{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1187704", "citation": "Res. 03305-2023 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Construcción de relleno sanitario en Mora no procede por falta de permisos ambientales", "title_en": "Landfill construction in Mora denied for lack of environmental permits", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo rechazó el recurso de apelación de Parque Industrial JATEO S.A. contra la resolución de la Alcaldía Municipal de Mora que denegó el otorgamiento de permisos de alineamiento vial y desfogue pluvial para la construcción de un relleno sanitario. El tribunal determinó que los actos impugnados eran reproductores de otros anteriores consentidos tácitamente, lo que los hacía irrecurribles. Adicionalmente, se constató que el reglamento municipal de residuos sólidos sí fue debidamente publicado, por lo que la alegación de ineficacia era improcedente. Sin embargo, el argumento de mayor peso fue la ausencia de estudios técnicos y ambientales que demostraran la sostenibilidad del proyecto. El juez invocó los principios preventivo y precautorio del derecho ambiental internacional y la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre el derecho a un ambiente sano, concluyendo que la petición debía ser denegada ante la incertidumbre sobre los impactos ambientales de un relleno sanitario, careciendo de los criterios técnicos necesarios para autorizarlo.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Court denied an appeal by Parque Industrial JATEO S.A. against the Municipality of Mora's refusal to grant road alignment and stormwater drainage permits for a landfill project. The court held that the challenged acts merely reproduced previous decisions that had been tacitly accepted, rendering them unreviewable. It also found that the municipal solid waste regulation had been duly published, rejecting the claim of ineffectiveness. More importantly, the court emphasized the complete lack of technical and environmental studies supporting the project. Citing the preventive and precautionary principles of international environmental law and constitutional jurisprudence on the right to a healthy environment, the judge ruled that in the face of uncertainty regarding the environmental impacts of a landfill, the permits could not be granted without adequate technical justification.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "date": "13/09/2023", "year": "2023", "topic_ids": [], "primary_topic_id": null, "es_concept_hints": [ "acto consentido", "acto reproductor", "jerarquía impropia", "principio preventivo", "principio precautorio", "agotamiento de la vía administrativa", "sana crítica racional", "sostenibilidad ambiental" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "relleno sanitario", "principio preventivo", "principio precautorio", "alineamiento vial", "desfogue pluvial", "acto consentido", "acto reproductor", "municipalidad", "jerarquía impropia", "derecho ambiental", "estudios técnicos", "La Gaceta", "consulta pública" ], "keywords_en": [ "landfill", "preventive principle", "precautionary principle", "road alignment", "stormwater drainage", "consented act", "reproductive act", "municipality", "improper hierarchy", "environmental law", "technical studies", "official gazette", "public consultation" ], "excerpt_es": "Así las cosas, independientemente de cualquier discusión acerca de si estamos en presencia de actos consentidos, actos que reproducen actos anteriores, o bien si fue correctamente publicado o no el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, la sana crítica racional bajo sus vectores de ciencia, experiencia y lógica, hacen ver a quien juzga, que no hay criterios técnicos suficientes en autos, que ni tan siquiera fueron conocidos o discutidos, orientados a entender la sostenibilidad ambiental de permisos o bien de licencias municipales vinculadas a la construcción de un relleno sanitario. Todo ello genera una situación de incerteza que es regulada por la Cumbre de Río, bajo Principio Preventivo, de profunda raíz constitucional conforme fue citado supra, que orienta la actuación del operador jurídico, de quien juzga este caso, para denegar la petición concreta de conceder las licencias requeridas al respectivo gobierno local. (...) En lo que fue motivo de agravio y fue conocido en esta resolución se tiene por agotada la vía administrativa, como en efecto se ordena.", "excerpt_en": "Thus, regardless of any discussion about whether we are in the presence of consented acts, acts that reproduce previous acts, or whether the Public Service Regulation for Integrated Solid Waste Management of the Canton of Mora was correctly published, sound rational criticism under its vectors of science, experience, and logic leads this judge to see that there are insufficient technical criteria in the record—criteria that were not even known or discussed—aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses related to the construction of a landfill. All of this creates a situation of uncertainty that is regulated by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, with deep constitutional roots as cited above, which guides the legal operator, who judges this case, to deny the specific request to grant the required licenses to the respective local government. (...) As for the grievances that were addressed in this resolution, the administrative process is hereby deemed exhausted, as ordered.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The appeal is denied; the Municipality's decision rejecting the requested permits is confirmed, as they are reproductive acts of previously consented ones and, in any case, due to a complete lack of technical-environmental studies for a project with potential serious impact.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación; se confirma la resolución de la Alcaldía que rechazó las autorizaciones solicitadas, por ser actos reproductores de otros consentidos y, en todo caso, por falta total de estudios técnico-ambientales para un proyecto con potencial impacto grave." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III)", "quote_en": "sound rational criticism under its vectors of science, experience, and logic leads this judge to see that there are insufficient technical criteria in the record—criteria that were not even known or discussed—aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses related to the construction of a landfill.", "quote_es": "la sana crítica racional bajo sus vectores de ciencia, experiencia y lógica, hacen ver a quien juzga, que no hay criterios técnicos suficientes en autos, que ni tan siquiera fueron conocidos o discutidos, orientados a entender la sostenibilidad ambiental de permisos o bien de licencias municipales vinculadas a la construcción de un relleno sanitario." }, { "context": "Considerando III)", "quote_en": "all of this creates a situation of uncertainty that is regulated by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, with deep constitutional roots as cited above, which guides the legal operator, who judges this case, to deny the specific request to grant the required licenses to the respective local government.", "quote_es": "todo ello genera una situación de incerteza que es regulada por la Cumbre de Río, bajo Principio Preventivo, de profunda raíz constitucional conforme fue citado supra, que orienta la actuación del operador jurídico, de quien juzga este caso, para denegar la petición concreta de conceder las licencias requeridas al respectivo gobierno local." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-21104", "citation": "Ley 7416", "title_en": "Law 7416 — Convention on Biological Diversity", "title_es": "Ley 7416 — Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/06/1994", "year": "1994" }, { "id": "norm-40197", "citation": "Ley 7794", "title_en": "Municipal Code", "title_es": "Código Municipal", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/04/1998", "year": "1998" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-1058645", "citation": "Res. 24807-2021 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Constitutional Chamber orders completion of studies on Fipronil's impact on pollinators", "title_es": "Sala Constitucional ordena culminar estudios sobre afectación del Fipronil en polinizadores", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "05/11/2021", "year": "2021" }, { "id": "norm-21104", "citation": "Ley 7416", "title_en": "Law 7416 — Convention on Biological Diversity", "title_es": "Ley 7416 — Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/06/1994", "year": "1994" }, { "id": "norm-40197", "citation": "Ley 7794", "title_en": "Municipal Code", "title_es": "Código Municipal", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/04/1998", "year": "1998" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-21104", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7416" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-1187704", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21104", "norm_num": "7416", "norm_name": "Ley 7416 — Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/06/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-40197", "norm_num": "7794", "norm_name": "Código Municipal", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "EV Generación de Machote: F:\\Gestion-Judicial\\Servidor de Archivos\\Modelos\\Contencioso\\TCRESOL016.dpj\r\n\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\n????????????????\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n20-003085-1027-CA - 1\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPROCESO:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\nJERARQUIA IMPROPIA (Municipal)\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nACTOR/A:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\nPARQUE INDUSTRIAL JATEO SA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nDEMANDADO/A:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\nMUNICIPALIDAD DE MORA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nNº N° 2023003305\n\r\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las diecinueve horas con veintidos minutos del trece de Setiembre del dos mil veintitres.-\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nConoce este Tribunal en condición de contralor no jerárquico de legalidad recurso de apelación presentado por Mario Esteban Sánchez Sibaja cédula 1-0817-0765 como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Paque Industrial JATEO S.A., cédula jurídica 3-101-295773 contra la resolución AMR-047-2020 de las 11:00 horas del 15 de mayo de 2020 dictada por la alcaldía de la Muncipalidad de Mora. \n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\r\n\nI- De la admisibildiad del recurso:\n\r\n\nEl 22 de mayo de 2020 fue notificada por correo electrónico la resolución impugnada. Lo anterior quiere decir, en aplicación de las reglas contenidas en el artículo 38 de la Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales que la parte promovente podía presentar el recurso hasta el día 01 de junio de 2020, razón por la cual, constatando en imagen 203 del expediente en sede judicial, que la apelación contra la resolución AMR-047-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020 dictada por la alcaldía de la Muncipalidad de Mora tiene sello de recibido con fecha el 29 de mayo de 2020; se concluye que esta fue presentada en tiempo, resultándo admisible el recurso. \n\r\n\nII-) Del antecedente procesal:\n\r\n\n1-) El origen del caso viene dado por solicitudes planteadas por la parte accionante en la sede administrativa para obtener persmiso de desfogue y alineamiento vial presentadas el 17 de mayo de 2018 (Ver recurso).\n\r\n\n2-) Las solicitudes indicadas en el numeral anterior fueron suspendidas mediante oficios DIG-019-18 y DDCU-13-2018 del 23 de mayo de 2018, para esperar que el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo conociera una apelación, también de la parte promovente, respecto de oficios AMR-18-2017 del 27 de junio de 2017 y ARM-2017 del 08 de septiembre de 2017 (Ver recurso).\n\r\n\n3-) El 18 de febrero de 2020 la parte promovente, luego del dictado del voto 611-2019 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo solicitó nuevamente que fueran conoceidas las solicitudes del 17 de mayo de 2018 respecto del alineamiento y vial desfogue.\n\r\n\n4-) Mediante resolución DDCU-011-2020 de fecha 04 de marzo de 2020 del Departamento de Desarrollo y Control Urbano y de a Unidad de Gestión Vial fueron rechazadas las gestiones del 17 de mayo de 2018 (Ver recurso).\n\r\n\n5-) El 09 de marzo de 2020 la parte promovente presentó recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución DDCU-011-2020 de fecha 04 de marzo de 2020 (Ver recurso en imagen 181 a 188 del expediene en sede judicial).\n\r\n\n6-) Mediante resolución DDCU-035-2020 de fecha 13 de abril de 2020 del Departamento de Desarrollo y Control Urbano y de la Unidad de Gestión Vial fue rechazado el recurso de revocatoria en cuanto al fondo, con la corrección de un error material en donde se mencionó que las solicitudes estaban vinculadas a un tema de uso de suelo, en lugar del asunto del alineamiento vial y del desfogue de aguas. (Ver recurso y resolución visible a imagen 189 a 191 del expediente en sede judicial).\n\r\n\n7-) El 22 de mayo de 2020 fue notificada la resolución AMR-047-2020 de la alcaldía de Mora en la que se rechazó el recurso de apelación del 09 de marzo de 2020. En lo medular dicha resolución determinó que: el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en resolución 611-2019 de las 09:15 horas del 27 de noviembre de 2019 confirmó todos los actos dictados por la alcaldía de Mora; entiende que respecto de la situación conocida en la resolución 611-2019, no ha variado el marco fáctico y que se está frente a una reiteración de hechos, en un contexto de acto consentido, al no recurrir o impugnar el acto por parte del administrado en el plazo y en las vías procedentes; en el contexto que desconocer la vigencia del Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, no es un hecho nuevo y que no es una situación alegada con anterioridad en los hechos ventilados en la resolución 611-2019; menciona que el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora fue publicado en la Gaceta número 72 del 16 de abril de 2013, pagina 33 a 39; y que en Gaceta número 122 del 26 de junio de 2013, página 64 (Ver recurso y resolución visible a imagen 194 a 198 del expediente en sede judicial).\n\r\n\n8-) El 29 de mayo de 2020 la parte promovente presentó un recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución AMR-047-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020, en el que formuló como agravios que: existen hechos nuevos respecto de los juzgado por este Tribunal en la resolución 2019-611 dictada en expediente 18-004025-1027-CA y que no se está en presencia de hechos reproductores de hechos anteriores; que se le estaba aplicando el Reglamento del servicio público para la gestión integral y aprovechamiento de los residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, a pesar que este no había sido publicado en forma completa en el Diario Oficial, La Gaceta; lo anterior hace que el reglamento mencionado sea ineficaz, destacando que lo correcto, para que surta efecto jurídico dicho reglamento es que sea publicado en el Diario Oficial y no así en el SINALEVI, considerando lesionados los artículos: 11, 27, 30, 41 y 129 de la Constitución Política; 43 del Código Municipal, 240 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; situación que en su entender le causa daño ya que no puede sujetarse el conocimiento de su trámite a una norma que no ha sido publicada integralmente en el Diario Oficial. Finalmente, en dicho recurso pide se revoque la resolución AMR-47-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020, que se le den las autorizaciones solicitadas de alineamiento y desfogue del 17 de mayo de 2018, para lo cual pide no podrá tomarse como fundamento el Reglamento para la Gestión Integral y Aprovechamiento de los Residuos Sólidos del Cantón de Mota, en razón de considerarla una norma ineficaz (Ver recurso en imagen 203 a 228 del expediente en sede judicial).\n\r\n\n9-) En resolución AMR-056-2020 de las 13:30 horas del 8 de junio de 2020 la alcaldía de la Muncipalidad de Mora conoció el recuso de revocatoria presentado contra la resolución AMR-047-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020, en la que se determinó que: el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora fue publicado en la Gaceta número 72 del 16 de abril de 2013, pagina 33 a 39; y que en Gaceta número 122 del 26 de junio de 2013, página 64; respecto de la resolución 611-2019 de las 09:15 horas del 27 de noviembre de 2019, se confirmó lo resuelto por la Municipalidad de Mora en relación con lo establecido en el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, sobre lo cual sostiene que el cuadro fáctico conocido en la resolución 611-2019 no ha cambiado, argumentando que se está ante las mismas resoluciones de desfogue pluvial y alineamiento vial, con los mismos sujetos solicitanes, el número número de finca, el mismo objeto del proyecto, sobre lo cual el Tribunal declaró el agotamiento de la vía administrativa; ratifica el contenido resuelto en la resolución AMR-047-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020; contradice al recurrente indicando que los dictámenes de la Procuraduría General de la República solo son vinculantes para la entidad que consulta y no para el resto de entidades. A partir de lo anterior, princiapalmente se dio el rechazo del recurso planteado en todos sus extremos (Ver recurso e imagen 291 a 299 del expediente en sede judicial).\n\r\n\nIII-) Análisis de fondo del Tribunal:\n\r\n\n1-) De previo:\n\r\n\nSobre el plazo peticionado en la pretensión procesal del recurso, para expresa agravios, conforme al artículo 192 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que indica: \"1) Recibido el expediente o aportada su copia certificada, el Tribunal dará audiencia por cinco días hábiles a los interesados, para que expresen sus agravios, y al concejo municipal, para que haga las alegaciones que estime pertinentes. Transcurrido el plazo para ello, deberá dictarse la resolución final correspondiente, dentro del quinto día hábil\"; este Tribunal ha venido interpretando y es del criterio que tal audiencia adicional para expresión de agravios está reservada para aquellos casos en donde se impugne un acto, o bien, una conducta administrativa formal emanda del Concejo Municipal y no así en las apelaciones planteadas contra los actos dictados por las alcaldías municipales; conclusión que se desprende de la literalidad, conforme al énfasis arriba señalado en el artículo citado. Tal situación no reviste ningún tipo de indefensión, toda vez, que la parte promovente el 29 de mayo de 2020 la parte promovente presentó un recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución AMR-047-2020 del 15 de mayo de 2020 en el que formuló los agravios que está conociendo este Tribunal. Aclarado lo anterior se omite la aplicación del artículo 192 de la Ley 8508.\n\r\n\n2-) Sobre los supuestos hechos nuevos y reproducción la reproducción de actos previos, vinculados a la resolución 2019-611 dictada en expediente 18-004025-1027-CA:\n\r\n\nEn atención a la resolución recién citada, es importante destacar lo que esta tuvo por hechos probados: \n\r\n\n\"I.- Antecedentes: De interés para la resolución del presente recurso se ha acreditado lo siguiente: 1) Que mediante oficio AMM-603-2016, de fecha 7 de diciembre de 2016, la Alcaldía Municipal del cantón de Mora, le informó a Parque Industrial Jateo S.A., del rechazo de los diversos trámites presentados tendentes a la obtención del desfogue y alineamiento para la construcción de un relleno sanitario en el cantón; 2) Que según resoluciones DDCU-006-2017, de fecha 26 de mayo de 2017 y DIG-031-2017, de fecha 31 de mayo de 2017, se rechazaron nuevamente las solicitudes de uso de suelo con alineamiento y desfogue de aguas, lo anterior en razón de existir ya un pronunciamiento sobre el tema, en el oficio AMM-603-2016 indicado en el hecho anterior; 3) Que en oficio AMR-18-2017, de fecha 27 de junio de 2017, la Alcaldía Municipal rechazó por improcedentes los recursos interpuestos DDCU-006-2017 y DIG-031-2017, estimando que se están impugnando actos administrativos reproductores de otro previo; 4) Que inconforme con la resolución recién indicada las sociedades recurrentes presentaron recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio para ante el Concejo Municipal; 5) Que la impugnación indicada en el hecho anterior fue rechazada por inadmisible mediante oficio AMR-27-2017, de fecha 8 de setiembre de 2017, y; 6) Que la parte recurrente interpuso recursos de revocatoria y apelación en contra de la resolución indicada en el hecho anterior\".\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nConforme se aprecia en lo que fue hechos probados, en lo medular se tienen probadas tres situaciones concretas que rescata este Tribunal, consistentes en que la parte promovente solicitó permisos de desfogue y alineamiento vial para la construcción de un relleno sanitario; que ya a la parte promovente se le había resuelto tal petición en forma negativa; y que presentó recursos al respecto, los cuales le fueron resueltos en forma negativa. Ahora bien, en lo que corresponde a la parte de fondo o considerativa de la resolución 2019-611 este Tribunal, pero con otra conformación se resolvió:\n\r\n\n\"IV.- Del caso concreto: Antes de incursionar en la revisión de los agravios presentados por la parte apelante, es indispensable ofrecer algunas precisiones de índole procedimental, fundamentales para comprender la forma en que el recurso en contra de la resolución AMR-18-2017 será resuelto. En este punto es necesario repasar brevemente los institutos de “acto consentido” y el de “acto reproductor de otro anterior”. En lo que hace a la primera de las categorías de actos antes indicadas, a saber, la del acto consentido, se tiene que este se configura cuando el destinatario de dicha conducta lo acepta de forma expresa manifestándolo de forma inequívoca, o bien cuando el acto no es impugnado oportunamente, situación que configura el denominado acto tácitamente consentido. Analizando este fenómeno procesal, en el contexto del agotamiento preceptivo de la vía en materia municipal, la Sala Constitucional precisó lo siguiente: “acto tácitamente consentido que tiene una lógica irrefutable en relación con el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa. Si el agotamiento de la vía administrativa –sustentado en el privilegio de la autotutela declarativa- es un requisito de admisibilidad de carácter obligatorio, consecuentemente, si el administrado no ejerce en tiempo y forma los recursos administrativos procedentes, el legislador presume, a partir de la conducta omisa del administrado, que ha consentido tácitamente el acto administrativo al no recurrirlo en los plazos y por los medios dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico.” (Sala Constitucional voto 3669-2006). De la revisión del expediente se tiene que la resolución AMR-603-2016, emitida por la Alcaldía Municipal de Mora es un acto consentido de manera tácita, en el tanto pese a ser contrario a los intereses de la parte que lo gestionó, ella no lo recurrió en el plazo legalmente establecido en el “ordenamiento” jurídico. Ofrecida la consideración anterior, es momento de precisar los contornos del “acto reproductor de otro previo”, aspecto que es el relevante para la resolución del recurso bajo estudio. A la fecha, tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia son contestes y unívocas en precisar que el acto que es reproducción de otro anterior es irrecurrible judicialmente. Esta clase de actos es definido por el prof. Jesús González Pérez como el que: “se dicta en presencia de los mismos hechos y en fuerza de iguales fundamentos, en el mismo expediente y en relación a los mismos interesados y reproduciéndola denegación que decretó la anterior resolución consentida.” Gonzáles Pérez, Jesús, Comentarios a la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción contencioso Administrativa, Editorial Cívitas, Madrid, año 1999, pág. 703. Como consta tanto en los oficios DDCU-006-2017 y DIG-031-2017, emitidos por los órganos subordinados a la Alcaldía, como en los oficios AMR-18-2017 y AMR-27-2017, se le informó a la parte recurrente, del rechazo de su gestión en razón de la existencia del pronunciamiento AMR-603-2016. Así las cosas, es claro que del texto expreso de todas las conductas emitidas en el año 2017, la corporación local entendió que los actos emitidos con posterioridad a la resolución AMR-603-2016, son reproductores de este y por tanto irrecurribles. Visto lo anterior, se ingresa a la revisión de los agravios presentados por la representación de la parte recurrente. Como primer reproche, la representación de la apelante indica que no existe normativa que impida solicitar de forma reiterada, desfogues, alineamientos, etc, razón por la cual lo actuado por la Alcaldía es contrario a derecho. El agravio es improcedente y se rechaza. Esta Sección debe indicar en primer término que, lleva razón la apelante en cuanto a que el “ordenamiento” no limita su derecho a solicitar la emisión de actos administrativos municipales como: un desfogue, un certificado de uso de suelo, una licencia constructiva, etc., las veces que lo estime necesario. No obstante lo anterior, también es verdad que si un acto administrativo emitido por la municipalidad, contrario a los intereses del solicitante, no es recurrido en tiempo, dicho acto administrativo municipal adquiere la condición de un acto administrativo consentido tácitamente. Así las cosas, si presentado nuevamente un trámite ante la corporación local, sin que varíen el cuadro fáctico o el marco jurídico, es evidente que el nuevo acto de rechazo de la gestión, que simplemente se limita a resolver en idéntico sentido (o incluso como sucedió en el presente caso, se hace referencia expresa a un rechazo anterior), este segundo acto es lo que antes se definió como acto reproductor de otro anterior, pues simplemente estaría reiterando el pronunciamiento que la parte ya conocía. Al margen de la controversia respecto de si el requerimiento previo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa es un derecho de la Administración Pública antes de ser demandada, o, si este es un derecho del administrado para tramitar su conflicto en una vía informal antes de recurrir a un proceso judicial, lo cierto es que en materia municipal el pronunciamiento de “agotamiento de la vía administrativa” como punto final al procedimiento seguido por quien combate una conducta administrativa municipal que estima contraria al bloque de legalidad, tiene como único efecto permitir la impugnación de actos administrativos en sede contenciosa administrativa, abriendo la posibilidad de presentar un proceso ordinario. A la fecha, la función de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en condición de contralor no jerárquico de legalidad, es justamente hacer dicho pronunciamiento. En el conflicto bajo análisis se tiene que, la resolución AMR-603-2016, es un acto consentido tácitamente, y las resoluciones de la Alcaldía AMR-18-2017 y AMR-27-2017, son actos reproductores del primero, en tanto mantienen el criterio haciendo expresa referencia a aquella conducta. Nótese que en sus impugnaciones ulteriores, la parte apelante no indica que haya existido un cambio de circunstancias o que ha variado el derecho aplicable. Más aún, de la revisión de las impugnaciones también es claro que, el objeto de los cuestionamientos sustantivos presentados por la representación de las sociedades apelantes, lo son las consideraciones incorporadas en el oficio AMR-603-2016, las cuales se enumeran y se cuestionan expresamente. Evidentemente, el trámite de agotamiento de la vía administrativa en vía municipal, se justifica cuando con él se brinda la posibilidad de acudir posteriormente a la sede judicial (si en sede administrativa no se corrige el acto que se estima ilegal). En sentido contrario, cuando sea imposible la presentación de un proceso contencioso administrativo, el procedimiento de agotamiento de la vía será improcedente por carecer de toda utilidad. En el “ordenamiento” jurídico costarricense el inciso primero del artículo 38 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, establece de manera expresa la imposibilidad de demandar la nulidad de actos reproductores de otros anteriores que fueron consentidos. Nótese que de no existir tal limitación, serían fácilmente eludibles los plazos de caducidad de la acción, expresión del Principio de Seguridad Jurídica de raigambre constitucional. En lo que interesa dicha norma textualmente establece: “Artículo 38.- 1) No será admisible la pretensión de nulidad en relación con los actos que, estando viciados, hayan sido consentidos expresamente o sean reproducción de otros anteriores, ya sean definitivos y firmes o confirmatorios de los consentidos.” (El original no está subrayado). En razón de lo anterior, al margen de la discusión presentada por la parte apelante, en cuanto a la relación de artículos utilizada por la Alcaldía de Mora para determinar la irrecurribilidad de un acto reproductor de uno previo que fue consentido, no cabe duda que la inimpugnabilidad decretada es plenamente conforme a derecho. En este punto de no está de más destacar que la regulación establecida en el artículo 163 inciso b) del Código Municipal, se fundamenta en la mismas consideraciones antes expuestas. En segundo lugar, se tiene que la parte recurrente ofrece un conjunto de agravios, tendentes a acreditar la ilegalidad de los razonamientos sustantivos incorporados en el oficio AMR-603-2016. Este conjunto de agravios es improcedente y se rechaza. Como se ha indicado a lo largo de este considerando, la resolución AMR-603-2016, es un acto consentido tácitamente, que no puede ser revisado por esta Cámara vía recurso de apelación, y de forma expresa se aclara que en esta resolución el Tribunal no hace ningún tipo de revisión respecto de su regularidad jurídica. En razón de lo anterior, resulta indefectible para este Tribunal confirmar la declaratoria que hiciera la Alcaldía de Mora, en cuanto a la inimpugnabilidad de los actos reproductorios de otros consentidos. El criterio recién expuesto es justamente el que determinará el alcance del pronunciamiento de agotamiento de la vía administrativa que se incorpora en esta resolución, el cual se limitará únicamente a dar por agotada esta sede exclusivamente en lo que respecta a la discusión o no de la recurribilidad de actos reproductores en los términos antes descritos, sin que la presente resolución pueda ser la base de la discusión sobre la legalidad del oficio AMR-603-2016, ni de sus fundamentos, temas que como se indicó antes, no son revisados ni confirmados por esta Sección.\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nSobre el acto consentido fue resuelto y se consideró que la resolución AMR-603-2016, emitida por la Alcaldía Municipal de Mora es un acto consentido de manera tácita por no haber sido recurrido en tiempo, en el tanto pese a ser contrario a los intereses de la parte que lo gestionó, ella no lo recurrió en el plazo legalmente establecido en el “ordenamiento” jurídico. Ahora bien, en lo concerniente a las consideraciones de si se está en presencia de un acto reproductor de otro previo, el Tribunal consideró que tal conducta es irrecurrible judicialmente; al estarse en presencia de los mismos hechos y fundamentos, en el mismo expediente con relación a los mismos interesados; todo ello en el contexto de la denegación que decretó la anterior resolución consentida. En dicho sentido, consideró a su momento el Tribunal que consta en los oficios DDCU-006-2017 y DIG-031-2017, emitidos por los órganos subordinados a la Alcaldía, como en los oficios AMR-18-2017 y AMR-27-2017 que se rechazó la gestión de la parte promovente, con sustento en la existencia del pronunciamiento AMR-603-2016. Por lo dicho entonces, el Tribunal compartió la tesis del gobierno local en el sentido claro de entender, que en las conductas emitidas en el año 2017, la corporación local concluyó que los actos emitidos con posterioridad a la resolución AMR-603-2016, son reproductores de este y por tanto irrecurribles. Ahora bien, sin perjuicio de lo indicado, es importante citar también la parte dispositiva o \"por tanto\" de la resolución 2019-611, que expresamente indicó:\n\r\n\n\"Por Tanto.\n\r\n\nSe declara inadmisible el recurso de apelación presentado en contra de la resolución AMR-27-2017, y se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación presentado en contra del oficio AMR-18-2017, ambos dictados por la Alcaldía de Mora, los cuales se confirman. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa en lo que hace a la discusión sobre la impugnabilidad de actos reproductores, derivada del recurso de apelación presentado en contra de la resolución AMR-18-2017.\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nLo cual permite concluir, del contenido destacado, que ya se dio la clausura operativa del sistema de apelaciones municipales y que la vía judicial quedó abierta y expedita para discutir la impugnabilidad de los supuestos actos reproductores; todo ello, en la vía y en la forma que la parte hubiera considerado idónea para la tutela de sus derechos e intereses. Siempre dentro del análsis del agravio, revisados los expedientes 18-004025-1027-CA y 20-003085-1027-CA, es importante destacar que no estamos en presencia de hechos nuevos, o bien eventos en el tiempo y en el espacio distintos del marco fáctico arriba citado; vinculado a lo que se juzgó, respecto de si estaba en presencia de un acto consentido, o bien si los actos eran reproductores de otros previos; es decir, situaciones que alerten o desdigan tal situación en el contexto de los permisos de alineamiento vial y desfogue de aguas para la construcción del relleno sanitario. Todo ello tiene sentido, por cuanto si bien, la parte se queja que el hecho nuevo es la existencia de una supuesta vigencia cuestionada del Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, se debe precisar que dicha situación ni siqueira fue discutida en el procedimiento conocido en la sumaria 18-004025-1027-CA, máxime que este tribunal entiende, comos se verá en el siguiente punto, que dicha norma fue publicada en la Gaceta número 72 del 16 de abril de 2013, pagina 33 a 39; y que en Gaceta número 122 del 26 de junio de 2013, página 64 (Véase sitio oficial de la Imprenta Nacional, en la sección del motor búsqueda para ediciones anteriores, tomado el 12 de septiembre de 2023:\n\r\n\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf \n\r\n\nDe lo anterior claramente se colige que el 16 de abril de 2013 fue publicado el reglamento, integralmente y al mismo tiempo sometido a la consulta prevista en el artículo 43 del Código Municipal en concordancia con el artículo 240 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; y que para tal efecto en ausencia de cuestionamientos al reglamento, el 26 de junio de 2013 se publicó un acuerdo complementario, referenciando la publicación hecha el 16 de abril de 2013 y que el reglamento tendría vigencia a partir del 26 de junio de 2013. Es decir, con fundamento entonces, en los artículos 129 de la Constitución Política, 8 del Código Civil, 43 del Código Municipal, 240 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al haber sido aprobado el reglamento y publicado en la Gaceta, conforme fue reseñado, no es admisible la tesis de la parte promovente de entender que esta situación, de la supuesta falta de publicación del reglamento, es un hecho nuevo, ya que esto implicaría, inobservar la máxima constitucional de que nadie puede alegar la ignorancia del derecho, presente en el artículo 129 de la Constitución Política. Según lo resuelto, el agravio no existe.\n\r\n\n3-) Sobre la falta de publicación del Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora:\n\r\n\nEn forma muy concreta es importante destacar sobre el agravio que cuestiona la eficacia de la referida norma y por ende la validez de la resolución impugnada, es importante recordar que el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora fue publicado en la Gaceta número 72 del 16 de abril de 2013, pagina 33 a 39; y que en Gaceta número 122 del 26 de junio de 2013, página 64 (Véase sitio oficial de la Imprenta Nacional, en la sección de búsqueda para ediciones anteriores, tomado el 12 de septiembre de 2023:\n\r\n\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\r\n\nAcorde con lo anterior, según los artículos 129 de la Constitución Política, 8 del Código Civil, 43 del Código Municipal, 240 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al haber sido aprobado el reglamento y publicado en la Gaceta, no es admisible la tesis de la parte promovente de entender que esta situación afecta la eficacia del reglamento y la validez de la resolución impugnada; ya que como bien se indicó, el reglamento fue aprobado y publicado integralmente en el Diario Oficial. Ahora bien, a mayor abundamento, sobre la pretensión concreta de otorgar los permisos de alineamiento vial y desfogue para la construcción de un relleno sanitario, no podrían ser concedidos en esta vía, ya que como se indicó, no hay nulidad posible apreciable por quien juzga de la resolución impugnada, además, no se cuenta en autos con criterios técnicos para tal efecto, sino que más bien, se está en presencia, en lo que fue el marco de discusión de este procedimiento de apelación, de la mera percepción subjetiva, semántico-jurídica del promovente, en el contexto de que lo que se quiere construir es un relleno sanitario que puede incidir en forma importante sobre el medio ambiente. Es decir, se echa de menos de un procedimiento específico para tal efecto, de citerios técnicos dados por geólogos, biólgos, ambientalistas entre otros expertos; ni tampoco se cuenta los permisos que pudieran emitir otros entes y órganos públicos vinculados a la protección del ambiente y autorización de desarrollos urbanísticos con impacto ambiental que eventualmente pudieran justificar tales licencias de funcionamiento municipal, máxime que quien juzga es claro conocedor de los Principios Preventivo y Precautorio presentes en la conocida Cumbre de Río, o bien, del Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica y Anexos (Río de Janeiro, 1992) ratificado por la Ley 7416 del 30 de junio de 1994. Acorde con lo anterior, la Sala Constitucional ha ilustrado al respecto:\n\r\n\nIV.- SOBRE EL DERECHO A UN AMBIENTE SANO Y ECOLÓGICAMENTE EQUILIBRADO. En reiteradas ocasiones, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha subrayado que el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado se encuentra reconocido tanto a nivel constitucional como convencional. Asimismo, se ha indicado que la protección efectiva a ese derecho requiere que los recursos sean utilizados de manera racional, contexto en que el Estado y la ciudadanía en general deben actuar según los principios que rigen la materia ambiental. En este orden de ideas, la doctrina especializada ha señalado que el principio preventivo demanda que, cuando haya certeza de posibles daños al ambiente, la actividad afectante deba ser prohibida, limitada, o condicionada al cumplimiento de ciertos requerimientos. En general, este principio aplica cuando existen riesgos claramente definidos e identificados al menos como probables; asimismo, tal principio resulta útil cuando no existen informes técnicos o permisos administrativos que garanticen la sostenibilidad de una actividad, pero hay elementos suficientes para prever eventuales impactos negativos. Por otra parte, el principio precautorio señala que, cuando haya peligro de daño grave e irreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente. De lo anterior, se advierte que el principio parte de una incertidumbre científica razonable en conjunto con la amenaza de un daño ambiental grave e irreversible. En términos generales, una diferencia relevante entre el principio preventivo y el precautorio radica en el nivel de conocimiento y certeza de los riesgos que una actividad u obra provoque. Mientras que en el primero existe tal certeza, en el segundo lo que se advierte es un estado de duda resultado de informaciones científicas o estudios técnicos. Así, el Estado costarricense se encuentra obligado a adoptar las medidas que garanticen la defensa y preservación efectiva del ambiente conforme a tales principios. Ahora, tal obligación objetiva no apareja, ineludiblemente, un derecho subjetivo de las personas a exigir, a través de los órganos jurisdiccionales, que se tome una medida determinada, pero sí a que se adopten las que sean idóneas en tutela de ese derecho, ante actitudes abiertamente negligentes de las autoridades, o bien, de personas físicas y jurídicas, conforme la reconocida teoría de la eficacia horizontal de los derechos fundamentales (Drittwirkung der Menschenrechte), entre cuyas manifestaciones procesales se encuentra el amparo contra sujetos de derecho privado\". (Resolución de la Sala Constitucional número 2021-024807 de las 09:20 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2021).\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nAsí las cosas, independientemtne de cualquier discusión acerca de si estámos en presencia de actos consentivos, actos que reproducen actos anteriores, o bien si fue correctamente publicado o no el Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, la sana crítica racional bajo sus vectores de ciencia, experiencia y lógica, hacen ver a quien juzga, que no hay criterios técnicos suficientes en autos, que ni tan siquiera fueron conocidos o discutidos, orientados a entender la sostenibilidad ambiental de permisos o bien de licencias municipales vinculadas a la construcción de un relleno sanitario. Todo ello genera una situación de incerteza que es regulada por la Cumbre de Río, bajo Principio Preventivo, de profunda raíz constitucional conforme fue citado supra, que orienta la actuación del operador jurídico, de quien juzga este caso, para denegar la petición concreta de conceder las licencias requeridas al respectivo gobierno local. Finalmene, por el fundamento arriba dado, la parte promovente deberá atenerse a lo resuelto en la resolución impugnada cuyo contenido se confirma por este tribunal. En lo que fue motivo de agravio y fue conocido en esta resolución se tiene por agotada la vía administrativa, como en efecto se ordena. \n\r\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\r\n\nSe declarar SIN LUGAR recurso; se confirma la resolución AMR-047-2020 de las 11:00 horas del 15 de mayo de 2020 dictada por la alcaldía de la Muncipalidad de Mora. En lo que fue motivo de agravio, conocido en esta resolución se tiene por agotada la vía administrativa. Notifíquese a las partes al medio señalado. Luis Arturo Polinaris Vives, Juez Contencioso Administrativo. Jerarquía Impropia Municipal. \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n???????????????\nQQQMLW6LGHY61\nLUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\n\r\n\nEXP: 20-003085-1027-CA\n\r\n\nGoicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr", "body_en_text": "**EXPEDIENTE:**\n20-003085-1027-CA - 1\n\n**PROCESO:**\nJERARQUIA IMPROPIA (Municipal)\n\n**ACTOR/A:**\nPARQUE INDUSTRIAL JATEO SA\n\n**DEMANDADO/A:**\nMUNICIPALIDAD DE MORA\n\nNº N° 2023003305\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at nineteen hours and twenty-two minutes on the thirteenth of September, two thousand twenty-three.-\n\nThis Tribunal, acting as a non-hierarchical controller of legality, hears the appeal filed by Mario Esteban Sánchez Sibaja, ID number 1-0817-0765, as unlimited general attorney-in-fact for the company Parque Industrial JATEO S.A., legal ID number 3-101-295773, against resolution AMR-047-2020 of 11:00 a.m. on May 15, 2020, issued by the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora.\n\n**CONSIDERANDO:**\n\n**I- On the admissibility of the appeal:**\nOn May 22, 2020, the contested resolution was notified by email. The foregoing means, in application of the rules contained in Article 38 of the Judicial Notifications Law, that the petitioner could file the appeal until June 1, 2020, which is why, noting in image 203 of the judicial court file that the appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, issued by the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora, bears a received stamp dated May 29, 2020, it is concluded that it was filed on time, and the appeal is admissible.\n\n**II-) On the procedural background:**\n1-) The origin of the case stems from requests made by the plaintiff in the administrative venue to obtain a drainage and road alignment permit filed on May 17, 2018 (See appeal).\n2-) The requests indicated in the preceding paragraph were suspended by official letters DIG-019-18 and DDCU-13-2018 of May 23, 2018, to await the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo's hearing of an appeal, also filed by the petitioner, regarding official letters AMR-18-2017 of June 27, 2017, and ARM-2017 of September 8, 2017 (See appeal).\n3-) On February 18, 2020, the petitioner, after the issuance of ruling 611-2019 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, again requested that the requests of May 17, 2018, regarding the alignment and road drainage be heard.\n4-) By resolution DDCU-011-2020 dated March 4, 2020, from the Department of Urban Development and Control and the Road Management Unit, the proceedings of May 17, 2018, were rejected (See appeal).\n5-) On March 9, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against resolution DDCU-011-2020 dated March 4, 2020 (See appeal in image 181 to 188 of the judicial court file).\n6-) By resolution DDCU-035-2020 dated April 13, 2020, from the Department of Urban Development and Control and the Road Management Unit, the motion for reconsideration was rejected on the merits, with the correction of a material error where it was mentioned that the requests were linked to a land-use issue, instead of the matter of road alignment and water drainage. (See appeal and resolution visible in image 189 to 191 of the judicial court file).\n7-) On May 22, 2020, resolution AMR-047-2020 of the Mayor's Office of Mora was notified, in which the appeal of March 9, 2020, was rejected. At its core, said resolution determined that: the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, in resolution 611-2019 of 09:15 a.m. on November 27, 2019, confirmed all acts issued by the Mayor's Office of Mora; it understands that regarding the situation heard in resolution 611-2019, the factual framework has not changed and that it is facing a reiteration of facts, in a context of a consented act, by not appealing or challenging the act by the administered party within the deadline and through the appropriate channels; in the context that ignoring the validity of the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora is not a new fact and is not a situation previously alleged in the facts aired in resolution 611-2019; it mentions that the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in Gazette number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and in Gazette number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See appeal and resolution visible in image 194 to 198 of the judicial court file).\n8-) On May 29, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it formulated as grievances that: there are new facts regarding those adjudicated by this Tribunal in resolution 2019-611 issued in case file 18-004025-1027-CA, and that it is not in the presence of facts that reproduce previous facts; that the Regulation for the public service for the integrated management and utilization of solid waste of the canton of Mora was being applied to it, even though it had not been published in its entirety in the Official Gazette, La Gaceta; the foregoing renders said regulation ineffective, emphasizing that for said regulation to have legal effect, it must be published in the Official Gazette and not in the SINALEVI, considering Articles 11, 27, 30, 41, and 129 of the Political Constitution; Article 43 of the Municipal Code, and Article 240 of the General Law of Public Administration to be violated; a situation that in its understanding causes it harm since the processing of its application cannot be subjected to a norm that has not been fully published in the Official Gazette. Finally, in said appeal, it requests that resolution AMR-47-2020 of May 15, 2020, be revoked, that the requested authorizations for alignment and drainage of May 17, 2018, be granted, for which purpose it requests that the Regulation for the Integrated Management and Utilization of Solid Waste of the Canton of Mora cannot be taken as a basis, considering it an ineffective norm (See appeal in image 203 to 228 of the judicial court file).\n9-) In resolution AMR-056-2020 of 1:30 p.m. on June 8, 2020, the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora heard the motion for reconsideration filed against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it was determined that: the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in Gazette number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and in Gazette number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64; regarding resolution 611-2019 of 09:15 a.m. on November 27, 2019, what was resolved by the Municipalidad de Mora was confirmed in relation to the provisions of the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora, on which it maintains that the factual picture heard in resolution 611-2019 has not changed, arguing that it faces the same resolutions for pluvial drainage and road alignment, with the same requesting subjects, the property number, the same project purpose, on which the Tribunal declared the exhaustion of administrative remedies; it ratifies the content resolved in resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020; it contradicts the appellant, indicating that the opinions of the Procuraduría General de la República are only binding for the consulting entity and not for the rest of the entities. Based on the foregoing, the main outcome was the rejection of the filed appeal in all its aspects (See appeal and image 291 to 299 of the judicial court file).\n\n**III-) Tribunal's analysis on the merits:**\n**1-) Preliminarily:**\nRegarding the deadline requested in the procedural claim of the appeal to state grievances, pursuant to Article 192 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, which states: \"1) Once the case file is received or its certified copy is provided, the Tribunal shall grant a hearing of five working days to the interested parties so that they may state their grievances, and to the municipal council, so that it may make the allegations it deems pertinent. Once the deadline for this has elapsed, the corresponding final resolution must be issued within the fifth working day\"; this Tribunal has been interpreting and holds the criterion that such an additional hearing to state grievances is reserved for those cases in which an act or a formal administrative conduct emanating from the Municipal Council is challenged, and not for appeals filed against acts issued by the municipal mayors' offices; a conclusion that follows from the literal wording, according to the emphasis indicated above in the cited article. Such a situation does not cause any type of defenselessness, given that on May 29, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it formulated the grievances that this Tribunal is hearing. Having clarified the above, the application of Article 192 of Law 8508 is omitted.\n\n**2-) Regarding the alleged new facts and the reproduction of prior acts, linked to resolution 2019-611 issued in case file 18-004025-1027-CA:**\nIn consideration of the recently cited resolution, it is important to highlight what it held as proven facts:\n\"I.- Background: Of interest for the resolution of this appeal, the following has been accredited: 1) That by official letter AMM-603-2016, dated December 7, 2016, the Mayor's Office of the canton of Mora informed Parque Industrial Jateo S.A. of the rejection of the various applications submitted aimed at obtaining drainage and alignment for the construction of a landfill in the canton; 2) That according to resolutions DDCU-006-2017, dated May 26, 2017, and DIG-031-2017, dated May 31, 2017, the applications for land use with alignment and water drainage were again rejected, on the grounds that there was already a pronouncement on the matter in official letter AMM-603-2016 indicated in the preceding fact; 3) That in official letter AMR-18-2017, dated June 27, 2017, the Mayor's Office rejected as unfounded the appeals filed against DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, deeming that administrative acts that reproduce a prior one are being challenged; 4) That disagreeing with the recently indicated resolution, the appellant companies filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal before the Municipal Council; 5) That the challenge indicated in the preceding fact was rejected as inadmissible by official letter AMR-27-2017, dated September 8, 2017, and; 6) That the appellant filed motions for reconsideration and appeal against the resolution indicated in the preceding fact.\"\n\nAs can be seen in what were the proven facts, at their core, three concrete situations are proven that this Tribunal highlights, consisting of the fact that the petitioner requested drainage and road alignment permits for the construction of a landfill; that the petitioner had already received a negative resolution to such a petition; and that it filed appeals in this regard, which were resolved negatively. Now, regarding the substantive or considerative part of resolution 2019-611, this Tribunal, but with a different composition, resolved:\n\"IV.- On the specific case: Before venturing into the review of the grievances presented by the appellant, it is essential to offer some procedural clarifications, fundamental to understanding the manner in which the appeal against resolution AMR-18-2017 will be resolved. At this point, it is necessary to briefly review the concepts of 'consented act' and 'act reproducing a prior one'. Regarding the first of the categories of acts indicated above, namely, the consented act, it occurs when the recipient of said conduct accepts it expressly, manifesting it unequivocally, or when the act is not challenged in a timely manner, a situation that constitutes the so-called tacitly consented act. Analyzing this procedural phenomenon, in the context of the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters, the Constitutional Chamber stated the following: 'tacitly consented act has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies – based on the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage – is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not exercise the appropriate administrative appeals in time and form, the legislator presumes, from the omitted conduct of the administered party, that it has tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and by the means provided by the legal system.' (Constitutional Chamber, Ruling 3669-2006). From the review of the case file, it is clear that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Municipalidad de Mora, is a tacitly consented act, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that processed it, it did not appeal it within the deadline legally established in the legal 'system'. Having offered the preceding consideration, it is time to specify the contours of the 'act reproducing a prior one', an aspect that is relevant for the resolution of the appeal under review. To date, both doctrine and jurisprudence are unanimous and unequivocal in specifying that an act that is a reproduction of a prior one is not subject to judicial appeal. This class of acts is defined by Prof. Jesús González Pérez as one that: 'is issued in the presence of the same facts and by force of equal grounds, in the same case file and in relation to the same interested parties, and reproducing the denial decreed by the prior consented resolution.' Gonzáles Pérez, Jesús, Commentaries on the Regulating Law of the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction, Editorial Cívitas, Madrid, year 1999, p. 703. As stated in both official letters DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office, and in official letters AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, the appellant was informed of the rejection of its proceeding due to the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016. That being the case, it is clear from the express text of all the conducts issued in 2017, the local corporation understood that the acts issued after resolution AMR-603-2016 are reproductive of it and therefore unappealable. Given the foregoing, we proceed to the review of the grievances presented by the appellant's representative. As a first objection, the appellant's representative indicates that there is no regulation that prevents repeated requests for drainage, alignments, etc., which is why the actions taken by the Mayor's Office are contrary to law. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. This Section must indicate in the first place that the appellant is correct in that the 'system' does not limit its right to request the issuance of municipal administrative acts such as: a drainage permit, a land-use certificate, a construction license, etc., as many times as it deems necessary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also true that if an administrative act issued by the municipality, contrary to the applicant's interests, is not appealed on time, said municipal administrative act acquires the status of a tacitly consented administrative act. That being the case, if an application is resubmitted to the local corporation, without the factual picture or the legal framework changing, it is evident that the new act rejecting the proceeding, which is simply limited to resolving in an identical sense (or even as happened in this case, express reference is made to a prior rejection), this second act is what was previously defined as an act reproducing a prior one, as it would simply be reiterating the pronouncement that the party already knew. Apart from the controversy regarding whether the prior requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is a right of the Public Administration before being sued, or whether it is a right of the administered party to process its conflict in an informal venue before resorting to a judicial process, the truth is that in municipal matters, the pronouncement of 'exhaustion of administrative remedies' as the final point to the procedure followed by whoever challenges a municipal administrative conduct they deem contrary to the bloc of legality, has the sole effect of allowing the challenge of administrative acts in the administrative-contentious venue, opening the possibility of filing an ordinary process. To date, the function of the Third Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, as a non-hierarchical controller of legality, is precisely to make such a pronouncement. In the conflict under analysis, it is clear that resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, and the Mayor's Office resolutions AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017 are acts reproducing the first, as they maintain the criterion making express reference to that conduct. Note that in its subsequent challenges, the appellant does not indicate that there has been a change of circumstances or that the applicable law has changed. Furthermore, from the review of the challenges, it is also clear that the object of the substantive objections presented by the representative of the appellant companies are the considerations incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016, which are expressly listed and questioned. Evidently, the process of exhausting administrative remedies in the municipal venue is justified when it provides the possibility of subsequently resorting to the judicial venue (if the act deemed illegal is not corrected in the administrative venue). Conversely, when it is impossible to file an administrative-contentious process, the procedure for exhausting remedies will be unfounded as it lacks any utility. In the Costa Rican legal 'system', the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code expressly establishes the impossibility of suing for the nullity of acts that reproduce prior ones that were consented to. Note that if such a limitation did not exist, the statute of limitations for the action, an expression of the Principle of Legal Certainty of constitutional origin, would be easily circumvented. In what interests us, said norm textually establishes: 'Article 38.- 1) The claim for nullity shall not be admissible in relation to acts that, being flawed, have been expressly consented to or are a reproduction of prior ones, whether definitive and final or confirmatory of those consented to.' (The original is not underlined). By reason of the foregoing, apart from the discussion presented by the appellant regarding the list of articles used by the Municipalidad de Mora to determine the unappealable nature of an act reproducing a prior consented one, there is no doubt that the decreed unappealability is fully in accordance with the law. At this point, it is worth highlighting that the regulation established in Article 163 subsection b) of the Municipal Code is based on the same considerations set forth above. Secondly, the appellant offers a set of grievances aimed at proving the illegality of the substantive reasoning incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016. This set of grievances is unfounded and is rejected. As indicated throughout this considerando, resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, which cannot be reviewed by this Chamber via appeal, and it is expressly clarified that in this resolution, the Tribunal does not perform any type of review regarding its legal regularity. For this reason, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to confirm the declaration made by the Municipalidad de Mora regarding the unappealability of acts reproducing other consented acts. The criterion just set forth is precisely what will determine the scope of the pronouncement of exhaustion of administrative remedies incorporated in this resolution, which will be limited solely to deeming this venue exhausted exclusively with respect to the discussion or not of the appealability of reproductive acts in the terms described above, without this resolution serving as the basis for the discussion on the legality of official letter AMR-603-2016, nor its grounds, topics that, as indicated before, are not reviewed or confirmed by this Section.\n\nRegarding the consented act, it was resolved and considered that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Municipalidad de Mora, is a tacitly consented act for not having been appealed on time, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that processed it, it did not appeal it within the deadline legally established in the legal 'system'. Now, concerning the considerations of whether it involves an act reproducing a prior one, the Tribunal considered that such conduct is not subject to judicial appeal; being in the presence of the same facts and grounds, in the same case file and in relation to the same interested parties; all within the context of the denial decreed by the prior consented resolution. In this regard, the Tribunal considered at the time that official letters DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office, as well as official letters AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, show that the petitioner's proceeding was rejected based on the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016. Therefore, the Tribunal shared the local government's thesis, clearly understanding that in the conducts issued in 2017, the local corporation concluded that the acts issued after resolution AMR-603-2016 are reproductive of it and therefore unappealable. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, it is also important to cite the operative part or \"por tanto\" of resolution 2019-611, which expressly stated:\n\"Por Tanto.\nThe appeal filed against resolution AMR-27-2017 is declared inadmissible, and the appeal filed against official letter AMR-18-2017 is declared without merit, both issued by the Municipalidad de Mora, which are confirmed. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted with respect to the discussion on the challengeability of reproductive acts, derived from the appeal filed against resolution AMR-18-2017.\"\n\nThis allows concluding, from the highlighted content, that the operative closure of the municipal appeals system has already occurred, and that the judicial venue was left open and expedited to discuss the challengeability of the alleged reproductive acts; all within the channel and form that the party would have considered suitable for the protection of its rights and interests. Still within the grievance analysis, having reviewed case files 18-004025-1027-CA and 20-003085-1027-CA, it is important to highlight that we are not in the presence of new facts, or events in time and space distinct from the factual framework cited above, linked to what was adjudicated regarding whether it was in the presence of a consented act, or whether the acts were reproductive of prior ones; that is, situations that would alert or contradict such a situation in the context of the road alignment and water drainage permits for the construction of the landfill. All of this makes sense, since although the party complains that the new fact is the existence of a questioned effective date of the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora, it must be specified that said situation was not even discussed in the procedure heard in summary proceeding 18-004025-1027-CA, especially since this tribunal understands, as will be seen in the following point, that said regulation was published in Gazette number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and in Gazette number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search engine section for previous editions, accessed September 12, 2023:\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is clearly inferred that on April 16, 2013, the regulation was published in its entirety and simultaneously subjected to the consultation provided for in Article 43 of the Municipal Code in concordance with Article 240 of the General Law of Public Administration; and that for this purpose, in the absence of challenges to the regulation, on June 26, 2013, a complementary agreement was published, referencing the publication made on April 16, 2013, and that the regulation would be effective as of June 26, 2013. That is, based on Articles 129 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the Civil Code, 43 of the Municipal Code, and 240 of the General Law of Public Administration, the regulation having been approved and published in the Gazette, as reviewed, the petitioner's thesis of understanding that this situation, the alleged lack of publication of the regulation, is a new fact is not admissible, as this would imply disregarding the constitutional maxim that no one can claim ignorance of the law, present in Article 129 of the Political Constitution. As resolved, the grievance does not exist.\n\n**3-) Regarding the lack of publication of the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora:**\nIn a very concrete manner, it is important to highlight regarding the grievance that questions the effectiveness of the referred norm and therefore the validity of the contested resolution, it is important to recall that the Public Service Regulation for the integrated management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in Gazette number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and in Gazette number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search section for previous editions, accessed September 12, 2023:\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, pursuant to Articles 129 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the Civil Code, 43 of the Municipal Code, and 240 of the General Law of Public Administration, the regulation having been approved and published in the Gazette, the petitioner's thesis of understanding that this situation affects the effectiveness of the regulation and the validity of the contested resolution is not admissible; since, as was correctly indicated, the regulation was approved and published in its entirety in the Official Gazette. Now, furthermore, regarding the specific claim to grant the road alignment and drainage permits for the construction of a landfill, they could not be granted in this venue, since, as indicated, there is no nullity appreciable by the adjudicator in the contested resolution. Additionally, the case file does not contain technical criteria for this purpose; rather, it is in the presence, within what was the discussion framework of this appeal procedure, of the mere subjective, semantic-legal perception of the petitioner, in the context that what is intended to be built is a landfill that could significantly impact the environment. That is, a specific procedure for this purpose is lacking, as well as technical criteria provided by geologists, biologists, environmentalists, among other experts; nor are there the permits that other public entities and bodies linked to environmental protection and the authorization of urban developments with environmental impact could issue, which could eventually justify such municipal operating licenses, especially since the adjudicator is clearly aware of the Preventive and Precautionary Principles established at the well-known Earth Summit, or the Convention on Biological Diversity and Annexes (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) ratified by Law 7416 of June 30, 1994.\n\nIn accordance with the above, the Constitutional Chamber has illustrated on the matter:\n\nIV.- ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY AND ECOLOGICALLY BALANCED ENVIRONMENT. On repeated occasions, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has underscored that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is recognized at both the constitutional and conventional levels. Likewise, it has been indicated that the effective protection of this right requires that resources be used in a rational manner, a context in which the State and the citizenry in general must act according to the principles governing environmental matters. In this vein, specialized doctrine has pointed out that the preventive principle demands that, when there is certainty of possible damage to the environment, the affecting activity must be prohibited, limited, or conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements. In general, this principle applies when there are clearly defined and identified risks, at least as probable; likewise, this principle proves useful when there are no technical reports or administrative permits that guarantee the sustainability of an activity, but there are sufficient elements to foresee eventual negative impacts. On the other hand, the precautionary principle (principio precautorio) states that, when there is danger of serious and irreversible damage, the lack of absolute scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. From the foregoing, it is noted that the principle stems from reasonable scientific uncertainty in conjunction with the threat of serious and irreversible environmental damage. In general terms, a relevant difference between the preventive principle (principio preventivo) and the precautionary principle lies in the level of knowledge and certainty regarding the risks that an activity or work may cause. While in the former such certainty exists, in the latter what is observed is a state of doubt resulting from scientific information or technical studies. Thus, the Costa Rican State is obligated to adopt measures that guarantee the defense and effective preservation of the environment in accordance with such principles. Now, this objective obligation does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through jurisdictional bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but it does entail that suitable measures be adopted in protection of that right, in the face of openly negligent attitudes by authorities, or by natural and legal persons, in accordance with the recognized theory of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (Drittwirkung der Menschenrechte), among whose procedural manifestations is the remedy of amparo against subjects of private law.\" (Resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2021-024807 of 09:20 hours on November 5, 2021).\n\nThus, regardless of any discussion about whether we are in the presence of consented acts, acts that reproduce previous acts, or whether the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was correctly published or not, sound rational criticism under its vectors of science, experience, and logic make the undersigned judge see that there are insufficient technical criteria in the case file, which were not even known or discussed, aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses linked to the construction of a landfill (relleno sanitario). All of this generates a situation of uncertainty that is regulated by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, of deep constitutional root as cited supra, which guides the action of the legal operator, the judge deciding this case, to deny the specific petition to grant the required licenses to the respective local government. Finally, due to the grounds given above, the promoting party must abide by what was resolved in the appealed resolution, the content of which is confirmed by this court. In what was the subject of grievance and was known in this resolution, the administrative proceeding (vía administrativa) is deemed exhausted, as is hereby ordered.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe appeal is declared WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR); resolution AMR-047-2020 of 11:00 hours on May 15, 2020, issued by the mayor's office of the Municipalidad de Mora, is confirmed. In what was the subject of grievance, known in this resolution, the administrative proceeding is deemed exhausted. Notify the parties at the indicated means. Luis Arturo Polinaris Vives, Juez Contencioso Administrativo. Jerarquía Impropia Municipal.\n\n???????????????\nQQQMLW6LGHY61\nLUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nEXP: 20-003085-1027-CA\n\nGoicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, across from Café Dorado. Telephone numbers: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nIn essence, said resolution determined that: the Administrative Litigation Court in resolution 611-2019 of 09:15 hours on November 27, 2019 confirmed all acts issued by the mayor's office of Mora; it understands that regarding the situation known in resolution 611-2019, the factual framework has not changed and that this is a repetition of facts, in a context of an act consented to, by the administered party not having appealed or challenged the act within the deadline and through the appropriate channels; in the context that ignoring the validity of the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora is not a new fact and it is not a situation previously alleged in the facts aired in resolution 611-2019; it mentions that the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was published in Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See appeal and resolution visible at images 194 to 198 of the judicial file).\n\n**8-)** On May 29, 2020, the moving party filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it formulated as grievances that: there are new facts regarding those judged by this Court in resolution 2019-611 issued in file 18-004025-1027-CA and that this is not a case of facts reproducing previous facts; that the Reglamento del servicio público para la gestión integral y aprovechamiento de los residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was being applied to it, even though it had not been published in full in the Official Gazette, La Gaceta; the foregoing renders the mentioned regulation ineffective, highlighting that the correct procedure, for said regulation to have legal effect, is for it to be published in the Official Gazette and not in SINALEVI, considering Articles: 11, 27, 30, 41, and 129 of the Political Constitution; 43 of the Código Municipal, 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública to be harmed; a situation which in its understanding causes it harm since the processing of its application cannot be subjected to a norm that has not been integrally published in the Official Gazette. Finally, in said appeal it requests that resolution AMR-47-2020 of May 15, 2020 be revoked, that it be granted the requested authorizations for alignment (alineamiento) and stormwater discharge (desfogue) of May 17, 2018, for which purpose it requests that the Reglamento para la Gestión Integral y Aprovechamiento de los Residuos Sólidos del Cantón de Mora cannot be taken as a basis, considering it an ineffective norm (See appeal at images 203 to 228 of the judicial file).\n\n**9-)** In resolution AMR-056-2020 of 13:30 hours on June 8, 2020, the mayor's office of the Municipality of Mora heard the appeal for reversal filed against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it was determined that: the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was published in Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64; regarding resolution 611-2019 of 09:15 hours on November 27, 2019, it confirmed what was resolved by the Municipality of Mora in relation to the provisions of the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, regarding which it maintains that the factual framework known in resolution 611-2019 has not changed, arguing that these are the same resolutions for stormwater discharge (desfogue pluvial) and road alignment (alineamiento vial), with the same requesting subjects, the same farm number, the same project purpose, regarding which the Court declared the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa); it ratifies the content resolved in resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020; it contradicts the appellant by indicating that the opinions of the Procuraduría General de la República are only binding for the entity that consults and not for other entities. Based on the foregoing, the appeal filed was primarily rejected in all its aspects (See appeal at images 291 to 299 of the judicial file).\n\n**III-) Substantive Analysis of the Court:**\n\n**1-) At the outset:**\n\nRegarding the deadline requested in the procedural claim of the appeal, for expressing grievances, pursuant to Article 192 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which states: *\"1) Once the file is received or its certified copy provided, the Court shall grant a hearing of five business days to the interested parties, for them to express their grievances, and to the municipal council, for it to make the allegations it deems pertinent. Once the deadline for this has elapsed, the corresponding final resolution must be issued within the fifth business day\";* this Court has been interpreting and is of the opinion that such additional hearing for the expression of grievances is reserved for those cases where an act is challenged, or a formal administrative conduct emanating from the *Municipal Council* and not so in appeals filed against acts issued by *municipal mayor's offices*; a conclusion that follows from the literal wording, according to the emphasis indicated above in the cited article. Such situation does not entail any type of defenselessness, given that on May 29, 2020, the moving party filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it formulated the grievances that this Court is hearing.\n\nHaving clarified the foregoing, the application of Article 192 of Ley 8508 is omitted.\n\n2-) Regarding the alleged new facts and the reproduction of prior acts, linked to resolution 2019-611 issued in file 18-004025-1027-CA:\n\nIn light of the recently cited resolution, it is important to highlight what it established as proven facts:\n\n\"I.- Background: Of interest for the resolution of this appeal, the following has been accredited: 1) That through official communication AMM-603-2016, dated December 7, 2016, the Municipal Mayor’s Office (Alcaldía Municipal) of the Mora canton informed Parque Industrial Jateo S.A. of the rejection of the various filings submitted aimed at obtaining the discharge (desfogue) and alignment for the construction of a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario) in the canton; 2) That according to resolutions DDCU-006-2017, dated May 26, 2017, and DIG-031-2017, dated May 31, 2017, the requests for land use with alignment and water discharge were again rejected, due to the existence of a prior pronouncement on the matter, in official communication AMM-603-2016 indicated in the previous fact; 3) That in official communication AMR-18-2017, dated June 27, 2017, the Municipal Mayor’s Office rejected the appeals filed against DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017 as inadmissible, considering that prior administrative acts that merely reproduced another were being challenged; 4) That dissatisfied with the resolution just indicated, the appellant companies filed a motion for reversal with a subsidiary appeal before the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal); 5) That the challenge indicated in the previous fact was rejected as inadmissible through official communication AMR-27-2017, dated September 8, 2017, and; 6) That the appellant party filed motions for reversal and appeal against the resolution indicated in the previous fact.\"\n\nAs can be seen in what were the proven facts, at its core, three specific situations are proven that this Court highlights, consisting of: the promoting party requested discharge and road alignment permits for the construction of a sanitary landfill; said promoting party had already been given a negative decision on that petition; and it filed appeals in that regard, which were resolved negatively. Now, in what corresponds to the substantive or recital section of resolution 2019-611, this Court, but with a different composition, resolved:\n\n\"IV.- On the specific case: Before delving into the review of the grievances presented by the appellant party, it is essential to offer some procedural clarifications, fundamental for understanding the way in which the appeal against resolution AMR-18-2017 will be resolved. At this point, it is necessary to briefly review the concepts of 'consented act' (acto consentido) and 'act that reproduces a previous one' (acto reproductor de otro anterior). Regarding the first of the aforementioned categories of acts, namely, the consented act, it is understood that this is configured when the recipient of such conduct accepts it expressly, manifesting it unequivocally, or when the act is not challenged in a timely manner, a situation that configures what is called a tacitly consented act. Analyzing this procedural phenomenon, in the context of the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía) in municipal matters, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) specified the following: 'tacitly consented act that has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies —sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-review— is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not exercise the appropriate administrative remedies in time and form, the legislator presumes, based on the omitted conduct of the administered party, that it has tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and by the means provided by the legal system.' (Constitutional Chamber vote 3669-2006). From the review of the file, it is evident that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Municipal Mayor’s Office of Mora, is a tacitly consented act, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that processed it, it did not appeal it within the legally established period in the legal 'system.' Having offered the previous consideration, it is now time to define the contours of the 'act that reproduces a previous one,' an aspect that is relevant for the resolution of the appeal under study. To date, both doctrine and jurisprudence are unanimous and unequivocal in specifying that an act that is a reproduction of a previous one is not judicially appealable. This class of acts is defined by Prof. Jesús González Pérez as that which: 'is issued in the presence of the same facts and based on the same grounds, in the same file and regarding the same interested parties, reproducing the denial decreed by the previous consented resolution.' González Pérez, Jesús, Commentaries on the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, Editorial Civitas, Madrid, year 1999, p. 703. As recorded in both official communications DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor’s Office, and in official communications AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, the appellant party was informed of the rejection of its filing due to the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016.\"\n\nAs such, it is clear from the express text of all the conduct issued in the year 2017, the local corporation understood that the acts issued subsequent to resolution AMR-603-2016 are reproductions thereof and therefore unappealable. In view of the foregoing, we proceed to review the grievances presented by the appellant's representation. As a first complaint, the appellant's representation indicates that there is no regulation that prevents repeatedly requesting clearances, alignments, etc., which is why the Mayor's actions are contrary to law. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. This Section must indicate in the first place that, the appellant is correct in that the \"legal system (ordenamiento)\" does not limit her right to request the issuance of municipal administrative acts such as: a clearance, a land-use certificate, a construction license, etc., as many times as she deems necessary. However, it is also true that if an administrative act issued by the municipality, contrary to the applicant's interests, is not appealed in time, said municipal administrative act acquires the condition of a tacitly consented administrative act. As such, if a procedure is again filed before the local corporation, without any change in the factual scenario or the legal framework, it is evident that the new act rejecting the application, which is simply limited to resolving in an identical manner (or even as happened in the present case, makes express reference to a prior rejection), this second act is what was previously defined as an act reproducing a previous one, as it would simply be reiterating the pronouncement that the party already knew. Regardless of the controversy regarding whether the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is a right of the Public Administration before being sued, or whether this is a right of the administered party to process their conflict through an informal channel before resorting to a judicial process, the truth is that in municipal matters, the pronouncement of \"exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)\" as the final point to the procedure followed by whoever challenges a municipal administrative conduct they deem contrary to the legality block, has the sole effect of allowing the challenge of administrative acts in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, opening the possibility of filing an ordinary process. To date, the function of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal as a non-hierarchical comptroller of legality is precisely to make said pronouncement. In the conflict under analysis, resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, and the Mayor's Office resolutions AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017 are acts reproducing the first, as they maintain the criterion making express reference to that conduct. Note that in her subsequent challenges, the appellant party does not indicate that there has been a change in circumstances or that the applicable law has varied. Furthermore, from the review of the challenges it is also clear that the object of the substantive questions presented by the representation of the appellant companies are the considerations incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016, which are listed and expressly questioned. Evidently, the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) through the municipal channel is justified when it provides the possibility of subsequently going to the judicial venue (if the act deemed illegal is not corrected in the administrative venue). On the contrary, when the filing of a contentious-administrative process is impossible, the procedure for exhaustion of remedies would be unfounded for lacking all utility. In the Costa Rican legal \"system (ordenamiento),\" the first paragraph of article 38 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo expressly establishes the impossibility of suing for the annulment of acts reproducing previous ones that were consented to. Note that if such a limitation did not exist, the deadlines for the expiration of the action, an expression of the Principle of Legal Certainty of constitutional root, would be easily evaded. In what is relevant, said norm textually establishes: \"Artículo 38.- 1) No será admisible la pretensión de nulidad en relación con los actos que, estando viciados, hayan sido consentidos expresamente o sean reproducción de otros anteriores, ya sean definitivos y firmes o confirmatorios de los consentidos.\" (The original is not underlined). By reason of the foregoing, regardless of the discussion presented by the appellant party regarding the relationship of articles used by the Mayor's Office of Mora to determine the unappealability of an act reproducing a previous one that was consented to, there is no doubt that the decreed inimpugnability is fully in accordance with the law. At this point, it is worth highlighting that the regulation established in article 163 subsection b) of the Código Municipal is based on the same considerations set forth above. Secondly, the appellant party offers a set of grievances aimed at demonstrating the illegality of the substantive reasonings incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016. This set of grievances is unfounded and is rejected. As has been indicated throughout this considerando, resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, which cannot be reviewed by this Chamber via appeal, and it is expressly clarified that in this resolution the Tribunal does not conduct any type of review regarding its legal regularity. By reason of the foregoing, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to confirm the declaration made by the Mayor's Office of Mora, regarding the inimpugnability of acts reproducing other consented acts.\n\nThe criterion just set forth is precisely what will determine the scope of the exhaustion of administrative remedies pronouncement incorporated in this resolution, which will be limited solely to deeming this venue exhausted exclusively with respect to the discussion regarding whether or not repetitive acts are appealable in the terms described above, without this resolution serving as a basis for the discussion on the legality of official communication AMR-603-2016, nor of its grounds, matters which, as previously indicated, are not reviewed or confirmed by this Section.\n\nRegarding the consented act, it was resolved and considered that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Mayor's Office of Mora (Alcaldía Municipal de Mora), is an act tacitly consented to for not having been appealed in time, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that managed it, that party did not appeal it within the term legally established in the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico). Now, concerning the considerations of whether we are in the presence of an act that reproduces a previous one, the Tribunal considered that such conduct is not judicially appealable, being in the presence of the same facts and grounds, in the same case file regarding the same interested parties, all within the context of the denial decreed by the previous consented resolution. In that sense, the Tribunal considered at the time that official communications DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office, as well as official communications AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, rejected the petitioner's management based on the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016. Therefore, the Tribunal shared the thesis of the local government in the clear understanding that, in the conduct issued in 2017, the local corporation concluded that the acts issued subsequent to resolution AMR-603-2016 are repetitive of it and therefore not appealable. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, it is also important to cite the operative part or \"Por tanto\" of resolution 2019-611, which expressly stated:\n\n\"Por Tanto.\n\nThe appeal filed against resolution AMR-27-2017 is declared inadmissible, and the appeal filed against official communication AMR-18-2017 is declared without merit, both issued by the Mayor's Office of Mora, which are confirmed. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted with regard to the discussion on the appealability of repetitive acts, derived from the appeal filed against resolution AMR-18-2017.\n\nWhich allows concluding, from the highlighted content, that the operative closure of the municipal appeals system has already occurred and that the judicial venue remained open and clear to discuss the appealability of the alleged repetitive acts; all of this, in the venue and in the manner that the party would have considered suitable for the protection of their rights and interests. Always within the analysis of the grievance, having reviewed case files 18-004025-1027-CA and 20-003085-1027-CA, it is important to emphasize that we are not in the presence of new facts, or events in time and space distinct from the factual framework cited above, linked to what was judged regarding whether we were in the presence of a consented act, or whether the acts were repetitive of previous ones; that is, situations that alert or contradict such a situation in the context of the road alignment and water drainage permits for the construction of the landfill (relleno sanitario). All this makes sense, since, although the party complains that the new fact is the existence of a supposed questioned validity of the Public Service Regulation for the Comprehensive Management of Solid Waste of the Canton of Mora (Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora), it must be specified that this situation was not even discussed in the procedure heard in summary proceeding 18-004025-1027-CA, especially since this tribunal understands, as will be seen in the following point, that said regulation was published in Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official site of the National Printing Office, in the search engine section for previous editions, accessed on September 12, 2023:\n\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is clearly inferred that on April 16, 2013, the regulation was published in its entirety and at the same time subjected to the consultation process provided for in Article 43 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) in conjunction with Article 240 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); and that for this purpose, in the absence of challenges to the regulation, on June 26, 2013, a complementary agreement was published, referencing the publication made on April 16, 2013, and that the regulation would take effect as of June 26, 2013. That is, based then on Articles 129 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 8 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), 43 of the Municipal Code, 240 of the General Law of Public Administration, the regulation having been approved and published in the Gaceta, as outlined, the thesis of the petitioner that this situation, of the supposed lack of publication of the regulation, is a new fact is inadmissible, since this would imply disregarding the constitutional maxim that no one can claim ignorance of the law, present in Article 129 of the Political Constitution.\n\nAccording to the decision, the grievance does not exist.\n\n3-) Regarding the lack of publication of the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora:\n\nVery specifically, it is important to highlight regarding the grievance that questions the effectiveness of the referenced regulation and therefore the validity of the challenged resolution, it is important to remember that the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was published in La Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and in La Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search section for previous editions, accessed on September 12, 2023:\n\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf \nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, pursuant to articles 129 of the Constitución Política, 8 of the Código Civil, 43 of the Código Municipal, 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, since the regulation was approved and published in La Gaceta, the thesis of the promoting party that this situation affects the effectiveness of the regulation and the validity of the challenged resolution is not admissible; since, as was well indicated, the regulation was approved and published in its entirety in the official gazette. Now, for greater abundance, regarding the specific claim to grant road alignment permits (permisos de alineamiento vial) and drainage permits for the construction of a landfill (relleno sanitario), they could not be granted through this channel, since as indicated, there is no possible nullity appreciable by the judge in the challenged resolution. Furthermore, the court record lacks technical criteria for that purpose; rather, within the framework of discussion of this appeal procedure, we are in the presence of the mere subjective, semantic-legal perception of the promoter, in the context that what is intended to be built is a landfill that could significantly affect the environment. That is to say, a specific procedure for that purpose is lacking, as are technical criteria provided by geologists, biologists, environmentalists, among other experts; nor are there the permits that could be issued by other entities and public bodies linked to environmental protection and the authorization of urban developments with environmental impact that could eventually justify such municipal operating licenses, especially since the judge is clearly knowledgeable about the Preventive and Precautionary Principles present in the well-known Earth Summit in Rio, or the Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica y Anexos (Río de Janeiro, 1992) ratified by Ley 7416 of June 30, 1994. In accordance with the foregoing, the Sala Constitucional has illustrated on the matter:\n\nIV.- ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY AND ECOLOGICALLY BALANCED ENVIRONMENT. On repeated occasions, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has emphasized that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is recognized both at the constitutional and conventional levels. Likewise, it has been indicated that the effective protection of this right requires that resources be used rationally, a context in which the State and the citizenry in general must act according to the principles governing environmental matters. In this regard, specialized doctrine has pointed out that the preventive principle demands that, when there is certainty of possible damage to the environment, the affecting activity must be prohibited, limited, or conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements. In general, this principle applies when there are clearly defined risks identified at least as probable; likewise, this principle is useful when there are no technical reports or administrative permits guaranteeing the sustainability of an activity, but there are sufficient elements to foresee eventual negative impacts. On the other hand, the precautionary principle indicates that, when there is a danger of serious and irreversible damage, the lack of absolute scientific certainty should not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective measures contingent upon the costs to prevent environmental degradation. From the foregoing, it is noted that the principle stems from reasonable scientific uncertainty together with the threat of serious and irreversible environmental damage. In general terms, a relevant difference between the preventive principle and the precautionary principle lies in the level of knowledge and certainty of the risks that an activity or work provokes. While in the former such certainty exists, in the latter what is observed is a state of doubt resulting from scientific information or technical studies. Thus, the Costa Rican State is obligated to adopt measures that guarantee the effective defense and preservation of the environment in accordance with these principles. Now, this objective obligation does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through jurisdictional bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but rather that those that are suitable for the protection of that right be adopted, in the face of openly negligent attitudes by authorities, or by natural and legal persons, according to the recognized theory of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (Drittwirkung der Menschenrechte), among whose procedural manifestations is the amparo against subjects of private law\". (Resolution of the Sala Constitucional number 2021-024807 of 09:20 hours on November 5, 2021).\n\nThus, regardless of any discussion about whether we are in the presence of consented acts, acts that reproduce previous acts, or whether the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was correctly published or not, sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional) under its vectors of science, experience, and logic, make the judge see that there are insufficient technical criteria on the record, criteria that were not even known or discussed, aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses linked to the construction of a landfill.\n\nAll of this generates a situation of uncertainty that is regulated by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, of profound constitutional root as cited above, which guides the action of the legal operator, who judges this case, to deny the concrete petition to grant the required licenses to the respective local government. Finally, on the grounds given above, the promoting party must abide by what was resolved in the challenged resolution, the content of which is confirmed by this tribunal. In what was the subject of grievance and was heard in this resolution, the administrative channel (vía administrativa) is deemed exhausted, as is hereby ordered.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe appeal is declared WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR); resolution AMR-047-2020 of 11:00 a.m. on May 15, 2020, issued by the Mayor's Office (alcaldía) of the Municipality of Mora (Muncipalidad de Mora), is confirmed. In what was the subject of grievance, heard in this resolution, the administrative channel (vía administrativa) is deemed exhausted. Notify the parties at the indicated means. Luis Arturo Polinaris Vives, Contentious-Administrative Judge. Improper Municipal Hierarchy (Jerarquía Impropia Municipal). \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

\"\"
???????????????
QQQMLW6LGHY61
LUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A

\n
\n

 

\n
\n

EXP: 20-003085-1027-CA

\n

Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr

\n

 

\n
\n\nNow, with regard to the substantive or considerative part of resolution 2019-611, this Tribunal, but with a different composition, resolved: \"IV.- Regarding the specific case: Before delving into the review of the grievances presented by the appellant, it is essential to offer some procedural clarifications, fundamental to understanding the manner in which the appeal against resolution AMR-18-2017 will be resolved. At this point, it is necessary to briefly review the institutes of 'consented act' (acto consentido) and 'act that reproduces a prior one' (acto reproductor de otro anterior). With regard to the first of the categories of acts indicated above, namely, the consented act, it is understood that this is configured when the recipient of said conduct accepts it expressly, stating so unequivocally, or when the act is not challenged in a timely manner, a situation that configures the so-called tacitly consented act. Analyzing this procedural phenomenon, in the context of the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía) in municipal matters, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) specified the following: 'tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies–sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-protection–is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not exercise the appropriate administrative remedies in a timely and proper manner, the legislator presumes, based on the omitted conduct of the administered party, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system.' (Constitutional Chamber vote 3669-2006). From the review of the file, it is understood that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office of Mora (Alcaldía Municipal de Mora), is a tacitly consented act, insofar as despite being contrary to the interests of the party that requested it, they did not appeal it within the deadline legally established in the legal 'system' (ordenamiento). Having offered the preceding consideration, it is time to specify the contours of the 'act that reproduces another prior one,' an aspect that is relevant for the resolution of the appeal under study. To date, both doctrine and jurisprudence are in agreement and unequivocal in specifying that an act that is a reproduction of a previous, final one is not subject to judicial appeal. This class of acts is defined by Prof.\"\n\nJesús González Pérez as one that: “is issued in the presence of the same facts and by force of the same grounds, in the same case file and in relation to the same interested parties, reproducing the denial decreed by the previous, consented resolution.” González Pérez, Jesús, Comentarios a la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción contencioso Administrativa, Editorial Cívitas, Madrid, year 1999, p. 703. As stated both in official letters DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office (Alcaldía), and in official letters AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, the appellant was informed of the rejection of their petition due to the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016. That being the case, it is clear from the express text of all the actions issued in the year 2017 that the local corporation understood that the acts issued subsequent to resolution AMR-603-2016 are merely reproductive of that resolution and therefore unappealable. In light of the foregoing, we proceed to review the grievances presented by the appellant's representation. As a first objection, the appellant's representation indicates that there is no regulation that prevents repeatedly requesting drainage easements (desfogues), alignments (alineamientos), etc., which is why the actions taken by the Mayor's Office (Alcaldía) are contrary to law. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. This Section must first state that the appellant is correct in that the “legal system” does not limit her right to request the issuance of municipal administrative acts—such as a drainage easement (desfogue), a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo), a construction permit (licencia constructiva), etc.—as many times as she deems necessary. However, it is also true that if an administrative act issued by the municipality, contrary to the applicant's interests, is not appealed in time, said municipal administrative act acquires the status of a tacitly consented administrative act. That being the case, if a petition is filed again before the local corporation without any change in the factual situation or the legal framework, any new act rejecting the petition—which is simply limited to ruling in an identical sense (or even, as happened in the present case, makes express reference to a previous rejection)—this second act is what was defined earlier as a reproductive act of a previous one, as it would simply be reiterating the pronouncement that the party already knew.\n\nLeaving aside the controversy over whether the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is a right of the Public Administration before being sued, or whether it is a right of the individual to process their dispute through an informal channel before resorting to a judicial process, the truth is that in municipal matters, the pronouncement of \"exhaustion of administrative remedies\" as the final point of the procedure followed by anyone challenging a municipal administrative conduct they deem contrary to the body of law, has the sole effect of allowing the challenge of administrative acts before the contentious-administrative court, opening the possibility of filing an ordinary proceeding. To date, the function of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal in its capacity as a non-hierarchical legality controller, is precisely to make such a pronouncement. In the conflict under analysis, it is found that resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, and the resolutions of the Mayor's Office (Alcaldía) AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017 are reproductive acts of the former, insofar as they maintain the criterion by making express reference to that conduct. Note that in their subsequent challenges, the appellant party does not indicate that there has been a change of circumstances or that the applicable law has varied. Furthermore, from the review of the challenges, it is also clear that the object of the substantive questions presented by the representation of the appellant companies are precisely the considerations incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016, which are itemized and expressly questioned. Evidently, the procedure of exhaustion of administrative remedies at the municipal level is justified when it provides the possibility of subsequently resorting to the judicial venue (if the act deemed illegal is not corrected at the administrative venue). Conversely, when filing a contentious-administrative proceeding is impossible, the procedure for exhausting administrative remedies will be inadmissible for lacking all utility. In the Costa Rican \"legal framework,\" the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo expressly establishes the impossibility of suing for annulment of acts that are reproductive of other previous ones that were consented to. Note that without such limitation, the statute of limitations for the action would be easily circumvented, an expression of the Principle of Legal Certainty (Principio de Seguridad Jurídica) of constitutional origin. In relevant part, said provision textually states: \"Artículo 38.- 1) The claim for annulment shall not be admissible in relation to acts that, being defective, have been expressly consented to or are a reproduction of other previous ones, whether they are final and firm or confirmatory of the consented ones.\" (The original is not underlined). By reason of the foregoing, regardless of the discussion presented by the appellant party regarding the relationship of articles used by the Mayor's Office of Mora to determine the unappealability of a reproductive act of a prior one that was consented to, there is no doubt that the decreed unchallengeability is fully consistent with the law.\n\nAt this point, it is worth further highlighting that the regulation established in article 163, subsection b) of the Código Municipal, is based on the same considerations set forth above. Secondly, it is noted that the appellant offers a set of grievances aimed at proving the illegality of the substantive reasoning incorporated in the official communication AMR-603-2016. This set of grievances is inadmissible and is rejected. As has been indicated throughout this recital (considerando), the resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act (acto consentido), which cannot be reviewed by this Chamber (Cámara) via an appeal (recurso de apelación), and it is expressly clarified that in this resolution the Tribunal does not conduct any type of review regarding its legal regularity. By reason of the foregoing, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to confirm the declaration made by the Alcaldía de Mora, regarding the unappealable nature (inimpugnabilidad) of acts that merely reproduce (actos reproductorios) other consented acts. The criterion just set forth is precisely what will determine the scope of the declaration of exhaustion of the administrative channel (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) that is incorporated in this resolution, which will be limited solely to declaring this venue exhausted (agotada esta sede) exclusively with respect to the discussion of the reviewability or lack thereof of acts that reproduce prior acts (actos reproductores) under the terms previously described, without this resolution serving as the basis for a discussion on the legality of the official communication AMR-603-2016, nor of its grounds, topics which, as previously indicated, are neither reviewed nor confirmed by this Section (Sección). Regarding the consented act, it was resolved and considered that the resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Alcaldía Municipal de Mora, is a tacitly consented act because it was not appealed (recurrido) in time, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that initiated the proceeding (gestionó), that party did not appeal it within the period legally established in the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico). Now, concerning the considerations of whether we are in the presence of an act that reproduces a prior one, the Tribunal considered that such conduct is judicially unappealable (irrecurrible judicialmente); being in the presence of the same facts and grounds, in the same file (expediente) in relation to the same interested parties; all within the context of the denial (denegación) decreed by the prior consented resolution. In this sense, the Tribunal considered at the time that it is recorded in the official communications DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Alcaldía, as well as in the official communications AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, that the management of the promoting party was rejected, based on the existence of the pronouncement AMR-603-2016. Therefore, the Tribunal shared the local government's thesis in the clear sense of understanding that, in the conduct issued in the year 2017, the local corporation concluded that the acts issued subsequent to the resolution AMR-603-2016 are merely reproductive of it and therefore unappealable. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, it is also important to cite the operative part or \"por tanto\" of resolution 2019-611, which expressly indicated: \"Por Tanto. Se declara inadmisible el recurso de apelación presentado en contra de la resolución AMR-27-2017, y se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación presentado en contra del oficio AMR-18-2017, ambos dictados por la Alcaldía de Mora, los cuales se confirman.\"\n\nThe administrative channel is hereby exhausted with respect to the discussion on the challengeability of reproductive acts, arising from the appeal filed against resolution AMR-18-2017.\n\nThis allows us to conclude, from the highlighted content, that the operative closure of the municipal appeals system has already occurred and that the judicial channel remained open and available to discuss the challengeability of the alleged reproductive acts; all of this, in the manner and form that the party would have considered suitable for the protection of their rights and interests. Always within the analysis of the grievance, having reviewed files 18-004025-1027-CA and 20-003085-1027-CA, it is important to emphasize that we are not in the presence of new facts, or events in time and space distinct from the factual framework cited above; linked to what was judged regarding whether it was in the presence of a consented act, or whether the acts were reproductive of previous ones; that is, situations that alert to or contradict such a situation in the context of the road alignment and water drainage permits for the construction of the landfill. All of this makes sense, since although the party complains that the new fact is the existence of a supposedly questioned validity of the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora, it must be specified that this situation was not even discussed in the proceeding known in summary case 18-004025-1027-CA, especially since this court understands, as will be seen in the next point, that said regulation was published in Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search engine section for previous editions, accessed September 12, 2023: https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf From the foregoing, it is clearly inferred that on April 16, 2013, the regulation was published in full and simultaneously subjected to the consultation provided for in Article 43 of the Código Municipal in accordance with Article 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; and that for this purpose, in the absence of challenges to the regulation, on June 26, 2013, a complementary agreement was published, referencing the publication made on April 16, 2013, and that the regulation would become effective as of June 26, 2013. That is, therefore, based on Articles 129 of the Constitución Política, 8 of the Código Civil, 43 of the Código Municipal, 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the regulation having been approved and published in the Gaceta, as described, the petitioner's thesis of understanding that this situation, of the alleged lack of publication of the regulation, is a new fact is inadmissible, since this would imply disregarding the constitutional maxim that no one can claim ignorance of the law, present in Article 129 of the Constitución Política.\n\nPursuant to the foregoing, the grievance does not exist. 3-) Regarding the lack of publication of the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora: Very specifically, it is important to note regarding the grievance that questions the effectiveness of the referenced regulation and therefore the validity of the challenged resolution, it is important to remember that the Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos del cantón de Mora was published in Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search section for previous editions, accessed on September 12, 2023: https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf)\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, pursuant to articles 129 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the Civil Code, 43 of the Código Municipal, 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the regulation having been approved and published in the Gaceta, the petitioner's thesis that this situation affects the regulation's effectiveness and the challenged resolution's validity is inadmissible; since, as was well stated, the regulation was approved and published integrally in the Diario Oficial. Now, furthermore, regarding the specific request to grant road alignment and drainage discharge permits for the construction of a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario), they could not be granted in this proceeding, since, as stated, there is no possible nullity appreciable by the undersigned in the challenged resolution. Additionally, the record does not contain technical criteria for that purpose; rather, we are in the presence of, within the framework of discussion of this appeal proceeding, the mere subjective, semantic-legal perception of the petitioner, in the context that what is intended to be built is a sanitary landfill that can significantly impact the environment. That is, a specific procedure for that purpose is sorely lacking, as are technical criteria provided by geologists, biologists, environmentalists, among other experts; nor are there permits that could be issued by other entities and public bodies linked to environmental protection and the authorization of urban developments (desarrollos urbanísticos) with environmental impact that could eventually justify such municipal operating licenses, especially since the undersigned is clearly knowledgeable of the Preventive and Precautionary Principles present at the well-known Cumbre de Río, or, indeed, the Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica and Annexes (Río de Janeiro, 1992) ratified by Ley 7416 of June 30, 1994. In accordance with the foregoing, the Sala Constitucional has illustrated on the matter: IV.- ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY AND ECOLOGICALLY BALANCED ENVIRONMENT. On repeated occasions, this Chamber's jurisprudence has underscored that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is recognized at both the constitutional and conventional levels. Likewise, it has been indicated that effective protection of this right requires that resources be used rationally, a context in which the State and the citizenry in general must act according to the principles governing environmental matters. In this vein, specialized doctrine has noted that the preventive principle (principio preventivo) demands that, when there is certainty of possible environmental damage, the affecting activity must be prohibited, limited, or conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements.\n\nIn general, this principle applies when there are clearly defined risks identified as at least probable; likewise, this principle is useful when there are no technical reports or administrative permits that guarantee the sustainability of an activity, but there are sufficient elements to foresee potential negative impacts. On the other hand, the precautionary principle (principio precautorio) indicates that, where there is a threat of serious and irreversible damage, the lack of absolute scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing the adoption of effective measures based on the costs to prevent environmental degradation. From the foregoing, it is noted that the principle stems from reasonable scientific uncertainty together with the threat of serious and irreversible environmental damage. In general terms, a relevant difference between the preventive principle and the precautionary principle lies in the level of knowledge and certainty of the risks that an activity or work causes. While in the former such certainty exists, in the latter what is observed is a state of doubt resulting from scientific information or technical studies. Thus, the Costa Rican State is obligated to adopt measures that guarantee the effective defense and preservation of the environment in accordance with such principles. Now, this objective obligation does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through jurisdictional bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but it does entail the right to demand that those measures that are suitable for protecting that right be adopted, in the face of openly negligent attitudes of authorities, or of natural and legal persons, in accordance with the recognized theory of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (Drittwirkung der Menschenrechte), among whose procedural manifestations is the amparo against subjects of private law\". (Resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2021-024807 of 09:20 hours on November 5, 2021). Therefore, regardless of any discussion about whether we are in the presence of consented acts, acts that reproduce previous acts, or whether the Regulation of Public Service for the comprehensive management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was correctly published or not, sound rational criticism under its vectors of science, experience, and logic, make it apparent to the judge that there are insufficient technical criteria in the case file, which were not even known or discussed, aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses linked to the construction of a landfill. All of this generates a situation of uncertainty that is governed by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, of deep constitutional roots as cited supra, which guides the actions of the legal operator, of the person judging this case, to deny the specific request to grant the required licenses to the respective local government. Finally, on the grounds stated above, the moving party must abide by what was resolved in the appealed resolution, the content of which is confirmed by this court.\n\nIn the matter that was the subject of the grievance and was heard in this resolution, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted, as is hereby ordered.[...].\"\n\nEXPEDIENTE:\n20-003085-1027-CA - 1\n\nPROCESO:\nJERARQUIA IMPROPIA (Municipal)\n\nACTOR/A:\nPARQUE INDUSTRIAL JATEO SA\n\nDEMANDADO/A:\nMUNICIPALIDAD DE MORA\n\nN° N° 2023003305\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at nineteen hours and twenty-two minutes on the thirteenth of September, two thousand and twenty-three.-\n\nThis Tribunal hears, in its capacity as non-hierarchical controller of legality, the appeal filed by Mario Esteban Sánchez Sibaja, identity card 1-0817-0765, as unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the company Parque Industrial JATEO S.A., legal identification number 3-101-295773, against resolution AMR-047-2020 issued at 11:00 a.m. on May 15, 2020, by the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora.\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI- On the admissibility of the appeal:\nThe challenged resolution was notified by email on May 22, 2020. The foregoing means, in application of the rules contained in article 38 of the Judicial Notifications Law (Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales), that the moving party could file the appeal until June 1, 2020, which is why, by verifying at image 203 of the judicial file that the appeal against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, issued by the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora, bears a receipt stamp dated May 29, 2020, it is concluded that it was filed in time, and the appeal is therefore admissible.\n\nII-) On the procedural background:\n1-) The origin of the case arises from requests made by the plaintiff in the administrative venue to obtain a drainage and road alignment permit (permiso de desfogue y alineamiento vial), filed on May 17, 2018 (See appeal).\n2-) The requests indicated in the preceding paragraph were suspended through official letters DIG-019-18 and DDCU-13-2018 of May 23, 2018, to await the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo's hearing of an appeal, also from the moving party, regarding official letters AMR-18-2017 of June 27, 2017, and ARM-2017 of September 8, 2017 (See appeal).\n3-) On February 18, 2020, the moving party, following the issuance of vote 611-2019 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, again requested that the requests of May 17, 2018, regarding the alignment and drainage road (alineamiento y vial desfogue) be heard.\n4-) Through resolution DDCU-011-2020 dated March 4, 2020, from the Departamento de Desarrollo y Control Urbano and the Unidad de Gestión Vial, the petitions of May 17, 2018, were rejected (See appeal).\n5-) On March 9, 2020, the moving party filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against resolution DDCU-011-2020 dated March 4, 2020 (See appeal at image 181 to 188 of the judicial file).\n6-) Through resolution DDCU-035-2020 dated April 13, 2020, from the Departamento de Desarrollo y Control Urbano and the Unidad de Gestión Vial, the motion for reconsideration was rejected on the merits, with the correction of a clerical error (error material) where it was mentioned that the requests were linked to a land-use (uso de suelo) issue, instead of the matter of road alignment (alineamiento vial) and water drainage (desfogue de aguas). (See appeal and resolution visible at image 189 to 191 of the judicial file).\n7-) On May 22, 2020, resolution AMR-047-2020 of the Mayor's Office of the Municipalidad de Mora was notified, in which the appeal of March 9, 2020, was rejected.\n\nIn essence, said resolution determined that: the Administrative Appeals Court, in resolution 611-2019 at 09:15 hours on November 27, 2019, confirmed all acts issued by the mayor's office of Mora; it understands that regarding the situation addressed in resolution 611-2019, the factual framework has not changed and that we are facing a repetition of facts, in a context of a consented act, as the managed party did not appeal or challenge the act within the established period and through the appropriate channels; in the context that disregarding the validity of the Public Service Regulation for the integral management of solid waste (Reglamento de Servicio Público para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos) of the canton of Mora is not a new fact and is not a situation previously alleged in the facts ventilated in resolution 611-2019; it mentions that the Public Service Regulation for the integral management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in La Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in La Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See appeal and resolution visible at images 194 to 198 of the judicial file).\n\n**8-)** On May 29, 2020, the petitioner filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which they formulated the following grievances: that there are new facts regarding those adjudicated by this Court in resolution 2019-611 issued in file 18-004025-1027-CA and that there are no facts reproducing previous facts; that the Regulation of the public service for the integral management and use of solid waste (Reglamento del servicio público para la gestión integral y aprovechamiento de los residuos sólidos) of the canton of Mora was being applied to them, despite it not having been published in full in the Official Gazette, La Gaceta; the foregoing makes the mentioned regulation ineffective, highlighting that the correct procedure, for said regulation to have legal effect, is for it to be published in the Official Gazette and not as such in the National System for Legal Information (SINALEVI), considering Articles: 11, 27, 30, 41, and 129 of the Political Constitution; Article 43 of the Municipal Code, Article 240 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) to be violated; a situation which in their understanding causes them harm since the knowledge of their application cannot be subjected to a rule that has not been integrally published in the Official Gazette. Finally, in said appeal they request that resolution AMR-47-2020 of May 15, 2020, be revoked, that the authorizations requested on May 17, 2018, for alignment (alineamiento) and storm drainage outlet (desfogue) be granted, for which purpose they request that the Regulation for the Integral Management and Use of Solid Waste of the Canton of Mora cannot be taken as a basis, given that it is considered an ineffective rule (See appeal at images 203 to 228 of the judicial file).\n\n**9-)** In resolution AMR-056-2020 at 13:30 hours on June 8, 2020, the mayor's office of the Municipality of Mora addressed the appeal for reversal filed against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which it was determined that: the Public Service Regulation for the integral management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in La Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in La Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64; regarding resolution 611-2019 at 09:15 hours on November 27, 2019, what was resolved by the Municipality of Mora concerning the provisions of the Public Service Regulation for the integral management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was confirmed, on which matter it asserts that the factual scenario addressed in resolution 611-2019 has not changed, arguing that we are faced with the same approvals for storm drainage outlet (desfogue pluvial) and road alignment (alineamiento vial), involving the same requesting parties, the same farm number (número de finca), the same project purpose, on which the Court declared the exhaustion of the administrative channel (vía administrativa); it ratifies the content resolved in resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020; it contradicts the appellant by indicating that the opinions of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) are only binding for the entity that consults and not for the rest of the entities. Based on the foregoing, the rejection of the appeal was primarily carried out in all its respects (See appeal and image 291 to 299 of the judicial file).\n\n**III-) Court's substantive analysis:**\n\n**1-) As a preliminary matter:**\n\nRegarding the period requested in the procedural claim of the appeal, for expressing grievances, in accordance with Article 192 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which states: *\"1) Once the file is received or its certified copy is provided, the Court shall grant a hearing period of five business days to the interested parties, so that they may express their grievances, and to the municipal council, so that it may make the allegations it deems pertinent. Once the period for this has elapsed, the corresponding final resolution must be issued within the fifth business day\"*; this Court has been interpreting and is of the opinion that such additional hearing for the expression of grievances is reserved for those cases where an act, or a formal administrative conduct, emanating from the *Municipal Council* is challenged, and not so in appeals filed against acts issued by the *municipal mayor's offices*; a conclusion that follows from the literal wording, according to the emphasis indicated above in the cited article. This situation does not constitute any type of defenselessness (indefensión), given that on May 29, 2020, the petitioner filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal for reconsideration against resolution AMR-047-2020 of May 15, 2020, in which they formulated the grievances that this Court is now hearing.\n\nHaving clarified the foregoing, the application of article 192 of Ley 8508 is omitted.\n\n2-) Regarding the alleged new facts and the reproduction of prior acts, linked to resolution 2019-611 issued in expediente 18-004025-1027-CA:\n\nIn light of the recently cited resolution, it is important to highlight what it considered as proven facts:\n\n**\"I.- Antecedents: Of interest for the resolution of this appeal, the following has been accredited: 1) That through official letter AMM-603-2016, dated December 7, 2016, the Municipal Mayor's Office of the canton of Mora informed Parque Industrial Jateo S.A. of the rejection of the various procedures submitted seeking the outlet and alignment for the construction of a sanitary landfill in the canton; 2) That according to resolutions DDCU-006-2017, dated May 26, 2017, and DIG-031-2017, dated May 31, 2017, the requests for land use with alignment and water outlet were again rejected, due to there already being a pronouncement on the subject, in official letter AMM-603-2016 indicated in the previous fact; 3) That in official letter AMR-18-2017, dated June 27, 2017, the Municipal Mayor's Office rejected as inadmissible the appeals filed against DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, considering that administrative acts that reproduce a prior one were being challenged; 4) That dissatisfied with the recently indicated resolution, the appellant companies filed a motion for reversal with subsidiary appeal to the Municipal Council; 5) That the challenge indicated in the previous fact was rejected as inadmissible through official letter AMR-27-2017, dated September 8, 2017, and; 6) That the appellant party filed motions for reversal and appeal against the resolution indicated in the previous fact\".**\n\nAs can be seen in what were proven facts, at its core, three specific situations that this Tribunal highlights have been proven, consisting of: the moving party requested outlet and road alignment permits for the construction of a sanitary landfill; that the moving party had already had such petition resolved negatively; and that it filed appeals in this regard, which were resolved negatively. Now, regarding the substantive or operative part of resolution 2019-611, this Tribunal, but with a different composition, resolved:\n\n**\"IV.- On the specific case: Before venturing into the review of the grievances presented by the appellant party, it is essential to offer some procedural clarifications, fundamental to understanding how the appeal against resolution AMR-18-2017 will be resolved. At this point, it is necessary to briefly review the institutes of \"consented act\" and \"act that reproduces a previous one\". With regard to the first of the aforementioned categories of acts, namely, the consented act, it is understood that this is configured when the addressee of such conduct accepts it expressly, manifesting it unequivocally, or when the act is not challenged in a timely manner, a situation that configures the so-called tacitly consented act. Analyzing this procedural phenomenon, in the context of mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters, the Constitutional Chamber specified the following: \"tacitly consented act which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies –sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-review– is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not exercise the applicable administrative appeals in time and form, the legislator presumes, based on the omitted conduct of the administered party, that it has tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system.\" (Constitutional Chamber vote 3669-2006). From the review of the expediente, it is evident that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office of Mora, is a tacitly consented act, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that processed it, it did not appeal it within the legally established period in the legal \"system\". Having offered the foregoing consideration, it is time to specify the contours of the \"act that reproduces a previous one\", an aspect that is relevant for the resolution of the appeal under study. To date, both doctrine and jurisprudence are unanimous and unequivocal in specifying that an act which is a reproduction of a previous one is not judicially appealable. This class of acts is defined by Prof. Jesús González Pérez as that which: \"is issued in the presence of the same facts and by force of the same grounds, in the same expediente and in relation to the same interested parties, reproducing the denial decreed by the previous consented resolution.\" González Pérez, Jesús, Comentarios a la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción contencioso Administrativa, Editorial Civitas, Madrid, year 1999, p. 703. As recorded in both official letters DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office, and in official letters AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, the appellant party was informed of the rejection of its petition due to the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016.**\n\nAs such, it is clear from the express text of all the actions issued in the year 2017, the local corporation understood that the acts issued subsequent to resolution AMR-603-2016 are reproductions of it and therefore unappealable. In view of the foregoing, we proceed to the review of the grievances presented by the representation of the appellant. As a first reproach, the appellant's representation indicates that there is no regulation that prevents repeatedly requesting drainage approvals (desfogues), alignment permits, etc., for which reason the actions taken by the Mayor's Office are contrary to law. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. This Section must first indicate that the appellant is correct in that the \"legal system (ordenamiento)\" does not limit her right to request the issuance of municipal administrative acts such as: a drainage approval, a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo), a construction permit, etc., as many times as she deems necessary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also true that if an administrative act issued by the municipality, contrary to the applicant's interests, is not appealed in time, said municipal administrative act acquires the status of a tacitly consented administrative act. As such, if a procedure is again filed before the local corporation, without a change in the factual circumstances or the legal framework, it is evident that the new act rejecting the request, which simply resolves in an identical manner (or even as happened in the present case, makes express reference to a prior rejection), this second act is what was previously defined as a reproductive act of an earlier one, as it would simply be reiterating the ruling that the party already knew. Setting aside the controversy regarding whether the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is a right of the Public Administration before being sued, or if it is a right of the individual to process their dispute in an informal channel before resorting to a judicial process, the truth is that in municipal matters, the ruling of \"exhaustion of administrative remedies\" as the final point of the procedure followed by someone challenging a municipal administrative action they deem contrary to the legality framework, has the sole effect of allowing the challenge of administrative acts before the contentious-administrative court, opening the possibility of filing an ordinary proceeding. At present, the function of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal as a non-hierarchical controller of legality is precisely to make such a ruling. In the conflict under analysis, it is established that resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, and the Mayor's Office resolutions AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017 are reproductive acts of the first, insofar as they maintain the criterion by making express reference to that action. Note that in her subsequent challenges, the appellant does not indicate that there has been a change in circumstances or that the applicable law has changed. Furthermore, from the review of the challenges it is also clear that the object of the substantive questions presented by the representation of the appellant companies are the considerations incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016, which are listed and expressly questioned. Evidently, the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies at the municipal level is justified when it provides the possibility of subsequently resorting to the judicial venue (if the act deemed illegal is not corrected at the administrative level). Conversely, when the filing of a contentious-administrative proceeding is impossible, the procedure for exhaustion of remedies would be inadmissible for lacking any utility. In the Costa Rican legal system, the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo expressly establishes the impossibility of suing for the nullity of acts that are reproductions of previous ones that were consented to. Note that if such a limitation did not exist, the expiry periods for the action, an expression of the Principle of Legal Certainty of constitutional origin, would be easily circumvented. In relevant part, said norm textually establishes: \"Article 38.- 1) The claim for nullity shall not be admissible in relation to acts that, being flawed, have been expressly consented to or are reproductions of previous ones, whether final and firm or confirmatory of those consented to.\" (The original is not underlined). For this reason, regardless of the discussion presented by the appellant regarding the set of articles used by the Alcaldía of Mora to determine the unappealable nature of a reproductive act of a previous one that was consented to, there is no doubt that the declared immunity from challenge is fully in accordance with the law. At this point, it is unnecessary to highlight that the regulation established in Article 163, subsection b) of the Código Municipal is based on the same considerations set forth above. Secondly, it is noted that the appellant offers a set of grievances aimed at proving the illegality of the substantive reasoning incorporated in official letter AMR-603-2016. This set of grievances is unfounded and is rejected. As has been indicated throughout this whereas clause (considerando), resolution AMR-603-2016 is a tacitly consented act, which cannot be reviewed by this Chamber through an appeal (recurso de apelación), and it is expressly clarified that in this resolution, the Tribunal does not perform any type of review regarding its legal regularity. For this reason, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to confirm the declaration made by the Alcaldía of Mora, regarding the immunity from challenge of acts that reproduce others that were consented to.\n\nThe criterion just set forth is precisely what will determine the scope of the exhaustion of administrative remedies pronouncement incorporated into this resolution, which will be limited solely to deeming this venue exhausted exclusively with respect to the discussion, or lack thereof, regarding the appealability of repetitive acts in the terms previously described, without this resolution serving as the basis for discussion on the legality of official communication AMR-603-2016, or its grounds, matters which, as indicated earlier, are neither reviewed nor confirmed by this Section.\n\nRegarding the consented act, it was resolved and considered that resolution AMR-603-2016, issued by the Mayor's Office of Mora, is an act tacitly consented to because it was not appealed in time, insofar as, despite being contrary to the interests of the party that pursued it, she did not appeal it within the period legally established in the legal system. Now, concerning the considerations of whether we are in the presence of an act that is reproductive of a previous one, the Tribunal considered that such conduct is not appealable judicially; being in the presence of the same facts and grounds, in the same case file, with respect to the same interested parties; all within the context of the denial decreed by the previous consented resolution. In that regard, the Tribunal considered at the time that it is evident in official communications DDCU-006-2017 and DIG-031-2017, issued by the bodies subordinate to the Mayor's Office, as well as in official communications AMR-18-2017 and AMR-27-2017, that the petitioner's request was rejected based on the existence of pronouncement AMR-603-2016. Therefore, the Tribunal shared the local government's thesis in the clear sense of understanding that, in the conduct issued in the year 2017, the local corporation concluded that the acts issued subsequent to resolution AMR-603-2016 are reproductive thereof and therefore unappealable. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also important to cite the operative part or \"por tanto\" of resolution 2019-611, which expressly stated:\n\n\"Por Tanto.\nThe appeal filed against resolution AMR-27-2017 is declared inadmissible, and the appeal filed against official communication AMR-18-2017 is declared without merit, both issued by the Mayor's Office of Mora, which are confirmed. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted with respect to the discussion on the appealability of repetitive acts, derived from the appeal filed against resolution AMR-18-2017.\"\n\nThis allows one to conclude, from the highlighted content, that the operational closure of the municipal appeals system has already occurred and that the judicial avenue remains open and unimpeded to discuss the appealability of the alleged repetitive acts; all of this, through the avenue and in the manner that the party deemed suitable for the protection of their rights and interests. Always within the analysis of the grievance, having reviewed case files 18-004025-1027-CA and 20-003085-1027-CA, it is important to note that we are not in the presence of new facts, or events in time and space distinct from the factual framework cited above; linked to what was adjudicated regarding whether one was in the presence of a consented act, or whether the acts were reproductive of previous ones; that is, situations that would alert or contradict such a situation in the context of the road alignment and water drainage permits for the construction of the landfill. All of this makes sense, because although the party complains that the new fact is the existence of an alleged questioned validity of the Public Service Regulation for the integral management of solid waste of the canton of Mora, it must be specified that this situation was not even discussed in the proceeding heard in summary case 18-004025-1027-CA, especially since this tribunal understands, as will be seen in the following point, that said regulation was published in Gazette number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in Gazette number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official site of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search engine section for previous editions, accessed on September 12, 2023:\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nFrom the foregoing, it is clearly inferred that on April 16, 2013, the regulation was published in its entirety and simultaneously subjected to the consultation process provided for in Article 43 of the Código Municipal in conjunction with Article 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; and that for this purpose, in the absence of challenges to the regulation, on June 26, 2013, a complementary agreement was published, referencing the publication made on April 16, 2013, and stating that the regulation would be effective as of June 26, 2013. That is, based then on Articles 129 of the Constitución Política, 8 of the Código Civil, 43 of the Código Municipal, and 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, since the regulation was approved and published in the Gazette, as reviewed, the thesis of the petitioner that this situation—the alleged lack of publication of the regulation—is a new fact is inadmissible, since this would imply disregarding the constitutional maxim that no one may claim ignorance of the law, present in Article 129 of the Constitución Política.\n\n3-) Regarding the failure to publish the Public Service Regulation for the comprehensive management of solid waste of the canton of Mora:\n\nVery specifically, it is important to highlight regarding the grievance that questions the effectiveness of the aforementioned regulation and therefore the validity of the challenged resolution, it is important to recall that the Public Service Regulation for the comprehensive management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was published in La Gaceta number 72 of April 16, 2013, pages 33 to 39; and that in La Gaceta number 122 of June 26, 2013, page 64 (See the official website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the search section for previous editions, accessed September 12, 2023:\n\nhttps://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/04/16/COMP_16_04_2013.pdf https://museodegacetas.imprentanacional.go.cr/ver/pub/2013/06/26/COMP_26_06_2013.pdf\n\nIn accordance with the above, pursuant to articles 129 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the Civil Code, 43 of the Código Municipal, 240 of the General Law on Public Administration, the regulation having been approved and published in La Gaceta, the thesis of the promoting party that this situation affects the effectiveness of the regulation and the validity of the challenged resolution is not admissible; since, as was rightly stated, the regulation was approved and published in its entirety in the Official Gazette. Now, more abundantly, regarding the specific claim to grant road alignment and drainage discharge permits for the construction of a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario), they could not be granted in this proceeding, since, as indicated, there is no nullity appreciable by the judge in the challenged resolution; furthermore, the case file does not contain technical criteria for that purpose, but rather, in what was the framework of discussion in this appeal proceeding, we are in the presence of the mere subjective, semantic-legal perception of the promoter, in the context that what is intended to be built is a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario) that may significantly impact the environment. That is, a specific procedure for this purpose is lacking, along with technical criteria provided by geologists, biologists, environmentalists, among other experts; nor are there permits that could have been issued by other entities and public bodies linked to environmental protection and the authorization of urban developments with environmental impact that could eventually justify such municipal operating licenses, especially since the judge is a clear expert on the Preventive and Precautionary Principles present at the well-known Rio Summit, or of the Convention on Biological Diversity and Annexes (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) ratified by Law 7416 of June 30, 1994. In accordance with the above, the Sala Constitucional has illustrated on the matter:\n\nIV.- ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY AND ECOLOGICALLY BALANCED ENVIRONMENT. On repeated occasions, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has emphasized that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is recognized at both the constitutional and conventional levels. Likewise, it has been indicated that the effective protection of this right requires that resources be used in a rational manner, a context in which the State and the citizenry in general must act according to the principles governing environmental matters. In this vein, specialized doctrine has pointed out that the preventive principle demands that, when there is certainty of possible damage to the environment, the affecting activity must be prohibited, limited, or conditioned to the fulfillment of certain requirements. In general, this principle applies when there are risks clearly defined and identified as at least probable; likewise, this principle is useful when there are no technical reports or administrative permits guaranteeing the sustainability of an activity, but there are sufficient elements to foresee potential negative impacts. On the other hand, the precautionary principle indicates that, when there is danger of serious and irreversible damage, the lack of absolute scientific certainty should not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective measures based on the costs to prevent environmental degradation. From the foregoing, it is noted that the principle departs from reasonable scientific uncertainty together with the threat of serious and irreversible environmental damage. In general terms, a relevant difference between the preventive principle and the precautionary principle lies in the level of knowledge and certainty of the risks that an activity or work causes. While in the former such certainty exists, in the latter what is noted is a state of doubt resulting from scientific information or technical studies. Thus, the Costa Rican State is obligated to adopt the measures that guarantee the effective defense and preservation of the environment in accordance with such principles. Now, such an objective obligation does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through jurisdictional bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but it does entail the right that measures suitable for the protection of that right be adopted, in the face of clearly negligent attitudes of the authorities, or of natural and legal persons, in accordance with the recognized theory of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (Drittwirkung der Menschenrechte), among whose procedural manifestations is the amparo against subjects of private law\". (Sala Constitucional resolution number 2021-024807 of 09:20 hours on November 5, 2021).\n\nThus, regardless of any discussion about whether we are in the presence of consented acts, acts that reproduce previous acts, or whether the Public Service Regulation for the comprehensive management of solid waste of the canton of Mora was correctly published or not, sound rational criticism under its vectors of science, experience, and logic, make this judge see that there are insufficient technical criteria in the case file, which were not even known or discussed, aimed at understanding the environmental sustainability of permits or municipal licenses linked to the construction of a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario).\n\nAll of this generates a situation of uncertainty that is regulated by the Rio Summit, under the Preventive Principle, of profound constitutional root as cited supra, which guides the actions of the legal operator, of the person judging this case, to deny the specific petition to grant the required licenses to the respective local government. Finally, based on the grounds given above, the promoting party must abide by what was resolved in the challenged resolution whose content is confirmed by this court. In what was a matter of grievance and was addressed in this resolution, the administrative route is deemed exhausted, as is hereby ordered.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe appeal is declared WITHOUT MERIT; resolution AMR-047-2020 of 11:00 hours on May 15, 2020, issued by the mayor's office of the Municipality of Mora is confirmed. In what was a matter of grievance, addressed in this resolution, the administrative route is deemed exhausted. Notify the parties at the indicated means. Luis Arturo Polinaris Vives, Administrative Litigation Judge. Improper Municipal Hierarchy. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

\"\"
???????????????
QQQMLW6LGHY61
LUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A

\n
\n

 

\n
\n

EXP: 20-003085-1027-CA

\n

Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr

\n

 

\n
\n" }