{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-1334024", "citation": "Res. 01107-2025 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Sobresueldos de docente reubicada por razones de salud no son un derecho adquirido", "title_en": "Teacher's extra pay upon reassignment for health reasons is not a vested right", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por mayoría, confirma la sentencia de primera instancia que ordenó al Estado restituir inmediatamente el pago de los sobresueldos 'Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo' y 'Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado' a una educadora reubicada en funciones administrativas por razones de salud, desde su supresión hasta que se mantenga en esa condición, más diferencias en aguinaldo, salario escolar y vacaciones. La Sala razona que la reubicación se basa en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo y el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales (Decreto 19113), los cuales garantizan un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad del salario que devengaba al momento de la reubicación. Distingue entre la supresión de recargos cuando el servidor deja de ejercer las funciones que los generaban, y el caso de quien no puede seguir trabajando normalmente por enfermedad, pues la normativa especial prevé mantener el salario total. Un voto salvado de dos magistradas sostiene que la docente no está incapacitada sino reubicada, por lo que no aplica el artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; los sobresueldos son temporales y no constituyen derecho adquirido, por lo que debió revocarse la condena. La Sala también modifica el monto de costas personales, fijándolo en un 15% de la condenatoria.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, by majority, upholds the trial court's ruling ordering the State to immediately restore payment of the extra pay 'Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo' and 'Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado' to a teacher reassigned to administrative duties for health reasons, from the date of their suppression until she remains in that condition, plus differences in Christmas bonus, school salary, and vacations. The Chamber reasons that the reassignment is based on Article 254 of the Labor Code and the Special Leaves Regulation (Decree 19113), which guarantee a subsidy equivalent to the total salary she was earning at the time of reassignment. It distinguishes between the suppression of extra pay when the worker stops performing the functions that generated them, and the case of someone who cannot continue working normally due to illness, since special regulations provide for maintaining the total salary. A dissenting opinion by two judges holds that the teacher is not on sick leave but reassigned, so Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute does not apply; extra pay is temporary and does not constitute a vested right, so the award should have been reversed. The Chamber also modifies the amount of personal costs, setting them at 15% of the award.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "04/04/2025", "year": "2025", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "sobresueldos", "reubicación por razones de salud", "derecho adquirido", "salario total", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Decreto Ejecutivo 19113", "voto salvado", "principio de legalidad" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "sobresueldos", "reubicación por salud", "docentes", "salario total", "derecho adquirido", "Código de Trabajo art. 254", "Decreto 19113", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil art. 174", "Recargo Comité Apoyo Educativo", "Escuela Modalidad Horario Ampliado" ], "keywords_en": [ "extra pay", "health-related reassignment", "teachers", "total salary", "vested right", "Labor Code Art. 254", "Decree 19113", "Civil Service Statute Art. 174", "Educational Support Committee surcharge", "Extended Schedule School surcharge" ], "excerpt_es": "No obstante, el presente asunto no versa sobre una persona servidora que en el ejercicio normal de sus funciones deja de estar en los supuestos que hacen viable el recargo sino, de una persona que por razones de salud queda impedida para seguir ejecutando sus labores habituales. En consecuencia, si al momento de la reubicación, la actora devengaba el sobresueldo referido, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a esa normativa especial a que, dentro de su remuneración como funcionaria administrativa reubicada por razones de salud, se le contemple ese plus (en semejante sentido la sentencia de esta Sala número 308, de las 10:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2014). En el caso, los recargos no fueron laborados dada la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a la docencia, por razones de salud. Es decir, el pago de los sobresueldos no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación, en tanto la normativa contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”.", "excerpt_en": "However, this case is not about a public servant who, in the normal exercise of her duties, ceases to meet the conditions that make the extra pay viable, but about a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform her usual work. Consequently, if at the time of reassignment the plaintiff was earning the aforementioned extra pay, her right is indisputable, under that special regulation, to have that bonus included in her remuneration as an administrative officer reassigned for health reasons (in a similar sense, the ruling of this Chamber number 308, at 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014). In this case, the extra pay was not earned because of the need to reassign the servant to non-teaching functions for health reasons. That is, the payment of the extra pay does not originate from the performance of those functions but in compliance with the rule that provides for the transfer with the recognition of the equivalent of the total salary the servant was earning at the time of reassignment, since the regulation provides the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the total of her salary.”", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied / Partially granted", "label_es": "Sin lugar / Parcialmente con lugar", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber denies the State's appeal and partially grants the plaintiff's appeal, upholding the restoration of extra pay but modifying the personal costs award to 15% of the judgment amount.", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda rechaza el recurso del Estado y acoge parcialmente el de la actora, confirmando la restitución de sobresueldos pero modificando la condena en costas personales a un 15% de la condenatoria." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "Temporary extra pay does not constitute a vested right and its payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of her usual duties, ceases to perform those for which she is remunerated with that bonus.", "quote_es": "Los sobresueldos temporales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y su pago debe suspenderse cuando la persona servidora, en el ejercicio de sus funciones habituales, deja de cumplir aquellas por las cuales se le remunera ese plus." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "Payment of the extra pay does not arise from the performance of duties but according to the rule that provides for the transfer with recognition of the equivalent of the total salary the servant was earning at the time of reassignment.", "quote_es": "El pago de los sobresueldos no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "No infringement is observed of Article 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, which criminalizes the illegal recognition of labor benefits, a provision directed at active administration and which is not observed here.", "quote_es": "No se observa la infracción del numeral 56 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, el cual tipifica como delito el reconocimiento ilegal de beneficios laborales, supuesto que está dirigido al ejercicio de la administración activa y que no se observa." }, { "context": "Voto salvado, Considerando VII", "quote_en": "The surcharge constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the duties are performed, and the fact of having performed them for a certain period does not create a subjective right for the interested party to continue being paid that amount, or to have the surcharge or alternate schedule maintained.", "quote_es": "El recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-13231", "citation": "Ley 6227", "title_en": "General Law of Public Administration", "title_es": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1978", "year": "1978" }, { "id": "norm-31486", "citation": "Ley 181", "title_en": "Education Code", "title_es": "Código de Educación", "doc_type": "law", "date": "28/01/2025", "year": "2025" }, { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-3672", "citation": "Ley 2166", "title_en": "Public Administration Salary Law", "title_es": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/10/1957", "year": "1957" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-8045", "citation": "Ley 5089", "title_en": "Labor Code", "title_es": "Código de Trabajo", "doc_type": "law", "date": "29/08/1943", "year": "1943" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-13231", "citation": "Ley 6227", "title_en": "General Law of Public Administration", "title_es": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1978", "year": "1978" }, { "id": "norm-31486", "citation": "Ley 181", "title_en": "Education Code", "title_es": "Código de Educación", "doc_type": "law", "date": "28/01/2025", "year": "2025" }, { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-3672", "citation": "Ley 2166", "title_en": "Public Administration Salary Law", "title_es": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/10/1957", "year": "1957" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-8045", "citation": "Ley 5089", "title_en": "Labor Code", "title_es": "Código de Trabajo", "doc_type": "law", "date": "29/08/1943", "year": "1943" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-1334024", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-31486", "norm_num": "181", "norm_name": "Código de Educación", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "28/01/2025" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32708", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953" }, { "doc_id": "norm-3672", "norm_num": "2166", "norm_name": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/10/1957" }, { "doc_id": "norm-53738", "norm_num": "8422", "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8045", "norm_num": "5089", "norm_name": "Código de Trabajo", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "29/08/1943" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8975", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "16/01/1955" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Revisión del Documento\n\n\n\n \n\nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\nSALA SEGUNDA\n\n \n\nExp: 21-002607-1178-LA \n\nRes: 2025001107\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas cincuenta y siete minutos del cuatro de abril de dos mil veinticinco .\n\n Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, por [Nombre 001], educadora, cédula de identidad [Valor 001] y vecina de Alajuela, contra el ESTADO, representado por su procuradora adjunta, la licenciada Cinthya Castro Hernández, soltera y vecina de San José. Figura, como apoderada especial judicial de la parte actora, la licenciada Julieth Gómez Gamboa, vecina de Heredia. Todas las personas son mayores, de estado civil desconocido y abogadas; con las excepciones indicadas. \n\n Redacta el magistrado Sánchez Rodríguez; y\n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\nI.- ANTECEDENTES: La apoderada especial judicial de la actora promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condene al Estado a restituirle de forma inmediata, el pago del sobresueldo del 25% por concepto de Escuela Modalidad Horario Ampliado y el recargo de Comité de Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo del 6.6%, con los que contaba antes de la reubicación en funciones administrativas y mientras mantenga la condición de reubicada. Demandó que el pago de esas diferencias fuera indexado a partir de ese momento, 01 de febrero de 2021, y hasta su efectivo pago, incluyendo diferencias generadas en aguinaldo, salario escolar y vacaciones; además de los intereses legales por las sumas devengadas; más las costas de la acción. La representante del Estado contestó en forma negativa en escrito visible a imagen 27 del expediente virtual del Juzgado; y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. El Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, por sentencia número 2024-0242 de las 07:45 horas del 13 de febrero de 2024, suscrita por la licenciada Floricel Oviedo Miranda, desestimó la indicada defensa y acogió la demanda, ordenándole al Estado la restitución inmediata del pago de los sobresueldos denominados \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" y \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", desde su supresión y hasta que se mantenga en esa condición; así como las diferencias generadas en aguinaldo, salario escolar y vacaciones (éstas últimas solo en caso de que en dicho período conste pago alguno por este concepto). Dispuso el rebajo de las cargas sociales y del impuesto al salario que corresponda; condenó al demandado al pago de intereses del principal desde su exigibilidad, “es decir desde la fecha se supresión y hasta el efectivo pago según el artículo 565 del Código de Trabajo reformado Ley N°9343. A falta de acuerdo, el interés legal será igual a la tasa básica pasiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica para operaciones en moneda nacional y a la tasa “prime rate” para operaciones en dólares americanos, en atención al artículo 497 del Código de Comercio.-“ También dispuso el pago de la indexación de los extremos económicos principales, actualizados a valor presente en el mismo porcentaje de variación del índice de precios para los consumidores del Área Metropolitana, entre el mes anterior a la demanda y el precedente a aquel en que efectivamente se realice el pago. Finalmente, le ordenó el pago de las costas, fijando las personales en la suma de DOSCIENTOS MIL COLONES.\n\n II.- RECURSO DE CASACIÓN DE LA PARTE ACTORA: La apoderada de la actora protesta el monto fijado por concepto de costas personales. Menciona que la normativa procesal civil y la laboral establecen como regla, la condena en costas a la parte vencida, pero considera arbitraria la condena en costas en la suma de doscientos mil colones. Señala que la actora ha contado con representación legal en cada una de las etapas del presente proceso, desde el estudio previo del caso, así como la interposición de la demanda; con sentencia favorable en el proceso, con evidente gasto de tiempo y con su patrocinio como profesional en derecho, labor que se ha realizado con la debida responsabilidad y cuidado. Señala además, que se han realizado todas las diligencias necesarias para una efectiva defensa técnica ante el incumplimiento de las responsabilidades del Estado, por lo que no existe fundamento alguno para que condene en doscientos mil colones las costas del proceso, pues el actuar del demandado generó un serio perjuicio en los derechos de la actora, quien tuvo que esperar años para contar con una sentencia a su favor y hacer valer sus derechos en instancias judiciales bajo la debida representación legal. Considera que esa suma no compensa la labor profesional ejercida en el presente proceso, donde se debe valorar no solo la cuantía del asunto, sino también, la laborar profesional desplegada. Pide que ese extremo se fije en forma porcentual o en una prudencial acorde a la labor técnica realizada. RECURSO DE CASACIÓN DEL DEMANDADO: La representación estatal objeta en primer lugar, la violación sustancial del ordenamiento jurídico, por errónea interpretación del artículo 254 del código de trabajo de frente a la errónea aplicación del artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Reglamento de licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública, decreto ejecutivo 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989, así como indebida valoración del elenco probatorio. Asegura que la reubicación de la actora fue acordada al amparo del numeral 254 del Código de Trabajo que implica la adecuación de las condiciones laborales para la persona reubicada; y no del decreto ejecutivo número 19113 de 28 de julio de 1989. Considera improcedente el análisis efectuado porque el citado reglamento no encuentra fundamento en el artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. En relación con la derogatoria del artículo 167 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil transcribe un fragmento del dictamen C-250-2004 de la Procuraduría General de la República donde se menciona que en virtud de la derogatoria de los artículos 167 al 169 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil desapareció la regla por la que, en presencia de una enfermedad incapacitante se adquiría el derecho a una licencia y pago de un auxilio equivalente a la totalidad del salario por todo el plazo de la incapacidad. Además, señala que las licencias vigentes son las especiales, establecidas en el artículo 166 del Estatuto, las que no han sido derogadas o anuladas; el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales se encuentra vigente en lo tocante a las licencias especiales, pues el artículo 166 que las regula, se encuentra vigente; respecto de las permanentes, el citado instrumento reglamentario quedó implícitamente derogado, por derogación de su norma habilitante como lo señaló la Sala Constitucional, en su jurisprudencia vinculante. También se apoya en el Dictamen C-250-2009, señalando que el razonamiento de que, en el caso de la actora se está ante una licencia especial y por ende le corresponde la aplicación del numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil en concordancia con los presupuestos del decreto 19113 no es correcto, porque la Sala ha reconocido que la licencia especial tiene sustento en el artículo 166 del Estatuto y es esa norma y no el 174, la que debe aplicarse. Insiste en que en el caso de la accionante se está frente a una reubicación en funciones administrativas, no frente a una incapacidad y por ello, a su caso no aplica el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Agrega que los sobresueldos recibidos por la actora hasta el 31 de enero de 2021 son temporales; y refiere al criterio emitido por esta Sala en el sentido de que en relaciones de empleo público cualquier extremo salarial debe tener respaldo en una norma jurídica que autorice su pago. Como segundo motivo de agravio señala la violación directa del artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública (Ley Nº 2166 del 9 de octubre de 1957) y del artículo 56 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (Ley Nº 8422 del 6 de octubre del año 2004), así como la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional sobre este tema. La primera de esas normas establece que los recargos de funciones son temporales y cuando el servicio lo demande. En la sentencia se desnaturaliza el carácter temporal del recargo, al otorgarlo de manera indefinida, sin que la actora lo labore o preste las funciones correspondientes a dicho recargo, sino que también se reconoce un componente salarial en contra de lo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico. Por su parte, el artículo 56 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública tipifica de manera clara y precisa el delito de reconocimiento ilegal de beneficios laborales, por lo que no es posible reconocer el pago de un recargo en forma irrestricta. Señala el voto número 7081-2019 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de abril de 2019, donde se menciona que los pluses o sobresueldos no constituyen parte esencial del salario, fenecen al terminar el curso lectivo. Considera que este tipo casos no se deben limitar a un análisis desde una perspectiva meramente laboralista protectora del interés particular del docente y dando la espalda al interés público y a los actos administrativos emitidos por el Ministerio de Educación Pública, que encuentran base para su formalización, en un análisis pormenorizado de las necesidades que el servicio público demanda, el presupuesto disponible para la cancelación de este tipo de sobresueldos y la contraprestación del servicio por parte del docente. Aduce, además, que la sentencia es ayuna de fundamentación al no efectuar un análisis de los argumentos expuestos sino que se basó en casos similares donde se aplicó el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública, obviando la Ley existente que regula la temporalidad de los pluses salariales. Menciona la resolución número 173-2021 de esta Sala Segunda, donde se desestimó la demanda con base en la tesis sostenida por esa representación; al igual que la sentencia número 455-2022 del Tribunal de Apelaciones del I Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera. Finalmente, protesta la condenatoria en costas, señalando una indebida aplicación de los ordinales 562 y 563 del Código de Trabajo, dado que considera haber litigado con evidente buena fe, pues no se han presentado gestiones dilatorias, los hechos de la demanda fueron contestados de manera objetiva y se colabora con la obtención de las pruebas; las pretensiones de la actora carecen de asidero fáctico y jurídico, lo que implica que existan razones suficientes para litigar en el presente proceso. En su criterio, se cumple la mayoría de presupuestos contemplados por el Código de Trabajo para eximir al demandado. Con base en esas consideraciones solicita se revoque el fallo, se desestime la demanda y se condene a la actora al pago de ambas costas o, en su lugar, se revoque el fallo en cuanto a la condena al pago de costas personales en favor del actor.\n\n III.- DE LA FALTA DE FUNDAMENTACIÓN DE LA SENTENCIA: El artículo 587 inciso 5 del Código de Trabajo contempla la falta de fundamento o fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia, como un motivo para la casación de un fallo. La representación estatal aduce que la sentencia es ayuna de fundamentación al no efectuar un análisis de los argumentos expuestos, sino que se basó en casos similares donde se aplicó el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública, obviando la Ley existente que regula la temporalidad de los pluses salariales. Sin embargo, del análisis del fallo dictado no es posible atribuirle la omisión imputada en tanto, la decisión sí contiene una suficiente y adecuada fundamentación de las razones fácticas y jurídicas, con sustento en criterios jurisprudenciales que apoyan la determinación del Juzgado, particularmente lo relativo a la temporalidad de los pluses salariales, aspecto en el que, en todo caso, no existe discusión según se verá en las consideraciones siguientes.\n\n IV.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO: No existe objeción al fallo en cuanto tuvo por acreditado que la actora labora para el Ministerio de Educación Pública, fue reubicada en otro puesto por razones de salud; y que antes de esa reubicación ella contaba con el pago de los sobresueldos \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" y \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\" los cuales le fueron suprimidos a partir del 31 de enero de 2021. Es claro, porque así se contempló en la resolución DRH-DPRH-ULIC-1688-2020 de 25 de febrero de 2020 (visible a imagen 8 del expediente virtual del Juzgado) donde a la actora se le comunicó la reubicación laboral temporal, que esta se acordó con fundamento en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo, el cual establece la obligación del empleador de reponer en su puesto a la persona trabajadora que haya sufrido un riesgo pero que esté en posibilidades de continuar laborando; y el deber patronal de proporcionarle un puesto diferente de acuerdo con sus posibilidades cuando, por recomendación médica, no pueda ejercer las funciones que venía desempeñando. Esa norma dispone literalmente en su párrafo segundo: “Si de conformidad con el criterio médico, el trabajador no pudiera desempeñar normalmente el trabajo que realizaba cuando le aconteció el riesgo, pero sí otro diferente en la misma empresa, el patrono estará obligado a proporcionárselo, siempre que ello sea factible, para lo cual podrá realizar los movimientos de personas que sean necesarios”. Esta normativa tiene relación directa con el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989), cuyo artículo 1° menciona que esta reglamentación tiene por objeto establecer las normas y los procedimientos a seguir por el Ministerio de Educación Pública para conceder licencia a sus servidores o servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, sobrevivientes de riesgos del trabajo o enfermedad. Por su parte, el numeral 2 establece: “Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares”. Esa normativa distingue entre licencia permanente y licencia parcial, declarando que tienen derecho a esta última aquellos servidores o servidoras respecto de los cuales la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en su valoración final, declaren una incapacidad menor permanente o una incapacidad parcial o permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones. El artículo 8 trata específicamente el supuesto de la concesión de la licencia especial en los siguientes términos: “De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 5° anterior, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, concederá una licencia especial a aquellos servidores que se encuentren en las siguientes circunstancias:/a) Que de acuerdo con su dolencia la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, recomiende en la valoración final del tratamiento su cambio de funciones./ b) Que en la valoración final de los efectos del riesgo de trabajo acaecido, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, determine una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomiende su incorporación al servicio con cambio de funciones”. Ahora bien, el canon 9 estipula que de previo a la concesión de la licencia, el Ministerio procederá a la reubicación de la persona servidora, lo que se ratifica en las normas siguientes, según las cuales “…esta licencia especial podrá ser suspendida, a juicio del Ministro de Educación Pública, a los efectos de asignar labores y funciones compatibles con sus condiciones personales, con las recomendaciones médicas y la formación académica del beneficiario, que con carácter temporal se requiera” y que “…el Ministerio de Educación Pública, podrá hacer uso del recurso humano que estuviere en disfrute de licencia especial para la atención de tareas y funciones de carácter administrativo, administrativo-docente o de carácter técnico, en cualquiera de sus dependencias cuando tales servicios se requieran para la buena marcha de las instituciones o para implementar programas especiales”, lo cual guarda absoluta correspondencia con el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. En el artículo 17 se estipula, de manera expresa, que “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De esa manera, se ha considerado que esta normativa complementa el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, el cual no hace diferencia alguna entre incapacidades permanentes o parciales y de ahí que tampoco se pueda realizar diferenciación para los efectos del pago entre las licencias permanentes y especiales. Este último dispone: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno´, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando./ b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes./c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder”. La normativa reglamentaria desarrolla esta expresa disposición, contemplando de manera indistinta el derecho a la indemnización, tanto para el caso de la licencia permanente como de la especial. El tema en estudio ha sido analizado por esta Sala en reiterados asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento. En todos esos casos, se ha indicado que la normativa sectorial aplicable establece el derecho de las personas que gozan de una licencia médica, a seguir percibiendo el salario total que estaban devengando de previo a la licencia. En el caso de la accionante no se observa ninguna particularidad que permita apartarse de ese criterio. Su reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. Se concuerda en que, los sobresueldos temporales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y su pago debe suspenderse cuando la persona servidora, en el ejercicio de sus funciones habituales, deja de cumplir aquellas por las cuales se le remunera ese plus. No obstante, el presente asunto no versa sobre una persona servidora que en el ejercicio normal de sus funciones deja de estar en los supuestos que hacen viable el recargo sino, de una persona que por razones de salud queda impedida para seguir ejecutando sus labores habituales. En consecuencia, si al momento de la reubicación, la actora devengaba el sobresueldo referido, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a esa normativa especial a que, dentro de su remuneración como funcionaria administrativa reubicada por razones de salud, se le contemple ese plus (en semejante sentido la sentencia de esta Sala número 308, de las 10:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2014). En el caso, los recargos no fueron laborados dada la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a la docencia, por razones de salud. Es decir, el pago de los sobresueldos no se origina en el cumplimiento de las funciones sino en atención a la norma que dispone el traslado con el reconocimiento de lo equivalente al salario total que estaba devengando la persona servidora al momento de la reubicación, en tanto la normativa contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”. Por lo expuesto tampoco es cierto se haya violentado el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública. Tal disposición no regula la situación que aquí se plantea y está prevista para el ejercicio efectivo de las funciones de docencia, no para los casos de personas servidoras a quienes se les prescribe una incapacidad o licencia. De igual forma, no se observa la infracción del numeral 56 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, el cual tipifica como delito el reconocimiento ilegal de beneficios laborales, supuesto que está dirigido al ejercicio de la administración activa y que no se observa. Lo decidido no resulta contrapuesto al criterio del Tribunal Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos tienen naturaleza temporal y no constituyen un derecho adquirido. Se insiste, el caso en análisis no se refiere a la situación de una persona servidora activa que demande el mantenimiento de los recargos luego de concluido el plazo para el cual estos fueron inicialmente previstos sino que el tema se reduce a establecer la remuneración que debe percibir una persona servidora reubicada en un cargo distinto en razón de no poder seguir efectuando sus labores normales ni los recargos que venía ejerciendo, debido a un padecimiento o afectación en su salud; tema totalmente distinto al planteamiento que hace la representante del demandado. La posición de la representación estatal, en el sentido de que la reubicación por razones de salud en casos como el de la actora se regula por lo dispuesto en el artículo 166 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil que contempla para las licencias por razón de enfermedad debidamente comprobada, el giro de la mitad del sueldo anterior al disfrute de la licencia, se contradice con lo actuado por la propia administración, la que, después de la reubicación y salvo el caso de los sobrecargos objeto de discusión en esta litis ( los que reconoció hasta el 31 de enero de 2021) mantuvo íntegro (100%) el salario base y los otros derechos salariales con que contaba la actora previa la reubicación, a pesar del cambio en sus funciones. Así se observa de la acción de personal 202101-MP-029811 (visible a imagen 156 ídem) y del oficio DRH-DR-UPLA-0361-2022 de 23 de febrero de 2022, emitido por el Departamento de Remuneración, Unidad Planillas del Ministerio de Educación Pública (visible a imagen 203 ídem). Conforme a lo expuesto, no cabe hacer reparo alguno a lo decidido por el Juzgado en cuanto a este tema.\n\n V.- COSTAS: La representación del Estado protesta contra la condena al pago de costas porque considera que su actuación procesal puede catalogarse de buena fe al tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 563 del Código de Trabajo. El tema de las costas está regulado en los artículos 562 al 564 del Código de Trabajo, el primero de los cuales textualmente reza: “En toda sentencia, incluidas las anticipadas, y las resoluciones que provoquen el perecimiento del proceso por litispendencia, incompetencia por razones del territorio nacional, satisfacción extraprocesal o deserción, se condenará al vencido, a quien ha satisfecho el derecho o a la parte sancionada con la finalización del asunto, al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas./ Si la sentencia resuelve el asunto por el fondo o acoge excepciones materiales de las calificadas como previas, las personales no podrán ser menores del quince por ciento (15%) ni mayores del veinticinco por ciento (25%) del importe líquido de la condenatoria o de la absolución, en su caso./ En los demás supuestos, así como cuando el proceso no fuera susceptible de estimación pecuniaria, la fijación se hará prudencialmente./ Para hacer la fijación del porcentaje o del monto prudencial se tomarán en cuenta la labor realizada, la cuantía de la cosa litigada y la posición económica del actor y demandado./ En los asuntos inestimables en que hubiera trascendencia económica se hará la fijación con base en el monto resultante hasta la firmeza de la sentencia y, si a consecuencia del proceso se siguiera generando en el futuro el resultado económico, podrá agregarse al monto fijado, según criterio prudencial, hasta un cincuenta por ciento (50%). Si el resultado económico fuera intrascendente se hará la fijación de forma prudencial con fundamento en los criterios mencionados”. Luego, el numeral 563 siguiente regula los supuestos que posibilitan a quien juzga, resolver el asunto sin especial condena de esos gastos; así como de aquellos en que se considera no existe buena fe. Esta norma dispone: “No obstante, se podrá eximir al vencido del pago de las costas personales y aun de las procesales, cuando: 1) Se haya litigado con evidente buena fe. 2) Las proposiciones hayan prosperado parcialmente. 3) Cuando haya habido vencimiento recíproco./ La exoneración debe ser siempre razonada./No podrá considerarse de buena fe a la parte que negó pretensiones evidentes que el resultado del proceso indique que debió aceptarlas, no asistió a la totalidad de la audiencia, adujo testigos sobornados o testigos y documentos falsos, no ofreció ninguna probanza para justificar su demanda o excepciones, si se fundaran en hechos disputados./ La exoneración de costas será imperativa, si alguna norma especial así lo dispone”. Según se observa, el numeral 563 transcrito prevé una facultad y no una obligación de exonerar a la parte vencida cuando se presente alguno de esos supuestos. Las razones con base en las cuales la representación del demandado pretende se le tenga como litigante de evidente buena fe no son de recibo. El contestar la demanda de manera objetiva, no presentar gestiones dilatorias y ofrecer las pruebas de su interés, son actuaciones propias de quien comparece a juicio y además, una exigencia de la lealtad procesal con la que deben proceder los litigantes, según lo estipula el artículo 421 del Código de Trabajo. Además, lejos podría estar esa parte de una actuación conforme con la buena fe, si ha negado en forma insistente, incluso ante la Sala, la procedencia del derecho demandado. Sobre este mismo tema la parte actora impugna lo relativo al monto ordenado por costas personales. Su inconformidad es de recibo. En la especie se está en presencia de un asunto de cuantía inestimable con trascendencia económica por cuanto el reconocimiento de los sobresueldos demandados se ha ordenado sin límite mientras la funcionaria se mantenga en la condición de reubicada, lo cual resulta incierto. Conforme a la normativa transcrita, en tal caso lo procedente no es la fijación de una suma prudencial, sino un porcentaje en los términos regulados en los incisos 2 y 5 del citado numeral 562. En ese orden de ideas, atendiendo a la labor realizada, la cuantía del asunto y la posición económica de las partes, se estima razonable fijar las costas personales en un 15% de la condenatoria hasta la firmeza del fallo y, si a consecuencia del proceso se siguiera generando en el futuro el resultado económico, podrá agregarse al monto fijado, según criterio prudencial, hasta un cincuenta por ciento, lo cual se determinará en ejecución de sentencia.\n\n VI.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: Con sustento en las razones dadas, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso formulado por la representación estatal y acoger el de la parte actora, anular el fallo en cuanto estableció en doscientos mil colones el monto por costas personales para en su lugar, establecer que por ese rubro, el demandado deberá cancelar un 15% de la condenatoria hasta la firmeza del fallo y, si a consecuencia del proceso se siguiera generando en el futuro el resultado económico, podrá agregarse al monto fijado, según criterio prudencial, hasta un cincuenta por ciento, lo cual se determinará en ejecución de sentencia (en el mismo sentido la sentencia número 2021-000832 de las 13:50 horas del 23 de abril de 2021).\n\n VII.- VOTO SALVADO DE LAS MAGISTRADAS VARELA ARAYA Y CHACÓN ARTAVIA: Las suscritas nos apartamos del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago de los sobresueldos denominados \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" y \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", desde su supresión y hasta que se mantenga en esa condición; así como las diferencias generadas en aguinaldo, salario escolar y vacaciones. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que la demandante devengaba esos pluses y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas; razón por la cual, tales sobresueldos se le dejaron de cancelar a partir del 01 de febrero de 2021. Asimismo, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. La Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y la servidora no se encuentra en los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no se encuentra incapacitada por enfermedad, que la hagan acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluimos que lo resuelto debe revocarse. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, antes citados, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno\" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…” Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por el recargo relacionado constituyen un sobresueldo temporal, anexo a la estructura salarial, que si bien forma parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no es un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede con razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes y ocurre en el caso de estudio, los recargos no constituyen un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión de los sobresueldos, al pasar la parte actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho. Por lo expuesto, las suscritas concluimos que debe acogerse el recurso del Estado, anular lo fallado y declarar sin lugar la demanda. Sin especial sanción en costas.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\n Se declara sin lugar el recurso de la parte demandada y se acoge el de la actora. Se anula el fallo en cuanto estableció en doscientos mil colones, la condena por costas personales. En su lugar, estas se fijan en un quince por ciento de la condenatoria hasta la firmeza del fallo y, si a consecuencia del proceso se siguiera generando en el futuro el resultado económico, podrá agregarse al monto fijado, según criterio prudencial, hasta un cincuenta por ciento, lo cual se determinará en ejecución de sentencia. Las magistradas Varela Araya y Chacón Artavia salvan el voto, declaran con lugar el recurso del Estado, anulan lo fallado, acogen la excepción de falta de derecho y declaran sin lugar la demanda. Resuelven sin especial sanción en costas.\n\nRes: 2025001107\n\nMALLON \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n \n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nRoxana Chacón Artavia\n\n \n\nAna Orfilia Briceño Yock\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n JPXPNSNZBTQ61 \n\n1 \n\nEXP: 21-002607-1178-LA\n\n \n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2258-4165. Correo Electrónico: sala-segunda@poder-judicial.go.cr", "body_en_text": "Review of the Document\n\n\n\n \n\nSupreme Court of Justice\n\nSECOND CHAMBER\n\n \n\nFile: 21-002607-1178-LA\n\nRes: 2025001107\n\nSECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on April fourth, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, by [Name 001], educator, identity card [Value 001] and resident of Alajuela, against the STATE, represented by its deputy procurator, licensed Cinthya Castro Hernández, single and resident of San José. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is licensed Julieth Gómez Gamboa, resident of Heredia. All persons are of legal age, of unknown marital status, and attorneys; with the indicated exceptions.\n\nDrafted by Judge Sánchez Rodríguez; and\n\nWHEREAS:\n\nI.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff's special judicial attorney filed this action so that, in a judgment, the State be ordered to immediately restitute to her the payment of the 25% additional pay (sobresueldo) for the concept of Extended Hours Modality School (Escuela Modalidad Horario Ampliado) and the 6.6% surcharge for the Educational Support Committee I and II cycle (Comité de Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo), which she had before the relocation to administrative functions and for as long as she maintains the status of being relocated. She demanded that the payment of these differences be indexed from that moment, February 1, 2021, until their effective payment, including differences generated in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations; in addition to legal interest on the amounts earned; plus the costs of the action. The State's representative answered negatively in a document visible at image 27 of the Court's virtual file; and raised the defense of lack of right. The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, by judgment number 2024-0242 at 07:45 hours on February 13, 2024, signed by licensed Floricel Oviedo Miranda, dismissed the indicated defense and granted the claim, ordering the State to immediately restitute the payment of the additional pays (sobresueldos) called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and for as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differences generated in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations (the latter only if any payment for this concept is recorded in that period). It ordered the deduction of social charges and the applicable salary tax; ordered the defendant to pay interest on the principal from its enforceability, \"that is, from the date of suppression until effective payment according to article 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) amended by Law N°9343. In the absence of agreement, the legal interest will be equal to the basic passive rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency and the 'prime rate' for operations in American dollars, in accordance with article 497 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio).-\" It also ordered the payment of the indexation of the main economic awards, updated to present value at the same percentage variation of the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area, between the month prior to the claim and the month preceding the one in which payment is effectively made. Finally, it ordered the payment of costs, setting the personal costs at the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES.\n\nII.- CASSATION APPEAL BY THE PLAINTIFF: The plaintiff's attorney contests the amount set for personal costs. She mentions that civil and labor procedural rules establish as a rule the awarding of costs against the losing party, but considers the award of costs in the sum of two hundred thousand colones arbitrary. She points out that the plaintiff has had legal representation at each stage of the present proceeding, from the preliminary study of the case, as well as the filing of the claim; with a favorable judgment in the proceeding, with evident expenditure of time and with her sponsorship as a legal professional, work that has been carried out with due responsibility and care. She also points out that all necessary steps have been taken for an effective technical defense against the State's failure to fulfill its responsibilities, so there is no basis whatsoever to award costs of two hundred thousand colones for the proceeding, since the defendant's conduct caused serious harm to the plaintiff's rights, who had to wait years for a judgment in her favor and to assert her rights in judicial instances under due legal representation. She considers that this sum does not compensate the professional work performed in this proceeding, where not only the amount of the matter must be assessed, but also the professional work deployed. She requests that this item be set in a percentage or in a prudential amount consistent with the technical work performed. CASSATION APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT: The State's representation objects, in the first place, to the substantial violation of the legal system, due to erroneous interpretation of article 254 of the labor code in light of the erroneous application of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Regulations for Leaves of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública), executive decree 19113 of July 28, 1989, as well as improper assessment of the body of evidence. It asserts that the plaintiff's relocation was agreed under the protection of numeral 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) which involves adapting the working conditions for the relocated person; and not executive decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989. It considers the analysis carried out improper because the cited regulation finds no basis in article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil). In relation to the repeal of article 167 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), it transcribes a fragment of opinion C-250-2004 of the Attorney General's Office where it is mentioned that, by virtue of the repeal of articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), the rule disappeared whereby, in the presence of a disabling illness, the right to a leave and payment of an aid equivalent to the total salary was acquired for the entire period of the disability. Furthermore, it points out that the leaves in force are the special ones, established in article 166 of the Statute (Estatuto), which have not been repealed or annulled; the Regulations for Special Leaves (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales) are in force regarding special leaves, because article 166 which regulates them is in force; regarding permanent leaves, the cited regulatory instrument was implicitly repealed, by repeal of its enabling norm as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its binding jurisprudence. It also relies on Opinion C-250-2009, pointing out that the reasoning that, in the plaintiff's case, it is a special leave and therefore she is entitled to the application of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) in accordance with the provisions of decree 19113 is not correct, because the Chamber has recognized that the special leave is based on article 166 of the Statute (Estatuto) and it is that norm, and not 174, that must be applied. It insists that in the plaintiff's case, it is a relocation to administrative functions, not a disability, and therefore, numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) does not apply to her case. It adds that the additional pays (sobresueldos) received by the plaintiff until January 31, 2021, are temporary; and refers to the criterion issued by this Chamber to the effect that in public employment relationships, any salary item must have support in a legal norm that authorizes its payment. As a second ground for grievance, it points out the direct violation of article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) (Law Nº 2166 of October 9, 1957) and article 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) (Law Nº 8422 of October 6, 2004), as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on this matter. The first of those norms establishes that function surcharges are temporary and when the service so demands. The judgment denatures the temporary nature of the surcharge, granting it indefinitely, without the plaintiff working it or providing the functions corresponding to said surcharge, but also recognizing a salary component contrary to what is established by the legal system. For its part, article 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) clearly and precisely typifies the crime of illegal recognition of labor benefits, so it is not possible to recognize the payment of a surcharge unrestrictedly. It cites vote number 7081-2019 at 9:20 hours on April 26, 2019, where it is mentioned that bonuses or additional pays (sobresueldos) do not constitute an essential part of the salary, they cease at the end of the school year. It considers that this type of case should not be limited to an analysis from a merely protective labor perspective of the teacher's private interest and turning its back on the public interest and the administrative acts issued by the Ministry of Public Education, which find a basis for their formalization in a detailed analysis of the needs that the public service demands, the available budget for the cancellation of this type of additional pays (sobresueldos), and the consideration of service by the teacher. It also argues that the judgment lacks grounds by not carrying out an analysis of the arguments presented but rather relied on similar cases where the Regulations for Special Leaves for Servants of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública) was applied, ignoring the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary bonuses. It mentions resolution number 173-2021 of this Second Chamber, where the claim was dismissed based on the thesis held by that representation; as well as judgment number 455-2022 of the Appeals Tribunal of the I Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section. Finally, it contests the cost award, pointing out an improper application of ordinals 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), given that it considers having litigated with evident good faith, as no dilatory actions have been filed, the facts of the claim were answered objectively, and it collaborated in obtaining the evidence; the plaintiff's claims lack factual and legal basis, which implies that there are sufficient reasons to litigate in the present proceeding. In its opinion, most of the conditions contemplated by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to exempt the defendant are met. Based on these considerations, it requests that the judgment be revoked, the claim be dismissed, and the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs or, instead, that the judgment be revoked regarding the order to pay personal costs in favor of the plaintiff.\n\nIII.- LACK OF GROUNDS IN THE JUDGMENT: Article 587 subsection 5 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) contemplates the lack of grounds or insufficient grounds of a judgment, as a reason for the cassation of a ruling. The State's representation argues that the judgment lacks grounds by not carrying out an analysis of the arguments presented, but rather relied on similar cases where the Regulations for Special Leaves for Servants of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública) was applied, ignoring the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary bonuses. However, from the analysis of the ruling issued, it is not possible to attribute the imputed omission to it, insofar as the decision does contain sufficient and adequate grounds of the factual and legal reasons, supported by jurisprudential criteria that support the Court's determination, particularly regarding the temporality of salary bonuses, an aspect on which, in any case, there is no dispute as will be seen in the following considerations.\n\nIV.- ANALYSIS OF THE CASE: There is no objection to the judgment insofar as it established that the plaintiff works for the Ministry of Public Education, was relocated to another position for health reasons; and that before that relocation she had the payment of the additional pays (sobresueldos) \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\" which were suppressed starting January 31, 2021. It is clear, because it was so contemplated in resolution DRH-DPRH-ULIC-1688-2020 of February 25, 2020 (visible at image 8 of the Court's virtual file) where the plaintiff was notified of the temporary work relocation, which was agreed based on article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate the worker who has suffered a risk but is in a position to continue working; and the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their possibilities when, by medical recommendation, they cannot perform the functions they had been performing. This norm literally states in its second paragraph: \"If, in accordance with medical criteria, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but could do another different one in the same company, the employer will be obliged to provide it, provided it is feasible, for which it may make the necessary personnel movements.\" This regulation is directly related to the Regulations for Special Leaves Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures to be followed by the Ministry of Public Education to grant leave to its servants, due to the diminution of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: \"The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those servants who, due to the diminution suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular servants.\" This regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that those servants for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions, have the right to the latter. Article 8 specifically deals with the case of granting special leave in the following terms: \"In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those servants who find themselves in the following circumstances: /a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) recommends in the final treatment assessment their change of functions. / b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work risk that occurred, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their incorporation into service with a change of functions.\" Now then, canon 9 stipulates that prior to granting the leave, the Ministry will proceed with the relocation of the servant, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which \"...this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purposes of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, with the medical recommendations and the academic background of the beneficiary, which are temporarily required\" and that \"...the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that was on special leave for attending to tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the smooth operation of the institutions or to implement special programs\", which is in absolute correspondence with article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Article 17 stipulates, expressly, that \"The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code on the matter.\" In this way, it has been considered that this regulation complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), which makes no distinction between permanent or partial disabilities and hence, no differentiation can be made for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves. The latter states: \"a) If the servant, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonal assignment (zonaje), alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment./ b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive corresponding salary increases./ c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy (subsidio), and the aids referred to in article 167, shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply.\" The regulatory framework develops this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent leave and special leave. The matter under study has been analyzed by this Chamber in repeated matters submitted for its knowledge. In all those cases, it has been indicated that the applicable sectoral regulations establish the right of persons who enjoy a medical leave to continue receiving the total salary they were earning prior to the leave. In the plaintiff's case, no particularity is observed that allows departing from that criterion. Her relocation was agreed upon in response to a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It is agreed that temporary additional pays (sobresueldos) do not constitute an acquired right and their payment must be suspended when the servant, in the exercise of their usual functions, stops performing those for which that bonus is remunerated. However, the present matter does not deal with a servant who, in the normal exercise of their functions, ceases to be in the circumstances that make the surcharge viable, but rather, a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to carry out their usual tasks. Consequently, if at the time of relocation, the plaintiff was earning the aforementioned additional pay (sobresueldo), the right she has, in accordance with that special regulation, that this bonus be included within her remuneration as an administrative official relocated for health reasons, is indisputable (in a similar sense, the judgment of this Chamber number 308, at 10:30 hours on March 26, 2014). In this case, the surcharges were not worked given the need to relocate the servant to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. That is, the payment of the additional pays (sobresueldos) does not originate from the performance of the functions but rather in accordance with the rule that provides for the transfer with the recognition of the equivalent of the total salary that the servant was earning at the time of the relocation, insofar as the regulations contemplate the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, \"a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the entirety of their salary.\" For the reasons stated, it is also not true that article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) was violated. Such provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is provided for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of servants who are prescribed a disability or leave. Likewise, no infringement of numeral 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito) is observed, which typifies the illegal recognition of labor benefits as a crime, a scenario directed at the exercise of active administration and which is not observed. The decision is not contrary to the Constitutional Court's criterion that surcharges are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right. It is reiterated, the case under analysis does not refer to the situation of an active servant demanding the maintenance of surcharges after the term for which they were initially provided has ended, but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that a servant relocated to a different position must receive because they cannot continue performing their normal duties nor the surcharges they were performing, due to a condition or health impairment; a completely different issue from the approach taken by the defendant's representative. The State representation's position, that relocation for health reasons in cases like the plaintiff's is regulated by the provisions of article 166 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) which provides for leaves due to duly proven illness, the payment of half the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave, contradicts the actions of the administration itself, which, after the relocation and except for the surcharges subject to discussion in this litigation (which it recognized until January 31, 2021), maintained the base salary and the other salary rights that the plaintiff had prior to the relocation in full (100%), despite the change in her functions. This is observed from personnel action 202101-MP-029811 (visible at image 156 idem) and from official letter DRH-DR-UPLA-0361-2022 of February 23, 2022, issued by the Department of Remuneration, Payroll Unit of the Ministry of Public Education (visible at image 203 idem). Based on the foregoing, no objection can be made to what was decided by the Court regarding this issue.\n\nV.- COSTS: The State's representation protests against the order to pay costs because it considers that its procedural conduct can be classified as in good faith according to the provisions of article 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). The matter of costs is regulated in articles 562 to 564 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the first of which literally states: \"In every judgment, including summary judgments, and resolutions that cause the expiration of the process due to lis pendens, lack of jurisdiction for reasons of the national territory, extrajudicial satisfaction, or abandonment, the losing party, the party who has satisfied the right, or the party sanctioned with the termination of the matter, shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred./ If the judgment resolves the matter on the merits or accepts material defenses classified as preliminary, the personal costs may not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of the net amount of the award or the dismissal, as applicable./ In other cases, as well as when the process is not susceptible to pecuniary estimation, the determination shall be made prudentially./ To make the determination of the percentage or the prudential amount, the work performed, the amount of the matter litigated, and the economic position of the plaintiff and defendant shall be taken into account./ In matters that are inestimable where there is economic significance, the determination shall be made based on the resulting amount up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a consequence of the process, the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent (50%) may be added to the set amount, according to prudential criteria. If the economic result is insignificant, the determination shall be made prudentially based on the mentioned criteria.\" Then, the following numeral 563 regulates the scenarios that enable the judge to resolve the matter without a special award of those expenses; as well as those in which it is considered there is no good faith. This rule states: \"Notwithstanding, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even procedural costs, when: 1) There has been litigation with evident good faith. 2) The propositions have partially succeeded. 3) When there has been reciprocal loss./ The exoneration must always be reasoned./A party that denied evident claims that the outcome of the process indicates it should have accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, adduced suborned witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any evidence to justify its claim or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts, may not be considered to be in good faith./ Exoneration from costs shall be mandatory if a special rule so provides.\" As observed, transcribed numeral 563 provides a power and not an obligation to exonerate the losing party when any of these scenarios occur. The reasons on which the defendant's representation intends to be considered as a litigant of evident good faith are not acceptable. Answering the claim objectively, not filing dilatory actions, and offering the evidence of its interest are actions typical of whoever appears in court and, furthermore, a requirement of procedural loyalty with which litigants must proceed, as stipulated by article 421 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Furthermore, that party could be far from an action consistent with good faith, if it has insistently denied, even before the Chamber, the validity of the right claimed. On this same issue, the plaintiff challenges the amount ordered for personal costs. Her disagreement is accepted. In this case, we are in the presence of a matter of inestimable amount with economic significance since the recognition of the claimed additional pays (sobresueldos) has been ordered without limit as long as the official remains in the relocated condition, which is uncertain. According to the transcribed regulations, in such a case, what is appropriate is not the setting of a prudential sum, but a percentage in the terms regulated in subsections 2 and 5 of the cited numeral 562. In that vein, considering the work performed, the amount of the matter, and the economic position of the parties, it is considered reasonable to set the personal costs at 15% of the award up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a consequence of the process, the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the set amount, according to prudential criteria, which shall be determined in the execution of the judgment.\n\nVI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Based on the reasons given, it is appropriate to declare the appeal filed by the State's representation without merit and to uphold that of the plaintiff, annulling the judgment in that it established the amount for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones, and instead, establish that for this item, the defendant must pay 15% of the award up to the finality of the judgment, and, if as a consequence of the process the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the set amount, according to prudential criteria, which shall be determined in the execution of the judgment (in the same sense, judgment number 2021-000832 at 13:50 hours on April 23, 2021).\n\nVII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA: The undersigned depart from the majority criterion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff the payment of the additional pays (sobresueldos) called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and for as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differences generated in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations. It has been duly accredited that the plaintiff earned these bonuses and that, due to health problems, she was relocated to administrative functions; which is why such additional pays (sobresueldos) ceased to be paid to her as of February 1, 2021. Likewise, it is clear that the relocation was agreed upon in response to a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not facing a disability per se. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, therefore it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the servant is not in the factual assumptions provided for in article 22 bis subsection a) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), because she is not disabled by illness, which would make her creditor of what is claimed.\n\nAfter reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the decision must be revoked. Sections 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Manual of Procedures for Managing Teaching Staff stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional assignments (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, payment of these must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements for their recognition. Furthermore, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming incapacitated due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for alternate schedule, or any extra pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment. /b) Sick leave, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive corresponding salary increases. (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other things, that may correspond. / (The preceding paragraph was added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (highlighting added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that an employee who is on sick leave, or a female employee on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary through extra pay (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case before us, the petitioner was reassigned to administrative duties and is not incapacitated, so her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that pursuant to the provisions of sections 118, subsection j), of the Education Code and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses are granted when the employee performs additional functions to those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these extra pay (sobresueldos) depends on whether the circumstances warrant it and, therefore, they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year (curso lectivo), according to the start and end dates regulated in section 176 of the Civil Service Statute; otherwise, the temporary service would be denatured and become an ordinary one. In accordance with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as an additional assignment (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those additional assignments (recargos) that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the employee's total salary, permanently and independently of the service provided, as is being sought in this case. There is vast jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber to the effect that additional assignments for duties (recargos de funciones) cannot be considered a vested right (derecho adquirido) of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the performance of a worker that may be classified as an additional assignment for duties (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) for the worker to whom it is assigned, obligating the Administration to keep them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such additional assignments (recargos)—because they respond to the need for service provision at a specific moment—is temporary in nature and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, and logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the additional assignment (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the duties are exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specified period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party to continue receiving payment for this item, or to keep the additional assignment (recargo) or alternate schedule” (emphasis added; see also rulings numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an extra pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (Judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: “The same must be stated regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited additional assignment (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether or not the duties are exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specified period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party to continue receiving payment for this item, or to keep the indicated additional assignment (recargo), so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…” Finally, in ruling No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that extra pays (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an extra pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met.” Pursuant to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the related additional assignment (recargo) constitute a temporary extra pay (sobresueldo), annexed to the salary structure, which, although forming part of the final remuneration received by the employee, is not a permanent substantial component, but an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the prerequisites established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each school period (periodo lectivo). It should be noted that the payment of these additional assignments (recargos) is appropriate based on the position and the duties performed by the employee, and may therefore be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Obliging the State to pay remuneration for a service that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing duties through some type of additional assignment (recargo), since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same additional assignment (recargo), when it has been necessary for the person replacing the one reassigned for health reasons to take it on. As stated before and as occurs in the case under study, additional assignments (recargos) do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching staff. Finally, it must be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the additional assignment (recargo), it is necessarily required that a regulation authorize it (principle of legality that governs the public sector) and that the conditions and prerequisites established by it be met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the elimination of the extra pays (sobresueldos), upon the plaintiff moving from the condition of teacher to performing administrative duties due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law. Therefore, the undersigned conclude that the State's appeal must be granted, the decision annulled, and the lawsuit dismissed. No special sanction as to costs.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nThe appeal of the defendant party is dismissed, and that of the plaintiff is granted. The judgment is annulled insofar as it established the condemnation for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones. Instead, these are set at fifteen percent of the condemnation until the judgment becomes final, and if, as a consequence of the process, an economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the fixed amount, according to prudential criteria, which shall be determined in the execution of the judgment. Judges Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, grant the State's appeal, annul the decision, uphold the objection of lack of right, and dismiss the lawsuit. They resolve without special sanction as to costs.\n\nRes: 2025001107\n\nMALLON\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez\n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n \n\nJorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nRoxana Chacón Artavia\n\n \n\nAna Orfilia Briceño Yock\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento Firmado Digitalmente\n\n-- Código verificador --\n\n\n\n JPXPNSNZBTQ61 \n\n1 \n\nEXP: 21-002607-1178-LA\n\n \n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2258-4165.\n\nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\nSALA SEGUNDA\n\nExp: 21-002607-1178-LA\n\nRes: 2025001107\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.\n\nSan José, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on April fourth, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, by **[Name 001]**, educator, identity card [Value 001] and resident of Alajuela, against the **STATE**, represented by its deputy attorney, Lic. Cinthya Castro Hernández, single and resident of San José. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Lic. Julieth Gómez Gamboa, resident of Heredia. All persons are of legal age, of unknown marital status, and attorneys; with the exceptions noted.\n\n**Drafted by Judge Sánchez Rodríguez; and**\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND:** The plaintiff's special judicial attorney filed this action so that, in judgment, the State be ordered to immediately reinstate the payment of the 25% additional pay (sobresueldo) for Extended Schedule Modality School (Escuela Modalidad Horario Ampliado) and the 6.6% Educational Support Committee I and II Cycle (Comité de Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo) surcharge (recargo), which she had before her reassignment (reubicación) to administrative functions and for as long as she maintains the reassigned status. She sought that the payment of these differentials be indexed from that moment, February 1, 2021, until their effective payment, including differentials generated in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations; in addition to legal interest on the amounts earned; plus the costs of the action. The State's representative answered in the negative in a document visible at image 27 of the Court's virtual file; and raised the defense of lack of right. The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, by judgment number 2024-0242 at 07:45 hours on February 13, 2024, signed by Lic. Floricel Oviedo Miranda, dismissed the indicated defense and upheld the claim, ordering the State to immediately reinstate the payment of the additional pay (sobresueldos) called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and for as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differentials generated in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations (the latter only if any payment for this concept is recorded in that period). It ordered the deduction of applicable social charges and salary tax; condemned the defendant to pay interest on the principal from its due date, _\"that is, from the date of suppression until effective payment according to Article 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) as amended by Law No. 9343. In the absence of an agreement, the legal interest rate shall be equal to the basic passive rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency and the 'prime rate' for operations in U.S. dollars, pursuant to Article 497 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio).-_ It also ordered the payment of the indexation of the main economic awards, updated to present value at the same percentage of variation of the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area, between the month prior to the claim and the month preceding that in which payment is actually made. Finally, it ordered the payment of costs, setting the personal costs at the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES.\n\n**II.- PLAINTIFF'S CASSATION APPEAL:** The plaintiff's attorney contests the amount set for personal costs. She mentions that civil and labor procedural rules establish, as a rule, the award of costs against the losing party, but considers the award of costs in the amount of two hundred thousand colones to be arbitrary. She indicates that the plaintiff has had legal representation at each stage of this proceeding, from the prior study of the case to the filing of the claim; with a favorable judgment in the process, with evident expenditure of time and with her sponsorship as a legal professional, work that has been carried out with due responsibility and care. She also indicates that all necessary steps have been taken for effective technical defense against the State's failure to meet its responsibilities, and therefore there is no basis whatsoever to award the costs of the proceeding at two hundred thousand colones, as the defendant's conduct caused serious harm to the plaintiff's rights, who had to wait years to obtain a judgment in her favor and to assert her rights in judicial instances under due legal representation. She considers that this sum does not compensate for the professional work performed in this proceeding, where not only the amount in controversy must be assessed, but also the professional work deployed. She requests that this item be set on a percentage basis or at a reasonable amount according to the technical work performed. **DEFENDANT'S CASSATION APPEAL:** The State's representation first objects to the substantial violation of the legal system, due to erroneous interpretation of Article 254 of the Labor Code in light of the erroneous application of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Ministry of Public Education's Regulation on Leaves (Reglamento de licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública), Executive Decree 19113 of July 28, 1989, as well as improper assessment of the evidentiary record. It asserts that the plaintiff's reassignment (reubicación) was agreed upon under the protection of Article 254 of the Labor Code, which implies the adaptation of working conditions for the reassigned person; and not Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989. It considers the analysis carried out improper because the cited regulation finds no basis in Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute. Regarding the repeal of Article 167 of the Civil Service Statute, it transcribes a fragment of Opinion C-250-2004 of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) mentioning that by virtue of the repeal of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, the rule disappeared whereby, in the presence of an incapacitating illness, the right to a leave and payment of an allowance equivalent to the full salary for the entire period of incapacity was acquired. Furthermore, it indicates that the leaves (licencias) currently in force are the special ones, established in Article 166 of the Statute, which have not been repealed or annulled; the Special Leaves Regulation remains in force regarding special leaves, since Article 166 that regulates them remains in force; regarding permanent leaves, the cited regulatory instrument was implicitly repealed, due to the repeal of its enabling norm as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, in its binding case law. It also relies on Opinion C-250-2009, indicating that the reasoning that, in the plaintiff's case, this is a special leave and therefore the application of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute in conjunction with the provisions of Decree 19113 applies is not correct, because the Chamber has recognized that the special leave is based on Article 166 of the Statute, and it is that norm, and not Article 174, that must be applied. It insists that in the plaintiff's case, this is a reassignment (reubicación) to administrative functions, not a disability, and therefore Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute does not apply to her case. It adds that the additional pay (sobresueldos) received by the plaintiff until January 31, 2021, are temporary; and refers to the criterion issued by this Chamber to the effect that in public employment relationships, any salary component must be supported by a legal norm authorizing its payment. As a second ground for grievance, it indicates the direct violation of Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) (Law No. 2166 of October 9, 1957) and Article 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) (Law No. 8422 of October 6, 2004), as well as the case law of the Constitutional Chamber on this matter. The first of these norms establishes that function surcharges (recargos) are temporary and when the service requires it. In the judgment, the temporary nature of the surcharge (recargo) is distorted, by granting it indefinitely, without the plaintiff working it or performing the functions corresponding to said surcharge, but a salary component is also recognized contrary to what is established by the legal system. For its part, Article 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service clearly and precisely defines the crime of illegal recognition of labor benefits, therefore it is not possible to recognize the payment of a surcharge (recargo) unrestricted. It points to vote number 7081-2019 at 9:20 hours on April 26, 2019, where it is mentioned that pluses or additional pay (sobresueldos) do not constitute an essential part of the salary and expire at the end of the school year.\n\nConsiders that this type of case should not be limited to an analysis from a purely labor-law perspective protective of the teacher's particular interest and turning its back on the public interest and the administrative acts issued by the Ministerio de Educación Pública, which find a basis for their formalization in a detailed analysis of the needs that the public service demands, the budget available for the payment of this type of supplementary salary (sobresueldos), and the service consideration by the teacher. Alleges, furthermore, that the judgment is devoid of reasoning (fundamentación) as it does not carry out an analysis of the arguments presented but rather relied on similar cases where the Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública was applied, disregarding the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary supplements (pluses salariales). Mentions resolution number 173-2021 of this Segunda Sala, where the claim was dismissed based on the thesis upheld by that representation; as well as judgment number 455-2022 of the Tribunal de Apelaciones del I Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera. Finally, protests the award of costs (condenatoria en costas), noting an improper application of articles 562 and 563 of the Código de Trabajo, given that it considers having litigated with evident good faith (buena fe), since no dilatory actions have been filed, the facts of the claim were answered objectively, and it cooperated with the obtaining of evidence; the plaintiff's claims lack factual and legal basis, which implies that there are sufficient reasons to litigate in the present proceeding. In its opinion, the majority of the conditions contemplated by the Código de Trabajo to exempt the defendant are met. Based on these considerations, requests that the judgment be revoked, the claim be dismissed, and the plaintiff be ordered to pay both sets of costs or, alternatively, that the judgment be revoked regarding the order to pay personal costs (costas personales) in favor of the plaintiff.\n\nIII.- OF THE LACK OF REASONING (FUNDAMENTACIÓN) OF THE JUDGMENT: Article 587, subsection 5 of the Código de Trabajo contemplates the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment as a ground for the cassation (casación) of a ruling. The State representation alleges that the judgment is devoid of reasoning as it does not carry out an analysis of the arguments presented, but rather relied on similar cases where the Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública was applied, disregarding the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary supplements. However, from the analysis of the issued judgment, it is not possible to attribute the omission imputed to it insofar as the decision does contain a sufficient and adequate reasoning of the factual and legal reasons, supported by jurisprudential criteria that uphold the determination of the Court (Juzgado), particularly regarding the temporality of salary supplements, an aspect on which, in any case, there is no discussion as will be seen in the following considerations.\n\nIV.- ANALYSIS OF THE CASE: There is no objection to the judgment insofar as it found it proven that the plaintiff works for the Ministerio de Educación Pública, was reassigned to another position for health reasons; and that before that reassignment, she received payment of the supplementary salaries \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado,\" which were withdrawn from her effective January 31, 2021. This is clear, because it was so contemplated in resolution DRH-DPRH-ULIC-1688-2020 of February 25, 2020 (visible at image 8 of the Court's virtual file) where the plaintiff was notified of the temporary work reassignment, which was agreed upon based on article 254 of the Código de Trabajo, which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate to their position the worker who has suffered a risk (riesgo) but is in a condition to continue working; and the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their possibilities when, by medical recommendation, the worker cannot perform the functions they were carrying out. That provision states literally in its second paragraph: “If, according to medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred to them, but could perform another different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it to them, provided this is feasible, for which purpose the employer may make the personnel movements that are necessary.” This regulation is directly related to the Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures to be followed by the Ministerio de Educación Pública to grant leave (licencia) to its employees, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work-related risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: “The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.” That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave (licencia permanente) and partial leave (licencia parcial), declaring that those employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment, declare a permanent minor disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions, are entitled to the latter. Article 8 specifically deals with the scenario of granting special leave (licencia especial) in the following terms: “In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministerio de Educación Pública shall grant a special leave to those employees who are in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social recommends in the final treatment assessment a change of functions./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work-related risk that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor permanent or partial permanent disability and recommends their return to service with a change of functions.”\n\nNow, rule 9 stipulates that prior to the granting of the leave, the Ministry shall proceed with the reassignment (reubicación) of the employee, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which “…this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purpose of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, with medical recommendations and the academic background of the beneficiary, which may be required on a temporary basis” and that “…the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that was on special leave for the attention of tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs”, which is in absolute accordance with article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Article 17 expressly stipulates that “The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code on the matter.” In this way, it has been considered that this regulation complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which makes no distinction whatsoever between permanent or partial disabilities and hence no differentiation can be made for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves. The latter provides: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonaje, horario alterno, or any other supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time./ b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other aspects, that may be applicable”. The regulatory norm develops this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent leave and for special leave. The issue under study has been analyzed by this Chamber in repeated matters submitted to its knowledge. In all those cases, it has been indicated that the applicable sectorial regulation establishes the right of persons who enjoy a medical leave to continue receiving the total salary they were earning prior to the leave. In the case of the plaintiff, no particularity is observed that would allow departing from that criterion. Her reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Labor Code. It is agreed that temporary supplementary salaries (sobresueldos temporales) do not constitute an acquired right and their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their regular functions, ceases to perform those for which they are remunerated with that extra pay. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their functions, ceases to fall under the assumptions that make the additional pay viable but, rather, a person who for health reasons is prevented from continuing to perform their regular work. Consequently, if at the time of reassignment, the plaintiff was earning the referred supplementary salary, it is indisputable the right she has, in accordance with that special regulation, that within her remuneration as a reassigned administrative employee for health reasons, that extra pay be included (in a similar sense, judgment of this Chamber number 308, at 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014). In the case, the additional pays were not worked given the need to reassign the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. That is, the payment of the supplementary salaries does not originate from the performance of the functions but in attention to the rule that orders the transfer with the recognition of what is equivalent to the total salary (salario total) that the employee was earning at the time of reassignment, as the regulation contemplates the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary.” For the foregoing reasons, it is also not true that article 15 of the Public Administration Salaries Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) has been violated. Such provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is foreseen for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees who are prescribed a disability or leave. Likewise, no infringement of numeral 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito) is observed, which typifies as a crime the illegal recognition of labor benefits, an assumption that is directed at the exercise of active administration and which is not observed. What was decided is not contrary to the criterion of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) in the sense that additional pays have a temporary nature and do not constitute an acquired right. It is insisted, the case under analysis does not refer to the situation of an active employee demanding the maintenance of additional pays after the conclusion of the term for which these were initially foreseen but rather the issue is reduced to establishing the remuneration that must be received by an employee reassigned to a different position due to being unable to continue performing their normal work nor the additional pays they had been performing, due to an ailment or an affliction to their health; a theme totally different from the approach made by the respondent's representative. The position of the State's representation, to the effect that reassignment for health reasons in cases such as the plaintiff's is regulated by the provisions of article 166 of the Civil Service Statute, which contemplates for leaves due to duly proven illness, the disbursement of half the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave, contradicts what was performed by the administration itself, which, after the reassignment and except for the case of the additional pays subject to discussion in this litigation (which it recognized until January 31, 2021), maintained intact (100%) the base salary and the other salary rights that the plaintiff had prior to the reassignment, despite the change in her functions. This is observed from the personnel action 202101-MP-029811 (visible at image 156 idem) and from official communication DRH-DR-UPLA-0361-2022 of February 23, 2022, issued by the Remuneration Department, Payroll Unit of the Ministry of Public Education (visible at image 203 idem). Based on the foregoing, no objection can be made to what was decided by the Trial Court on this matter.\n\n**V.- COSTS:** The representation of the State protests against the order to pay costs because it considers that its procedural conduct can be classified as good faith pursuant to the provisions of article 563 of the Labor Code.\n\nThe matter of costs is regulated in articles 562 through 564 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the first of which states verbatim: \"In every judgment, including anticipatory ones, and in resolutions that cause the proceedings to perish due to lis pendens (litispendencia), incompetence for reasons of national territory, extraprocedural satisfaction (satisfacción extraprocesal), or abandonment (deserción), the defeated party, the party who has satisfied the right, or the party sanctioned with the termination of the matter shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) incurred. If the judgment resolves the matter on the merits or upholds substantive defenses classified as preliminary, the personal costs (personales) may not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the net amount of the judgment or the acquittal, as the case may be. In other cases, as well as when the proceeding is not susceptible to pecuniary estimation, the determination shall be made prudentially. To determine the percentage or the prudential amount, the work performed, the amount in controversy (cuantía), and the economic position of the plaintiff and defendant shall be taken into account. In non-estimable matters where there is economic significance, the determination shall be made based on the amount resulting up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a consequence of the proceeding the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent (50%) may be added to the fixed amount, at the prudential discretion, in the enforcement of judgment (ejecución de sentencia) stage. If the economic result is insignificant, the determination shall be made prudentially based on the aforementioned criteria.\" Subsequently, article 563 regulates the circumstances that allow the adjudicator to resolve the matter without a special award of those expenses; as well as those in which a lack of good faith (buena fe) is considered to exist. This provision states: \"Notwithstanding, the defeated party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even procedural costs, when: 1) The litigation was conducted with evident good faith (buena fe). 2) The claims have partially succeeded. 3) There has been reciprocal defeat. The exoneration (exoneración) must always be reasoned. A party who denied evident claims that the outcome of the proceeding indicates should have been accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, or offered no evidence to justify their claim or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts, may not be considered to have acted in good faith (buena fe). The exoneration of costs shall be mandatory, if a special rule so provides.\" As observed, transcribed article 563 provides a power and not an obligation to exonerate the defeated party when any of those circumstances arise. The reasons on which the defendant's representation seeks to be considered a litigant of evident good faith are not well-founded. Answering the complaint objectively, not filing dilatory motions, and offering the evidence of its interest are actions typical of one who appears in court and also a requirement of the procedural loyalty with which litigants must proceed, as stipulated by article 421 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Moreover, that party could hardly be considered to be acting in accordance with good faith, if it has insistently denied, even before this Chamber (Sala), the propriety of the claimed right. On this same matter, the plaintiff challenges the amount ordered for personal costs (costas personales). Her disagreement is well-founded. In this case, we are in the presence of a matter of non-estimable amount (cuantía inestimable) with economic significance, because the recognition of the claimed bonuses (sobresueldos) has been ordered without limit as long as the employee remains in the reassigned (reubicada) condition, which is uncertain. Pursuant to the transcribed regulations, in such a case what is appropriate is not the determination of a prudential sum, but rather a percentage under the terms regulated in subparagraphs 2 and 5 of the cited article 562. In this vein, considering the work performed, the amount of the matter, and the economic position of the parties, it is deemed reasonable to set the personal costs at 15% of the judgment until the finality of the ruling and, if as a consequence of the proceeding the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the fixed amount, at prudential discretion, which shall be determined in the enforcement of judgment (ejecución de sentencia) stage.\n\nVI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Based on the reasons given, the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal filed by the state's representation and uphold that of the plaintiff, to annul the ruling insofar as it set the amount for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones, and in its place, to establish that for this item, the defendant must pay 15% of the judgment until the finality of the ruling and, if as a consequence of the proceeding the economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the fixed amount, at prudential discretion, which shall be determined in the enforcement of judgment (ejecución de sentencia) stage (in the same sense, judgment number 2021-000832 at 1:50 p.m. on April 23, 2021).\n\nVII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA: We, the undersigned, depart from the majority's criterion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's right to the payment of the bonuses (sobresueldos) called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and for as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differences generated in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations. It has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was earning those bonuses and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned (reubicada) to administrative functions; which is why such bonuses stopped being paid to her as of February 1, 2021. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment (reubicación) was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability (incapacidad) strictly speaking. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, so it may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized by the legal system (articles 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the employee does not meet the factual conditions set forth in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not disabled (incapacitada) by illness, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After a reconsideration of the analysis on the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that what was resolved must be revoked. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain bonuses (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: \"a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled (incapacitarse) due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zone pay (zonaje), for alternate shift (horario alterno), or any bonus (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive corresponding salary increases.\n\n(As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the allowances referred to in Article 167 shall be considered wages, and shall therefore be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may be applicable. / (The foregoing subsection added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (highlighting added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that a public servant who is on sick leave due to illness, or a female official on maternity leave, who had been receiving additional salary through bonus payments (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these considered when determining the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned (reubicada) to administrative functions and is not on sick leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that according to the provisions of numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses are granted when the public servant performs additional functions to those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these bonus payments depends on the circumstances warranting it, and they are therefore assigned on a temporary basis, for each academic year, according to the start and end dates established in ordinal 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the temporary nature of the service would be distorted and it would become an ordinary one. Consistent with the foregoing, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge, therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those surcharges that depend on a particular condition being met in order to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irrevocably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, on a permanent basis and regardless of the service provided, as is claimed in this case. There is extensive case law from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that functional surcharges cannot be considered a vested right of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it stated: \"It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a functional surcharge (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right for the worker to whom it is assigned and that obliges the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges - because it is due to the need to provide the service at a given time - is temporary in nature and is paid for a specific quantity of tasks, with its value logically to be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the surcharge or alternate schedule is maintained\" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 at 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 at 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the circumstances for which a bonus (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (judgment No. 2006-010959 at 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: \"Similarly, it is fitting to rule regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to cease receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the compensation for the cited surcharge constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated surcharge is maintained, thus the appeal, with regard to this last objection, is also unfounded…\" Finally, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: \"This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that bonus payments that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a bonus was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met.\" Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the related surcharge constitute a temporary bonus, annexed to the salary structure, which although forming part of the final remuneration received by the official, is not a substantial, permanent component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the person meeting the prerequisites established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each academic period. It should be noted that the payment of these surcharges is appropriate based on the position and the functions performed by the public servant, and therefore it may be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Forcing the State to pay a remuneration for a service that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition, it would give an undue advantage to the reassigned persons compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing the functions through a surcharge of some type, since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same surcharge, when it has become necessary for it to be assumed by the person replacing the one who has been reassigned (reubicada) for health reasons. As stated before and as occurs in the case under study, the surcharges do not constitute a vested right, besides which, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teachers. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to demand payment of the surcharge, it is necessarily required that a rule authorizes it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and prerequisites established by it; which does not occur in the present case. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the bonus payments (sobresueldos), when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment (reubicación), is in accordance with the law. For the reasons set forth, the undersigned conclude that the State's appeal must be upheld, the ruling annulled, and the claim declared without merit. No special award of costs.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nThe appeal of the defendant is dismissed and the appeal of the plaintiff is upheld.\n\nThe judgment is annulled insofar as it set the award for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones. In its place, these are fixed at fifteen percent of the condemnation amount up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a result of the proceeding an economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the set amount, according to prudential criteria, which shall be determined in execution of judgment. Magistrates Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, uphold the State’s appeal, annul the ruling, grant the exception of lack of right, and dismiss the claim.\n\nThey resolve with no special sanction in costs.\n\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| | | |\n| Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez | | |\n| | | |\n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| | Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez |\n\n| |\n| --- |\n| Mario Masís Fernández |\n\n

Roxana Chacón Artavia

 

\"\"

Ana Orfilia Briceño Yock

 

 

Documento Firmado Digitalmente

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 JPXPNSNZBTQ61

1

EXP: 21-002607-1178-LA

 

 Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406.

\n\nIV.- The appellant claims that she is entitled to the payment of overtime (sobresueldo) for the time she was reassigned (reubicación) to administrative duties due to a medical license (licencia por enfermedad). She argues that she continued working the alternate schedule (horario alterno) and that the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública, MEP) failed to prove that she did not render services under this schedule. The Chamber disagrees. The evidence in the record shows that, once the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties at the Regional Directorate of Education (Dirección Regional de Educación) in Pérez Zeledón, her working hours changed to a regular administrative schedule. The ruling being appealed confirmed that she was not required to work the alternate schedule during this period, which is consistent with the documentation and witness statements. Consequently, the right to the payment of overtime that derives exclusively from the alternate schedule does not apply, given that this factual premise was not met. This ground of appeal is dismissed.\n\n...the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal course of their duties, ceases to be in the circumstances that make the surcharge viable, but rather, a person who is prevented from continuing to perform their usual work for health reasons. Consequently, if at the time of the relocation, the plaintiff was earning the referred-to salary supplement, her right is indisputable, according to that special regulation, to have that bonus included in her remuneration as a relocated administrative official for health reasons (in a similar sense, the judgment of this Chamber number 308, at 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014). [...]\"\n\nThe Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (articles 11 of the Constitución Política and 11 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), and the employee does not meet the factual circumstances provided for in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, since she is not disabled by illness, which would make her eligible for what is sought. After re-examining the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the decision must be revoked.\n\n**SALA SEGUNDA\n\nExp: 21-002607-1178-LA\nRes: 2025001107\n\n**SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on the fourth of April of two thousand twenty-five.\n\nOrdinary labor proceeding established before the Labor Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of San José, case number 21-002607-1178-LA, brought by [Name 001], [Name 002], [Name 003], [Name 004], [Name 005], [Name 006], [Name 007], [Name 008], [Name 009], [Name 010], [Name 011], [Name 012], [Name 013], [Name 014], [Name 015], [Name 016], [Name 017], [Name 018], [Name 019], [Name 020], [Name 021], [Name 022], [Name 023], [Name 024], [Name 025], [Name 026], [Name 027], [Name 028], [Name 029], [Name 030], [Name 031], [Name 032], [Name 033], [Name 034], [Name 035], [Name 036], [Name 037], [Name 038], [Name 039], [Name 040], [Name 041], [Name 042], [Name 043], [Name 044], [Name 045], [Name 046], [Name 047], [Name 048], [Name 049], [Name 050], [Name 051], [Name 052], [Name 053], [Name 054], and [Name 055], against the BANCO DE COSTA RICA. All of the plaintiffs are represented by their special power of attorney granted to the licensed attorneys Diego Lerma Córdoba, Carlos Vega González, and Manfred Gaba D' Truch, with the first named acting as their sole and exclusive attorney in fact under the terms of Article 1251 of the Civil Code. The defendant appeared, represented by the legal proxy holder Karla Cascante Lizano. The figure of the third interested party was granted to the COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE SERVIDORES JUDICIALES R.L. (COOPEJUDICIAL R.L.), represented by its Manager Roy Leiva Solís. It, along with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, were notified of the filing of this claim. The matter involves the payment of salary differences, salary adjustments, to which the plaintiffs claim they are entitled as workers of an institution of the Banking System for the implementation of the Single Salary Scheme, among other claims.\n\n1. **Background**: The plaintiffs appealed the judgment of first instance, and the defendant Banco de Costa Rica appealed on its own behalf. The Labor Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of San José, in judgment number 2022001606, handed down at nine hours on the twenty-first of September of two thousand twenty-two, resolved the matter as follows: \"Pursuant to the cited articles and grounds stated, the ordinary labor proceeding established by [Name 001] and fifty-four others against the Banco de Costa Rica is partially upheld, understanding the special power of attorney granted to the licensed attorneys Diego Lerma Córdoba, Carlos Vega González, and Manfred Gaba D' Truch, with the first named as their sole attorney in fact, and the third interested party is COOPEJUDICIAL R.L. The salary petitions of the plaintiffs as workers of the Banco de Costa Rica are partially upheld. The plaintiffs are entitled to the payment of dedicated exclusivity, salary adjustments resulting from the adjustments approved by the Board of Directors, salary increases for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 with the conditions and amounts that were approved by said body, and the application of the salary adjustments originally approved by the Board of Directors respecting their vested rights. The salary scale established by the Sessions of the Board of Directors for the years 2015 to 2019 is accepted as a salary adjustment for the actors. Consequently, the Banco de Costa Rica is hereby ordered to pay each of the plaintiffs the corresponding differences in dedicated exclusivity, the salary differences indicated in the expert report prepared within this file. Furthermore, the Banco de Costa Rica is ordered to adjust the salary scale in accordance with the percentage increases granted by the Board of Directors, in accordance with the expert opinion issued in this lawsuit (the rest of the claims are denied). This pronouncement is without special condemnation as to costs. This ruling shall be enforced in accordance with the terms of Article 506 and following of the Labor Code, applicable by supplementary provision of numeral 467 of the same code.\" (images 2268 to 2314). The knowledgeable collegiate court confirmed the judgment of first instance, except on the extreme of the ruling relating to the application of the percentage adjustment for dedicated exclusivity, which it set as ordered in the third Consideration Clause of its decision. It declared it a matter of law to resolve the appeal actions filed by the representative of the plaintiffs and the Banco de Costa Rica without special condemnation as to costs.\n\n2. **Recourse**: Dissatisfied, the BANCO DE COSTA RICA, and the plaintiffs, represented by their common attorney in fact, filed appeals for cassation before this Chamber, stating the reasons for disagreement and requesting the annulment of the judgment on appeal. Additionally, the legal proxy holder of the defendant Bank filed a motion to include documentary evidence and recuse the members of the Chamber, which, for the reasons stated in the grounds, is hereby rejected. The incorporation of new evidence into the cassation phase is not appropriate, since it is not one of the events authorized by law for this purpose; it is not a supervening document that would have the effect of varying the factual situation of the matter, nor is it a confession of the opposing party. Furthermore, it seeks to bring to these jurisdictional stages a piece of evidence available to it during the processing of the lawsuit and it has not provided a justification for its omission. As for the motion to recuse, the allegations are not directed at the natural persons who serve as members of this Chamber, but rather at a previous resolution of this Chamber of a different nature, for which reason it is not appropriate to process it administratively as a recusal of the judges, but rather it corresponds to its rejection by means of this resolution. Furthermore, it should be noted that the hearing of the parties was granted in this matter, and the appeals were placed on the decision list at the hearing; thus, the right of defense of the parties was guaranteed.\n...\n\n**III.- Regarding the protection of salary adjustments and the principle of irreducibility (irreductibilidad).** In a matter like the present one, where a group of workers, employees of a state-owned bank, who, based on their status, are not entitled to receive annual salary increases, it becomes imperative to support what was decided by the judges of first instance. As already analyzed, in the precedent \"Voto 4654-2003\" of the Constitutional Chamber, this practice of adjustment was validated as a prerogative for the specific year 2003, without this implying the creation of a superior right that would require its projection into the future. Therefore, the right of the claimants is limited to the application of the percentage increases approved by the Board of Directors for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019; but without effectiveness for the subsequent annual periods, in particular 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024, until a new approval from the Board of Directors dictates otherwise. This reasoning interprets, for the specific case of the plaintiffs, the mandate established in the fourth paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Law number 6968 of October 2, 1984, regarding the guarantee of the right to salary adjustments, in a contextualized manner, meaning that the appropriate salary adjustments must be applied, but those approved by the Board of Directors of the defendant entity, without discarding the possibility of an additional review by the Board in subsequent years. The principle of the prohibition of salary reduction is not distorted, precisely because it starts from the basis that, for the years from 2015 to 2019, the actors have a right in the terms decided in the judgment, while for the subsequent ones, there is no pre-existing right that could be diminished; they maintain the salary they received—of which there is no evidence it has been reduced—with the expectation that the employer, through its Board of Directors, may approve a new adjustment in the future. Naturally, there is no obstacle for the Board of Directors, in the exercise of its powers, to grant annual salary increases prospectively. On this point, the reasoning of the collegiate court is shared, when it analyzes the similar pronouncement of a claimant in relation to the principle of salary irreducibility (irreductibilidad salarial): \"... the appellant wishes to extrapolate the application of the increase established by the Board of Directors for their salary group from 2018 to subsequent years, which is not legally appropriate, in the opinion of this Chamber, because by virtue of Articles 2 and 7 of the Convention on the Autonomous Entities signed between the Executive Branch and this Bank, salaries are set by the Board of Directors of the defendant Bank; thus, it is not feasible for the Judiciary to establish it judicially. In other words, the fixing of salaries is entrusted to the Board of Directors of the defendant Bank...\" In summary, the claim of the common representative of the plaintiffs in this extreme of the appeal is unfounded; therefore, the appealed judgment must be confirmed.\n\n**IV.-**\n\n**V.-**\n\n**VI.- Regarding the errors of the lower court judgment in relation to the so-called ‘salary adjustments’.** The defendant Bank, in its appeal, questions the application of salary adjustments and the figure of \"dedicated exclusivity\" to the plaintiffs, alleging that they are not entitled due to the nature of their position and the regime they belong to. As analyzed in the first consideration clause of this decision, the reasoning and the interpretative line of the appeals presented by the plaintiffs and the defendant entity have been integrated, thus the pronouncement on the specific grievances of each party must be understood in an integral and unified manner. Even so, the specific grievances of the defendant Bank are addressed. In relation to the prohibition on the application of salary updates for public sector employees established by Law 9635, it must be stated that the defendant Bank falls within the non-financial public sector, but it is not included in the Government Sector or General Government, but rather in the decentralized non-state public sector, which maintains a special employment regime in labor matters, typical of the state banking entity and with a nature and effects distinct from the public employment regime. Moreover, it has its own Labor autonomy by constitutional provision, as provided for in Article 189 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, the legal restrictions on salary increases approved by the Government of the Republic for public sector entities are not strictly applicable to it, nor do they bind its autonomous decisions, unless its own special laws establish a contrary rule; consequently, the defendant Bank is subject to its Internal Labor Regulations and the resolutions of its Board of Directors regarding labor-salary matters. Consequently, the alleged violation of Articles 1 and 2, sections 5 and 6, and 33 and 34 of the aforementioned law, by the defendant Bank, is not configured, since the law is not applicable. Consequently, the appeal claim is dismissed.\n\n**SECOND DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE**.\n\nSan José, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on April fourth, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nOrdinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, by **[Nombre 001]**, educator, identity card [Valor 001] and resident of Alajuela, against the **STATE**, represented by its deputy procuradora, attorney Cinthya Castro Hernández, single and resident of San José. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is attorney Julieth Gómez Gamboa, resident of Heredia. All persons are of legal age, of unknown marital status, and attorneys; with the exceptions noted.\n\n**Drafted by the magistrate Sánchez Rodríguez; and**\n\n**CONSIDERING:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND:** The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff filed this action so that, in judgment, the State be ordered to immediately restore the payment of the 25% bonus for Extended Schedule School Modality (Escuela Modalidad Horario Ampliado) and the 6.6% surcharge for Educational Support Committee I and II cycle (Comité de Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo), which she had before her relocation (reubicación) to administrative functions and as long as she maintains the condition of being relocated (reubicada). She demanded that the payment of those differences be indexed from that moment, February 1, 2021, and until their effective payment, including differences generated in year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations; in addition to legal interest on the amounts earned; plus the costs of the action. The State’s representative responded negatively in a filing visible at image 27 of the Court’s virtual case file; and interposed the defense of lack of right. The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Section One, by judgment number 2024-0242 at 07:45 hours on February 13, 2024, signed by attorney Floricel Oviedo Miranda, dismissed the indicated defense and granted the claim, ordering the State to immediately restore the payment of the bonuses called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differences generated in year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations (the latter only if any payment for this concept is recorded in that period). It ordered the deduction of social charges and the corresponding salary tax; it ordered the defendant to pay interest on the principal from the date it became due, “that is, from the date of its suppression until effective payment according to Article 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) amended by Law N° 9343. In the absence of an agreement, the legal interest shall be equal to the basic passive rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for transactions in national currency and the ‘prime rate’ for transactions in U.S. dollars, in accordance with Article 497 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio).-” It also ordered the payment of indexation of the principal economic amounts, updated to present value at the same percentage variation of the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area, between the month prior to the lawsuit and the one preceding that in which payment is actually made. Finally, it ordered the payment of costs, setting the personal costs at the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES.\n\n**II.- CASSATION APPEAL (RECURSO DE CASACIÓN) OF THE PLAINTIFF:** The plaintiff's attorney protests the amount set for personal costs. She mentions that civil and labor procedural regulations establish, as a rule, the award of costs against the losing party, but considers the award of costs in the sum of two hundred thousand colones to be arbitrary. She indicates that the plaintiff has had legal representation at each stage of this proceeding, from the prior case study, as well as the filing of the lawsuit; with a favorable judgment in the process, with evident expenditure of time and with her representation as a legal professional, work that has been carried out with due responsibility and care. She further indicates that all necessary steps have been taken for an effective technical defense in the face of the State's non-compliance with its responsibilities, therefore, there is no basis whatsoever for awarding the costs of the proceeding at two hundred thousand colones, since the defendant's actions caused serious harm to the plaintiff's rights, who had to wait years to obtain a judgment in her favor and to enforce her rights in judicial instances under due legal representation. She considers that this sum does not compensate for the professional work performed in this proceeding, where not only the amount in dispute must be assessed, but also the professional work deployed. She requests that this item be set as a percentage or at a prudential amount consistent with the technical work performed. **CASSATION APPEAL (RECURSO DE CASACIÓN) OF THE DEFENDANT:** The State’s representation objects, in the first place, to the substantial violation of the legal system, due to an erroneous interpretation of Article 254 of the Labor Code (código de trabajo) vis-à-vis the erroneous application of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Regulations for Leaves of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de licencias del Ministerio de Educación Pública), Executive Decree (decreto ejecutivo) 19113 of July 28, 1989, as well as an improper assessment of the evidentiary record. It asserts that the plaintiff's relocation (reubicación) was agreed under the protection of numeral 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which implies the adaptation of working conditions for the relocated (reubicada) person; and not under Executive Decree (decreto ejecutivo) number 19113 of July 28, 1989. It considers the analysis performed to be improper because the cited regulation finds no basis in Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil). Regarding the repeal of Article 167 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), it transcribes a fragment of Opinion C-250-2004 of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) which mentions that by virtue of the repeal of Articles 167 through 169 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), the rule by which, in the presence of a disabling illness, the right to a leave and payment of an allowance equivalent to the entirety of the salary for the entire period of disability was acquired, disappeared. Furthermore, it indicates that the leaves currently in force are the special leaves, established in Article 166 of the Statute, which have not been repealed or annulled; the Regulations for Special Leaves remain in force regarding special leaves, as Article 166, which regulates them, remains in force; regarding permanent leaves, the cited regulatory instrument was implicitly repealed, due to the repeal of its enabling norm, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its binding jurisprudence. It also relies on Opinion C-250-2009, indicating that the reasoning that, in the plaintiff's case, this involves a special leave and therefore the application of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) in concordance with the provisions of Decree 19113 applies to her is not correct, because the Chamber has recognized that special leave is based on Article 166 of the Statute and it is that norm, and not 174, which must be applied. It insists that in the plaintiff's case, this involves a relocation (reubicación) to administrative functions, not a disability, and therefore, numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) does not apply to her case. It adds that the bonuses received by the plaintiff until January 31, 2021, are temporary; and refers to the criterion issued by this Chamber to the effect that in public employment relationships, any salary item must have backing in a legal norm that authorizes its payment. As a second ground for grievance, it indicates the direct violation of Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) (Law Nº 2166 of October 9, 1957) and of Article 56 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) (Law Nº 8422 of October 6, 2004), as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on this matter. The first of these norms establishes that function surcharges are temporary and are applied when the service requires it. The judgment distorts the temporary nature of the surcharge, by granting it indefinitely, without the plaintiff working it or performing the functions corresponding to said surcharge; it also recognizes a salary component contrary to what is established by the legal system. For its part, Article 56 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) clearly and precisely typifies the crime of illegal recognition of labor benefits, so it is not possible to recognize the payment of a surcharge in an unrestricted manner. It cites Ruling (voto) number 7081-2019 at 9:20 a.m. on April 26, 2019, which mentions that bonuses or additives (sobresueldos) do not constitute an essential part of the salary and expire when the school year ends.\n\nIt considers that this type of case should not be limited to an analysis from a purely labor-law perspective protective of the teacher's private interest and turning its back on the public interest and on the administrative acts issued by the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública), which find a basis for their formalization in a detailed analysis of the needs that the public service demands, the budget available for the payment of these types of supplementary pay (sobresueldos), and the consideration for the service by the teacher. It further argues that the judgment is devoid of reasoning (ayuna de fundamentación) as it does not carry out an analysis of the arguments presented but was based on similar cases where the Regulation on Special Leave for Servants of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales de los Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública) was applied, ignoring the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary bonuses (pluses salariales). It mentions resolution number 173-2021 of this Second Chamber, where the claim was dismissed based on the thesis upheld by this representation; as well as judgment number 455-2022 of the Court of Appeals of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelaciones del I Circuito Judicial de San José), First Section. Finally, it objects to the order to pay costs, pointing out an improper application of articles 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), given that it considers having litigated with evident good faith, since no dilatory actions have been filed, the facts of the claim were answered objectively, and it cooperated with the obtaining of evidence; the plaintiff's pretensions lack factual and legal basis, which implies there are sufficient reasons to litigate in the present proceeding. In its view, the majority of criteria contemplated by the Labor Code to exempt the defendant are met. Based on these considerations, it requests that the ruling be revoked, the claim dismissed, and the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs or, alternatively, that the ruling be revoked regarding the order to pay personal costs in favor of the plaintiff.\n\nIII.- REGARDING THE LACK OF REASONING IN THE JUDGMENT (FALTA DE FUNDAMENTACIÓN DE LA SENTENCIA): Article 587, subsection 5 of the Labor Code contemplates the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment as a ground for cassation. The State representation argues that the judgment is devoid of reasoning as it does not carry out an analysis of the arguments presented, but was based on similar cases where the Regulation on Special Leave for Servants of the Ministry of Public Education was applied, ignoring the existing Law that regulates the temporality of salary bonuses. However, from the analysis of the ruling issued, it is not possible to attribute the omission alleged to it, as the decision does contain sufficient and adequate reasoning of the factual and legal bases, supported by jurisprudential criteria that support the determination of the Court (Juzgado), particularly regarding the temporality of salary bonuses, an aspect in which, in any case, there is no dispute as will be seen in the following considerations.\n\nIV.- CASE ANALYSIS (ANÁLISIS DEL CASO): There is no objection to the ruling insofar as it found it proven that the plaintiff works for the Ministry of Public Education, was reassigned to another position for health reasons; and that before this reassignment, she was receiving payment of the supplementary pay \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado,\" which were eliminated as of January 31, 2021. This is clear, as it was contemplated in resolution DRH-DPRH-ULIC-1688-2020 of February 25, 2020 (visible at image 8 of the virtual court file) where the plaintiff was notified of the temporary work reassignment, which was agreed upon based on article 254 of the Labor Code, which establishes the obligation of the employer to restore to their position the worker who has suffered a workplace risk (riesgo) but is in a condition to continue working; and the employer's duty to provide them with a different position according to their abilities when, by medical recommendation, they cannot perform the functions they had been carrying out. That norm literally states in its second paragraph: “If, in accordance with medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but could perform a different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it to them, provided this is feasible, for which purpose they may carry out the necessary personnel reassignments (movimientos de personas).” This regulation is directly related to the Regulation on Special Leave of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree No. 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose Article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures to be followed by the Ministry of Public Education to grant leave to its servants, due to the reduction of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of workplace risks, or illness. For its part, article 2 establishes: “The leave referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those servants who, due to the reduction suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular servants.” That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that those servants for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial permanent disability and recommend a change of functions, are entitled to the latter. Article 8 specifically addresses the scenario of granting special leave in the following terms: “In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant special leave to those servants who find themselves in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, in the final assessment of the treatment, recommends a change of functions./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the workplace risk suffered, the National Insurance Institute determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their reincorporation into service with a change of functions.”\n\nNow, canon 9 stipulates that prior to the granting of the license, the Ministry shall proceed with the relocation (reubicación) of the employee, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which “…this special license may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purposes of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, with the medical recommendations and the academic background of the beneficiary, which may be temporarily required” and that “…the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that was enjoying a special license for attending to administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical tasks and functions, in any of its units when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs,” which is absolutely consistent with article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Article 17 expressly stipulates that “The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code on the matter.” In this way, it has been considered that this regulation complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which makes no distinction whatsoever between permanent or partial disabilities, and hence no differentiation can be made for payment purposes between permanent and special licenses. The latter provides: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonage, alternating schedule, or any extra pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment./ b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall therefore be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply.” The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, indistinctly contemplating the right to compensation, both in the case of the permanent license and the special one.\n\nThe issue under study has been analyzed by this Chamber in repeated matters submitted for its consideration. In all those cases, it has been indicated that the applicable sectoral regulations establish the right of persons enjoying medical leave to continue receiving the total salary they were earning prior to the leave. In the case of the plaintiff, no particularity is observed that would allow deviating from that criterion. Her relocation was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in article 254 of the Labor Code. It is agreed that temporary extra pays do not constitute an acquired right and their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to perform those for which they are remunerated with that extra amount. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their duties, ceases to fall within the assumptions that make the surcharge viable, but rather, a person who for health reasons is prevented from continuing to perform their regular duties.\n\nConsequently, if at the time of the relocation, the plaintiff was earning the referred extra pay, the right she has, in accordance with that special regulation, to have that extra amount included within her remuneration as a relocated administrative employee for health reasons is indisputable (in a similar sense, ruling of this Chamber number 308, at 10:30 hours on March 26, 2014). In this case, the surcharges were not worked given the need to relocate the employee to functions other than teaching, for health reasons. That is, the payment of the extra pays does not originate from the performance of the duties but rather in attention to the rule that provides for the transfer with the recognition of the equivalent of the total salary that the employee was earning at the time of the relocation, as the regulations contemplate the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary.”\n\nBased on the foregoing, it is also untrue that article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) has been violated. Such provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is intended for the effective exercise of teaching duties, not for cases of employees who are prescribed a disability or leave. Likewise, no violation of numeral 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito) is observed, which criminalizes the illegal recognition of labor benefits, an assumption that is directed at the exercise of active administration and which is not observed here.\n\nWhat has been decided is not contrary to the criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (Tribunal Constitucional) to the effect that surcharges are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right. It is reiterated, the case under analysis does not refer to the situation of an active employee demanding the maintenance of surcharges after the term for which they were initially intended has concluded, but rather the issue is reduced to establishing the remuneration that an employee relocated to a different position should receive because they can no longer continue performing their normal duties or the surcharges they had been exercising, due to a medical condition or health impairment; a topic totally different from the approach made by the defendant's representative.\n\nThe position of the State's representation, to the effect that relocation for health reasons in cases such as the plaintiff's is regulated by the provisions of article 166 of the Civil Service Statute, which provides, for duly verified sick leave, the payment of half the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave, is contradicted by the actions of the administration itself, which, after the relocation and except in the case of the surcharges under discussion in this litigation (which it recognized until January 31, 2021), maintained in full (100%) the base salary and the other salary rights that the plaintiff had prior to the relocation, despite the change in her duties. This is evident from personnel action 202101-MP-029811 (visible at image 156 ibidem) and from official communication DRH-DR-UPLA-0361-2022 of February 23, 2022, issued by the Remuneration Department, Payroll Unit of the Ministry of Public Education (visible at image 203 ibidem). In accordance with the foregoing, no objection can be made to what was decided by the Trial Court regarding this issue.\n\nV.- COSTS: The State's representation objects to the order to pay costs because it considers that its procedural conduct can be classified as good faith under the terms of article 563 of the Labor Code.\n\nThe issue of costs (costas) is regulated in articles 562 to 564 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the first of which textually reads as follows: \"In every judgment, including summary judgments, and resolutions that cause the termination of the proceeding due to lis pendens, lack of jurisdiction for reasons of national territory, extra-procedural satisfaction, or abandonment, the defeated party, the party who has satisfied the right, or the party sanctioned with the termination of the matter shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred./ If the judgment resolves the matter on the merits or accepts substantive defenses classified as preliminary, the personal costs may not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the liquidated amount of the award or acquittal, as the case may be./ In all other cases, as well as when the proceeding is not susceptible to pecuniary estimation, the determination shall be made equitably (prudencialmente)./ To make the determination of the percentage or the equitable amount, the labor performed, the amount in controversy, and the economic position of the plaintiff and defendant shall be taken into account./ In matters not susceptible to estimation in which there is economic significance, the determination shall be made based on the amount resulting up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a result of the proceeding the economic outcome continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent (50%) may be added to the determined amount, according to equitable criteria. If the economic outcome is insignificant, the determination shall be made equitably based on the mentioned criteria.\" Then, the following numeral 563 regulates the cases that enable the judge to resolve the matter without a special award of those expenses; as well as those in which it is considered that there is no good faith. This rule provides: \"Notwithstanding, the defeated party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even procedural costs, when: 1) There has been litigation with evident good faith. 2) The claims have partially succeeded. 3) When there has been reciprocal defeat./ The exoneration must always be reasoned./ A party may not be considered to be in good faith if it denied evident claims that the outcome of the proceeding indicates it should have accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, alleged bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, or offered no proof whatsoever to justify its claim or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts./ The exoneration of costs shall be mandatory if any special rule so provides.\" As can be observed, the transcribed numeral 563 provides a power and not an obligation to exonerate the defeated party when any of those cases arises. The reasons based on which the defendant's representation seeks to be considered a litigant of evident good faith are not admissible. Answering the complaint objectively, not filing delaying tactics, and offering the evidence of its interest are actions proper to whoever appears in court and, moreover, a requirement of the procedural loyalty with which litigants must proceed, as stipulated in Article 421 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Furthermore, far from being an action consistent with good faith could this party be, if it has insistently denied, even before this Chamber, the merit of the right claimed. On this same matter, the plaintiff challenges that related to the amount ordered for personal costs. Her disagreement is admissible. In this case, we are in the presence of a matter of indeterminable amount with economic significance, since the recognition of the claimed additional salaries has been ordered without limit for as long as the official remains in the reassigned condition, which is uncertain. In accordance with the transcribed regulations, in such a case, the proper course is not the determination of an equitable sum, but a percentage under the terms regulated in subsections 2 and 5 of the aforementioned numeral 562. In that line of thought, considering the labor performed, the amount in controversy, and the economic position of the parties, it is deemed reasonable to set the personal costs at 15% of the award up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a result of the proceeding the economic outcome continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the determined amount, according to equitable criteria, which shall be determined in the judgment execution phase.\n\nVI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Based on the reasons given, the proper course is to dismiss the appeal filed by the state representation and to grant that of the plaintiff, to annul the judgment insofar as it established the amount for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones and instead, to establish that for this item, the defendant must pay 15% of the award up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a result of the proceeding the economic outcome continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the determined amount, according to equitable criteria, which shall be determined in the judgment execution phase (in the same sense, judgment number 2021-000832 of 1:50 p.m. on April 23, 2021).\n\nVII.- DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA: The undersigned depart from the majority opinion insofar as it awards the plaintiff the payment of the additional salaries called \"Rec. Comité Apoyo Educativo I y II ciclo\" and \"Rec. Esc. Mod. Horario Ampliado\", from their suppression and for as long as she remains in that condition; as well as the differences generated in Christmas bonus, school salary, and vacations. It has been duly proven that the plaintiff was earning those increments and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions; for which reason, such additional salaries ceased to be paid to her as of February 1, 2021. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon due to a medical recommendation, based on Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not in the presence of a disability properly speaking. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, therefore it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and the employee does not meet the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), because she is not disabled due to illness, which would make her eligible for what is claimed. After a reconsideration of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that what was decided should be revoked. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional duties, which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of her usual duties, stops meeting the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: \"a) If the servant, at the time of being incapacitated due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location, for alternate schedule, or any other additional salary, she shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary she was earning at that time. /b) Licenses due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases.\n\n(As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the allowances referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall therefore be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other things, that may be applicable. /(The preceding subsection was added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that a public servant who is on sick leave due to illness, or a female official on maternity leave, who has been earning additional salary through overtime pay (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these considered when determining the amount of the subsidy to be paid. In the case at hand, the claimant was reassigned (reubicada) to administrative functions and is not on sick leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that according to the provisions of numerals 118, subsection j), of the Código de Educación and 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these plus payments are granted when the public servant performs additional duties beyond those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of educational centers, for reasons of timeliness and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these overtime pay (sobresueldos) depends on whether the circumstances so warrant, and they are therefore assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in ordinal 176 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In line with the foregoing, Article 15 of the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge, therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those surcharges that depend on a particular condition to be granted are not configured as an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is being sought in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Sala Constitucional to the effect that function surcharges cannot be considered an acquired right of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a function surcharge does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, which would oblige the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges —because it responds to the need for service provision at a given moment— has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, and, logically, its value must be determined by the respondent authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For that reason, the surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specified period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party for such amount to continue to be paid, or for the surcharge or alternate schedule to be maintained\" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in Voto No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an overtime pay (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: “It is equally appropriate to rule regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to cease receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specified period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, for such amount to continue to be paid, or for the indicated surcharge to be maintained, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…” Lastly, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was noted: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that overtime pay (sobresueldos) that depend on a condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an overtime pay (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met.” In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the related surcharge constitute a temporary overtime pay (sobresueldo), annexed to the salary structure, which, although it forms part of the final remuneration received by the official, is not a permanent substantial component, but an additional one, whose recognition depends on whether the official meets the premises established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each school period. It is noteworthy that the payment of these surcharges proceeds by reason of the position and the functions performed by the public servant, and therefore may be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Forcing the State to pay remuneration for a service that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to that, it would give an undue advantage to reassigned individuals, compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing functions through a surcharge of some kind, since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same amount. Additionally, the State would be paying twice (to two officials) for the same surcharge, when it has been necessary for it to be assumed by the person substituting the one who has been reassigned (reubicada) for health reasons. As stated before and occurs in the case under study, surcharges do not constitute an acquired right, and additionally, given the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it should be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the surcharge, it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and that the conditions and premises established by it are met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the overtime pay (sobresueldos), when the plaintiff transitioned from teaching status to performing administrative functions due to reassignment (reubicación), is in accordance with the law. Based on the above, we, the undersigned, conclude that the State's appeal must be upheld, the decision set aside, and the claim dismissed without place. Without special sanction as to costs.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe appeal of the defendant is dismissed without place and that of the plaintiff is upheld.\n\nThe judgment is annulled insofar as it set the award for personal costs at two hundred thousand colones. In its place, these are fixed at fifteen percent of the condemnation amount up to the finality of the judgment and, if as a result of the proceeding an economic result continues to be generated in the future, up to fifty percent may be added to the set amount, according to prudential criteria, which shall be determined in execution of judgment. Magistrates Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, uphold the State’s appeal, annul the ruling, grant the exception of lack of right, and dismiss the claim.\n\nThey resolve with no special sanction in costs.\n\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| | | |\n| Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez | | |\n| | | |\n\nJulia Varela Araya\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| | Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez |\n\n| |\n| --- |\n| Mario Masís Fernández |\n\n

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Roxana Chacón Artavia