{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1231714", "citation": "Res. 00552-2024 Juzgado de Familia Especializado en Apelaciones de Pensiones Alimentarias", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Improcedencia de archivo de pensión alimentaria por discapacidad del beneficiario al alcanzar mayoría de edad sin representación", "title_en": "Child support file closure improper when beneficiary with disability reaches adulthood without representative", "summary_es": "La resolución analiza un proceso alimentario en el que el beneficiario, diagnosticado con autismo grave y discapacidades múltiples, alcanzó la mayoría de edad. El tribunal de primera instancia, pese a conocer la condición del joven, exigió el cumplimiento de cargas procesales (como demostrar estudios, según el artículo 173 inciso 5 del Código de Familia) que resultaban imposibles para él y que no correspondían a su situación, puesto que su derecho alimentario se fundamentaba en el artículo 169 inciso 3 del mismo código (personas con discapacidad). Además, aceptó el archivo del expediente solicitado por la madre, quien no había sido formalmente designada como representante en ese momento, disponiendo así de un derecho personalísimo e irrenunciable. El tribunal de segunda instancia confirma la resolución impugnada en cuanto deniega la devolución de pagos al obligado, pero declara que el archivo fue improcedente, ya que se basó en requisitos inaplicables y fue tramitado por quien carecía de facultades para renunciar al derecho alimentario del beneficiario. Ordena remitir el caso a la Inspección Judicial y tomar medidas de saneamiento para garantizar el acceso a la justicia del joven.", "summary_en": "This ruling addresses a child support case where the beneficiary, diagnosed with severe autism and multiple disabilities, reached legal age. The lower court, despite being fully aware of the young man's condition, required him to fulfill procedural obligations impossible for him—such as proving student status under Article 173(5) of the Family Code—when his right to support actually derived from Article 169(3) (persons with disabilities). Moreover, the court allowed the case to be closed at the request of the mother, who was not yet his formal representative, thereby waiving a personal and inalienable right. The appellate court upholds the decision denying reimbursement to the obligor but declares the closure improper: it was based on inapplicable requirements and executed by someone without authority to relinquish the beneficiary's support rights. The lower court is directed to refer the matter to the Judicial Inspectorate and to take corrective measures to ensure the young man's access to justice.", "court_or_agency": "Juzgado de Familia Especializado en Apelaciones de Pensiones Alimentarias", "date": "02/05/2024", "year": "2024", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "pensión alimentaria", "discapacidad", "mayoría de edad", "neurodiversidad", "representante legal", "derecho personalísimo", "irrenunciable", "archivo de expediente", "inciso 3) del artículo 169 Código de Familia", "Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "pensión alimentaria", "discapacidad", "mayoría de edad", "neurodiversidad", "autismo grave", "representación legal", "derecho personalísimo", "irrenunciabilidad", "archivo improcedente", "artículo 169 Código de Familia", "artículo 173 Código de Familia", "Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad", "Ley 9379", "Ley 8661", "acceso a la justicia", "Inspección Judicial" ], "keywords_en": [ "child support", "disability", "age of majority", "neurodiversity", "severe autism", "legal representation", "personal right", "non-waivable", "improper closure", "Article 169 Family Code", "Article 173 Family Code", "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities", "Law 9379", "Law 8661", "access to justice", "Judicial Inspectorate" ], "excerpt_es": "En este caso, el accionado reclama la nulidad de la resolución impugnada, porque según él, su hijo no tiene derecho a los alimentos debido a que no cumplió lo previsto en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, pero, tanto la primera instancia como el recurrente, han dejado de lado que el derecho a los alimentos del joven beneficiario tiene fundamento en el inciso 3) del artículo 169 del Código de Familia y que, tal derecho es personalísimo así como, irrenunciable cuando se trata de una persona que ni siquiera puede opinar y tampoco atender sus propios intereses. Incluso, si en este caso la información diagnóstica referente al joven no merecía credibilidad a la primera instancia -aspecto nunca alegado para proceder como lo hizo- bastaba con requerir una pericia utilizando los mecanismos propios de la cooperación judicial internacional. (...) el archivo del proceso ha sido dispuesto a partir de una gestión hecha por quien no representaba al joven neurodiverso y con discapacidades varias, pero, ni aun representándolo conforme al artículo 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, tal circunstancia no le alcanza para disponer del derecho alimentario del joven beneficiario, derecho que además es de orden personalísimo e irrenunciable en su caso.", "excerpt_en": "In this case, the respondent seeks annulment of the contested ruling, arguing that his son is not entitled to support because he failed to meet the requirements of Article 173(5) of the Family Code. However, both the lower court and the appellant have overlooked that the young beneficiary's right to support is grounded in Article 169(3) of the Family Code, and that this right is personal and non-waivable when it concerns a person who cannot even express an opinion or attend to their own interests. Even if the diagnostic information regarding the young man lacked credibility for the lower court—a claim it never made to justify its actions—it could have ordered an expert evaluation through international judicial cooperation mechanisms. (...) The closure of the proceedings was based on a request made by someone who was not the young neurodiverse and multi-disabled person's representative; and even if representing him under Article 10 of the Child Support Law, such a person lacks the capacity to dispose of the beneficiary's support right, which is also personal and non-waivable in his case.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Partially affirmed", "label_es": "Confirma parcialmente", "summary_en": "The claim for annulment is denied and the ruling rejecting the return of support payments is affirmed; however, the closure of the case is declared improper and the matter is referred to the Judicial Inspectorate.", "summary_es": "Se deniega la nulidad reclamada y se confirma la resolución que rechaza la devolución de pensiones; sin embargo, se declara que el archivo del expediente fue improcedente y se ordena remitir el asunto a la Inspección Judicial." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VIII", "quote_en": "the young beneficiary's right to support is grounded in Article 169(3) of the Family Code, and that this right is personal and non-waivable when it concerns a person who cannot even express an opinion or attend to their own interests.", "quote_es": "el derecho a los alimentos del joven beneficiario tiene fundamento en el inciso 3) del artículo 169 del Código de Familia y que, tal derecho es personalísimo así como, irrenunciable cuando se trata de una persona que ni siquiera puede opinar y tampoco atender sus propios intereses." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "even if representing him under Article 10 of the Child Support Law, such a person lacks the capacity to dispose of the beneficiary's support right, which is also personal and non-waivable in his case.", "quote_es": "ni aun representándolo conforme al artículo 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, tal circunstancia no le alcanza para disponer del derecho alimentario del joven beneficiario, derecho que además es de orden personalísimo e irrenunciable en su caso." }, { "context": "Por tanto", "quote_en": "the regrettable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter must be brought to the attention of the Judicial Inspectorate so that the case can be studied and any applicable disciplinary responsibilities be determined", "quote_es": "la situación tan lamentable e inexcusable generada en este asunto debe ser puesta en conocimiento del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial a efecto de que el caso sea estudiado y, se sienten las responsabilidades disciplinarias que correspondan si es que ello resulta pertinente" } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-33635", "citation": "", "title_en": "Organic Law of the Judiciary", "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial", "doc_type": null, "date": "01/12/1937", "year": "1937" }, { "id": "norm-970", "citation": "Ley 5476", "title_en": "Family Code", "title_es": "Código de Familia", "doc_type": "law", "date": "21/12/1973", "year": "1973" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-236027", "citation": "Res. 02771-2003 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Presidential re-election — annulment of partial reform due to substantive defect", "title_es": "Reelección presidencial — anulación de reforma parcial por vicio material", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "04/04/2003", "year": "2003" }, { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-80098", "citation": "Res. 01147-1990 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Loss of pension due to criminal conduct is unconstitutional", "title_es": "Pérdida de jubilación por conducta penal es inconstitucional", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "21/09/1990", "year": "1990" }, { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-82278", "citation": "Res. 01319-1997 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Right of every minor to appeal adverse criminal decisions", "title_es": "Derecho de todo menor a recurrir decisiones penales adversas", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "04/03/1997", "year": "1997" }, { "id": "norm-33635", "citation": "", "title_en": "Organic Law of the Judiciary", "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial", "doc_type": null, "date": "01/12/1937", "year": "1937" }, { "id": "norm-970", "citation": "Ley 5476", "title_en": "Family Code", "title_es": "Código de Familia", "doc_type": "law", "date": "21/12/1973", "year": "1973" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-1231714", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-33635", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "01/12/1937" }, { "doc_id": "norm-970", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_name": "Código de Familia", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "21/12/1973" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Documento PJEDITOR\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\n????????????????\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEXPEDIENTE:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n03-001223-0503-PA - 2\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPROCESO:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\nSEGUNDA INSTANCIA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nACTOR/A:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n[Nombre 001]\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nDEMANDADO/A:\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n[Nombre 002]\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\nSENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA\n\r\n\n N° 2024000552 \n\r\n\n JUZGADO DE FAMILIA ESPECIALIZADO EN APELACIONES DE PENSIONES ALIMENTARIAS.- A las diecisiete horas cuatro minutos del dos de mayo de dos mil veinticuatro.-\n\r\n\n Proceso alimentario en beneficio de [Nombre 001], cédula de identidad número [Valor 001] contra [Nombre 002], cédula de identidad número [Valor 002]. Visto el recurso de apelación con nulidad concomitante formulado por el obligado alimentario contra la resolución de las 13:41 de 12 de abril de 2024 y, \n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\r\n\n I. Consta en autos que el proceso alimentario inició cuando el beneficiario tenía pocos meses de edad. Para entonces, era prácticamente imposible conocer que años después sería diagnosticado con autismo grave y otras circunstancias que se dirán. Fue así como la sentencia de primera instancia de las 13:40 de 1° de marzo de 2020 -imagen 176 y siguientes- no tomó en consideración tal situación. Los años pasaron y, en el expediente consta que madre e hijo salieron del país. Como la obligación alimentaria, entre otras cosas, se caracteriza por ser extraterritorial, es decir, no existe norma que obligue a residir en el país para que una persona sea beneficiaria de alimentos, el expediente siguió su tramitación. \n\r\n\n II. En marzo del año 2020, la madre, siendo el beneficiario todavía menor de edad, pues nació el 7 de noviembre de 2002, solicitó el aumento automático y, el día 5 de marzo de 2020, informó al juzgado que el entonces casi adulto beneficiario había sido diagnosticado con autismo severo, problemas con el control impulsivo, desorden de discapacidad intelectual, trastorno del sueño, severa discapacidad sobre comunicación e interacción social y, severa discapacidad intelectual, entre otras cosas. Esa información consta en la certificación apostillada de imagen 282 al 284. La madre, con fundamento en esta documental, solicitó ser tenida como representante del joven una vez que adquiriera la mayoría de edad. Al respecto, la primera instancia resolvió mediante resolución de las 10:01 de 10 de marzo de 2020, que la solicitud de ser designada representante debía formularla en el momento oportuno. Es decir, la primera instancia conocía perfectamente de la neurodiversidad del joven y sus profundas limitaciones con el entorno y postergó el tema de la representación para ser decidido una vez que el joven adquiriera la mayoría de edad, obligando a la madre a volver a gestionar cuando eso ocurriera. Es decir, la primera instancia no reservó el tema para cuando se verificara la mayoría de edad. \n\r\n\n III. La madre de beneficiario menor de edad designó como apoderada generalísima a una tercera persona quien se apersonó al proceso con el poder debidamente inscrito. Dicha apoderada, actualizó la información diagnóstica del joven y es así como, mediante certificación aportillada de fecha 9 de octubre de 2020, visible desde la imagen 317 al 320 se logra determinar que el casi adulto joven con discapacidad fue diagnosticado con autismo grave, trastorno de control de impulsos con conducta disruptiva; discapacidad intelectual entre media y grave; trastorno grave del sueño, estreñimiento, dispepsia funcional, alotrofagia, capacidad de adaptación extremadamente reducida en general y para la vida diaria; no habla español ni lo entiende; trastorno grave del habla y de la comunicación en el idioma sueco. Además, se determinó que requiere supervisión y vigilancia constante. Es decir, nuevamente la primera instancia conocía de forma actualizada la neurodiversidad del joven y sus profundas limitaciones con el entorno, pero además, sus limitaciones para cumplir por sí mismo cualquier carga procesal, pero además, que su derecho a los alimentos no tendría relación alguna con el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. Esto era conocido desde antes de que el joven cumpliera la mayoría de edad. Para entonces ya constaba que el joven estaba asistiendo a una escuela para niños debido a sus circunstancias.\n\r\n\n IV. Esta información diagnóstica del beneficiario fue agregada a los autos según resolución de las 4:37 de 10 de noviembre de 2020. Es decir, ya cuando el joven era mayor de edad y sin mayor atención sobre su contenido. Luego, por medio de resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020, esa información diagnóstica fue puesta en conocimiento del accionado y fue notificado en el medio que entonces tenía para atender notificaciones. Lo más extraño es que, aunque la primera instancia conocía plenamente la neurodiversidad del joven y las diferentes discapacidades, así como, que asistía a una escuela para niños, que no estaba en el país al menos desde el año 2005 y que tenía limitaciones en cuanto a comunicación, por medio de resolución de las 1:24 de 4 de diciembre de 2020, previno al joven apersonarse al proceso, comprobar que estaba estudiando conforme al artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, así como, demostrar su récord y carga académica. Además, ordenó notificarle dicha resolución de forma personal. Es decir, previno algo que el beneficiario no podía cumplir, algo que no era aplicable a él y, además, ordenó notificarle algo que jamás podría ni siquiera leer y, por consiguiente, la primera instancia también incumplió lo previsto en el artículo 5 de la Ley de Notificaciones N.°8687, publicada en La Gaceta N.°20 de 29 de enero de 2009. Nótese que, incluso, mediante resolución de las 9:44 de 17 de agosto de 2023, la primera instancia insiste en que el joven debe ser notificado de la resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020. Además, constaba en el expediente que el beneficiario salió del país desde el marzo del año 2005 y, según la información diagnóstica que constaba en el expediente, era muy claro que el joven beneficiario estaba incorporado a un sistema de apoyos que en nada se relaciona con escolaridad propiamente dicha. \n\r\n\n V. Seguidamente, la primera instancia en dos resoluciones deniega archivar el expediente según gestión que hizo el accionado. El motivo del rechazo fue que, la exclusión debe ser tramitada formalmente. Así consta en las resoluciones de las 15:57 de 12 de mayo de 2023 y, 12:26 de 27 de junio de 2023. Véase que, la primera instancia nunca consideró la neurodiversidad y las discapacidades del beneficiario en torno a su derecho alimentario ya no conforme al artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia sino, a tenor de lo que dispone el inciso 3) del artículo 169 de ese Código. Es decir, la resolución de las 1:24 de 4 de diciembre de 2020 fue dictada sin estudiar el expediente y desatendiendo la información diagnóstica del joven beneficiario, así como, al margen no solo del inciso 3) del artículo 169 del Código de Familia sino de la normativa especial en materia de discapacidad. Además, la primera instancia generó a una persona neurodiversa y con discapacidades varias, enfrentar cargas procesales que no podía cumplir y además, que no tenía por qué cumplir, en tanto su derecho a los alimentos no derivaba del inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia. \n\r\n\n Es así como, la madre del joven, indicando claramente que es ella quien lo cuida y supervisa, es decir, evidentemente colocada en el supuesto de hecho que contempla el artículo 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, solicitó el archivo del proceso alimentario. Para ello, indicó que solicitaba el archivo porque le era imposible cumplir lo que la primera instancia le exigía y, además, porque el diagnóstico del joven le impide tener contacto con el mundo exterior sin riesgo para sí, de forma que tampoco el joven podría viajar a Costa Rica. Entonces, fue la primera instancia la que generó tal presión en la madre del joven, que provocó la citada solicitud de archivo, pero, además, fue la primera instancia quien ignoró las circunstancias del joven y, además, aceptó que una persona que para entonces no representaba a la persona neurodiversa y con discapacidades, dispusiera de un derecho de orden personalísimo del joven beneficiario. Véase que, la solicitud de archivo data de 9 de noviembre de 2023 y, para entonces, no existía resolución alguna que designara a la madre como representante. Para mayor claridad, fue mediante resolución de las 15:44 de 23 de noviembre de 2023, que la primera instancia no solamente ordena el archivo del expediente pedido por quien no había sido designada representante sino que además, es hasta ese momento y, paradógicamente, que tiene a la madre como representante del joven neurodiverso y con discapacidades. Es decir, la primera instancia concreta la violación inexcusable de derecho alimentario del joven ordenando el archivo del expediente. Entones, fue admitido el archivo del proceso solicitado por quien no era representante del joven y, además, ni siquiera siéndolo, podría disponer de un derecho personalísimo e irrenunciable como es el derecho alimentario, en este último caso, característica que surge porque la persona titular ni siquiera puede comunicarse y no puede atender sus intereses. \n\r\n\n VI. Luego, el padre del joven, conociendo perfectamente la neurodiversidad de su hijo y las discapacidades diagnosticadas, solicita que le sea devuelto todo el dinero que no ha sido girado al joven beneficiario. Eso le fue denegado mediante resolución de las 13:41 de 12 de abril de 2024. Como fundamento del rechazo, la primera instancia alega que, todo lo pagado antes del archivo del proceso corresponde al beneficiario. Es esa resolución la que apela el obligado alimentario alegando nulidad concomitante, pues indica que la resolución impugnada carece de fundamentación, que el joven beneficiario no cumplió con lo que dispone el artículo 175 inciso 5) del Código de Familia y, por consiguiente, el dinero que no le ha sido girado, le pertenece al accionado. Por ello solicita que la resolución le sea revocada. \n\r\n\n VII. Como se observa, el archivo del proceso ha sido dispuesto a partir de una gestión hecha por quien no representaba al joven neurodiverso y con discapacidades varias, pero, ni aun representándolo conforme al artículo 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, tal circunstancia no le alcanza para disponer del derecho alimentario del joven beneficiario, derecho que además es de orden personalísimo e irrenunciable en su caso. \n\r\n\n En este sentido, la actuación de la primera instancia ha sido en abierta inobservancia de las Normas Uniformes sobre la Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad, aprobadas por la Asamblea General de la ONU, 20 de diciembre de 1993; la Convención Interamericana para la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra las Personas con Discapacidad, Ley N.°7948, publicada en La Gaceta N.°238 de 8 de diciembre de 1999; la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad y su Protocolo, Ley N.°8661, La Gaceta N.°187, 29 de setiembre de 2008; la Ley para la Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, Ley N.°9379 publicada en La Gaceta N.°166 de 30 de agosto de 2016, Alcance N.°153 y que cuenta con el Reglamento N.°41087 – MTSS, publicado en La Gaceta N.°90, 23 de mayo de 2018, Alcance N.°108. Además, lo resuelto es contrario al artículo 51 de la Constitución Política, reformado mediante Ley N.°9697, el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política dice: “La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado. Igualmente, el niño y la niña, las personas adultas mayores y las personas con discapacidad,” reforma publicada en La Gaceta N.°147, 7 de agosto de 2019, Alcance N.°176. Como complemento, se ha desatendido también la Convención Iberoamericana de Derechos de los Jóvenes, Ley N.°8612, La Gaceta N.°231, 30 de noviembre de 2007. Por último, la primera instancia se ha desatendido también de la Ley General de la Persona Joven, sea la Ley N.°8612, publicada en La Gaceta N.°231, 30 de noviembre de 2007; de las Reglas de Brasilia Sobre Acceso a la Justicia de las personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad, así como los Principios y Directrices Internacionales sobre el Acceso a la Justicia para las Personas con Discapacidad refrendados por la Comisión Internacional de Juristas, la Alianza Internacional de la Discapacidad y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. Todo esto, además, considerando que, gracias a los pronunciamientos vinculantes según el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y el artículo 8.1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial emitidos por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en nuestro país, los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, que hayan sido ratificados o no por la Asamblea Legislativa, se incorporan automáticamente al ordenamiento jurídico y, con rango supraconstitucional. Al respecto, pueden ser consultadas las sentencias constitucionales N.°282-90, 17:00 de 13 de marzo de 1990; N.°719-90, 16:30 de 26 de junio de 1990; N.°1147-90, 16:00 de 21 de setiembre de 1990; N.°1846-90; 14:10, 14 de diciembre de 1990; N.°709-91, 13:56 de 20 de abril de 1991; N.°3435-92, 16:20 de 11 de noviembre de 1992; N.°3550-92, 16:00 de 24 de noviembre de 1992; N.°5759-93, 14:15 de 10 de noviembre de 1993; N.°1054-94, 15:24 de 22 de febrero de 1994; N.°1058-94, 15:36 de 22 de febrero de 1994; N.°2665-94, 15:51 de 7 de junio de 1994; N.°2313-95, 16: 18 de 9 de mayo de 1995; N.°7072-95, 11:15 de 22 de diciembre de 1995; N.°1032-96, 9:03 de 1° de marzo de 1996; N.°1319-97, 14:51 de 4 de marzo de 1997; N.°3001-97, 16:18 de 30 de mayo de 1997; N.°7706-97, 12:09 de 19 de noviembre de 1997; N.°1232-98, 16:00 25 de febrero de 1998; N.°2822-98, 15:18 de 28 de abril de 1998; N.°1801-98, 9:12 de 13 de marzo de 1998; N.°3223-98, 9:00 de 15 de mayo de 1998, N.°6830-98, 15:06 de 24 de setiembre de 1998; N.°7484-00, 9:21 de 25 de agosto de 2000; N.°7498-2000, 9:35 de 25 de agosto de 2000; N.°9685-2000, 14:56 de 1° de noviembre de 2000; N.°10693-2002, 18:20 de 7 de noviembre de 2002, N.°2771-2003, 11:40 de 4 de abril de 2003; N.°9992-2004, 14:30 de 8 de setiembre de 2004; N.°17745-2006, 14:35 de 11 de diciembre de 2006; N.°649-2007, 11:40 de 19 de enero de 2007; N.°1682-2007, 10:34 de 9 de febrero de 2007; N.°3043-2007, 14:54 de 7 de marzo de 2007; N.°4276-2007, 14:59 de 27 de marzo de 2007; N.°14183-2007, 9:53 de 24 de setiembre de 2007; N.°1682-07, 10:34 de 9 de febrero de 2007; N.°4276-07, 14:49 de 27 de marzo de 2007; N.°14183-2008, 10:03 de 24 de setiembre de 2008; N.°18902-08, 13:52 de 19 de diciembre de 2008; N.°7387-2009, 14:56 de 6 de mayo de 2009; N.°15481-2013, 11:30 de 22 de noviembre de 2013; N.°12242-19, 9:30 de 5 de julio de 2019 y N.°13821-2020, 9:15 de 22 de julio de 2020, entre otras.\n\r\n\n VIII. En este caso, el accionado reclama la nulidad de la resolución impugnada, porque según él, su hijo no tiene derecho a los alimentos debido a que no cumplió lo previsto en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, pero, tanto la primera instancia como el recurrente, han dejado de lado que el derecho a los alimentos del joven beneficiario tiene fundamento en el inciso 3) del artículo 169 del Código de Familia y que, tal derecho es personalísimo así como, irrenunciable cuando se trata de una persona que ni siquiera puede opinar y tampoco atender sus propios intereses. Incluso, si en este caso la información diagnóstica referente al joven no merecía credibilidad a la primera instancia -aspecto nunca alegado para proceder como lo hizo- bastaba con requerir una pericia utilizando los mecanismos propios de la cooperación judicial internacional.\n\r\n\nAsí las cosas, en cuanto a la resolución recurrida, es claro que es impugnable porque produce un efecto propio, cual es no recuperar dineros pagados, pero por lo ya expuesto, es claro que no lleva razón quien recurre y, lo que corresponde es denegar la nulidad reclamada y confirmar la resolución, con la aclaración de que, este asunto nunca debió ser archivado, de forma que, los efectos de tal archivo que reclama el recurrente, son contrarios a la normativa expuesta y además, no son ciertos, porque el archivo no tiene efecto retroactivo como parece entender quien apela, máxime que, el derecho a los alimentos del joven está dado por el artículo 169 inciso 3) del Código de Familia y no el inciso 5) del artículo 173 de ese Código. Además, debe quedar muy claro que, la resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020 además de que fue dictada contra el mérito de los autos y la normativa expuesta, fue dictada cuando el joven era mayor de edad y, su madre no había sido tenida como representante del joven. Nótese que tal situación -la representación- fue determinada hasta la resolución de las 15:44 de 23 de noviembre de 2023. Entonces, la resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020 nunca adquirió firmeza, puesto que fue notificada a quien entonces no representaba al joven. Además, el archivo dispuesto obedece a la imposibilidad del joven de cumplir lo que nunca debió ser prevenido y, ha sido admitido un archivo contrario a todo lo ya expuesto. Debe quedar muy claro a la primera instancia que, la situación tan lamentable e inexcusable generada en este asunto, debe ser puesta en conocimiento del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial a efecto de que el caso sea estudiado y, se sienten las responsabilidades disciplinarias que correspondan si es que ello resulta pertinente, pues en autos se indica que, se han devuelto al accionado las pensiones pagadas después del archivo. Además, corresponde a la primera instancia tomar las medidas de saneamiento necesarias para que la persona neurodiversa y con discapacidades varias, obtenga un verdadero acceso a la justicia y logre materializar su derecho de fondo que es: humano, personalísimo e irrenunciable. En este caso, la madre ha optado por no ejecutar el derecho alimentario de su hijo debido a los obstáculos irracionales que ha generado la primera instancia. \n\r\n\nPOR TANTO: \n\r\n\n En cuanto a la resolución recurrida, se deniega la nulidad reclamada y se confirma la resolución, con la aclaración de que, este asunto nunca debió ser archivado, de forma que, los efectos de tal archivo que reclama el recurrente son contrarios a la normativa expuesta. Como complemento, debe quedar muy claro que, la resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020 además de que fue dictada contra el mérito de los autos y la normativa expuesta, fue dictada cuando el joven era mayor de edad y, su madre no había sido tenida como representante del joven. Nótese que tal situación -la representación- fue determinada hasta la resolución de las 15:44 de 23 de noviembre de 2023. Entonces, la resolución de las 0:32 de 19 de noviembre de 2020 nunca adquirió firmeza, puesto que fue notificada a quien entonces no representaba al joven. Además, el archivo dispuesto obedece a la imposibilidad del joven de cumplir lo que nunca debió ser prevenido y, ha sido admitido un archivo contrario a todo lo ya expuesto. Debe quedar muy claro a la primera instancia que, la situación tan lamentable e inexcusable generada en este asunto debe ser puesta en conocimiento del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial a efecto de que el caso sea estudiado y, se sienten las responsabilidades disciplinarias que correspondan si es que ello resulta pertinente, pues en autos se indica que, se han devuelto al accionado las pensiones pagadas después del archivo. Además, corresponde a la primera instancia tomar las medidas de saneamiento necesarias para que la persona neurodiversa y con discapacidades varias, obtenga un verdadero acceso a la justicia y logre materializar su derecho de fondo que es: humano, personalísimo e irrenunciable, en este último caso, para quien no puede opinar ni atender sus propios intereses. En este caso, la madre ha optado por no ejecutar el derecho alimentario de su hijo debido a los obstáculos irracionales que ha generado la primera instancia. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Juez(a).- MSOLISM \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n???????????????\nI2MXMFQRHNW61\nMAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A TRAMITADOR/A\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\n\r\n\nEXP: 03-001223-0503-PA\n\r\n\nI Circuito Judicial de San José, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Teléfonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627. Correo electrónico: asis-j1familia@poder-judicial.go.cr", "body_en_text": "Documento PJEDITOR\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEXPEDIENTE:\n\n\n03-001223-0503-PA - 2\n\n\n\nPROCESO:\n\n\nSEGUNDA INSTANCIA\n\n\n\nACTOR/A:\n\n\n[Nombre 001]\n\n\n\nDEMANDADO/A:\n\n\n[Nombre 002]\n\n\n\n\nSENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA\n\nN° 2024000552\n\nJUZGADO DE FAMILIA ESPECIALIZADO EN APELACIONES DE PENSIONES ALIMENTARIAS.- At seventeen hours four minutes on the second of May, two thousand twenty-four.-\n\nChild support proceeding for the benefit of [Nombre 001], identity card number [Valor 001] against [Nombre 002], identity card number [Valor 002]. Having reviewed the appeal with concomitant nullity filed by the obligor against the resolution of 13:41 of April 12, 2024, and\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI. The record shows that the child support proceeding began when the beneficiary was a few months old. At that time, it was practically impossible to know that years later he would be diagnosed with severe autism and other circumstances that will be described. Thus, the first-instance judgment of 13:40 of March 1, 2020—image 176 et seq.—did not take such a situation into account. The years passed, and the record shows that the mother and son left the country. Since the support obligation, among other things, is characterized by being extraterritorial, that is, there is no rule requiring residence in the country for a person to be a beneficiary of support, the proceeding continued its course.\n\nII. In March 2020, the mother, the beneficiary still being a minor, since he was born on November 7, 2002, requested the automatic increase, and on March 5, 2020, informed the court that the then almost-adult beneficiary had been diagnosed with severe autism, impulse control problems, intellectual disability disorder, sleep disorder, severe disability in communication and social interaction, and severe intellectual disability, among other things. That information appears in the apostilled certification from image 282 to 284. The mother, based on this documentary evidence, requested to be considered the young man's representative once he reached the age of majority. In this regard, the first instance resolved by resolution of 10:01 of March 10, 2020, that the request to be designated representative should be made at the appropriate time. That is, the first instance was perfectly aware of the young man's neurodiversity and his profound limitations with his environment and postponed the issue of representation to be decided once the young man reached the age of majority, forcing the mother to reapply when that occurred. That is, the first instance did not reserve the issue for when the age of majority was verified.\n\nIII. The mother of the minor beneficiary designated a third person as generalisimo attorney-in-fact (apoderada generalísima), who appeared in the proceeding with the duly registered power of attorney (poder). Said attorney-in-fact updated the young man's diagnostic information and it is thus, through an apostilled certification dated October 9, 2020, visible from image 317 to 320, it can be determined that the almost-adult young man with a disability was diagnosed with severe autism, impulse control disorder with disruptive behavior; intellectual disability between moderate and severe; severe sleep disorder, constipation, functional dyspepsia, allotriophagy, an extremely reduced adaptive capacity in general and for daily life; he does not speak Spanish nor does he understand it; severe speech and communication disorder in the Swedish language. Furthermore, it was determined that he requires constant supervision and monitoring. That is, once again the first instance was aware in an updated manner of the young man's neurodiversity and his profound limitations with his environment, but additionally, his limitations in fulfilling any procedural burden (carga procesal) by himself, but additionally, that his right to support would bear no relation to Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). This was known before the young man reached the age of majority. At that time, it was already on record that the young man was attending a school for children due to his circumstances.\n\nIV. This diagnostic information about the beneficiary was added to the record according to a resolution at 4:37 on November 10, 2020. That is, already when the young man was of legal age and without much attention paid to its content. Later, by resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, that diagnostic information was made known to the defendant and he was notified at the means he then had for receiving notifications. The most unusual thing is that, although the first instance was fully aware of the young man's neurodiversity and the different disabilities, as well as that he attended a school for children, that he had not been in the country since at least the year 2005, and that he had limitations regarding communication, by resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, it ordered the young man to appear in the proceeding, prove that he was studying in accordance with Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, and demonstrate his academic record and course load. Furthermore, it ordered that said resolution be personally served upon him. That is, it ordered something the beneficiary could not fulfill, something that was not applicable to him, and, additionally, it ordered him to be notified of something he could never even read, and consequently, the first instance also failed to comply with Article 5 of the Notifications Law (Ley de Notificaciones) No. 8687, published in La Gaceta No. 20 of January 29, 2009. Note that, even by resolution at 9:44 on August 17, 2023, the first instance insists that the young man must be notified of the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020. Furthermore, it was on record that the beneficiary left the country in March 2005 and, according to the diagnostic information in the file, it was very clear that the young beneficiary was incorporated into a support system that has nothing to do with formal schooling.\n\nV. Subsequently, the first instance, in two resolutions, denies the archiving of the file according to a request made by the defendant. The reason for the rejection was that the termination (exclusión) must be formally processed. This appears in the resolutions at 15:57 on May 12, 2023, and 12:26 on June 27, 2023. Note that the first instance never considered the neurodiversity and disabilities of the beneficiary regarding his right to support, no longer under Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, but under the provisions of subsection 3) of Article 169 of that Code. That is, the resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, was issued without studying the file and disregarding the diagnostic information of the young beneficiary, as well as outside the scope not only of subsection 3) of Article 169 of the Family Code but of the special regulations on disability. Additionally, the first instance caused a neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities to face procedural burdens he could not fulfill and, moreover, did not have to fulfill, as his right to support did not derive from subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code.\n\nThus, the young man's mother, clearly indicating that she is the one who cares for and supervises him, that is, evidently placed in the fact scenario contemplated by Article 10 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), requested the archiving of the child support proceeding. To this end, she indicated that she requested archiving because it was impossible for her to comply with what the first instance demanded of her and, furthermore, because the young man's diagnosis prevents him from having contact with the outside world without risk to himself, meaning the young man also could not travel to Costa Rica. Therefore, it was the first instance that generated such pressure on the young man's mother, which prompted the aforementioned request for archiving, but, furthermore, it was the first instance that ignored the young man's circumstances and, additionally, accepted that a person who at that time did not represent the neurodiverse person with disabilities could dispose of a right of a deeply personal nature (derecho de orden personalísimo) belonging to the young beneficiary. Note that the archiving request dates from November 9, 2023, and at that time, there was no resolution whatsoever designating the mother as representative. For greater clarity, it was by resolution at 15:44 on November 23, 2023, that the first instance not only ordered the archiving of the file requested by someone who had not been designated representative but also, paradoxically, only at that moment considered the mother as representative of the neurodiverse young man with disabilities. That is, the first instance materialized the inexcusable violation of the young man's right to support by ordering the archiving of the file. Thus, the archiving of the proceeding requested by someone who was not the young man's representative was accepted, and, further, even if she had been, she could not dispose of a deeply personal and non-waivable right (derecho personalísimo e irrenunciable) such as the right to support; in this latter case, a characteristic arising because the holder cannot even communicate and cannot attend to his own interests.\n\nVI. Later, the young man's father, perfectly aware of his son's neurodiversity and the diagnosed disabilities, requests that all the money not disbursed to the young beneficiary be returned to him. This was denied by resolution at 13:41 on April 12, 2024. As grounds for the rejection, the first instance argues that everything paid before the filing of the proceeding belongs to the beneficiary. It is this resolution that the obligor appeals, alleging concomitant nullity, since he indicates that the challenged resolution lacks reasoning, that the young beneficiary did not comply with Article 175, subsection 5) of the Family Code, and consequently, the money not disbursed to him belongs to the defendant. For this reason, he requests that the resolution be revoked.\n\nVII. As observed, the archiving of the proceeding was ordered based on an action taken by someone who did not represent the neurodiverse young man with multiple disabilities, but, even representing him under Article 10 of the Child Support Law, such a circumstance is insufficient for her to dispose of the right to support of the young beneficiary, a right that is, moreover, deeply personal and non-waivable in his case.\n\nIn this regard, the actions of the first instance have been in clear disregard of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, approved by the UN General Assembly, December 20, 1993; the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 7948, published in La Gaceta No. 238 of December 8, 1999; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Law No. 8661, La Gaceta No. 187, September 29, 2008; the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 9379 published in La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Supplement No. 153, and which has Regulation No. 41087 – MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 90, May 23, 2018, Supplement No. 108. Furthermore, the decision is contrary to Article 51 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), amended by Law No. 9697; Article 51 of the Political Constitution states: \"The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State. Likewise, children, older adults, and persons with disabilities,\" amendment published in La Gaceta No. 147, August 7, 2019, Supplement No. 176. As a complement, the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth, Law No. 8612, La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007, has also been disregarded. Finally, the first instance has also disregarded the General Law on Young Persons, namely Law No. 8612, published in La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007; the Brasilia Rules Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People, as well as the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities endorsed by the International Commission of Jurists, the International Disability Alliance, and the United Nations Development Programme. All this, moreover, considering that, thanks to the binding pronouncements under Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and Article 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in our country, international human rights instruments, whether ratified or not by the Legislative Assembly, are automatically incorporated into the legal system and with supra-constitutional rank. In this regard, the constitutional judgments N.°282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; N.°719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; N.°1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; N.°1846-90; 14:10, December 14, 1990; N.°709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; N.°3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; N.°3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; N.°5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; N.°1054-94, 15:24 of February 22, 1994; N.°1058-94, 15:36 of February 22, 1994; N.°2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; N.°2313-95, 16: 18 of May 9, 1995; N.°7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; N.°1032-96, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; N.°1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; N.°3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; N.°7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; N.°1232-98, 16:00 February 25, 1998; N.°2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; N.°1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; N.°3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998, N.°6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; N.°7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; N.°7498-2000, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; N.°9685-2000, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; N.°10693-2002, 18:20 of November 7, 2002, N.°2771-2003, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; N.°9992-2004, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; N.°17745-2006, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; N.°649-2007, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; N.°1682-2007, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; N.°3043-2007, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; N.°4276-2007, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; N.°14183-2007, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; N.°1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; N.°4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; N.°14183-2008, 10:03 of September 24, 2008; N.°18902-08, 13:52 of December 19, 2008; N.°7387-2009, 14:56 of May 6, 2009; N.°15481-2013, 11:30 of November 22, 2013; N.°12242-19, 9:30 of July 5, 2019, and N.°13821-2020, 9:15 of July 22, 2020, among others, may be consulted.\n\nVIII. In this case, the defendant claims the nullity of the challenged resolution because, according to him, his son has no right to support since he did not comply with Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, but both the first instance and the appellant have overlooked the fact that the young beneficiary's right to support is founded on subsection 3) of Article 169 of the Family Code and that such a right is deeply personal, as well as non-waivable when it concerns a person who cannot even express an opinion and also cannot attend to their own interests. Even if, in this case, the diagnostic information regarding the young man lacked credibility for the first instance—a point never alleged to proceed as it did—it was sufficient to request an expert report (pericia) using the mechanisms of international judicial cooperation.\n\nThus, regarding the challenged resolution, it is clear that it is appealable because it produces its own effect, which is the non-recovery of monies paid, but for the reasons already set forth, it is clear that the appellant is not correct, and what is appropriate is to deny the claimed nullity and confirm the resolution, with the clarification that this matter should never have been archived, so that the effects of such filing claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth and, moreover, are not accurate, because the filing does not have a retroactive effect as the appellant seems to understand, especially since the young man's right to support is granted by Article 169, subsection 3) of the Family Code and not subsection 5) of Article 173 of that Code. Furthermore, it must be very clear that the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, besides having been issued against the merits of the record and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man was of legal age and his mother had not been considered as the young man's representative. Note that such situation—the representation—was not determined until the resolution at 15:44 on November 23, 2023. Thus, the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, never became final (adquirió firmeza), since it was served upon someone who did not then represent the young man. Furthermore, the ordered filing is due to the young man's impossibility to comply with what should never have been ordered, and a filing contrary to all that has been set forth has been admitted. It must be very clear to the first instance that the regrettable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter must be brought to the attention of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial so that the case can be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities are established, if pertinent, since it is indicated in the record that the support payments made after the filing have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the first instance to take the necessary corrective measures (medidas de saneamiento) so that the neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities obtains true access to justice and manages to materialize his substantive right, which is: human, deeply personal, and non-waivable. In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's right to support due to the irrational obstacles generated by the first instance.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nRegarding the challenged resolution, the claimed nullity is denied and the resolution is confirmed, with the clarification that this matter should never have been archived, so that the effects of such filing claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth. As a complement, it must be very clear that the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, besides having been issued against the merits of the record and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man was of legal age and his mother had not been considered as the young man's representative. Note that such situation—the representation—was not determined until the resolution at 15:44 on November 23, 2023. Thus, the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, never became final, since it was served upon someone who did not then represent the young man. Furthermore, the ordered filing is due to the young man's impossibility to comply with what should never have been ordered, and a filing contrary to all that has been set forth has been admitted. It must be very clear to the first instance that the regrettable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter must be brought to the attention of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial so that the case can be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities are established, if pertinent, since it is indicated in the record that the support payments made after the filing have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the first instance to take the necessary corrective measures so that the neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities obtains true access to justice and manages to materialize his substantive right, which is: human, deeply personal, and non-waivable (in this latter case, for someone who cannot opine or attend to their own interests). In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's right to support due to the irrational obstacles generated by the first instance. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Judge.- MSOLISM\n\n\n\n???????????????\nI2MXMFQRHNW61\nMAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A TRAMITADOR/A\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEXP: 03-001223-0503-PA\n\nI Circuito Judicial de San José, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Teléfonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627.\n\nEMAIL: asis-j1familia@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\n| EXPEDIENTE: | 03-001223-0503-PA - 2 |\n| PROCESO: | SEGUNDA INSTANCIA |\n| ACTOR/A: | [Nombre 001] |\n| DEMANDADO/A: | [Nombre 002] |\n\nSENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA\n\n N° 2024000552\n\nJUZGADO DE FAMILIA ESPECIALIZADO EN APELACIONES DE PENSIONES ALIMENTARIAS.- At seventeen hours four minutes on the second of May two thousand twenty-four.-\n\nChild support proceeding (proceso alimentario) for the benefit of **[Nombre 001]**, identity card number **[Valor 001]** against **[Nombre 002]**, identity card number [Valor 002]. Having reviewed the appeal with concomitant nullity (recurso de apelación con nulidad concomitante) filed by the support obligor against the resolution of 13:41 on 12 April 2024 and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\n**I.** The record shows that the child support proceeding began when the beneficiary was a few months old. At that time, it was practically impossible to know that years later he would be diagnosed with severe autism and other circumstances to be discussed. Thus, the first-instance judgment of 13:40 on 1° of March 2020 -image 176 and following- did not take that situation into consideration. The years passed and the record shows that mother and son left the country. Since the support obligation (obligación alimentaria), among other things, is characterized by being extraterritorial, meaning there is no rule requiring a person to reside in the country to be a beneficiary of support (alimentos), the proceeding continued its course.\n\n**II.** In March 2020, the mother, the beneficiary still being a minor since he was born on 7 November 2002, requested the automatic increase and, on 5 March 2020, informed the court that the then almost-adult beneficiary had been diagnosed with severe autism, impulse control problems, intellectual disability disorder, sleep disorder, severe communication and social interaction disability, and severe intellectual disability, among other things. This information is contained in the apostilled certification from image 282 to 284. Based on this documentary evidence, the mother requested to be considered the young man's representative once he reached the age of majority. In this regard, the first instance court resolved by resolution at 10:01 on 10 March 2020, that the request to be designated representative had to be filed at the appropriate time. That is, the first instance court was perfectly aware of the young man's neurodiversity and his profound limitations interacting with his environment and postponed the representation issue to be decided once the young man reached the age of majority, forcing the mother to re-file when that occurred. That is, the first instance court did not reserve the matter for when the age of majority was verified.\n\n**III.** The mother of the minor beneficiary designated a third party as her generalísima attorney-in-fact (apoderada generalísima), who appeared in the proceeding with the duly registered power of attorney. Said attorney updated the young man's diagnostic information, and it is thus, through an apostilled certification dated 9 October 2020, visible from image 317 to 320, that it is established that the nearly adult young man with a disability was diagnosed with severe autism, impulse control disorder with disruptive behavior; moderate to severe intellectual disability; severe sleep disorder, constipation, functional dyspepsia, allotriophagy, extremely reduced adaptive capacity in general and for daily life; he does not speak Spanish nor understand it; severe speech and communication disorder in the Swedish language. Furthermore, it was determined that he requires constant supervision and monitoring. That is, once again, the first instance court was aware in an updated manner of the young man's neurodiversity and his profound limitations interacting with his environment, but additionally, his limitations in fulfilling any procedural burden by himself, and moreover, that his right to support (alimentos) would have no relation whatsoever to Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). This was known before the young man reached the age of majority. By then, the record already showed that the young man was attending a school for children due to his circumstances.\n\n**IV.**\n\nThis diagnostic information regarding the beneficiary was added to the case file by resolution at 4:37 on November 10, 2020. That is, when the young man was already of legal age and without greater attention to its content. Subsequently, by resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, this diagnostic information was made known to the respondent and was notified through the means he then had to receive notifications. What is most strange is that, although the lower court fully knew of the young man's neurodiversity and the different disabilities, as well as that he attended a school for children, that he had not been in the country at least since the year 2005, and that he had communication limitations, by resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, it ordered the young man to appear in the proceedings, to prove that he was studying in accordance with Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), as well as to demonstrate his academic record and course load. Moreover, it ordered that said resolution be notified to him personally. That is, it ordered something that the beneficiary could not fulfill, something that was not applicable to him and, moreover, ordered notifying him of something that he could never even read and, consequently, the lower court also failed to comply with the provisions of Article 5 of the Notifications Law No. 8687 (Ley de Notificaciones N° 8687), published in La Gaceta No. 20 of January 29, 2009. Note that, even by resolution at 9:44 on August 17, 2023, the lower court insists that the young man must be notified of the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020. Furthermore, it was on record in the case file that the beneficiary left the country in March 2005 and, according to the diagnostic information in the file, it was very clear that the young beneficiary was part of a support system that had nothing to do with schooling per se.\n\nV. Subsequently, the lower court in two resolutions denies archiving the case file following a request made by the respondent. The reason for the rejection was that the exclusion must be formally processed. This is recorded in the resolutions at 15:57 on May 12, 2023, and 12:26 on June 27, 2023. Notably, the lower court never considered the beneficiary's neurodiversity and disabilities regarding his maintenance right, not in accordance with Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code but rather, pursuant to the provisions of subsection 3) of Article 169 of that Code. That is, the resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, was issued without studying the case file and disregarding the young beneficiary's diagnostic information, as well as aside from not only subsection 3) of Article 169 of the Family Code but also the special regulations on disability. Furthermore, the lower court caused a neurodiverse person with various disabilities to face procedural burdens that he could not fulfill and, moreover, that he had no reason to fulfill, since his right to maintenance did not derive from subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code.\n\nThus, it was that the young man's mother, clearly indicating that she is the one who cares for and supervises him, that is, evidently placed within the factual situation contemplated by Article 10 of the Maintenance Pensions Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), requested the archiving of the maintenance proceeding. To this end, she indicated that she was requesting the archiving because it was impossible for her to comply with what the lower court demanded and, moreover, because the young man's diagnosis prevents him from having contact with the outside world without risk to himself, so the young man also could not travel to Costa Rica. Therefore, it was the lower court itself that generated such pressure on the young man's mother, which provoked the aforementioned request for archiving, but, furthermore, it was the lower court that ignored the young man's circumstances and, moreover, accepted that a person who at that time did not represent the neurodiverse person with disabilities, dispose of a highly personal right of the young beneficiary. Note that the request for archiving dates from November 9, 2023, and at that time, there was no resolution designating the mother as representative. For greater clarity, it was by resolution at 15:44 on November 23, 2023, that the lower court not only orders the archiving of the file requested by someone who had not been designated as representative but, moreover, it is only at that moment and, paradoxically, that it recognizes the mother as the representative of the neurodiverse young man with disabilities. That is, the lower court consummates the inexcusable violation of the young man's maintenance right by ordering the archiving of the file. Thus, the archiving of the proceeding was admitted at the request of someone who was not the young man's representative and, moreover, even if she were, she could not dispose of a highly personal and inalienable right such as the maintenance right, in this last case, a characteristic that arises because the titleholder cannot even communicate and cannot attend to his own interests.\n\nVI. Subsequently, the young man's father, knowing perfectly well his son's neurodiversity and the diagnosed disabilities, requests that all the money that has not been remitted to the young beneficiary be returned to him. This was denied by resolution at 13:41 on April 12, 2024. As a basis for the rejection, the lower court alleges that everything paid before the archiving of the proceeding belongs to the beneficiary.\n\nIt is that resolution which the child support obligor appeals, alleging concomitant nullity, as he indicates that the challenged resolution lacks reasoning, that the young beneficiary did not comply with the provisions of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and, consequently, the money that has not been remitted to him belongs to the defendant. He therefore requests that the resolution be revoked.\n\n**VII.** As can be seen, the closure (archivo) of the proceeding was ordered based on a petition made by someone who did not represent the neurodiverse young man with multiple disabilities, and even if she had represented him in accordance with article 10 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), such circumstance is insufficient for her to dispose of the young beneficiary’s right to child support, a right that is, moreover, strictly personal (personalísimo) and inalienable (irrenunciable) in his case.\n\nIn this regard, the lower court’s action has been in open disregard of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, approved by the UN General Assembly, December 20, 1993; the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 7948, published in La Gaceta No. 238 of December 8, 1999; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Law No. 8661, La Gaceta No. 187, September 29, 2008; the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 9379 published in La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Supplement (Alcance) No. 153 and which has Regulation No. 41087 – MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 90, May 23, 2018, Supplement (Alcance) No. 108. Furthermore, the decision is contrary to article 51 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), amended by Law No. 9697, article 51 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) states: *“The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to special protection by the State. Likewise, children, older adults, and persons with disabilities,”* reform published in La Gaceta No. 147, August 7, 2019, Supplement (Alcance) No. 176. In addition, the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth, Law No. 8612, La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007, has also been disregarded. Finally, the lower court has also disregarded the General Law on Young Persons, i.e., Law No. 8612, published in La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007; the Brasilia Rules Regarding Access to Justice for Persons in Vulnerable Conditions, as well as the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities endorsed by the International Commission of Jurists, the International Disability Alliance, and the United Nations Development Programme. All of this, furthermore, considering that, thanks to the binding pronouncements under article 13 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and article 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in our country, international human rights instruments, whether or not they have been ratified by the Legislative Assembly, are automatically incorporated into the legal system with supra-constitutional rank. In this regard, constitutional judgments No. 282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; No. 719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; No. 1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; No. 1846-90; 14:10, December 14, 1990; No. 709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; No. 3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; No. 3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; No. 5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; No. 1054-94, 15:24 of February 22, 1994; No. 1058-94, 15:36 of February 22, 1994; No. 2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; No. 2313-95, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; No. 1032-96, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; No. 1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; No. 3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; No. 7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; No. 1232-98, 16:00 February 25, 1998; No. 2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; No. 1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; No. 3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998, No. 6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; No. 7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; No. 7498-2000, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; No. 9685-2000, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; No. 10693-2002, 18:20 of November 7, 2002, No. 2771-2003, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; No. 9992-2004, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; No. 17745-2006, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; No. 649-2007, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; No. 1682-2007, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 3043-2007, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; No. 4276-2007, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-2007, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-2008, 10:03 of September 24, 2008; No. 18902-08, 13:52 of December 19, 2008; No. 7387-2009, 14:56 of May 6, 2009; No. 15481-2013, 11:30 of November 22, 2013; No. 12242-19, 9:30 of July 5, 2019 and No. 13821-2020, 9:15 of July 22, 2020, among others, may be consulted.\n\n**VIII.** In this case, the defendant claims the nullity of the challenged resolution, because according to him, his son is not entitled to child support due to his failure to comply with the provisions of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), but both the lower court and the appellant have overlooked that the young beneficiary’s right to child support is based on subsection 3) of article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and that such right is strictly personal (personalísimo) as well as inalienable (irrenunciable) when it concerns a person who cannot even express an opinion, nor attend to his own interests. Even if, in this case, the diagnostic information regarding the young man did not appear credible to the lower court—an aspect never alleged in order to proceed as it did—it would have been sufficient to request an expert evaluation using the mechanisms inherent in international judicial cooperation.\n\nThus, regarding the appealed resolution, it is clear that it is challengeable because it produces a specific effect, namely, the non-recovery of monies paid, but based on the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant is not correct, and what is appropriate is to deny the nullity claimed and confirm the resolution, with the clarification that this matter should never have been closed (archivarse), so the effects of such closure (archivo) claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth and, moreover, are not accurate, because the closure (archivo) has no retroactive effect as the appellant seems to understand, especially since the young man’s right to child support is established by article 169, subsection 3) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and not subsection 5) of article 173 of that Code. Furthermore, it must be very clear that the resolution of 0:32 of November 19, 2020, besides having been issued against the merits of the case file and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man was of legal age and his mother had not been appointed as the young man’s representative. It should be noted that this situation—the representation—was not determined until the resolution of 15:44 of November 23, 2023. Therefore, the resolution of 0:32 of November 19, 2020 never became final (firmeza), since it was notified to someone who did not then represent the young man. Moreover, the ordered closure (archivo) stems from the young man’s impossibility of complying with what he should never have been ordered to do, and a closure (archivo) contrary to everything already set forth has been admitted.\n\nIt must be very clear to the first instance that the lamentable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter should be brought to the attention of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) so that the case may be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities may be determined if deemed pertinent, since the record indicates that the support payments made after the archiving have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the first instance to take the necessary remedial measures so that the neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities obtains true access to justice and is able to realize his substantive right, which is: human, highly personal, and inalienable. In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's support right due to the irrational obstacles generated by the first instance.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nRegarding the appealed ruling, the claimed nullity is denied and the ruling is confirmed, with the clarification that this matter should never have been archived, such that the effects of said archiving claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth. As a complement, it must be very clear that the ruling of 00:32 on November 19, 2020, besides being issued against the merits of the record and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man had reached the age of majority and his mother had not been named as the young man's representative. Note that this situation —the representation— was not determined until the ruling at 3:44 p.m. on November 23, 2023. Therefore, the ruling of 00:32 on November 19, 2020 never became final, since it was notified to someone who did not represent the young man at the time. Furthermore, the ordered archiving is due to the impossibility of the young man to comply with what should never have been ordered, and an archiving contrary to all that has been set forth has been admitted. It must be very clear to the first instance that the lamentable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter should be brought to the attention of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) so that the case may be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities may be determined if deemed pertinent, since the record indicates that the support payments made after the archiving have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the first instance to take the necessary remedial measures so that the neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities obtains true access to justice and is able to realize his substantive right, which is: human, highly personal, and inalienable, in this latter case, for someone who cannot express an opinion or attend to his own interests. In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's support right due to the irrational obstacles generated by the first instance. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Judge.- MSOLISM \n\n| | | |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| \"\"
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MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A TRAMITADOR/A | | |\n\nEXP: 03-001223-0503-PA\n\nI Circuito Judicial de San José, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Teléfonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627. Correo electrónico: asis-j1familia@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nEven if, in this case, the diagnostic information concerning the young man did not merit credibility from the first instance court—an aspect never alleged to proceed as it did—it was sufficient to request an expert opinion using the mechanisms of international judicial cooperation. [...]\"\n\nThat is to say, once again the first instance was fully aware of the young man's neurodiversity and his profound limitations with his environment, but also his limitations in fulfilling any procedural burden by himself, and furthermore, that his right to child support (alimentos) bore no relation whatsoever to Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). This was known before the young man reached the age of majority. By then, it was already on record that the young man was attending a school for children due to his circumstances.\n\nIV. This diagnostic information of the beneficiary was added to the case file (autos) by resolution at 4:37 on November 10, 2020. That is, when the young man was already of legal age and without much attention paid to its content. Subsequently, by resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020, this diagnostic information was made known to the defendant and he was notified through the means he then had for receiving notifications. What is even stranger is that, although the first instance was fully aware of the young man's neurodiversity and various disabilities, as well as that he attended a school for children, that he had not been in the country since at least the year 2005, and that he had communication limitations, by resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, it ordered the young man to appear in the process, to prove he was studying in accordance with Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), and to demonstrate his academic record and course load. Furthermore, it ordered that this resolution be notified to him personally. That is, it ordered something the beneficiary could not fulfill, something that was not applicable to him, and, furthermore, it ordered notification of something he could never even read, and consequently, the first instance also failed to comply with the provisions of Article 5 of the Notifications Law No. 8687 (Ley de Notificaciones N.° 8687), published in La Gaceta No. 20 of January 29, 2009. Note that, even by resolution at 9:44 on August 17, 2023, the first instance insists that the young man must be notified of the resolution at 0:32 on November 19, 2020. Furthermore, it was on record in the case file that the beneficiary had left the country in March of the year 2005 and, according to the diagnostic information in the case file, it was very clear that the young beneficiary was incorporated into a support system that has nothing to do with formal schooling per se.\n\nV. Next, in two resolutions, the first instance denies archiving the case file according to a request made by the defendant. The reason for the rejection was that the termination must be formally processed. This is recorded in the resolutions at 15:57 on May 12, 2023, and 12:26 on June 27, 2023. It can be seen that the first instance never considered the beneficiary's neurodiversity and disabilities regarding his right to child support, no longer under Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) but, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3) of Article 169 of that Code. That is, the resolution at 1:24 on December 4, 2020, was issued without studying the case file and disregarding the diagnostic information of the young beneficiary, as well as outside the scope not only of subsection 3) of Article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) but also of the special regulations on disability. Moreover, the first instance caused a neurodiverse person with multiple disabilities to face procedural burdens he could not fulfill and, furthermore, had no reason to fulfill, since his right to child support did not derive from subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia).\n\nThus, the young man's mother, clearly indicating that she is the one who cares for and supervises him, that is, evidently placed in the factual scenario contemplated by Article 10 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), requested the archiving of the child support process. To that end, she stated that she was requesting the archiving because it was impossible for her to comply with what the first instance was demanding and, furthermore, because the young man's diagnosis prevents him from having contact with the outside world without risk to himself, so the young man also could not travel to Costa Rica. So, it was the first instance that generated such pressure on the young man's mother that it provoked the aforementioned request for archiving, but, furthermore, it was the first instance that ignored the young man's circumstances and, moreover, allowed a person who at that time did not represent the neurodiverse person with disabilities to dispose of a right of a highly personal nature belonging to the young beneficiary. Note that the archiving request dates from November 9, 2023, and by that time, there was no resolution designating the mother as a representative. For greater clarity, it was by resolution at 15:44 on November 23, 2023, that the first instance not only orders the archiving of the case file requested by someone who had not been designated as a representative but also, it is only at that moment and, paradoxically, that it recognizes the mother as the representative of the neurodiverse young man with disabilities. That is, the first instance finalizes the inexcusable violation of the young man's right to child support by ordering the case file to be archived.\n\nThen, the filing of the case was admitted, requested by someone who was not the young man's representative and, moreover, even if they were, they could not dispose of a highly personal and inalienable right such as the right to child support (derecho alimentario), in this latter case, a characteristic that arises because the holder cannot even communicate and cannot attend to their own interests.\n\n**VI.** Subsequently, the young man's father, fully aware of his son's neurodiversity and diagnosed disabilities, requests that all money not paid to the young beneficiary be returned to him. This was denied by a resolution at 1:41 p.m. on April 12, 2024. As grounds for the denial, the lower court argues that everything paid before the case was filed belongs to the beneficiary. It is this resolution that the child support obligor (obligado alimentario) appeals, alleging concomitant nullity, as he indicates that the challenged resolution lacks legal reasoning (fundamentación), that the young beneficiary did not comply with the provisions of Article 175, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and, consequently, the money that has not been paid to him belongs to the defendant. He therefore requests that the resolution be revoked.\n\n**VII.** As can be observed, the filing of the case was ordered based on an action taken by someone who did not represent the neurodiverse young man with multiple disabilities, but, even if representing him in accordance with Article 10 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), such circumstance does not extend to allowing him to dispose of the young beneficiary's right to child support, a right which is also highly personal and, in his case, inalienable.\n\nIn this regard, the lower court's actions have been in open disregard of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, approved by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1993; the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 7948, published in La Gaceta No. 238 of December 8, 1999; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Law No. 8661, La Gaceta No. 187, September 29, 2008; the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities (Ley para la Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad), Law No. 9379 published in La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Supplement No. 153 and which has Regulation No. 41087 – MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 90, May 23, 2018, Supplement No. 108. Furthermore, the decision is contrary to Article 51 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), reformed by Law No. 9697, Article 51 of the Political Constitution states: *\"The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to special protection by the State. Likewise, the child, older adults, and persons with disabilities,\"* a reform published in La Gaceta No. 147, August 7, 2019, Supplement No. 176. As a complement, the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth (Convención Iberoamericana de Derechos de los Jóvenes), Law No. 8612, La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007, has also been disregarded. Finally, the lower court has also disregarded the General Law of the Young Person (Ley General de la Persona Joven), specifically Law No. 8612, published in La Gaceta No. 231, November 30, 2007; the Brasilia Rules Regarding Access to Justice for Persons in Vulnerable Conditions (Reglas de Brasilia Sobre Acceso a la Justicia de las personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad), as well as the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities endorsed by the International Commission of Jurists, the International Disability Alliance, and the United Nations Development Programme. All of this, additionally, considering that, thanks to the binding pronouncements according to Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and Article 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in our country, international human rights instruments, whether ratified or not by the Legislative Assembly, are automatically incorporated into the legal system and with supra-constitutional rank. In this regard, the following constitutional judgments can be consulted: No. 282-90, 5:00 p.m. of March 13, 1990; No. 719-90, 4:30 p.m. of June 26, 1990; No. 1147-90, 4:00 p.m. of September 21, 1990; No. 1846-90; 2:10 p.m., December 14, 1990; No. 709-91, 1:56 p.m. of April 20, 1991; No. 3435-92, 4:20 p.m. of November 11, 1992; No. 3550-92, 4:00 p.m. of November 24, 1992; No. 5759-93, 2:15 p.m. of November 10, 1993; No. 1054-94, 3:24 p.m. of February 22, 1994; No. 1058-94, 3:36 p.m. of February 22, 1994; No. 2665-94, 3:51 p.m. of June 7, 1994; No. 2313-95, 4:18 p.m. of May 9, 1995; No. 7072-95, 11:15 a.m. of December 22, 1995; No. 1032-96, 9:03 a.m. of March 1, 1996; No. 1319-97, 2:51 p.m. of March 4, 1997; No. 3001-97, 4:18 p.m. of May 30, 1997; No. 7706-97, 12:09 p.m. of November 19, 1997; No. 1232-98, 4:00 p.m. February 25, 1998; No. 2822-98, 3:18 p.m. of April 28, 1998; No. 1801-98, 9:12 a.m. of March 13, 1998; No. 3223-98, 9:00 a.m. of May 15, 1998, No. 6830-98, 3:06 p.m. of September 24, 1998; No. 7484-00, 9:21 a.m. of August 25, 2000; No. 7498-2000, 9:35 a.m. of August 25, 2000; No. 9685-2000, 2:56 p.m. of November 1, 2000; No. 10693-2002, 6:20 p.m. of November 7, 2002, No. 2771-2003, 11:40 a.m. of April 4, 2003; No. 9992-2004, 2:30 p.m. of September 8, 2004; No. 17745-2006, 2:35 p.m. of December 11, 2006; No. 649-2007, 11:40 a.m. of January 19, 2007; No. 1682-2007, 10:34 a.m. of February 9, 2007; No. 3043-2007, 2:54 p.m. of March 7, 2007; No. 4276-2007, 2:59 p.m. of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-2007, 9:53 a.m. of September 24, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 a.m. of February 9, 2007; No. 4276-07, 2:49 p.m. of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-2008, 10:03 a.m. of September 24, 2008; No. 18902-08, 1:52 p.m. of December 19, 2008; No. 7387-2009, 2:56 p.m. of May 6, 2009; No. 15481-2013, 11:30 a.m. of November 22, 2013; No. 12242-19, 9:30 a.m. of July 5, 2019 and No. 13821-2020, 9:15 a.m. of July 22, 2020, among others.\n\n**VIII.** In this case, the defendant claims the nullity of the challenged resolution because, according to him, his son is not entitled to child support because he did not comply with the provisions of Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, but both the lower court and the appellant have overlooked that the young beneficiary's right to child support is based on subsection 3) of Article 169 of the Family Code and that such right is highly personal and inalienable when it concerns a person who cannot even express an opinion and also cannot attend to their own interests.\n\nEven if, in this case, the diagnostic information regarding the young man did not merit credibility to the first instance—an aspect never alleged for it to proceed as it did—it would have been sufficient to request an expert opinion using the mechanisms of international judicial cooperation.\n\nThus, as for the appealed resolution, it is clear that it is appealable because it produces its own effect, which is the non-recovery of monies paid, but for the reasons already set forth, it is clear that the appellant is not correct, and what is appropriate is to deny the claimed nullity and confirm the resolution, with the clarification that this matter should never have been archived, such that the effects of that archiving claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth and, furthermore, are not true, because the archiving does not have retroactive effect as the appellant seems to understand, especially since the young man's right to support (alimentos) is established by Article 169, subsection 3) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and not subsection 5) of Article 173 of that Code. Furthermore, it must be made very clear that the resolution of 0:32 on November 19, 2020, in addition to having been issued against the merits of the case file and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man was of legal age and his mother had not been considered his representative. Note that this situation—the representation—was not determined until the resolution of 15:44 on November 23, 2023. Therefore, the resolution of 0:32 on November 19, 2020, never became final, since it was notified to someone who at that time did not represent the young man. Furthermore, the ordered archiving is due to the young man's impossibility of complying with what he should never have been ordered to do, and an archiving contrary to everything already set forth has been admitted. It must be made very clear to the first instance that this highly regrettable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter must be brought to the attention of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial so that the case may be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities may be established if that is pertinent, since the case file indicates that the support payments made after the archiving have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the first instance to take the necessary remedial measures (medidas de saneamiento) so that the neurodiverse person with various disabilities obtains true access to justice and manages to materialize his substantive right, which is: human, highly personal, and inalienable. In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's support right due to the irrational obstacles that the first instance has generated.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nRegarding the appealed resolution, the claimed nullity is denied and the resolution is confirmed, with the clarification that this matter should never have been archived, such that the effects of that archiving claimed by the appellant are contrary to the regulations set forth. As a complement, it must be made very clear that the resolution of 0:32 on November 19, 2020, in addition to having been issued against the merits of the case file and the regulations set forth, was issued when the young man was of legal age and his mother had not been considered his representative. Note that this situation—the representation—was not determined until the resolution of 15:44 on November 23, 2023. Therefore, the resolution of 0:32 on November 19, 2020, never became final, since it was notified to someone who at that time did not represent the young man. Furthermore, the ordered archiving is due to the young man's impossibility of complying with what he should never have been ordered to do, and an archiving contrary to everything already set forth has been admitted. It must be made very clear to the first instance that this highly regrettable and inexcusable situation generated in this matter must be brought to the attention of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial so that the case may be studied and the corresponding disciplinary responsibilities may be established if that is pertinent, since the case file indicates that the support payments made after the archiving have been returned to the defendant. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the first instance to take the necessary remedial measures (medidas de saneamiento) so that the neurodiverse person with various disabilities obtains true access to justice and manages to materialize his substantive right, which is: human, highly personal, and inalienable, in the latter case, for someone who cannot express an opinion or attend to their own interests. In this case, the mother has chosen not to enforce her son's support right due to the irrational obstacles that the first instance has generated. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Juez(a).- MSOLISM\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| ![]() | |\n\nEXP: 03-001223-0503-PA\nI Circuito Judicial de San José, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Teléfonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627. Correo electrónico: asis-j1familia@poder-judicial.go.cr" }