{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1049666",
  "citation": "Res. 00086-2021 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Responsabilidad municipal por mal funcionamiento de tapa de alcantarillado pluvial en ruta nacional",
  "title_en": "Municipal Liability for Malfunctioning Storm Drain Cover on a National Highway",
  "summary_es": "La Sección IV del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resuelve una demanda por responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración Pública interpuesta por una conductora que sufrió un accidente de tránsito causado por una tapa de alcantarillado pluvial en posición vertical sobre la carretera de Circunvalación (Ruta Nacional 39). La actora demandó al CONAVI, al Estado, al AyA y a la Municipalidad de San José. El tribunal determina que, conforme a la jurisprudencia constitucional reiterada, la responsabilidad principal por la creación y mantenimiento de las redes de alcantarillado pluvial corresponde a las municipalidades, independientemente de la clasificación de la vía. Rechaza las excepciones de falta de legitimación opuestas por el Estado y el AyA, pero acoge las de estos y declara la falta de legitimación pasiva del CONAVI. Condena exclusivamente a la Municipalidad de San José al pago de daño moral subjetivo por las lesiones corporales (¢1,700,000) y por los efectos emocionales y traumáticos (¢3,400,000), al acreditarse el nexo causal entre la omisión municipal y el daño, sin que se demostrara fuerza mayor, hecho de un tercero o culpa de la víctima. Las demás pretensiones indemnizatorias fueron rechazadas por falta de prueba.",
  "summary_en": "The Fourth Chamber of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal ruled on a claim for non-contractual liability of the Public Administration brought by a driver who suffered a traffic accident caused by a storm drain cover standing vertically on the Circunvalación highway (National Route 39). The plaintiff sued CONAVI, the State, AyA, and the Municipality of San José. The tribunal determines that, in accordance with reiterated constitutional case law, the primary responsibility for the creation and maintenance of storm drainage networks rests with municipalities, regardless of the road classification. It rejects the lack-of-standing defenses raised by the State and AyA, but upholds them and declares CONAVI's lack of passive standing. It awards exclusively against the Municipality of San José subjective moral damages for bodily injuries (¢1,700,000) and for emotional and traumatic effects (¢3,400,000), having established the causal link between the municipal omission and the harm, without proof of force majeure, third-party act, or contributory negligence. The other compensation claims were dismissed for lack of proof.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "date": "29/07/2021",
  "year": "2021",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "responsabilidad extracontractual",
    "alcantarillado pluvial",
    "daño moral subjetivo",
    "legitimación pasiva",
    "cosa juzgada",
    "Ley Constitutiva del AyA",
    "ARESEP",
    "Código Municipal"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "responsabilidad extracontractual",
    "alcantarillado pluvial",
    "municipalidad",
    "daño moral subjetivo",
    "CONAVI",
    "AyA",
    "tapa de alcantarilla",
    "competencia municipal",
    "Sala Constitucional"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "non-contractual liability",
    "storm drainage",
    "municipality",
    "subjective moral damages",
    "CONAVI",
    "AyA",
    "manhole cover",
    "municipal competence",
    "Constitutional Chamber"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Tal y como puede apreciarse con claridad a partir de la jurisprudencia constitucional, lo concerniente al alcantarillado pluvial es competencia municipal, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en los ordinales 1 y 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del AyA, toda vez que, como lo indica la Sala Constitucional, dicho Instituto \"es el órgano rector en la materia y la entidad técnicamente más especializada para asesorar en el debido mantenimiento del referido servicio.\" Así las cosas, sin importar el tipo de carretera -entiéndase nacional o cantonal- lo atinente a dicho servicio le corresponde al Gobierno Local respectivo. Y en esta línea, nótese como el Alto Tribunal hace expresa referencia a que la responsabilidad de las municipalidades en este tema es principal, debiendo las mismas coordinar \"con el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Ministerio de Salud según sea el caso.\" Así las cosas, conforme a la jurisprudencia constitucional de cita, no existe duda alguna en cuanto a que son las municipalidades las responsables directas \"de crear y mantener las redes del alcantarillado pluvial\" dentro de la respectiva circunscripción territorial -cantón- que administran.\n\nSiendo ello así, a la luz de la normativa y sentencias constitucionales citadas, quien debe responder por el adecuado funcionamiento de todo el sistema de alcantarillado pluvial vinculado con las carreteras que se ubican en el Cantón Central de San José -sean nacionales o no-, es la Municipalidad de San José, quien incluso cuenta con un \"Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José\", publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 155 del 27 de agosto de 2018. Y en ese tanto, cualquier daño generado por dicho sistema o alguno de sus elementos, le resulta imputable a la misma.",
  "excerpt_en": "As can be clearly seen from the constitutional case law, matters concerning storm drainage are a municipal competence, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of AyA, since, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body in the matter and the most technically specialized entity to advise on the proper maintenance of the referred service.\" Therefore, regardless of the type of road—whether national or cantonal—that service falls to the respective Local Government. And in this line, note how the High Court expressly refers to the fact that the responsibility of municipalities in this matter is primary, and they must coordinate \"with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers and the Ministry of Health as the case may be.\" Thus, in accordance with the cited constitutional case law, there is no doubt that municipalities are the direct responsible entities \"for creating and maintaining storm drainage networks\" within their respective territorial circumscription—canton—that they administer.\n\nThis being so, in light of the cited regulations and constitutional rulings, the entity that must answer for the proper functioning of the entire storm drainage system linked to the roads located in the Central Canton of San José—whether national or not—is the Municipality of San José, which even has a \"Regulation for the Granting of Storm Water Discharges and Availabilities in the Canton of San José,\" published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 155 of August 27, 2018. And to that extent, any damage generated by said system or any of its elements is imputable to it.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The res judicata defense is rejected; CONAVI's lack of passive standing is declared ex officio and the lack-of-standing defenses of the State and AyA are upheld, dismissing the claim against these entities. Against the Municipality of San José, the lack-of-standing defense is rejected and the claim is partially granted, ordering it to pay the plaintiff: i) ¢1,700,000 for subjective moral damages for bodily injuries; ii) ¢3,400,000 for subjective moral damages for emotional and traumatic effects; and iii) both procedural costs. The remaining compensation claims are denied.",
    "summary_es": "Se rechaza la excepción de cosa juzgada; se declara de oficio la falta de legitimación pasiva del CONAVI y se acogen las excepciones de falta de legitimación del Estado y del AyA, declarando sin lugar la demanda contra estas entidades. Contra la Municipalidad de San José se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación y se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda, condenándola a pagar a la actora: i) ¢1,700,000 por daño moral subjetivo por lesiones corporales; ii) ¢3,400,000 por daño moral subjetivo por efectos emocionales y traumáticos; y iii) ambas costas del proceso. Se deniegan las demás pretensiones indemnizatorias."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "matters concerning storm drainage are a municipal competence, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of AyA, since, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body in the matter and the most technically specialized entity to advise on the proper maintenance of the referred service.\"",
      "quote_es": "lo concerniente al alcantarillado pluvial es competencia municipal, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en los ordinales 1 y 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del AyA, toda vez que, como lo indica la Sala Constitucional, dicho Instituto \"es el órgano rector en la materia y la entidad técnicamente más especializada para asesorar en el debido mantenimiento del referido servicio.\""
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando Sentencia No. 2012-001015",
      "quote_en": "the obligation to create and maintain storm drainage networks falls to municipalities since these, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Municipal Code and Article 169 of the Political Constitution, are the primary entities obliged to safeguard cantonal interests and services within their respective jurisdiction, which justifies the fact that such corporations collect municipal taxes, which include the item corresponding to the maintenance and operation of the storm network.",
      "quote_es": "la obligación de crear y mantener las redes del alcantarillado pluvial le corresponde a las municipalidades por cuanto estas, de conformidad con lo regulado en los numerales 3 del Código Municipal y 169 de la Constitución Política, son las principales obligadas a salvaguardar los intereses y servicios cantonales dentro de la jurisdicción correspondiente, lo que justifica el hecho de que tales corporaciones cobren impuestos municipales, en los que se incluye el rubro correspondiente al mantenimiento y operación de la red pluvial."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "it has been established that the plaintiff suffered a car accident because a cover that was part of a storm drainage system—a public service under the competence of the Municipality of San José in this case, according to the constitutional case law cited above—\"did not behave as expected\"—the efficient cause of the mishap—since after being run over by a vehicle traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff here, it was left in a vertical position.",
      "quote_es": "se ha tenido por acreditado que la actora sufrió un accidente automovilístico porque una tapa que formaba parte de un sistema de alcantarillado pluvial -servicio público competencia de la Municipalidad de San José en este caso, según la jurisprudencia constitucional supracitada-, \"no se comportó de la forma esperada\" -causa eficiente del percance-, pues luego de ser pisada por un vehículo que viajaba delante del que era conducido por la aquí demandante, quedó en posición vertical."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-37097",
      "citation": "Ley 2726",
      "title_en": "Organic Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers",
      "title_es": "Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "14/04/1961",
      "year": "1961"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-26314",
      "citation": "Ley 7593",
      "title_en": "Public Services Regulatory Authority Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "09/08/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1021019",
      "citation": "Res. 05042-2021 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Amparo – Sewer System Failures and Pollution in Desamparados",
      "title_es": "Amparo por deficiencias en alcantarillado y contaminación en Desamparados",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "12/03/2021",
      "year": "2021"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-540041",
      "citation": "Res. 01015-2012 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Responsibility of AyA and municipalities for stormwater drainage to prevent flooding",
      "title_es": "Responsabilidad del AyA y municipalidades en alcantarillado pluvial para evitar inundaciones",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "27/01/2012",
      "year": "2012"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-977174",
      "citation": "Res. 09707-2020 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Sewage Contamination in an Irrigation Ditch in Barva de Heredia",
      "title_es": "Contaminación por aguas residuales en acequia en Barva de Heredia",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "29/05/2020",
      "year": "2020"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-26314",
      "citation": "Ley 7593",
      "title_en": "Public Services Regulatory Authority Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "09/08/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-37097",
      "citation": "Ley 2726",
      "title_en": "Organic Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers",
      "title_es": "Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "14/04/1961",
      "year": "1961"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-37097",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 2726  Art. 1"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-26314",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7593  Art. 5"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-1049666",
  "tier": 2,
  "is_environmental": false,
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    {
      "doc_id": "norm-26314",
      "norm_num": "7593",
      "norm_name": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "09/08/1996"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-37097",
      "norm_num": "2726",
      "norm_name": "Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados",
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  "body_es_text": "EXPEDIENTE: 17-008361-1027-\n\nCA\n\nPROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO\n\nACTORA: [Nombre62 001] \n\nDEMANDADOS: CONAVI Y OTROS\n\nNo. 86-2021-IV\n\nSECCIÓN CUARTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo\n\nCircuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , a las catorce horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veintinueve de julio de dos mil veintiuno. \n\nProceso de Conocimiento interpuesto por [Nombre62 001], cédula [Valor CED63], representada por su Apoderado Especial Judicial, Licenciado José Joaquín Villalobos Soto, carnet CED88932 contra el CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD -CONAVI-, representado por su Apoderado Especial Judicial, Licenciado Óscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, carnet CED87822, EL ESTADO, representado por la señora Procuradora Silvia Patiño Cruz, carnet CED31858, INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS -AyA-, representado por su Apoderado Especial Judicial, Licenciado Robny Portilla Barrantes, carnet CED89026 y la MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, representada por su Apoderado Especial Judicial, Licenciado Marco Vinicio Álvarez Mattey, carnet CED89027. \n\nRESULTANDO\n\nI.- La parte actora interpuso el presente Proceso a efecto de que en Sentencia se declare:\n\n\"Se condene en sentencia al CONAVI, o, de manera subsidiaria al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados o a la Municipalidad de San José, de manera individual a una o a dos, o a todas las entidades demandadas en conjunto, al pago de los siguientes extremos: IPago de la diferencia indemnizada en el valor real del vehículo destruido por tres millones de colones. II- Pago de los seis meses en que no pudo dedicarse a su trabajo de cuidado de ancianos por los efectos dolorosos de sus lesiones, en la suma de ¢4,164, 784.92 (cuatro millones sesenta y cuatro mil colones con noventa y dos céntimos). III. Costo de transporte y alimentación en cada cita, en la clínica del INS, que representa un gasto anormal en mis actividades, a diez mil colones por cita, ¢140.000.00 (ciento cuarenta mil colones). IV. Pago por el daño moral sufrido a través de sus lesiones, el dolor causado por los golpes sufridos en vuelco del vehículo, lesiones en cabeza, cuello, ambos hombros, mano izquierda, cintura, abdomen ambos muslos, pie derecho y cefalea permanente con mareos, equimosis en el tercio distal de la clavícula con dolor local y en mano izquierda, edema en en dorso a nivel de 4° y 5° metacarpo, dolor general en todo el cuerpo, Cervicalgia por latigazo (a nivel de vértebras cervicales), que requirieron tratamiento con antiinflamatorio y analgésicos: Diclofenaco, Tramadol, Ungüento de Metilo, Tizanidinna Aluminio Acetato en Polvo, Indometacina, Carbamazepina, por tres meses, más veinte días de incapacidades, sumado al proceso inflamatorio que puede producir dolor y edema por tiempo indefinido, de unos 8 meses a un año, los cuales se valoran de manera prudencial en treinta millones de colones. V. Pago por el daño moral por los efectos emocionales y traumáticos sufridos por el accidente que se manifestaron en padecimientos de dificultad para dormir, pesadillas, falta de apetito, llanto recurrente, pensamientos intrusivos, episodios ansiosos, estado de hiperexitación, sensación de inseguridad y miedo a manejar o salir a la calle y dificultad para trabajar por el dolor en los dedos, requiriendo tratamiento de Sertralina Vo 50 Mg Hs Y De Difenhidramina Vo 50 Mg Hs, por tres meses, con secuelas a la fecha que me impiden volver a circular por la misma calle, a lo que se tuvo que sumar tratamiento psicológico simultáneo por reacción depresiva ansiosa por estrés postraumático, con un tratamiento a lo largo de seis meses, los cuales se valoran de manera prudencial en treinta millones de colones. VI. Eventualmente y sujeto a resultado de la prueba pericial, monto a determinar, ante una eventual incapacidad parcial temporal o permanente en el uso de la mano izquierda.\" El representante de la parte actora aclaró que en la pretensión número IV se refiere al daño moral generado por aspectos físicos y en la pretensión V se refiere a daño moral generado por aspectos emocionales. (Imágenes 2 a 22, 253 a 262 del expediente judicial y respaldo digital de Audiencia Preliminar).\n\nII.- Conferido el traslado de ley, las entidades accionadas contestaron negativamente la demanda y opusieron las siguientes excepciones: CONAVI: Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario incompleto -resuelta interlocutoriamente- y Falta de Derecho. ESTADO: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva y Falta de Derecho. AyA: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva. MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva. (Imágenes 81 a 86, 99 a 106, 111 a 139 y 141 a 154 del expediente judicial). \n\nIII.- La Audiencia Preliminar en el presente Proceso se llevó en fecha 10 de julio de 2018.\n\n(Imágenes 253 a 262 del expediente judicial. Respaldo electrónico de dicha audiencia).\n\nIV.- El Juicio Oral y Público se llevó a cabo a las 8:30 horas los días 7 y 9 de julio de 2021. El primero de tales días, al amparo del ordinal 50.2 del CPCA, se concedió a las partes 3 días hábiles a efecto de que se manifestaran por escrito sobre la prueba documental que para mejor resolver aportó el CONAVI, plazo que venció en fecha 12 de julio de 2021. Posteriormente se declaró inevacuable el testimonio del señor Nombre61250 , procediéndose luego a la evacuación del resto de prueba admitida en la Audiencia Preliminar, y previo al cierre del debate, se brindó la oportunidad a las partes de emitir sus respectivas conclusiones. (Respaldo disco compacto de la Audiencia Complementaria). \n\nV.- Se dicta esta Sentencia, previa deliberación de los integrantes del Tribunal, dentro del plazo de quince días establecido en el artículo 111.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -al haberse declarado complejo el presente asunto-, sin que se observen causales capaces de invalidar lo actuado. \n\nRedacta el Juez Baltodano Gómez , con el voto afirmativo de los juzgadores (as) Reyes Castillo y Salas Leitón. \n\n CONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- SOBRE LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER. Durante la etapa de Juicio Oral y\n\nPúblico -más concretamente el día 7 de julio de 2021-, la representación del CONAVI indicó al Tribunal el haber allegado al expediente mediante escrito de esa misma fecha, los documentos que seguidamente se indican, a efecto de que se valorara la admisión de los mismos como prueba para mejor resolver: 1. Certificación Registral literal del vehículo placas [Valor 002] . 2. Certificación Registral del folio microfilmado inscrito en el tomo [Valor 003], Asiento [Valor 004], Secuencia 001. Bienes Muebles, corresponde al vehículo placas [Placa703 ]. 3. Informe de inspección sobre los trabajos realizados en la Dirección13576 . , fechado setiembre del 2016. 4. Oficio UE-DCPA-0112018-025 (0613) fechado el 13 de febrero del 2018. Concedida que fue la palabra a la parte proponente de dicha prueba, esta explicó de manera amplia las razones por las cuales, en su criterio, la misma debía ser admitida. Luego, ante consulta de la representación de la parte actora, el Apoderado Especial Judicial del CONAVI manifestó que por tratarse de una\n\ncertificación correspondiente a otro vehículo, desistía de las 2 primeras páginas de la prueba aportada. A la documentación señalada, se le dio el tratamiento previsto en el ordinal 50.2 del CPCA, concediéndosele a las demás partes el plazo de 3 días hábiles a efecto de que se refirieran a la misma por escrito. Período de tiempo el anterior, que venció en fecha 12 de julio de los corrientes. Criterio de este Órgano Colegiado. En atención a la ya conocida admisión facultativa de la prueba para mejor resolver, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha sostenido que el rechazo de la misma no produce la indefensión de las partes. Entre otras sentencias, se transcribe en lo que interesa el texto de la número 547-F2002 de las dieciséis horas del doce de julio de dos mil dos, que indica: “(…) IV.- Múltiples precedentes de esta Sala, refiriéndose a la prueba para mejor resolver, han señalado que esta es prueba del juez, y no de las partes. En consecuencia, la decisión de recabarla es facultativa del órgano jurisdiccional, y puede prescindirse de ella sin necesidad de resolución alguna. Ergo, la omisión de pronunciamiento a su respecto, precisamente porque ha sido rebasada la etapa probatoria, en la cual deben las partes demostrar los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, según lo imponen las normas sobre la carga de la prueba y precluída aquella etapa, será facultad exclusiva del juzgador, determinar si deben allegarse a los autos nuevas probanzas necesarias para la correcta decisión del litigio. Pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras las siguientes resoluciones; 59 de las 15:20 horas del 31 de mayo de 1996, 23 de las 14:20 horas del 4 de marzo de 1992, 34 de las 10:45 horas del 28 de mayo de 1993 y 83 de las 14:40 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1993. (…)”. En abono a lo anterior, la sentencia número 29-1995 de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintidós de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, también dictada por la Sala Primera, aclara lo siguiente: “(…) Dentro de las facultades instructoras y ordenatorias del juez, está la de ordenar prueba para mejor proveer (artículo 97, inciso 2, y 331 del Código Procesal Civil), cuando las probanzas por practicar tengan una influencia decisiva en el resultado del proceso (…). El aspecto medular de la prueba para mejor proveer es su carácter facultativo o discrecional, no pudiendo ser exigida por las partes; su ordenación depende enteramente, de la iniciativa, prudente y criterio del órgano jurisdiccional, consecuentemente su denegatoria no causa indefensión alguna”. Dicho todo esto, estima esta Cámara que la documentación traída a los autos por la representación del CONAVI, además de encontrarse vinculada a su Teoría del\n\nCaso y al objeto del Proceso, resulta pertinente, útil y necesaria para resolver el fondo de la presente litis. De ahí que se admita la misma como prueba para mejor resolver. \n\nII.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS. De importancia para la resolución de la presente litis, se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes: 1) Que para el momento del accidente que se dirá -acaecido en fecha 20 de octubre 2016- la aquí actora era propietaria del vehículo placa [Valor Placa11683], Marca: Nissan, Estilo: X-Trail Clasicc, Año: 2011, Color: dorado. (Imágenes 21 a 35 del expediente judicial); 2) Que en fecha 20 de octubre de 2016, la accionante conducía su vehículo después de medio día por la Dirección13577 . en dirección San José-San Sebastián- en el paso a desnivel, cuando otro automotor delante de la misma pasó sobre una alcantarilla y la descolocó de su posición, dejándola de forma vertical y al continuar ella su marcha en su automotor, una de las llantas delanteras del mismo impactó con la referida alcantarilla generando el vuelco de su vehículo. (Hecho no controvertido en cuanto al lugar y hora del accidente, imagen 66 del expediente judicial, consistente en Constancia de Incidente emitida por el Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos, Parte Oficial de Tránsito visible a imagen 157 del expediente judicial y declaración en Juicio del señor Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo); 3) Que producto del accidente narrado en el hecho probado inmediato anterior, al vehículo de la accionante se le declaró pérdida total y en cuanto a ella, no sufrió lesiones que requirieran de traslado al Hospital. (Imágenes 36 a 37 del expediente judicial); 4) Que por encontrarse asegurado el referido vehículo propiedad de la demandante, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros canceló a la misma la suma de seis millones de colones -¢6.000.000- debido a la pérdida total del citado automotor. (Imágenes 36 a 37 del expediente judicial y hecho 24 de la demanda); 6) Que al momento en que acaeció el accidente, la actora se dedicaba al Cuido de Adultos Mayores. (Imágenes 41 a 44, 45 a 46 del expediente judicial y declaración en Juicio de la señora [Nombre62 004]); 7) Que pese a desarrollar la actividad indicada en el hecho probado inmediato anterior, la demandante no se encontraba inscrita como contribuyente ante la Dirección General de Tributación del Ministerio de Hacienda. (Hecho no controvertido); 8) Que la actora no quedó con secuelas producto del accidente (Ver Dictamen Médico Legal a imágenes 171 a 174 del expediente judicial); 9) Que en el Parte Oficial de\n\nTránsito, se consignó como causa del accidente en \"Observaciones\": \"DERRAPE Y VUELCO A\n\nCAUSA DE DESPRENDIMIENTO DE TAPA DE ALCANTARILLA\" y como \"Factor de Riesgo:\n\nExceso de velocidad\". (Imágenes 156 a 157 del expediente judicial. La mayúscula corresponde al original); 10) Que con ocasión del accidente sufrido por la actora, el Juzgado de Tránsito de Hatillo, San José, en sumaria tramitada bajo el expediente No. 16-0026810492-TC, resolvió por Sentencia No. 278-2017 de las catorce horas del seis de marzo de dos mil diecisiete, absolver de toda pena y responsabilidad a la aquí accionante. (Imagen 190 del expediente judicial); 11) Que con ocasión del accidente sufrido por la actora, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, además de lo relativo a la indemnización por la pérdida total de su vehículo, canceló a la misma las siguientes suma de dinero: i) Pago de transporte: Quince mil setecientos colones -¢15.700,00-. ii) Servicios Médicos: Setecientos veintisiete mil ochocientos setenta y siete colones con cincuenta y nueve céntimos -¢727.877,59-. Quedando un saldo en la cobertura de cinco millones doscientos cincuenta y seis mil cuatrocientos veintidós colones con cuarenta y un céntimos -¢5.256.422,41-. (Certificación SEAD-05123-2017 emitida el 30 octubre de 2017 por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, visible a imagen 199 del expediente judicial); 12) Que con ocasión del accidente, la actora fue incapacitada en diversas ocasiones por los Servicios de: Medicina General -13 días-, de Ortopedia -4 días- y Psiquiatría -3 días- todos del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, para un total de 20 días de incapacidad, requiriendo además un día de terapia física -20 de enero de 2017y se le programaron varias citas tanto para Psiquiatría como Psicología. (Imágenes 49 a 59 y 61 a 64 del expediente judicial); 13) Que a la demandante se le causó un daño moral subjetivo derivado tanto de las lesiones corporales sufridas como de los efectos emocionales y traumáticos experimentados con ocasión del accidente de tránsito en el que se vio involucrada. (Imágenes 49 a 59, 61 a 64 del expediente judicial y declaración en Juicio de [Nombre62 004]).\n\nIII.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: Por encontrase ayuno de pruebas para acreditar su acaecimiento, se tiene como indemostrado: 1) Que el vehículo propiedad de la actora tuviere al momento en que acaeció el accidente, un valor en el mercado de nueve millones de colones -¢9.000.000-. 2) Que la actora viajara a exceso de velocidad cuando conducía su vehículo en la supra citada Dirección13577 . y más concretamente al pasar por la alcantarilla que originó el percance. 3) Que en el accidente acaecido a la actora en fecha 20 de octubre de 2016, hubiere mediado fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima -por exceso de velocidad, impericia y/o imprudencia- o el hecho de un tercero. 4) Que para la fecha en que acaeció el accidente, la aquí accionante se dedicara -aunque lo fuera como actividad secundaria- a Corredora de Bienes Raíces. 5) Que la actora haya debido alquilar un vehículo por un plazo de 32 días a partir del 20 de noviembre de 2016 a efecto de acudir a las citas médicas y continuar con sus labores habituales. 6) Que los ingresos mensuales de la demandante generados por su actividad de Cuido de Adultos Mayores, fuere de setecientos cincuenta mil colones brutos -¢750.000- y seiscientos noventa y cuatro mil ciento treinta colones con ochenta y dos céntimos, netos -¢694.130,82-. 7) Que con ocasión del percance sufrido, la actora se haya visto imposibilitada por espacio de 6 meses para ejercer su actividad de cuido de Adultos Mayores. 8) Que como una consecuencia del accidente sufrido por la demandante, la misma haya quedado con una incapacidad parcial temporal o permanente en el uso de su mano izquierda.\n\nIV.- SOBRE LA EXCEPCIÓN DE COSA JUZGADA OPUESTA EN JUICIO POR LA\n\nREPRESENTACIÓN DEL CONAVI. Aduce la representación legal del Consejo Nacional de\n\nVialidad, que con ocasión del accidente que sufrió la aquí actora, se tramitó el Proceso de Tránsito No. 16-002681-0492-TC ante el Juzgado de Tránsito de Hatillo, San José, el cual expresamente se resolvió por Sentencia No. 278-2017 de las catorce horas del seis de marzo de dos mil diecisiete. Que en razón de ello, habiendo sido esa la oportunidad para discutir la existencia o no de responsabilidad del CONAVI, sin que así haya sido, lo así resuelto en dicha sede, adquirió firmeza y en ese tanto, existe en la especie una cosa juzgada material. Criterio de esta Cámara. Como es sabido, para la configuración de la excepción que se analiza, se requiere de la existencia de una triple identidad entre los Procesos respectivos. Es decir, que en ambos figuren las mismas partes -identidad subjetiva-, que en el Proceso con Sentencia firme, se haya analizado y fallado por el fondo sobre todas o alguna (s) de las pretensiones que se esgrimen en el segundo Proceso -identidad objetiva- y que ambos asuntos tengan su génesis en los mismos hechos -identidad en la causa-. En la especie, claramente la mencionada triple identidad no se da. En esta línea, en el Proceso de Tránsito no fue parte el CONAVI -como lo acepta su misma representación legal-, lo que entrada descarta el que podamos hablar de identidad subjetiva. Luego, con una simple de lectura de la supra citada Sentencia de Tránsito y del resto actuaciones y pruebas constantes en el expediente certificado aportado a los autos, salta a la vista que muy lejos estamos de una identidad objetiva, pues lo pretendido en este Proceso Civil de Hacienda -véase el Resultando I de este Fallo-, dista y en mucho, de lo que se perseguía -objeto- en el citado Proceso de Tránsito -la determinación de responsabilidad de la accionante-. Hasta aquí se evidencia lo improcedente de la excepción aducida, resultando en razón de ello innecesario, analizar lo relativo a la existencia o no identidad en la causa. Así las cosas, a juicio de este Órgano Colegiado, la excepción opuesta debe rechazarse como en efecto se dispone.\n\nV.- DE LA POSICIÓN DE LAS PARTES.- En síntesis y sin perjuicio de la literalidad de sus argumentaciones, las cuales han sido estudiadas en su totalidad por este Tribunal, cada una de las partes alegan lo que seguidamente se detalla en este apartado. ACTORA: Que el día 20 de octubre del año 2016, como a las trece horas y quince minutos más o menos, conducía su vehículo por la carretera nacional 39, construida y administrada por CONAVI, en concreto en la Dirección13578 , tomando el paso a desnivel en ruta a Santa Marta y Dirección3898 , zona en la cual, los conductores se aperciben del fuere ruido que producen las tapas de las alcantarillas al pasar los carros. Que a la fecha y horas referidas en el punto anterior, se desplazaba sobre sobre el carril izquierdo, a la velocidad autorizada de ochenta kilómetros por hora, observó por el retrovisor que, por su derecha, avanzaban tres motociclistas, lo que me alertó de que no podía desplazarse a ese carril sin poner la vida de ellos en riesgo. Que detrás de ella venía otro vehículo conducido por quien después de los hechos se identificó como Nombre112465 , de cédula CED89028. Que ella por su parte iba detrás de otro vehículo, a una distancia prudencial, cuando de pronto, desde debajo del vehículo que iba adelante, notó que frente a ella había una alcantarilla sobre la vía de circulación de su carril, la cual tenía a tapa levantada, esto es, en lugar de estar horizontal cubriendo el agujero de la alcantarilla, estaba en posición vertical, con la mitad dentro del agujero y el resto sobresaliendo sobre la calle, conformando un obstáculo en la vía. Que en ese momento tenía a su izquierda la baranda metálica de la orilla del paso elevado y, a la derecha, a los motociclistas. Que perdió el control de conducción del vehículo, la dirección del mismo no le respondía, sintió que todo el entorno le daba vuelta, mientras los objetos que iban sueltos en automóvil flotaban o caían a su alrededor, como la cartera, las alfombras del carro, el celular y la sombrilla. Que a continuación y en cuestión segundos, la tapa de la alcantarilla golpeó el parabrisas del automóvil que conducía, el cual se fracturó en multitud de rajaduras y filamentos en la parte frontal, generando un lluvia de pedacitos de vidrio sobre ella, en concreto en su cara y cabeza, sin que para ese momento tuviera claro lo que estaba pasando. Que el señor Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo, vecino del lugar y el señor Nombre112465 , quien manejaba su vehículo detrás de ella, observaron como el auto de ella, al cruzar sobre la tapa en cuestión, se elevó por completo en el aire, junto con la tapa de la alcantarilla que, al chocar con la llanta de su carro, la fuerza cinética provocó que la misma se saliera de su lugar, se elevara junto con su carro y, derivando en el aire, impactara contra el parabrisas de mi vehículo, para caer luego en la calle, quedando a unos cuatro metros de la alcantarilla que le correspondía y a cuatro de la baranda, casi en la linea de separación entre carriles. Que su vehículo dio varias vueltas en el aire, golpeó el suelo y finalmente cayó sobre la calle, quedando de costado, del lado del conductor, donde todavía el impulso hizo que se arrastrara sobre el suelo un trecho, quedando volcado y atravesado a lo ancho sobre el carril derecho, a unos doce metros de la alcantarilla y tres y medio de la baranda de la calle, la placa delantera quedó torcida como un guiñapo sobre la carretera. Que su vehículo luego de caer en la calle continúo arrastrándose de costado sobre la misma con ella dentro conmocionada y sujetada al asiento del conductor por el cinturón de seguridad, que, si bien la sostenía al asiento, al estar en una posición inclinada y halada por la gravedad, le cortaba la respiración. Que los vecinos de la zona reportan que, desde mucho tiempo antes del accidente que interesa a esta demanda, el mal funcionamiento de la tapa de alcantarilla ha causado accidentes leves y graves en ese mismo punto. Que en el periódico CR-Hoy, de circulación nacional, del 13 de febrero de 2017, se reporta que en mismo lugar se han dado varios accidente más, en virtud del mal funcionamiento de la tapa de la alcantarilla, dado que de hecho, en el repone se indica que la misma se ha quebrado y desaparecido, dejando el agujero sin protección. Que la tapa original, que identificaba que era una alcantarilla municipal, fue sustituida por otra que dice Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillado. Que el accidente, tal y como consta en los dictámenes médicos le causó a la actora una conmoción lo que alteró su paz y tranquilidad, su vida personal fue profundamente trastornada en lo emocional, lo cual le ha causado estados de angustia, depresión y ansiedad, los primeros días no pudo dormir bien y necesitó medicamentos para conciliar el sueño, además de cefaleas periódicas que duraron entre dos y tres meses, hoy día, pese al tiempo transcurrido, todavía padece de estados periódicos de ansiedad y tristeza. Que el accidente provocó la pérdida total del vehículo, cuyo valor reportado en el mercado de autos usados es por lo menos de nueve millones colones, pero el seguro le dio una indemnización por la suma de seis millones de colones, de manera que ello implicó una pérdida patrimonial de por lo menos tres millones. Que en este momento, para poder comprar un vehículo en las mismas condiciones que el primero, pero nuevo tuvo que hacer una compra en abonos por una inversión de treinta y un mil novecientos dólares de los Estados Unidos de América. Que es una persona independiente que vela por su propia manutención, se dedica a corredora de bienes raíces y, principalmente, al cuidado de personas adultas mayores en estado de discapacidad o seniles, por lo que el accidente, debido a las limitaciones de movimiento que le causó, tales dolor en manos, espalda, cabeza y estrés, le impidió realizar dicha actividad, pues no podía hacerse responsable de sostener a un anciano con sus manos para moverlo o desplazarlo, sin riesgo de causarle una caída y lesiones, de manera que en realidad no pudo trabajar y mantenerse durante seis meses, de octubre de 2016 hasta abril de 2017; lo que le causó la pérdida de clientes fijos que tenía en ese momento y le impedía realizar sus actividades laborales en general. Que en consecuencia, sus ingresos brutos, de un promedio de ¢7.500.000 mensuales, disminuyeron ¢4.500.000 mensuales, lo que luego de los gastos representa una pérdida neta de sus ingresos en seis meses por no poder trabajar, de ¢4.164.784.92. Que la pérdida de su vehículo y la necesidad de desplazarse a las citas médicas, coordinar con sus clientes, asistir a terapia y atender sus demás compromisos pendientes, la obligó a alquilar un vehículo por un mes en la suma de seiscientos mil colones, costo que se le hizo imposible mantener en forma continua. Que le domingo 23 de julio de 2017, aproximadamente a las 4 de la tarde, se desplazaba en su vehículo nuevo por la misma carretera donde fue el accidente y a pesar de que desde aquel día toma el carril extremo derecho, en ese momento por reparaciones en un puente a desnivel, estaban cerrados los dos carriles derechos y el tránsito estaba desviado solo por el carril izquierdo. Que fue entonces cuando se enfrentó al hecho de tener que pasar por el lugar del accidente y entró en estado de pánico y se paralizó sin poder continuar. Que debido a la presa que provocó, se apersonó un policía de tránsito que le hizo el favor de tomar el volante y cruzar el lugar del accidente. Que dos días después volvió a cita con el psiquiatra del INS, quien le renovó el tratamiento de medicamentos. Que con ocasión de lo acaecido, la responsabilidad es plena de las autoridades responsables de la instalación y mantenimiento de la carretera, de la alcantarilla y de la tapa de ésta última, por lo que se les demanda en conjunto en virtud de que sus conductas han generado el mal funcionamiento del servicio de carretera y consecuentemente los daños causados. CONAVI: Que es inexacta la afirmación de la demandante, cuando señala que conducía \"a la velocidad autorizada de ochenta kilómetros por hora\", por cuanto como se puede acreditar de la prueba ofrecida por la propia actora, que en el Parte Oficial No. 2016-248600029, Boleta #Identificacion533 elaborado por el Inspector No. 2486, el señor Pablo Agüero Rojas, se describe como un factor de riesgo el exceso de velocidad en que conducía la misma. Que al respecto, textualmente se consginó lo siguiente: \"Factor de Riesgo: Exceso de velocidad\", en el accidente acaecido el día 20 de octubre de 2016, a las \"1:18:46 p.m.\" Que indica la actora, que la tapa de alcantarillado pluvial tenía grabada la leyenda \"alcantarillado pluvial municipal\". Que no obstante ello, es la impericia e imprudencia de la accionante al conducir a exceso de velocidad, la que ocasiona el accidente y por ende, no puede pretender atribuirle responsabilidad alguna al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, por este concepto. Que en todo caso, sobre el manejo de las aguas resulta de obligada observación las consideraciones emitidas por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en materia de alcantarillado, en las que señala las instancias administrativas del Poder Ejecutivo a las cuales compete la construcción y operación de los sistemas de provisión de agua potable y de evacuación de aguas negras -Sentencia No. 2007-05894 de las once horas y cincuenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de abril del dos mil siete-. Existiendo claridad, en cuanto a que le corresponde a la Municipalidad la administración de los servicios e intereses locales, garantizando entre otros, buenos sistemas de provisión de agua potable y de evacuación de aguas servidas, mediante adecuados sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados, por lo que, la solución definitiva en materia de manejo de aguas pluviales y residuales le compete a la Municipalidad y al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. ESTADO: Que tal y como informó el CONAVI en su respuesta a la presente demanda, en vista de la complejidad del proyecto vial donde se aduce acaeció el accidente, se siguió un cuidadoso seguimiento a cada una de las etapas del mismo -diseño y construcción-, tanto por personal de planta de CONAVI, como por profesionales externos y del Consorcio Supervisor contratado, esto de la mano de la propia supervisión de la empresa contratista. Dando como resultado, la garantía que las obras cumplieran con los parámetros técnicos y estructurales contenidos en el contrato de obra pública. AyA: Que realizadas las inspecciones de los técnicos del AyA en el lugar del evento se determinó que la Alcantarilla descrita en el accidente es de Administración del CONAVI para el sistema mantenimiento de aguas pluviales de la circunvalación. Que las tapas de todos el país son chorreadas por el fabricante de tapas, con la inscripción de las siglas del AyA, sin embargo estas tapas son de venta libre, cualquier persona puede comprar este tipo de tapas y ponerlos en sus proyectos sin que esto signifique, que la estructura es nuestra. Que así las cosas es muy difícil ver tapas como las descritas de sistemas alcantarillado pluvial de San José, pues estas tapas son echas para ellos de forma muy exclusivas. Que el Sistema Pluvial es de competencia de cada Municipalidad y por ello el Gobierno Central le asigna presupuesto a cada Gobierno Local, para el mantenimiento anual de estos sistemas pluviales. Que el AyA no recibe ningún tipo de presupuesto para mantenimiento pluvial, relevándolo así de responsabilidad por eventos pluviales, siendo que el uso de fondos de AyA para estos temas de mantenimiento de estructuras pluviales se configuraría en una desviación irregular de fondos públicos. Que pese a que las Municipalidades son quienes deben dar este tipo de cuidado a los sistemas pluviales, en Carreteras Nacionales esta responsabilidad se comparte con el CONAVI pudiendo ser delegada totalmente al ente Municipal del todo, de acuerdo a las situaciones especificas. MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: Que efectivamente la alcantarilla en cuestión cuenta con una tapa identificada como propiedad de Acueductos y Alcantarillado, de manera que este punto ratifica que la Municipalidad de San José no es responsable por la colocación, reposición o mantenimiento de tapas de alcantarillado sobre rutas nacionales, corno en la que se dio el incidente alegado por la parte actora. Que se desconoce si anteriormente existía una tapa municipal en dicha alcantarilla, y de ser así, no fue esa Municipalidad quién la colocó al no contar con competencia para ello, al tratarse de ruta que escapa de la administración municipal. Que los hechos denunciados en la presente demanda acaecieron sobre la carretera 39 según lo expone la parte actora, misma que obedece a la clasificación de Red Vial Nacional, de manera que tanto la construcción de la vía, como su administración y posterior mantenimiento, escapa del ámbito competencial, funcional y operativo de la Municipalidad de San José. \n\nVI.- DEL FUNDAMENTO DE LA DEMANDA Y SU VALORACIÓN POR PARTE DE ESTE TRIBUNAL: Tal y como se puede apreciar del cuadro fáctico y las pretensiones de la demanda, en la especie nos encontramos frente a un típico Proceso Civil de Hacienda, en el que se viene reclamando la responsabilidad extracontractual de una Administración Pública. Ciertamente como lo aducen las Administraciones codemandadas, quien acciona no identifica a la entidad u órgano con personalidad jurídica instrumental -caso del CONAVI- causante de los daños cuya indemnización pretende. Sino que, se dirige contra todas, ante la incertidumbre fáctico-jurídica en la que se encuentra no sólo ella, sino también las Administraciones demandadas, quienes aducen no tener responsabilidad, ya sea porque en su criterio hicieron todo muy bien -caso del CONAVI secundado por el Estado- o porque lo relativo al alcantarillado pluvial es ajeno a sus competencias -caso del AyA y la Municipalidad de San José-. Basta una simple lectura de las contestaciones de la demanda, para advertir la incertidumbre dicha, que curiosamente aducen como una falencia que obligaría a declarar según su criterio- la improcedencia de la demanda. Sea, de lo argumentado en sus contestaciones, se evidencia que las Administraciones accionadas no tienen una idea clara de hasta dónde llegan sus competencias en el tema de los alcantarillados pluviales, por tratarse precisamente de un tema para nada sencillo. Pero pese a ello, todas buscan eximirse de responsabilidad ante lo acaecido a la demandante, utilizando como argumento base que la alcantarilla con ocasión de la cual se produjo el accidente no tiene nada que ver con cada una de ellas. Ante tal panorama, la única opción lógica de quien acciona era proceder como lo hizo; sea, demandando a quienes desde su perspectiva podrían tener alguna injerencia sobre el funcionamiento de la alcantarilla causante del percance. Y ello a juicio de este Tribunal, no demerita en absoluto el ejercicio de su derecho de acción y mucho menos, la posibilidad de obtener la reparación de todos, algunos o alguno de los daños cuya indemnización pretende. Aclarado lo anterior, debe recordarse que Costa Rica es un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, en el cual, desde la propia Constitución Política se sientan las bases indiscutibles de la responsabilidad del Estado -Central y Descentralizado-. (Artículos 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 140.8, 139.4, 148, 149, 150, 154, 188 y 191). Preceptos constitucionales que son desarrollados entre otras, por la Ley General de la Administración Pública -ordinales 190 y siguientes-, en donde a manera de síntesis, se establece la responsabilidad de la Administración por los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo, ilegítimo, normal y anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. El desarrollo doctrinal y jurisprudencial de las citadas normas y otras muchas que versan sobre el tema, ha sido más que abundante, existiendo coincidencia en cuanto a que al administrado debe garantizársele no solo el acceso a la justicia, sino también su derecho constitucional a una indemnización plena, siempre que acredite la existencia de: i) Una conducta -formal, material u omisiva- de una Administración Pública. ii) Un daño que no está obligado a soportar. iii) Un nexo de causalidad (relación causa-efecto) entre aquella conducta y el daño experimentado. Así entonces, esos son los tres presupuestos, que tal y como se indicó en líneas precedentes, debe demostrar quien pretenda una indemnización derivada del actuar de una Administración Pública. Dicho esto, es más que notorio a partir de una simple lectura de las normas constitucionales y legales supra indicadas, que el derecho a una indemnización plena, no se encuentra supeditado a que el administrado se encuentre inscrito ante la Dirección General de Tributación o haya tributado lo correspondiente como lo aduce el CONAVI secundado por la Representación Estatal. Tal postura resulta insostenible a la luz de los ordinales arriba indicados, mismos en los que ninguna de tales condiciones establecieron por un lado el constituyente y por otro el legislador ordinario, para acceder a la justicia costarricense y obtener de la misma -cuando se acrediten los presupuestos arriba indicadosuna indemnización plena por los daños causados por una Administración Pública. En la especie, como se ha dicho, el CONAVI y la Procuraduría General de la República, manifestaron en diversas ocasiones -por escrito ambas representaciones y oralmente en Juicio el Apoderado Especial Judicial del CONAVI- que resultaba necesario solicitar al Ministerio de Hacienda las Declaraciones de Renta de la accionante, en los tres períodos previos al año en el que acaeció el accidente. Prueba absolutamente irrelevante para este tipo de casos -por las razones dadas en esta Sentencia-, pero que fuera admitida por el Juez Tramitador sin que este la gestionara oportunamente. Ante ello, esta Cámara hizo lo propio y mediante resolución catorce horas cinco minutos del primero de julio de dos mil veintiuno, ordenó al Ministerio de Hacienda la remisión de las Declaraciones de Renta correspondientes a los períodos 2014, 2015 y 2016, las que a la fecha en que se emite este Fallo no han sido remitidas al Despacho. No obstante, la ausencia de dicha probanza en modo alguno impide fallar el presente asunto ni causa indefensión a las partes codemandadas que la solicitaron, pues como se ha dicho es absolutamente irrelevante y en todo caso, no existe controversia en cuanto a que la demandante no tributaba para cuando acaeció el accidente, pues el Apoderado Especial Judicial de la misma no ha tenido reparo alguno en reconocer expresamente -incluso en el Juicio Oral y Público- que su representada no se encontraba inscrita como contribuyente para aquel momento -entiéndase del percance-. Sea, la parte actora reconoce expresa e indubitablemente que no tributaba para cuando acaecieron los hechos en los que sustenta su demanda, pero aún así las citadas Administraciones insistieron en tal prueba, pese a que la misma es absolutamente irrelevante por las razones que de seguido se indican: i) El derecho a una indemnización plena del daño causado por una Administración Pública, no tiene absolutamente nada que ver con la condición tributaria del damnificado. ii) El constituyente y el legislador ordinario, no establecieron como presupuesto para acceder a esa indemnización plena, el estar inscrito como contribuyente o bien como trabajador independiente. iii) En un Proceso como el que nos ocupa, resulta ajeno al objeto del mismo, el determinar la condición tributaria de un administrado. iv) Si la Dirección General de Tributación o la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social estimaren que deben proceder contra un administrado que acciona en sede judicial procurando la reparación de los daños que aduce haber experimentado debido a una conducta de cualquier Administración Pública, es una potestad que tienen las mismas, pero que en nada incide sobre el objeto de este Proceso. Así entonces, la condición tributaria de la aquí demandante, no tiene ninguna transcendencia ni puede erigirse como parámetro o limitante alguna, para fallar este asunto como en Derecho corresponde, prescindiendo como se hace, de la referida probanza. Ahora bien, como se ha dicho, todas las Administraciones demandadas aducen no tener nada que ver con al alcantarilla que generó el accidente sufrido por la aquí accionante, pero lo cierto es que una de ellas, a la luz de la jurisprudencia constitucional, ciertamente sí que se encuentra directamente vinculada. De ahí que en las siguientes líneas, se citará normativa y jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, en la que se aborda la temática relativa al tema que nos ocupa. Tal y como de seguro recordarán las partes, el señor Ingeniero del CONAVI Kennet Enrique Solano Carmona, manifestó en Juicio que en el Proyecto de dicha carretera se contempló la construcción de alcantarillado pluvial, pues en ese sector corrían aguas pluviales combinadas con aguas negras, tratándose con ocasión de ello de un cuerpo de agua contaminado que desfoga en el río María Aguilar y en razón de lo cual, afirmó que en algún momento se formuló consulta a la Municipalidad de San José. Lo así dicho por el referido testigo en cuanto al sistema de alcantarillado pluvial, es confirmado por el Ingeniero Willian Reinilgen Sancho, funcionario de AyA, quien en su Informe DRyT-OMSR-2017-00849 del 27 de octubre de 2017, en tanto señala que: \n\n\"En el lugar no existe red de alcantarillado sanitario, administrada por el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA). Se observó la existencia de una red de (sic) pluvial, la cual no es de administración por el AyA ... \" (El subrayado y la negrita corresponde al original).\n\nAsí las cosas, en la zona donde acaeció el accidente lo que existe es una red o sistema de alcantarillado pluvial, siendo irrelevante con ocasión de lo que se dirá, el que dicha infraestructura esté en una Ruta Nacional, como lo aduce la Municipalidad de San José. Ahora bien, respecto de este tipo de sistema y más concretamente a quién corresponde su administración, claro está que no existe uniformidad de criterios en la especie, por lo que se hace necesario acudir tanto a la normativa atinente al tema, como a la jurisprudencia constitucional que se ha emitido al respecto. En esta línea, los ordinales 1 y 2 de la Ley No. 2726 del 14 de abril de 1961: Ley Constitutiva Instituto Costarricense Acueductos y Alcantarillados, expresamente establece:\n\n\"ARTICULO 1º.- Con el objeto de dirigir, fijar políticas, establecer y aplicar normas, realizar y promover el planeamiento, financiamiento y desarrollo y de resolver todo lo relacionado con el suministro de agua potable y recolección y evacuación de aguas negras y residuos industriales líquidos, lo mismo que el aspecto normativo de los sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial en áreas urbanas, para todo el territorio nacional se crea el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, como institución autónoma del Estado”.\n\n\"ARTICULO 2º.- Corresponde al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y\n\nAlcantarillados:\n\nDirigir y vigilar todo lo concerniente para proveer a los habitantes de larepública de un servicio de agua potable, recolección y evacuación de aguas negras y residuos industriales líquidos y de aguas pluviales en las áreas urbanas;\n\nDeterminar la prioridad, conveniencia y viabilidad de los diferentes proyectos que sepropongan para construir, reformar, ampliar, modificar obras de acueductos y alcantarillados; las cuales no se podrán ejecutar sin su aprobación;\n\nPromover la conservación de las cuencas hidrográficas y la protección ecológica, asícomo el control de la contaminación de las aguas;\n\nAsesorar a los demás organismos del Estado y coordinar las actividades públicas yprivadas en todos los asuntos relativos al establecimiento de acueductos y alcantarillados y control de la contaminación de los recursos de agua, siendo obligatoria, en todo caso, su consulta, e inexcusable el cumplimiento de sus recomendaciones;\n\nElaborar todos los planos de las obras públicas relacionadas con los fines de estaley, así como aprobar todos los de las obras privadas que se relacionen con los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados, según lo determinen los reglamentos respectivos;\n\nAprovechar, utilizar, gobernar o vigilar, según sea el caso, todas las aguas dedominio público indispensables para el debido cumplimiento de las disposiciones de esta ley, en ejercicio de los derechos que el Estado tiene sobre ellas, conforme a la ley número 276 de 27 de agosto de 1942, a cuyo efecto el Instituto se considerará el órgano sustitutivo de las potestades atribuidas en esa ley al Estado, ministerios y municipalidades;\n\nAdministrar y operar directamente los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados entodo el país, los cuales se irán asumiendo tomando en cuenta la conveniencia y disponibilidad de recursos. Los sistemas que actualmente están administrados y operados por las corporaciones municipales podrán seguir a cargo de éstas, mientras suministren un servicio eficiente.\n\nBajo ningún concepto podrá delegar la administración de los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillado sanitario del Área Metropolitana.\n\nTampoco podrá delegar la administración de los sistemas sobre los cuales exista responsabilidad financiera y mientras ésta corresponda directamente al Instituto.\n\nQueda facultada la institución para convenir con organismos locales, la administración de tales servicios o administrarlos a través de juntas administradoras de integración mixta entre el Instituto y las respectivas comunidades, siempre que así conviniere para la mejor prestación de los servicios y de acuerdo con los reglamentos respectivos.\n\nPor las mismas razones y con las mismas características, también podrán crearse juntas administradoras regionales que involucren a varias municipalidades;\n\nHacer cumplir la Ley General de Agua Potable, para cuyo efecto el Instituto seconsiderará como el organismo sustituto de los ministerios y municipalidades indicados en dicha ley;\n\nConstruir, ampliar y reformar los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados enaquellos casos en que sea necesario y así lo aconseje la mejor satisfacción de las necesidades nacionales; y\n\nControlar la adecuada inversión de todos los recursos que el Estado asigne paraobras de acueductos y alcantarillado sanitario.\"\n\nPor su parte, el numeral 5 de la Ley No. 7593 del 09 de agosto de 1996: Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), establece:\n\n\"Artículo 5.- Funciones\n\n En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son:\n\nSuministro de energía eléctrica en las etapas de generación, trasmisión, distribucióny comercialización.\n\n(Así derogado este inciso por el artículo 42 de la Ley N° 8660 del 8 de agosto de\n\n2008)\n\nSuministro del servicio de acueducto y alcantarillado, incluso el aguapotable, la recolección, el tratamiento y la evacuación de las aguas negras, las aguas residuales y pluviales, así como la instalación, la operación y el mantenimiento del servicio de hidrantes.\n\n(Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 5° de la Ley N° 8641 del 11 de junio del 2008)\n\nSuministro de combustibles derivados de hidrocarburos, dentro de los que seincluyen: 1) los derivados del petróleo, asfaltos, gas y naftas destinados a abastecer la demanda nacional en planteles de distribución y 2) los derivados del petróleo, asfaltos, gas y naftas destinados al consumidor final. La Autoridad Reguladora deberá fijar las tarifas del transporte que se emplea para el abastecimiento nacional.\n\nRiego y avenamiento, cuando el servicio se presta por medio de una empresapública o por concesión o permiso.\n\nCualquier medio de transporte público remunerado de personas, salvo el aéreo.\n\nLos servicios marítimos y aéreos en los puertos nacionales.\n\nTransporte de carga por ferrocarril.\n\nRecolección y tratamiento de desechos sólidos e industriales.\n\nLa autorización para prestar el servicio público será otorgada por los entes citados a continuación:\n\nInciso a): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nInciso c): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nInciso d.2): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nInciso e): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nInciso f): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes\n\nInciso g): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; Junta de\n\nAdministración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica e Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectivamente.\n\nInciso h): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.\n\nInciso i): Las municipalidades.\n\n En el otorgamiento de la concesión para el aprovechamiento de aguas para riego deberá incluirse la obligación del usuario de aplicar las técnicas adecuadas de manejo de agua, a fin de evitar la degradación del recurso suelo, ya sea por erosión, revenimiento, salinización, hidromorfismo y otros efectos perjudiciales. (Así adicionado este párrafo final por el artículo 63 de la Ley de Uso y Conservación de Suelos No.7779 de 30 de abril de 1998).\"\n\nTal y como puede apreciarse a partir de la normativa supra transcrita, entre otros, lo relativo a los sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial, es un servicio público y en ese tanto, se encuentra sujeto a los Principios Fundamentales del mismo. (Artículo 4 LGAP). Ahora bien, sobre si es el AyA o la Municipalidad respectiva quien debe encargarse de prestar dicho servicio, la Sala Constitucional ha señalado en lo de interés lo siguiente:\n\n\"III.- Sobre el derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el alcantarillado pluvial y las competencias de las\n\nAdministraciones Públicas al respecto.- Este Tribunal en jurisprudencia reiterada ha reconocido que el derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado es un derecho fundamental que deriva del artículo 50 Constitucional, según el cual, no sólo consagra el derecho de todo ciudadano a gozar de un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, sino que además obliga al Estado a garantizar el ejercicio de dicho derecho, mediante los medios establecidos al efecto por la legislación vigente. Concretamente, tal como lo ha dicho esta Sala en el voto n°05-9900 de las 10 horas del 29 de julio del 2005 debe la Municipalidad construir la infraestructura necesaria para hacer discurrir adecuadamente las aguas, para así garantizar el derecho a la salud y a un ambiente libre de contaminación y sin perjudicar a terceros:\n\nV.-Sobre las obligaciones municipales en materia de alcantarillado pluvial.- Es conveniente tomar en cuenta que el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política establece que la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal. Los intereses y servicios locales han sido definidos por la Sala como conceptos jurídicos indeterminados donde la ley no resuelve con exactitud su contenido para su aplicación a casos concretos, por lo que resulta necesario acudir a criterios de valor y de experiencia, por parte de quien le corresponde aplicarlo, para determinar su contenido. La creación de medios de drenaje adecuados dentro de una comunidad a efectos de no causar daños a la propiedad, a la salud ni problemas de ambientales a sus vecinos es, dentro de los términos indicados por la Constitución Política, de interés del cantón y es parte de los servicios que la Municipalidad está en la obligación de brindar. En este mismo sentido la Ley General de Salud en su artículo 285 establece que las aguas pluviales deberán ser eliminadas adecuada y sanitariamente a fin de evitar la contaminación del suelo y de las fuentes naturales de agua para el uso y consumo humano, la formación de criaderos de vectores y enfermedades y la contaminación del aire mediante condiciones que atenten contra su pureza y calidad. Por tal motivo, la Municipalidad de Nombre594., está obligada a asumir un determinado comportamiento para la satisfacción de sus fines, tomando las medidas requeridas para proveer a la comunidad amparada, de un sistema eficiente de drenaje de las aguas pluviales. Ajustado a criterios de razonabilidad debe la Municipalidad construir la infraestructura necesaria para hacer discurrir adecuadamente esas aguas, para así garantizar el derecho a la salud y a un ambiente libre de contaminación y sin perjudicar a terceros. Asimismo, en atención a lo dispuesto por el artículo 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, tal obligación municipal debe ser compartida con el Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, ya que éste, como órgano rector de la materia, es el encargado a nivel nacional de dirigir, coordinar y vigilar todo lo concerniente a la evacuación de aguas negras, alcantarillados y contaminación de los recursos de agua en beneficio de los habitantes de la República, por lo que esta Institución no es ajena del todo al problema que plantea la amparada.\n\nPor otro lado, aunque el problema fuera solamente ocasionado por el alcantarillado pluvial, el Ministerio de Salud no puede desentenderse de ello, puesto que, de conformidad con los artículos 21 de la Constitución, 2° de la Ley General de Salud, y 2° de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, le corresponde la función esencial de velar por la salud de los habitantes de la República, debiendo adoptar todas las medidas generales y particulares necesarias (artículos 337 y 355 de la Ley N°5395) para garantizar el pleno disfrute de ese derecho. Asimismo, hacer cumplir con lo establecido en la Ley General de Salud en su artículo 285 y 292:\n\nARTICULO 285.-\n\nLas excretas, las aguas negras, las servidas y las pluviales, deberán ser eliminadas adecuada y sanitariamente a fin de evitar la contaminación del suelo y de las fuentes naturales de agua para el uso y consumo humano, la formación de criaderos de vectores y enfermedades y la contaminación del aire mediante condiciones que atenten contra su pureza o calidad.\n\nARTICULO 292.-\n\nQueda prohibido en todo caso la descarga de las aguas negras, de las aguas servidas y de residuos industriales al alcantarillado pluvial. El Ministerio queda facultado para restringir, regular, o prohibir la eliminación de productos sintéticos no biodegradables a través de los sistemas de recolección de excretas, aguas.\n\nComo se desprende de lo expuesto anteriormente, la competencia en materia de alcantarillado pluvial, se encuentra establecida, expresa e implícitamente, por la legislación común. Si bien, el actual Código Municipal no establece ninguna disposición específica en cuanto este tema, la Sala ha declarado, en sentencia Nº 2002-08696 de las 10:14 horas del 6 de setiembre del 2002, que esto no excluye la obligación de los entes municipales -evidentemente, en coordinación con el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados que es el ente rector por excelencia en la materia-, de desarrollar, entre otras obras de carácter comunal, lo relativo a adecuados sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados. En efecto, el artículo 4 inciso c) del Código Municipal vigente establece en términos generales, como una atribución municipal, el administrar y prestar los servicios públicos municipales, dentro de los cuales, sin duda alguna, se encuentran los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados.\n\nAdemás, el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados tiene igualmente una competencia compartida al respecto. En la referida resolución Nº 2002-08696 de las 10:14 horas del 6 de setiembre del 2002, la Sala concluyó que “... la atribución de crear y mantener las redes del alcantarillado sanitario, le corresponde a las municipalidades, por cuanto éstas, según el artículo 3 del Código Municipal vigente, son las principales obligadas de velar por los intereses y servicios cantonales dentro de la jurisdicción que tengan a su cargo y porque expresamente así se deriva del artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, que establece la competencia genérica de las Municipalidades en esta materia. Sin embargo, en atención a lo dispuesto por el artículo 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, tal obligación debe ser compartida con el Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, ya que éste, como órgano rector de la materia, es el encargado a nivel nacional (sic) de dirigir, coordinar y vigilar todo lo concerniente a la evacuación de aguas negras, alcantarillados y contaminación de los recursos de agua en beneficio de los habitantes de la República.” (Sentencia No. 2008-001191 de las once horas y treinta y seis minutos del veinticinco de enero del dos mil ocho. El subrayado y la negrita son nuestros). Igualmente en otro de sus Fallos, el Alto Tribunal precisando el tema de las competencias en el campo que nos ocupa, indicó:\n\n\"En esta materia no puede olvidarse que la competencia y responsabilidad por el manejo del alcantarillado pluvial corresponde principalmente a las Municipalidades -aunque en coordinación con el Instituto Costarricense de\n\nAcueductos y Alcantarillados y el Ministerio de Salud según sea el caso para\n\nlo cual debe efectuar la coordinación del caso- y este ente local, a pesar de ser conocedor del problema actual y de la solución que debe dársele, no procedió inmediatamente a atender el problema, dejando pasar los años plagados de omisiones y acciones improductivas.\" (Sentencia No. 2008-004210 de las trece horas y cincuenta y nueve minutos del catorce de marzo del dos mil ocho. En similar sentido Voto No. 18465-2020 de las nueve horas quince minutos del veinticinco de setiembre de dos mil veinte. La negrita es propia).\n\nEn otro de sus Votos, en el que específicamente se refiere a la Municipalidad de San José, la referida Sala manifestó:\n\n\"Lo anterior, constituye una clara violación a los derechos fundamentales de los amparados, la que es imputable a la Municipalidad de San José, ya que, según se desprende del expediente, dicha autoridad es la competente para atender el alcantarillado pluvial del cantón.\" (Sentencia No. 2011-006903 de las doce horas y nueve minutos del veintisiete de mayo del dos mil once. En similar sentido resolución No. 2020-009707 de las nueve horas quince minutos del veintinueve de mayo de dos mil veinte. El resaltad en negrita es de esta Cámara). \n\nTambién, mediante Sentencia No. 2012-001015 de las nueve horas cinco minutos del veintisiete de enero de dos mil doce, el Alto Tribunal señaló:\n\n\"Ciertamente, en primera instancia, la obligación de crear y mantener las redes del alcantarillado pluvial le corresponde a las municipalidades por cuanto estas, de conformidad con lo regulado en los numerales 3 del Código Municipal y 169 de la Constitución Política, son las principales obligadas a salvaguardar los intereses y servicios cantonales dentro de la jurisdicción correspondiente, lo que justifica el hecho de que tales corporaciones cobren impuestos municipales, en los que se incluye el rubro correspondiente al mantenimiento y operación de la red pluvial. No obstante, en atención a lo dispuesto en los numerales 1 y 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, esa obligación debe ser compartida con el Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, ya que este es el órgano rector en la materia y la entidad técnicamente más especializada para asesorar en e l debido mantenimiento del referido servicio.\" (Tanto el subrayado como la negrita son de este Órgano Colegiado).\n\nDe igual manera, en uno de sus Fallos más recientes sobre el tema que nos ocupa, la mencionada Sala sostuvo:\n\n\"En el caso concreto, la recurrente alega la afectación al derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado con ocasión a dos problemas: a) canalización de las aguas del alcantarillado en Dirección289 , Barrio Los Ángeles de San Rafael Debajo de Desamparados, lo que causa que las aguas se desborden causando inundaciones...\n\nRespecto a tales alegatos, a partir de la relación de hechos probados se tiene por acreditado que la problemática de cita ha sido denunciada por la amparada y demás vecinos de la comunidad, desde el año 2019. Así, consta que el 21 de octubre de 2019, interpusieron una denuncia ante la Municipalidad de Desamparados, alegando problemas con la canalización de aguas, a partir de lo cual han sufrido inundaciones, daños en tuberías y alcantarillado, daños en la calzada y daños en sus propiedades.\n\n(...) En el desarrollo, tutela y pleno disfrute de los derechos de cita, resulta de relevancia la función de las Municipalidades y sus órganos –incluyendo los concejos municipales de distrito-, las cuales, a partir del artículo 169 constitucional, se encuentran en la obligación de prestar en forma efectiva los servicios públicos que les han sido encomendados. Así, de aplicación en el caso concreto, tales obligaciones conllevan el efectivo mantenimiento de las vías públicas caminos, aceras y alcantarillado-, por medio de las cuales se ejercitan y disfrutan otros derechos, tales como la libertad ambulatoria, la salud y el derecho a un ambiente sano.\" (Sentencia No. 2021-005042 de las nueve horas quince minutos del doce de marzo de dos mil veintiuno. La negrita no corresponde al original).\n\nTal y como puede apreciarse con claridad a partir de la jurisprudencia constitucional, lo concerniente al alcantarillado pluvial es competencia municipal, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en los ordinales 1 y 2 de la Ley Constitutiva del AyA, toda vez que, como lo indica la Sala Constitucional, dicho Instituto \"es el órgano rector en la materia y la entidad técnicamente más especializada para asesorar en el debido mantenimiento del referido servicio.\" Así las cosas, sin importar el tipo de carretera -entiéndase nacional o cantonal- lo atinente a dicho servicio le corresponde al Gobierno Local respectivo. Y en esta línea, nótese como el Alto Tribunal hace expresa referencia a que la responsabilidad de las municipalidades en este tema es principal, debiendo las mismas coordinar \"con el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Ministerio de Salud según sea el caso.\" Así las cosas, conforme a la jurisprudencia constitucional de cita, no existe duda alguna en cuanto a que son las municipalidades las responsables directas \"de crear y mantener las redes del alcantarillado pluvial\" dentro de la respectiva circunscripción territorial -cantón- que administran. Siendo ello así, a la luz de la normativa y sentencias constitucionales citadas, quien debe responder por el adecuado funcionamiento de todo el sistema de alcantarillado pluvial vinculado con las carreteras que se ubican en el Cantón Central de San José -sean nacionales o no-, es la Municipalidad de San José, quien incluso cuenta con un \"Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José\", publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 155 del 27 de agosto de 2018. Y en ese tanto, cualquier daño generado por dicho sistema o alguno de sus elementos, le resulta imputable a la misma. Ahora bien, en la especie no existe duda alguna en cuanto al accidente acaecido, el lugar en el que ocurrió y la causa eficiente del mismo -tapa de alcantarillado pluvial en posición vertical-, sin que se haya demostrado la existencia de fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima -por exceso de velocidad, impericia y/o imprudencia- o hecho de un tercero. En este sentido, claramente el percance no se debió a un hecho de la naturaleza, según se desprende con sobrada claridad de la dinámica del accidente narrada por la actora en su demanda y que resulta congruente con la declaración del testigo Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo. El referido deponente manifestó vivir en Dirección13579 , misma que se ubica frente a la zona donde acaeció el accidente. Indicó además que la momento del percance, él pudo observar como un vehículo de 3 ó 4 toneladas que iba delante del conducido por la actora y que al pasar aquel sobre la tapa de alcantarilla, esta quedó en posición vertical, por lo que acto seguido la llanta delantera derecho del automotor de la accionante impactó la misma y salió catapultado, dando varias vueltas sobre la carretera. La representación del CONAVI, intentó desvirtuar lo así declarado por el referido testigo aduciendo que no había precisión en cuanto a cuál de las dos llantas delanteras fue la que impactó la alcantarilla y cómo era que le testigo había dicho que se encontraba mensajeando por WhatsApp al momento del accidente y aún así pudo presenciar el accidente. Al respecto valga indicar, en primer lugar que para esta Cámara resulta irrelevante si el testigo podía precisar cuál de las dos llantas delanteras del vehículo conducido por la accionante fue la que impactó con la alcantarilla de comentario, pues lo de transcendencia es que una de las llantas de adelante hizo impacto con la tapa alcantarilla y en segundo lugar, si bien el testigo indicó que estaba mensajeando mientras descansaba, ello en modo alguno significa que el mismo se encontrara abstraído de la realidad circundante. En esta línea, en ningún momento el testigo refirió que su atención fuere completa y absoluta para el intercambio de mensajes en el que se encontraba, contrario a ello, aclaró que al darse un descanso de sus labores habituales, aprovechó para mensajear, mientras observaba hacia el exterior de su vivienda. Tampoco es dable sostener que existió el hecho de un tercero, solamente porque según la narrativa de lo acaecido, fue un vehículo que viajaba delante de la actora el que, al pasar por la mencionada alcantarilla \"dejó la misma\" en posición vertical, pues tal circunstancia no acaeció porque tal vehículo pasara sobre la alcantarilla, sino porque la misma, no se comportó como debía. Sea, podían pasar ese y otros vehículos más sobre dicho elemento y el mismo debía mantenerse en su sitio o espacio denominado aro base o \"flanger\". (En tal sentido, véase el Informe DRyTOMSR-2017-00849 elaborado por el Ing. William Leininger Sancho, que se encuentra visible a imágenes 91 a 94 del expediente judicial). Finalmente, no se aprecia la existencia de culpa de la víctima, toda vez que el argumento esgrimido en cuanto a la distancia que debía guardar la actora con respecto al vehículo que circulaba delante del suyo no era la adecuada por la velocidad a la que conducía la misma, pues de haberlo sido, bien hubiere podido reaccionar para maniobrar y evitar el impactar con la tapa de la alcantarilla, fue solamente eso, un alegato ayuno de prueba. En esta línea, -sea respecto al tema del exceso de velocidad-, es un hecho que no se tuvo por demostrado, pues si bien en el Parte Oficial de Tránsito, se consignó como causa del accidente en \"Observaciones\": \"DERRAPE Y VUELCO A CAUSA DE DESPRENDIMIENTO DE TAPA DE ALCANTARILLA\" y como \"Factor de Riesgo: Exceso de velocidad\", lo cierto es que ello no pasa de ser un simple comentario de un Oficial de Tránsito que no presenció el accidente. Y en todo caso, se reitera, la referida tapa no debía comportarse de la forma en que lo hizo, lo que en modo alguno puede imputársele a la aquí demandante. Dicho esto, se reitera que en la especie se ha tenido por acreditado que la actora sufrió un accidente automovilístico porque una tapa que formaba parte de un sistema de alcantarillado pluvial -servicio público competencia de la Municipalidad de San José en este caso, según la jurisprudencia constitucional supracitada-, \"no se comportó de la forma esperada\" -causa eficiente del percance-, pues luego de ser pisada por un vehículo que viajaba delante del que era conducido por la aquí demandante, quedó en posición vertical. Lo hasta aquí señalado, además de despejar la dudas sobre la Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva, permite a esta Cámara adentrarse en las siguientes líneas en los daños y perjuicios reclamados por quien acciona. 1. Diferencia no indemnizada respecto del valor real del vehículo (¢3.000.000). Tal y como fue indicado en el elenco de hecho probados, producto de la póliza que la actora tenía suscrita con el INS, la misma recibió de dicho Instituto una indemnización por un monto de ¢6.000.000, en razón de la pérdida total de su vehículo. Ahora bien, no queda claro si quien acciona se encuentra inconforme con lo así concedido por la referida entidad aseguradora, en cuyo caso debió accionar contra la misma lo que no hizo en la especie- a efecto de que este Tribunal pudiera revisar la legalidad de la conducta desplegada. Si contrario a ello, la accionante estimaba que lo indemnizado por el INS resultaba acorde con la póliza contratada, pero que su vehículo tenía un mayor valor de mercado -por el que no lo había asegurado- y que en consecuencia esa diferencia debía ser cubierta por los codemandados, se encontraba en la obligación de probar tal circunstancia. Lo que tampoco hizo, pues se tuvo por indemostrado que \"el vehículo propiedad de la actora tuviere al momento en que acaeció el accidente, un valor de mercado de nueve millones de colones -¢9.000.000-.\" De ahí que, respecto de este pedimento, se imponga su rechazo. 2. Seis meses que no pudo dedicarse a su trabajo (¢4.164.784,92). Pese a las argumentaciones de las Administraciones accionadas en torno a que la actora al rendir su Declaración Indagatoria ante el Juzgado de Tránsito de Hatillo, manifestó ser ama de casa para cuando ocurrió el percance, en la especie se tuvo por acreditado que la misma se dedicaba al cuido de adultos mayores. En este sentido, nótese que si bien el primero de los oficios fue el que se consignó en la referida Declaración Indagatoria, se ignora si ello obedeció porque ante quien se rindió la misma no modificó tal información en el formato que se utiliza para detallar las calidades en ese tipo de acto procesal o si efectivamente así lo indicó la propia demandante. No obstante ello, en este Proceso se ha ido más allá del simple dicho y se ha traído prueba sobre la ocupación de la misma para cuando acaeció el accidente. En este sentido, puede observarse la Declaración Jurada rendida por quien demanda, visible a imágenes 45 a 46 del expediente, en la cual expresamente manifiesta bajo la gravedad del juramento -lo que de paso valga decir, no ocurre en una Declaración Indagatoria-, que se dedicaba al cuido de adultos mayores. Manifestación la anterior, que fue respaldada por la testigo [Nombre62 004], hermana de la actora, cuando al ser consultada en Juicio sobre si conocía a qué se dedicaba su hermana, manifestó sin titubear -sea con total seguridad-: \"[Nombre62 001] no es profesional, cuida personas adultas mayores para ganarse la vida\". A lo que agregó, que se trataba de un trabajo con horario fijo. Posteriormente indicó, que al momento del accidente su hermana tenía a cargo unos señores mayores que atendía en Sabanilla. Lo así dicho tanto por la actora como por la citada testigo, resulta congruente con lo indicado en cuanto a la actividad de la demandante por el Contador Público Autorizado Rodolfo Jenkins Conejo, en la Certificación emitida por el mismo, que si bien como se verá, no constituye prueba suficiente para acreditar los ingresos de quien acciona, ciertamente se erige como un elemento de convicción más, que aunado a los 2 previamente indicados, permite tener por demostrado a qué se dedicaba la accionante al momento del percance. Ahora bien, pese a ello, sea a que ha sido acreditada la actividad a la cual se dedicaba la accionante cuando acaeció el accidente, conforme fuera indicado en el Considerando relativo a los hechos no probados, en la especie se ha tenido por indemostrado, que con ocasión del percance sufrido, la actora se haya visto imposibilitada por espacio de 6 meses para ejercer su actividad de cuido de Adultos Mayores. Siendo ello así, pues no existe prueba médica idónea que acredite tal circunstancia, la Certificación de Contador Público Autorizado que aporta la actora para cuantificar el extremo reclamado carece de relevancia y por tal razón de innecesario análisis en cuanto a su contenido. No obstante ello, sin perjuicio de lo así señalado, ha de recordarse que ese tipo de certificaciones en modo alguno constituye plena prueba para casos como el que nos ocupa. Precisamente, analizando este tema con total claridad, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha señalado:\n\n“ III.- Respecto al argumento indicado como Primero, esta Sala ha señalado, que las certificaciones emitidas por los contadores públicos en lo que se refiere a la materia de su competencia constituyen documentos públicos, sin que la fe pública de estos funcionarios sea extensiva al contenido o verdad intrínseca de los estados financieros o contables que hagan constar, de ahí que sean indispensables los comprobantes de las operaciones a fin de verificarlas. Sobre la fuerza probatoria de dichos instrumentos este órgano jurisdiccional ha indicado que la plena prueba se refiere a los hechos que el oficial afirme haber realizado él mismo, o que hubieren pasado en su presencia, en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Si no se está ante estos supuestos, aún cuando el documento sea de ese tipo, por haber sido expedido con los requisitos señalados por el numeral 369 del Código Procesal Civil, su contenido puede ser combatido por cualquier medio de prueba. En cuanto a los expedidos por los profesionales en contaduría pública, ha manifestado: “De acuerdo con el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Contadores Públicos de Costa Rica, los documentos que expidan los CPA en el ramo de su competencia, tendrán el valor de documentos públicos. …en consideración al interés público que permea la materia tributaria, tal carácter no implica que los estados financieros o contables de los contribuyentes objeto de la certificación sean correctos o verdaderos, per sé. La naturaleza de público y, por ende de plena prueba, se circunscribe a la constatación de la existencia de los registros analizados por el CPA y a los actos o hechos realizados o ejecutados por ellos. Consecuente con lo anterior, el numeral 49 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, dispone que la opinión o interpretación contenida en las certificaciones para efectos tributarios, no constituye plena prueba contra el Fisco, y no obliga a la Administración Tributaria” . No. 421 de 9 horas 40 minutos del 20 de junio del 2005. Por ende no lleva razón el casacionista cuando afirma que la certificación del profesional en contaduría es plena prueba por ser documento público, porque como se dijo, se limita a dejar constancia de la contabilidad de una persona física o jurídica, sin que ello implique su certeza. En la especie el Tribunal no le otorgó un valor distinto al que\n\nposee.” (Sentencia No. 00947 de las quince horas del siete de Diciembre del año dos mil cinco. Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Ver además, Sentencia No. 000421-F-2005 de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del veinte de Junio del dos mil cinco, emitida por la misma Sala).\n\nAunado a lo hasta aquí señalado, se ha tenido por demostrado que las incapacidades que en su momento le fueron otorgadas a la demandante con ocasión del accidente no superaron en conjunto los 20 días. Circunstancia la anterior, que permite concluir razonablemente, que a criterio médico la accionante sí estaba en capacidad de realizar sus labores habituales. Así las cosas, lo procedente es rechazar el presente extremo petitorio, como en efecto se dispone. 3. Costo del transporte y alimentación los días de cita médica, correspondiente a diez mil colones por cita (¢140.000). Según se demuestra con la certificación SEAD-051232017 del 30 de octubre de 2017 emitida por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, producto de la cobertura del seguro obligatorio de vehículos, a la demandante le han sido cubiertos los siguientes gastos: a) Pago de transportes: quince mil setecientos colones -¢15.700,00-. b) Servicios Médicos: setecientos veintisiete mil ochocientos setenta y siete colones con cincuenta y nueve céntimos -¢727.877,59-. Lo anterior suma un Total de gastos de setecientos cuarenta y tres mil quinientos setenta y siete colones con cincuenta y nueve céntimos -¢743.577,59-. Como lógica consecuencia de lo anterior, quien demanda no puede pretender el cobro de gastos de transporte, si éstos ya fueron reconocidos por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Aunado a lo anterior, la accionante no explica, justifica ni concreta, el monto que pretende en cuanto a la alimentación, así como tampoco aporta respaldo documental alguno de este tipo de gasto, que permita examinar la procedencia o no del mismo. Por lo hasta aquí señalado, se impone el rechazo de esta pretensión. 4. Daño moral subjetivo por las lesiones corporales (prudencialmente en ¢30.000.000). En cuanto a este tipo de daño, ha de recordarse que el mismo incide sobre la psiquis de la persona, por lo que se la denominado como daño incorporal, extrapatrimonial o de afección. De ahí que se ha estimado que el mismo se encuentra vinculado a “… la angustia, frustración, impotencia, inseguridad, zozobra, ansiedad, pena, intranquilidad, desilusión, entre otros, su común denominador es el sufrimiento o la aflicción psíquica o emocional”. (Sentencia No. 269 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 23 de abril de 2004, emitida por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). La prueba del daño moral subjetivo, es “in re ipsa”, porque es el propio hecho generador el que hace surgir este tipo de vejamen, y las pruebas se obtienen a través de “presunciones de hombre”, las cuales son inferidas de los indicios. De esta manera, se ha dicho: “XIII.- En lo referente a la prueba del daño moral el principio es el siguiente: debe acreditarse su existencia y gravedad, carga que le corresponde a la víctima, sin embargo se ha admitido que tal prueba se puede lograr a través de presunciones de hombre inferidas de los indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc. es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe \"in re ipsa\". (Sentencia No. 725 de las 12 horas 15 minutos del 25 de agosto de 2004. Así como Votos No. 564 de las 11 horas del 10 de setiembre de 2003, No. 311 de las 16 horas 10 minutos del 25 de abril de 2001 y No. 725 de las 12 horas 15 minutos del 25 de agosto de 2004. Todas emitidas por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Ahora bien, la reparación de este daño, es decir el monto que se fije por concepto de indemnización del mismo, si bien depende del prudente arbitrio del Juzgador, es lo cierto que en modo alguno puede resultar desproporcionado, ya sea por exiguo o por excesivamente elevado. Así las cosas, en la especie no se cuestiona que el accidente haya producido lesiones a quien demanda, mismas que si bien no ameritaron su traslado al Hospital ni una incapacidad como la reclamada de 6 meses, ciertamente si le generó consecuencias corporales que ameritaron su incapacidad por varios días, llegando a requerir hasta un día de terapia física -20 de enero de 2017-, todo lo cual se tuvo por debidamente acreditado en la especie. De ahí que resulte razonable concluir, que tales lesiones corporales hayan generado un impacto negativo en la psiquis de la actora, ocasionándole el daño que reclama y consecuentemente haciendo florecer en ella, una serie de emociones y sentimientos que van desde la impotencia y la ansiedad, hasta el desánimo y la frustración. Daño el de comentario que en tanto la misma no tiene el deber de soportar, corresponde ser indemnizado. Ahora bien, con el respeto de costumbre estima esta Cámara que la suma pedida por tal concepto es evidentemente desproporcionada y en ese tanto, lo procedente es fijar el quantum de lo pedido en la suma prudencial de un millón setecientos mil colones -¢1.700.000-. Monto que si bien es por mucho inferior al pedido, ciertamente permite efectivizar razonablemente el derecho que le asiste a la demandante a ser indemnizada por el daño causado sin generar un enriquecimiento ilícito en perjuicio de las finanzas municipales. 5. Daño moral por los efectos emocionales y traumáticos (prudencialmente en ¢30.000.000). Por tratarse del mismo tipo de daño moral que se peticiona en el apartado precedente, con el respeto acostumbrado, se remite a las partes a lo que ahí se manifestó respecto del daño moral subjetivo, incluido el tema de la desproporcionalidad de lo pedido. Dicho lo anterior, habiendo sido demostrado que la actora requirió de atención tanto Psicológica como Psiquiátrica, siendo incluso incapacitada por esta última Especialidad Médica del Instituto Nacional de Seguros con ocasión del accidente sufrido, resulta razonable presumir que tales tratamientos obedecieron a que la misma experimentó un impacto negativo en su psiquis, con las consecuencias ya ampliamente explicadas en el apartado anterior, lo que se confirma con las manifestaciones de la testigo [Nombre62 004] -hermana de la demandante-, quien indicó en Juicio que lloró mucho espontánea y constantemente, así como que tuvo problemas para dormir. Lo hasta aquí señalado se traduce en un evidente daño moral subjetivo, que en tanto la actora no se encuentra en el deber de soportar, debe indemnizársele. En cuanto al monto a conceder por tal concepto, de la misma forma en que se indicó en el acápite que antecede, a juicio de este Colegio de Jueces la suma pretendida por tal concepto es evidentemente desproporcionada y en ese tanto, lo procedente es fijar el quantum de lo pedido en la suma prudencial de tres millones cuatrocientos mil colones -¢3.400.000-. Monto que pese a ser el doble de lo concedido en el apartado precedente es por mucho inferior al pedido, ciertamente permite efectivizar razonablemente el derecho que le asiste a la demandante a ser indemnizada por el daño causado sin generar un enriquecimiento ilícito en perjuicio de las finanzas municipales. Llegado a este punto, considera esta Cámara que es importante aclarar, que ciertamente la parte actora reclama dos extremos de daño moral subjetivo y que se están concediendo ambos -aunque por montos inferiores a los pedidos-, pero en modo alguno debe entenderse ello como un doble pago, sino como daños que tuvieron su propia génesis en causas distintas. Así, el concedido en el apartado precedente deriva de las lesiones corporales que sufrió la demandante con ocasión del accidente de tránsito y que requirieron de atención médica, incapacidades y un día de terapia física. Mientras que el otorgado en este acápite, tiene su origen en las secuelas emocionales que experimentó por el percance acaecido y que ameritaron atención Psicológica y Psiquiátrica, así como una incapacidad por esta última Especialidad Médica. Siendo ello así, no se trata de un doble pago por exactamente lo mismo.\n\n6. Eventual incapacidad parcial temporal o permanente en el uso de su mano izquierda. En cuanto a este extremo petitorio, nótese que existe en autos el dictamen médico legal No. 2016-0001979 del 27 de octubre de 2016 emitido por el Departamento de Medicina Legal del OIJ, el cual señala como parte de sus conclusiones lo siguiente: \"1. Lesiones: Accidente de tránsito can contusiones simples. 2. Incapacidad temporal: DIEZ (10) DÍAS a partir de la fecha de los hechos en estudio. 3. Las lesiones sufridas tienden a la curación sin dejar secuelas funcionales.\" Tal y como puede apreciarse a partir de lo transcrito, las lesiones que sufrió la actora fueron catalogadas como simples que tienden a sanar sin secuela funcional alguna. Siendo ello así y habiéndose tenido por indemostrado que como una consecuencia del accidente sufrido por la demandante, la misma haya quedado con una incapacidad parcial temporal o permanente en el uso de su mano izquierda, lo procedente es rechazar este pedimento, como en efecto se dispone. Por último, en cuanto al alquiler de un vehículo por espacio de 32 días, pese a ser un tema discutido por las partes, al no existir pretensión alguna sobre ello se omite analizar tal punto, junto la prueba atinente al mismo -recibo de dinero y declaración en Juicio de Yancy Ramírez Ramírez-. Lo hasta aquí señalado nos permite evidenciar, que en la especie se encuentran presentes los tres presupuestos supra señalados como esenciales, para que surja la responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración Pública: i) Una conducta -omisiva en este caso- de la Municipalidad de San José -Administración Pública Descentralizada-, respecto de su ineludible deber de inspeccionar y/o reparar cualquier elemento de riesgo en los sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial que operan en el Cantón Central de San José. ii) El daño causado, tanto al vehículo de la actora que en este caso fue cubierto por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, así como el de naturaleza moral subjetivo que se analizó líneas atrás. iii) El nexo de causalidad, entre la referida omisión y el daño que causado. Así las cosas, los extremos concedidos en el presente Fallo, deben ser cubiertos exclusivamente por la Municipalidad de San José. \n\nVII.- DE LA EXCEPCIONES OPUESTAS: Tal y como fue indicado en el Resultando II de esta Sentencia, al contestar la demanda las Administraciones accionada opusieron las siguientes excepciones: CONAVI: Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario incompleto -resuelta interlocutoriamente- y Falta de Derecho. ESTADO: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva y Falta de Derecho. AyA: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva. MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: Falta de Legitimación Pasiva. Al respecto, en el Considerando precedente se realizó un abordaje temático sobre los alcantarillados pluviales, sustentado en la jurisprudencia constitucional, según la cual, son las Municipalidades las competentes y consecuentemente responsables de la construcción, mantenimiento y funcionamiento adecuado de los mismos. Siendo ello así, claro está que en cuanto al CONAVI de oficio procede declarar la Falta de Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva, acogiendo además la excepción que en tal sentido opusieron tanto el Estado como el AyA. En lo atinente al ente municipal accionado, debe rechazarse la excepción de comentario, en tanto como se ha dicho, es el referido Gobierno Local el que a juicio de esta Cámara ha incurrido a través de su conducta omisiva, en la responsabilidad que se reclama. (Artículo 12.1 del CPCA). Por la forma en que se resuelve, se omite pronunciamiento acerca de la excepción de Falta de Derecho interpuesta tanto por el CONAVI como por la Representación Estatal. \n\nVIII.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS: El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable: a) cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar; b) cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas que desconociera la parte contraria; o bien, c) cuando se incurra en plus petitio, esto es, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento (15%) o más, a no ser que las bases de la demanda sean expresamente consideradas provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos (ordinal 194 ibídem). En la especie, estima este Órgano Colegiado que sin necesidad de mayor esfuerzo, con una simple lectura no sólo de las contestaciones de demanda realizadas por las Administraciones accionadas, sino también de los aspectos de fondo desarrollados en este Fallo, es dable concluir que la actora tiene motivos de sobra para litigar de la forma en que lo hizo. Esto es, demandando a todas las Administraciones aquí citadas, pues para nada era claro y/o sencillo determinar la entidad u órgano responsable de lo acaecido. Así las cosas, en criterio de este Órgano Colegiado, lo procedente es resolver sin especial condenatoria en costas respecto del CONAVI, Estado y el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. Pero en lo atinente a la Municipalidad de San José, corresponde condenarla al pago de ambas costas de este Proceso. Quantum de las mismas que se determinará en la Fase de Ejecución de Sentencia a ruego de la parte vencedora.\n\nPOR TANTO \n\nSe admite la prueba documental para mejor resolver aportada por la representación del CONAVI y se rechaza la excepción de Cosa Juzgada opuesta por la misma. Respecto del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad de oficio se declara la Falta de Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva, acogiendo además la excepción que en tal sentido opusieron tanto el Estado como el AyA. En consecuencia contra tales Administraciones Públicas se declara sin lugar la demanda sin especial condenatoria en costas. En lo atinente a la Municipalidad de San José, se rechaza la excepción de Falta de Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva y consecuentemente, se declara Parcialmente Con Lugar la demanda incoada en su contra, entendiéndose denegada en lo no expresamente concedido: i) Deberá el ente municipal capitalino, pagar a la aquí actora, la suma de un millón setecientos mil colones -¢1.700.000- por concepto de daño moral subjetivo derivado de las lesiones corporales sufridas. ii) Igualmente deberá la Municipalidad accionada cancelar a la demandante, la suma de tres millones cuatrocientos mil colones ¢3.400.000-, por concepto de daño moral subjetivo derivado de los efectos emocionales y traumáticos experimentados. iii) Se condena a la Municipalidad de San José, al pago de ambas costas de este Proceso a favor de la aquí actora. Quantum de las mismas que se determinará en la Etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia a instancia de la parte vencedora. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se omite pronunciamiento acerca de la excepción de Falta de Derecho interpuesta tanto por el CONAVI como por la Representación Estatal. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Juez Ponente, Judith Reyes Castillo, Jueza e Iván Salas Leitón, Juez.-",
  "body_en_text": "**FILE:** 17-008361-1027-CA\n\n**PROCEEDING:** ORDINARY PROCEEDING\n\n**PLAINTIFF:** [Nombre62 001]\n\n**DEFENDANTS:** CONAVI AND OTHERS\n\n**No. 86-2021-IV**\n\n**FOURTH SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL.** Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , at fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on the twenty-ninth of July of two thousand twenty-one.\n\nOrdinary Proceeding filed by [Nombre62 001], identity card [Valor CED63], represented by her Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado José Joaquín Villalobos Soto, bar card CED88932 against the NATIONAL ROAD COUNCIL -CONAVI-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Óscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, bar card CED87822, THE STATE, represented by Procuradora Silvia Patiño Cruz, bar card CED31858, COSTA RICAN INSTITUTE OF AQUEDUCTS AND SEWERS -AyA-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Robny Portilla Barrantes, bar card CED89026 and the MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Marco Vinicio Álvarez Mattey, bar card CED89027.\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\nI.- The plaintiff filed this Proceeding so that in Judgment it be declared:\n\n\"CONAVI be ordered in judgment, or, subsidiarily, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers or the Municipality of San José, individually one, two, or all the defendant entities jointly, to pay the following items: I- Payment of the difference indemnified in the real value of the destroyed vehicle of three million colones. II- Payment for the six months in which she could not dedicate herself to her elderly care work due to the painful effects of her injuries, in the sum of ¢4,164,784.92 (four million sixty-four thousand colones with ninety-two cents). III. Cost of transportation and food for each appointment, at the INS clinic, which represents an abnormal expense in my activities, at ten thousand colones per appointment, ¢140,000.00 (one hundred forty thousand colones). IV. Payment for the moral damage suffered through her injuries, the pain caused by the blows suffered in the rollover of the vehicle, injuries to the head, neck, both shoulders, left hand, waist, abdomen, both thighs, right foot, and permanent headache with dizziness, bruising (equimosis) in the distal third of the clavicle with local pain and in the left hand, swelling (edema) on the back at the level of the 4th and 5th metacarpal, general pain throughout the body, Cervicalgia from whiplash (at the level of the cervical vertebrae), which required treatment with anti-inflammatories and analgesics: Diclofenac, Tramadol, Methyl Salicylate Ointment, Tizanidine, Aluminum Acetate Powder, Indomethacin, Carbamazepine, for three months, plus twenty days of disability leave, added to the inflammatory process that can produce pain and swelling (edema) for an indefinite time, from about 8 months to a year, which are valued prudentially at thirty million colones. V. Payment for moral damage for the emotional and traumatic effects suffered from the accident that manifested in ailments of difficulty sleeping, nightmares, lack of appetite, recurrent crying, intrusive thoughts, anxious episodes, state of hyperarousal, feeling of insecurity and fear of driving or going out on the street, and difficulty working due to pain in the fingers, requiring treatment with Sertraline Vo 50 Mg Hs and Diphenhydramine Vo 50 Mg Hs, for three months, with sequelae to date that prevent me from driving on the same street again, to which simultaneous psychological treatment had to be added for anxious depressive reaction due to post-traumatic stress, with treatment over six months, which are valued prudentially at thirty million colones. VI. Eventually and subject to the result of the expert evidence, an amount to be determined, for an eventual temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of the left hand.\" The plaintiff's representative clarified that claim number IV refers to moral damage generated by physical aspects and claim V refers to moral damage generated by emotional aspects. (Images 2 to 22, 253 to 262 of the judicial file and digital backup of the Preliminary Hearing).\n\nII.- Having been served process, the defendant entities answered the complaint negatively and raised the following defenses: CONAVI: Incomplete necessary passive joinder -resolved interlocutorily- and Lack of Right. STATE: Lack of Passive Standing and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Standing. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Standing. (Images 81 to 86, 99 to 106, 111 to 139 and 141 to 154 of the judicial file).\n\nIII.- The Preliminary Hearing in this Proceeding was held on July 10, 2018.\n\n(Images 253 to 262 of the judicial file. Electronic backup of said hearing).\n\nIV.- The Oral and Public Trial was held at 8:30 a.m. on July 7 and 9, 2021. On the first of those days, under article 50.2 of the CPCA, the parties were granted 3 business days to submit written statements regarding the documentary evidence that CONAVI provided for better judgment, a period that expired on July 12, 2021. Subsequently, the testimony of Mr. Nombre61250 was declared impossible to take, proceeding then to the taking of the rest of the evidence admitted at the Preliminary Hearing, and prior to the closing of the debate, the parties were given the opportunity to present their respective conclusions. (Compact disc backup of the Supplementary Hearing).\n\nV.- This Judgment is issued, after deliberation by the members of the Tribunal, within the fifteen-day period established in article 111.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code -this matter having been declared complex-, without observing any grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Judge Baltodano Gómez, with the affirmative vote of the judges Reyes Castillo and Salas Leitón.\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\nI.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER JUDGMENT. During the Oral and Public Trial stage -more specifically on July 7, 2021-, CONAVI's representation indicated to the Tribunal that it had submitted to the file, by means of a brief of that same date, the documents indicated below, so that their admission as evidence for better judgment could be assessed: 1. Literal Registry Certification of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 002]. 2. Registry Certification of the microfilmed folio registered in volume [Valor 003], Entry [Valor 004], Sequence 001. Movable Property, corresponding to the vehicle with license plate [Placa703]. 3. Inspection report on the works carried out at Dirección13576, dated September 2016. 4. Official letter UE-DCPA-0112018-025 (0613) dated February 13, 2018. Having been given the floor to the proponent of said evidence, it extensively explained the reasons why, in its opinion, it should be admitted. Then, upon inquiry from the plaintiff's representation, CONAVI's Special Judicial Attorney stated that, because it was a certification corresponding to another vehicle, it was withdrawing the first 2 pages of the evidence provided. The documentation indicated was given the treatment provided for in article 50.2 of the CPCA, granting the other parties a period of 3 business days to refer to it in writing. This period of time expired on July 12 of the current year. Criteria of this Collegiate Body. In view of the already known discretionary admission of evidence for better judgment, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has held that its rejection does not cause defenselessness to the parties. Among other judgments, the text of number 547-F2002 of sixteen hours on July twelfth, two thousand two, is transcribed in what is relevant, which states: \"(…) IV. Multiple precedents of this Chamber, referring to evidence for better judgment, have indicated that this is evidence of the judge, and not of the parties. Consequently, the decision to collect it is discretionary for the jurisdictional body, and it can be dispensed with without the need for any resolution. Ergo, the omission of a ruling on it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been surpassed, in which the parties must demonstrate the constitutive facts of their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof, and once that stage has precluded, it will be the exclusive power of the judge to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation should be added to the record. The following resolutions can be consulted, among many others; 59 of 15:20 hours on May 31, 1996, 23 of 14:20 hours on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 hours on May 28, 1993 and 83 of 14:40 hours on December 22, 1993. (…)\". In support of the above, judgment number 29-1995 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on February twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five, also issued by the First Chamber, clarifies the following: \"(…) Within the instructional and ordering powers of the judge, is that of ordering evidence for better judgment (article 97, subsection 2, and 331 of the Civil Procedure Code), when the evidence to be practiced has a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceeding (…) . The core aspect of evidence for better judgment is its optional or discretionary nature, and it cannot be demanded by the parties; its ordering depends entirely on the initiative, prudence, and criteria of the jurisdictional body, consequently its denial does not cause any defenselessness\". Having said all this, this Chamber considers that the documentation brought to the record by CONAVI's representation, in addition to being linked to its Theory of the Case and the object of the Proceeding, is pertinent, useful, and necessary to resolve the merits of this dispute. Hence, it is admitted as evidence for better judgment.\n\nII.- REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS. Of importance for the resolution of this dispute, the following are considered duly accredited: 1) That at the time of the accident to be discussed -which occurred on October 20, 2016- the plaintiff here was the owner of the vehicle with license plate [Valor Placa11683], Make: Nissan, Style: X-Trail Classic, Year: 2011, Color: gold. (Images 21 to 35 of the judicial file); 2) That on October 20, 2016, the plaintiff was driving her vehicle after midday on Dirección13577 in the direction of San José-San Sebastián- on the overpass, when another vehicle in front of her passed over a sewer grate and dislodged it from its position, leaving it vertically, and as she continued her course in her vehicle, one of its front tires impacted said sewer grate, causing her vehicle to roll over. (Uncontested fact regarding the place and time of the accident, image 66 of the judicial file, consisting of an Incident Report issued by the Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos, Official Traffic Report visible at image 157 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo); 3) That as a result of the accident narrated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff's vehicle was declared a total loss and, regarding her, she did not suffer injuries that required transfer to the Hospital. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file); 4) That because said vehicle owned by the plaintiff was insured, the National Insurance Institute paid her the sum of six million colones -¢6,000,000- due to the total loss of the aforementioned vehicle. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file and fact 24 of the complaint); 6) That at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff was dedicated to the Care of Older Adults. (Images 41 to 44, 45 to 46 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of Mrs. [Nombre62 004]); 7) That despite carrying out the activity indicated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff was not registered as a taxpayer before the Dirección General de Tributación of the Ministerio de Hacienda. (Uncontested fact); 8) That the plaintiff did not have sequelae as a result of the accident (See Medico-Legal Opinion at images 171 to 174 of the judicial file); 9) That in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\" as: \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO SEWER GRATE DETACHMENT\" and as \"Risk Factor: Excess speed\". (Images 156 to 157 of the judicial file. The capital letters correspond to the original); 10) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the Traffic Court of Hatillo, San José, in a summary proceeding processed under file No. 16-0026810492-TC, resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on March sixth, two thousand seventeen, to acquit the plaintiff here of all penalty and responsibility. (Image 190 of the judicial file); 11) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the National Insurance Institute, in addition to what relates to the indemnity for the total loss of her vehicle, paid her the following sums of money: i) Transportation payment: Fifteen thousand seven hundred colones -¢15,700.00-. ii) Medical Services: Seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents -¢727,877.59-. Leaving a balance in the coverage of five million two hundred fifty-six thousand four hundred twenty-two colones with forty-one cents -¢5,256,422.41-. (Certification SEAD-05123-2017 issued on October 30, 2017, by the National Insurance Institute, visible at image 199 of the judicial file); 12) That on the occasion of the accident, the plaintiff was placed on disability leave on various occasions by the Services of: General Medicine -13 days-, Orthopedics -4 days- and Psychiatry -3 days- all from the National Insurance Institute, for a total of 20 days of disability, also requiring one day of physical therapy -January 20, 2017- and several appointments were scheduled for both Psychiatry and Psychology. (Images 49 to 59 and 61 to 64 of the judicial file); 13) That the plaintiff suffered subjective moral damage derived both from the bodily injuries suffered and from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced on the occasion of the traffic accident in which she was involved. (Images 49 to 59, 61 to 64 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of [Nombre62 004]).\n\nIII.- UNPROVEN FACTS: Due to a lack of evidence to prove their occurrence, the following are considered unproven: 1) That the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had, at the time the accident occurred, a market value of nine million colones -¢9,000,000-. 2) That the plaintiff was traveling at excess speed when she was driving her vehicle on the aforementioned Dirección13577, and more specifically when passing over the sewer grate that caused the mishap. 3) That in the accident that occurred to the plaintiff on October 20, 2016, force majeure, fault of the victim -due to excess speed, lack of skill and/or imprudence-, or the act of a third party intervened. 4) That on the date the accident occurred, the plaintiff here was dedicated -even as a secondary activity- to being a Real Estate Broker. 5) That the plaintiff had to rent a vehicle for a period of 32 days starting November 20, 2016, in order to attend medical appointments and continue with her usual tasks. 6) That the plaintiff's monthly income generated from her activity of Care for Older Adults was seven hundred fifty thousand gross colones -¢750,000- and six hundred ninety-four thousand one hundred thirty colones with eighty-two cents, net -¢694,130.82-. 7) That on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was unable to carry out her activity of caring for Older Adults for a period of 6 months. 8) That as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of her left hand.\n\nIV.- REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA RAISED AT TRIAL BY CONAVI'S REPRESENTATION. The legal representation of the National Road Council alleges that, on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff here, Traffic Proceeding No. 16-002681-0492-TC was processed before the Traffic Court of Hatillo, San José, which was expressly resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on March sixth, two thousand seventeen. That for this reason, that having been the opportunity to discuss the existence or not of CONAVI's responsibility, without it having been so, what was resolved in that venue became final and, to that extent, there exists in the case material res judicata. Criteria of this Chamber. As is known, for the configuration of the defense being analyzed, the existence of a triple identity between the respective Proceedings is required. That is, that the same parties appear in both -subjective identity-, that the Proceeding with a final Judgment has analyzed and ruled on the merits on all or some of the claims asserted in the second Proceeding -objective identity-, and that both matters have their genesis in the same facts -identity of cause-. In the present case, clearly the aforementioned triple identity does not exist. In this vein, CONAVI was not a party in the Traffic Proceeding -as its own legal representation accepts-, which immediately rules out that we can speak of subjective identity. Then, with a simple reading of the aforementioned Traffic Judgment and the rest of the actions and evidence contained in the certified file provided to the record, it is evident that we are very far from an objective identity, since what is sought in this Civil Public Finance Proceeding -see the First Whereas Clause of this Ruling-, is far, and by much, from what was sought -object- in the cited Traffic Proceeding -the determination of the plaintiff's responsibility. Up to this point, the inadmissibility of the defense raised is evident, making it therefore unnecessary to analyze what relates to the existence or not of identity of cause. This being the case, in the opinion of this Collegiate Body, the defense raised must be rejected, as is hereby ordered.\n\nV.- REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES.- In summary and without prejudice to the literal nature of their arguments, which have been studied in their entirety by this Tribunal, each of the parties alleges what is detailed below in this section. PLAINTIFF: That on October 20, 2016, at about thirteen hours and fifteen minutes more or less, she was driving her vehicle on national highway 39, built and administered by CONAVI, specifically at Dirección13578, taking the overpass on the route to Santa Marta and Dirección3898, an area in which drivers notice the strong noise produced by the sewer grates when cars pass over them. That on the date and times referred to in the previous point, she was traveling in the left lane, at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour, she observed through the rearview mirror that, on her right, three motorcyclists were advancing, which alerted her that she could not move into that lane without putting their lives at risk. That behind her came another vehicle driven by someone who, after the events, identified himself as Nombre112465, identity card CED89028. That she, for her part, was behind another vehicle, at a safe distance, when suddenly, from underneath the vehicle ahead, she noticed that in front of her there was a sewer grate on the roadway of her lane, which had its cover raised, that is, instead of being horizontal covering the sewer hole, it was in a vertical position, with half inside the hole and the rest protruding onto the street, forming an obstacle on the road. That at that moment she had the metal railing of the edge of the overpass to her left and, to her right, the motorcyclists. That she lost driving control of the vehicle, its steering did not respond, she felt that the entire surroundings were spinning, while loose objects in the car floated or fell around her, like her purse, the car mats, her cell phone, and the umbrella. That then, in a matter of seconds, the sewer grate cover hit the windshield of the car she was driving, which fractured into a multitude of cracks and filaments on the front part, generating a rain of small glass pieces over her, specifically on her face and head, without her being clear at that moment what was happening. That Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo, a resident of the place, and Mr. Nombre112465, who was driving his vehicle behind her, observed how her car, upon crossing over the cover in question, lifted completely into the air, together with the sewer grate cover which, upon colliding with her car's tire, the kinetic force caused it to come out of its place, lift up along with her car and, deflecting in the air, impact against the windshield of my vehicle, to then fall on the street, ending up about four meters from the sewer it belonged to and four from the railing, almost on the lane separation line. That her vehicle spun several times in the air, hit the ground, and finally fell onto the street, ending up on its side, on the driver's side, where the momentum still caused it to drag on the ground for a stretch, ending up overturned and lying across the width of the right lane, about twelve meters from the sewer and three and a half from the street railing, the front license plate was twisted like a rag on the road. That her vehicle, after falling on the street, continued dragging on its side on it with her inside, shocked and held to the driver's seat by the seat belt, which, although it held her to the seat, being in an inclined position and pulled by gravity, was cutting off her breathing. That residents of the area report that, since long before the accident relevant to this claim, the malfunction of the sewer grate cover has caused minor and serious accidents at that same point. That in the newspaper CR-Hoy, of national circulation, of February 13, 2017, it is reported that several more accidents have occurred in the same place, by virtue of the malfunction of the sewer grate cover, given that, in fact, the report indicates that it has broken and disappeared, leaving the hole unprotected. That the original cover, which identified it as a municipal sewer, was replaced by another that says Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillado. That the accident, as stated in the medical opinions, caused the plaintiff a concussion which altered her peace and tranquility, her personal life was profoundly disrupted emotionally, which has caused her states of anguish, depression, and anxiety, the first days she could not sleep well and needed medication to fall asleep, in addition to periodic headaches that lasted between two and three months; today, despite the time elapsed, she still suffers from periodic states of anxiety and sadness. That the accident caused the total loss of the vehicle, whose reported value in the used car market is at least nine million colones, but the insurance gave her an indemnity for the sum of six million colones, so this implied a patrimonial loss of at least three million. That at this moment, in order to buy a vehicle in the same conditions as the first one, but new, she had to make an installment purchase for an investment of thirty-one thousand nine hundred United States dollars. That she is an independent person who provides for her own support, she is dedicated to being a real estate broker and, mainly, to the care of elderly persons in a state of disability or senile, so the accident, due to the movement limitations it caused, such as pain in hands, back, head, and stress, prevented her from carrying out said activity, since she could not be responsible for holding an elderly person with her hands to move or transfer them, without risk of causing a fall and injuries, so she actually could not work and support herself for six months, from October 2016 to April 2017; which caused her to lose the regular clients she had at that time and prevented her from carrying out her work activities in general. That consequently, her gross income, from an average of ¢7,500,000 monthly, decreased by ¢4,500,000 monthly, which after expenses represents a net loss of her income over six months due to not being able to work, of ¢4,164,784.92. That the loss of her vehicle and the need to travel to medical appointments, coordinate with her clients, attend therapy, and meet her other pending commitments, forced her to rent a vehicle for a month in the sum of six hundred thousand colones, a cost that became impossible for her to maintain continuously. That on Sunday, July 23, 2017, at approximately 4 in the afternoon, she was traveling in her new vehicle on the same highway where the accident was and even though since that day she takes the extreme right lane, at that moment due to repairs on an overpass, the two right lanes were closed and traffic was diverted only through the left lane. That it was then when she faced the fact of having to pass through the place of the accident and entered a state of panic and froze, unable to continue. That due to the traffic jam she caused, a traffic police officer appeared who did her the favor of taking the wheel and crossing the place of the accident. That two days later she returned for an appointment with the INS psychiatrist, who renewed her medication treatment. That on the occasion of what happened, the responsibility is full for the authorities responsible for the installation and maintenance of the highway, the sewer, and the cover of the latter, for which reason they are jointly sued by virtue of the fact that their conduct has generated the malfunction of the highway service and consequently the damages caused. CONAVI: That the plaintiff's statement is inaccurate, when she indicates that she was driving \"at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour,\" since, as can be proven from the evidence offered by the plaintiff herself, in the Official Report No. 2016-248600029, Ticket #Identificacion533 prepared by Inspector No. 2486, Mr. Pablo Agüero Rojas, the excess speed at which she was driving is described as a risk factor. That in this regard, the following was literally recorded: \"Risk Factor: Excess speed,\" in the accident that occurred on October 20, 2016, at \"1:18:46 p.m.\" That the plaintiff indicates that the storm sewer grate cover had engraved the legend \"municipal storm sewer.\" That nevertheless, it is the plaintiff's lack of skill and imprudence in driving at excess speed that causes the accident and therefore, she cannot attempt to attribute any responsibility to the National Road Council for this concept. That in any case, regarding water management, the considerations issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on sewer matters are of mandatory observation, in which it indicates the administrative instances of the Executive Branch that are responsible for the construction and operation of drinking water supply systems and sewage evacuation -Judgment No. 2007-05894 of eleven hours fifty-eight minutes on April twenty-seventh, two thousand seven-. There being clarity, as to that the Municipality is responsible for the administration of local services and interests, guaranteeing, among others, good drinking water supply and sewage evacuation systems, through adequate aqueduct and sewer systems, therefore, the definitive solution in matters of rainwater and residual water management is the responsibility of the Municipality and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers. STATE: That as CONAVI reported in its response to this claim, given the complexity of the road project where it is claimed the accident occurred, careful monitoring was carried out at each of its stages -design and construction-, both by CONAVI's permanent staff, and by external professionals and the contracted Supervisory Consortium, this hand in hand with the supervision of the contractor company itself. Resulting in the guarantee that the works complied with the technical and structural parameters contained in the public works contract. AyA: That after inspections by AyA technicians at the scene of the event, it was determined that the Sewer described in the accident is under the Administration of CONAVI for the rainwater maintenance system of the Circunvalación.\n\nThat the manhole covers throughout the country are cast by the cover manufacturer with the inscription of the AyA acronym; however, these covers are freely sold; any person can buy this type of cover and place them in their projects without this meaning that the structure is ours. That, as things stand, it is very difficult to see covers like those described from the San José storm sewer systems, since these covers are made for them in a very exclusive manner. That the Storm Sewer System is the responsibility of each Municipality, and therefore the Central Government assigns a budget to each Local Government for the annual maintenance of these storm sewer systems. That AyA does not receive any type of budget for storm sewer maintenance, thus relieving it of responsibility for stormwater events, given that the use of AyA funds for these matters of maintaining storm sewer structures would constitute an irregular diversion of public funds. That despite the fact that Municipalities are the ones who must provide this type of care for storm sewer systems, on National Highways this responsibility is shared with CONAVI and may be fully delegated to the Municipal entity in its entirety, according to specific situations. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: That indeed the sewer in question has a cover identified as the property of Acueductos y Alcantarillado, so this point confirms that the Municipality of San José is not responsible for the placement, replacement, or maintenance of sewer covers on national routes, such as the one where the incident alleged by the plaintiff occurred. That it is unknown if a municipal cover previously existed in said sewer, and if so, it was not that Municipality that placed it, as it lacks the competence to do so, given that it is a route beyond municipal administration. That the events reported in this lawsuit occurred on Highway 39, as stated by the plaintiff, which falls under the classification of National Road Network, so that both the construction of the road and its administration and subsequent maintenance are beyond the jurisdictional, functional, and operational scope of the Municipality of San José.\n\nVI.- THE BASIS OF THE LAWSUIT AND THIS COURT'S ASSESSMENT THEREOF: As can be seen from the factual background and the claims of the lawsuit, in this case we are faced with a typical Civil Treasury Proceeding (Proceso Civil de Hacienda), in which the extracontractual liability of a Public Administration is being claimed. Indeed, as the co-defendant Administrations argue, the plaintiff does not identify the entity or body with instrumental legal personality—in the case of CONAVI—that caused the damages for which she seeks compensation. Instead, she proceeds against all of them, given the factual-legal uncertainty in which not only she finds herself, but also the defendant Administrations, who claim to have no responsibility, either because, in their view, they did everything very well—in the case of CONAVI, supported by the State—or because matters relating to storm sewers are outside their competencies—in the case of AyA and the Municipality of San José. A simple reading of the responses to the lawsuit is enough to note said uncertainty, which they curiously cite as a deficiency that would require declaring—in their view—the inadmissibility of the lawsuit. That is, from what is argued in their responses, it is evident that the sued Administrations do not have a clear idea of how far their competencies extend regarding storm sewers, precisely because it is a topic that is not at all simple. But despite this, all seek to exempt themselves from responsibility for what happened to the plaintiff, using as a base argument that the sewer on the occasion of which the accident occurred has nothing to do with each of them. Faced with such a scenario, the only logical option for the plaintiff was to proceed as she did; that is, suing those who, from her perspective, could have some involvement in the functioning of the sewer that caused the mishap. And in this Court's judgment, this does not in any way detract from the exercise of her right of action, much less the possibility of obtaining reparation for all, some, or any of the damages for which she seeks compensation. Having clarified the foregoing, it must be remembered that Costa Rica is a Social and Democratic Rule of Law State, in which, from the Political Constitution itself, the indisputable foundations of the responsibility of the State—Centralized and Decentralized—are laid down. (Articles 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 140.8, 139.4, 148, 149, 150, 154, 188, and 191). Constitutional precepts that are developed, among others, by the Ley General de la Administración Pública—articles 190 et seq.—where, by way of summary, the Administration's responsibility is established for damages caused by its legitimate, illegitimate, normal, and abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. The doctrinal and jurisprudential development of the cited norms and many others dealing with the subject has been more than abundant, with consensus that the individual (administrado) must be guaranteed not only access to justice, but also their constitutional right to full compensation, provided they prove the existence of: i) Conduct—formal, material, or omissive—by a Public Administration. ii) Damage that they are not obliged to bear. iii) A causal link (cause-effect relationship) between that conduct and the damage experienced. Thus, these are the three requirements that, as indicated in previous lines, must be demonstrated by anyone seeking compensation arising from the actions of a Public Administration. That said, it is more than evident from a simple reading of the constitutional and legal norms indicated above, that the right to full compensation is not contingent upon the individual being registered with the Dirección General de Tributación or having paid corresponding taxes, as argued by CONAVI, supported by the State Representation. Such a position is untenable in light of the articles indicated above, in which neither the constituent power nor the ordinary legislator established any such conditions for accessing Costa Rican justice and obtaining from it—when the requirements indicated above are proven—full compensation for damages caused by a Public Administration. In this case, as stated, CONAVI and the Procuraduría General de la República stated on various occasions—in writing, both representations, and orally at Trial, the Special Judicial Representative of CONAVI—that it was necessary to request from the Ministerio de Hacienda the Tax Returns of the plaintiff for the three periods prior to the year in which the accident occurred. Evidence is absolutely irrelevant for this type of case—for the reasons given in this Judgment—but which was admitted by the Processing Judge without him processing it in a timely manner. Given this, this Chamber did what was necessary and, by resolution at two hours five minutes in the afternoon on July first, two thousand twenty-one, ordered the Ministerio de Hacienda to send the Tax Returns corresponding to the periods 2014, 2015, and 2016, which as of the date this Ruling is issued have not been sent to the Court. However, the absence of said evidence in no way prevents ruling on this matter nor causes defenselessness to the co-defendant parties that requested it, since, as stated, it is absolutely irrelevant and, in any case, there is no controversy that the plaintiff was not paying taxes when the accident occurred, as her Special Judicial Representative has had no qualms in expressly acknowledging—even in the Oral and Public Trial—that his client was not registered as a taxpayer at that time—understood as the time of the mishap. That is, the plaintiff expressly and undoubtedly acknowledges that she was not paying taxes when the events on which she bases her lawsuit occurred, but even so, the cited Administrations insisted on such evidence, despite it being absolutely irrelevant for the reasons indicated below: i) The right to full compensation for damage caused by a Public Administration has absolutely nothing to do with the tax status of the injured party. ii) The constituent power and the ordinary legislator did not establish being registered as a taxpayer or as an independent worker as a requirement to access such full compensation. iii) In a Proceeding like the one before us, determining the tax status of an individual is outside its purpose. iv) If the Dirección General de Tributación or the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social should deem it necessary to proceed against an individual who is suing in court seeking reparation for the damages they claim to have suffered due to the conduct of any Public Administration, it is a power they possess, but one that has no bearing on the purpose of this Proceeding. Thus, the tax status of the plaintiff herein has no transcendence, nor can it be established as a parameter or any limitation, for ruling on this matter as is proper in Law, dispensing, as is done, with the referred evidence. Now, as stated, all the defendant Administrations claim to have nothing to do with the sewer that caused the accident suffered by the plaintiff herein, but the truth is that one of them, in light of constitutional jurisprudence, is indeed directly linked. Hence, in the following lines, regulations and jurisprudence from the Sala Constitucional will be cited, addressing the matter relating to the subject that concerns us. As the parties will surely recall, Mr. Engineer from CONAVI, Kennet Enrique Solano Carmona, stated at Trial that the Project for said highway contemplated the construction of a storm sewer, since in that sector stormwater mixed with black water ran, thus being a contaminated body of water that discharges into the María Aguilar River, and for this reason, he affirmed that at some point a consultation was made to the Municipality of San José. What was said by the aforementioned witness regarding the storm sewer system is confirmed by Engineer Willian Reinilgen Sancho, an AyA official, who in his Report DRyT-OMSR-2017-00849 of October 27, 2017, states that:\n\n\"In the location, there is no sanitary sewer network administered by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA). The existence of a stormwater (pluvial) network was observed, which is not administered by AyA ... \" (Underlining and bold text correspond to the original).\n\nThus, in the area where the accident occurred, what exists is a storm sewer network or system, it being irrelevant, for what will be stated, that this infrastructure is on a National Route, as argued by the Municipality of San José. Now, regarding this type of system and more specifically to whom its administration corresponds, it is clear that there is no uniformity of criteria in this case, so it is necessary to refer both to the regulations pertaining to the matter and to the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued in this regard. Along these lines, articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 2726 of April 14, 1961: Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, expressly state:\n\n\"ARTICLE 1.- For the purpose of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying norms, carrying out and promoting the planning, financing, and development, and resolving everything related to the supply of drinking water and collection and evacuation of black water and liquid industrial waste, as well as the normative aspect of storm sewer systems (sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial) in urban areas, for the entire national territory, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is created, as an autonomous institution of the State.\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 2.- It corresponds to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y\nAlcantarillados:\n\nTo direct and supervise everything concerning the provision to the inhabitants of the republic of a service of drinking water, collection, and evacuation of black water and liquid industrial waste and stormwater (aguas pluviales) in urban areas;\n\nTo determine the priority, convenience, and viability of the different projects proposed to construct, reform, expand, or modify aqueduct and sewer works; which shall not be executed without its approval;\n\nTo promote the conservation of hydrographic basins and ecological protection, as well as the control of water contamination;\n\nTo advise other State bodies and coordinate public and private activities in all matters relating to the establishment of aqueducts and sewers and control of water resource contamination, its consultation being mandatory in all cases, and compliance with its recommendations inexcusable;\n\nTo prepare all plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works that relate to aqueduct and sewer systems, as determined by the respective regulations;\n\nTo use, utilize, govern, or supervise, as the case may be, all public domain waters indispensable for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State holds over them, in accordance with Law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities;\n\nTo directly administer and operate the aqueduct and sewer systems throughout the country, which will be gradually assumed, taking into account convenience and resource availability. Systems currently administered and operated by municipal corporations may continue under their charge, provided they deliver efficient service.\n\nUnder no concept may it delegate the administration of the aqueduct and sanitary sewer systems of the Metropolitan Area.\n\nNor may it delegate the administration of systems over which financial responsibility exists and while this corresponds directly to the Institute.\n\nThe institution is authorized to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrative boards of mixed integration between the Institute and the respective communities, provided this is convenient for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations.\n\nFor the same reasons and with the same characteristics, regional administrative boards involving several municipalities may also be created;\n\nTo enforce the Ley General de Agua Potable, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered as the substitute body for the ministries and municipalities indicated in said law;\n\nTo construct, expand, and reform aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and so advised for the better satisfaction of national needs; and\n\nTo control the adequate investment of all resources that the State allocates for aqueduct and sanitary sewer works.\"\n\nFor its part, article 5 of Law No. 7593 of August 9, 1996: Law of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), establishes:\n\n\"Article 5.- Functions\n\nFor the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; furthermore, it shall ensure compliance with the standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:\n\nSupply of electrical energy in the generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization stages.\n\n(Thus repealed this subsection by Article 42 of Law No. 8660 of August 8, 2008)\n\nSupply of the aqueduct and sewer service, including drinking water, the collection, treatment, and evacuation of black water, wastewater, and stormwater (pluviales), as well as the installation, operation, and maintenance of the hydrant service.\n\n(Thus amended the previous subsection by Article 5 of Law No. 8641 of June 11, 2008)\n\nSupply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons, within which are included: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined to supply national demand at distribution facilities and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer. The Regulatory Authority must set the transport rates used for national supply.\n\nIrrigation and drainage, when the service is provided by a public company or by concession or permit.\n\nAny means of paid public transportation of persons, except air transport.\n\nMaritime and air services in national ports.\n\nFreight transport by rail.\n\nCollection and treatment of solid and industrial waste.\n\nThe authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:\n\nSubsection a): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nSubsection c): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nSubsection d.2): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nSubsection e): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía.\n\nSubsection f): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes\n\nSubsection g): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; Junta de\nAdministración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica and Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectively.\n\nSubsection h): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.\n\nSubsection i): The municipalities.\n\nIn the granting of the concession for the use of water for irrigation, the obligation of the user to apply appropriate water management techniques must be included, in order to avoid the degradation of the soil resource, whether by erosion, softening, salinization, hydromorphism, and other harmful effects. (Thus added this final paragraph by Article 63 of the Ley de Uso y Conservación de Suelos No. 7779 of April 30, 1998).\"\n\nAs can be appreciated from the regulations transcribed above, among other things, matters relating to storm sewer systems are a public service and, to that extent, they are subject to the Fundamental Principles thereof. (Article 4 LGAP). Now, regarding whether it is AyA or the respective Municipality that must be responsible for providing said service, the Sala Constitucional has pointed out what is of interest:\n\n\"III.- On the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, storm sewers, and the competencies of the Public Administrations regarding this.- This Court has repeatedly recognized in jurisprudence that the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is a fundamental right deriving from Article 50 of the Constitution, according to which, it not only enshrines the right of every citizen to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment but also obliges the State to guarantee the exercise of said right, through the means established for this purpose by current legislation. Specifically, as this Chamber has stated in Ruling No. 05-9900 of 10:00 hours on July 29, 2005, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to make water flow adequately, thus guaranteeing the right to health and an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties:\n\nV.- On municipal obligations regarding storm sewers (alcantarillado pluvial).- It is pertinent to take into account that Article 169 of the Constitution establishes that the administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. Local interests and services have been defined by the Chamber as indeterminate legal concepts where the law does not exactly resolve their content for application to specific cases, so it is necessary to resort to criteria of value and experience, on the part of whoever is responsible for applying it, to determine their content. The creation of adequate drainage means within a community for the purpose of not causing damage to property, health, or environmental problems to its neighbors is, within the terms indicated by the Constitution, of cantonal interest and is part of the services that the Municipality is obliged to provide. In this same sense, the Ley General de Salud, in its Article 285, establishes that stormwater must be eliminated adequately and sanitarily to avoid contamination of the soil and natural water sources for human use and consumption, the formation of vector breeding sites and diseases, and air contamination through conditions that threaten its purity and quality. For this reason, the Municipality of Nombre594. is obliged to assume a certain behavior for the satisfaction of its purposes, taking the required measures to provide the protected community with an efficient stormwater drainage system. Adjusted to criteria of reasonableness, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to make those waters flow adequately, thus guaranteeing the right to health and an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties. Likewise, in compliance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, such municipal obligation must be shared with the Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, since the latter, as the governing body in the matter, is responsible at the national level for directing, coordinating, and supervising everything concerning the evacuation of black water, sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic; therefore, this Institution is not entirely unrelated to the problem raised by the protected party.\n\nOn the other hand, even if the problem were solely caused by the storm sewer, the Ministerio de Salud cannot disregard it, since, in accordance with Articles 21 of the Constitution, 2 of the Ley General de Salud, and 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, it has the essential function of overseeing the health of the inhabitants of the Republic, and must adopt all general and particular measures necessary (Articles 337 and 355 of Law No. 5395) to guarantee the full enjoyment of that right. Also, enforce what is established in the Ley General de Salud in its Articles 285 and 292:\n\nARTICLE 285.-\nExcreta, black water, wastewater, and stormwater (pluviales) must be eliminated adequately and sanitarily in order to avoid contamination of the soil and natural water sources for human use and consumption, the formation of vector breeding sites and diseases, and air contamination through conditions that threaten its purity or quality.\n\nARTICLE 292.-\nThe discharge of black water, wastewater, and industrial waste into the storm sewer is strictly prohibited. The Ministry is authorized to restrict, regulate, or prohibit the elimination of non-biodegradable synthetic products through excreta and water collection systems.\n\nAs can be deduced from the foregoing, competence in matters of storm sewers is established, expressly and implicitly, by common legislation. Although the current Código Municipal does not establish any specific provision regarding this matter, the Chamber has declared, in Judgment No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002, that this does not exclude the obligation of municipal entities—evidently, in coordination with the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, which is the governing body par excellence in the matter—to develop, among other community works, matters relating to adequate aqueduct and sewer systems. Indeed, Article 4(c) of the current Código Municipal establishes in general terms, as a municipal attribution, the administration and provision of municipal public services, within which, without a doubt, are aqueduct and sewer systems.\n\nFurthermore, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados likewise has a shared competence in this regard. In the aforementioned Resolution No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002, the Chamber concluded that \"... the attribution to create and maintain sanitary sewer networks corresponds to the municipalities, since the latter, according to Article 3 of the current Código Municipal, are the primary parties obliged to safeguard cantonal interests and services within the jurisdiction under their charge and because this is expressly derived from Article 169 of the Constitution, which establishes the generic competence of the Municipalities in this matter. However, in compliance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, such obligation must be shared with the Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, since the latter, as the governing body in the matter, is responsible at the national level (sic) for directing, coordinating, and supervising everything concerning the evacuation of black water, sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic.\" (Judgment No. 2008-001191 of eleven hours and thirty-six minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eight. Underlining and bold text are ours). Likewise, in another of its Rulings, the High Court, specifying the issue of competencies in the field that concerns us, indicated:\n\n\"In this matter, it cannot be forgotten that the competence and responsibility for the management of storm sewers (alcantarillado pluvial) corresponds mainly to the Municipalities—although in coordination with the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Ministerio de Salud, as the case may be, for which it must carry out the relevant coordination—and this local entity, despite being aware of the current problem and the solution that must be given to it, did not immediately proceed to address the problem, letting years pass filled with omissions and unproductive actions.\" (Judgment No. 2008-004210 of thirteen hours fifty-nine minutes on March fourteenth, two thousand eight. In a similar sense, Ruling No. 18465-2020 of nine hours fifteen minutes on September twenty-fifth, two thousand twenty. Bold text is ours).\n\nIn another of its Rulings, in which it specifically refers to the Municipality of San José, the referred Chamber stated:\n\n\"The foregoing constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the protected parties, which is attributable to the Municipality of San José, since, as can be deduced from the file, said authority is the competent entity to handle the storm sewer (alcantarillado pluvial) of the canton.\" (Judgment No. 2011-006903 of twelve hours and nine minutes on May twenty-seventh, two thousand eleven. In a similar sense, Resolution No. 2020-009707 of nine hours fifteen minutes on May twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty. The bold highlighting is from this Chamber).\n\nAlso, by Judgment No. 2012-001015 of nine hours five minutes on January twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, the High Court pointed out:\n\n\"Indeed, in the first instance, the obligation to create and maintain storm sewer networks corresponds to the municipalities, since the latter, in accordance with what is regulated in Articles 3 of the Código Municipal and 169 of the Constitution, are the primary parties obliged to safeguard cantonal interests and services within the corresponding jurisdiction, which justifies the fact that such corporations collect municipal taxes, in which the item corresponding to the maintenance and operation of the storm sewer network (red pluvial) is included. However, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, that obligation must be shared with the Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, since the latter is the governing body in the matter and the entity technically most specialized to advise on the proper maintenance of the referred service.\" (Both the underlining and the bold text are from this Collegiate Body).\n\nSimilarly, in one of its most recent Rulings on the subject that concerns us, the mentioned Chamber held:\n\n\"In the specific case, the appellant alleges the violation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment on the occasion of two problems: a) channeling of sewer waters in Dirección289, Barrio Los Ángeles, San Rafael Debajo de Desamparados, which causes the waters to overflow, causing floods...\nRegarding such allegations, from the list of proven facts, it is established that the cited problems have been denounced by the protected party and other community neighbors since the year 2019.\n\nThus, it is recorded that on October 21, 2019, they filed a complaint with the Municipality of Desamparados, alleging problems with water channeling, as a result of which they have suffered floods, damage to pipes and sewer systems, damage to the roadway, and damage to their properties.\n\n(...) In the development, protection, and full enjoyment of the cited rights, the function of the Municipalities and their bodies—including the district municipal councils—is of relevance, which, pursuant to Article 169 of the Constitution, are obligated to effectively provide the public services entrusted to them. Thus, applicable in the specific case, such obligations entail the effective maintenance of public roads, sidewalks, and sewer systems—through which other rights are exercised and enjoyed, such as freedom of movement, health, and the right to a healthy environment.\" (Judgment No. 2021-005042 of nine fifteen on March twelfth, two thousand twenty-one. The bold text does not correspond to the original).\n\nAs can be clearly seen from the constitutional case law, matters concerning stormwater drainage (alcantarillado pluvial) fall under municipal jurisdiction, without prejudice to the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of AyA, since, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body in the matter and the most technically specialized entity to advise on the proper maintenance of the referred service.\" Thus, regardless of the type of road—whether national or cantonal—matters pertaining to said service correspond to the respective Local Government. And along these lines, note how the High Court expressly refers to the fact that the responsibility of the municipalities in this matter is primary, and they must coordinate \"with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) and the Ministry of Health as the case may be.\" Thus, in accordance with the cited constitutional case law, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is the municipalities that are directly responsible \"for creating and maintaining the stormwater drainage networks\" within the respective territorial jurisdiction—canton—they administer. This being so, in light of the cited regulations and constitutional judgments, the entity that must answer for the proper functioning of the entire stormwater drainage system linked to the roads located in the Central Canton of San José—whether national or not—is the Municipality of San José, which even has a \"Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José,\" published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 155 of August 27, 2018. And to that extent, any damage generated by said system or any of its elements is attributable to it.\n\nNow then, in the present case there is no doubt whatsoever as to the accident that occurred, the place where it occurred, and its efficient cause—a stormwater manhole cover (tapa de alcantarillado pluvial) in a vertical position—without the existence of force majeure, victim's fault—due to speeding, lack of skill, and/or imprudence—or an act of a third party having been demonstrated. In this sense, the mishap clearly was not due to an act of nature, as is abundantly clear from the dynamics of the accident narrated by the plaintiff in her complaint and which is consistent with the statement of the witness Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo. The aforementioned deponent stated that he lives at Dirección13579, which is located in front of the area where the accident occurred. He also indicated that at the moment of the mishap, he could observe how a 3 or 4-ton vehicle traveling in front of the one driven by the plaintiff, upon passing over the manhole cover, left it in a vertical position, so that immediately afterwards the right front tire of the claimant's vehicle impacted it and went catapulting, rolling over several times on the road. The representation of CONAVI attempted to distort what was declared by the aforementioned witness, arguing that there was no precision as to which of the two front tires was the one that impacted the manhole and how it was that the witness had said he was messaging via WhatsApp at the time of the accident and still could witness the accident. In this regard, it is worth indicating, firstly, that for this Chamber it is irrelevant whether the witness could specify which of the two front tires of the vehicle driven by the claimant was the one that impacted the manhole in question, since what is of importance is that one of the front tires made impact with the manhole cover, and secondly, even though the witness indicated he was messaging while resting, this in no way means that he was abstracted from the surrounding reality. Along these lines, at no time did the witness state that his attention was complete and absolute to the exchange of messages he was engaged in; on the contrary, he clarified that upon taking a break from his usual work, he took the opportunity to message while observing the outside of his home. Nor is it sustainable that there was an act of a third party, solely because according to the narrative of what happened, it was a vehicle traveling in front of the plaintiff that, upon passing over the mentioned manhole \"left it\" in a vertical position, since this circumstance did not occur because such vehicle passed over the manhole, but because it did not behave as it should have. That is, that vehicle and many others could pass over said element, and it should have remained in its site or space called the base ring or \"flange\" (flanger). (In this sense, see Report DRyTOMSR-2017-00849 prepared by Eng. William Leininger Sancho, which is visible at images 91 to 94 of the judicial file). Finally, no fault of the victim is observed, since the argument raised regarding that the distance the plaintiff should have maintained with respect to the vehicle traveling in front of hers was not adequate due to the speed at which she was driving, because if it had been, she could well have reacted to maneuver and avoid impacting the manhole cover, was only that: an argument devoid of proof. Along these lines—that is, regarding the issue of speeding—it is a fact that was not held as proven, since although in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\": \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO DETACHMENT OF MANHOLE COVER\" and as \"Risk Factor: Speeding,\" the truth is that this is nothing more than a simple comment by a Traffic Officer who did not witness the accident. And in any case, it is reiterated, the referred cover should not have behaved in the way it did, which in no way can be attributed to the plaintiff here. Having said this, it is reiterated that in the present case it has been accredited that the plaintiff suffered an automobile accident because a cover that formed part of a stormwater drainage system—a public service under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of San José in this case, according to the supra-cited constitutional case law—\"did not behave in the expected manner\"—efficient cause of the mishap—since after being run over by a vehicle traveling in front of the one driven by the plaintiff here, it remained in a vertical position. The foregoing, besides clearing up doubts regarding Passive Ad Causam Standing (Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva), allows this Chamber to delve in the following lines into the damages claimed by the person bringing the action.\n\n1. Uncompensated difference regarding the real value of the vehicle (¢3,000,000). As was indicated in the list of proven facts, as a result of the policy the plaintiff had taken out with INS, she received from said Institute an indemnity in the amount of ¢6,000,000, due to the total loss of her vehicle. Now then, it is not clear whether the person bringing the action is dissatisfied with what was thus granted by the referred insurance entity, in which case she should have brought an action against it—which she did not do in the present case—so that this Court could review the legality of the conduct deployed. If, contrary to that, the claimant considered that the amount indemnified by INS was in accordance with the contracted policy, but that her vehicle had a higher market value—for which she had not insured it—and that consequently this difference should be covered by the co-defendants, she was obligated to prove this circumstance. Which she also did not do, since it was held as unproven that \"the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had, at the moment the accident occurred, a market value of nine million colones—¢9,000,000.\" Hence, regarding this petition, its rejection is imposed.\n\n2. Six months that she could not dedicate to her work (¢4,164,784.92). Despite the arguments of the defendant Administrations that the plaintiff, when rendering her Investigative Statement (Declaración Indagatoria) before the Traffic Court of Hatillo, stated that she was a housewife when the mishap occurred, in the present case it was accredited that she dedicated herself to the care of older adults. In this sense, note that even though the first of the occupations was the one recorded in the referred Investigative Statement, it is unknown whether this was because the person before whom it was given did not modify such information in the format used to detail personal details in that type of procedural act, or if the plaintiff herself effectively indicated so. Despite that, this Proceeding has gone beyond mere assertion and has brought forth evidence regarding her occupation when the accident occurred. In this sense, one can observe the Affidavit (Declaración Jurada) rendered by the claimant, visible at images 45 to 46 of the file, in which she expressly states under the gravity of oath—which, it is worth saying in passing, does not occur in an Investigative Statement—that she dedicated herself to the care of older adults. The foregoing statement was supported by the witness [Nombre62 004], the plaintiff's sister, when, upon being consulted at Trial about whether she knew what her sister did, she stated without hesitation—that is, with total certainty—: \"[Nombre62 001] is not a professional, she takes care of older adults to earn a living.\" To which she added that it was a job with a fixed schedule. She subsequently indicated that at the moment of the accident, her sister had charge of some elderly people she attended to in Sabanilla. What was thus said by both the plaintiff and the cited witness is consistent with what was indicated regarding the claimant's activity by the Certified Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado) Rodolfo Jenkins Conejo, in the Certification issued by him, which, although as will be seen, does not constitute sufficient proof to accredit the income of the person bringing the action, certainly stands as one more element of conviction, which added to the 2 previously indicated, allows it to be taken as proven what the claimant dedicated herself to at the moment of the mishap. Now then, despite this—that is, that the activity the claimant dedicated herself to when the accident occurred has been accredited—as was indicated in the Recital (Considerando) relating to unproven facts, in the present case it has been held as unproven that, on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was disabled for a period of 6 months from exercising her activity of caring for Older Adults. This being so, since there is no adequate medical proof accrediting such circumstance, the Certification from the Certified Public Accountant that the plaintiff contributes to quantify the claimed item lacks relevance and, for that reason, an analysis of its content is unnecessary. Notwithstanding this, without prejudice to what has been thus stated, it must be remembered that this type of certification in no way constitutes full proof for cases such as the one before us. Precisely, analyzing this issue with total clarity, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated:\n\n\" III.- Regarding the argument indicated as First, this Chamber has stated that certifications issued by public accountants in matters of their competence constitute public documents, without the public faith of these officials being extensive to the content or intrinsic truth of the financial or accounting statements they attest to, hence the vouchers of the operations are indispensable in order to verify them. Regarding the probative force of such instruments, this jurisdictional body has indicated that full proof refers to the facts that the official affirms having performed himself, or that happened in his presence, in the exercise of his functions. If one is not in these cases, even if the document is of that type, having been issued with the requirements indicated by numeral 369 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), its content can be challenged by any means of proof. Regarding those issued by professionals in public accounting, it has stated: 'According to Article 8 of the Organic Law of the College of Public Accountants of Costa Rica, documents issued by CPAs in the branch of their competence shall have the value of public documents. ...in consideration of the public interest that permeates tax matters, such character does not imply that the financial or accounting statements of the taxpayers subject to certification are correct or true, per se. The nature of public and, hence of full proof, is circumscribed to the verification of the existence of the records analyzed by the CPA and to the acts or facts performed or executed by them. Consequent to the above, numeral 49 of the Income Tax Law provides that the opinion or interpretation contained in certifications for tax purposes does not constitute full proof against the Treasury, and does not bind the Tax Administration.' No. 421 of 9 hours 40 minutes of June 20, 2005. Therefore, the cassation appellant is incorrect when he affirms that the certification of the accounting professional is full proof because it is a public document, because as stated, it is limited to recording the accounting of an individual or legal entity, without this implying its certainty. In the present case, the Court did not grant it a value different from what it possesses.\" (Judgment No. 00947 of fifteen hours on December seventh, the year two thousand five. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. See also, Judgment No. 000421-F-2005 of nine hours forty minutes on June twentieth, two thousand five, issued by the same Chamber).\n\nIn addition to what has been stated so far, it has been taken as proven that the medical leave (incapacidades) that were at the time granted to the plaintiff on the occasion of the accident did not exceed, in total, 20 days. The foregoing circumstance allows one to reasonably conclude that, in medical opinion, the claimant was indeed capable of performing her usual tasks. Thus, the appropriate course is to reject this petitionary item, as is hereby ordered.\n\n3. Cost of transportation and food on medical appointment days, corresponding to ten thousand colones per appointment (¢140,000). As demonstrated by certification SEAD-051232017 of October 30, 2017, issued by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as a result of the mandatory vehicle insurance coverage, the following expenses have been covered for the plaintiff: a) Payment for transportation: fifteen thousand seven hundred colones—¢15,700.00—. b) Medical Services: seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents—¢727,877.59—. The above sums to a Total of expenses of seven hundred forty-three thousand five hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents—¢743,577.59—. As a logical consequence of the above, the claimant cannot seek the collection of transportation expenses if these have already been recognized by the National Insurance Institute. In addition to the above, the plaintiff does not explain, justify, or specify the amount she seeks regarding food, nor does she provide any documentary support for this type of expense that would allow for examining its appropriateness or not. For what has been stated so far, the rejection of this claim is imposed.\n\n4. Subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) for bodily injuries (discretionarily in the amount of ¢30,000,000). Regarding this type of damage, it must be remembered that it affects the psyche of the person, which is why it has been termed incorporeal, non-pecuniary, or emotional damage. Hence, it has been considered that it is linked to \"… anguish, frustration, impotence, insecurity, anxiety, grief, unease, disillusionment, among others; their common denominator is suffering or psychic or emotional affliction.\" (Judgment No. 269 of 9 hours 10 minutes of April 23, 2004, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). The proof of subjective moral damage is \"in re ipsa,\" because it is the very generating fact that gives rise to this type of vexation, and the evidence is obtained through \"presumptions of fact (presunciones de hombre),\" which are inferred from circumstantial evidence. Thus, it has been said: \"XIII.- Regarding the proof of moral damage, the principle is as follows: its existence and severity must be accredited, a burden that corresponds to the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through presumptions of fact inferred from circumstantial evidence, since the unlawful generating act reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, hence it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa.'\" (Judgment No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. As well as Votes No. 564 of 11 hours of September 10, 2003, No. 311 of 16 hours 10 minutes of April 25, 2001, and No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. All issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now then, the reparation of this damage, that is, the amount fixed as indemnification for it, while it depends on the prudent discretion of the Judge, the truth is that it can in no way be disproportionate, whether because it is meager or excessively high. Thus, in the present case, it is not questioned that the accident produced injuries to the claimant, injuries that, while they did not warrant her transfer to the Hospital nor a medical leave like the 6 months claimed, certainly did generate bodily consequences for her that warranted her medical leave for several days, even requiring up to one day of physical therapy—January 20, 2017—all of which was duly accredited in the present case. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that such bodily injuries generated a negative impact on the plaintiff's psyche, causing her the damage she claims and consequently causing a series of emotions and feelings to arise in her, ranging from impotence and anxiety to discouragement and frustration. The damage in question, insofar as she has no duty to bear it, must be indemnified. Now then, with the customary respect, this Chamber estimates that the sum requested for this concept is evidently disproportionate, and to that extent, the appropriate course is to fix the quantum of what was requested at the discretionary sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones—¢1,700,000—. An amount that, while far lower than what was requested, certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be indemnified for the damage caused without generating unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito) to the detriment of municipal finances.\n\n5. Moral damage for emotional and traumatic effects (discretionarily in the amount of ¢30,000,000). As this is the same type of moral damage petitioned in the preceding section, with the accustomed respect, the parties are referred to what was stated there regarding subjective moral damage, including the issue of the disproportionality of what was requested. Having said that, it having been demonstrated that the plaintiff required both Psychological and Psychiatric attention, even being granted medical leave by this latter Medical Specialty of the National Insurance Institute on the occasion of the accident suffered, it is reasonable to presume that such treatments were due to the fact that she experienced a negative impact on her psyche, with the consequences already extensively explained in the previous section, which is confirmed by the statements of the witness [Nombre62 004]—sister of the plaintiff—who indicated at Trial that she cried a lot spontaneously and constantly, and that she had problems sleeping. What has been stated so far translates into evident subjective moral damage, which, insofar as the plaintiff does not have the duty to bear, must be indemnified to her. As for the amount to be granted for this concept, in the same way as was indicated in the preceding section, in the judgment of this Panel of Judges, the sum sought for this concept is evidently disproportionate, and to that extent, the appropriate course is to fix the quantum of what was requested at the discretionary sum of three million four hundred thousand colones—¢3,400,000—. An amount that, despite being double what was granted in the preceding section, is far lower than what was requested, and certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be indemnified for the damage caused without generating unjust enrichment to the detriment of municipal finances. Having reached this point, this Chamber considers it important to clarify that the plaintiff indeed claims two items of subjective moral damage and that both are being granted—although for amounts lower than those requested—, but this should in no way be understood as a double payment, but rather as damages that had their own genesis in different causes. Thus, the one granted in the preceding section derives from the bodily injuries the plaintiff suffered on the occasion of the traffic accident and that required medical attention, medical leaves, and one day of physical therapy. While the one granted in this section originates from the emotional sequelae she experienced due to the mishap that occurred and that warranted Psychological and Psychiatric attention, as well as a medical leave by this latter Medical Specialty. This being so, it is not a double payment for exactly the same thing.\n\n6. Possible temporary or permanent partial disability (incapacidad) in the use of her left hand. Regarding this petitionary item, note that the case file contains the medical-legal expert opinion No. 2016-0001979 of October 27, 2016, issued by the Department of Legal Medicine of the OIJ, which states as part of its conclusions the following: \"1. Injuries: Traffic accident with simple contusions. 2. Temporary incapacity: TEN (10) DAYS from the date of the facts under study. 3. The injuries suffered tend to heal without leaving functional sequelae.\" As can be appreciated from what has been transcribed, the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were classified as simple ones tending to heal without any functional sequela. This being so, and it having been held as unproven that as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of her left hand, the appropriate course is to reject this petition, as is hereby ordered. Finally, regarding the rental of a vehicle for a period of 32 days, despite being an issue discussed by the parties, as there is no claim whatsoever concerning it, this point is omitted from analysis, along with the pertinent evidence—money receipt and statement at Trial by Yancy Ramírez Ramírez—.\n\nWhat has been stated so far allows us to demonstrate that the three presuppositions supra-indicated as essential for the non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) of the Public Administration to arise are present in this case: i) A conduct—omissive in this case—by the Municipality of San José—Decentralized Public Administration—regarding its inescapable duty to inspect and/or repair any element of risk in the stormwater drainage systems operating in the Central Canton of San José. ii) The damage caused, both to the plaintiff's vehicle, which in this case was covered by the National Insurance Institute, as well as the subjective moral nature damage that was analyzed above. iii) The causal link (nexo de causalidad) between the referred omission and the damage caused. Thus, the items granted in this Judgment must be covered exclusively by the Municipality of San José.\n\nVII.- OF THE OBJECTIONS (EXCEPCIONES) RAISED: As was indicated in the Second Recital (Resultando II) of this Judgment, when answering the complaint, the defendant Administrations raised the following objections: CONAVI: Incomplete Necessary Passive Joinder (Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario incompleto)—resolved interlocutorily—and Lack of Right (Falta de Derecho). STATE: Lack of Passive Standing (Falta de Legitimación Pasiva) and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Standing. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Standing. In this regard, in the preceding Recital, a thematic approach was carried out regarding stormwater drainage, supported by constitutional case law, according to which, Municipalities are the competent and consequently responsible entities for the construction, maintenance, and proper functioning of the same. This being so, it is clear that regarding CONAVI, the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing proceeds to be declared ex officio, also upholding the objection that in this sense both the State and AyA raised. Regarding the defendant municipal entity, the objection in question must be rejected, insofar as, as has been stated, it is the referred Local Government that, in the judgment of this Chamber, has incurred, through its omissive conduct, the liability claimed. (Article 12.1 of the CPCA). Due to the manner in which this is resolved, a pronouncement is omitted regarding the objection of Lack of Right raised by both CONAVI and the State Representation.\n\nVIII.- ON COSTS (COSTAS): Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to what is provided in that same rule, in accordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable: a) when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or, c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or an expert's opinion (subsection 194 ibidem). In this case, this Collegiate Body estimates that without the need for great effort, with a simple reading not only of the answers to the complaint made by the defendant Administrations, but also of the substantive aspects developed in this Judgment, it is feasible to conclude that the plaintiff has ample reason to litigate in the manner she did. That is, by suing all the Administrations cited herein, since it was by no means clear and/or simple to determine the entity or body responsible for what happened. Thus, in the view of this Collegiate Body, the proper course is to resolve without special condemnation in costs regarding CONAVI, the State, and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers. But regarding the Municipality of San José, it is appropriate to condemn it to the payment of both costs of this Proceeding. The quantum of the same shall be determined in the Sentence Execution Phase at the request of the prevailing party.\n\nTHEREFORE (POR TANTO)\n\nThe documentary evidence for a better resolution contributed by the representation of CONAVI is admitted, and the objection of Res Judicata (Cosa Juzgada) raised by it is rejected. Regarding the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad), the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is declared ex officio, also upholding the objection that in this sense both the State and AyA raised. Consequently, the claim is declared without merit against such Public Administrations without special condemnation in costs. Regarding the Municipality of San José, the objection of Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is rejected, and consequently, the claim filed against it is declared Partially With Merit, with the understanding that it is denied in what is not expressly granted: i) The capital municipal entity must pay to the plaintiff here the sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones—¢1,700,000—for subjective moral damage derived from the bodily injuries suffered. ii) Likewise, the defendant Municipality must pay to the plaintiff the sum of three million four hundred thousand colones—¢3,400,000—for subjective moral damage derived from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced. iii) The Municipality of San José is condemned to the payment of both costs of this Proceeding in favor of the plaintiff here. The quantum of the same shall be determined in the Sentence Execution Stage at the instance of the prevailing party. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, a pronouncement is omitted regarding the objection of Lack of Right raised by both CONAVI and the State Representation.\n\nNOTIFY.– Elías Baltodano Gómez, Presiding Judge, Judith Reyes Castillo, Judge and Iván Salas Leitón, Judge.–\",\n\nFILE: 17-008361-1027-CA\n\nORDINARY PROCEEDING\n\nPLAINTIFF: [Name62 001]\n\nDEFENDANTS: CONAVI AND OTHERS\n\nNo. 86-2021-IV\n\nSECTION FOUR OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Address01 , at fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on the twenty-ninth of July, two thousand twenty-one.\n\nOrdinary Proceeding filed by [Name62 001], identification number [Valor CED63], represented by her Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado José Joaquín Villalobos Soto, bar card CED88932 against the NATIONAL ROAD COUNCIL -CONAVI-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Óscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, bar card CED87822, THE STATE, represented by Procuradora Silvia Patiño Cruz, bar card CED31858, COSTA RICAN INSTITUTE OF AQUEDUCTS AND SEWERS -AyA-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Robny Portilla Barrantes, bar card CED89026 and the MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Marco Vinicio Álvarez Mattey, bar card CED89027.\n\nWHEREAS\n\nI.- The plaintiff filed this Proceeding so that in Judgment it be declared:\n\n\"That CONAVI, or, subsidiarily the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers or the Municipality of San José, individually one or two, or all the defendant entities jointly, be ordered in judgment to pay the following items: I. Payment of the indemnified difference in the real value of the destroyed vehicle for three million colones. II. Payment for the six months in which she could not dedicate herself to her work of caring for the elderly due to the painful effects of her injuries, in the sum of ¢4,164,784.92 (four million sixty-four thousand colones with ninety-two cents). III. Cost of transportation and food for each appointment, at the INS clinic, which represents an abnormal expense in my activities, at ten thousand colones per appointment, ¢140,000.00 (one hundred forty thousand colones). IV. Payment for the moral damages suffered through her injuries, the pain caused by the blows suffered in the rollover of the vehicle, injuries to the head, neck, both shoulders, left hand, waist, abdomen, both thighs, right foot and permanent headache with dizziness, ecchymosis in the distal third of the clavicle with local pain and in the left hand, edema on the dorsum at the level of the 4th and 5th metacarpal, general pain throughout the body, Cervicalgia from whiplash (at the level of the cervical vertebrae), which required treatment with anti-inflammatory and analgesic medications: Diclofenac, Tramadol, Methyl Ointment, Tizanidine Aluminum Acetate Powder, Indomethacin, Carbamazepine, for three months, plus twenty days of sick leave, added to the inflammatory process that can produce pain and edema for an indefinite time, of about 8 months to a year, which are prudentially valued at thirty million colones. V. Payment for the moral damages for the emotional and traumatic effects suffered from the accident that manifested in ailments of difficulty sleeping, nightmares, lack of appetite, recurrent crying, intrusive thoughts, anxious episodes, state of hyperarousal, feelings of insecurity and fear of driving or going out on the street and difficulty working due to pain in the fingers, requiring treatment of Sertraline Vo 50 Mg QHS and Diphenhydramine Vo 50 Mg QHS, for three months, with sequelae to date that prevent me from circulating again on the same street, to which simultaneous psychological treatment had to be added for anxious depressive reaction due to post-traumatic stress, with treatment over six months, which are prudentially valued at thirty million colones. VI. Eventually and subject to the result of the expert evidence, an amount to be determined, for a potential partial temporary or permanent disability (incapacidad parcial temporal o permanente) in the use of the left hand.\" The plaintiff's representative clarified that claim number IV refers to moral damages generated by physical aspects and claim V refers to moral damages generated by emotional aspects. (Images 2 to 22, 253 to 262 of the judicial file and digital backup of the Preliminary Hearing).\n\nII.- Having granted the legal transfer, the sued entities answered the complaint negatively and raised the following defenses: CONAVI: Incomplete necessary passive joinder of parties –resolved interlocutorily– and Lack of Right. STATE: Lack of Passive Standing and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Standing. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Standing. (Images 81 to 86, 99 to 106, 111 to 139 and 141 to 154 of the judicial file).\n\nIII.- The Preliminary Hearing in this Proceeding was held on July 10, 2018.\n(Images 253 to 262 of the judicial file. Electronic backup of said hearing).\n\nIV.- The Oral and Public Trial was held at 8:30 a.m. on July 7 and 9, 2021. On the first of those days, pursuant to ordinal 50.2 of the CPCA, the parties were granted 3 business days to submit written statements regarding the documentary evidence that CONAVI provided to better provide, a deadline that expired on July 12, 2021. Subsequently, the testimony of Mr. Name61250 was declared unavoidable, then proceeding to the production of the rest of the evidence admitted in the Preliminary Hearing, and prior to the closing of the debate, the opportunity was given to the parties to issue their respective conclusions. (Compact disc backup of the Supplementary Hearing).\n\nV.- This Judgment is issued, after deliberation by the members of the Tribunal, within the fifteen-day period established in article 111.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code –this matter having been declared complex–, without observing any grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings.\n\nJudge Baltodano Gómez writes, with the affirmative vote of the judges Reyes Castillo and Salas Leitón.\n\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI.- ON THE EVIDENCE TO BETTER PROVIDE. During the stage of the Oral and Public Trial –more specifically on July 7, 2021–, the representation of CONAVI indicated to the Tribunal that it had added to the file, by means of a writing of that same date, the documents indicated below, in order for their admission as evidence to better provide to be assessed: 1. Literal Registry Certification of the vehicle with plates [Valor 002]. 2. Registry Certification of the microfilmed folio inscribed in volume [Valor 003], Entry [Valor 004], Sequence 001. Movable Property, corresponds to the vehicle with plates [Placa703]. 3. Inspection report on the works carried out at Address13576., dated September 2016. 4. Official Letter UE-DCPA-0112018-025 (0613) dated February 13, 2018. Once the floor was given to the proponent of said evidence, they extensively explained the reasons why, in their opinion, it should be admitted. Then, upon inquiry from the plaintiff's representation, the Special Judicial Attorney of CONAVI stated that, as it was a certification corresponding to another vehicle, they were withdrawing the first 2 pages of the evidence provided. Said documentation was given the treatment provided for in ordinal 50.2 of the CPCA, granting the other parties a period of 3 business days to refer to it in writing. The aforementioned period expired on July 12 of the current year. Criterion of this Collegiate Body. In view of the already well-known discretionary admission of evidence to better provide, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has held that its rejection does not produce the defenselessness of the parties. Among other judgments, the text of number 547-F2002 of sixteen hours on July twelve, two thousand two, is transcribed in relevant part, which states: \"(…) IV.- Multiple precedents of this Chamber, referring to evidence to better provide, have indicated that this is evidence of the judge, and not of the parties. Consequently, the decision to gather it is optional for the jurisdictional body, and it can be dispensed with without need of any resolution. Ergo, the omission of a pronouncement regarding it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been exceeded, in which the parties must demonstrate the constitutive facts of their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof and once that stage has closed, it will be the exclusive faculty of the judge to determine whether new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation should be brought to the record. The following resolutions, among many others, can be consulted: 59 of 15:20 on May 31, 1996, 23 of 14:20 on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 on May 28, 1993 and 83 of 14:40 on December 22, 1993. (…)\". In support of the above, judgment number 29-1995 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on February twenty-two, nineteen ninety-five, also issued by the First Chamber, clarifies the following: \"(…) Within the instructive and ordering powers of the judge, is that of ordering evidence to better provide (article 97, subsection 2, and 331 of the Civil Procedural Code), when the evidence to be practiced has a decisive influence on the outcome of the process (…). The core aspect of evidence to better provide is its optional or discretionary nature, it cannot be demanded by the parties; its ordering depends entirely on the initiative, prudence and criterion of the jurisdictional body, consequently its denial does not cause any defenselessness\". All this said, this Chamber considers that the documentation brought to the record by the representation of CONAVI, besides being linked to its Theory of the Case and the purpose of the Proceeding, is relevant, useful and necessary to resolve the merits of this litigation. Hence, it is admitted as evidence to better provide.\n\nII.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS. Of importance for the resolution of this litigation, the following are considered duly accredited: 1) That at the time of the accident to be mentioned –which occurred on October 20, 2016– the plaintiff here was the owner of the vehicle plate [Valor Placa11683], Make: Nissan, Style: X-Trail Classic, Year: 2011, Color: gold. (Images 21 to 35 of the judicial file); 2) That on October 20, 2016, the plaintiff was driving her vehicle after noon on Address13577 in the direction San José-San Sebastián– on the overpass (paso a desnivel), when another motor vehicle in front of her passed over a manhole (alcantarilla) and dislodged it from its position, leaving it vertically and as she continued driving her motor vehicle, one of the front tires of the same impacted the referred manhole causing her vehicle to rollover. (Uncontroverted fact regarding the place and time of the accident, image 66 of the judicial file, consisting of an Incident Certificate issued by the Benemérito Fire Department, Official Traffic Report visible at image 157 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo); 3) That as a result of the accident narrated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff's vehicle was declared a total loss and as for her, she did not suffer injuries requiring transfer to the Hospital. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file); 4) That because the plaintiff's referred vehicle was insured, the National Insurance Institute paid her the sum of six million colones -¢6,000,000- due to the total loss of the cited automobile. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file and fact 24 of the complaint); 6) That at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff was dedicated to the Care of Older Adults. (Images 41 to 44, 45 to 46 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of Mrs. [Name62 004]); 7) That despite carrying out the activity indicated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff was not registered as a taxpayer before the General Directorate of Taxation of the Ministry of Finance. (Uncontroverted fact); 8) That the plaintiff was not left with sequelae as a result of the accident (See Medical-Legal Opinion at images 171 to 174 of the judicial file); 9) That in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\": \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO A MANHOLE COVER COMING OFF\" and as \"Risk Factor: Excess speed\". (Images 156 to 157 of the judicial file. The uppercase corresponds to the original); 10) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the Traffic Court of Hatillo, San José, in summary proceedings processed under file No. 16-0026810492-TC, resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on March six, two thousand seventeen, to acquit the plaintiff here of all penalty and responsibility. (Image 190 of the judicial file); 11) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the National Insurance Institute, in addition to the compensation for the total loss of her vehicle, paid her the following sums of money: i) Payment of transportation: Fifteen thousand seven hundred colones -¢15,700.00-. ii) Medical Services: Seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents -¢727,877.59-. Leaving a balance in the coverage of five million two hundred fifty-six thousand four hundred twenty-two colones with forty-one cents -¢5,256,422.41-. (Certification SEAD-05123-2017 issued on October 30, 2017 by the National Insurance Institute, visible at image 199 of the judicial file); 12) That on the occasion of the accident, the plaintiff was placed on sick leave on various occasions by the Services of: General Medicine -13 days-, Orthopedics -4 days- and Psychiatry -3 days- all from the National Insurance Institute, for a total of 20 days of sick leave, also requiring one day of physical therapy -January 20, 2017- and several appointments were scheduled for both Psychiatry and Psychology. (Images 49 to 59 and 61 to 64 of the judicial file); 13) That the plaintiff was caused subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) derived both from the bodily injuries suffered and from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced on the occasion of the traffic accident in which she was involved. (Images 49 to 59, 61 to 64 of the judicial file and testimony at Trial of [Name62 004]).\n\nIII.- UNPROVEN FACTS: For lacking evidence to prove its occurrence, the following is considered undemonstrated: 1) That the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had, at the time the accident occurred, a market value of nine million colones -¢9,000,000-. 2) That the plaintiff was traveling at excess speed when driving her vehicle on the above-cited Address13577, and more specifically when passing over the manhole (alcantarilla) that caused the mishap. 3) That in the accident that occurred to the plaintiff on October 20, 2016, there intervened force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim –due to excess speed, lack of skill (impericia) and/or imprudence (imprudencia)– or the act of a third party. 4) That on the date the accident occurred, the plaintiff here was engaged –even if as a secondary activity– as a Real Estate Broker. 5) That the plaintiff had to rent a vehicle for a period of 32 days starting November 20, 2016 in order to attend medical appointments and continue with her usual tasks. 6) That the plaintiff's monthly income generated from her activity of Care of Older Adults, was seven hundred fifty thousand colones gross -¢750,000- and six hundred ninety-four thousand one hundred thirty colones with eighty-two cents, net -¢694,130.82-. 7) That on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was prevented for a period of 6 months from exercising her activity of caring for Older Adults. 8) That as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a permanent or temporary partial disability in the use of her left hand.\n\nIV.- ON THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA (COSA JUZGADA) RAISED AT TRIAL BY THE REPRESENTATION OF CONAVI. The legal representation of the National Road Council argues that on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff here, Traffic Proceeding No. 16-002681-0492-TC was processed before the Traffic Court of Hatillo, San José, which was expressly resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on March six, two thousand seventeen. That for this reason, that having been the opportunity to discuss the existence or not of CONAVI's responsibility, and it not having been so, what was resolved in that venue acquired finality and to that extent, material res judicata exists in this case. Criterion of this Chamber. As is known, for the configuration of the defense being analyzed, the existence of a triple identity between the respective Proceedings is required. That is, that both feature the same parties –subjective identity–, that in the Proceeding with a final Judgment, the merits of all or some of the claims made in the second Proceeding were analyzed and ruled upon –objective identity–, and that both matters have their genesis in the same facts –identity in the cause–. In this case, the aforementioned triple identity clearly does not exist. In this line, CONAVI was not a party in the Traffic Proceeding –as its own legal representation accepts–, which outright rules out being able to speak of subjective identity. Then, with a simple reading of the above-cited Traffic Judgment and the rest of the proceedings and evidence contained in the certified file provided to the record, it is evident that we are very far from an objective identity, since what was sought in this Civil Treasury Proceeding –see Whereas I of this Ruling–, differs, and greatly, from what was sought –purpose– in the cited Traffic Proceeding –the determination of the plaintiff's responsibility–. Up to here, the inappropriateness of the defense alleged is evidenced, resulting thereby unnecessary to analyze the existence or not of identity in the cause.\n\nThus, in the judgment of this Collegiate Body, the exception raised must be rejected as is hereby ordered.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:10.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">V.- ON THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">In summary and without prejudice to the literalness of their arguments, which have been studied in their entirety by this Court, each of the parties alleges what is detailed below in this section.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">PLAINTIFF:</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#03050d\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That on October 20, 2016, at approximately one fifteen in the afternoon, she was driving her vehicle on National Route 39, built and administered by CONAVI, specifically at Dirección13578</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, taking the overpass on route to Santa Marta and Dirección3898, an area where drivers become aware of the loud noise produced by the manhole covers when cars pass over them. That on the date and time mentioned in the previous point, she was traveling in the left lane, at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour, and observed through the rearview mirror that three motorcyclists were advancing on her right, which alerted her that she could not move into that lane without putting their lives at risk. That behind her was another vehicle driven by someone who, after the events, identified himself as Nombre112465</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, ID number CED89028. That she, for her part, was behind another vehicle at a prudent distance, when suddenly, from beneath the vehicle ahead, she noticed that in front of her there was a manhole on the roadway of her lane, which had its cover raised, that is, instead of being horizontal covering the manhole opening, it was in a vertical position, with half inside the opening and the rest protruding above the street, forming an obstacle on the road. That at that moment she had the metal railing of the edge of the overpass on her left and the motorcyclists on her right. That she lost control of the vehicle, its steering did not respond, she felt the entire environment spinning around her, while loose objects in the car floated or fell around her, such as her purse, the car mats, her cell phone, and an umbrella. That immediately thereafter, in a matter of seconds, the manhole cover struck the windshield of the car she was driving, which fractured into a multitude of cracks and filaments on the front, generating a shower of glass fragments onto her, specifically onto her face and head, without her being clear at that moment about what was happening. That Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo, a resident of the area, and Mr. Nombre112465</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, who was driving his vehicle behind her, observed how her car, upon passing over the cover in question, lifted completely into the air, together with the manhole cover which, upon hitting her car's tire, the kinetic force caused it to come out of its place, rise up with her car, and, spinning in the air, impact against the windshield of her vehicle, then fall to the street, landing about four meters from its corresponding manhole and four meters from the railing, almost on the dividing line between lanes. That her vehicle spun several times in the air, hit the ground, and finally fell onto the street, landing on its side on the driver's side, where the momentum still caused it to drag along the ground for a stretch, ending up overturned and lying across the right lane, about twelve meters from the manhole and three and a half meters from the street railing; the front license plate was left twisted like a rag on the road. That after falling onto the street, her vehicle continued sliding sideways along it with her inside, shocked and held to the driver's seat by the seatbelt, which, although it kept her in the seat, being in an inclined position and pulled by gravity, cut off her breathing. That residents of the area report that, for a long time before the accident relevant to this lawsuit, the malfunctioning manhole cover has caused minor and serious accidents at that same point. That the newspaper CR-Hoy, of national circulation, on February 13, 2017, reported that several more accidents have occurred at the same location, due to the malfunctioning manhole cover, given that, in fact, the report indicates that it has broken and disappeared, leaving the opening unprotected. That the original cover, which identified it as a municipal manhole, was replaced by another that says Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillado. That the accident, as stated in the medical opinions, caused the plaintiff a shock which altered her peace and tranquility, her personal life was profoundly disrupted emotionally, which has caused her states of anguish, depression, and anxiety; the first few days she could not sleep well and needed medication to fall asleep, in addition to periodic headaches that lasted between two and three months; today, despite the time elapsed, she still suffers from periodic states of anxiety and sadness. That the accident caused the total loss of the vehicle, whose reported value in the used car market is at least nine million colones, but the insurance gave her compensation in the sum of six million colones, so that implied a patrimonial loss of at least three million. That at this moment, in order to buy a vehicle in the same conditions as the first one, but new, she had to make an installment purchase for an investment of thirty-one thousand nine hundred dollars of the United States of America. That she is an independent person who provides for her own maintenance, works as a real estate broker and, mainly, in the care of elderly persons in a state of disability or senility, so the accident, due to the movement limitations it caused her, such as pain in her hands, back, head, and stress, prevented her from carrying out said activity, since she could not be responsible for holding an elderly person with her hands to move or transfer them, without the risk of causing a fall and injuries, so that in reality she could not work and support herself for six months, from October 2016 until April 2017;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> which caused her to lose regular clients she had at that time and prevented her from performing her work activities in general. That consequently, her gross income, from an average of ¢7,500,000 monthly, decreased by ¢4,500,000 monthly, which after expenses represents a net loss of income over six months due to being unable to work, of ¢4,164,784.92. That the loss of her vehicle and the need to travel to medical appointments, coordinate with her clients, attend therapy, and manage her other pending commitments, forced her to rent a vehicle for one month in the sum of six hundred thousand colones, a cost that became impossible for her to maintain continuously. That on Sunday, July 23, 2017, at approximately 4 in the afternoon, she was traveling in her new vehicle on the same highway where the accident occurred and despite the fact that since that day she takes the extreme right lane, at that moment, due to repairs on an overpass bridge, the two right lanes were closed and traffic was diverted only through the left lane. That it was then that she faced the fact of having to pass through the accident site and entered a state of panic and was paralyzed, unable to continue. That due to the traffic jam she caused, a traffic officer came over who did her the favor of taking the wheel and crossing the accident site. That two days later she returned for an appointment with the psychiatrist at INS, who renewed her medication treatment. That in light of what occurred, the responsibility is fully that of the authorities responsible for the installation and maintenance of the highway, the manhole, and the cover of the latter, for which they are sued jointly because their actions have generated the malfunctioning of the highway service and consequently the damages caused. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">CONAVI: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That the plaintiff's statement is inaccurate when she indicates that she was driving \"at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour,\" since as can be accredited from the evidence offered by the plaintiff herself, that in Official Report No. 2016-248600029, Ticket #Identificacion533 prepared by Inspector No. 2486, Mr. Pablo Agüero Rojas, excessive speed at which she was driving is described as a risk factor. That in this regard, the following was textually recorded: \"Risk Factor: Excessive speed,\" in the accident that occurred on October 20, 2016, at \"1:18:46 p.m.\" That the plaintiff indicates that the stormwater manhole cover had engraved the legend \"alcantarillado pluvial municipal.\" That notwithstanding this, it is the lack of skill and imprudence of the plaintiff in driving at excessive speed that causes the accident, and therefore, she cannot attempt to attribute any responsibility to the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad on this account. That in any case, regarding water management, the considerations issued by the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia in matters of sewer systems are of mandatory observance, in which they indicate the administrative instances of the Poder Ejecutivo which are responsible for the construction and operation of systems for providing potable water and evacuating sewage -Judgment No. 2007-05894 of eleven hours and fifty-eight minutes of April twenty-seventh, two thousand seven-. There being clarity, as to which it corresponds to the Municipalidad (Municipality) to administer local services and interests, guaranteeing, among others, good systems for providing potable water and evacuating wastewater, through adequate aqueduct and sewer systems, therefore, the definitive solution in the matter of stormwater and residual water management falls to the Municipalidad and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">STATE: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That as reported by CONAVI in its response to this lawsuit, in view of the complexity of the road project where the accident is alleged to have occurred, careful follow-up was carried out on each of its stages -design and construction-, both by CONAVI plant personnel, as well as by external professionals and the contracted Supervisory Consortium, this in conjunction with the supervision of the contracting company itself. Resulting in the guarantee that the works complied with the technical and structural parameters contained in the public works contract. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">AyA: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That upon conducting the inspections by AyA technicians at the site of the event, it was determined that the manhole described in the accident is administered by CONAVI for the stormwater maintenance system of the bypass road. That the covers throughout the entire country are cast by the cover manufacturer with the inscription of the AyA initials, however these covers are freely sold, any person can buy this type of cover and put them in their projects without this signifying that the structure is ours. That thus, it is very difficult to see covers like those described for San José stormwater manhole systems, since these covers are made for them in a very exclusive manner. That the stormwater system is the responsibility of each Municipalidad and for this reason the Gobierno Central assigns a budget to each Local Government for the annual maintenance of these stormwater systems. That AyA does not receive any type of budget for stormwater maintenance, thus relieving it of responsibility for stormwater events, since the use of AyA funds for these matters of maintaining stormwater structures would constitute an irregular diversion of public funds. That despite the fact that the Municipalidades are the ones who must provide this type of care for stormwater systems, on National Highways this responsibility is shared with CONAVI, and can be fully delegated to the Municipal entity entirely, according to specific situations. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That indeed the manhole in question has a cover identified as property of Acueductos y Alcantarillado, so this point confirms that the Municipalidad de San José is not responsible for the placement, replacement, or maintenance of manhole covers on national routes, as is the one where the incident alleged by the plaintiff occurred. That it is unknown if previously there existed a municipal cover on said manhole, and if so, it was not this Municipalidad that placed it, as it does not have the competence to do so, since it involves a route that is beyond municipal administration. That the acts denounced in this lawsuit occurred on Highway 39 as stated by the plaintiff, the same one that corresponds to the classification of Red Vial Nacional, so that both the construction of the road, as well as its administration and subsequent maintenance, are beyond the competency, functional, and operational scope of the Municipalidad de San José. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:10.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">VI.- ON THE BASIS OF THE LAWSUIT AND ITS EVALUATION BY THIS COURT: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">As can be appreciated from the factual scenario and the claims of the lawsuit, in this case we are facing a typical Civil Proceeding against the Treasury, in which the extracontractual liability of a Public Administration is being claimed. Certainly, as the co-defendant Administrations argue, the plaintiff does not identify the entity or body with instrumental legal personality -the case of CONAVI- that caused the damages for which compensation is sought. Rather, she acts against all of them, given the factual-legal uncertainty in which not only she, but also the defendant Administrations find themselves, who argue they have no liability, either because in their opinion they did everything very well -the case of CONAVI supported by the State- or because matters relating to stormwater manholes are outside their competencies -the case of AyA and the Municipalidad de San José-. A simple reading of the responses to the lawsuit is enough to notice the said uncertainty, which they curiously allege as a flaw that would require declaring -according to their opinion- the inadmissibility of the lawsuit. That is, from what is argued in their responses, it is evident that the respondent Administrations do not have a clear idea of where their competencies reach on the subject of stormwater manholes, precisely because it is a topic that is not simple at all. But despite this, they all seek to exempt themselves from responsibility for what happened to the plaintiff, using as a basic argument that the manhole on the occasion of which the accident occurred has nothing to do with each of them. Faced with such a panorama, the only logical option for the plaintiff was to proceed as she did; that is, suing those who from her perspective could have some involvement in the operation of the manhole causing the mishap. And this, in the judgment of this Court, in no way diminishes the exercise of her right of action and much less, the possibility of obtaining reparation for all, some, or any of the damages for which compensation is sought. Having clarified the above, it must be remembered that Costa Rica is a Social and Democratic State of Law, in which, from the Constitución Política (Political Constitution) itself, the indisputable foundations of the liability of the State -Central and Decentralized- are laid. (Articles 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 140.8, 139.4, 148, 149, 150, 154, 188, and 191). Constitutional precepts that are developed, among others, by the Ley General de la Administración Pública -ordinals 190 et seq.-, where, in summary, the liability of the Administration for damages caused by its legitimate, illegitimate, normal, and abnormal operation is established, excepting force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. The doctrinal and jurisprudential development of the cited norms and many others that deal with the subject has been more than abundant, existing coincidence that the administered party must be guaranteed not only access to justice, but also their constitutional right to full compensation, provided they prove the existence of: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">i)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> A conduct -formal, material, or omissive- of a Public Administration. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">ii)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> A damage that they are not obligated to bear. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">iii) </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">A causal link (cause-effect relationship) between that conduct and the damage experienced. Thus then, those are the three presuppositions, which, as indicated in previous lines, must be demonstrated by anyone seeking compensation derived from the actions of a Public Administration. This said, it is more than obvious from a simple reading of the constitutional and legal norms indicated above, that the right to full compensation is not conditioned on the administered party being registered with the Dirección General de Tributación or having paid the corresponding taxes, as argued by CONAVI supported by the State Representation. Such a position is untenable in light of the ordinals indicated above, in none of which did the constituent power on the one hand, and the ordinary legislator on the other, establish such conditions to access Costa Rican justice and obtain from it -when the presuppositions indicated above are proven- full compensation for the damages caused by a Public Administration. In this case, as has been said, CONAVI and the Procuraduría General de la República, stated on various occasions -both representations in writing and the Special Judicial Attorney of CONAVI orally at Trial- that it was necessary to request from the Ministerio de Hacienda the Tax Returns of the plaintiff, in the three periods prior to the year in which the accident occurred. Evidence absolutely irrelevant for this type of case -for the reasons given in this Judgment-, but which was admitted by the Case Management Judge without him processing it in a timely manner. In view of this, this Chamber did its part and by resolution at fourteen hours five minutes of July first, two thousand twenty-one, ordered the Ministerio de Hacienda to remit the Tax Returns corresponding to the periods 2014, 2015, and 2016, which as of the date this Ruling is issued have not been remitted to the Court. Nevertheless, the absence of said evidence in no way prevents ruling on this matter nor causes defenselessness to the co-defendant parties that requested it, since as has been said it is absolutely irrelevant and in any case, there is no controversy as to the fact that the plaintiff was not paying taxes when the accident occurred, since her Special Judicial Attorney has had no qualms in expressly acknowledging -even in the Oral and Public Hearing- that his client was not registered as a taxpayer at that time -meaning the time of the mishap-. That is, the plaintiff expressly and undoubtedly acknowledges that she was not paying taxes when the events on which she bases her lawsuit occurred, but even so the cited Administrations insisted on such evidence, despite it being absolutely irrelevant for the reasons indicated below: i) The right to full compensation for damage caused by a Public Administration has absolutely nothing to do with the tax status of the injured party. ii) The constituent power and the ordinary legislator did not establish being registered as a taxpayer or as an independent worker as a presupposition to access that full compensation. iii) In a Proceeding such as the one before us, determining the tax status of an administered party is outside the object of the same. iv) If the Dirección General de Tributación or the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social were to consider that they must proceed against an administered party who brings action in court seeking reparation for the damages they claim to have experienced due to conduct of any Public Administration, it is a power that they have, but which in no way affects the object of this Proceeding. Thus then, the tax status of the plaintiff here has no transcendence nor can it stand as a parameter or any limitation, to rule on this matter as Law corresponds, doing without, as is done, the referred evidence. Now then, as has been said, all the defendant Administrations argue that they have nothing to do with the manhole that caused the accident suffered by the plaintiff here, but the truth is that one of them, in light of constitutional jurisprudence, is certainly directly linked. Hence, in the following lines, norms and jurisprudence from the Sala Constitucional will be cited, in which the subject matter relating to the topic that concerns us is addressed. As the parties will surely remember, Mr. CONAVI Engineer Kennet Enrique Solano Carmona, stated at Trial that in the Project for said highway the construction of stormwater manholes was contemplated, since in that sector stormwater combined with sewage flowed, it being on occasion of this a contaminated body of water that discharges into the río María Aguilar and for which reason, he affirmed that at some point a consultation was formulated to the Municipalidad de San José. What was thus stated by the referred witness regarding the stormwater manhole system is confirmed by Engineer Willian Reinilgen Sancho, an AyA official, who in his Report DRyT-OMSR-2017-00849 of October 27, 2017, insofar as he indicates that: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:145%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"In the place there is no sanitary sewer network, administered by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA). The existence of a stormwater network was observed, which </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">is not administered</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> by AyA ... \" (The underline and bold correspond to the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">Thus, in the area where the accident occurred what exists is a stormwater manhole network or system, it being irrelevant on the occasion of what will be said, that said infrastructure is on a National Route, as argued by the Municipalidad de San José. Now then, regarding this type of system and more specifically to whom its administration corresponds, it is clear that there is no uniformity of criteria in this case, so it is necessary to resort both to the norms relevant to the topic, and to the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued in this regard. In this line, ordinals 1 and 2 of Ley No. 2726 of April 14, 1961: Ley Constitutiva Instituto Costarricense Acueductos y Alcantarillados, expressly establish:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:28.9pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"ARTICLE 1º.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">With the object of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying norms, carrying out and promoting the planning, financing, and development, and of resolving everything related to</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> the supply of potable water and collection and evacuation of sewage and liquid industrial waste, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">as well as the normative aspect of stormwater manhole systems in urban areas, for the entire national territory</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is created, as an autonomous institution of the State”.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:1.4pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"ARTICLE 2º.- It corresponds to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:14.2pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">Alcantarillados:</span></p><ol type=\"a\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span>To direct and supervise everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the Republic with a service of potable water, collection and evacuation of sewage and liquid industrial waste, and of stormwater in urban areas;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To determine the priority, convenience, and feasibility of the different projects proposed to build, reform, expand, modify aqueduct and sewer works; which cannot be executed without its approval;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To promote the conservation of hydrographic basins and ecological protection, as well as the control of water pollution;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 59pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To advise other State bodies and coordinate public and private activities in all matters relating to the establishment of aqueducts and sewer systems and control of water resource pollution, its consultation being obligatory, in any case, and compliance with its recommendations inexcusable;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To elaborate all the plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works related to aqueduct and sewer systems, as determined by the respective regulations;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.99pt; padding-left:0.01pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To take advantage of, use, govern, or supervise, as the case may be, all public domain waters indispensable for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State has over them, in accordance with law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute will be considered the substituting body of the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 59pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To administer and operate directly the aqueduct and sewer systems throughout the country, which will be gradually assumed taking into account convenience and availability of resources.</span></li></ol>\n\nSystems currently administered and operated by municipal corporations may remain under their charge, as long as they provide efficient service.\n\nUnder no circumstances may it delegate the administration of the potable water and sanitary sewer systems of the Metropolitan Area.\n\nNor may it delegate the administration of systems for which there exists financial responsibility and while such responsibility corresponds directly to the Institute.\n\nThe institution is empowered to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrative boards of mixed integration between the Institute and the respective communities, whenever it is deemed convenient for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations.\n\nFor the same reasons and with the same characteristics, regional administrative boards involving several municipalities may also be created;\n\nh) Enforce the General Potable Water Law, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the ministries and municipalities indicated in said law;\n\ni) Build, expand, and modify potable water and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and so advised for the better satisfaction of national needs; and\n\nj) Control the adequate investment of all resources that the State allocates for potable water and sanitary sewer works.\"\n\nFor its part, numeral 5 of Law No. 7593 of August 9, 1996: Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (ARESEP), establishes:\n\n\"Article 5.- Functions\n\nIn the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; furthermore, it shall ensure compliance with the standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, pursuant to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:\n\na) Supply of electrical energy in the stages of generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization.\n\nb) (Thus repealed this subsection by Article 42 of Law No. 8660 of August 8,\n\n2008)\n\nc) Supply of potable water and sewer service, including drinking water, the collection, treatment, and disposal of black water, wastewater, and stormwater, as well as the installation, operation, and maintenance of the hydrant service.\n\n(Thus amended the preceding subsection by Article 5 of Law No. 8641 of June 11, 2008)\n\nd) Supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons, which include: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas intended to supply national demand at distribution plants, and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas intended for the final consumer. The Regulatory Authority shall set the transportation rates used for national supply.\n\ne) Irrigation and drainage, when the service is provided by a public company or by concession or permit.\n\nf) Any means of remunerated public transportation of persons, except air.\n\ng) Maritime and air services in national ports.\n\nh) Cargo transport by railway.\n\ni) Collection and treatment of solid and industrial waste.\n\nThe authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:\n\nSubsection a): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection c): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection d.2): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection e): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection f): Ministry of Public Works and Transport\n\nSubsection g): Ministry of Public Works and Transport; Board of\n\nPort Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Coast and Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports, respectively.\n\nSubsection h): Ministry of Public Works and Transport.\n\nSubsection i): The municipalities.\n\nIn granting the concession for the use of water for irrigation, the obligation of the user to apply appropriate water management techniques must be included, in order to avoid the degradation of the soil resource, whether by erosion, waterlogging, salinization, hydromorphism, and other harmful effects. (Thus added this final paragraph by Article 63 of the Law of Soil Use and Conservation No. 7779 of April 30, 1998).\"\n\nAs can be appreciated from the supra-transcribed regulations, among others, matters relating to storm sewer systems constitute a public service, and to that extent, are subject to its Fundamental Principles. (Article 4 LGAP). Now then, regarding whether it is the AyA or the respective Municipality that must be responsible for providing said service, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated the following, in what is of interest:\n\n\"III.- On the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the storm sewer system, and the competencies of the\n\nPublic Administrations in this regard.- This Tribunal, in reiterated jurisprudence, has recognized that the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is a fundamental right deriving from Article 50 of the Constitution, according to which, it not only enshrines the right of every citizen to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, but also obligates the State to guarantee the exercise of said right, through the means established to that effect by current legislation. Specifically, as this Chamber has stated in Voto n°05-9900 of 10:00 hours on July 29, 2005, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to adequately channel these waters, in order to guarantee the right to health and to an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties:\n\nV.- On municipal obligations regarding storm sewers.- It is pertinent to take into account that Article 169 of the Political Constitution establishes that the administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. Local interests and services have been defined by the Chamber as indeterminate legal concepts where the law does not specify their exact content for application to concrete cases, making it necessary to resort to criteria of value and experience, on the part of whoever is responsible for applying it, to determine its content. The creation of adequate drainage means within a community for the purpose of not causing damage to property, health, or environmental problems to its neighbors is, within the terms indicated by the Political Constitution, of interest to the canton and is part of the services that the Municipality is obligated to provide. In this same sense, the General Health Law, in its Article 285, establishes that stormwater must be eliminated adequately and sanitarily in order to avoid the contamination of the soil and of natural sources of water for human use and consumption, the formation of vector breeding grounds and diseases, and the contamination of the air through conditions that threaten its purity and quality. For this reason, the Municipality of Nombre594., is obligated to assume a determined behavior for the satisfaction of its purposes, taking the required measures to provide the protected community with an efficient stormwater drainage system. Adjusted to criteria of reasonableness, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to adequately channel those waters, in order to guarantee the right to health and to an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, such municipal obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, since the latter, as the governing body on the matter, is responsible at the national level for directing, coordinating, and overseeing everything concerning the disposal of black water, sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic, so this Institution is not entirely unrelated to the problem raised by the protected party.\n\nOn the other hand, even if the problem were solely caused by the storm sewer system, the Ministry of Health cannot disregard it, since, in accordance with Articles 21 of the Constitution, 2 of the General Health Law, and 2 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, it is responsible for the essential function of safeguarding the health of the inhabitants of the Republic, being required to adopt all necessary general and particular measures (Articles 337 and 355 of Law No. 5395) to guarantee the full enjoyment of that right. Likewise, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the General Health Law in its Articles 285 and 292:\n\nARTICLE 285.-\n\nExcreta, black water, gray water, and stormwater must be eliminated adequately and sanitarily in order to avoid the contamination of the soil and of natural sources of water for human use and consumption, the formation of vector breeding grounds and diseases, and the contamination of the air through conditions that threaten its purity or quality.\n\nARTICLE 292.-\n\nThe discharge of black water, gray water, and industrial waste into the storm sewer system is prohibited in all cases. The Ministry is empowered to restrict, regulate, or prohibit the disposal of non-biodegradable synthetic products through excreta and water collection systems.\n\nAs is evident from the above, competency in the matter of storm sewers is established, expressly and implicitly, by common legislation. Although the current Municipal Code does not establish any specific provision regarding this topic, the Chamber has declared, in judgment No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002, that this does not exclude the obligation of municipal entities -evidently, in coordination with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, which is the governing entity par excellence in the matter-, to develop, among other community works, matters relating to adequate potable water and sewer systems. In effect, Article 4, subsection c) of the current Municipal Code generally establishes, as a municipal power, the administration and provision of municipal public services, within which, without a doubt, potable water and sewer systems are found.\n\nFurthermore, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers equally has a shared competency in this regard. In the referenced resolution No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002, the Chamber concluded that “... the power to create and maintain sanitary sewer networks corresponds to the municipalities, since they, according to Article 3 of the current Municipal Code, are primarily obligated to safeguard the cantonal interests and services within the jurisdiction under their charge, and because this is expressly derived from Article 169 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the generic competence of the Municipalities in this matter. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, such obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, since the latter, as the governing body on the matter, is responsible at the national level (sic) for directing, coordinating, and overseeing everything concerning the disposal of black water, sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic.” (Judgment No. 2008-001191 of eleven hours and thirty-six minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eight. The underlining and bold type are ours). Similarly, in another of its Rulings, the High Tribunal, clarifying the topic of competencies in the field that concerns us, indicated:\n\n\"In this matter, it cannot be forgotten that the competency and responsibility for the management of the storm sewer system corresponds primarily to the Municipalities -although in coordination with the Costa Rican Institute of\n\nAqueducts and Sewers and the Ministry of Health, as the case may be, for\n\nwhich it must carry out the corresponding coordination- and this local entity, despite being aware of the current problem and of the solution that must be given to it, did not immediately proceed to address the problem, allowing years to pass plagued with omissions and unproductive actions.\" (Judgment No. 2008-004210 of thirteen hours and fifty-nine minutes on March fourteenth, two thousand eight. In a similar sense, Voto No. 18465-2020 of nine hours fifteen minutes on September twenty-fifth, two thousand twenty. The bold type is our own).\n\nIn another of its Votes, which specifically refers to the Municipality of San José, the referenced Chamber stated:\n\n\"The foregoing constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the protected parties, which is attributable to the Municipality of San José, since, as is evident from the expediente, said authority is the competent one for attending to the storm sewer system of the canton.\" (Judgment No. 2011-006903 of twelve hours and nine minutes on May twenty-seventh, two thousand eleven. In a similar sense, resolution No. 2020-009707 of nine hours fifteen minutes on May twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty. The bold highlighting is from this Chamber).\n\nAlso, through Judgment No. 2012-001015 of nine hours five minutes on January twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, the High Tribunal indicated:\n\n\"Certainly, in the first instance, the obligation to create and maintain storm sewer networks corresponds to the municipalities because these, in accordance with what is regulated in numerals 3 of the Municipal Code and 169 of the Political Constitution, are primarily obligated to safeguard the cantonal interests and services within the corresponding jurisdiction, which justifies the fact that such corporations collect municipal taxes, which include the item corresponding to the maintenance and operation of the stormwater network. However, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, that obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, since this is the governing body on the matter and the most technically specialized entity to advise on the proper maintenance of the referenced service.\" (Both the underlining and the bold type are from this Collegiate Body).\n\nIn the same manner, in one of its most recent Rulings on the topic that concerns us, the mentioned Chamber held:\n\n\"In the specific case, the appellant alleges the violation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment on the occasion of two problems: a) canalization of sewer waters in Dirección289, Barrio Los Ángeles of San Rafael Debajo of Desamparados, which causes the waters to overflow causing floods...\n\nRegarding such allegations, from the list of proven facts, it is established that the cited problem has been reported by the protected party and other neighbors of the community since 2019. Thus, it is recorded that on October 21, 2019, they filed a complaint before the Municipality of Desamparados, alleging problems with water canalization, as a result of which they have suffered floods, damage to pipes and sewers, damage to the roadway, and damage to their properties.\n\n(...) In the development, protection, and full enjoyment of the cited rights, the function of the Municipalities and their bodies –including the municipal district councils– is relevant, which, based on Article 169 of the Constitution, are obligated to effectively provide the public services that have been entrusted to them. Thus, as applied to the specific case, such obligations entail the effective maintenance of public roads –paths, sidewalks, and sewers–, through which other rights are exercised and enjoyed, such as freedom of movement, health, and the right to a healthy environment.\" (Judgment No. 2021-005042 of nine hours fifteen minutes on March twelfth, two thousand twenty-one. The bold type does not correspond to the original).\n\nAs can be clearly appreciated from the constitutional jurisprudence, matters concerning storm sewers are the competency of the municipalities, without prejudice to the provisions of ordinals 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of the AyA, since, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body on the matter and the most technically specialized entity to advise on the proper maintenance of the referenced service.\" Thus, regardless of the type of road -understood as national or cantonal- matters relating to said service correspond to the respective Local Government. And along these lines, note how the High Tribunal makes express reference to the fact that the responsibility of the municipalities in this matter is principal, and they must coordinate \"with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers and the Ministry of Health, as the case may be.\" Thus, in accordance with the cited constitutional jurisprudence, there is no doubt whatsoever that the municipalities are directly responsible \"for creating and maintaining storm sewer networks\" within the respective territorial circumscription -canton- they administer. This being so, in light of the regulations and constitutional judgments cited, the entity that must be answerable for the proper functioning of the entire storm sewer system linked to the roads located in the Central Canton of San José -whether national or not- is the Municipality of San José, which even has a \"Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José\" (Regulation for the Granting of Storm Drain Outlets and Availabilities in the Canton of San José), published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 155 of August 27, 2018. And to that extent, any damage generated by said system or any of its elements is attributable to it.\n\nNow, in the present case, there is no doubt whatsoever regarding the accident that occurred, the place where it happened, and its efficient cause—a storm drain cover in a vertical position—, without it having been demonstrated that there was force majeure, fault of the victim—due to excessive speed, lack of skill, and/or imprudence—or an act of a third party. In this sense, the mishap was clearly not due to an act of nature, as is abundantly clear from the dynamics of the accident narrated by the plaintiff in her complaint, which is consistent with the statement of the witness Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo. The aforementioned deponent stated that he lives at Dirección13579, which is located in front of the area where the accident occurred. He also indicated that at the moment of the mishap, he was able to observe a 3 or 4-ton vehicle traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff, and that when that vehicle passed over the sewer cover, the cover was left in a vertical position, so that immediately afterward, the right front tire of the plaintiff's motor vehicle struck it and was catapulted out, flipping several times on the road. The representation of CONAVI attempted to distort what was thus declared by the aforementioned witness, arguing that there was no precision as to which of the two front tires struck the sewer and how it was possible that the witness, who had said he was messaging on WhatsApp at the time of the accident, could still have witnessed the accident. In this regard, it is worth noting, first, that for this Chamber, it is irrelevant whether the witness could specify which of the two front tires of the vehicle driven by the plaintiff struck the sewer in question, because what is transcendent is that one of the front tires impacted the sewer cover; and second, although the witness indicated he was messaging while resting, this in no way means that he was detached from the surrounding reality. Along these lines, at no time did the witness state that his attention was complete and absolute to the exchange of messages in which he was engaged; on the contrary, he clarified that while taking a break from his usual work, he took the opportunity to message, while observing the outside from his home. Nor is it possible to sustain that there was an act of a third party, solely because, according to the narrative of what occurred, it was a vehicle traveling ahead of the plaintiff that, upon passing over the mentioned sewer, \"left the same\" in a vertical position, since this circumstance did not happen because such vehicle passed over the sewer, but because the sewer itself did not behave as it should have. That is, that vehicle and many others could pass over said element, and it should have remained in its place or space called the base ring or \"flanger.\" (In this sense, see Report DRyTOMSR-2017-00849 prepared by Eng. William Leininger Sancho, which is visible at images 91 to 94 of the judicial file). Finally, the existence of fault by the victim is not appreciated, given that the argument put forward regarding the distance the plaintiff should have maintained from the vehicle traveling ahead of hers not being adequate for the speed at which she was driving, because if it had been, she could well have reacted to maneuver and avoid striking the sewer cover, was merely that: an allegation devoid of evidence. Along these lines,—namely, regarding the issue of excessive speed—it is a fact that was not held as proven, because although in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\" as: \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO DETACHMENT OF SEWER COVER\" and as \"Risk Factor: Excessive speed,\" the truth is that this is nothing more than a simple comment from a Traffic Officer who did not witness the accident. And in any case, it is reiterated, the aforementioned cover should not have behaved the way it did, which can in no way be attributed to the plaintiff herein. Having said this, it is reiterated that in the present case, it has been held as proven that the plaintiff suffered a car accident because a cover that formed part of a storm drainage system—a public service under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of San José in this case, according to the constitutional jurisprudence cited above—\"did not behave as expected\"—the efficient cause of the mishap—since after being run over by a vehicle traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff herein, it was left in a vertical position. What has been pointed out up to here, besides clearing up the doubts regarding the Passive Ad Causam Standing, allows this Chamber to delve, in the following lines, into the damages and losses claimed by the party bringing the action. 1. Uncompensated difference regarding the real value of the vehicle (¢3,000,000). As was indicated in the list of proven facts, as a result of the policy the plaintiff had subscribed with the INS, she received from said Institute compensation for an amount of ¢6,000,000, due to the total loss of her vehicle. Now, it is not clear if the party bringing the action is dissatisfied with what was thus granted by the aforementioned insurance entity, in which case she should have brought action against the same—which she did not do in the present case—so that this Court could review the legality of the conduct displayed. If, contrary to that, the plaintiff considered that the amount compensated by the INS was in accordance with the contracted policy, but that her vehicle had a greater market value—for which she had not insured it—and that, consequently, this difference should be covered by the co-defendants, she was under the obligation to prove such circumstance. Which she also did not do, since it was held as unproven that \"the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had, at the time the accident occurred, a market value of nine million colones -¢9,000,000-.\" Hence, regarding this request, its rejection is mandatory. 2. Six months she could not dedicate to her work (¢4,164,784.92). Despite the arguments of the sued Administrations regarding the fact that the plaintiff, when giving her Investigative Statement before the Traffic Court of Hatillo, stated she was a housewife when the mishap occurred, in the present case, it was held as proven that she was engaged in caring for the elderly. In this sense, note that although the first of the occupations was the one recorded in the aforementioned Investigative Statement, it is unknown whether this was because, before the person to whom it was given, such information was not modified in the format used to detail personal information in that type of procedural act, or if it was effectively so indicated by the plaintiff herself. Notwithstanding this, in this Proceeding, we have gone beyond mere say-so, and evidence of her occupation at the time the accident occurred has been brought forth. In this sense, one can observe the Sworn Affidavit given by the person suing, visible at images 45 to 46 of the file, in which she expressly states under the gravity of oath—which, incidentally, does not occur in an Investigative Statement—that she was dedicated to caring for the elderly. The previous statement was supported by the witness [Name62 004], the plaintiff's sister, who, when consulted at Trial about whether she knew what her sister did for a living, stated without hesitation—that is, with total certainty—: \"[Name62 001] is not a professional; she cares for elderly people to earn a living.\" To which she added, that it was a job with fixed hours. Subsequently, she indicated that at the time of the accident, her sister was in charge of some elderly gentlemen whom she attended in Sabanilla. What was thus said by both the plaintiff and the cited witness is consistent with what was indicated regarding the plaintiff's activity by the Certified Public Accountant Rodolfo Jenkins Conejo, in the Certification issued by him, which, although as will be seen, does not constitute sufficient evidence to prove the income of the person bringing the action, certainly stands as one more element of conviction, which, joined with the 2 previously indicated, allows it to be held as demonstrated what the plaintiff was dedicated to at the moment of the mishap. Now, despite this—that is, the activity to which the plaintiff was dedicated when the accident occurred having been proven—, as was indicated in the Whereas Clause relating to the unproven facts, in the present case it has been held as unproven that, on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was disabled for a period of 6 months from exercising her activity of caring for the Elderly. This being the case, since there is no suitable medical evidence to prove such circumstance, the Certification from the Certified Public Accountant provided by the plaintiff to quantify the claimed item lacks relevance and, for this reason, requires no analysis regarding its content. Notwithstanding this, without prejudice to what has been thus pointed out, it must be remembered that such certifications in no way constitute full proof for cases such as the one at hand. Precisely, analyzing this topic with total clarity, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has pointed out:\n\n“ III.- Regarding the argument indicated as First, this Chamber has pointed out that the certifications issued by public accountants regarding the matter of their competence constitute public documents, without the public faith of these officials being extensive to the content or intrinsic truth of the financial or accounting statements they record, hence the receipts of the operations are indispensable for verifying them. On the evidentiary force of said instruments, this jurisdictional body has indicated that full proof refers to the facts that the official affirms having carried out himself, or that occurred in his presence, in the exercise of his functions. If one is not facing these scenarios, even though the document is of that type, having been issued with the requirements indicated by numeral 369 of the Civil Procedure Code, its content can be contested by any means of proof. Regarding those issued by professionals in public accounting, it has stated: “In accordance with article 8 of the Organic Law of the College of Public Accountants of Costa Rica, the documents issued by CPAs in the branch of their competence will have the value of public documents. …in consideration of the public interest permeating tax matters, such character does not imply that the financial or accounting statements of the taxpayers subject to the certification are correct or true, per se. The nature of public, and therefore of full proof, is circumscribed to the verification of the existence of the records analyzed by the CPA and to the acts or facts performed or executed by them. Consistent with the above, numeral 49 of the Income Tax Law provides that the opinion or interpretation contained in the certifications for tax purposes does not constitute full proof against the Treasury, and does not bind the Tax Administration” . No. 421 of 9 hours 40 minutes of June 20, 2005. Therefore, the cassation appellant is not correct when he affirms that the certification from the accounting professional is full proof because it is a public document, because as was said, it is limited to recording the accounting of a natural or legal person, without this implying its certainty. In the present case, the Court did not grant it a value other than what\n\nit possesses.” (Judgment No. 00947 of fifteen hours of December seventh, two thousand five. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. See also, Judgment No. 000421-F-2005 of nine hours forty minutes of June twentieth, two thousand five, issued by the same Chamber).\n\nAdded to what has been pointed out up to here, it has been held as demonstrated that the disability leaves that were granted at the time to the plaintiff on the occasion of the accident did not collectively exceed 20 days. The previous circumstance allows one to reasonably conclude that, in medical opinion, the plaintiff was indeed capable of performing her usual tasks. Things being thus, the appropriate action is to reject the present petitionary claim, as is hereby ordered. 3. Cost of transportation and food on days of medical appointments, corresponding to ten thousand colones per appointment (¢140,000). As is demonstrated with certification SEAD-051232017 of October 30, 2017, issued by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as a result of the coverage from the mandatory vehicle insurance, the following expenses have been covered for the plaintiff: a) Payment for transportation: fifteen thousand seven hundred colones -¢15,700.00-. b) Medical Services: seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones and fifty-nine centimos -¢727,877.59-. The above sums a Total expense of seven hundred forty-three thousand five hundred seventy-seven colones and fifty-nine centimos -¢743,577.59-. As a logical consequence of the foregoing, the party suing cannot claim the collection of transportation expenses if these have already been recognized by the National Insurance Institute. Added to the above, the plaintiff does not explain, justify, or specify the amount she claims regarding food, nor does she provide any documentary backup for this type of expense, which would allow an examination of its appropriateness or not. For what has been stated up to here, the rejection of this claim is mandatory. 4. Subjective moral damages for the bodily injuries (at the court's discretion at ¢30,000,000). Regarding this type of damage, it must be remembered that it affects the psyche of the person, which is why it has been called non-physical, non-pecuniary, or affective damage. Hence, it has been considered that it is linked to “… anguish, frustration, impotence, insecurity, anxiety, worry, grief, unease, disillusionment, among others, their common denominator is suffering or psychic or emotional affliction.” (Judgment No. 269 of 9 hours 10 minutes of April 23, 2004, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). The proof of subjective moral damage is “in re ipsa,” because it is the generating fact itself that makes this type of vexation arise, and proof is obtained through “presumptions of fact,” which are inferred from indicia. In this way, it has been said: “XIII.- Regarding the proof of moral damage, the principle is as follows: its existence and gravity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through presumptions of fact inferred from indicia, since the unlawful generating fact makes the moral damage evident, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc. are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa'.” (Judgment No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. As well as Rulings No. 564 of 11 hours of September 10, 2003, No. 311 of 16 hours 10 minutes of April 25, 2001, and No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. All issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now, the reparation of this damage, that is, the amount set as compensation for it, while it depends on the prudent discretion of the Judge, the fact is that it can in no way be disproportionate, whether by being meager or excessively high. Thus, in the present case, it is not questioned that the accident produced injuries to the party suing, injuries which, although they did not warrant her transfer to the Hospital nor a disability leave like the 6 months claimed, certainly did generate bodily consequences that warranted her disability for several days, even requiring up to one day of physical therapy—January 20, 2017—, all of which was held as duly proven in the present case. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that such bodily injuries generated a negative impact on the plaintiff's psyche, causing her the damage she claims and consequently bringing forth in her a series of emotions and feelings ranging from impotence and anxiety to discouragement and frustration. The aforementioned damage, which the plaintiff does not have a duty to bear, must be compensated. Now, with customary respect, this Chamber estimates that the sum requested for this concept is evidently disproportionate, and in that measure, it is appropriate to set the quantum of what is requested at the discretionary sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones -¢1,700,000-. An amount that, although far less than what was requested, certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be compensated for the damage caused, without generating an unlawful enrichment to the detriment of the municipal finances. 5. Moral damages for the emotional and traumatic effects (at the court's discretion at ¢30,000,000). Because it concerns the same type of moral damage requested in the preceding section, with accustomed respect, the parties are referred to what was stated there regarding subjective moral damage, including the issue of the disproportionality of what was requested. Having said the above, having been demonstrated that the plaintiff required both Psychological and Psychiatric care, even being given disability leave by this last Medical Specialty of the National Insurance Institute on the occasion of the accident suffered, it is reasonable to presume that such treatments were due to the fact that she experienced a negative impact on her psyche, with the consequences already amply explained in the preceding section, which is confirmed by the statements of the witness [Name62 004]—the plaintiff's sister—, who indicated at Trial that she cried a lot spontaneously and constantly, and that she had trouble sleeping. What has been pointed out up to here translates into evident subjective moral damage, which, insofar as the plaintiff does not have a duty to bear, must be compensated. Regarding the amount to be granted for this concept, in the same way as indicated in the preceding subsection, in the judgment of this Panel of Judges, the sum sought for this concept is evidently disproportionate, and in that measure, it is appropriate to set the quantum of what is requested at the discretionary sum of three million four hundred thousand colones -¢3,400,000-. An amount that, despite being double what was granted in the preceding section, is far less than what was requested, certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be compensated for the damage caused, without generating an unlawful enrichment to the detriment of the municipal finances. Having reached this point, this Chamber considers it important to clarify, that it is true that the plaintiff claims two items of subjective moral damage and that both are being granted—although for amounts lower than those requested—, but this should in no way be understood as a double payment, but rather as damages that had their own genesis in distinct causes. Thus, that granted in the preceding section derives from the bodily injuries the plaintiff suffered on the occasion of the traffic accident and which required medical care, disability leaves, and one day of physical therapy. Meanwhile, what is awarded in this subsection has its origin in the emotional consequences she experienced due to the mishap that occurred and which warranted Psychological and Psychiatric care, as well as a disability leave from this latter Medical Specialty. This being so, it is not a double payment for exactly the same thing.\n\n6. Possible temporary partial or permanent disability in the use of her left hand. Regarding this petitionary claim, note that in the record exists the medical-legal opinion No. 2016-0001979 of October 27, 2016, issued by the Department of Legal Medicine of the OIJ, which indicates as part of its conclusions the following: \"1. Injuries: Traffic accident with simple contusions. 2. Temporary disability: TEN (10) DAYS from the date of the facts under study. 3. The injuries suffered tend towards healing without leaving functional sequelae.\" As can be appreciated from what has been transcribed, the injuries the plaintiff suffered were classified as simple injuries that tend to heal without any functional sequela. This being so, and having been held as unproven that as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a temporary partial or permanent disability in the use of her left hand, it is appropriate to reject this claim, as is hereby ordered. Finally, regarding the rental of a vehicle for a period of 32 days, despite being an issue discussed by the parties, as there is no claim whatsoever regarding this, the analysis of this point is omitted, along with the evidence pertaining to it—money receipt and statement at Trial from Yancy Ramírez Ramírez—. What has been pointed out up to here allows us to demonstrate that in the present case, the three essential elements supra indicated for the extra-contractual liability of the Public Administration are present: i) A conduct—an omission in this case—by the Municipality of San José—a Decentralized Public Administration—, regarding its inescapable duty to inspect and/or repair any element of risk in the storm drainage systems that operate in the Central Canton of San José. ii) The damage caused, both to the plaintiff's vehicle, which in this case was covered by the National Insurance Institute, as well as the subjective moral damage analyzed above. iii) The causal link, between the aforementioned omission and the damage caused. Thus, the items granted in this Judgment must be covered exclusively by the Municipality of San José.\n\nVII.- OF THE OPPOSED DEFENSES: As was indicated in Resultando II of this Judgment, upon answering the complaint, the sued Administrations opposed the following defenses: CONAVI: Incomplete necessary passive joinder—resolved interlocutorily—and Lack of Right. STATE: Lack of Passive Standing and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Standing. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Standing. In this regard, in the preceding Whereas Clause, a thematic approach was made regarding storm drainage systems, based on constitutional jurisprudence, according to which, it is the Municipalities that are competent and consequently responsible for the construction, maintenance, and adequate functioning of the same. This being so, it is clear that regarding CONAVI, on the Court's own motion, the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing must be declared, also upholding the defense that in this sense was opposed by both the State and the AyA. Regarding the sued municipal entity, the defense in question must be rejected, inasmuch as, as has been said, it is the aforementioned Local Government that, in the judgment of this Chamber, has incurred, through its omission, the liability that is claimed. (Article 12.1 of the CPCA). Due to the manner in which it is resolved, a pronouncement is omitted regarding the defense of Lack of Right filed by both CONAVI and the State Representation.\n\nVIII.- ON COSTS: Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the defeated party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even on the Court's own motion, according to the provisions of that same rule, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibid. Exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when, in the judgment of the Court, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or, c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what is claimed and what is ultimately obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the complaint are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or an expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibid). In the present case, this Collegiate Body estimates that without need for great effort, with a simple reading not only of the answers to the complaint made by the sued Administrations but also of the substantive aspects developed in this Ruling, it is possible to conclude that the plaintiff has more than enough reasons to litigate in the manner she did. That is, suing all the Administrations cited herein, because it was by no means clear and/or simple to determine the entity or organ responsible for what occurred. Thus, in the criterion of this Collegiate Body, it is appropriate to resolve without a special imposition of costs regarding CONAVI, the State, and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados). But regarding the Municipality of San José, it is appropriate to condemn it to pay both costs of this Proceeding. The quantum of the same will be determined in the Judgment Execution Phase at the request of the prevailing party.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe documentary evidence for a more just ruling provided by the representation of CONAVI is admitted, and the defense of Res Judicata opposed by the same is rejected. Regarding the National Roadway Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad), on the Court's own motion, the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is declared, also upholding the defense that in this sense was opposed by both the State and the AyA. Consequently, the complaint is declared without merit against such Public Administrations, without a special imposition of costs. Regarding the Municipality of San José, the defense of Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is rejected, and consequently, the complaint filed against it is declared Partially Granted, understanding as denied that which is not expressly granted: i) The capital municipal entity must pay to the plaintiff herein, the sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones -¢1,700,000- for subjective moral damages derived from the bodily injuries suffered.\n\nii) Likewise, the respondent Municipality must pay the plaintiff the sum of three million four hundred thousand colones (¢3,400,000.00) for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) arising from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced. iii) The Municipality of San José is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding in favor of the plaintiff herein. The amount of these costs shall be determined in the Judgment Enforcement Stage at the request of the prevailing party.\n\nDue to the manner in which this matter is resolved, a ruling on the Lack of Right (Falta de Derecho) defense raised by both CONAVI and the State Representation is omitted.\n\nNOTIFY.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Judge Rapporteur, Judith Reyes Castillo, Judge, and Iván Salas Leitón, Judge.-\n\n(The bold is our own).\n\nIn another of its Rulings (Votos), in which it specifically refers to the Municipality of San José (Municipalidad de San José), the aforementioned Chamber stated:\n\n\"The foregoing constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the amparados, **which is attributable to the Municipality of San José, since, as is evident from the case file, said authority is the competent entity to attend to the canton's storm sewer system (alcantarillado pluvial).**\" (Judgment No. 2011-006903 of twelve hours and nine minutes of May twenty-seventh, two thousand eleven. In a similar sense resolution No. 2020-009707 of nine hours fifteen minutes of May twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty. The bold highlighting is this Chamber's).\n\nAlso, through Judgment No. 2012-001015 of nine hours five minutes of January twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, the High Court indicated:\n\n\"**Certainly, in the first instance, the obligation to create and maintain storm sewer networks (redes del alcantarillado pluvial) corresponds to the municipalities** since these, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 3 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), **are the primary entities obligated to safeguard cantonal interests and services within the corresponding jurisdiction, which justifies the fact that such corporations collect municipal taxes, which include the item corresponding to the maintenance and operation of the stormwater network.** However, in attention to the provisions of numerals 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), <u>that obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, since it is the</u> <strong><u>governing body in the</u></strong> <u> </u><strong><u>subject matter</u></strong><u> and</u> <strong><u> the most technically specialized entity to advise</u></strong> <u>on t</u><u>he proper maintenance of the referred service.</u>\" (Both the underlining and the bold are this Collegiate Body's).\n\nSimilarly, in one of its most recent Judgments on the subject before us, the mentioned Chamber held:\n\n\"In the specific case, the appellant alleges the infringement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment on account of two problems: a) channeling of sewer waters on Calle Mora, Barrio Los Ángeles of San Rafael Debajo de Desamparados, which causes the waters to overflow causing floods...\n\nRegarding such allegations, from the statement of proven facts it is held as accredited that the cited problem has been denounced by the amparada and other residents of the community since 2019. Thus, it is on record that on October 21, 2019, **they filed a complaint before the Municipality of Desamparados, alleging problems with water channeling, as a result of which they have suffered floods, damage to pipes and sewers, damage to the roadway, and damage to their properties.**\n\n(...) In the development, protection, and full enjoyment of the cited rights, the function of the Municipalities and their bodies –including the district municipal councils– is relevant, which, based on article 169 of the Constitution, are obligated to effectively provide the public services that have been entrusted to them. **Thus, applicable in the specific case, such obligations entail the effective maintenance of public roads, paths, sidewalks, and sewers,** through which other rights are exercised and enjoyed, such as freedom of movement, health, and the right to a healthy environment.\" (Judgment No. 2021-005042 of nine hours fifteen minutes of March twelfth, two thousand twenty-one. The bold does not correspond to the original).\n\nAs can be clearly appreciated from the constitutional jurisprudence, **matters concerning the storm sewer system are municipal competence**, without prejudice to the provisions of ordinal numbers 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of AyA, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body in the subject matter and the <u>most technically specialized entity to advise</u> on the proper maintenance of the referred service.\" Thus, regardless of the type of road – understood as national or cantonal – matters pertaining to said service correspond to the respective Local Government. And along these lines, note how the High Court makes express reference that the responsibility of the municipalities in this matter is primary, and they must coordinate \"with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers and the Ministry of Health as the case may be.\" Thus, according to the constitutional jurisprudence cited, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is the municipalities that are directly responsible \"for creating and maintaining storm sewer networks\" within the respective territorial circumscription – canton – they administer. This being so, in light of the cited regulations and constitutional judgments, the entity that must answer for the proper functioning of the entire storm sewer system linked to the roads located in the Central Canton of San José – whether national or not – is the Municipality of San José, which even has a \"Regulation for the Granting of Storm Drain Outlets and Availabilities in the Canton of San José\" (Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José), published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 155 of August 27, 2018. And in that regard, any damage generated by said system or any of its elements is attributable to it.\n\nNow, in the present case there is no doubt whatsoever regarding the accident that occurred, the place where it occurred, and the efficient cause thereof – a storm sewer manhole cover (tapa de alcantarillado pluvial) in a vertical position – without it having been demonstrated that there was force majeure, fault of the victim – due to excessive speed, lack of skill and/or imprudence – or an act of a third party. In this sense, the mishap was clearly not due to an act of nature, as is evident with ample clarity from the dynamics of the accident narrated by the plaintiff in her complaint and which is consistent with the declaration of the witness Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo. The referred deponent stated that he lives in Urbanización Los Geranios, which is located in front of the area where the accident occurred. He also indicated that at the moment of the mishap, he could observe a 3 or 4-ton vehicle that was traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff, and that when that vehicle passed over the manhole cover, it ended up in a vertical position, so that immediately afterwards the right front tire of the plaintiff's vehicle impacted it and was catapulted, flipping several times on the road. The representation of CONAVI attempted to distort what was thus declared by the referred witness, arguing that there was no precision as to which of the two front tires impacted the manhole and how it was that the witness had said he was messaging on WhatsApp at the time of the accident and was still able to witness the accident. In this regard it is worth noting, firstly, that for this Chamber it is irrelevant whether the witness could specify which of the two front tires of the vehicle driven by the plaintiff was the one that impacted the manhole in question, since what is of importance is that one of the front tires made impact with the manhole cover, and secondly, although the witness indicated that he was messaging while resting, that in no way means that he was abstracted from the surrounding reality. Along these lines, at no time did the witness state that his attention was complete and absolute on the exchange of messages in which he was engaged; on the contrary, he clarified that while taking a break from his usual work, he took the opportunity to message while observing the outside of his home. Nor is it possible to maintain that there was an act of a third party, solely because according to the narrative of the events, it was a vehicle traveling ahead of the plaintiff that, upon passing over the mentioned manhole \"left it\" in a vertical position, since such a circumstance did not occur because that vehicle passed over the manhole, but rather because the manhole itself did not behave as it should. That is, that vehicle and other vehicles could pass over said element and the element itself had to remain in its place or space called the base ring or \"flange\" (flanger). (In that sense, see Report DRyTOMSR-2017-00849 prepared by Eng. William Leininger Sancho, which is visible at images 91 to 94 of the judicial file). Finally, no fault of the victim is observed, since the argument put forward that the distance the plaintiff should have kept with respect to the vehicle traveling ahead of hers was not adequate for the speed at which she was driving, because if it had been, she could have reacted to maneuver and avoid impacting the manhole cover, was merely an allegation devoid of proof. Along these lines – that is, regarding the issue of excessive speed – it is a fact that was not held as proven, since although in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\" as: \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO DETACHMENT OF MANHOLE COVER\" and as \"Risk Factor: Excessive speed\", the truth is that this is nothing more than a simple comment by a Traffic Officer who did not witness the accident. And in any case, it is reiterated, the referred cover should not have behaved in the way it did, which can in no way be attributed to the plaintiff here. Having said this, it is reiterated that in the present case it has been held as accredited that the plaintiff suffered an automobile accident because a cover that formed part of a storm sewer system – a public service falling under the competence of the Municipality of San José in this case, according to the aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence – \"did not behave in the expected way\" – the efficient cause of the mishap – since after being run over by a vehicle traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff here, it ended up in a vertical position. What has been pointed out so far, in addition to clearing up the doubts regarding the Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva, allows this Chamber to delve into the following lines regarding the damages claimed by the party filing the action.\"\n\nAmount that, although far less than the amount requested, certainly makes it possible to reasonably give effect to the right of the plaintiff to be compensated for the damage caused without generating unlawful enrichment to the detriment of municipal finances.\"</span></span></p>\n\n***\n\nEXPEDIENTE: 17-008361-1027-CA\n\nPROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO\n\nACTORA: [Nombre62 001]\n\nDEMANDADOS: CONAVI Y OTROS\n\nNo. 86-2021-IV\n\nSECCIÓN CUARTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , at fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on the twenty-ninth of July of two thousand twenty-one.\n\nProceso de Conocimiento filed by [Nombre62 001], ID [Valor CED63], represented by her Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado José Joaquín Villalobos Soto, bar card CED88932 against the CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD -CONAVI-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Óscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, bar card CED87822, EL ESTADO, represented by the Procuradora Silvia Patiño Cruz, bar card CED31858, INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS -AyA-, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Robny Portilla Barrantes, bar card CED89026 and the MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, represented by its Special Judicial Attorney, Licenciado Marco Vinicio Álvarez Mattey, bar card CED89027.\n\nRESULTANDO\n\nI.- The plaintiff filed the present Proceso in order that in Judgment it be declared: \"That CONAVI, or, subsidiarily, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados or the Municipalidad de San José, individually one or two, or all the defendant entities jointly, be ordered in judgment to pay the following items: I. Payment of the difference indemnified regarding the real value of the destroyed vehicle for three million colones. II. Payment for the six months in which she could not dedicate herself to her work of caring for the elderly due to the painful effects of her injuries, in the sum of ¢4,164,784.92 (four million sixty-four thousand colones with ninety-two céntimos). III. Cost of transportation and food for each appointment, at the INS clinic, which represents an abnormal expense in my activities, at ten thousand colones per appointment, ¢140,000.00 (one hundred forty thousand colones). IV. Payment for the moral damage suffered through her injuries, the pain caused by the blows suffered in the rollover of the vehicle, injuries to head, neck, both shoulders, left hand, waist, abdomen, both thighs, right foot and permanent headache with dizziness, ecchymosis in the distal third of the clavicle with local pain and in the left hand, edema on the dorsum at the level of the 4th and 5th metacarpal, general pain throughout the body, cervicalgia due to whiplash (at the level of the cervical vertebrae), which required treatment with anti-inflammatory and analgesic drugs: Diclofenac, Tramadol, Methyl Salicylate Ointment, Tizanidine, Aluminum Acetate Powder, Indomethacin, Carbamazepine, for three months, plus twenty days of disability, in addition to the inflammatory process that can produce pain and edema for an indefinite time, from about 8 months to a year, which are valued prudentially at thirty million colones. V. Payment for the moral damage for the emotional and traumatic effects suffered due to the accident that manifested in ailments of difficulty sleeping, nightmares, lack of appetite, recurrent crying, intrusive thoughts, anxious episodes, state of hyperexcitement, feeling of insecurity and fear of driving or going out on the street, and difficulty working due to pain in the fingers, requiring treatment with Sertraline 50 Mg Po Hs and Diphenhydramine 50 Mg Po Hs, for three months, with sequelae to date that prevent me from circulating on the same street again, to which simultaneous psychological treatment for anxious depressive reaction due to post-traumatic stress had to be added, with treatment over six months, which are valued prudentially at thirty million colones. VI. Eventually and subject to the result of the expert evidence, amount to be determined, for a possible temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of the left hand.\" The plaintiff's representative clarified that claim number IV refers to moral damage generated by physical aspects and claim V refers to moral damage generated by emotional aspects. (Images 2 to 22, 253 to 262 of the judicial file and digital backup of the Audiencia Preliminar).\n\nII.- Once the legal transfer was conferred, the defendant entities answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the following defenses: CONAVI: Incomplete necessary passive joinder -decided interlocutorily- and Lack of Right. ESTADO: Lack of Passive Legitimacy and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Legitimacy. MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Legitimacy. (Images 81 to 86, 99 to 106, 111 to 139 and 141 to 154 of the judicial file).\n\nIII.- The Audiencia Preliminar in the present Proceso was held on July 10, 2018. (Images 253 to 262 of the judicial file. Electronic backup of said hearing).\n\nIV.- The Juicio Oral y Público was held at 8:30 hours on the 7th and 9th of July 2021. On the first of those days, under the protection of section 50.2 of the CPCA, the parties were granted 3 business days to express themselves in writing on the documentary evidence that CONAVI provided for better resolution, a period that expired on July 12, 2021. Subsequently, the testimony of Mr. Nombre61250 was declared impossible to take, proceeding then to the taking of the rest of the evidence admitted in the Audiencia Preliminar, and prior to the closing of the debate, the parties were given the opportunity to make their respective conclusions. (Compact disc backup of the Audiencia Complementaria).\n\nV.- This Judgment is issued, after deliberation by the members of the Tribunal, within the fifteen-day period established in article 111.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -having declared this matter complex-, without observing any grounds capable of invalidating what has been done.\n\nDrafted by Judge Baltodano Gómez, with the affirmative vote of the judges Reyes Castillo and Salas Leitón.\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- ON THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER RESOLUTION. During the Juicio Oral y Público stage -more specifically on July 7, 2021-, CONAVI's representation indicated to the Tribunal that it had added to the file, by means of a filing of that same date, the documents indicated below, so that their admission as evidence for better resolution could be assessed: 1. Literal Registry Certification of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 002]. 2. Registry Certification of the microfilmed folio inscribed in the volume [Valor 003], Entry [Valor 004], Sequence 001. Movable Property, corresponding to the vehicle with license plate [Placa703 ]. 3. Inspection report on the works carried out on Dirección13576, dated September 2016. 4. Communication UE-DCPA-0112018-025 (0613) dated February 13, 2018. Once the floor was given to the proponent of said evidence, she extensively explained the reasons why, in her opinion, it should be admitted. Then, upon inquiry from the plaintiff's representation, CONAVI's Special Judicial Attorney stated that as it was a certification corresponding to another vehicle, he was withdrawing the first 2 pages of the evidence provided. The documentation indicated was given the treatment provided in section 50.2 of the CPCA, granting the other parties a period of 3 business days to refer to it in writing. The foregoing period of time expired on July 12 of the current year. Criterion of this Collegiate Body. In view of the already known facultative admission of evidence for better resolution, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has held that its rejection does not produce the defenselessness of the parties. Among other judgments, the relevant text of judgment number 547-F2002 of sixteen hours on the twelfth of July of two thousand two is transcribed, which indicates: \"(...) IV. Multiple precedents of this Sala, referring to evidence for better resolution, have indicated that this is evidence of the judge, and not of the parties. Consequently, the decision to gather it is facultative of the jurisdictional body, and it can be dispensed with without the need for any decision. Ergo, the omission of a pronouncement regarding it, precisely because the evidentiary stage has been exceeded, in which the parties must demonstrate the constitutive facts of their right, as imposed by the rules on the burden of proof and since said stage is precluded, it will be the exclusive faculty of the judge to determine if new evidence necessary for the correct decision of the litigation must be added to the record. Among many others, the following decisions can be consulted; 59 of 15:20 hours on May 31, 1996, 23 of 14:20 hours on March 4, 1992, 34 of 10:45 hours on May 28, 1993 and 83 of 14:40 hours on December 22, 1993. (...)\". In furtherance of the above, judgment number 29-1995 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on the twenty-second of February of nineteen ninety-five, also issued by the Sala Primera, clarifies the following: \"(...) Within the instructional and ordering powers of the judge, is that of ordering evidence for better provision (article 97, paragraph 2, and 331 of the Código Procesal Civil), when the evidence to be produced has a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceeding (...). The core aspect of evidence for better provision is its facultative or discretionary nature, not being able to be demanded by the parties; its ordering depends entirely on the initiative, prudence, and criterion of the jurisdictional body, consequently its denial does not cause any defenselessness.\" Having said all this, this Chamber considers that the documentation brought to the record by CONAVI's representation, besides being linked to its Case Theory and the object of the Proceso, is pertinent, useful, and necessary to resolve the merits of the present litis. Hence, it is admitted as evidence for better resolution.\n\nII.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS. Of importance for the resolution of the present litis, the following are considered duly accredited: 1) That at the time of the accident to be mentioned -occurring on October 20, 2016- the plaintiff herein was the owner of the vehicle with license plate [Valor Placa11683], Make: Nissan, Style: X-Trail Clasicc, Year: 2011, Color: gold. (Images 21 to 35 of the judicial file); 2) That on October 20, 2016, the plaintiff was driving her vehicle after noon along Dirección13577 towards San José-San Sebastián- on the overpass, when another vehicle ahead of her passed over a manhole and dislodged it from its position, leaving it vertically and, as she continued driving her vehicle, one of its front tires impacted said manhole causing her vehicle to roll over. (Uncontroverted fact regarding the place and time of the accident, image 66 of the judicial file, consisting of the Incident Certificate issued by the Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos, Official Traffic Report visible at image 157 of the judicial file and trial testimony of Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo); 3) That as a result of the accident narrated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff's vehicle was declared a total loss and as for her, she did not suffer injuries requiring transfer to the Hospital. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file); 4) That because the aforementioned vehicle owned by the plaintiff was insured, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros paid her the sum of six million colones -¢6,000,000- due to the total loss of said automobile. (Images 36 to 37 of the judicial file and fact 24 of the lawsuit); 6) That at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff was dedicated to the Care of Older Adults. (Images 41 to 44, 45 to 46 of the judicial file and trial testimony of Mrs. [Nombre62 004]); 7) That despite carrying out the activity indicated in the immediately preceding proven fact, the plaintiff was not registered as a taxpayer before the Dirección General de Tributación of the Ministerio de Hacienda. (Uncontroverted fact); 8) That the plaintiff did not have sequelae as a result of the accident (See Medical Legal Opinion at images 171 to 174 of the judicial file); 9) That in the Official Traffic Report, the cause of the accident was recorded in \"Observations\": \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO MANHOLE COVER DETACHMENT\" and as \"Risk Factor: Excessive speed\". (Images 156 to 157 of the judicial file. The capital letters correspond to the original); 10) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the Juzgado de Tránsito de Hatillo, San José, in summary proceedings processed under file No. 16-0026810492-TC, resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on the sixth of March of two thousand seventeen, to absolve the plaintiff herein of all penalty and responsibility. (Image 190 of the judicial file); 11) That on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in addition to what related to the compensation for the total loss of her vehicle, paid her the following sums of money: i) Transportation payment: Fifteen thousand seven hundred colones -¢15,700.00-. ii) Medical Services: Seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine céntimos -¢727,877.59-. Leaving a remaining balance in coverage of five million two hundred fifty-six thousand four hundred twenty-two colones with forty-one céntimos -¢5,256,422.41-. (Certification SEAD-05123-2017 issued on October 30, 2017, by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, visible at image 199 of the judicial file); 12) That on the occasion of the accident, the plaintiff was disabled on various occasions by the Services of: General Medicine -13 days-, Orthopedics -4 days- and Psychiatry -3 days-, all of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, for a total of 20 days of disability, also requiring one day of physical therapy -January 20, 2017- and several appointments were scheduled for both Psychiatry and Psychology. (Images 49 to 59 and 61 to 64 of the judicial file); 13) That subjective moral damage was caused to the plaintiff derived both from the bodily injuries suffered and from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced on the occasion of the traffic accident in which she was involved. (Images 49 to 59, 61 to 64 of the judicial file and trial testimony of [Nombre62 004]).\n\nIII.- UNPROVEN FACTS: For lacking evidence to prove their occurrence, the following is considered unproven: 1) That the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had, at the time the accident occurred, a market value of nine million colones -¢9,000,000-. 2) That the plaintiff was traveling at excessive speed when she was driving her vehicle on the aforementioned Dirección13577, and more specifically when passing over the manhole that originated the mishap. 3) That in the accident that occurred to the plaintiff on October 20, 2016, force majeure, fault of the victim -due to excessive speed, lack of skill and/or imprudence- or the act of a third party had intervened. 4) That at the date the accident occurred, the plaintiff herein was dedicated -even if it was as a secondary activity- to being a Real Estate Broker. 5) That the plaintiff had to rent a vehicle for a period of 32 days starting November 20, 2016, in order to attend medical appointments and continue with her usual activities. 6) That the plaintiff's monthly income generated by her activity of Care of Older Adults was seven hundred fifty thousand colones gross -¢750,000- and six hundred ninety-four thousand one hundred thirty colones with eighty-two céntimos, net -¢694,130.82-. 7) That on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was unable for a period of 6 months to exercise her activity of caring for Older Adults. 8) That as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of her left hand.\n\nIV.- ON THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA RAISED AT TRIAL BY CONAVI'S REPRESENTATION. The legal representation of the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad argues that on the occasion of the accident suffered by the plaintiff herein, Tránsito Proceso No. 16-002681-0492-TC was processed before the Juzgado de Tránsito de Hatillo, San José, which was expressly resolved by Judgment No. 278-2017 of fourteen hours on the sixth of March of two thousand seventeen. That for this reason, that having been the opportunity to discuss the existence or not of CONAVI's responsibility, without it having been so, what was resolved in that venue became final and, to that extent, there exists in this case material res judicata. Criterion of this Chamber. As is known, for the configuration of the defense being analyzed, the existence of a triple identity between the respective Procesos is required. That is, that in both the same parties appear -subjective identity-, that in the Proceso with a final Judgment, it has been analyzed and decided on the merits on all or some of the claims that are put forward in the second Proceso -objective identity-, and that both matters have their genesis in the same facts -identity of cause-. In this case, the aforementioned triple identity clearly does not exist. Along this line, CONAVI was not a party in the Tránsito Proceso -as its own legal representation accepts-, which immediately rules out that we can speak of subjective identity. Then, with a simple reading of the aforementioned Tránsito Judgment and the rest of the proceedings and evidence contained in the certified file provided to the record, it is obvious that we are very far from an objective identity, since what is claimed in this Civil Hacienda Proceso -see the Resultando I of this Judgment- is far different, and by a lot, from what was pursued -object- in the cited Tránsito Proceso -the determination of the plaintiff's responsibility-. Up to this point, the inappropriateness of the defense claimed is evident, making it unnecessary, for this reason, to analyze what is related to the existence or not of identity of cause.\n\nThus, in the judgment of this Collegiate Body, the objection raised must be rejected, as is hereby ordered.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:10.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">V.- THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">In summary and without prejudice to the literalness of their arguments, which have been studied in their entirety by this Court, each of the parties alleges what is detailed below in this section.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">PLAINTIFF:</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#03050d\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That on October 20, 2016, at approximately one-fifteen in the afternoon, she was driving her vehicle on national highway 39, built and administered by CONAVI, specifically at Dirección13578</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, taking the overpass on the route to Santa Marta and Dirección3898, an area in which drivers notice the loud noise produced by the manhole covers when cars pass over them. That on the date and time referred to in the previous point, she was traveling in the left lane, at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour; she observed in the rearview mirror that three motorcyclists were advancing on her right, which alerted her that she could not move into that lane without putting their lives at risk. That behind her came another vehicle driven by a person who, after the events, identified himself as Nombre112465</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, ID number CED89028. That she, for her part, was traveling behind another vehicle, at a safe distance, when suddenly, from underneath the vehicle ahead, she noticed that there was a manhole in front of her on the driving path of her lane, which had its cover raised; that is, instead of being horizontal covering the manhole opening, it was in a vertical position, with half inside the opening and the rest protruding over the street, forming an obstacle in the road. That at that moment, she had the metal guardrail of the edge of the overpass on her left and the motorcyclists on her right. That she lost control of the vehicle, the steering did not respond, she felt the entire environment spinning around her, while loose objects in the car floated or fell around her, such as her purse, the car mats, her cell phone, and her umbrella. That immediately afterwards and in a matter of seconds, the manhole cover struck the windshield of the car she was driving, which shattered into a multitude of cracks and filaments on the front part, generating a shower of small glass pieces over her, specifically on her face and head, without her being clear at that moment what was happening. That Mr. Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo, a neighbor of the area, and Mr. Nombre112465</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">, who was driving his vehicle behind her, observed how her car, upon passing over the cover in question, became completely airborne, along with the manhole cover which, upon striking the tire of her car, the kinetic force caused it to come out of its place, rise up along with her car, and, veering in the air, impact the windshield of my vehicle, then fall onto the street, ending up about four meters from the manhole it belonged to and four meters from the guardrail, almost on the line dividing the lanes. That her vehicle flipped several times in the air, hit the ground, and finally fell onto the street, ending up on its side, on the driver's side, where the momentum still caused it to drag on the ground for a stretch, ending up overturned and lying across the width of the right lane, about twelve meters from the manhole and three and a half from the street guardrail; the front license plate was left twisted like a rag on the highway. That after falling onto the street, her vehicle continued to drag on its side along it with her inside, concussed and held to the driver's seat by the seatbelt, which, although holding her to the seat, being in an inclined position and pulled by gravity, cut off her breathing. That residents of the area report that, for a long time before the accident relevant to this lawsuit, the malfunction of the manhole cover has caused minor and serious accidents at that same point. That the newspaper CR-Hoy, of national circulation, on February 13, 2017, reports that several more accidents have occurred at the same location by virtue of the malfunction of the manhole cover, given that, in fact, the report indicates that it has broken and disappeared, leaving the opening unprotected. That the original cover, which identified it as a municipal manhole, was replaced by another one that says Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillado. That the accident, as stated in the medical reports, caused the plaintiff a concussion that altered her peace and tranquility; her personal life was profoundly disrupted emotionally, which has caused her states of anguish, depression, and anxiety; the first few days she could not sleep well and needed medication to fall asleep, in addition to periodic headaches that lasted between two and three months; today, despite the time elapsed, she still suffers from periodic states of anxiety and sadness. That the accident caused the total loss of the vehicle, whose reported value in the used car market is at least nine million colones, but the insurance gave her compensation for the sum of six million colones, meaning that this implied a patrimonial loss (pérdida patrimonial) of at least three million. That at this time, in order to buy a vehicle in the same condition as the first one, but new, she had to make an installment purchase for an investment of thirty-one thousand nine hundred dollars of the United States of America. That she is an independent person who looks after her own maintenance; she works as a real estate broker and, mainly, caring for elderly persons in a state of disability or senility, so the accident, due to the movement limitations it caused her, such as pain in her hands, back, head, and stress, prevented her from performing said activity, as she could not be responsible for holding an elderly person with her hands to move or transfer them, without the risk of causing them a fall and injuries, so in reality she could not work and support herself for six months, from October 2016 until April 2017;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> which caused her the loss of the fixed clients she had at that time and prevented her from carrying out her work activities in general. That consequently, her gross income, from an average of ¢7,500,000 monthly, decreased by ¢4,500,000 monthly, which after expenses represents a net loss of her income over six months for being unable to work, of ¢4,164,784.92. That the loss of her vehicle and the need to travel to medical appointments, coordinate with her clients, attend therapy, and meet her other pending commitments, forced her to rent a vehicle for one month for the sum of six hundred thousand colones, a cost she found impossible to maintain continuously. That on Sunday, July 23, 2017, at approximately 4 in the afternoon, she was traveling in her new vehicle on the same highway where the accident occurred, and although since that day she takes the far-right lane, at that moment, due to repairs on an overpass, the two right lanes were closed and traffic was diverted only through the left lane. That it was then that she faced having to pass through the place of the accident and she entered a state of panic and became paralyzed, unable to continue. That due to the traffic jam she caused, a traffic police officer appeared who did her the favor of taking the wheel and crossing the place of the accident. That two days later, she returned to an appointment with the psychiatrist at INS, who renewed her medication treatment. That on the occasion of what happened, the responsibility is full on the part of the authorities responsible for the installation and maintenance of the highway, the manhole (alcantarilla), and the cover of the latter, for which reason they are sued jointly by virtue of the fact that their conduct has generated the malfunction of the highway service and consequently the damages caused. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">CONAVI: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That the plaintiff’s assertion is inaccurate when she states she was driving \"at the authorized speed of eighty kilometers per hour,\" since, as can be credited from the evidence offered by the plaintiff herself, in the Official Report (Parte Oficial) No. 2016-248600029, Ticket #Identificacion533 prepared by Inspector No. 2486, Mr. Pablo Agüero Rojas, excessive speed at which she was driving is described as a risk factor. That in this regard, the following was textually recorded: \"Risk Factor: Excessive speed,\" in the accident that occurred on October 20, 2016, at \"1:18:46 p.m.\" That the plaintiff indicates that the stormwater manhole cover had the inscription \"municipal stormwater manhole\" (alcantarillado pluvial municipal). That notwithstanding this, it is the lack of skill and imprudence of the plaintiff in driving at excessive speed that causes the accident, and therefore, she cannot seek to attribute any responsibility to the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad for this concept. That in any case, regarding water management, the considerations issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice on matters of sewerage are of obligatory observation, in which it indicates the administrative instances of the Executive Branch to which the construction and operation of potable water supply and black water evacuation systems correspond - Judgment No. 2007-05894 at eleven hours and fifty-eight minutes on April twenty-seventh, two thousand seven-. There being clarity that the Municipality is responsible for the administration of local services and interests, guaranteeing, among others, good potable water supply and wastewater evacuation systems, through adequate aqueduct and sewerage systems, so the definitive solution regarding stormwater and residual water management is the responsibility of the Municipality and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">STATE: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That as reported by CONAVI in its response to the present lawsuit, in view of the complexity of the road project where the accident is alleged to have occurred, careful follow-up was carried out on each of its stages -design and construction-, both by CONAVI's permanent staff, as well as by external professionals and the contracted Supervisory Consortium (Consorcio Supervisor), this hand-in-hand with the supervision of the contractor company itself. Resulting in the guarantee that the works complied with the technical and structural parameters contained in the public works contract. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#03050d\">AyA: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That upon carrying out inspections by AyA technicians at the site of the event, it was determined that the Manhole (Alcantarilla) described in the accident is under the Administration of CONAVI for the stormwater maintenance system of the beltway (circunvalación). That the covers throughout the country are cast by the cover manufacturer with the inscription of the AyA initials; however, these covers are freely sold; anyone can buy this type of cover and place them in their projects without this meaning that the structure is ours. That this being the case, it is very difficult to see covers like those described for stormwater sewer systems in San José, as covers for them are made very exclusively. That the Stormwater System (Sistema Pluvial) is the responsibility of each Municipality, and for this reason, the Central Government assigns a budget to each Local Government for the annual maintenance of these stormwater systems. That AyA does not receive any type of budget for stormwater maintenance, thus relieving it of responsibility for stormwater events, given that the use of AyA funds for these matters of maintaining stormwater structures would constitute an irregular diversion of public funds. That despite the fact that Municipalities are the ones who must provide this type of care to stormwater systems, on National Roads this responsibility is shared with CONAVI, and may be fully delegated to the Municipal entity according to specific situations. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">That effectively, the manhole in question has a cover identified as property of Acueductos y Alcantarillado, thus this point confirms that the Municipalidad de San José is not responsible for the placement, replacement, or maintenance of manhole covers on national routes, such as the one where the incident alleged by the plaintiff occurred. That it is unknown if a municipal cover previously existed on said manhole, and if so, it was not this Municipality who placed it, as it lacks the competence to do so, given that it is a route beyond municipal administration. That the events reported in the present lawsuit occurred on highway 39, as stated by the plaintiff, which falls under the classification of the National Road Network (Red Vial Nacional), meaning that both the construction of the road, as well as its administration and subsequent maintenance, lie outside the jurisdictional, functional, and operational scope of the Municipalidad de San José. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:10.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">VI.- LEGAL BASIS OF THE LAWSUIT AND ITS ASSESSMENT BY THIS COURT: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">As can be appreciated from the factual background and the claims of the lawsuit, in this case, we are faced with a typical Civil Treasury Proceeding (Proceso Civil de Hacienda), in which the non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) of a Public Administration is being claimed. Certainly, as the co-defendant Administrations allege, the plaintiff does not identify the entity or organ with instrumental legal personality -in the case of CONAVI- that caused the damages for which she seeks compensation. Rather, she directs her action against all of them, given the factual-legal uncertainty in which not only she finds herself, but also the defendant Administrations, who allege having no responsibility, either because in their opinion they did everything very well -in the case of CONAVI, seconded by the State- or because matters relating to stormwater sewerage are outside their competencies -in the case of AyA and the Municipalidad de San José-. A simple reading of the responses to the lawsuit is enough to notice said uncertainty, which they curiously argue as a deficiency that would require declaring, according to their view, the inadmissibility of the lawsuit. That is, from what is argued in their responses, it is evident that the sued Administrations do not have a clear idea of the extent of their competencies regarding stormwater sewer systems, precisely because it is a topic that is not simple at all. Yet despite this, they all seek to exempt themselves from responsibility for what happened to the plaintiff, using as a basic argument that the manhole on the occasion of which the accident occurred has nothing to do with each one of them. Faced with such a scenario, the only logical option for the plaintiff was to proceed as she did; that is, suing those who, from her perspective, could have some involvement in the functioning of the manhole causing the mishap. And this, in the judgment of this Court, in no way diminishes the exercise of her right of action, much less the possibility of obtaining the repair of all, some, or any of the damages for which she seeks compensation. Having clarified the above, it must be remembered that Costa Rica is a Social and Democratic Rule of Law State, in which, the indisputable foundations of State responsibility -Central and Decentralized- are established in the Political Constitution itself. (Articles 9, 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 140.8, 139.4, 148, 149, 150, 154, 188, and 191). Constitutional precepts that are developed, among others, by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) -ordinals 190 and following -, which, by way of summary, establishes the Administration's liability for damages caused by its legitimate, illegitimate, normal, and abnormal functioning, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party. The doctrinal and jurisprudential development of the cited norms and many others that deal with the topic has been more than abundant, with coincidence that the administered party must be guaranteed not only access to justice but also their constitutional right to full compensation, provided they prove the existence of: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">i)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> Conduct -formal, material, or by omission- of a Public Administration. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">ii)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> Damage that they are not obligated to bear. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">iii) </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">A causal link (cause-effect relationship) between that conduct and the damage experienced. Thus, those are the three requirements that, as indicated in preceding lines, anyone seeking compensation derived from the actions of a Public Administration must demonstrate. That said, it is more than notorious from a simple reading of the constitutional and legal norms indicated above, that the right to full compensation is not contingent on the administered party being registered with the Dirección General de Tributación or having paid the corresponding taxes, as argued by CONAVI, seconded by the State Representation. Such a position is untenable in light of the ordinals indicated above, in which none of such conditions were established, on one hand by the constitutional legislator and on the other by the ordinary legislator, to access Costa Rican justice and obtain from it -when the requirements indicated above are proven- full compensation for damages caused by a Public Administration. In this case, as stated, CONAVI and the Procuraduría General de la República stated on several occasions -both representations in writing, and orally at trial by the Special Judicial Representative of CONAVI- that it was necessary to request the Income Tax Returns of the plaintiff from the Ministerio de Hacienda, for the three periods prior to the year in which the accident occurred. Evidence absolutely irrelevant for this type of case -for the reasons given in this Judgment-, but which was admitted by the Processing Judge without them managing it in a timely manner. Given this, this Chamber did the appropriate thing and, by resolution at fourteen hours five minutes on July first, two thousand twenty-one, ordered the Ministerio de Hacienda to send the Income Tax Returns corresponding to the periods 2014, 2015, and 2016, which as of the date this Ruling is issued have not been remitted to the Court. However, the absence of said evidence in no way prevents ruling on this matter nor causes defenselessness to the co-defendant parties that requested it, because as stated, it is absolutely irrelevant and in any case, there is no controversy regarding the fact that the plaintiff was not paying taxes when the accident occurred, as her Special Judicial Representative has had no qualms in expressly acknowledging -even in the Oral and Public Trial (Juicio Oral y Público)- that her client was not registered as a taxpayer at that time -meaning at the time of the mishap-. That is, the plaintiff expressly and undoubtedly acknowledges that she was not paying taxes when the events on which she bases her lawsuit occurred, but even so, the cited Administrations insisted on such evidence, even though it is absolutely irrelevant for the reasons indicated below: i) The right to full compensation for damage caused by a Public Administration has absolutely nothing to do with the tax status of the injured party. ii) The constitutional legislator and the ordinary legislator did not establish registration as a taxpayer or as an independent worker as a requirement to access that full compensation. iii) In a Proceeding (Proceso) such as the one at hand, determining the tax status of an administered party is alien to the subject matter of the proceeding. iv) If the Dirección General de Tributación or the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social deem that they must proceed against an administered party who files a legal action seeking repair for damages they claim to have experienced due to conduct of any Public Administration, it is a power that said entities have, but which in no way affects the subject matter of this Proceeding. Thus, the tax status of the plaintiff herein has no significance whatsoever, nor can it be erected as a parameter or any limitation to rule on this matter as required by Law, dispensing with said evidence as is done here. Now then, as stated, all defendant Administrations allege having nothing to do with the manhole that caused the accident suffered by the plaintiff herein, but the truth is that one of them, in light of constitutional jurisprudence, is certainly directly linked. Hence, in the following lines, norms and jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber will be cited, addressing the subject matter related to the issue at hand. As the parties will surely remember, CONAVI Engineer Kennet Enrique Solano Carmona stated at trial that the stormwater sewerage (alcantarillado pluvial) construction was contemplated in the Project for said highway, as stormwater combined with black water (aguas negras) ran through that sector, thus constituting a contaminated body of water that discharges into the Río María Aguilar, and for this reason, he affirmed that at some point a query was made to the Municipalidad de San José. What was so stated by the aforementioned witness regarding the stormwater sewer system is confirmed by Engineer Willian Reinilgen Sancho, an AyA official, in his Report DRyT-OMSR-2017-00849 of October 27, 2017, where he states that: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:145%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"In the location there is no sanitary sewer network (red de alcantarillado sanitario), administered by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA). The existence of a stormwater (pluvial) network was observed, which </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">is not under the administration</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> of AyA ... \" (The underlining and bold correspond to the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-right:2.85pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:149%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">Thus, in the area where the accident occurred, what exists is a stormwater sewer network or system, and it is irrelevant, on the occasion of what will be stated, whether said infrastructure is on a National Route, as argued by the Municipalidad de San José. Now, regarding this type of system and more specifically who is responsible for its administration, it is clear that there is no uniformity of criteria in this case, so it is necessary to resort to both the legislation relevant to the subject and the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued in this regard. Along these lines, ordinals 1 and 2 of Law No. 2726 of April 14, 1961: Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, expressly establish:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:28.9pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"ARTICLE 1.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">In order to direct, set policies, establish and apply standards, carry out and promote planning, financing, and development, and to resolve everything related to</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> the supply of potable water and the collection and evacuation of black water (aguas negras) and liquid industrial waste, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">as well as the normative aspect of stormwater sewer systems (sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial) in urban areas, for the entire national territory</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\"> the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is created, as an autonomous institution of the State”.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:1.4pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">\"ARTICLE 2.- It corresponds to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:14.2pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">Alcantarillados:</span></p><ol type=\"a\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span>To direct and oversee everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the republic with a service of potable water, collection and evacuation of black water (aguas negras) and liquid industrial waste and stormwater (aguas pluviales) in urban areas;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To determine the priority, convenience, and feasibility of the different projects proposed to build, reform, expand, modify aqueduct and sewerage works; which cannot be executed without its approval;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To promote the conservation of watersheds (cuencas hidrográficas) and ecological protection, as well as the control of water pollution;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 59pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To advise other State bodies and coordinate public and private activities in all matters relating to the establishment of aqueducts and sewer systems and water resource pollution control, its consultation being obligatory, in all cases, and compliance with its recommendations inexcusable;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.98pt; padding-left:0.02pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To prepare all plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works related to aqueduct and sewer systems, as determined by the respective regulations;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 58.99pt; padding-left:0.01pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To take advantage of, use, govern, or supervise, as the case may be, all public domain waters indispensable for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State has over them, in accordance with law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute organ for the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities;</span></li><li style=\"margin:12pt 1pt 12pt 59pt; font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">To administer and operate directly the aqueduct and sewer systems throughout the country, which shall be assumed gradually, taking into account convenience and availability of resources.</span></li></ol>\n\nThe systems currently administered and operated by municipal corporations may remain under their charge, as long as they provide efficient service.\n\nUnder no circumstances may it delegate the administration of the water supply (acueductos) and sanitary sewer systems of the Metropolitan Area.\n\nNor may it delegate the administration of systems for which financial responsibility exists and while said responsibility corresponds directly to the Institute.\n\nThe institution is empowered to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrative boards (juntas administradoras) of mixed integration between the Institute and the respective communities, provided this is convenient for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations.\n\nFor the same reasons and with the same characteristics, regional administrative boards involving several municipalities may also be created;\n\nh) Enforce the General Drinking Water Law (Ley General de Agua Potable), for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the ministries and municipalities indicated in said law;\n\ni) Build, expand, and reform water supply and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and recommended for the better satisfaction of national needs; and\n\nj) Control the proper investment of all resources that the State allocates for water supply and sanitary sewer works.\"\n\nFor its part, Article 5 of Law No. 7593 of August 9, 1996: Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (ARESEP), establishes:\n\n\"Article 5.- Functions\n\n In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; additionally, it shall ensure compliance with standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, pursuant to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:\n\na) Supply of electrical energy in the generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization stages.\n\nb) (This subsection thus repealed by Article 42 of Law No. 8660 of August 8,\n\n2008)\n\nc) Supply of water supply and sewer service (acueducto y alcantarillado), including potable water, the collection, treatment, and evacuation of black water (aguas negras), residual water (aguas residuales), and stormwater (pluviales), as well as the installation, operation, and maintenance of the hydrant service.\n\n(This subsection thus amended by Article 5 of Law No. 8641 of June 11, 2008)\n\nd) Supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons, including: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined to supply national demand at distribution plants and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer. The Regulatory Authority must set the transportation rates used for national supply.\n\ne) Irrigation and drainage (riego y avenamiento), when the service is provided through a public enterprise or by concession or permit.\n\nf) Any remunerated public means of transportation of persons, except air.\n\ng) Maritime and air services in national ports.\n\nh) Freight transport by railroad.\n\ni) Collection and treatment of solid and industrial waste.\n\nThe authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:\n\nSubsection a): Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía).\n\nSubsection c): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection d.2): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection e): Ministry of Environment and Energy.\n\nSubsection f): Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes)\n\nSubsection g): Ministry of Public Works and Transport; Board of\n\nPort Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica) and Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), respectively.\n\nSubsection h): Ministry of Public Works and Transport.\n\nSubsection i): The municipalities.\n\n In granting the concession for the use of water for irrigation, the obligation of the user to apply appropriate water management techniques must be included, in order to avoid degradation of the soil resource, whether by erosion, waterlogging (revenimiento), salinization, hydromorphism, and other harmful effects. (Thus added this final paragraph by Article 63 of the Law of Soil Use and Conservation No. 7779 of April 30, 1998).\"\n\nAs can be appreciated from the regulations transcribed above, among other things, matters relating to stormwater sewer systems (alcantarillado pluvial) constitute a public service and, to that extent, are subject to its Fundamental Principles. (Article 4 LGAP). Now, regarding whether it is AyA or the respective Municipality that must be in charge of providing said service, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has indicated, with respect to the matter of interest, the following:\n\n\"III.- Regarding the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, stormwater sewer systems, and the competencies of the\n\nPublic Administrations in this regard.- This Court, in reiterated jurisprudence, has recognized that the right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is a fundamental right derived from Article 50 of the Constitution, according to which, not only is the right of every citizen to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment enshrined, but it also obligates the State to guarantee the exercise of said right, through the means established for this purpose by current legislation. Specifically, as this Chamber has stated in ruling No. 05-9900 of 10:00 a.m. on July 29, 2005, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to properly channel these waters, in order to guarantee the right to health and an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties:\n\nV.- Regarding municipal obligations in the matter of stormwater sewers (alcantarillado pluvial).- It is pertinent to take into account that Article 169 of the Political Constitution establishes that the administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. Local interests and services have been defined by the Chamber as indeterminate legal concepts where the law does not exactly resolve their content for application to specific cases, making it necessary to resort to criteria of value and experience by the party responsible for applying them to determine their content. The creation of adequate drainage means within a community for the purpose of not causing damage to property, health, or environmental problems to its neighbors is, within the terms indicated by the Political Constitution, of interest to the canton and is part of the services that the Municipality is obligated to provide. In this same sense, the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) in its Article 285 establishes that stormwater (aguas pluviales) must be properly and sanitarily eliminated to avoid contamination of the soil and natural water sources for human use and consumption, the formation of breeding grounds for vectors and diseases, and air contamination through conditions that threaten its purity and quality. For this reason, the Municipality of [Name594], is obligated to assume a certain behavior for the satisfaction of its purposes, taking the required measures to provide the protected community with an efficient stormwater drainage system. Adjusted to reasonableness criteria, the Municipality must build the necessary infrastructure to properly channel these waters, in order to guarantee the right to health and an environment free from contamination and without harming third parties. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers (Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), such municipal obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Water Supply and Sewers (Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), since the latter, as the governing body in the matter, is in charge at the national level of directing, coordinating, and overseeing everything concerning the evacuation of black water (aguas negras), sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic, meaning this Institution is not entirely unrelated to the problem raised by the petitioner.\n\nOn the other hand, even if the problem were solely caused by the stormwater sewer system, the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) cannot disengage from it, since, in accordance with Articles 21 of the Constitution, 2 of the General Health Law, and 2 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud), it has the essential function of safeguarding the health of the inhabitants of the Republic, and must adopt all general and particular measures necessary (Articles 337 and 355 of Law No. 5395) to guarantee the full enjoyment of that right. Likewise, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the General Health Law in its Articles 285 and 292:\n\nARTICLE 285.-\n\nExcreta, black water, grey water (aguas servidas), and stormwater must be properly and sanitarily eliminated to avoid contamination of the soil and natural water sources for human use and consumption, the formation of breeding grounds for vectors and diseases, and air contamination through conditions that threaten its purity or quality.\n\nARTICLE 292.-\n\nThe discharge of black water, grey water, and industrial waste into the stormwater sewer system is prohibited in all cases. The Ministry is empowered to restrict, regulate, or prohibit the disposal of non-biodegradable synthetic products through excreta and water collection systems.\n\nAs is evident from the foregoing, competence in the matter of stormwater sewers is established, expressly and implicitly, by ordinary legislation. While the current Municipal Code (Código Municipal) does not establish any specific provision on this topic, the Chamber has declared, in ruling No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 a.m. on September 6, 2002, that this does not exclude the obligation of municipal entities -evidently, in coordination with the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers, which is the governing body par excellence in the matter-, to develop, among other community works, matters relating to adequate water supply and sewer systems. Indeed, Article 4, subsection c) of the current Municipal Code establishes in general terms, as a municipal power, the administration and provision of municipal public services, among which, without a doubt, are water supply and sewer systems.\n\nFurthermore, the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers equally has shared competence in this regard. In the aforementioned resolution No. 2002-08696 of 10:14 a.m. on September 6, 2002, the Chamber concluded that \"... the authority to create and maintain the sanitary sewer (alcantarillado sanitario) networks corresponds to the municipalities, since these, according to Article 3 of the current Municipal Code, are primarily obligated to safeguard cantonal interests and services within the jurisdiction under their charge and because this is expressly derived from Article 169 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the generic competence of the Municipalities in this matter. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers, this obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Water Supply and Sewers, since the latter, as the governing body in the matter, is in charge at the national level [sic] of directing, coordinating, and overseeing everything concerning the evacuation of black water, sewers, and contamination of water resources for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Republic.\" (Ruling No. 2008-001191 of eleven thirty-six in the morning on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eight. The underlining and boldface are ours). Equally, in another of its Rulings, the High Court, clarifying the topic of competencies in the field at hand, indicated:\n\n\"In this matter, it must not be forgotten that the competence and responsibility for the management of the stormwater sewer system corresponds primarily to the Municipalities -although in coordination with the Costa Rican Institute of\n\nWater Supply and Sewers and the Ministry of Health as the case may be, for\n\nwhich it must carry out the corresponding coordination- and this local entity, despite being aware of the current problem and the solution that must be given to it, did not immediately proceed to address the problem, letting years pass filled with omissions and unproductive actions.\" (Ruling No. 2008-004210 of one fifty-nine in the afternoon on March fourteenth, two thousand eight. In a similar sense, Vote No. 18465-2020 of nine fifteen in the morning on September twenty-fifth, two thousand twenty. The boldface is ours).\n\nIn another of its Votes, in which it specifically refers to the Municipality of San José, the aforementioned Chamber stated:\n\n\"The foregoing constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners, which is attributable to the Municipality of San José, since, as is evident from the case file (expediente), said authority is competent to attend to the canton's stormwater sewer system.\" (Ruling No. 2011-006903 of twelve and nine minutes on May twenty-seventh, two thousand eleven. In a similar sense, resolution No. 2020-009707 of nine fifteen in the morning on May twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty. The highlighting in boldface is from this Chamber [Cámara]).\n\nAlso, through Ruling No. 2012-001015 of nine and five minutes on January twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, the High Court stated:\n\n\"Certainly, in the first instance, the obligation to create and maintain stormwater sewer networks corresponds to the municipalities, since these, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 of the Municipal Code and 169 of the Political Constitution, are primarily obligated to safeguard cantonal interests and services within the corresponding jurisdiction, which justifies the fact that such corporations charge municipal taxes, which include the item corresponding to the maintenance and operation of the stormwater network (red pluvial). However, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers, that obligation must be shared with the National Institute of Water Supply and Sewers, since the latter is the governing body in the matter and the entity technically most specialized to advise on the proper maintenance of the aforementioned service.\" (Both the underlining and the boldface are from this Collegiate Body [Órgano Colegiado]).\n\nSimilarly, in one of its most recent Rulings on the topic at hand, the mentioned Chamber held:\n\n\"In the specific case, the appellant alleges the impairment of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment on the occasion of two problems: a) channeling of sewer waters in [Address289], Barrio Los Ángeles of San Rafael Debajo de Desamparados, which causes the waters to overflow, causing flooding...\n\nRegarding such allegations, from the recitation of proven facts, it is established that the cited problem has been reported by the petitioner and other community residents since 2019. Thus, it is recorded that on October 21, 2019, they filed a complaint before the Municipality of Desamparados, alleging problems with water channeling, from which they have suffered floods, damage to pipes and sewers, damage to the road surface, and damage to their properties.\n\n(...) In the development, protection, and full enjoyment of the cited rights, the function of the Municipalities and their bodies –including district municipal councils (concejos municipales de distrito)– is relevant, which, based on Article 169 of the Constitution, are obligated to effectively provide the public services that have been entrusted to them. Thus, applicable in the specific case, such obligations entail the effective maintenance of public thoroughfares –roads, sidewalks, and sewers–, through which other rights are exercised and enjoyed, such as freedom of movement, health, and the right to a healthy environment.\" (Ruling No. 2021-005042 of nine fifteen in the morning on March twelfth, two thousand twenty-one. The boldface does not correspond to the original).\n\nAs can be clearly appreciated from the constitutional jurisprudence, matters concerning stormwater sewers are a municipal competence, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitutive Law of AyA, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber indicates, said Institute \"is the governing body in the matter and the entity technically most specialized to advise on the proper maintenance of the aforementioned service.\" This being the case, regardless of the type of road –meaning national or cantonal– the responsibility for said service lies with the respective Local Government. And along these lines, note how the High Court makes express reference to the fact that the responsibility of the municipalities on this topic is primary, and they must coordinate \"with the Costa Rican Institute of Water Supply and Sewers and the Ministry of Health as the case may be.\" This being so, pursuant to the cited constitutional jurisprudence, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is the municipalities that are directly responsible \"for creating and maintaining stormwater sewer networks\" within the respective territorial district –canton– they administer. Therefore, in light of the cited regulations and constitutional rulings, the party that must answer for the proper functioning of the entire stormwater sewer system linked to the roads located in the Central Canton of San José –whether national or not– is the Municipality of San José, which even has a \"Regulation for the Granting of Stormwater Discharges and Availability in the Canton of San José\" (Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Desfogues Pluviales y Disponibilidades en el Cantón de San José), published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 155 of August 27, 2018. And to that extent, any damage generated by said system or any of its elements is attributable to it.\n\nNow, in the instant case, there is no doubt whatsoever regarding the accident that occurred, the place where it occurred, and the efficient cause thereof —a storm drain manhole cover in a vertical position—, without the existence of force majeure, fault of the victim —due to speeding, inexperience and/or recklessness— or an act of a third party having been demonstrated. In this regard, the mishap was clearly not due to an act of nature, as is abundantly clear from the dynamics of the accident described by the plaintiff in her complaint, which is consistent with the declaration of the witness Adolfo Jiménez Lacayo. The aforementioned deponent stated that he lives at Dirección13579, which is located in front of the area where the accident happened. He also indicated that at the time of the mishap, he was able to observe a 3- or 4-ton vehicle traveling in front of the one driven by the plaintiff and that as that vehicle passed over the manhole cover, the cover ended up in a vertical position, such that immediately afterwards the right front tire of the plaintiff's motor vehicle struck it and was catapulted, flipping several times on the road. The representation of CONAVI attempted to distort the testimony thus given by the aforementioned witness by arguing that there was no precision as to which of the two front tires struck the manhole cover and how it was that the witness had said he was messaging on WhatsApp at the time of the accident and yet was able to witness the accident. In this regard, it is worth noting, first, that for this Chamber it is irrelevant whether the witness could specify which of the two front tires of the vehicle driven by the plaintiff struck the manhole cover in question, because what is significant is that one of the front tires impacted the manhole cover, and second, even though the witness indicated he was messaging while resting, that in no way means he was abstracted from the surrounding reality. In this line, at no time did the witness state that his attention was complete and absolute to the exchange of messages in which he was engaged; contrary to that, he clarified that while taking a break from his usual work, he took the opportunity to message, while observing the outside of his home. Nor is it possible to maintain that an act of a third party existed, merely because, according to the narrative of what happened, it was a vehicle traveling ahead of the plaintiff that, upon passing over the mentioned manhole cover, \"left the same\" in a vertical position, since such a circumstance did not happen because that vehicle passed over the manhole cover, but because the cover itself did not behave as it should have. That is, that vehicle and other vehicles could have passed over said element, and it should have remained in its place or space called the base ring or \"flanger.\" (In this sense, see Report DRyTOMSR-2017-00849 prepared by Eng. William Leininger Sancho, which is visible at images 91 to 94 of the judicial file). Finally, no fault of the victim is perceived, since the argument put forth that the distance the plaintiff should have maintained from the vehicle traveling in front of hers was not adequate for the speed at which she was driving, because if it had been, she would have been able to react to maneuver and avoid impacting the manhole cover, was just that —a claim devoid of proof. In this line —that is, regarding the issue of speeding— it is a fact that was not held as proven, because although the Official Traffic Report noted in \"Observations\" as the cause of the accident: \"SKID AND ROLLOVER DUE TO DETACHMENT OF MANHOLE COVER\" and as \"Risk Factor: Speeding,\" the truth is that this is nothing more than a simple comment by a Traffic Officer who did not witness the accident. And in any case, it is reiterated, the aforementioned cover should not have behaved the way it did, which can in no way be imputed to the plaintiff here. Having said this, it is reiterated that in the instant case, it has been deemed accredited that the plaintiff suffered a motor vehicle accident because a cover that formed part of a storm drain system —a public service under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of San José in this case, according to the supra-cited constitutional jurisprudence— \"did not behave as expected\" —the efficient cause of the mishap—, since after being driven over by a vehicle traveling ahead of the one driven by the plaintiff here, it remained in a vertical position. What has been indicated up to here, in addition to clearing up doubts about the Passive Ad Causam Standing (Legitimación Ad Causam Pasiva), allows this Chamber to delve in the following lines into the damages claimed by the party bringing suit. 1. Uncompensated difference regarding the real value of the vehicle (¢3,000,000). As was indicated in the list of proven facts, as a result of the policy that the plaintiff had subscribed with the INS, she received from said Institute compensation in the amount of ¢6,000,000, for the total loss of her vehicle. Now then, it is not clear whether the plaintiff disagrees with what was thus granted by the aforementioned insurance entity, in which case she should have sued the same —which she did not do in the instant case— so that this Court could review the legality of the conduct displayed. If, contrary to that, the plaintiff considered that the amount compensated by the INS was in accordance with the contracted policy, but that her vehicle had a higher market value —for which she had not insured it— and that consequently this difference should be covered by the co-defendants, she was obliged to prove such circumstance. Which she also did not do, because it was held as unproven that \"the vehicle owned by the plaintiff had a market value of nine million colones —¢9,000,000— at the time the accident occurred.\" Hence, regarding this petition, its rejection must follow. 2. Six months she could not dedicate to her work (¢4,164,784.92). Despite the arguments of the sued Administrations that the plaintiff, when giving her Investigative Statement (Declaración Indagatoria) before the Traffic Court of Hatillo, stated she was a housewife when the mishap occurred, in the instant case it was deemed accredited that she was engaged in the care of elderly adults. In this sense, note that although the former occupation was the one recorded in said Investigative Statement, it is unknown whether this was because before whom it was given, the information was not modified in the format used to detail personal information in that type of procedural act, or if the plaintiff herself indeed so indicated. Notwithstanding this, in this Proceeding we have gone beyond the simple word and have brought evidence regarding her occupation at the time the accident occurred. In this sense, the Sworn Statement (Declaración Jurada) given by the plaintiff can be observed, visible at images 45 to 46 of the file, in which she expressly states under the seriousness of the oath —which, incidentally, it is worth saying, does not occur in an Investigative Statement— that she was dedicated to the care of elderly adults. The foregoing statement was supported by the witness [Nombre62 004], the plaintiff's sister, who, when consulted at Trial about whether she knew what her sister did for a living, stated without hesitation —that is, with total certainty—: \"[Nombre62 001] is not a professional, she cares for elderly adults to earn a living.\" To which she added that it was a job with fixed hours. She subsequently indicated that at the time of the accident, her sister was in charge of some elderly individuals she attended to in Sabanilla. What was thus said by both the plaintiff and the cited witness is consistent with what was indicated regarding the plaintiff's activity by the Certified Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado) Rodolfo Jenkins Conejo, in the Certification issued by the same, which although, as will be seen, does not constitute sufficient evidence to prove the plaintiff's income, certainly stands as one more element of conviction, which joined to the 2 previously indicated, allows us to hold as proven what the plaintiff did for a living at the time of the mishap. Now then, despite this —that is, that the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged when the accident occurred has been accredited—, as was indicated in the Considering clause regarding unproven facts, in the instant case it has been held as unproven that, on the occasion of the mishap suffered, the plaintiff was prevented for a period of 6 months from carrying out her activity of caring for Elderly Adults. This being so, since there is no suitable medical evidence to prove such circumstance, the Certification from the Certified Public Accountant that the plaintiff provides to quantify the claimed item lacks relevance and, for that reason, requires unnecessary analysis regarding its content. Notwithstanding this, and without prejudice to what has been so noted, it must be remembered that this type of certification in no way constitutes full evidence for cases such as the one before us. Precisely, in analyzing this issue with total clarity, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated:\n\n“III.- Regarding the argument indicated as First, this Chamber has indicated that the certifications issued by public accountants regarding matters within their competence constitute public documents, without the public faith of these officials extending to the content or intrinsic truth of the financial or accounting statements they attest to, hence the vouchers of the operations are indispensable in order to verify them. On the probative weight of said instruments, this jurisdictional body has indicated that full proof refers to facts that the official affirms having performed himself, or that occurred in his presence, in the exercise of his functions. If one is not faced with these scenarios, even though the document is of that type, having been issued with the requirements indicated by numeral 369 of the Civil Procedure Code, its content may be challenged by any means of evidence. Regarding those issued by professionals in public accounting, it has stated: 'According to Article 8 of the Organic Law of the College of Public Accountants of Costa Rica, documents issued by CPAs in the branch of their competence shall have the value of public documents. …in consideration of the public interest that permeates tax matters, such character does not imply that the financial or accounting statements of the taxpayers that are the object of the certification are correct or true, per se. The nature of public, and therefore full proof, is circumscribed to the verification of the existence of the records analyzed by the CPA and to the acts or facts performed or executed by them. Consistent with the foregoing, numeral 49 of the Income Tax Law provides that the opinion or interpretation contained in certifications for tax purposes does not constitute full proof against the Treasury, and does not bind the Tax Administration.' No. 421 of 9 hours 40 minutes of June 20, 2005. Therefore, the appellant in cassation is incorrect when he affirms that the certification of the accounting professional is full proof because it is a public document, since as stated, it is limited to attesting to the accounting of a natural or legal person, without this implying its certainty. In the instant case, the Court did not grant it a value different from the one it possesses.”\n(Sentence No. 00947 of fifteen hours of December seven, two thousand five. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. See also Sentence No. 000421-F-2005 of nine hours forty minutes of June twenty, two thousand five, issued by the same Chamber).\n\nIn addition to what has been indicated up to here, it has been held as proven that the sick leaves (incapacidades) that were granted to the plaintiff on the occasion of the accident did not exceed, in total, 20 days. The foregoing circumstance allows us to reasonably conclude that, in medical opinion, the plaintiff was indeed capable of performing her usual work. This being the case, the appropriate course is to reject the present petitionary item, as is hereby ordered. 3. Cost of transportation and food on days of medical appointments, corresponding to ten thousand colones per appointment (¢140,000). As demonstrated by certification SEAD-051232017 of October 30, 2017, issued by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as a result of the mandatory vehicle insurance coverage, the following expenses have been covered for the plaintiff: a) Transportation payment: fifteen thousand seven hundred colones -¢15,700.00-. b) Medical Services: seven hundred twenty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents -¢727,877.59-. The foregoing sums a Total expenses of seven hundred forty-three thousand five hundred seventy-seven colones with fifty-nine cents -¢743,577.59-. As a logical consequence of the foregoing, the plaintiff cannot claim the collection of transportation expenses if these have already been recognized by the National Insurance Institute. In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff does not explain, justify, or specify the amount she seeks regarding food, nor does she provide any documentary support for this type of expense that would allow an examination of its appropriateness or lack thereof. Due to what has been indicated up to here, the rejection of this claim must follow. 4. Subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) for bodily injuries (prudentially at ¢30,000,000). Regarding this type of damage, it must be remembered that it affects the psyche of the person, which is why it has been termed incorporeal, non-pecuniary, or affection damage. Hence, it has been considered that it is linked to “… anguish, frustration, impotence, insecurity, unease, anxiety, sorrow, restlessness, disillusionment, among others; their common denominator is psychological or emotional suffering or affliction.” (Sentence No. 269 of 9 hours 10 minutes of April 23, 2004, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). The proof of subjective moral damages is “in re ipsa,” because it is the very generating event that brings about this type of injury, and the evidence is obtained through “presumptions of man,” which are inferred from the indications. Thus, it has been said: “XIII.- Regarding the proof of moral damages, the principle is the following: its existence and gravity must be proven, a burden that corresponds to the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through presumptions of man inferred from the indications, since the unlawful generating event reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, privacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage; for this reason, it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa'.” (Sentence No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. As well as Rulings No. 564 of 11 hours of September 10, 2003, No. 311 of 16 hours 10 minutes of April 25, 2001, and No. 725 of 12 hours 15 minutes of August 25, 2004. All issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now then, the reparation of this damage, that is, the amount set as compensation for it, although dependent on the prudent discretion of the Judge, certainly can in no way be disproportionate, whether excessively low or excessively high. Thus, in the instant case, it is not questioned that the accident caused injuries to the plaintiff, which, although they did not warrant her transfer to the Hospital nor a sick leave as claimed for 6 months, certainly did generate bodily consequences that warranted her sick leave for several days, even requiring up to one day of physical therapy —January 20, 2017—, all of which was held as duly proven in the instant case. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that such bodily injuries generated a negative impact on the plaintiff's psyche, causing her the damage she claims and consequently giving rise in her to a series of emotions and feelings ranging from impotence and anxiety to discouragement and frustration. The damage under discussion, insofar as she does not have a duty to bear it, must be compensated. Now then, with customary respect, this Chamber considers that the sum requested for this concept is clearly disproportionate and to that extent, the appropriate course is to set the quantum of what was requested at the prudential sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones -¢1,700,000-. An amount which, although far lower than the requested one, certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be compensated for the damage caused, without generating unjust enrichment to the detriment of municipal finances. 5. Moral damages for emotional and traumatic effects (prudentially at ¢30,000,000). As this is the same type of moral damages claimed in the preceding section, with customary respect, the parties are referred to what was stated there regarding subjective moral damages, including the issue of the disproportionality of the request. Having said the foregoing, it having been demonstrated that the plaintiff required both Psychological and Psychiatric care, even being granted sick leave by this latter Medical Specialty of the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) on the occasion of the accident suffered, it is reasonable to presume that such treatments were due to her experiencing a negative impact on her psyche, with the consequences already extensively explained in the previous section, which is confirmed by the statements of the witness [Nombre62 004] —the plaintiff's sister—, who indicated at Trial that she cried a lot spontaneously and constantly, and that she had problems sleeping. What has been indicated up to here translates into evident subjective moral damages, which, insofar as the plaintiff is not obliged to bear, must be compensated. Regarding the amount to be granted for this concept, in the same way as indicated in the preceding subsection, in the judgment of this Panel of Judges the sum sought for this concept is clearly disproportionate and to that extent, the appropriate course is to set the quantum of what was requested at the prudential sum of three million four hundred thousand colones -¢3,400,000-. An amount which, despite being double what was granted in the preceding subsection, is far lower than the requested one, and certainly allows for reasonably effectuating the right that assists the plaintiff to be compensated for the damage caused, without generating unjust enrichment to the detriment of municipal finances. At this point, this Chamber considers it important to clarify that the plaintiff indeed claims two items of subjective moral damages and both are being granted —although for amounts lower than those requested—, but this in no way should be understood as a double payment, but rather as damages that had their own genesis in different causes. Thus, the one granted in the preceding subsection derives from the bodily injuries that the plaintiff suffered on the occasion of the traffic accident and which required medical attention, sick leaves, and one day of physical therapy. Whereas the one granted in this subsection originates from the emotional sequelae she experienced due to the mishap that occurred, which warranted Psychological and Psychiatric attention, as well as a sick leave for this latter Medical Specialty. This being so, it is not a double payment for exactly the same thing.\n\n6. Possible temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of her left hand. Regarding this petitionary item, note that in the record there exists the medical-legal opinion No. 2016-0001979 of October 27, 2016, issued by the Department of Legal Medicine of the OIJ, which states as part of its conclusions the following: \"1. Injuries: Traffic accident with simple contusions. 2. Temporary incapacity: TEN (10) DAYS as of the date of the events under study. 3. The injuries sustained tend toward healing without leaving functional sequelae.\" As can be observed from the transcribed text, the injuries the plaintiff suffered were classified as simple and tending to heal without any functional sequela. This being so and it having been held as unproven that as a consequence of the accident suffered by the plaintiff, she was left with a temporary or permanent partial disability in the use of her left hand, the appropriate course is to reject this petition, as is hereby ordered. Finally, regarding the rental of a vehicle for a period of 32 days, despite being an issue discussed by the parties, as there is no claim whatsoever regarding it, analysis of this point is omitted, along with the pertinent evidence —money receipt and statement at Trial by Yancy Ramírez Ramírez—. What has been indicated up to here allows us to demonstrate that the three requirements previously indicated as essential for the non-contractual liability of the Public Administration to arise are present in the instant case: i) Conduct —omissive in this case— by the Municipality of San José —Decentralized Public Administration—, regarding its unavoidable duty to inspect and/or repair any element of risk in the storm drain systems operating in the Central Canton of San José. ii) The damage caused, both to the plaintiff's vehicle, which in this case was covered by the National Insurance Institute, and the subjective moral damage nature, which was analyzed above. iii) The causal link between the aforementioned omission and the damage caused. Thus, the items granted in this Ruling must be covered exclusively by the Municipality of San José.\n\nVII.- OF THE OPPOSED EXCEPTIONS: As was indicated in Resultando II of this Judgment, when answering the complaint, the sued Administrations opposed the following exceptions: CONAVI: Incomplete necessary passive joinder (litisconsorcio pasivo necesario incompleto) —resolved interlocutorily— and Lack of Right. STATE: Lack of Passive Standing (Falta de Legitimación Pasiva) and Lack of Right. AyA: Lack of Passive Standing. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSÉ: Lack of Passive Standing. In this regard, in the preceding Considering clause, a thematic approach was made regarding storm drains, supported by constitutional jurisprudence, according to which, it is the Municipalities that are competent and consequently responsible for the construction, maintenance, and adequate functioning thereof. This being so, it is clear that with respect to CONAVI, the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing must be declared ex officio, also upholding the exception that both the State and the AyA opposed in this sense. With regard to the sued municipal entity, the exception under discussion must be rejected, insofar as, as has been stated, it is the aforementioned Local Government that, in the judgment of this Chamber, has incurred, through its omissive conduct, the liability being claimed. (Article 12.1 of the CPCA). Due to the way this is resolved, a ruling on the exception of Lack of Right interposed by both CONAVI and the State Representation is omitted.\n\nVIII.- ON COSTS: Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the sole fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, according to the provisions of that same rule, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable: a) when there was, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the complaint are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibidem). In the instant case, this Collegiate Body considers that without the need for greater effort, with a simple reading not only of the answers to the complaint made by the sued Administrations, but also of the substantive aspects developed in this Ruling, it is possible to conclude that the plaintiff has ample reasons to litigate in the way she did. That is, suing all the Administrations cited here, because it was in no way clear and/or simple to determine the entity or body responsible for what happened. Thus, in the opinion of this Collegiate Body, it is appropriate to resolve without a special condemnation in costs with respect to CONAVI, the State, and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados). But with respect to the Municipality of San José, it corresponds to condemn it to pay both sets of costs of this Proceeding. The quantum of the same shall be determined in the Sentence Execution Phase at the request of the prevailing party.\n\nTHEREFORE (POR TANTO)\n\nThe documentary evidence submitted for better resolution by the representation of CONAVI is admitted, and the exception of Res Judicata (Cosa Juzgada) opposed by the same is rejected. With respect to the National Roadway Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad), the Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is declared ex officio, also upholding the exception that both the State and the AyA opposed in this sense. Consequently, the claim against such Public Administrations is declared without merit, with no special condemnation in costs. With respect to the Municipality of San José, the exception of Lack of Passive Ad Causam Standing is rejected and consequently, the claim filed against it is declared Partially With Merit, understood as denied in what is not expressly granted: i) The capital municipal entity must pay the plaintiff here the sum of one million seven hundred thousand colones -¢1,700,000- for subjective moral damages derived from the bodily injuries suffered.\n\nii) Likewise, the respondent Municipality must pay the plaintiff the sum of three million four hundred thousand colones (¢3,400,000.00), as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) arising from the emotional and traumatic effects experienced. iii) The Municipality of San José is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this proceeding to the plaintiff herein. The quantum thereof shall be determined in the Judgment Enforcement Stage upon request of the prevailing party.\n\nGiven the manner in which this matter is resolved, no ruling is made regarding the Lack of Standing (Falta de Derecho) defense raised by both CONAVI and the State Representation.\n\nNOTIFÍQUESE.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Presiding Judge, Judith Reyes Castillo, Judge, and Iván Salas Leitón, Judge.-"
}