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V3PKAXTOU1S61
ANGELA GARRO MORALES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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QBAGE9AGLSA61
MARIA ANGELICA FALLAS CARVAJAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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EXP: 21-001354-0173-LA
\nBarrio González Lahmann, Edificio Torre Judicia1. Noveno piso. Teléfonos: 2212-0110. Fax: 2295-3627.
\nPLAINTIFF:
\\r\\n[Nombre 001]
\\r\\nDEFENDANT:
\\r\\nTHE STATE
\\r\\n\\r\\n
RESOLUTION Nº N° 2025001277
\\r\\nLABOR APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ, THIRD SECTION.- At two thirty-seven in the afternoon on the eighteenth of September, two thousand twenty-five.-
\\r\\nOrdinary proceeding heard before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre 001], [...], against The State, represented by its Attorney A, Licenciada Liyanyi Granados Granados, of legal age, single, attorney, resident of San José, identity card number: 1-1151- 0312. Appearing as Special Judicial Representative for the plaintiff is Licenciado Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, of legal age, married, attorney, identity card number: 1-1-740-696, resident of San José.-
\\r\\nAuthored by Judge Garro Morales; and,
\\r\\nWHEREAS:
\\r\\nI. Background: a) Claim. The plaintiff requests the following: \\\"That this Ordinary Claim be granted, ordering the State to: \\\" a) Pay all salary differences owed from the date on which the last adjustment was made for Length-of-Service Bonuses (Anualidades) and up to the date of their effective payment, including retroactive payment for expired fiscal periods and differences that may arise for year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary, and vacations. b) Pay legal interest on the amounts owed, as well as the corresponding indexation. c) Pay personal costs (attorney's fees) and procedural costs of this action (attorney's fees). b) Answer. The representative of the State entity answered the action in the negative, and raised the defense of lack of right. She requests that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding and the payment of interest until their effective cancellation. c) Resolution. The lower court (A-quo), by means of judgment N°: 2023002145 of five twenty-nine in the afternoon on the twenty-first of November, two thousand twenty-three, resolved the matter as follows: \\\"Based on the foregoing extensive analysis, and thus these proceedings of [Nombre 001], of legal age, ID card [Valor 001], against THE STATE (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION), represented by the Attorney, Licda. Liyanyi Granados Granados, are hereby DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. Defenses: The defendant raised the defense of LACK OF RIGHT, which is upheld by the manner in which these proceedings are resolved, as the plaintiff lacks reason to file these proceedings. Based on the foregoing extensive analysis, the claims for: 'a) Pay all salary differences owed from the date on which the last adjustment was made for Length-of-Service Bonuses (Anualidades) and up to the date of their effective payment, including retroactive payment for expired fiscal periods and differences that may arise for year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary, and vacations. This because in these proceedings, no differences to pay were determined in any way, much less regarding year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salaries, or vacations. b) Pay legal interest on the amounts owed, as well as the corresponding indexation. Suffers the same fate, as there are no amounts to pay. Costs: Without special assessment for both costs, considering that the plaintiff acted in good faith. Article 563 of the Labor Code. The parties are advised of the provisions of article 590 of the Labor Code regarding the appeals that may be filed against this resolution, which literally reads: 'Article 590.- The filing of the appeal must contain, under penalty of being declared inadmissible, the clear and precise reasons warranting the reversal of the ruling, including any allegations of concomitant nullity deemed of interest. The cassation appeal must specify in the same manner the reasons for which it is deemed the legal system has been violated and for which the nullity and eventual reversal of the challenged judgment is appropriate; procedural claims shall be made first and then the substantive ones. / Under no circumstances is it necessary to cite the legal provisions considered violated, but the claim must be clear as to the reasons why the party considers itself affected. Errors that may be made in mentioning provisions shall not be grounds to declare the appeal inadmissible. / If there is a reserved appeal, the respective grievance must be maintained. / The grounds for the appeal may not be modified or expanded and shall delimit the debate regarding them and the jurisdiction of the appellate body to resolve.'NOTIFY\\\". d) Appeal. This Tribunal hears that ruling on appeal filed against the first-instance judgment by both parties.
\\r\\nII. Jurisdiction. This proceeding is decided based on the regulations established in Law 2, Labor Code, of August 27, 1943, as well as in Law 9343, Labor Procedural Reform.
\\r\\nIII. Proven Facts: As a faithful reflection of the evidentiary elements incorporated into the proceeding, the proven facts contained in the appealed judgment are adopted.
\\r\\nIV. Grievances: A) Plaintiff: The appellant literally states the following: \\\"The undersigned, Lic. Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, of legal age, attorney, special judicial representative of the plaintiff, with due respect appears before your authority to, in a timely manner, file a formal appeal against judgment number 2023002145 of this court issued at 5:29 p.m. on November 21, two thousand twenty-three, and the appeal is based on the following ground: Violation of evidence provided by the plaintiff. It is of utmost importance to refer to the fact that the cited first-instance resolution violates the assessment of the evidence provided by the plaintiff in this proceeding. It is important to maintain that, at the appropriate time, the Service Rating Certification issued by the Colegio Metodista was provided, and the same is sealed and signed by the person acting as Supervisor of Circuit 03, of the Regional Directorate of San José. Thus, the challenged judgment is incorrect in taking for granted that, because it is a private institution, the recognition of said Length-of-Service Bonuses (Anualidades) is not applicable; for this purpose, the following link, which is from the official website of the Ministry of Public Education, can be consulted regarding the process for recognizing Length-of-Service Bonuses in a private institution: https://dgth.mep.go.cr/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/ INSTRUCTIVO - ESTUDIO-DE-ANUALIDADES.pdf. In which the following image is displayed: (image attached). Thus, the defendant has a process for the recognition of those Length-of-Service Bonuses, and under the principle of legality, by complying with the relevant legislation, it must proceed when the requirements are met. It is necessary to indicate that in the claim, it was demonstrated that not only was the Ministry of Education requested to proceed to resolve his administrative complaint, but that, in accordance with the image and information required by said ministry, the certification with start and end dates was provided, as well as the rating obtained by Mr. [Nombre 001], in each year he worked at the aforementioned private educational institution. Therefore, the judgment cannot be based on evidence that was disproved, and, as is maintained, the evidentiary elements were presented together with the claim, since the evidence provided by Mr. [Nombre 001] in this proceeding is overwhelming in demonstrating and disproving that judicial error of the lower court (A-quo), and categorically demonstrates that the required Length-of-Service Bonuses must be recognized, updated, and retroactively paid. In this same vein, in point 2 of the Proven Facts, the lower court (A-quo) assumes as true that, because he worked in a private institution, the ministry has no obligation to pay those years as recognized, and consistent with the arguments expressed above, the challenged resolution is not applicable, given that, yes, there is an internal process within the Ministry of Education to recognize those Length-of-Service Bonuses, which the judge seems to be unaware of. The challenged resolution maintains the same erroneous line by considering the condition satisfied in which said ministry paid my client money for career advancement (carrera profesional) and Length-of-Service Bonuses, but this has no direct bearing on the Length-of-Service Bonuses in a private institution requested in the claim. That is, it grossly errs because there is no legal basis that determines that said Length-of-Service Bonuses do not correspond to him, or that the document presented to the defendant did not meet the legal requirements for such purpose. Instead, it only maintains that by receiving payment, the defendant satisfied the object of the claim and the interest and right of Mr. [Nombre 001], which is manifestly incorrect. It is important to review in detail the arguments put forward by the lower court (A-quo) to reject the claim, as it upholds the defense of Lack of Right and suppresses the plaintiff's right, by confusing the concepts regarding the recognition of Length-of-Service Bonuses, including, as has been maintained, in a private educational institution. Direct violation of Article 563 of the Labor Code regarding the acquittal in the imposition of the cost assessment.
\n\nCosts are governed by the provisions of Articles 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (reformed), and Articles 221 and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the latter being applicable in this matter by provision of the Labor Code. The Labor Code, in the cited article, establishes as a general rule the condemnation to pay costs to the party that loses the process, allowing only exceptionally the non-application thereof, and provided that the litigation was conducted in good faith; the relevant part of that article states the following: Article 563: \"(...)”. It is sensible to condemn the losing party to pay costs, given that it forced the other party to resort to the judicial process, since, without just cause, it deducted from my client's salary the amount corresponding to the category of Annual Bonuses (Anualidades), which, as has been established, is recognized for teaching personnel when they have worked in a private educational center in the same position they now hold in the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública), and that, therefore, injures the right of Mr. [Name 001] by not having that category updated in his base salary. That is, a judicial process had to be initiated, and it is also worth stating that the defendant did not acquiesce to the complaint but rather responded negatively to it, acts that demonstrate the complete opposite of good faith. ARTICLE 562.- (...). Petition: By virtue of the facts presented and the law invoked, I request that the first-instance judgment be revoked, and that the Annual Bonuses worked in a private educational center be included as proven, for their recognition and respective payment, because the employer itself contemplates this in the internal procedure for that purpose. Likewise, that the contested judgment be revoked regarding THE ABSOLUTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF COSTS of the First-Instance Judgment 2023002145 issued at 5:29 p.m. on November 21, two thousand twenty-three, THAT IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS THE ISSUED JUDGMENT BE UPHELD, AND CONSEQUENTLY, THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PROPORTIONATELY CONDEMNED TO PAY COSTS.”\n\nB) Grievances of the defendant party: The duly appearing Deputy Prosecutor (Procuradora Adjunta), Liyanyi Granados Granados, filed an appeal against the first-instance judgment No. 202300-2145 issued at 5:29 p.m. on November 21, 2023, solely for exonerating the plaintiff from the payment of personal costs in favor of the State: \"This Appeal is filed based on Articles 586 to 590 of the Labor Code, together with the fact that the Transfer Order omitted to indicate the amount in dispute (cuantía) of the process, likewise in the complaint the plaintiff omitted to establish an amount in dispute, compounded by the fact that the First-Instance Judgment generically indicates that the appeal must adhere to legal parameters. To facilitate understanding of the matter, the background of the case will be briefly presented. Case Background. The present matter is based on the plaintiff's request regarding the recognition of Annual Bonuses (anualidades), to which end they allege they submitted an administrative claim on December 11, 2019, for the purpose of recognizing the years worked in a private educational center. In the response to the complaint, it was argued that the regulations governing the payment of Annual Bonuses make the recognition of Annual Bonuses obtained in a private educational center impossible, because Article 27, subsection 4) of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) states that an incentive is an additional amount to the base salary recognized to the worker with the objective of promoting a specific conduct. The foregoing implies that the incentive was created to recognize the work of the suitable official who works for the Public Administration, all in order to provide the public service rendered in the best possible manner. Article 56 of the aforementioned Law stipulates that the application of incentives, including the Annual Bonuses remunerated as of the date of entry into force of the Public Administration Salary Law (year 1957), will be carried out prospectively and NOT retroactively to the detriment of the worker or their patrimonial rights, which again confirms the subjection to the Principle of Legality for the recognition and application of the salary supplement called Annual Bonuses (Anualidades). Based on the regulations governing the matter, the recognition of Annual Bonuses is based on the qualification obtained in the Performance Evaluation (Evaluación de Desempeño), as well as on the time at which its recognition was requested, precisely because upon the entry into force of the Law for Strengthening Public Finances (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas), Law ? 9635 of December 3, 2018; the new Annual Bonuses obtained by officials are subject to the rules established therein, however, the Annual Bonuses that were recognized prior to the effectiveness of the cited Law are kept under the same terms in which they were recognized. Therefore, it is evident that the recognition of Annual Bonuses is granted to public officials who work for the Public Administration, provided they possess the necessary qualification requirements to obtain the incentive under discussion. The plaintiff filed an administrative claim on December 11, 2019, in which they expressly request the recognition of the 05 years worked at the Colegio Metodista, which is a private educational center, a circumstance accepted by the plaintiff themselves in the fourth fact of the ordinary labor complaint. In the response to the complaint, it was indicated that the claim lacks logical and practical sense, as well as factual and legal basis, precisely because the Annual Bonus constitutes an economic recognition to the suitable public official, who possesses the adequate qualification in the Performance Evaluation and who works for the Public Administration continuously. The First-Instance Judgment No. 2023-2145 had as Proven Facts that the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Public Education from February 7, 2005, until March 22, 2011, when they stopped working there for 08 years (from 2011 to 2018), during which they worked for the Colegio Metodista, then returned to work for the Ministry on June 6, 2019; that the Annual Bonuses the plaintiff seeks to be recognized correspond to the years in which they worked as a teacher in a private educational center, which is NOT appropriate. (See Proven Fact 01, Proven Fact 03, of the contested Judgment). Based on those Proven Facts, the Judgment aptly dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiff; however, it exonerated the plaintiff from the payment of personal costs by considering that the plaintiff [Name 001] litigated in good faith, in accordance with Article 563 of the Labor Code. In this regard, the First-Instance Judgment No. 2023-2145 issued at 5:29 p.m. on November 21, 2023, by the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, Second Section (Juzgado de Trabajo Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Segunda), exonerated from the payment of personal costs by considering that the plaintiff litigated in good faith, analyzing the following: “(…). The cited statement omitted to indicate the reasons why it considered that the plaintiff litigated in good faith, nor did it establish the evidence that led it to that conclusion; on the contrary, when analyzing the evidence contained in the File, a completely different conclusion is reached than that contained in the contested Judgment, because the plaintiff intended for the Administration (Ministry of Public Education) to pay the Annual Bonuses corresponding to the years they worked in the private sector (Colegio Metodista), it being evident that it is a DIFFERENT EMPLOYER, one governed by public regulations, the other by private regulations, coupled with the NON-EXISTENCE of a rule that would permit a payment of such magnitude (Principle of Legality), making evident the LACK of good faith in the litigation shown by the plaintiff [Name 001]. In addition to the foregoing, it is important to refer to Article 563 of the Labor Code, to know the assumptions for the exoneration from payment of personal costs: (verbatim quote). The transcribed rule establishes as a requirement to exonerate the losing party from paying costs to the opposing party, that the losing party possesses EVIDENT good faith; note that, a contrario sensu, this phrase means that in the event that good faith is NOT evident, that is, it is NOT obvious, palpable, clear, the losing party must be condemned to pay personal costs. The jurisprudence emanating from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), has established the necessity of the existence of evident good faith for the exoneration of the payment of costs to proceed, (...), (See Resolution No. 2021-000416 issued at 10:50 a.m. on March 10, 2021, by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). The rule requires that good faith be EVIDENT, clear, indubitable, in order to sustain the existence of good faith and, consequently, the exoneration from the payment of costs. In the same vein, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that the possibility of exoneration is based on evident procedural good faith. (See Considering III) of Resolution ? 2019-000718 issued at 9:20 a.m. on May 3, 2019, by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).\n\nIt is observed that article 563 of the Labor Code establishes that the exemption from the payment of costs must be REASONED, a situation that the First Instance Judgment fails to comply with, since it merely points out that the plaintiff litigated in good faith WITHOUT EXPLAINING the reasons for considering it to exist, even LESS citing, NOR analyzing evidence to support the generic statement made, to such an extent that it simply cites article 563 of the Labor Code WITHOUT making any reasoning whatsoever, all of which demonstrates that the exemption from the payment of costs is NOT duly reasoned as required by the norm under discussion. The need to ground the exemption from the payment of costs is based on the essential grounding of Judgments, which labor jurisprudence has conceptualized as stating the factual and legal grounds that serve to support its criterion, otherwise its decision would be arbitrary. (See Considering III) of Resolution No. 2019-649 of 14:25 hours on April 23, 2019, issued by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). By virtue of the foregoing, when the subordinate person files a claim, it must have evidence to accredit its allegation; otherwise, one is in the presence of a claim lacking grounds that leads to the losing party reimbursing the winning party for the expenses incurred in defending against it, as observed in the specific case. In that same sense, labor jurisprudence has indicated that when a party omits to bring fundamental evidence to the process, it can in no way be considered a good faith litigant, therefore condemnation to pay costs is appropriate. (See Considering IV) of Resolution No. 2019-001117 of 10:10 hours on June 27, 2019, issued by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Thus, the judicial authority, when issuing the First Instance Judgment No. 2023-2145 of November 21, 2023, errs by omitting to expressly state the reasons and evidence for which it considers that the plaintiff supposedly litigated in good faith, it being clear that it is IMPROPER to exempt the plaintiff from the payment of costs in favor of the State. In this way, the Judgment incurs an erroneous interpretation of the norm since it does NOT authorize exemption from the payment of costs when good faith is NOT evident, it being clear that in the event it is NOT unquestionably so, the corresponding action is to impose the condemnation of costs on the losing party. For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the challenged Judgment be quashed on the terms above, because the interpretation given by it to the exemption from the payment of costs for the plaintiff is erroneous and detrimental to the interests of my client, who must be compensated for the expenses incurred in defending the theory of the case in an ordinary labor proceeding lacking grounds. Based on the foregoing, we request that the Appeal for Cassation filed against the First Instance Judgment No. 2023-2145 of 17:29 hours on November 21, 2023, be upheld, ONLY with regard to the exemption from the payment of costs, in order that instead the plaintiff be condemned to pay costs and legal interest in favor of the State.\"\n\n**V. Analysis of the Merits. A) Appeal filed by the plaintiff's representation:**\nThe plaintiff alleges the existence of a violation of evidence. It indicates that it provided the Service Qualification certification issued by the Colegio Metodista, which is stamped and signed by who served as Supervisor of District 03 of the San José Regional Directorate. It reproaches that the challenged judgment is incorrect in determining that since it is a private institution, the recognition of said annual increments (anualidades) is not applicable. It argues that it requested the Ministry of Education to resolve its administrative claim, for which it provided the certification with its effective and expiration dates, and the qualification obtained by Mr. [Name 001] for each year he worked at the educational institution. It assures that with the complaint, the evidential elements that categorically demonstrate that the annual increments (anualidades) must be recognized, updated, and paid retroactively were presented. The appellant argues that there is an internal process in the Ministry of Education to recognize the annual increments (anualidades) for having worked in a private institution. It affirms that there is no legal basis to determine that said annual increments (anualidades) do not correspond to him. In this regard, the appellant is not correct, because according to the technical report, the time worked at the Colegio Metodista in the years (2014, 2016-2019) is not recognized for the employee, since it does not enter in the same job class according to article 181 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), (see Report: DRH-UGR-49383-2022, visible at image 136 of the electronic file). In the case under analysis, it must be considered that the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) established the payment of annual increases for public sector employees (article 5°), as recognition for time served. That same body of norms, for purposes of calculating seniority (antigüedad) for the calculation of said additional salary, regulated in its subsection 12 d) the following: *\"public sector servants, permanent or interim, shall be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases referred to in the preceding article 5, the time of services rendered in other entities of the Public Sector. This provision shall not have retroactive effect.\"* That normative precept established the doctrine of the State as sole employer (patrono único), in order to remedy the situation of those employees who were transferred from one public institution to another. Subsequently, Law No. 6835, of December 22, 1982, had a subsection d) added to article 12, to establish that all servants of the Public Sector, permanent or interim, would be recognized, for purposes of the annual increases provided for in the indicated article 5, the time of service rendered in other entities of said Public Sector; expressly stating that this provision did not have retroactive effect. This norm covered the situation of those servants who transferred to work at a different entity, but within the same Sector, without the time previously served being recognized, to the detriment of the benefits derived from seniority in service, for the same employer. With the entry into force of the Law for the Strengthening of Public Finances (Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas), No. 9635 of December 3, 2018, article 5 of the Public Administration Salary Law was repealed, and article 12 of said law was reformed by article 49, sub-subsection a) of the Framework Public Employment Law (Ley Marco de Empleo Público), No. 10159 of March 8, 2022, establishing the following: *\"Article 12- The annual increment incentive (incentivo por anualidad) shall be recognized the month immediately following the anniversary of the entry or re-entry of the public servant working under the composite salary scheme and in accordance with the following rules: a) If the servant is transferred to a position of equal or lower category than the position being occupied, there shall be no interruption whatsoever regarding the computation of time for the salary increase. b) If the servant is promoted, they shall begin to receive the minimum annual increments (anualidades) of the new category; under no circumstances shall the already recognized incentives be revalued. c) For public servants, permanent or interim, the time of service rendered in other public sector entities shall be computed for purposes of recognizing the annual increment incentive (incentivo por anualidad).\"* In the case under study, the Colegio Metodista cannot be considered a member of the public sector.\n\nThe General Public Administration Law, in its Article 1 on this section, regulates the following: *“The Public Administration shall be constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with legal personality and capacity under public and private law.”* For its part, national doctrine defines the legal concept under discussion in the following manner: *“The Public Administration, for didactic purposes, is the set of public entities that make up the administrative organization of a given legal system. This group is comprised, broadly speaking, of the major public entity or State and all the rest of the minor public entities that have been created by an act of authority –normative– of the former”* (Jinesta Lobo Ernesto. (2006). Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., San José, Costa Rica, pp. 32). To determine the issue raised here, a series of applicable parameters have been tested. However, two are fundamental for establishing the public or private nature of a given body, namely, its origin and its operational regime. Based on the first of these, an entity shall be considered public when its creation was carried out by a law of the republic. Jointly, the second of them postulates as a differentiating criterion the fact that the organization and external activity of the entity is regulated by public law. As can be appreciated, despite the fact that private educational institutions provide a service of a public nature such as education, the reality is that, in light of the foregoing reasoning, they cannot be inserted within the administrative organization of the State. Note that these are entities of a private nature, when the Magna Carta in its Article 80 provides: *“Private initiative in educational matters shall merit encouragement from the State, in the manner indicated by law.”* It establishes only a programmatic norm responsible for protecting the right to freedom of education. This means that those bodies are not incorporated into the public sector as one more entity, since in addition to lacking the aforementioned requirement, their legal framework concerning their organizational relations remains subject to the norms derived from private law. For greater detail, it is pertinent to cite Voto 2000-11251 of 16:20 hours on December 19, 2000, in which the Constitutional Chamber denied that a public employment relationship existed between that class of institutions and their workers.\n\nIn accordance with the above, it is concluded that the defect attributed to the lower court judgment under review does not exist. Thus, it is not legally feasible to order the payment of the requested wage item, for the concept of service years premiums (anualidades), during the period in which the plaintiff worked for a private educational center, and the fact that there is an internal process in the Ministry of Public Education for the recognition of service years premiums, which details the steps to submit the request for a study of service years premiums that encompasses the request in the private educational center or in the public institution, does not imply that it is taken as proven and that it must be approved in each specific case. Said procedure aims to maximize and digitize the user service by applying the use of technological means, facilitating and streamlining the processes for MEP officials, to strengthen digitization in Costa Rican education and as indicated to reinforce sanitary measures due to the COVID 19 pandemic, but the existence of a series of steps to make the request and the respective process does not imply that, as in the present case, the recognition of the incentive claimed is appropriate. On the other hand, the appellant alleges that there is a violation of Article 563 of the Labor Code regarding the acquittal on the imposition of a costs order. He points out that the Labor Code in the cited article establishes as a general rule the order to pay legal costs (costas) against the party that loses the proceeding, allowing the non-application thereof only exceptionally, provided that the litigation was conducted in good faith. He adds that it is sensible to order the losing party to pay legal costs, since it forced the other party to resort to the jurisdictional route. In this aspect, the plaintiff is also not correct, by virtue of the fact that the claim was declared without merit in all its petitionary aspects, therefore, the State was not the losing party in the proceeding, hence the costs order sought is not appropriate, given that in accordance with the reasons previously indicated, the lower court judgment must be confirmed in all its scope.\n\n**B) Appeal filed by the State’s representation.** In relation to the objections of the defendant party, and once this matter has been studied and discussed, it is the criterion of the members of this Tribunal that it is not correct. Regarding the costs order, it must be borne in mind that in this matter, the issue concerning legal costs finds its normative basis in numerals 562 and 563 of the Labor Code. Notwithstanding that the rule contained in Article 562 is to order the losing party to pay both types of legal costs of the lawsuit, numeral 563 allows the judging persons to exonerate the losing party from the payment of those expenses, for litigants who fall within the circumstances contemplated therein. The study of the case file allows an exception to the objective principle of defeat and leads to the determination that the plaintiff litigated with evident good faith, even though the ordinary labor action was dismissed. In good conscience, it is estimated that, in the matter at hand, the plaintiff did not act recklessly or in bad faith and there is merit to depart from the general rule and exempt him from the payment of procedural and personal expenses generated as a direct consequence of filing this proceeding. Despite the fact that the general principle of ordering legal costs against the losing party is supported by the objective fact of defeat cited above, the procedural system grants a margin of discretion and, by exception, in certain circumstances such as the present one, authorizes judging persons to exempt the losing party, with the purpose of allowing an equitable criterion to be applied in the respective decision. So that the exoneration from legal costs, even in the situation provided for by the norm, is not obligatory but rather optional. Based on that premise, it is observed that the sentencing person at the lower instance was not obliged to order legal costs, given that, in the exercise of their legal powers, they were obliged to make a value judgment related to the conduct of the litigant who was the losing party, in order to establish whether such exoneration was appropriate or not. In the criterion of this appellate body, in the present matter, although in accordance with Article 563 of the Labor Code, whoever is the losing party in the proceeding must bear the payment of those disbursements, it must be taken into consideration that, as an exception to that general provision, numeral 563 ibidem authorizes exempting the losing party from those expenses and, for that, it requires, among other demands, as explained supra, that the plaintiff filed the action with evident good faith which, in this proceeding, is indisputable by all accounts. In this regard, it is important to note that the constitutional right, guaranteed in Article 41 by providing that, by resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests, added to the service of the jurisdictional Administration of Justice under the State's charge and the existence of a right of equal stature, tending to obtain specialized labor justice, essentially, impose compliance with the state duty to facilitate and ensure that any worker and/or employer freely accesses the Labor Courts to settle conflicts of interest. Consequently, it is unjust to apply the principle of defeat in a literal, rigid manner and to impose economic burdens on them, which in some cases can nullify access to justice, becoming true obstacles that directly threaten the exercise of the rights protected in Articles 41 and 70 of the fundamental Charter. In the present case, it is inferred that the plaintiff assessed that his claim was appropriate and understood that it had a legal basis, therefore, in the judgment of this Tribunal there was no recklessness or temerity on his part and, unquestionably, we arrive at the decision that he litigated in good faith. Under these conditions, he must be exempted from the payment of both types of legal costs, which is why the plaintiff was within his right to file the claim, without this implying the existence of bad faith. Thus, it is imperative to confirm what was decided by the A Quo on legal costs which, decreeing the exoneration, in exercise of the legal prerogatives that, in a case such as the present, materialized in favor of the losing party upon reaching the valid judgment that the plaintiff, in effect, litigated with evident good faith, given that, in thinking that his claim deserved to be debated as it in reality and unquestionably has been, he had a well-founded conviction and believed he had the right to payment of the sought items.\n\nThose circumstances allow exempting her from the previously indicated expenses, noting additionally that her purpose in initiating this action was never to mislead the first-instance adjudicator and, even less, has it been determined that it aimed to obtain an undue advantage.\n\nVI. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, in all its aspects.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThere being no vices or defects causing nullity or defenselessness, the appealed judgment is confirmed. agarrom.\n\n| | | |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| 