{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-82088", "citation": "Res. 04242-1996 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Rechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra normativa urbanística del INVU", "title_en": "Outright dismissal of unconstitutionality action against INVU urban planning regulations", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada por Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos S.A. contra el artículo 115 de la Ley 7015, el Reglamento de Construcciones del INVU y el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del INVU. La empresa impugnó estas normas porque el INVU le denegó el visto bueno para remodelar un edificio como hotel, alegando que vulneraban la autonomía municipal y que la regulación vía presupuesto era atípica. Sin embargo, la Sala determinó que la acción era inadmisible por dos razones: primero, porque al momento de interponerla no se había agotado la vía administrativa —el asunto principal aún estaba en apelación ante la Junta Directiva del INVU y no se había recurrido al Poder Ejecutivo como exige la Ley de Planificación Urbana—; y segundo, porque no se trataba de intereses difusos sino de un interés individual y directo de la empresa, que no cumplía los supuestos de acción directa del artículo 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional. La resolución no entra al fondo de la controversia constitucional.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses the unconstitutionality action filed by Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos S.A. against Article 115 of Law 7015, the INVU Building Regulations, and Article 5 of the INVU Organic Law. The company challenged these norms because the INVU denied approval to remodel a building into a hotel, arguing they violated municipal autonomy and that budget-law regulation was atypical. The Chamber found the action inadmissible on two grounds: first, because when filed the administrative route had not been exhausted—the main matter was still under appeal to the INVU Board and had not been taken to the Executive as required by the Urban Planning Law—; and second, because this was not a diffuse interest case but an individual and direct interest of the company, failing the requirements for a direct action under Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. The ruling does not address the merits of the constitutional controversy.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "20/08/1996", "year": "1996", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic", "procedural-environmental" ], "primary_topic_id": "procedural-environmental", "es_concept_hints": [ "rechazo de plano", "interés difuso", "lesión individual y directa", "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "INVU", "visto bueno", "Plan Regulador", "potestad reglamentaria", "Ley de Planificación Urbana" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Planificación Urbana", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-35669", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 4240", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-35669", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "3", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "3", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "8", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "8", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "9", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "9", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento de Construcciones", "article": "10", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento 0", "article": "10", "doc_id": "norm-53161", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "INVU", "acción de inconstitucionalidad", "intereses difusos", "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "inadmisibilidad", "Reglamento de Construcciones", "Ley de Planificación Urbana", "autonomía municipal", "norma presupuestaria" ], "keywords_en": [ "INVU", "unconstitutionality action", "diffuse interests", "exhaustion of administrative remedies", "inadmissibility", "Building Regulations", "Urban Planning Law", "municipal autonomy", "budgetary norm" ], "excerpt_es": "Efectivamente, llevan razón la Procuraduría General de la República y el representante de la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), al señalar que la acción resulta inadmisible. [...] Esta gestión de inconstitucionalidad fue promovida el diez de abril de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, es decir, al momento de interponerse, no se encontraba en la etapa de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, como lo exige el párrafo primero del citado artículo 75, sino que aún estaba pendiente de resolver el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa accionante ante la Junta Directiva del INVU, contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo por las que se le denegó el permiso solicitado [...].\n\nPor último, en el caso en concreto, definitivamente no nos encontramos frente a la defensa de un interés difuso [...] Tampoco nos encontramos frente a un interés que atañe a la colectividad en su conjunto, o un interés corporativo, por cuanto el accionante promueve esta acción en su condición personal [...]. Por último, en virtud de la naturaleza del asunto planteado, efectivamente sí se produce una lesión individual y directa, en perjuicio de las personas que se les aplique la normativa cuestionada, lo que implica la necesidad de un asunto pendiente de resolver, en los términos establecidos en el citado artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.", "excerpt_en": "Indeed, the Office of the Attorney General and the representative of the Directorate of Urban Planning of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU) are correct in pointing out that the action is inadmissible. [...] This unconstitutionality proceeding was filed on April 10, 1995, i.e., when it was lodged, it was not at the stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as required by the first paragraph of said Article 75, but rather the appeal filed by the plaintiff company to the INVU Board against the Urban Planning Directorate decisions denying the requested permit was still pending [...].\n\nFinally, in the specific case, we are definitely not confronted with the defense of a diffuse interest [...] Nor are we faced with an interest that concerns the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the plaintiff brings this action in a personal capacity [...]. Lastly, given the nature of the matter raised, there is indeed an individual and direct injury, to the detriment of persons to whom the challenged regulation is applied, which implies the need for a pending matter to be resolved, under the terms set forth in said Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Inadmissible", "label_es": "Inadmisible", "summary_en": "The unconstitutionality action is summarily dismissed because the administrative route had not been exhausted and it did not involve diffuse interests but an individual and direct injury.", "summary_es": "La acción de inconstitucionalidad se rechaza de plano por no haberse agotado la vía administrativa y por no tratarse de intereses difusos sino de una lesión individual y directa." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando II", "quote_en": "it is not enough for that matter to exist, nor the mere invocation of unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, but rather the unconstitutionality action must constitute a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured", "quote_es": "no basta la mera existencia de ese asunto, ni la simple invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada, sino que la acción de inconstitucionalidad debe constituir medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés considerado lesionado" }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "in the specific case, we are definitely not confronted with the defense of a diffuse interest", "quote_es": "en el caso en concreto, definitivamente no nos encontramos frente a la defensa de un interés difuso" }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "diffuse interests have a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—being common to a generality—and individual, such that they may be claimed in that character.", "quote_es": "los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-82088", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "04242\n\nExp.No.2214-M-95 No.4242-95\n\nSALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a\n\nlas dieciséis horas veinticuatro minutos del veinte de agosto de\n\nmil novecientos noventa y seis.\n\nAcción de Inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre129193 \n\n, mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de San José, cédula de\n\nidentidad número CED57932, en su condición de apoderado especial\n\njudicial de la empresa _REFINADORA COSTARRICENSE DE METALES\n\nPRECIOSOS, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA_, contra el artículo 115 de la Ley\n\nnúmero 7015, del veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta\n\ny cinco, que es Ley de Modificación del Presupuesto Ordinario del\n\nPeríodo Fiscal para mil novecientos noventa y cinco, que modificó\n\nel Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, número 4240\n\ndel quince de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho y sus\n\nreformas, el Reglamento de Construcciones, dictado por el\n\nInstituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, específicamente en los\n\nartículos I.1 hasta el XI.26.3, y sus reformas acordados también\n\npor el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo; y por\n\nconexidad, contra el artículo 5 inciso a.) de la Ley Orgánica del\n\nINVU, número 1788, del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos\n\ncincuenta y cuatro. Intervienen el Licenciado Farid Beirute\n\nBrenes, en su condición de Procurador General Adjunto de la\n\nRepública y el Director a.i. de la Dirección de Urbanismo, Rodolfo\n\nSancho Rojas.\n\nResultando:\n\n1.- El representante de la empresa _Refinadora Costarricense\n\nde Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_, promueve acción contra el\n\nartículo 115 de la Ley número 7015, del veintidós de noviembre de\n\nmil novecientos ochenta y cinco, que es Ley de Modificación del\n\nPresupuesto Ordinario del Período Fiscal para mil novecientos\n\nnoventa y cinco, que modificó el Transitorio II de la Ley de\n\nPlanificación Urbana, número 4240 del quince de noviembre de mil\n\nnovecientos sesenta y ocho y sus reformas, en cuanto rebasa los\n\nlímites constitucionales en lo que se refiere a la regulación\n\nnormativa vía leyes de presupuesto, por tratarse de una norma\n\natípica; el Reglamento de Construcciones, dictado por el Instituto\n\nNacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), específicamente en los\n\nartículos I.1 hasta el XI.26.3, y sus reformas acordados también\n\npor el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, en cuanto fue\n\ndictado con fundamento en una competencia dada por una norma\n\natípica, y excediendo con ello los límites de la potestad\n\nreglamentaria, la cual corresponde exclusivamente al Poder\n\nEjecutivo o a los gobiernos locales -Municipalidades- en lo que\n\nse refiere a su jurisdicción (cantonal), ya que la competencia\n\nreglamentaria del INVU se refiere únicamente a su organización\n\ninterna o a la prestación de sus servicios; y por conexidad,\n\ncontra el artículo 5 inciso a.) de la Ley Orgánica del INVU,\n\nnúmero 1788, del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos\n\ncincuenta y cuatro, en cuanto establece gestiones atinentes a la\n\nobtención de una licencia municipal en la materia referente a las\n\nvías o aceras, en la cual no hay competencia derivada de ley, por\n\ncorresponder su administración a los entes municipales o al\n\nMinisterio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Señala, además, que\n\nlas facultades legales para ordenar la materia de urbanismo,\n\nconstrucción, etc., competen exclusivamente a las corporaciones\n\nlocales, y no al INVU ni a ninguna otra entidad.\n\n2.- Figura como asunto previo el reclamo administrativo que\n\nse tramita ante la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto Nacional\n\nde Vivienda y Urbanismo, por la negación de permisos de\n\nfuncionamiento de un hotel. También fundamenta su legitimación\n\npara promover esta gestión, en la consideración de que en el caso\n\nen particular, no es necesaria la existencia de un asunto\n\npendiente, _pues se trata de la defensa intereses difusos y que\n\natañen a la colectividad en su conjunto (artículo 75 de la Ley de\n\nla Jurisdicción Constitucional)._\n\n3.- Por resolución de las trece horas cuarenta y cinco\n\nminutos del siete de mayo del año en curso, se le dio curso a la\n\nacción, confiriéndosele audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la\n\nRepública y a la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto de Vivienda\n\ny Urbanismo.\n\n4.- La Procuraduría General de la República, al contestar la\n\naudiencia concedida, solicita que la acción sea rechazada de plano\n\npor resultar inadmisible, en cuanto, en el caso que figura como\n\nbase de la acción, quien agota la vía administrativa es el Poder\n\nEjecutivo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la\n\nLey de Planificación Urbana, y en el momento de presentarse la\n\nacción, se conoce de una apelación ante la Dirección de Urbanismo;\n\nasimismo, señala que, en el caso en concreto, no existen intereses\n\ndifusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto\n\nal fondo, estima que la normativa impugnada no es contraria a los\n\nartículos 140 inciso 3.), 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política,\n\nni quebranta el principio de autonomía municipal, por lo que\n\nrecomienda se declare sin lugar la acción. En relación con el\n\nartículo 115 de la Ley 7015, de noviembre de mil novecientos\n\nnoventa y cinco, señala que de acuerdo con los antecedentes\n\nadministrativos y jurisprudenciales, considera que no hay\n\ndiscusión alguna respecto a la valoración de que el contenido del\n\nTransitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana no es materia\n\npropia de ejecución presupuestaria, por lo que, resulta contraria\n\na las normas constitucionales que regulan el presupuesto, ya que\n\ndebió haberse aprobado mediante el procedimiento legislativo\n\nordinario. Sin embargo, señala que de declararse inconstitucional\n\nesta norma, entraría a regir nuevamente el texto del Transitorio\n\naprobado mediante ley ordinaria número 5900, del diecinueve de\n\nabril de mil novecientos setenta y seis, manteniéndose con ello el\n\ncarácter _supletorio_ de la normativa del INVU en los casos en que\n\nno exista promulgación de Planes Reguladores dictados por las\n\nrespectivas municipalidades. Alega que tanto el Transitorio II de\n\nla Ley de Planificación Urbana, como el artículo 5 de la Ley\n\nOrgánica del INVU, no niegan la competencia de los gobiernos\n\nlocales en la materia de urbanismo, _todo lo contrario_, la\n\nreconocen y hacen prevalecer frente a la regulación general del\n\nINVU. Pareciera más bien que la inconstitucionalidad deriva de la\n\nomisión o inercia de las municipalidades de dictar sus planes\n\nreguladores y reglamentos en la materia de urbanismo. La\n\nconstitucionalidad del reglamento de Construcciones dictado por el\n\nINVU deriva de estas normas, en relación con lo establecido en el\n\nartículo 21 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana; por lo que los\n\nreglamentos que elabora esta institución, salvo el interno, son,\n\nal igual que los planes reguladores, de una aplicación supletoria,\n\nlo que implica que serían susceptibles de aplicar en el supuesto\n\nde inercia de la municipalidad en la materia respectiva. Lo\n\nanterior encuentra fundamento en el interés público de no dejar\n\nsin normativa esta materia.\n\n5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, en su condición de Director a.i. de\n\nla Dirección de Urbanismo, señala que en el caso en estudio no\n\nexiste asunto pendiente de resolver, conforme lo ordena el\n\nartículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que es\n\ncon fundamento en el recurso de reconsideración o de alzada ante\n\nel superior jerarca que agota la vía administrativa, que se cumple\n\neste requisito. En este sentido señala que: 1.- el veintinueve de\n\nagosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, la Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo del INVU rechaza el permiso de remodelación de un\n\nedificio de oficinas para convertirlo en un hotel, por adolecer\n\nlos planos presentados de una serie de incumplimientos, en\n\nrelación con el Reglamento de Construcciones; que no fueron\n\ncorregidos, normativa que se le señaló de acatamiento obligatorio;\n\n2.- el diez de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, la Junta\n\nDirectiva del INVU en sesión número 4505 en el artículo VI,\n\ndeclaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa\n\naccionante contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo\n\nUR-101, del veintitrés de enero y UR-398, del trece de marzo,\n\nambas de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, y se mantiene el\n\ncriterio emitido por la Dirección de Urbanismo de no otorgarle el\n\nvisto bueno de uso, porque el proyecto incumple el artículo 5 de\n\nla Ley de Construcciones y los artículos III.4.1. y IV.13 del\n\nReglamento de Construcciones (folio 61); 3.- el siete de junio del\n\nmismo año, en sesión número 4513, en el artículo XIII, rechazó por\n\nimprocedente el recurso de reconsideración promovido contra la\n\nresolución anterior (sesión ordinaria de la Junta Directiva número\n\n4505, artículo VI.), y además se le indicó que a esa instancia no\n\nle correspondía dar por agotada la vía administrativa, sino que\n\ncorresponde al Poder Ejecutivo (folio 62); 4.- el diecinueve de\n\njulio del mismo año, en sesión número 4525, en el artículo IX, se\n\nrechazó por improcedente el incidente de nulidad interpuesto\n\ncontra la resolución de la Junta Directiva en sesión número 4513,\n\nartículo XIII (folio 64). La accionante no ha demostrado que\n\nplanteó ante el Poder Ejecutivo la reconsideración de las\n\ndecisiones tomadas por la Junta Directiva del INVU, como lo\n\ndispone el artículo 13 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. En\n\ncuanto al fondo, argumenta que la normativa impugnada no resulta\n\ncontraria a los artículos 140 incisos 3.), 169 y 170 de la\n\nConstitución Política, ya que de declararse inconstitucional la\n\nreforma del Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, dada\n\nen la Ley número 7015, quedaría rigiendo la redacción de por la\n\nley ordinaria número 5900, la cual mantiene la competencia\n\nsupletoria del INVU en la materia de urbanismo, en el tanto los\n\ngobiernos locales no hayan dictado las normas respectivas. Esta\n\ncompetencia del INVU también se enmarca en lo dispuesto en el\n\nartículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del INVU.\n\n6.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del\n\nartículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron\n\npublicados en los Boletines Judiciales números 97, 98 y 99 de los\n\ndías veintidós, veintitrés, y veinticuatro de mayo del año en\n\ncurso.\n\n7.- El párrafo primero del artículo 9 de la Ley de la\n\nJurisdicción Constitucional, faculta a esta Sala para que, en\n\ncualquier momento procesal, rechace de plano las gestiones ante\n\nella promovidas, cuando considere que resultan manifiestamente\n\nimprocedentes e infundadas.\n\nRedacta el Magistrado Mora Mora, y\n\nConsiderando:\n\nI. DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCI_N. El artículo 75 de la\n\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos\n\nde admisibilidad en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, y regula\n\ntres situaciones distintas: en el párrafo primero, exige la\n\nexistencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede\n\njudicial, incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo, o\n\nen la administrativa, en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta\n\nvía, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma\n\ncuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se\n\nconsidera lesionado en el asunto principal; en los párrafos\n\nsegundo y tercero, se regula la acción directa -no se requiere del\n\nasunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: cuando por la\n\nnaturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se\n\ntrate de la defensa de interes difusos, o que atañen en la\n\ncolectividad en su conjunto; y cuando la acción sea promovida por\n\nel Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la\n\nRepública, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los\n\nHabitantes.\n\nII. La exigencia de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de\n\nresolver, establecida en el párrafo primero de la Ley que rige\n\nesta Jurisdicción, como se anotó anteriormente, ha sido\n\ninterpretada por esta Sala de manera tal que, no basta la mera\n\nexistencia de ese asunto, ni la simple invocación de\n\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada, sino que la acción de\n\ninconstitucionalidad debe constituir _medio razonable para amparar\n\nel derecho o interés considerado lesionado_, tal y como lo dispone\n\nla norma en comentario, es decir, no basta la mera invocación de\n\ninconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, sino que la misma\n\ndebe ser de aplicación -directa o indirecta- en el asunto que le\n\nda sustento a la acción; tal y como lo ha manifestado en forma\n\nreiterada esta Sala, entre otras, ver las sentencias 1668-90,\n\n4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.\n\nIII. Efectivamente, llevan razón la Procuraduría General de la\n\nRepública y el representante de la Dirección de Urbanismo del\n\nInstituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), al señalar que\n\nla acción resulta inadmisible. En el caso en estudio, la empresa\n\n_Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_\n\nseñala que tiene la patente municipal para funcionamiento de\n\nactividades lucrativas, y que para el funcionamiento de un hotel,\n\ncontó con los permisos municipales de remodelación autorizados y\n\nsupervisados por la Municipalidad de Tibás; pero que previo a\n\nautorizar la licencia para la explotación hotelera, se le indicó\n\nque debía contar con el visto bueno de la Oficina de Urbanismo del\n\nINVU. El veintitrés de enero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco,\n\nse le notifica que desde el veintinueve de agosto del año\n\nanterior, le fue rechazada su solicitud de remodelación, por\n\nadolecer los planos presentados de una serie de incumplimientos en\n\nrelación con el Reglamento de Construcciones -normativa que se le\n\nseñaló de acatamiento obligatorio-, que no fueron corregidos. El\n\ndiez de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, la Junta\n\nDirectiva del INVU en sesión número 4505 en el artículo VI,\n\ndeclaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa\n\naccionante contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo\n\nque denegaron su solicitud, manteniendo el criterio emitido por la\n\nDirección de Urbanismo de no otorgarle el visto bueno de uso,\n\nporque el proyecto incumple el artículo 5 de la Ley de\n\nConstrucciones y los artículos III.4.1. y IV.13 del Reglamento de\n\nConstrucciones (folio 61). El siete de junio del mismo año, en\n\nsesión número 4513, en el artículo XIII, la Junta Directiva del\n\nINVU rechazó por improcedente el recurso de reconsideración\n\npromovido contra la resolución anterior (sesión ordinaria de la\n\nJunta Directiva número 4505, artículo VI), y además se le indicó\n\nque a esa instancia no le correspondía dar por agotada la vía\n\nadministrativa, sino que le correspondía al Poder Ejecutivo (folio\n\n62). El diecinueve de julio del mismo año, en sesión número 4525,\n\nen el artículo IX, se rechazó por improcedente el incidente de\n\nnulidad interpuesto contra la resolución de la Junta Directiva en\n\nsesión número 4513, artículo XIII (folio 64). Esta gestión de\n\ninconstitucionalidad fue promovida el diez de abril de mil\n\nnovecientos noventa y cinco, es decir, al momento de interponerse,\n\nno se encontraba en la etapa de agotamiento de la vía\n\nadministrativa, como lo exige el párrafo primero del citado\n\nartículo 75, sino que aún estaba pendiente de resolver el recurso\n\nde apelación promovido por la empresa accionante ante la Junta\n\nDirectiva del INVU, contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo por las que se le denegó el permiso solicitado (UR-101,\n\nde veintitrés de enero y UR-398, del trece de marzo, ambas de mil\n\nnovecientos noventa y cinco). Al respecto, debe tenerse presente\n\nque el artículo 13 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana establece:\n\n_Las municipalidades y las partes afectadas\n\npodrán pedir a la Junta Directiva del Instituto revisión\n\nde las decisiones de la Dirección de Urbanismo.\n\nDe lo que resuelva la Junta Directiva en las\n\nmaterias comprendidas en los incisos 1.), 2.), y 4.) del\n\nartículo 10, podrá recurrise dentro del plazo de quince\n\ndías hábiles que se contarán a partir de la fecha en que\n\nnotifique la resolución, ante el Poder Ejecutivo, el\n\ncuál oirá cuando lo estimare conveniente, la opinión de\n\nla Junta Directiva del _Colegio de Ingenieros y\n\nArquitectos_ dentro del plazo que le señalará al efecto\n\ny que no podrá ser mayor de treinta días. Pasado ese\n\nplazo, el Poder Ejecutivo resolverá dentro de los\n\ntreinta días siguientes y quedará agotada la vía\n\nadministrativa._;\n\ny el artículo 10 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana en los incisos\n\nque interesan, dispone:\n\n_Corresponde asimismo a la Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo, dentro de las funciones de control que le\n\nasigna el inciso 4.) del artículo 7, las siguientes:\n\n1.) Revisar y aprobar los planes reguladores y\n\nsus reglamentos, antes de su adopción por las\n\nmunicipalidades;\n\n2.) Examinar y visar, en forma ineludible, los\n\nplanes correspondientes a proyectos de urbanización o de\n\nfraccionamiento para efectos de urbanización,\n\npreviamente a su aprobación municipal;\n\n[...]\n\n4.) Ordenar la suspensión de aquella obra en que\n\nha habido las infracciones contempladas en el inciso\n\nanterior cuando, después de transcurrido un término\n\nprudencial desde que formule la respectiva denuncia, no\n\nactúe la municipalidad como le corresponde, en el\n\nsentido de impedir o corregir la transgresión apuntada;\n\n[...]_;\n\ncon lo cual queda claro, que en los casos en que se ordena una\n\nsuspensión de obra, como en el caso que nos ocupa, quien agota la\n\nvía administrativa es el Poder Ejecutivo. Asimismo, según se\n\nconstata con la contestación del Director a.i. de la Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo, el asunto que da sustento a esta acción, ya fue\n\ndefinitivamente resuelto por la Junta Directiva del INVU, sin que\n\nla empresa accionante, al ser notificada del rechazo del incidente\n\nde nulidad promovido contra el artículo XIII de la sesión número\n\n4513 del siete de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco,\n\npromoviese el respectivo recurso ante el Poder Ejecutivo, para\n\ntener por agotada la vía administrativa, no obstante que la propia\n\nJunta Directiva le había aclarado que no le correspondía a esa\n\ninstitución agotar esa vía.\n\nIV. Por último, en el caso en concreto, definitivamente no nos\n\nencontramos frente a la defensa de un interés difuso, que esta\n\nSala ha calificado como:\n\n\"Ese concepto de intereses difusos», tiene por objeto\n\ndesarrollar una forma de legitimación, que en los últimos tiempos\n\nha constituido uno de los principios tradicionales de la\n\nlegitimación y que se ha venido abriendo paso, especialmente en el\n\námbito del derecho administrativo, como último ensanchamiento,\n\nnovedoso pero necesario, para que sea cada vez más efectiva y\n\neficaz. Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más\n\ndifícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo\n\nha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan\n\ndifusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad\n\nnacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos\n\nresulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas\n\ndeterminadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación\n\nderivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos\n\no que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces de\n\nintereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más\n\no menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y,\n\npor ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial,\n\nmás o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que\n\nse trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran\n\nen determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas.\n\nEs decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble\n\nnaturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una\n\ngenralidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en\n\ntal carácter.\" (Sentencia número 3750-93);\n\nTampoco nos encontramos frente a un interés que atañe a la\n\ncolectividad en su conjunto, o un interés corporativo, por cuanto\n\nel accionante promueve esta acción en su condición personal, y no\n\nen representación de ninguna asociación o agrupación jurídicamente\n\norganizada, que tenga como objeto defender los intereses del\n\ngremio que asocia. Por último, en virtud de la naturaleza del\n\nasunto planteado, efectivamente sí se produce una lesión\n\nindividual y directa, en perjuicio de las personas que se les\n\naplique la normativa cuestionada, lo que implica la necesidad de\n\nun asunto pendiente de resolver, en los términos establecidos en\n\nel citado artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.\n\nV. Con fundamento en las anteriores razones es que procede\n\nrechazar de plano la acción, al amparo de lo dispuesto en el\n\npárrafo primero del artículo 9 de la Ley que rige esta\n\nJurisdicción.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nSe rechaza de plano la acción\n\nLuis Paulino Mora Mora\n\nPresidente\n\nLuis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .\n\nCarlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.\n\nJosé Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.", "body_en_text": "04242\n\nExp.No.2214-M-95 No.4242-95\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at\n\nsixteen hours twenty-four minutes on the twentieth of August,\n\nnineteen ninety-six.\n\nAction of Unconstitutionality brought by Nombre129193,\n\nof legal age, married, attorney, resident of San José, identity\n\ncard number CED57932, in his capacity as special judicial\n\nrepresentative of the company _REFINADORA COSTARRICENSE DE METALES\n\nPRECIOSOS, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA_, against Article 115 of Law\n\nnumber 7015, of the twenty-second of November, nineteen eighty-\n\nfive, which is the Law Modifying the Ordinary Budget for the\n\nFiscal Period for nineteen ninety-five, which modified\n\nTransitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, number 4240\n\nof the fifteenth of November, nineteen sixty-eight and its\n\namendments, the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones), issued by the\n\nInstituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, specifically in\n\nArticles I.1 through XI.26.3, and their amendments also agreed upon\n\nby the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo; and by\n\nassociation, against Article 5, subsection a.) of the Organic Law of the\n\nINVU, number 1788, of the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen\n\nfifty-four. Appearing are Licenciado Farid Beirute\n\nBrenes, in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the\n\nRepublic, and the Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, Rodolfo\n\nSancho Rojas.\n\nResultando:\n\n1.- The representative of the company _Refinadora Costarricense\n\nde Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_, brings an action against\n\nArticle 115 of Law number 7015, of the twenty-second of November,\n\nnineteen eighty-five, which is the Law Modifying the\n\nOrdinary Budget for the Fiscal Period for nineteen\n\nninety-five, which modified Transitory Provision II of the\n\nUrban Planning Law, number 4240 of the fifteenth of November, nineteen\n\nsixty-eight and its amendments, insofar as it exceeds\n\nconstitutional limits regarding normative regulation\n\nvia budget laws, as it is an atypical\n\nnorm; the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones), issued by the Instituto\n\nNacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), specifically in\n\nArticles I.1 through XI.26.3, and their amendments also agreed upon\n\nby the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, insofar as it was\n\nissued based on a competence granted by an atypical\n\nnorm, and thereby exceeding the limits of the regulatory\n\npower, which corresponds exclusively to the Executive\n\nBranch or to local governments -Municipalities- in what\n\nrefers to their jurisdiction (cantonal), since the regulatory\n\ncompetence of the INVU refers only to its internal\n\norganization or the provision of its services; and by association,\n\nagainst Article 5, subsection a.) of the Organic Law of the INVU,\n\nnumber 1788, of the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen\n\nfifty-four, insofar as it establishes procedures related to the\n\nobtainment of a municipal license in matters concerning\n\nroads or sidewalks, in which there is no competence derived from law, as\n\nits administration corresponds to municipal entities or the\n\nMinisterio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. It also indicates that\n\nthe legal powers to regulate matters of urban planning,\n\nconstruction, etc., belong exclusively to local\n\ncorporations, and not to the INVU or any other entity.\n\n2.- Appearing as a prior matter is the administrative claim\n\nbeing processed before the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto Nacional\n\nde Vivienda y Urbanismo, for the denial of operating\n\npermits for a hotel. It also bases its standing\n\nto bring this action on the consideration that in this\n\nparticular case, the existence of a pending\n\nmatter is not necessary, _since it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that\n\nconcern the community as a whole (Article 75 of the Law of\n\nConstitutional Jurisdiction)._\n\n3.- By resolution at thirteen hours forty-five\n\nminutes on the seventh of May of the current year, the\n\naction was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la\n\nRepública and the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto de Vivienda\n\ny Urbanismo.\n\n4.- The Procuraduría General de la República, in responding to the\n\nhearing granted, requests that the action be rejected outright\n\nas inadmissible, insofar as, in the case serving as\n\nthe basis for the action, the party exhausting the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) is the Executive\n\nBranch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the\n\nUrban Planning Law, and at the time of filing the\n\naction, an appeal before the Dirección de Urbanismo is pending;\n\nlikewise, it indicates that, in this specific case, there are no diffuse\n\ninterests or ones that concern the community as a whole. Regarding\n\nthe merits, it considers that the challenged regulations are not contrary to\n\nArticles 140, subsection 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution,\n\nnor do they violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore\n\nrecommends that the action be dismissed. In relation to\n\nArticle 115 of Law 7015, of November, nineteen\n\nninety-five, it indicates that according to the administrative\n\nand jurisprudential background, it considers there is no\n\ndiscussion whatsoever regarding the assessment that the content of\n\nTransitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law is not a matter\n\nproper to budget execution, and therefore, it is contrary\n\nto the constitutional norms regulating the budget, since it\n\nshould have been approved through the ordinary legislative\n\nprocedure. However, it indicates that if declared unconstitutional,\n\nthis norm would cause the text of the Transitory Provision\n\napproved by ordinary law number 5900, of the nineteenth of\n\nApril, nineteen seventy-six, to come back into force, thereby maintaining the\n\n_supplementary_ nature of the INVU regulations in cases where\n\nthere is no promulgation of Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) issued by the\n\nrespective municipalities. It alleges that both Transitory Provision II of\n\nthe Urban Planning Law and Article 5 of the Organic\n\nLaw of the INVU do not deny the competence of local\n\ngovernments in urban planning matters, _quite the contrary_, they\n\nrecognize it and make it prevail over the general regulation of the\n\nINVU. It seems rather that the unconstitutionality derives from the\n\nomission or inertia of the municipalities in issuing their regulatory plans (planes reguladores)\n\nand regulations in urban planning matters. The\n\nconstitutionality of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) issued by the\n\nINVU derives from these norms, in relation to the provisions of\n\nArticle 21 of the Urban Planning Law; therefore, the\n\nregulations drafted by this institution, except for internal ones, are,\n\nlike the regulatory plans, of supplementary application,\n\nwhich implies they would be applicable in the event\n\nof inertia by the municipality in the respective matter. The\n\nforegoing is grounded in the public interest of not leaving\n\nthis matter without regulation.\n\n5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, in his capacity as Acting Director of\n\nthe Dirección de Urbanismo, indicates that in the case under study there\n\nis no pending matter to be resolved, as mandated by\n\nArticle 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since it is\n\nbased on the appeal for reconsideration or appeal before\n\nthe hierarchical superior that exhausts the administrative procedure (vía administrativa), that this\n\nrequirement is met. In this regard, he indicates that: 1.- on the twenty-ninth of\n\nAugust, nineteen ninety-four, the Dirección de Urbanismo\n\nof the INVU rejected the remodeling permit for an\n\noffice building to convert it into a hotel, because\n\nthe submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances, in\n\nrelation to the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones); which were not\n\ncorrected, a regulation whose mandatory compliance was indicated to them;\n\n2.- on the tenth of May, nineteen ninety-five, the Junta Directiva\n\nof the INVU, in session number 4505 in Article VI,\n\ndeclared without merit the appeal (recurso de apelación) brought by the plaintiff\n\ncompany against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo\n\nUR-101, of the twenty-third of January and UR-398, of the thirteenth of March,\n\nboth of nineteen ninety-five, and upheld the\n\ncriterion issued by the Dirección de Urbanismo of not granting the\n\napproval for use, because the project violates Article 5 of\n\nthe Construction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the\n\nConstruction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) (folio 61); 3.- on the seventh of June of the\n\nsame year, in session number 4513, in Article XIII, it rejected as\n\nimproper the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) brought against the\n\nprevious resolution (ordinary session of the Junta Directiva number\n\n4505, Article VI.), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not\n\nthe responsibility of that instance to declare the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted, but rather\n\nit corresponds to the Executive Branch (folio 62); 4.- on the nineteenth of\n\nJuly of the same year, in session number 4525, in Article IX, it\n\nrejected as improper the motion to nullify (incidente de nulidad) filed\n\nagainst the resolution of the Junta Directiva in session number 4513,\n\nArticle XIII (folio 64). The plaintiff has not demonstrated that\n\nit filed the reconsideration with the Executive Branch of the\n\ndecisions made by the Junta Directiva of the INVU, as\n\nprovided in Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law. Regarding\n\nthe merits, it argues that the challenged regulations do not prove\n\ncontrary to Articles 140, subsections 3.), 169, and 170 of the\n\nPolitical Constitution, since if the\n\namendment to Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, given\n\nin Law number 7015, were declared unconstitutional, the text approved by\n\nordinary law number 5900 would remain in force, which maintains the supplementary\n\ncompetence of the INVU in urban planning matters, insofar as local\n\ngovernments have not issued the respective norms. This\n\ncompetence of the INVU is also framed within the provisions of\n\nArticle 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU.\n\n6.- The notices referred to in the second paragraph of\n\nArticle 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were\n\npublished in Judicial Bulletins (Boletines Judiciales) numbers 97, 98, and 99 on the\n\ndays twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current\n\nyear.\n\n7.- The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of\n\nConstitutional Jurisdiction empowers this Chamber to, at\n\nany procedural stage, reject outright the actions\n\nbrought before it, when it considers them manifestly\n\nimproper and unfounded.\n\nDrafted by Judge Mora Mora, and\n\nConsiderando:\n\nI. ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the\n\nLaw of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites\n\nfor admissibility in actions of unconstitutionality, and regulates\n\nthree different situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the\n\nexistence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial\n\nvenue, including habeas corpus or amparo appeals, or\n\nin the administrative venue, in the procedure for exhausting this\n\nprocedure (vía), in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged\n\nnorm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered\n\ninjured in the principal matter; in the second\n\nand third paragraphs, the direct action is regulated -the underlying\n\nmatter is not required-, in the following cases: when by the\n\nnature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or when\n\nit concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern\n\nthe community as a whole; and when the action is brought by\n\nthe Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la\n\nRepública, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los\n\nHabitantes.\n\nII. The requirement for the existence of a pending matter to\n\nbe resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing\n\nthis Jurisdiction, as noted above, has been\n\ninterpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere\n\nexistence of that matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of\n\nunconstitutionality of the challenged norm, but rather the action of\n\nunconstitutionality must constitute a _reasonable means to protect\n\nthe right or interest considered injured_, as provided by\n\nthe norm under discussion, that is, the mere invocation of\n\nunconstitutionality of the challenged norm is not enough; rather, it\n\nmust be applicable -directly or indirectly- to the matter that\n\nsupports the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly\n\nstated, among others, see rulings 1668-90,\n\n4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.\n\nIII. Indeed, the Procuraduría General de la República\n\nand the representative of the Dirección de Urbanismo of the\n\nInstituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU) are correct in stating that\n\nthe action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company\n\n_Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_\n\nindicates that it has the municipal license for the operation of\n\nlucrative activities, and that for the operation of a hotel,\n\nit had the municipal remodeling permits authorized and\n\nsupervised by the Municipality of Tibás; but that prior to\n\nauthorizing the license for hotel operation, it was indicated\n\nthat it needed the approval of the Urbanismo Office of the\n\nINVU. On the twenty-third of January, nineteen ninety-five,\n\nit was notified that since the twenty-ninth of August of the previous\n\nyear, its remodeling request had been rejected because\n\nthe submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances in\n\nrelation to the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) -a regulation whose\n\nmandatory compliance was indicated- which were not corrected. On\n\nthe tenth of May, nineteen ninety-five, the Junta Directiva\n\nof the INVU in session number 4505 in Article VI,\n\ndeclared without merit the appeal (recurso de apelación) brought by the plaintiff\n\ncompany against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo\n\nthat denied its request, upholding the criterion issued by the\n\nDirección de Urbanismo of not granting the approval for use,\n\nbecause the project violates Article 5 of the\n\nConstruction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the\n\nConstruction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) (folio 61). On the seventh of June of the same year, in\n\nsession number 4513, in Article XIII, the Junta Directiva of the\n\nINVU rejected as improper the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración)\n\nbrought against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the\n\nJunta Directiva number 4505, Article VI), and furthermore, it was indicated\n\nthat it was not the responsibility of that instance to declare the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted,\n\nbut rather it corresponded to the Executive Branch (folio\n\n62). On the nineteenth of July of the same year, in session number 4525,\n\nin Article IX, it rejected as improper the motion to nullify (incidente de\n\nnulidad) filed against the resolution of the Junta Directiva in\n\nsession number 4513, Article XIII (folio 64). This action of\n\nunconstitutionality was filed on the tenth of April, nineteen\n\nninety-five, that is, at the time of filing,\n\nit was not at the stage of exhausting the administrative\n\nprocedure (vía), as required by the first paragraph of the cited\n\nArticle 75, but rather the appeal (recurso de\n\napelación) brought by the plaintiff company before the Junta\n\nDirectiva of the INVU against the resolutions of the Dirección\n\nde Urbanismo denying the requested permit (UR-101,\n\nof the twenty-third of January and UR-398, of the thirteenth of March, both of\n\nnineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be borne in mind\n\nthat Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes:\n\n_Municipalities and affected parties\n\nmay request the Junta Directiva of the Institute to review\n\nthe decisions of the Dirección de Urbanismo.\n\nAgainst what the Junta Directiva resolves in the\n\nmatters included in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of\n\nArticle 10, an appeal may be filed within a period of fifteen\n\nbusiness days, counted from the date on which\n\nthe resolution is notified, before the Executive Branch,\n\nwhich will hear, when it deems it appropriate, the opinion of\n\nthe Junta Directiva of the _Colegio de Ingenieros y\n\nArquitectos_ within a period that it will set for this purpose\n\nand which may not exceed thirty days. After that\n\nperiod, the Executive Branch will resolve within the\n\nthirty following days and the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) will be exhausted._;\n\nand Article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the subsections\n\nof interest, provides:\n\n_It is also the responsibility of the Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo, within the control functions assigned to it\n\nby subsection 4.) of Article 7, the following:\n\n1.) Review and approve the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and\n\ntheir regulations, prior to their adoption by the\n\nmunicipalities;\n\n2.) Examine and approve, in an unavoidable manner, the\n\nplans corresponding to urbanization projects or\n\nsubdivision (fraccionamiento) projects for urbanization purposes,\n\nprior to their municipal approval;\n\n[...]\n\n4.) Order the suspension of any work in which\n\nthe infractions contemplated in the previous subsection\n\nhave occurred when, after a reasonable period\n\nhas elapsed since the respective complaint was filed, the\n\nmunicipality does not act as it should, in the\n\nsense of preventing or correcting the noted transgression;\n\n[...]_;\n\nwhereby it is clear that in cases where a\n\nwork suspension is ordered, as in the case at hand, the party that exhausts\n\nthe administrative procedure (vía administrativa) is the Executive Branch. Likewise, as\n\nconfirmed by the response of the Acting Director of the Dirección de\n\nUrbanismo, the matter supporting this action has already been\n\ndefinitively resolved by the Junta Directiva of the INVU, without the\n\nplaintiff company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to nullify (incidente\n\nde nulidad) brought against Article XIII of session number\n\n4513 of the seventh of June, nineteen ninety-five,\n\nfiling the respective appeal before the Executive Branch, to\n\nhave the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted, even though the\n\nJunta Directiva itself had clarified that it was not the responsibility of that\n\ninstitution to exhaust that procedure (vía).\n\nIV. Finally, in this specific case, we are definitely not\n\nfaced with the defense of a diffuse interest, which this\n\nChamber has characterized as:\n\n\"That concept of 'diffuse interests' aims to\n\ndevelop a form of standing, which in recent times\n\nhas constituted one of the traditional principles of\n\nstanding and has been gaining ground, especially in the\n\nfield of administrative law, as a final broadening,\n\nnovel but necessary, so that it is increasingly more effective and\n\nefficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more\n\ndifficult to identify, cannot be in our Law -as this Chamber\n\nhas already stated- merely collective interests; nor so\n\ndiffuse that their ownership blends with that of the national\n\ncommunity as a whole, nor so concrete that against them\n\ndetermined or easily identifiable\n\npersons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing\n\nwould derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones\n\nor those that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, then,\n\nindividual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more\n\nor less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and,\n\ntherefore, receive a benefit or a detriment, actual or potential,\n\nmore or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that\n\nit concerns equal interests of the groups that find themselves\n\nin certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them.\n\nThat is, diffuse interests partake of a dual\n\nnature, as they are at once collective -for being common to a\n\ngenerality- and individual, for which they can be claimed in\n\nthat capacity.\" (Ruling number 3750-93);\n\nNor are we faced with an interest that concerns the\n\ncommunity as a whole, or a corporate interest, since\n\nthe plaintiff brings this action in his personal capacity, and not\n\nin representation of any legally organized association or group\n\nwhose purpose is to defend the interests of the\n\nguild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the\n\nmatter raised, an individual and direct injury\n\nis indeed produced, to the detriment of the persons to whom\n\nthe challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for\n\na pending matter to be resolved, under the terms established in\n\nthe cited Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.\n\nV. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to\n\nreject the action outright, under the protection of the provisions of\n\nthe first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law governing this\n\nJurisdiction.\n\nPor tanto:\n\nThe action is rejected outright\n\nLuis Paulino Mora Mora\n\nPresidente\n\nLuis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .\n\nCarlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.\n\nJosé Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.\n\nIt further points out that the legal authority to regulate matters of urban planning, construction, etc., belongs exclusively to local corporations, and not to the INVU or any other entity.\n\n2.- The prior matter is the administrative claim being processed before the Urban Planning Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo) of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo), regarding the denial of operating permits for a hotel. It also bases its standing to promote this proceeding on the consideration that, in this particular case, the existence of a pending matter is not required, *since it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole (article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).*\n\n3.- By resolution at one forty-five in the afternoon on May seventh of the current year, the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Urban Planning Directorate of the Institute of Housing and Urbanism.\n\n4.- The Office of the Attorney General, in responding to the granted hearing, requests that the action be summarily dismissed as inadmissible, given that, in the case serving as the basis for the action, it is the Executive Branch that exhausts the administrative channel, in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), and at the time the action was filed, an appeal before the Urban Planning Directorate was known to be pending; likewise, it points out that, in the specific case, there are no diffuse interests or those pertaining to the community as a whole. Regarding the merits, it considers that the challenged regulations are not contrary to articles 140 subsection 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, nor do they violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore it recommends that the action be dismissed. In relation to article 115 of Law 7015, of November nineteen ninety-five, it points out that according to administrative and jurisprudential precedents, it considers there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the assessment that the content of Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law is not a matter proper to budget execution, and therefore, it is contrary to the constitutional norms regulating the budget, as it should have been approved through the ordinary legislative procedure. However, it points out that if this norm were declared unconstitutional, the text of the Transitory Provision approved by ordinary law number 5900, of April nineteenth nineteen seventy-six, would come back into effect, thereby maintaining the *supplementary* nature of the INVU regulations in cases where there are no enacted Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) issued by the respective municipalities. It alleges that both Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law and article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU (Ley Orgánica del INVU) do not deny the competence of local governments in matters of urban planning; *quite the contrary*, they recognize it and make it prevail over the general regulation of the INVU. It would seem rather that the unconstitutionality derives from the omission or inertia of the municipalities in issuing their regulatory plans and regulations on urban planning. The constitutionality of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) issued by the INVU derives from these norms, in relation to what is established in article 21 of the Urban Planning Law; therefore, the regulations prepared by this institution, except for internal ones, are, like the regulatory plans, of supplementary application, which implies they would be applicable in the event of municipal inertia in the respective matter. The foregoing is based on the public interest of not leaving this matter without regulation.\n\n5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, in his capacity as Acting Director of the Urban Planning Directorate, points out that in the case under study, there is no pending matter to be resolved, as ordered by article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since it is through the motion for reconsideration or appeal before the superior hierarchical authority that exhausts the administrative channel, that this requirement is fulfilled. In this regard, he points out that: 1.- on August twenty-ninth nineteen ninety-four, the Urban Planning Directorate of the INVU rejected the remodeling permit for an office building to convert it into a hotel, because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances, in relation to the Construction Regulations, which were not corrected, and which regulation was indicated to them as mandatory; 2.- on May tenth nineteen ninety-five, the Board of Directors of the INVU, in session number 4505, article VI, dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five, and upheld the criterion issued by the Urban Planning Directorate not to grant the certificate of use approval (visto bueno de uso), because the project fails to comply with article 5 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) and articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61); 3.- on June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, article XIII, it rejected as inadmissible the motion for reconsideration filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, article VI.), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not for that instance to deem the administrative channel exhausted, but that it is the responsibility of the Executive Branch (folio 62); 4.- on July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, article IX, the nullity motion filed against the resolution of the Board of Directors in session number 4513, article XIII was rejected as inadmissible (folio 64). The plaintiff has not demonstrated that it filed for reconsideration before the Executive Branch of the decisions made by the Board of Directors of the INVU, as provided by article 13 of the Urban Planning Law. Regarding the merits, it argues that the challenged regulations are not contrary to articles 140 subsections 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, since if the reform of Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, enacted in Law number 7015, were declared unconstitutional, the wording from ordinary law number 5900 would remain in force, which maintains the supplementary competence of the INVU in the matter of urban planning, as long as the local governments have not issued the respective rules. This competence of the INVU is also framed within the provisions of article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU.\n\n6.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in Judicial Bulletins (Boletines Judiciales) numbers 97, 98, and 99 of the twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current year.\n\n7.- The first paragraph of article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers this Chamber to summarily dismiss, at any procedural stage, the proceedings brought before it, when it considers them to be manifestly improper and unfounded.\n\nPrepared by Magistrate Mora Mora, and\n\nConsidering:\n\nI. ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility in unconstitutionality actions and regulates three distinct situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue, including habeas corpus or amparo appeals, or in the administrative venue, in the procedure for exhausting this channel, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter; in the second and third paragraphs, direct action is regulated—the base matter is not required—in the following cases: when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those pertaining to the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Attorney General, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsperson.\n\nII. The requirement of the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, as previously noted, has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, but rather the unconstitutionality action must constitute a *reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured*, as provided by the norm under discussion; that is, the mere invocation of the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is not sufficient, but it must be applicable—directly or indirectly—in the matter supporting the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, see, among others, rulings 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.\n\nIII. Indeed, the Office of the Attorney General and the representative of the Urban Planning Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU) are correct in pointing out that the action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company *Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima* states that it has the municipal license for operating lucrative activities, and that for the operation of a hotel, it obtained municipally authorized and supervised remodeling permits from the Municipality of Tibás; but prior to authorizing the license for hotel operation, it was told it needed the approval from the Urbanism Office of the INVU. On January twenty-third nineteen ninety-five, it was notified that since August twenty-ninth of the previous year, its remodeling application had been rejected because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances in relation to the Construction Regulations—regulation indicated as mandatory—that were not corrected. On May tenth nineteen ninety-five, the Board of Directors of the INVU, in session number 4505, article VI, dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate that denied its application, upholding the criterion issued by the Urban Planning Directorate not to grant the certificate of use approval, because the project fails to comply with article 5 of the Construction Law and articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61). On June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, article XIII, the Board of Directors of the INVU rejected as inadmissible the motion for reconsideration filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, article VI), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not for that instance to deem the administrative channel exhausted, but that it was the responsibility of the Executive Branch (folio 62). On July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, article IX, the nullity motion filed against the resolution of the Board of Directors in session number 4513, article XIII was rejected as inadmissible (folio 64). This unconstitutionality claim was filed on April tenth nineteen ninety-five; that is, at the time it was filed, it was not in the stage of exhausting the administrative channel, as required by the first paragraph of the cited article 75; rather, the appeal filed by the plaintiff company before the Board of Directors of the INVU against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate denying the requested permit (UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes: *The municipalities and the affected parties may request the Board of Directors of the Institute to review the decisions of the Urban Planning Directorate. Decisions made by the Board of Directors on matters covered in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of article 10 may be appealed, within a period of fifteen working days counted from the date the resolution is notified, before the Executive Branch, which shall hear, when it deems it appropriate, the opinion of the Board of Directors of the College of Engineers and Architects within the period it shall set for that purpose, which may not exceed thirty days. After that period, the Executive Branch shall rule within the following thirty days and the administrative channel shall be deemed exhausted.*; and article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the relevant subsections, provides: *It also falls to the Urban Planning Directorate, within the control functions assigned to it by subsection 4.) of article 7, the following: 1.) To review and approve regulatory plans and their regulations, before their adoption by the municipalities; 2.) To examine and certify (visar), in an unavoidable manner, the plans for urbanization projects or subdivisions for urbanization purposes, prior to their municipal approval; [...] 4.) To order the suspension of any construction work where the infractions contemplated in the previous subsection have occurred when, after a reasonable period has elapsed since it filed the respective complaint, the municipality fails to act as it should, in order to prevent or correct the noted transgression; [...]; making it clear that in cases where a work suspension is ordered, as in the case before us, it is the Executive Branch that exhausts the administrative channel. Likewise, as is confirmed by the response of the Acting Director.\n\nof the Urban Planning Department (Dirección de Urbanismo), the matter that provides the basis for this action was already definitively resolved by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of INVU, without the plaintiff company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to set aside (incidente de nulidad) filed against article XIII of session number 4513 of June seventh, nineteen ninety-five, having filed the respective recourse before the Executive Branch, in order to have the administrative remedy exhausted (agotada la vía administrativa), despite the fact that the Board of Directors itself had clarified that it was not that institution's responsibility to exhaust that remedy.\n\nIV. Finally, in the specific case, we are definitively not faced with the defense of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), which this Chamber has characterized as:\n\n\"That concept of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) aims to develop a form of standing (legitimación), which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and has been making its way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final, novel but necessary broadening, so that it becomes increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot under our Law -as this Chamber has already stated- be merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, specific persons or personalized groups are identifiable or easily identifiable, whose standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests (intereses difusos), but from corporate interests or those that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) share a dual nature, since they are at once collective -because they are common to a generality- and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in that capacity.\" (Judgment number 3750-93);\n\nNeither are we faced with an interest that concerns the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the plaintiff brings this action in his personal capacity, and not as a representative of any legally organized association or group, whose purpose is to defend the interests of the guild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the matter raised, an individual and direct harm is indeed produced, to the detriment of the persons to whom the challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for a matter pending resolution, in the terms established in the cited article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).\n\nV. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to dismiss the action outright (rechazar de plano la acción), under the provisions of the first paragraph of article 9 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction.\n\nTherefore (Por tanto):\n\nThe action is dismissed outright (Se rechaza de plano la acción)\n\nLuis Paulino Mora Mora\n\nPresident\n\nLuis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .\n\nCarlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.\n\nJosé Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.\n\nThe authority of INVU is also framed within the provisions of Article 5 of the INVU Organic Law.\n\n6.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in Judicial Bulletins numbers 97, 98, and 99 of the twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current year.\n\n7.- The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers this Chamber to, at any procedural stage, summarily dismiss claims brought before it when it considers them to be manifestly improper and unfounded.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Mora Mora, and\n\nConsidering:\n\nI. ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates three distinct situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue, including habeas corpus or amparo remedies, or in the administrative venue, at the exhaustion of administrative remedies stage, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the principal matter; the second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—no underlying matter is required—in the following cases: when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that affect the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.\n\nII. The requirement of the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, as noted above, has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter, or the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, is not sufficient; rather, the unconstitutionality action must constitute a *reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed*, just as the norm under discussion provides. That is, the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is not enough; instead, it must be applicable—directly or indirectly—in the matter that supports the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, among others, see judgments 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.\n\nIII. Indeed, the Procuraduría General de la República and the representative of the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU) are correct in pointing out that the action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company *Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima* states that it holds the municipal license to operate for-profit activities, and that for the operation of a hotel, it had the authorized municipal remodeling permits supervised by the Municipalidad de Tibás; but that prior to authorizing the license for hotel operation, it was told that it required the approval of the INVU Office of Urbanism. On January twenty-third, nineteen ninety-five, it was notified that since August twenty-ninth of the previous year, its remodeling application had been rejected because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances regarding the Construction Regulations—rules that were indicated as mandatory—which were not corrected. On May tenth, nineteen ninety-five, the INVU Board of Directors, in session number 4505, Article VI, denied the appeal filed by the claimant company against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo that denied its application, maintaining the criterion issued by the Dirección de Urbanismo of not granting the land-use approval (visto bueno de uso), because the project fails to comply with Article 5 of the Construction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61). On June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, Article XIII, the INVU Board of Directors rejected as improper the reconsideration remedy filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, Article VI), and it was also indicated to the party that it was not for that body to deem the administrative route exhausted, but rather that this corresponded to the Poder Ejecutivo (folio 62). On July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, Article IX, the motion to nullify filed against the Board of Directors' resolution in session number 4513, Article XIII, was rejected as improper (folio 64). This unconstitutionality claim was filed on April tenth, nineteen ninety-five; that is, at the time of filing, it was not at the administrative remedies exhaustion stage, as required by the first paragraph of the aforementioned Article 75, but rather the appeal filed by the claimant company before the INVU Board of Directors against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo that denied the requested permit (UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be kept in mind that Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes: *The municipalities and the affected parties may request the Institute’s Board of Directors review of the decisions of the Dirección de Urbanismo. From what the Board of Directors resolves on matters included in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of Article 10, an appeal may be filed within fifteen business days, counted from the date the resolution is notified, before the Poder Ejecutivo, which shall hear, when it deems appropriate, the opinion of the Board of Directors of the *Colegio de Ingenieros y Arquitectos* within the deadline it shall set for that purpose, which may not exceed thirty days. Once that deadline has passed, the Poder Ejecutivo shall resolve within the following thirty days, and the administrative route shall be exhausted.*; and Article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the relevant subsections, provides: *It also corresponds to the Dirección de Urbanismo, within the control functions assigned to it by subsection 4.) of Article 7, the following: 1.) Review and approve regulatory plans and their regulations, prior to their adoption by the municipalities; 2.) Examine and approve, in an unavoidable manner, the plans corresponding to urbanization projects or subdivision (fraccionamiento) projects for urbanization purposes, prior to their municipal approval; [...] 4.) Order the suspension of any work where the infractions contemplated in the previous subsection have occurred when, after a reasonable period has elapsed since the respective complaint was filed, the municipality does not act as it should, in the sense of preventing or correcting the noted transgression; [...]*; with which it is clear that in cases where a work suspension is ordered, as in the case before us, it is the Poder Ejecutivo that exhausts the administrative route. Likewise, as confirmed by the response of the Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, the matter supporting this action was already definitively resolved by the INVU Board of Directors, without the claimant company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to nullify filed against Article XIII of session number 4513 of June seventh, nineteen ninety-five, having filed the corresponding remedy before the Poder Ejecutivo to have the administrative route considered exhausted, even though the Board of Directors itself had clarified to it that it was not for that institution to exhaust that route.\n\nIV. Finally, in this specific case, we are definitively not faced with the defense of a diffuse interest, which this Chamber has characterized as: \"That concept of 'diffuse interests' aims to develop a form of standing which, in recent times, has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been gaining ground, especially in the field of Administrative Law, as the latest, novel but necessary expansion, so that it is increasingly effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—purely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership merges with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, facing them, specific persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that affect a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—being common to a generality—and individual, which is why they can be claimed in such capacity.\" (Judgment number 3750-93); Neither are we faced with an interest that affects the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the claimant brings this action in their personal capacity, and not as a representative of any legally organized association or group whose purpose is to defend the interests of the guild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the matter raised, an individual and direct harm is indeed produced, to the detriment of persons to whom the challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for a pending matter to be resolved, in the terms established in the aforementioned Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.\n\nV. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to summarily dismiss the action, under the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction.\n\nTherefore:\n\nThe action is summarily dismissed.\n\nLuis Paulino Mora Mora\n\nPresident\n\nLuis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .\n\nCarlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.\n\nJosé Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H." }