislativa, precisely from this bill. The exclusive competence given to Parliament by Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution is thus not contravened. It is a valid manifestation of the legislator's discretion, who in this case acts to safeguard the interests of the local governments themselves and -consequently- those of the entire community. (judgment No. 2006-06589).\n\nIt concerns regulations created by common legislation, not by municipal initiative, but by a decision of the central State and, in this sense, municipalities would not be allowed to eliminate or modify said tax. However, it is clear that the constituent power established limits on the legislator by granting the Municipalities administrative and governmental autonomy, which in turn is instituted as a guarantee for the residents, but if conflicts with national interests exist, this situation must be elucidated by this Chamber, as occurs with the challenged regulations.”\n\nIt is concluded that the plaintiff could not come to claim the defense of municipal competencies of participation in the configuration of taxes, regarding a tax of unquestionable national character such as the cited tax on real estate.- The same reasoning must be applied in relation to what the plaintiff identifies as a tax on the transfer of real estate and which, as the advisory body also specifies, seems to refer rather to the municipal stamp that must be paid as part of the tax burden of some registrable operations in the Public Registry and that appears regulated in Article 84 of the Municipal Code, and therefore also possesses an undoubtable national character.- In summary, regarding these two recently cited taxes, the action filed must be flatly rejected.-\n\nVI.- Other precisions on the issues submitted for decision within this action.- Also adhering to what was requested by the plaintiff and outlined supra, it is appropriate to clarify that this pronouncement does not undertake to contrast the general validity of the incentive regime or the ten-year period for them, prescribed in said law, since such issues have not been challenged, and likewise any examination of the legislative procedure followed at the time for the enactment of the Ley de Zonas Francas número 7210 is discarded, regarding which – as reported by the advisory body – the effective realization at the time of the consultation of the country's Municipalities is also verified, and specifically that carried out with the Municipalidad del Cantón de Belén, as can be seen on folio 366 of legislative file 10562 that gave rise to Ley 7210.-\n\nThus, the examination of the claim against the issuance of Leyes 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Ley 8794, of January 12, 2010, shall be carried out in the following order:\n\n1) verification that the text of Article 20 bis of Ley 7830 of September 22, 1998, and that of Transitory Provisions I and II of Ley 8794, of January 12, 2010, actually contain modifications in municipal tax matters as the appellant affirms and;\n\n2) in the affirmative case, confirm and rule out compliance with the consultation of the municipal entities.\n\nVII.- In relation to the claim against Ley 7830.- As explained, the plaintiff's claim is specified in that the bill that gave rise to this law was not consulted with the Municipalities even though the bill contained Article 20 bis, which affects the municipal treasury by allowing the competent administrative authorities to extend the period of exemption from municipal taxes.- The text of said article states:\n\n“Article 20 bis.-\n\nThe Free Trade Zone Regime shall not be granted to natural or legal persons to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the incentives of the Regime, even if it was under the protection of a different natural or legal person, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments justify it; all at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of this law.”\n\nThis Court observes that, contrary to what the plaintiff states, there is no new or different provision in it that has been added to the current regime of exemptions, nor regarding its period.- On the contrary, both the original text and its reform are exhausted in regulations on the set of subjects that can be benefited, and the reform inserted in Article 20 bis in particular begins by establishing a prohibition for any company or investment project from receiving the incentives of the free trade zone regime if it has already been a beneficiary of the same.- Subsequently, the exceptions to the previous rule are included, and at that point is where the plaintiff understands that an extension of the exemptions to municipal taxes has been authorized; however, for this Court, the plaintiff's interpretation does not adhere to the meaning of the norm, since -as explained- what has been issued are rules directed to the competent entity ordering the exercise of its power to issue new granting agreements for the development of new projects or new stages in some cases that merit it due to their importance.- It is therefore a faculty of the administration, but not aimed at expanding exemption periods, but rather at specifying a set of selection rules for natural or legal persons authorized to operate under the free trade zone regime. It is clear that new projects by new companies or new development plans exceptionally authorized for a company that has already had incentives, make it possible to enjoy all the advantages of the free trade zone, but that is what normally occurs according to the dynamics of the original law, the purpose of which is to get people to invest in the free trade zones.- It is precisely a faculty that -as a whole- the legislator at the time left in the hands of the administrative authorities, and what has now been done is an adjustment to the rules that will result in an agreement granting the regime and along with it a right to enjoy benefits fixed in advance in Ley 7210 in terms of amount and period. There is therefore no affectation of the interests of the Municipalidad, beyond the scope of the restrictions already contained in Ley 7210, because what changed were the conditions for the application of the regime in certain cases.- In short, the plaintiff's logic in this case could not be accepted, as his reasoning would lead us to have to admit that any legislative change that modifies requirements for a person to access the free trade zone regime would have to be consulted with the Municipalities because it could eventually affect their interests, as the existence of a greater number of exempted entities becomes possible. For the Chamber, the interests of the Municipalities in that sense were already taken into consideration in the formulation of Ley 7210, and more than cover the point because that law, given its general and abstract character, makes it possible for an indeterminate universe of persons to access the free trade zone regime, and enjoy the fiscal benefits established there as they meet the requirements. For all these reasons, there is no affectation of municipal competencies in the text of Article 20 bis that was added to Ley 7210 by Ley 7830, and -for the same reason, the consultation procedure with the country's Municipalities was not necessary in this case.-\n\nVIII.- In relation to the claim against Transitory Provisions I and II of Ley número 8794 of January 12, 2010. As explained above, the claim against these two legal norms is specified in that the approval procedure in the Asamblea Legislativa omitted the necessary consultation of the municipalities, despite the fact that they provide for an extension of the periods of exemption from municipal taxes for companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime.- It is important to review the text of such provisions.-\n\n“Transitory Provision I.-\n\nThe incentives of subsections b), d), f), g), h) and i) of Article 20 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its reforms, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the period provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which forms part of the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, approved by Ley No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains such extensions, at which time the benefits shall cease and be rendered without effect.\n\nNo later than the same date on which the aforementioned period expires, the other incentives applicable to companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime must have been adjusted, as pertinent, with respect to the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the mentioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch shall issue for that purpose.”\n\n“Transitory II.- The provisions in Transitory I modify, as pertinent, the scope and the periods of the exemptions and incentives provided for in Article 20 of the Ley de régimen de zonas francas, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the cited Law, and shall be understood to be incorporated into the respective agreements granting the free trade zone regime, without prejudice to good faith acquired rights, should any such rights exist in any case.”\n\nRegarding these provisions, the petitioner states in his claim:\n\n“However, one of the main motivations of the Executive Branch in promoting the amendment to the Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas since April 2009 was to fulfill the commitments assumed by the Country in the signed Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Said agreement obliges the elimination of export-linked incentives for the processing industry within a period of eight (8) years, extendable, such that new investors or those already enjoying the system could continue to enjoy the exemptions provided for in the law, including the payment of the Municipal License Fee (Patente Municipal) and territorial tax, until the years provided for in the indicated Agreement are completed or Costa Rica maintains the possibility of obtaining new extensions of the initial period.- The final objective is to begin preparations for the end of the exemptions related to export subsidies. (…)”\n\nAnd then, later on, he explains that:\n\n“According to the transcribed transitory provisions, the initially provided period of ten years is subsumed into a new 8-year period starting from the signing of the agreement by Costa Rica and with the additional possibility of being prolonged over time according to Costa Rica’s access to the extensions provided for in said agreement. The last period expired in 2007. However, in July 2007, the General Council of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted the decision to continue the procedures for extending the transition period for the elimination of export subsidy programs from certain developing countries.- Costa Rica is among the countries benefiting from said extension agreement.- The decision allows the Subsidies Committee to continue granting extensions to the transition period until the end of 2013, with a final phase-out period of two years, which will end no later than December 31, 2015.”\n\nIn summary, the petitioner appears to understand that the periods for the exemption from payment of municipal taxes enjoyed by companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime have been extended, and that the ten years contained in the law must now be added to the 8-year period granted in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and also the extension of that period that Costa Rica eventually obtains and which currently runs until 2015.- The final result of these transitory provisions would then be that the Municipalities must bear the municipal tax exemptions of Law 7210, beyond the ten years established in Article 20 of said law, which is why they should have been consulted prior to its approval, as indicated by the text of Article 190 of the Constitution.\n\nIX.- On the other hand, the Chamber observes that, faced with the same legal text, the responses from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Foreign Trade Promoter, as well as the Asociación de empresas de Zona Franca de Costa Rica – all of them protagonists and directly implicated in the application of the law – present a diametrically opposed interpretation to that of the petitioner, and which, if accepted by the Chamber, would mean this action must be dismissed because the situation regarding the interests of the municipal entities has not been modified. This interpretation holds that, indeed, the transitory provisions transcribed above are intended to adjust the Costa Rican legal system to the commitments that the country acquired within the World Trade Organization and that precisely because of this, they seek to generally eliminate the exemptions for companies engaged in certain activities.- It is asserted that a correct understanding of the transitory provisions can never produce an extension of the periods if, rather, it involves adjusting the companies to the non-exemption conditions required by the international agreement, such that when the texts state that the exemptions \"…shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the period provided for in the article…expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions…\" it must be understood that it is rather a reduction or restriction of the benefit, which will no longer be for the full 10-year period as ordered by the law, but will only last until the final date defined through the mechanisms established in the respective agreements of the World Trade Organization, all the foregoing \"without prejudice to good faith acquired rights if any such rights exist,\" as expressly indicated by the questioned Transitory II of Law 8794.\n\nX.- The Court thus finds itself with the peculiarity that the normative text itself as well as the explanatory statement of the original bill – which has been reviewed – are of no use in dispelling the doubt as to whether the rule contained in the discussed transitory provisions extended or did not extend the exemptions over time, to the detriment of the revenues to the treasury of the Municipalities in whose territory free trade zone regime companies operate.- The issue is key insofar as the utility of this action is at stake, meaning its character as a reasonable means for the defense of the petitioner’s rights and interests, which form the rationale for its claim regarding the failure to comply with the formality of consulting the Municipalities.\n\nXI.- Faced with such a predicate, this Court understands that constitutional justice and the protection of constitutional norms and principles on one hand, as well as the protection of all interests compromised in this case, are better served if the interpretation that the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Foreign Trade Promoter, and the various interested associations make of the normative content of the discussed texts is accepted, and in this regard, the fact is emphasized that, as the interested parties note, the texts of the transitory provisions in question do not employ the concept of “extension (prórroga)” or any other similar term anywhere to describe the situation in which the exemptions are to remain. This term is only used to refer to the actions of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and clearly refers to the extension of the adjustment period that this organization has set. In addition to the above, the Chamber understands that this reading of the norms is more consistent with all the purposes involved, that is, in balancing the stimulus for attracting investments that the country has sought through the free trade zone mechanism and its exemption regime, against municipal interests and their undeniable need to obtain direct benefits through the payment of taxes by companies operating in their territory.- This is achieved if the transitory provisions are understood in the sense that the exemption periods for the companies specifically included in them are not added to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, whereby there is no extension of exemption periods as denounced and resented by the petitioner, and even less so an impact on its municipal interests, which have remained unchanged in relation to what is already regulated in the cited Article 20 of Law 7210.- As a corollary to what has been said, the transitory provisions are not directed at, nor can they be used to, extend the exemption periods and - therefore - there is no injury to municipal autonomy or to the duty of consultation with these entities.\n\nXII.- Conclusion: From all the foregoing, it is concluded, first, that the action – insofar as it is directed against the failure to comply with constitutional formalities regarding exemptions from taxes on real estate and the tax on real estate transfers – must be summarily dismissed as these are taxes of unquestionable national character.- Second, the claim for failure to comply with constitutional formalities regarding Article 20 bis added to Law 7210, by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, must be declared without merit.- Finally, the claim must also be declared without merit on the understanding that Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 do not violate Article 190 of the Constitution, since the period established for the described companies is not added to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, an interpretation that responds to the idea that this court must endeavor, as far as possible, to find a solution, within the constitutional parameter, that resolves the conflict with the least derogatory and disruptive effort to the legal system and the expectations created within society.\n\nXIII.- Different reasons of Magistrate Castillo Víquez\n\nOn the matter concerning the defect of non-consultation with the municipalities, I conclude that this has not occurred. There is no doubt that constitutional consultation constitutes a limitation on the power to legislate. In some cases, it aggravates it – Articles 97 and 167 of the Political Constitution – when the opinion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and that of the Supreme Court of Justice is negative towards the parliamentary initiative; in another, it temporarily suspends the legislative process for the bill in question – six months before and four after the holding of a popular election – when the opinion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is also negative; and in others, it must be carried out to avoid a defect of unconstitutionality that would affect the entire Law – to the State Universities – Article 88 of the Political Constitution –, to the Central Bank of Costa Rica – subsection 17 of Article 121 of the Fundamental Charter – and to the autonomous institutions – 190 of the Political Code.\n\nRegarding the latter, it is worth recalling that it was the Social Democratic faction that presented, as part of the title related to autonomous institutions, the following rule: “(…) No bill relating to matters entrusted to an Autonomous Institution may be discussed in the Legislative Assembly without the respective Institution having rendered a report on the matter. Said report must be mandatorily included and published as one of the considerandos of the law that is approved.” (A.A.C.: volume III; p. 465). Note that the provision regarding a qualified majority for the approval of a bill where the Institution’s opinion is negative is no longer proposed. We assume that the adverse votes in the National Constituent Assembly in the cases of the University and the Technical Body responsible for determining the monetary unit dissuaded the members of the Social Democratic faction from presenting that initiative.\n\nThe reasons for this regulation are offered by Facio Brenes when indicating that: “(…) through it, what is sought is to oblige the essentially political body that is the Congress, to hear the voice of the autonomous institutions in those matters that affect them.” (A.A.C.N.: volume III; p. 467).\n\nThe reasons why this article was not approved in the proposed form were:\n\n“The representatives Arroyo, Vargas, Fernández and Esquivel expressed disagreement. The first stated that it was not possible to continue subtracting powers from the Legislative Assembly, obliging it to consult all the autonomous institutions of the state. The Assembly integrates, from within, various commissions that have the obligation to consult and document themselves properly regarding matters entrusted to them. If a bill related to an autonomous institution is presented, it is logical that those bodies will be consulted. The second indicated that the motion under debate introduces a new system, since if an autonomous institution does not render the respective report, the Legislative Assembly will not be able to take cognizance of the bill. The third stated that he will not vote for any motion that comes to the detriment of the faculties of the Legislative Assembly, the highest representation of the people in our political system, obliging it even to include in the considerandos of the approved law the Report of the Autonomous Institution” (A.A.N.C.: volume III; p.473).\n\nAs a result, representative Chacón Jinesta suggested a new wording:\n\n“for the discussion and approval of projects relating to an Autonomous Institution, the Legislative Assembly must hear the opinion of the latter” (A.A.N.C.: volume III, p. 473).\n\nDeputy Facio Brenes, on behalf of his colleague, decided to withdraw the motion, and definitively, the proposal of deputy Chacón Jinesta was voted on.\n\nFrom the foregoing discussion, it is clear that those who drafted the current Political Constitution were well aware that constitutional consultation limits the power to legislate, and that the obligation of consultation was directed, in this case, solely and exclusively to those entities that have the legal nature of an autonomous institution, not to those that have the legal nature of a corporation, as occurs with entities decentralized by region.\n\nIt is well known that the doctrine establishes a clear difference between the institution and the corporation. Indeed, in the case of the former, there is an instituting entity, generally the State, which creates the entity; it provides the resources or, at least, the source for its financing, and has involvement in appointing the highest authorities of the instituted entity. In the case of the latter, the entity is created on the initiative of its members, although, in many cases, the issuance of a State act is necessary, for example: the creation of a professional association; it is its members who, generally, finance the entity and, finally, it is they, through the General Assembly or the residents, who elect the highest authorities of the governing bodies. Autonomous institutions, in our context, correspond to the first nature; while municipalities correspond to the second; hence the correctness of the Constituent Assembly’s terminology. From this perspective, municipalities cannot be equated with autonomous institutions.\n\nOn the other hand, given the degree of autonomy that the Law of the Constitution grants to the municipalities – political autonomy in the administration of the interests and local services of the canton (Article 169) – the legislature, in the use of the power to legislate, has important limitations, since it cannot assign the exercise of a municipal competence to another different entity or organ, nor can it adopt legal norms that depart from or contradict the democratic character of municipal organization. We are, then, facing a matter not available to the Legislative Branch in the exercise of the power to legislate, though it is available in the exercise of the constituent power – acting as a reforming power. This is a constitutional content which cannot be regulated by the Legislative Branch in the exercise of the power to legislate. The foregoing constitutes a guarantee for municipal corporations, just as it did for autonomous institutions until their autonomy in matters of government was suppressed – through Law No. 4123 of May 31, 1968 –, in the sense that the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the power to legislate, cannot affect the matters that the Law of the Constitution (values, principles, and norms) attributes exclusively and preclusively to corporate-based entities. Although both enjoyed the same degree of autonomy, the fact of the matter is that the Constituent Assembly only established constitutional consultation for bills relating to autonomous institutions, and not for bills relating to municipalities.\n\nFinally, it is clear from the constitutional text that the municipal regime is regulated in Title XII; while that of autonomous institutions is in Title XIV; hence, these are different constitutional legal regimes, such that it is not appropriate to apply the norms designed for one to the other.\n\nIn summary, the Legislative Assembly is not obliged to consult the municipalities on bills related to them. Hence, the defect invoked by the petitioner does not exist as such.\n\nFrom my perspective, the issue of unconstitutionality resides in another sphere, which is whether or not the Legislative Assembly can create an exemption from a municipal tax, as this would injure the taxing power and municipal autonomy that the Law of the Constitution recognizes for municipal corporations. This being so, the question is whether the exemption from municipal taxes made in the challenged legal norm injures or does not injure what is established in subsection 13 of Article 121; a subsection that expressly recognizes in favor of the Municipalities the exclusivity to determine the elements of the municipal tax, as it is they who must propose the bills for the creation of such levies. As a general rule, it can be held that the Assembly does not have the competence, unilaterally, to create and grant exemptions through ordinary laws regarding municipal taxes. Said initiative can only originate in the Council (Concejo); Parliament’s only role is to approve or disapprove; indeed, the power of creation and exemption in favor of municipalities is so exclusive that the members of the Chamber lack the power of amendment; their competence is limited to removing an obstacle so that the act of creation or exemption can come into legal existence. It must be borne in mind that from a reading of the constitutional norms and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it can be deduced that there are, among others, two types of taxes in our context: national and municipal. The former are those created by the Legislative Assembly in the exercise of the taxing power possessed by the State, which is expressed through the power to legislate; they can have a specific destination, although what is collected from them must necessarily enter the Single Fund (Caja Única) (Article 185 of the Fundamental Charter), or to a specific recipient other than the State, among them, local governments, and which fall on acts, events, goods, services, activities, yields, and expenses carried out or occurring at the national level. The latter, in contrast, are those created by the Council, in the exercise of a derived taxing power, which requires subsequent authorization from the Legislative Assembly, whose sole recipient is the local government, whose obligatory destination is to defray the expenses demanded by the provision of local services, and which fall on acts, events, goods, services, activities, yields, and expenses carried out or linked to the local sphere. However, the foregoing does not prevent the Legislative Assembly from authorizing the local government, through an enabling legal norm, to apply an exemption from municipal taxes, provided that the respective agreement of the Council is given; what is not admissible, from my point of view, is for the Legislative Assembly to exempt or exonerate a tax whose competence – concerning the definition of the structural elements of the tax – belongs to the Council.\n\nNotwithstanding the above, we must clarify that the previous rule is not absolute, as it has exceptions. Indeed, when the Legislative Assembly approves an international treaty that establishes a tax exemption, it is clear that in these cases, municipal taxes are also understood to be exempted. This is how this Court has understood it in ruling 2007-009469, in which it stated the following: “It is evident that our State commits itself in a commercial agreement to comply with certain obligations, thereby also committing all levels of Government, including local administration.” The foregoing stance is a logical consequence of what is provided in subsection 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states, categorically, as follows:\n\n“[…] 29. Territorial scope of treaties. A treaty is binding upon each of the parties in respect of its entire territory, unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established.”\n\nAnother case is when the State, in the interest of the objective satisfaction of national interests, promotes a public policy in which the exemption of municipal taxes by means of a Law of the Republic becomes necessary. In this circumstance, it is also not required that the exemption originate in the Council, for the simple reason that, eventually, a local interest could thwart the effective satisfaction of a national interest. We are faced with a typical situation where the local interest yields to the national interest. In the case of the free trade zone regime, there is no doubt that this has been an attractive scheme for promoting foreign investment, which has translated into enormous benefits for the Costa Rican population, especially the increase in our exports, specifically non-traditional products to both traditional and non-traditional markets, in direct and indirect employment, in investment in areas of lesser relative development, and in productive expansion projects. Ergo, for the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the alleged defect of unconstitutionality does not exist.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is summarily dismissed insofar as it claims failure to comply with constitutional formalities in the establishment of exemptions from the Taxes on Real Estate and the Tax on Real Estate Transfers. The action filed against Article 20 bis of Law 7210 of November 23, 1990, added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, is declared without merit. Likewise, the action against Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 of January 12, 2010, is declared without merit, on the understanding that they are not unconstitutional. Let this ruling be communicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Let this ruling be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify. Magistrate Castillo Víquez gives different reasons. Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro append a note.\n\nGilbert Armijo S.\nPresidente\n\nErnesto Jinesta L.\n\nFernando Cruz C.\n\nFernando Castillo V.\n\nPaul Rueda L.\n\nLuis Fdo. Salazar A.\n\nJorge Araya G.\n\nExp. 12-009520\n\nNote of magistrates Cruz Castro and Armijo Sancho, drafted by the former. On the questions regarding free trade zones and global justice.\n\nThe concern of those who raised this constitutional objection is legitimate; however, as clearly expressed in the text of the unanimous vote, there is an erroneous interpretation on the part of the petitioner regarding the effective periods of the exemptions and the consultation of municipal corporations.\n\nFree trade zones raise various questions, because the State develops an exemption policy to be able to attract investments; it is a necessity imposed by globalization. Societies with little economic development, such as the Central American ones, with little influence in the power blocs on the international stage, have to compete for foreign investment funds, especially from transnational corporations, offering advantages that are not enjoyed by ordinary citizens or companies that do not meet the requirements of the free trade zone regime. These regimes of privilege raise questions, varied concerns about global justice, equity in international economic relations, but these questions do not become objections of unconstitutionality, perhaps because the globalized injustice caused by a capitalism that some deem “savage” escapes the limited scope of national constitutionality; the legal structure of the Constitution does not impose limits on the rules and principles governing international economic relations.\n\nThe imperative need to attract investments demands a structural response to compete for private investment funds. Some questions that arise from these regimes of privilege reveal grave injustices, but they can rarely become an unconstitutionality. The sphere of international economic relations is almost always foreign to the issue of constitutionality.\n\nDespite these structural limitations that create inequalities beyond the control of constitutionality, in some cases the right to equality and equity could arise, trying to establish if the free trade zone creates a constitutionally inadmissible privilege; it is an exceptional discussion that can arise regarding an investment attraction policy; however, these are not the objections raised in this action. It might be that the exemption regime of free trade zones becomes a structural privilege, as mentioned; however, that condition does not allow us to infer that there is a violation of the principle of equality and equity with respect to citizens and companies that do not meet the requirements demanded in the free trade zone regimes.\n\nThe exemption regime could well have a disproportionate and unreasonable period, an extreme that could indeed be constitutionally challenged. Nor would it be admissible for the exemption to be granted by regulation and not by a legislative act, because in this matter, respect for the principle of legal reserve is relevant. None of these objections is raised in this matter.\n\nIn principle, the free trade zone regime is a component of economic and fiscal policy that could not be forcefully unconstitutional, despite the privileges granted to some economic actors. These exceptions have been common currency in the economic history of Costa Rica, since the times when the contract-law was admitted. Despite the possible injustices of privilege regimes, that assessment is not sufficient to consider them unconstitutional; the rules of globalization, unreachable for constitutional jurisdiction, require privileged tax regimes.\n\nThese tax exemption zones must be resolved within the political sphere, which faces too many conditioning factors; the convenience of these exemption regimes must be evaluated, taking into account elements as important as linkages with the local economy and job creation. The insurmountable contradictions of economic development are attenuated by free zone regimes, but the questions about human development and equity in international economic relations remain valid. Not all injustices are elucidated in the constitutional instance. Injustices may exist, but the constitutional jurisdiction is incapable of conjuring the injustice that reaches planetary dimensions. Hélder Câmara rightly said: “today it is not enough to think that injustice exists between individual and individual, between group and group, but between nation and nation and nation, between world and world…” (See by the author, “Para llegar a tiempo”-Ed. Sígueme-Spain-1972-p. 36). Constitutional justice does not reach planetary injustice; that is reflected in the design and effects of tax privilege regimes. There are problems of global scope that prove untouchable for constitutional justice, as occurs with some rules governing free trade treaties. The responsibility for avoiding these excesses remains under the exclusive control of the actors, determining their convenience, the benefits obtained, and the justice of their validity.\n\nRarely can the constitutional instance influence the roots of global economic dependence, the roots of the hegemony of transnational capital, dominated by economic groups that hold great political and economic power, power that finds no very clear boundary in the local constitutional order.\n\nFernando Cruz C. Gilbert Armijo S.\n\nMagistrate Magistrate\n\n1 See the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber nos. 6455-94, 5398-94 and 1341-93\n\n2 See judgments nos. 4528-99 and 4529-99 of the Constitutional Court.\n\n3 See judgment no. 4529-99 of the Constitutional Court.\n\n4 See, among others, judgments nos. 3930-95, 4785-93, 4072-95, 4268-95, 6935-93, 687-96 and 467-99.\n\n5 In judgment no. 467-99 the Constitutional Court stated the following: “'IX).- MUNICIPAL TAXING POWER AND COMPETENCE.- We have previously stated that the tax that must be paid by quarry and pit extraction companies, while a national tax whose beneficiaries are the Municipalities, is constitutionally compatible with the principles and rules that regulate what we might call Municipal Tax Law. This concept was elaborated by the Chamber in Judgment No. 4785-93 of eight thirty on September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three, Considerando VII, by expressing the following:\n\n'VII.- It remains to analyze what pertains to the figure of the \"collection agent,\" which is the term used by the action. The most important doctrine on the matter has generally indicated that the \"TAXING POWER\" (potestad tributaria, potestad impositiva, poder de imposición, among others) consists of \"... the faculty to apply contributions (or establish exemptions)...\"; in other words, \"...the power to sanction legal norms from which derives or may derive, for certain individuals or certain categories of persons, the obligation to pay a tax...\". Parallel to the \"TAXING POWER,\" there is also recognized the faculty to exercise it on the material plane, which is called \"TAX COMPETENCE\" (COMPETENCIA TRIBUTARIA), such that both powers may coincide in the same body, but not necessarily, as they manifest in different spheres. Indeed, there may exist bodies endowed with tax competence and lacking taxing power. The power to tax, as noted, is inherent to the State and cannot be suppressed, delegated, or ceded; but the power to make it effective, on the material plane, can be transferred and granted to parastatal or private entities. The differences between both concepts have been made manifest, in our context, by establishing the separation between the active subject of the taxing power and the active subject of the tax obligation. From the foregoing it is concluded that what can be transferred, as we have seen, is the so-called tax competence, that is, the right to make the benefit effective.’\n\nConsequently, it is more than evident that the municipalities, according to what the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been expressing, are constitutionally endowed with Taxing Power and, for the specific case of the tax created in Article 36 of the Mining Code, with Tax Competence; that is, the power to make that tax effective on the material plane...”. (What is in bold does not correspond to the original).\n\n6 The Constitutional Chamber has indicated that municipalities have an original taxing power, vote no. 687-96, a thesis we do not share for what is indicated below. Since in our country there is no phenomenon of political decentralization, as happens in Federal States, in Spain with the Autonomous Communities, or in Italy with the Regions, and in Great Britain with the decision of the Labour Government headed by Mr. Tony Blair to reopen the parliaments of Edinburgh and Wales, but rather of administrative decentralization, in its various forms (by region and by service), it is improper to state that local governments in Costa Rica enjoy an original taxing power (potestad tributaria originaria). This is only possible in the cases we have indicated, where local legislative powers can create taxes without oversight by the national government, requiring for its validity and efficacy only respect for the distribution of national and local or regional competences set forth in the Political Constitution and, in the case of Great Britain which lacks a written constitution, in the pertinent legal instrument.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding the incentives, these are effectively regulated in subsection 20 of law 7210, and include exemption from municipal taxes, so that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (la Sala Constitucional), such norms must have been consulted with said autonomous entities, which was effectively done as can be seen from the legislative file. Also related to this, it is good to remember that local interests do not prevail over national ones but rather there is a coexistence, as in the case of free trade zones (zonas francas). With this it should be clear that the plaintiff is not correct in claiming the lack of competence of the Assembly (la Asamblea) to issue this type of development legislation including in it incentives of different types. It is also important to frame the action by clarifying that there is a clear difference between national taxes destined for municipalities and properly municipal taxes, which the Constitutional Chamber (la Sala Constitucional) has defined as those that are the product of a municipal initiative. On this point it is important to highlight that precisely the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), formerly known as territorial tax, has not ceased to be a national tax, regarding which the only thing in which the Municipalities participate is in its collection and benefit. Also as part of the framework of analysis of this action, it must be underscored that the main characteristic of the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) is the development activity, a topic in which national and local interests must converge because both parties, the local one and the national government, receive benefits. Specifically, the benefits of the operation of free trade zones (zonas francas) can be demonstrated with numbers since, for example, they have had a participation close to fifty percent of total exports, and their value in 2012 was slightly less than six billion dollars with a growth of 4.7 percent, higher than the 4.3 of total goods exports. Equally, this wealth is distributed if we look at the increase in jobs that reach practically 70 thousand jobs, that is, 17 thousand more jobs than in 2008 and with an average salary that is 1.7 times higher than the national private salary average. The importance of the project is also seen when looking at the linkages that are produced, which have led to the purchase of national goods and services for 2 billion dollars. Against this, the benefits for the companies that have been questioned by the plaintiff must be analyzed: firstly, the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), which, as the Chamber (la Sala) has pointed out (6589-2006), is a national tax. Secondly, the real estate transfer tax (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles) which was not only created as a national tax by its law but also has no relation whatsoever with the Municipalities regarding benefits or administration. The appellant states that it was probably intended to rescue the municipal stamp that is charged on real estate transfers, but this is also a national tax established in the Municipal Code, and from which the Municipalities are beneficiaries under similar conditions as the real estate tax (impuesto de bienes inmuebles). The tax mentioned in the exemption of subsection g) of the challenged article 20 also has the nature of a national levy, that is, the one that exempts from payment the taxes that levy profits. Finally, subsection h) does mention municipal taxes and business license (patente), but on this point it is worth remembering that in this case the mandatory consultation that has been required was indeed carried out. The second part of the action claims against law 7830, but it must be observed that rather, said law established a delimitation and greater restriction in the granting of benefits for companies under the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) and does not contain an expansion or extension of deadlines as is erroneously pointed out. Indeed, in said law it was amended to include an issue related to minimum investment amounts since before there were no minimums; controls in the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) were increased: for example, environmental protection, customs control; obligation to treat waste and by-products, restrictions for granting benefits in the case of industrial park management companies to close loopholes with the installation of national companies that could indirectly take advantage of such benefits; the reports required of free trade zone companies in relation to their operations were expanded; the tax exemption benefit of article 20 for marketing companies was eliminated; greater controls are established for industrial park management companies; as stated, greater specific restrictions were established to grant the regime, specifically with the challenged 20 bis, which, read correctly, rather sought to limit the possibility of prolonging the regime for the companies, since it must be taken into account that it went from a system of unlimited prolongation to one where objective and clear conditions were imposed to consider (not to automatically grant) a new benefit period; a greater investment requirement was also created inside and outside the park; the maximum percentage of sales in the local market was also delimited. In summary, as can be seen, there is no affectation of municipal competences. Regarding law 8794, it must be made clear that none of the challenged transitory provisions extends the established incentives. The background of this law is very specific and is related to Costa Rica's commitments with the World Trade Organization (la Organización Mundial del Comercio) and particularly those linked to export activity granted to manufacturing companies. This was fulfilled with said law by eliminating the prohibited subsidies granted to manufacturing companies, respecting the consolidated situations that already have operations. In the statement of motives, it is clearly indicated that it is to adapt internal regulations. The transitory provisions were incorporated to clarify that once the extensions granted to Costa Rica by the WTO (la OMC) expire, the benefits established in article 20 for processing companies will cease and become without effect, and the Costa Rican State will no longer grant said incentives to companies entering the regime. Likewise, transitory provision IV says that the companies of the specified category that have entered the regime before the expiration of the established deadline and are under the conditions indicated, will have the conditions indicated in said subsection and the deadlines established in the executive granting agreement respected. The objective of the transitory provisions is to restrict the period for granting the incentives prohibited by the WTO (la OMC) and in no case can it be interpreted that they extend them. Even such conditioning is included in the granting agreements and in the operations contracts, so it is clear that the cited law did not modify or create municipal tax exemptions. As a result, it is important to emphasize that law 8794 did not modify or vary any element of the exempt event regularly created in its time in law 7210. The transitory provisions are rather responsible for dimensioning the effects of a norm created earlier (law 7210) as a result of the need to comply with international obligations. It was the original law that created the exemption, so for all that has been said, the action must be dismissed.\n\n6.- Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, in her capacity as Vice President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma) of the Association Chamber of Industrialists of Costa Rica (la Asociación Cámara de Industriales de Costa Rica); Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, in his capacity as First Vice President and legal representative of the Association Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (la Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica) and Mónica Segnini Acosta, in her capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) of the Association Chamber of Exporters of Costa Rica (la Asociación Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica), separately file their joinder briefs with virtually similar texts and in which they point out that the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) is of enormous importance for the country, as it is a development activity that stimulates the realization of new investments in the country. It is logical to understand that international companies entering the country require and seek national companies to collaborate in their tasks, and thus a series of advantages are reproduced that make the economy grow, and it is also obvious that any attempt to attack the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) is also a detriment to the national industry, which therefore has the duty to contribute to the defense of the law. Regarding the particular claim, it is pointed out that the plaintiff lacks standing because the claim possesses an abstract character and does not coincide with the exceptions established in the law and with the incidental nature of the action, but it can also be accused that it is not sufficiently grounded. It adds, already regarding the merits, that the incentives created by the law in question satisfy national interests, and thus, the tax benefits offered comprise exemptions from national taxes and not municipal ones, but it must also be indicated that not even all the taxes in which the municipalities participate have that character, as the Constitutional Chamber (la Sala Constitucional) has pointed out regarding the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). Then, the only thing left is the exemption from the municipal business license (patente municipal) which was consulted with the municipal governments as the Attorney General's Office (la Procuraduría) points out in its report. Regarding law 7830, the joinder party claims that it never had the objective of extending or prolonging the term of fiscal or other benefits, but rather that more controls were established for the regime, as can be seen from articles 13, 14, 2, 16, 19.d among others, and the requirements for granting the free trade zone regime (régimen de zonas francas) were expanded. Regarding law 8794, its transitory provisions are challenged, about which the plaintiff incurs an erroneous interpretation, because when analyzing the questioned law, it is seen that its purpose was to adapt the law to the requirements of the World Trade Organization (la Organización Mundial de Comercio) particularly in the case of manufacturing companies that export. Thus, the transitory provisions do not entail an extension or prolongation of terms or benefits, since rather the objective of the transitory provisions is to restrict the period for granting incentives prohibited by the WTO (la OMC), so it is clear that the periods continue to be those of the law and particularly those of article 20. As a complement to the previous statement, it is worth pointing out that in practice the Executive Branch grants the benefits in compliance with what is established in said article, as can be observed from the executive agreements that are usually issued. For that reason, municipal competences were not affected, and therefore, there was no obligation to consult, as the Attorney General's Office (la Procuraduría) indicates, and it is also worth mentioning the constitutional jurisprudence in relation to the non-existence of an obligation to consult again on bills that contemplate modifications to a previously consulted norm, as seen in judgment 2008-15760.\n\n7.- Jorge Brenes Ramírez, in his capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) of the Association of Free Trade Zone Companies of Costa Rica (la Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica), also intervenes as a joinder party in favor of the constitutionality of the norm and points out that there is a clear interest of his group and that the plaintiff, on the other hand, does not meet the legal requirements as there are serious contradictions in his legal grounds. Regarding the merits, a description is made of the operation of the free trade zones (zonas francas), and emphasis is placed on the need for an agreement by the competent body of the Administration (la Administración). Also, on the other hand, it addresses the issue of municipal powers and the consultation of article 190 and concludes that there is in reality no obligation to consult, but that they abide by what was decided by the Chamber (la Sala) in the sense that said rule applies despite not being expressly established for them. In any case, it is indicated, the exemptions were consulted as a bill to the Municipalities, including that of Belén. It adds that, specifically regarding the claims of the action, the one referring to the decrease and affectation of municipal revenues must be denied because historically the Municipality of Belén (la Municipalidad de Belén) closed with a budget surplus in recent years, so it could not be pointed out that it lacks money if, rather, it does not spend everything it collects and presents differences in its favor of more than 5,000 million colones. Regarding the issue of the need for consultation, it must begin by pointing out that not all the taxes claimed are municipal, but only the one called municipal business license (patente municipal), since the others, and especially the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), are national as the Constitutional Chamber (la Sala Constitucional) has held. A similar situation occurs with respect to the real estate transfer tax (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles) since it is not even destined for the Municipalities. It is claimed that article 20 bis of the Law (la Ley) included by law 7830 was also not consulted, but just reading it is enough for it to be clear that it is rather a restrictive article to prevent a company from receiving the benefits again for the same project, and also none of the elements of the tax or the exemption are touched. Finally, regarding the transitory provisions of Law (la Ley) 8794, it is emphasized that the plaintiff starts from an erroneous interpretation of its text and therefore it should be a matter of legality. However, it is stated that the correct reading of them is that they come to reduce the periods of the regime's benefits, and thus a reservation is made of the rights acquired in good faith. There are no extensions but rather, as can be seen from the texts of the executive authorization agreements, the contract says that the benefits will be limited according to what the WTO (la OMC) provides. Although the article speaks of extensions, it does so regarding the adjustment of Costa Rican legislation but does not automatically imply an extension. Lastly, if the Chamber (la Sala) decides to declare the limitation of the benefits of subsection h) of article 20, it is requested that it take into account the rights acquired under the protection of the law as they are clearly in front of consolidated situations.\n\n8.- Humberto Pacheco Alpízar, in his capacity as President and legal representative of the Costa Rican-North American Chamber of Commerce Association (la Asociación Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio), also files a joinder brief within which he sets forth the criteria of the association he represents in relation to the action filed. He begins by defining the concepts of taxing power and national tax to conclude that in general the exemptions claimed are of a national nature and do not affect municipal autonomy. Regarding the latter, he points out that it effectively allows for exclusivity in the initiative to create and modify taxes, but according to the jurisprudence of the Chamber (la Sala), this can be resolved by the Assembly (la Asamblea) through the consultation mechanism. Having laid out the above, he goes on to analyze the plaintiff's arguments and points out that he lacks active standing, and regarding the merits, he indicates that it must be made clear that law 7210 on free trade zones (zonas francas) was indeed consulted with the Municipalities at the time, and with that, any doubt is eliminated. Regarding law 7830, he explains that said regulation did not modify the nature of the tax or its exemption because the deadlines remained the same and rather the possibilities in the law to grant new projects to already benefiting companies were restricted. For his part, regarding the transitory provisions of law 8794, it is said that in general the consultation was not necessary because the conditions and the exemption had not been changed. It is stated that there is an erroneous interpretation of the regulations because it cannot be understood that there is an extension to the incentives, as the purpose was more to adapt national conditions to the commitments with the World Trade Organization (la Organización Mundial de Comercio). Therefore, the objective of the transitory provisions is rather to restrict the period for granting incentives, and they cannot be understood to be extended, which is why the transitory provisions must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the WTO (la O. M. C.) agreements.\n\n9.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 91, 92, and 93 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín judicial), on May 14, 15, and 16, 2014.\n\n10.- On June 6, 2014, the file was turned over to Magistrate Hernández López for her study and resolution.\n\n11.- On March 17, 2015, the motion to recuse presented by Magistrate Hernández López from hearing this matter was granted, and Magistrate Jorge Araya García was appointed in her place.\n\n13.- The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber (la Sala) by numeral 9 ibidem, considering this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.\n\n14.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of the law have been complied with.\n\n Drafted by Magistrate Araya García; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On the formal aspects and the standing for the presentation of this action of unconstitutionality. In this action of unconstitutionality, the involved parties have raised objections, both regarding the plaintiff's standing and the failure to comply with the proper legal grounds of the claim. In relation to the first point, there is a consistent jurisprudential line regarding the possibility of the Municipal Mayor, with the authorization of the Municipal Council, activating the constitutional review process in order to protect the rights of the residents of his canton. That is precisely the case where the documentation allows concluding that the Mayor has been instructed by the Municipal Council to file this action in favor of the collection of taxes whose product they receive and allocate for municipal management. From that perspective, the claim finds its fit in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Political Constitution (la Constitución Política), with the exception of some of the taxes that have been included within the claim, but the challenge must be rejected outright. For the rest, the filing brief for the action turns out to be sufficiently explicit as to the manner in which the legal norms harm the competences that the Political Constitution (la Constitución Política) grants to the Municipalities.\n\nTherefore, the action must be admitted and heard with respect to the merits of what has been raised.\n\n**II.- Regarding the norms subject to challenge.** The legal norms for which a declaration of unconstitutionality is requested are the following:\n\n**A) Article 20 bis of Law 7210, the Free Zone Law (Ley de Zonas Francas), which was added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998** exclusively for lack of compliance with the consultation to the Municipalities required in Article 190 of the Constitution. The text of said article reads:\n\n\"**Article 20 bis**.- \n\nThe Free Zone Regime shall not be granted to natural or legal persons to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the incentives of the Regime, even if it was under the protection of a different natural or legal person, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments justify it; all at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of this law.\"\n\n**B)** The nullity of **Transitory Provisions (Transitorios) I and II of Law number 8794 of January 12, 2010** is also claimed, on the understanding that during its legislative approval procedure, the required consultation to the municipalities was also omitted. Such norms textually state:\n\n**\"Transitorio I.-**\n\nThe incentives of subparagraphs b), d), f), g), h), and i) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its reforms, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subparagraph a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the period foreseen in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which forms part of the Final Act incorporating the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, approved by Law No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains such extensions, at which time the benefits shall cease and be rendered without effect. No later than the same date on which the aforementioned period expires, the other incentives applicable to the beneficiary companies of the Free Zone Regime must have been adapted, in the pertinent aspects, with respect to the companies indicated in subparagraph a) of Article 17 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the mentioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch shall issue for this purpose.\"\n\n\"**Transitorio II.-**\n\nThe provisions in Transitorio I modify, in the pertinent aspects, the scope and the terms of the exemptions and incentives provided in Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subparagraph a) of Article 17 of the cited Law and must be understood as incorporated into the respective agreements granting the Free Zone Regime, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, if any exist.\"\n\n**III.- Brief framing of the Free Zone Regime within the productive economic environment at the national level.-** Before presenting its strictly legal reasoning, this court considers it appropriate to reproduce some of the data provided to this file (expediente) by some intervening parties, in relation to the contribution to the national economy of the companies operating under the Free Zone Regime, in order to give greater solidity to the thesis that issues of national importance are at stake in this matter and exceed the scope of local interests and services. Based on the report titled \"Balance of Free Zones: net benefit of the regime for Costa Rica\" prepared in April 2015, it is established that the companies under this regime numbered 297 in 2013, and through them the country accounts for more than half of exports between 2009 and 2013. Also attributable to this regime is a diversification of exportable products with less concentration in agricultural products and an expansion of export destinations, which proves to be an undeniable advantage in cases of economic crises such as those that have recently affected some areas of the globe.-\n\nOn the other hand, in terms of employment, the level of gross employment generated by companies in the Free Zone grew by an average of 8.7 in 2013, higher than the 5.7 at the national level, reaching just over 75 thousand direct jobs. It is indicated that the wages paid in companies under the Free Zone Regime are on average 73 percent higher than those paid by the rest of the Costa Rican private sector. \n\nThe spillover of advantages produced by the regime towards other sectors that are indirectly benefited is also highlighted, thanks to the so-called productive linkages, regarding which the report indicates they have grown at a rate of 13.5 percent and that in 2013 a figure of 1,547 million dollars was reached, the most benefited by this money being the sector of national companies that provide services to the beneficiaries of the regime.\n\nFinally, and being relevant to what is discussed here, it is interesting to repeat the data provided by the mentioned report in relation to a measurement instrument called Net Country Benefit (Beneficio País Neto, BPN) which is constructed by quantifying, first, the Country Benefit (Beneficio País, BP) that arises from adding the differentials generated by the regime in wages, in social charges; in taxes associated with employment, in national spending on the purchase of goods and services; and the changes in accumulated investment of the companies, to then subtract from said Country Benefit (BP) the cost of the exemptions recognized to the companies under the Free Zone Regime regarding income tax; import tax; property taxes; municipal taxes; sales taxes on local purchases and administrative expenses of the regime.-\n\nAs indicated, this operation of subtracting the cost of exemptions produces the so-called Net Country Benefit (BPN), which is what the country earned net from the regime, and it is indicated that for the 2012-2013 period, the BPN averaged 3,316 million dollars; this represents that for every dollar the country invested in the regime to attract companies, 7.4 dollars of net benefit were generated for the Costa Rican economy. In this vein, the report closes with a clear and forceful piece of data: that figure of 3,316 million dollars of Net Country Benefit (BPN) is equivalent, for the 2012-2013 period studied, to 7.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, which for practical purposes, is equivalent to what the country invests annually in public education.\n\n**IV.- Delimitation of the object of the action and the scope of this decision.** Regarding the object of this action, the plaintiff points out in his petition:\n\n\"In virtue of all the foregoing, we request this Honorable Constitutional Chamber to *annul as unconstitutional the reforms to the Free Zone Law that keep in force* the incentives contained in that legislation, specifically subparagraphs d) and h) of Article 20 of Law 7210, which exempt the companies covered by that regime from the payment of tax on real estate (bienes inmuebles), on the transfer of real estate, from the payment of all tributes and particularly the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal), through Laws 7830 of September 22, 1998 and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010.\" (the highlighting in italics does not belong to the original)\n\nSaid petition is based on the fact that such legal reforms did not comply with essential requirements of the legislative procedure and specifically the lack of consultation to the Municipalities of the country is missed. In his own words:\n\n\"This being the case, if during the processing of the bills that gave rise to Laws 7830 of September 22, 1998, through which Article 20 bis was added, which serves as the basis for COMEX to extend the exemption periods, and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010, which extends the periods and expands the number of beneficiary companies, the Municipalities were not heard regarding the implications of said bills, the current laws are therefore unconstitutional and must be declared so with the respective legal consequences.\"\n\nThe previous extracts serve this Court to delineate the object of the action and the grounds for unconstitutionality as summarized below:\n\n**a)** the invalidity of the legislative process of Law 7830 of September 22, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as *\"Law 7830\"*) is accused, which among other norms introduced the current Article 20 bis into the Free Zone Law number 7210. Regarding that specific norm (Article 20 bis), it is indicated that, despite worsening sources of municipal revenue, it was not consulted with the Municipalities of the country as required by Article 190 of the Constitution.\n\n**b)** the invalidity of the legislative process of Law 8794, of January 12, 2010 (hereinafter identified as \"*Law 8794*\") is also accused, which introduced, among other norms on the subject of free zones, Transitorios I and II. Regarding these norms (Transitorios I and II), it is alleged that they provide for an extension of the exemption period from municipal taxes for the beneficiary companies of the Free Zone Regime, but the bill was not consulted with the Municipalities as mandated by Article 190 of the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental).\n\n**V.- Rejection of the action regarding the tax on real estate (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) and the tax on the transfer of real estate (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles).-** As just explained, the plaintiff appears in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Belén, instructed by the Municipal Council of said canton, in order to defend the interests of his community against legislative norms that are said to affect them in the specific terms indicated above, that is, insofar as they impose extensions on the exemptions from municipal tributes without complying with the consultation procedure of Article 190 of the Constitution.- However, the standing granted by the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) that supports the plaintiff does not extend to challenging all the tributes exempted through Law number 7210 of Free Zones, but only to defending their interests regarding the *tributes of a municipal nature (tributos de carácter municipal)*, that is to say, those that have emerged in legal life by municipal initiative under the terms of Article 121, subparagraph 13) of the Political Constitution. Thus, the objection for lack of consultation must be rejected firstly insofar as it is directed against the tax on real estate (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) established in Law number 7509 of May 9, 1995, and its reforms, which – as the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) indicates – has a national character because it was enacted through an ordinary law, even though the tax authority for its administration and the definition of the destination of the funds corresponds to the municipal corporations.- This point was clearly specified by this Chamber in judgment number 2011-003075, which indicated:\n\n**A.- On the jurisprudence related to the tax on real estate (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles).** One of the aspects that this Chamber must resolve is settled in the jurisprudence of the Chamber, as the nature of the tax has been determined, that is, whether it is a municipal or national levy. The foregoing has consequences for the approach to the claims raised by the Municipality of Escazú. The precedents of this Chamber have reiterated that it is a national tax with a municipal destination, and that, although the tax initiative is recognized for the municipalities, it is not possible to understand exclusivity in this matter that limits the freedom of configuration when the initiative is exercised by the legislator. In this sense, the State can, through national taxes, provide extraordinary resources to the Municipalities of the country with the important objective of financing them. In this way, it has been indicated that:\n\n*VII.- Municipal discretion in relation to national tributes. In the judgment of the consultants, it is unconstitutional for municipalities to dispose of extremes related to the tax on real estate, which is a national, not local, tribute. Indeed, the Law on the Tax on Real Estate, number 7509 of May nine, nineteen ninety-five, establishes a national tax, in favor of the municipalities, which, regarding said tribute, have the status of beneficiaries and of tax administration. Thus, this Chamber understood it in judgment number 3930-95, of fifteen hours twenty-seven minutes of July eighteen, nineteen ninety-five, in which it provided that: \"What was expressed in the previous recital should not lead to the false conclusion that only municipal tributes originating from a local government initiative are constitutional. The jurisprudence has clearly indicated that there are public services that by their nature cannot be other than municipal and that are involved in the definition given by Article 169 of the Political Constitution when stating that 'The administration of the interests and local services of each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government.' If those interests and services require the payment of taxes and contributions from the residents of the corresponding territorial jurisdiction, then the tax initiative can only be municipal, a product of the tax authority of the local government and which is defined in the jurisprudence commented on above. But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax; through a regional tax, which benefits a certain number of local governments; or, through a special tax that levies certain activities, such as the export of bananas, to be distributed among the producing cantons. In these cases, the initiative for the formulation of the tax law is the ordinary one, since here it is not about the authorization of a municipal tribute, but the creation of a different one, in which it turns out that the recipient or recipients, the beneficiaries, will be one or several local governments, as in the case of the tax created in Article 36 of the Mining Code, or in the tax on the sale of liquors. In this case, the tribute will be municipal by its destination, but its origin is the common law, as it involves extraordinary and beneficial resources for the communities. In synthesis, the municipal tax authority, which originates in the creation of the tribute by the local government to be authorized by the Legislative Assembly, does not prevent the legislator from being able, extraordinarily and through the procedures of common law, to grant different rents and economic resources, of a national character, in which case the respective bill does not necessarily have to originate from the municipal initiative, even if the beneficiaries of the tribute are the local governments themselves. In this latter case, the collection, disposition, administration, and liquidation correspond to the Municipalities destined to receive the tributes.\" In relation to your questions, it is clear that the consultants lack reason. That the tax on real estate is a national tribute refers to the fact that the initiative for its creation and approval is a central decision, adopted by the State and not by local governments. It obeys an intention of the State to increase municipal revenues in order to facilitate the adequate provision of local public services based on the levy on a taxable event (hecho generador) such as ownership of real estate, recognized and regulated by the national order and not by the municipal one. However, despite said characteristic, in this case, a delegation of powers proper to the Legislative Assembly is not occurring. It would be so if local governments were allowed to eliminate the tribute or modify any of the elements regulated by Law 7509. What the municipalities are authorized to do is to forgive the interest, surcharges, and fines resulting from non-compliance in the payment of said tribute by the taxpayers of the respective canton. That is, they are authorized to forgive liquid sums in favor of each municipality and not the contribution obligations imposed by the Law. Being entities that are beneficiaries of the referred tax, the initiative is fully valid, once the corporations are allowed to forgive the mentioned extremes, only for those taxpayers who pay the totality of their debt, having the \"framework\" authorization of the Legislative Assembly, precisely from this bill. Thus, the exclusive competence given to Parliament by Article 121, subparagraph 13) of the Political Constitution is not contravened. It is a valid manifestation of the legislator's discretion, which in this case acts to safeguard the interests of the local governments themselves and -consequently- those of the entire community. (judgment No. 2006-06589).*\n\nThis is a regulation created by common legislation, not by municipal initiative, but by a decision of the central State and, in this sense, municipalities would not be allowed to eliminate or modify said tribute.\n\nHowever, it is clear that the constituent power established limits on the legislator by granting the Municipalities administrative and governmental autonomy, which in turn is instituted as a guarantee for the residents, but should conflicts with national interests exist, this situation must be elucidated by this Chamber, as occurs with the challenged regulations.\"\n\nIt is concluded that the claimant could not come to claim the defense of municipal powers of participation in the configuration of taxes, with respect to a tax of unquestionable national character such as the aforementioned real estate tax.— The same reasoning applies in relation to what the claimant identifies as a real estate transfer tax and which, as the advisory body also specifies, seems to refer rather to the municipal stamp that must be paid as part of the tax burden of certain operations registrable in the Public Registry and which is regulated in article 84 of the Municipal Code, for which reason it also possesses an undoubted national character.— In summary, with respect to these two aforementioned taxes, the action filed must be rejected outright.—\n\n**VI.- Other clarifications on the issues submitted for decision within this action.—** Also in adherence to what was requested by the claimant and outlined supra, it should be clarified that this ruling does not proceed to contrast the general validity of the incentive regime or the ten-year term for them, prescribed in said law, since such issues have not been questioned, and likewise any examination of the legislative procedure followed at the time for the promulgation of the Free Zone Law number 7210 is ruled out, regarding which – according to what the advisory body reports – the effective completion at the time of the consultation with the Municipalities of the country is also verified, and specifically that carried out with the Municipality of the Canton of Belén, as seen on folio 366 of legislative file 10562 which gave rise to Law 7210.—\n\nIn this manner, the examination of the claim against the issuance of laws 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010, will be conducted in the following order:\n\n**1)** verification that the text of article 20 bis of 7830 of September 22, 1998, and that of Transitory Provisions I and II and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010, really contain modifications in municipal tax matters as the appellant affirms and;\n\n**2)** in the affirmative case, confirm and rule out compliance with the consultation with municipal entities.\n\n**VII.- In relation to the claim against Law 7830.—** As explained, the claimant's claim is concretized in that the bill that gave rise to this law was not consulted with the Municipalities despite the fact that the bill contained article 20 bis, which affects the municipal treasury by allowing the competent administrative authorities to extend the term of the exemption from municipal taxes.— The text of said article says:\n\n\"**Article 20 bis**.—-\n\nNo Free Zone Regime shall be granted to natural or legal persons to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the Regime's incentives, even if it was under the protection of a different natural or legal person, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments so justify; all at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in accordance with the provisions of the regulation of this law.\"\n\nThis Court observes that, contrary to what the claimant indicates, there is no new or different provision in it that has been added to the current exemption regime, nor regarding its term.— On the contrary, both the original text and its reform are exhausted in regulations on the set of subjects that may be benefited, and the reform inserted in article 20 bis in particular begins by establishing a prohibition for any company or investment project from receiving the incentives of the free zone regime if it has already been a beneficiary thereof.— Then, exceptions to the previous rule are included, and it is at that point where the claimant understands that an extension of the exemptions from municipal taxes has been authorized; however, for this Court, the claimant's interpretation does not adhere to the meaning of the norm, since—as explained—what has been issued are rules directed at the competent entity and that order the exercise of its power to issue new granting agreements for the development of new projects or new stages in some cases that, due to their importance, merit it.— It is, then, a power of the administration but not aimed at extending exemption terms, but rather at specifying a set of rules for the selection of natural or legal persons authorized to operate under the free zone regime. It is clear that new projects by new companies or new development plans exceptionally authorized for a company that has already had incentives, make it possible to enjoy all the advantages of the free zone, but that is what normally occurs according to the dynamics of the original law, whose purpose is to achieve that persons invest in the free zones.— It is precisely a power that—as a whole—the legislator left at the time in the hands of the administrative authorities, and now what has been done is an adjustment in the rules that will result in a granting agreement for the regime and along with it, a right to enjoy benefits fixed beforehand in Law 7210 regarding amount and term.— There is, therefore, no affectation of the interests of the Municipality, beyond the scope of the restrictions already contained in Law 7210, because what varied were the conditions for the application of the regime in certain cases.— In short, the claimant's logic could not be accepted in this case, because their reasoning would lead us to have to admit that any legislative change that modifies requirements for a person to access the free zone regime would have to be consulted with the Municipalities for eventually affecting their interests as the existence of a greater number of exempt parties is possible. For the Chamber, the interests of the Municipalities in that sense were already taken into consideration in the formulation of Law 7210, and amply cover the point because that law, with its general and abstract character, makes it possible for an undetermined universe of persons to access the free zone regime, and enjoy the fiscal benefits established therein according to compliance with the requirements. For all this, there is no affectation of municipal powers in the text of article 20 bis which was added to Law 7210 by Law 7830, and—for the same reason—the consultation procedure with the Municipalities of the country was not necessary in this case.—\n\n**VIII.- In relation to the claim against Transitory Provisions I and II of Law number 8794 of January 12, 2010.** As explained above, the claim against these two legal norms is concretized in that the procedure for their approval in the Legislative Assembly omitted the necessary consultation with the municipalities, despite the fact that they provide for an extension of the terms of exemption from municipal taxes for the beneficiary companies of the free zone regime.— It is important to review the text of such provisions.—\n\n**\"Transitory Provision I.—**\n\nThe incentives of subsections b), d), f), g), h) and I) of article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its reforms, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the term provided for in paragraph 4 of article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which forms part of the Final Act incorporating the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, approved by Law No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains said extensions, at which time the benefits shall cease and be rendered without effect. No later than the same date on which the aforementioned term expires, the other incentives applicable to the beneficiary companies of the free zone regime must have been adapted, as pertinent, with respect to the companies indicated in subsection a) of article 17 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the mentioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch shall issue for this purpose.\"\n\n\"**Transitory Provision II.—**\n\nThe provisions of Transitory Provision 1 modify, as pertinent, the scope and terms of the exemptions and incentives provided for in article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subsection a) of article 17 of the cited Law, and must be understood as incorporated into the respective granting agreements for the free zone regime, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, if they exist in any case.\"\n\nIn relation to said norms, the claimant states in their claim:\n\n\"However, one of the main motivations of the Executive Branch in promoting the modification to the Free Zone Regime Law since April of the year 2009, was to comply with the commitments assumed by the Country in the signed Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Said agreement obliges the elimination of incentives linked to exports regarding the processing industry, within a term of eight (8) extensible years, so new investors or those who were enjoying the system, could continue to enjoy the exemptions provided for in the law, including the payment of Municipal Patent and territorial tax, until the years provided for in the indicated Agreement are completed or Costa Rica maintains the possibility of obtaining new extensions of the initial term.— The final objective is to begin preparations for the end of the exemptions related to export subsidies. (...)”\n\nAnd then, later it explains that:\n\n\"According to the transcribed transitory provisions, the initially provided ten-year term is subsumed into a new term of 8 years from the subscription of the agreement by Costa Rica and with the possibility also of being prolonged over time as Costa Rica accesses the extensions provided for in said agreement. The last term expired in 2007. However, in July 2007, the General Council of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted the decision to continue the procedures for extending the transition period for the elimination of export subsidy programs of some developing countries.— Costa Rica figures among the beneficiary countries of said extension agreement.— The decision allows the Committee on Subsidies to continue granting extensions to the transition period until the end of 2013, with a final gradual elimination period of two years, which will end no later than December 31, 2015.\"\n\nIn summary, the claimant seems to understand that the terms of the exemption from payment of municipal taxes enjoyed by the beneficiary companies of the free zone regime have been extended, and that the ten years contained in the law must now be added to the 8-year term that was granted in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and also the extension of such term that Costa Rica eventually obtains and which currently reach until 2015.— The final result of these transitory provisions would then be that the Municipalities must bear the exemptions from municipal taxes of Law 7210, beyond the ten years established in article 20 of said law, a reason for which they should have been consulted prior to their approval, just as the text of Constitutional Article 190 indicates.\n\n**IX.-** On the other hand, the Chamber observes that in the face of the same legal text, in the responses of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, of the Foreign Trade Promoter, as well as of the Association of Free Zone Companies of Costa Rica – all of them protagonists and directly implicated in the application of the law – an interpretation is made diametrically opposed to that of the claimant and which, if accepted by the Chamber, would mean this action must be dismissed because the situation regarding the interests of the municipal entities has not been modified. Such interpretation maintains that, effectively, the transitory provisions transcribed above have the purpose of adjusting the Costa Rican legal order to the commitments that the country acquired within the World Trade Organization and that precisely because of that, they seek to eliminate, in a general manner, the exemptions for companies that engage in certain activities.— It is affirmed that the correct understanding of the transitory provisions can never produce an extension of the terms if rather it is about adjusting the companies to the conditions of non-exemption demanded in the international convention, for which reason when the texts provide that the exemptions “…shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the term provided for in article…expires for Costa Rica…including the extensions…” it must be understood that it is rather a reduction or restriction of the benefit, which will no longer be for the entire 10-year term, as the law ordered, but will only last until the final date defined through the mechanisms established in the respective agreements of the World Trade Organization, all of the foregoing \"without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith if they exist in any case\", just as the challenged Transitory Provision II of Law 8794 expressly indicates.\n\n**X.-** The court is thus faced with the peculiarity that the normative text itself, as well as the statement of motives of the original bill—which has been reviewed—are useless to settle the doubt of whether the rule contained in the discussed transitory provisions extended the exemptions over time or not, to the detriment of the revenues to the treasury of the Municipalities in whose territory companies operate under the free zone regime.— The issue is key insofar as the utility of this action is at stake, that is, its character as a reasonable means for the defense of the rights and interests of the claimant, which constitute the raison d'être of its claim for the failure to comply with the formality of consultation with the Municipalities.\n\n**XI.-** Faced with such a predicament, this Court understands that constitutional justice and the protection of constitutional norms and principles on the one hand, as well as the protection of all the interests compromised in this case, are better served if the interpretation made by both the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Trade Promoter, and the different associations of interested parties regarding the normative content of the discussed texts is accepted, and in this respect, the fact is emphasized that, as the interested parties indicate, the texts of the transitory provisions in question do not employ anywhere the concept of \"extension\" or any other similar term to describe the situation in which the exemptions are to remain.\n\nThe term is used only to refer to actions of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and clearly refers to the extension of the adjustment period that organization has established. In addition to the above, the Chamber understands that this reading of the rules is more consistent with all the purposes involved, that is to say, in that it balances the incentive for attracting investment that the country has sought through the free trade zone mechanism and its exemption regime, against municipal interests and their undeniable need to obtain direct benefits through the payment of taxes by companies operating in their territory. This is achieved if the transitional provisions are understood in the sense that the exemption periods of the companies specifically included therein are not added to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, with which there is no extension of the exemption periods that the plaintiff has denounced and resents, and even less any impact on his municipal interests, which have remained without any alteration relative to what is already regulated in the cited Article 20 of Law 7210. As a corollary of the foregoing, the transitional provisions are not aimed at nor can they be used to extend the exemption periods, and therefore there is no harm to municipal autonomy or to the duty to consult these entities.\n\n**XII.- Conclusion:** From all of the foregoing, it is concluded, firstly, that the action—insofar as it is directed against the failure to comply with constitutional formalities regarding exemptions from taxes on real property and real property transfer taxes—must be dismissed outright because these are taxes of unquestionable national character. Secondly, the claim regarding the failure to comply with constitutional formalities on the part of Article 20 bis added to Law 7210 by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, must be declared without merit. Finally, the claim must also be declared without merit upon understanding that Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 do not harm Article 190 of the Constitution, since the period established for the companies described therein is not added to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, an interpretation that responds to the idea that this court must strive, as much as possible, to find a solution, within the constitutional parameter, that resolves the conflict with the least derogatory and distorting effort on the legal system and the expectations created within society.\n\n**XIII.- Different Reasons of Judge Castillo Víquez**\n\nRegarding the defect due to the lack of consultation with the municipalities, I conclude that this has not occurred. There is no doubt that the constitutional consultation constitutes a limitation on the power to legislate. In some cases, it aggravates it, Articles 97 and 167 of the Constitución Política—when the criterion of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and that of the Corte Suprema de Justicia is negative regarding the parliamentary initiative; in another, it temporarily suspends it for the bill in question, six months before and four months after the holding of a popular election—when the criterion of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is also negative; and in others, it must be carried out to avoid a defect of unconstitutionality that would affect the entire Law—the State Universities—Article 88 of the Constitución Política, the Banco Central de Costa Rica—subsection 17 of Article 121 of the Carta Fundamental—and the autonomous institutions—Article 190 of the Código Político.\n\nIn regard to the latter, it is worth recalling that it was the Social Democratic faction that presented, as part of the title relating to autonomous institutions, the following rule: \"(…) No bill relating to matters entrusted to an Autonomous Institution may be discussed in the Asamblea Legislativa without the respective Institution having rendered an opinion on the matter. Said opinion must be included and published, mandatorily, as one of the considerandos of the law that is approved.\" (A.A.C.: volume III; p. 465). It should be noted that the matter relating to the qualified majority for the approval of a bill where there is a negative criterion of the Institution is no longer proposed. We assume that the adverse votes of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente in the cases of the University and the Technical Body responsible for determining the monetary unit dissuaded the members of the Social Democratic faction from presenting that initiative.\n\nThe reasons for this regulation are offered by Facio Brenes when he indicates that: \"(…) through it, what is sought is to force the essentially political body that is the Congress, to listen to the voice of the autonomous institutions in those matters that affect them.\" (A.A.C.N.: volume III; p. 467).\n\nThe reasons why this article was not approved in the proposed form were:\n\n\"Representatives Arroyo, Vargas, Fernández, and Esquivel expressed disagreement. The first stated that it was not possible to continue reducing the powers of the Asamblea Legislativa, obliging it to consult all the autonomous institutions of the state. The Asamblea forms, from its body, different commissions that have the obligation to consult and document themselves in due form regarding matters entrusted to them. If a bill related to an autonomous institution is presented, it is logical that these organisms will be consulted. The second indicated that the motion under debate introduces a new system, since if an autonomous institution does not render the respective opinion, the Asamblea Legislativa will not be able to consider the bill. The third stated that he would not vote for any motion that comes to the detriment of the powers of the Asamblea Legislativa, the highest representation of the people in our political system, obliging it even to include in the considerandos of the law that is approved, the Opinion of the Autonomous Institution\" (A.A.N.C.: volume III; p. 473).\n\nAs a result, representative Chacón Jinesta suggested a new wording:\n\n\"for the discussion and approval of projects relating to an Autonomous Institution, the Asamblea Legislativa must hear the opinion of that institution\" (A.A.N.C.: volume III, p. 473).\n\nDeputy Facio Brenes, on behalf of his colleague, decided to withdraw the motion, and ultimately the proposal of Deputy Chacón Jinesta was voted on.\n\nFrom the preceding discussion, it is clear that those who drafted the current Constitución Política were well aware that the constitutional consultation limits the power to legislate, and that the obligation of consultation was directed, in this case, solely and exclusively to those entities that have the juridical nature of an autonomous institution, and not to those that have the juridical nature of a corporation, as occurs with entities decentralized by region.\n\nIt is well known that the doctrine establishes a clear difference between the institution and the corporation. Indeed, in the case of the first, there is an instituting entity, generally the State, which creates the entity; it provides the resources or, at least, the source for its financing, and has interference in the appointment of the highest authorities of the instituted entity. In the case of the second, it is through the initiative of its members that the entity is created, although, in many cases, the issuance of an act of the State is necessary, for example: the creation of a professional association; its members are, generally, those who finance the entity, and, finally, it is they, through the Asamblea General or the citizens, who elect the highest authorities of the governing bodies. The autonomous institutions, in our sphere, correspond to the first nature; while the municipalities, to the second; hence the correctness of the Constituent in the terminology it uses. From this perspective, municipalities cannot be equated to autonomous institutions.\n\nOn the other hand, given the degree of autonomy that the Derecho de la Constitución grants to the municipalities—political autonomy in the administration of the interests and local services of the canton (Article 169)—the legislative power, in the exercise of the power to legislate, has important limitations, since it cannot assign the exercise of a municipal competence to another different entity or organ, nor can it adopt legal norms that move away from or contradict the democratic character of the municipal organization. We are, then, facing matters not available to the Legislative Power in the exercise of the power to legislate, although they are in the exercise of the constituent power—acting as the reforming power. It is a constitutional content that cannot be regulated by the Legislative Power in the exercise of the power to legislate. The foregoing constitutes a guarantee for municipal corporations, just as it did for autonomous institutions until their autonomy in matters of government was suppressed—through Law No. 4123 of May 31, 1968—in the sense that the Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of the power to legislate, cannot affect the matters that the Derecho de la Constitución (values, principles, and norms) attributes to the entities of a corporate base exclusively and excludably. Although both enjoyed the same degree of autonomy, the fact of the matter is that the Constituent only established the constitutional consultation for bills relating to autonomous institutions, and not for projects relating to municipalities.\n\nFinally, it is clear from the constitutional text that the municipal regime is regulated in Title XII; while that of the autonomous institutions is in Title XIV; hence, they are different constitutional legal regimes, and it is not appropriate to apply norms designed for one to the other.\n\nIn summary, the Asamblea Legislativa is not obligated to consult the municipalities regarding bills relating to them. Hence, the defect invoked by the plaintiff does not exist as such.\n\nFrom my perspective, the question of unconstitutionality lies in another sphere, which is whether the Asamblea Legislativa can or cannot create an exemption from a municipal tax, since this would harm the taxing power and municipal autonomy that the Derecho de la Constitución recognizes for municipal corporations. Thus, the question is whether the exemption of municipal taxes established in the challenged legal norm harms or not what is established in subsection 13 of Article 121; a provision that expressly recognizes in favor of the Municipalities the exclusivity to determine the elements of the municipal tax, since they are the ones who must propose the projects for the creation of such levies. As a rule of principle, it can be maintained that the Asamblea does not have the competence, unilaterally, to create and grant exemptions through ordinary laws regarding municipal taxes. Said initiative can only originate in the Concejo; all that corresponds to Parliament is to approve or reject; indeed, the power of creation and exemption in favor of the municipalities is so exclusive that the members of the Cámara lack the power of amendment; their competence is limited to removing an obstacle so that the act of creation or exemption can emerge into legal life. It must be borne in mind that from the reading of constitutional norms and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it can be deduced that there are, among others, two types of taxes in our sphere: national and municipal. The former are those created by the Asamblea Legislativa in the exercise of the taxing power[^1] possessed by the State, which is expressed through the power to legislate, which may have a specific destination[^2], although necessarily what is collected because of them must enter the Caja Única (Article 185 of the Carta Fundamental)[^3], or to a specific recipient different from the State, among them, local governments[^4] and that fall on facts, acts, goods, services, activities, income, and expenses carried out at the national level. The latter, on the other hand, are those created by the Concejo[^5], in the exercise of a derived taxing power[^6], that requires subsequent authorization from the Asamblea Legislativa, whose sole recipient is the local government, whose mandatory destination is to cover the expenses demanded by the provision of local services, and that fall on facts, acts, goods, services, activities, income, and expenses carried out or linked to the local sphere. Now, the foregoing is not an impediment for the Asamblea Legislativa to authorize the local government, through an enabling legal norm, to apply an exemption from municipal taxes, provided that the respective agreement of the Concejo mediates; what is not admissible, from my point of view, is for the Asamblea Legislativa to exempt or exonerate a tax whose competence is—in relation to the definition of the structural elements of the tax—of the Concejo.\n\n[^1]: Note Text 1\n[^2]: Note Text 2\n[^3]: Note Text 3\n[^4]: Note Text 4\n[^5]: Note Text 5\n[^6]: Note Text 6\n\nNotwithstanding the above, we must clarify that the foregoing rule is not absolute, as it has exceptions. Indeed, when the Asamblea Legislativa approves an international treaty that establishes a tax exemption, it is clear that in these cases municipal taxes are also understood to be exempt. This Court has so understood in ruling 2007-009469, in which it expressed the following: \"It is evident that our State commits itself in a trade agreement to fulfill certain obligations, thereby also committing all levels of Government, including the local administration.\" The foregoing position is a logical consequence of what is provided in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, where the following is categorically expressed:\n\n\"[…]\n\n29. Territorial scope of treaties. A treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory, unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established.\"\n\nAnother case is when the State, in the interest of the objective satisfaction of national interests, promotes a public policy in which the exemption of municipal taxes is necessary through a Law of the Republic. In this case, it is also not required that the exemption originate from the Concejo, for the elementary reason that, eventually, a local interest could thwart the effective satisfaction of a national interest. We are facing a typical situation where the local interest yields to the national interest. In the case of the free trade zone regime, there is no doubt that this has been an attractive scheme for promoting foreign investment, which has resulted in enormous benefits for the Costa Rican population, especially the increase of our exports, specifically of non-traditional products to both traditional and non-traditional markets, of direct and indirect employment, of investment in zones of lesser relative development, and of productive expansion projects. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the alleged defect of unconstitutionality does not exist.\n\n**Por tanto:**\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción en cuanto reclama la falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales en el establecimiento de exoneraciones de los Impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y el impuesto sobre traspasos de bienes inmuebles.\n\nThe action brought against article 20 bis of Law 7210 of November 23, 1990, added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, is dismissed. Likewise, the action against Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 of January 12, 2010, is dismissed, as they are understood not to be unconstitutional. Let this ruling be communicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Let this ruling be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Let it be notified. Magistrate Castillo Víquez provides separate reasons. Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro append a note.\n\n| Gilbert Armijo S. | |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| Presidente | |\n| | |\n| Ernesto Jinesta L. | Fernando Cruz C. |\n| | |\n| | |\n| Fernando Castillo V. | Paul Rueda L. |\n| | |\n| | |\n| Luis Fdo. Salazar A. | Jorge Araya G. |\n\n**Exp. 12-009520**\n\n**Note of Magistrates Cruz Castro and Armijo Sancho, drafted by the former. On the questionings of free zones and global justice.**\n\nThe concern of those who raised this constitutional objection is legitimate; however, as is well expressed in the text of the unanimous vote, there is an erroneous interpretation on the part of the petitioner regarding the effective terms of the exemptions and the consultation with municipal corporations.\n\nFree zones raise various questionings because the State develops an exoneration policy to be able to attract investments; it is a necessity imposed by globalization. Societies with little economic development, such as those of Central America, with little influence in power blocs at the international level, must compete for foreign investment funds, especially from transnational corporations, offering advantages not enjoyed by ordinary citizens or companies that do not meet the requirements of the free zone regime. These privilege regimes raise questions, varied concerns about global justice and equity in international economic relations, but these questions do not become objections of unconstitutionality, perhaps because the globalized injustice caused by a capitalism that some deem \"savage\" escapes the limited scope of national constitutionality; the legal structure of the Constitution does not impose limits on the rules and principles governing international economic relations.\n\nThe imperative need to attract investments demands a structural response to compete for private investment funds. Some questions that arise with these privilege regimes reveal serious injustices, but they can seldom become an unconstitutionality. The sphere of international economic relations is almost always foreign to the issue of constitutionality.\n\nDespite these structural limitations that create inequalities beyond constitutional control, in some cases the right to equality and equity could arise, attempting to establish whether the free zone creates a constitutionally inadmissible privilege; it is an exceptional discussion that may arise regarding an investment attraction policy; however, these are not the objections raised in this action. It could be that the exoneration regime of free zones becomes a structural privilege, as mentioned; however, that condition does not allow inferring that there is a violation of the principle of equality and equity vis-à-vis citizens and companies that do not meet the requirements demanded in free zone regimes.\n\nThe exoneration regime could well have a disproportionate and unreasonable term, an extreme that could indeed be discussed constitutionally. Nor would it be admissible for the exoneration to be granted by regulation rather than by a legislative act, because in this matter respect for the principle of legal reserve is relevant. None of these objections are raised in this matter.\n\nIn principle, the free zone regime is a component of economic and fiscal policy that could not, perforce, be unconstitutional, despite the privileges granted to some economic actors. These exceptions have been legal tender in Costa Rica's economic history, since the times when the contrato-ley was admitted. Despite the possible injustices of privilege regimes, that assessment is not enough to consider them unconstitutional; the rules of globalization, unreachable for constitutional jurisdiction, require privileged tax regimes. These tax exception zones must be resolved within the political sphere, which faces too many conditioning factors; the suitability of these exoneration regimes must be evaluated, taking into account elements as important as linkages with the local economy and job creation. The unsalvageable contradictions of economic development are attenuated by free zone regimes, but the questions about human development and equity in international economic relations remain valid. Not all injustices are elucidated in the constitutional instance. There may be injustices, but the constitutional jurisdiction is incapable of conjuring the injustice that reaches planetary dimensions. Hélder Câmara well said: \"today it is not enough to think that injustice exists between individual and individual, between groups and groups, but between nations and nations and nations, between world and world…\" (See the author, \"Para llegar a tiempo\"-Ed. Sígueme-España-1972-p. 36). Constitutional justice does not reach planetary injustice; that is reflected in the design and effects of tax privilege regimes. There are problems of global scope that remain untouchable for constitutional justice, as occurs with some rules governing free trade treaties. The responsibility for avoiding these excesses remains under the exclusive control of the actors, determining their suitability, the benefits obtained, and the justice of their validity.\n\nRarely can the constitutional instance affect the roots of global economic dependence, the roots of the hegemony of transnational capital, dominated by economic groups that hold great political and economic power, power that finds no very clear border in the local constitutional order.\n\n**Fernando Cruz C.** **Gilbert Armijo S.**\n**Magistrate** **Magistrate**\n\n“the claim for failure to comply with constitutional formalities by Article 20 bis added to Law 7210, by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, must be dismissed.- (…) the claim must also be dismissed as it is understood that Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 do not violate Article 190 of the Constitution, since the period established for the companies described *is not added* to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, an interpretation that responds to the idea that this court must strive, as far as possible, to find a solution, within the constitutional parameter, that resolves the conflict with the least derogatory and distorting effect on the legal system and the expectations created within society.” **JUDGMENT 7688-15**\n\n007688-15. INCENTIVES TO COMPANIES SUBJECT TO THE FREE ZONE REGIME WITHOUT CONSULTING THE MUNICIPALITIES. MUNICIPAL PATENTS. Free Zone Regime Law. No. 7830 of 22-09-1998 and the Reform to the Free Zone Regime Law. No. 8794 of 12-01-2010.\n\n**File No.: 12-009520-0007-CO**\n\n**Res. No. 2015007688**\n\n**CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours zero minutes on the twenty-seventh of May, two thousand fifteen.**\n\nAction of unconstitutionality (Acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by HORACIO ALVARADO BOGANTES, of legal age, single, bearer of identity card number 0401240551, resident of La Ribera de Belén, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Belén, against subsections d), g) and h) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law; Law Number 7210; Article 20 bis added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Transitory Provisions I and II of Law Number 8794 of January twelve, two thousand ten. Intervening in the proceedings are Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Curridabat, ID card 4-127-782 in her capacity as **Attorney General of the Republic (Procuradora General de la República)**; Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, of legal age, identity card number 1-191-100, in his capacity as **Acting Minister of Foreign Trade (Ministro a.i. de Comercio Exterior)**; Jorge Sequeira Picado, of legal age, identity card 1-576-012 in his capacity as General Manager of the **Foreign Trade Promoter of Costa Rica (Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica)**; Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, in her capacity as Vice President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the **Association Chamber of Industrialists of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Industriales de Costa Rica)**; Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, in his capacity as First Vice President and legal representative of the **Association Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica)**; Mónica Segnini Acosta, in her capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the **Association Chamber of Exporters of Costa Rica (Asociación Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica)**; Jorge Brenes Ramírez, in his capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the **Association of Free Zone Companies of Costa Rica (Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica)** and Humberto Pacheco Alpízar, in his capacity as President and legal representative of the **Costa Rican-North American Chamber of Commerce Association (Asociación Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio).**\n\n**Whereas (Resultando):**\n\n**1.-** The petitioner comes to request the declaration of unconstitutionality of subsections d), g) and h) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law; Law Number 7210; Article 20 bis added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, and Transitory Provisions I and II of Law Number 8794 of January twelve, two thousand ten, as he understands they are contrary to Articles 121 subsection 13, 169 and 170, 175 and 190 of the Political Constitution, understanding that their approval did not consider the criterion of the Municipalities of the country. It is explained that the discussed laws came to modify Law Number 7210 on Free Zones (hereinafter Law 7210) in several aspects but, in what is relevant to the filed action, on the topic of fiscal benefits for companies favored under that regime.- Specifically, it is claimed that one of the motivations for the modification through Law 8794 was the need to adapt to the agreements signed on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO, which obliges the elimination of incentives linked to exports for the processing industry within a period of eight years, renewable, such that new investors or those already enjoying the system could enjoy the law's exemptions, including the non-payment of patents and territorial tax, until the years provided for in the indicated Agreement or in the extensions achieved are completed.- In line with the above, Transitory Provisions I and II were included in the law, which are challenged in this action, in which the period initially provided for 10 years of exemption is extended and subsumed into a new period of 8 years from the signing of the aforementioned agreement by Costa Rica and with the possibility of being prolonged over time according to the applicable extensions.- It is affirmed that the last period expired in 2007; however, through the extension mechanism, the exemption was allowed to be maintained until the end of 2013, with a final two-year gradual elimination period until December 31, 2015.- He affirms that, in relation to municipal taxing power (potestad tributaria) and autonomy, the exemption of subsections g) and h) must be understood as covered by what is established in Article 121 subsection 13 regarding that it is exclusively the Municipalities that are responsible for determining the elements of the tax (tributo), as they are the ones who must propose the projects for the creation of such levies. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Assembly cannot unilaterally arrogate the competence to create and grant exemptions through ordinary laws regarding municipal taxes. It is affirmed that the Chamber, when trying to reconcile this power with that of the Assembly, to regulate cases of national interest that touch upon local matters, has pointed out that the Constitution resolves the problem with the establishment of the consultation to the Municipalities on projects on this matter. Thus, it is clear that the challenged laws should have been, in their pertinent parts, the initiative of the Municipality or that their text should have been consulted, since Law 7830, which allows COMEX to extend the benefits and periods of exemption from municipal taxes to companies, and Law 8794, whose transitory provision extends the exemption period generally and subject to extensions regarding compliance with obligations with the World Trade Organization. Therefore, it was required to comply with the due consultation of the Municipalities, which did not occur. By virtue of the foregoing, he requests that the reforms to the Free Zones Law that keep the incentives contained in that legislation in force be annulled, specifically subsections d) and h) of Article 20 of Law 7210, which exempts companies under that regime from the payment of tax on real estate.\n\n**2.-** The processing of this action was suspended on March 20, 2013, in accordance with Article 84 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), while a similar petition filed previously was being resolved, which was dismissed on September 25, 2013.-\n\n**3.-** By resolution at seventeen hours eighteen minutes on April 3, 2014, this action of unconstitutionality was admitted and a hearing was granted to the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.\n\n**4.-** In a brief dated May 7, 2014, Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Curridabat, ID card in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, appears and responds to the hearing granted, indicating that the petitioner's claim is aimed at having the Chamber declare the unconstitutionality of the discussed rules that regulate exemptions for companies operating in free zones, and indicates that the core of his argument is the lack of consultation of such legislative decisions with the municipal corporations, as they are rules that exempt such companies from municipal taxes. The advisory body indicates that an analysis must be made of which taxes are exempted to first determine if they are municipal or not, and then verify the existence of the consultation with the municipal entities.- The product of this task leads to the conclusion that not all of the exemptions being challenged are municipal taxes, and specifically, the tax on real estate and the payment of stamps for transfer transactions are not, so that regarding the exemption of such taxes, no injury to municipal autonomy or to the taxing power of those entities is configured. She adds that in any case, Law 7210, during its legislative process, did include the respective consultation with the Municipalities regarding its text.- On the other hand, there exists in Article 20 subsection h) of the cited Law an exemption from the payment of municipal patents, such that regarding that tax, it is appropriate to analyze whether or not the requirement was met, given that, to begin with, the original text of the law was consulted, as just indicated.- On the other hand, regarding Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 being challenged, it is affirmed that the fact that said law was not consulted with the Municipalities must be evaluated, even though the exemptions of the law, and in particular the one related to municipal patents, were extended in said transitory provisions.- The Attorney General's Office points out that attention must be paid to the fact that the period is not an essential element of the tax or of the exempt event, so it can well be affirmed that the extension of the period for the enjoyment of the discussed incentives did not have to adhere to the consultation procedure of Article 190 of the Constitution. Finally, it is indicated that Law 7830 is not unconstitutional because it is not in it that the exemptions being challenged are created.-\n\n**5.-** Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, of legal age, identity card number 1-191-100, in his capacity as Acting Minister\n\nof Foreign Trade, and Jorge Sequeira Picado, of legal age, identity card 1-576-012, in his capacity as General Manager of the Foreign Trade Promoter of Costa Rica (Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica), appear to respond to the granted hearing and set forth their opinion on the action filed.- Firstly, they object to the plaintiff's legal standing (legitimación) because they consider that it has not been demonstrated that this is a case of non-existence of individual and direct injury, nor is the presence of diffuse interests demonstrated, since only reference is made to the possible injury of interests that the Council deems relevant. As to the merits, it is noted that the legal situation created by the free zone law is highly complex and involves several bodies that ensure that the granting of benefits awarded to companies corresponds to the best interests of the country. Thus, there is no automatic right to the regime, but rather a margin of discretion. Furthermore, regarding the incentives, these are effectively regulated in subsection 20 of Law 7210, and include exemption from municipal taxes, so that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), such rules should have been consulted with said autonomous entities, which was indeed done as seen in the legislative file. Also related to this, it is worth remembering that local interests do not prevail over national ones, but rather a coexistence exists, as in the case of free zones. With this, it should be clear that the plaintiff is not correct in claiming the Legislative Assembly's lack of competence (competencia) to issue this type of promotion legislation, including various types of incentives therein. It is also important to frame the action by clarifying that there is a clear difference between national taxes destined for municipalities and taxes that are properly municipal, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as those that are the product of a municipal initiative. At this point, it is important to highlight that precisely the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), formerly known as territorial tax, has never ceased to be a national tax, regarding which the only thing Municipalities participate in is its collection and benefit. Also, as part of the analytical framework for this action, it must be emphasized that the main characteristic of the free zone regime is the promotion activity, an area in which national and local interests must converge, as both the local party and the national government receive benefits.- Specifically, the benefits of free zone operations can be demonstrated with numbers, as, for example, they have accounted for nearly fifty percent of total exports, and their value in 2012 was just under six billion dollars with a growth of 4.7 percent, greater than the 4.3 percent growth of total goods exports. This wealth is likewise distributed if we see the increase in jobs, which reach practically 70 thousand jobs, that is, 17 thousand jobs more than in 2008, and with an average salary that is 1.7 times higher than the national private sector average salary. The importance of the project is also appreciated when looking at the linkages generated, which have resulted in the purchase of two billion dollars in national goods and services. Against this, the benefits for companies that have been questioned by the plaintiff must be analyzed: firstly, the real estate tax, which, as the Chamber has indicated (6589-2006), is a national tax. Secondly, the real estate transfer tax (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles), which was not only created as a national tax by its law but also has no relation to the Municipalities regarding benefits or administration. The appellant states that what was probably intended was to recover the municipal stamp duty (timbre municipal) charged on real estate transfers, but this is also a national tax established in the Municipal Code, and of which the Municipalities are beneficiaries under conditions similar to the real estate tax. The tax mentioned in the exemption of subsection g) of the challenged Article 20, that is, the one that exempts from payment of taxes levied on profits, also has the nature of a national levy. Finally, subsection h) does mention municipal taxes and business license tax (patente municipal), but on this point, it is worth remembering that in this case, the mandatory consultation that has been required did occur. The second part of the action challenges Law 7830, but it should be noted that said law established a delimitation and greater restriction on the granting of benefits for companies under the free zone regime and does not contain an extension or prolongation of timeframes as is erroneously stated. In effect, that law was amended to include a topic related to minimum investment amounts, as previously there were no minimums; controls on the free zone regime were increased: for example, environmental protection, customs control; obligation to treat waste and by-products, restrictions on granting benefits in the case of industrial park management companies to close loopholes regarding the installation of national companies that indirectly took advantage of such benefits; the reports required of free zone companies regarding their operations were expanded; the tariff reduction benefit of Article 20 for trading companies was eliminated; greater controls are established for industrial park management companies; as stated, greater specific restrictions were established for granting the regime, specifically with the challenged Article 20 bis, which, read correctly, rather aimed to limit the possibility of prolonging the regime for companies, since it must be considered that the system shifted from an unlimited prolongation system to one where objective and clear conditions were imposed, to consider (not to automatically grant) a new benefit period; a greater investment requirement was also created inside and outside the park; the maximum percentage of sales in the local market was also delimited. In summary, as can be seen, there is no impact on municipal competences.- As for Law 8794, it must be made clear that none of the challenged transitional provisions extend the established incentives. The background of this law is very specific and is related to Costa Rica's commitments to the World Trade Organization and, in particular, those linked to the export activity granted to manufacturing companies. This was fulfilled with said law by eliminating the prohibited subsidies granted to manufacturing companies, respecting consolidated situations already in operation.- The statement of legislative intent clearly indicates that it is meant to adapt domestic regulations. The transitional provisions were incorporated to clarify that once the extensions granted to Costa Rica by the WTO expire, the benefits established in Article 20 for processing companies will cease and become null and void, and the Costa Rican State will no longer grant said incentives to companies entering the regime. Likewise, Transitory Provision IV states that companies of the specified category that entered the regime before the expiration of the established deadline and meet the indicated conditions will have the conditions indicated in said subsection and the deadlines established in the executive agreement granting the regime respected.- The objective of the transitional provisions is to restrict the granting period of the incentives prohibited by the WTO, and in no case can it be interpreted that they extend them. Even such conditioning is included in the granting agreements and in the operation contracts, so it is clear that the cited law did not modify or create exemptions from municipal taxes. As a result, it is important to emphasize that Law 8794 did not modify or vary any element of the exempt event (hecho exento) regularly created in its moment by Law 7210. The transitional provisions rather address the purpose of dimensioning the effects of a rule created previously (Law 7210) as a result of the need to comply with international obligations. It was the original law that created the dispensation, so, for all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed.-\n\n6.- Martha Eugenia Castillo Díaz, in her capacity as Vice President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma) of the Costa Rican Chamber of Industries (Asociación Cámara de Industriales de Costa Rica); Víctor Manuel Ruiz Pacheco, in his capacity as First Vice President and legal representative of the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce (Asociación Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica); and Mónica Segnini Acosta, in her capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) of the Costa Rican Chamber of Exporters (Asociación Cámara de Exportadores de Costa Rica), present separately their joinder (coadyuvancia) briefs with virtually similar texts and in which they state that the free zone regime is of enormous importance for the country, since it is a promotion activity that stimulates new investments in the country. It is logical to understand that international companies entering the country require and seek out national companies to collaborate in their tasks, and thus a series of advantages are reproduced that make the economy grow, and it is also obvious that any attempt to attack the free zone regime also results in detriment to national industry, which therefore has the duty to contribute to the defense of the law.- Regarding the particular claim, it is stated that the plaintiff lacks legal standing because the claim is abstract in nature and does not align with the exceptions established in the law and with the incidental nature of the action, but it can also be charged that it is not sufficiently substantiated.- It adds, as to the merits, that the incentives created by the law in question satisfy national interests, and thus, the tax benefits offered include exemptions from national taxes and not municipal ones, but it should also be noted that not even all taxes in which municipalities participate have that character, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated regarding the real estate tax.- This leaves only the exemption for the municipal business license tax (patente municipal), which was consulted with the municipal governments as the Attorney General's Office indicates in its report. Regarding Law 7830, the coadjuvant party affirms that it never aimed to extend or prolong the period of fiscal or other benefits, but rather that more controls were established on the regime, as can be seen from Articles 13, 14, 2, 16, 19.d among others, and the requirements for granting the free zone regime were expanded. Concerning Law 8794, its transitional provisions are challenged, regarding which the plaintiff incurs an erroneous interpretation, because when analyzing the questioned law, it is seen that its purpose was to adapt the law to the requirements of the World Trade Organization, particularly in the case of manufacturing companies that export.- Thus, the transitional provisions do not entail an extension or prolongation of deadlines or benefits, since rather the objective of the transitional provisions is to restrict the granting period of the incentives prohibited by the WTO, so it is clear that the deadlines remain those of the law and in particular those of Article 20. Complementing the previous statement, it is worth noting that in practice, the Executive Branch grants the benefits in accordance with what is established in said article, as can be observed from the executive agreements that are usually issued.- For that reason, municipal competences were not affected, and therefore, there was no obligation for consultation as the Attorney General's Office indicates, and furthermore, it is appropriate to mention the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the non-existence of an obligation to consult again on legislative bills that contemplate modifications to a rule previously consulted, as seen in ruling 2008-15760.\n\n7.- Jorge Brenes Ramírez, in his capacity as President with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) of the Association of Free Zone Companies of Costa Rica (Asociación de Empresas de Zonas Francas de Costa Rica), also appears as a coadjuvant party in favor of the constitutionality of the rule and states that there is a clear interest on the part of his association and that the plaintiff, conversely, does not meet the legal requirements, as there are serious contradictions in his argumentation.- As to the merits, a description is made of the functioning of free zones, and emphasis is placed on the need for an agreement by the competent body of the Administration. Also, on the other hand, it addresses the issue of municipal powers (potestades municipales) and the consultation of Article 190, concluding that there is actually no obligation for consultation whatsoever, but that they abide by what the Chamber has resolved, in the sense that said rule applies despite not being expressly established for them.- In any case, it is indicated that the exemptions were consulted as a bill to the Municipalities, including that of Belén. It adds that, specifically regarding the claims of the action, the one referring to the reduction and impact on municipal revenues must be denied, because historically the Municipality of Belén closed with a budget surplus in recent years, so it could not be argued that it lacks money if it rather does not spend all that it collects and presents differences in its favor of more than 5000 million colones. Regarding the topic of the need for consultation, it must be initially stated that not all the taxes claimed are municipal, but rather only the one called municipal business license tax (patente municipal), since the others, and especially the real estate tax, are national as the Constitutional Chamber has held.- A similar situation occurs with respect to the real estate transfer tax, as it is not even destined for the Municipalities.- It is claimed that Article 20 bis of the Law, included by Law 7830, was also not consulted, but one need only read it for it to be clear that it is a rather restrictive article to prevent a company from receiving the benefits again for the same project, and furthermore, none of the elements of the tax or the exemption are touched upon.- Finally, regarding the transitional provisions of Law 8794, it is emphasized that the plaintiff starts from an erroneous interpretation of its text, and therefore, this should be a matter of legality.- However, it is affirmed that the correct reading of them is that they come to reduce the benefit periods of the regime, and thus, the rights acquired in good faith are reserved. There are no extensions (prórrogas), but rather, as can be seen from the texts of the executive authorization agreements, the contract states that the benefits will be limited as stipulated by the WTO. Even though the article speaks of extensions, it does so regarding the adjustment of Costa Rican legislation but does not automatically imply an extension. Lastly, if the Chamber decides to declare the limitation of the benefits of subsection h) of Article 20, it is requested that the rights acquired under the protection of the law be taken into account, as this clearly involves consolidated situations.-\n\n8.- Humberto Pacheco Alpízar, in his capacity as President and legal representative of the Costa Rican-American Chamber of Commerce (Asociación Cámara Costarricense Norteamericana de Comercio), also presents a joinder (coadyuvancia) brief within which he sets forth the opinion of the association he represents regarding the action filed. He begins by defining the concepts of tax authority (poder tributario) and national tax to conclude that, in general, the claimed exemptions are national in nature and do not affect municipal autonomy.- Regarding the latter, he points out that it indeed allows for exclusivity in the initiative for creating and modifying taxes, but, according to the jurisprudence of the Chamber, this can be resolved by the Legislative Assembly through the consultation mechanism. Having stated the foregoing, he proceeds to analyze the plaintiff's arguments and states that he lacks active legal standing (legitimación activa), and as to the merits, indicates that it must be made clear that Law 7210 on free zones was indeed consulted with the Municipalities at the time, thereby eliminating any doubt. As for Law 7830, he explains that said regulation did not modify the nature of the tax or its exemption, since the deadlines remained the same and the possibilities in the law for granting new projects to already beneficiary companies were rather restricted. For his part, regarding the transitional provisions of Law 8794, it is stated that, in general, consultation was not necessary as the conditions and the exemption had not been changed. It is affirmed that there is an erroneous interpretation of the regulation, because it cannot be understood that there exists an extension of the incentives, since its purpose was rather to adapt national conditions to the commitments with the World Trade Organization. Therefore, the objective of the transitional provisions is rather to restrict the granting period of incentives, and they cannot be understood as extended, for which reason the transitional provisions must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the WTO agreements.\n\n9.- The notices referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 91, 92, and 93 of the Judicial Bulletin, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of May, 2014.\n\n10.- On June 6, 2014, the file was referred to Magistrate Hernández López for study and resolution.-\n\n11.- On March 17, 2015, the recusal (inhibitoria) presented by Magistrate Hernández López for hearing this matter was accepted, and Magistrate Jorge Araya García was appointed in her place.\n\n13.- The oral hearing (vista) indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution to be sufficiently founded on principles and evident norms, as well as on the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.\n\n14.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Araya García; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- On the procedural aspects and legal standing for the filing of this unconstitutionality action. In this unconstitutionality action, the involved parties have raised objections, both regarding the plaintiff's standing (legitimación) and the failure to comply with the proper substantiation of the claim.- In relation to the first point, there is a consistent jurisprudential line regarding the possibility for the Municipal Mayor, with the authorization of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), to activate the constitutional control avenue in order to protect the rights of the residents of their canton. This is precisely the case where the documentation allows the conclusion that the Mayor has been instructed by the Municipal Council to file this action in favor of collecting taxes whose proceeds they receive and allocate for municipal management.- From that perspective, the claim finds its fit in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Political Constitution, with the exception of some of the taxes that have been included within the claim, but the objection must be rejected outright. For the rest, the brief presenting the action proves to be sufficiently explicit as to the manner in which the legal norms injure the competences (competencias) that the Political Constitution grants to the Municipalities.\n\nTherefore, the action must be admitted and heard regarding the merits of the claims.\n\n**II.- On the norms challenged.** The legal norms for which a declaration of unconstitutionality is requested are the following:\n\n**A)** **Article 20 bis of Law 7210, the Free Zone Regime Law (Ley de Zonas Francas), which was added through Law 7830 of September 22, 1998,** exclusively for failure to comply with the consultation of the Municipalities required by Article 190 of the Constitution. The text of said article reads:\n\n\"**Article 20 bis**.- \n\nThe Free Zone Regime (Régimen de Zonas Francas) shall not be granted to individuals or legal entities to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the Regime's incentives, even if under the protection of a different individual or legal entity, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments justify it; all at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) and in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of this law.\"\n\n**B)** The nullity of **Transitory Provisions (Transitorios) I and II of Law number 8794 of January 12, 2010** is also claimed, as it is understood that the necessary consultation of the municipalities was also omitted during its legislative approval process. Said norms state textually:\n\n**\"Transitory Provision I.-**\n\nThe incentives of subsections b), d), f), g), h) and i) of Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its reforms, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the deadline provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that forms part of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, approved through Law No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains such extensions, at which time the benefits shall cease and be rendered without effect. No later than the same date on which the aforementioned deadline expires, the other incentives applicable to the beneficiary companies of the free zone regime must have been adapted, as pertinent, with respect to the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the mentioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) shall issue for this purpose.\"\n\n**\"Transitory Provision II.-**\n\nThe provisions of Transitory Provision 1 modify, as pertinent, the scope and the deadlines of the exemptions and incentives provided for in Article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the cited Law and shall be understood as incorporated into the respective agreements granting the free zone regime, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, if any exist.\"\n\n**III.- Brief framing of the free zone regime within the national productive economic environment.-** Before presenting its strictly legal reasoning, this tribunal considers it appropriate to reproduce some of the data contributed to this file (expediente) by some intervenors, regarding the contribution of companies operating under the free zone regime to the national economy, with the aim of giving greater solidity to the thesis that in this matter, issues of national significance are at stake and exceed the scope of local interests and services. Based on the report titled \"Balance of Free Zones: net benefit of the regime for Costa Rica\" (Balance de las Zonas Francas: beneficio neto del régimen para Costa Rica) prepared in April 2015, the companies under this regime amounted to 297 in the year 2013 and through them, the country constitutes more than half of the exports between 2009 and 2013. Also attributable to this regime is a diversification of exportable products with less concentration in agricultural products and a broadening of export destinations, which proves to be an undoubted advantage in cases of economic crises such as those that have recently affected some areas of the globe.-\n\nFurthermore, in labor matters, the gross employment level generated by the companies under the Free Zone Regime grew in 2013 by an average of 8.7, higher than the 5.7 at the national level, reaching slightly more than 75 thousand direct jobs. It is indicated that the salaries paid in companies under the free zone regime are, on average, 73 percent higher than those paid by the rest of the Costa Rican private sector.\n\nAlso notable is the spillover of the advantages produced by the regime to other sectors that are indirectly benefited, thanks to the so-called productive linkages, regarding which the report indicates that they have grown at a rate of 13.5 percent and that in 2013 a figure of 1,547 million dollars was reached, with the most benefited from this money being the sector of national companies that provide services to the beneficiaries of the regime.\n\nFinally, and being relevant for what is discussed here, it is interesting to repeat the data provided by the mentioned report in relation to a measurement tool called Net Country Benefit (Beneficio País Neto, BPN) which is constructed by quantifying, first, the Country Benefit (BP), which arises from adding the differentials generated by the regime in salaries, in social charges; in employment-related taxes, in national spending on the purchase of goods and services; and the changes in accumulated investment of the companies, to then subtract from said Country Benefit (BP) the cost of the exemptions recognized to the companies under the Free Zone Regime regarding income tax; import tax; property taxes; municipal taxes; sales taxes on local purchases and administrative expenses of the regime.-\n\nAs indicated, this operation of subtracting the costs of exemptions produces the so-called Net Country Benefit (BPN), which is what the country earned net with the regime, and it is indicated that for the 2012-2013 period, the BPN averaged 3,316 million dollars; this represents that for every dollar the country invested in the regime to attract companies, 7.4 dollars of net benefit were generated for the Costa Rican economy. In this line, the report closes with a clear and compelling figure: that figure of 3,316 million dollars of Net Country Benefit (BPN), is equivalent, for the 2012-2013 period studied, to 7.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, which for practical purposes, is equivalent to what the country invests annually in public education.\n\n**IV.- Delimitation of the object of the action and the scope of this decision.** Regarding the object of this action, the plaintiff indicates in its petition:\n\n\"In virtue of all the foregoing, we request this Honorable Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to *annul as unconstitutional the reforms to the Free Zone Regime Law that keep in force* the incentives contained in that legislation, specifically subsections d) and h) of Article 20 of Law 7210, which exempt the companies covered by that regime from the payment of taxes on immovable property, on the transfer of immovable property, from the payment of all tributes and particularly the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal), through Laws 7830 of September 22, 1998 and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010.\" (the italicized emphasis does not belong to the original)\n\nSaid petition is based on the fact that such legal reforms did not comply with essential requirements of the legislative procedure and specifically, the lack of consultation of the Municipalities of the country is noted as missing. In its own words:\n\n\"Thus, if during the processing of the projects that gave rise to Laws 7830 of September 22, 1998, through which Article 20 bis is added, serving as a basis for COMEX to extend the exemption periods, and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010, which extends the periods and broadens the number of beneficiary companies, the Municipalities were not heard so that they could express their views on the implications of said projects, the current laws are unconstitutional and must be declared so with the respective legal consequences.\"\n\nThe previous extracts serve this Tribunal to clarify the object of the action and the grounds for unconstitutionality as summarized below:\n\n**a)** The invalidity of the legislative process of Law 7830 of September 22, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as \"*Law 7830*\") is alleged, which among other norms introduced the current Article 20 bis into the Free Zone Regime Law number 7210. Regarding that specific norm (Article 20 bis), it is indicated that, despite worsening sources of municipal revenue, it was not consulted with the Municipalities of the country as required by Article 190 of the Constitution.\n\n**b)** The invalidity of the legislative process of Law 8794, of January 12, 2010 (identified hereinafter as \"*Law 8794*\") is also alleged, which introduced, among other norms on the subject of free zones, Transitory Provisions I and II. Regarding said norms (Transitory Provisions I and II), it is claimed that they provide for an extension of the exemption period for municipal taxes for the companies benefiting from the free zone regime, but the bill was not consulted with the Municipalities as imposed by numeral 190 of the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental).\n\n**V.- Dismissal of the action regarding the tax on immovable property (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) and the tax on the transfer of immovable property (impuesto al traspaso de bienes inmuebles).-** As just explained, the plaintiff appears in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Belén and instructed by the Municipal Council of said canton in order to defend the interests of his community against legislative norms that they say affect them in the specific terms indicated above, that is, insofar as it involves imposing extensions on the exemptions of municipal tributes without complying with the consultation procedure of Article 190 of the Constitution.- Now then, the legal standing under the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) on which the plaintiff relies does not suffice for him to challenge all the tributes exempted through the Free Zone Regime Law number 7210, but only to defend his interests regarding *municipal tributes (tributos de carácter municipal)*, that is, those that have come into legal existence through a municipal initiative in terms of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In this way, the objection for lack of consultation must be dismissed, first of all, insofar as it is directed against the tax on immovable property established in Law number 7509 of May 9, 1995, and its reforms, which - as indicated by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) - possesses a national character as it was issued through an ordinary law, even though the tax authority for its administration and the definition of the destination of the funds corresponds to the municipal corporations.- This point was clarified with precision by this Chamber in ruling number 2011-003075, which indicated:\n\n**A.- On the jurisprudence related to the tax on immovable property.** One of the aspects that this Chamber must resolve is settled in the jurisprudence of the Chamber, having determined the nature of the tax, that is, whether it is a municipal or national levy. The foregoing has consequences for the focus of the claims raised by the Municipality of Escazú. The precedents of this Chamber have reiterated that it is a national tax with a municipal destination, and that, although the tax initiative is recognized to the municipalities, it is not possible to understand exclusivity in this matter that limits the freedom of configuration when the legislator exercises the initiative. In this sense, the State may, through national taxes, provide extraordinary resources to the Municipalities of the country with the important objective of financing them. Thus, it has been indicated that:\n\n*VII.- Municipal discretion in relation to national tributes. In the opinion of the consultant(s), it is unconstitutional for municipalities to be able to dispose of aspects related to the tax on immovable property, which is a national, not a local, tribute. Indeed, the Law on the Tax on Immovable Property, number 7509 of May nine, nineteen ninety-five, establishes a national tax, in favor of the municipalities, which, regarding said tribute, have the status of beneficiaries and tax administration authorities. This was understood by this Chamber in ruling number 3930-95, of fifteen hours twenty-seven minutes of July eighteen, nineteen ninety-five, in which it established that: \"What was stated in the preceding recital should not lead to the false conclusion that only municipal tributes originating from a local government initiative are constitutional. The jurisprudence has clearly indicated that there are public services which, by their nature, cannot be other than municipal and which are involved in the definition given by Article 169 of the Political Constitution when stating that «The administration of the interests and local services of each canton shall be in charge of the Municipal Government.» If those interests and services require the payment of taxes and contributions from the residents of the corresponding territorial jurisdiction, then the tax initiative can only be municipal, a product of the tax power of the local government, and it is the one defined in the jurisprudence commented on before. But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax; through a regional tax that benefits a certain number of local governments; or, through a special tax that levies certain activities, such as the export of bananas, to be distributed among the producing cantons. In these cases, the initiative for the formulation of the tax law is the ordinary one, since here it does not concern the authorization of a tribute of a municipal nature, but the creation of a different one, in which it turns out that the addressee or beneficiaries shall be one or several local governments, as in the case of the tax created in Article 36 of the Mining Code, or in the tax on the sale of liquors. In this case, the tribute shall be municipal by its destination, but its origin is the common law, as it concerns extraordinary and beneficial resources for the communities. In summary, the municipal tax power, which is the one originating in the creation of the tribute by the local government to be authorized by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), does not prevent the legislator from being able, extraordinarily and through the procedures of common law, to grant different rents and economic resources, of a national character, in which case, the respective bill does not necessarily have to originate from the municipal initiative, even though the beneficiaries of the tribute are the local governments themselves. In this latter case, the collection, disposition, administration, and liquidation correspond to the Municipalities that are the recipients of the tributes.\" In relation to their questions, it is clear that the consultant(s) are not correct. That the tax on immovable property is a national tribute refers to the fact that the initiative for its creation and approval is a central decision, adopted by the State and not by the local governments. It responds to an intention of the State to increase municipal revenues in order to facilitate the adequate provision of local public services through the levying of a taxable event (hecho generador) such as property over immovable property, recognized and regulated by the national, and not the municipal, legal order. However, despite this characteristic, in the specific case, a delegation of powers proper to the Legislative Assembly is not occurring. It would be so if local governments were permitted to eliminate the tribute or modify it in any of the elements regulated by Law 7509. What the municipalities are authorized to do is to condone the interests, surcharges, and fines resulting from the non-payment of said tribute by the taxpayers of the respective canton. That is, they are authorized to condone liquid sums in favor of each municipality and not the contribution obligations imposed by the Law. Dealing with entities that are beneficiaries of the referred tax, the initiative is fully valid, since corporations are permitted to condone the mentioned items, only for those taxpayers who pay the entirety of their debt, having the \"framework\" authorization of the Legislative Assembly, precisely, from this bill. The exclusive competence given to Parliament by Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution is not contravened. It is a valid manifestation of the legislator's discretion, which in this case acts to safeguard the interests of the local governments themselves and - consequently - those of the entire community. (ruling No. 2006-06589).*\n\nThis concerns regulations created by common legislation, not by municipal initiative, but by a decision of the central State and, in this sense, the municipalities would not be permitted to eliminate or modify said tribute.\n\nHowever, it is clear that the constituent assembly established limits on the legislator by granting the Municipalities administrative and governmental autonomy, which in turn is instituted as a guarantee for the residents, but if conflicts with national interests exist, this situation must be elucidated by this Chamber, as occurs with the challenged regulations.\"\n\nIt is concluded that the petitioner could not come to claim the defense of municipal powers of participation in the configuration of taxes, regarding a tax of unquestionable national character such as the cited real estate tax.- The same reasoning applies in relation to what the petitioner identifies as a real estate transfer tax and which, as the advisory body also specifies, seems to refer rather to the municipal stamp that must be paid as part of the tax burden of some operations registrable in the Public Registry and which is regulated in Article 84 of the Municipal Code, therefore it also possesses an undoubted national character.- In summary, regarding these two recently cited taxes, the action filed must be rejected outright.-\n\n**VI.- Other clarifications on the issues submitted for decision within this action.-** Also in accordance with what was requested by the petitioner and outlined supra, it should be clarified that this pronouncement does not proceed to contrast the general validity of the incentive regime or the ten-year term for them, prescribed in said law since these issues have not been challenged, and equally any examination of the legislative procedure followed at the time for the enactment of Law 7210 on Free Trade Zones is dismissed, regarding which – according to what the advisory body reports – the effective completion at the time of the consultation with the Municipalities of the country is also verified, and specifically the consultation carried out with the Municipality of the Cantón de Belén, as seen at folio 366 of legislative file 10562 that gave rise to Law 7210.-\n\nIn this way, the examination of the claim against the issuance of Law 7830 of September 22, 1998 and Law 8794, of January 12, 2010 will be carried out under the following order:\n\n**1)** verification that the text of Article 20 bis of Law 7830 of September 22, 1998 and that of Transitional Provisions I and II of Law 8794, of January 12, 2010 really contain modifications in municipal tax matters as the appellant affirms and;\n\n**2)** in the affirmative case, confirm and rule out compliance with the consultation with municipal entities.\n\n**VII.- In relation to the claim against Law 7830.-** As explained, the petitioner's claim is that the bill that gave rise to this law was not consulted with the Municipalities despite the fact that the bill contained Article 20 bis which affects the municipal treasury by allowing the competent administrative authorities to extend the term of the exemption from municipal taxes.- The text of said article states:\n\n\"**Article 20 bis**.- \n\nThe Free Trade Zone Regime shall not be granted to individuals or legal entities to operate or develop a company or investment project already benefiting from the incentives of the Regime, even if it had been under the protection of a different individual or legal entity, unless it is demonstrated that it is a new project or, in exceptional cases, when the nature and magnitude of the additional investments justify it; all at the judgment of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of this law.\"\n\n \n\nThis Court observes that contrary to what the petitioner indicates, there is no new or different provision in it that has been added to the current exemption regime, nor regarding its term.- On the contrary, both the original text and its reform are limited to regulations regarding the set of subjects that may be benefited and the reform inserted in Article 20 bis in particular begins by establishing a prohibition for any company or investment project from receiving the incentives of the free trade zone regime if it has already been a beneficiary of it.- Subsequently, exceptions to the previous rule are included and at that point is where the petitioner understands that an extension of the exemptions to municipal taxes has been authorized; however, for this Court, the petitioner's interpretation does not adhere to the meaning of the norm, since - as explained - what has been issued are rules directed at the competent entity that regulate the exercise of its power to issue new granting agreements for the development of new projects or new stages in some cases that due to their importance warrant it.- It is therefore a power of the administration but not directed at extending exemption terms, but rather specifying a set of selection rules for individuals or legal entities authorized to operate under the free trade zone regime. It is clear that new projects by new companies or new development plans exceptionally authorized for a company that has already had incentives, make it possible to enjoy all the advantages of the free trade zone, but that is what normally occurs according to the dynamics of the original law, the purpose of which is to get people to invest in the free trade zones.- It is precisely a power that – as a whole – the legislator at the time left in the hands of the administrative authorities and now what has been done is an adjustment in the rules that will result in a granting agreement for the regime and, along with it, a right to enjoy benefits fixed in advance in Law 7210 regarding amount and term. There is then no affectation of the interests of the Municipality, beyond the scope of the restrictions already contained in Law 7210, because what changed were the conditions for the application of the regime in certain cases.- In short, the petitioner's logic in this case could not be accepted, since his reasoning would lead us to have to admit that any legislative change that modifies requirements for a person to access the free trade zone regime would have to be consulted with the Municipalities for eventually impacting their interests as it might be possible for there to be a greater number of exempted parties. For the Chamber, the interests of the Municipalities in that sense were already taken into consideration in the formulation of Law 7210, and amply cover the point because that law, with its general and abstract character, makes it possible for an indeterminate universe of people to access the free trade zone regime, and enjoy the fiscal benefits that were established there as long as they meet the requirements. For all these reasons, there is no affectation of municipal powers in the text of Article 20 bis that was added to Law 7210 by Law 7830, and – for the same reason, the consultation procedure with the Municipalities of the country was not necessary in this case.-\n\n**VIII.- In relation to the claim against Transitional Provisions I and II of Law number 8794 of January 12, 2010. ** As explained above, the claim against these two legal norms is that the procedure for their approval in the Legislative Assembly omitted the necessary consultation with the municipalities, despite the fact that they provide for an extension of the terms for exemption from municipal taxes for companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime.- It is important to review the text of such provisions.-\n\n**\"Transitional Provision I.-**\n\nThe incentives of subsections b), d), f), g), h) and I) of Article 20 of the Free Trade Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, and its amendments, shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the term provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that forms part of the Final Act incorporating the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, approved through Law No. 7475, of December 20, 1994, expires for Costa Rica, including the extensions approved by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and as long as Costa Rica is eligible and obtains said extensions, at which time the benefits will cease and be rendered without effect. No later than the same date on which the aforementioned term expires, the other incentives applicable to companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime must have been adapted in the pertinent parts, with respect to the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the Free Trade Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, to the provisions of the aforementioned Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in accordance with the regulatory provisions that the Executive Branch will issue for this purpose.\"\n\n\"**Transitional Provision II.-**\n\n What is provided in Transitional Provision 1 modifies in the pertinent part the scope and terms of the exemptions and incentives provided for in Article 20 of the Free Trade Zone Regime Law, No. 7210, of November 23, 1990, regarding the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of the cited Law, and must be understood as incorporated into the respective granting agreements for the free trade zone regime, without prejudice to acquired rights in good faith, if they exist in any case.\"\n\nRegarding said norms, the petitioner states in his claim:\n\n\"However, one of the main motivations of the Executive Branch in promoting the amendment to the Free Trade Zone Regime Law since April 2009, was to comply with the commitments assumed by the Country in the signed Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Said agreement obliges the elimination of incentives linked to exports in the processing industry, within a term of eight (8) years extendable, so new investors or those who were enjoying the system could continue to enjoy the exemptions provided for in the law, including the payment of Municipal Patent and territorial tax, until the years provided for in the indicated Agreement are completed or Costa Rica maintains the possibility of obtaining new extensions of the initial term.- The final objective is to begin preparations for the end of the exemptions related to export subsidies. (…)\"\n\nAnd then, further on he explains that:\n\n\"According to the transcribed transitional provisions, the initially foreseen term of ten years *is subsumed into a new term of 8 years from the subscription of the agreement* by Costa Rica and also with the possibility of extending over time as Costa Rica accesses the extensions provided for in said agreement. The last term expired in 2007, However, in July 2007, the General Council of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted the decision to continue the procedures for extending the transition period for the elimination of export subsidy programs of some developing countries.- Costa Rica is included within the beneficiary countries of said extension agreement.- The decision allows the Committee on Subsidies to continue granting extensions to the transition period until the end of 2013, with a final phase-out period of two years, which will end no later than December 31, 2015.\"\n\nIn summary, the petitioner seems to understand that the terms of the exemption from payment of municipal taxes enjoyed by companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime have been extended, and that to the ten years contained in the law must now be added the 8 years of term that were granted in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and also the extension of such term that Costa Rica eventually obtains and that currently reach until 2015.- The final result of these transitional provisions would then be that the Municipalities must bear the municipal tax exemptions of Law 7210, beyond the ten years established in Article 20 of said law, reason for which they should have been consulted prior to their approval, as indicated in the text of Article 190 of the Constitution.\n\n**IX.-** On another side, the Chamber observes that in the face of the same legal text, in the responses of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, of the Promotora de Comercio Exterior, as well as of the Association of Free Trade Zone Companies of Costa Rica – all of them protagonists and directly involved in the application of the law – an interpretation diametrically opposed to that of the petitioner is made and which, if adopted by the Chamber, would mean that this action must be dismissed because the situation regarding the interests of the municipal entities has not been modified. Such interpretation maintains that, effectively, the transitional provisions transcribed above aim to adjust the Costa Rican legal system to the commitments that the country acquired within the World Trade Organization and that *precisely because of this*, they *seek* to *eliminate* in a general way the exemptions for companies dedicated to certain activities.- It is affirmed that the correct understanding of the transitional provisions can never produce an extension of the terms since *rather* it is about adjusting the companies to the non-exemption conditions required in the international convention, so when the texts provide that the exemptions *\"…shall continue to be enjoyed by the companies indicated in subsection a) of Article 17 of said Law, until the date on which the term provided for in the article…including the extensions…\" expires for Costa Rica* it must be understood that it is rather a reduction or restriction of the benefit, which will no longer be for the entire 10-year term, as the law ordered, but will only reach the final date that is defined through the mechanisms established in the respective agreements of the World Trade Organization, all of the foregoing *\"without prejudice to acquired rights in good faith if they exist in any case\", * just as the challenged Transitional Provision II of Law 8794 expressly indicates.\n\n**X.-** The court thus finds itself with the peculiarity that the normative text itself as well as the statement of motives of the original bill - which has been reviewed - are useless to resolve the doubt as to whether the rule contained in the discussed transitional provisions extended the exemptions over time or not, with prejudice to the revenues of the treasury of the Municipalities in whose territory companies operate under the free trade zone regime.- The issue is key insofar as the utility of this action is at stake, that is, its character as a reasonable means for the defense of the rights and interests of the petitioner, which constitute the raison d'être of his claim for non-compliance with the formality of consultation with the Municipalities.\n\n**XI.-** In light of such premise, this Court understands that constitutional justice and the protection of constitutional norms and principles on one hand, as well as the protection of all interests compromised in this case, are better served if the interpretation that both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Promotora de Comercio and the different associations of interested parties make of the normative content of the discussed texts is adopted, and in this regard the fact is emphasized that, as the interested parties point out, the texts of the transitional provisions in question do not use the concept of “extension” or any other similar one anywhere to describe the situation in which the exemptions are to remain.\n\nThat term is used only to refer to the actions of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization and clearly refers to the extension of the adjustment period that the organization has set. In addition to the foregoing, the Chamber understands that this reading of the rules is more consistent with all the purposes involved, that is, in that it balances the incentive for attracting investments that the country has sought through the free zone mechanism and its exemption regime, against municipal interests and their undeniable need to obtain direct benefits through the payment of taxes made by companies operating in their territory. This is achieved if the transitory provisions are understood in the sense that the exemption periods of the companies specifically included therein *are not added* to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, whereby there is no extension of exemption periods that the plaintiff has denounced and resents, and even less so an impact on his municipal interests, which have remained without any alteration compared to what is already regulated in the cited Article 20 of Law 7210. As a corollary of the foregoing, the transitory provisions are not directed at, nor can they be used to, extend the exemption periods and—therefore—there is no injury to municipal autonomy or to the duty to consult these entities.\n\n**XII.- Conclusion:** From all the foregoing, it is concluded, first, that the action—insofar as it is directed against the failure to comply with constitutional formalities regarding exemptions from taxes on real estate and the transfer of real estate—must be rejected outright as these are taxes of unquestionable national character. Second, the claim for failure to comply with constitutional formalities on the part of Article 20 bis added to Law 7210 by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, must be dismissed. Finally, the claim must also be dismissed upon understanding that Transitory Provisions I and II of Law 8794 do not violate Article 190 of the Constitution, since the period established for the companies described therein *is not added* to the original ten-year exemption period authorized by Article 20 of Law 7210, an interpretation that responds to the idea that this court must strive, as far as possible, to find a solution, within the constitutional parameter, that resolves the conflict with the least derogatory and distorting effort on the legal system and the expectations created within society.\n\n**XIII.- Different Reasons of Magistrate Castillo Víquez**\n\nRegarding the defect for the failure to consult the municipalities, I conclude that this has not occurred. There is no doubt that the constitutional consultation constitutes a limitation on the power to legislate. In some cases, it aggravates it—Articles 97 and 167 of the Political Constitution, when the opinion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and that of the Supreme Court of Justice is negative to the parliamentary initiative—in another, it temporarily suspends it for the bill in question—six months before and four after the holding of a popular election, when the opinion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is also negative—and in others it must be carried out to avoid a defect of unconstitutionality that would affect the entire Law—to the State Universities—Article 88 of the Political Constitution—, to the Central Bank of Costa Rica—Article 121, subsection 17 of the Fundamental Charter—and to the autonomous institutions—Article 190 of the Political Code.\n\nRegarding the latter, it is worth remembering that it was the Social Democratic faction that presented, as part of the title relating to autonomous institutions, the following rule: \"(...) *No bill relating to matters entrusted to an Autonomous Institution may be discussed in the Legislative Assembly without the respective Institution having rendered a report on the matter. Said report must be included and published, obligatorily, as one of the recitals of the law that is approved*.\" (A.A.C.: volume III; page 465). Note that the proposal regarding the qualified majority for the approval of a bill where there is a negative opinion from the Institution is no longer included. We assume that the adverse votes of the National Constituent Assembly in the cases of the University and the Technical Body responsible for determining the monetary unit dissuaded the members of the Social Democratic faction from presenting that initiative.\n\nThe reasons for this regulation are offered by Facio Brenes when he indicates that: \"(...) *through it, what is sought is to oblige the essentially political body that is the Congress to hear the voice of the autonomous institutions in those matters that affect them*.\" (A.A.C.N.: volume III; p. 467).\n\nThe reasons why this article was not approved in the proposed form were:\n\n\"*Representatives Arroyo, Vargas, Fernández, and Esquivel expressed disagreement. The first expressed that it was not possible to continue taking powers away from the Legislative Assembly, obliging it to consult all the autonomous institutions of the state. The Assembly integrates from its bosom different commissions that have the obligation to consult and document themselves in due form regarding matters entrusted to them. If a bill related to an autonomous institution is presented, it is logical that those bodies will be consulted. The second indicated that the motion under debate introduces a new system, since if an autonomous institution does not render the respective report, the Legislative Assembly cannot consider the bill. The third stated that he will not vote for any motion that comes to the detriment of the powers of the Legislative Assembly, the maximum representation of the people in our political system, obliging it even to include in the recitals of the law that is approved the Report of the Autonomous Institution*\" (A.A.N.C.: volume III; p.473).\n\nAs a result, Representative Chacón Jinesta suggested a new wording:\n\n\"*for the discussion and approval of bills relating to an Autonomous Institution, the Legislative Assembly must hear the opinion of the former*\" (A.A.N.C.: volume III, p. 473).\n\nDeputy Facio Brenes, on behalf of his colleague, decided to withdraw the motion and, definitively, the proposal of Deputy Chacón Jinesta was voted on.\n\nFrom the foregoing discussion, it is clear that those who drafted the current Political Constitution were well aware that the constitutional consultation limits the power to legislate, and that the obligation of consultation was directed, in this case, solely and exclusively at those entities that have the legal nature of an autonomous institution, and not those that have the legal nature of a corporation, as occurs with entities decentralized by region.\n\nIt is well known that doctrine establishes a clear difference between the institution and the corporation. Indeed, in the case of the former, there is an instituting entity, generally the State, which creates the entity; it provides the resources or, at least, the source for its financing, and has influence in the appointment of the highest authorities of the instituted entity. In the case of the latter, it is by the initiative of its members that the entity is created, although, in many cases, the issuance of a State act is necessary, for example: the creation of a professional association; it is its members who, generally, finance the entity and, finally, it is they, through the General Assembly or the municipal residents, who elect the highest authorities of the governing bodies. Autonomous institutions, in our environment, respond to the first nature; while municipalities, to the second; hence the correctness of the Constituent in the terminology used. From this perspective, municipalities cannot be equated to autonomous institutions.\n\nOn the other hand, given the degree of autonomy that Constitutional Law grants to municipalities—political autonomy in the administration of the local interests and services of the canton (Article 169)—the legislature, in the use of the power to legislate, has important limitations, since it cannot assign the exercise of a municipal competence to another different entity or body, nor can it adopt legal norms that distance themselves from or contradict the democratic character of municipal organization. We are, then, faced with subject matter unavailable to the Legislative Branch in the exercise of the power to legislate, although it is available in the exercise of the constituent power—acting as a reform power. This is a constitutional content that cannot be regulated by the Legislative Branch in the exercise of the power to legislate. The foregoing constitutes a guarantee for municipal corporations, just as it constituted one for autonomous institutions until their autonomy in matters of government was suppressed—by Law No. 4123 of May 31, 1968—in the sense that the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the power to legislate, cannot affect the matters that Constitutional Law (values, principles, and norms) attributes exclusively and excludably to entities of a corporate base. Although both enjoyed the same degree of autonomy, the fact of the matter is that the Constituent only established the constitutional consultation for bills relating to autonomous institutions, and not for bills relating to municipalities.\n\nFinally, it is clear from the constitutional text that the municipal regime is regulated in Title XII; while that of the autonomous institutions is in Title XIV, hence these are different constitutional legal regimes, meaning it is not appropriate to apply the norms designed for one to the other.\n\nIn summary, the Legislative Assembly is not obliged to consult municipalities on bills relating to them. Hence, the defect invoked by the plaintiff does not exist as such.\n\nFrom my perspective, the question of unconstitutionality resides in another area, and it is whether the Legislative Assembly can or cannot create an exemption from a municipal tax, since that would injure the taxing power and municipal autonomy that Constitutional Law recognizes for municipal corporations. Thus, the question is whether the exemption from municipal taxes made in the challenged legal norm injures or does not injure what is established in Article 121, subsection 13; a provision that expressly recognizes in favor of the Municipalities the exclusivity to determine the elements of the municipal tribute, as it is they who must propose the projects for the creation of such levies. As a general rule, it can be held that the Assembly does not have the unilateral competence to create and grant exemptions through ordinary laws regarding municipal tributes. Such initiative can only originate in the Council; the Parliament only corresponds to approve or disapprove it; indeed, the power of creation and exoneration in favor of the municipalities is so exclusive that the members of the Chamber lack the power of amendment; their competence is limited to removing an obstacle so that the act of creation or exoneration can arise in legal life. One must bear in mind that from reading the constitutional norms and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it can be deduced that there exist, among others, two types of taxes in our environment: national and municipal. The former are those created by the Legislative Assembly in the exercise of the taxing power¹ that the State possesses, which is expressed through the power to legislate, which may have a specific destination², although necessarily what is collected because of them must enter the Single Fund³ (Article 185 of the Fundamental Charter), or a specific recipient other than the State, among them, local governments⁴, and which fall on facts, acts, goods, services, activities, yields, and expenses carried out in the national sphere. The latter, in contrast, are those created by the Council⁵, in the exercise of a derived taxing power⁶, which requires a subsequent authorization from the Legislative Assembly, whose sole recipient is the local government, whose obligatory destination is to defray the expenses demanded by the provision of local services, and which fall on facts, acts, goods, services, activities, yields, and expenses carried out or linked to the local sphere. Now, the foregoing is not an obstacle for the Legislative Assembly to authorize the local government, through an enabling legal norm, to apply an exemption from municipal taxes, provided that the respective agreement of the Council is involved; what is not admissible, from my point of view, is that the Legislative Assembly exempts or exonerates a tax whose competence—in relation to the definition of the structural elements of the tribute—belongs to the Council.\n\nHowever, this being said, we must clarify that the previous rule is not absolute, as it has exceptions. Indeed, when the Legislative Assembly approves an international treaty establishing a tax exemption, it is clear that in these cases, municipal taxes are also understood to be exempted. This was understood by this Court in judgment 2007-009469, in which it expressed the following: *\"It is evident that our State commits in a commercial agreement to fulfill certain obligations, thereby also committing all levels of Government, including the local administration\"*. The foregoing position is a logical consequence of what is provided in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which categorically states the following:\n\n“[…]\n29. Territorial scope of treaties. A treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory, unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established.”\n\nAnother case is when the State, for the objective satisfaction of national interests, promotes a public policy in which the exemption of municipal taxes is necessary through a Law of the Republic. In this case, it is also not required that the exemption originate in the Council, for the elementary reason that, eventually, a local interest could thwart the effective satisfaction of a national interest. We are facing a typical situation where local interest yields to national interest. In the case of the free zone regime, there is no doubt that this has been an attractive scheme for promoting foreign investment, which has translated into enormous benefits for the Costa Rican population, especially the increase in our exports, specifically of non-traditional products to both traditional and non-traditional markets, in direct and indirect employment, in investment in areas of relative lesser development, and in productive expansion projects. Ergo, for the foregoing reasons, I conclude that there is no defect of unconstitutionality alleged.\n\n**Por tanto:**\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción en cuanto reclama la falta de cumplimiento de formalidades constitucionales en el establecimiento de exoneraciones de los Impuestos sobre bienes inmuebles y el impuesto sobre traspasos de bienes inmuebles.\n\nThe action filed against Article 20 bis of Law 7210 of November 23, 1990, added by Law 7830 of September 22, 1998, is declared without merit. Likewise, the action against Transitional Provisions I and II of Law 8794 of January 12, 2010, is declared without merit, on the understanding that they are not unconstitutional. This ruling shall be communicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. This ruling shall be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify. Magistrate Castillo Víquez gives different reasons. Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro append a note.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n
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Gilbert Armijo\n S.

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Presidente

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Ernesto Jinesta L.

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Fernando Cruz C.

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Fernando Castillo V.

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Paul Rueda L.

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Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

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Jorge\n Araya G.

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\n\n**Exp. 12-009520**\n\n**Note of Magistrates Cruz Castro and Armijo Sancho, drafted by the former. Regarding the questions on free trade zones and global justice.**\n\nThe concern of those who raised this constitutional objection is legitimate; however, as is well expressed in the text of the unanimous vote, there is an erroneous interpretation on the part of the petitioner regarding the validity periods of the exemptions and the consultation with municipal corporations.\n\nFree trade zones (zonas francas) raise various questions, because the State develops a policy of exemptions to attract investments; it is a necessity imposed by globalization. Societies with little economic development, like those of Central America, with little influence in power blocs in the international sphere, must compete for foreign investment funds, especially from transnational corporations, by offering advantages that ordinary citizens or companies that do not meet the requirements of the free trade zone regime do not enjoy. These regimes of privilege raise questions, varied concerns about global justice, equity in international economic relations, but these questions do not become objections of unconstitutionality, perhaps because the globalized injustice caused by a capitalism that some deem \"savage\" escapes the limited reach of national constitutionality; the legal structure of the Constitution does not impose limits on the rules and principles governing international economic relations.\n\nThe imperative need to attract investments demands a structural response to compete for private investment funds. Some questions that arise with these regimes of privilege reveal serious injustices, but they can rarely become an unconstitutionality. The sphere of international economic relations is almost always outside the realm of constitutionality.\n\nDespite these structural limitations that create inequalities beyond the control of constitutionality review, in some cases the right to equality and equity could arise, trying to establish whether the free trade zone creates a constitutionally inadmissible privilege. This is an exceptional discussion that can arise regarding an investment attraction policy; however, these are not the objections raised in this action. The exemption regime of free trade zones could become a structural privilege, as mentioned, however, that condition does not allow one to infer that there is a violation of the principle of equality and equity vis-à-vis citizens and companies that do not meet the requirements demanded in the free trade zone regimes.\n\nThe exemption regime could well have a disproportionate and unreasonable term, an extreme that could indeed be discussed constitutionally. Nor would it be admissible for the exemption to be granted by regulation rather than by a legislative act, because in this matter, respect for the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) is relevant. None of these objections are raised in this matter.\n\nIn principle, the free trade zone regime is a component of economic and fiscal policy that could not necessarily be unconstitutional, despite the privileges granted to some economic actors. These exceptions have been legal tender in the economic history of Costa Rica, since the times when the contract-law (contrato-ley) was admitted. Despite the possible injustices of the regimes of privilege, that assessment is not sufficient to consider them unconstitutional; the rules of globalization, unattainable for the constitutional jurisdiction, require privileged tax regimes. These zones of tax exception must be resolved within the political sphere, which faces too many constraints; the advisability of these exemption regimes must be evaluated, taking into account elements as important as linkages with the local economy and job creation. The insurmountable contradictions of economic development are mitigated by free trade zone regimes, but the questions about human development and equity in international economic relations remain valid. Not all injustices are resolved in the constitutional instance. Injustices may exist, but the constitutional jurisdiction is incapable of averting injustice that reaches planetary dimensions. Hélder Câmara well said: \"today it is not enough to think that injustice exists between individual and individual, between groups and groups, but between nations and nations, between worlds and worlds...\" (See by the author, \"Para llegar a tiempo\"-Ed. Sígueme-Spain-1972-p. 36). Constitutional justice does not reach planetary injustice; this is reflected in the design and effects of tax privilege regimes. There are problems of global scope that remain untouchable for constitutional justice, as occurs with some rules governing free trade treaties. The responsibility to avoid these excesses remains under the exclusive control of the actors, determining their advisability, the benefits obtained, and the justice of their validity.\n\nRarely can the constitutional instance influence the roots of global economic dependence, the roots of the hegemony of transnational capital, dominated by economic groups that hold great political and economic power, a power that finds no clear boundary in the local constitutional order.\n\n**Fernando Cruz C. Gilbert Armijo S.**\n**Magistrate Magistrate**" }