{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-678086",
  "citation": "Res. 09960-2016 Sala Constitucional",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
  "title_es": "Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio — Validez del trámite legislativo",
  "title_en": "Minamata Convention on Mercury — Validity of the Legislative Process",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional evacúa la consulta legislativa preceptiva sobre el proyecto de ley 'Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio' (expediente N° 19.426). El tribunal analiza el procedimiento legislativo seguido y el contenido del convenio. En cuanto al trámite, la Sala concluye que no se produjeron vicios sustanciales que lo invaliden, pese a que la Comisión dictaminó el proyecto antes de recibir todos los informes de consultas no obligatorias y volvió sobre un asunto ya conocido en la misma sesión. Las consultas eran discrecionales y no perjudicaron derechos. Sobre el fondo, el convenio se considera conforme con la Constitución Política, particularmente con los artículos 21 y 50, al buscar proteger la salud humana y el medio ambiente de las emisiones de mercurio. La Sala estima que las obligaciones asumidas no implican cargas financieras extraordinarias y respetan el ordenamiento interno. El dictamen evacúa la consulta en el sentido de que el proyecto no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.",
  "summary_en": "The Constitutional Court responds to the mandatory legislative consultation on the bill for the 'Minamata Convention on Mercury' (legislative file No. 19,426). The court analyzes the legislative procedure and the treaty's content. Regarding the procedure, the Court concludes that there were no substantial procedural flaws to invalidate it, even though the Committee issued its report before receiving all non-mandatory consultation responses and reconsidered a matter that had already been discussed in the same session. The consultations were discretionary and did not prejudice any rights. On the merits, the convention is found to be consistent with the Constitution, particularly Articles 21 and 50, as it aims to protect human health and the environment from mercury emissions. The Court considers that the obligations assumed do not entail extraordinary financial burdens and respect domestic law. The opinion evacuates the consultation, stating that the bill contains no essential procedural flaws or unconstitutional provisions.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional",
  "date": "15/07/2016",
  "year": "2016",
  "topic_ids": [
    "art-50-constitution"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "art-50-constitution",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "consulta legislativa preceptiva",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "Constitución Política",
    "artículo 50",
    "Convenio de Minamata",
    "procedimiento legislativo",
    "vicio esencial",
    "tratado internacional"
  ],
  "article_citations": [
    {
      "law": "Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio",
      "article": "all",
      "doc_id": "norm-82755",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Tratados Internacionales 9391",
      "article": "all",
      "doc_id": "norm-82755",
      "source": "metadata"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "Convenio de Minamata",
    "mercurio",
    "consulta legislativa preceptiva",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "vicio de procedimiento",
    "trámite legislativo",
    "Constitución Política",
    "derecho a un ambiente sano",
    "tratado internacional",
    "Costa Rica"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "Minamata Convention",
    "mercury",
    "mandatory legislative consultation",
    "Constitutional Court",
    "procedural defect",
    "legislative process",
    "Constitution",
    "right to a healthy environment",
    "international treaty",
    "Costa Rica"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 98, de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, este Tribunal Constitucional revisó el procedimiento legislativo para la tramitación del proyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, advirtiéndose que no se ha producido algún vicio sustancial o de trascendencia, capaz de invalidarlo por quebranto a principios esenciales, tales como el democrático, de participación, de representación política, respeto de las minorías o de publicidad y transparencia. (...) En mérito de lo expuesto, se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que, el proyecto de ley en cuestión, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento o disposiciones que lo invaliden. (...) Se evacua la consulta en el sentido que el proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, expediente legislativo N° 19.426, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento, ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.",
  "excerpt_en": "In accordance with Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for processing the bill called 'Minamata Convention on Mercury,' finding that no substantial or significant defect has occurred that could invalidate it due to a breach of essential principles such as democratic participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. (...) By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is evacuated in the sense that the bill in question contains no essential procedural defects or invalidating provisions. (...) The consultation is evacuated in the sense that the bill 'Minamata Convention on Mercury,' legislative file No. 19,426, contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Opinion finding no defects",
    "label_es": "Dictamen sin vicios",
    "summary_en": "The Constitutional Court rules that the bill for the Minamata Convention on Mercury contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional dictamina que el proyecto de ley del Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "Far from contravening the Constitution, the foregoing is consistent with it, particularly with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, among others.",
      "quote_es": "Lo anterior, lejos de contravenir la Carta Constitucional, por el contrario, es acorde con ésta, en particular, con lo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política, entre otros."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The Executive Power may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the convocation decree shall be heard, except for the appointment of officials that the Assembly must make, or legal reforms that are essential to resolve the matters submitted to its consideration.",
      "quote_es": "El Poder Ejecutivo podrá convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. En estas no se conocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-42751",
      "citation": "Ley 7615",
      "title_en": "Law Approving the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties",
      "title_es": "Ley de Aprobación de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "24/07/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-42751",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7615  Art. 7"
      }
    ],
    "external": [
      {
        "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1291141",
        "url": "",
        "kind": "related_voto",
        "label": "",
        "nexus_id": "sen-1-0007-1291141"
      }
    ]
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-678086",
  "tier": 2,
  "is_environmental": true,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [
    "sen-1-0007-1291141"
  ],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "*160077430007CO*\n\r\n\r\n\nExp:\r\n16-007743-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\nRes. Nº\r\n2016009960\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nSALA\r\nCONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas\r\nveinte minutos del quince de julio de dos mil dieciseis .\n\r\n\r\n\n Consulta\r\nlegislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad formulada por el Directorio de la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, sobre el proyecto de Ley \"Convenio de Minamata sobre\r\nel Mercurio\", expediente legislativo N° 19.426.\n\r\n\r\n\nResultando:\n\r\n\r\n\n 1.-\r\nLa consulta, que se formula en cumplimiento de lo que establece el inciso\r\na), del artículo 96, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, fue recibida\r\nen la Secretaría de la Sala a las 17:26 horas, del 15 de junio de 2016, con una\r\ncopia certificada del expediente legislativo. La Presidencia de la Sala tuvo\r\npor presentada la consulta mediante resolución de las 07:42 horas, del 16 de\r\njunio siguiente. En consecuencia, el término para evacuarla vence el día 15 de\r\njulio del año en curso.\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.-\r\nEn el procedimiento se cumplió con las formalidades establecidas en la ley.\n\r\n\r\n\n Redacta\r\nel Magistrado Salazar Alvarado; y,\n\r\n\r\n\nConsiderando:\n\r\n\r\n\n I.-\r\nDe previo.- Lo\r\nprimero que procede, a los efectos de evacuar la consulta, es verificar los\r\ntrámites seguidos en este caso, en concordancia con lo que señala el artículo\r\n98, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, al disponer que la consulta\r\ndeberá hacerse después de aprobado el proyecto en primer debate y antes de la\r\naprobación definitiva y que, al evacuarla, la Sala dictaminará sobre\r\ncualesquiera aspectos o motivos que estime relevantes desde el punto de vista\r\nconstitucional, pero vinculante sólo en lo que se refiere a los trámites. Para\r\nlos efectos anteriores y por la importancia del asunto de que se trata, en el\r\nsiguiente considerando se hará una síntesis cronológica del proyecto de ley.\n\r\n\r\n\n II.-\r\nLa tramitación del expediente en la Asamblea Legislativa.- El proyecto de Ley\r\n\"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\", que se tramita en el\r\nexpediente legislativo N° 19.426, ha seguido el siguiente orden cronológico: \n\r\n\r\n\n a) El proyecto, que es de\r\niniciativa del Poder Ejecutivo, fue presentado a la Secretaría del Directorio\r\nde la Asamblea Legislativa, a las 15:00 horas, del 1 de diciembre de 2014\r\n(folios 1 y siguientes la copia certificada del expediente legislativo).\n\r\n\r\n\n b) El Presidente de la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, ordenó pasar la iniciativa de ley a la Comisión\r\nPermanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y de Comercio Exterior para\r\nel dictamen correspondiente. De igual manera, se trasladó el proyecto original\r\nal Departamento de Archivo para su publicación y trámite, y remitió copia fiel\r\nal Departamento de Servicios Parlamentarios y al Departamento de Servicios\r\nParlamentarios, con el fin de que el texto sea incluido en el Sistema Integrado\r\nLegislativo (folios 77).\n\r\n\r\n\nc) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n38.950-MP, del 7 de abril de 2015, el Poder Ejecutivo amplió la convocatoria a\r\nSesiones Extraordinarias a la Asamblea Legislativa, hecha por el Decreto\r\nEjecutivo N° 38.734-MP, a fin de que el órgano legislativo conociera, entre\r\notros, el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de\r\nLey “ Convenio de Minamata\r\nsobre el Mercurio” (folios 78 a 80).\n\r\n\r\n\nd) El 14 de abril de 2015,\r\nel Departamento de Archivo, Investigación y Trámite, envió para su publicación,\r\nen el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, el expediente N° 19.426, que es proyecto de Ley\r\n\"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\", proyecto que se publicó en\r\nel Alcance N° 28, del Diario Oficial La Gaceta, N° 82, de 29 de abril de 2015\r\n(folios 82 y 83).\n\r\n\r\n\ne) En la Sesión Ordinaria\r\nN° 2, del 18 de junio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, aprobó moción para que se consulte\r\nel proyecto de ley a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al Ministerio de Relaciones\r\nExteriores y Culto, al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, al Ministerio de Salud\r\ny a las Cementeras del país (folios 86 a 95).\n\r\n\r\n\nf) En la Sesión Ordinaria\r\nN° 3, del 25 de junio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, aprobó moción para que se convoque\r\nen audiencia ante esa Comisión al señor Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director de la\r\nDirección de Desarrollo de Servicios de Salud, Subárea de Gestión Ambiental, de\r\nla Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, audiencia que se fijó para las 09:15\r\nhoras, del 2 de julio de 2015 (folios 96 a 102 y 127).\n\r\n\r\n\ng) Por oficio número\r\nAL-DEST-OFI-IJU-175-2015, del 24 de junio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente\r\nEspecial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, recibió el Informe\r\nJurídico del proyecto de Ley \"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\"\r\n(folios 103 a 126).\n\r\n\r\n\nh) Por oficio N°\r\nSP-202-2015, del 02 de julio de 2015, la Secretaria General de la Corte Suprema\r\nde Justicia, solicitó a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, una ampliación no menor a treinta días\r\nhábiles en el plazo para rendir el informe solicitado (folio 151).\n\r\n\r\n\ni) En la Sesión Ordinaria\r\nN° 4, del 09 de julio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, aprobó moción para que se consulte\r\nel proyecto de ley al Ministerio de Hacienda y se otorgó una prórroga por ocho\r\ndías hábiles a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, para que rinda el informe\r\nsolicitado. Asimismo, en dicha sesión, se recibió en audiencia al señor\r\nRigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director de la Dirección de Desarrollo de Servicios de\r\nSalud de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Finalmente, se aprobó una\r\nmoción de orden para que la Comisión acuerde volver en el orden del día al\r\nconocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, “Convenio de Minamata sobre el\r\nMercurio\". Con base en ello, la Presidenta de la Comisión, sometió a\r\ndiscusión por el fondo dicho proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado,\r\nunánimemente, por los ocho diputados presentes, y se asignó a uno de los\r\ndiputados de la Comisión la elaboración del dictamen respectivo (folios 155 a\r\n185).\n\r\n\r\n\nj) Por oficio N°\r\nDAJ-853-2015, del 9 de julio de 2015, la Directora de la Asesoría Jurídica del\r\nMinisterio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE), solicitó a la Comisión Permanente\r\nEspecial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, una prórroga de\r\nocho días hábiles para rendir el informe solicitado (folio 188).\n\r\n\r\n\n k) Por oficio N°\r\nDAJ-809-2015, del 22 de julio de 2015, la Directora a.i. de la Dirección de\r\nAsesoría Jurídica del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE), rindió el\r\ninforme que le solicitara la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, en relación con el proyecto de ley\r\n“Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\", en el cual manifestó no tener\r\nninguna observación al respecto y solicitó su aprobación por el órgano\r\nlegislativo (folio 189).\n\r\n\r\n\n l) Por oficio\r\nAL-DEST-CJU-0077-2015, del 22 de julio de 2015, el Departamento de Estudios,\r\nReferencias y Servicios Técnicos, envió a la Comisión Permanente Especial de\r\nRelaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, el Informe de Consulta sobre la\r\nposibilidad de alterar el orden del día para volver al conocimiento de\r\nexpedientes ya conocidos en el punto respectivo del Orden del Día (folios 191 a\r\n195).\n\r\n\r\n\n m) Por oficio sin número,\r\ndel 23 de julio de 2015, la Presidenta de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, rindió\r\nel informe que le solicitara la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, en relación con el proyecto de ley\r\n“Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\", en el cual manifestó que dicho\r\ntexto no se refiere a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial,\r\nconforme lo establece el artículo 157, de la Constitución Política, por lo que\r\nla Corte omite pronunciamiento alguno al respecto (folio 196).\n\r\n\r\n\n n) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39111-MP del 30 de julio de 2015, el Poder Ejecutivo convocó a Sesiones\r\nExtraordinarias a la Asamblea Legislativa, a partir del 3 de agosto de 2015, a\r\nfin de que el órgano legislativo conociera, entre otros, el expediente\r\nlegislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de Ley “ Convenio de Minamata\r\nsobre el Mercurio ”\r\n(folios 205 a 212).\n\r\n\r\n\n ñ) El dictamen unánime\r\nafirmativo sobre e l proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre Mercurio”,\r\nexpediente legislativo N° 19.426, fue elaborado y entregado a la Secretaría del\r\nDirectorio Legislativo el 5 de agosto de 2015 (folios 266 y 267).\n\r\n\r\n\n o) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39337-MP, del 30 de noviembre de 2015, el Poder Ejecutivo convocó a Sesiones\r\nExtraordinarias a la Asamblea Legislativa, a partir del 1 de diciembre de 2015,\r\na fin de que el órgano legislativo conociera, entre otros, el expediente\r\nlegislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de ley “ Convenio de Minamata\r\nsobre el Mercurio ”\r\n(folios 269 a 277).\n\r\n\r\n\n p) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39364-MP, del 03 de diciembre de 2015, el Poder Ejecutivo retiró, del\r\nconocimiento de las Sesiones Extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa, entre\r\notros, el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de\r\nley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio ” (folios 278 a 280).\n\r\n\r\n\n q) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39580-MP, del 28 de marzo de 2016, el Poder Ejecutivo amplió la convocatoria a\r\nSesiones Extraordinarias a la Asamblea Legislativa, a partir de esa fecha,\r\nrealizada por el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39337-MP, a fin de que el órgano\r\nlegislativo conociera, entre otros, el expediente legislativo No. 19.426, en el\r\nque se tramita el proyecto de Ley “ Convenio\r\nde Minamata sobre el Mercurio” (folios 281 y 282);\n\r\n\r\n\n r) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39583-MP, del 12 de abril de 2016, el Poder Ejecutivo retiró del conocimiento\r\nde las Sesiones Extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa, entre otros, el\r\nexpediente legislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de ley\r\n“Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio ” (folios 283 a 287).\n\r\n\r\n\n s) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39584-MP, del 14 de abril de 2016, el Poder Ejecutivo amplió la convocatoria a\r\nSesiones Extraordinarias a la Asamblea Legislativa, a partir de esa fecha,\r\nrealizada por el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39337-MP, a fin de que el órgano\r\nlegislativo conociera, entre otros, el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, en el\r\nque se tramita el proyecto de ley “ Convenio\r\nde Minamata sobre el Mercurio” (folios 288 a 290);\n\r\n\r\n\n t) Por Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n39621-MP, del 18 de abril de 2016, el Poder Ejecutivo retiró del conocimiento\r\nde las Sesiones Extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa, entre otros, el\r\nexpediente legislativo N° 19.426, en el que se tramita el proyecto de ley\r\n“Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio ” (folios 291 a 294).\n\r\n\r\n\n u) En la Sesión Plenaria\r\nOrdinaria N° 25, del 9 de junio de 2016, se presentó y aprobó, por unanimidad\r\nde los cuarenta y cinco diputados y diputadas presentes, una moción de orden\r\npara que el Plenario Legislativo pospusiera el conocimiento de los asuntos\r\npendientes en el orden del día, para entrar a conocer, de forma inmediata,\r\nentre otros proyectos de ley, el expediente N° 19.426, “Convenio de Minamata\r\nsobre el Mercurio”. Posteriormente, se inició la discusión, por el fondo, en el\r\ntrámite de primer debate, de ese expediente legislativo, proyecto de ley que\r\nfue aprobado, en primer debate, en esa misma sesión por votación unánime de los\r\ncuarenta diputados y diputadas presentes. El expediente se pasó a la Comisión\r\nde Redacción y se dispuso su consulta ante esta Sala (folios 414 a 429).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nv) En la Sesión Ordinaria N° 05 del 13 de junio de 2015, la Comisión\r\nPermanente Especial de Redacción, conoció y aprobó, por unanimidad, la\r\nRedacción Final del expediente legislativo N° 19.426, proyecto de ley “Convenio\r\nde Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, al cual no le hizo modificaciones (folios 345-\r\n412).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nw) El 10 de junio de 2106, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Redacción\r\nentregó el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, proyecto de ley “Convenio de\r\nMinamata sobre el Mercurio”, a la Secretaría del Directorio para que se continúe\r\ncon el trámite respectivo (folio 413).\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n III.-\r\nOBJETO Y ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA. Esta consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad, se formula por el\r\nDirectorio de la Asamblea Legislativa en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el\r\nartículo 10, inciso b), de la Constitución Política, y 96, inciso a), de la Ley\r\nde la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en relación con el proyecto de ley “Convenio\r\nde Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, que se tramita en expediente legislativo N°\r\n19.426, por tratarse de la aprobación legislativa de un tratado internacional.\r\nDado que el citado proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate en la Sesión\r\nPlenaria N° 25, del 9 de junio de 2016, procede su conocimiento, de conformidad\r\ncon lo dispuesto en el artículo 98, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- SOBRE EL PROCEDIMIENTO LEGISLATIVO EN EL CASO\r\nCONCRETO. De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 98, de la Ley que rige\r\nesta Jurisdicción, este Tribunal Constitucional revisó el procedimiento\r\nlegislativo para la tramitación del proyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de\r\nMinamata sobre el Mercurio”, advirtiéndose que no se ha producido algún vicio\r\nsustancial o de trascendencia, capaz de invalidarlo por quebranto a principios\r\nesenciales, tales como el democrático, de participación, de representación\r\npolítica, respeto de las minorías o de publicidad y transparencia. Al respecto,\r\nsegún se desprende de la copia certificada del expediente legislativo N°\r\n19.426, el “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio” fue firmado por el Estado\r\ncostarricense, en la ciudad de Kumamoto, Japón, el día 10 de octubre de 2013\r\n(folios 2 y 56). Asimismo, obra en el expediente electrónico de la consulta\r\nlegislativa, documento remitido a esta Sala por el señor Óscar Omar Monge\r\nCastro, Jefe del Departamento de Tratados, Límites y Fronteras, del Ministerio\r\nde Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, en el que consta que el señor Álvaro Cedeño\r\nMolinari, Embajador de Costa Rica en Japón, fue quien, a nombre y en\r\nrepresentación del Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica, suscribió dicho\r\nconvenio, acto para el cual, la entonces Presidenta de la República, señora\r\nLaura Chinchilla Miranda, con el refrendo de la Ministra a.i. de Relaciones\r\nExteriores y Culto, señora Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, le confirió Plenos Poderes.\r\nSi bien, de la lectura del artículo 140, inciso 10), de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, se desprende que la firma de los tratados internacionales es una\r\natribución del Poder Ejecutivo, entendido como el órgano colegiado compuesto\r\npor el Presidente y el Ministro del Ramo, la propia Convención de Viena sobre\r\nel Derecho de los Tratados, aprobada mediante Ley N° 7615, de 24 de julio de\r\n1996, en su artículo 7°, dispone, en relación con este tema:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“ARTÍCULO 7.- Plenos poderes. 1.- Para la adopción o la autenticación\r\ndel texto de un tratado, o para manifestar el consentimiento del Estado en\r\nobligarse por un tratado, se considerará que una persona representa a un\r\nEstado: a) Si se presentan los adecuados plenos poderes…”.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nDe modo, que dicho\r\nfuncionario se encontraba legitimado para proceder a la firma del Convenio en\r\ncuestión, en representación del Estado costarricense, en virtud de lo dispuesto\r\nen el citado artículo, toda vez que contaba con los poderes necesarios y\r\nsuficientes para ello. Además, lo anterior se refuerza con el aval que le da el\r\nPresidente de la República al Convenio a través de las diversas etapas del\r\nprocedimiento legislativo. Efectivamente, el proyecto de ley fue presentado\r\nante la corriente legislativa, por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de\r\nsu poder de iniciativa, previsto en el artículo 140, inciso 5), de la\r\nConstitución Política (folios 1-77 de la copia del expediente legislativo).\r\nAsimismo, se acredita que, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo N° 38.950-MP, del 7 de\r\nabril de 2015 (folios 78 a 80 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto\r\nEjecutivo N° 39.111-MP, del 30 de julio de 2015 (folios 206 a 212 del\r\nexpediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.337-MP, del 30 de noviembre de\r\n2015 (folios 269 a 277 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto\r\nEjecutivo N° 39.364-MP, del 3 de diciembre de 2015 (folios 278 a 280 de la\r\ncopia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.580-MP, del 28 de\r\nmarzo de 2016 (folios 281 y 282 de la copia del expediente legislativo);\r\nDecreto Ejecutivo N° 39.583-MP, del 12 de abril de 2016 (folios 283 a 287 de la\r\ncopia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.584-MP, del 14 de\r\nabril de 2016 (folios 288 a 290 de la copia del expediente legislativo); y\r\nDecreto Ejecutivo N° 39.621-MP, del 18 de abril de 2016 (folios 291 a 294 de la\r\ncopia del expediente legislativo), el Poder Ejecutivo convocó o amplió la\r\nconvocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, a fin de que la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nconociera, entre otros, el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, o bien, lo retiró\r\ndel conocimiento de Sesiones Extraordinarias del Órgano Legislativo. De modo,\r\nque no se observa ningún vicio en relación con la suscripción del Convenio.\r\nTambién, se acreditó que el proyecto de ley fue publicado en el Alcance N° 28,\r\ndel Diario Oficial La Gaceta, N° 82, de 29 de abril de 2015 (folios 82 y 83 del\r\nexpediente legislativo, así como la dirección del Sitio Web de La Imprenta\r\nNacional, en el formato denominado pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). El texto del proyecto\r\nfue remitido ante la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales\r\ny Comercio Exterior, donde, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de\r\n2015, esa Comisión Permanente Especial, lo aprobó por votación unánime la totalidad de los ocho diputados\r\npresentes, sin que se le hiciera modificación alguna.\n\r\n\r\n\nSin embargo, aún cuando\r\nesta Sala no encuentra, en la tramitación del proyecto de ley en cuestión,\r\nirregularidad alguna que implique nulidad por ser contraria a la Constitución\r\nPolítica o al procedimiento legislativo regulado en el Reglamento de la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, que es parámetro de constitucionalidad, es preciso hacer\r\nalgunas aclaraciones. Durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias de la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa, la iniciativa en la formación de las leyes la ostenta,\r\nexclusivamente, el Poder Ejecutivo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el\r\nartículo 118, Constitucional, el cual faculta al Poder Ejecutivo para convocar\r\na la Asamblea Legislativa a sesionar en forma extraordinaria, lo cual es\r\nreiterado en el artículo 140, inciso 14), de la Norma Fundamental. La\r\nconvocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, faculta a la Asamblea Legislativa para\r\nrestablecer, en los períodos de forzada inactividad, la capacidad -que de otro\r\nmodo no tendría- para ejercer sus propias competencias y, en concreto, para\r\nejercitar la potestad legislativa; no obstante, sus competencias están\r\nsensiblemente limitadas, ya que depende de la voluntad del Poder Ejecutivo (en\r\nsentido similar, Sentencia Nº 5582-1998, de las 13:36 horas, del 31 de julio de\r\n1998). En la convocatoria a Sesiones Extraordinarias, se hacen patentes las\r\npotestades del Poder Ejecutivo como colegislador, particularmente, en lo\r\ntocante a la iniciativa gubernativa o externa al órgano legislativo. Es claro,\r\nque ese poder de convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, es un medio\r\nindispensable, del Poder Ejecutivo, para incidir en las tareas parlamentarias, pues\r\nen este período, la Asamblea Legislativa tiene vedado reunirse de pleno derecho\r\ny sólo lo puede hacer, bajo la convocatoria del Ejecutivo. En este sentido, la\r\nnorma constitucional dispone: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\"Artículo 118.- El Poder Ejecutivo podrá\r\nconvocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. En estas no se\r\nconocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria,\r\nexcepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a\r\nla Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver\r\nlos asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento\".\n\r\n\r\n\nSegún esta norma, la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa no puede conocer asuntos que no hayan sido incluidos en el Decreto\r\nde Convocatoria. Esto, sin perjuicio de las competencias relacionadas con los\r\nnombramientos de funcionarios que corresponda hacer al Poder Legislativo, o\r\nproyectos de ley sobre reformas legales que sean indispensables para resolver\r\nlos asuntos sometidos al conocimiento del órgano legislativo, como bien señala\r\nel citado artículo. Esta Sala ya ha tenido ocasión de examinar y pronunciarse\r\ncon respecto a los alcances de las potestades encomendadas a los órganos\r\nconstitucionales durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias, Así, en\r\nSentencia N° 6939-1996, de las 9:24 horas, del 20 de diciembre de 1996,\r\nconsideró:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"VI. DEL PERÍODO DE SESIONES EXTRAORDINARIAS. En este orden de ideas,\r\ncabe señalar que por período de sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa, se entiende la previsión que tiene la misma para reunirse fuera de\r\nlos plazos establecidos con carácter normal. Es el artículo 118 constitucional,\r\nel que regula su convocatoria, correspondiendo al Poder Ejecutivo, de manera\r\nque en ellas, no se conocerá de materia distintas a las expresadas en el\r\ndecreto de convocatoria, con excepción de lo que se trate de nombramientos de\r\nfuncionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea Legislativa, o de reformas\r\nlegales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su\r\nconocimiento. Se trata de una potestad de ejercicio discrecional. En relación\r\ncon lo anterior, cabe aclarar que con el período de sesiones extraordinarias,\r\nla Asamblea Legislativa únicamente pierde la iniciativa legislativa, pero no\r\nlas demás funciones a ella encomendadas, entre las que destacan precisamente\r\ndos: la de legislar y la de ejercer el control político. En virtud de lo\r\ndispuesto en el artículo 118 constitucional, se pretende que en Plenario se\r\nconozcan y voten exclusivamente los asuntos incluidos en el decreto de convocatoria\r\ndel Poder Ejecutivo, por lo que la Asamblea Legislativa puede seguir\r\nfuncionando normalmente en todas sus demás funciones, e inclusive puede\r\nrechazar un proyecto de ley del Ejecutivo, enviarlo a comisión, demorarlo,\r\nmodificarlo, e incluirle asuntos no sugeridos por el Poder Ejecutivo, lo cual\r\nes propio de la dinámica del Parlamento. Sin embargo, no puede modificar o\r\nsustituir totalmente una propuesta, por la de algún diputado, pues su ejercicio\r\nestá condicionado por el decreto de convocatoria. (…)\".\n\r\n\r\n\nAsí, para la validez del procedimiento de aprobación de los proyectos de\r\nley que se tramitan durante el período de las sesiones extraordinarias, es\r\npreciso que el Poder Ejecutivo haya convocado de manera indubitable a la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa con ese objeto. En efecto, la convocatoria fija las\r\nmaterias sobre las cuales la Asamblea Legislativa puede desplegar válidamente\r\nsus atribuciones, por lo que, en consecuencia, quedan excluidas todas aquellas\r\nque no se expresan en el Decreto de Convocatoria. Esto implica, ciertamente,\r\nuna sujeción parcial y temporal, de la Asamblea Legislativa, a la voluntad del\r\nPoder Ejecutivo, manifestada en el Decreto de Convocatoria. No debe perderse de\r\nvista, que la convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias constituye un acto\r\ntípicamente político; y, por ende, su ejercicio es discrecional. En este\r\nsentido, la función gubernamental, como una actividad de dirección política es,\r\nnormalmente, discrecional, y no tiene mayores límites que los dispuestos en la\r\nConstitución Política. De manera, que una de las formas en que el Ejecutivo\r\nparticipa en la actividad legislativa, es a través de la convocatoria a\r\nsesiones extraordinarias, por medio de la definición, en virtud de una\r\nplanificación y programación previas, de los proyectos de ley prioritarios y\r\nurgentes para la buena marcha del Gobierno. En efecto, durante las sesiones\r\nextraordinarias, la agenda del Parlamento se define, facultativamente,\r\natendiendo razones de dirección política, y se exterioriza a través del\r\nrespectivo decreto ejecutivo. Por tratarse de una decisión política, goza de\r\nuna esfera de discrecionalidad para salvaguardar su necesidad de adaptación a\r\nlos requerimientos del país. En ese orden de ideas, dado que debe de adaptarse\r\na las exigencias nacionales, se trata, entonces, de una decisión flexible; y,\r\nnecesariamente, mutable. Por lo tanto, el Poder Ejecutivo puede,\r\ndiscrecionalmente, ampliar el decreto de convocatoria a sesiones\r\nextraordinarias, o bien, retirar los proyectos convocados. Para ello, puede\r\nbasarse en la necesidad de que la Asamblea Legislativa conozca y discuta sobre\r\nlos proyectos que el Poder Ejecutivo considere prioritarios en atención a los\r\nintereses colectivos para una correcta y sana gestión de gobierno. Resultaría\r\nabsurdo y contrario al sistema ideado, que el Poder Ejecutivo, de alguna\r\nmanera, quede sujeto a uno o varios decretos de convocatoria, pues en esta\r\nmateria debe imperar una gran flexibilidad, en atención a las necesidades y a\r\nlos requerimientos de carácter colectivo que le sirven de sustento y que están\r\nen constante mutación. Esta posición ya fue sostenida anteriormente por esta\r\nTribunal Constitucional en Sentencia Nº 6939-1996, de las 9:24 horas, del 20 de\r\ndiciembre de 1996, oportunidad en la que dijo:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"IV. DE LA INICIATIVA LEGISLATIVA. Respecto\r\ndel primer punto, cabe señalar que la iniciativa legislativa es la fase\r\nintroductoria o iniciadora del procedimiento legislativo, o dicho de otro modo,\r\nes la facultad de someter a un Parlamento un proyecto de ley sobre una cuestión\r\ndeterminada, con la consiguiente obligación de la Asamblea Legislativa de\r\ndeliberar sobre él, salvo el caso de que, cuando la iniciativa proceda del\r\nPoder Ejecutivo, éste lo retire durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias.\r\nTécnicamente, la iniciativa no integra la potestad legislativa, aunque sí\r\nconstituye una operación esencial dentro del procedimiento legislativo; se\r\ntrata de un acto de impulso y no de un acto de decisión legislativa, en tanto\r\nla competencia legislativa reside exclusivamente en la Asamblea Legislativa\r\n-artículos 105 y 121 inciso 1) de la Constitución Política-. Por su parte, la\r\niniciativa gubernativa se refiere a la facultad que se da al Poder Ejecutivo en\r\nvirtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso 5) de la Constitución\r\nPolítica, para promover proyectos de ley, facultad que puede ejercer durante\r\ntoda la legislatura, y con exclusividad en los períodos de sesiones\r\nextraordinarios -artículo 123 ibídem-. Sin embargo, el que corresponda al Poder\r\nEjecutivo la iniciativa legislativa en exclusiva para un período determinado de\r\nsesiones de la Asamblea Legislativa, no quiere decir que la preparación y\r\nelaboración de los proyectos a discutir deban ser elaborados también en\r\nexclusiva por el Poder Ejecutivo, el mismo puede convocar al Parlamento para\r\nque discuta de algún proyecto que ya está en trámite en la Asamblea y que haya\r\nsido elaborado directamente por los diputados. En este sentido, cabe recalcar,\r\nque lo que interesa es que, mediante el decreto de convocatoria, sea el Poder\r\nEjecutivo quien defina qué asuntos son de su interés, para que se tramiten y\r\nvoten en el Plenario. Asimismo, es importante señalar que la doctrina es\r\nunánime en cuanto durante este período excepcional, el Poder Ejecutivo, así\r\ncomo dispone libremente de la facultad de proponer (no elaborar) los proyectos\r\nde ley que se tramitarán, así tiene la facultad para retirar los que considere,\r\nsin que ello implique violación a disposición o procedimiento legislativo\r\nalguno, siempre y cuando el mismo no haya sido definitivamente aprobado como Ley\r\nde la República. La iniciativa legislativa es un acto típicamente político, que\r\npor su propia naturaleza, es revocable por razones enteramente discrecionales,\r\nmotivo por el cual, a su antojo y voluntad, el Poder Ejecutivo puede modificar\r\nla \"agenda\", es decir, los asuntos que somete a discusión de los\r\ndiputados, sea ampliando la convocatoria incluyendo nuevos asuntos, o\r\neliminando de la lista proyectos ya convocados (…)\".\n\r\n\r\n\nDe lo dicho por esta Sala en la\r\nsentencia parcialmente transcrita, se colige que la reserva dispuesta en el\r\nartículo 118, de la Constitución Política, implica que la Asamblea Legislativa\r\nsólo puede legislar sobre los proyectos de ley incluidos en el Decreto de\r\nConvocatoria; y, a su vez, se ha reservado al Ejecutivo la determinación de la importancia\r\ny conveniencia de los proyectos que se incluyen en dicho decreto, posibilidad\r\nque es flexible y atiende a las prioridades e intereses del Gobierno. Incluso,\r\nesta Sala ha avalado la posibilidad que mediante decreto ejecutivo se\r\ndesconvoquen todos los proyectos sometidos a conocimiento de la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa, pues sería un contrasentido, que atentaría contra el principio de\r\nrazonabilidad, que el Ejecutivo no pudiera desconvocar lo que haya sido\r\nincluido en el respectivo decreto. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal, en\r\nSentencia N° 057-98, de las 15:36 horas, del 7 de enero de 1998, resolvió lo\r\nsiguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"(…) De conformidad con lo que establecen los\r\nartículos 116 y 118 de la Constitución Política, la Asamblea Legislativa se\r\nreunirá cada año el día primero de mayo, aún cuando no haya sido convocada y\r\nsus sesiones ordinarias durarán seis meses, divididas en dos períodos, del\r\nprimero de mayo al treinta y uno de julio y del primero de setiembre al treinta\r\nde noviembre. El Poder Ejecutivo, por su parte, podrá convocar a la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa a sesiones extraordinarias, en las que no se conocerá de materias\r\ndistintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate\r\ndel nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las\r\nreformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a\r\nsu conocimiento. Es claro que en el caso bajo estudio, el retiro de los\r\nproyectos de ley por parte del Ejecutivo no implica que deba producirse el\r\ncierre de sesiones extraordinarias, por cuanto, nada impide que se vuelva a\r\nproducir otra convocatoria, por encontrarse dentro del período\r\nconstitucionalmente dispuesto para ello (…)\".\n\r\n\r\n\nLa dirección política del\r\nGobierno, precisa de la concreción de las decisiones, al determinar cuáles son\r\nlos objetivos por lograr. De allí, que si el Decreto de Convocatoria a las\r\nsesiones extraordinarias, constituye un acto político y, en consecuencia,\r\ndiscrecional del Poder Ejecutivo, se puede concluir que el órgano dispone de\r\namplias facultades para agregar o retirar proyectos de ley en atención a los\r\nintereses nacionales y a las razones de oportunidad y conveniencia. En el caso\r\ndel proyecto de ley consultado, éste estaba incluido en los Decretos Ejecutivos\r\nde convocatoria -o ampliación de convocatoria- de la Asamblea Legislativa a\r\nsesiones extraordinarias. De modo, que la Asamblea Legislativa estaba en la\r\nposibilidad de deliberar sobre el proyecto de ley en cuestión. Por su parte, el\r\nPoder Ejecutivo hizo un manejo discrecional de las convocatorias y\r\ndesconvocatorias a sesiones extraordinarias para conocer el proyecto de ley en\r\ncuestión. Lo así actuado por el Poder Ejecutivo, está dentro de las\r\ncompetencias constitucionalmente otorgadas, sin que con el ejercicio de tal\r\nfacultad se viole algún principio constitucional, en particular, los de\r\nrazonabilidad, proporcionalidad, publicidad y seguridad jurídica. Esto es así\r\nporque, precisamente, la facultad del Poder Ejecutivo consiste en la\r\nposibilidad de indicar qué proyectos de ley se pueden conocer durante el\r\nperíodo de sesiones extraordinarias. La Constitución Política permite, al Poder\r\nEjecutivo, convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa o no hacerlo, y, en el primero de\r\nlos casos, es para la deliberación de los proyectos que ese Poder de la\r\nRepública proponga. De modo que puede, de conformidad con sus prioridades\r\ngubernamentales, no convocar a la Asamblea, suspender las sesiones o modificar,\r\nen atención a sus intereses, los términos de la convocatoria. Resulta evidente\r\nque las prioridades del Gobierno pueden mutar con el transcurso del tiempo y si\r\nestas se modifican, también pueden variar los proyectos para cuyo conocimiento\r\ny deliberación convoca a la Asamblea Legislativa. Cualquier rigidez en esta\r\nmateria puede afectar la satisfacción de los intereses generales y la necesidad\r\nde regular determinados aspectos de la vida nacional. Por esta razón, el Poder\r\nEjecutivo no está limitado para desconvocar proyectos de ley durante las\r\nsesiones extraordinarias y, además, goza de discrecionalidad relativa en el manejo\r\nde la agenda parlamentaria. En el caso bajo examen, el proyecto de ley\r\nconsultado estaba incluido en los decretos de convocatoria o ampliación a\r\nsesiones extraordinarias y se encontraba agendado en el orden del día de la\r\nComisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior.\r\nPor otra parte, ante las desconvocatorias de proyectos de ley por parte del\r\nPoder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de las facultades otorgadas constitucionalmente,\r\nincluido el proyecto que aquí interesa, la consecuencia esperable y lógica es\r\nla modificación el orden del día previsto y que los Diputados entraran a\r\nconocer, únicamente, aquellos proyectos que sí se mantenían por el Gobierno en\r\nsu Decreto de Convocatoria. Además, el ejercicio de esta facultad del Ejecutivo,\r\nno forma parte, propiamente, de los procedimientos legislativos, sino que se\r\nrefiere a una práctica inveterada de ese Poder, que afecta el trámite de otros\r\nprocedimientos. De cualquier modo, el proyecto de ley permaneció en la agenda\r\nlegislativa, durante los períodos en que convocó al órgano legislativo para su\r\nconocimiento durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias, con lo cual no se\r\nvieran afectadas las posibilidades de participación, representación, oposición\r\ny deliberación de los Diputados, como tampoco los principios de publicidad y\r\nseguridad jurídica, aspectos resguardados por el procedimiento legislativo (ver\r\nen este mismo sentido la Sentencia N° 2006-06732, de las 14:47 horas, del 17de\r\nmayo de 2006). Así, en el caso de la tramitación del expediente N° 19.426,\r\nproyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, durante el período de\r\nsesiones extraordinarias, la Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, sólo lo conoció cuando el Poder Ejecutivo,\r\npor medio del respectivo Decreto Ejecutivo, convocó o amplió la convocatoria a\r\ndichas sesiones extraordinarias e incluyó, dentro del decreto, el conocimiento\r\nde este proyecto de ley. Por otra parte, cesó en su conocimiento, cuando el\r\nPoder Ejecutivo, también por medio de decreto, lo retiró del conocimiento de\r\nlas sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa. Con lo cual, en lo que\r\nrespecta a este punto, el procedimiento legislativo no presenta vicios de\r\nconstitucionalidad.\n\r\n\r\n\nOtro punto del\r\nprocedimiento legislativo sobre el que es oportuno hacer un breve examen, es el\r\nrelativo a las consultas que, en su momento, hizo la Comisión Especial\r\nPermanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior a varias\r\ninstituciones públicas, así como también a sujetos de derecho privado.\r\nEfectivamente, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 2, del 18 de junio de 2015, la citada\r\nComisión aprobó moción para que el proyecto de ley fuera consultado a la Corte\r\nSuprema de Justicia, al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, al\r\nMinisterio de Ambiente y Energía, al Ministerio de Salud y a las Cementeras del\r\npaís. De igual modo, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, esa\r\nComisión aprobó otra moción para que se consultara el proyecto de ley al\r\nMinisterio de Hacienda. Sin embargo, en esa misma sesión, se aprobó una moción\r\nde orden para que la Comisión acordara volver en el orden del día al\r\nconocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, “Convenio de Minamata sobre el\r\nMercurio\", por lo que la Presidenta de la Comisión sometió a discusión por\r\nel fondo dicho proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado unánimemente por los ocho\r\ndiputados presentes, sin haberse vencido aún el plazo otorgado -conforme a las\r\nprórrogas acordadas- para rendir algunos de los informes solicitados. Sin\r\nembargo, esto no constituye ninguna irregularidad que pueda considerarse grave\r\nen la tramitación del proyecto. Nótese, que las consultas hechas no son\r\nobligatorias, sino de decisión discrecional de la respectiva Comisión\r\nLegislativa. Su fin es recabar el criterio de determinados sectores públicos o\r\nprivados que, eventualmente, podrían tener algún interés -en sentido amplio- en\r\nel proyecto de ley, lo que, en su momento, la Comisión Legislativa respectiva\r\nconsideró oportuno, pero de las que podría, incluso, prescindir el órgano\r\nlegislativo, en forma tácita o expresa. De cualquier modo, los informes de esas\r\nconsultas bien podrían recibirse durante la tramitación del proyecto en el\r\nplenario, sin que el hecho de que, en definitiva, no se evacuen, pueda, de\r\nalgún modo, invalidar el procedimiento legislativo. De manera tal, que resulta\r\nirrelevante si las consultas en cuestión no fueron atendidas -como en este caso\r\nen que únicamente constan los criterios de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y del\r\nMinisterio de Ambiente y Energía con respecto al proyecto de ley- o si lo\r\nfueron vencido el plazo otorgado al efecto o si, finalmente, la Comisión\r\nLegislativa respectiva dictaminó el proyecto sin que hubiese vencido el plazo\r\nconcedido para que las instituciones públicas o los sujetos de derecho privado\r\nse pronunciaran al efecto o, incluso, no hubiese ni siquiera empezado a correr\r\ndicho plazo, como sucedió con la consulta al Ministerio de Hacienda, pues en la\r\nmisma sesión en que se solicitó, la Comisión legislativa dictaminó el proyecto\r\nde ley, ya que nada de ello constituye un vicio en el trámite legislativo capaz\r\nde invalidarlo.\n\r\n\r\n\nNo obstante lo dicho, es\r\nnecesario hacer una valoración adicional con respecto a la posibilidad de los\r\ndiputados de variar el orden del día y volver a conocer sobre un proyecto de\r\nley que ya había sido conocido, según el orden del día de esa sesión, y que,\r\npor lo tanto, se trata de una fase del trámite legislativo ya precluida. Tal\r\nsucedió con el proyecto de ley bajo estudio, ya que en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4,\r\ndel 9 de julio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones\r\nInternacionales y Comercio Exterior, aprobó una moción de orden para que la\r\nComisión acuerde volver en el orden del día al conocimiento del expediente N°\r\n19.426, “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\", que ya había sido\r\ndiscutido en esa misma sesión y cuyo conocimiento se había dado por terminado,\r\npasando al conocimiento de otros asuntos. Así, la Presidenta de la Comisión,\r\nsometió a discusión por el fondo dicho proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado\r\n-unánimemente- por los ocho diputados presentes. Si bien, en un primer momento,\r\nel asesor del Departamento de Servicios Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa,\r\nseñor Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, ante consulta de la Presidenta de la Comisión\r\nPermanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, expresó\r\nverbalmente, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, que no veía\r\nproblema alguno en volver al orden del día y conocer de nuevo sobre un proyecto\r\nde ley sobre el que ya se hubiese conocido en esa misma sesión, siempre que,\r\ncomo en este caso, todos los señores y señoras diputados y diputadas estuvieran\r\nde acuerdo y así lo decidiesen (folio 179 de la copia certificada del\r\nexpediente legislativo); luego, al rendir el dictamen escrito solicitado por la\r\nPresidenta de la Comisión (folios 190 a 195), ese mismo Departamento cambió su\r\ncriterio y consideró que la práctica de retrotraer asuntos en la misma sesión\r\npara volverlos a conocer es contrario a los principios democrático, seguridad\r\njurídica, publicidad, transparencia, preclusión de los actos y razonabilidad,\r\npor lo que estima esa práctica contraria a la Constitución Política. Analizado\r\nel asunto, esta Sala estima que ni uno ni otro criterio son válidos, ya que\r\ntodo depende de las circunstancias en que dicha alteración del orden del día se\r\nproduce. Esto quiere decir que habrá que valorar cada caso en concreto, a fin\r\nde determinar si, efectivamente, se produce o no lesión a los citados\r\nprincipios constitucionales y, en caso afirmativo, a trámites esenciales del\r\nprocedimiento legislativo, como consecuencia. Del examen de las circunstancias\r\nen que se dio la vuelta al conocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, en Sesión\r\nOrdinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, de la Comisión Permanente Especial de\r\nRelaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, considera este Tribunal\r\nConstitucional que no se produjo lesión alguna a los citados principios\r\nconstitucionales; y, por ende, tampoco violación esencial al procedimiento\r\nlegislativo de aprobación del Convenio. El ambiente legislativo que rodeaba al\r\nproyecto de ley en Comisión, así como el criterio del Ministerio de Ambiente y\r\nEnergía, era absolutamente favorable al proyecto de ley, sin que ninguna\r\ninstitución o sujeto de derecho privado haya externado reparo alguno al\r\nrespecto. Y si bien es cierto, según el orden del día de la Sesión Ordinaria N°\r\n4, del 9 de julio de 2015, ya se había conocido sobre el proyecto de ley en\r\ncuestión, también lo es que dicho conocimiento no había terminado, sino que\r\nhabía sido suspendido para conocer el resto de la agenda, a fin de dar tiempo\r\npara que compareciera el señor Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director de la Dirección\r\nde Desarrollo de Servicios de Salud de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social,\r\na quien se le había citado para audiencia en esa sesión para que se refiriera\r\nal Convenio. De manera, que no había precluido aún ese punto de la agenda de la\r\nComisión y, por lo tanto, bien podía, a través de una moción de orden, volver\r\nla Comisión sobre el asunto y votarlo, como efectivamente se hizo. No solo todos\r\nlos señores y señoras diputados y diputadas estuvieron de acuerdo en dictaminar\r\nde forma inmediata ese proyecto de ley, dado lo apremiante que resulta para el\r\npaís la aprobación del Convenio, sino que no existe ningún elemento que indique\r\nque hubiese alguien con un interés contrario que se haya visto sorprendido en\r\nsus intereses por la aprobación de ese proyecto de ley en Comisión. No hay\r\nninguna lesión a los intereses y derechos de los diputados ni de la ciudadanía\r\ncon el proceder de la Comisión, por lo que no existe razón para considerar que,\r\nen este caso, se haya dado una violación a un trámite esencial en el\r\nprocedimiento legislativo en torno al proyecto de ley del expediente N° 19.426\r\npor el hecho de que la Comisión, por unanimidad, haya acordado volver sobre ese\r\nproyecto y darle el dictamen unánime afirmativo. Adicionalmente, no se observa\r\ninfracción a los derechos y potestades de los legisladores, pues el proyecto de\r\nley fue conocido por el Plenario Legislativo como correspondía, por tratarse de\r\nun Convenio Internacional; y, por lo tanto, no podía ser delegado en una\r\nComisión Legislativa con Potestad Plena, según lo establece el artículo 124,\r\npárrafo 3, de la Constitución Política, en relación con el 121, inciso 4),\r\nibídem. De otra parte, el proyecto de ley en consulta fue convocado, en su\r\nmomento, por el Poder Ejecutivo, para ser conocido en sesiones extraordinarias,\r\nsegún se relató anteriormente, respetándose lo dispuesto en el artículo 118, de\r\nla Constitución Política, y contó, para su aprobación en primer debate, con el\r\nvoto unánime de los cuarenta diputados y diputadas presentes, según consta en\r\nel Acta de la Sesión Plenaria N° 25, llevada a cabo el 9 de junio de 2016\r\n(folios 414 a 429 de la copia del expediente legislativo). En consecuencia,\r\neste Tribunal Constitucional advierte que en el trámite de aprobación del\r\nproyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio” , no se ha\r\nproducido algún vicio sustancial o de trascendencia que lo invalide, por\r\nquebranto a principios esenciales, tales como, el democrático, de\r\nparticipación, de representación política, respeto de las minorías o de\r\npublicidad y transparencia.\n\r\n\r\n\n V.-\r\nObservaciones en cuanto al fondo del proyecto. De previo a realizar algunas\r\nobservaciones en cuanto al fondo del proyecto de ley consultado, debe tenerse\r\npresente que, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 101, de la Ley de la\r\nJurisdicción Constitucional, el dictamen de esta Sala sólo será vinculante en\r\ncuanto establezca la existencia de trámites inconstitucionales del proyecto\r\nconsultado. Además, en cuanto al contenido de los diversos artículos, se hará\r\nreferencia a los aspectos más relevantes del Convenio, sin hacer un análisis de\r\ntodos y cada uno de los artículos, ya que, en principio, se consideran conformes\r\ncon el Derecho de la Constitución.\n\r\n\r\n\n VI.-\r\nSOBRE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL TRATADO CONSULTADO. El día 10 de octubre de\r\n2013, en original y en textos auténticos en idioma árabe, chino, español,\r\nfrancés, inglés y ruso, fue suscrito en la ciudad de Kumamoto, Japón, el\r\nConvenio bajo estudio, con la finalidad -según consta en la exposición de\r\nmotivos y en el propio texto del Acuerdo-, de “proteger la salud humana y el\r\nmedio ambiente de las emisiones y liberaciones de mercurio y compuestos de\r\nmercurio ”\r\n(artículo 1, del Convenio consultado). Lo anterior, lejos de contravenir la\r\nCarta Constitucional, por el contrario, es acorde con ésta, en particular, con\r\nlo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política, entre\r\notros. Asimismo, analizado el contenido del articulado que conforma el Convenio\r\nconsultado, este Tribunal Constitucional estima que, en términos generales,\r\nsustancialmente, es conforme con los preceptos, valores y principios\r\nfundamentales del Derecho de la Constitución.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA\r\nNORMATIVA DEL CONVENIO. Las normas contenidas en el Convenio bajo estudio\r\n-que conforman un total de treinta y cinco artículos, más cinco anexos (A, B,\r\nC, D y E)- son las propias y comunes que integran los convenios de esta naturaleza.\r\nAsí, tal y como se detalla en el informe jurídico N° AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015,\r\nelaborado por el Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicio Técnicos de\r\nla Asamblea Legislativa, en relación con el proyecto de ley que se tramita en\r\nexpediente N° 19.426, los artículos 1 y 2, del Convenio, son disposiciones\r\ngenerales en las que se establecen el objetivo general del Convenio y las\r\ndefiniciones de los términos empleados en él. En los artículos del 3 al 7, se\r\nestablecen los compromisos de los Estados signatarios para la eliminación total\r\nde nuevas fuentes primarias de extracción de mercurio a partir del 2020, la\r\nmoratoria de las ya existentes por un plazo determinado y la prohibición del\r\nuso de determinados productos que se emplean en la fabricación de compuestos de\r\nmercurio, definidos en los respectivos Anexos del Convenio, así como de ciertos\r\nprocesos industriales que causan la emisión o liberación de mercurio, artículos\r\ncuyo comercio se prohíbe. Conforme con la técnica propia del Derecho\r\nInternacional, estas prohibiciones absolutas o a plazo determinado, contemplan\r\nexcepciones y un procedimiento especial para que una Parte interesada pueda\r\nacoger o solicitar exenciones temporales con respecto a esas prohibiciones. Se\r\ncontemplan también obligaciones de medios, no de resultados, que implican el\r\ncompromiso de las Partes a realizar acciones, sin que se precise un límite o un\r\nresultado específico. Como parte de estas obligaciones de medios, se encuentra\r\nel deber de elaborar distintos planes de acción nacional para ir reduciendo o\r\nmitigando los factores humanos que sean fuente de emisiones o liberación de\r\nmercurio, así como el brindar cooperación internacional, concientizar a la\r\npoblación e intercambiar información científica, técnica o relevante. Otras\r\nobligaciones menores consisten en brindar informes nacionales o la remisión a\r\nobligaciones contempladas en otros instrumentos internacionales, como el de\r\nBasilea, sobre disposición de desechos peligrosos (artículo 11.3.a). Es\r\nimportante resaltar, que del estudio del articulado, se colige que el Convenio\r\nno impone ninguna obligación financiera a las Partes más allá de la dotación a\r\nlas instituciones nacionales con recursos para el cumplimiento efectivo de las\r\nobligaciones asumidas y, por el contrario, prevé la posibilidad de los Estados\r\nde acceder a los recursos del Fondo Fiduciario para el medio ambiente de\r\nNaciones Unidas para países en desarrollo (artículo 13, del Convenio). Se\r\nprevé, asimismo, la transferencia tecnológica (artículo 14, del Convenio) y se\r\ncrean, además de la Conferencia de las Partes, un Comité de Aplicación y\r\nCumplimiento de quince países miembros, que es el encargado de aplicar y\r\nverificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones, y una Secretaría a cargo de las\r\nfunciones burocráticas o asignadas por el Convenio al Director Ejecutivo del\r\nPrograma para el Medio Ambiente de Naciones Unidas (artículos 15, 23 y 24, del\r\nConvenio). Se cierra el Convenio con las usuales regulaciones del derecho de\r\nlos tratados relativas a enmiendas, entrada en vigor, depósito, textos\r\nauténticos y anexos (artículos 26 a 35, y Anexos A, B, C, D y E, del Convenio),\r\ntodo lo cual no presenta ningún problema de constitucionalidad. En torno a las\r\nobligaciones que con la suscripción del Convenio adquiere el Estado, la única\r\nnorma que se relaciona con el tema financiero, es el artículo 13, pero este lo\r\núnico que impone a las Partes es la obligación de dotar a sus propios\r\norganismos nacionales, en la medida de sus posibilidades, de los recursos\r\nnecesarios para la implementación del Convenio, lo cual ya está implícito desde\r\nel momento en que se adquieren esos compromisos. Por otra parte, la\r\ncontribución con fondos para el Mecanismo creado en el Convenio, es solo una\r\ninvitación, no una obligación (artículo 13, inciso 12, del Convenio) y se abre\r\nla posibilidad de acceder a los fondos de la cooperación internacional para\r\npaíses en desarrollo. De manera tal, que esta Sala estima que los compromisos\r\nasumidos por el país en este Convenio se enmarcan dentro de la previsión\r\npresupuestaria habitual, ya que esos compromisos son acciones que ya figuran\r\ndentro del giro ordinario de la institucionalidad nacional. En cuanto a las\r\nobligaciones de medios, no de resultados, que implican el compromiso de las\r\nPartes a realizar acciones, sin que se precise un límite o un resultado\r\nespecífico, únicamente tienen valor de directriz o de orientación política o,\r\nsi se quiere, programático, pero no imponen ninguna responsabilidad al Estado y\r\nno pueden dar base a una reclamación internacional contra el Gobierno. Tal es el\r\ncaso de las obligaciones que contienen los artículos 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 y\r\n20, del Convenio. Por el contrario, en los artículos 3 a 8, del Convenio, se\r\nimpone a las Partes una serie de obligaciones sustantivas. Estas obligaciones o\r\ncompromisos adquiridos por el Estado están referidos a la extracción primaria\r\nen minas, al uso de productos con compuestos de mercurio, a los procesos\r\nindustriales, a la extracción artesanal de oro y al tema de las emisiones. En\r\nesta materia, las obligaciones del Estado van desde la prohibición de autorizar\r\nnuevas fuentes de extracción primaria de mercurio hasta la realización de un\r\nplan nacional tendente a la disminución o reducción de la presencia del\r\nmercurio. Dentro de estas obligaciones impuestas en el Convenio, está la de\r\nhacer un inventario de la situación del país en torno al tema del mercurio en\r\ncada uno de las áreas que contempla ese instrumento internacional. Todas estas\r\nobligaciones, que son propias de convenios de esta naturaleza y que constituyen\r\nuna técnica normativa de amplia utilización en el derecho internacional y a las\r\nque voluntariamente pueden someterse los Estados, no solo no presentan ninguna\r\ncontradicción con el Derecho de la Constitución, sino que, más bien, son\r\nacordes en todo con lo preceptuado en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución\r\nPolítica. Además, del análisis de los compromisos que adquiere el Estado\r\ncostarricense con la firma y aprobación legislativa del Convenio, se colige que\r\nlas acciones a tomar en esta materia ya están incluidas en las competencias\r\nordinarias de las instituciones nacionales relacionadas con el tema, por lo que\r\nno implica la dotación de recursos o competencias adicionales. En fin, todas\r\nlas obligaciones impuestas en el Convenio, como la eliminación total de la\r\nextracción de nuevas fuentes de mercurio, la moratoria de las ya existentes\r\ndentro de un plazo determinado, la prohibición del uso de compuestos de\r\nmercurio, así como su paulatina eliminación, las adquiere el Estado pero con\r\ntotal respeto del ordenamiento interno y de los intereses nacionales, lo cual\r\nes propio de este tipo de convenios internacionales. El Convenio también\r\ncontempla cláusulas temporales de excepción del cumplimiento de las\r\nobligaciones relativas a la fabricación, uso o utilización de procesos industriales\r\nque involucren mercurio, así como mecanismos de enmiendo y adopción del\r\nconvenio y sus anexos, en consonancia con las legislaciones internas de los\r\npaíses, lo cual son regulaciones típicas y normales en el Derecho\r\nInternacional. Asimismo, en cuanto a la ratificación, aceptación, aprobación o\r\nadhesión al Convenio (artículo 30), a la imposibilidad de formular reservas al\r\nConvenio (artículo 32) y las condiciones y plazos de su denuncia (artículo 33),\r\nse trata también de disposiciones comunes del derecho de los tratados, cuyo\r\nsometimiento voluntario por parte del Estado no presenta ningún conflicto de\r\nconstitucionalidad. En relación con el Anexo E, del Convenio, que trata sobre\r\nel procedimiento de arbitraje y conciliación, tampoco encuentra esta Sala reparo\r\nalguno de constitucionalidad, ya que se trata de normativa que es típica en\r\nesta materia en el Derecho Internacional y a la que voluntariamente se pueden\r\nsometer los Estados, como lo es el caso de nuestro país al suscribir el\r\nConvenio. Por último, dado que este Convenio no implica, de modo alguno, la\r\natribución o transferencia de competencias del Estado a un ordenamiento\r\njurídico comunitario (artículo 121, inciso 4), de la Constitución Política),\r\npara su aprobación en primer y segundo debate, basta la mayoría absoluta de\r\nvotos de los diputados y diputadas presentes en la sesión parlamentaria, de\r\nconformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 119, de la Carta Política. Por otra\r\nparte, el conocimiento de este Convenio no puede ser delegado en una Comisión\r\nLegislativa Plena, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 124,\r\npárrafo tercero, Constitucional. Estos requisitos fueron satisfechos al\r\naprobarse este Convenio en primer debate, en Sesión Plenaria Ordinaria N° 25,\r\ndel 9 de junio de 2016, por votación unánime de los cuarenta diputados y\r\ndiputadas presentes.\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- Conclusión. En mérito de lo\r\nexpuesto, se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que, el proyecto de ley en\r\ncuestión, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento o disposiciones que lo\r\ninvaliden.\n\r\n\r\n\nPor tanto:\n\r\n\r\n\n Se evacua la consulta en el\r\nsentido que el proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”,\r\nexpediente legislativo N° 19.426, no contiene vicios esenciales de\r\nprocedimiento, ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.-\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nFernando\r\n Cruz C.\n\r\n \nPresidente\r\n a.i\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nNancy\r\n Hernández L.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nLuis Fdo.\r\n Salazar A.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nJorge\r\n Araya G.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nAracelly\r\n Pacheco S.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nEnrique\r\n Ulate C.\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\n\r\n \nJose\r\n Paulino Hernández G.\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nDocumento\r\nFirmado Digitalmente\n\r\n\r\n\n-- Código\r\nverificador --\n\r\n\r\n\n*V3DOYCL2IXQ61*\n\r\n\r\n\n V3DOYCL2IXQ61 \n\r\n\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 16-007743-0007-CO \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.\r\nDirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio\r\nCorte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González\r\nLahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6",
  "body_en_text": "*160077430007CO*\n\nExp: 16-007743-0007-CO\nRes. No. 2016009960\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of July, two thousand sixteen.\n\nMandatory legislative consultation of constitutionality submitted by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", legislative file No. 19.426.\n\nWhereas:\n\n1.- The consultation, submitted in compliance with the provisions of subsection a) of Article 96 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 17:26 hours on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber acknowledged receipt of the consultation by resolution at 07:42 hours on the following June 16. Consequently, the term to evacuate it expires on July 15 of the current year.\n\n2.- In the proceeding, the formalities established by law were observed.\n\nDrafted by Judge Salazar Alvarado; and,\n\nConsidering:\n\nI.- Preliminarily.- The first step, in order to evacuate the consultation, is to verify the proceedings followed in this case, in accordance with what is indicated in Article 98 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, by providing that the consultation must be made after the bill is approved in the first debate and before final approval, and that, when evacuating it, the Chamber will rule on any aspects or reasons it deems relevant from a constitutional point of view, but binding only with respect to the proceedings. For the above purposes and due to the importance of the matter in question, a chronological summary of the bill will be made in the following considering.\n\nII.- The processing of the file in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", processed in legislative file No. 19.426, has followed this chronological order:\n\na) The bill, which was initiated by the Executive Branch, was presented to the Secretariat of the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly at 15:00 hours on December 1, 2014 (folios 1 and following of the certified copy of the legislative file).\n\nb) The President of the Legislative Assembly ordered the legislative initiative to be referred to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade for the corresponding report. Likewise, the original bill was transferred to the Archive Department for its publication and processing, and a faithful copy was sent to the Department of Parliamentary Services and to the Department of Parliamentary Services, so that the text could be included in the Integrated Legislative System (folio 77).\n\nc) By Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP of April 7, 2015, the Executive Branch extended the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, made by Executive Decree No. 38.734-MP, so that the legislative body could hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 78 to 80).\n\nd) On April 14, 2015, the Department of Archive, Research, and Processing sent legislative file No. 19.426, which is the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", for publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, a bill that was published in Supplement No. 28 of Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 82 of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83).\n\ne) In Ordinary Session No. 2 of June 18, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health, and the country's cement companies (folios 86 to 95).\n\nf) In Ordinary Session No. 3 of June 25, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to summon to a hearing before that Committee Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development, Sub-area of Environmental Management, of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, a hearing that was set for 09:15 hours on July 2, 2015 (folios 96 to 102 and 127).\n\ng) By official communication number AL-DEST-OFI-IJU-175-2015 of June 24, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade received the Legal Report on the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" (folios 103 to 126).\n\nh) By official communication No. SP-202-2015 of July 2, 2015, the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice requested the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an extension of no less than thirty business days in the term to render the requested report (folio 151).\n\ni) In Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill to the Ministry of Finance and granted an extension of eight business days to the Supreme Court of Justice to render the requested report. Furthermore, in said session, Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, was received in a hearing. Finally, a procedural motion was approved for the Committee to agree to return in the order of the day to the hearing of file No. 19.426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\". Based on this, the Committee Chair submitted said bill for substantive discussion, which was approved unanimously by the eight deputies present, and one of the Committee deputies was assigned to draft the respective report (folios 155 to 185).\n\nj) By official communication No. DAJ-853-2015 of July 9, 2015, the Director of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) requested the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an extension of eight business days to render the requested report (folio 188).\n\nk) By official communication No. DAJ-809-2015 of July 22, 2015, the Acting Director of the Directorate of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", in which she stated she had no observations on the matter and requested its approval by the legislative body (folio 189).\n\nl) By official communication AL-DEST-CJU-0077-2015 of July 22, 2015, the Department of Studies, References and Technical Services sent the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade the Consultation Report on the possibility of altering the order of the day to return to the hearing of files already heard at the respective point of the Order of the Day (folios 191 to 195).\n\nm) By unnumbered official communication of July 23, 2015, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", in which she stated that said text does not refer to the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch, as established in Article 157 of the Political Constitution, therefore the Court omits any pronouncement in this regard (folio 196).\n\nn) By Executive Decree No. 39111-MP of July 30, 2015, the Executive Branch called the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions starting August 3, 2015, so that the legislative body could hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 205 to 212).\n\nñ) The unanimous affirmative report on the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", legislative file No. 19.426, was prepared and delivered to the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate on August 5, 2015 (folios 266 and 267).\n\no) By Executive Decree No. 39337-MP of November 30, 2015, the Executive Branch called the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions starting December 1, 2015, so that the legislative body could hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 269 to 277).\n\np) By Executive Decree No. 39364-MP of December 3, 2015, the Executive Branch withdrew, from the hearing of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 278 to 280).\n\nq) By Executive Decree No. 39580-MP of March 28, 2016, the Executive Branch extended the call to Extraordinary Sessions to the Legislative Assembly, as of that date, made by Executive Decree No. 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 281 and 282);\n\nr) By Executive Decree No. 39583-MP of April 12, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the hearing of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 283 to 287).\n\ns) By Executive Decree No. 39584-MP of April 14, 2016, the Executive Branch extended the call to Extraordinary Sessions to the Legislative Assembly, as of that date, made by Executive Decree No. 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 288 to 290);\n\nt) By Executive Decree No. 39621-MP of April 18, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the hearing of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" is processed (folios 291 to 294).\n\nu) In Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25 of June 9, 2016, a procedural motion was presented and approved unanimously by the forty-five deputies present, for the Legislative Plenary to postpone the hearing of pending matters on the order of the day to hear, immediately, among other bills, file No. 19.426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\". Subsequently, the substantive discussion began, in the first debate proceeding, of that legislative file, a bill that was approved in the first debate in that same session by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present. The file was passed to the Drafting Committee and its consultation before this Chamber was ordered (folios 414 to 429).\n\nv) In Ordinary Session No. 05 of June 13, 2015, the Permanent Special Drafting Committee heard and unanimously approved the Final Draft of legislative file No. 19.426, bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", to which it made no modifications (folios 345-412).\n\nw) On June 10, 2016, the Permanent Special Drafting Committee delivered legislative file No. 19.426, bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", to the Secretariat of the Directorate for the respective proceeding to continue (folio 413).\n\nIII.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This mandatory consultation of constitutionality is submitted by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b) of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, regarding the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", processed in legislative file No. 19.426, as it concerns the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate in Plenary Session No. 25 of June 9, 2016, its hearing is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.\n\nIV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for processing the bill called \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", noting that no substantial or significant defect has occurred capable of invalidating it due to a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as evident from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Also, in the electronic file of the legislative consultation, a document was forwarded to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, stating that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica to Japan, was the one who, in the name and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Mrs. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mrs. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred Full Powers upon him. Although from a reading of Article 140, subsection 10) of the Political Constitution, it appears that the signing of international treaties is an attribution of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the Branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996, provides in its Article 7, regarding this topic:\n\n\"ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered as representing a State: a) If he produces appropriate full powers…\".\n\nThus, said official was authorized to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, since he possessed the necessary and sufficient powers to do so. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement given to the Convention by the President of the Republic through the various stages of the legislative procedure. Indeed, the bill was presented before the legislative stream by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5) of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Also, it is accredited that, through Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch called or extended the call to extraordinary sessions so that the Legislative Assembly would hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or else withdrew it from the hearing of Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed regarding the signing of the Convention. It was also accredited that the bill was published in Supplement No. 28 of Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 82 of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the address of the Website of the National Printing Office, in pdf format, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, that Permanent Special Committee approved it by a unanimous vote of all eight deputies present, without any modification being made.\n\nHowever, even though this Chamber finds no irregularity whatsoever in the processing of the bill in question that implies nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the extraordinary sessions period of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, which empowers the Executive Branch to call the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary session, a point reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14) of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to restore, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity – which it would otherwise lack – to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, of 13:36 hours on July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator become apparent, particularly regarding governmental initiative or initiative external to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is prohibited from meeting by full right and can only do so under the call of the Executive Branch. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:\n\n\"Article 118.- The Executive Branch may call the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, matters other than those expressed in the call decree shall not be heard, except for the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or legal reforms that are indispensable in resolving the matters submitted for its hearing\".\n\nAccording to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot hear matters that have not been included in the Call Decree. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointments of officials that the Legislative Branch is responsible for making, or bills on legal reforms that are indispensable for resolving matters submitted for the hearing of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly indicates. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule on the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the extraordinary sessions period. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours on December 20, 1996, it considered:\n\n\"VI. ON THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS PERIOD. In this vein, it should be noted that the extraordinary sessions period of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision for it to meet outside the normally established timeframes. It is Article 118 of the Constitution that regulates its call, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in these, matters other than those expressed in the call decree shall not be heard, with the exception of the appointment of officials that the Legislative Assembly is responsible for making, or legal reforms that are indispensable in resolving the matters submitted for its hearing. It is a power of discretionary exercise. Regarding the foregoing, it should be clarified that with the extraordinary sessions period, the Legislative Assembly only loses legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which precisely two stand out: legislating and exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, it is intended that only the matters included in the Executive Branch's call decree be heard and voted on in the Plenary, so the Legislative Assembly can continue functioning normally in all its other functions, and can even reject a bill from the Executive Branch, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is part of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot totally modify or substitute a proposal with that of any deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the call decree. (…)\".\n\nThus, for the validity of the approval procedure for bills processed during the extraordinary sessions period, the Executive Branch must have undoubtedly called the Legislative Assembly for that purpose. Indeed, the call fixes the matters upon which the Legislative Assembly can validly exercise its attributions, so consequently, all those not expressed in the Call Decree are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Call Decree. It should not be overlooked that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those provided in the Political Constitution. So, one of the ways in which the Executive Branch participates in legislative activity is through the call to extraordinary sessions, by means of defining, by virtue of prior planning and programming, the priority and urgent bills for the smooth running of the Government. Indeed, during extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is optionally defined, based on reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. As a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need for adaptation to the country's requirements. In this vein, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch can, at its discretion, extend the call decree to extraordinary sessions, or else withdraw the called projects. To do this, it can rely on the need for the Legislative Assembly to hear and discuss the projects that the Executive Branch considers priorities in attending to collective interests for proper and sound government management. It would be absurd and contrary to the designed system for the Executive Branch to somehow remain subject to one or more call decrees, since great flexibility must prevail in this matter, in attention to the needs and collective requirements that serve as its foundation and that are in constant mutation. This position was previously held by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours on December 20, 1996, an occasion on which it stated:\n\n\"IV. ON LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or in other words, it is the faculty to submit a bill on a specific matter to a Parliament, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case where, when the initiative proceeds from the Executive Branch, it withdraws it during the extraordinary sessions period. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impetus and not an act of legislative decision, while legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly -Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution-. For its part, governmental initiative refers to the faculty given to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty that can be exercised throughout the legislature, and exclusively during extraordinary session periods -Article 123 ibidem-. However, the fact that legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific session period of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the projects to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it can call Parliament to discuss any project already being processed in the Assembly and that has been drafted directly by the deputies. In this sense, it should be emphasized that what matters is that, through the call decree, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, so that they are processed and voted on in the Plenary. Also, it is important to note that the doctrine is unanimous that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not draft) the bills to be processed, likewise has the faculty to withdraw those it considers appropriate, without this implying a violation of any constitutional provision or legislative procedure, provided the same has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic.\n\nThe legislative initiative is a typically political act, which,\nby its very nature, is revocable for entirely discretionary reasons,\nwhich is why, at its whim and will, the Executive Branch may modify\nthe \"agenda,\" that is, the matters it submits for discussion by the\ndeputies, either expanding the convocation by including new matters, or\nremoving from the list projects already convened (…).\"\n\nFrom what this Chamber stated in the\npartially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation established in\nArticle 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly\nmay only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the Executive has been reserved the determination of the importance\nand advisability of the projects included in said decree, a\npossibility that is flexible and attends to the priorities and interests of the Government. Even\nthis Chamber has endorsed the possibility that, by executive decree,\nall projects submitted to the knowledge of the Legislative Assembly may be de-convoked, since it would be a contradiction, which would violate the principle of\nreasonableness, for the Executive not to be able to de-convoke what has been\nincluded in the respective decree. On this matter, this Court, in\nJudgment No. 057-98, at 15:36 hours, on January 7, 1998, resolved the\nfollowing:\n\n\"(…) In accordance with the provisions of\nArticles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall\nmeet each year on the first day of May, even if it has not been convened, and\nits ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from\nthe first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirty-first\nof November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative\nAssembly for extraordinary sessions, in which no matters\nother than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be considered, except in the case of\nthe appointment of officials that correspond to the Assembly, or the\nlegal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to\nits knowledge. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of\nbills by the Executive does not imply that the closure of\nextraordinary sessions must occur, because nothing prevents another convocation from taking place again, since it is within the period\nconstitutionally provided for that purpose (…).\"\n\nThe political direction of the\nGovernment requires the specification of decisions, by determining what the\nobjectives to be achieved are. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to\nextraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, a\ndiscretionary one of the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has\nbroad powers to add or withdraw bills in response to\nnational interests and reasons of opportunity and convenience. In the case\nof the bill under consultation, it was included in the Executive Decrees\nof convocation —or expansion of convocation— of the Legislative Assembly to\nextraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly was in a\nposition to deliberate on the bill in question. For its part, the\nExecutive Branch made discretionary use of the convocations and\nde-convocations to extraordinary sessions to consider the bill in\nquestion. What was thus done by the Executive Branch is within the\nconstitutionally granted powers, without the exercise of such\npower violating any constitutional principle, in particular, those of\nreasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so\nbecause, precisely, the power of the Executive Branch consists of the\npossibility of indicating which bills can be considered during the\nperiod of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the\nExecutive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not to do so, and, in the former\ncase, it is for the deliberation of the projects that that Branch of the\nRepublic proposes. Thus, it may, in accordance with its governmental\npriorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify,\nin response to its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident\nthat the Government's priorities may change over time, and if\nthese are modified, the projects for whose consideration\nand deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly may also vary. Any rigidity in this\nmatter may affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need\nto regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive\nBranch is not limited in de-convoking bills during\nextraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in the management\nof the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill under\nconsultation was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to\nextraordinary sessions and was agendized on the order of the day of the\nSpecial Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade.\nOn the other hand, before the de-convocations of bills by the\nExecutive Branch, in the exercise of the powers granted constitutionally,\nincluding the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is\nthe modification of the planned order of the day and that the Deputies would proceed to\nconsider only those projects that were kept by the Government in\nits Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this power of the Executive\ndoes not form part, strictly speaking, of the legislative procedures, but rather\nrefers to a long-standing practice of that Branch, which affects the processing of other\nprocedures. In any case, the bill remained on the legislative\nagenda during the periods in which it convened the legislative body for its\nconsideration during the period of extraordinary sessions, whereby the\npossibilities of participation, representation, opposition,\nand deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and\nlegal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see\nin this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, at 14:47 hours, on May 17,\n2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19,426,\nthe bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" during the period of\nextraordinary sessions, the Special Permanent Commission on International\nRelations and Foreign Trade only considered it when the Executive Branch,\nby means of the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the convocation to\nsaid extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the consideration\nof this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its consideration when the\nExecutive Branch, also by means of a decree, withdrew it from the consideration of\nthe extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, as\nregards this point, the legislative procedure does not present\nconstitutionality defects.\n\nAnother point of the\nlegislative procedure that it is opportune to briefly examine is the\none relating to the consultations that, at the time, the Special Permanent\nCommission on International Relations and Foreign Trade made to several\npublic institutions, as well as to private legal entities.\nIndeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, on June 18, 2015, the aforementioned\nCommission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted to the\nSupreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the\nMinistry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health, and the Cement Companies of the\ncountry. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, that\nCommission approved another motion for the bill to be consulted to the\nMinistry of Finance. However, in that same session, an order\nmotion was approved so that the Commission would agree to return in the order of the day to the\nconsideration of file No. 19,426, \"Minamata Convention on\nMercury,\" whereby the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion\non the merits, which was approved unanimously by the eight\ndeputies present, without the deadline granted —according to the\nagreed extensions— to render some of the requested reports having yet expired. However,\nthis does not constitute any irregularity that could be considered serious\nin the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made were not\nmandatory but rather a discretionary decision of the respective Legislative\nCommission. Their purpose is to gather the opinion of certain public or\nprivate sectors that, eventually, could have some interest —in a broad sense— in\nthe bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission\nconsidered opportune, but of which the legislative body could, even, dispense\ntacitly or expressly. In any case, the reports from those\nconsultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the\nplenary, without the fact that they were not ultimately rendered being able, in\nany way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. Thus, it is\nirrelevant whether the consultations in question were not responded to —as in this case\nin which only the opinions of the Supreme Court of Justice and the\nMinistry of Environment and Energy with respect to the bill are on record— or whether they were\nresponded to after the deadline granted for that purpose had expired, or whether, finally, the respective\nLegislative Commission issued a committee report on the bill without the deadline\ngranted for the public institutions or private legal entities\nto pronounce on the matter having expired or, even, when said deadline had not even begun to run,\nas happened with the consultation to the Ministry of Finance, because in the\nsame session in which it was requested, the legislative Commission issued a committee report on the\nbill, since none of that constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable\nof invalidating it.\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, it\nis necessary to make an additional assessment regarding the possibility of the\ndeputies to vary the order of the day and return to consider a\nbill that had already been considered, according to the order of the day of that session, and that,\ntherefore, it concerns a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such\nhappened with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4,\non July 9, 2015, the Special Permanent Commission on International\nRelations and Foreign Trade approved an order motion so that the\nCommission would agree to return in the order of the day to the consideration of file No.\n19,426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" which had already been\ndiscussed in that same session and whose consideration had been concluded,\nmoving on to the consideration of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission\nsubmitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved\n—unanimously— by the eight deputies present. Although, initially,\nthe advisor of the Department of Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly,\nMr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, when consulted by the President of the\nSpecial Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, expressed\norally, in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, that he saw\nno problem whatsoever in going back in the order of the day and considering again a\nbill that had already been considered in that same session, provided that,\nas in this case, all the deputies\nagreed and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the\nlegislative file); later, when rendering the written opinion requested by the\nPresident of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its\nopinion and considered that the practice of reverting matters in the same session\nto reconsider them is contrary to the democratic principles, legal\ncertainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness,\nand therefore it deemed that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed\nthe matter, this Chamber considers that neither opinion is valid, since\neverything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the order of the day\noccurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order\nto determine whether, indeed, harm is caused to the cited\nconstitutional principles and, in the affirmative, to essential steps of the\nlegislative procedure, as a consequence. From the examination of the circumstances\nin which the return to the consideration of file No. 19,426 occurred, in Ordinary\nSession No. 4, on July 9, 2015, of the Special Permanent Commission on International\nRelations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional Court considers\nthat no harm whatsoever was caused to the cited constitutional\nprinciples; and, therefore, no essential violation of the\nlegislative procedure for the approval of the Convention occurred either. The legislative environment surrounding the\nbill in Commission, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and\nEnergy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any\ninstitution or private legal entity having expressed any objection\nregarding it. And although it is true, according to the order of the day of Ordinary Session No.\n4, on July 9, 2015, that the bill in\nquestion had already been considered, it is also true that said consideration had not ended but\nhad been suspended to consider the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time\nfor Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of\nHealth Services Development of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund,\nwho had been summoned for a hearing in that session to speak about\nthe Convention, to appear. Thus, that point of the agenda of the\nCommission had not yet precluded, and, therefore, the\nCommission could well, through an order motion, return\nto the matter and vote on it, as was indeed done. Not only did all\nthe deputies agree to immediately issue a committee report on\nthat bill, given how urgent the approval of the Convention is for the\ncountry, but there is no element indicating\nthat there was anyone with a contrary interest who may have been surprised\nin their interests by the approval of that bill in Commission. There is\nno harm to the interests and rights of the deputies or the citizenry\nwith the actions of the Commission, so there is no reason to consider that,\nin this case, an essential step in the\nlegislative procedure surrounding the bill of file No. 19,426 was violated\nby the fact that the Commission, unanimously, agreed to return to that\nbill and give it the unanimous favorable committee report. Additionally, no infringement is observed\nof the rights and powers of the legislators, since the bill\nwas considered by the Legislative Plenary as corresponded, because it is\nan International Convention; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a\nLegislative Commission with Plenary Powers, according to the provisions of Article 124,\nparagraph 3, of the Political Constitution, in relation to Article 121, section 4),\nibid. On the other hand, the bill under consultation was convened, in\nits time, by the Executive Branch, to be considered in extraordinary sessions,\nas previously related, respecting the provision in Article 118 of\nthe Political Constitution, and it had, for its approval in the first debate, the\nunanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in\nthe Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016\n(folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently,\nthis Constitutional Court notes that in the process of approving the\nbill called \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" no\nsubstantial or significant defect has occurred to invalidate it, due to\nthe breach of essential principles, such as the democratic, of\nparticipation, of political representation, respect for minorities, or of\npublicity and transparency.\n\nV.—\nObservations regarding the substance of the bill. Before making some\nobservations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be\nborne in mind that, according to the provisions of Article 101 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law,\nthe advisory opinion of this Chamber will only be binding\nwhen it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the\nbill under consultation. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will be made\nto the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without making an analysis of\neach and every one of the articles, since, in principle, they are considered in conformity\nwith the Law of the Constitution.\n\nVI.—\nON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION. On October 10,\n2013, in original and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish,\nFrench, English, and Russian, the Convention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan,\nwith the purpose —as stated in the explanatory memorandum and in the text of the Agreement itself— of “protecting human health and the\nenvironment from emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds”\n(Article 1 of the Convention under consultation). The foregoing, far from contravening the\nConstitutional Charter, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, in particular, with\nthe provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, among\nothers. Likewise, having analyzed the content of the articles comprising the Convention\nunder consultation, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms,\nsubstantially, it is in conformity with the precepts, values, and\nfundamental principles of the Law of the Constitution.\n\nVII.— DESCRIPTION OF THE\nPROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. The provisions contained in the Convention under study\n—which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B,\nC, D, and E)— are those proper and common that make up conventions of this nature.\nThus, as detailed in legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015,\nprepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of\nthe Legislative Assembly, in relation to the bill processed in\nfile No. 19,426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general\nprovisions establishing the general objective of the Convention and the\ndefinitions of the terms used in it. In Articles 3 through 7, the\ncommitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination\nof new primary sources of mercury extraction starting from 2020, the\nmoratorium on existing ones for a determined period, and the prohibition of the\nuse of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds,\ndefined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as of certain\nindustrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles\nwhose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the technique proper to International\nLaw, these absolute or fixed-term prohibitions contemplate\nexceptions and a special procedure for an interested Party to\naccede to or request temporary exemptions with respect to those prohibitions.\nObligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which imply the\ncommitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a\nspecific result. As part of these obligations of means, is found\nthe duty to prepare various national action plans to progressively reduce or\nmitigate the human factors that are sources of emissions or releases of\nmercury, as well as to provide international cooperation, raise public\nawareness, and exchange scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other\nminor obligations consist of providing national reports or reference to\nobligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the\nBasel Convention on the disposal of hazardous wastes (Article 11.3.a). It\nis important to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention\ndoes not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond the provision to\nnational institutions of resources for the effective compliance with the\nobligations assumed and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility of States\naccessing the resources of the United Nations Environment Trust Fund for\ndeveloping countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Furthermore,\ntechnology transfer is provided for (Article 14 of the Convention), and,\nin addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and\nCompliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is responsible for applying and\nverifying compliance with obligations, and a Secretariat in charge of\nbureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the\nUnited Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the\nConvention). The Convention closes with the usual treaty law regulations\nrelating to amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic\ntexts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E of the Convention),\nall of which present no constitutionality problem. Regarding the\nobligations that the State acquires with the signing of the Convention, the only\nprovision related to the financial issue is Article 13, but this\nonly imposes on the Parties the obligation to provide their own\nnational bodies, to the extent of their possibilities, with the\nnecessary resources for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from\nthe moment those commitments are acquired. On the other hand, the\ncontribution of funds for the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an\ninvitation, not an obligation (Article 13, section 12, of the Convention), and the\npossibility of accessing international cooperation funds for\ndeveloping countries is opened. Thus, this Chamber considers that the commitments\nassumed by the country in this Convention fall within the scope of ordinary\nbudgetary provision, since those commitments are actions that already appear\nwithin the ordinary course of national institutional structure. Regarding the\nobligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the\nParties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a\nspecific result, they only have the value of guidelines or political orientation or,\nif preferred, programmatic, but they do not impose any responsibility on the State and\ncannot provide grounds for an international claim against the Government. Such is the\ncase with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and\n20 of the Convention. By contrast, in Articles 3 to 8 of the Convention, a\nseries of substantive obligations are imposed on the Parties. These obligations or\ncommitments acquired by the State refer to primary mining\nextraction, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial\nprocesses, artisanal gold mining, and the issue of emissions. In\nthis matter, the State's obligations range from prohibiting the authorization of\nnew sources of primary mercury extraction to the preparation of a\nnational plan aimed at the decrease or reduction of the presence of\nmercury. Within these obligations imposed in the Convention is that of\nmaking an inventory of the country's situation regarding the issue of mercury in\neach of the areas covered by that international instrument. All these\nobligations, which are typical of conventions of this nature and which constitute\na regulatory technique widely used in international law and to which\nStates may voluntarily submit, not only present no\ncontradiction with the Law of the Constitution, but rather, are\nentirely consistent with the precepts of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political\nConstitution. Furthermore, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the\nCosta Rican State with the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that\nthe actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary\npowers of the national institutions related to the subject, so it\ndoes not imply the provision of additional resources or powers. In short, all\nthe obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of the\nextraction of new sources of mercury, the moratorium on existing ones\nwithin a determined period, the prohibition of the use of compounds of\nmercury, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State but with\ntotal respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which\nis typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also\ncontemplates temporary exemption clauses from compliance with the\nobligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes\ninvolving mercury, as well as amendment mechanisms and adoption of the\nconvention and its annexes, in harmony with the domestic legislation of the\ncountries, which are typical and normal regulations in International\nLaw. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or\naccession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the\nConvention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33),\nthese are also common provisions of treaty law, the\nvoluntary submission to which by the State presents no conflict of\nconstitutionality. In relation to Annex E of the Convention, which deals with\nthe arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber finds no\nconstitutionality objection either, since it is a provision that is typical in\nthis matter in International Law and to which States may voluntarily\nsubmit, as is the case of our country upon signing the\nConvention. Finally, given that this Convention does not imply, in any way, the\nattribution or transfer of State powers to a community\nlegal order (Article 121, section 4, of the Political Constitution),\nfor its approval in the first and second debates, the absolute majority of\nvotes of the deputies present in the parliamentary session suffices, in\naccordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. On the other\nhand, the consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a\nLegislative Commission with Plenary Powers, in accordance with the provisions of Article 124,\nthird paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied upon\napproving this Convention in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25,\non June 9, 2016, by the unanimous vote of the forty deputies\npresent.\n\nVIII.— Conclusion. By virtue of the\nforegoing, the consultation is answered in the sense that the bill in\nquestion does not contain essential procedural defects or provisions that\ninvalidate it.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe consultation is answered in the\nsense that the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury,”\nlegislative file No. 19,426, does not contain essential procedural defects,\nnor unconstitutional provisions.-\n\nFernando\nCruz C.\nPresiding Judge\na.i.\n\nNancy\nHernández L.\n\nLuis Fdo.\nSalazar A.\n\nJorge\nAraya G.\n\nAracelly\nPacheco S.\n\nEnrique\nUlate C.\n\nJose\nPaulino Hernández G.\n\nDocument\nDigitally Signed\n\n-- Verification\nCode --\n\n*V3DOYCL2IXQ61*\n\nV3DOYCL2IXQ61\n\nFILE No. 16-007743-0007-CO\n\nTelephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.\nElectronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.\n\nBuilding  \nSupreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, 19th and 21st Streets, 8th and 6th Avenues\n\n**Exp: 16-007743-0007-CO**\n\n**Res. No. 2016009960**\n\n**CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of July two thousand sixteen.\n\nMandatory pre-legislative constitutionality consultation filed by the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", legislative file No. 19.426.\n\n**Whereas:**\n\n**1.-** The consultation, filed in compliance with the provisions of subsection a), of Article 96, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (*Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional*), was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 17:26 hours, on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation by resolution at 07:42 hours, on the following June 16. Consequently, the term to render the decision expires on July 15 of the current year.\n\n**2.-** The formalities established by law were observed in the proceeding.\n\nDrafted by the Magistrate **Salazar Alvarado**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- Preliminarily.-** The first matter to address, for the purposes of rendering the decision on the consultation, is to verify the procedures followed in this case, in accordance with what is set forth in Article 98 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which provides that the consultation must be made after the bill has been approved in the first debate and before final approval, and that, in rendering its decision, the Chamber shall rule on any aspects or grounds it deems relevant from a constitutional standpoint, but its decision is binding only with respect to the procedures.\n\nFor the foregoing purposes and due to the importance of the matter at hand, the following recital (considerando) will provide a chronological summary of the bill.\n\nII.- Processing of the legislative file (expediente) in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", processed under legislative file (expediente legislativo) No. 19.426, has followed this chronological order:\n\na) The bill, which originates from the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), was submitted to the Secretariat of the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly at 3:00 p.m. on December 1, 2014 (folio 1 and following of the certified copy of the legislative file).\n\nb) The President of the Legislative Assembly ordered the bill to be referred to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade for the corresponding report (dictamen). Likewise, the original bill was transferred to the Archive Department for publication and processing, and a faithful copy was sent to the Department of Parliamentary Services and to the Department of Parliamentary Services, so that the text could be included in the Integrated Legislative System (folio 77).\n\nc) By Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, made by Executive Decree No. 38.734-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 78 to 80).\n\nd) On April 14, 2015, the Department of Archives, Research, and Processing sent legislative file No. 19.426, which is the bill for the \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", for publication in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta), a bill that was published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 28 to Official Gazette No. 82 of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83).\n\ne) In Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill with the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), the Ministry of Health, and the country's cement companies (folios 86 to 95).\n\nf) In Ordinary Session No. 3, of June 25, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to summon, to a hearing before that Committee, Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development, Environmental Management Sub-area, of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), a hearing scheduled for 9:15 a.m. on July 2, 2015 (folios 96 to 102 and 127).\n\ng) By official letter number AL-DEST-OFI-IJU-175-2015, of June 24, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade received the Legal Report on the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" (folios 103 to 126).\n\nh) By official letter No. SP-202-2015, of July 2, 2015, the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice requested from the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an extension of no fewer than thirty business days for the deadline to render the requested report (folio 151).\n\ni) In Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill with the Ministry of Finance and granted an eight-business-day extension to the Supreme Court of Justice to render the requested report. Likewise, in that session, Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, was heard in a hearing. Finally, a procedural motion was approved for the Committee to agree to return in the order of business to the consideration of file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”. Based on this, the Committee Chair submitted said bill for substantive discussion, which was approved unanimously by the eight deputies present, and one of the Committee deputies was tasked with drafting the respective report (dictamen) (folios 155 to 185).\n\nj) By official letter No. DAJ-853-2015, of July 9, 2015, the Director of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) requested from the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an eight-business-day extension to render the requested report (folio 188).\n\nk) By official letter No. DAJ-809-2015, of July 22, 2015, the Acting Director of the Legal Advisory Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, in which she stated having no observations on it and requested its approval by the legislative body (folio 189).\n\nl) By official letter AL-DEST-CJU-0077-2015, of July 22, 2015, the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services sent to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade the Consultation Report on the possibility of altering the order of business to return to the consideration of files already addressed at the respective point of the Order of Business (folios 191 to 195).\n\nm) By an unnumbered official letter, of July 23, 2015, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, in which she stated that said text does not refer to the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), as established in Article 157 of the Political Constitution, and therefore the Court refrains from making any pronouncement on it (folio 196).\n\nn) By Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 39111-MP of July 30, 2015, the Executive Branch called the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions, starting August 3, 2015, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 205 to 212).\n\nñ) The unanimous affirmative report (dictamen) on the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, legislative file No. 19.426, was drafted and delivered to the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate on August 5, 2015 (folios 266 and 267).\n\no) By Executive Decree No. 39337-MP, of November 30, 2015, the Executive Branch called the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions, starting December 1, 2015, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 269 to 277).\n\np) By Executive Decree No. 39364-MP, of December 3, 2015, the Executive Branch withdrew, from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 278 to 280).\n\nq) By Executive Decree No. 39580-MP, of March 28, 2016, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, effective from that date, made by Executive Decree No. 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 281 and 282);\n\nr) By Executive Decree No. 39583-MP, of April 12, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 283 to 287).\n\ns) By Executive Decree No. 39584-MP, of April 14, 2016, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, effective from that date, made by Executive Decree No. 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 288 to 290);\n\nt) By Executive Decree No. 39621-MP, of April 18, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is being processed (folios 291 to 294).\n\nu) In Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, a procedural motion was presented and approved unanimously by the forty-five deputies present for the Legislative Plenary to postpone the consideration of pending matters on the order of business, in order to immediately take up, among other bills, file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”. Subsequently, substantive discussion began, in the first debate (primer debate) stage, of that legislative file, a bill that was approved in the first debate at that same session by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present. The file was sent to the Style Committee (Comisión de Redacción) and its consultation before this Chamber (Sala) was ordered (folios 414 to 429).\n\nv) In Ordinary Session No. 05 of June 13, 2015, the Permanent Special Style Committee considered and approved, unanimously, the Final Wording (Redacción Final) of legislative file No. 19.426, the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, to which it made no changes (folios 345-412).\n\nw) On June 10, 2016, the Permanent Special Style Committee delivered legislative file No. 19.426, the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, to the Secretariat of the Directorate for the corresponding processing to continue (folio 413).\n\nIII.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This mandatory constitutionality consultation (consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad) is filed by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b), of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a), of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in relation to the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, processed under legislative file No. 19.426, as it involves the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate during Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, its review is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.\n\nIV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for the processing of the bill titled “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, observing that no substantial or material defect has occurred capable of invalidating it due to a breach of essential principles, such as those of democracy, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as is evident from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the “Minamata Convention on Mercury” was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Likewise, the electronic file of the legislative consultation contains a document sent to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, which states that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica in Japan, was the one who, on behalf and in representation of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Ms. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Ms. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred Full Powers upon him. Although a reading of Article 140, subsection 10), of the Political Constitution shows that the signing of international treaties is a power of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the relevant branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Law No. 7615, of July 24, 1996, in its Article 7, provides, regarding this matter:\n\n“ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered as representing a State: a) If he produces appropriate full powers…”.\n\nThus, said official was authorized to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, given that he possessed the necessary and sufficient powers to do so. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement the President of the Republic gives to the Convention throughout the various stages of the legislative procedure.\n\nIndeed, the bill was submitted to the legislative process by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5), of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Likewise, it is certified that, by means of Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP, of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP, of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP, of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP, of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP, of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP, of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP, of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch convened or expanded the call to extraordinary sessions, so that the Legislative Assembly would take cognizance of, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or else, withdrew it from the cognizance of Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed in relation to the signing of the Convention. It was also certified that the bill was published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 28, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta, No. 82, of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the website address of the National Printing Office (Imprenta Nacional), in the format called pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Special Permanent Commission approved it by unanimous vote of the totality of the eight deputies present, without any modification being made to it.\n\nHowever, even though this Chamber finds no irregularity in the processing of the bill in question that implies nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, which empowers the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary session, a point reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14), of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to re-establish, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity—which it would not otherwise have—to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise the legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, of 13:36 hours, of July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator are made evident, particularly with regard to governmental or external initiative to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is barred from meeting as of right and may only do so under the call of the Executive. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:\n\n***“Article 118.-*** The Executive Branch may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, except in the case of the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Assembly to make, or of the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance.\"\n\nAccording to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot take cognizance of matters that have not been included in the Decree of Convocation. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Legislative Branch to make, or bills for legal reforms that are indispensable to resolve the matters submitted to the cognizance of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly points out. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule with respect to the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the period of extraordinary sessions. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours, of December 20, 1996, it considered:\n\n\"***VI. THE PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS.*** In this order of ideas, it should be noted that the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision for it to meet outside the periods established on a normal basis. It is Article 118 of the Constitution that regulates its convocation, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in them, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, with the exception of the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Legislative Assembly to make, or of the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance. It is a power of discretionary exercise. In relation to the foregoing, it is necessary to clarify that with the period of extraordinary sessions, the Legislative Assembly only loses the legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which two stand out: that of legislating and that of exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, the intent is that in the Plenary, only the matters included in the decree of convocation of the Executive Branch be taken cognizance of and voted on, meaning that the Legislative Assembly can continue to function normally in all its other functions, and it may even reject a bill from the Executive, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is characteristic of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot completely modify or substitute a proposal with one from a deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the decree of convocation. (...)”\n\nThus, for the validity of the procedure for approving bills processed during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Executive Branch must have convened the Legislative Assembly in an unmistakable manner for that purpose. Indeed, the convocation sets the matters on which the Legislative Assembly can validly deploy its powers; therefore, consequently, all those not expressed in the Decree of Convocation are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Decree of Convocation. It must not be lost sight of that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, the governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those provided in the Political Constitution. Thus, one of the ways in which the Executive participates in legislative activity is through the call to extraordinary sessions, by means of defining, in virtue of prior planning and programming, the legislative bills that are a priority and urgent for the good progress of the Government. Indeed, during extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is defined facultatively, attending to reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. Because it is a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need to adapt to the country's requirements. In that order of ideas, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch may, discretionally, expand the decree of convocation to extraordinary sessions, or else, withdraw the bills convened. To do this, it can base itself on the need for the Legislative Assembly to take cognizance of and discuss the bills that the Executive Branch considers a priority in view of the collective interests for a correct and sound management of government. It would be absurd and contrary to the conceived system for the Executive Branch, in some way, to remain subject to one or several decrees of convocation, since in this matter great flexibility must prevail, in view of the needs and requirements of a collective nature that serve as its foundation and that are in constant mutation. This position was previously held by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours, of December 20, 1996, at which time it stated:\n\n\"***IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE.*** With respect to the first point, it should be noted that the legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or put another way, it is the faculty to submit to a Parliament a bill on a specific matter, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case that, when the initiative originates from the Executive Branch, the latter withdraws it during the period of extraordinary sessions. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impulse and not an act of legislative decision, insofar as the legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly - Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution -. For its part, the governmental initiative refers to the faculty given to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty it can exercise during the entire legislative term, and exclusively in the periods of extraordinary sessions - Article 123 ibidem -. However, the fact that the legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific period of sessions of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the bills to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it may convene Parliament to discuss some bill already in process in the Assembly that has been prepared directly by the deputies. In this sense, it must be emphasized that what matters is that, by means of the decree of convocation, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, for them to be processed and voted on in the Plenary. Likewise, it is important to note that the doctrine is unanimous in that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not prepare) the bills to be processed, has the faculty to withdraw those it considers appropriate, without this implying a violation of any legislative provision or procedure, provided that the same has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic. The legislative initiative is a typically political act, which by its own nature, is revocable for wholly discretionary reasons, which is why, at its pleasure and will, the Executive Branch can modify the 'agenda', that is, the matters it submits for discussion to the deputies, either by expanding the convocation to include new matters, or by eliminating from the list bills already convened (...)”\n\nFrom what has been said by this Chamber in the partially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation provided in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly may only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and advisability of the bills included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and attends to the priorities and interests of the Government. This Chamber has even endorsed the possibility of de-convening, via executive decree, all bills submitted to the cognizance of the Legislative Assembly, since it would be counterintuitive and against the principle of reasonableness for the Executive not to be able to de-convene what has been included in the respective decree. On the matter, this Court, in Judgment No. 057-98, of 15:36 hours, of January 7, 1998, resolved the following:\n\n\"(…) In accordance with what Articles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution establish, the Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the first day of May, even if not convened, and its ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from the first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirtieth of November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions, in which no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, except for the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Assembly to make, or the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of bills by the Executive does not imply that the closing of extraordinary sessions must occur, insofar as nothing prevents another convocation from occurring, since it is within the period constitutionally provided for this purpose (…)\"\n\nThe political direction of the Government requires the concretization of decisions by determining which are the objectives to be achieved. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to extraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, a discretionary one of the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has broad faculties to add or withdraw bills in view of national interests and reasons of opportunity and advisability. In the case of the bill under consultation, it was included in the Executive Decrees of convocation—or expansion of convocation—of the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly had the possibility of deliberating on the bill in question. For its part, the Executive Branch made discretionary management of the convocations and de-convocations to extraordinary sessions to take cognizance of the bill in question. What was thus acted upon by the Executive Branch is within the constitutionally granted competencies, without the exercise of such faculty violating any constitutional principle, in particular, those of reasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so precisely because the faculty of the Executive Branch consists of the possibility of indicating which bills can be taken cognizance of during the period of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not, and, in the first case, it is for the deliberation of the bills that that Branch of the Republic proposes. Thus, it may, in accordance with its governmental priorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify, in view of its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident that the Government's priorities can change over time, and if these are modified, the bills for whose cognizance and deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly can also change. Any rigidity in this matter can affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need to regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive Branch is not limited in de-convening bills during extraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in the management of the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill under consultation was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to extraordinary sessions and was on the agenda of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade. On the other hand, in the face of the de-convocations of bills by the Executive Branch, in exercise of the constitutionally granted faculties, including the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is the modification of the planned agenda and that the Deputies would proceed to take cognizance of only those bills that were maintained by the Government in its Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this faculty of the Executive does not properly form part of the legislative procedures, but rather refers to an established practice of that Branch that affects the processing of other procedures. In any event, the bill remained on the legislative agenda during the periods when it convened the legislative body for its cognizance during the period of extraordinary sessions, by which the possibilities of participation, representation, opposition, and deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and legal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see in this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, of 14:47 hours, of May 17, 2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19.426, the bill for the “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade only took cognizance of it when the Executive Branch, by means of the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the call to said extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the cognizance of this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its cognizance when the Executive Branch, also by means of a decree, withdrew it from the cognizance of the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. By which, with regard to this point, the legislative procedure presents no defects of constitutionality.\n\nAnother point of the legislative procedure on which it is opportune to conduct a brief examination is that relating to the consultations that, at the time, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade made to various public institutions, as well as to private law subjects. Indeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the cited Commission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health, and the country's cement companies. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Commission approved another motion for the bill to be consulted to the Ministry of Finance. However, in that same session, a procedural motion (moción de orden) was approved so that the Commission would agree to return on the agenda to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, for which reason the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was unanimously approved by the eight deputies present, without the deadline granted—in accordance with the agreed extensions—for rendering some of the requested reports having yet expired. However, this does not constitute any irregularity that could be considered serious in the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made are not mandatory, but rather a discretionary decision of the respective Legislative Commission. Their purpose is to gather the criteria of certain public or private sectors that, eventually, might have some interest—in a broad sense—in the bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission considered opportune, but which the legislative body could, even, dispense with, tacitly or expressly. In any event, the reports from those consultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the plenary, without the fact that, definitively, they are not completed being able, in any way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. In such a way, it is irrelevant if the consultations in question were not answered—as in this case where only the criteria of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the bill are on record—or if they were answered after the deadline granted for that purpose, or if, finally, the respective Legislative Commission issued its opinion on the bill without the deadline granted for the public institutions or private law subjects to pronounce on the matter having expired, or even, as happened with the consultation to the Ministry of Finance, said deadline had not even begun to run, since in the same session in which it was requested, the legislative Commission issued its opinion on the bill, given that none of this constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable of invalidating it.\n\nNotwithstanding what has been said, it is necessary to make an additional assessment regarding the possibility of the deputies to vary the agenda and return to take cognizance of a bill that had already been taken cognizance of, according to the agenda of that session, and that, therefore, represents a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such happened with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a procedural motion for the Commission to agree to return on the agenda to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, which had already been discussed in that same session and whose cognizance had been concluded, moving on to the cognizance of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved—unanimously—by the eight deputies present. While, initially, the advisor from the Department of Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, upon consultation by the President of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, expressed verbally, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that he saw no problem in returning to the agenda and taking cognizance again of a bill that had already been taken cognizance of in that same session, provided that, as in this case, all the deputies were in agreement and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the legislative file); later, upon rendering the written opinion requested by the President of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its criteria and considered that the practice of bringing matters back in the same session to take cognizance of them again is contrary to the democratic, legal certainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness principles, for which reason it deems that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed the matter, this Chamber deems that neither one nor the other criterion is valid, since everything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the agenda occurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order to determine whether, effectively, injury to the cited constitutional principles occurs or not, and, if affirmative, to essential processes of the legislative procedure, as a consequence.\n\nFrom the examination of the circumstances\nin which the review of file No. 19.426 was revisited, in\nOrdinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, of the Permanent Special Commission of\nInternational Relations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional\nCourt considers that no injury was caused to the cited constitutional\nprinciples; and, therefore, nor was there an essential violation of the\nlegislative procedure for approval of the Convention. The legislative environment surrounding the\nbill in Commission, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and\nEnergy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any\ninstitution or private legal entity having expressed any objection in\nthis regard. And while it is true, according to the agenda of Ordinary Session No.\n4, of July 9, 2015, the bill in\nquestion had already been discussed, it is also true that this discussion had not concluded, but\nhad been suspended to address the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time\nfor Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Health Services Development Directorate\nof the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social,\nwho had been summoned for a hearing in that session to address\nthe Convention, to appear. Thus, that point on the Commission's agenda had not yet been precluded\nand, therefore, the\nCommission could, through a motion of order, revisit\nthe matter and vote on it, as was effectively done. Not only all\nthe deputies agreed to issue an immediate report on\nthat bill, given how urgent the approval of the Convention is for the\ncountry, but there is no element indicating\nthat there was anyone with a contrary interest who was caught by surprise\nby the approval of that bill in Commission. There is no\ninjury to the interests and rights of the deputies or of the citizenry\nwith the Commission's proceeding, so there is no reason to consider that,\nin this case, a violation of an essential procedure occurred\nin the legislative procedure regarding the bill of file No. 19.426\ndue to the fact that the Commission, unanimously, agreed to revisit that\nbill and issue a unanimous affirmative report. Additionally, no\ninfringement of the rights and powers of legislators is observed, since the bill\nwas heard by the Legislative Plenary as appropriate, as it concerns\nan International Convention; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a\nLegislative Commission with Full Powers, as established by Article 124,\nparagraph 3, of the Constitución Política, in relation to 121, subsection 4),\nibid. On the other hand, the bill under consultation was convened, in due\ncourse, by the Poder Ejecutivo, to be heard in extraordinary sessions,\nas previously recounted, respecting the provisions of Article 118, of\nthe Constitución Política, and it secured, for its approval in the first debate, the\nunanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in\nthe Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016\n(folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently,\nthis Constitutional Court notes that in the approval process of\nthe bill entitled <i>\"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\"</i> (Minamata Convention on Mercury), <i>no</i>\nsubstantive or significant defect has occurred to invalidate it,\ndue to a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, the principle of\nparticipation, of political representation, respect for minorities, or of\npublicity and transparency.\n\nV.-\nObservations regarding the substance of the bill.\n Prior to making some\nobservations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be borne in\nmind that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 101, of the Ley de la\nJurisdicción Constitucional, the opinion of this Chamber will only be binding in\nthat it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the\nbill consulted. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will\nbe made to the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without performing an analysis of\neach and every article, since, in principle, they are considered consistent\nwith the Derecho de la Constitución.\n\nVI.-\nON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION.\n On October 10,\n2013, in the original and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish,\nFrench, English, and Russian, the\nConvention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan,\nwith the purpose—as stated in the explanatory memorandum\nand in the text of the Agreement itself—of \"<i>protecting human health and the\nenvironment from emissions and releases of mercury and mercury\ncompounds</i>\" (Article 1, of the Convention under consultation). The foregoing, far from contravening the\nCarta Constitucional, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, in particular, with\nthe provisions of Articles 21 and 50, of the Constitución Política, among\nothers. Likewise, after analyzing the content of the articles that make up the Convention\nunder consultation, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms,\nit is substantially consistent with the precepts, values, and\nfundamental principles of the Derecho de la Constitución.\n\nVII.- DESCRIPTION OF THE\nCONVENTION'S REGULATIONS.\n The rules contained in the Convention under study\n—which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B,\nC, D, and E)— are the typical and common ones that make up conventions of this nature.\nThus, as detailed in the legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015,\nprepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of\nthe Asamblea Legislativa, in relation to the bill processed in\nfile No. 19.426, Articles 1 and 2, of the Convention, are general\nprovisions establishing the general objective of the Convention and the\ndefinitions of the terms used therein. In Articles 3 to 7, the\ncommitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination\nof new primary sources of mercury extraction starting in 2020, the\nmoratorium of existing ones for a specific period, and the prohibition\nof the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury\ncompounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as of certain\nindustrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles\nwhose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the technique of Derecho\nInternacional, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions contemplate\nexceptions and a special procedure so that an interested Party may\navail itself of or request temporary exemptions with respect to those prohibitions.\nObligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which involve the\ncommitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a\nspecific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is\nthe duty to develop various national action plans to reduce or\nmitigate human factors that are a source of mercury emissions or releases,\nas well as providing international cooperation, raising awareness among the\npopulation, and exchanging scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other\nminor obligations consist of providing national reports or the referral to\nobligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the\nBasel Convention, on the disposal of hazardous waste (Article 11.3.a). It is\nimportant to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention\ndoes not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond the provision to\nnational institutions of resources for the effective fulfillment of the\nobligations assumed and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility of States\naccessing the resources of the United Nations Environment Fund Trust Fund\nfor developing countries (Article 13, of the Convention).\nTechnological transfer is also provided for (Article 14, of the Convention) and,\nin addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and\nCompliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is\nresponsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations,\nand a Secretariat in charge of the bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of\nthe United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24, of the\nConvention). The Convention closes with the usual treaty law\nregulations relating to amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic\ntexts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, of the Convention),\nall of which present no problem of constitutionality. Regarding the\nobligations that the State acquires by signing the Convention, the only\nrule related to the financial issue is Article 13, but this only\nobliges the Parties to provide their own\nnational agencies, within their means, with the\nresources necessary for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from\nthe moment those commitments are acquired. On the other hand, the\ncontribution of funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an\ninvitation, not an obligation (Article 13, paragraph 12, of the Convention), and the\npossibility of accessing international cooperation funds for\ndeveloping countries is opened. Thus, this Chamber considers that the commitments\nassumed by the country in this Convention fall within the ordinary\nbudgetary planning, as those commitments are actions that are already part\nof the normal scope of national institutions. As for the\nobligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the\nParties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a\nspecific result, they only have the value of a directive or political guidance or,\nif preferred, a programmatic nature, but do not impose any responsibility on the State and\ncannot give rise to an international claim against the Government. Such is the\ncase of the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and\n20, of the Convention. On the contrary, in Articles 3 to 8, of the Convention, a\nseries of substantive obligations is imposed on the Parties. These obligations or\ncommitments acquired by the State refer to primary extraction\nin mines, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial\nprocesses, artisanal gold extraction, and the issue of emissions. In\nthis matter, the State's obligations range from the prohibition of authorizing\nnew primary sources of mercury extraction to the implementation of a\nnational plan aimed at decreasing or reducing the presence of\nmercury. Among these obligations imposed in the Convention is the\nrequirement to inventory the country's situation regarding the mercury issue\nin each of the areas contemplated by that international instrument. All these\nobligations, which are typical of conventions of this nature and which constitute\na regulatory technique widely used in international law and to\nwhich States may voluntarily submit, not only do not present any\ncontradiction with the Derecho de la Constitución, but rather, are\nentirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50, of the Constitución\nPolítica. Furthermore, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the\nCosta Rican State with the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that\nthe actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary\npowers of national institutions related to the issue, so it\ndoes not imply the provision of additional resources or powers. In short, all\nthe obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of the\nextraction of new mercury sources, the moratorium of existing ones\nwithin a specific period, the prohibition of the use of mercury\ncompounds, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State but with\ntotal respect for the domestic legal system and national interests, which\nis typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also\ncontemplates temporary exemption clauses from compliance with the\nobligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes\ninvolving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amendment and adoption of the\nconvention and its annexes, in line with the domestic legislation of\ncountries, which are typical and normal regulations in Derecho\nInternacional. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or\naccession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the\nConvention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33),\nthese are also common provisions of treaty law, whose\nvoluntary submission by the State presents no conflict of\nconstitutionality. In relation to Annex E, of the Convention, which deals with\nthe arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber also finds no\nobjection of constitutionality, as it concerns regulations that are typical in\nthis matter in International Law and to which States can voluntarily\nsubmit themselves, as is the case of our country upon signing the\nConvention. Finally, given that this Convention does not imply, in any way, the\nattribution or transfer of State competences to a community\nlegal system (Article 121, subsection 4), of the Constitución Política),\nfor its approval in the first and second debates, the absolute majority of\nvotes of the deputies present in the parliamentary session is sufficient, in\naccordance with the provisions of Article 119, of the Carta Política. On the other\nhand, the hearing of this Convention cannot be delegated to a\nComisión Legislativa Plena, in accordance with the provisions of Article 124,\nthird paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when\nthis Convention was approved in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25,\nof June 9, 2016, by the unanimous vote of the forty deputies\npresent.\n\nVIII.- Conclusion.\n By virtue of the\nforegoing, the consultation is answered in the sense that the bill in\nquestion contains no essential procedural defects or provisions that\ninvalidate it.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe consultation is answered in the sense that the bill \"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\",\nlegislative file No. 19.426, contains no essential procedural defects\nor unconstitutional provisions.-\n\n\n\n\n\n|   |   |   |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n|   |   |   |\n|   | Fernando Cruz C. |   |\n|   | President a.i. |   |\n|   |   |   |\n|   | Nancy Hernández L. |   |\n|   |   |   |\n|   | Jorge Araya G. |   |\n|   |   |   |\n|   | Enrique Ulate C. |   |\n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n*V3DOYCL2IXQ61*\n\n V3DOYCL2IXQ61 \n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 16-007743-0007-CO\n\n\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.\n\nBuilding  \nSupreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6\n\n| \"...the Executive Branch may, at its discretion, expand the decree convening extraordinary sessions, or withdraw the projects convened. To do so, it can rely on the need for the Legislative Assembly to consider and discuss projects that the Executive Branch deems priorities in light of collective interests for proper and sound governance. It would be absurd and contrary to the designed system if the Executive Branch were, in any way, bound by one or several convening decrees, since great flexibility must prevail in this matter, given the constantly changing collective needs and requirements that support it...\" | **Decision 9960-16** |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| \"the reservation established in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly may only legislate on the bills included in the Convening Decree; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and expediency of the projects included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and responds to the Government's priorities and interests. This Chamber has even endorsed the possibility of unconvening, by executive decree, all projects submitted to the Legislative Assembly, since it would be a contradiction, offending the principle of reasonableness, if the Executive could not unconvene what has been included in the respective decree.\" | **Decision 9960-16** |\n\n“…\\(^{14}\\) The provisions contained in the Convention under study—which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)—are the typical and common features of conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in legal report N° AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, in relation to the bill being processed under expediente N° 19.426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general provisions that establish the overall objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used therein. Articles 3 through 7 establish the commitments of the signatory States for the total elimination of new primary mercury mining sources starting in 2020, a moratorium on existing ones for a set period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the typical technique of International Law, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions contemplate exceptions and a special procedure allowing an interested Party to avail itself of or request temporary exemptions regarding those prohibitions. Obligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which involve the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is the duty to prepare various national action plans to progressively reduce or mitigate human factors that are sources of mercury emissions or releases, as well as providing international cooperation, raising public awareness, and exchanging scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of submitting national reports or referring to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention, on the disposal of hazardous wastes (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond providing national institutions with resources for the effective fulfillment of the assumed obligations and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility for States to access resources from the United Nations Environment Fund for developing countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Likewise, technology transfer is foreseen (Article 14 of the Convention), and in addition to the Conference of the Parties, a fifteen-member-country Implementation and Compliance Committee is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations, and a Secretariat in charge of bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the Convention).\"\n\nThe Convention closes with the usual treaty-law provisions regarding amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 through 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, of the Convention), none of which presents any constitutional issue. With respect to the obligations the State assumes upon signing the Convention, the only provision related to financial matters is Article 13, but this merely requires the Parties to provide their own national bodies, to the extent possible, with the resources necessary for implementing the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment those commitments are undertaken. Furthermore, contributing funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is merely an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, paragraph 12, of the Convention), and the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries is opened. Accordingly, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the scope of ordinary budget planning, since those commitments are actions already within the ordinary operations of the national institutional framework. As for obligations of means, not of results, which entail the Parties' commitment to carry out actions without specifying a limit or a specific result, they hold only the value of a guideline, political orientation, or, if one wishes, a programmatic nature, but they impose no liability on the State and cannot serve as the basis for an international claim against the Government. Such is the case with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Convention. In contrast, Articles 3 through 8 of the Convention impose a series of substantive obligations on the Parties. These obligations or commitments undertaken by the State relate to primary mining (extracción primaria en minas), the use of products containing mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal gold mining (extracción artesanal de oro), and the issue of emissions. In this area, the State's obligations range from prohibiting the authorization of new sources of primary mercury mining to carrying out a national plan aimed at reducing or decreasing the presence of mercury. Among these obligations imposed by the Convention is that of preparing an inventory of the country's situation regarding mercury in each of the areas covered by this international instrument. All these obligations, which are characteristic of conventions of this nature and constitute a normative technique widely used in international law, to which States may voluntarily submit, not only present no contradiction with Constitutional Law but, rather, are entirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Moreover, from the analysis of the commitments the Costa Rican State assumes by signing and obtaining legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary competencies of the national institutions related to the issue, and therefore do not entail the allocation of additional resources or competencies. In short, all the obligations imposed by the Convention, such as the total elimination of extraction from new sources of mercury, the phase-out (moratoria) of existing ones within a set timeframe, the prohibition of the use of mercury compounds, and their gradual elimination, are assumed by the State with full respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which is characteristic of this type of international convention. The Convention also provides for temporary exemption clauses from compliance with obligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amending and adopting the convention and its annexes, consistent with the domestic legislation of the countries, which are typical and normal regulations in International Law. Likewise, with respect to ratification, acceptance, approval of, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, the State's voluntary submission to which presents no conflict with constitutionality. Regarding Annex E of the Convention, which addresses the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber likewise finds no objection on constitutional grounds, as it is a provision that is typical in this area of International Law and to which States may voluntarily submit, as is the case with our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention does not, in any way, entail the attribution or transfer of State competencies to a community legal order (Article 121, paragraph 4, of the Political Constitution), its approval in the first and second debates requires only the absolute majority of votes of the deputies present at the parliamentary session, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. Furthermore, consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Full Legislative Commission, in accordance with Article 124, third paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when this Convention was approved in the first debate, at Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, of 9 June 2016, by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present…\"\n\n**Having reviewed:**\n\n1.- The consultation, which is submitted in compliance with the provisions of subsection a) of Article 96 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, was received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 5:26 p.m. on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation by resolution at 7:42 a.m. on the following June 16. Consequently, the deadline to resolve it expires on July 15 of the current year.\n\n2.- The formalities established by law were observed in the procedure.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate **Salazar Alvarado**; and,\n\n**Considering:**\n\n**I.- Preliminary.-** The first step, for the purpose of resolving the consultation, is to verify the procedures followed in this case, in accordance with Article 98 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which provides that the consultation must be made after the bill has been approved in first debate and before final approval, and that, when resolving it, the Chamber shall rule on any aspects or grounds it deems relevant from a constitutional standpoint, but its decision shall be binding only with regard to procedures.\n\nFor the foregoing purposes and due to the importance of the matter at hand, the following recital (considerando) will provide a chronological summary of the bill.\n\n          II.- The processing of the file (expediente) in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" (\"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\"), processed under legislative file (expediente legislativo) No. 19.426, has followed the chronological order below:\n\n          a) The bill, which originates from the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), was submitted to the Secretariat of the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly at 3:00 p.m. on December 1, 2014 (folio 1 and following of the certified copy of the legislative file).\n\n          b) The President of the Legislative Assembly ordered the bill to be referred to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade (Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y de Comercio Exterior) for the corresponding report (dictamen). Likewise, the original bill was transferred to the Archives Department for its publication and processing, and a faithful copy was sent to the Department of Parliamentary Services and to the Department of Parliamentary Services, so that the text could be included in the Integrated Legislative System (Sistema Integrado Legislativo) (folio 77).\n\nc) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, made by Decreto Ejecutivo N° 38.734-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” (\"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio\") is processed (folios 78 to 80).\n\nd) On April 14, 2015, the Department of Archives, Research, and Processing sent file No. 19.426, which is the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\", for publication in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta). The bill was published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 28 to the Official Gazette No. 82, of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83).\n\ne) In Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill with the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto), the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), and the country's cement companies (folios 86 to 95).\n\nf) In Ordinary Session No. 3, of June 25, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to summon Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Health Services Development Directorate, Environmental Management Subarea, of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), to a hearing before that Committee. The hearing was scheduled for 9:15 a.m. on July 2, 2015 (folios 96 to 102 and 127).\n\ng) By official letter number AL-DEST-OFI-IJU-175-2015, of June 24, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade received the Legal Report on the bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\" (folios 103 to 126).\n\nh) By official letter No. SP-202-2015, of July 2, 2015, the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice requested from the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an extension of no less than thirty business days for the deadline to render the requested report (folio 151).\n\ni) In Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a motion to consult the bill with the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) and granted an eight-business-day extension to the Supreme Court of Justice to render the requested report. Likewise, in that session, Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Health Services Development Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, was received in a hearing. Finally, a procedural motion was approved for the Committee to agree to return, in the order of the day, to the consideration of file No. 19.426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury\". Based on this, the Chairwoman of the Committee submitted said bill for discussion on its merits, which was unanimously approved by the eight deputies present, and one of the Committee deputies was assigned the preparation of the respective report (dictamen) (folios 155 to 185).\n\nj) By official letter No. DAJ-853-2015, of July 9, 2015, the Director of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), requested from the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade an eight-business-day extension to render the requested report (folio 188).\n\n          k) By official letter No. DAJ-809-2015, of July 22, 2015, the Acting Director of the Legal Advisory Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, in which she stated she had no observations on the matter and requested its approval by the legislative body (folio 189).\n\n          l) By official letter AL-DEST-CJU-0077-2015, of July 22, 2015, the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services sent the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade the Consultation Report on the possibility of altering the order of the day to return to the consideration of files already reviewed at the respective point of the Order of the Day (folios 191 to 195).\n\n          m) By an unnumbered official letter, of July 23, 2015, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice rendered the report requested by the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade regarding the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, in which she stated that said text does not refer to the organization or functioning of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), as established in Article 157 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); therefore, the Court refrains from issuing any opinion on the matter (folio 196).\n\n          n) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39111-MP of July 30, 2015, the Executive Branch convened the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions starting August 3, 2015, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “ Minamata Convention on Mercury ” is processed (folios 205 to 212).\n\n          ñ) The unanimous affirmative report (dictamen) on the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, legislative file No. 19.426, was prepared and delivered to the Secretariat of the Legislative Board of Directors on August 5, 2015 (folios 266 and 267).\n\n          o) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39337-MP, of November 30, 2015, the Executive Branch convened the Legislative Assembly to Extraordinary Sessions starting December 1, 2015, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “ Minamata Convention on Mercury ” is processed (folios 269 to 277).\n\n          p) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39364-MP, of December 3, 2015, the Executive Branch withdrew, from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is processed (folios 278 to 280).\n\n          q) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39580-MP, of March 28, 2016, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, starting from that date, made by Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “ Minamata Convention on Mercury” is processed (folios 281 and 282);\n\n          r) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39583-MP, of April 12, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is processed (folios 283 to 287).\n\n          s) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39584-MP, of April 14, 2016, the Executive Branch expanded the call for Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, starting from that date, made by Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39337-MP, so that the legislative body could consider, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “ Minamata Convention on Mercury” is processed (folios 288 to 290);\n\n          t) By Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39621-MP, of April 18, 2016, the Executive Branch withdrew from the consideration of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Assembly, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, in which the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury” is processed (folios 291 to 294).\n\n          u) In Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, a procedural motion was presented and approved unanimously by the forty-five deputies present for the Legislative Plenary to postpone the consideration of pending matters on the order of the day, in order to immediately consider, among other bills, file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”. Subsequently, the discussion on the merits, in the first debate (primer debate) procedure, of that legislative file began. The bill was approved in the first debate in that same session by the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present. The file was referred to the Drafting Committee (Comisión de Redacción) and its consultation before this Chamber was ordered (folios 414 to 429).\n\nv) In Ordinary Session No. 05 of June 13, 2015, the Permanent Special Drafting Committee considered and unanimously approved the Final Wording (Redacción Final) of legislative file No. 19.426, the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, to which it made no modifications (folios 345-412).\n\nw) On June 10, 2106, the Permanent Special Drafting Committee delivered legislative file No. 19.426, the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, to the Secretariat of the Board of Directors to continue with the respective processing (folio 413).\n\n          III.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION (CONSULTA). This mandatory constitutional consultation (consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad) is formulated by the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b), of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a), of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in relation to the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, processed in legislative file No. 19.426, as it concerns the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate in Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, its consideration is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.\n\nIV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Tribunal reviewed the legislative procedure for the processing of the bill titled “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, noting that no substantial or significant defect (vicio sustancial) has occurred, capable of invalidating it for a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, the principle of participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as can be deduced from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the “Minamata Convention on Mercury” was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Likewise, in the electronic file of the legislative consultation, there is a document sent to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, which states that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica to Japan, was the one who, in the name and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed (suscribió) said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Mrs. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature (refrendo) of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mrs. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred upon him Full Powers (Plenos Poderes). Although from a reading of Article 140, subsection 10), of the Political Constitution, it can be deduced that the signing of international treaties is an attribution of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the relevant Branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Ley N° 7615, of July 24, 1996, in its Article 7, provides, regarding this matter:\n\n“ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered to represent a State: (a) If he produces appropriate full powers…”.\n\nThus, said official was empowered (legitimado) to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, since he had the necessary and sufficient powers for it. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement (aval) given to the Convention by the President of the Republic through the various stages of the legislative procedure.\n\nIndeed, the bill was presented to the legislative stream by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5), of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Likewise, it is certified that, through Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP, of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP, of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP, of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP, of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP, of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP, of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP, of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch convened or expanded the call to extraordinary sessions, so that the Legislative Assembly would take cognizance of, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or, withdrew it from the cognizance of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed in relation to the signing of the Agreement. It was also certified that the bill was published in Alcance No. 28, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta, No. 82, of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the address of the Website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the format called pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Comisión Permanente Especial approved it by unanimous vote of all eight deputies present, without any modification being made to it.\n\nHowever, even though this Chamber does not find, in the processing of the bill in question, any irregularity that would imply nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118, Constitutional, which empowers the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary form, which is reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14), of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to restore, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity—which otherwise it would not have—to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise its legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, at 13:36, of July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator are made evident, particularly concerning gubernative initiative or initiative external to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is barred from meeting as of right and can only do so under the call of the Executive. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:\n\n \"Article 118.- The Executive Branch may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, except in the case of the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or of the legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance.\"\n\nAccording to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot hear matters that have not been included in the Decree of Convocation. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointment of officials that the Legislative Branch is responsible for making, or bills on legal reforms that are indispensable to resolve the matters submitted to the cognizance of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly points out. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule regarding the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the period of extraordinary sessions. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, at 9:24, of December 20, 1996, it considered:\n\n\"VI. OF THE PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS. In this vein, it is worth noting that the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision it has to meet outside the normally established periods. It is Article 118 of the constitution that regulates its convocation, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in them, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, with the exception of the appointment of officials that the Legislative Assembly is responsible for making, or of legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance. It is a power of discretionary exercise. In relation to the foregoing, it is worth clarifying that with the period of extraordinary sessions, the Legislative Assembly only loses the legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which two stand out precisely: that of legislating and that of exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the constitution, it is intended that in the Plenary, only the matters included in the decree of convocation of the Executive Branch be heard and voted on, so the Legislative Assembly can continue to function normally in all its other functions, and may even reject a bill from the Executive, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is typical of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot totally modify or substitute a proposal with one from a deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the decree of convocation. (…)\"\n\nThus, for the validity of the approval procedure for bills processed during the period of extraordinary sessions, it is essential that the Executive Branch has unequivocally convened the Legislative Assembly for that purpose. In effect, the convocation fixes the matters upon which the Legislative Assembly can validly deploy its attributions, so that, consequently, all those not expressed in the Decree of Convocation are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Decree of Convocation. One must not lose sight of the fact that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those established in the Political Constitution. Thus, one of the ways in which the Executive participates in legislative activity is through the convocation to extraordinary sessions, by means of the definition, by virtue of prior planning and programming, of the priority and urgent bills for the smooth running of the Government. In effect, during the extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is defined, facultatively, attending to reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. As it is a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need for adaptation to the country's requirements. In that vein, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch may, discretionally, expand the decree of convocation to extraordinary sessions, or withdraw the convened bills. For this, it may base itself on the need for the Legislative Assembly to hear and discuss the bills that the Executive Branch considers a priority in light of the collective interests for a correct and sound government management. It would be absurd and contrary to the devised system for the Executive Branch to become, in any way, subject to one or several decrees of convocation, because in this matter great flexibility must prevail, in light of the needs and requirements of a collective nature that serve as its foundation and are in constant mutation. This position was previously upheld by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, at 9:24, of December 20, 1996, an occasion on which it stated:\n\n\"IV. OF THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that the legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or put another way, it is the faculty to submit to a Parliament a bill on a specific matter, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case where, when the initiative comes from the Executive Branch, the latter withdraws it during the period of extraordinary sessions. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impetus and not an act of legislative decision, insofar as the legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly —Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution—. For its part, the gubernative initiative refers to the faculty granted to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty it can exercise during the entire legislative term, and exclusively during the periods of extraordinary sessions —Article 123 ibid—. However, the fact that the legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific period of sessions of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the bills to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it can convene Parliament to discuss a bill already pending in the Assembly that has been drafted directly by the deputies. In this sense, it should be emphasized that what matters is that, through the decree of convocation, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, to be processed and voted on in the Plenary. Likewise, it is important to point out that the doctrine is unanimous that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not draft) the bills to be processed, also has the faculty to withdraw those it deems appropriate, without this implying a violation of any legislative provision or procedure, provided that the bill has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic. The legislative initiative is a typically political act, which by its very nature is revocable for entirely discretionary reasons, which is why, at its pleasure and will, the Executive Branch can modify the 'agenda,' that is, the matters it submits for discussion by the deputies, whether by expanding the convocation to include new matters, or by removing from the list bills already convened (…)\"\n\nFrom what this Chamber stated in the partially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation provided for in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly can only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and advisability of the bills included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and attends to the Government's priorities and interests. Indeed, this Chamber has endorsed the possibility that, by means of an executive decree, all the bills submitted to the cognizance of the Legislative Assembly be de-convened, because it would be a contradiction, which would violate the principle of reasonableness, if the Executive could not de-convene what had been included in the respective decree. On this matter, this Tribunal, in Judgment No. 057-98, at 15:36, of January 7, 1998, resolved the following:\n\n\"(…) In accordance with the provisions of Articles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the first day of May, even if it has not been convened, and its ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from the first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirtieth of November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions, in which no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, except in the case of the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or of the legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of the bills by the Executive does not imply that the closure of extraordinary sessions must occur, since nothing prevents another convocation from being made, given that we are within the constitutionally provided period for this (…)\"\n\nThe political direction of the Government requires the concretion of decisions, by determining which objectives are to be achieved. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to extraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, is discretionary for the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has ample faculties to add or withdraw bills in light of national interests and reasons of opportunity and convenience. In the case of the bill consulted, it was included in the Executive Decrees of convocation—or expansion of convocation—of the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly was in a position to deliberate on the bill in question. For its part, the Executive Branch made discretionary use of convocations and de-convocations to extraordinary sessions to hear the bill in question. The actions thus taken by the Executive Branch fall within the constitutionally granted competencies, and the exercise of this faculty does not violate any constitutional principle, in particular, those of reasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so precisely because the faculty of the Executive Branch consists of the possibility of indicating which bills can be heard during the period of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not to do so, and, in the first case, it is for the deliberation of the bills that that Branch of the Republic proposes. Thus, it can, in accordance with its governmental priorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify, in light of its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident that the Government's priorities can change over time, and if these are modified, the bills for whose cognizance and deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly can also vary. Any rigidity in this matter can affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need to regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive Branch is not limited in de-convening bills during extraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in managing the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill consulted was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to extraordinary sessions and was agendized on the order of the day of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior. Moreover, in light of the de-convocations of bills by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its constitutionally granted faculties, including the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is the modification of the planned order of the day and that the Deputies would only hear those bills that were maintained by the Government in its Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this faculty by the Executive does not form part, properly, of the legislative procedures, but rather refers to a longstanding practice of that Branch, which affects the processing of other procedures. In any case, the bill remained on the legislative agenda during the periods when it convened the legislative body for its cognizance during the period of extraordinary sessions, such that the possibilities for participation, representation, opposition, and deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and legal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see in this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, at 14:47, of May 17, 2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19.426, bill \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior only heard it when the Executive Branch, through the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the convocation to said extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the cognizance of this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its cognizance when the Executive Branch, also through decree, withdrew it from the cognizance of the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. Consequently, regarding this point, the legislative procedure does not present defects of constitutionality.\n\nAnother point of the legislative procedure on which it is appropriate to make a brief examination is that related to the consultations that, at the time, the Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior made to several public institutions, as well as to subjects of private law. Indeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the cited Commission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the Ministerio de Salud, and the country's cement companies. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Commission approved another motion to consult the bill with the Ministerio de Hacienda. However, in that same session, a procedural motion was approved for the Commission to agree to return on the order of the day to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" so the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, and it was unanimously approved by the eight deputies present, without the deadline granted—according to the agreed extensions—for submitting some of the requested reports having yet expired. However, this does not constitute any irregularity that can be considered serious in the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made are not mandatory, but rather a matter of discretionary decision by the respective Legislative Commission. Their purpose is to gather the criteria of certain public or private sectors that could, eventually, have some interest—in a broad sense—in the bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission considered opportune, but which the legislative body could even, tacitly or expressly, dispense with. In any case, the reports from these consultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the plenary, without the fact that they are not ultimately submitted being able, in any way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the consultations in question were not responded to—as in this case, where only the criteria of the Corte Suprema de Justicia and the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía regarding the bill are recorded—or if they were responded to after the deadline granted for that purpose had expired, or if, finally, the respective Legislative Commission issued its report on the bill without the deadline granted for the public institutions or subjects of private law to pronounce on the matter having expired, or, even if said deadline had not even begun to run, as happened with the consultation to the Ministerio de Hacienda, since in the same session in which it was requested, the Legislative Commission issued its report on the bill, given that none of this constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable of invalidating it.\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, an additional assessment is necessary regarding the possibility of the deputies altering the order of the day and returning to hear a bill that had already been heard, according to the order of the day of that session, and that, therefore, involves a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such occurred with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior approved a procedural motion for the Commission to agree to return on the order of the day to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, \"Minamata Convention on Mercury,\" which had already been discussed in that same session and whose hearing had been concluded, moving on to the hearing of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved—unanimously—by the eight deputies present. Although, initially, the advisor of the Departamento de Servicios Técnicos of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, in response to a query from the President of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, verbally expressed, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that he saw no problem whatsoever in returning to the order of the day and hearing again a bill that had already been heard in that same session, provided that, as in this case, all the deputies present were in agreement and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the legislative file); later, when submitting the written opinion requested by the President of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its criterion and considered that the practice of retracting matters in the same session to hear them again is contrary to the democratic principle, legal certainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness, and thus it deems that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed the matter, this Chamber considers that neither one criterion nor the other is valid, since everything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the order of the day occurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order to determine whether, indeed, an injury to the cited constitutional principles is or is not produced, and, in the affirmative case, to essential steps of the legislative procedure, as a consequence.\n\nFrom the examination of the circumstances under which the matter of file No. 19.426 was revisited, in Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, of the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional Court considers that no injury to the cited constitutional principles occurred; and, therefore, no essential violation of the legislative procedure for the approval of the Agreement took place. The legislative environment surrounding the bill in Committee, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any institution or private legal subject having raised any objection whatsoever. And while it is true, according to the agenda of Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, that the bill in question had already been discussed, it is also true that such discussion had not concluded but had been suspended to address the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time for Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to appear; he had been summoned to a hearing in that session to comment on the Agreement. Thus, that point on the Committee's agenda had not yet concluded and, therefore, the Committee could well, through a motion of order, revisit the matter and vote on it, as indeed occurred. Not only were all the deputies in agreement to issue an immediate report on that bill, given how pressing the approval of the Agreement is for the country, but there is also no element indicating that anyone with a contrary interest was taken by surprise regarding their interests by the approval of that bill in Committee. There is no injury to the interests and rights of the deputies or the citizenry through the Committee's procedure; therefore, there is no reason to consider that, in this case, a violation of an essential step in the legislative procedure occurred regarding the bill in file No. 19.426 by virtue of the Committee having unanimously agreed to revisit that bill and issue it a unanimous affirmative report. Additionally, no infringement of the legislators' rights and powers is observed, since the bill was considered by the Legislative Plenary as was appropriate, given that it is an International Agreement; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a Legislative Committee with Full Powers, pursuant to Article 124, paragraph 3, of the Political Constitution, in relation to Article 121, subsection 4), ibid. Furthermore, the bill under consultation was duly convoked by the Executive Branch to be considered in extraordinary sessions, as previously recounted, respecting the provisions of Article 118 of the Political Constitution, and for its approval in the first debate, it received the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in the Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016 (folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently, this Constitutional Court finds that in the approval process for the bill titled *\"Minamata Convention on Mercury\"*, no substantial or significant defect has occurred that would invalidate it for violation of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency.\n\nV.- Observations regarding the substance of the bill. Before making some observations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be borne in mind that, according to the provisions of Article 101 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the opinion of this Chamber shall only be binding to the extent it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted bill. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will be made to the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without conducting an analysis of each and every article, since, in principle, they are considered consistent with Constitutional Law.\n\nVI.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION. On October 10, 2013, in original form and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, French, English, and Russian, the Convention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, with the objective—as stated in the statement of purposes and in the text of the Agreement itself—of \"*protecting human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds*\" (Article 1 of the consulted Convention). The foregoing, far from contravening the Constitutional Charter, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, particularly with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, among others. Likewise, having analyzed the content of the articles that make up the consulted Convention, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms, it is substantially consistent with the precepts, values, and fundamental principles of Constitutional Law.\n\nVII.- DESCRIPTION OF THE CONVENTION'S REGULATIONS. The rules contained in the Convention under study—comprising a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)—are typical and common to those comprising conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill processed in file No. 19.426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general provisions establishing the overall objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used therein. In Articles 3 through 7, the commitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination of new primary sources of mercury extraction after 2020, the moratorium on existing ones for a determined period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the typical technique of International Law, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions include exceptions and a special procedure for an interested Party to avail itself of or request temporary exemptions regarding those prohibitions. Also contemplated are obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is the duty to develop various national action plans to progressively reduce or mitigate the human factors that are sources of mercury emissions or releases, as well as to provide international cooperation, raise public awareness, and exchange scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of providing national reports or referring to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention on the control of hazardous waste disposal (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond providing national institutions with resources for the effective fulfillment of the assumed obligations; on the contrary, it provides for the possibility of States accessing resources from the United Nations Environment Programme Trust Fund for developing countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Likewise, technological transfer is provided for (Article 14 of the Convention), and in addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and Compliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations, and a Secretariat is established to handle bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the Convention). The Convention concludes with the usual treaty law regulations concerning amendments, entry into force, depository, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E of the Convention), none of which presents any constitutional problem. Regarding the obligations that the State acquires upon signing the Convention, the only rule related to the financial topic is Article 13, but this only imposes on the Parties the obligation to provide their own national agencies, to the extent of their capabilities, with the resources necessary for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment these commitments are undertaken. Furthermore, the contribution of funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, section 12, of the Convention), and it opens up the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries. In such a way, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the ordinary budget planning, since those commitments are actions that already form part of the normal operations of the national institutional framework. Regarding the obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result, they only have value as a directive or political orientation, or, if one wishes, programmatic, but do not impose any responsibility on the State and cannot serve as the basis for an international claim against the Government. Such is the case with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Convention. On the contrary, in Articles 3 to 8 of the Convention, a series of substantive obligations is imposed on the Parties. These obligations or commitments acquired by the State refer to primary mining extraction, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal and small-scale gold extraction, and the topic of emissions. In this matter, the State's obligations range from the prohibition of authorizing new primary sources of mercury extraction to the implementation of a national plan aimed at the decrease or reduction of mercury presence. Among the obligations imposed in the Convention is that of conducting an inventory of the country's situation regarding the topic of mercury in each of the areas covered by that international instrument. All these obligations, which are characteristic of conventions of this nature and constitute a widely used regulatory technique in international law to which States may voluntarily submit, not only do not present any contradiction with Constitutional Law, but rather are entirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Moreover, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the Costa Rican State through the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included within the ordinary competencies of the national institutions related to the topic, and therefore, it does not imply the provision of additional resources or competencies. In short, all the obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of extraction from new mercury sources, the moratorium on existing ones within a determined period, the prohibition of the use of mercury compounds, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State with full respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which is typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also includes temporary exemption clauses for compliance with obligations related to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amending and adopting the convention and its annexes, in accordance with the countries' domestic legislation, which are typical and normal regulations in International Law. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, the State's voluntary submission to which presents no constitutional conflict. In relation to Annex E of the Convention, which deals with the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber also finds no constitutional objection, since it concerns regulations that are typical in this matter in International Law and to which States can voluntarily submit, as is the case with our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention in no way implies the attribution or transfer of State competencies to a community legal order (Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution), for its approval in the first and second debate, an absolute majority vote of the deputies present in the parliamentary session is sufficient, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. Furthermore, the consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Legislative Committee with Full Powers, in accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 124 of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when this Convention was approved in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25 of June 9, 2016, by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present.\n\nVIII.- Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, the consultation is resolved in the sense that the bill in question contains no essential procedural defects or provisions that would invalidate it.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe consultation is resolved in the sense that the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, legislative file No. 19.426, contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.-\n\n|  |  |  |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n|  | Fernando Cruz C. |  |\n|  | President a.i |  |\n| Nancy Hernández L. |  | Luis Fdo. Salazar A. |\n| Jorge Araya G. |  | Aracelly Pacheco S. |\n| Enrique Ulate C. |  | Jose Paulino Hernández G. |\n\nDigitally Signed Document\n-- Verification code --\n*V3DOYCL2IXQ61*\n V3DOYCL2IXQ61 \n\nEXPEDIENTE N° 16-007743-0007-CO \n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.\n\nBuilding  \nSupreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6"
}