{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-397489",
  "citation": "Res. 00007-2008 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Improcedencia del interdicto de amparo de posesión sobre bienes de dominio público expropiados",
  "title_en": "Inadmissibility of possessory interdict over expropriated public domain property",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal revoca la sentencia de primera instancia que declaró con lugar un interdicto de amparo de posesión interpuesto por herederos contra la Municipalidad de Alajuela en relación con fincas expropiadas para una ciudadela deportiva y el ferrocarril. El Tribunal determina que los inmuebles son bienes de dominio público, destinados a zonas verdes y derecho de vía ferroviario, por lo que están fuera del comercio y no pueden ser objeto de posesión por particulares. La acción interdictal es improcedente por la naturaleza demanial de los terrenos, el pago total de la indemnización y la posesión legítima ejercida por la municipalidad. Se condena en costas a los actores por su actuación temeraria intentando ejercer posesión sobre bienes que sabían expropiados.",
  "summary_en": "The Court reverses a first-instance ruling that granted a possessory interdict in favor of heirs against the Municipality of Alajuela regarding properties expropriated for a sports complex and railway. The Court finds the properties are public domain assets, designated as green areas and railway right-of-way, and therefore outside commerce and not subject to private possession. The interdict is inadmissible due to the public nature of the land, full payment of compensation, and the municipality's lawful possession. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay costs for their reckless attempt to claim possession over property they knew had been expropriated.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II",
  "date": "17/01/2008",
  "year": "2008",
  "topic_ids": [
    "property-and-titling",
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "property-and-titling",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "interdicto de amparo de posesión",
    "bienes demaniales",
    "derecho de vía",
    "inalienabilidad",
    "imprescriptibilidad",
    "retrocesión",
    "bienes comunales",
    "poder de policía"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "interdicto de amparo de posesión",
    "dominio público",
    "bienes demaniales",
    "expropiación",
    "zonas verdes",
    "derecho de vía",
    "inalienabilidad",
    "imprescriptibilidad",
    "municipalidad",
    "posesión ilegítima"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "possessory interdict",
    "public domain",
    "demanial assets",
    "expropriation",
    "green zones",
    "railway right-of-way",
    "inalienability",
    "imprescriptibility",
    "municipality",
    "illegitimate possession"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "el amparo de posesión no procede contra bienes de dominio público, pues no existe por parte de los particulares un derecho de posesión, sino de uso, a través de los permisos y concesiones dados conforme a la ley; de donde, la posesión -como atributo del derecho de posesión- sólo puede ser ejercida por los entes titulares del derecho, sin que ningún sujeto privado pueda legalmente reclamar actos posesorios -salvo que estos se hayan efectuado antes de que la Institución pública adquiera la propiedad, y únicamente para efectos de una eventual indemnización-.",
  "excerpt_en": "the possessory interdict does not lie against public domain assets, because individuals do not have a right of possession but only a right of use through legally granted permits and concessions; hence possession—as an attribute of ownership—can only be exercised by the title-holding entities, and no private person may lawfully claim possessory acts (unless they were carried out before the public institution acquired the property, and solely for purposes of a potential indemnification).",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Denegado",
    "summary_en": "The lower court's ruling is reversed and the interdict is dismissed, finding the possessory action inadmissible over public domain assets.",
    "summary_es": "Se revoca la sentencia de instancia y se declara sin lugar el interdicto, declarando improcedente la acción posesoria sobre bienes de dominio público."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "the possessory interdict does not lie against public domain assets, because individuals do not have a right of possession but only a right of use through legally granted permits and concessions.",
      "quote_es": "el amparo de posesión no procede contra bienes de dominio público, pues no existe por parte de los particulares un derecho de posesión, sino de uso, a través de los permisos y concesiones dados conforme a la ley."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "the interdicts filed are inadmissible, due to the special nature of the properties that are the subject of this proceeding.",
      "quote_es": "son improcedentes los interdictos formulados, en razón de la especial naturaleza de las fincas sobre las que se formula este proceso."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "this evidences a clearly reckless action and claim, especially considering that the Nombre70526 siblings themselves filed a request for reversion of the expropriation... which shows they were aware that the lands do not belong to them, nor does their possession.",
      "quote_es": "ello evidencia una actuación y demanda a todas luces temerarias, sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta que, los mismos hermanos Nombre70526 formularon gestión de retrocesión de la expropiación ... lo cual evidencia el conocimiento de que tales tierras no les pertenecen, así como tampoco su posesión."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-27738",
      "citation": "Ley 7554",
      "title_en": "Organic Environmental Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "04/10/1995",
      "year": "1995"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-35669",
      "citation": "Ley 4240",
      "title_en": "Urban Planning Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Planificación Urbana",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "15/11/1968",
      "year": "1968"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-41661",
      "citation": "Ley 7575",
      "title_en": "Forestry Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Forestal",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "13/02/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    }
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  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-139705",
      "citation": "Res. 10466-2000 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Hydroelectric concessions require specific framework law",
      "title_es": "Concesiones hidroeléctricas requieren ley marco específica",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "24/11/2000",
      "year": "2000"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-193702",
      "citation": "Res. 02988-1999 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Land titling in protected areas: unconstitutionality of Art. 8 Law 7599",
      "title_es": "Titulación en áreas protegidas: inconstitucionalidad del Art. 8 Ley 7599",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "23/04/1999",
      "year": "1999"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-241772",
      "citation": "Res. 03480-2003 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Constitutionality of the Playa Platanares Regulatory Plan Versus the Preciosa-Platanares National Wildlife Refuge",
      "title_es": "Constitucionalidad del Plan Regulador de Playa Platanares frente al Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Preciosa-Platanares",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "02/05/2003",
      "year": "2003"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-27738",
      "citation": "Ley 7554",
      "title_en": "Organic Environmental Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "04/10/1995",
      "year": "1995"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-35669",
      "citation": "Ley 4240",
      "title_en": "Urban Planning Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Planificación Urbana",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "15/11/1968",
      "year": "1968"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-41661",
      "citation": "Ley 7575",
      "title_en": "Forestry Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Forestal",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "13/02/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-397489",
  "tier": 2,
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    {
      "doc_id": "norm-35669",
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  "body_es_text": "Exp\n\n \n\nExp. 01-002278-638-CI \n\n No. 7-2008. \n\nSECCIÓN SEGUNDA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del diecisiete de enero del dos mil ocho. \n\nInterdicto de amparo de posesión y suspensión de obra promovido por Nombre70522 , profesor, cédula de identidad número CED52755; Nombre70523 , profesora, con cédula número CED52756; Nombre70524 , profesora, portadora de la cédula CED52757; Nombre70525 , ama de casa, cédula de identidad CED52758; Nombre70526 , ama da casa, portadora de la cédula CED52759 y Nombre70526 , mecánico de precisión, cédula número CED52760, todos mayores y casados, a excepción de los dos últimos, vecinos de Monserrat de Alajuela de la Iglesia setenta y cinco metros al este, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE ALAJUELA, representada por su Alcaldesa Nombre37958 , mayor, Doctora en Filosofía, casada, cédula de identidad número CED30206, vecina de Alajuela. Actúa como apoderado especial judicial de los gestionantes el licenciado Alvaro Enrique Hernández Hernández, cédula número CED35483 y vecino de Alajuela. \n\nRESULTANDO: \n\n1.- Los gestionantes interponen proceso interdictal de amparo de posesión y suspensión de obra para que en sentencia se ordene a la Municipalidad de Alajuela que cese la construcción de una cerca y de realizar actos perturbatorios que tienen la intención de despojarlos de las propiedades de las cuales son propietarios registrales y poseedores inscritas en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, Partido de Alajuela, Folio Real Matrículas número Placa11499, Placa11497 , situadas en Monserrat de Alajuela, costado sur del Polideportivo de Alajuela que colinda además con calle pública; posesión que acreditan con el pago de los impuestos municipales del dos mil y labores de limpieza de las fincas indicadas. Asimismo, solicitan que se condene a la municipalidad accionada al pago de las costas personales y procesales de este proceso (folios 77 a 79 y 82). \n\n2.- En tiempo y forma la municipalidad demandada contesta negativamente la demanda interpuesta en su contra, alegando que esas propiedades fueron expropiadas por el municipio conforme a diligencias de expropiación que se tramitaron ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo en expediente número 3061-75, precisamente para al construcción de un polideportivo, inmuebles que fueron debidamente pagados, y en virtud de lo cual, han realizado actos posesorios en esos inmuebles, por lo que solicita se declare sin lugar la presente acción y se ordene a los actores la paralización de los obras por ellos realizadas, en aras de la protección del interés público. Asimismo, solicita que se condene a los accionantes al pago de ambas costas de esta acción (92 a 99). \n\n3.- Que el Juez de Instancia, Otto González Vílchez, en sentencia 377-07, de las quince horas treinta minutos del veinte de marzo del dos mil siete dispuso: \"Se declara inadmisible las prueba para mejor resolver aportada por la parte actora, respecto a la copia certificada del juicio sucesorio número 00-001758-638-CI. Se declaran inadmisibles las pruebas para mejor resolver aportadas por la parte demandada que consisten en la copia certificada del expediente judicial de expropiación número 3061 del año 75 y la copia del reclamo administrativo presentado por los actores ante el ente municipal. Se admiten como prueba para mejor resolver la ampliación de la prueba testimonial ordenada por el Juzgado Civil y Agrario de Alajuela, visibles a folios 724 al 726 y a folios 733 al 734, todos del expediente judicial. De conformidad con los artículos 457, 459, 461 y 463 del Código Procesal Civil -de aplicación plena en esta materia por permitirlo el artículo 103 de la Ley Reguladora de esta Jurisdicción- se declara con lugar la presente demanda sumaria interdictal, en su modalidad de amparo de posesión, interpuesta por Nombre70522 , Nombre70523 , Nombre70524 , Nombre70525 , Nombre70526 y Nombre70526 contra la Municipalidad de Alajuela. De conformidad con el artículo 463 del Código Procesal Civil, se ordena mantener a los actores en posesión de los inmuebles objeto de este interdicto. Asimismo, se le ordena a la Municipalidad de Alajuela, para que en lo sucesivo, se abstenga de perturbar la posesión de los accionantes sobre los inmuebles objeto de este interdicto, bajo el apercibimiento de que en caso contrario serán juzgados los representantes y funcionarios de dicha corporación municipal, que no acaten lo ordenado en esta sentencia, por el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad. Se condena al pago de ambas costas de esta acción a la parte demandada, Municipalidad de Alajuela\" (folios 771 y 772). \n\n4.- Inconforme con lo resuelto por el A-quo, apela la Alcaldesa de la Municipalidad demandada, recurso que fue admitido, y en virtud del cual conoce este Tribunal en alzada. \n\n5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor, sin que se noten causales de nulidad susceptibles de invalidar lo actuado, y se dicta sentencia, previa deliberación; y, \n\nRedacta la Juez Fernández Brenes; y, \n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\nI.- DE LA PRUEBA OFRECIDA PARA MEJOR PROVEER.- Mediante escrito presentado el cinco de abril del dos mil dos (visible de folio149), los gestionantes de este interdicto aportan certificación del sucesorio tramitado en expediente número 00- 001758-638-CI, ante el Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajuela (folios 151 a 229); a efecto de que se tenga como prueba para mejor resolver; y de igual manera, el gobierno local demandado en memorial del diecisiete de abril (folio 230) y del trece de junio (folio 679), ambos memoriales del dos mil dos, presenta copia certificada de las diligencias de expropiación que se tramitaron en expediente 3061-75 de los inmuebles 120.442, 98.418,122.604 y13.326 (folios 231 a 668 vuelto) y de la gestión formulada por los hermanos Nombre70526 ante esa institución (folios 650 a 687), donde solicita la retrocesión de los inmuebles expropiados a su difunta madre por esa corporación. Conforme al artículo 331 del Código Procesal Civil la pertinencia de su admisión está reservada al grado de influencia que tenga en la decisión del fallo; de manera que, habiéndose puesto en conocimiento de las partes intervinientes de este proceso la prueba referida (resolución de las siete horas cincuenta minutos del veintiocho de noviembre del dos mil dos, del Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, visible a folio 710), y analizada en esta instancia, estima este Tribunal que la misma sí es pertinente a las resultas de esta decisión, en tanto, no obstante que en los procesos interdictales la discusión está constreñida a la posesión del inmueble y no al mejor derecho que se tenga sobre éste (artículo 457 del Código Procesal Civil), es lo cierto que de esta prueba es posible derivar, la especial naturaleza de los inmuebles sobre cuya posesión se intenta hacer la declaratoria, al ser bienes de dominio público, en atención al proceso de expropiación indicado. \n\nII.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- Se sustituyen los hechos tenidos por probados por existir una serie de omisiones e inconsistencias en su consignación, para que se tengan de la siguiente manera: 1.) Que la Municipalidad de Alajuela decidió expropiar los inmuebles del Partido de Alajuela, con las matrículas número Placa11500, Placa11498, Placa11501 y Placa11502, ubicados en el Dirección7894: , ; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, para la construcción de una ciudadela deportiva (contestación de la demanda, folios 95 y 96, Artículo II de la sesión ordinaria 14 del Concejo de Alajuela, del 21 de febrero de 1974, y Artículo 14 de la sesión ordinaria 43, del 17 de abril de 1975, folios 246 a 249, y 251 a 252); 2.) Que habiéndose opuesto la propietaria -Nombre70527 - al valor de la indemnización dado en el avalúo administrativo, formuló diligencias de expropiación, que se tramitaron ante el Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en expediente número 3061-75 (folios 240 a 244); 3.) Que estando en curso estas diligencias de expropiación, le fue expropiada a la señora Nombre70527 , de la finca inscrita en el sistema de folio real con la matrícula Placa11498, una franja de terreno de tres mil cuatrocientos cincuenta metros cuadrados, para la construcción de la interconexión de ferrocarriles en Alajuela (FECOSA); dejando dos remanentes, que conjuntamente miden mil ciento ochenta y siete metros cuadrados cuarenta y un decímetros, sesenta centímetros cuadrados, cuya indemnización fue fijada en avalúo administrativo por la suma de doscientos cuarenta y un mil colones, la cual fue aceptada por la expropiada (estudio y avalúo administrativo, folios 356 a 367, y sentencia de las diez horas del cinco de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y ocho, del Juzgado Primero de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, folios 401 a 404); 4.) Que el monto de la indemnización de las fincas 12.442, 98.418, 122.604 y 13.326, ubicados en el Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, menos la franja expropiada para la interconexión de ferrocarriles de Alajuela, fue fijado en seis millones trescientos cuarenta y cuatro mil cuatrocientos setenta y seis colones con veinte céntimos (¢ 6.344.476.20), debiendo pagar intereses del seis por ciento anual de la indemnización fijada, a partir de la entrada en posesión de los inmuebles, (sentencias número 6, de las 9:45 horas del 6 de enero de 1986, dictada por el Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda y número 2743, de las 5:20 horas del primero de agosto de 1986, de la Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, folios 417 a 423 y 523 a 525); 5.) Que la Municipalidad de Alajuela canceló la totalidad de la deuda principal y los intereses devengados (depósito judicial del avalúo administrativo, número 932.290, del 21 de octubre de 1976, por el monto de doscientos cinco mil trescientos sesenta y ocho colones con cincuenta y cinco colones -¢ 205.368.55-; depósito judicial número 707831, del 19 de agosto de 1987, por el monto de seis millones ciento treinta y nueve mil ciento ocho colones -¢ ...299-; depósito judicial número 622047c, por la suma de quinientos sesenta y ocho mil doscientos setenta y dos colones con noventa y un céntimos -¢ 568.272.91-; y el depósito judicial 858332 CH, por cuarenta y cinco mil cuatrocientos siete colones con ochenta y siete céntimos ¢ 45.407.87-, y resolución de las 9:00 horas del 22 de febrero de 1991 del Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda; folios 263, 567 y 568, 626 y 627, 660, 665, respectivamente), a Nombre70528 , a quien la señora Nombre70527 había cedido los derechos derivados de las diligencias de expropiación, con conocimiento de sus hijos, en tanto Nombre70522 , firma en nombre de la cedente por su mal estado de salud, y figuran como testigos Nombre70523 y Nombre70526 , ambos Nombre70526 (escrito visible a folio 415) (testimonio de Nombre70529 , folios 129 frente y vuelto); 6.) Que a las 9:15 horas del 30 de setiembre 1988, se puso en posesión a la Municipalidad de las fincas expropiadas (acta de puesta en posesión, folios 611 y 612); 7.) Que en la resolución de las 13:30 horas del 9 de julio del 2001, el Juzgado Segundo Civil y de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía del Primero Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, en sucesión de Nombre70528 y Nombre70527 -que se tramitó en expediente 00-001758-638-CI- declaró únicos y universales herederos de los causantes a sus hijos Nombre70522 , Nombre70523, Nombre70526 , Nombre70524, Nombre70525 y Nombre70526, todos de apellidos Nombre70526 , habiéndose inventariado como parte del haber sucesorio o caudal hereditario los inmuebles del Partido de Alajuela, con las matrículas número Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 y Placa11502, ubicados en el Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, \"sin perjuicio de terceros de mejor derecho\" (folios 169 frente y vuelto, 189 a 196); 7.) Que los hermanos Nombre70526 aparecen registralmente como propietarios de los inmuebles del Partido de Alajuela, con las matrículas número Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 y Placa11502, ubicados en el Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, a partir del 3 de setiembre del 2001, consignándose como causa de adquisición la herencia (certificaciones de propiedad a folios 5 al 76 del expediente judicial); 8.) Que en las fincas cuya posesión se discute se realizaron actividades deportivas, construyéndose al efecto una cancha de béisbol, una pista para motocross, con su torre de control incluida y una plaza para niños, instalaciones que están en desuso, por lo que los lotes están enzacatados y en partes recortado, sobre las que la municipalidad ejerce un control de vigilancia, por lo que levantó parte de una tapia (reconocimiento judicial folio 121 y 122, testimonios de Nombre70530 , Nombre70531 , Nombre70532 , Nombre70533 , Nombre70534 , folios 123 vuelto; 125 frente, 126 frente; 127 frente y 128 frente y 735; 130 vuelto y 131 vuelto; 133 frente y vuelto, 134 frente y vuelto, 135 frente y vuelto, respectivamente); 9.) Que a partir del año 2000, sin precisarse fecha exacta, los hermanos Nombre70526 intentaron realizar labores de limpieza de las fincas objeto de este interdicto, labores que fueron interrumpidas por la policía municipal (testimonios de Nombre70530 , Nombre70531 , Nombre70532 ; Nombre70534 , folios 123 vuelto y 728; 125 frente y vuelto y 726 frente; 126 vuelto, 127 frente y 128 frente; 133 vuelto, 134 vuelto, 135 frente y vuelto, 735, respectivamente); 10.) Que los vecinos del lugar tuvieron conocimiento de las diligencias de expropiación de parte de la Municipalidad de Alajuela, para la construcción de un polideportivo y del desalojo de la familia Nombre70526 , con ocasión de las mismas (testimonios de Nombre70531 , Nombre70532 y Nombre70530 , folios 125 frente, 126 frente; 128 vuelto y 735; 728, respectivamente); 11.) Que en el terreno pastan unas cabras y caballos (reconocimiento judicial realizado a las 9:00 horas del 154 de marzo del 2002, testimonios de Nombre70530 , Nombre70531 , Nombre70532 , folios 123 vuelto y 728; 125 vuelto y 727 frente; 128 frente, respectivamente); 12.) Que el 5 de abril del 2002, los hermanos Nombre70526 formularon gestión de retrocesión de la expropiación realizada por la Municipalidad de Alajuela sobre las fincas inscritas en folio real en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, en la Provincia de Alajuela, números 120.442, 126.604, 13.326 y 98.418 (folios 681 a 687); y, 13.) Que en diligencia de suspensión de obra sobre las propiedades objeto de este interdicto, realizada a las 7:30 horas del 22 de octubre del 2001, se pudo apreciar lo siguiente: \"Se trata de una propiedad con frente a calle pública por el costado oeste. En la misma se observan algunos árboles y se encuentra bastante enzacatada. En el lindero oeste de dicha propiedad exactamente en los puntos 1 - 2, existe una cerca recién construida, la misma esta hecha en alambre de púas y postes de cemento, esta cerca tiene aproximadamente un metro y medio de altura, en los puntos 2- 4 no se ha levantado ninguna cerca al día de hoy. Luego donde termina el terreno sea hacia el sur, hay una cerca de unos quince metros y medio de largo, levantada en malla y tubos, la cual cuenta con una altura de dos metros diez centímetros, que tiene varios años de estar levantada. En virtud de no haber persona alguna realizando labores en el terreno no se decreta en este acto la suspensión de la obra solicitada\" (acta, folio 83). \n\nIII.- DE LOS AGRAVIOS DEL RECURRENTE.- No obstante que la alcaldesa de Alajuela no formula agravios ante este Tribunal, cuando fueron elevados los autos, es lo cierto que la misma hizo expresión de ellos al momento de presentar su apelación contra resolución número 377-07, de las quince horas treinta minutos del veinte de marzo del dos mil siete, ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, de manera que se tienen por tales los siguientes: a.) por haber declarado inadmisible la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver -copia certificada del expediente de expropiación de la corporación que representa contra Nombre70527 , madre de los gestores de este interdicto-, sin valorar que la prueba versa puntualmente sobre el hecho principal de la causa de este proceso, \"que es precisamente establecer y demostrar quien ostenta la posesión de los inmuebles en cuestión con el fin de determinar quien cuenta con el derecho de realizar actos posesorios sobre ellos\"; diligencias en las que se acredita que desde mil novecientos ochenta y ocho la Municipalidad de Alajuela es la poseedora de esos inmuebles, por resolución del Juzgado Segundo Contencioso Administrativo, acto judicial que es desconocido por el Juez de Instancia, lo que denota que los actores fueron los que han estado perturbando el derecho de esta institución de ejercer su derecho de posesión, y que eran conocedores de esa expropiación; b.) una errónea valoración de la prueba, lo que atenta contra el principio de la objetividad que rige la función jurisdiccional, por cuanto toma extractos de los testimonios rendidos y sin atender a la prueba testimonial y documental ofrecida por su representada, lo que le lleva a no detallar que los actos de limpieza eran casuales, por lo que en modo alguno pueden sustentar la posesión reclamada, debiéndose tener más bien, como actos de perturbación del derecho de la Municipalidad de Alajuela; el conocimiento de los testigos de la expropiación de las tierras; las actividades deportivas llevadas a cabo en las mismas; así como el desconocimiento de los testigos de quien es realmente el poseedor de los inmuebles; y c.) la afectación de los intereses de la colectividad -no sólo de la municipalidad demandada- por tratarse de bienes de dominio público, que los dotan de características propias, como lo son la inembargabilidad, la inalienabilidad y estar fuera del comercio de los hombres, teoría que el A-quo -contra ley- calificó como \"intrascedente\" para este caso. En virtud de lo anterior, solicita que se declare con lugar el recurso de apelación formulado y se revoque en su totalidad la sentencia impugnada, para lo cual, debe de ordenarse el conocimiento de la prueba documental y testimonial aportada por la Municipalidad, para su nueva resolución. \n\nIV.- DEL PRIMERO Y SEGUNDO AGRAVIOS DE LA APELANTE.- LLeva razón la apelante en relación con los dos primeros agravios que hace, a los cuales, se ha hecho mención en los Considerandos I.- y II.- de esta sentencia, en tanto, en el primero de ellos, se admitió la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver ofrecida por ambas partes, esto es, las copias certificadas de los expedientes relativos a la sucesión de Nombre70528 y Nombre70527 , tramitado en expediente número 00-001758-638-CI, ante el Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajuea (folios 151 a 229) -aportado por los actores- y de las diligencias de expropiación que se tramitaron en expediente 3061-75 de los inmuebles 120.442, 98.418,122.604 y 13.326 (folios 231 a 668 vuelto) y de la gestión formulada por los hermanos Nombre70526 ante esa institución, en que requieren la retrocesión de la expropiación (folios 650 a 687) -aportados por la Municipalidad de Alajuela-. La admisión de esa prueba hizo que se modificara el cuadro fáctico que sustenta esta decisión, lo que se ve reflejando en el indicado Considerando II. A continuación se analiza el requerimiento de posesión interpuesto, conforme a los agravios faltantes, esto es, en atención a la especial naturaleza del bien de que se trata, el conocimiento de los actores de la expropiación de las fincas, lo que conlleva al derecho de posesión de su representada y los actos perturbadores de esa tenencia, por no ser posible derivar de las labores de limpieza casuales, el derecho para declarar la tutela requerida. \n\nV.- DE LA TUTELA PREVISTA EN LOS INTERDICTOS DE AMPARO DE POSESIÓN.- En los procesos interdicales se discute únicamente problemas que nacen con motivo de la perturbación o despojo de la posesión o tenencia de los bienes inmuebles, o de una obra nueva que afectare a un inmueble, cuya finalidad consiste en obtener una decisión judicial que ampare o restituya la posesión u ordene la suspensión definitiva o destrucción de la obra; de ahí que los diversos tipos de interdictos regulados en nuestro ordenamiento sean el de amparo de posesión, de restitución, de reposición de mojones, de suspensión de obra nueva y de derribo; con lo cual, se excluye cualquier pretensión sobre la titularidad o posesión definitiva de dichos bienes -artículo 457 del Código Procesal Civil-. Es importante hacer varias aclaraciones sobre la procedencia de este tipo de procesos: En primer lugar, se diseñaron para tutelar la \"posesión\", entendiendo por tal \"la tenencia de una cosa bajo el poder y voluntad de una persona, o el goce de un derecho\" (Nombre60957 , . Tratado de los Bienes. Librería e Imprenta Lehmann.Tercera edición. San José. Costa Rica. 1940. p. 41); de manera que son indispensables para su procedencia, el poder de hecho sobre el objeto (corpus) y la voluntad de retenerlo bajo su dependencia (animus), de donde, se adquiere la posesión \"desde el momento en que existe la posibilidad actual y exclusiva de ejercer sobre una cosa actos materiales de usufructo, uso o transformación, aunque no se haya ejercido todavía ninguno positivamente\" (Ídem); o (inclusiva) la \"tenencia\", entendiendo por tal \"(L)a mera posesión de una cosa, su ocupación corporal, sin título que permita disfrutarla ni adueñarse de ella\" (Nombre60167, . Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual. Tomo VIII T-Z. Editorial Heliasta S.R.L. 21a. edición, revisada, actualizada y ampliada. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 1989, pag. 33); lo que implica una asimilación de los conceptos utilizados. De manera que, tratándose del interdicto de amparo de posesión (artículo 461 del Código Procesal Civil), el mismo está diseñado para la protección de la posesión, como lo señaló el citado Nombre60957 \n\n\"El poseedor de bienes inmuebles o de derechos reales de servidumbre, usufructo, uso o habitación, puede hacer que cesen las perturbaciones dirigidas contra su posesión, recurriendo al interdicto de amparo\" (Op. Cit. pag. 64); \n\ntoda vez que está previsto para que quien ejerce la posesión o tenencia de un inmueble, pueda reclamar ante la autoridad jurisdiccional la protección de esa posesión, frente a actos que implican una perturbación potencial o efectiva con intención de despojo; lo que obliga a detallar si se cumplen los presupuestos de esa posesión, conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 279 inciso segundo, 284 y 285 del Código Civil, esto es, una ocupación quieta, pública, pacífica, anual y de buena fe; entendiendo que es poseedor de buena fe el que no conoce el vicio que invalida el título en que funda su posesión, y consecuentemente, de mala fe, el que sí conoce esa circunstancia, y el que posee sin ningún título. Corolario de lo anterior es que bien puede concluirse que para que proceda la tutela del interdicto, se requiere de una presunción de legitimidad en la gestión, precisamente por tratarse de un proceso sumario (supuestamente expedito y simple), dispuesto precisamente para resguardar de manera primaria la posesión (legítima), en espera de una eventual discusión del derecho, en un proceso ordinario; de lo contrario, el ordenamiento jurídico estaría amparando situaciones de despojo arbitrarias y con ánimo violento, lo que resulta ajeno a los principios rectores del Derecho. Por ello, cobra tanta importancia determinar si se da el elemento de la buena fe (si el poseedor conocía o no del vicio de su título -causa jurídica que da origen al derecho de la posesión-) en los conflictos que suelen ocurrir sobre la posesión, porque \"naturalmente, el que posee una cosa con entero conocimiento de que no le asiste derecho para ello, comete una acción punible que no puede menos de colocarle en situación desventajosa; y, por el contrario, el que procede sin malicia, ignorante de la mala calidad de su título, no merece ningún castigo; y aún es preciso para establecer el equilibrio legal, limitar los perjuicios que sufra, hasta donde sea compatible con el derecho de su adversario.\" (Nombre60957 , . Op. Cit. pag.44.) En segundo lugar, la tutela que se da es respecto de \"actos que inquieten y manifiesten la intención de despojo\", lo que hace que sea improcedente contra las acciones del titular del derecho para recuperar su derecho, o, tratándose de bienes públicos, las acciones de la Administración para recuperar su dominio. En tercer lugar, es importantísimo advertir que este tipo de procesos sólo son procedentes respecto de bienes inmuebles en régimen de propiedad privada, es decir, son inconducentes en relación con bienes de carácter público o comunes, en tanto ellos no puede ser poseidos por los particulares, conforme lo disponen los artículos 261 y 262 del Código Civil: \n\n\"Artículo 261.- Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. \n\nTodas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado, o a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencias de cualquier persona.\" \n\n\"Artículo 262.- Las cosas públicas están fuera del comercio; y no podrán entrar en él, mientras legalmente no se disponga así, separándolos del uso público a que estaban destinadas.\" \n\nEs con sustento en las anteriores consideraciones que se analizarán los interdictos interpuesto. \n\nVI.- DE LA IMPROCEDENCIA DE LOS INTERDICTOS FORMULADOS POR LA NATURALEZA DE LOS INMUEBLES.- Como se indicó en el Considerando anterior, el amparo de posesión no procede contra bienes de dominio público, pues no existe por parte de los particulares un derecho de posesión, sino de uso, a través de los permisos y concesiones dados conforme a la ley; de donde, la posesión -como atributo del derecho de posesión- sólo puede ser ejercida por los entes titulares del derecho, sin que ningún sujeto privado pueda legalmente reclamar actos posesorios -salvo que estos se hayan efectuado antes de que la Institución pública adquiera la propiedad, y únicamente para efectos de una eventual indemnización-. En el caso en estudio, de las diligencias de expropiación se denota la especial naturaleza de las fincas sobre las que se intenta la declaratoria de posesión, en tanto, como bien lo afirma la apelante (Municipalidad de Alajuela), se trata de inmuebles afectos a un régimen especial, al comprender el demanio público, que administra esa corporación local, y por ende, no sujetos a posesión por parte de particulares. Como lo ha considerado la Sala Constitucional en diversos precedentes (entre otras, pueden consultarse las sentencias número 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158), por demaniales o dominicales deben de entenderse el conjunto de bienes –tanto inmuebles como muebles– que tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico virtualmente opuesto a los privados, en tanto por expresa voluntad del constituyente o el legislador, se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada ni de posesión, de modo que están fuera del comercio de los hombres, es decir, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado –en sentido estricto–, por cuanto éste se limita a su administración y tutela. Así, los bienes de dominio público y los de dominio privado del Estado (fiscales) se diferencian por su finalidad y el sujeto titular, en tanto lo que define la naturaleza jurídica de los primeros es el destino que se da a este tipo de bienes, sea, en tanto se afectan y están al servicio del uso público, en los términos previstos en el artículo 261 del Código Civil. (En este mismo sentido, se pueden consultar las sentencias número 2306-91 y 2988-99, entre otras, ambas de la Sala Constitucional.) Es así como entran en esta categoría –sin que se constituya en una lista cerrada– la zona marítimo terrestre, el patrimonio forestal o natural del Estado –áreas protegidas– (conformado por parques nacionales, reservas forestales, reservas biológicas, zonas protectoras, refugios de vida silvestre, humedales y monumentos naturales –artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554, de dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco–), las zonas de protección hidrográfica –artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal– (contíguas a los manantiales, a las riveras de los ríos y lagos), las zonas limítrofes (artículo 10 de la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos, número 13, de diez de enero de mil novecientos treinta y nueve), el derecho de vía, las líneas ferroviarias, las reservas indígenas, el patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico, los recursos mineros, el patrimonio arqueológico, los parques y zonas verdes, etc. Se trata de bienes que, en tanto por su vocación y destino están fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo que son inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables, de manera que no es posible su dominio o posesión, ni a título gratuito ni oneroso; no pueden perderse por prescripción, así como tampoco, ganarse por usucapión, de modo que conservan su vigencia jurídica permanentemente; y no son susceptibles de embargo, en los términos del Derecho Civil; además de que están sujetos al poder de policía, en lo atinente a su aprovechamiento y uso, ya que su uso privativo está condicionado al otorgamiento de las respectivas licencias y permisos y al control y fiscalización de parte la Administración; y la Administración ostenta poderes suficientes para su recuperación, sin necesidad de acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, ni siquiera a un procedimiento administrativo, por no existir de parte del \"ocupante\" ningún derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo, de manera que la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para su restitución. Por ello, el régimen jurídico de los bienes de dominio público es especial y diferenciado en atención al tipo de bienes de que se trata. La distinción entre bienes o cosas privadas y bienes y cosas públicas se hace depender, en primer lugar, en la \"titularidad\" o \"dominio\" del bien, por cuanto de este elemento se define su naturaleza y régimen jurídico diferenciados; y en consecuencia, del derecho aplicable, en tanto el primero se sujeta al derecho privado, y el segundo al derecho público. Así, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres y por ello los permisos que se otorguen serán siempre a título precario y revocables por la Administración, unilateralmente, cuando razones de necesidad o de interés general así lo requieran, para la preservación del uso natural de la cosa pública. En virtud de lo cual, no resulta posible la infracción o lesión del derecho de propiedad, consagrado en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, por tratarse de un régimen jurídico totalmente diverso, donde la ley lo que hace es establecer condiciones mediante las que es posible el uso y disfrute por parte de los particulares. Así, quien pretenda por medios no autorizados ejercer un uso privativo de esa zona tendrá vedada la posibilidad de consumarlo, pues es aceptable también, desde tiempo inmemorial, que se trata de bienes imprescriptibles en favor de particulares y que están fuera del comercio, principios recogidos en el numeral 261 y 262 del Código Civil, que data de mil ochocientos ochenta y seis. \n\nVII.- Así las cosas, son improcedentes los interdictos formulados, en razón de la especial naturaleza de las fincas sobre las que se formula este proceso. En efecto, habiéndose acreditado que la causa de interés público de las expropiaciones que realizó la Municipalidad de Alajuela a la finada Nombre70527 de las fincas inscritas en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, bajo el sistema de folio real, con las matrículas número Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 y Placa11502, ubicados en el Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, fue para destinarlo a la construcción de una ciudadela deportiva, ello implica que se trata de bienes comunales, por destino y vocación, bajo la advocación de zonas verdes, entendiendo por tales, los bienes pertenecientes a las municipalidades (en tanto ostentan la nuda propiedad del bien) destinadas al aprovechamiento vecinal, es decir, están dispuestos para el disfrute de los vecinos (Nombre70535 , Nombre70536, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Dirección4451. . 1994. pag. 35), los cuales gozan de las características de los bienes de dominio público, como lo aseveró la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 4605- 96, tratándose de las áreas comunales derivadas del proceso de urbanismo: \n\n\"XXII. Las áreas verdes destinadas al uso público, en virtud de su uso y naturaleza, es parte del patrimonio de la comunidad y deben quedar bajo la jurisdicción de los entes municipales para que los administre como bienes de dominio público, con lo cual participan del régimen jurídico de estos bienes, que los hace inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables, es decir, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada del urbanizador o fraccionador, tal y como lo dispone el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. (...)\" \n\nEs lo cierto que en el caso en estudio las canchas deportivas que se construyeron en las fincas objeto de esta litis están en desuso, y que, pareciera que los inmuebles están abandonados, sin que se hayan destinado al fin por el cual fueron expropiadas; sin embargo, no por ello resulta posible desconocer la demanialidad de los mismos (sentencia número 2006-0382 de la Sala Constitucional), toda vez que la afectación que reviste de importancia trascendental, en este tipo de bienes, a tal punto que la propia Sala Constitucional ha anulado la modificación de destino o su desafectación, así por ejemplo en sentencia número 2000-4332, bajo las siguientes consideraciones: \n\n\"La municilalidad local no puede libremente eliminar el destino de los terrenos dedicados a parque, tampoco podría hacerlo el legislador -sin definir a cambio un espacio que compense la pérdida del área de parque- pues ello convertiría en inconstitucional el acuerdo o ley que así lo dispusiera, por irrespeto del contenido esencial del derecho de los vecinos a disfrutar de esas zonas de esparcimiento, que como se indicó, hacen parte de la calidad de vida que la Constitución les garantiza. El término 'facilidades comunales' no tiene la amplitud que se le quiere implicar. Resulta obvio para esta Sala que se refiere a construcciones indispensables para el disfrute comunal del bien destinado a área verde, parque y esparcimiento; consiguientemente, la construcción de edificios para servicios públicos a manera de ejemplo bibliotecas, escuelas, salones comunales, etc., resultan incompatibles con el destino de áreas de parque y zona verde que el legislador ha exigido para algunos terrenos, y, sin duda, para que las asociaciones interesadas pueden emprender la construcción de edificaciones como las que resultan de su interés, deben sufragar los costos, lo que involucra a todos los miembros o vecinos de la localidad que se van a beneficiar con el uso público y general del inmueble -el costo del mismo. La Sala no puede admitir que por la vía de donación o autorizaciones de construcción (sic) como las que se intentan, se desconozca el derecho de los vecinos accionantes a disfrutar del terreno que en forma íntegra pertenece a la comunidad de Cipreses como zona verde y parque y que la Municipalidad únicamente posee en administración de los intereses locales.\" \n\nTambién quedó acreditado que la Municipalidad canceló la totalidad de la indemnización correspondiente a su indemnización, lo que denota que se trata de una posesión legítima, no sólo por su vocación (o destino), sino también por darse en pleno respeto del artículo 45 constitucional. De igual manera, otra porción de la finca inscrita en folio real con la matrícula Placa11498 (supra indicada), concretamente una franja de terreno de tres mil cuatrocientos cincuenta metros cuadrados, también es bien de dominio público, al haber sido expropiada por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para la construcción de la interconexión de ferrocarriles en Alajuela (FECOSA), de manera que está afectada para el derecho de vía. Es necesario recordar que al tenor de lo dispuesto en el párrafo final del inciso 14) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, en su ordinal 121, se otorga el carácter demanial al ferrocarril -junto a otros bienes-, condición que se mantiene en el artículo 4 de la Ley General de Ferrocarriles, número 5066, de mil novecientos setenta y dos. En cuanto al derecho de vía, se aclara que implica un espacio físico donde se realiza y lleva a cabo la actividad ferroviaria, de forma tal que existen respecto al mismo las limitaciones y prohibiciones respecto de terceros, propias de los bienes de dominio público, en razón de su destino o vocación, según se desprende de los artículos 46, 52 y 53 de la Ley General de Ferrocarriles. \n\nVIII.- DEL EJERCICIO DE LA POSESIÓN SOBRE LOS INMUEBLES RECLAMADOS.- En adición de lo indicado en los Considerando anteriores, estima este Tribunal que el requerimiento que se hace es improcedente en razón de que la Municipalidad de Alajuela ejerce la tenencia de las fincas sobre las que se promueve el proceso, como ha quedado acreditado en los testimonios rendidos, en que ha ejercido el poder de policía propio de la Administración en defensa del demanio público, a tal grado, que ante los intentos de limpieza de los actores, la acción de la municipalidad ha sido prácticamente que inmediata, impidiéndoles su realización, motivo por el cual, se vió obligada a levantar una tapia, misma que fue objeto de esta demanda; lo que lleva a concluir que, lejos de ser \"perturbadoras\" las actuaciones del gobierno local demandado, son absolutamente legítimas y conformes a derecho. LLeva razón la Alcaldesa de Alajuela al señalar que las supuestas acciones de limpieza -valga la aclaración- fallidas en razón del estado de los inmuebles (según reporte de los diversos reconocimientos realizados), por la propia actuación de defensa de la autoridad demandada, no pueden ser tenidos como actos posesorios que sustenten este proceso, toda vez que no han sido en forma contínua, ni tampoco quieta, sino más bien ocasionales, llamando la atención a este órgano jurisdiccional por llevarse a cabo, a partir del año dos mil (sin precisarse fecha exacta), como consecuencia del proceso sucesorio que los hermanos Nombre70526 promovieron con la muerte de sus padres, en que, inventariaron como patrimonio, las fincas que habían sido expropiadas, tanto por la Municipalidad de Alajuela como del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; siendo el título de la posesión registral, precisamente la herencia. Ello evidencia una actuación y demanda a todas luces temerarias, sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta que, los mismos hermanos Nombre70526 formularon gestión de retrocesión de la expropiación realizada por la Municipalidad de Alajuela sobre las fincias inscritas en folio real en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, en la Provincia de Alajuela, números 120.442, 126.604, 13.326 y 98.418, lo cual evidencia el conocimiento de que tales tierras no les pertenecen, así como tampoco su posesión. \n\nIX.- DE LAS COSTAS.- Solicita el apelante la revocatoria de la sentencia también en este extremo. Al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil, de aplicación supletoria como lo prevé el artículo 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, se debe condenar al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales. Al estarse revocando la sentencia recurrida para desestimarse en todos sus extremos, procede la condenatoria en costas a los actores, por no encontrarnos en ninguno de los supuestos de excepción previstos en el artículo 98 de la Ley Reguladora de esta Jurisdicción, por cuanto, se observa una actuación temeraria de los promoventes, que intentaron, sacar provecho de su propio dolo por tratarse de un bien de domunio público. \n\nPOR TANTO: \n\nSe admite la prueba para mejor resolver ofrecida por los promoventes (copia del sucesorio de Nombre70528 y Nombre70527 , tramitada en expediente 00-001758-638-CA, ante el Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajyela) y por la municipalidad demandada (diligencias de expropiación, tramitado en expediente 3061-75 y copia de la gestión de retrocesión formulada por los gestores de este interdicto ante la Municipalidad de San José). Se revoca la resolución impugnada para en su lugar, denegar en todos los extremos los interdictos formulados. Se advierte a los hermanos Nombre70526 de realizara actuaciones que pertuben \n\nSe condena al pago de las costas personales y procesales a los actores, éstas últimas, comprenden las de la apelación formulada. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nNombre70537 Nombre8483 Sandra María Quesada Vargas \n\nExp.01-002278-638-CI \n\nInterdicto \n\nNombre70522 y otros contra la Municipalidad de Alajuela \n\namv",
  "body_en_text": "Exp. 01-002278-638-CI\n\nNo. 7-2008.\n\nSECOND SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at nine hours thirty minutes on January seventeenth, two thousand eight.\n\nInjunction for protection of possession (interdicto de amparo de posesión) and suspension of work filed by Nombre70522, teacher, identity card number CED52755; Nombre70523, teacher, with identity card number CED52756; Nombre70524, teacher, bearer of identity card CED52757; Nombre70525, homemaker, identity card CED52758; Nombre70526, homemaker, bearer of identity card CED52759, and Nombre70526, precision mechanic, identity card number CED52760, all of legal age and married, except for the last two, residents of Monserrat de Alajuela, from the church seventy-five meters east, against the MUNICIPALITY OF ALAJUELA, represented by its Mayoress Nombre37958, of legal age, Doctor of Philosophy, married, identity card number CED30206, resident of Alajuela. Licensed attorney Alvaro Enrique Hernández Hernández, identity card number CED35483 and resident of Alajuela, acts as special judicial representative of the petitioners.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- The petitioners file an injunctive proceeding for protection of possession and suspension of work so that, in judgment, the Municipality of Alajuela is ordered to cease the construction of a fence and the performance of disturbing acts intended to dispossess them of the properties of which they are registered owners and possessors, inscribed in the Public Property Registry, Alajuela Section, Real Folio registration numbers Placa11499, Placa11497, located in Monserrat de Alajuela, south side of the Alajuela Sports Complex, which also borders a public street; possession they accredit with the payment of municipal taxes for two thousand and cleaning work on the indicated properties. Likewise, they request that the defendant municipality be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of this proceeding (folios 77 to 79 and 82).\n\n2.- In a timely manner, the defendant municipality answers the lawsuit filed against it in the negative, alleging that those properties were expropriated by the municipality pursuant to expropriation proceedings processed before the Contentious-Administrative Court in case file number 3061-75, precisely for the construction of a sports complex, properties that were duly paid for, and by virtue of which, they have performed possessory acts on those properties, for which reason it requests that this action be declared without merit and the plaintiffs be ordered to halt the works carried out by them, in order to protect the public interest. Likewise, it requests that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay both costs of this action (92 to 99).\n\n3.- That the Trial Judge, Otto González Vílchez, in judgment 377-07, at fifteen hours thirty minutes on March twentieth, two thousand seven, ordered: \"The evidence for better resolution offered by the plaintiff party, regarding the certified copy of the probate case number 00-001758-638-CI, is declared inadmissible. The evidence for better resolution offered by the defendant party, consisting of the certified copy of the judicial expropriation file number 3061 of the year 75 and the copy of the administrative claim presented by the plaintiffs before the municipal entity, is declared inadmissible. The expansion of the testimonial evidence ordered by the Civil and Agrarian Court of Alajuela, viewable at folios 724 to 726 and folios 733 to 734, all of the judicial file, is admitted as evidence for better resolution. In accordance with articles 457, 459, 461, and 463 of the Civil Procedure Code —fully applicable in this matter as permitted by article 103 of the Regulatory Law of this Jurisdiction— this summary injunctive lawsuit, in its modality of protection of possession, filed by Nombre70522, Nombre70523, Nombre70524, Nombre70525, Nombre70526, and Nombre70526 against the Municipality of Alajuela, is declared with merit. In accordance with article 463 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiffs are ordered to be maintained in possession of the properties subject to this injunction. Likewise, the Municipality of Alajuela is ordered to abstain henceforth from disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs over the properties subject to this injunction, under the warning that otherwise, the representatives and officials of said municipal corporation who do not comply with what is ordered in this judgment shall be prosecuted for the crime of disobedience to authority. The defendant party, Municipality of Alajuela, is ordered to pay both costs of this action\" (folios 771 and 772).\n\n4.- Disagreeing with the decision of the lower court, the Mayoress of the defendant Municipality appeals; the appeal was admitted, and by virtue of it, this Tribunal has jurisdiction on appeal.\n\n5.- In the proceedings, the required formalities have been observed, without noting grounds for nullity susceptible to invalidating the actions taken, and judgment is rendered after deliberation; and,\n\nDrafted by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,\n\nWHEREAS:\n\nI.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER RESOLUTION.- By means of a brief filed on April fifth, two thousand two (viewable at folio 149), the petitioners of this injunction provide certification of the probate proceeding processed in case file number 00-001758-638-CI, before the Civil Court of Higher Quantification of Alajuela (folios 151 to 229); in order to have it considered as evidence for better resolution; and similarly, the defendant local government, in briefs dated April seventeenth (folio 230) and June thirteenth (folio 679), both briefs from two thousand two, presents a certified copy of the expropriation proceedings processed in file 3061-75 for properties 120.442, 98.418, 122.604, and 13.326 (folios 231 to 668 verso) and of the request made by the Nombre70526 siblings before that institution (folios 650 to 687), where they request the reversion (retrocesión) of the properties expropriated from their deceased mother by that corporation. According to article 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, the relevance of its admission is reserved to the degree of influence it has on the decision of the ruling; so that, having notified the intervening parties in this process of the referred evidence (resolution at seven hours fifty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand two, from the Civil Court of Higher Quantification of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, viewable at folio 710), and having analyzed it in this instance, this Tribunal deems that said evidence is indeed pertinent to the outcome of this decision, insofar as, even though in injunction proceedings the discussion is constrained to the possession of the property and not to the better right one may have over it (article 457 of the Civil Procedure Code), it is true that from this evidence it is possible to derive the special nature of the properties over whose possession a declaration is sought, being public domain goods, in view of the indicated expropriation process.\n\nII.- REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS.- The facts held as proven are substituted due to a series of omissions and inconsistencies in their recording, to be held as follows: 1.) That the Municipality of Alajuela decided to expropriate the properties of the Alajuela Section, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, Placa11501, and Placa11502, located at Dirección7894: , ; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, for the construction of a sports compound (contestación de la demanda, folios 95 and 96, Article II of Ordinary Session 14 of the Alajuela Council, dated February 21, 1974, and Article 14 of Ordinary Session 43, dated April 17, 1975, folios 246 to 249, and 251 to 252); 2.) That the owner -Nombre70527- having opposed the value of the indemnity given in the administrative appraisal, filed expropriation proceedings, which were processed before the Second Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, in case file number 3061-75 (folios 240 to 244); 3.) That while these expropriation proceedings were underway, a strip of land measuring three thousand four hundred fifty square meters was expropriated from Mrs. Nombre70527, from the property inscribed in the real folio system under registration number Placa11498, for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA); leaving two remnants, which jointly measure one thousand one hundred eighty-seven square meters and forty-one square decimeters, sixty square centimeters, whose indemnity was set in the administrative appraisal at the sum of two hundred forty-one thousand colones, which was accepted by the expropriated party (administrative study and appraisal, folios 356 to 367, and judgment at ten hours on August fifth, nineteen eighty-eight, from the First Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, folios 401 to 404); 4.) That the indemnity amount for properties 12.442, 98.418, 122.604, and 13.326, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, less the strip expropriated for the Alajuela railway interconnection, was set at six million three hundred forty-four thousand four hundred seventy-six colones with twenty céntimos (¢ 6,344,476.20), having to pay interest of six percent annually on the set indemnity, from the entry into possession of the properties (judgments number 6, at 9:45 hours on January 6, 1986, issued by the Second Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, and number 2743, at 5:20 hours on August first, 1986, from the Second Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, folios 417 to 423 and 523 to 525); 5.) That the Municipality of Alajuela paid the totality of the principal debt and the accrued interest (judicial deposit of the administrative appraisal, number 932,290, of October 21, 1976, for the amount of two hundred five thousand three hundred sixty-eight colones with fifty-five colones -¢ 205,368.55-; judicial deposit number 707831, of August 19, 1987, for the amount of six million one hundred thirty-nine thousand one hundred eight colones -¢ ...299-; judicial deposit number 622047c, for the sum of five hundred sixty-eight thousand two hundred seventy-two colones with ninety-one céntimos -¢ 568,272.91-; and judicial deposit 858332 CH, for forty-five thousand four hundred seven colones with eighty-seven céntimos -¢ 45,407.87-, and resolution at 9:00 hours on February 22, 1991, from the Second Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court; folios 263, 567 and 568, 626 and 627, 660, 665, respectively), to Nombre70528, to whom Mrs. Nombre70527 had assigned the rights derived from the expropriation proceedings, with the knowledge of her children, insofar as Nombre70522 signs on behalf of the assignor due to her poor health condition, and Nombre70523 and Nombre70526, both surname Nombre70526, appear as witnesses (brief viewable at folio 415) (testimony of Nombre70529, folios 129 front and verso); 6.) That at 9:15 hours on September 30, 1988, the Municipality was placed in possession of the expropriated properties (acta de puesta en posesión, folios 611 and 612); 7.) That in the resolution at 13:30 hours on July 9, 2001, the Second Civil and Labor Court of Higher Quantification of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, in the probate of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527 —which was processed in file 00-001758-638-CI— declared the sole and universal heirs of the decedents to be their children Nombre70522, Nombre70523, Nombre70526, Nombre70524, Nombre70525, and Nombre70526, all with the surname Nombre70526, having inventoried as part of the hereditary estate or assets the properties of the Alajuela Section, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604, and Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, \"without prejudice to third parties with better right\" (folios 169 front and verso, 189 to 196); 7.) That the Nombre70526 siblings appear registrally as owners of the properties of the Alajuela Section, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604, and Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, as of September 3, 2001, with inheritance recorded as the cause of acquisition (property certifications at folios 5 to 76 of the judicial file); 8.) That on the properties whose possession is in dispute, sports activities were carried out, a baseball field, a motocross track with its control tower included, and a children's playground having been built to that effect, facilities that are in disuse, so the lots are overgrown with weeds and partially cut, over which the municipality exercises surveillance control, for which reason it erected part of a wall (judicial inspection, folio 121 and 122, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, Nombre70533, Nombre70534, folios 123 verso; 125 front, 126 front; 127 front and 128 front and 735; 130 verso and 131 verso; 133 front and verso, 134 front and verso, 135 front and verso, respectively); 9.) That as of the year 2000, without specifying an exact date, the Nombre70526 siblings attempted to carry out cleaning work on the properties subject to this injunction, work that was interrupted by the municipal police (testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532; Nombre70534, folios 123 verso and 728; 125 front and verso and 726 front; 126 verso, 127 front and 128 front; 133 verso, 134 verso, 135 front and verso, 735, respectively); 10.) That the residents of the area were aware of the expropriation proceedings by the Municipality of Alajuela, for the construction of a sports complex, and of the eviction of the Nombre70526 family on the occasion thereof (testimonies of Nombre70531, Nombre70532, and Nombre70530, folios 125 front, 126 front; 128 verso and 735; 728, respectively); 11.) That some goats and horses graze on the land (judicial inspection carried out at 9:00 hours on March 154, 2002, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, folios 123 verso and 728; 125 verso and 727 front; 128 front, respectively); 12.) That on April 5, 2002, the Nombre70526 siblings filed a request for reversion of the expropriation carried out by the Municipality of Alajuela over the properties inscribed in real folio in the Public Property Registry, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120.442, 126.604, 13.326, and 98.418 (folios 681 to 687); and, 13.) That in the suspension of work proceeding on the properties subject to this injunction, carried out at 7:30 hours on October 22, 2001, the following was observed: \"This is a property with a front facing a public street on the west side. Some trees are observed on it, and it is quite overgrown with weeds. On the west boundary of said property, exactly at points 1 - 2, there is a recently constructed fence; this is made of barbed wire and cement posts; this fence is approximately one and a half meters high; at points 2-4, no fence has been erected to this day. Then, where the land ends towards the south, there is a fence about fifteen and a half meters long, erected with wire mesh and tubes, which is two meters ten centimeters high and has been standing for several years. By virtue of there being no person performing work on the land, the suspension of the requested work is not decreed at this act\" (acta, folio 83).\n\nIII.- REGARDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.- Even though the mayoress of Alajuela does not formulate grievances before this Tribunal when the case files were elevated, it is true that she expressed them at the time of filing her appeal against resolution number 377-07, at fifteen hours thirty minutes on March twentieth, two thousand seven, before the Contentious-Administrative Court, so the following are taken as such: a.) for having declared inadmissible the evidence offered for better resolution —certified copy of the expropriation file of the corporation she represents against Nombre70527, mother of the petitioners of this injunction—, without assessing that the evidence deals precisely with the main fact of the cause of this process, \"which is precisely to establish and demonstrate who holds possession of the properties in question in order to determine who has the right to perform possessory acts over them\"; proceedings in which it is accredited that since nineteen eighty-eight, the Municipality of Alajuela has been the possessor of those properties, by resolution of the Second Contentious-Administrative Court, a judicial act that is ignored by the Trial Judge, which denotes that the plaintiffs were the ones who have been disturbing the right of this institution to exercise its right of possession, and that they were aware of that expropriation; b.) an erroneous assessment of the evidence, which violates the principle of objectivity that governs the jurisdictional function, since it takes excerpts from the testimonies given and, without attending to the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by her represented party, this leads it to fail to detail that the cleaning acts were casual, so they can in no way support the claimed possession, having to be considered rather as acts of disturbance of the right of the Municipality of Alajuela; the witnesses' knowledge of the land expropriation; the sports activities carried out on them; as well as the witnesses' lack of knowledge as to who is really the possessor of the properties; and c.) the affectation of the interests of the community —not only of the defendant municipality— as these are public domain goods, which endow them with their own characteristics, such as being exempt from seizure, inalienable, and outside the commerce of men, a theory that the lower court —contrary to law— qualified as \"irrelevant\" for this case. By virtue of the foregoing, it requests that the filed appeal be declared with merit and that the challenged judgment be revoked in its entirety, for which purpose, the review of the documentary and testimonial evidence provided by the Municipality must be ordered for a new decision.\n\nIV.- REGARDING THE FIRST AND SECOND GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.- The appellant is correct regarding the first two grievances she makes, which have been mentioned in the Recitals I.- and II.- of this judgment, insofar as, in the first of them, the evidence offered for better resolution by both parties was admitted, that is, the certified copies of the files related to the probate of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527, processed in case file number 00-001758-638-CI, before the Civil Court of Higher Quantification of Alajuela (folios 151 to 229) —provided by the plaintiffs— and of the expropriation proceedings processed in file 3061-75 for properties 120.442, 98.418, 122.604, and 13.326 (folios 231 to 668 verso) and of the request made by the Nombre70526 siblings before that institution, in which they demand the reversion of the expropriation (folios 650 to 687) —provided by the Municipality of Alajuela—. The admission of that evidence caused the factual framework supporting this decision to be modified, which is reflected in the indicated Recital II. The filed claim for possession is analyzed below, in accordance with the remaining grievances, that is, in view of the special nature of the good in question, the plaintiffs' knowledge of the expropriation of the properties, which entails the right of possession of her represented party and the acts disturbing that tenure, as it is not possible to derive the right to declare the required protection from casual cleaning work.\n\nV.- REGARDING THE PROTECTION PROVIDED IN INJUNCTIONS FOR PROTECTION OF POSSESSION.- In injunction proceedings, only problems arising from the disturbance or dispossession of possession or tenure of immovable property, or from new works affecting a property, are discussed, the purpose of which is to obtain a judicial decision that protects or restores possession or orders the definitive suspension or destruction of the work; hence, the various types of injunctions regulated in our legal system are those for protection of possession, restitution, replacement of boundary markers, suspension of new work, and demolition; thus, any claim regarding the ownership or definitive possession of said goods is excluded —article 457 of the Civil Procedure Code—. It is important to make several clarifications on the admissibility of this type of proceeding: First, they were designed to protect \"possession,\" understanding by that \"the tenure of a thing under the power and will of a person, or the enjoyment of a right\" (Nombre60957, . Tratado de los Bienes. Librería e Imprenta Lehmann. Third edition. San José. Costa Rica. 1940. p. 41); so that the de facto power over the object (corpus) and the will to retain it under one's control (animus) are indispensable for its admissibility, from which possession is acquired \"from the moment the current and exclusive possibility exists to exercise material acts of usufruct, use, or transformation over a thing, even if none have yet been positively exercised\" (Idem); or (even) \"tenure,\" understanding by that \"The mere possession of a thing, its bodily occupation, without title permitting its enjoyment or appropriation\" (Nombre60167, . Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual. Volume VIII T-Z. Editorial Heliasta S.R.L. 21st edition, revised, updated, and expanded. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 1989, pg. 33); which implies an assimilation of the concepts used. So that, in the case of the injunction for protection of possession (article 461 of the Civil Procedure Code), it is designed for the protection of possession, as noted by the cited Nombre60957:\n\n\"The possessor of immovable property or of real rights of easement, usufruct, use, or habitation may cause the disturbances directed against his possession to cease by resorting to the injunction for protection\" (Op. Cit. pg. 64);\n\nsince it is provided so that whoever exercises possession or tenure of a property may claim before the jurisdictional authority the protection of that possession against acts that imply a potential or effective disturbance with intention to dispossess; which obliges one to detail whether the requirements of that possession are met, in accordance with the provisions of articles 279 subparagraph two, 284, and 285 of the Civil Code, that is, an occupation that is quiet, public, peaceful, annual, and in good faith; understanding that a possessor in good faith is one who does not know of the defect that invalidates the title on which his possession is based, and consequently, in bad faith, one who does know of that circumstance, and one who possesses without any title. A corollary of the foregoing is that it can well be concluded that for the injunction protection to proceed, a presumption of legitimacy in the action is required, precisely because it is a summary proceeding (supposedly expeditious and simple), designed precisely to protect possession (legitimate) in a primary way, pending a possible discussion of the right in an ordinary proceeding; otherwise, the legal system would be protecting arbitrary and violently intended dispossession situations, which is alien to the guiding principles of Law. Therefore, it is so important to determine if the element of good faith is present (whether the possessor knew or not of the defect in his title —the legal cause giving rise to the right of possession—) in the conflicts that usually occur over possession, because \"naturally, he who possesses a thing with full knowledge that no right assists him to do so commits a punishable action that cannot but place him in a disadvantageous situation; and, conversely, he who proceeds without malice, ignorant of the poor quality of his title, deserves no punishment; and it is even necessary, to establish legal balance, to limit the damages he suffers, insofar as is compatible with the right of his adversary.\" (Nombre60957, . Op. Cit. pg.44.) Second, the protection given is regarding \"acts that disturb and manifest the intention to dispossess,\" which makes it inadmissible against the actions of the right holder to recover his right, or, in the case of public goods, the actions of the Administration to recover its domain. Third, it is extremely important to warn that this type of proceeding is only admissible regarding immovable property under a private property regime, that is, they are unproductive in relation to goods of a public or common nature, since those cannot be possessed by private individuals, as provided in articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code:\n\n\"Article 261.- Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can utilize for being delivered to public use.\n\nAll other things are private and the object of private property, even if they belong to the State, or to the Municipalities, who in that case, as civil persons, are no different from any person.\"\n\n\"Article 262.- Public things are outside commerce; and they may not enter into it, while it is not legally so ordered, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.\"\n\nIt is based on the foregoing considerations that the injunctions filed will be analyzed.\n\nVI.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE INJUNCTIONS FILED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTIES.- As indicated in the previous Recital, the protection of possession does not proceed against public domain goods, since there is no right of possession on the part of private individuals, but rather of use, through the permits and concessions granted according to the law; hence, possession —as an attribute of the right of possession— can only be exercised by the entities that hold the right, and no private subject may legally claim possessory acts —unless these were performed before the public Institution acquired ownership, and solely for the purposes of eventual compensation—. In the case under study, the special nature of the properties over which the declaration of possession is sought is evident from the expropriation proceedings, insofar as, as the appellant (Municipality of Alajuela) correctly asserts, these are properties subject to a special regime, comprising the public domain (demanio público) administered by that local corporation, and therefore not subject to possession by private individuals. As the Constitutional Chamber has considered in various precedents (among others, judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 may be consulted), public domain or demanial goods must be understood as the set of goods —both immovable and movable— that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, insofar as, by express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are affected to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that for this reason, they cannot be the object of private property or possession, so that they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot individually belong to private individuals, nor to the State —in the strict sense—, since the latter limits itself to their administration and tutelage. Thus, public domain goods and private domain goods of the State (fiscal) differ by their purpose and the holder subject, insofar as what defines the legal nature of the former is the purpose given to this type of good, that is, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use, in the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, judgments number 2306-91 and 2988-99, among others, both from the Constitutional Chamber, may be consulted.) Thus, the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural patrimony of the State —protected areas— (composed of national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments —article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five—), hydrographic protection zones —article 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal)— (adjacent to springs, riverbanks, and lake shores), border zones (article 10 of the Vacant Lands Law, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the right-of-way, railway lines, indigenous reserves, historical-architectural heritage, mining resources, archaeological heritage, parks and green zones, etc., fall under this category —without this constituting a closed list—.\n\nThese are goods which, by their vocation and purpose, are outside the commerce of men, and therefore are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable, meaning that ownership or possession, whether free or for consideration, is not possible; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by usucapion, so they permanently retain their legal validity; and they are not susceptible to seizure, under the terms of Civil Law; in addition, they are subject to police power regarding their exploitation and use, since their exclusive use is conditional upon the granting of the respective licenses and permits and upon control and oversight by the Administration; and the Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery, without needing to resort to the judicial route, or even to an administrative procedure, as no subjective right or legitimate interest exists on the part of the \"occupant\", so that administrative action replaces possessory interdicts for their restitution. Therefore, the legal regime of public domain goods is special and differentiated based on the type of goods in question. The distinction between private goods or things and public goods or things depends, first of all, on the \"ownership\" or \"domain\" of the good, as this element defines its nature and differentiated legal regime; and consequently, on the applicable law, given that the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain goods places them outside the commerce of men and, for this reason, the permits that are granted will always be granted on a precarious basis (título precario) and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. As a result, an infringement or violation of the property right enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution is not possible, since it concerns a completely different legal regime, where the law does no more than establish conditions through which use and enjoyment by private parties is possible. Thus, anyone attempting unauthorized means to exercise exclusive use of that zone will be barred from consummating it, since it is also accepted, from time immemorial, that these are goods imprescriptible in favor of private parties and that they are outside commerce, principles set forth in sections 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, dating from eighteen hundred and eighty-six.\n\nVII.- That being the case, the possessory interdicts filed are inadmissible, due to the special nature of the properties on which this proceeding is based. In fact, it has been proven that the public interest cause for the expropriations carried out by the Municipality of Alajuela from the late Nombre70527 of the properties registered in the Public Property Registry, under the real folio system, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604, and Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, was to allocate them for the construction of a sports complex; this implies that they are communal goods (bienes comunales), by purpose and vocation, under the designation of green zones (zonas verdes), understood as goods belonging to the municipalities (insofar as they hold the bare property of the good) intended for neighborhood use, that is, they are arranged for the enjoyment of the residents (Nombre70535, Nombre70536, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Dirección4451. . 1994. pag. 35), which enjoy the characteristics of public domain goods (bienes de dominio público), as affirmed by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 4605-96, concerning communal areas derived from the urban development process:\n\n\"XXII. Green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's heritage and must remain under the jurisdiction of municipal entities for them to administer as public domain goods, whereby they participate in the legal regime of these goods, which makes them inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable, meaning they cannot be the object of private property by the developer or subdivider, as provided in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law. (...)\"\n\nIt is true that in the case under study, the sports courts that were built on the properties that are the subject of this litigation are in disuse, and that it seems the real estate is abandoned, without having been allocated to the purpose for which they were expropriated; however, this does not make it possible to disregard their public domain character (demanialidad) (judgment number 2006-0382 of the Constitutional Chamber), since the dedication that is of transcendental importance in this type of goods, to the point that the Constitutional Chamber itself has annulled the modification of purpose or their declassification (desafectación), for example in judgment number 2000-4332, under the following considerations:\n\n\"The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the purpose of lands dedicated as a park, nor could the legislator do so - without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area - because this would render the agreement or law that so provided unconstitutional, due to disrespect for the essential content of the residents' right to enjoy those recreational zones, which, as indicated, form part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'community facilities' does not have the breadth that is sought to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the good destined as a green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services, by way of example libraries, schools, community halls, etc., are incompatible with the purpose of park areas and green zones that the legislator has required for certain lands, and, undoubtedly, in order for interested associations to undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of interest to them, they must bear the costs, which involves all members or residents of the locality who will benefit from the public and general use of the property - the cost thereof. The Chamber cannot admit that, by way of donation or construction authorizations (sic) such as those being attempted, the right of the petitioning residents to enjoy the land that integrally belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone and park and that the Municipality merely possesses in administration of local interests is disregarded.\"\n\nIt was also proven that the Municipality paid the full amount of the corresponding compensation for its indemnification, which denotes that it is a legitimate possession, not only by its vocation (or purpose), but also because it occurs in full respect of Article 45 of the Constitution. Likewise, another portion of the property registered in real folio with registration number Placa11498 (indicated supra), specifically a strip of land of three thousand four hundred and fifty square meters, is also public domain, having been expropriated by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport for the construction of the railroad interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA), such that it is dedicated to the right-of-way (derecho de vía). It must be remembered that pursuant to the provisions of the final paragraph of subsection 14) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, in its ordinal 121, the railroad is granted public domain character (carácter demanial) - along with other goods - a condition maintained in Article 4 of the General Law of Railroads, number 5066, of nineteen seventy-two. Regarding the right-of-way, it is clarified that it implies a physical space where the railway activity is performed and carried out, in such a way that there exist, regarding it, the limitations and prohibitions with respect to third parties, proper to public domain goods, due to its purpose or vocation, as derived from Articles 46, 52, and 53 of the General Law of Railroads.\n\nVIII.- OF THE EXERCISE OF POSSESSION OVER THE CLAIMED PROPERTIES.- In addition to what is indicated in the preceding Considerandos, this Court finds that the request made is inadmissible because the Municipality of Alajuela exercises tenure (tenencia) of the properties over which the proceeding is brought, as has been proven in the testimonies rendered, in which it has exercised the police power proper to the Administration in defense of the public domain, to such a degree that, in the face of the plaintiffs' attempts at cleaning, the municipality's action has been practically immediate, preventing them from carrying it out, which is why it was forced to erect a wall, the same wall that was the object of this lawsuit; this leads to the conclusion that, far from being \"disturbing\", the actions of the defendant local government are absolutely legitimate and lawful. The Mayoress of Alajuela is correct in pointing out that the supposed cleaning actions - it is worth clarifying - failed due to the state of the properties (according to the report of the various on-site inspections carried out), by virtue of the defensive action of the defendant authority, cannot be taken as possessory acts (actos posesorios) that support this proceeding, since they have been neither continuous, nor peaceful, but rather occasional, drawing this jurisdictional body's attention to the fact that they were carried out starting from the year two thousand (without specifying an exact date), as a consequence of the probate proceeding that the Nombre70526 siblings brought upon the death of their parents, in which they inventoried as assets, the properties that had been expropriated, both by the Municipality of Alajuela and by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; with the title of the registry possession being precisely the inheritance. This evidences a clearly reckless action and lawsuit, above all, taking into account that the same Nombre70526 siblings filed a reversion (retrocesión) action regarding the expropriation carried out by the Municipality of Alajuela on the properties registered in real folio in the Public Property Registry, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120.442, 126.604, 13.326, and 98.418, which demonstrates knowledge that such lands do not belong to them, nor does their possession.\n\nIX.- OF COSTS (COSTAS).- The appellant requests the reversal of the judgment also in this regard. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application as provided in Article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the losing party must be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales). As the appealed judgment is being reversed to be dismissed in all its respects, it is proper to impose costs (condenatoria en costas) on the plaintiffs, as we are not in any of the exceptional cases provided for in Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of this Jurisdiction, given that a reckless action by the promoters is observed, who attempted to take advantage of their own fraud, as it concerns a public domain good.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe evidence for better deciding (prueba para mejor resolver) offered by the plaintiffs (copy of the probate of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527, processed in file 00-001758-638-CA, before the Civil Court of Greater Amount of Alajuela) and by the defendant municipality (expropriation proceedings, processed in file 3061-75 and copy of the reversion action filed by the promoters of this interdict before the Municipality of San José) is admitted. The appealed resolution is reversed, and in its place, the filed interdicts are denied in all respects. The Nombre70526 siblings are warned against carrying out acts that disturb.\n\nThe plaintiffs are ordered to pay personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), the latter including those of the appeal filed.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nNombre70537 Nombre8483 Sandra María Quesada Vargas\n\nExp.01-002278-638-CI\n\nInterdict\n\nNombre70522 and others against the Municipality of Alajuela\n\namv\n\n**II.- PROVEN FACTS.-** The facts held as proven are substituted due to a series of omissions and inconsistencies in their recording, to be held as follows: **1.)** That the *Municipalidad de Alajuela* decided to expropriate the properties of the *Partido de Alajuela*, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, Placa11501 and Placa11502, located at Dirección7894: , Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, *for the construction of a sports complex (ciudadela deportiva)* (answer to the complaint, folios 95 and 96, Article II of ordinary session 14 of the *Concejo de Alajuela*, of February 21, 1974, and Article 14 of ordinary session 43, of April 17, 1975, folios 246 to 249, and 251 to 252); **2.)** That the owner -Nombre70527- having opposed the compensation value given in the administrative appraisal, filed expropriation proceedings, which were processed before the *Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda*, in case file number 3061-75 (folios 240 to 244); **3.)** That while these expropriation proceedings were underway, a strip of land measuring three thousand four hundred fifty square meters was expropriated from Mrs. Nombre70527, from the property registered in the *folio real* system under registration number Placa11498, *for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA)*; leaving two remnants, which jointly measure one thousand one hundred eighty-seven square meters and forty-one square decimeters and sixty square centimeters, whose compensation was fixed in an administrative appraisal at the sum of two hundred forty-one thousand colones, which was accepted by the expropriated party (administrative study and appraisal, folios 356 to 367, and judgment of ten o'clock on August five, nineteen eighty-eight, from the *Juzgado Primero de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda*, folios 401 to 404); **4.)** That the *compensation amount for properties 12.442, 98.418, 122.604 and 13.326*, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, less the strip expropriated for the railway interconnection of Alajuela, was fixed at *six million three hundred forty-four thousand four hundred seventy-six colones and twenty céntimos (¢ 6.344.476.20)*, with interest payable at six percent annually on the fixed compensation, from the date of taking possession of the properties, (judgments number 6, of 9:45 a.m. on January 6, 1986, issued by the *Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda* and number 2743, of 5:20 a.m. on August first, 1986, of the *Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo*, folios 417 to 423 and 523 to 525); **5.)** That the *Municipalidad de Alajuela paid the entirety of the principal debt and accrued interest* (judicial deposit of the administrative appraisal, number 932.290, of October 21, 1976, for the amount of two hundred five thousand three hundred sixty-eight colones and fifty-five céntimos -¢ 205.368.55-; judicial deposit number 707831, of August 19, 1987, for the amount of six million one hundred thirty-nine thousand one hundred eight colones -¢ ...299-; judicial deposit number 622047c, for the sum of five hundred sixty-eight thousand two hundred seventy-two colones and ninety-one céntimos -¢ 568.272.91-; and judicial deposit 858332 CH, for forty-five thousand four hundred seven colones and eighty-seven céntimos ¢ 45.407.87-, and resolution of 9:00 a.m. on February 22, 1991, of the *Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda*; folios 263, 567 and 568, 626 and 627, 660, 665, respectively), to Nombre70528, to whom Mrs. Nombre70527 had assigned the rights derived from the expropriation proceedings, with the knowledge of her children, as Nombre70522, signs on behalf of the assignor due to her poor state of health, and Nombre70523 and Nombre70526 appear as witnesses, both Nombre70526 (writing visible at folio 415) (testimony of Nombre70529, folios 129 front and back); **6.)** That at 9:15 a.m. on September 30, 1988, the Municipality was placed in possession of the expropriated properties (record of placing in possession, folios 611 and 612); **7.)** That in the resolution of 1:30 p.m. on July 9, 2001, the *Juzgado Segundo Civil y de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía del Primero Circuito Judicial de Alajuela*, in the succession of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527 -which was processed in case file 00-001758-638-CI- declared their children Nombre70522, Nombre70523, Nombre70526, Nombre70524, Nombre70525 and Nombre70526, all with the surnames Nombre70526, as the sole and universal heirs of the decedents, having inventoried as part of the hereditary estate or hereditary assets the properties of the *Partido de Alajuela*, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 and Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, \"*without prejudice to third parties with better rights (sin perjuicio de terceros de mejor derecho)*\" (folios 169 front and back, 189 to 196); **7.)** That *the Nombre70526 siblings appear registered as owners of the properties of the Partido de Alajuela, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 and Placa11502*, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, as of September 3, 2001, with *inheritance (la herencia)* recorded as the cause of acquisition (property certifications at folios 5 to 76 of the judicial file); **8.)** That on the properties whose possession is disputed, sports activities were carried out, with a baseball field, a motocross track, including its control tower, and a children's playground built for this purpose, facilities that are in disuse, so the lots are overgrown with weeds (enzacatados) and partially cut, over which the municipality exercises surveillance control, for which reason it erected part of a wall (judicial inspection folio 121 and 122, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, Nombre70533, Nombre70534, folios 123 back; 125 front, 126 front; 127 front and 128 front and 735; 130 back and 131 back; 133 front and back, 134 front and back, 135 front and back, respectively); **9.)** That starting in the year 2000, without specifying the exact date, the Nombre70526 siblings attempted to carry out cleaning work on the properties subject to this possessory interdict (interdicto), work that was interrupted by the municipal police (testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532; Nombre70534, folios 123 back and 728; 125 front and back and 726 front; 126 back, 127 front and 128 front; 133 back, 134 back, 135 front and back, 735, respectively); **10.)** That the neighbors of the area learned of the expropriation proceedings by the *Municipalidad de Alajuela*, for the construction of a sports complex and the eviction of the Nombre70526 family, on occasion of the same (testimonies of Nombre70531, Nombre70532 and Nombre70530, folios 125 front, 126 front; 128 back and 735; 728, respectively); **11.)** That some goats and horses graze on the land (judicial inspection conducted at 9:00 a.m. on March 154, 2002, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, folios 123 back and 728; 125 back and 727 front; 128 front, respectively); **12.)** That on *April 5, 2002*, the Nombre70526 siblings filed a motion for reversión (retrocesión) of the expropriation carried out by the *Municipalidad de Alajuela* over the properties registered in *folio real* in the *Registro Público de la Propiedad*, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120.442, 126.604, 13.326 and 98.418 (folios 681 to 687); and, **13.)** That in the *suspension of work (suspensión de obra)* proceeding regarding the properties subject to this possessory interdict (interdicto), conducted at 7:30 a.m. on October 22, 2001, the following could be observed: \"*It is a property with frontage to a public street on the west side. Some trees are observed on it and it is quite overgrown with weeds (enzacatada). On the west boundary of said property, exactly at points 1 - 2, there is a newly built fence, it is made of barbed wire and concrete posts, this fence is approximately one and a half meters high, at points 2- 4 no fence has been erected as of today. Then where the land ends, that is to the south, there is a fence about fifteen and a half meters long, erected with wire mesh and tubes, which has a height of two meters ten centimeters, and has been standing for several years. As there is no person performing work on the land, the requested suspension of the work is not decreed at this time*\" (record, folio 83).\n\n**III.- OF THE APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES.-** Notwithstanding that the mayor of Alajuela did not formulate grievances before this Court when the case file was referred, the truth is that she expressed them at the time of filing her appeal against resolution number 377-07, of three thirty p.m. on March twenty, two thousand seven, before the *Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo*, so the following are taken as such: **a.)** *for having declared inadmissible the evidence offered for a better decision (prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver)* -certified copy of the expropriation case file of the corporation she represents against Nombre70527, mother of the petitioners of this possessory interdict (interdicto)-, without assessing that the evidence specifically concerns the main fact of the cause of this proceeding, \"*which is precisely to establish and demonstrate who holds possession of the properties in question in order to determine who has the right to perform possessory acts over them*\"; proceedings in which it is proven that since nineteen eighty-eight the *Municipalidad de Alajuela* is the possessor of those properties, by resolution of the *Juzgado Segundo Contencioso Administrativo*, a judicial act that is ignored by the Trial Judge, which denotes that the plaintiffs were the ones who have been disturbing this institution's right to exercise its right of possession, and that they were aware of that expropriation; **b.)** *an erroneous assessment of the evidence, which violates the principle of objectivity that governs the jurisdictional function*, as it takes excerpts from the testimonies rendered and disregards the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by her represented party, which leads it to not detail that the cleaning acts were casual, so in no way can they support the claimed possession, rather they should be considered acts of disturbance of the right of the *Municipalidad de Alajuela*; the witnesses' knowledge of the expropriation of the lands; the sports activities carried out on them; as well as the witnesses' ignorance of who is really the possessor of the properties; and **c.)** *the affectation of the interests of the community -not only of the defendant municipality- because they are public domain assets (bienes de dominio público)*, which endow them with their own characteristics, such as being unseizable (inembargabilidad), inalienable, and outside the commerce of men, a theory that the A-quo -against the law- qualified as \"*irrelevant (intrascendente)*\" for this case. By virtue of the foregoing, it requests that the filed appeal be granted and the appealed sentence be revoked in its entirety, for which purpose, the knowledge of the documentary and testimonial evidence provided by the Municipality must be ordered, for its new resolution.\n\n**IV.- OF THE FIRST AND SECOND GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.-** The appellant is correct regarding the first two grievances she makes, which have been mentioned in *Considerandos* I.- and II.- of this judgment, in that, in the first one, *the evidence offered for a better decision (prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver) offered by both parties was admitted*, that is, the certified copies of the case files related to the *succession of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527*, processed in case file number 00-001758-638-CI, before the *Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajuea* (folios 151 to 229) -provided by the plaintiffs- and the *expropriation proceedings (diligencias de expropiación)* that were processed in case file 3061-75 for properties 120.442, 98.418, 122.604 and 13.326 (folios 231 to 668 back) and the motion filed by the Nombre70526 siblings before that institution, in which they request the reversión (retrocesión) of the expropriation (folios 650 to 687) -provided by the *Municipalidad de Alajuela*-. The admission of this evidence meant that *the factual framework supporting this decision was modified*, which is reflected in the stated *Considerando* II. Below, the claim for possession filed is analyzed, in accordance with the remaining grievances, that is, in consideration of the special nature of the asset in question, the plaintiffs' knowledge of the expropriation of the properties, which entails the right of possession of its represented party and the acts disturbing that tenancy, as it is not possible to derive from the casual cleaning work the right to declare the requested protection.\n\n**V.- OF THE PROTECTION PROVIDED FOR IN POSSESSORY INTERDICTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF POSSESSION (INTERDICTOS DE AMPARO DE POSESIÓN).-** In possessory interdict (interdictos) proceedings, only *problems arising from the disturbance or dispossession of the possession or tenancy of real estate, or from a new work that affects a property*, are discussed, the purpose of which is to obtain a judicial decision that protects or restores possession or orders the definitive suspension or destruction of the work; hence, the various types of possessory interdicts (interdictos) regulated in our legal system are that for the protection of possession (amparo de posesión), for restitution, for the replacement of landmarks, for the suspension of new work, and for demolition; whereby, *any claim regarding the ownership or definitive possession of said assets is excluded* -article 457 of the *Código Procesal Civil*-. It is important to make several clarifications regarding the admissibility of this type of proceeding. **First**, they were designed to protect \"*possession (posesión)*\", understood as \"*the tenancy (tenencia) of a thing under the power and will of a person, or the enjoyment of a right*\" (Nombre60957, . *Tratado de los Bienes*. Librería e Imprenta Lehmann. Third edition. San José. Costa Rica. 1940. p. 41); so that the factual power over the object (*corpus*) and the will to retain it under one's dependence (*animus*) are indispensable for its admissibility, from which, possession (posesión) is acquired \"*from the moment there exists the actual and exclusive possibility of exercising material acts of usufruct, use, or transformation over a thing, even if none have yet been positively exercised*\" (Idem); or (even) \"*tenancy (tenencia)*\", understood as \"*The mere possession of a thing, its corporal occupation, without title to enjoy it or take ownership of it*\" (Nombre60167, . *Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual*. Volume VIII T-Z. Editorial Heliasta S.R.L. 21st edition, revised, updated and expanded. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 1989, pag. 33); which implies an assimilation of the concepts used. So that, in the case of the *possessory interdict for the protection of possession (interdicto de amparo de posesión)* (article 461 of the *Código Procesal Civil*), it *is designed for the protection of possession (posesión)*, as the cited Nombre60957 pointed out.\n\n\"*The possessor of real estate or of real rights of easement (servidumbre), usufruct, use, or habitation, can cause the disturbances directed against his possession (posesión) to cease, by resorting to the possessory interdict for the protection of possession (interdicto de amparo)*\" (Op. Cit. pag.\n\n64);</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">inasmuch as it is established for anyone who exercises the possession or tenure of a property to be able to claim protection of that possession before the jurisdictional authority, against acts that imply potential or effective disturbance with the intention of despoilment; which requires detailing whether the prerequisites of that possession are met, in accordance with the provisions of articles 279, second paragraph, 284 and 285 of the Civil Code, that is, an occupation that is uninterrupted, public, peaceful, annual and in good faith; it being understood that a </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">possessor in good faith</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> is one who does not know the defect that invalidates the title on which their possession is based, and consequently, a </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">possessor in bad faith</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> is one who does know that circumstance, and one who possesses without any title. A corollary of the foregoing is that it can well be concluded that for the protection of the possessory interdict (interdicto) to proceed, a presumption of legitimacy in the action is required, precisely because it is a summary proceeding (supposedly expeditious and simple), established precisely to protect possession (legitimate) in a primary manner, pending a possible discussion of the right, in an ordinary proceeding; otherwise, the legal system would be protecting situations of arbitrary and violently motivated despoilment, which is foreign to the guiding principles of Law. Therefore, it is so important to determine whether the element of good faith exists (whether the possessor knew or not of the defect in their title - the legal cause giving rise to the right of possession) in conflicts that usually occur over possession, because \\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">naturally, he who possesses a thing with full knowledge that he has no right to it commits a punishable act that cannot help but place him in a disadvantageous situation; and, conversely, he who proceeds without malice, ignorant of the poor quality of his title, deserves no punishment; and it is even necessary, to establish legal balance, to limit the damages he suffers, as far as is compatible with the right of his adversary.</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\" (Name60957, . Op. Cit. p.44.) In </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\\\">second place</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">,</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> the protection afforded is with respect to \\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">acts that disturb and manifest the intention of despoilment</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\", which makes it inapplicable against the actions of the holder of the right to recover their right, or, in the case of public goods, the actions of the Administration to recover its domain. In </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">third place</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, it is extremely important to note that this type of process is only applicable with respect to immovable property under a private property regime, that is, they are ineffective in relation to </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">goods of a public nature</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> or </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">communal goods</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">,</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> inasmuch as they cannot be possessed by private individuals, as provided in articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code:</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin:0pt 56.7pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Article 261.-</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\"> Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can take advantage, being entrusted to public use.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin:0pt 56.7pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">All other things are private and objects of private property, even if they belong to the State, or to the Municipalities, who in such case, as civil persons, are not differentiated from any person.</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin:0pt 56.7pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Article 262.-</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\"> Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter into it, while it is not legally so provided, separating them from the public use to which they were destined</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">.\\\"</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">It is based on the foregoing considerations that the possessory interdicts (interdictos) filed will be analyzed.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">VI.- ON THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE POSSESSORY INTERDICTS FILED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTIES.-</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> As indicated in the preceding Considering, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">the protection of possession does not proceed against public domain (dominio público) assets</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, since there is no right of possession on the part of private individuals, but rather a right of use, through permits and concessions granted in accordance with the law; hence, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">possession -as an attribute of the right of possession- can only be exercised by the entities holding the right</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts -except if these were carried out before the public Institution acquired the property, and only for the purposes of eventual compensation-. In the case under study, the expropriation proceedings denote the special nature of the farms (fincas) over which the declaration of possession is sought, inasmuch as, as the appellant (Municipality of Alajuela) correctly asserts, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">these are properties subject to a special regime, comprising the public domain (demanio público), which that local corporation administers</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, and therefore, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">not subject to possession by private individuals</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">.</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered in various precedents (among others, judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 can be consulted), by demanial or dominical assets must be understood the set of assets –both immovable and movable– that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposed to private ones, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">inasmuch as, by the express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are affected by a special destiny of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that for this reason, they cannot be the object of private property nor of possession</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, so that they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private individuals,</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> nor to the State –in a strict sense–, since it is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain assets and the private domain assets of the State (fiscal) are differentiated by their purpose and the titular subject, inasmuch as </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">what defines the legal nature of the former</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> is the destiny given to this type of asset, that is, inasmuch as they are affected and are at the service of public use</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, under the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, judgments number 2306-91 and 2988-99, among others, both from the Constitutional Chamber, can be consulted.) Thus, entering into this category –without it constituting a closed list– are the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural heritage of the State –protected areas– (comprised of national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands and natural monuments –article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of the eighteenth of September of nineteen ninety-five–), the hydrographic protection zones –article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)– (adjacent to springs, to the banks of rivers and lakes), the bordering zones (article 10 of the Vacant Lands Law, number 13, of the tenth of January of nineteen thirty-nine), the </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">right of way (derecho de vía)</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, railway lines, indigenous reserves, the historical-architectural heritage, mining resources, the archaeological heritage, parks and green zones, etc. These are assets that, inasmuch as by their vocation and destiny they are outside the commerce of men, are therefore </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">inalienable, imprescriptible and unattachable</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, such that their domain or possession is not possible, neither gratuitously nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor gained by usucapion (usucapión), so that they </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">permanently retain their legal validity</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">; and they are not susceptible to judicial attachment (embargo), under the terms of Civil Law; in addition to being </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">subject to police power, regarding their exploitation and use</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, since their private use is conditioned on the granting of the respective licenses and permits and on the control and supervision by the Administration; and the </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, without needing to resort to the jurisdictional route, nor even to an administrative procedure, as there exists on the part of the \\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">occupant</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\" no subjective right or legitimate interest, so that the </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">administrative action substitutes for possessory interdicts (interdictos) for their restitution. </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">Therefore, the legal regime of public domain assets is special and differentiated according to the type of assets in question. The distinction between private goods or things and public goods and things is made to depend, in the first place, on the \\\"ownership\\\" or \\\"domain\\\" of the asset, since the differentiated nature and legal regime is defined by this element; and consequently, on the applicable law, inasmuch as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain assets places them outside the commerce of men and therefore the permits that are granted will always be on a precarious and revocable basis by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">it is not possible to infringe or injure the right of property, enshrined in article 45 of the Political Constitution</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, given that it involves a totally diverse legal regime, where the law establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment by private individuals is possible. Thus, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">whoever attempts by unauthorized means to exercise a private use of that zone will be barred from consummating it, since it is also acceptable, from time immemorial, that these are imprescriptible assets in favor of private individuals and that are outside of commerce</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, principles set forth in articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, which dates from eighteen eighty-six.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">VII.- </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">Thus, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">the possessory interdicts (interdictos) filed are inapplicable, due to the special nature of the farms (fincas) over which this process is filed</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">. Indeed, having been proven that the cause of public interest for the expropriations carried out by the Municipality of Alajuela from the deceased Name70527</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; -aw-import:spaces\\\">   </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">of the farms registered in the Public Registry of Property, under the folio real (folio real) system,</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 and</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">was to destine them for the construction of a sports citadel</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, this implies that </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">these are </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">communal goods (bienes comunales), by destiny and vocation, under the advocacy of green zones</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, understanding by such, the assets belonging to the municipalities (inasmuch as they hold the bare ownership of the asset) destined for neighborhood use, that is, they are arranged for the enjoyment of the neighbors (Name70535, Name70536, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline\\\">Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Address4451. . 1994. p. 35), which </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">enjoy the characteristics of public domain assets</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) asserted in judgment number 4605-96, in the case of communal areas derived from the urbanization process:</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin:0pt 56.7pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">XXII.</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\"> Green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's heritage and must remain under the jurisdiction of municipal entities so that they may administer them </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">as public domain assets, with which they participate in the legal regime of these assets, which makes them inalienable, imprescriptible and unattachable</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">, that is, they cannot be the object of private property by the urbanizer or subdivider (fraccionador), as provided in article 40 of the Urban Planning Law. (...)</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">The truth is that in the case under study, the sports fields that were built on the farms subject to this litigation are in disuse, and that it seems the properties are abandoned, without having been destined for the purpose for which they were expropriated; however, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">it is not therefore possible to ignore their public domain status (demanialidad) </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">(judgment number 2006-0382 of the Constitutional Chamber), since the affectation is of transcendental importance in this type of asset, to such a point that the Constitutional Chamber itself has annulled the modification of destiny or declassification, for example in judgment number 2000-4332, under the following considerations:</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin:0pt 56.7pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the destiny of the lands dedicated to parks, nor could the legislator do so -without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area- since that would make the agreement or law unconstitutional, for disrespecting the essential content of the neighbors' right to enjoy those recreational areas, which, as indicated, are part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'communal facilities' does not have the breadth that is intended to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the asset destined as a green area, park and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services such as, for example, libraries, schools, communal halls, etc., are incompatible with the destiny of park areas and green zones that the legislator has required for some lands, and, without a doubt, so that the interested associations can undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of their interest, they must bear the costs, which involves all the members or neighbors of the locality who will benefit from the public and general use of the property -the cost of the same. The Chamber cannot admit that through donations or construction authorizations </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">(sic) </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">such as those being attempted, the right of the plaintiff neighbors to enjoy the land that integrally belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone and park, and that the Municipality only possesses in administration of local interests, is disregarded.</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\"</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">It was also proven that the Municipality paid the totality of the corresponding compensation, which denotes that it is a legitimate possession, not only due to its vocation (or destiny), but also because it occurs in full respect of article 45 of the Constitution. Likewise, another </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">portion of the farm registered in folio real (folio real) under registration number Placa11498</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> (supra indicated), specifically a strip of land of three thousand four hundred fifty square meters, is also a </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">public domain (dominio público)</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> asset, having been expropriated by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, MOPT) for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA), so that it is affected for the </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">right of way (derecho de vía)</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">. It must be remembered that in accordance with the provisions of the final paragraph of subsection 14) of article 121 of the Political Constitution, in its ordinance 121, the demanial character is granted to the railway -along with other assets-, a condition that is maintained in article 4 of the General Railways Law, number 5066, of nineteen seventy-two. Regarding the right of way (derecho de vía), it is clarified that</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> it implies a physical space where the railway activity is carried out, in such a way that the limitations and prohibitions exist with respect to the same regarding third parties, typical of public domain assets, by reason of their destiny or vocation, as follows from articles 46, 52 and 53 of the General Railways Law.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">VIII.- ON THE EXERCISE OF POSSESSION OVER THE CLAIMED PROPERTIES.-</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\"> In addition to what has been indicated in the foregoing Considering paragraphs, this Court considers that the request made is inapplicable because </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">the Municipality of Alajuela exercises tenure of the farms over which the process is being promoted</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, as has been proven in the testimonies rendered, in that it has exercised the police power inherent to the Administration in defense of the public domain (demanio público), to such a degree that, in the face of the plaintiffs' cleaning attempts, the municipality's action has been practically immediate, preventing them from carrying them out, which is why it was forced to erect a wall, which was the subject of this suit; which leads to the conclusion that, far from being \\\"</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\\\">disturbing</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">\\\", the actions of the defendant local government are absolutely legitimate and in accordance with the law. The Mayor of Alajuela is correct in pointing out that the alleged cleaning actions -worth clarifying- failed by reason of the state of the properties (according to the report of the various inspections carried out), due to the defense action of the defendant authority itself, </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">cannot be considered as possessory acts that support this process</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">, since they have not been continuous, nor quiet, but rather occasional, drawing this jurisdictional body's attention to being carried out, beginning in the year two thousand (without specifying an exact date), as a consequence of the succession process that the siblings Name70526</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; -aw-import:spaces\\\">  </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">promoted upon the death of their parents, in which they inventoried as heritage the farms that had been expropriated, both by the Municipality of Alajuela and by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT); the title of their registry possession being precisely the inheritance. This shows a clearly reckless action and claim, especially if it is taken into account that the same siblings Name70526</span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; -aw-import:spaces\\\">  </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">filed a request for reversion (retrocesión) of the expropriation carried out by the Municipality of Alajuela over the farms registered in folio real (folio real) in the Public Registry of Property, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120.442, 126.604, 13.326 and 98.418, which demonstrates their knowledge that such lands do not belong to them, nor does their possession.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\\\">IX.- ON COSTS (COSTAS).- </span><span style=\\\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\\\">The appellant requests the revocation of the judgment on this point as well.</span><span> </span></p>\n\nPursuant to the provisions of article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable supplementarily as provided for in article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the losing party must be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs. Since the appealed judgment is being revoked and dismissed in its entirety, the plaintiffs must be ordered to pay costs, as we are not in any of the exception scenarios provided for in article 98 of the Regulatory Law of this Jurisdiction, given that reckless conduct (actuación temeraria) is observed on the part of the petitioners, who attempted to profit from their own fraud (dolo) since the matter involves a public domain asset (bien de dominio público).\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe evidence submitted by the petitioners for a better resolution (copy of the probate proceedings of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527, processed under file 00-001758-638-CA, before the Civil Court of Higher Amounts of Alajuela) and by the respondent municipality (expropriation proceedings, processed under file 3061-75 and copy of the reversion (retrocesión) request filed by the managers of this interdict before the Municipality of San José) is admitted. The challenged decision is revoked to instead deny the filed interdicts in all their aspects. The siblings Nombre70526 are warned against carrying out acts that disturb\n\nThe plaintiffs are ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, the latter including those of the filed appeal.\n\n\n\n\n\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes\n\n\n\nNombre70537                             Nombre8483                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Sandra María Quesada Vargas\n\nExp.01-002278-638-CI\n\nInterdicto\n\nNombre70522    and others against the Municipalidad de Alajuela\n\namv\n\nTherefore, it is of such great importance to determine whether the element of good faith (buena fe) is present (whether the possessor knew or did not know of the defect in their title -the legal cause giving rise to the right of possession-) in conflicts that often occur over possession, because \"<i>naturally, he who possesses a thing with full knowledge that he has no right to do so, commits a punishable action that cannot help but place him in a disadvantageous situation; and, on the contrary, he who acts without malice, ignorant of the poor quality of his title, deserves no punishment; and it is even necessary, to establish legal equilibrium, to limit the harm he suffers, insofar as it is compatible with the right of his adversary.</i>\" (BRENES CÓRDOBA, Alberto. Op. Cit. pag.44.) <b><i><u>Secondly</u></i></b>, the protection provided is regarding \"<i>acts that disturb and manifest the intention of dispossession</i>\", which makes it inadmissible against actions by the right-holder to recover their right, or, in the case of public property, the actions of the Administration to recover their property. <b>Thirdly</b>, it is extremely important to note that this type of proceeding is only admissible regarding real estate under a private property regime, that is, they are inapplicable in relation to <b><i>property of a public nature</i></b> or <b><i>common property</i></b>, as they cannot be possessed by private individuals, pursuant to the provisions of articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code: \"<b><i>Article 261.-</i></b><i> Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can take advantage of because they are dedicated to public use.</i> <i>All other things are private and objects of private property, even if they belong to the State, or to the Municipalities, who in that case, as civil persons, do not differ from any ordinary person.</i>\" \"<b><i>Article 262.-</i></b><i> Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter into it, as long as it is not legally disposed otherwise, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.</i>\" It is based on the foregoing considerations that the filed possessory interdicts (interdictos) will be analyzed. <b>VI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE POSSESSORY INTERDICTS FILED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTIES.-</b> As indicated in the preceding Whereas Clause, <b><i>the protection of possession (amparo de posesión) is not admissible against public domain property (bienes de dominio público)</i></b>, since private individuals do not have a right of possession, but a right of use, through permits and concessions granted according to law; hence, <b><i>possession—as an attribute of the right of ownership—can only be exercised by the entities holding the right</i></b>, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts—unless these were carried out before the public Institution acquired the property, and solely for purposes of eventual compensation—. In the case under study, the expropriation proceedings denote the special nature of the properties over which the declaration of possession is sought, as, as the appellant (Municipalidad de Alajuela) rightly asserts, <b><i>they are properties subject to a special regime, comprising the public domain (demanio público) that this local corporation administers</i></b>, and therefore, <b><i>not subject to possession by private individuals</i></b>. As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered in various precedents (among others, judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 may be consulted), public domain properties (demaniales or dominicales) must be understood as the set of goods—both immovable and movable—that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, <b><i>since by express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are affected by a special destiny of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and therefore, cannot be objects of private property or possession</i></b>, so that they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private individuals, nor to the State—in the strict sense—since the State is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain property and the State's private property (fiscales) are differentiated by their purpose and the titular subject, as <b><i>what defines the legal nature of the former is the destiny given to this type of property, that is, insofar as they are affected by and are in the service of public use</i></b>, in the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, judgments number 2306-91 and 2988-99, among others, both from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), may be consulted.) It is thus that this category includes—without constituting a closed list—the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural heritage of the State—protected areas—(comprised of national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments—article 32 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, number 7554, of September eighteen, nineteen ninety-five—), water protection zones—article 33 of the Ley Forestal—(adjacent to springs (nacientes), riverbanks, and lakes), border zones (article 10 of the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos, number 13, of January ten, nineteen thirty-nine), the <b><i>right-of-way (derecho de vía)</i></b>, railway lines, indigenous reserves, historical-architectural heritage, mining resources, archaeological heritage, parks and green zones, etc. These are properties which, insofar as by their vocation and destiny they are outside the commerce of men, are <b><i>inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable</i></b>, so that their ownership or possession is not possible, neither gratuitously nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by adverse possession (usucapión), so that <b><i>they permanently retain their legal validity</i></b>; and they are not susceptible to attachment, in the terms of Civil Law; in addition to being <b><i>subject to police power, regarding their exploitation and use</i></b>, since their exclusive use is conditioned upon the granting of the respective licenses and permits and the control and supervision by the Administration; and <b><i>the Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery</i></b>, without needing to resort to judicial channels, nor even an administrative procedure, because the \"<i>occupant</i>\" does not have any subjective right or legitimate interest, so that <b><i>administrative action replaces possessory interdicts for their restitution. </i></b>Therefore, the legal regime for public domain property is special and differentiated according to the type of property involved. The distinction between private property or things and public property or things is made to depend, first of all, on the \"ownership\" or \"dominion\" of the property, since this element defines its differentiated nature and legal regime; and consequently, on the applicable law, as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime for public domain property places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore the permits granted will always be on a precarious and revocable basis by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, <b><i>the infringement or injury of the right of property, enshrined in article 45 of the Political Constitution, is not possible</i></b>, as it involves a totally different legal regime, where the law merely establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment by private individuals is possible. Thus, <b><i>anyone who attempts by unauthorized means to exercise exclusive use of that zone will be barred from the possibility of consummating it, since it is also acceptable, from time immemorial, that these are properties imprescriptible in favor of private individuals and that are outside of commerce</i></b>, principles set forth in numerals 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, which dates from eighteen eighty-six. <b>VII.-</b> This being the case, <b><i>the filed possessory interdicts are inadmissible, due to the special nature of the properties over which this proceeding is filed</i></b>. Indeed, having been accredited that the cause of public interest for the expropriations carried out by the Municipalidad de Alajuela on the late Carmelina Arrieta Rodríguez of the properties registered in the Public Registry of Property, under the registered title system, with registration numbers 12.442, 98.418, 122.604 and 13.326, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, <b><i>was to destine them for the construction of a sports citadel</i></b>, this implies that <b>they are <i>communal property (bienes comunales), by destiny and vocation, under the designation of green zones</i></b>, understanding by such, property belonging to municipalities (as they hold the bare ownership of the property) destined for neighborhood use, that is, they are arranged for the enjoyment of the neighbors (COLOM PIAZUELO, Eloy, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Madrid. España. 1994. pag. 35), which <b><i>enjoy the characteristics of public domain property</i></b>, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) affirmed in judgment number 4605-96, in the case of communal areas derived from the urbanization process: \"<b><i>XXII.</i></b><i> Green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's patrimony and must remain under the jurisdiction of municipal entities so that they administer them <b>as public domain property, thus sharing the legal regime of these properties, which makes them inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable</b>, that is, they cannot be objects of private property of the developer or subdivider, as provided in article 40 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana. (...)</i>\" It is true that in the case under study the sports fields that were built on the properties subject to this litigation are in disuse, and it seems that the properties are abandoned, without having been destined for the purpose for which they were expropriated; however, <b><i>it is not thereby possible to disregard their public domain nature (demanialidad) </i></b>(judgment number 2006-0382 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)), since the affectation is of transcendental importance in this type of property, to such a point that the Constitutional Chamber itself has annulled the modification of destiny or its de-affectation, for example in judgment number 2000-4332, under the following considerations: \"<i>The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the destiny of the land dedicated to a park, nor could the legislator do so—without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area—because this would make the agreement or law that so ordered unconstitutional, for disrespect of the essential content of the neighbors' right to enjoy these recreation zones, which, as indicated, form part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'community facilities' does not have the breadth that is being implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the property destined as a green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services, for example libraries, schools, community halls, etc., are incompatible with the destiny of park areas and green zones that the legislator has required for some lands, and, without doubt, for the interested associations to be able to undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of their interest, they must bear the costs, which involves all the members or neighbors of the locality who are going to benefit from the public and general use of the property—the cost of the same. The Chamber cannot admit that by means of donation or construction authorizations </i>(sic)<i> such as those being attempted, the right of the petitioning neighbors to enjoy the land that in its entirety belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone and park, and that the Municipalidad only possesses in administration of local interests, be disregarded.</i>\" It was also accredited that the Municipalidad paid the totality of the compensation corresponding to its indemnification, which indicates that it is a legitimate possession, not only due to its vocation (or destiny), but also because it is carried out in full respect of constitutional article 45. Similarly, another <b><i>portion of the property registered under registered title with registration number 98.418</i></b> (indicated supra), specifically a strip of land of three thousand four hundred fifty square meters, is also <b><i>public domain property</i></b>, having been expropriated by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA), so it is affected for the <b><i>right-of-way (derecho de vía)</i></b>. It is necessary to recall that pursuant to the provisions in the final paragraph of subsection 14) of article 121 of the Political Constitution, in its ordinal 121, public domain character is granted to the railway—along with other properties—, a condition that is maintained in article 4 of the Ley General de Ferrocarriles, number 5066, of nineteen seventy-two. Regarding the right-of-way, it is clarified that it implies a physical space where railway activity is realized and carried out, in such a way that there exist regarding it the limitations and prohibitions with respect to third parties, characteristic of public domain property, due to its destiny or vocation, as is inferred from articles 46, 52, and 53 of the Ley General de Ferrocarriles.\n\nIn accordance with articles 457, 459, 461, and 463 of the Civil Procedure Code—fully applicable in this matter as permitted by article 103 of the Law Governing this Jurisdiction—the present summary possessory interdict action, in its modality of protection of possession, filed by Nombre70522, Nombre70523, Nombre70524, Nombre70525, Nombre70526, and Nombre70526 against the Municipalidad de Alajuela, is declared with merit. In accordance with article 463 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiffs are ordered to be maintained in possession of the properties subject to this interdict. Likewise, the Municipalidad de Alajuela is ordered to henceforth refrain from disturbing the plaintiffs' possession of the properties subject to this interdict, under the warning that, should it do otherwise, the representatives and officials of said municipal corporation who fail to comply with what is ordered in this judgment will be tried for the crime of disobedience to authority. The defendant, Municipalidad de Alajuela, is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action\" (folios 771 and 772).\n\n**4.-** Disagreeing with the decision of the lower court, the Mayor of the defendant Municipality appeals, a recourse that was admitted, and by virtue of which this Court hears the matter on appeal.\n\n**5.-** The mandatory procedural requirements have been observed in the proceedings, without noting grounds for nullity capable of invalidating what has been done, and judgment is rendered, after deliberation; and,\n\n**Drafted by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,**\n\n**CONSIDERING:**\n\n**I.- OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION.-** By means of a brief filed on April 5, 2002 (visible at folio 149), the claimants in this interdict provide certification of the probate proceeding processed in case file number 00-001758-638-CI, before the Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajuela (folios 151 to 229); in order that it be taken as evidence for better resolution; and likewise, the defendant local government, in memorials of April 17 (folio 230) and June 13 (folio 679), both memorials from 2002, presents a certified copy of the expropriation proceedings that were processed in case file 3061-75 regarding properties 120,442, 98,418, 122,604, and 13,326 (folios 231 to 668 verso) and of the petition filed by the Nombre70526 siblings before that institution (folios 650 to 687), where they request the reversion of the properties expropriated from their deceased mother by that corporation. Pursuant to article 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, the pertinence of its admission is reserved to the degree of influence it has on the decision of the ruling; so that, having brought the referred evidence to the attention of the parties involved in this process (resolution of seven hours fifty minutes on November 28, 2002, of the Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, visible at folio 710), and having analyzed it at this instance, **this Court considers that said evidence is indeed pertinent to the outcome of this decision**, since, despite the fact that in possessory interdict proceedings the discussion is limited to the possession of the property and not to the better right one may have over it (article 457 of the Civil Procedure Code), the truth is that from this evidence it is possible to derive, **the special nature of the properties over whose possession the declaration is sought to be made, as they are public domain assets**, in view of the indicated expropriation process.\n\n**II.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.-** The facts taken as proven are substituted due to a series of omissions and inconsistencies in their recording, so that they are taken as follows: **1.)** That the **Municipalidad de Alajuela decided to expropriate the properties of the Partido de Alajuela, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, Placa11501, and Placa11502**, located at Dirección7894: , ; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, **for the construction of a sports complex (ciudadela deportiva)** (statement of defense, folios 95 and 96, Article II of the ordinary session 14 of the Concejo de Alajuela, of February 21, 1974, and Article 14 of the ordinary session 43, of April 17, 1975, folios 246 to 249, and 251 to 252); **2.)** That, the owner—Nombre70527—having opposed the amount of compensation given in the administrative appraisal, she filed expropriation proceedings, which were processed before the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, in case file number 3061-75 (folios 240 to 244); **3.)** That while these expropriation proceedings were underway, **a strip of land measuring three thousand four hundred and fifty square meters was expropriated from Mrs. Nombre70527, from the farm registered in the folio real system under registration number Placa11498, for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA)**; leaving two remnants, which jointly measure one thousand one hundred and eighty-seven square meters and forty-one square decimeters, sixty square centimeters, the compensation for which was set in an administrative appraisal at the sum of two hundred and forty-one thousand colones, which was accepted by the expropriated party (study and administrative appraisal, folios 356 to 367, and judgment of ten hours on August 5, 1988, of the Juzgado Primero de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, folios 401 to 404); **4.)** That the **amount of compensation for farms 12,442, 98,418, 122,604, and 13,326**, located in Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, less the strip expropriated for the Alajuela railway interconnection, was set at **six million three hundred forty-four thousand four hundred seventy-six colones and twenty céntimos (¢ 6,344,476.20)**, with interest to be paid at six percent annually on the set compensation, starting from the entry into possession of the properties, (judgments number 6, of 9:45 a.m. on January 6, 1986, issued by the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda and number 2743, of 5:20 a.m. on August 1, 1986, of the Sección Segunda of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, folios 417 to 423 and 523 to 525); **5.)** That the Municipalidad de Alajuela **paid the entirety of the principal debt and accrued interest** (judicial deposit of the administrative appraisal, number 932,290, of October 21, 1976, for the amount of two hundred five thousand three hundred sixty-eight colones and fifty-five céntimos—¢ 205,368.55—; judicial deposit number 707,831, of August 19, 1987, for the amount of six million one hundred thirty-nine thousand one hundred eight colones—¢ ...299—; judicial deposit number 622047c, for the sum of five hundred sixty-eight thousand two hundred seventy-two colones and ninety-one céntimos—¢ 568,272.91—; and judicial deposit 858332 CH, for forty-five thousand four hundred seven colones and eighty-seven céntimos—¢ 45,407.87—, and resolution of 9:00 a.m. on February 22, 1991, of the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda; folios 263, 567 and 568, 626 and 627, 660, 665, respectively), to **Nombre70528**, to whom Mrs. Nombre70527 had ceded the rights derived from the expropriation proceedings, with the knowledge of her children, given that Nombre70522 signs on behalf of the transferor due to her poor health, and Nombre70523 and Nombre70526, both Nombre70526, appear as witnesses (brief visible at folio 415) (testimony of Nombre70529, folios 129 front and verso); **6.)** That at 9:15 a.m. on September 30, 1988, the Municipality was placed in possession of the expropriated farms (record of placement in possession, folios 611 and 612); **7.)** That in the resolution of 1:30 p.m. on July 9, 2001, the Juzgado Segundo Civil y de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía del Primero Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, in the succession of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527—which was processed in case file 00-001758-638-CI—declared their children Nombre70522, Nombre70523, Nombre70526, Nombre70524, Nombre70525, and Nombre70526, all with the surnames Nombre70526, as the sole and universal heirs of the decedents, having inventoried as part of the hereditary estate or assets the properties of the Partido de Alajuela, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122,604, and Placa11502, located in Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, \"without prejudice to third parties of better right\" (folios 169 front and verso, 189 to 196); **7.)** That **the Nombre70526 siblings appear registered as owners of the properties of the Partido de Alajuela, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122,604, and Placa11502**, located in Distrito: cuatro, San Antonio; Cantón: Alajuela; Provincia de Alajuela, as of September 3, 2001, with the cause of acquisition recorded as **inheritance (herencia)** (property certifications at folios 5 to 76 of the judicial file); **8.)** That on the farms whose possession is disputed, sports activities were carried out, building for this purpose a baseball field, a motocross track, with its control tower included, and a children's playground, facilities that are in disuse, so the lots are overgrown with weeds and partly trimmed, over which the municipality exercises surveillance control, for which reason it erected part of a wall (judicial inspection folio 121 and 122, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, Nombre70533, Nombre70534, folios 123 verso; 125 front, 126 front; 127 front and 128 front and 735; 130 verso and 131 verso; 133 front and verso, 134 front and verso, 135 front and verso, respectively); **9.)** That starting in the year 2000, without specifying the exact date, the Nombre70526 siblings tried to carry out cleaning work on the farms subject to this interdict, work that was interrupted by the municipal police (testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532; Nombre70534, folios 123 verso and 728; 125 front and verso and 726 front; 126 verso, 127 front and 128 front; 133 verso, 134 verso, 135 front and verso, 735, respectively); **10.)** That the neighbors of the place had knowledge of the expropriation proceedings by the Municipalidad de Alajuela, for the construction of a sports complex and of the eviction of the Nombre70526 family, on the occasion thereof (testimonies of Nombre70531, Nombre70532, and Nombre70530, folios 125 front, 126 front; 128 verso and 735; 728, respectively); **11.)** That some goats and horses graze on the land (judicial inspection conducted at 9:00 a.m. on March 15, 2002, testimonies of Nombre70530, Nombre70531, Nombre70532, folios 123 verso and 728; 125 verso and 727 front; 128 front, respectively); **12.)** That on **April 5, 2002**, the Nombre70526 siblings filed a petition for reversion of the expropriation carried out by the Municipalidad de Alajuela over the farms registered in folio real in the Registro Público de la Propiedad, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120,442, 126,604, 13,326, and 98,418 (folios 681 to 687); and, **13.)** That in a **proceeding for suspension of work (diligencia de suspensión de obra)** on the properties subject to this interdict, conducted at 7:30 a.m. on October 22, 2001, the following could be observed: \"*It is a property fronting a public street on the west side. Some trees are observed on it and it is quite overgrown with weeds. On the west boundary of said property exactly at points 1-2, there is a recently built fence, made of barbed wire and concrete posts, this fence is approximately one and a half meters high; at points 2-4 no fence has been erected to date. Then, where the land ends, that is towards the south, there is a fence about fifteen and a half meters long, erected with mesh and tubes, which is two meters ten centimeters high, and which has been erected for several years. Since there is no person whatsoever performing work on the land, the requested suspension of work is not decreed at this time*\" (record, folio 83).\n\n**III.- OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.-** Despite the fact that the Mayor of Alajuela does not formulate grievances before this Court, when the case file was submitted, it is true that she made an expression of them at the time of filing her appeal against resolution number 377-07, of three thirty p.m. on March 20, 2007, before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, so that the following are taken as such: **a.)** **for having declared inadmissible the evidence offered for better resolution**—a certified copy of the expropriation file of the corporation she represents against Nombre70527, mother of the claimants in this interdict—, without assessing that the evidence relates precisely to the main fact of the cause of this process, \"*which is precisely to establish and demonstrate who holds possession of the properties in question in order to determine who has the right to perform possessory acts over them*\"; proceedings in which it is proven that since 1988 the Municipalidad de Alajuela has been the possessor of those properties, by resolution of the Juzgado Segundo Contencioso Administrativo, a judicial act that is ignored by the Trial Judge, which denotes that the plaintiffs were the ones who have been disturbing the right of this institution to exercise its right of possession, and that they were aware of that expropriation; **b.)** **an erroneous assessment of the evidence, which violates the principle of objectivity that governs the jurisdictional function**, because it takes excerpts from the testimonies given and without attending to the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by her client, which leads it not to detail that the cleaning acts were casual, and therefore can in no way support the claimed possession, but rather should be viewed as acts of disturbance of the right of the Municipalidad de Alajuela; the witnesses' knowledge of the expropriation of the lands; the sports activities carried out on them; as well as the witnesses' lack of knowledge of who the true possessor of the properties is; and **c.)** **the impact on the interests of the community—not just of the defendant municipality—as these are public domain assets (bienes de dominio público)**, which endow them with particular characteristics, such as immunity from seizure (inembargabilidad), inalienability (inalienabilidad), and being outside of commerce, a theory that the lower court—contrary to law—classified as \"*immaterial*\" to this case. By virtue of the foregoing, it requests that the appeal filed be declared with merit and that the contested judgment be completely revoked, for which purpose, the admission for its consideration of the documentary and testimonial evidence provided by the Municipality must be ordered, for a new resolution.\n\n**IV.- OF THE FIRST AND SECOND GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT.-** The appellant is correct in relation to the first two grievances she makes, to which mention has been made in Considering sections I.- and II.- of this judgment, insofar as, in the first of them, **the evidence offered for better resolution by both parties was admitted**, that is, the certified copies of the files relating to the **succession of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527**, processed in case file number 00-001758-638-CI, before the Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Alajuela (folios 151 to 229)—provided by the plaintiffs—and of the **expropriation proceedings (diligencias de expropiación)** that were processed in case file 3061-75 regarding properties 120,442, 98,418, 122,604, and 13,326 (folios 231 to 668 verso) and of the petition filed by the Nombre70526 siblings before that institution, in which they request the reversion of the expropriation (folios 650 to 687)—provided by the Municipalidad de Alajuela—. The admission of this evidence caused **the factual framework supporting this decision to be modified**, which is reflected in the indicated Considering section II.\n\nBelow is an analysis of the possessory claim filed, in accordance with the remaining grievances, that is, in light of the special nature of the property in question, the plaintiffs' knowledge of the expropriation of the properties, which entails the right to possession of their represented party and the acts disturbing that holding, as it is not possible to derive from casual cleaning tasks the right to declare the requested protection.\n\n**V.- OF THE PROTECTION PROVIDED FOR IN THE INTERIM POSSESSORY PROCEEDINGS (INTERDICTOS DE AMPARO DE POSESIÓN).-** In possessory proceedings (procesos interdicales), the only matters discussed are problems arising from the disturbance or dispossession of the possession or holding of real property, or from a new work that affects a property, the purpose of which is to obtain a judicial decision that protects or restitutes possession or orders the definitive suspension or demolition of the work; hence, the various types of possessory actions (interdictos) regulated in our legal system are those for protection of possession (amparo de posesión), restitution (restitución), replacement of boundary markers (reposición de mojones), suspension of new work (suspensión de obra nueva), and demolition (derribo); thereby, any claim regarding the ownership or definitive possession of said property is excluded -Article 457 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)-. It is important to make several clarifications about the admissibility of this type of proceeding: **First**, they were designed to protect \"possession (posesión)\", understood as \"the holding of a thing under the power and will of a person, or the enjoyment of a right\" (Nombre60957 , . Tratado de los Bienes. Librería e Imprenta Lehmann.Tercera edición. San José. Costa Rica. 1940. p. 41); so that indispensable for their admissibility are de facto power over the object (*corpus*) and the will to retain it under one's dependence (*animus*), whereby, possession (posesión) is acquired \"from the moment there exists the actual and exclusive possibility of exercising material acts of enjoyment, use, or transformation over a thing, even if none have yet been positively exercised\" (Ídem); or (even) the \"holding (tenencia)\", understood as \"(T)he mere possession of a thing, its corporeal occupation, without title to enjoy it or appropriate it\" (Nombre60167, . Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual. Tomo VIII T-Z. Editorial Heliasta S.R.L. 21a. edición, revisada, actualizada y ampliada. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 1989, pag. 33); which implies an assimilation of the concepts used. So that, in the case of the **interim possessory proceeding for protection of possession (interdicto de amparo de posesión)** (Article 461 of the Civil Procedure Code), it **is designed for the protection of possession (posesión)**, as stated by the cited Nombre60957\n\n> \"The possessor of real property or of real rights of easement (servidumbre), usufruct, use, or habitation, may cause the disturbances directed against his possession to cease, by resorting to the interim possessory proceeding for protection (interdicto de amparo)\" (Op. Cit. pag. 64);\n\nsince it is provided for so that whoever exercises possession (posesión) or holding (tenencia) of a property, can claim before the jurisdictional authority the protection of that possession, against acts that imply a potential or effective disturbance with the intention of dispossession; which requires detailing whether the requirements of that possession are met, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 279 subsection two, 284 and 285 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), that is, an occupation that is quiet, public, peaceful, annual, and in good faith; understanding that a **possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe)** is one who does not know of the defect that invalidates the title on which he bases his possession, and consequently, one in **bad faith (mala fe)**, is one who does know of that circumstance, and one who possesses without any title. A corollary of the foregoing is that it can be concluded that for the protection of the possessory action (interdicto) to be granted, a presumption of legitimacy in the proceeding is required, precisely because it is a summary proceeding (supposedly expeditious and simple), provided precisely to safeguard possession (posesión) (legitimate) in a primary manner, pending an eventual discussion of the right, in an ordinary proceeding; otherwise, the legal system would be protecting arbitrary and violent dispossession situations, which is alien to the guiding principles of Law. Therefore, it becomes so important to determine whether the element of good faith is present (whether the possessor knew or not of the defect in his title -the legal cause giving rise to the right of possession-) in the conflicts that usually occur over possession, because \"naturally, he who possesses a thing with full knowledge that no right assists him to do so, commits a punishable action that cannot but place him in a disadvantageous situation; and, on the contrary, he who proceeds without malice, ignorant of the poor quality of his title, deserves no punishment; and it is even necessary to establish legal balance, to limit the damages he suffers, as far as is compatible with the right of his adversary.\" (Nombre60957 , . Op. Cit. pag.44.) **Second**, the protection that is given is regarding \"acts that disturb and manifest the intention of dispossession\", which makes it inadmissible against the actions of the right holder to recover their right, or, in the case of public property, the actions of the Administration to recover its domain. **Third**, it is of the utmost importance to note that this type of proceeding is only admissible regarding real property under a private property regime, that is, they are ineffective in relation to **property of a public nature (bienes de carácter público)** or **common property (comunes)**, insofar as they cannot be possessed by private individuals, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code:\n\n> \"**Article 261.-** Things are public which, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which everyone can take advantage of because they are dedicated to public use.\n>\n> All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State, or to the Municipalities, who in that case, as civil persons, are no different from any person.\"\n\n> \"**Article 262.-** Public things are outside of commerce; and they shall not enter into it, while it is not legally so provided, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.\"\n\nIt is with support in the foregoing considerations that the filed possessory actions (interdictos) will be analyzed.\n\n**VI.- OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE POSSESSORY ACTIONS (INTERDICTOS) FILED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTIES.-** As indicated in the preceding Recital (Considerando), **the protection of possession (amparo de posesión) is not admissible against public domain property (bienes de dominio público)**, since private individuals do not have a right of possession, but of use, through the permits and concessions granted according to the law; hence, **possession (posesión) -as an attribute of the right of ownership- can only be exercised by the entities holding the right**, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts -unless these were carried out before the public Institution acquired the property, and solely for the purposes of a potential compensation-. In the case under study, the expropriation proceedings denote the special nature of the properties over which the declaration of possession is sought, insofar as, as the appellant (Municipalidad de Alajuela) correctly affirms, **these are properties subject to a special regime, comprising the public domain (demanio público) administered by that local corporation**, and therefore, **not subject to possession by private individuals**. As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered in various precedents (among others, decisions number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 may be consulted), public domain property (demaniales) or state-owned property (dominicales) should be understood as the set of goods –both real and personal property– that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, **insofar as by the express will of the constituent power or the legislator, they are dedicated to a special purpose of serving the community, be it the public interest, and for that reason, cannot be the object of private property or possession**, so that they are outside of commerce among men, that is, they cannot individually belong to private individuals, nor to the State –in the strict sense–, as the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, public domain property (bienes de dominio público) and the private domain property of the State (fiscales) are differentiated by their purpose and the owning subject, insofar as **what defines the legal nature of the former is the purpose given to this type of property, be it, insofar as they are dedicated and are at the service of public use**, in the terms provided in Article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this same sense, decisions number 2306-91 and 2988-99, among others, both from the Constitutional Chamber, may be consulted.) It is thus that this category includes –without this constituting a closed list– the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), the forest or natural heritage of the State –protected areas– (made up of national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments –Article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five–), the hydrographic protection zones –Article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)– (contiguous to springs (manantiales), to the banks of rivers and lakes), the border zones (Article 10 of the Vacant Lands Law, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the **right-of-way (derecho de vía)**, railway lines, indigenous reserves, the historical-architectural heritage, mineral resources, the archaeological heritage, parks and green zones, etc. These are property that, insofar as by their vocation and purpose they are outside of commerce among men, are **inalienable, unseizable by adverse possession (imprescriptibles), and unattachable (inembargables)**, so that their ownership or possession is not possible, whether gratuitously or for consideration; they cannot be lost by statute of limitations (prescripción), nor gained by usucapion (usucapión), so that **they permanently retain their legal validity**; and they are not susceptible to attachment (embargo), under the terms of Civil Law; in addition, they **are subject to police power, regarding their use and exploitation**, since their private use is conditional upon the granting of the respective licenses and permits and the control and oversight by the Administration; and the **Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery**, without needing to resort to judicial channels, nor even to an administrative procedure, because the \"occupant (ocupante)\" has no subjective right or legitimate interest, so that **administrative action substitutes for the possessory actions (interdictos) for their restitution.** Therefore, the legal regime of public domain property is special and differentiated in accordance with the type of property in question. The distinction between private property or things and public property and things depends, in the first place, on the \"ownership\" or \"domain\" of the property, because this element defines its differentiated nature and legal regime; and consequently, on the applicable law, insofar as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain property places them outside of commerce among men, and therefore, the permits that are granted will always be precarious and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, **the infringement or injury of the right of property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), is not possible**, because it involves a totally different legal regime, where the law establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment by private individuals is possible. Thus, **whoever intends by unauthorized means to exercise a private use of that zone will be barred from consummating it, as it is also acceptable, since time immemorial, that they are property unseizable by adverse possession (imprescriptibles) in favor of private individuals and that they are outside of commerce**, principles set forth in numerals 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, which dates from eighteen eighty-six.\n\n**VII.-** Thus, **the possessory actions (interdictos) filed are inadmissible, due to the special nature of the properties over which this proceeding is filed.** Indeed, having been accredited that the cause of public interest for the expropriations carried out by the Municipalidad de Alajuela from the deceased Nombre70527 of the properties registered in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad), under the real folio system, with registration numbers Placa11500, Placa11498, 122.604 and Placa11502, located in District: four, San Antonio; Canton: Alajuela; Province of Alajuela, **was to destine it for the construction of a sports citadel**, this implies that **it concerns communal property (bienes comunales), by purpose and vocation, under the designation of green zones (zonas verdes)**, understanding such to mean, the property belonging to the municipalities (insofar as they hold the bare ownership of the property) destined for neighborhood use, that is, they are arranged for the enjoyment of the residents (Nombre70535 , Nombre70536, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Dirección4451. . 1994. pag. 35), which **enjoy the characteristics of public domain property (bienes de dominio público)**, as the Constitutional Chamber asserted in decision number 4605-96, dealing with communal areas derived from the urbanization process:\n\n> \"**XXII.** Green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's heritage and must remain under the jurisdiction of municipal entities so that they administer them **as public domain property, thereby they partake in the legal regime of these property, which makes them inalienable, unseizable by adverse possession (imprescriptibles), and unattachable (inembargables)**, that is, they cannot be the object of private property of the urbanizer or subdivider, as provided in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana). (...)\"\n\nThe truth is that in the case under study, the sports fields that were built on the properties subject to this litigation are in disuse, and it seems that the properties are abandoned, without having been destined for the purpose for which they were expropriated; however, **it is not possible for this reason to disregard their public domain character (demanialidad)** (decision number 2006-0382 of the Constitutional Chamber), since the designation (afectación) is of transcendental importance in this type of property, to such a point that the Constitutional Chamber itself has annulled the modification of purpose or its release from designation (desafectación), for example, in decision number 2000-4332, under the following considerations:\n\n> \"The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the purpose of the lands dedicated to a park, nor could the legislator do so -without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area- since this would render unconstitutional the agreement or law that so provided, for disrespect of the essential content of the residents' right to enjoy those recreation areas, which as indicated, are part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'communal facilities' does not have the breadth that is intended to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the property destined to a green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services, by way of example, libraries, schools, community halls, etc., are incompatible with the purpose of park and green zone areas that the legislator has required for some lands, and, without a doubt, for the interested associations to be able to undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of their interest, they must cover the costs, which involves all the members or residents of the locality that are to benefit from the public and general use of the property -the cost thereof-.\n\nThe Chamber cannot accept that, by way of donation or construction authorizations (sic) such as those being attempted, the right of the neighboring plaintiffs to enjoy the land that integrally belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone and park, and which the Municipality possesses solely as administrator of local interests, be ignored.\"\n\nIt was also established that the Municipality paid the entirety of the compensation corresponding to its indemnification, which indicates that this is a legitimate possession, not only because of its designation (or purpose) but also because it is carried out in full respect of Art. 45 of the Constitution. Likewise, another portion of the property inscribed in folio real with registration Placa11498 (indicated above), specifically a strip of land measuring three thousand four hundred fifty square meters, is also a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), having been expropriated by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes for the construction of the railway interconnection in Alajuela (FECOSA), meaning it is encumbered by a right-of-way (derecho de vía). It is necessary to recall that pursuant to the final paragraph of subsection 14) of Art. 121 of the Political Constitution, in its article 121, the railway —along with other assets— is granted demanial character, a condition maintained in Art. 4 of the General Railway Law, number 5066, of nineteen hundred and seventy-two. Regarding the right-of-way, it is clarified that it involves a physical space where railway activity is carried out and takes place, such that limitations and prohibitions with respect to third parties, characteristic of public-domain assets, exist regarding it by reason of its destination or designation, as inferred from Articles 46, 52, and 53 of the General Railway Law.\n\n**VIII.- REGARDING THE EXERCISE OF POSSESSION OVER THE CLAIMED PROPERTIES.-** In addition to what is indicated in the preceding Considerandos, this Court finds that the request made is inadmissible due to the fact that the *Municipalidad de Alajuela exercises tenure of the properties over which the proceeding is brought*, as has been established in the testimonies rendered, in which it has exercised its administrative police power in defense of the public demesne, to such an extent that in the face of the plaintiffs' attempts to clean the property, the municipality's action has been practically immediate, preventing them from doing so, which is why it was forced to erect a wall, which itself became the object of this lawsuit. This leads to the conclusion that, far from being \"disturbing,\" the actions of the defendant local government are absolutely legitimate and in accordance with the law. The Mayor of Alajuela is correct in pointing out that the supposed cleaning actions —which, it is worth clarifying, were unsuccessful due to the state of the properties (as reported in the various inspections carried out) and the defense actions of the defendant authority itself— cannot be considered possessory acts that sustain this proceeding, since they have not been continuous, nor peaceful, but rather occasional. This Court notes they were carried out starting in the year two thousand (without specifying an exact date), as a consequence of the succession proceeding that the Nombre70526 siblings promoted upon the death of their parents, in which they inventoried as estate assets the properties that had been expropriated by both the Municipalidad de Alajuela and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; the basis for their registered possession being precisely the inheritance. This demonstrates a clearly reckless action and lawsuit, especially considering that the same Nombre70526 siblings filed a reversion of expropriation petition regarding the expropriation carried out by the Municipalidad de Alajuela on the properties inscribed in folio real in the Public Property Registry, in the Province of Alajuela, numbers 120,442, 126,604, 13,326, and 98,418, which demonstrates their knowledge that such lands do not belong to them, nor is their possession theirs.\n\n**IX.- REGARDING COSTS.-** The appellant requests the revocation of the judgment on this point as well. Pursuant to the provisions of Art. 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable supplementarily as provided in Art. 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the losing party must be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs. As the appealed judgment is being revoked to be denied in all its aspects, it is appropriate to impose costs on the plaintiffs, as we find ourselves in none of the exception scenarios provided for in Art. 98 of the Law Regulating this Jurisdiction, given that a reckless action by the petitioners is observed, who attempted to benefit from their own fraud, as the property in question is a public-domain asset.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe evidence for better resolution offered by the petitioners (copy of the succession proceeding of Nombre70528 and Nombre70527, processed under expediente 00-001758-638-CA, before the Civil Court of Greater Quantities of Alajuela) and by the defendant municipality (expropriation proceedings, processed under expediente 3061-75 and copy of the reversion petition filed by the petitioners of this injunction before the San José Municipality) is admitted. The challenged resolution is revoked and instead, the filed injunctions are denied in all their aspects. The Nombre70526 siblings are warned against carrying out actions that disturb\n\nThe plaintiffs are ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, the latter including those of the filed appeal.\n\n\n\n\n\n**Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes**\n\n\n\n\n\n**Nombre70537                                     Nombre8483                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Sandra María Quesada Vargas**\n\n*Exp.01-002278-638-CI*\n\n*Injunction (Interdicto)*\n\n*Nombre70522    and others against the Municipalidad de Alajuela*\n\n*amv*"
}