{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-378296",
  "citation": "Res. 00797-2005 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Exención de patente municipal para empresa en zona franca de Esparza",
  "title_en": "Exemption from municipal patent tax for a free-zone company in Esparza",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte analiza si una empresa beneficiaria del régimen de zona franca está exenta del impuesto de patente municipal en el cantón de Esparza. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo había rechazado la pretensión, pero la Sala, en casación, determina que aunque el inciso g) del artículo 20 de la Ley de Zonas Francas no aplica a tributos municipales, el inciso h) del mismo artículo sí otorga una exoneración expresa de todos los tributos y patentes municipales por diez años a las empresas bajo este régimen. Dado que el impuesto de patente de Esparza fue creado por la Ley 2447 de 1959 —previo a la Ley de Zonas Francas—, la exención resulta procedente. La Sala acoge parcialmente el recurso de la empresa, declara con lugar la demanda, anula los actos administrativos municipales que pretendían el cobro y ordena la devolución de los montos pagados con intereses. El recurso de la Municipalidad se rechaza, sin condena en costas.",
  "summary_en": "The First Division of the Costa Rican Supreme Court examines whether a company benefiting from the free-zone regime is exempt from the municipal patent tax in the canton of Esparza. The lower court had dismissed the claim, but the Division, on appeal, determines that while section 20(g) of the Free Zone Law does not cover municipal taxes, section 20(h) expressly grants a ten-year exemption from all municipal taxes and fees to companies under this regime. Since the Esparza patent tax was created by Law No. 2447 of 1959—prior to the Free Zone Law—the exemption applies. The Division partially upholds the company’s appeal, grants the action, voids the municipal acts that attempted to collect the tax, and orders the refund of amounts paid with interest. The Municipality’s appeal is dismissed, without a special award of costs.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "03/11/2005",
  "year": "2005",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "patente municipal",
    "zona franca",
    "exención tributaria",
    "tributos municipales",
    "artículo 20 inciso h Ley 7210",
    "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
    "principio de territorialidad",
    "hecho generador"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "impuesto de patente municipal",
    "exoneración zona franca",
    "Ley 7210",
    "Municipalidad de Esparza",
    "artículo 20 inciso h",
    "Corte Suprema de Justicia",
    "Sala Primera",
    "proceso especial tributario",
    "exención tributaria",
    "tributos municipales",
    "principio de territorialidad",
    "base imponible"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "municipal patent tax",
    "free zone exemption",
    "Law 7210",
    "Municipality of Esparza",
    "article 20 paragraph h",
    "Supreme Court of Justice",
    "First Division",
    "special tax proceeding",
    "tax exemption",
    "municipal taxes",
    "territoriality principle",
    "tax base"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Sobre el particular cabe señalar que esta Sala concuerda con el criterio adoptado por el Tribunal en el sentido de que el inciso g) del artículo 20 de la citada legislación no es aplicable a la actora, por ende, no permite el beneficio fiscal que se pretende. [...] No obstante, en virtud de lo debatido, cabe indicar que en el inciso h) de ese precepto aludido, se estableció una exoneración a favor de las empresas acogidas al régimen de zona franca, respecto de todos los tributos y patentes municipales, por un espacio temporal de diez años. [...] Por otro lado, si bien el mandato 63 del Código referido establece que la exención no se entiende extensible a los tributos establecidos luego de su creación, esa norma no es óbice para la eficacia a este caso del incentivo de referencia, ya que como se ha indicado, el tributo que se examina no nació con la emisión de la Ley no. 7562, sino que surgió a la vida jurídica con la Ley no. 2447 de octubre de 1959.",
  "excerpt_en": "Regarding this point, the Division agrees with the lower court's ruling that section 20(g) of the cited legislation does not apply to the plaintiff and therefore does not allow the tax benefit sought. [...] Nevertheless, it should be noted that section 20(h) of the same article provides an exemption in favor of companies benefiting from the free-zone regime from all municipal taxes and fees for a period of ten years. [...] Moreover, although section 63 of the Tax Code provides that an exemption does not extend to taxes created after its establishment, this provision does not bar the effectiveness of the incentive in this case, since, as noted, the tax at issue did not originate with Law No. 7562, but rather came into legal existence with Law No. 2447 of October 1959.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The company's appeal is partially granted; the lower court's ruling is overturned, and the company is declared exempt from the Esparza patent tax, with the Municipality ordered to refund the amounts paid with interest.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de la empresa, se anula la sentencia del Tribunal y se establece que la empresa está exenta del impuesto de patente de Esparza, debiendo la Municipalidad devolver los montos pagados con intereses."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "The tax in question has as its taxable event the carrying on of lucrative activities. As long as such an activity exists, the duty to pay the tax arises.",
      "quote_es": "El tributo en cuestión tiene como hecho generador el desarrollo de actividades lucrativas. En tanto exista una actividad de esta naturaleza, surge el deber de cancelar el impuesto."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XI",
      "quote_en": "Certainly, that provision does not apply to municipal taxes, but rather to taxes on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to profits, dividends, income, or sales.",
      "quote_es": "Ciertamente, ese mandato no es de aplicación a los tributos municipales, sino a los impuestos sobre las utilidades y otros cuya base imponible se determine en relación con las ganancias, dividendos, ingresos o ventas."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XI",
      "quote_en": "Section 20(h) of the same article provides an exemption in favor of companies benefiting from the free-zone regime from all municipal taxes and fees for a period of ten years.",
      "quote_es": "En el inciso h) de ese precepto aludido, se estableció una exoneración a favor de las empresas acogidas al régimen de zona franca, respecto de todos los tributos y patentes municipales, por un espacio temporal de diez años."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-11593",
      "citation": "Ley 7210",
      "title_en": "Free Zone Regime Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "23/11/1990",
      "year": "1990"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-32135",
      "citation": "Ley 7293",
      "title_en": "Law Regulating Current Exemptions",
      "title_es": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "31/03/1992",
      "year": "1992"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-148531",
      "citation": "Res. 00190-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III",
      "title_en": "Municipal patent tax exemption for a company under the free-zone regime",
      "title_es": "Exención de patente municipal para empresa en régimen de zonas francas",
      "doc_type": "court_decision",
      "date": "14/05/2013",
      "year": "2013"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-150860",
      "citation": "Res. 00032-2014 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
      "title_en": "Exemption from real estate tax for free zone companies",
      "title_es": "Exención del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles para empresas de zona franca",
      "doc_type": "court_decision",
      "date": "28/02/2014",
      "year": "2014"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-158693",
      "citation": "Res. 00233-2016 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo",
      "title_en": "Municipal business license exemption for free trade zone companies",
      "title_es": "Exoneración de patente municipal para empresas de zona franca",
      "doc_type": "court_decision",
      "date": "31/05/2016",
      "year": "2016"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-158355",
      "citation": "Res. 05445-1999 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Reaffirmation of municipal autonomy and its limits regarding legality control",
      "title_es": "Reiteración de autonomía municipal y sus límites frente al control de legalidad",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "14/07/1999",
      "year": "1999"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-11593",
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      "citation": "Ley 7293",
      "title_en": "Law Regulating Current Exemptions",
      "title_es": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "31/03/1992",
      "year": "1992"
    }
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  "body_es_text": "* 990012740161CA * \n\n*EXP: 99-001274-0161-CA \n\nRES: 000797-F-2005 \n\n SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José a las ocho horas del tres de noviembre del dos mil cinco. \n\n Proceso contencioso administrativo -especial tributario- tramitado en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, por ALUMINIOS NACIONALES SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (en adelante ALUNASA), representada por su apoderado general con límite de suma Nombre208048 , licenciado en Ciencias Económicas y su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Nombre48382 ; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE ESPARZA, representada por su Alcalde Municipal el señor Nombre65132 , ingeniero agrónomo, vecino de Esparza. Figura además, como apoderados especiales judiciales de las partes, respectivamente, el doctor Gonzalo Fajardo Salas, vecino de Heredia y el licenciado Rodolfo Alfaro Morera, vecino de Grecia. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José. \n\nRESULTANDO \n\n 1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, la sociedad actora estableció demanda contencioso administrativo -especial tributario-, cuya cuantía se fijó inestimable, a fin de que en sentencia se declare: ”1. La actora se encuentra exenta del pago del impuesto de patente municipal del Cantón de Esparza, según lo dispone el inciso g) del artículo 20 de la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas. 2. Son ilegales los actos administrativos de la Municipalidad de Esparza que pretenden gravar con el impuesto de patente municipal, las actividades de la actora. PIDO ASIMISMO CONDENAR A LA MUNICIPALIDAD DEMANDADA A: 3. Devolver a la actora, las sumas pagadas indebidamente por ella a esa Municipalidad por el cobro ilegal del impuesto de patente municipal, juntamente con los intereses que correspondan calculados a la tasa de interés establecida en el artículo 58, en relación con el artículo 57, de la Ley 4755 de mayo de 1971, y sus reformas, Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, aplicable en la especie en forma supletoria, desde la fecha de su pago por el contribuyente hasta su efectiva devolución por parte de la Municipalidad demandada. 4. Al pago de ambas costas del juicio.” \n\n 2.- El representante municipal contestó negativamente y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. \n\n 3.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, integrado por los Jueces Horacio González Quiroga, Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez y Joaquín Villalobos Soto, en sentencia no. 56-2004 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 18 de febrero del 2004, resolvió: Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por la Municipalidad de Esparza. Se declara improcedente la demanda en todos sus extremos. Se exonera en costas a la vencida.” \n\n 4.- Ambas partes formulan recurso de casación. La sociedad actora expone razones procesales y de fondo, alegando violación de los artículos 155 inciso 3) párrafo ch, 594 incisos 3), 7) y 9) y 595 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Civil; 58 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa; 20 inciso g) de la Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca; 3 del Código Municipal y el numeral 1º del párrafo final de la Ley no. 7562 de Impuestos Municipales de Esparza. A su vez, la demandada enuncia razones de fondo, invocando conculcados los cardinales 222 y 223 del Código Procesal Civil y el ordinal 98 inciso c) de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. \n\n 5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales. Interviene en la decisión de este asunto el Magistrado Suplente Álvaro Meza Lázarus. \n\nRedacta la Magistrada Escoto Fernández \n\nCONSIDERANDO \n\n I.- La Municipalidad de Esparza en sesión ordinaria no. 24, artículo 3, Capítulo III, efectuada el 12 de septiembre de 1998, no aprobó la solicitud formulada por Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (en adelante ALUNASA), para que se eliminaran los saldos pendientes de pago por Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, así como del Impuesto de Patentes correspondientes al segundo trimestre de 1998. Lo anterior debido a que por Acuerdo Ejecutivo no. 061-98 del 12 de febrero de 1998, publicado en La Gaceta no. 54 del 18 de marzo de 1998, se le otorgó el régimen de zona franca, calificándola como empresa procesadora de exportación de papel de aluminio y discos de aluminio. El 5 de marzo de 1999 Nombre36117 interpuso formal reclamo ante el Municipio, pidió se suspendiera la solicitud de cobro y se emitieran las certificaciones respectivas sobre su cumplimiento en las obligaciones tributarias. El Ayuntamiento, mediante oficio SM. 168-99, informó a la empresa actora, que en sesión ordinaria no. 49, artículo 14, Capítulo III, del 6 de marzo de 1999, se acordó suspender la gestión de cobro durante un mes, con el fin de esperar pronunciamiento de la Procuraduría General de la República y; expedir las constancias solicitadas. Posteriormente y en lo que al caso interesa, se le notificó la posición de la representación estatal, referente al debido cobro del Impuesto de Patentes reclamado, criterio en el que se aclara que el beneficio fiscal creado por la Ley no. 7210 comprende únicamente los tributos y patentes municipales vigentes al momento de la promulgación de ese cuerpo normativo. La demandada decidió continuar con los trámites para hacer efectivos los tributos correspondientes. El 25 de mayo de 1999, la sociedad actora interpuso recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra ese acuerdo. El siguiente 12 de junio, le rechazaron las impugnaciones por improcedentes; ante lo cual Nombre36117 presentó recurso de revisión. En sesión ordinaria no. 14, artículo 1, Capítulo IV, del 9 de agosto de 1999, se rechazó y se dio por agotada la vía administrativa. El 6 de octubre de 1999, la actora interpuso demanda especial tributaria contra el Municipio de Esparza. En lo medular indicó, que Nombre36117 durante el año 1998, vendió en el cantón de Esparza únicamente el 0,04% de su producción; otro 6,58% en el resto del territorio costarricense; exportó a Centroamérica un 12,55% y el 80,83% restante fue vendido a otros mercados. Aquel año, refiere, mediante Acuerdo Ejecutivo número 061-98 del 12 de febrero de 1998 publicado en La Gaceta del 18 de marzo siguiente, se le otorgó el régimen de zona franca, clasificándola como empresa procesadora de exportación de papel de aluminio y discos de aluminio. Posteriormente el 25 de febrero del mismo año, suscribió un contrato con la Promotora de Comercio Exterior (PROCOMER), a fin de beneficiarse con la exoneración de tributos a las utilidades y cualquier otro que se determinara en relación con las ganancias brutas o netas. Basada en tales hechos, en lo esencial, solicita en sentencia se declare: 1- está exenta del pago del impuesto de patente municipal del cantón de Esparza; 2- la ilegalidad de los actos administrativos de la demandada que pretenden gravar con ese impuesto su actividad; 3- la obligación del Ayuntamiento de devolver las sumas pagadas por ese concepto, junto con los intereses que correspondan, calculados de conformidad con el canon 58, en relación con el ordinal 57 ambos del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 4- ambas costas a cargo de la demandada. La Municipalidad contestó de forma negativa e interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho. El Tribunal acogió esa defensa y declaró improcedente la demanda en todos sus extremos. Las partes formulan recurso de casación. \n\nRecurso de Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (ALUNASA). \n\nCasación por razones procesales \n\n II.- En virtud de los agravios planteados y lo establecido en el numeral 610 del Código Procesal Civil, el cual establece las pautas a seguir al momento de dictar sentencia en casación, se deben analizar en primer término las censuras de orden procesal y posteriormente se conocerán las de fondo. Respecto a aquellas, invoca un único motivo. Violación de los artículos 58, 83 y 103 todos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, además del ordinal 418 del Código Procesal Civil. El Tribunal, dice, no otorgó plazo para formular conclusiones, previo al dictado de sentencia, incluso notificó junto con el fallo, la decisión tomada diez minutos antes, de no concederlo, al amparo del citado numeral 83. Las normas procesales, aduce, deben interpretarse de la manera en que mejor atiendan el derecho de defensa. Es cierto que tal precepto no contempla esa etapa, sin embargo, señala, tampoco regula otros actos procesales y no por esa razón se dejan de aplicar. A modo de ejemplo, trae a colación la audiencia que se otorga para referirse al expediente administrativo, la cual no está sustentada en ese ordinal. Cuando lo cierto es, desarrolla, que el numeral 58 ya citado, advierte que una vez vencida la fase probatoria, el Tribunal debe conceder un lapso a las partes para manifestar conclusiones sobre los hechos alegados, la prueba practicada y los fundamentos de sus pretensiones. \n\n III.- Reclama el recurrente no se le dio plazo para formular conclusiones, violentándose en su criterio, los numerales 58, 83 y 103 todos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, además del ordinal 418 del Código Procesal Civil. En este sentido, cabe señalar que mediante escrito presentado el 12 de diciembre del 2001 (visible a folio 127), la actora solicitó le fuera concedida la audiencia para emitir conclusiones. Sin embargo, esa petición fue rechazada en resolución de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 5 de febrero del 2002 (folio 129), por considerarse que “…la solicitud para que se otorgue plazo para formular conclusiones sucintas, es improcedente, por cuanto en este tipo de procesos no existe esa etapa.” Contra dicha decisión la demandante no interpuso recurso alguno. Esa gestión fue luego reiterada el 31 de mayo del 2002 y el 10 de febrero del 2004 (folios 138 y 188 respectivamente). Esta última, fue de nuevo rechazada mediante el fallo no. 55-2004 de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 18 de febrero del 2004, por no encontrarse contemplada en el numeral 83 de la Ley Reguladora citada, norma que regula el trámite del proceso en materia tributaria (folio 189). Contra ese criterio la accionante tampoco formuló ningún reparo. Cuando se alegan nulidades procesales, conforme a lo estatuido por los cánones 597 y 598 del Código Procesal Civil, para que el cargo resulte admisible, es imperativo solicitar la rectificación del vicio ante la autoridad jurisdiccional correspondiente y además, cuando procediere, haber formulado los recursos pertinentes. En la especie, según se indicó, no obstante el rechazo de sus gestiones que buscaban le fuera otorgado plazo para emitir conclusiones, la casacionista no impugnó lo resuelto, aún cuando era su facultad hacerlo. Esta situación, al amparo de las normas señaladas, veda la posibilidad de esta Sala para ingresar al estudio del cargo, razón por la cual, deberá rechazarse. \n\nCasación por razones de fondo \n\n IV.- Alega los siguientes cuatro motivos, los cuales para una mejor comprensión se reordenan de la siguiente manera. Primero: considera, hubo evidente omisión por parte del Tribunal al no analizar la prueba pericial, consistente en un estudio preparado por el contador público licenciado Letner Hernández Vargas, designado por ese Órgano, sobre las ventas que realizó Nombre36117 en el período fiscal 98. Allí se determinó que solo el 0,04% se realizaron en el cantón de Esparza, el 6,58% en Costa Rica y el restante 93,38% fuera del país. Olvidó, asevera, la existencia de esa prueba ya que no mencionó nada al respecto en su fallo. En todo caso, manifiesta, si no le resultaba relevante, debió haberlo indicado; y al no hacerlo, viola lo previsto en el numeral 155 inciso 3) apartes ch) y d) del Código Procesal Civil. Segundo: La sentencia, afirma, debe detallar los hechos probados y no demostrados; y en este caso, es omisa sobre ese aspecto; así se conculca no solo el artículo de previa cita y comete infracción de fondo, sino que también refleja, una causal por razones procesales de acuerdo a los incisos 2 y 3 del ordinal 594 ibídem. Tercero: invoca violación de los artículos 96 y 98 ambos del Código Municipal por indebida interpretación, inaplicación del canon 4 de la Ley de Impuestos Municipales de Esparza no. 7562 y violación de ley del ordinal 20 inciso g) de la Ley del Régimen de Zonas Francas no. 7210, al darles un alcance que no tienen, con el fundamento de que lo gravable es la actividad lucrativa y no la obtención de beneficios. No comparte, continúa, la posición del Tribunal cuando indica que el hecho de realizarse o no una actividad y el sitio donde se generan las ventas, resulte irrelevante para efectos de generar el impuesto, pues con ello confunde los elementos de la obligación tributaria: hecho generador con la base imponible. Estos no son sinónimos, dice, junto con otros conforman la estructura de los tributos. La base imponible del impuesto de patente municipal del cantón de Esparza, afirma, no es la actividad productiva en sí –que es el hecho generador-, sino su resultado, es decir, los ingresos brutos y la renta líquida gravable, determinados por su orden en los artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley 7562, de tal forma que la tarifa que se aplica a esa base, varía de acuerdo a cada uno de esos dos componentes. Es por ello que, sostiene, si el impuesto de patente se calcula sobre las ventas o ingresos brutos y sobre las utilidades, resultarían ser estas la base imponible del tributo. Ignora el Tribunal, manifiesta, lo estipulado en el artículo 4 de la Ley 7562 bajo el pretexto de que el hecho generador no está conformado por los ingresos brutos o netos. Reitera, el hecho es la patente municipal, pero el impuesto, tiene como componentes de la base imponible, las ganancias o ingresos brutos y las ganancias netas, monto sobre el cual se determina el tributo. De igual forma, alega, es relevante se haya llevado a cabo actividad lucrativa, ya que de lo contrario no habría ingresos y mucho menos utilidades, consecuentemente no existiría suma dineraria sobre la cual tasar el tributo. Además, señala, no se concibe un impuesto que no mida la capacidad económica del contribuyente, es decir si no hay actividad económica no existe obligación de pago del tributo. El numeral 20 de la Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca, modificado en 1998, arguye, reconoce la exención a la actora del pago de cualquier impuesto cuya base imponible sean los ingresos brutos y las ganancias netas, por eso, no proteger dicho beneficio, viola la ley. Cuarto: plantea, se conculcaron los preceptos 3 del Código Municipal y 1 de la Ley número 7562. Falla el Tribunal, dice, al ignorar el concepto de “territorialidad”, referido en la demanda y la prueba aportada al expediente reforzando esta tesis. La sentencia, expone, se limita a indicar que al ser la patente el hecho generador, resulta irrelevante dónde se generen los ingresos brutos y la renta líquida gravable, porque el impuesto es indiferente al sitio donde esas rentas se originan. Sin embargo, aduce, tal afirmación no corresponde a los preceptos de la ley, debido a que el lugar donde se obtienen los ingresos sí es esencial para efectos de aplicación del impuesto; según se desprende del ordinal 1 de la Ley no. 7562 que transcribe. Así, resultaría procedente determinar dónde se realizan los negocios ya que de ello depende el impuesto que perciba la Municipalidad de Esparza. Tal norma en su criterio, limita la competencia de esa Corporación, entendiéndose que no puede exceder más allá del territorio que administra. El fallo, insiste, omite lo estipulado en el último párrafo del ordinal primero de previa cita y resolvió contra lo allí ordenado, cuando consta en el expediente que el 99,96% de los ingresos de Nombre36117 se realizaron fuera de Esparza. En esta tesitura, recalca, la resolución extralimita el poder tributario de la demandada, al ser este un ente corporativo territorial no estatal, por lo cual ejerce sus competencias en el espacio geográfico de su cantón y; cualquier petitoria para ampliarlo, atenta contra el numeral 3 del Código Municipal, al estar circunscrito su poder tributario a la jurisdicción correspondiente y entonces lo que se realice fuera de ésta no puede ser gravado por la demandada. \n\n V.- En su primer cargo, la recurrente recrimina que no se tomó en cuenta el peritaje constante en autos. Acota, en todo caso, si esa probanza no se estimaba relevante, así debió consignarse en el fallo. El cargo no se ajusta a la técnica debida. El aspecto medular que se endilga en este agravio consiste en una supuesta preterición de prueba, en concreto, del aludido dictamen profesional del licenciado Hernández Vargas. El vicio que se acusa ocurre cuando los juzgadores dejan de considerar, ya sea total o parcialmente, las probanzas aportadas a los autos. Ello implica el desconocimiento del valor que la ley les otorga; y como tal, constituye un error de derecho. Este último tipo de yerro, según lo ha indicado esta Sala, tiene lugar cuando se le otorga a las pruebas un valor legalmente indebido, o se les niega el propio; también, cuando se ignora una prueba o bien, se infringen las reglas de la sana crítica. En este supuesto, le resulta indispensable al casacionista indicar, con precisión, las normas quebrantadas concernientes al valor de los elementos probatorios que estima han sido analizados de manera equivocada. Además, como en el error de hecho, es de rigor señalar cuáles fueron las pruebas mal apreciadas, en qué consisten los yerros cometidos y a su vez, resulta imperativo explicitar las normas jurídicas que de manera indirecta, se han visto infringidas en cuanto al fondo, precisando en qué consiste y cómo se ha producido la lesión, lo que viene establecido de los preceptos 595 inciso 3, 596 párrafo segundo y 597, todos del Código Procesal Civil. En el presente caso la casacionista omite hacer mención alguna a las normas relacionadas con el valor probatorio del elemento demostrativo que se estima fue preterido y por ende, dejado de apreciar. De igual modo, se extraña la cita a los cánones de fondo que se aduce se han visto conculcados con el proceder jurisdiccional. Su exposición se limita al contenido y resultados de la pericia en torno a la proporción de las ventas que fueron realizadas en el cantón de Esparza. Según se ha indicado, ambas referencias aludidas resultan ser elementales para que este órgano colegiado pueda ingresar al examen del cargo. Por ende, al no hacerlo, el reparo resulta informal, lo que conlleva a su rechazo. \n\n VI.- En el segundo reproche, se acusa que el fallo del Tribunal es omiso en cuanto al detalle de los hechos probados y no demostrados, lo que configura el vicio de incongruencia. Sobre el punto cabe señalar que ese defecto consiste en la falta de relación entre lo pedido por las partes, no a lo largo del proceso, sino en sus escritos de demanda o contrademanda como en sus respectivas contestaciones, y lo resuelto en el fallo; no porque en éste se decida algo diferente a lo querido por los litigantes, sino porque se omite pronunciamiento sobre algún extremo sometido a debate (minima petita), o se otorga más de lo rogado (ultra petita), o porque lo resuelto no guarda correspondencia con lo peticionado (extra petita), o bien porque contiene disposiciones contradictorias. Sin embargo, en realidad, lo alegado consiste en una indebida fundamentación de la sentencia, lo que es propio del recurso por razones de fondo, por violación indirecta. Esta Sala ha indicado en reiteradas ocasiones que la denominación dada por el recurrente a sus agravios no es óbice para el análisis de rigor, siendo que su calificación jurídica le incumbe de manera exclusiva. De ahí que haya analizado como de fondo cargos planteados como de forma y viceversa. Claro está que el examen está sujeto al cumplimiento de las diversas exigencias que el Ordenamiento Jurídico establece para el vicio en concreto. Así visto, el reproche no se ajusta a la técnica debida. Lo anterior en virtud de que la casacionista no indica con la claridad requerida en que radica el defecto, tampoco señala cuáles son las normas de fondo que se han visto conculcadas. Esas deficiencias determinan el rechazo del agravio. Con todo, a mayor abundamiento de razones, no se observa la ilegalidad denunciada. En efecto, un estudio de la resolución criticada lleva a concluir que no presenta las omisiones referidas. La sentencia contiene todo un considerando referente a los hechos probados que sirvieron de base para el análisis de fondo y a la conclusión a que arribó el Tribunal, conforme lo requiere el canon 155 de la normativa procesal civil. Asimismo, si los Juzgadores determinaron que no hubo hechos que pudieran tenerse como indemostrados, o que de alguna forma incidieran en el pronunciamiento que se emite, resultaba innecesario dejar constancia de ello. Por lo expuesto, el reparo debe ser rechazado. \n\n VII.- En lo que corresponde a los cargos tercero y cuarto, el punto medular gira en torno al deber o no de la casacionista de pagar el impuesto de patente a la Municipalidad de Esparza. La recurrente esgrime que el numeral 20 de la Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca les exime del pago de ese tributo. Por otro lado, que en virtud del concepto de territorialidad, la base imponible del impuesto de patente estaría compuesta por los ingresos y ventas realizadas en Esparza, no así las practicadas en otras localidades. De este modo, su examen se realizará de manera integrada por versar sobre temas comunes. \n\n VIII.- Sobre el impuesto de patente municipal. Hecho generador. La autonomía conferida por el constituyente a las corporaciones locales (artículo 170 de la Carta Magna) les faculta, como manifestación de esta independencia, en su dimensión tributaria, proponer (a modo de iniciativa), la creación, modificación, extinción de tributos que se generen en el contexto de su ámbito territorial y que por ende, vengan a establecerse como obligaciones tributarias que buscan obtener ingresos que le permitan hacer frente a sus funciones. Dentro de esta manifestaciones incluye, claro está, la propuesta de establecer regímenes de exención o en general, beneficios tributarios en el marco de esas relaciones jurídico tributarias que se suscitan en el entorno local. Conforme lo estatuye el precepto 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, es a la Asamblea Legislativa a quien corresponde aprobar esas proposiciones impositivas (sobre este tema, véase, entre muchas, sentencias 4072-95, 5445-99, 0620-2001 del Tribunal Constitucional). En virtud del principio de legalidad tributaria que deriva de ese mandato, es con la emisión de la ley respectiva que nace el tributo y por ende, la obligación contributiva. Desde este plano, el Código Municipal vigente establece en su mandato 79 que para el ejercicio de actividades lucrativas se requiere de una licencia emitida por el ayuntamiento (denominada popularmente como patente), la que se obtiene mediante el pago de un impuesto. Se trata de una norma que permite a cada Gobierno Local establecer las bases propias de ese gravamen en su jurisdicción territorial. Este tributo, por ende, es objeto de regulación por cada ente local, al que le corresponde, en los términos dichos, establecer los elementos esenciales del gravamen. En esa dirección, la Sala Constitucional ha sostenido que cada municipalidad es libre e independiente para definir los límites de su propio poder impositivo, así como el sistema de imposición, en lo que respecta a la base imponible, cobro y recolección. De ahí que existan variados sistemas tributarios según se trate de cada ayuntamiento. Entre otros, puede consultarse el fallo no. 620-2001 de ese alto Tribunal. En cuanto a uno de sus componentes esenciales, sea, el hecho generador o elemento material objetivo, el tema ha sido de vasto desarrollo por parte de la Sala Constitucional. Así por ejemplo, mediante el voto 10153 de las 14 horas 44 minutos del 10 de octubre del 2001, tuvo la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre el contenido de la aludida Ley no. 7562, y en específico sobre el gravamen de patente en Esparza. En esa sentencia indicó en lo relevante: “…En este sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta que este tributo tiene como hecho generador el simple ejercicio de una actividad lucrativa en una jurisdicción territorial determinada, y por lo tanto, en modo alguno puede configurarse como un impuesto a las utilidades, o como en el caso en estudio, como un incentivo a la producción o la riqueza... Como ya se dijo, el pago de patente es un impuesto para ejercer la actividad... no es un impuesto a las utilidades, sino para mantener la vigencia de una licencia para el ejercicio de una actividad, de tal manera que no se puede crear una categoría cuando no hay razón para crearla... Debe tenerse en cuenta que en la forma en que está redactada la normativa aplicable, todos tienen que pagar la patente, tengan o no ganancias o utilidades en sus negocios o actividades, por cuanto el impuesto en cuestión no se configura como un impuesto de la renta, ni mucho menos...”. En cuanto a las causas que justificaban la existencia de este tributo señaló: “… la patente municipal… determina sus elementos distintivos que derivan de su especial naturaleza jurídica: 1.- la justificación de este impuesto, que deriva de la necesidad de sufragar los costos de los servicios públicos que el particular recibe de la municipalidad, y que implican un beneficio para los negocios y comercios, tales como la seguridad, aseo, servios de agua potable y luz, etc.; 2.- la variedad en los sistemas de este tributo, que deriva de la potestad tributaria de los gobiernos locales, de donde las bases imponibles serán las más variadas depediendo (sic) de cada cantón...”. De lo anterior queda claro que el tributo en cuestión tiene como hecho generador el desarrollo de actividades lucrativas. En tanto exista una actividad de esta naturaleza, surge el deber de cancelar el impuesto. En el presente caso, es evidente que ese elemento material estaría limitado al ejercicio de tal tipo de actividades dentro del cantón de Esparza, con independencia de si esa actividad ha generado utilidades o no, siendo que ese aspecto es solo relevante para establecer la base de cálculo, más no constituye un punto medular de cara a definir cuando surge el elemento material. De ahí que en cuanto al elemento subjetivo, el sujeto pasivo será toda aquella persona que se dedique al ejercicio de este tipo de actividades dentro de la jurisdicción territorial de la localidad. Así, en efecto, se establece en el párrafo inicial del artículo 1 de la citada Ley no. Placa25503, cuando señala: “Las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen al ejercicio de actividades lucrativas de cualquier tipo en el cantón de Esparza, estarán obligadas a pagar un impuesto de patentes, conforme a esta ley.” \n\n IX.- El caso de la Municipalidad de Esparza. Creación legal. Criterios para fijar la base de cálculo. Como se ha señalado, dentro de las diversas manifestaciones de autonomía, en el plano tributario, cada entidad local posee la competencia para proponer la creación de los tributos que se constituyan como deberes contributivos de los munícipes, en virtud de relaciones o servicios prestados por la corporación. En el de las patentes, al igual que en los demás tributos que surjan como consecuencia del ejercicio de esta competencia, cada ente local propone los elementos principales del gravamen, dentro de ellos, el hecho generador, base imponible, período de cobro, entre otros, aspectos todos que penden de la aprobación legislativa y desde luego, de la emisión de la ley respectiva. En el caso particular que interesa, el impuesto de patentes municipales de Esparza fue creado mediante la Ley no. 2447 del 22 de octubre de 1959, en la que se autorizó a la Corporación Local el cobro de ese gravamen. Este conjunto legal fue modificado por la Ley no. 3057 de 7 de noviembre de 1962 y luego mediante la no. 4869 de 18 de octubre de 1971. Posteriormente con la promulgación de la Ley no. 6762 de 31 de mayo de 1982, se establecieron parámetros claros para obtener la base de cálculo del tributo. Desde este plano, en el artículo 6 se indicó: “Salvo los casos en que esta ley determina un procedimiento diferente para calcular el monto del impuesto de patente, se establecen como factores determinantes de la imposición, la renta líquida gravable y las ventas o los ingresos brutos, que perciban las personas físicas o jurídicas afectas al impuesto, durante el ejercicio económico anterior al período que se grava. Por ventas se entiende el volumen de éstas, hecha la deducción del impuesto que se establece en la ley del impuesto sobre la renta.” El resaltado es propio. Luego, esa legislación fue derogada por la Ley número 7562 “Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza”, promulgada el 26 de diciembre de 1995. En esta última, respecto de la base imponible, se tomaron como criterios para su establecimiento, los mismos que utilizaba la normativa derogada. Así, en el ordinal 3 se estableció: “Factores determinantes de la imposición. Salvo los casos en que esta ley determine un procedimiento diferente para fijar el monto del impuesto de patentes, se establecen como factores determinantes de la imposición, la renta líquida gravable y las ventas o los ingresos brutos anuales que perciban las personas físicas o jurídicas afectas al impuesto, durante el período fiscal anterior al año que se grava./ Por ventas se entiende el volumen de estas, hecha la deducción del impuesto establecido en la Ley del impuesto sobre las ventas y en otras que estipulen salvedades, lo cual deberá demostrar el patentado./ En el caso de los establecimientos financieros y de correduría de bienes muebles e inmuebles, se consideran ventas o ingresos brutos los percibidos por concepto de comisiones e intereses.”. El destacado no es del original. Como se observa, la Ley no. 7562 sigue los mismos principios fijados por su predecesora, Ley no. 6762, en lo que se refiere a los factores determinantes de la base imponible del tributo. Nótese que lo dispuesto en el artículo 6 de la Ley 6762, mantuvo su redacción en el canon 3 de la Ley 7562 en lo que incumbe a esos referentes objetivos. De este modo, la base de cálculo está determinada por aspectos que se relacionan a las utilidades percibidas por la actividad desarrollada, lo que no implica que el hecho generador sean esas utilidades según se ha expuesto. Conviene en este punto aclarar cuáles de los ingresos percibidos son susceptibles de ser considerados dentro de la base imponible. En cuanto al alcance del gravamen, cabe señalar que cubre la renta líquida gravable, ventas e ingresos brutos, percibidos por el sujeto pasivo dentro de la jurisdicción territorial de la Municipalidad de Esparza, lo que infiere un principio de territorialidad. Es decir, no estarían comprendidos aquellos que fueran generados o percibidos en otros lugares. Lo anterior obedece a que las potestades de los entes locales, incluida la tributaria, aplica dentro la zona geográfica en la cual, el Ordenamiento le confiere la competencia de administrar los intereses locales, estando fuera de este ámbito actividades que se desarrollen fuera de la localidad. En esta línea, el artículo 3 del Código Municipal establece: “La jurisdicción territorial de la municipalidad es el cantón respectivo...”. El numeral primero de la Ley no. 7562 desarrolla ese criterio de territorialidad. Por un lado, al establecer que los obligados son aquellas personas que realicen actividades lucrativas en el cantón. Por otro, ante el supuesto de que ese desarrollo se presente además en otros sitios, dispone en su párrafo final: “Las personas físicas o jurídicas cuya actividad esté distribuida en uno o más cantones y que, por tal motivo, estén sujetas al pago de patente en esos cantones, deberán determinar y demostrar, mediante certificación de un contador público autorizado, la proporción del volumen de sus negocios que se genera en el cantón de Esparza.” Entonces, la base imponible estará compuesta por la renta líquida gravable, ventas e ingresos que se hayan percibido dentro del cantón, lo que supone la posible aplicación de un criterio de proporcionalidad cuando se desarrollen en otras localidades, de modo que se grave el porcentaje que corresponde a las tareas realizadas en Esparza. Lo anterior, debido a que el resto de actividades realizadas fuera de la competencia del municipio, se encuentran afectas a los impuestos de patente que cada municipalidad establezca, de manera que de no realizar esta distinción, existe el riesgo de incurrir en una doble imposición. \n\n X.- Sobre el caso concreto. Régimen de exoneración en zonas francas. Ahora bien, realizadas las anteriores precisiones en cuanto a elementos y componentes relevantes del tributo, cabe ingresar a establecer la aplicabilidad o no de ese gravamen a la casacionista, siendo que en su criterio, está exenta por disposición expresa del artículo 20 inciso g) de la Ley no. 7210, al pertenecer a una zona franca. A juicio del Tribunal, los tributos a que dispensa el mencionado numeral, no son los municipales, sino los que recaen sobre las utilidades y otros cuya base imponible se determine en relación con las ganancias, dividendos, ingresos o ventas. Por ende, estimó, siendo que el impuesto de patente tiene como hecho generador la realización de actividades lucrativas y no la renta líquida gravable, no se deriva a favor de la actora una exoneración a su favor de los tributos locales. Adicionalmente, sustentó su fallo en el aspecto de que conforme al literal 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, las exenciones no alcanzan a los impuestos establecidos con posterioridad a su creación, de modo que siendo que la Ley no. Placa25503 no contempla esa excepción, Nombre36117 no estaba exenta de pagar la patente. \n\n XI.- En relación al punto de análisis, cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Con la Ley no. 7210 de 23 de noviembre de 1990, publicada en La Gaceta no. 238 de 14 de diciembre de 1990, se estableció el régimen de zonas francas, mediante el cual se dispone un conjunto de alicientes otorgados por el Estado a las empresas que realicen inversiones nuevas en el país. Se trata de una norma que a través de beneficios de ese orden, busca el fortalecimiento de la inversión en suelo nacional, es decir, constituye una manifestación legislativa que evidencia una política de promocionar la inyección de capital en la economía nacional, mediante el establecimiento de alicientes de diversa naturaleza. En el capítulo VII del cuerpo normativo aludido, se fijaron estímulos de diversa naturaleza a las empresas que se incorporaran a dicho régimen. La intención del legislador en cuanto a este, quedó confirmada cuando en la Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, no. 7293, el sistema de incentivos aludido no fue derogado, sino que por el contrario, de manera expresa se fijó su vigencia. De este modo, en el inciso k) del artículo 2 se estableció como excepción a la derogatoria general de exoneraciones que establecía el ordinal primero, las exenciones que: “Se otorguen mediante la Ley de Zonas Francas No 7210 del 23 de noviembre de 1990, excepto los beneficios para las empresas mencionadas en el inciso ch) del artículo 17.” Así expuesto, el punto medular, se insiste, estriba en concluir sobre si los tributos municipales, dentro de estos, el denominado impuesto a la patente, se encuentra o no exento al amparo del régimen de beneficios establecido por la Ley no. 7293. Sobre el particular cabe señalar que esta Sala concuerda con el criterio adoptado por el Tribunal en el sentido de que el inciso g) del artículo 20 de la citada legislación no es aplicable a la actora, por ende, no permite el beneficio fiscal que se pretende. En efecto, esa norma en cuestión, en lo que viene relevante al caso, dispuso una “Exención de todos los tributos a las utilidades, así como de cualquier otro, cuya base imponible se determine en relación con las ganancias brutas o netas, los dividendos abonados a los accionistas o ingresos o ventas…” Ciertamente, ese mandato no es de aplicación a los tributos municipales, sino a los impuestos sobre las utilidades y otros cuya base imponible se determine en relación con las ganancias, dividendos, ingresos o ventas. El impuesto que se analiza, se reitera, no grava las utilidades, sino que se establece como un gravamen que surge por el desarrollo de actividades lucrativas, independientemente de que se obtengan o no rentas. No obstante, en virtud de lo debatido, cabe indicar que en el inciso h) de ese precepto aludido, se estableció una exoneración a favor de las empresas acogidas al régimen de zona franca, respecto de todos los tributos y patentes municipales, por un espacio temporal de diez años. Ahora bien, según se colige de los autos, mediante el acuerdo no. 61-98 del 12 de febrero de 1998 publicado en La Gaceta del 18 de marzo de 1998, el Poder Ejecutivo tomó la decisión de colocar a la empresa dentro del régimen de zonas francas. Con dicho acto, la accionante pasó a ostentar una situación jurídica que le colocó en una posición subjetiva que le permitía, en el curso de la vigencia de la gracia tributaria, beneficiarse de la totalidad de los incentivos contenidos en el marco regulatorio de las zonas francas a partir de 1990, los que, se insiste, no fueron derogados con la Ley de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, no. 7293, en el año de 1992. Por otro lado, si bien el mandato 63 del Código referido establece que la exención no se entiende extensible a los tributos establecidos luego de su creación, esa norma no es óbice para la eficacia a este caso del incentivo de referencia, ya que como se ha indicado, el tributo que se examina no nació con la emisión de la Ley no. 7562, sino que surgió a la vida jurídica con la Ley no. 2447 de octubre de 1959. Por tal motivo, al momento de formular la solicitud de exoneración (1998), la contribuyente estaba exenta del pago del impuesto de patente de la Municipalidad de Esparza conforme a lo regulado por el artículo 20 inciso h) de la Ley no. 7210. De ahí que cualquier acto que pretendiera negar esa situación y a raíz de ello, imponer el pago de tributos municipales en el curso temporal de la exoneración aludida, son contrarios a legalidad y por esa razón, son nulos. Por ende, ante los motivos expuestos, debe acogerse el recurso en cuanto a este particular. \n\nRecurso de la Municipalidad de Esparza \n\n XII.- Interpone recurso por razones de fondo alegando un único motivo. Estima violados los artículos 222 y 223 del Código Procesal Civil, así como el ordinal 98 inciso c) de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, por haberse exonerado a la parte vencida al pago de las costas. Tal exención, dice, es una facultad concedida al juez, sin embargo no es absoluta, así lo ha estimado la Sala y a su favor menciona algunas resoluciones. Es necesario, continúa, se realice un juicio de valor relativo a la conducta del litigante vencido, con el fin de determinar si se justifica o no, se le libere del pago de dicho extremo. En el presente caso, afirma, el Tribunal consideró que al tratarse de una materia que permitía varias interpretaciones jurídicas, había motivo suficiente para discutir el tema en sede jurisdiccional. Sin embargo, considera, esa postura no constituye un juicio de valor relativo a la conducta del litigante, ya que en estricto sentido, tener motivo bastante para litigar, importa no solo, la convicción de la parte, sino que requiere que responda a datos objetivos del proceso, de los cuales el juzgador pueda concluir que tenía razones fundadas para creer en la procedencia de la pretensión. En el caso concreto, continúa, no puede extraerse justificación alguna para que proceda la exoneración, por el contrario la demandante obvió normas constitucionales (numerales 169 y 170), de la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, la Ley de Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del cantón de Esparza y el principio de reserva de ley en los supuestos de exenciones tributarias. Ahora bien, indica, de previo a la interposición del proceso especial tributario, a la actora se le había prevenido de cuál era su situación, por ende conocía los dictámenes de la Procuraduría General de la República C-282-98 y C-062-99, de tal forma que no existe fundamento suficiente del Tribunal para permitirle se le exima a la actora del pago de las costas del proceso. \n\n XIII.- Sobre las costas. Informalidad. La casacionista reprocha la dispensa en costas dictada por el Tribunal, criterio que considera, quebranta los preceptos 222 y 223 del Código Procesal Civil así como del canon 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. El cargo no se ajusta a la técnica debida. Acorde al numeral 596 del Código Procesal Civil, es imperativo al inconforme señalar las normas que en su criterio se han visto conculcadas con el proceder del Juzgador, haciendo mención expresa y clara, en qué consiste el error y cómo se ha producido. Desde este plano, es menester indicar que en el tema de costas en sede contenciosa administrativa, ante remisión expresa que realiza el ordinal 103 de la Ley Reguladora de aquella, las regulaciones a aplicar, conjuntamente con los mandatos 97 al 101 de ese cuerpo legal, son las dispuestas por la legislación procesal civil (excepción hecha del caso previsto en el cardinal 69 de dicha Ley Reguladora). En la especie, a juicio de la recurrente, no cabía eximir en costas. En el fondo, lo que pretende es la aplicación del principio de condena al vencido. No obstante, omite señalar como norma conculcada el precepto 221 del Código de rito, la cual establece la imposición de las costas a la parte que haya resultado vencida en el proceso. Es precisamente esa disposición la que, dentro del marco de lo alegado en este cargo, pudo haber resultado quebrantada por falta de aplicación. De esta manera, al no haberla citado, el reparo resulta informal. En todo caso, a mayor abundamiento de razones, el agravio carece de interés actual, siendo que en la presente resolución se ha acogido el recurso formulado por la actora, de manera que no cabe cargarle las costas siendo que no ha resultado vencida. \n\n XIV.- Corolario. En virtud de lo anteriormente examinado, se declarará parcialmente con lugar el recurso formulado por la parte accionante, en lo que respecta a las razones de fondo, no así el relativo a los aspectos procesales, los que se rechazan. En consecuencia, se anulará el pronunciamiento del Tribunal y fallando por el fondo, se declarará con lugar la demanda en el sentido de que la empresa Aluminios Nacionales S.A. se encuentra exenta del pago del impuesto de patente municipal del cantón de Esparza. Son ilegales los actos administrativos que pretenden gravar con el impuesto de patente la actividad desarrollada por dicha empresa. Será obligación de la demandada devolver las sumas pagadas indebidamente de más por la actora en razón del cobro de ese tributo, así como de los intereses que correspondan desde la fecha de su pago y hasta la efectiva devolución. Dada la naturaleza compleja del objeto debatido, estima esta Sala que procede resolverse sin especial condena en costas de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el inciso c) del canon 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. Se rechaza el recurso de la Municipalidad de Esparza con sus costas a su cargo, conforme lo dispone el numeral 611 ibidem. \n\nPOR TANTO \n\n Se rechaza el recurso presentado por la Municipalidad de Esparza y el que por razones procesales formula la parte actora, que se acoge por el fondo. Se anula el pronunciamiento del Tribunal y fallando por el fondo, se declara con lugar la demanda y la procedencia de la acción. En consecuencia se dispone que la empresa Aluminios Nacionales S.A. está exenta del pago de patente municipal del cantón de Esparza. Por ende son ilegales los acuerdos de ese Municipio que pretenden gravarla con ese tributo. Así mismo, debe devolver las sumas que se hubiesen pagado indebidamente por ese concepto junto con los intereses que correspondan desde la fecha de su pago y hasta la efectiva devolución. Se resuelve sin especial condena en costas. \n\n \n\n \n\nAnabelle León Feoli \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Óscar Eduardo González Camacho \n\n \n\n \n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández Álvaro Meza Lázarus \n\n \n\nNombre165222",
  "body_en_text": "EXP: 99-001274-0161-CA\n\nRES: 000797-F-2005\n\nFIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at eight o'clock on the third of November of two thousand five.\n\nContentious-administrative proceeding —special tax— processed in the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, First Section, by ALUMINIOS NACIONALES SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (hereinafter ALUNASA), represented by its general agent with a sum limit Nombre208048, a graduate in Economic Sciences, and its generalissimo agent without a sum limit, Nombre48382; against the MUNICIPALITY OF ESPARZA, represented by its Municipal Mayor, Mr. Nombre65132, agronomist, resident of Esparza. Also appearing as special judicial attorneys for the parties, respectively, are Dr. Gonzalo Fajardo Salas, resident of Heredia, and attorney Rodolfo Alfaro Morera, resident of Grecia. The individuals are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, and residents of San José.\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\n1.- Based on the facts it set forth and legal provisions it cited, the plaintiff company filed a contentious-administrative claim —special tax—, the amount of which was deemed inestimable, so that the judgment declares: \"1. The plaintiff is exempt from payment of the municipal patent tax of the Canton of Esparza, as provided in subsection g) of article 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law. 2. The administrative acts of the Municipality of Esparza that seek to levy the municipal patent tax on the plaintiff's activities are illegal. I ALSO REQUEST THAT THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITY BE ORDERED TO: 3. Return to the plaintiff the sums unduly paid by it to that Municipality for the illegal collection of the municipal patent tax, together with the corresponding interest calculated at the interest rate established in article 58, in connection with article 57, of Law 4755 of May 1971, and its amendments, Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, applicable in this matter on a supplementary basis, from the date of its payment by the taxpayer until its effective return by the defendant Municipality. 4. Payment of both costs of the proceedings.\"\n\n2.- The municipal representative answered negatively and raised the defense of lack of right.\n\n3.- The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, First Section, composed of Judges Horacio González Quiroga, Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez, and Joaquín Villalobos Soto, in judgment no. 56-2004 at 10 hours 30 minutes on February 18, 2004, resolved: \"The defense of lack of right raised by the Municipality of Esparza is upheld. The claim is declared inadmissible in all its aspects. The defeated party is exonerated from costs.\"\n\n4.- Both parties filed a cassation appeal. The plaintiff company sets forth procedural and substantive reasons, alleging violation of articles 155 subsection 3) paragraph ch, 594 subsections 3), 7) and 9), and 595 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code; 58 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction; 20 subsection g) of the Free Zone Regime Law; 3 of the Municipal Code, and numeral 1 of the final paragraph of Law no. 7562 on Municipal Taxes of Esparza. In turn, the defendant states substantive reasons, invoking as violated articles 222 and 223 of the Civil Procedure Code and article 98 subsection c) of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.\n\n5.- The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings. Substitute Magistrate Álvaro Meza Lázarus participates in the decision of this matter.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Escoto Fernández\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\nI.- The Municipality of Esparza, in ordinary session no. 24, article 3, Chapter III, held on September 12, 1998, did not approve the request made by Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (hereinafter ALUNASA) to eliminate the outstanding balances for the Real Estate Tax, as well as the Patent Tax corresponding to the second quarter of 1998. This was due to the fact that by Executive Agreement no. 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta no. 54 of March 18, 1998, it was granted the free zone regime, classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. On March 5, 1999, Nombre36117 filed a formal claim before the Municipality, requesting that the collection request be suspended and that the respective certifications regarding its compliance with tax obligations be issued. The City Council, through official letter SM. 168-99, informed the plaintiff company that in ordinary session no. 49, article 14, Chapter III, of March 6, 1999, it was agreed to suspend the collection proceeding for one month, in order to await a pronouncement from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and to issue the requested certifications. Subsequently, and as relevant to this case, it was notified of the state representation's position regarding the due collection of the claimed Patent Tax, a criterion that clarifies that the tax benefit created by Law no. 7210 includes only the municipal taxes and patents in force at the time of the enactment of that body of law. The defendant decided to continue with the procedures to enforce the corresponding taxes. On May 25, 1999, the plaintiff company filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against that agreement. The following June 12, the challenges were rejected as inadmissible; whereupon Nombre36117 filed a petition for review. In ordinary session no. 14, article 1, Chapter IV, of August 9, 1999, it was rejected, and the administrative route was deemed exhausted. On October 6, 1999, the plaintiff filed a special tax claim against the Municipality of Esparza. In essence, it stated that during 1998, Nombre36117 sold only 0.04% of its production in the canton of Esparza; another 6.58% in the rest of Costa Rican territory; it exported 12.55% to Central America, and the remaining 80.83% was sold to other markets. That year, it states, by Executive Agreement number 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of March 18 following, it was granted the free zone regime, classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. Subsequently, on February 25 of the same year, it signed a contract with the Foreign Trade Promoter (PROCOMER), in order to benefit from the exemption of taxes on profits and any other tax determined in relation to gross or net earnings. Based on these facts, in essence, it requests that the judgment declares: 1- it is exempt from payment of the municipal patent tax of the canton of Esparza; 2- the illegality of the administrative acts of the defendant that seek to levy its activity with that tax; 3- the obligation of the City Council to return the sums paid for that concept, together with the corresponding interest, calculated in accordance with article 58, in connection with article 57, both of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; 4- both costs to be borne by the defendant. The Municipality answered negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The Tribunal upheld that defense and declared the claim inadmissible in all its aspects. The parties filed a cassation appeal.\n\n**Appeal of Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (ALUNASA).**\n\n**Cassation on procedural grounds**\n\nII.- By virtue of the grievances raised and the provisions of numeral 610 of the Civil Procedure Code, which establishes the guidelines to follow when issuing a cassation judgment, the procedural objections must be analyzed first, and the substantive ones will be addressed later. Regarding the former, it invokes a single ground. Violation of articles 58, 83, and 103, all of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to article 418 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Tribunal, it says, did not grant a period to formulate conclusions, prior to issuing judgment; it even notified, together with the ruling, the decision taken ten minutes earlier, not to grant it, under the cited numeral 83. The procedural rules, it argues, must be interpreted in the way that best serves the right of defense. It is true that such precept does not contemplate that stage; however, it points out, it also does not regulate other procedural acts, and that is not why they cease to be applied. By way of example, it brings up the hearing granted to refer to the administrative file, which is not based on that numeral. When in fact, it argues, the already-cited numeral 58 warns that once the evidentiary phase has concluded, the Tribunal must grant a period to the parties to express conclusions on the alleged facts, the evidence presented, and the grounds for their claims.\n\nIII.- The appellant claims it was not given a period to formulate conclusions, allegedly violating, in its view, numerals 58, 83, and 103, all of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to article 418 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this regard, it should be noted that through a brief filed on December 12, 2001 (visible on page 127), the plaintiff requested that the hearing to present conclusions be granted. However, that request was rejected in a resolution at 9:15 a.m. on February 5, 2002 (page 129), considering that \"...the request for a period to formulate brief conclusions is inadmissible, because in this type of proceeding, that stage does not exist.\" The plaintiff did not file any recourse against that decision. That request was later reiterated on May 31, 2002, and February 10, 2004 (pages 138 and 188, respectively). This latter request was again rejected through ruling no. 55-2004 at 10:20 a.m. on February 18, 2004, as it is not contemplated in numeral 83 of the cited Regulatory Law, a norm that regulates the proceeding in tax matters (page 189). The plaintiff also did not formulate any objection against that criterion. When procedural nullities are alleged, in accordance with the provisions of articles 597 and 598 of the Civil Procedure Code, for the charge to be admissible, it is imperative to request the rectification of the defect before the corresponding jurisdictional authority and, furthermore, when appropriate, to have filed the relevant recourses. In this case, as indicated, despite the rejection of its requests seeking to be granted a period to present conclusions, the appellant did not challenge what was resolved, even when it was within its power to do so. This situation, under the cited rules, precludes the possibility of this Chamber entering into the study of the charge, for which reason it must be rejected.\n\n**Cassation on substantive grounds**\n\nIV.- It alleges the following four grounds, which are reordered as follows for better understanding. First: it considers there was an evident omission by the Tribunal in not analyzing the expert evidence, consisting of a study prepared by certified public accountant Letner Hernández Vargas, appointed by that Court, regarding the sales made by Nombre36117 during the 1998 fiscal period. There, it was determined that only 0.04% were made in the canton of Esparza, 6.58% in Costa Rica, and the remaining 93.38% outside the country. It forgot, it asserts, the existence of that evidence, as it mentioned nothing about it in the ruling. In any case, it states, if it was not relevant, it should have indicated so; and by not doing so, it violates the provisions of numeral 155 subsection 3) paragraphs ch) and d) of the Civil Procedure Code. Second: The judgment, it affirms, must detail the proven and unproven facts; and in this case, it is silent on that aspect; thus violating not only the previously cited article and committing a substantive infraction, but also reflecting a ground on procedural grounds according to subsections 2 and 3 of article 594 ibid. Third: it invokes a violation of articles 96 and 98, both of the Municipal Code, due to incorrect interpretation, and the non-application of article 4 of Law no. 7562 on Municipal Taxes of Esparza, and a violation of the law of article 20 subsection g) of Law no. 7210 Free Zone Regime Law, by giving them a scope they do not have, based on the reasoning that what is taxable is the lucrative activity and not the obtaining of benefits. It does not share, it continues, the Tribunal's position when it indicates that whether or not an activity is carried out, and the place where sales are generated, is irrelevant for the purpose of generating the tax, since this confuses the elements of the tax obligation: the taxable event with the taxable base. These are not synonyms, it says; along with others, they form the structure of taxes. The taxable base of the municipal patent tax of the canton of Esparza, it affirms, is not the productive activity itself – which is the taxable event – but its result, that is, the gross income and the net taxable profit, determined, in order, in articles 3 and 4 of Law 7562, such that the rate applied to that base varies according to each of these two components. It is for this reason, it maintains, that if the patent tax is calculated on sales or gross income and on profits, these would be the taxable base of the tax. The Tribunal ignores, it states, the provisions of article 4 of Law 7562 under the pretext that the taxable event is not made up of gross or net income. It reiterates, the event is the municipal patent, but the tax has, as components of the taxable base, the profits or gross income and net profits, the amount upon which the tax is determined. Similarly, it alleges, it is relevant that a lucrative activity was carried out, since otherwise there would be no income, much less profits, and consequently there would be no monetary sum upon which to assess the tax. Furthermore, it points out, a tax that does not measure the taxpayer's economic capacity is inconceivable, that is, if there is no economic activity, there is no obligation to pay the tax. Numeral 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law, amended in 1998, it argues, recognizes the plaintiff's exemption from the payment of any tax whose taxable base is gross income and net profits; therefore, not protecting that benefit violates the law. Fourth: it raises that precepts 3 of the Municipal Code and 1 of Law number 7562 were violated. The Tribunal errs, it says, by ignoring the concept of \"territoriality,\" referred to in the claim and the evidence provided to the file reinforcing this thesis. The judgment, it states, limits itself to indicating that, since the patent is the taxable event, where the gross income and net taxable profit are generated is irrelevant, because the tax is indifferent to the place where those incomes originate. However, it argues, such an affirmation does not correspond to the precepts of the law, because the place where the income is obtained is indeed essential for the purposes of applying the tax; as is derived from article 1 of Law no. 7562, which it transcribes. Thus, it would be appropriate to determine where the businesses are conducted, since the tax received by the Municipality of Esparza depends on it. Such a norm, in its view, limits the competence of that Corporation, it being understood that it cannot exceed the territory it administers. The ruling, it insists, omits the provisions of the last paragraph of the first article cited above and resolved against what is ordered there, when it is recorded in the file that 99.96% of Nombre36117's income was earned outside of Esparza. In this context, it emphasizes, the resolution exceeds the taxing power of the defendant, which is a non-state, territorial corporate entity, and therefore exercises its competencies in the geographical space of its canton; and any petition to expand it violates numeral 3 of the Municipal Code, as its taxing power is circumscribed to the corresponding jurisdiction, and therefore, what is conducted outside of it cannot be taxed by the defendant.\n\nV.- In its first charge, the appellant reproaches that the expert report contained in the record was not considered. It notes that, in any case, if that evidence was not deemed relevant, it should have been recorded in the ruling. The charge does not conform to due technique. The core aspect imputed in this grievance consists of a supposed disregard of evidence, specifically, the aforementioned professional opinion of attorney Hernández Vargas. The defect alleged occurs when the judges fail to consider, either totally or partially, the evidence submitted to the record. This implies ignorance of the value the law grants it; and as such, it constitutes an error of law. This latter type of error, as this Chamber has indicated, takes place when evidence is granted a legally improper value, or its proper value is denied; also, when evidence is ignored, or the rules of sound criticism are infringed. In this case, it is indispensable for the appellant to precisely indicate the violated rules concerning the value of the evidentiary elements it believes have been incorrectly analyzed. Furthermore, as with an error of fact, it is essential to point out which pieces of evidence were poorly appreciated, what the errors committed consist of, and, in turn, it is imperative to specify the substantive legal rules that have been indirectly infringed, detailing what the injury consists of and how it has occurred, as established by precepts 595 subsection 3, 596 second paragraph, and 597, all of the Civil Procedure Code. In the present case, the appellant omits any mention of the rules related to the probative value of the evidentiary element that is claimed to have been disregarded and, therefore, left unappreciated. Similarly, the citation of the substantive rules that are alleged to have been violated by the jurisdictional conduct is missing. Its exposition is limited to the content and results of the expert report regarding the proportion of sales that were made in the canton of Esparza. As indicated, both alluded references are essential for this collegiate body to examine the charge. Therefore, by not doing so, the objection is informal, leading to its rejection.\n\nVI.- In the second reproach, it is accused that the Tribunal's ruling is remiss in detailing the proven and unproven facts, which constitutes the defect of incongruence. On this point, it should be noted that this defect consists of the lack of relation between what was requested by the parties, not throughout the proceeding but in their statements of claim or counterclaim and their respective answers, and what was resolved in the ruling; not because the ruling decides something different from what was wanted by the litigants, but because a pronouncement on some aspect submitted to debate is omitted (*minima petita*), or more than what was requested is granted (*ultra petita*), or because what was resolved does not correspond to what was requested (*extra petita*), or because it contains contradictory provisions. However, in reality, what is alleged consists of an improper grounding of the judgment, which is proper to an appeal on substantive grounds, for indirect violation. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the name given by the appellant to its grievances is not an obstacle to the required analysis, as their legal classification is its exclusive responsibility. Hence, it has analyzed charges raised as procedural as substantive grounds and vice versa. Of course, the examination is subject to compliance with the various requirements that the Legal System establishes for the specific defect. Seen this way, the reproach does not conform to due technique. This is because the appellant does not indicate, with the required clarity, what the defect consists of, nor does it point out the substantive rules that have been violated. These deficiencies determine the rejection of the grievance. Even so, for the sake of further reasoning, the alleged illegality is not observed. Indeed, a study of the criticized resolution leads to the conclusion that it does not present the referred omissions. The judgment contains an entire considering clause regarding the proven facts that served as a basis for the substantive analysis and the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, as required by article 155 of the civil procedural rules. Likewise, if the Judges determined that there were no facts that could be considered unproven, or that in any way affected the pronouncement issued, it was unnecessary to record this. For the foregoing, the objection must be rejected.\n\nVII.- Regarding the third and fourth charges, the core point revolves around whether the appellant must pay the patent tax to the Municipality of Esparza. The appellant argues that numeral 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law exempts it from paying that tax. On the other hand, that by virtue of the concept of territoriality, the taxable base of the patent tax would be composed of the income and sales made in Esparza, not those conducted in other localities. Thus, their examination will be carried out in an integrated manner as they address common themes.\n\nVIII.- Regarding the municipal patent tax. Taxable event. The autonomy conferred by the constitution on local corporations (article 170 of the Magna Carta) empowers them, as a manifestation of this independence, in its tax dimension, to propose (by way of initiative) the creation, modification, and extinction of taxes generated within the context of their territorial scope and that, therefore, are established as tax obligations seeking to obtain income to allow them to meet their functions. These manifestations obviously include the proposal to establish exemption regimes or, in general, tax benefits within the framework of those legal-tax relationships arising in the local environment. As established by precept 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, it is the Legislative Assembly that has the power to approve those tax proposals (on this topic, see, among many, rulings 4072-95, 5445-99, 0620-2001 of the Constitutional Court). By virtue of the principle of tax legality derived from that mandate, the tax, and therefore, the tax obligation, is created with the issuance of the respective law. From this plane, the current Municipal Code establishes in its article 79 that a license issued by the city council (commonly known as a patent) is required to conduct lucrative activities, which is obtained through the payment of a tax. This is a rule that allows each Local Government to establish its own bases for that levy in its territorial jurisdiction. This tax, therefore, is subject to regulation by each local entity, which is responsible, in the terms stated, for establishing the essential elements of the levy. In that direction, the Constitutional Chamber has held that each municipality is free and independent to define the limits of its own taxing power, as well as the tax system, regarding the taxable base, collection, and recovery. Hence, there are various tax systems depending on each city council. Among others, ruling no. 620-2001 of that high Court can be consulted. Regarding one of its essential components, namely, the taxable event or objective material element, the topic has been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. Thus, for example, through vote 10153 at 14:44 on October 10, 2001, it had the opportunity to rule on the content of the aforementioned Law no. 7562, and specifically on the patent levy in Esparza. In that judgment, it stated, relevantly: \"…In this sense, it must be borne in mind that the taxable event of this tax is the simple exercise of a lucrative activity in a specific territorial jurisdiction, and therefore, it can in no way be configured as a tax on profits, or as in the case under study, as an incentive to production or wealth… As already stated, the payment of a patent is a tax to conduct the activity… it is not a tax on profits, but to maintain the validity of a license for the exercise of an activity, such that a category cannot be created when there is no reason to create it… It must be borne in mind that, in the manner in which the applicable regulations are drafted, everyone must pay the patent, whether or not they have earnings or profits in their businesses or activities, since the tax in question is not configured as an income tax, much less…\". Regarding the causes justifying the existence of this tax, it pointed out: \"… the municipal patent… determines its distinctive elements that derive from its special legal nature: 1.- the justification for this tax, which derives from the need to cover the costs of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, and which imply a benefit for businesses and commerce, such as security, cleaning, drinking water and electricity services, etc.; 2.- the variety in the systems of this tax, which derives from the tax power of local governments, from which the taxable bases will be the most varied depending (sic) on each canton…\". From the foregoing, it is clear that the taxable event of the tax in question is the conduct of lucrative activities. As long as an activity of this nature exists, the duty to pay the tax arises. In the present case, it is evident that this material element would be limited to the exercise of such activities within the canton of Esparza, regardless of whether that activity has generated profits or not, that aspect being only relevant to establishing the calculation base, but it does not constitute a core point for defining when the material element arises. Hence, regarding the subjective element, the taxpayer will be any person engaged in conducting such activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the locality. Thus, indeed, it is established in the initial paragraph of article 1 of the cited Law no. Placa25503, when it states: \"Individuals or legal entities engaged in conducting lucrative activities of any type in the canton of Esparza shall be obliged to pay a patent tax, in accordance with this law.\"\n\nIX.- The case of the Municipality of Esparza. Legal creation. Criteria for setting the calculation base. As noted, within the various manifestations of autonomy, on the tax plane, each local entity possesses the competence to propose the creation of taxes that constitute contributive duties for the residents, by virtue of relations or services provided by the corporation. In the case of patents, as with other taxes arising from the exercise of this competence, each local entity proposes the main elements of the levy, including the taxable event, taxable base, collection period, among others, all aspects that depend on legislative approval and, of course, the issuance of the respective law. In the specific case of interest, the municipal patent tax of Esparza was created through Law no. 2447 of October 22, 1959, which authorized the Local Corporation to collect that levy. This legal set was modified by Law no. 3057 of November 7, 1962, and later by Law no. 4869 of October 18, 1971. Subsequently, with the enactment of Law no. 6762 of May 31, 1982, clear parameters were established to obtain the calculation base for the tax. From this plane, article 6 stated: \"Except in cases where this law determines a different procedure for calculating the amount of the patent tax, the determining factors for taxation are established as the net taxable profit and the sales or gross income, received by individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal year prior to the period being taxed. By sales is meant the volume of sales, after deducting the tax established in the income tax law.\" The emphasis is ours. Later, that legislation was repealed by Law number 7562 \"Tariffs for Municipal Taxes of the Canton of Esparza,\" enacted on December 26, 1995. In this latter law, regarding the taxable base, the same criteria used by the repealed regulation were taken for its establishment. Thus, article 3 established: \"Determining factors of taxation.\n\nExcept in cases where this law determines a different procedure for setting the amount of the patent tax (impuesto de patentes), the determining factors for the imposition are established as the taxable net income (renta líquida gravable) and the annual gross sales or revenues (ventas o los ingresos brutos anuales) received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed./ By sales is meant the volume thereof, after deducting the tax established in the Sales Tax Law (Ley del impuesto sobre las ventas) and in others that stipulate exceptions, which the patent holder must demonstrate./ In the case of financial institutions and brokerage firms for movable and immovable property, gross sales or revenues are considered to be those received by way of commissions and interest.” The emphasis is not from the original. As observed, Law no. 7562 follows the same principles set by its predecessor, Law no. 6762, regarding the determining factors of the tax's taxable base. It is noted that the provisions of article 6 of Law 6762 maintained their wording in canon 3 of Law 7562 concerning those objective references. Thus, the calculation base is determined by aspects related to the profits received from the developed activity, which does not imply that the taxable event (hecho generador) is those profits, as has been stated. It is appropriate at this point to clarify which of the received revenues are susceptible to being considered within the taxable base. Regarding the scope of the levy, it should be noted that it covers the taxable net income, sales, and gross revenues received by the passive subject within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Esparza, which infers a principle of territoriality. That is, those generated or received in other places would not be included. The foregoing is because the powers of local entities, including taxation, apply within the geographical area in which the Legal System confers the competence to administer local interests, with activities carried out outside the locality being outside this scope. In this line, article 3 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) establishes: “The territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is the respective canton...”. The first numeral of Law no. 7562 develops that criterion of territoriality. On one hand, by establishing that the obligated parties are those persons who carry out lucrative activities in the canton. On the other, in the event that such development also occurs in other places, it provides in its final paragraph: “Individuals or legal entities whose activity is distributed in one or more cantons and who, for this reason, are subject to the payment of a patent in those cantons, must determine and demonstrate, by certification from an authorized public accountant, the proportion of the volume of their business that is generated in the canton of Esparza.” Therefore, the taxable base will be composed of the taxable net income, sales, and revenues that have been received within the canton, which implies the possible application of a proportionality criterion when they are developed in other localities, so that the percentage corresponding to the tasks carried out in Esparza is taxed. The foregoing is because the rest of the activities carried out outside the municipality's competence are subject to the patent taxes that each municipality establishes, so that if this distinction is not made, there is a risk of incurring double taxation.\n\nX.- On the specific case. Exemption regime in free trade zones (zonas francas). Now, having made the previous precisions regarding relevant elements and components of the tax, it is necessary to proceed to establish the applicability or not of that levy to the appellant, given that in her view, she is exempt by express provision of article 20, subsection g) of Law no. 7210, by belonging to a free trade zone. In the opinion of the Court (Tribunal), the taxes from which the mentioned numeral exempts are not municipal ones, but those that fall on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to earnings, dividends, income, or sales. Therefore, it considered, given that the taxable event of the patent tax is the carrying out of lucrative activities and not the taxable net income, an exemption in her favor from local taxes is not derived for the plaintiff. Additionally, it supported its ruling on the aspect that, according to literal 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation, so that since Law no. Placa25503 does not contemplate that exception, Nombre36117 was not exempt from paying the patent.\n\nXI.- In relation to the point of analysis, it is worth noting what is set out below. With Law no. 7210 of November 23, 1990, published in La Gaceta no. 238 of December 14, 1990, the free trade zone regime was established, by which a set of incentives granted by the State to companies making new investments in the country is provided. It is a rule that, through benefits of this order, seeks the strengthening of investment on national soil, that is, it constitutes a legislative manifestation that evidences a policy of promoting the injection of capital into the national economy, through the establishment of incentives of various types. In Chapter VII of the aforementioned normative body, incentives of various types were established for the companies that joined said regime. The legislator's intention regarding this was confirmed when, in the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions (Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes), no. 7293, the mentioned incentive system was not repealed, but on the contrary, its validity was expressly established. Thus, in subsection k) of article 2, it was established as an exception to the general repeal of exemptions that the first ordinal established, the exemptions that: “Are granted through the Free Trade Zone Law No 7210 of November 23, 1990, except the benefits for the companies mentioned in subsection ch) of article 17.” Thus stated, the core point, it is insisted, lies in concluding whether or not municipal taxes, among these, the so-called patent tax, are exempt under the protection of the benefits regime established by Law no. 7293. On this particular matter, it should be noted that this Chamber agrees with the criterion adopted by the Court to the effect that subsection g) of article 20 of the cited legislation is not applicable to the plaintiff, therefore, it does not allow the tax benefit sought. In effect, that rule in question, in what is relevant to the case, provided an “Exemption from all taxes on profits, as well as from any other, whose taxable base is determined in relation to gross or net earnings, dividends paid to shareholders or income or sales…” Certainly, that mandate is not applicable to municipal taxes, but to taxes on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to earnings, dividends, income or sales. The tax under analysis, it is reiterated, does not tax profits, but is established as a levy that arises from the development of lucrative activities, independently of whether or not income is obtained. However, by virtue of what has been debated, it should be noted that in subsection h) of that aforementioned precept, an exemption was established in favor of companies covered by the free trade zone regime, regarding all municipal taxes and patents, for a period of ten years. Now, as can be deduced from the case file, through agreement no. 61-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of March 18, 1998, the Executive Branch made the decision to place the company within the free trade zone regime. With said act, the plaintiff came to hold a legal situation that placed her in a subjective position that allowed her, during the term of the tax benefit, to benefit from all the incentives contained in the regulatory framework of the free trade zones as of 1990, which, it is insisted, were not repealed by the Law of All Current Exemptions, no. 7293, in 1992. On the other hand, although mandate 63 of the referenced Code establishes that the exemption is not understood as extendable to taxes established after its creation, this rule is not an obstacle to the effectiveness in this case of the reference incentive, since as has been indicated, the tax under examination was not created with the issuance of Law no. 7562, but rather came into legal existence with Law no. 2447 of October 1959. For this reason, at the time of formulating the exemption request (1998), the taxpayer was exempt from payment of the patent tax of the Municipality of Esparza in accordance with what is regulated by article 20, subsection h) of Law no. 7210. Hence, any act that intended to deny that situation and, as a result, impose the payment of municipal taxes during the time period of the aforementioned exemption, is contrary to legality and for that reason, is null. Therefore, given the reasons stated, the appeal must be upheld on this particular point.\n\nAppeal of the Municipality of Esparza\n\nXII.- It files an appeal for substantive reasons, alleging a single ground. It considers articles 222 and 223 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) violated, as well as ordinal 98, subsection c) of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), for having exempted the losing party from the payment of litigation costs. Such exemption, it says, is a power granted to the judge, however it is not absolute, as this Chamber has considered, and in its favor it mentions some resolutions. It is necessary, it continues, to make a value judgment relative to the conduct of the losing litigant, in order to determine whether or not it is justified to release them from the payment of said item. In the present case, it affirms, the Court considered that since it was a matter that allowed for various legal interpretations, there was sufficient reason to debate the issue in court. However, it considers, that posture does not constitute a value judgment relative to the litigant's conduct, since in strict sense, having sufficient reason to litigate entails not only the party's conviction, but requires that they respond to objective data of the process, from which the judge can conclude that they had founded reasons to believe in the appropriateness of the claim. In the specific case, it continues, no justification can be extracted for the exemption to proceed; on the contrary, the plaintiff ignored constitutional rules (numerals 169 and 170), the Law Regulating Current Exemptions, Repeals and Exceptions, the Law of Municipal Tax Tariffs of the canton of Esparza, and the principle of legal reserve in cases of tax exemptions. Now, it indicates, prior to the filing of the special tax proceeding, the plaintiff had been warned what her situation was, therefore she knew the opinions of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) C-282-98 and C-062-99, such that there is no sufficient basis for the Court to allow the plaintiff to be exempted from the payment of the costs of the proceeding.\n\nXIII.- On litigation costs. Informality. The appellant reproaches the exemption from costs ordered by the Court, a criterion that, it considers, violates precepts 222 and 223 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as canon 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The charge does not conform to the due technique. According to numeral 596 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is imperative for the objector to indicate the rules that in their view have been violated by the Judge's conduct, making express and clear mention of what the error consists of and how it occurred. From this perspective, it is necessary to indicate that regarding the issue of costs in contentious-administrative proceedings, before the express referral made by ordinal 103 of the Regulatory Law of that jurisdiction, the regulations to be applied, jointly with mandates 97 to 101 of that legal body, are those provided by civil procedural legislation (with the exception of the case provided for in cardinal 69 of said Regulatory Law). In this instance, in the opinion of the appellant, it was not appropriate to exempt from costs. At bottom, what it seeks is the application of the principle of condemning the losing party. However, it omits to mention as a violated rule precept 221 of the Code of Procedure, which establishes the imposition of costs on the party that has resulted as the losing party in the proceeding. It is precisely that provision which, within the framework of what is alleged in this charge, could have been violated due to lack of application. In this way, by not having cited it, the objection is informal. In any case, for the sake of further reasoning, the grievance lacks current interest, given that in the present resolution the appeal filed by the plaintiff has been upheld, so it is not appropriate to charge her the costs given that she has not been the losing party.\n\nXIV.- Corollary. By virtue of the foregoing examined, the appeal filed by the plaintiff party will be partially granted, regarding the substantive reasons, but not the one relating to the procedural aspects, which are rejected. Consequently, the pronouncement of the Court will be annulled, and ruling on the merits, the lawsuit will be granted in the sense that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from the payment of the municipal patent tax of the canton of Esparza. The administrative acts that attempt to tax the activity carried out by said company with the patent tax are illegal. The defendant shall be obligated to return the sums unduly overpaid by the plaintiff due to the collection of that tax, as well as the corresponding interest from the date of its payment and until the effective refund. Given the complex nature of the debated matter, this Chamber considers that it is appropriate to resolve without a special condemnation in costs in accordance with the provisions of subsection c) of canon 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The appeal of the Municipality of Esparza is rejected, with its litigation costs at its charge, as provided by numeral 611 ibidem.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal filed by the Municipality of Esparza and the one filed by the plaintiff party on procedural grounds are rejected, while the latter is upheld on the merits. The pronouncement of the Court is annulled, and ruling on the merits, the lawsuit and the appropriateness of the action are granted. Consequently, it is ordered that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from payment of the municipal patent of the canton of Esparza. Therefore, the agreements of that Municipality that attempt to tax it with that tribute are illegal. Likewise, it must return the sums that may have been unduly paid for this concept together with the corresponding interest from the date of their payment and until the effective refund. It is resolved without a special condemnation in costs.\n\nAnabelle León Feoli\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Óscar Eduardo González Camacho\n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández Álvaro Meza Lázarus\n\nNombre165222\n\nThe Substitute Magistrate Álvaro Meza Lázarus participates in the decision of this matter.\n\n**Magistrate Escoto Fernández writes**\n\n**CONSIDERING**\n\n**I.-** The Municipality of Esparza, in regular session no. 24, article 3, Chapter III, held on September 12, 1998, did not approve the request made by Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (hereinafter ALUNASA) to eliminate the outstanding balances payable for Real Estate Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles) and for Business License Tax (Impuesto de Patentes) corresponding to the second quarter of 1998. This was because, by Executive Agreement (Acuerdo Ejecutivo) no. 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta no. 54 of March 18, 1998, it was granted the free zone regime (régimen de zona franca), classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. On March 5, 1999, Nombre36117 filed a formal claim before the Municipality, requesting that the collection action be suspended and that the respective certifications regarding its compliance with tax obligations be issued. The Municipal Council (Ayuntamiento), through official letter SM. 168-99, informed the plaintiff company that in regular session no. 49, article 14, Chapter III, of March 6, 1999, it was agreed to suspend the collection action for one month, in order to await a pronouncement from the Procuraduría General de la República, and to issue the requested certifications. Subsequently, and as relevant to the case, it was notified of the State’s position regarding the proper collection of the claimed Business License Tax (Impuesto de Patentes), an opinion that clarified that the tax benefit created by Law no. 7210 only includes the municipal taxes and license fees (tributos y patentes municipales) in force at the time of the enactment of that regulatory body. The defendant decided to continue with the procedures to make the corresponding taxes effective. On May 25, 1999, the plaintiff company filed an appeal for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against that agreement. The following June 12, its challenges were rejected as inadmissible; whereupon Nombre36117 filed a motion for review (recurso de revisión). In regular session no. 14, article 1, Chapter IV, of August 9, 1999, it was rejected and the administrative channel (vía administrativa) was deemed exhausted. On October 6, 1999, the plaintiff filed a special tax lawsuit (demanda especial tributaria) against the Municipality of Esparza. In essence, it indicated that during 1998, Nombre36117 sold only 0.04% of its production in the canton of Esparza; another 6.58% in the rest of Costa Rican territory; it exported 12.55% to Central America, and the remaining 80.83% was sold to other markets. That year, it notes, through Executive Agreement (Acuerdo Ejecutivo) number 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of the following March 18, it was granted the free zone regime (régimen de zona franca), classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. Subsequently, on February 25 of the same year, it signed a contract with the Foreign Trade Promoter (Promotora de Comercio Exterior, PROCOMER), in order to benefit from the exoneration of taxes on profits and any other tax determined in relation to gross or net earnings. Based on such facts, it essentially requests in the judgment that it be declared: 1- it is exempt from the payment of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza; 2- the illegality of the administrative acts of the defendant that seek to levy its activity with that tax; 3- the obligation of the Municipal Council (Ayuntamiento) to refund the sums paid for that concept, together with the corresponding interest, calculated in accordance with canon 58, in relation to ordinal 57, both from the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 4- both costs charged to the defendant. The Municipality answered negatively and filed the exception (excepción) of lack of right (falta de derecho). The Tribunal upheld that defense and declared the lawsuit inadmissible in all its aspects. The parties filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación).\n\n**Appeal of Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (ALUNASA).**\n\n**Cassation on procedural grounds**\n\n**II.-** By virtue of the grievances raised and the provisions of numeral 610 of the Código Procesal Civil, which establishes the guidelines to follow when issuing a cassation judgment, the procedural objections must be analyzed first, and the substantive ones will be addressed later. Regarding the former, it invokes **a single ground**. Violation of articles 58, 83, and 103, all of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in addition to ordinal 418 of the Código Procesal Civil. The Tribunal, it says, did not grant a deadline to formulate conclusions (conclusiones) prior to issuing the judgment; it even notified, along with the ruling, the decision taken ten minutes earlier not to grant it, under the protection of the cited numeral 83. Procedural rules, it argues, must be interpreted in the way that best serves the right of defense. It is true that such a precept does not contemplate that stage; however, it indicates, neither does it regulate other procedural acts, and they are not left unapplied for that reason. By way of example, it brings up the hearing granted to address the administrative file, which is not supported by that ordinal. When the truth is, it develops, that the already-cited numeral 58 warns that once the evidentiary phase is over, the Tribunal must grant a period to the parties to express conclusions on the alleged facts, the evidence presented, and the bases of their claims.\n\n**III.-** The appellant claims it was not given a deadline to formulate conclusions (conclusiones), violating, in its view, numerals 58, 83, and 103, all of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in addition to ordinal 418 of the Código Procesal Civil. In this regard, it is worth noting that by a brief filed on December 12, 2001 (visible at folio 127), the plaintiff requested that it be granted the hearing to issue conclusions. However, that petition was rejected in a resolution of 9:15 a.m. on February 5, 2002 (folio 129), considering that “…the request for a deadline to formulate succinct conclusions is inadmissible, since in this type of process that stage does not exist.” The plaintiff filed no appeal whatsoever against that decision. That action was later reiterated on May 31, 2002, and on February 10, 2004 (folios 138 and 188, respectively). The latter was again rejected by means of ruling no. 55-2004 of 10:20 a.m. on February 18, 2004, because it is not contemplated in numeral 83 of the cited Ley Reguladora, a rule that regulates the process in tax matters (folio 189). The plaintiff also formulated no objection against that criterion. When procedural nullities are alleged, according to what is established by canons 597 and 598 of the Código Procesal Civil, for the charge to be admissible, it is imperative to request the correction of the defect before the corresponding jurisdictional authority and, furthermore, when applicable, to have formulated the pertinent appeals. In this case, as indicated, despite the rejection of its actions seeking a deadline to issue conclusions, the cassation appellant did not challenge what was resolved, even though it was empowered to do so. This situation, under the protection of the indicated rules, bars this Chamber from examining the charge, which is why it must be rejected.\n\n**Cassation on substantive grounds**\n\n**IV.-** It alleges the following **four grounds**, which for better comprehension are reordered as follows. **First:** it considers there was an evident omission by the Tribunal in not analyzing the expert evidence (prueba pericial), consisting of a study prepared by the public accountant Lic. Letner Hernández Vargas, appointed by that Body, regarding the sales made by Nombre36117 in the 1998 fiscal period. There, it was determined that only 0.04% were made in the canton of Esparza, 6.58% in Costa Rica, and the remaining 93.38% outside the country. It forgot, it asserts, the existence of that evidence since it mentioned nothing about it in its ruling. In any case, it states, if it was not relevant, it should have indicated so; and by not doing so, it violates the provisions of numeral 155, subparagraph 3), sections ch) and d) of the Código Procesal Civil. **Second:** The judgment, it affirms, must detail the proven and unproven facts; and in this case, it is silent on that aspect; thus not only is the previously cited article violated and a substantive infraction committed, but it also reflects a ground for procedural reasons according to subparagraphs 2 and 3 of ordinal 594 ibid. **Third:** it invokes violation of articles 96 and 98, both of the Código Municipal due to improper interpretation, non-application of canon 4 of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales de Esparza no. 7562, and violation of law of ordinal 20, subparagraph g) of the Ley del Régimen de Zonas Francas no. 7210, by giving them a scope they do not have, based on the reasoning that what is taxable is the lucrative activity and not the obtaining of benefits. It does not share, it continues, the Tribunal's position when it indicates that whether or not an activity is carried out and the place where sales are generated is irrelevant for the purposes of generating the tax, because with this it confuses the elements of the tax obligation: the taxable event (hecho generador) with the taxable base (base imponible). These are not synonyms, it says; together with others, they form the structure of taxes. The taxable base (base imponible) of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza, it affirms, is not the productive activity itself –which is the taxable event (hecho generador)– but rather its result, that is, the gross income (ingresos brutos) and the taxable net income (renta líquida gravable), determined respectively in articles 3 and 4 of Law 7562, in such a way that the rate applied to that base varies according to each of those two components. That is why, it maintains, if the business license tax (impuesto de patente) is calculated on sales or gross income and on profits, these would be the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax. The Tribunal ignores, it states, what is stipulated in article 4 of Law 7562 under the pretext that the taxable event (hecho generador) is not made up of gross or net income. It reiterates, the event is the municipal license, but the tax has as components of the taxable base the profits or gross income (ganancias o ingresos brutos) and the net profits (ganancias netas), an amount on which the tax is determined. Likewise, it alleges, it is relevant that lucrative activity took place, since otherwise there would be no income and even less profits, and consequently there would be no monetary sum on which to assess the tax. Furthermore, it points out, a tax that does not measure the taxpayer's economic capacity is inconceivable, that is, if there is no economic activity, there is no obligation to pay the tax. Numeral 20 of the Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca, amended in 1998, it argues, recognizes the plaintiff's exemption from the payment of any tax whose taxable base (base imponible) is the gross income (ingresos brutos) and the net profits (ganancias netas); therefore, not protecting that benefit violates the law. **Fourth:** it raises the claim that precepts 3 of the Código Municipal and 1 of Law number 7562 were violated. The Tribunal errs, it says, by ignoring the concept of “territoriality,” referred to in the lawsuit and the evidence provided to the file reinforcing this thesis. The judgment, it states, limits itself to indicating that since the license is the taxable event (hecho generador), where the gross income (ingresos brutos) and the taxable net income (renta líquida gravable) are generated is irrelevant, because the tax is indifferent to the place where those incomes originate. However, it argues, such a statement does not correspond to the precepts of the law, because the place where the income is obtained is indeed essential for the purposes of applying the tax, as can be inferred from ordinal 1 of Law no. 7562, which it transcribes. Thus, it would be appropriate to determine where the businesses are conducted since the tax received by the Municipality of Esparza depends on that. Such a rule, in its view, limits that Corporation's competence, understanding that it cannot exceed the territory it administers. The ruling, it insists, omits what is stipulated in the last paragraph of the first ordinal previously cited and resolved against what was ordered there, when the record shows that 99.96% of Nombre36117's income was generated outside Esparza. In this context, it emphasizes, the resolution exceeds the taxing power of the defendant, since it is a territorial corporate entity and not a state one, for which reason it exercises its competencies within the geographical space of its canton; and any petition to expand it violates numeral 3 of the Código Municipal, since its taxing power is circumscribed to the corresponding jurisdiction, and therefore, what is carried out outside of it cannot be taxed by the defendant.\n\n**V.-** In its **first** charge, the appellant reproaches that the expert report (peritaje) contained in the record was not taken into account. It adds, in any case, that if that evidence was not considered relevant, it should have been so recorded in the ruling. The charge does not conform to proper technique. The core aspect attributed in this grievance consists of an alleged pretermission of evidence (preterición de prueba), specifically, of the aforementioned professional opinion of Lic. Hernández Vargas. The defect accused occurs when judges fail to consider, either totally or partially, the evidence provided to the record. This implies a disregard for the value that the law grants them; and as such, it constitutes an error of law (error de derecho). This last type of error, as this Chamber has indicated, occurs when evidence is given a legally improper value, or it is denied its own value; also, when evidence is ignored, or the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) are infringed. In this scenario, it is indispensable for the cassation appellant to indicate, with precision, the violated rules concerning the value of the evidentiary elements that it estimates have been analyzed in a mistaken manner. Also, as in an error of fact, it is strictly necessary to indicate which evidence was poorly appreciated, what the errors committed consist of, and in turn, it is imperative to specify the substantive legal rules that have been indirectly infringed, specifying what the injury consists of and how it was produced, which is established by precepts 595, subparagraph 3, 596, second paragraph, and 597, all of the Código Procesal Civil. In the present case, the cassation appellant fails to make any mention of the rules related to the probative value of the evidentiary element that is estimated to have been pretermitted and, therefore, left unappreciated. Likewise, the citation of the substantive canons that are argued to have been violated by the jurisdictional procedure is missed. Its exposition is limited to the content and results of the expert opinion regarding the proportion of sales that were made in the canton of Esparza. As has been indicated, both referenced citations are elementary for this collegiate body to examine the charge. Therefore, by not doing so, the objection is informal, which leads to its rejection.\n\n**VI.-** In the **second** reproach, it is accused that the Tribunal's ruling is silent regarding the detail of the proven and unproven facts, which constitutes the defect of incongruence (vicio de incongruencia). On this point, it should be noted that this defect consists of the lack of relationship between what was requested by the parties—not throughout the process, but in their statements of claim or counterclaim and in their respective answers—and what was resolved in the ruling; not because the ruling decides something different from what the litigants wanted, but because it omits a pronouncement on some point submitted to debate (*minima petita*), or grants more than requested (*ultra petita*), or because what is resolved does not correspond to what was petitioned (*extra petita*), or because it contains contradictory provisions. However, in reality, what is alleged consists of an improper justification of the judgment, which is characteristic of an appeal on substantive grounds, for indirect violation. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the designation given by the appellant to their grievances is not an obstacle to the required analysis, since their legal classification is exclusively its responsibility. Hence, it has analyzed charges raised as procedural as substantive, and vice versa. It is clear, however, that the examination is subject to compliance with the various requirements that the Legal System establishes for the specific defect. Seen this way, the reproach does not conform to proper technique. The foregoing is because the cassation appellant does not indicate with the required clarity what the defect consists of, nor does it indicate which substantive rules have been violated. These deficiencies determine the rejection of the grievance. Nevertheless, for greater abundance of reasons, the alleged illegality is not observed. Indeed, a study of the criticized resolution leads to the conclusion that it does not present the referred omissions. The judgment contains an entire considering section regarding the proven facts that served as the basis for the substantive analysis and for the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, as required by canon 155 of the civil procedural regulations. Likewise, if the Judges determined that there were no facts that could be considered unproven, or that in some way influenced the pronouncement issued, it was unnecessary to leave a record of it. Based on the foregoing, the objection must be rejected.\n\nVII.- Regarding the third and fourth charges, the core issue revolves around whether or not the appellant has the duty to pay the business license tax (impuesto de patente) to the Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza). The appellant argues that numeral 20 of the \"Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca\" exempts them from paying that tax. Furthermore, by virtue of the concept of territoriality, the taxable base of the business license tax would be composed of the income and sales made in Esparza, not those carried out in other localities. Therefore, their examination will be conducted in an integrated manner since they deal with common themes.\n\nVIII.- On the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal). Taxable event (Hecho generador). The autonomy conferred by the constituent power on local corporations (article 170 of the \"Carta Magna\") empowers them, as a manifestation of this independence in its tax dimension, to propose (by way of initiative) the creation, modification, and extinction of taxes that arise within the context of their territorial scope and that, therefore, are established as tax obligations aimed at obtaining income that allows them to meet their functions. Among these manifestations, it includes, of course, the proposal to establish exemption regimes or, in general, tax benefits within the framework of those legal-tax relationships that arise in the local environment. As stipulated by precept 121, subsection 13) of the \"Constitución Política,\" it is the Legislative Assembly that is responsible for approving those tax proposals (on this subject, see, among many others, rulings 4072-95, 5445-99, 0620-2001 of the Constitutional Court). By virtue of the principle of tax legality derived from that mandate, the tax, and therefore the tax obligation, is born with the issuance of the respective law. From this standpoint, the current \"Código Municipal\" establishes in its mandate 79 that the exercise of lucrative activities requires a license issued by the municipality (commonly known as a business license (patente)), which is obtained through the payment of a tax. This is a norm that allows each Local Government to establish the specific bases of that levy in its territorial jurisdiction. This tax, therefore, is subject to regulation by each local entity, which is responsible, in the stated terms, for establishing the essential elements of the levy. In that direction, the Constitutional Chamber has held that each municipality is free and independent to define the limits of its own taxing power, as well as the taxation system, with respect to the taxable base, collection, and gathering. Hence, there exist varied tax systems depending on the specific municipality. The ruling no. 620-2001 of that high Court can be consulted, among others. Regarding one of its essential components, namely, the taxable event or objective material element, the topic has been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. For example, through vote 10153 of 2:44 p.m. on October 10, 2001, it had the opportunity to rule on the content of the aforementioned Law no. 7562, and specifically on the business license tax in Esparza. In that ruling, it stated the following relevant part: “…In this sense, it must be kept in mind that this tax’s taxable event is the mere exercise of a lucrative activity in a specific territorial jurisdiction, and therefore, it can in no way be configured as a tax on profits, or as in the case under study, as an incentive for production or wealth... As already stated, the payment of the business license is a tax to exercise the activity... it is not a tax on profits, but rather to maintain the validity of a license for the exercise of an activity, such that a category cannot be created when there is no reason to create it... It should be noted that in the way the applicable regulations are drafted, everyone must pay the business license, whether or not they have gains or profits in their businesses or activities, since the tax in question is not configured as an income tax, nor anything close..”. Regarding the causes that justified the existence of this tax, it indicated: “… the municipal business license (patente municipal)… determines its distinctive elements that derive from its special legal nature: 1.- the justification for this tax, which derives from the need to cover the costs of public services that the individual receives from the municipality, and which imply a benefit for businesses and commercial establishments, such as security, cleanliness, potable water and electricity services, etc.; 2.- the variety in the systems of this tax, which derives from the tax power of local governments, whereby the taxable bases will be the most varied depending (sic) on each canton...”. From the foregoing, it is clear that the tax in question has as its taxable event the development of lucrative activities. As long as an activity of this nature exists, the duty to pay the tax arises. In the present case, it is evident that this material element would be limited to the exercise of such activities within the canton of Esparza, regardless of whether that activity has generated profits or not, as that aspect is only relevant for establishing the basis of calculation, but does not constitute a core point when defining when the material element arises. Hence, regarding the subjective element, the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) will be any person engaged in the exercise of such activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the locality. Thus, in effect, it is established in the initial paragraph of article 1 of the cited Law no. Placa25503, when it states: “Natural or legal persons engaged in the exercise of lucrative activities of any kind in the canton of Esparza shall be obliged to pay a business license tax (impuesto de patentes), in accordance with this law.”\n\nIX.- The case of the Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza). Legal creation. Criteria for fixing the cost basis. As has been noted, within the diverse manifestations of autonomy, in the tax sphere, each local entity has the competence to propose the creation of taxes that constitute the tax duties of the residents, by virtue of relationships or services provided by the corporation. In the case of business licenses, as with other taxes arising as a consequence of the exercise of this competence, each local entity proposes the main elements of the levy, among them, the taxable event, the taxable base, the collection period, among others, all aspects that depend on legislative approval and, of course, on the issuance of the respective law. In the particular case of interest, the municipal business license tax of Esparza was created through Law no. 2447 of October 22, 1959, in which the Local Corporation was authorized to collect that levy. This legal body was modified by Law no. 3057 of November 7, 1962, and later by Law no. 4869 of October 18, 1971. Subsequently, with the enactment of Law no. 6762 of May 31, 1982, clear parameters were established for obtaining the tax’s calculation base. From this standpoint, article 6 was indicated: “Except in cases where this law determines a different procedure for calculating the amount of the business license tax, the net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) and sales or gross income (ingresos brutos) received by natural or legal persons subject to the tax during the fiscal year prior to the period being taxed are established as determining factors of the taxation. Sales are understood as the volume thereof, after deducting the tax established in the income tax law.” The highlighting is our own. Later, that legislation was repealed by Law number 7562 “Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza,” enacted on December 26, 1995. In this latter law, regarding the taxable base, the criteria used for its establishment were the same as those used by the repealed regulations. Thus, in ordinal 3 it was established: “Determining factors of the taxation. Except in cases where this law determines a different procedure for setting the amount of the business license tax, net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) and annual sales or gross income (ingresos brutos anuales) received by natural or legal persons subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed, are established as determining factors of the taxation./ Sales are understood as the volume thereof, after deducting the tax established in the Sales Tax Law and in others that stipulate exceptions, which the licensee must demonstrate./ In the case of financial establishments and brokerage firms for movable and immovable property, sales or gross income are considered those received from commissions and interest.” The highlighting is not from the original. As can be observed, Law no. 7562 follows the same principles set by its predecessor, Law no. 6762, regarding the determining factors of the taxable base of the tax. Note that the provisions of article 6 of Law 6762 retained their wording in canon 3 of Law 7562 with respect to those objective references. Thus, the cost basis is determined by aspects related to the profits received from the developed activity, which does not imply that the taxable event is those profits, as has been explained. At this point, it is convenient to clarify which of the received income is susceptible to being considered within the taxable base. Regarding the scope of the levy, it should be noted that it covers the net taxable income, sales, and gross income received by the taxpayer within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza), which infers a principle of territoriality. That is, those generated or received in other places would not be included. The foregoing is because the powers of local entities, including the tax power, apply within the geographical area in which the legal system confers the competence to administer local interests, with activities developed outside the locality being outside this scope. Along these lines, article 3 of the \"Código Municipal\" establishes: “The territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is the respective canton...”. The first numeral of Law no. 7562 develops this criterion of territoriality. On one hand, by establishing that the obligated parties are those persons who carry out lucrative activities in the canton. On the other hand, given the scenario where this development also occurs in other places, it provides in its final paragraph: “Natural or legal persons whose activity is distributed in one or more cantons and who, for that reason, are subject to the payment of a business license in those cantons, must determine and demonstrate, by certification of a certified public accountant, the proportion of their business volume that is generated in the canton of Esparza.” Then, the taxable base will be composed of the net taxable income, sales, and income that have been received within the canton, which implies the possible application of a proportionality criterion when they are developed in other localities, so that the percentage corresponding to the tasks carried out in Esparza is taxed. The foregoing is because the rest of the activities carried out outside the municipality's competence are subject to the business license taxes that each municipality establishes, and if this distinction is not made, there is a risk of incurring double taxation.\n\nX.- On the specific case. Exemption regime in free trade zones (zonas francas). Now, having made the previous clarifications regarding the tax’s elements and relevant components, it is appropriate to proceed to establish the applicability or not of that levy to the appellant, given that in their view, they are exempt by express provision of article 20, subsection g) of Law no. 7210, by belonging to a free trade zone. In the judgment of the Court, the taxes from which the mentioned numeral dispenses are not municipal ones, but rather those levied on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to gains, dividends, income, or sales. Therefore, it estimated, since the business license tax (impuesto de patente) has as its taxable event the performance of lucrative activities and not the net taxable income, no exoneration from local taxes is derived in favor of the plaintiff. Additionally, it supported its ruling on the aspect that, according to literal 63 of the \"Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios,\" exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation, such that since Law no. Placa25503 does not contemplate that exception, Nombre36117 was not exempt from paying the business license.\n\nXI.- In relation to the point of analysis, it is appropriate to point out what is set forth below. With Law no. 7210 of November 23, 1990, published in \"La Gaceta\" no. 238 of December 14, 1990, the free trade zone regime was established, through which a set of incentives granted by the State to companies making new investments in the country is provided. It is a norm that, through benefits of that kind, seeks the strengthening of investment on national soil; that is, it constitutes a legislative manifestation that evidences a policy of promoting the injection of capital into the national economy, through the establishment of incentives of diverse nature. In Chapter VII of the aforementioned normative body, incentives of various natures were set for companies that joined said regime. The legislator's intention regarding this was confirmed when, in the Law Regulating All Current Exemptions, no. 7293, the aforementioned incentive system was not repealed, but on the contrary, its validity was expressly established. Thus, in subsection k) of article 2, the exceptions from the general repeal of exemptions established by the first ordinal were set as the exemptions that: “Are granted through the \"Ley de Zonas Francas\" No. 7210 of November 23, 1990, except the benefits for the companies mentioned in subsection ch) of article 17.” Thus stated, the core point, it is insisted, lies in concluding whether municipal taxes, and within these, the so-called business license tax (impuesto a la patente), are or are not exempt under the benefit regime established by Law no. 7293. Regarding this matter, it should be noted that this Chamber agrees with the criterion adopted by the Court in the sense that subsection g) of article 20 of the cited legislation is not applicable to the plaintiff, and therefore, does not allow the intended tax benefit. Indeed, that norm in question, in what is relevant to the case, provided for an “Exemption from all taxes on profits, as well as from any other tax whose taxable base is determined in relation to gross or net gains, dividends paid to shareholders, or income or sales…” Certainly, that mandate does not apply to municipal taxes, but rather to taxes on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to gains, dividends, income, or sales. The tax under analysis, it is reiterated, does not tax profits, but is established as a levy that arises from the development of lucrative activities, regardless of whether or not income is obtained. However, by virtue of what was debated, it should be indicated that in subsection h) of that aforementioned precept, an exoneration was established in favor of companies benefiting from the free trade zone regime, regarding all municipal taxes and business licenses, for a period of ten years. Now, as can be inferred from the case file records, through agreement no. 61-98 of February 12, 1998, published in \"La Gaceta\" of March 18, 1998, the Executive Branch made the decision to place the company within the free trade zone regime. With that act, the plaintiff came to hold a legal situation that placed them in a subjective position that allowed them, during the term of the tax grace period, to benefit from all the incentives contained in the regulatory framework for free trade zones from 1990 onwards, which, it is insisted, were not repealed with the \"Ley de todas las exoneraciones vigentes,\" no. 7293, in the year 1992. On the other hand, although mandate 63 of the referred-to \"Código\" establishes that the exemption is not understood to be extendable to taxes established after its creation, that norm is not an obstacle to the effectiveness of the referenced incentive in this case, since as has been indicated, the tax under examination was not born with the issuance of Law no. 7562, but rather came into legal existence with Law no. 2447 of October 1959. For this reason, at the time of filing the exemption request (1998), the taxpayer was exempt from paying the business license tax (impuesto de patente) of the Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza) in accordance with what is regulated by article 20, subsection h) of Law no. 7210. Hence, any act that sought to deny that situation and, as a result, impose the payment of municipal taxes during the temporal course of the aforementioned exoneration, is contrary to law and for that reason, is null. Therefore, given the presented reasons, the appeal must be granted regarding this particular matter.\n\n**Appeal of the Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza)**\n\nXII.- It files an appeal on substantive grounds, alleging a **single reason**. It considers articles 222 and 223 of the \"Código Procesal Civil\" violated, as well as ordinal 98, subsection c) of the \"Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa,\" because the losing party was exonerated from paying the legal costs (costas). Such exoneration, it says, is a power granted to the judge; however, it is not absolute, as this Chamber has so considered, and in its favor, it mentions some resolutions. It is necessary, it continues, to make a value judgment regarding the conduct of the losing litigant in order to determine whether or not it is justified to release them from the payment of that item. In the present case, it affirms, the Court considered that since it was a matter allowing for several legal interpretations, there was sufficient reason to discuss the issue in a judicial venue. However, it considers, that posture does not constitute a value judgment regarding the litigant's conduct, since strictly speaking, having sufficient reason to litigate not only involves the party's conviction but requires that it respond to objective data from the process, from which the judge can conclude that they had well-founded reasons to believe in the merits of the claim. In the specific case, it continues, no justification can be extracted for the exoneration to proceed; on the contrary, the plaintiff ignored constitutional norms (numerals 169 and 170), the \"Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones,\" the \"Ley de Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del cantón de Esparza,\" and the principle of legal reserve in cases of tax exemptions. Now, it indicates, prior to the filing of the special tax process, the plaintiff had been warned about their situation, and therefore, they knew the opinions of the \"Procuraduría General de la República\" C-282-98 and C-062-99, such that there is no sufficient basis for the Court to allow the plaintiff to be exempted from paying the legal costs of the process.\n\nXIII.- On legal costs (costas).\n\nInformality. The appellant challenges the exemption from costs granted by the Tribunal, a criterion it considers violates precepts 222 and 223 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) as well as canon 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). The complaint does not adhere to proper technique. Pursuant to numeral 596 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is imperative for the objecting party to identify the rules that, in its opinion, have been violated by the Judge's conduct, expressly and clearly stating what the error consists of and how it was produced. From this standpoint, it is necessary to indicate that regarding the matter of costs in contentious-administrative proceedings, given the express referral made by ordinal 103 of the Law Regulating the same, the regulations to be applied, jointly with mandates 97 through 101 of that legal body, are those provided by the civil procedural legislation (with the exception of the case provided for in cardinal 69 of said Regulatory Law). In the present case, in the appellant's judgment, exemption from costs was not appropriate. In essence, what it seeks is the application of the principle of condemning the losing party. However, it omits to identify, as a violated rule, precept 221 of the Code of Procedure, which establishes the imposition of costs upon the party that has lost the case. It is precisely that provision which, within the framework of what is alleged in this complaint, could have been breached due to lack of application. In this manner, by not having cited it, the objection proves informal. In any case, for the sake of more abundant reasoning, the grievance lacks current interest, given that in the present resolution, the appeal filed by the plaintiff has been granted, so there is no basis to charge costs to it as it has not lost the case.\n\nXIV.- Corollary. By virtue of the foregoing examination, the appeal filed by the plaintiff is partially granted, with respect to the reasons on the merits, but not regarding the procedural aspects, which are rejected. Consequently, the Tribunal's ruling is annulled and, deciding on the merits, the lawsuit is granted in the sense that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from payment of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza. The administrative acts intending to levy the business license tax (impuesto de patente) on the activity carried out by said company are illegal. The defendant will be obligated to return the sums paid in excess unduly by the plaintiff by reason of the collection of that tax, as well as the corresponding interest from the date of its payment until its effective return. Given the complex nature of the debated object, this Chamber considers that resolution is appropriate without special condemnation in costs in accordance with the provisions of subsection c) of canon 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The appeal of the Municipality of Esparza is rejected, with its costs at its own expense, as provided by numeral 611 ibidem.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal filed by the Municipality of Esparza and the one filed on procedural grounds by the plaintiff are rejected; the latter is granted on the merits. The Tribunal's ruling is annulled and, deciding on the merits, the lawsuit and the appropriateness of the action are granted. Consequently, it is ordered that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from payment of the municipal business license tax (patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza. Therefore, the agreements of that Municipality intending to levy that tax on it are illegal. Likewise, it must return the sums that were paid unduly for that concept together with the corresponding interest from the date of its payment until the effective return. It is resolved without special condemnation in costs.\n\nAnabelle León Feoli\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Óscar Eduardo González Camacho\n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández Álvaro Meza Lázarus\n\nName165222\n\nIn that regard, the Constitutional Chamber has held that each municipality is free and independent to define the limits of its own taxing power, as well as the tax system, with respect to the taxable base, collection, and gathering. Hence, there exist varied tax systems depending on each local government. Among others, ruling no. 620-2001 of that high Court can be consulted. As for one of its essential components, that is, the taxable event (hecho generador) or objective material element, the issue has been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. Thus, for example, through vote 10153 issued at 14:44 on October 10, 2001, it had the opportunity to rule on the content of the aforementioned Law No. 7562, and specifically on the patent tax (gravamen de patente) in Esparza. In that judgment, it stated, in relevant part: <span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">\"…In this sense, it must be borne in mind that this tax has as its taxable event the mere exercise of a for-profit activity in a specific territorial jurisdiction, and therefore, it can in no way be configured as a tax on profits, or as in the case under study, as an incentive for production or wealth... As already stated, the payment of the patent is a tax to exercise the activity... it is not a tax on profits, but rather to maintain the validity of a license for the exercise of an activity, such that a category cannot be created when there is no reason to create it... It must be borne in mind that, in the way the applicable regulations are drafted, everyone has to pay the patent, whether or not they have gains or profits in their businesses or activities, because the tax in question is not configured as an income tax, much less..</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">.\" Regarding the causes that justified the existence of this tax, it pointed out: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">\"… the municipal patent… determines its distinctive elements which derive from its special legal nature: 1.- the justification for this tax, which derives from the need to cover the costs of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, and which imply a benefit for the businesses and shops, such as security, cleanliness, potable water and electricity services, etc.; 2.- the variety in the systems of this tax, which derives from the taxing power (potestad tributaria) of local governments, from which the taxable bases will be the most varied depending </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">(sic)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> on each canton...</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">\".</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> From the foregoing, it is clear that the tax in question has as its taxable event the development of for-profit activities. As long as there is an activity of this nature, the duty to pay the tax arises. In the present case, it is evident that this material element would be limited to the exercise of such activities within the canton of Esparza, regardless of whether that activity has generated profits or not, that aspect being relevant only to establish the calculation base, but not constituting a core point for defining when the material element arises. Hence, regarding the subjective element, the passive subject (sujeto pasivo) will be any person engaged in the exercise of this type of activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the locality. This is, in effect, established in the initial paragraph of article 1 of the cited Law No. 7562, when it states: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Individuals or legal entities that engage in for-profit activities of any type in the canton of Esparza shall be obliged to pay a patent tax, pursuant to this law</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">.\" </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IX.- The case of the Municipality of Esparza. Legal creation. Criteria for setting the calculation base.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> As has been noted, within the diverse manifestations of autonomy, on the tax plane, each local entity possesses the competence to propose the creation of taxes constituted as contributory duties of the residents, by virtue of relations or services rendered by the corporation. In the case of patents, as with other taxes arising from the exercise of this competence, each local entity proposes the main elements of the levy, among them, the taxable event, taxable base (base imponible), collection period, among others, all aspects which depend on legislative approval and, of course, on the issuance of the respective law. In the particular case of interest, the municipal patent tax of Esparza was created by Law No. 2447 of October 22, 1959, in which the Local Corporation was authorized to collect that levy. This legal set was modified by Law No. 3057 of November 7, 1962, and later by No. 4869 of October 18, 1971. Subsequently, with the enactment of Law No. 6762 of May 31, 1982, clear parameters were established to obtain the calculation base for the tax. From this</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> point, Article 6 stated: \"S</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">ave in those cases in which this law determines a different procedure for calculating the amount of the patent tax, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) and sales or gross income are established as determining factors of the imposition</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the prior fiscal year to the period being taxed.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Sales are understood as the volume thereof, after deducting the tax established in the income tax law.\" </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The highlighting is ours.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Later, that legislation was repealed by Law Number 7562 \"Municipal Tax Rates of the Canton of Esparza,\" enacted on December 26, 1995. In that latter law, regarding the taxable base, the same criteria used by the repealed regulations were taken for its establishment.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Thus, in section 3 it was established: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Determining factors of the imposition. Except in those cases in which this law determines a different procedure for setting the amount of the patent tax, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">net taxable income and annual sales or gross income received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed, are established as determining factors of the imposition</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">./ Sales are understood as the volume thereof, after deducting the tax established in the Sales Tax Law and in other laws stipulating exceptions, which the patent holder must demonstrate./ In the case of financial institutions and brokerage firms for movable and immovable property, sales or gross income are considered to be those received as commissions and interest.\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. The highlighting is not from the original. As observed, Law No. 7562 follows the same principles set by its predecessor, Law No. 6762, regarding the determining factors of the taxable base of the tax. Note that what was provided in Article 6 of Law 6762 maintained its wording in canon 3 of Law 7562 concerning those objective referents. In this way, the calculation base is determined by aspects related to the profits received from the developed activity, which does not imply that the taxable event is those profits, as has been explained. At this point, it is appropriate to clarify which of the received income are susceptible to being considered within the taxable base. Regarding the scope of the levy, it should be noted that it covers net taxable income, sales, and gross income, received by the passive subject within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Esparza, which infers a principle of territoriality. That is, those generated or received in other places would not be included. The foregoing is because the powers of local entities, including the tax power, apply within the geographic area in which the Legal System confers the competence to administer local interests, with activities developed outside the locality being outside this scope. In this line, Article 3 of the Municipal Code establishes: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">\"The territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is the respective canton...\".</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Section one of Law No. 7562 develops that criterion of territoriality. On the one hand, by establishing that the obligors are those persons who carry out for-profit activities in the canton. On the other hand, in the event that such development also occurs in other places, it provides in its final paragraph: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Individuals or legal entities whose activity is distributed in one or more cantons and who, for this reason, are subject to the payment of a patent in those cantons, must determine and demonstrate, through certification by a licensed public accountant, the proportion of their business volume that is generated in the canton of Esparza</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">.\" Therefore, the taxable base will be composed of the net taxable income, sales, and income that have been received within the canton, which implies the possible application of a criterion of proportionality when they are developed in other localities, so that the percentage corresponding to the tasks performed in Esparza is taxed. The foregoing is due to the fact that the rest of the activities carried out outside the competence of the municipality are subject to the patent taxes that each municipality establishes, so that if this distinction is not made, there is a risk of incurring double taxation. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">X.- On the specific case. Exemption regime in free trade zones (zonas francas). </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Now, having made the preceding clarifications regarding elements and relevant components of the tax, it is appropriate to proceed to establish the applicability or not of that levy to the appellant, given that, in its opinion, it is exempt by express provision of Article 20, subsection g) of Law No. 7210, as it belongs to a free trade zone.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the judgment of the Court, the taxes from which the aforementioned numeral exempts are not municipal taxes, but rather those levied on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to gains, dividends, income, or sales. Therefore, it deemed, given that the taxable event of the patent tax is the performance of for-profit activities and not net taxable income, no exoneration from local taxes is derived in favor of the plaintiff. Additionally, it based its ruling on the aspect that pursuant to literal 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation, so that given that Law No. 7562 does not contemplate that exception, Nombre11381 was not exempt from paying the patent. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">XI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In relation to the point of analysis, it is worth noting what is set forth below. With</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Law No. 7210 of November 23, 1990, published in La Gaceta No. 238 of December 14, 1990, the free trade zone regime was established, through which a set of incentives granted by the State to companies making new investments in the country is provided. It is a regulation that</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> through benefits of that order, seeks the strengthening of investment on national soil, that is, it constitutes a legislative manifestation evidencing a policy of promoting the injection of capital into the national economy, through the establishment of incentives of diverse nature. In Chapter VII of the aforementioned regulatory body, incentives of diverse nature were set for companies that joined said regime. The legislator's intention regarding this was confirmed when, in the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, No. 7293, the aforementioned incentive system was not repealed, but on the contrary, its validity was expressly established. In this way, subsection k) of Article 2 established as an exception to the general repeal of exemptions that the first section established, the exemptions that: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Are granted through the Free Trade Zone Law No. 7210 of November 23, 1990, except the benefits for the companies mentioned in subsection ch) of Article 17.\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> Thus stated, the core point, it is insisted, lies in concluding whether municipal taxes, among them the so-called patent tax, are or are not exempt under the benefit regime established by Law No. 7293. On this matter, it should be noted that this Chamber agrees with the criterion adopted by the Court in the sense that subsection g) of Article 20 of the cited legislation is not applicable to the plaintiff, and therefore, does not allow the tax benefit sought. Indeed, that norm in question, in what is relevant to the case, provided for an \"</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Exemption from all taxes on profits, as well as any other, whose taxable base is determined in relation to gross or net gains, dividends paid to shareholders, or income or sales…</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">\" Certainly, that mandate is not applicable to municipal taxes, but to taxes on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to gains, dividends, income, or sales. The tax being analyzed, it is reiterated, does not tax profits, but is established as a levy arising from the development of for-profit activities, regardless of whether incomes are obtained or not. However, by virtue of what was debated, it should be noted that subsection h) of that aforementioned precept established an exemption in favor of companies covered by the free trade zone regime, with respect to all municipal taxes and patents, for a period of ten years. Now, as deduced from the case file, through agreement no. 61-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of March 18, 1998, the Executive Branch made the decision to place the company within the free trade zone regime. With that act, the plaintiff came to hold a legal situation that placed her in a subjective position that allowed her, during the term of the tax grace, to benefit from all the incentives contained in the regulatory framework of the free trade zones from 1990 onward, incentives which, it is insisted, were not repealed with the Law of All Current Exemptions, No. 7293, in the year 1992. On the other hand, although mandate 63 of the mentioned Code establishes that an exemption is not understood to extend to taxes established after its creation, that norm is not an obstacle to the effectiveness in this case of the incentive in question, because, as has been indicated, the tax being examined was not born with the issuance of Law No. 7562, but rather emerged into legal life with Law No. 2447 of October 1959. For this reason, at the time of filing the exemption request (1998), the taxpayer was exempt from paying the patent tax of the Municipality of Esparza in accordance with what is regulated by Article 20, subsection h) of Law No. 7210. Hence, any act that sought to deny that situation and as a result, impose the payment of municipal taxes during the temporal course of the aforementioned exemption, is contrary to legality and for that reason, is null and void. Therefore, given the reasons set forth, the appeal must be upheld in this regard.\" </span></p></div></body></html>\"\n\nThe losing party is exonerated from costs.  \n\n**4.-** Both parties file an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación). The plaintiff company sets forth procedural and substantive reasons, alleging violation of articles 155 subsection 3) paragraph ch, 594 subsections 3), 7) and 9) and 595 subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil); 58 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa); 20 subsection g) of the Free Zone Regime Law (Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca); 3 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and numeral 1 of the final paragraph of Law no. 7562 on Municipal Taxes of Esparza (Ley de Impuestos Municipales de Esparza). In turn, the defendant sets forth substantive reasons, invoking the violation of articles 222 and 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) and article 98 subsection c) of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa).  \n\n**5.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings. Substitute Magistrate Álvaro Meza Lázarus participates in the decision of this matter.  \n\n**Drafted by Magistrate Escoto Fernández**  \n\n**CONSIDERANDO**  \n\n**I.-** The Municipality of Esparza (Municipalidad de Esparza), in ordinary session no. 24, article 3, Chapter III, held on September 12, 1998, did not approve the request filed by Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (hereinafter ALUNASA), to eliminate the outstanding balances payable for Real Estate Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles), as well as for the Business License Tax (Impuesto de Patentes) corresponding to the second quarter of 1998. The foregoing was because, by Executive Agreement (Acuerdo Ejecutivo) no. 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta no. 54 of March 18, 1998, it was granted the free zone regime (régimen de zona franca), classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. On March 5, 1999, Nombre36117 filed a formal claim before the Municipality, requesting the suspension of the collection request and the issuance of the respective certifications regarding its compliance with tax obligations. The Municipality, through official letter SM. 168-99, informed the plaintiff company that in ordinary session no. 49, article 14, Chapter III, of March 6, 1999, it was agreed to suspend the collection action for one month, in order to await a pronouncement from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), and to issue the requested certifications. Subsequently, and as relevant to the case, it was notified of the State representation's position regarding the proper collection of the claimed Business License Tax (Impuesto de Patentes), a criterion in which it is clarified that the tax benefit created by Law no. 7210 includes only the municipal taxes and business licenses (patentes municipales) in force at the time of the enactment of that legal body. The defendant decided to continue with the procedures to make the corresponding taxes effective. On May 25, 1999, the plaintiff company filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against that agreement. On the following June 12, the challenges were rejected as inadmissible; whereupon Nombre36117 filed an appeal for review (recurso de revisión). In ordinary session no. 14, article 1, Chapter IV, of August 9, 1999, it was rejected and the administrative channel was deemed exhausted. On October 6, 1999, the plaintiff filed a special tax lawsuit (demanda especial tributaria) against the Municipality of Esparza. In its core argument, it indicated that during 1998, Nombre36117 sold only 0.04% of its production in the canton of Esparza; another 6.58% in the rest of Costa Rican territory; it exported 12.55% to Central America, and the remaining 80.83% was sold to other markets. That year, it states, through Executive Agreement (Acuerdo Ejecutivo) number 061-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of the following March 18, it was granted the free zone regime (régimen de zona franca), classifying it as an export processing company for aluminum foil and aluminum discs. Subsequently, on February 25 of the same year, it signed a contract with the Foreign Trade Promoter (Promotora de Comercio Exterior, PROCOMER), in order to benefit from the exoneration of taxes on profits and any other tax determined in relation to gross or net earnings. Based on such facts, in essence, it requests that the judgment declare: 1- it is exempt from the payment of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza; 2- the illegality of the defendant's administrative acts that seek to tax its activity with that tax; 3- the obligation of the Municipality to refund the sums paid for this concept, together with the corresponding interest, calculated in accordance with article 58, in relation to article 57, both of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); 4- both sets of costs to be borne by the defendant. The Municipality responded negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho). The Court upheld that defense and declared the lawsuit inadmissible in all its aspects. The parties file an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación).  \n\n**Appeal of Aluminios Nacionales Sociedad Anónima (ALUNASA).**  \n\n**Cassation for procedural reasons**  \n\n**II.-** By virtue of the grievances raised and the provisions of numeral 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), which establishes the guidelines to follow when rendering judgment in cassation, the procedural objections must be analyzed first, and subsequently, the substantive ones will be heard. Regarding the former, it invokes **a single ground**. Violation of articles 58, 83, and 103, all of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), in addition to article 418 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). The Court, it says, did not grant a period to submit conclusions, prior to rendering judgment; it even notified, together with the ruling, the decision taken ten minutes earlier not to grant it, under the protection of the cited numeral 83. The procedural rules, it argues, must be interpreted in the way that best serves the right of defense. It is true that such a precept does not contemplate that stage; however, it points out, neither does it regulate other procedural acts, and they are not left unapplied for that reason. By way of example, it brings up the hearing that is granted to refer to the administrative file, which is not supported by that article. When the truth is, it elaborates, that the already cited numeral 58 warns that once the evidentiary phase has concluded, the Court must grant a period to the parties to express conclusions on the alleged facts, the evidence produced, and the grounds for their claims.  \n\n**III.-** The appellant claims it was not given a period to submit conclusions, thereby violating, in its opinion, numerals 58, 83, and 103, all of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), in addition to article 418 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). In this sense, it should be noted that through a brief filed on December 12, 2001 (visible at folio 127), the plaintiff requested to be granted the hearing to present conclusions. However, that petition was rejected in a resolution issued at 9:15 a.m. on February 5, 2002 (folio 129), on the grounds that “*…the request to grant a period to submit succinct conclusions is inadmissible, because in this type of proceeding, that stage does not exist.*” The plaintiff did not file any appeal against that decision. That request was later reiterated on May 31, 2002, and on February 10, 2004 (folios 138 and 188 respectively). The latter was again rejected through ruling no. 55-2004, issued at 10:20 a.m. on February 18, 2004, because it was not contemplated in numeral 83 of the cited Regulatory Law, a provision that regulates the procedure in tax matters (folio 189). The plaintiff also did not formulate any objection against that criterion. When procedural nullities are alleged, pursuant to the provisions of canons 597 and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), it is imperative, for the claim to be admissible, to request the rectification of the defect before the corresponding jurisdictional authority and, furthermore, when applicable, to have filed the pertinent appeals. In this case, as indicated, despite the rejection of its requests seeking to be granted a period to present conclusions, the appellant in cassation did not challenge the decision, even though it was within its power to do so. This situation, under the protection of the cited norms, precludes the possibility for this Chamber to examine the claim, which is why it must be rejected.  \n\n**Cassation for substantive reasons**  \n\n**IV.-** It alleges the following **four grounds**, which, for better understanding, are reordered as follows. **First:** it considers there was an evident omission by the Court in not analyzing the expert evidence (prueba pericial), consisting of a study prepared by the certified public accountant Licentiate Letner Hernández Vargas, appointed by that Body, on the sales made by Nombre36117 in the 1998 fiscal period. There it was determined that only 0.04% were made in the canton of Esparza, 6.58% in Costa Rica, and the remaining 93.38% outside the country. It asserts that it forgot the existence of that evidence, as it mentioned nothing about it in its ruling. In any case, it states, if it did not consider it relevant, it should have indicated so; and by not doing so, it violates the provisions of numeral 155 subsection 3) subparagraphs ch) and d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). **Second:** The judgment, it affirms, must detail the facts proven and not proven; and in this case, it is silent on that aspect; thus, not only is the previously cited article violated, and a substantive infraction committed, but it also reflects a ground for procedural reasons according to subsections 2 and 3 of article 594 ibidem. **Third:** it invokes a violation of articles 96 and 98, both of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), due to improper interpretation, the non-application of canon 4 of the Law on Municipal Taxes of Esparza no. 7562, and a violation of law regarding article 20 subsection g) of the Free Zone Regime Law no. 7210 (Ley del Régimen de Zonas Francas), by giving them a scope they do not have, based on the argument that what is taxable is the lucrative activity and not the obtaining of benefits. It does not share, it continues, the Court's position when it indicates that whether or not an activity is carried out and the place where sales are generated is irrelevant for the purpose of generating the tax, because thereby it confuses the elements of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria): the taxable event (hecho generador) with the taxable base (base imponible). These are not synonyms, it says; together with others, they form the structure of taxes. The taxable base (base imponible) of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza, it affirms, is not the productive activity itself – which is the taxable event (hecho generador) – but rather its result, that is, the gross income and the taxable net income, determined in turn by articles 3 and 4 of Law 7562, such that the rate applied to that base varies according to each of those two components. That is why, it maintains, if the business license tax (impuesto de patente) is calculated on sales or gross income and on profits, these would be the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax. It states, the Court ignores what is stipulated in article 4 of Law 7562 under the pretext that the taxable event (hecho generador) is not constituted by gross or net income. It reiterates, the event is the municipal business license (patente municipal), but the tax has, as components of the taxable base (base imponible), the gross earnings or income and the net earnings, the amount on which the tax is determined. Similarly, it argues, it is relevant that a lucrative activity was carried out, since otherwise there would be no income, much less profits; consequently, there would be no monetary sum on which to assess the tax. Furthermore, it points out, a tax that does not measure the taxpayer's economic capacity is inconceivable; that is, if there is no economic activity, there is no obligation to pay the tax. Numeral 20 of the Free Zone Regime Law (Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca), amended in 1998, it contends, recognizes the plaintiff's exemption from the payment of any tax whose taxable base (base imponible) is gross income and net earnings; therefore, not protecting that benefit violates the law. **Fourth:** it argues that precepts 3 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and 1 of Law number 7562 were violated. It says the Court errs by ignoring the concept of \"territoriality\", referred to in the lawsuit and the evidence provided to the file reinforcing this thesis. The judgment, it explains, merely indicates that, since the business license (patente) is the taxable event (hecho generador), where the gross income and taxable net income are generated is irrelevant, because the tax is indifferent to the place where those incomes originate. However, it argues, such an assertion does not correspond to the precepts of the law, because the place where the income is obtained is indeed essential for purposes of applying the tax, as can be inferred from article 1 of Law no. 7562, which it transcribes. Thus, it would be appropriate to determine where the business is conducted, since the tax perceived by the Municipality of Esparza depends on that. Such a norm, in its opinion, limits the competence of that Corporation, implying it cannot exceed the territory it administers. The ruling, it insists, omits what is stipulated in the last paragraph of the aforementioned first article and resolved against what is ordered therein, when the file shows that 99.96% of Nombre36117's income was generated outside of Esparza. In this light, it emphasizes, the resolution exceeds the tax power of the defendant, as this is a non-State territorial corporate entity, which therefore exercises its powers within the geographical space of its canton; and any petition to extend it violates numeral 3 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), as its tax power is circumscribed to the corresponding jurisdiction, and therefore, what takes place outside it cannot be taxed by the defendant.  \n\n**V.-** In its **first** claim, the appellant reproaches that the expert report (peritaje) included in the case file was not taken into account. It adds, in any case, if that evidence was not deemed relevant, it should have been recorded as such in the ruling. The claim does not adhere to the proper technique. The core aspect alleged in this grievance consists of a supposed pretermission of evidence, specifically, of the aforementioned professional opinion of Licentiate Hernández Vargas. The defect being alleged occurs when the judges fail to consider, either totally or partially, the evidence provided in the case file. This implies an ignorance of the value the law grants them; and as such, it constitutes an error of law. This last type of error, as this Chamber has indicated, takes place when evidence is granted a legally improper value, or when its proper value is denied; also, when evidence is ignored or the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) are infringed. In this instance, it is essential for the appellant in cassation to indicate, with precision, the violated rules concerning the value of the evidentiary elements it deems have been analyzed erroneously. Furthermore, as with an error of fact, it is strictly necessary to indicate which evidence was poorly assessed, what the errors committed consist of, and in turn, it is imperative to specify the legal norms that have been indirectly infringed upon on the merits, stating what the injury consists of and how it occurred, as established by precepts 595 subsection 3, 596 second paragraph, and 597, all of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). In the present case, the appellant in cassation omits any mention of the rules related to the evidentiary value of the demonstrative element it deems was pretermitted and, therefore, left unappreciated. Likewise, the citation of the substantive canons it alleges were violated by the jurisdictional conduct is missing. Its exposition is limited to the content and results of the expert opinion regarding the proportion of sales that were made in the canton of Esparza. As has been indicated, both alluded references prove to be elementary for this collegiate body to be able to examine the claim. Therefore, by failing to do so, the objection is informal, which leads to its rejection.\n\nVI.- In the second complaint, it is argued that the Tribunal's ruling is remiss in detailing the proven and unproven facts, which constitutes the defect of inconsistency. On this point, it should be noted that this defect consists of a lack of correspondence between what was requested by the parties, not throughout the process, but in their statements of claim or counterclaim and their respective responses, and what was decided in the ruling; not because the ruling decides something different from what the litigants wanted, but because a ruling on some matter submitted for debate is omitted (minima petita), or more than what was requested is granted (ultra petita), or because what was decided does not correspond to what was petitioned (extra petita), or because it contains contradictory provisions. However, in reality, what is alleged is an improper foundation of the judgment, which is proper to an appeal on substantive grounds, due to indirect violation. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the name given by the appellant to their grievances is not an obstacle to the rigorous analysis, as its legal classification is exclusively its responsibility. Hence, it has analyzed charges filed as procedural as if they were substantive, and vice versa. Of course, the examination is subject to compliance with the various requirements that the Legal System establishes for the specific defect. Seen in this light, the complaint does not conform to the proper technique. This is because the appellant does not indicate with the required clarity where the defect lies, nor does she specify which substantive rules have been infringed. These deficiencies determine the rejection of the grievance. Nevertheless, for an abundance of reasoning, the alleged illegality is not observed. Indeed, a study of the criticized resolution leads to the conclusion that it does not present the referred omissions. The judgment contains an entire recital referring to the proven facts that served as the basis for the substantive analysis and the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, as required by canon 155 of the civil procedural law. Likewise, if the Judges determined that there were no facts that could be considered unproven, or that in any way affected the pronouncement issued, it was unnecessary to make a record of this. Therefore, the objection must be rejected.\n\nVII.- Regarding the third and fourth charges, the core point revolves around the appellant's duty or lack thereof to pay the patent tax (impuesto de patente) to the Municipalidad de Esparza. The appellant argues that numeral 20 of the Ley del Régimen de Zona Franca exempts them from paying that tax. Furthermore, by virtue of the concept of territoriality, the taxable base (base imponible) of the patent tax would be comprised of the income and sales made in Esparza, not those made in other locations. Thus, their examination will be carried out jointly as they deal with common themes.\n\nVIII.- On the municipal patent tax. Taxable event (Hecho generador). The autonomy conferred by the constituent on local corporations (article 170 of the Constitution) empowers them, as a manifestation of this independence, in its tax dimension, to propose (by way of initiative) the creation, modification, and extinction of taxes generated within the context of their territorial scope and that, therefore, are established as tax obligations seeking to obtain income to meet their functions. Within these manifestations, of course, it includes the proposal to establish exemption regimes or, in general, tax benefits within the framework of those legal-tax relationships that arise in the local environment. As stipulated by precept 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, it is the Asamblea Legislativa that is responsible for approving those tax proposals (on this subject, see, among many, judgments 4072-95, 5445-99, 0620-2001 from the Constitutional Court). By virtue of the principle of tax legality that derives from that mandate, it is with the issuance of the respective law that the tax is born and, therefore, the tax obligation arises. From this perspective, the current Código Municipal establishes in its mandate 79 that the exercise of lucrative activities requires a license issued by the local government (popularly called a patent (patente)), which is obtained by paying a tax. This is a rule that allows each Local Government to establish the specific bases of that levy in its territorial jurisdiction. This tax, therefore, is subject to regulation by each local entity, which is responsible, in the stated terms, for establishing the essential elements of the levy. In that direction, the Sala Constitucional has held that each municipality is free and independent to define the limits of its own taxing power, as well as the tax system, regarding the taxable base, collection, and gathering. Hence, there are various tax systems depending on each local government. Among others, ruling no. 620-2001 of that high Court can be consulted. Regarding one of its essential components, i.e., the taxable event or objective material element, the subject has been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. For example, through vote 10153 at 14:44 on October 10, 2001, it had the opportunity to rule on the content of the aforementioned Law No. 7562, and specifically on the patent tax in Esparza. That judgment stated, in relevant part: \"...In this sense, it must be kept in mind that this tax has as its taxable event the mere exercise of a lucrative activity in a determined territorial jurisdiction, and therefore, in no way can it be configured as a tax on profits, or as in the case under study, as an incentive to production or wealth... As already stated, patent payment is a tax to exercise the activity... it is not a tax on profits, but to maintain the validity of a license for the exercise of an activity, in such a way that a category cannot be created when there is no reason to create it... It must be kept in mind that in the way the applicable regulations are drafted, everyone has to pay the patent, whether or not they have earnings or profits in their businesses or activities, since the tax in question is not configured as an income tax, far from it…”. Regarding the causes that justified the existence of this tax, it stated: “... the municipal patent… determines its distinctive elements that derive from its special legal nature: 1.- the justification for this tax, which derives from the need to cover the costs of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, and which imply a benefit for businesses and shops, such as security, sanitation, potable water and electricity services, etc.; 2.- the variety in the systems of this tax, which derives from the taxing power of local governments, from which the taxable bases will be the most varied depending (sic) on each canton...”. From the foregoing, it is clear that the tax in question has as its taxable event the development of lucrative activities. As long as an activity of this nature exists, the duty to pay the tax arises. In the present case, it is evident that this material element would be limited to the exercise of such type of activities within the canton of Esparza, regardless of whether that activity has generated profits or not, as that aspect is only relevant to establish the base for calculation, but does not constitute a core point for defining when the material element arises. Hence, regarding the subjective element, the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) will be any person engaged in the exercise of this type of activity within the territorial jurisdiction of the locality. Thus, indeed, it is established in the initial paragraph of article 1 of the cited Law no. Placa25503, when it states: \"Individuals or legal entities engaged in the exercise of lucrative activities of any type in the canton of Esparza, shall be obligated to pay a patent tax, in accordance with this law.”\n\nIX.- The case of the Municipalidad de Esparza. Legal creation. Criteria for setting the calculation base. As has been pointed out, within the various manifestations of autonomy, in the tax sphere, each local entity has the competence to propose the creation of the taxes constituted as contributory duties of the local residents, by virtue of relations or services provided by the corporation. In the case of patents, as with other taxes that arise as a consequence of the exercise of this competence, each local entity proposes the principal elements of the levy, including the taxable event, the taxable base, the collection period, among others, all of which depend on legislative approval and, of course, the issuance of the respective law. In the particular case at hand, the municipal patent tax of Esparza was created through Law no. 2447 of October 22, 1959, which authorized the Local Corporation to charge that levy. This legal set was modified by Law no. 3057 of November 7, 1962, and then by Law no. 4869 of October 18, 1971. Subsequently, with the enactment of Law no. 6762 of May 31, 1982, clear parameters were established to obtain the calculation base for the tax. From this perspective, article 6 stated: “Save for the cases in which this law determines a different procedure to calculate the amount of the patent tax, the determinative factors for the imposition are established as the net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) and the sales or gross income, received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal year prior to the period being taxed. By sales is understood the volume thereof, after the deduction of the tax established in the income tax law.” The emphasis is our own. Then, that legislation was repealed by Law number 7562 “Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza”, enacted on December 26, 1995. In this latter law, with respect to the taxable base, the same criteria used by the repealed regulation were taken for its establishment. Thus, in ordinal 3 it was established: “Determinative factors for the imposition. Save for the cases in which this law determines a different procedure to fix the amount of the patent tax, the determinative factors for the imposition are established as the net taxable income and the annual sales or gross income received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed./ By sales is understood the volume thereof, after the deduction of the tax established in the sales tax Law and in others stipulating exceptions, which the patent holder must demonstrate./ In the case of financial establishments and brokerages of movable and immovable property, sales or gross income are considered to be those received for commissions and interest.” The highlighting is not from the original. As observed, Law no. 7562 follows the same principles set by its predecessor, Law no. 6762, concerning the determinative factors of the taxable base of the tax. Note that the provision in article 6 of Law 6762 maintained its wording in canon 3 of Law 7562 regarding those objective references. In this way, the calculation base is determined by aspects related to the profits received from the activity carried out, which does not imply that the taxable event is those profits, as has been explained. At this point, it is important to clarify which of the income received is liable to be considered within the taxable base. Regarding the scope of the levy, it should be noted that it covers the net taxable income, sales, and gross income, received by the taxpayer within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalidad de Esparza, which implies a principle of territoriality. That is, those generated or received in other places would not be included. The above is due to the fact that the powers of local entities, including the taxing power, apply within the geographical area in which the Legal System confers competence to administer local interests, activities carried out outside the locality being outside this scope. In this line, article 3 of the Código Municipal establishes: “The territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is the respective canton...”. The first numeral of Law no. 7562 develops this criterion of territoriality. On one hand, by establishing that the obligated parties are those persons who carry out lucrative activities in the canton. On the other hand, in the event that this development also occurs in other places, it provides in its final paragraph: “Individuals or legal entities whose activity is distributed in one or more cantons and who, for that reason, are subject to patent payment in those cantons, must determine and demonstrate, through certification from an authorized public accountant, the proportion of their business volume generated in the canton of Esparza.” Therefore, the taxable base will be composed of the net taxable income, sales, and income that have been received within the canton, which implies the possible application of a proportionality criterion when they are developed in other localities, so that the percentage corresponding to the tasks carried out in Esparza is taxed. The above, due to the fact that the rest of the activities carried out outside the competence of the municipality are subject to the patent taxes that each municipality establishes, so that if this distinction is not made, there is a risk of incurring double taxation.\n\nX.- Regarding the specific case. Exemption regime in free trade zones (zonas francas). Now, having made the previous precisions regarding the relevant elements and components of the tax, it is necessary to proceed to establish the applicability or not of that levy to the appellant, given that, in her opinion, she is exempt by express provision of article 20, subsection g) of Law no. 7210, as she belongs to a free trade zone. In the Tribunal's judgment, the taxes from which the mentioned numeral releases are not the municipal ones, but those levied on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to earnings, dividends, income, or sales. Therefore, it estimated, given that the patent tax has as its taxable event the performance of lucrative activities and not the net taxable income, no exemption from local taxes is derived in favor of the plaintiff. Additionally, it supported its judgment on the aspect that according to literal 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation, so that, since Law no. Placa25503 does not contemplate that exception, Nombre36117 was not exempt from paying the patent.\n\nXI.- In relation to the point of analysis, it is pertinent to note what is set forth below. With Law no. 7210 of November 23, 1990, published in La Gaceta no. 238 of December 14, 1990, the free trade zone regime was established, through which a set of incentives granted by the State to companies making new investments in the country is provided. This is a norm that, through benefits of that order, seeks to strengthen investment on national soil, that is, it constitutes a legislative manifestation evidencing a policy of promoting the injection of capital into the national economy, by establishing incentives of a diverse nature. In chapter VII of the aforementioned regulatory body, incentives of a diverse nature were set for the companies that joined said regime. The legislator's intention regarding this was confirmed when, in the Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, no. 7293, the indicated incentive system was not repealed, but on the contrary, its validity was expressly established. Thus, in subsection k) of article 2, it was established as an exception to the general repeal of exemptions that the first ordinal established, the exemptions that: \"Are granted through the Ley de Zonas Francas No 7210 of November 23, 1990, except for the benefits for the companies mentioned in subsection ch) of article 17.\" Having laid this out, the crucial point, it is insisted, lies in concluding whether municipal taxes, among them the so-called patent tax, are or are not exempt under the benefit regime established by Law no. 7293. On this particular, it is pertinent to note that this Chamber agrees with the criterion adopted by the Tribunal in the sense that subsection g) of article 20 of the cited legislation is not applicable to the plaintiff, and therefore, does not allow the tax benefit sought. Indeed, that rule in question, in what is relevant to the case, provided an \"Exemption from all taxes on profits, as well as any other, whose taxable base is determined in relation to gross or net earnings, dividends paid to shareholders, or income or sales…\" Certainly, that mandate is not applicable to municipal taxes, but to taxes on profits and others whose taxable base is determined in relation to earnings, dividends, income, or sales. The tax under analysis, it is reiterated, does not tax profits, but is established as a levy that arises from the development of lucrative activities, regardless of whether income is obtained or not. However, by virtue of what has been debated, it is pertinent to indicate that in subsection h) of that alluded precept, an exemption was established in favor of companies covered by the free trade zone regime, regarding all municipal taxes and patents, for a period of ten years. Now, as can be deduced from the case file, through agreement no. 61-98 of February 12, 1998, published in La Gaceta of March 18, 1998, the Executive Branch made the decision to place the company within the free trade zone regime. With this act, the plaintiff came to hold a legal situation that placed her in a subjective position allowing her, during the term of the tax grace period, to benefit from all the incentives contained in the regulatory framework of free trade zones starting from 1990, which, it is insisted, were not repealed by the Ley de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, no. 7293, in the year 1992. On the other hand, although mandate 63 of the referred Code establishes that the exemption is not understood to be extensible to taxes established after its creation, that norm is not an obstacle to the effectiveness of the reference incentive in this case, since, as has been indicated, the tax under examination was not born with the issuance of Law no. 7562, but rather arose into legal life with Law no. 2447 of October 1959. For this reason, at the time of formulating the exemption request (1998), the taxpayer was exempt from paying the patent tax of the Municipalidad de Esparza, in accordance with what is regulated by article 20, subsection h) of Law no. 7210. Hence, any act that sought to deny that situation and, as a result, impose the payment of municipal taxes during the temporal course of the indicated exemption, is contrary to legality and, for that reason, is null. Therefore, in view of the stated reasons, the appeal must be upheld on this particular.\n\nAppeal by the Municipality of Esparza\n\n**XII.-** It files an appeal on substantive grounds, alleging a **single ground.** It considers that articles 222 and 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) have been violated, as well as subsection c) of article 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), because the losing party was exempted from paying costs. Such exemption, it says, is a power granted to the judge; however, it is not absolute, as this Chamber has held, and it mentions some resolutions in its favor. It is necessary, it continues, to make a value judgment regarding the conduct of the losing litigant, in order to determine whether or not it is justified to release them from paying that item. In the present case, it affirms, the Tribunal considered that, as it was a matter allowing for various legal interpretations, there was sufficient reason to litigate the issue in court. However, it considers that this position does not constitute a value judgment regarding the litigant's conduct, since, strictly speaking, having sufficient reason to litigate implies not only the party's conviction but also requires that it responds to objective data in the proceedings, from which the judge can conclude that there were well-founded reasons to believe in the merit of the claim. In the specific case, it continues, no justification can be extracted for the exemption to proceed; on the contrary, the plaintiff ignored constitutional provisions (articles 169 and 170), the Law Regulating Existing Exemptions, Repeals, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones), the Law on Municipal Tax Rates of the canton of Esparza (Ley de Tarifas de Impuestos Municipales del cantón de Esparza), and the principle of legal reserve in cases of tax exemptions. Now then, it indicates that, prior to the filing of the special tax proceeding, the plaintiff had been warned of its situation; therefore, it knew the opinions of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) C-282-98 and C-062-99, such that there is no sufficient basis for the Tribunal to allow the plaintiff to be exempted from paying the costs of the proceeding.\n\n**XIII.-** **Regarding costs. Informality.** The appellant challenges the waiver of costs ordered by the Tribunal, a criterion which, it considers, violates the provisions of articles 222 and 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as article 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The complaint does not conform to proper technique. According to article 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is imperative for the objecting party to indicate the rules that, in its opinion, have been violated by the Judge's actions, expressly and clearly stating what the error consists of and how it occurred. From this standpoint, it must be noted that on the matter of costs in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, given the express referral made by article 103 of its Regulating Law, the regulations to be applied, together with the mandates of articles 97 to 101 of that legal body, are those provided for by civil procedural legislation (with the exception of the case provided for in article 69 of said Regulating Law). In the present case, in the appellant's judgment, an exemption from costs was not appropriate. In essence, what it seeks is the application of the principle that costs are to be borne by the losing party. However, it omits to identify article 221 of the Code of Procedure as the violated rule, which establishes the imposition of costs on the party that has lost the proceeding. It is precisely that provision which, within the framework of what has been alleged in this complaint, could have been violated by lack of application. Thus, by not having cited it, the objection becomes informal. In any case, for further abundance of reasons, the grievance lacks current interest, given that in this present resolution the appeal filed by the plaintiff has been upheld, so that it is not appropriate to charge it with costs since it has not been the losing party.\n\n**XIV.-** **Corollary.** By virtue of the foregoing examination, the appeal filed by the plaintiff is partially upheld, regarding the substantive grounds, but not that relating to procedural aspects, which are rejected. Consequently, the pronouncement of the Tribunal is annulled and, ruling on the merits, the claim is upheld in the sense that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from paying the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) of the canton of Esparza. The administrative acts that seek to tax the activity carried out by said company with the business license tax are illegal. It shall be the obligation of the defendant to return the sums overpaid by the plaintiff due to the collection of that tax, as well as the corresponding interest from the date of its payment until the effective refund. Given the complex nature of the subject debated, this Chamber considers it appropriate to resolve without special imposition of costs, in accordance with the provisions of subsection c) of article 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The appeal of the Municipality of Esparza is rejected, with its costs to be borne by it, as provided in article 611 ibidem.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal filed by the Municipality of Esparza is rejected, along with the appeal filed by the plaintiff on procedural grounds; the latter is upheld on the merits. The pronouncement of the Tribunal is annulled and, ruling on the merits, the claim and the appropriateness of the action are declared with merit. Consequently, it is ordered that the company Aluminios Nacionales S.A. is exempt from paying the municipal business license tax of the canton of Esparza. Therefore, the agreements of that Municipality that seek to tax it with that tribute are illegal. Likewise, it must return the sums that were improperly paid for that concept, together with the corresponding interest from the date of their payment until the effective refund. Resolved without special imposition of costs.\n\n**Anabelle León Feoli**\n\n**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Óscar Eduardo González Camacho**\n\n**Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Álvaro Meza Lázarus**\n\nNombre165222"
}