{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-336489",
  "citation": "Res. 00276-2006 Tribunal Agrario",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Nulidad de exclusión anticipada de bienes gananciales en proceso sucesorio",
  "title_en": "Nullification of Premature Exclusion of Marital Assets in Succession",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Agrario anula una resolución de primera instancia que, dentro de un incidente de exclusión de bienes en un proceso sucesorio agrario, había excluido anticipadamente el 50% de dos fincas como bienes gananciales a favor de la conviviente supérstite. El tribunal considera que la decisión de fondo sobre la liquidación del haber sucesorio y la determinación del valor neto de los gananciales es prematura, ya que debe realizarse en la sentencia definitiva del proceso sucesorio, una vez liquidado el activo y deducidas las deudas. Se fundamenta en los artículos 520 y 572 del Código Civil, que rigen la apertura de la sucesión y los derechos del conviviente, así como en el artículo 26 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Se rechazan los demás agravios por referirse a aspectos firmes de un proceso previo de reconocimiento de unión de hecho. La nulidad se declara para garantizar el debido proceso y la correcta liquidación del patrimonio hereditario, ordenando continuar los procedimientos conforme a derecho.",
  "summary_en": "The Agrarian Tribunal nullifies a lower court ruling that, within an asset exclusion incident in an agrarian succession process, had prematurely excluded 50% of two properties as marital community property in favor of the surviving cohabitant. The tribunal holds that the substantive decision on the liquidation of the estate and the determination of the net value of the marital gains is premature; such a determination must be made in the final judgment of the succession proceeding, after liquidation of the assets and deduction of debts. It relies on Articles 520 and 572 of the Civil Code, governing the opening of succession and the rights of cohabitants, as well as Article 26 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law. Other grievances are rejected as they pertain to final matters from a prior common-law marriage recognition proceeding. The nullification is ordered to safeguard due process and the proper liquidation of the inheritance estate, with proceedings to continue accordingly.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Agrario",
  "date": "15/03/2006",
  "year": "2006",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "bienes gananciales",
    "incidente de exclusión de bienes",
    "proceso sucesorio",
    "haber sucesorio",
    "liquidación de la mortual",
    "debido proceso",
    "unión de hecho",
    "Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "bienes gananciales",
    "proceso sucesorio",
    "exclusión de bienes",
    "incidente de exclusión de bienes",
    "nulidad",
    "debido proceso",
    "adelanto de criterio",
    "haber sucesorio",
    "liquidación de la mortual",
    "gananciales",
    "sociedad de ganancias",
    "Código Civil",
    "Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria",
    "conviviente",
    "unión de hecho",
    "IDA",
    "adjudicatario"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "marital community property",
    "succession proceeding",
    "asset exclusion",
    "incident of exclusion of assets",
    "nullification",
    "due process",
    "premature decision",
    "estate",
    "liquidation of mortual",
    "marital gains",
    "community of gains",
    "Civil Code",
    "Agrarian Jurisdiction Law",
    "cohabitant",
    "common-law marriage",
    "IDA",
    "allottee"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "La forma en la que se resuelve afecta el patrimonio del haber sucesorio por cuanto al no haberse liquidado dicho haber no se tiene cual es el valor neto que puede quedar para hacer una repartición de bienes gananciales. Por valor neto ha de entenderse la operación de deducir de los bienes las deudas que pesan sobre ellos. Total de bienes menos deudas igual ganancias. Deberá ser en sentencia donde se disponga respecto al valor neto de los gananciales y lo que corresponde a la señora Xinia María González Soto, por tal concepto. El Tribunal Superior Civil en voto N° 1860-74, criterio que es compartido por este Tribunal, indicó lo siguiente: “los bienes adquiridos a título oneroso durante el matrimonio, al disolverse el mismo se consideran comunes y en consecuencia deben sufrir el trámite de la liquidación de la mortual, en forma total, ya que los gananciales podrían ser pagados con otros bienes, toda vez que se trata de un juicio universal, y por esa razón, la porción correspondiente a gananciales no queda liberada de soportar el pago de las deudas, así como los gastos causados con motivo del trámite del respectivo juicio sucesorio, pago que, conjuntamente debe ser cargado a todo el acervo de la herencia”. Partiendo de todo lo anteriormente expuesto y conforme a lo dispuesto por el ordinal 26 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria se anula por anticipada la resolución dictada por el juzgado de origen a las quince horas del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil cinco.",
  "excerpt_en": "The manner in which the matter is resolved affects the estate's patrimony since, without having liquidated said estate, the net value available for distributing marital community property is unknown. Net value is understood as the operation of deducting from the assets the debts encumbering them. Total assets minus debts equals gains. It must be in the final judgment where the net value of the marital gains and the corresponding share for Mrs. Xinia María González Soto are determined. The Superior Civil Court, in vote No. 1860-74, a criterion shared by this Tribunal, stated: \"assets acquired for value during the marriage, upon its dissolution, are considered common and consequently must undergo the entire liquidation procedure of the mortual, since the marital gains could be paid with other assets, given that it is a universal proceeding, and for that reason, the portion corresponding to marital gains is not released from bearing the payment of debts, as well as the expenses incurred due to the respective succession proceeding, payment which must be jointly charged to the entire estate.\" Based on the foregoing and pursuant to Article 26 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, the resolution issued by the court of origin at fifteen hours on February twenty-fourth of two thousand five is annulled as premature.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Null",
    "label_es": "Nula",
    "summary_en": "The Agrarian Tribunal declares the nullity of the lower court ruling that prematurely excluded 50% of the property as marital community property, as the decision was premature; proceedings are ordered to continue.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal Agrario declara la nulidad de la resolución de primera instancia que excluyó anticipadamente el 50% de los bienes como gananciales, por ser prematura la decisión; se ordena continuar el procedimiento."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "Nullification should not be declared for its own sake; it must be declared to guarantee due process, either to guide its normal course or to guarantee the right of defense, as a corollary of the constitutional right to swift and complete justice.",
      "quote_es": "La nulidad no debe declararse por la nulidad misma, debe declararse para garantizar el debido proceso, ya sea para orientar su curso normal o bien para garantizar el derecho de defensa, lo anterior como correlativo del derecho constitucional de Justicia Pronta y Cumplida."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "The manner in which the matter is resolved affects the estate’s patrimony since, without having liquidated said estate, the net value available for distributing marital community property is unknown.",
      "quote_es": "La forma en la que se resuelve afecta el patrimonio del haber sucesorio por cuanto al no haberse liquidado dicho haber no se tiene cual es el valor neto que puede quedar para hacer una repartición de bienes gananciales."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII (citando voto N° 1860-74)",
      "quote_en": "Assets acquired for value during the marriage, upon its dissolution, are considered common and consequently must undergo the entire liquidation procedure of the mortual, since the marital gains could be paid with other assets, given that it is a universal proceeding.",
      "quote_es": "Los bienes adquiridos a título oneroso durante el matrimonio, al disolverse el mismo se consideran comunes y en consecuencia deben sufrir el trámite de la liquidación de la mortual, en forma total, ya que los gananciales podrían ser pagados con otros bienes, toda vez que se trata de un juicio universal."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
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      "id": "norm-12443",
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    {
      "id": "norm-2107",
      "citation": "Ley 6734",
      "title_en": "Agrarian Jurisdiction Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria",
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      "date": "29/03/1982",
      "year": "1982"
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      "id": "norm-970",
      "citation": "Ley 5476",
      "title_en": "Family Code",
      "title_es": "Código de Familia",
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      "date": "21/12/1973",
      "year": "1973"
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    {
      "id": "norm-2107",
      "citation": "Ley 6734",
      "title_en": "Agrarian Jurisdiction Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria",
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  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-336489",
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  "body_es_text": "Nº 276-F-06\n\nNº 276-F-06\n\n TRIBUNAL AGRARIO SECCION SEGUNDA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, a las quince horas treinta minutos del quince de marzo del dos mil seis.-\n\n Incidente de Exclusión de Bienes interpuesto por [Nombre1] , mayor, soltera, de oficios domésticos, vecina de Cañas, con cédula de identidad número CED1- - , contra [Nombre2] , mayor, casado una vez, agricultor, vecino de Atenas, con cédula de identidad número CED2- - , dentro del proceso Sucesorio de [Nombre3] , quien fue mayor, soltero, agricultor, vecino de Cañas con cédula de identidad número CED3- - y como Albacea [Nombre2] . Actúa el licenciado Franklin Segura López, mayor, divorciado dos veces, abogado, vecino de Cañas con cédula CED4- - en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de la incidentista, y el licenciado Carlos Alberto Montero Barrantes, mayor, abogado, vecino de Liberia, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de la parte incidentada.-\n\n Redacta el juez Darcia Carranza; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- Se rechaza la prueba documental ofrecida para mejor resolver de folios 39 y 40, por cuanto a folio 408 del principal se tiene Oficio OSRC – 0472-2005 de fecha 2 de mayo del 2005, emitido por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, mediante el cual se indica claramente el señor Eddier Francisco Torres Arroyo es adjudicatario de las [Dirección1] , ubicado en Cañas Guanacaste y tal adjudicación lo fue mediante acuerdo de Junta Directiva, artículo IV de la Sesión 40-92, de fecha 25 de mayo de 1992.\n\nII.- El tribunal por la forma en la que se resuelve el presente asunto no prohija los hechos tenidos por demostrados en la resolución venida en alzada.\n\nIII.- La resolución recurrida, dictada a las quince horas del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil cinco (folios 33 a 35 del legajo), acogió parcialmente el incidente de exclusión de bienes y excluyó del inventario del proceso sucesorio principal el derecho al cincuenta por ciento que corresponde a la incidentista [Nombre1] sobre las fincas del Partido de Guanacaste Setenta y nueve mil ciento treinta y tres – cero cero cero y Setenta y nueve mil ciento treinta y cuatro – cero cero cero. (ver folio 33 a 35). Contra tal resolución el apoderado especial judicial de la parte incidentada interpone recurso de apelación, en memoriales presentado a estrados el 04 de marzo del 2005, exponiendo los siguientes motivos de disconformidad: 1) Dice, no entiende como se señala como hecho probado en el considerando segundo sin tener a mano la certificación de la escritura de venta de las propiedades del Partido de Guanacaste CED5 y CED6. Alega que sin tener a mano tales certificaciones no se puede tener por probado el hecho 4 que dice: “4) los convivientes durante la vigencia de la relación, adquirieron del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, dos parcelas que se encuentran inscritas…”, pues el mismo es falso, pues la conviviente manifestó ella inició tal convivio con el causante durante nueve años, a partir del 28 de diciembre de 1992 y en esa fecha el causante ya había adquirido las propiedades dichas, puesto que las adquirió en junio de 1992, siendo soltero y sin haber conocido a la señora González Soto. Por ello aduce, el juez no puede tener por demostrado tal hecho en la forma que lo hace. 2) Alude el apelante en que en los hechos no probados el Juez a quo señala que no se ha probado la fecha en que acaeció la muerte del señor [Nombre3] , y declara en el por tanto “Se declara parcialmente con lugar… y hasta el fallecimiento del señor [Nombre3] ”, por lo que si no se probó la muerte del señor [Nombre3] como el a quo pudo dictar sentencia en este sentido. 3) Alega el recurrente que si el ordinal 242 del Código de Familia reza que para que se de la unión de hecho la mujer debe tener “APTITUD LEGAL PARA CONTRAER MATRIMONIO”, lo cual en este caso la señora [Nombre1] “NO LATENÍA”, ya que en el año 1992 tenía apenas trece años, lo que significa era menor de edad. El retrotraer los efecto al año 1992 sería desde su punto de vista una aberración jurídica, puesto que a esa edad no tenía aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio. Dice, el a quo solo se basó en los testimonios y no en la prueba documental. Alega, la actora solo ha utilizado la intimidación para con él y por ello se le declaró rebelde y cuando apeló la resolución no pudo presentar los documentos idóneos, porque es hasta la sentencia de segunda instancia donde se viene a enterar de la edad de la actora y de la fecha en que el causante adquirió la propiedad. 4) Aduce el apelante la resolución en la cual se basa la a quo para resolver que es la sentencia de la Unión de Hecho, la cual presentará revisión de la misma, es absolutamente nula (folios 43 y 44).\n\n IV.- El recurrente se muestra disconforme en su primer agravio en cuanto al hecho probado 4, lo cual revisados que fueron los autos, tal hecho no existe en la resolución venida en alzada. No obstante lo anterior nota este Tribunal se refiere al hecho tenido por demostrado en la sentencia dictada por el Juzgado Agrario de Liberia a las 14 horas del quince de octubre del dos mil dos en proceso de Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho, lo cual no es objeto de revisión en este momento procesal por cuanto lo resuelto en la misma se encuentra firme (ver resolución de primera instancia folios 1 al 5 y voto del Tribunal de Familia N° 964-04 confirmando lo resuelto por la primera instancia a folios 9 al 14 de este legajo). Por tales motivos se rechaza el primer agravio. \n\n V.- En el segundo agravio, al igual que lo hizo en el primero agravio hace referencia a aspectos contenidos en la resolución del proceso de la unión de hecho y en este caso particular se refiere al hecho no probado a) de la sentencia dictada por el Juzgado Agrario de Liberia a las 14 horas del quince de octubre del dos mil dos en proceso de Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho, lo cual no es objeto de revisión en este momento procesal por cuanto lo resuelto en la misma se encuentra firme (ver resolución de primera instancia folios 1 al 5 y voto del Tribunal de Familia N° 964-04 confirmando lo resuelto por la primera instancia a folios 9 al 14 de este legajo). De ahí al igual que lo resuelto en el considerando anterior resultan improcedentes los embates que atacan una sentencia firme a través de una resolución de algo totalmente distinto como lo es el incidente de exclusión de bienes dentro de un proceso sucesorio.\n\nVI.- Los agravios identificados con los numerales 3 y 4, también se refieren a la discusión sobre aspectos de lo resuelto en el proceso abreviado de Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho que planteó la señora Xinia González Soto contra la sucesión de [Nombre3] , tan es así que se entra a combatir la aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio de la aquí incidentista, así como la nulidad de la sentencia dictada en dicho proceso, contra la cual, dice, presentará recurso de revisión. Los argumentos de apelación no viene a atacar la resolución del incidente de exclusión de bienes sino la sentencia dictada en el abreviado de Reconocimiento de Unión de Hecho la cual esta firme y nos factible entrar a conocer sobre la misma por lo que se rechazan sus embates.\n\n VII.- De acuerdo con el orden jurídico procesal, la nulidad no debe declararse por la nulidad misma, debe declararse para garantizar el debido proceso, ya sea para orientar su curso normal o bien para garantizar el derecho de defensa, lo anterior como correlativo del derecho constitucional de Justicia Pronta y Cumplida (en este sentido ver votos 584-90 y 703-90 de la Sala Constitucional). La nulidad tiende a que se rehaga lo hecho y se desconozcan los efectos de las resoluciones dictadas y de la actuación en general, como consecuencia natural de su invalidez. La marcha ordenada del proceso hace indispensable que se tengan que resolver cada uno de los puntos debatidos, la evacuación de la prueba aceptada. Uno de los principios fundamentales del procedimiento es su normal desarrollo dentro de un proceso. Solamente por medio de la nulidad, ha de orientarse el curso normal de los procedimientos y es como podrá dejarse sin efecto toda una actuación que responde a una errónea gestión de procedimientos, (artículo 26 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, y de aplicación supletoria el ordinal 197 Código Procesal Civil). No obstante lo anteriormente expuesto en el considerando anterior, estima este Tribunal, la resolución venida en alzada se dictó de manera anticipada por cuanto si bien la a-quo resolvió el incidente, en el fondo se está pronunciando sobre la liquidación del haber sucesorio. Los bienes gananciales de que se habla en la resolución se refiere a las [Dirección2] del Partido de Guanacaste, cuyo cincuenta por ciento fue excluido por la quo en la resolución venida en alzada, no era el momento procesal oportuno para pronunciarse sobre bienes gananciales. Considera este Tribunal hay que tomar en consideración el ordinal 520 del Código Civil el cual establece: “La sucesión de una persona se abre por la muerte de ella. Nada podrá estipularse sobre los derechos a la sucesión de una persona, mientras esté viva, aunque ella consienta”. Resulta lógico entender que en ese mismo instante surge el derecho a los gananciales, porque se disuelve el vínculo matrimonial, recordemos que de conformidad con el ordinal 572 del mismo cuerpo normativo el conviviente en unión de hecho es parte de los herederos legítimos según se establece en el inciso ch), lo cual de todas maneras deberá, ser objeto de análisis en el momento procesal oportuno pertinente. Además ese derecho a gananciales surge tanto en los bienes del causante cuanto del cónyuge sobreviviente. Situación que no se modifica por la reforma al artículo 41 del Código de Familia, introducida por la Ley N° 5985 de 23 de marzo de 1976, pues la disolución del vínculo se da por la muerte del causante y es partir de dicha disolución que se adquiere el derecho a participar en la mitad del valor neto de los gananciales constatados en el patrimonio del otro. Es decir surge así la llamada sociedad de ganancias o gananciales la que debe liquidarse para repartirse el valor neto de su activo entre el cónyuge sobreviviente y los herederos del causante, y sin perjuicio de que aquél participe también de esta calidad. La forma en la que se resuelve afecta el patrimonio del haber sucesorio por cuanto al no haberse liquidado dicho haber no se tiene cual es el valor neto que puede quedar para hacer una repartición de bienes gananciales. Por valor neto ha de entenderse la operación de deducir de los bienes las deudas que pesan sobre ellos. Total de bienes menos deudas igual ganancias. Deberá ser en sentencia donde se disponga respecto al valor neto de los gananciales y lo que corresponde a la señora Xinia María González Soto, por tal concepto. El Tribunal Superior Civil en voto N° 1860-74, criterio que es compartido por este Tribunal, indicó lo siguiente: “los bienes adquiridos a título oneroso durante el matrimonio, al disolverse el mismo se consideran comunes y en consecuencia deben sufrir el trámite de la liquidación de la mortual, en forma total, ya que los gananciales podrían ser pagados con otros bienes, toda vez que se trata de un juicio universal, y por esa razón, la porción correspondiente a gananciales no queda liberada de soportar el pago de las deudas, así como los gastos causados con motivo del trámite del respectivo juicio sucesorio, pago que, conjuntamente debe ser cargado a todo el acervo de la herencia”. Partiendo de todo lo anteriormente expuesto y conforme a lo dispuesto por el ordinal 26 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria se anula por anticipada la resolución dictada por el juzgado de origen a las quince horas del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil cinco. Continúese los procedimientos según corresponda.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nSe anula la resolución dictada por el juzgado de origen a las quince horas del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil cinco. Continúese los procedimientos según corresponda.\n\n \n\n \n\nANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA\n\n \n\n \n\nALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA VANESSA FISHER GONZALEZ\n\n \n\nNº EXPN1\n\nIncidente Exclusión de Bienes\n\nIncidentista [Nombre1] \n\nIncidentado Sucesión [Nombre3] \n\nli.+++",
  "body_en_text": "Nº 276-F-06\n\nNº 276-F-06\n\n SECOND DIVISION AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, at fifteen hours thirty minutes on the fifteenth of March, two thousand six.-\n\n Incident of Exclusion of Assets filed by [Nombre1], of legal age, single, engaged in domestic work, resident of Cañas, with identification number CED1--, against [Nombre2], of legal age, married once, farmer, resident of Atenas, with identification number CED2--, within the Probate proceeding of [Nombre3], who was of legal age, single, farmer, resident of Cañas with identification number CED3--, and as Executor [Nombre2]. Licensed attorney Franklin Segura López, of legal age, divorced twice, lawyer, resident of Cañas with identification number CED4--, acts in his capacity as special judicial representative of the incident filer, and licensed attorney Carlos Alberto Montero Barrantes, of legal age, lawyer, resident of Liberia, in his capacity as special judicial representative of the incident respondent.-\n\n Judge Darcia Carranza writes; and,\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI.- The documentary evidence offered for better resolution on pages 39 and 40 is rejected, because on page 408 of the main file there is Official Communication OSRC – 0472-2005 dated May 2, 2005, issued by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which clearly states that Mr. Eddier Francisco Torres Arroyo is the allottee of the [Dirección1], located in Cañas Guanacaste, and such allotment was made by agreement of the Board of Directors, article IV of Session 40-92, dated May 25, 1992.\n\nII.- Due to the manner in which this matter is resolved, the tribunal does not endorse the facts held as proven in the resolution under appeal.\n\nIII.- The appealed resolution, issued at fifteen hours on the twenty-fourth of February, two thousand five (pages 33 to 35 of the file), partially granted the incident of exclusion of assets and excluded from the inventory of the main probate proceeding the right to fifty percent corresponding to the incident filer [Nombre1] over the properties of the Partido de Guanacaste number Seventy-nine thousand one hundred thirty-three – zero zero zero and Seventy-nine thousand one hundred thirty-four – zero zero zero (see pages 33 to 35). Against this resolution, the special judicial representative of the incident respondent filed an appeal, in briefs submitted to the court on March 4, 2005, setting forth the following grounds of disagreement: 1) He says, he does not understand how a proven fact is stated in the second considering without having at hand the certification of the sale deed for the properties of the Partido de Guanacaste CED5 and CED6. He claims that without having such certifications at hand, fact 4 cannot be held as proven, which states: “4) the cohabitants during the term of the relationship acquired from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario two parcels that are registered...”, because this is false, as the female cohabitant stated she began such cohabitation with the decedent for nine years, starting on December 28, 1992, and on that date the decedent had already acquired said properties, since he acquired them in June 1992, being single and without having met Mrs. González Soto. Therefore, he argues, the judge cannot hold such fact as proven in the way he does. 2) The appellant alludes that in the unproven facts, the Judge a quo indicates that the date on which the death of Mr. [Nombre3] occurred has not been proven, and declares in the operative part \"It is partially granted... and until the death of Mr. [Nombre3]\", so if the death of Mr. [Nombre3] was not proven, how could the a quo issue a judgment in this sense. 3) The appellant alleges that if Article 242 of the Family Code states that for a common-law union to exist, the woman must have \"LEGAL CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE,\" which in this case Mrs. [Nombre1] \"DID NOT HAVE,\" since in 1992 she was only thirteen years old, meaning she was a minor. To retroact the effects to the year 1992 would, from his point of view, be a legal aberration, since at that age she lacked the legal capacity to contract marriage. He says, the a quo based the decision only on the testimonies and not on the documentary evidence. He alleges that the plaintiff has only used intimidation against him, which is why he was declared in default, and when he appealed the resolution he could not present the appropriate documents, because it is only in the second instance judgment that he becomes aware of the age of the plaintiff and the date on which the decedent acquired the property. 4) The appellant argues that the resolution on which the a quo bases its decision, which is the judgment of the Common-Law Union, against which he will file a motion for review, is absolutely null (pages 43 and 44).\n\n IV.- The appellant disagrees in his first grievance regarding proven fact 4, which, upon reviewing the case file, does not exist in the resolution under appeal. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Tribunal notes that it refers to the fact held as proven in the judgment issued by the Agrarian Court of Liberia at 14:00 hours on October 15, two thousand two, in the Judicial Recognition of Common-Law Union proceeding, which is not subject to review at this procedural stage because what was resolved therein is final (see first instance resolution pages 1 to 5 and ruling of the Family Tribunal N° 964-04 confirming the first instance decision on pages 9 to 14 of this file). For these reasons, the first grievance is rejected.\n\n V.- In the second grievance, just as in the first grievance, it refers to aspects contained in the resolution of the common-law union proceeding, and in this particular case, it refers to the unproven fact a) of the judgment issued by the Agrarian Court of Liberia at 14:00 hours on October 15, two thousand two, in the Judicial Recognition of Common-Law Union proceeding, which is not subject to review at this procedural stage because what was resolved therein is final (see first instance resolution pages 1 to 5 and ruling of the Family Tribunal N° 964-04 confirming the first instance decision on pages 9 to 14 of this file). Hence, similarly to what was resolved in the preceding considering, the attacks that challenge a final judgment through a resolution of something entirely different, such as an incident of exclusion of assets within a probate proceeding, are unfounded.\n\nVI.- The grievances identified with numerals 3 and 4 also refer to the discussion on aspects of what was resolved in the summary proceeding of Judicial Recognition of Common-Law Union filed by Mrs. Xinia González Soto against the estate of [Nombre3], to such an extent that arguments are entered into against the legal capacity to contract marriage of the incident filer here, as well as the nullity of the judgment rendered in said proceeding, against which, she says, she will file a motion for review. The appeal arguments do not attack the resolution of the incident of exclusion of assets but rather the judgment rendered in the summary proceeding of Recognition of Common-Law Union, which is final and it is not feasible to review it at this stage; therefore, his attacks are rejected.\n\n VII.- In accordance with the procedural legal order, nullity must not be declared for nullity's sake; it must be declared to guarantee due process, either to guide its normal course or to guarantee the right of defense, the foregoing as a corollary of the constitutional right to Speedy and Complete Justice (in this sense, see rulings 584-90 and 703-90 of the Constitutional Chamber). Nullity aims to redo what was done and to disregard the effects of the resolutions issued and the actions in general, as a natural consequence of their invalidity. The orderly progression of the process makes it essential that each of the debated points and the production of the admitted evidence be resolved. One of the fundamental principles of the procedure is its normal development within a process. Only through nullity must the normal course of the procedures be guided, and it is how an entire proceeding that responds to an erroneous procedural management may be nullified (Article 26 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, and the supplementary application of Article 197 of the Código Procesal Civil). Notwithstanding the foregoing, explained in the preceding considering, this Tribunal considers that the resolution under appeal was issued prematurely, since although the judge a quo resolved the incident, in substance, she is ruling on the liquidation of the probate estate. The community property referred to in the resolution concerns [Dirección2] of the Partido de Guanacaste, fifty percent of which was excluded by the judge a quo in the resolution under appeal; it was not the appropriate procedural moment to rule on community property. This Tribunal considers that Article 520 of the Civil Code must be taken into consideration, which establishes: “The succession of a person is opened by their death. Nothing may be stipulated regarding the rights to the succession of a person while they are alive, even if they consent.” It is logical to understand that at that very moment, the right to community property arises, because the marital bond is dissolved; let us remember that, in accordance with Article 572 of the same regulatory body, the cohabitant in a common-law union is among the legitimate heirs, as established in subsection ch), which in any case must be subject to analysis at the appropriate relevant procedural moment. Furthermore, this right to community property arises both from the assets of the decedent and from those of the surviving spouse. A situation that is not modified by the reform to Article 41 of the Family Code, introduced by Law N° 5985 of March 23, 1976, since the dissolution of the bond occurs upon the death of the decedent, and it is from that dissolution that the right to participate in half of the net value of the community property verified in the other's estate is acquired. That is, the so-called community of gains thus arises, which must be liquidated so that the net value of its assets is distributed between the surviving spouse and the decedent's heirs, and without prejudice to the former also participating in this capacity. The way in which this is resolved affects the estate of the probate assets, since, as said estate has not been liquidated, it is not known what the net value is that may remain for a distribution of community property. Net value is understood to mean the operation of deducting from the assets the debts that encumber them. Total assets minus debts equal gains. It must be in the judgment where a ruling is made regarding the net value of the community property and what corresponds to Mrs. Xinia María González Soto for that concept. The Superior Civil Tribunal, in ruling N° 1860-74, a criterion shared by this Tribunal, stated the following: “assets acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage, upon its dissolution, are considered common and consequently must undergo the process of liquidation of the mortual, in full, since the community property could be paid with other assets, given that it is a universal proceeding, and for that reason, the portion corresponding to community property is not freed from bearing the payment of debts, as well as the expenses incurred due to the processing of the respective probate proceeding, payment that must be jointly charged to the entire corpus of the inheritance.” Based on all of the foregoing and pursuant to the provisions of Article 26 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the resolution issued by the court of origin at fifteen hours on the twenty-fourth of February, two thousand five, is annulled as premature. Let the proceedings continue accordingly.\n\nTHEREFORE\n\nThe resolution issued by the court of origin at fifteen hours on the twenty-fourth of February, two thousand five, is annulled. Let the proceedings continue accordingly.\n\n\n\nANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA\n\n\n\nALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA VANESSA FISHER GONZALEZ\n\nNº EXPN1\n\nIncident of Exclusion of Assets\n\nIncident filer [Nombre1]\n\nIncident respondent Estate of [Nombre3]\n\nli.+++\n\nThe appeal arguments do not challenge the ruling on the incident of exclusion of property but rather the judgment rendered in the summary proceeding for Recognition of De Facto Union, which is final, and it is not feasible for us to review it; therefore, his attacks are rejected.\n\n**VII.-** In accordance with the procedural legal order, a nullity must not be declared for its own sake; it must be declared to guarantee due process, either to guide its normal course or to guarantee the right of defense, the foregoing as a corollary of the constitutional right to Prompt and Complete Justice (in this regard, see votes 584-90 and 703-90 of the Constitutional Chamber). Nullity aims to redo what was done and disregard the effects of the resolutions issued and of the proceedings in general, as a natural consequence of their invalidity. The orderly progress of the process makes it indispensable to resolve each of the debated points and the admission of accepted evidence. One of the fundamental principles of the procedure is its normal development within a proceeding. Only through nullity must the normal course of the proceedings be guided, and it is thus how an entire proceeding that arises from an erroneous procedural handling may be set aside (Article 26 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, and for supplementary application, Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code). Notwithstanding the foregoing as set forth in the previous recital, this Court considers that the resolution under appeal was issued prematurely because, although the lower court resolved the incident, in substance it is pronouncing on the liquidation of the estate (haber sucesorio). The community property (bienes gananciales) discussed in the resolution refers to the [Dirección2] of the Partido de Guanacaste, fifty percent of which was excluded by the lower court in the resolution under appeal; it was not the opportune procedural moment to rule on community property. This Court considers that Article 520 of the Civil Code must be taken into account, which establishes: \"The succession of a person opens upon their death. Nothing may be stipulated regarding the rights to a person's succession while they are alive, even if they consent.\" It is logical to understand that at that same moment, the right to the community property arises because the matrimonial bond is dissolved; let us remember that in accordance with Article 572 of the same normative body, the cohabitant in a de facto union is among the legitimate heirs as established in subsection ch), which in any case must be subject to analysis at the pertinent opportune procedural moment. Furthermore, that right to community property arises both in the assets of the decedent (causante) and of the surviving spouse. A situation that is not modified by the amendment to Article 41 of the Family Code, introduced by Law No. 5985 of March 23, 1976, since the dissolution of the bond occurs upon the death of the decedent, and it is from said dissolution that the right is acquired to participate in half of the net value of the community property found in the other's patrimony. That is, the so-called community property partnership (sociedad de ganancias or gananciales) thus arises, which must be liquidated in order to distribute the net value of its assets between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the decedent, and without prejudice to the former also participating in this latter capacity. The manner in which it is resolved affects the estate's patrimony because, the estate not having been liquidated, the net value available for a distribution of community property is not known. Net value must be understood as the operation of deducting from the assets the debts that encumber them. Total assets minus debts equals profits. The net value of the community property and what corresponds to Mrs. Xinia María González Soto for that concept must be determined in the judgment. The Superior Civil Court, in vote No. 1860-74, a criterion shared by this Court, indicated the following: \"assets acquired for valuable consideration during marriage, upon the dissolution of the same, are considered common and consequently must undergo the liquidation proceeding of the mortual, in its entirety, since the community property could be paid with other assets, given that it is a universal proceeding, and for that reason, the portion corresponding to community property is not released from bearing the payment of debts, as well as the expenses incurred due to the processing of the respective succession proceeding, a payment which, jointly, must be charged to the entire inheritance estate (acervo de la herencia).\" Based on all the foregoing and in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, the resolution issued by the court of origin at fifteen hours on February twenty-fourth, two thousand five, is annulled for being premature. The proceedings shall continue as appropriate.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe resolution issued by the court of origin at fifteen hours on February twenty-fourth, two thousand five, is annulled. The proceedings shall continue as appropriate.\n\n \n\n \n\nANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA\n\n \n\n \n\nALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA         VANESSA FISHER GONZALEZ\n\n \n\nNº EXPN1\nIncidente Exclusión de Bienes\nIncidentista [Nombre1]\nIncidentado Sucesión [Nombre3]\nli.+++\n\nActing is Attorney Franklin Segura López, of legal age, twice divorced, lawyer, resident of Cañas, with identity card CED4- in his capacity as special judicial representative of the petitioner, and Attorney Carlos Alberto Montero Barrantes, of legal age, lawyer, resident of Liberia, in his capacity as special judicial representative of the respondent party.-\n\nDrafted by Judge Darcia Carranza; and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- The documentary evidence offered for a better decision at folios 39 and 40 is rejected, inasmuch as at folio 408 of the main file there is Official Letter OSRC – 0472-2005 dated May 2, 2005, issued by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which clearly indicates that Mr. Eddier Francisco Torres Arroyo is the allottee of the [Address1], located in Cañas Guanacaste, and that such allotment was made by agreement of the Board of Directors, Article IV of Session 40-92, dated May 25, 1992.\n\nII.- Due to the manner in which this matter is resolved, the tribunal does not adopt the facts held as proven in the resolution under appeal.\n\nIII.- The appealed resolution, issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on February twenty-fourth, two thousand five (folios 33 to 35 of the case file), partially granted the incident of exclusion of property and excluded from the inventory of the main probate proceeding the right to fifty percent corresponding to the petitioner [Name1] over the properties of the Partido de Guanacaste numbered seventy-nine thousand one hundred thirty-three – zero zero zero and seventy-nine thousand one hundred thirty-four – zero zero zero. (see folios 33 to 35). Against such resolution, the special judicial representative of the respondent party filed an appeal, in briefs submitted to the court on March 4, 2005, setting forth the following grounds for disagreement: 1) He says he does not understand how it is stated as a proven fact in the second considerando without having at hand the certification of the deed of sale for the properties of the Partido de Guanacaste CED5 and CED6. He alleges that without having such certifications at hand, fact 4, which states: \"4) the cohabitants during the existence of the relationship, acquired from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, two parcels that are registered…\", cannot be held as proven, since the same is false, as the cohabitant stated she began such cohabitation with the decedent for nine years, starting December 28, 1992, and on that date the decedent had already acquired said properties, since he acquired them in June of 1992, being single and without having met Mrs. González Soto. For this reason, he argues, the judge cannot hold such fact as proven in the manner he does. 2) The appellant alludes that in the unproven facts, the trial Judge points out that the date on which the death of Mr. [Name3] occurred has not been proven, and declares in the por tanto \"It is partially granted... and until the death of Mr. [Name3]\", so if the death of Mr. [Name3] was not proven, how could the trial judge issue a judgment in this sense. 3) The appellant alleges that if Article 242 of the Código de Familia states that for a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) to exist, the woman must have \"LEGAL CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE\", which in this case Mrs. [Name1] \"DID NOT HAVE\", since in 1992 she was barely thirteen years old, meaning she was a minor. To retroact the effects to 1992 would be, from his point of view, a legal aberration, since at that age she did not have the legal capacity to contract marriage. He says the trial judge only relied on the testimonies and not on the documentary evidence. He alleges the plaintiff has only used intimidation against him and for that reason he was declared in default, and when he appealed the resolution he could not present the suitable documents, because it is only from the second instance judgment that he comes to learn of the plaintiff's age and the date on which the decedent acquired the property. 4) The appellant argues the resolution on which the trial judge bases her decision, which is the judgment of the Common-law Marriage, which he will file a review against, is absolutely null (folios 43 and 44).\n\nIV.- The appellant disagrees in his first grievance regarding proven fact 4, which, upon review of the court records, such fact does not exist in the resolution under appeal. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court notes that he refers to the fact held as proven in the judgment issued by the Juzgado Agrario de Liberia at 2:00 p.m. on October fifteenth, two thousand two, in the proceeding for Judicial Recognition of Common-law Marriage (Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho), which is not subject to review at this procedural stage because the decision therein is final (see first instance resolution folios 1 to 5 and decision of the Tribunal de Familia No. 964-04 confirming the first instance decision at folios 9 to 14 of this case file). For these reasons, the first grievance is rejected.\n\nV.- In the second grievance, just as he did in the first grievance, he makes reference to aspects contained in the resolution of the common-law marriage proceeding and in this particular case he refers to the unproven fact a) of the judgment issued by the Juzgado Agrario de Liberia at 2:00 p.m. on October fifteenth, two thousand two, in the proceeding for Judicial Recognition of Common-law Marriage (Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho), which is not subject to review at this procedural stage because the decision therein is final (see first instance resolution folios 1 to 5 and decision of the Tribunal de Familia No. 964-04 confirming the first instance decision at folios 9 to 14 of this case file). Hence, just as decided in the preceding considerando, the attacks that challenge a final judgment through a resolution on something entirely different, such as the incident of exclusion of property within a probate proceeding, are inadmissible.\n\nVI.- The grievances identified with numerals 3 and 4 also refer to the discussion on aspects of the final decision in the summary proceeding for Judicial Recognition of Common-law Marriage (Reconocimiento Judicial de Unión de Hecho) filed by Mrs. Xinia González Soto against the estate of [Name3]; so much so that it proceeds to contest the legal capacity to contract marriage of the petitioner herein, as well as the nullity of the judgment issued in said proceeding, against which, he says, he will file a petition for review. The appeal arguments do not come to attack the resolution of the incident of exclusion of property but rather the judgment issued in the summary proceeding for Recognition of Common-law Marriage, which is final, and it is not feasible for us to hear the matter, so his attacks are rejected.\n\nVII.- In accordance with the procedural legal order, nullity must not be declared for nullity's sake; it must be declared to guarantee due process, either to guide its normal course or to guarantee the right of defense, the foregoing as a correlative of the constitutional right to Speedy and Fulfilled Justice (in this sense, see decisions 584-90 and 703-90 of the Sala Constitucional). Nullity tends to redo what was done and disregard the effects of the issued resolutions and the proceedings in general, as a natural consequence of their invalidity. The orderly progress of the process makes it essential that each of the debated points and the admission of accepted evidence be resolved. One of the fundamental principles of procedure is its normal development within a process. Only by means of nullity must the normal course of proceedings be guided, and it is how an entire proceeding that responds to an erroneous management of procedures may be voided (Article 26 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, and by supplementary application, Article 197 of the Código Procesal Civil). Notwithstanding the foregoing set out in the preceding considerando, this Court considers that the resolution under appeal was issued prematurely, since although the trial judge resolved the incident, she is, in essence, ruling on the liquidation of the estate. The community property (bienes gananciales) referred to in the resolution concerns the [Address2] of the Partido de Guanacaste, whose fifty percent was excluded by the trial judge in the resolution under appeal; it was not the opportune procedural moment to rule on community property. This Court considers that one must take into consideration Article 520 of the Código Civil, which establishes: \"The estate of a person opens upon their death. Nothing may be stipulated regarding the rights to a person's estate while they are alive, even if they consent.\" It is logical to understand that at that very instant the right to community property arises, because the marital bond is dissolved; let us remember that in accordance with Article 572 of the same regulatory body, the cohabitant in a common-law marriage is one of the legitimate heirs as established in subsection ch), which must, in any case, be subject to analysis at the pertinent opportune procedural moment. Furthermore, this right to community property arises both in the property of the decedent and that of the surviving spouse. A situation that is not modified by the reform to Article 41 of the Código de Familia, introduced by Ley N° 5985 of March 23, 1976, since the dissolution of the bond occurs due to the death of the decedent, and it is from said dissolution that the right to participate in half of the net value of the community property verified in the other's estate is acquired. That is to say, the so-called community property regime or community gains thus arises, which must be liquidated to distribute the net value of its assets between the surviving spouse and the decedent's heirs, and without prejudice to the former also participating in this latter capacity. The manner in which the matter is resolved affects the estate's capital because, since said estate has not been liquidated, the net value that may remain to make a distribution of community property is not known. Net value is to be understood as the operation of deducting from the assets the debts that weigh upon them. Total assets minus debts equals gains. It must be in the judgment where the net value of the community property and what corresponds to Mrs. Xinia María González Soto for such concept is ordered. The Tribunal Superior Civil, in decision No. 1860-74, a criterion shared by this Court, stated the following: \"goods acquired for valuable consideration during marriage, upon dissolution of the same, are considered common and consequently must undergo the process of liquidation of the estate, in total form, since the community property could be paid with other goods, given that it is a universal proceeding, and for that reason, the portion corresponding to community property is not freed from bearing the payment of debts, as well as the expenses incurred by reason of the process of the respective probate proceeding, payment which must be jointly charged to the entire mass of the inheritance.\" Based on all the foregoing and pursuant to the provisions of Article 26 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the resolution issued by the court of origin at three o'clock in the afternoon on February twenty-fourth, two thousand five, is annulled as premature. Let the proceedings continue as appropriate.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe resolution issued by the court of origin at three o'clock in the afternoon on February twenty-fourth, two thousand five, is annulled. Let the proceedings continue as appropriate.\n\nANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA\n\nALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA VANESSA FISHER GONZALEZ\n\nNº EXPN1\nIncidente Exclusión de Bienes\nIncidentista [Name1]\nIncidentado Sucesión [Name3]\nli.+++"
}