Daniel Aguilar Méndez
\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes José Roberto Garita Navarro
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NOTE FROM JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.- Regarding the order to pay costs, although the criterion is unanimous that it must indeed be imposed on the losing party for the sole fact of being so, with all due respect I differ from my colleagues regarding the abstract nature of this part of the judgment. Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes that the order to pay costs is an ex officio and mandatory pronouncement for the adjudicator, concerning an item of a monetary nature and which, therefore, should be liquidated in the judgment (Art. 123.1 CPCA: “…When it is possible to fix any item in the judgment itself, the Court shall liquidate it, including its proper updating…”). Said provision is reinforced by the supplementary application of Article 62.1 of the Código Procesal Civil (pursuant to numerals 220 thereof and Articles 9 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which prescribes that in any order regarding economic aspects determinable in money “… the exact amount of the sums granted must be established at once, their adjustments up to the judgment, including interest and costs…” (Highlighting is not from the original). Furthermore, the deciding body has the necessary elements to make that pronouncement, and since it is an obligation arising from law, based on a mandatory procedural rule (Art. 3.5 CPC) and a pronouncement that is in any case ex officio, it does not depend on a party's request, so that its liquidation in the judgment would not violate the party disposition principle. Finally, I consider that the omission of a pronouncement and its reservation to the enforcement phase ends up affecting the duration of proceedings and increases the judicial backlog, which contradicts the right to effective judicial protection and the principles of procedural impetus, economy, and celerity, as well as concentration, which pursuant to Article 2.8 CPC implies that “… All procedural activity should be carried out in the fewest possible acts and time…” Thus, I consider that the Court has an ex officio duty to liquidate that amount in the ruling and not reserve its pronouncement for the judgment enforcement stage. - Daniel Aguilar Méndez, Judge.-
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EXP: 22-004246-1027-CA
\nGoicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006.
\n\nEmail: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nVIII.- In essence, this public consultation hearing seeks citizen participation in public affairs, in this case, through decentralized entities and corporate organizations and associations recognized by law.\"\n\n-\nCONSIDERING:\n\n**I.- PRELIMINARY ASPECTS. -** **A)** This resolution is issued in accordance with the formalities established in Law No. 9342, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and the Regulations on the Electronic Judicial File before the Judicial Branch (REJEPJ), approved by the Full Court in article XXXI of session No. 22-13, held on May 20, 2013. In that sense, it is recorded that, by provision adopted by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch in Art. XXXV adopted in session No. 80-2024 of September 5, 2024, and the second paragraph of art. 28.2 CPC, the date and time set forth for this resolution corresponds to that automatically assigned by institutional computer systems. **B)** The ruling is adopted **unanimously**, after the respective deliberation, with the drafting of the resolution in charge of the **rapporteur, judge Aguilar Méndez, with the concurring vote and opinion of judges Garita Navarro and Fernández Brenes.** However, Judge Aguilar Méndez includes a note regarding the costs section. **C)** As recorded in the Virtual Desktop System, this process was assigned to the Team 6 Collegiate Court and the reporting judge, in accordance with the criteria defined for the implementation of the redesign of the Jurisdiction approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch in agreements numbers XXVIII of Session No. 84-2021 of September 28, 2021, and XXXIX of Session No. 95-2021 of November 4, 2021, and as ordered by the Commission on Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation in agreements No. 2.VI.2023, 11.VI.2023, and 12.VI.2023, adopted in the session held on July 27, 2023, in articles X and XI of the session held on August 24, 2023 (Official Communications 001- CCACH-2023 and 003-CCACH-2023, respectively), and article III of the session held on September 6, 2023 (Official Communication 017-CCACH-2023). **D)** Based on the provisions of article 147 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as well as the principle of functional equivalence of electronic documents, set forth in articles 3 of the Law on Certificates, Digital Signatures, and Electronic Documents, and 11 REJEPJ, coupled with the fact that the CPC only requires the identification of the evidentiary source for the list of proven and unproven facts in the judgment (Art. 61.2.2), and taking into account that the documentary collection corresponding to the judicial file is directly incorporated into the databases of this Branch of the Republic, this Chamber has decided that for purposes of reference and identification of the documentary evidence and procedural acts contained therein, only the image numbers (im. /ims.) in which these appear in the digital document—which, in a \".pdf\" format file and ordered in ascending manner, has been downloaded from the electronic judicial file computer application as of the date of this resolution—will be indicated. –\n\n**II.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING AND ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. -** The claims that constitute the object of this proceeding—as they were defined in the preliminary hearing—correspond to the following:\n\n\"… IV- CLAIMS.\nPRIMARY: I request that the judgment declare:\n1.- The absolute nullity and invalidity of RESOLUTION No. SENASA - DG - 002 - 2021, of January sixth, two thousand twenty-one.\n2.- That the Respondent Party be ordered to pay the entirety of the costs of this proceeding…\"\n\nIn summary, the plaintiff supports said annulment claim on five allegations: **1)** Lack of competence of the Directorate of SENASA to issue the contested act, as it opines that this corresponds to the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios de Costa Rica; **2)** Lack of grounds (motivo), since the contested conduct does not indicate the facts on which it is based, in addition to resorting to an illegal grounds; **3)** Defect in the content, which it qualifies as illegitimate, since this act seeks the use of the \"sanitary order (orden sanitaria)\" figure for purposes other than those provided for in the legislation, through the delegation of official inspection duties to private workers; **4)** Lack of reasoning (motivación), since the challenged resolution does not express the studies, reports, expert opinions, or criteria on which it is supported; and **5)** Lack of procedure, since, in its view, due legal process was violated. – For their part, both the representation of the **State** and of **SENASA** answered the complaint negatively, raised the material defense of lack of right, and requested that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay both sets of costs. In the case of the **State,** its judicial representation argues that SENASA has sufficient legal powers under articles 5 and 6 of the Ley General de Salud Animal to issue the act in question, as it is an operating requirement for animal slaughter establishments; likewise, it asserts that this conduct is not regulating the profession of veterinary doctors and, therefore, it is not interfering with the powers of the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios. It alleges that the plaintiff incurs a contradiction regarding the defect in the grounds (motivo), since it either lacks grounds or they are illegal, not both at the same time. In any case, it considers that the fact that the contested resolution does not have a facts section does not in itself imply an absence of grounds, and that in the contested conduct this can be verified in the Considering clauses of the act.\n\nIt alleges that the sanitary order being challenged by the plaintiffs is in accordance with the legal powers of SENASA pursuant to Articles 89 and 91 of the General Animal Health Law (Ley General de Salud Animal), as well as numerals 3, 7, and 8 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing (Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes) (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001), and also Articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Physicians (Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios) (19184 of July 10, 1989), given that it is not that body which is responsible for the veterinary medical oversight of animal slaughter establishments, but rather the veterinary physicians, and it is the obligation of said businesses to have the supervision (regencia) of those professionals. Regarding the alleged lack of reasoning (motivación), the State's representative alleges that the fact that technical criteria are not mentioned in the resolution does not mean they are non-existent. She notes that in the administrative file it can be verified that the act complies with the corresponding criteria and studies. Furthermore, she points out that although the act does not indicate the remedies available against it, this is not a substantive defect, since the conduct is subject to the remedial provisions of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), of which the plaintiffs cannot claim ignorance. She adds that, in any case, the distribution of the resolution by region was delegated to the National Operations Directorate of SENASA, and it was also published on that agency's website. The judicial defense of SENASA indicates, like the State, that this body has the authority to issue the act in question, specifically, in Law No. 8495, the General Animal Health Law (Ley General de Salud Animal). It notes that the Sanitary Authority must comply, in a binding manner, with guidelines issued by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH/OIE), which is a reference body in the field of Animal Health within the system established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and of which Costa Rica is a member. It points out that among these binding directives is section 3.4.5 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Código Sanitario para los animales terrestres), which stipulates the possibility that “...the Competent Authorities delegate specific tasks incumbent upon them...”. It notes that this model has been recognized in Costa Rica and programs of this type have been established, in order to establish authorization criteria for individuals and legal entities for each specific activity, as well as the responsibilities assumed and their limitations. In this way, it states that establishments like those of the plaintiffs carry out their activities supervised and inspected by that body, complying with the sanitary requirements established by the Sanitary Authority, and should they fail to do so, the latter may resort to the powers established in Law 8495, and the corresponding sanitary orders or measures may be issued, including the withdrawal of the Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO) that authorizes the productive activity. It argues that it does not regulate the professional practice of veterinary physicians, which it recognizes is the exclusive competence of the Professional Association (Colegio Profesional) of that discipline. It notes that what is intended by the administrative conduct is to establish, among the requirements or authorization criteria for individuals or legal entities to engage in the activities subject to the control of that Authority, the requirement to have an Officialized Veterinary Physician Supervisor (Regente Médico Veterinario Oficializado). On the issue of the grounds (motivo), it states that the absence of “Resultandos” in the resolution does not imply the absence of this element, since the grounds for the act are expressed in the Considerandos. Regarding the reasoning (motivación), it claims that it has the authority to issue the act. It points out that Law 8495 grants SENASA the power to exercise sanitary policing (policía sanitaria), and it is through these powers that it can issue sanitary measures in protection of public health or animal health, as occurs in the challenged resolution. It also indicates that the act is based on technical, scientific, and professional criteria, in accordance with the principle of legality and the powers granted to this body by Law 8495. Regarding the content, it rejects that what was ordered constitutes a delegation to private workers of official oversight duties concerning animal slaughter establishments, since veterinary medical supervision (regencia médica veterinaria) is not a function or competence of SENASA. It indicates that said figure is regulated in Articles 3, 7, and 8 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing (Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes) (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001) and in Articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Physicians (Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios) (No. 19184). It notes that the concept of officialization (oficialización) is justified in Article 6, subsections ñ) and o) of Law 8495, and is distinct from the supervisors (regentes), since its function cannot be entrusted to them, due to the position they hold relative to the establishments to be inspected. Finally, regarding the procedure, it argues that the challenged conduct complies with it, as the administrative file demonstrates. It claims that the act was made known to the plaintiffs, who, in accordance with the legal system, have had the possibility of filing the administrative remedies provided for in the LGAP. - Due to the manner in which this is resolved, the arguments on which the parties base their theory of the case will be examined further below, in the order necessary to adequately address the claims that give rise to this proceeding. -\n\nIII.- PROVEN FACTS. - Of importance for the issuance of this resolution, the following facts are held to be duly demonstrated in accordance with sound critical reasoning (sana crítica racional), meaning as they emerge from the body of evidence provided and admitted in this proceeding, or because the parties have accepted them: -\n\n1.- The companies Macoteco S.R.L. and 3-102-770877 S.R.L., are owners of slaughter and processing plants for animals destined for human consumption (“slaughterhouses” (mataderos)), located in the localities of San Rafael de Vázquez de Coronado (“Matadero Macoteco SRL”) and San Vito de Coto Brus (“Matadero Torre Alta”) (images 32 and 33).\n\n2.- Veterinary physicians have the function, in relation to the operation of establishments for the slaughter and processing of animals for human consumption, of the ante- and post-mortem inspection of each of the animals that are stunned, slaughtered, and processed to designate their meat for human consumption, in order to determine if they have any pathology that represents a danger to human and animal health.\n\nTo achieve these ends, Costa Rica relies on a system based on veterinary regents appointed and supervised by the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios de Costa Rica, or alternatively, on a system based on official or \"officialized\" regents, who, although not linked to the State, have received training to carry out these functions, under the guidelines and direct supervision of SENASA (declaration of witness Warren Hidalgo Jara and official communication SENASA-DG-1482-2019 of November 28, 2019, visible on folios 02 to 04 of the certified copy of the administrative file).\n\n3.- The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, MAG), SENASA, and the Regional International Organization for Agricultural Health (Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria, OIRSA), signed two cooperation agreements, through which the latter would provide its structure to SENASA, so that it could carry out an official veterinary inspection service (servicio de inspección veterinaria oficializada) in slaughter, processing, and storage plants for products and by-products of animal origin. The first of these was signed on April 28, 2016, in order to implement the service in plants dedicated to export, \"…to comply, among others, with international sanitary requirements for trade…\" (Clause One). The second was signed on August 27, 2021, and would cover establishments that SENASA defined \"…to comply, among other reasons, with national and international sanitary requirements…\" (Clause One). According to Clauses Two and Seven of both Cooperation Agreements, the fees to implement said official veterinary service (servicio veterinario oficializado) would be covered by the plants or establishments that SENASA would determine (f. 08 to 12 and 70 to 74 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 84 to 92 and 200 to 210 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n4.- Through official communication DVM-ACQS-524-2019 of November 15, 2019, signed by Mrs. Ana Cristina Quirós Soto, Vice Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, addressed to Bernardo Jaén Hernández, General Director of SENASA, she indicates that despite the efforts sent to her by the Corporación Ganadera, in which it was requested \"…that all slaughter plants in the country have an officialized veterinary doctor (médico veterinario oficializado)…\", as well as the work within the framework of a CORFOGA-SENASA-Mataderos commission, \"…to date no action has been taken on this matter; for this reason, I request you establish a schedule to comply with said request…\" (f. 01 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 70 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n5.- In response to the missive indicated in the preceding proven fact, the Acting General Director (Director General a.i.) of SENASA indicated to the Vice Minister, through official communication SENASA-DG-1482-2019 of November 28, 2019, that although SENASA \"…is of the opinion that having official veterinary doctors (médicos veterinarios oficiales) in the establishments would be an invaluable element in strengthening sanitary controls…\", however, given the limitation on the appointment of public officials and the costs that having such a system implies, he requests a more detailed analysis and the adoption of measures, such as transitional periods or differentiation according to animal slaughter volume \"…since, if the multiple variables are not taken into account, the imposition of single requirements or fees could eventually represent the closure of some of these establishments…\" (f. 02 to 04 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 70 to 76 of the electronic judicial file. Highlighting is not from the original).\n\n6.- Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding memorandum, the Vice Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, in official communication No. DVM-ACQS-540-2019 of November 28, 2019, again requested from SENASA a proposed schedule for the implementation of officialized veterinary regencies (regencias veterinarias oficializadas). In this way, the General Directorate of SENASA sent, via note SENASA-DG-1527-2019 of December 10 of that same year, the following schedule: \"…\n\n| Activity | responsible [sic] | Execution date |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Define the scope of the officialization (officialización) (types and sizes of establishments). | General Directorate SENASA | December 20, 2019 |\n| Determine the organization or entity administering the officialization agreement. | General Directorate SENASA | December 20, 2019 |\n\n...” (f. 05 to 07 of the certified copy of the administrative file, viewable at im. 78 to 82 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n7.- By email sent at 12:03 p.m. on September 30, 2020, from the Directorate of Animal Origin Product Safety (Dirección Inocuidad de Productos de Origen Animal, DIPOA) of SENASA, to officials Antonio Vanderlucht Leal and Joe Vargas Blanco, a draft was attached with a series of considerations for the formalization (oficialización) of veterinary services \"of establishments dedicated to domestic consumption.\" Said email was answered by official Joe Vargas Blanco, Director of the DIPOA, at 04:45 p.m. on the following October 2, who added aspects to consider regarding the formalization (f. 13 to 23 of the certified copy of the administrative file, viewable at im. 94 to 110 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n8.- Through emails sent on the days October 12, December 10, 11, and 22, all of the year 2020, officials from various SENASA departments circulated among themselves various drafts and contributions for the \"... formalization (oficialización) [of] veterinary services of establishments dedicated to domestic consumption...\" (f. 24 to 26 of the certified copy of the administrative file, viewable at im.\n\n(ims. 112 to 117 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n9.- By means of the administrative resolution of the General Directorate of the National Animal Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal) no. SENASA-DG-002-2021, issued at 2:50 p.m. on January 6, 2021, titled \"…A sanitary order is issued to establish the obligation for establishments slaughtering bovine, buffalo, equine, porcine, and poultry livestock to have an Official Veterinary Regent (Regente Médico Veterinario Oficial) under an officialization procedure applied by the National Animal Health Service…\", said body ordered the following:\n\n\"…Article 1.- It is established as a general sanitary measure the obligation that every establishment for the slaughter of bovine, buffalo, equine, porcine, and poultry livestock must have an Official Veterinary Regent under officialization procedures for private personnel.\n\nArticle 2.- The following establishments are subject to this sanitary order:\n\n| Slaughter establishments | Monthly slaughter volumes exceeding: |\n| --- | --- |\n| Bovine and buffalo | 100 animals |\n| Equine | 100 animals |\n| Porcine | 100 animals |\n| Poultry | 20,000 animals |\n\nArticle 3.- It takes effect six calendar months after its adoption. Notify each of the establishments with an authorized Veterinary Operation Certificate for the slaughter of bovine, buffalo, equine, porcine, and poultry livestock, for which the National Operations Directorate is charged, through its corresponding Regional Directorates. Publish on the SENASA website for disclosure purposes…\"\n\n(ims. 26 to 31 and f. 27 to 32 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 118 to 125 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n10.- In an email chain carried out on January 6 and 7, 2021, between SENASA officials Antonio Vaderlucht Leal, Olivet Cruz Vasquez, and Warren Hidalgo Jara, the first communicated to the others that \"…considering that we do not have money to publish, we must notify each of the establishments that will be covered by it. Given this, it is necessary to have the list of that universe so that Operations can notify each of them…\" (Highlighting is not from the original). In response to said request, official Hidalgo Jara attached a document with \"…the slaughterhouses by region for beef, pork, chicken, to which the directive applies. I would like to remind you that the only ones we met with in person were the owners and managers of the bovine and porcine slaughterhouses; the poultry ones have not yet been informed, so I await your instructions to proceed accordingly and notify them beforehand, if you consider it prudent…\" (f. 54 to 61 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 170 to 184 of the electronic judicial file. Highlighting is not from the original).\n\n11.- On March 4, 2021, two virtual meetings were held through the \"Microsoft Teams\" application between SENASA officials, the Manager and Veterinarian of the \"Ecopollo\" establishment, as well as the Manager and Veterinarian of the \"Gallisur\" establishment, in order to present the officialization project for veterinarians of slaughterhouses for national consumption (f. 62 to 65 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im. 186 to 196 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n12.- On July 7, 2021, a virtual meeting was carried out through the \"Microsoft Teams\" application between SENASA officials, the Manager and Veterinarian of the \"Pollos San José\" establishment, in order to present the officialization project for veterinarians of slaughterhouses for national consumption (f. 86 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at im.\n\n238 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n13.- In an email sent by the DIPOA official, Warren Hidalgo Jara, at 10:45 a.m. on November 13, 2021, he informs other SENASA officials that *“…I have spoken with Mr. Marco Zúñiga, from the MACOTECO slaughterhouse, who tells me he is available to meet with us next Tuesday the 16th at 1:00 pm, to address the issue of officialization…”*. On that occasion, he copied the message to the email address of the legal representative of one of the plaintiff companies here (f. 01 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at image of the electronic judicial file).\n\n14.- In a note dated November 24, 2021, addressed to the SENASA official Antonio Vanderlucht Leal, signed by the Director of Food Safety (Inocuidad), Olivet Cruz, the latter attaches *“… documentation compiled by this directorate for the purpose of having supporting elements in the implementation process of resolution No. SENASA-DG-002-2021…”* (f. 90 to 99 of the certified copy of the administrative file, visible at images 242 to 260 of the electronic judicial file).\n\n15.- On July 29, 2022, the plaintiff companies in this proceeding filed this administrative contentious lawsuit (consultation in the electronic judicial file as of the date of this resolution).\n\n16.- Through certification No. CMV-FE-1002-2022 dated October 05, 2022, Mrs. Ninuska Key Castillo, acting as Prosecutor (Fiscal) of the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios de Costa Rica, attested that the establishment Macoteco SRL located in San Rafael de Vázquez de Coronado has had four authorized veterinarian-in-charge (regencias) approved by said Corporation, in the period from July 8, 2020, to March 31, 2023 (ims. 332 and 333).\n\n17.- Through certification No. CMV-FE-1010-2022 dated October 06, 2022, Mrs. Ninuska Key Castillo, acting as Prosecutor (Fiscal) of the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios de Costa Rica, attested that the establishment Matadero Torre Alta located in San Vito de Coto Brus has had three authorized veterinarian-in-charge (regencias) approved by said Corporation, in the period from March 23, 2020, to March 31, 2023 (ims. 334 and 335). -\n\nIV.- UNPROVEN FACTS. - For the purposes of this ruling, the following facts are deemed not demonstrated, either because the parties failed to meet their evidentiary burdens, or because the Court did not find suitable evidence that, in light of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), would allow them to be proven:\n\n1.- The granting of a hearing to the decentralized entities and to the organizations and associations of a corporate nature recognized by Law, affected or potentially affected by the administrative resolution of the Directorate General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021, prior to its issuance.\n\n2.- The submission to public consultation of a draft or preliminary bill of the administrative resolution of the Directorate General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021, prior to its issuance.\n\n3.- That meetings, workshops, sessions, or working groups were held with the recipients, decentralized entities, and organizations and associations of a corporate nature recognized by Law, affected or potentially affected by the administrative resolution of the Directorate General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021, prior to its issuance.\n\n4.- The publication in the official gazette La Gaceta of the administrative resolution of the Directorate General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021.\n\n5.- The existence of facts that would have constituted a matter of public interest or emergency justifying the dispensation of consultation and publication of the draft or preliminary bill of the administrative resolution of the Directorate General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021.-\n\nV.- ON THE MERITS.- In the present lawsuit, two companies that manage establishments for the slaughter and processing of animals for human consumption (“slaughterhouses” or mataderos) have come to challenge a resolution of the Directorate General of SENASA, specifically, No. SENASA-DG-002-2021 of January 6, 2021, in which this body orders that this type of business must *“…have an Official Regent Veterinary Doctor under procedures for the officialization of private personnel…”*.\n\nThe judicial defense of the plaintiff companies argues that this health authority has incurred a series of defects in the issuance of said formal conduct; specifically, it claims that the act lacks competence, content, grounds, motivation, and procedure. Against these challenges, the State and SENASA have raised the defense of lack of right, arguing that this body has acted in accordance with the legal system and that, therefore, the challenged conduct must be upheld. Having considered by the Court both the written documentation of this process, as well as the preliminary and supplementary hearing, and having exhaustively weighed the allegations of the parties and the evidentiary record, this Chamber finds that the nullity action filed by the plaintiffs must be granted, because being an administrative act of general scope, the resolution issued by the Directorate General of SENASA should have followed the corresponding procedure for that type of provision, so that by being completely absent that essential element, the impugned conduct is indeed invalid as alleged by the plaintiff and, therefore, must be set aside on grounds of the absolute nullity it presents. We will now proceed to justify this decision.-\n\nVI.- LEGAL NATURE OF THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT: AN ACT OF GENERAL SCOPE. – The Court notes that in the conclusions of the State and SENASA, both judicial representations openly accept that the challenged administrative conduct constitutes an act of general scope and that, at the same time, due process was satisfied because the plaintiff companies were notified, with the caveat that the General Public Administration Law guaranteed them the right to administratively appeal the act in question. For this Chamber, these statements denote a conceptual confusion, as we shall now explain. The national legal system—unlike other jurisdictions—provides that administrative acts comprise, depending on the recipients of their effects, two main categories: acts of specific scope (actos de alcance concreto) and those of general scope (actos de alcance general). Articles 120 and 121 of the General Public Administration Law, Law No. 6227 of May 2, 1978, provide in this regard:\n\n“…Article 120.-\n1. For purposes of classification and value, acts of the Administration are classified as external or internal, depending on whether they are addressed to the administered party or not; and as specific or general, depending on whether they are addressed to an identified subject or not.\n2. The specific act shall in all cases be subject to the general act, and the internal act to the external act, with the exception contemplated in articles 126 and 127.\nArticle 121.-\n1. Acts shall be called decrees when they are of general scope and agreements when they are specific.\n2. Decrees of normative scope shall also be called regulations or regulatory decrees.\n3. Agreements that decide an administrative appeal or claim shall be called resolutions…” (Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nAt the outset, it is understood that the terminology used by the General Law could generate some confusion, especially because one could erroneously believe that the difference between both types of acts lies in the plurality or not of recipient subjects. However, the distinction between both manifestations of formal administrative conduct lies in determining whether the persons receiving the effectiveness of the act are or are not duly identified in its content. An act of specific scope (acto de alcance concreto) would therefore be one that indicates the person or persons upon whom legal situations are being created, modified, or terminated with the unilateral declaration of judgment, knowledge, or will made by the Administration; if not, we are facing an act of general scope (acto de alcance general), in which not only has that plurality of recipients not been identified, but neither is it presumed, since the grounds and the content do not require such determination in order to create, modify, or terminate the effects established therein; likewise, as we will see later, the lack of identification of the act's recipients makes its administrative procedure different from that followed for acts of specific scope, as well as the means for its proper communication. Now, in the case at hand, SENASA and the State are correct in their conclusions that, indeed, resolution no. SENASA-DG-002-2021 constitutes conduct of general scope. In the first place, as just explained, the challenged act does not identify in its content who the recipients of the act are, but rather what it does in article 1 is a generic reference to “bovine, buffalo, equine, porcine, and avian slaughter establishments,” that is, any business engaged in that activity. It is true that in article 2 a specification of recipients is made by limiting the establishments affected by the imposed requirement by “Monthly slaughter volumes”; however, the Administration continues without identifying the persons affected. Finally, in article 3, only a transitional provision is established. Therefore, since the subjects to whom the administrative will is directed cannot be precisely established from the content of the act, it is not possible to consider said manifestation of conduct as a specific act, but rather one of general scope. It is worth saying that the phrase included at the close of the document: “…Notify each of the establishments with a Veterinary Operation Certificate authorized for the slaughter of bovine, buffalo, equine, porcine, and avian animals…” cannot be considered as a form of identification of the recipients, because it is a provision concerning the communication of the act, not of the act itself, nor of its content, besides the fact that it also does not specify to whom it is directed, that is, the persons upon whom the obligation to “have an Official Veterinary Medical Director” is being created. Moreover, due to its condition as an act of general scope, resolution no. SENASA-DG-002-2021 does not require or need an individualization of its recipients, because its effects are normative, given that the provisions contained in the act possess erga omnes effectiveness and are innovative, general, and abstract in nature.\n\nThat is to say, it creates for an indefinite generality of persons, independently of the legal-administrative relationship they have with the Health Authority, a new legal situation (the obligation to have an official veterinary technical supervision, regencia veterinaria oficial), whose non-observance entails for the Administration the enablement of a series of self-tutelage powers that permit the coercive imposition of the measure. However, unlike what was stated by the defendant parties and as we will analyze below, it is not evident from the case file that the corresponding procedure for issuing provisions of general scope, which our legal system provides for that purpose, was complied with, thereby also affecting the adequacy of the grounds element (elemento motivo), rendering the conduct invalid and consequently, absolutely null and void.\n\nVII.- ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. The administrative procedure constitutes an essential formal element of any formal administrative conduct. Borrowing the general notions of the juridical act, as well as through the influence of the dominant legal thought at the time, the Costa Rican administrative legal system has come to construct an approximate definition of the administrative act, as that administrative conduct consisting of a unilateral declaration of will, judgment, or knowledge, through which a subject of Administrative Law, in the exercise of an administrative function, creates, modifies, or extinguishes administrative legal situations of a general or specific nature. The doctrine positivized in Articles 128 and 158 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), Law No. 6227 of May 2, 1978, establishes that for said declaration to be considered legitimate or valid, that is, as conforming to the legal system, it must lack substantial defects that affect it, and in order to determine precisely that, a legal technique has been used by which a series of prerequisites, requirements, or constitutive elements of the administrative act are distinguished, which must occur in their entirety, since otherwise that manifestation of public conduct would be considered invalid or unlawful. Article 158.1 of the LGAP states: “The lack or defect of any requirement of the administrative act, expressly or implicitly required by the legal system, shall constitute a defect thereof.” Those requirements or elements of the act are explained by the doctrine in the following terms: “…Let the components comprising its existence, as an act of will or external conduct of the Administration, in accordance with the law, be called the elements of the administrative act. From the latter's point of view, all administrative action […] every act of will of the Administration, must obey a typical scheme that requires the orderly and related presence of several objects -internal or external to the public servant-, necessary for that conduct to be considered as fully externalized [ …] The subject of the elements of the administrative act is that which refers to the manner in which the legal order determines the formation and manifestation. Said elements are, then, the legal qualities that a conduct of the Administration destined to produce a legal effect must possess, in order to effectively produce it and achieve its purpose. When one is missing, that purpose is frustrated and the order sanctions the lack with the impossibility of the desired legal effect; the effect is not produced…” (Ortiz, E. (2002) Administrative Law Thesis. T. II. San José: Stradtmann, pp. 339-341. Emphasis not from the original). Assuming said position, the legislator chose to address said constitutive elements in the third chapter of the sixth title of the first book of the General Public Administration Act, precisely titled “Of the Elements and Validity.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither in the LGAP, nor in any other regulatory body, is there a detailed list or catalogue of those requirements, this because the lawfulness of the act is not only derived from compliance with what is regulated in that chapter, but from the entire legal system; hence, both in jurisprudence and in doctrine, we can find a variegated amalgam of classifications or lists of said elements, without being able to affirm a priori that one or the other is erroneous. Despite this limitation, the recourse to the elements of the administrative act has proven essential for determining its conformity or non-conformity with the legal system, not only due to its utility, but because the LGAP itself so prescribes. Thus, in repeated pronouncements of this Chamber, we have indicated that these prerequisites can be listed or classified as follows: a) Subjective elements (related to the public entity and the public servants adopting the conduct), encompassing competence, proper appointment (investidura), will, and standing (legitimación); b) Material elements (concerning the declaration made, its basis, and effects), which encompass the grounds (motivo), content (contenido), and purpose (fin); and c) Formal elements (responding to the manner in which the power giving rise to the act is adopted or exercised), such as: the form of manifestation, the statement of reasons (motivación), and the procedure. The latter, regulated in the second book of the LGAP, that is, from article 214 to 363, fulfills a dual purpose; on the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its conduct and, on the other hand, it imposes itself as a reference framework that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of the public conduct, in order to establish control that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules guiding that procedure. It seeks, therefore, to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against the Public Power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. In this sense, it is worth recalling that it is not in vain that the completion of the administrative procedure is required for the adoption of certain administrative acts, and for this reason it constitutes an essential and prior element thereof, without which, what has been acted upon is absolutely null and void.\n\nThus, as set forth in canon 214 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, its objective is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final act, not their mere verification in order to justify the imposition of an administrative decision: \"... The administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the purposes of the Administration, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system...\" (Highlighting is not from the original). This formal element is, therefore, imperative for achieving a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in article 225.1 of the cited Ley General, which provides: \"The body shall conduct the procedure with the intention of achieving maximum speed and efficiency within respect for the legal system and the rights and interests of the administered party.\" (The highlighting is not from the original.) Hence, canon 216.1 of the same law requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. This is how the instrumental nature of the administrative procedure is evidenced, insofar as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution thereof, while simultaneously ensuring respect for the rights of the administered person.-\n\nVIII.- CONTINUES. – Having previously defined that the contested conduct corresponds to an act of general scope of a normative nature and in the absence of an applicable special rule, it is the opinion of this Tribunal that the procedure for its issuance corresponded to that provided for in article 361 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 17 and 18 of Ley N.º 8220 of March 4, 2002, Ley de Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos, and its Reglamento Ejecutivo, regulations to which SENASA should have resorted for the issuance of the contested regulations, as also prescribed by the Ley General de Salud Animal itself:\n\n\"... Artículo 83.-Principles of legality and due process. Senasa shall apply the measures established in this Law or in its Regulations, in accordance with the principles of legality and due process. In procedural matters, in the absence of an express provision in this Law, the general provisions of the administrative procedure of the Ley general de la Administración Pública shall apply…\" (Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nFundamentally, numeral 361 LGAP establishes a prior and special procedure for the drafting of provisions of a general and normative nature, which constitutes, in principle, a formal limit and an indispensable requirement for their existence (see on this matter the judgment of this Section N° 40-2023-VI of 09:00 hours on May 31, 2023). It is a specific regulation that imposes a concrete procedural element indispensable for the validity of the issuance of acts of a normative and general scope. Specifically, it establishes the obligation to grant a hearing, among others, to decentralized entities and those representing general or corporate interests on the drafts of general provisions that may affect them, as well as to present their views, unless reasons of public interest or urgency oppose this, which must necessarily be recorded in the preliminary draft (Art. 361.2 LGAP). It is also worth saying that, in cases such as this one, where the act of general scope entails the establishment of mandatory requirements for the administered party, the need for such a hearing is reinforced by numerals 17 and 18 of Ley N.º 8220, as well as articles 11 to 12 bis of its Reglamento Ejecutivo, decreto ejecutivo n.º 37045-MP-MEIC. In essence, this public consultation hearing seeks citizen participation in public affairs, in this case, through decentralized entities and corporate organizations and associations recognized by Law. It is a principle recognized, furthermore, in article 9 of the Constitución Política, as amended by Ley No. 8364 of July 1, 2003, as an expression of the constitutional democratic and citizen participation principles. The foregoing, of course, is always aimed at the best realization of public interests. In this sense, it is worth emphasizing that acts of general scope, unlike what occurred in the case file (see proven fact n° 10), are not communicated by means of personal notice (notificación), but rather through publication in the official gazette (see judgment of this Section n° 61-2011-VI of 09:00 nine hours on March 9, 2011), precisely due to the lack of identification of their specific addressees; it is so provided in the Ley General de la Administración Pública:\n\n\"… Artículo 240.-\n\n1. General acts shall be communicated by publication and specific acts by personal notice (notificación).\n\n2. When a general act particularly affects a person whose address for service is indicated in the file or known by the Administration, the act must also be notified to them…\" (Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nThis last provision, certainly prescribes that, in addition to being published, acts of general scope must be notified to the parties whose means of contact appear in the case file, when it particularly affects them. However, it is an additional condition to publication, which does not replace the duty of communication through that means. Thus, even if the act were notified, it would not have the virtue of being opposable or of producing effects, since given its general scope and normative character, its cycle of general effectiveness depends on publication and it could not produce effects only for those who had been notified. This being the case, the violation of the procedure enshrined in Article 361 of the LGAP, in relation to ordinals 17 and 18 of Law No. 8220, constitutes an omission of a substantial formality, which pursuant to Article 223 of the referenced legislation, entails the nullity of everything done by the Administration, an aspect that this Court could declare even on its own motion, as expressly provided by Article 182, subsection 1) of the same LGAP. Now, in the specific case, **the plaintiff** has challenged the lack of procedure in the issuance of the conduct, focusing on the absence of the formation of an administrative file, of the provision of remedies or means of challenge, as well as the notification record of the sanitary measure, which concludes, in its view, in a violation of the right to due process. On the contrary, both **the State and the respondent individual/organ** opine that the challenged conduct is in accordance with Law regarding the procedure—in substance—because they allege that, according to the administrative file, the act was made known to the plaintiffs, who, in accordance with the legal system, have had the possibility of filing the administrative remedies provided in the LGAP. However, from the analysis of the case record, especially the background provided by the defendant Administration and based on what has been explained above, **this Court** has not been able to verify that, as resolution no. **SENASA-DG-002-2021** is an act of general scope, the procedure provided in ordinals 361 of the LGAP and 17 and 18 of Law No. 8220 was applied in the specific case. As we pointed out *ut supra*, the function of the administrative procedure, according to Articles 214 and 221 LGAP, is satisfied through the verification of “... *the facts that serve as the basis for the final act in the most faithful and complete manner possible…* ”, however, in the specific case, it cannot be inferred from the resolution, nor from the considerations on which it is based, much less from the administrative file, that the procedure carried out by the sanitary authority corresponded to the proper one for this type of conduct. Note thus that resolution no. **SENASA-DG-002-2021** has a total of fifteen considerations, of which four (1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th) correspond to citations related to the competence of SENASA as a technical body and sanitary authority to order what is contained in the act; three considerations (3rd, 4th, 10th) deal with provisions of a normative nature on which the sanitary measure is based; seven considerations (7th to 9th and 11th to 14th) deal with explanations of the officialization system and veterinary regency, and lastly, the 15th, concerning the purpose of the act of general scope. Added to this is the non-existence of the respective dispensation from consultation and publication of the draft or preliminary project of the administrative resolution for reasons of public interest or urgency that would justify it (Art. 361.2 LGAP). This being the case, it is evident that what was carried out by SENASA was based solely on the criteria of its officials, without consultations with public or private sector entities, opinions, or expert reports of any kind και, therefore, it is reinforced that there was no administrative activity truly aimed at verifying the factual basis of the act of general scope. The omission thus incurred, that is, the failure to apply the administrative procedure for provisions of general scope, provided in numeral 361 of the LGAP, prior to the issuance of resolution no. **SENASA-DG-002-2021**, constitutes, in the Court's view, an infraction of a pre-existing legal obligation that injures the right of defense of the plaintiff entities and causes a defect in the procedural element of the challenged conduct. This is further evidenced in the copy of the administrative file itself provided to the record—whose certification is seen at image 69 of the record—in which this judicial body has been able to identify that, of the 126 folios (249 images) that comprise it, only the first 26 predate the issuance of the challenged conduct; in turn, of those 26 folios, it is found that only 18 are directly related to the issuance of the administrative conduct, consisting of 4 internal documents (official letters DVM-ACQS-524-2019, SENASA-DG-1482-2019, DVM-ACQS-540-2019, and SENASA-DG-1527-2019, listed in the list of proven facts) and a chain of emails between SENASA officials, in which drafts of what would become resolution no. **SENASA-DG-002-2021** were circulated. Thus, for this Court it has been fully proven that, despite the legal nature of the challenged conduct as an act of general scope with normative effect, the Administration completely failed to apply the regulations relating to the procedure that should have been followed for the issuance of that type of administrative act, thereby configuring a defect of absolute nullity due to the absence of a substantial element, with the legal consequences that derive from it. –\n\n**IX.- IN CONCLUSION.** – Every act of general scope, such as the challenged resolution, possesses elements of validity that must be satisfied and accredited by the defendant Administration.\n\nHowever, in this specific case, this Court has not been able to corroborate the fulfillment of the substantial element of the procedure that would allow the verification of \"...the facts that serve as grounds for the final act in the most faithful and complete manner possible...\" (articles 214 and 221 LGAP), namely, the one provided for in section 361 LGAP for provisions of general scope. Thus, as requested by the plaintiff in this proceeding, its annulment claim being in accordance with sections 158, 166 and 167 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by reason of the real and/or legal absence of that constitutive element of the challenged administrative act (acto administrativo), the appropriate course is to decree the invalidity and consequent absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the administrative resolution (resolución administrativa) of the Dirección General del Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. **SENASA-DG-002-2021** of **January 6, 2021**. Given that the publication of that act of general scope in the official gazette La Gaceta has been deemed not proven, the Chamber considers that, in accordance with articles 171 LGAP, 39.2 and 131.1 CPCA, this pronouncement must be declaratory and retroactive to the date of the annulled conduct, without prejudice to good faith acquired rights. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of article 130.3 CPCA, once this judgment is final, its full publication is ordered for a single time in the official gazette La Gaceta, at the expense of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería. For such purposes, that body politic is granted a maximum period of three months from the date this judgment becomes final to prove before the executing judge the referred publication. In the event of not doing so within the indicated period and given that, pursuant to the aforementioned section 130.3 ibidem, the absolute nullity declared here produces *erga omnes* effects, the executing judge is ordered to proceed, sua sponte, to exercise the functional powers granted by the legal system, in order to guarantee compliance with the final judgment. Finally, in order to protect the principle of legal security and certainty (principio de seguridad y certeza jurídica) of the users who access or consult the SENASA website, whoever holds the position of Director (a) General of that body politic is ordered to register and publicize the annulment of the referred resolution; which must be proven before the executing judge of this Court, within the aforementioned three-month period. - Due to the manner in which the matter is resolved, a ruling on the other grounds for invalidity argued by the plaintiff is omitted.\n\n**X.- REGARDING THE OPPOSED DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES).** – In accordance then with the reasoning of this ruling, the defenses of lack of right (falta de Derecho) raised by the State and SENASA are rejected, and the claim asserted by the plaintiff is fully upheld. –\n\n**XI.- REGARDING COSTS (COSTAS).** – Pursuant to articles 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 73 of the Código Procesal Civil (Law No. 9342), the order to pay costs (costas) constitutes an obligation for the losing party—by the mere fact of being so—benefiting the winning party, so that the latter is reimbursed for the various categories of expenses listed therein. Both sections provide for various grounds for exemption from this order, however, in the absence of arguments or evidence that allow this Court, in the specific case, to weigh and consider any of these grounds as proven, it is not possible to exempt the losing party, totally or partially, from the application of said maxim, therefore, in accordance with the cited regulations and in particular, pursuant to article 73.3 CPC (Law No. 9342), the proper course is to jointly impose on both losing parties the obligation to pay costs, for the benefit of the winning parties here. By majority opinion of this Court, the order is made in the abstract and therefore, pending liquidation in the judgment enforcement phase, where the discretionary determination of the amount of costs must be carried out, according to the criteria outlined in article 76.1 CPC (Law No. 9342), given that in this case there is no amount of economic significance for the action filed, as well as the respective liquidation and evidence that must be submitted to the record by the winning party. – Regarding the abstract order for the payment of costs, Judge Aguilar Méndez files a separate note. -\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe defense of lack of right (falta de Derecho) raised by the defendants is rejected. Consequently, **the claim filed by MACOTECO SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA AND 3-102-770877 SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA is hereby GRANTED** against **THE STATE** and the **SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD ANIMAL (SENASA)**. The absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the administrative resolution of the Dirección General del Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No. **SENASA-DG-002-2021**, issued at 2:50 p.m. on **January 6, 2021**, entitled \"...A sanitary order is issued to establish the obligation for slaughter establishments for cattle, buffalo, equine, swine, and poultry to have an Official Veterinary Regent under an accreditation procedure applied by the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal...\" is decreed. In accordance with articles 171 LGAP, 39.2 and 131.1 CPCA, this pronouncement is declaratory and retroactive to the date of the annulled conduct, without prejudice to good faith acquired rights. Pursuant to article 130.3 CPCA, once this judgment is final, its full publication is ordered for a single time in the official gazette La Gaceta, at the expense of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería. In the event of non-compliance with this provision, the executing judge is ordered to proceed, sua sponte, to exercise the functional powers granted by the legal system, in order to guarantee compliance with the final judgment. Finally, in order to protect the principle of legal security and certainty of the users who access or consult the SENASA website, whoever holds the position of Director (a) General of that body politic is ordered to register and publicize the annulment of the referred resolution; which must be proven before the executing judge of this Court, within the aforementioned three-month period. – The losing parties are jointly ordered to pay the costs (costas). On this point, Judge Aguilar Méndez files a note. - **Notify.**\n\n-\nDaniel Aguilar Méndez
\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes José Roberto Garita Navarro
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NOTE FROM JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.- Regarding the order to pay costs, although it is a unanimous criterion that it must indeed be imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, I respectfully differ from my colleagues regarding the abstract nature of this part of the judgment. Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes that the order to pay costs is an ex officio and mandatory pronouncement for the adjudicator, which deals with a monetary item and, therefore, should be liquidated in the judgment (Art. 123.1 CPCA: “…When it is possible to set any item in the judgment itself, the Court shall liquidate it, including its due update…”). Said provision is reinforced by the supplementary application of Article 62.1 of the Código Procesal Civil (pursuant to numerals 220 ibid and Articles 9 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which prescribes that in any condemnatory ruling on economic matters determinable in money “… the exact amount of the sums granted, their adjustments up to the judgment, including interest and costs, must be established at once…” (Highlighting not in the original). Furthermore, the deciding body has the necessary elements to make that pronouncement, in addition to the fact that, being an obligation of legal source, anchored in a non-waivable procedural norm (Art. 3.5 CPC) and a pronouncement that is in any case ex officio, it does not depend on a request from a party, such that its liquidation in the judgment would not violate the party disposition principle. Finally, I believe that the omission of a pronouncement and its reservation for the execution phase ultimately affects the duration of proceedings and increases the judicial backlog, which contradicts the right to effective judicial protection and the principles of procedural momentum, economy and celerity (economía y celeridad), as well as concentration, which pursuant to Article 2.8 CPC, implies that “…All procedural activity should be carried out in the least number of acts and the shortest time possible…”. Thus, I consider that the Court is under the ex officio duty to liquidate that amount in the ruling and not reserve its pronouncement for the judgment execution stage. - Daniel Aguilar Méndez, Judge.-
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EXP: 22-004246-1027-CA
\nGoicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Café Dorado. Phones: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Email: tproca-sgdoc@poder-judicial.go.cr
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