{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-418510",
  "citation": "Res. 00530-2008 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Competencia en reivindicación de fundo dentro de refugio de vida silvestre no expropiado",
  "title_en": "Jurisdiction over property recovery within a non-expropriated wildlife refuge",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conoció un recurso de casación en un proceso ordinario de reivindicación de un fundo agrario denominado “La Chanchita”, ubicado en la zona fronteriza norte. El propietario reclamaba la restitución contra ocupantes. El Procurador General alegó incompetencia de la jurisdicción agraria, ya que el inmueble se encontraba dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, declarado por el Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM, y constituía parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, por lo que la competencia correspondía a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. La mayoría de la Sala acogió este argumento: al estar el fundo dentro de los límites del refugio, existía la posibilidad de que se tratara de un bien de dominio público. Por ello, anuló todo lo actuado desde el auto inicial y ordenó remitir el expediente al Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. La sentencia incluye un voto salvado de la Magistrada Escoto Fernández, quien sostuvo que la competencia seguía siendo agraria porque los inmuebles estaban inscritos a nombre del actor antes de la creación del refugio y no habían sido expropiados por el Estado. Esta resolución fija un criterio sobre la competencia cuando un fundo privado está ubicado dentro de un área silvestre protegida aún no expropiada.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court reviewed an appeal in an ordinary agrarian property recovery action for a farm called “La Chanchita” in the northern border area. The plaintiff sought eviction of occupants. The Attorney General argued that the agrarian court lacked jurisdiction because the property lay within the Corredor Fronterizo Norte National Wildlife Refuge, declared by Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM, and was part of the State’s Natural Heritage, so the case belonged in the administrative-contentious jurisdiction. The majority agreed: since the farm was inside the refuge limits, there was a possibility it was public domain. It annulled all proceedings after the initial ruling and sent the file to the Administrative-Contentious Court. A dissenting vote by Judge Escoto Fernández maintained that agrarian jurisdiction remained competent because the properties were registered in the plaintiff’s name before the refuge was created and had not been expropriated. The decision establishes criteria on jurisdiction when a private farm is within an un-expropriated protected wildlife area.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "01/08/2008",
  "year": "2008",
  "topic_ids": [
    "property-and-titling"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": null,
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "competencia agraria",
    "competencia contencioso administrativa",
    "bien demanial",
    "dominio público",
    "Patrimonio Natural del Estado",
    "expropiación",
    "reivindicación"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "competencia agraria",
    "competencia contencioso administrativa",
    "refugio de vida silvestre",
    "dominio público",
    "Patrimonio Natural del Estado",
    "reivindicación",
    "bien demanial",
    "expropiación",
    "Decreto 22962-MIRENEM",
    "Ley 2825",
    "voto salvado"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "agrarian jurisdiction",
    "administrative-contentious jurisdiction",
    "wildlife refuge",
    "public domain",
    "State Natural Heritage",
    "property recovery",
    "demanial property",
    "expropriation",
    "Decree 22962-MIRENEM",
    "Law 2825",
    "dissenting vote"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "“Los terrenos cuyo título de propiedad se encuentre legítimamente inscrito ante el Registro Público de la Propiedad en el área comprendida dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, solamente se considerarán parte del mismo hasta que el Estado compre o expropie su derecho de propiedad.”\n\nEn el sub júdice, los juzgadores de las instancias no se cuestionaron y, por ende, tampoco analizaron la legitimidad de los títulos de propiedad inscritos en el Registro Público a favor del señor [actor]. Por lo anterior, ante la posibilidad de estar involucrado un inmueble afecto al dominio público, la jurisdicción competente para conocer este proceso es la Contencioso Administrativa.",
  "excerpt_en": "“Lands whose title is legitimately registered in the Public Property Registry within the area of the National Wildlife Refuge shall only be considered part thereof until the State purchases or expropriates their ownership right.”\n\nIn this case, the lower-court judges did not question and therefore did not analyze the legitimacy of the title registered in the Public Registry in favor of [plaintiff]. Consequently, given the possibility that a property affected by public domain is involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this case is the Administrative-Contentious.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Annulment decreed",
    "label_es": "Nulidad decretada",
    "summary_en": "The Chamber declared the agrarian jurisdiction incompetent, annulled all prior proceedings, and ordered the case transferred to the administrative-contentious jurisdiction.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala declaró la incompetencia de la jurisdicción agraria y anuló todo lo actuado, ordenando remitir el proceso a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "Lands whose title is legitimately registered in the Public Property Registry within the area of the National Wildlife Refuge shall only be considered part thereof until the State purchases or expropriates their ownership right.",
      "quote_es": "Los terrenos cuyo título de propiedad se encuentre legítimamente inscrito ante el Registro Público de la Propiedad en el área comprendida dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, solamente se considerarán parte del mismo hasta que el Estado compre o expropie su derecho de propiedad."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "given the possibility that a property affected by public domain is involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this case is the Administrative-Contentious.",
      "quote_es": "ante la posibilidad de estar involucrado un inmueble afecto al dominio público, la jurisdicción competente para conocer este proceso es la Contencioso Administrativa."
    },
    {
      "context": "Voto salvado, Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The cited norm 22(ch) provides for situations like the one under study, where in an agrarian venue the State can be a legally obligated party, in matters relating to the protection of public domain, without requiring the case to be aired in the contentious jurisdiction.",
      "quote_es": "La norma reproducida 22 inciso ch) prevé situaciones como las de estudio, donde en sede agraria se puede tener como parte obligada legalmente al Estado, en asuntos relativos a la tutela del dominio público, sin preverse deba ventilarse en la jurisdicción contenciosa."
    }
  ],
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      "citation": "Res. 00338-2020 Tribunal Agrario",
      "title_en": "Dispute over water easement crossing public domain assets falls under administrative jurisdiction",
      "title_es": "Conflicto sobre servidumbre de aguas que atraviesa bienes demaniales compete a la vía contenciosa",
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  "body_es_text": "* 971601810387AG * \n\nEXP: 97-160181-0387-AG \n\nRES: 000530-F-S1-2008 \n\n SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del primero de agosto de dos mil ocho. \n\n Proceso ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Agrario de Liberia, por Nombre159947 , soltero, ganadero, pasaporte no. Placa40852, vecino de Rivas Nicaragua; contra Nombre35779 ﻿; ISMAEL LÓPEZ VÁSQUEZ; CATALINA HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, soltera, de oficios domésticos, vecina de Liberia; MARGARITO RÍOS QUINTANILLA, soltero; FELICIANA LÓPEZ FERNÁNDEZ; FLORENTINO VÁSQUEZ LÓPEZ; Nombre114660 ; Nombre159950 , divorciada; Nombre216011 ; Nombre216012 ; Nombre159948 ; Nombre216014 ; Nombre35778 ; Nombre216015 ; Nombre216016 conocido como Nombre216017 , soltero, ciudadano nicaragüense con cédula de residencia temporal no. CED148528- ; Nombre216018 conocido como Nombre216018 , ciudadano nicaragüense; Nombre216019 , en unión libre, operario; y Nombre216020 . En el proceso se tuvo como parte al INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, cuyo representante no se apersonó. Figuran además, como apoderados especiales judiciales; del actor, los licenciados Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro, abogado, vecino de Liberia, y Luis Eduardo Leal Vega, abogado, vecino de Santa Cruz; y, por los demandados, con excepción de don José Luis Condega Vásquez; el licenciado Orlando Leiva Rojas, abogado, vecino de San José. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas, casados, agricultores y vecinos de La Cruz. \n\nRESULTANDO \n\n 1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, el actor estableció demanda cuya cuantía se fijó en la suma de cien millones de colones, a fin de que en sentencia se declare: \"a) Con lugar esta demanda en todos sus extremos. b) Que la finca conocida como La Chanchita, unidad material integrada por las tres fincas en el Registro Público, identificadas y descritas en la relación de hechos de esta demanda me pertenece en exclusiva y específicamente con exclusión de los aquí demandados. c) Que los aquí demandados usurparon mi finca con clandestinidad y violencia, con mala fé y así se mantuvieron hasta que fueron desalojados por la autoridad Administrativa y que tales demandados conscientes de su mala fé, asintieron en aquel desalojo. d) Que al haber ingresado con clandestinidad y violencia y haber ocupado de mala fé partes de mi finca, mi impidieron el pleno goce y disfrute de los derechos que me garantiza la ley como propietario único y exclusivo de ese inmueble. Que me limitaron y hasta me impidieron el pleno goce y disfrute de los atributos del dominio que me garantiza como propietario el Código Civil y la Constitución Política de Costa Rica. e) Que aún y cuando fueron puestos en posesión de mi finca por la sentencia dictada en el Interdicto, tal posesión no es legítima ni de buena fé, pues la sentencia se basó en consideraciones de tipo procesal, de supuestas violaciones al debido proceso en el Desahucio Administrativo y no en un análisis de fondo, sobre la forma viciosa, clandestina y violenta por la cual usurparon mi finca los demandados. f) Que se ordene en sentencia a los demandados desalojar mi finca en un plazo perentorio a partir de la fecha en que adquiera firmeza la sentencia y que tal desalojo se practique por la fuerza pública en caso de que los usurpadores no lo hagan voluntariamente. g) Que en sentencia se condene a los demandados a pagarme los daños y perjuicios que me han producido con su acción maliciosa, los cuales consisten entre otros, en que me han impedido el libre acceso a mi finca, al cual tengo derecho como propietario en que han interrumpido la producción en mi finca al ingresar y la impidieron durante el tiempo en que se han permanecido en ella. Que el monto de tales daños y perjuicios será establecido en ejecución de sentencia pero que consisten además en que los demandados me han impedido usufructuar mi finca y disponer de ella libremente como su propietario que soy. h) Que en sentencia se condene a los demandados a pagarme las costas personales y procesales del juicio. i) Que se ordene restituirme en la posesión de mi finca.\" \n\n 2.- El licenciado Orlando Leiva Rojas contestó negativamente e interpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de causa, falta de personería activa y pasiva, la expresión genérica de \"sine actione agit\"; falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, litis consorcio y litis pendencia. \n\n 3.- Los demandados Nombre216017 , Nombre216019 y Nombre216020 no contestaron la demanda, por lo que se declaró su rebeldía. \n\n 4.- El Juez Rodrigo Valverde Umaña, en sentencia de las 11 horas del 19 de julio de 2004, resolvió: \"De conformidad con lo expuesto, los artículos 1, 2 (sic) 6, 26, 55 y 79 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria y demás normas citadas aplicadas supletoriamente en materia agraria y la jurisprudencia, se resuelve: Se RECHAZA la excepción de FALTA DE DERECHO, FALTA DE CAUSA, LA DE FALTA DE PERSONERÍA ACTIVA Y PASIVA, LA GENÉRICA SINE ACTIONE, la de FALTA DE AGOTAMIENTO LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA y la de LITIS PENDENCIA Y LITIS CONSORCIO. Se ACOGE LA DEMANDA, en la forma que se dirá, entendiéndose denegado lo que expresamente no se indique y modificado lo que no se aprueba como se pidió en la demanda: 1.- Deben los demandados a partir de la firmeza de esta resolución desalojar de inmediato los terrenos objeto de la litis sean las fincas inscritas bajo el sistema de folio real No. 6.608-000, con una medida de dos millones de metros cuadrados, la No. 5.633-000, con una medida de un millón quinientos mil metros cuadrados, y la No. Placa21267, con una medida de novecientos cincuenta y tres mil trescientos cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados la cuales forman una sola unidad, y que se encuentran inscrita (sic) a nombre del actor Nombre159947 . En caso de no cumplir con lo ordenado se procederá a su desalojo con el auxilio de la fuerza pública. 2.- Con respecto a la pretensión de declaratoria de usurpación, debe la parte actora acudir a la vía pertinente. 3.- Se condena a los demandados al pago de daños y perjuicios los cuales serán establecido (sic) en ejecución de sentencia. 4.- Son las costas procesales y personales a cargo de los demandados.\" \n\n 5.- El apoderado especial judicial apeló y el Tribunal Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por los Jueces Enrique Ulate Chacón, Antonio Darcia Carranza y Carlos Picado Vargas, en sentencia No. 1003-F-07 de las 14 horas 20 minutos del 7 de diciembre de 2007, dispuso:\"Se rechaza (sic) nulidad concomitante y se confirma la sentencia recurrida.\" \n\n 6.- Don Orlando Leiva Rojas, en su expresado carácter formula recurso de casación con indicación expresa de las razones en que se apoya para refutar la tesis del tribunal de instancia. \n\n 7.- En los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de ley. \n\nRedacta el Magistrado Solís Zelaya \n\nCONSIDERANDO \n\nI.- El 6 de octubre de 1997, el señor Nombre159947 formuló este proceso ordinario ante el Juzgado Agrario de Liberia, en contra de José Luis Condega Vásquez, Ismael López Vásquez, Catalina Hernández Sánchez, Margarito Ríos Quintanilla, Feliciana López Fernández, Florentino Vásquez López, Nombre114660 , Nombre159950 , Nombre216011 , Nombre216012 , Nombre159948 , Nombre216014 , Nombre35778 , Nombre216015 , Nombre216016 , Nombre216018 , Nombre216021 (de quien desistió posteriormente –folios 193 y 194- ), Nombre216019 y Nombre216020 . Se tuvo como parte interviniente al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), sin embargo, su representante no se apersonó. Don Nombre159947 pretende se le reivindique la finca conocida como “La Chanchita”, la cual es una unidad material integrada por tres inmuebles inscritos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad a su nombre: 1) matrícula de folio real Placa21263, con los siguientes linderos: norte, línea divisoria entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua; sur, Nombre216022 ; este, río Tirurí, que la divide de Nombre216023 ; y, oeste, Nombre216024 , calle pública en parte y otro. Con una cabida de 2.000.000 de metros cuadrados. 2) matrícula de folio real Placa40853, colindando al norte con Nombre216025 y otro; sur, con Nombre216026 ; este, con baldíos nacionales y otro; y, oeste, con calle pública. Mide 1.500.000 metros cuadrados. 3) matrícula de folio real Placa21267, limitando, por el norte, con baldío ocupado y Nombre114672 ; al sur, este y oeste con baldíos. Tiene una cabida de 953.352 metros cuadrados. En consecuencia, la propiedad que se solicita reivindicar presenta los siguientes linderos: norte: línea divisoria entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua; sur: Nombre216022 ; este: río Tirurí en medio de Nombre216023 ; y, oeste: camino público que la divide de Nombre216024 . De igual manera, pide se condene a los demandados al pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados, así como a las costas del proceso. Los accionados se opusieron y formularon las defensas de falta de: derecho, causa, personería activa y pasiva, agotamiento de la vía administrativa; litis consorcio pasivo necesario –reclamaban que el IDA debía ser parte - y litis pendencia. Asimismo, alegaron la expresión genérica “sine actione agit”. El Juzgado las desestimó. En lo de interés, acogió la demanda en los siguientes términos: 1) le ordenó a los accionados, a partir de la firmeza del fallo, desalojar los terrenos objeto de esta lite, sean las fincas inscritas bajo el sistema de folio real números 6608-000, 5633-000 y 5384-000, y que forman una sola unidad; 2) los condenó al pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados, cuyo monto sería fijado en la etapa de ejecución de la sentencia; y, 3) les impuso las costas del proceso. El Tribunal confirmó. Inconforme, el apoderado especial judicial de los demandados interpuso recurso de casación. De igual manera, y a título de parte interesada, lo hace el señor Procurador, quien alega la incompetencia de la jurisdicción agraria para conocer el sub júdice, pues, según indica, el inmueble litigioso está ubicado en la zona fronteriza norte, la cual conforma el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, integrante del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, y administrado por el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, razón por la cual, amén de tratarse de un bien de dominio público, el Estado debe figurar como parte, mas no el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA). \n\nII.- La Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 del 14 de octubre de 1961 y sus reformas, dispone en el canon 7 inciso f) lo siguiente: “Mientras el Estado, por voluntad propia o por indicación del Ministerio de Agricultura o del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, atendiendo razones de conveniencia nacional, no determine los terrenos que deben mantenerse bajo su dominio, se considerarán inalienables y no susceptibles de adquirirse por denuncio o posesión, salvo los que estuvieren bajo el dominio privado, con título legítimo, los siguientes: … f) Los comprendidos en una zona de 2.000 metros de ancho a lo largo de las fronteras con Nicaragua y con Panamá …”(Lo subrayado es suplido). Por su parte, el Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM, del 15 de febrero de 1994 y sus reformas, siguiendo ese criterio, declara Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre al corredor fronterizo conformado por los terrenos comprendidos a lo largo de la frontera con Nicaragua, desde Punta Castilla en el Mar Caribe, hasta Bahía Salinas en el Océano Pacífico. En este sentido, el canon 1 dispone: “Declárase Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre el corredor fronterizo conformado por los terrenos comprendidos en una zona de 2.000 m de ancho a lo largo de la frontera con Nicaragua desde Punta Castilla en el Mar Caribe hasta Bahía Salinas en el Océano Nombre99660, según se dispone en el Tratado Cañas-Jerez del 15 de abril de 1858” Como se indicó en el considerando anterior, la heredad en litigio, por su rumbo norte, colinda con la línea divisoria entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua, lo cual es así señalado por el actor en el hecho 1 de su demanda –folios 1 vuelto y 2-. Esto implica, sin duda alguna, que, al menos en parte, coincide su ubicación con el área protegida. De conformidad con el artículo 2 del señalado Decreto Ejecutivo: “Los terrenos cuyo título de propiedad se encuentre legítimamente inscrito ante el Registro Público de la Propiedad en el área comprendida dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, solamente se considerarán parte del mismo hasta que el Estado compre o expropie su derecho de propiedad.”(Lo subrayado es suplido). En el sub júdice, los juzgadores de las instancias no se cuestionaron y, por ende, tampoco analizaron la legitimidad de los títulos de propiedad inscritos en el Registro Público a favor del señor Nombre159947 . Por lo anterior, ante la posibilidad de estar involucrado un inmueble afecto al dominio público, la jurisdicción competente para conocer este proceso es la Contencioso Administrativa. Debe considerarse, asimismo, que el ordinal 3 del indicado Decreto Ejecutivo establece: “La administración del Refugio corresponde a la Dirección General de vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas”, hoy Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (MINAE), norma que debe relacionarse con lo dispuesto en los numerales 13, 14, 15, 18 de la Ley Forestal, número 7575 del 5 de febrero de 1996; 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554 del 4 de octubre de 1995; 22 y 28 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, número 7788 del 30 de abril de 1998. En consecuencia, el proceso debe tramitarse, además, con la intervención del Estado para la defensa de la demanialidad y no con el IDA, quien no administra los refugios nacionales de vida silvestre, por lo que carece de interés. \n\nIII.- En mérito de lo indicado, al amparo de lo dispuesto en los numerales 10 y 194 del Código Procesal Civil, al resultar incompetente la jurisdicción Agraria para conocer esta lite por razón de la materia, se impone anular todo lo actuado y resuelto a partir del auto de las 7 horas del 9 de octubre de 1997 (folio 15). En aplicación del principio de justicia pronta y cumplida, se ordenará remitir los autos al Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para que lo tramite y fenezca conforme a la normativa procesal vigente (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), por ser hasta ahora que será conocido en esa vía. \n\nPOR TANTO \n\nSe anula todo lo actuado y resuelto a partir del auto de las 7 horas del 9 de octubre de 1997 (folio 15). Remítanse los autos al Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para que lo tramite y fenezca conforme a la normativa procesal vigente (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). \n\n \n\n \n\nAnabelle León Feoli \n\n \n\n \n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya \n\n \n\n \n\nNombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández \n\n \n\nVoto salvado de la Magistrada Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández \n\n I.- Con el respeto debido a la decisión de los demás Integrantes, la suscrita juzgadora disiente de las conclusiones a que arriba el fallo de mayoría, propiamente en el considerando identificado como II, razón por la cual se separa de ese criterio y salva el voto con fundamento en las siguientes estimaciones. \n\n II.- El conflicto que se presenta es eminentemente de naturaleza agraria, al estar de por medio tres fundos, los cuales conforman una sola heredad conocida como La Chanchita; dedicados a ganado vacuno y pecuario así como a la cría de animales domésticos, cultivo de granos y verduras, entre otras tubérculos y raíces. A su vez, ha preservado áreas montañosas, flora y fauna en peligro de extinción, según lo afirma el demandante, quien es ganadero, lo cual también se colige del reconocimiento judicial practicado en autos. Agrega, él los adquirió mediante compra desde 1972 y aparecen inscritos a su nombre hace años en el respectivo Registro. Pero al estar localizados dentro de un refugio de vida silvestre creado mediante Decreto Ejecutivo 22962- MIRENEM en Febrero 15 de 1994, se estima en el voto de mayoría ser del conocimiento de la sede contencioso administrativa. \n\n III.- Este asunto se inició en el año 1997, ante el Juzgado Agrario de Liberia (folio 12 vlto. 1er. tomo), ni siquiera se tiene que considerar los predios en contienda como parte del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, aunque estén dentro de sus límites, porque no se colige de los autos a la fecha se haya expropiado ninguna de las tres fincas que conforman el fundo denominado La Chanchita. \n\n IV.- Dispone el ordinal 22 inciso ch) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria: “En los negocios de conocimiento de la jurisdicción agraria, son partes: ch) La Procuraduría General de la República, en todos los asuntos relativos a la tutela del dominio público y al ejercicio de las atribuciones que la ley le confiere en esta materia. Los tribunales examinarán de oficio, o a petición del actor o demandado, si en realidad existe el interés directo aludido. Así reformado por el artículo 2º de la ley No. 6815 del 27 de septiembre de 1982 )”. (Lo destacado no responde al original). El inciso ch) es claro al establecer que en todo caso se debe examinar la existencia de este interés aludido. Y en este litigio no se ha alegado el interés directo del Estado, porque se trata de fincas que aún están en dominio privado. De acuerdo con los artículos 22 de la LJA de reciente transcripción y el 7 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización este asunto es de competencia agraria, tanto por los criterios funcional, como el objetivo y el subjetivo. Tómese en cuenta que el Decreto Ejecutivo que creó el Refugio 22962-MIRENEM es de 1994; y el precepto 2 de esa normativa dice que, solamente se considerarán parte del refugio de referencia hasta que el Estado compre o expropie su derecho de propiedad, lo cual en este caso no se da. El interés directo del Estado a la fecha aún no lo tiene para tenerle como parte dentro de este proceso agrario; ello, porque se trata de fincas inscritas en el Registro Nacional de la Propiedad Inmueble, por lo cual aún se encuentran en dominio privado. En consecuencia, la competencia es agraria, pues no existen elementos probatorios donde se acredite que los inmuebles jurídicamente forman parte del refugio. Si bien es cierto que esta integrante comparte el criterio de que las áreas silvestres protegidas son bienes del Estado y por ende forman parte del dominio público, esto lo es sólo cuando ya han sido expropiadas. Aunado a lo anterior con base en la disposición transcrita, ello no obsta para que por la especialidad el asunto se discuta en una sede especializada agraria si se está ante fundos de tal naturaleza, independientemente de las partes obligadas que haya que tener como tales, en este caso al Estado dados los intereses que pueda tener. La norma reproducida 22 inciso ch) prevé situaciones como las de estudio, donde en sede agraria se puede tener como parte obligada legalmente al Estado, en asuntos relativos a la tutela del dominio público, sin preverse deba ventilarse en la jurisdicción contenciosa. \n\n V.- Y, respecto a lo esbozado en el Considerando identificado como II. de la resolución que responde al voto de mayoría, de tratarse de una simple posibilidad, en este caso, de que esté involucrado un bien afecto a dominio público, lo cual a la fecha no está acreditado en autos, ha de indicarse que lo dispuesto en este proceso afecte al Estado pues queda incólume la posibilidad de discutir ahora sí, en sede contenciosa, con pretensiones específicas por parte de la Procuraduría General de la República que la firma inscrita en el respectivo Registro, no es de naturaleza privada sino demanial, sea entonces del Estado, independientemente de cómo se resuelva el presente litigio. Tampoco consta en este caso que la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, esté ejerciendo administración alguna sobre el fundo objeto de contienda inscrito como bien de dominio privado en el Registro Público, lo cual refuerza la competencia agraria, a tenor de lo dispuesto por el ordinal 108 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Las pretensiones de este proceso son eminentemente privadas sin impugnar o cuestionar acto administrativo alguno pues lo que respetuosamente estimo, no cabe la nulidad decretada. La heredad en discusión denominada la Chanchita, según aduce el acciónate desde su esctito inicial está conformada por tres fincas que aparecen inscritas una de ellas desde 1982 y las dos restantes en 1993. (Folios 590, 597, 651 y 805 vlto.) Es decir, antes de la promulgación del Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM de 7-2- 1994. Y, por ende, no cabe afectar retroactivamente el inmueble, salvo que se hubiere dado el trámite de expropiación, quedándole en todo caso abierta la vía correspondiente al Estado para reclamar los eventuales derechos que estime corresponderle. \n\n VI.- Aunado a lo anterior, tómese en consideración que este litigio se inició en 1997, donde ya se evacuó la prueba ofrecida por las partes así como se han dictado las sentencias de primera y segunda instancia, en sede especializada agraria. En este caso en el expediente existen ya hechos irreproductibles, que al anularse prácticamente quedarán en indefensión las partes, quienes aportaron dicha prueba. De ahí que no se comparta lo dispuesto por mayoría de anular todo lo actuado y resuelto a partir del auto de las 7 horas del 9 de octubre de 1997, ordenándose remitir los autos al Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo para que lo tramite y fenezca conforme a la normativa procesal vigente. (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). En consecuencia, la suscrita vota en contra de la nulidad, estimándose que la Sala es competente para entrar a conocer del fondo del recurso interpuesto ante este órgano decisor; lo cual se omite por cuanto la nulidad decretara por mayoría así lo impide. Además, si esta juzgadora entrara a analizar el fondo del asunto, como en voto de mayoría se remite a la sede contenciosa, al ser esta Sala el superior de dicha materia en procesos ordinarios como el de análisis, sería adelantar criterio pues si viene luego como proceso contencioso ya habría resuelto el punto en cuanto al fondo de la contienda. \n\n \n\n \n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández \n\n \n\nmja/gdc.- \n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico ...36",
  "body_en_text": "* 971601810387AG *\n\nEXP: 97-160181-0387-AG\n\nRES: 000530-F-S1-2008\n\n FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on the first of August of two thousand eight.\n\n Ordinary proceeding filed in the Agrarian Court of Liberia, by Nombre159947 , single, cattle rancher, passport no. Placa40852, resident of Rivas Nicaragua; against Nombre35779 ; ISMAEL LÓPEZ VÁSQUEZ; CATALINA HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, single, domestic worker, resident of Liberia; MARGARITO RÍOS QUINTANILLA, single; FELICIANA LÓPEZ FERNÁNDEZ; FLORENTINO VÁSQUEZ LÓPEZ; Nombre114660 ; Nombre159950 , divorced; Nombre216011 ; Nombre216012 ; Nombre159948 ; Nombre216014 ; Nombre35778 ; Nombre216015 ; Nombre216016 also known as Nombre216017 , single, Nicaraguan citizen with temporary residence card no. CED148528- ; Nombre216018 also known as Nombre216018 , Nicaraguan citizen; Nombre216019 , in a common-law union, laborer; and Nombre216020 . The AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE was included as a party in the proceeding, but its representative did not appear. Also appearing as special judicial attorneys-in-fact; for the plaintiff, attorneys Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro, lawyer, resident of Liberia, and Luis Eduardo Leal Vega, lawyer, resident of Santa Cruz; and, for the defendants, with the exception of Mr. José Luis Condega Vásquez; attorney Orlando Leiva Rojas, lawyer, resident of San José. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, farmers, and residents of La Cruz.\n\nRESULTANDO\n\n 1.- Based on the facts set forth and the legal provisions cited, the plaintiff filed a claim, the amount in controversy of which was set at the sum of one hundred million colones, so that the judgment declares: \"a) This claim is upheld in all its aspects. b) That the property known as La Chanchita, a material unit composed of the three properties registered in the Public Registry, identified and described in the statement of facts of this claim, belongs to me exclusively and specifically to the exclusion of the defendants herein. c) That the defendants herein usurped my property clandestinely and violently, in bad faith, and remained that way until they were evicted by the Administrative authority, and that such defendants, aware of their bad faith, consented to that eviction. d) That by having entered clandestinely and violently and having occupied parts of my property in bad faith, they prevented me from the full use and enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to me by law as the sole and exclusive owner of that real property. That they limited and even prevented me from the full use and enjoyment of the attributes of ownership guaranteed to me as owner by the Civil Code and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. e) That even though they were placed in possession of my property by the judgment rendered in the Interdict, such possession is not legitimate nor in good faith, since the judgment was based on procedural considerations, on alleged violations of due process in the Administrative Eviction and not on an analysis of the merits, regarding the wrongful, clandestine, and violent manner by which the defendants usurped my property. f) That the judgment orders the defendants to vacate my property within a peremptory period from the date the judgment becomes final and that such eviction be carried out by the public force if the usurpers do not do so voluntarily. g) That the judgment orders the defendants to pay me the damages (daños y perjuicios) they have caused me with their malicious action, which consist, among others, in that they have prevented me free access to my property, to which I have a right as owner, in that they have interrupted production on my property by entering it and prevented it during the time they have remained on it. That the amount of such damages (daños y perjuicios) shall be established in the enforcement of judgment stage but that they also consist in that the defendants have prevented me from usufructing my property and disposing of it freely as its owner that I am. h) That the judgment orders the defendants to pay me the personal and procedural costs of the lawsuit. i) That it be ordered to restore me to possession of my property.\"\n\n 2.- Attorney Orlando Leiva Rojas answered negatively and asserted the defenses of lack of right, lack of cause, lack of active and passive standing, the generic expression \"sine actione agit\"; failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), necessary joinder of parties (litis consorcio), and pendency of another action (litis pendencia).\n\n 3.- The defendants Nombre216017 , Nombre216019 , and Nombre216020 did not answer the claim, therefore their default (rebeldía) was declared.\n\n 4.- Judge Rodrigo Valverde Umaña, in a judgment at 11:00 hours on July 19, 2004, ruled: \"In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 1, 2 (sic) 6, 26, 55, and 79 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and other cited norms applied supplementarily in agrarian matters and jurisprudence, it is resolved: The defenses of LACK OF RIGHT, LACK OF CAUSE, LACK OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE STANDING, THE GENERIC SINE ACTIONE, FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (FALTA DE AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA), and PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION AND NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES (LITIS PENDENCIA Y LITIS CONSORCIO) are DISMISSED. THE CLAIM IS UPHELD, in the manner to be stated, understanding as denied what is not expressly indicated and modified what is not approved as requested in the claim: 1.- The defendants must, from the finality of this ruling, immediately vacate the lands that are the subject matter of the litis, being the properties registered under the folio real system No. 6.608-000, measuring two million square meters, No. 5.633-000, measuring one million five hundred thousand square meters, and No. Placa21267, measuring nine hundred fifty-three thousand three hundred fifty-two square meters, which form a single unit, and which are registered in the name of the plaintiff Nombre159947 . Should they fail to comply with what is ordered, their eviction shall be carried out with the assistance of the public force. 2.- Regarding the claim for a declaration of usurpation, the plaintiff must resort to the appropriate avenue. 3.- The defendants are ordered to pay damages (daños y perjuicios), which shall be established in the enforcement of judgment stage. 4.- Procedural and personal costs are charged to the defendants.\"\n\n 5.- The special judicial attorney-in-fact appealed, and the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of Judges Enrique Ulate Chacón, Antonio Darcia Carranza, and Carlos Picado Vargas, in judgment No. 1003-F-07 at 14 hours 20 minutes on December 7, 2007, ordered: \"The concomitant nullity is dismissed and the appealed judgment is affirmed.\"\n\n 6.- Mr. Orlando Leiva Rojas, in his stated capacity, files a cassation appeal with an express indication of the reasons on which he relies to refute the thesis of the trial court.\n\n 7.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\nMagistrate Solís Zelaya writes\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- On October 6, 1997, Mr. Nombre159947 filed this ordinary proceeding before the Agrarian Court of Liberia, against José Luis Condega Vásquez, Ismael López Vásquez, Catalina Hernández Sánchez, Margarito Ríos Quintanilla, Feliciana López Fernández, Florentino Vásquez López, Nombre114660 , Nombre159950 , Nombre216011 , Nombre216012 , Nombre159948 , Nombre216014 , Nombre35778 , Nombre216015 , Nombre216016 , Nombre216018 , Nombre216021 (from whom he subsequently desisted –folios 193 and 194- ), Nombre216019 , and Nombre216020 . The Agrarian Development Institute (IDA) was included as an intervening party; however, its representative did not appear. Mr. Nombre159947 seeks to be revendicated the property known as “La Chanchita,” which is a material unit composed of three real properties registered in the Public Property Registry in his name: 1) folio real registration number Placa21263, with the following boundaries: north, dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south, Nombre216022 ; east, Tirurí River, which divides it from Nombre216023 ; and, west, Nombre216024 , public road in part and another. With an area of 2,000,000 square meters. 2) folio real registration number Placa40853, bordering on the north with Nombre216025 and another; south, with Nombre216026 ; east, with national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) and another; and, west, with public road. It measures 1,500,000 square meters. 3) folio real registration number Placa21267, bounded, on the north, with occupied vacant land (baldío ocupado) and Nombre114672 ; to the south, east, and west with vacant lands (baldíos). It has an area of 953,352 square meters. Consequently, the property sought to be revendicated has the following boundaries: north: dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south: Nombre216022 ; east: Tirurí River in the middle of Nombre216023 ; and, west: public road that divides it from Nombre216024 . Likewise, he requests that the defendants be ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, as well as the costs of the proceeding. The defendants opposed and formulated the defenses of lack of: right, cause, active and passive standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa); necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) –they claimed that the IDA should be a party- and pendency of another action (litis pendencia). Likewise, they alleged the generic expression “sine actione agit.” The Court dismissed them. Of interest, it upheld the claim in the following terms: 1) it ordered the defendants, from the finality of the ruling, to vacate the lands that are the subject matter of this lite, being the properties registered under the folio real system numbers 6608-000, 5633-000, and 5384-000, and which form a single unit; 2) it ordered them to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, the amount of which would be set in the judgment enforcement stage; and, 3) it imposed the costs of the proceeding on them. The Tribunal affirmed. Disagreeing, the special judicial attorney-in-fact for the defendants filed a cassation appeal. Similarly, and as an interested party, the State Attorney does so, alleging the incompetence of the agrarian jurisdiction to hear the sub júdice, since, as he indicates, the litigious real property is located in the northern border zone, which constitutes the Corredor Fronterizo Norte National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte), part of the Natural Heritage of the State, and administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, reason for which, besides being a public domain asset, the State must appear as a party, but not the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA).\n\nII.- The Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, provides in canon 7 subsection f) the following: “While the State, by its own will or at the indication of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Agrarian Development Institute, considering reasons of national convenience, does not determine the lands that must remain under its domain, the following shall be considered inalienable and not susceptible to acquisition by denouncement or possession, except those that were under private domain, with legitimate title: … f) Those comprised within a zone of 2,000 meters wide along the borders with Nicaragua and with Panama …”(The underlining is supplied). For its part, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 22962-MIRENEM, of February 15, 1994, and its amendments, following that criterion, declares a National Wildlife Refuge the border corridor formed by the lands comprised along the border with Nicaragua, from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea, to Bahía Salinas on the Nombre99660 Ocean. In this sense, canon 1 provides: “The border corridor formed by the lands comprised within a zone of 2,000 m wide along the border with Nicaragua from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Nombre99660 Ocean, as provided in the Cañas-Jerez Treaty of April 15, 1858, is declared a National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre).” As indicated in the preceding considerando, the property in litigation, along its northern boundary, borders the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which is thus indicated by the plaintiff in fact 1 of his claim –folios 1 verso and 2-. This implies, without a doubt, that, at least in part, its location coincides with the protected area. In accordance with article 2 of the aforementioned Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo): “The lands whose property title is legitimately registered before the Public Property Registry in the area comprised within the National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre), shall only be considered part thereof until the State purchases or expropriates their property right.”(The underlining is supplied). In the sub júdice, the judges of the instances did not question and, therefore, did not analyze the legitimacy of the property titles registered in the Public Registry in favor of Mr. Nombre159947 . Therefore, given the possibility of a real property subject to public domain being involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this proceeding is the Administrative Litigation jurisdiction. It must also be considered that numeral 3 of the indicated Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) establishes: “The administration of the Refuge corresponds to the General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines,” today the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), a norm that must be related to what is provided in numerals 13, 14, 15, 18 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), number 7575 of February 5, 1996; 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554 of October 4, 1995; 22 and 28 of the Biodiversity Law, number 7788 of April 30, 1998. Consequently, the proceeding must also be handled with the intervention of the State for the defense of public ownership (demanialidad) and not with the IDA, which does not administer national wildlife refuges, and therefore lacks interest.\n\nIII.- By virtue of what has been indicated, under the protection of what is provided in numerals 10 and 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Agrarian jurisdiction being incompetent to hear this lite by reason of subject matter, it is imperative to annul everything acted and resolved from the order at 7:00 hours on October 9, 1997 (folio 15). In application of the principle of swift and complete justice, it will be ordered to remit the case file to the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) so that it processes and concludes it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Administrative Litigation Procedure Code / Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as it is only now that it will be heard in that venue.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nEverything acted and resolved is annulled from the order at 7:00 hours on October 9, 1997 (folio 15). Let the case file be remitted to the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) so that it processes and concludes it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Administrative Litigation Procedure Code / Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\nAnabelle León Feoli\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya\n\nNombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nDissenting vote of Magistrate Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\n I.- With due respect for the decision of the other Members, the undersigned judge dissents from the conclusions reached in the majority ruling, specifically in the considerando identified as II, for which reason she separates from that criterion and saves her vote based on the following considerations.\n\n II.- The conflict presented is eminently of an agrarian nature, as three rural properties (fundos) are at stake, which form a single property (heredad) known as La Chanchita; dedicated to cattle and livestock as well as to the breeding of domestic animals, cultivation of grains and vegetables, among other tubers and roots. In turn, it has preserved mountainous areas, endangered flora and fauna, as affirmed by the plaintiff, who is a cattle rancher, which is also inferred from the judicial inspection carried out in the case file. He adds, he acquired them through purchase since 1972 and they have been registered in his name for years in the respective Registry. But being located within a wildlife refuge created by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 22962-MIRENEM of February 15, 1994, the majority vote deems it to be under the jurisdiction of the administrative litigation venue.\n\n III.- This matter was initiated in the year 1997, before the Agrarian Court of Liberia (folio 12 verso, 1st volume); the properties in dispute should not even be considered as part of the Corredor Fronterizo Norte National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte), even if they are within its limits, because it is not inferred from the case file to date that any of the three properties that form the rural property (fundo) called La Chanchita have been expropriated.\n\n IV.- Numeral 22 subsection ch) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law provides: “In matters under the jurisdiction of agrarian jurisdiction, the following are parties: ch) The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in all matters relating to the protection of public domain (tutela del dominio público) and to the exercise of the powers that the law confers upon it in this matter. The courts shall examine ex officio, or at the request of the plaintiff or defendant, whether the direct interest alluded to actually exists. Thus amended by article 2 of law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982).” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). Subsection ch) is clear in establishing that in every case the existence of this alluded interest must be examined. And in this litigation, the direct interest of the State has not been alleged, because it deals with properties that are still under private domain. In accordance with articles 22 of the LJA as recently transcribed and 7 of the Land and Colonization Law, this matter falls under agrarian jurisdiction, based on functional, objective, and subjective criteria. It should be taken into account that the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) that created the Refuge 22962-MIRENEM is from 1994; and precept 2 of that regulation says that, they shall only be considered part of the refuge in question until the State purchases or expropriates their property right, which in this case has not occurred. The State does not yet have a direct interest to be considered a party within this agrarian proceeding; this, because it deals with properties registered in the National Registry of Real Property, which is why they are still under private domain. Consequently, the jurisdiction is agrarian, as there is no evidentiary material proving that the real properties legally form part of the refuge. While it is true that this member shares the criterion that protected wildlife areas are assets of the State and therefore form part of the public domain, this is only when they have already been expropriated. In addition to the foregoing, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent the matter, due to its specialty, from being discussed in a specialized agrarian venue if dealing with rural properties (fundos) of such nature, regardless of the obligated parties that must be included as such, in this case the State given the interests it may have. The reproduced norm 22 subsection ch) foresees situations such as the one under study, where in the agrarian venue the State can be legally included as an obligated party in matters related to the protection of public domain (tutela del dominio público), without foreseeing it must be ventilated in the administrative litigation jurisdiction.\n\n V.- And, regarding what was outlined in the Considerando identified as II. of the resolution corresponding to the majority vote, about it being a simple possibility, in this case, that an asset subject to public domain is involved, which to date is not accredited in the case file, it must be indicated that what is resolved in this proceeding does not affect the State, as the possibility remains intact to discuss now, in the administrative litigation venue, with specific claims by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, that the registration recorded in the respective Registry is not of a private nature but rather of public ownership (demanial), that is, of the State, independently of how this litigation is resolved. Nor is it evident in this case that the General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines is exercising any administration over the rural property (fundo) under dispute, which is registered as a private domain asset in the Public Registry, which reinforces agrarian jurisdiction, in accordance with what is provided by numeral 108 of the Biodiversity Law. The claims in this proceeding are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act, which is why, respectfully, the decreed nullity is not appropriate. The property (heredad) in dispute called La Chanchita, according to what the plaintiff argues since his initial brief, is composed of three properties that appear registered, one of them since 1982 and the remaining two in 1993. (Folios 590, 597, 651, and 805 verso.) That is, before the enactment of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 22962-MIRENEM of 2-7-1994. And, therefore, it is not possible to retroactively affect the real property, unless expropriation proceedings had been carried out, in any case leaving the corresponding avenue open for the State to claim any eventual rights it deems correspond to it.\n\n VI.- In addition to the foregoing, it should be considered that this litigation was initiated in 1997, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been taken, and the first and second instance judgments have been rendered, in the specialized agrarian venue. In this case, there are already irreproducible facts in the case file, which upon being annulled will practically leave the parties, who provided said evidence, defenseless. Hence, I do not share what was decided by the majority to annul everything acted and resolved from the order at 7:00 hours on October 9, 1997, ordering the remittal of the case file to the Administrative Litigation Court for it to process and conclude it in accordance with the current procedural regulations. (Administrative Litigation Procedure Code / Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that the Chamber is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by the majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, since the majority vote refers it to the administrative litigation venue, this Chamber being the superior of said subject matter in ordinary proceedings such as the one under analysis, it would be to advance a criterion, because if it later comes as an administrative litigation proceeding, the point regarding the merits of the dispute would have already been resolved.\n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nmja/gdc.-\n\nPhones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email ...36\n\nPlaca40852, a resident of Rivas, Nicaragua; against Nombre35779; ISMAEL LÓPEZ VÁSQUEZ; CATALINA HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ, single, domestic worker, resident of Liberia; MARGARITO RÍOS QUINTANILLA, single; FELICIANA LÓPEZ FERNÁNDEZ; FLORENTINO VÁSQUEZ LÓPEZ; Nombre114660; Nombre159950, divorced; Nombre216011; Nombre216012; Nombre159948; Nombre216014; Nombre35778; Nombre216015; Nombre216016 also known as Nombre216017, single, Nicaraguan citizen with temporary residence card no. CED148528- ; Nombre216018 also known as Nombre216018, Nicaraguan citizen; Nombre216019, in a common-law union, laborer; and Nombre216020. The INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO was included as a party in the proceeding, whose representative did not appear. Additionally, the following appear as special judicial attorneys-in-fact: for the plaintiff, licensed attorneys Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro, lawyer, resident of Liberia, and Luis Eduardo Leal Vega, lawyer, resident of Santa Cruz; and, for the defendants, with the exception of Mr. José Luis Condega Vásquez, licensed attorney Orlando Leiva Rojas, lawyer, resident of San José. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, married, farmers, and residents of La Cruz.\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\n**1.-** Based on the facts he set forth and the legal provisions he cited, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit whose amount was set at one hundred million colones, in order that the judgment declare: *\"a) This lawsuit is upheld in all its aspects. b) That the farm known as La Chanchita, a material unit comprised of the three farms in the Public Registry, identified and described in the statement of facts of this lawsuit, belongs exclusively to me and specifically to the exclusion of the defendants herein. c) That the defendants herein usurped my farm with clandestinity and violence, in bad faith, and remained there until they were evicted by the Administrative authority, and that such defendants, aware of their bad faith, consented to that eviction. d) That by having entered with clandestinity and violence and having occupied parts of my farm in bad faith, they prevented me from the full enjoyment and exercise of the rights guaranteed to me by law as the sole and exclusive owner of that property. That they limited and even prevented me from the full enjoyment and exercise of the attributes of ownership guaranteed to me as the owner by the Civil Code and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. e) That even though they were placed in possession of my farm by the judgment issued in the Interdict, such possession is neither legitimate nor in good faith, since the judgment was based on procedural considerations, on alleged violations of due process in the Administrative Eviction and not on an analysis of the merits, regarding the wrongful, clandestine, and violent manner by which the defendants usurped my farm. f) That the defendants be ordered in the judgment to vacate my farm within a peremptory period from the date the judgment becomes final, and that such eviction be carried out by the public force should the usurpers not do so voluntarily. g) That the defendants be ordered in the judgment to pay me the damages (daños y perjuicios) they have caused me by their malicious action, which consist, among others, of having prevented my free access to my farm, to which I have a right as owner, in having interrupted production on my farm upon entering it, and having prevented it during the time they remained on it. That the amount of such damages (daños y perjuicios) shall be established in the execution of judgment, but which also consist of the defendants having prevented me from enjoying the usufruct of my farm and from freely disposing of it as its owner that I am. h) That the defendants be ordered in the judgment to pay me the personal and procedural costs of the trial. i) That my restitution to the possession of my farm be ordered.\"*\n\n**2.-** Licensed attorney Orlando Leiva Rojas filed a negative response and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of cause, lack of active and passive standing, the generic expression *\"sine actione agit\"*; failure to exhaust administrative remedies, joinder of parties (litis consorcio), and pendency of another action (litis pendencia).\n\n**3.-** The defendants Nombre216017, Nombre216019, and Nombre216020 did not respond to the lawsuit, and therefore their default (rebeldía) was declared.\n\n**4.-** Judge Rodrigo Valverde Umaña, in a judgment delivered at 11:00 a.m. on July 19, 2004, resolved: *\"In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 1, 2 (sic) 6, 26, 55, and 79 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria and other cited norms applied supplementarily in agrarian matters, and jurisprudence, it is resolved: The defense of LACK OF RIGHT is DENIED, LACK OF CAUSE, THAT OF LACK OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE STANDING, THE GENERIC SINE ACTIONE, that of FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, and that of LITIS PENDENCIA AND LITIS CONSORCIO. THE LAWSUIT IS UPHELD, in the manner to be stated, it being understood that what is not expressly indicated is denied and what is not approved as requested in the lawsuit is modified: 1.- The defendants must, as of the finality of this ruling, immediately vacate the lands subject to the litigation, being the farms registered under the folio real system No. 6.608-000, with an area of two million square meters, No. 5.633-000, with an area of one million five hundred thousand square meters, and No. Placa21267, with an area of nine hundred fifty-three thousand three hundred fifty-two square meters, which form a single unit, and which are registered in the name of the plaintiff Nombre159947. Should they fail to comply with this order, their eviction shall proceed with the assistance of the public force. 2.- With respect to the claim for a declaration of usurpation, the plaintiff must resort to the pertinent legal avenue. 3.- The defendants are ordered to pay damages (daños y perjuicios), which shall be established in the execution of judgment. 4.- Procedural and personal costs are to be borne by the defendants.\"*\n\n**5.-** The special judicial attorney-in-fact appealed, and the Tribunal Agrario of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of Judges Enrique Ulate Chacón, Antonio Darcia Carranza, and Carlos Picado Vargas, in judgment No. 1003-F-07 at 2:20 p.m. on December 7, 2007, ordered: *\"The concomitant nullity is denied and the appealed judgment is upheld.\"*\n\n**6.-** Mr. Orlando Leiva Rojas, in his stated capacity, files a cassation appeal with an express indication of the reasons upon which he relies to refute the thesis of the trial court.\n\n**7.-** In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Magistrate Solís Zelaya\n\n**CONSIDERING**\n\n**I.-** On October 6, 1997, Mr. Nombre159947 filed this ordinary proceeding before the Juzgado Agrario of Liberia, against José Luis Condega Vásquez, Ismael López Vásquez, Catalina Hernández Sánchez, Margarito Ríos Quintanilla, Feliciana López Fernández, Florentino Vásquez López, Nombre114660, Nombre159950, Nombre216011, Nombre216012, Nombre159948, Nombre216014, Nombre35778, Nombre216015, Nombre216016, Nombre216018, Nombre216021 (from whom he later desisted – folios 193 and 194 -), Nombre216019, and Nombre216020.\n\nThe Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA) was considered an intervening party; however, its representative did not appear. Mr. Nombre159947 seeks to recover the farm known as \"La Chanchita,\" which is a single material unit composed of three properties registered in the Public Property Registry in his name: 1) real folio registration Placa21263, with the following boundaries: north, the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south, Nombre216022; east, the Tirurí River, which separates it from Nombre216023; and, west, Nombre216024, a public road in part and other. With an area of 2,000,000 square meters. 2) real folio registration Placa40853, bordering to the north with Nombre216025 and other; south, with Nombre216026; east, with national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) and other; and, west, with a public road. It measures 1,500,000 square meters. 3) real folio registration Placa21267, bounded on the north by occupied vacant land and Nombre114672; to the south, east and west with vacant lands. It has an area of 953,352 square meters. Consequently, the property sought to be recovered presents the following boundaries: north: the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south: Nombre216022; east: the Tirurí River in between Nombre216023; and, west: a public road that separates it from Nombre216024. Likewise, he requests that the defendants be ordered to pay the damages caused, as well as the costs of the proceeding. The defendants opposed and raised the defenses of lack of: right, cause, active and passive standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies; necessary passive joinder—they claimed the IDA had to be a party—and pendency of action. Additionally, they raised the generic expression \"sine actione agit.\" The Court dismissed them. On the merits, it granted the claim in the following terms: 1) it ordered the defendants, once the judgment becomes final, to vacate the lands subject to this litigation, being the properties registered under the real folio system numbers 6608-000, 5633-000 and 5384-000, which form a single unit; 2) it ordered them to pay the damages caused, the amount of which would be determined in the judgment enforcement stage; and, 3) it imposed the costs of the proceeding upon them. The Appellate Court confirmed. In disagreement, the special judicial representative of the defendants filed a cassation appeal. Likewise, and as an interested party, the State Attorney does so, alleging the incompetence of the agrarian jurisdiction to hear the sub judice, since, according to him, the litigious property is located in the northern border zone, which constitutes the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, part of the Natural Heritage of the State, and administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, reason for which, aside from being a public domain asset, the State must appear as a party, but not the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA).\n\nII.- The Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its reforms, provides in canon 7 subsection f) the following: \"While the State, by its own will or by indication of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Institute of Agrarian Development, taking into account reasons of national convenience, does not determine the lands that must be maintained under its domain, the following shall be considered inalienable and not susceptible to acquisition by complaint or possession, except those that were under private domain, with legitimate title: … f) Those comprised within a zone of 2,000 meters wide along the borders with Nicaragua and with Panama …\"(The underlining is supplied). For its part, Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM, of February 15, 1994 and its reforms, following that criterion, declares the border corridor formed by the lands comprised along the border with Nicaragua, from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea, to Bahía Salinas on the Pacific Ocean, as a National Wildlife Refuge. In this sense, canon 1 provides: \"The border corridor formed by the lands comprised in a zone of 2,000 m wide along the border with Nicaragua from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Nombre99660 Ocean, as provided in the Cañas-Jerez Treaty of April 15, 1858, is declared a National Wildlife Refuge.\" As indicated in the previous recital (considerando), the estate in dispute, on its northern side, borders the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which is thus indicated by the plaintiff in fact 1 of his complaint—folios 1 verso and 2. This implies, without a doubt, that, at least in part, its location coincides with the protected area. In accordance with article 2 of the indicated Executive Decree: \"The lands whose ownership title is legitimately registered before the Public Property Registry in the area comprised within the National Wildlife Refuge, shall only be considered part thereof until the State purchases or expropriates their right of ownership.\"(The underlining is supplied). In the sub judice, the judges of the lower instances did not question and, therefore, did not analyze the legitimacy of the ownership titles registered in the Public Registry in favor of Mr. Nombre159947. For the foregoing, given the possibility that a property subject to public domain is involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this proceeding is the Contentious-Administrative. It must also be considered that ordinal 3 of the indicated Executive Decree establishes: \"The administration of the Refuge corresponds to the General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines,\" today the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), a rule that must be related to the provisions of numerals 13, 14, 15, 18 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), number 7575 of February 5, 1996; 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554 of October 4, 1995; 22 and 28 of the Biodiversity Law, number 7788 of April 30, 1998. Consequently, the proceeding must also be processed with the intervention of the State for the defense of public domain status and not with the IDA, which does not administer national wildlife refuges, and therefore lacks interest.\n\nIII.- By virtue of what has been indicated, under the protection of the provisions of numerals 10 and 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the Agrarian jurisdiction is incompetent to hear this dispute by reason of subject matter, it is necessary to annul everything done and decided from the order at 7 o'clock on October 9, 1997 (folio 15). In application of the principle of swift and complete justice, it will be ordered to send the case file to the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Court (Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) so that it processes and concludes it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), since it will be known in that venue only as of now.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nEverything done and decided from the order at 7 o'clock on October 9, 1997 (folio 15) is annulled. Let the case file be sent to the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Court (Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) so that it processes and concludes it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code).\n\nAnabelle León Feoli\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya\n\nNombre11387 Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nDissenting Vote of Judge Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nI.- With due respect for the decision of the other members, the undersigned judge dissents from the conclusions reached by the majority opinion, specifically in the recital (considerando) identified as II, for which reason she separates from that criterion and dissents with support in the following considerations.\n\nII.- The conflict presented is eminently of an agrarian nature, as three rural properties are at stake, which form a single estate known as La Chanchita; dedicated to cattle and livestock as well as the breeding of domestic animals, cultivation of grains and vegetables, among other tubers and roots. In turn, it has preserved mountainous areas, endangered flora and fauna, as affirmed by the plaintiff, who is a cattle rancher, which is also inferred from the judicial inspection practiced in the case file. He adds that he acquired them through purchase since 1972 and they have been registered in his name for years in the respective Registry. But being located within a wildlife refuge created by Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM on February 15, 1994, it is deemed in the majority vote to be under the cognizance of the contentious-administrative venue.\n\nIII.- This matter began in 1997, before the Agrarian Court of Liberia (folio 12 verso, 1st volume), and the properties in dispute do not even have to be considered as part of the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, even though they are within its limits, because it is not inferred from the case file to date that any of the three properties that form the estate called La Chanchita have been expropriated.\n\nIV.- Ordinal 22 subsection ch) of the Law of the Agrarian Jurisdiction provides: \"In matters within the cognizance of the agrarian jurisdiction, the following are parties: ch) The General Attorney's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in all matters related to the protection of the public domain and the exercise of the powers that the law confers upon it in this matter. The courts shall examine ex officio, or at the request of the plaintiff or defendant, if the aforementioned direct interest actually exists. Thus amended by article 2 of Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982).\" (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). Subsection ch) is clear in establishing that in every case, the existence of this alleged interest must be examined. And in this dispute, the direct interest of the State has not been alleged, because they are properties that are still under private domain. According to articles 22 of the LJA recently transcribed and 7 of the Land and Colonization Law, this matter is of agrarian competence, based on the functional, as well as the objective and subjective criteria. It must be taken into account that the Executive Decree that created the Refuge, 22962-MIRENEM, is from 1994; and precept 2 of that regulation says that they shall only be considered part of the aforementioned refuge until the State purchases or expropriates their right of ownership, which in this case has not occurred. The direct interest of the State to date does not yet exist to be considered a party within this agrarian proceeding; this, because they are properties registered in the National Registry of Immovable Property, for which reason they are still under private domain. Consequently, competence lies with the agrarian jurisdiction, as there are no evidentiary elements proving that the properties legally form part of the refuge. While it is true that this member shares the criterion that protected wild areas are assets of the State and therefore form part of the public domain, this is only so when they have already been expropriated. Added to the above, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent the matter from being discussed in a specialized agrarian venue due to its specialty, if one is dealing with rural properties of such nature, regardless of the required parties that must be involved, in this case the State given the interests it may have.\n\nThe rule reproduced in subsection 22 ch) provides for situations such as those under study, where in the agrarian venue the State can be considered a legally obligated party, in matters relating to the protection of public domain, without it being required that the matter be ventilated in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.\n\n**V.-** And, regarding what was outlined in the whereas clause (Considerando) identified as **II.** of the decision that corresponds to the majority vote, that it is a simple possibility, in this case, that a property affected by public domain is involved, which to date is not accredited in the case file, it must be stated that what is decided in this proceeding affects the State, because the possibility remains intact to discuss, now in the contentious-administrative venue, with specific claims by the Procuraduría General de la República, that the registration filed in the respective Registry is not of a private nature but rather demanial (demanial), that is, belonging to the State, regardless of how this litigation is resolved. Nor is it evident in this case that the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas is exercising any administration over the property under dispute, registered as a privately owned property in the Public Registry, which reinforces agrarian jurisdiction (competencia agraria), in accordance with the provisions of Article 108 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad). The claims in this proceeding are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act whatsoever, for which I respectfully believe the decreed nullity is not appropriate. The property under discussion, called la Chanchita, according to the plaintiff's initial brief, is comprised of three farms that appear registered, one of them since 1982 and the remaining two in 1993. (Folios 590, 597, 651 and 805 vlto.) That is, before the enactment of Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM of 7-2-1994. And, therefore, the property cannot be retroactively affected, unless the expropriation procedure had been carried out, leaving open in any case the corresponding avenue for the State to claim any eventual rights it deems applicable.\n\n**VI.-** In addition to the above, it must be taken into consideration that this litigation began in 1997, wherein the evidence offered by the parties has already been taken, and first and second instance judgments have been issued, in the specialized agrarian venue (sede especializada agraria). In this case, there are already irreproducible facts in the case file, which, if annulled, would practically leave the parties who provided said evidence defenseless. Hence, I do not agree with what was decided by the majority to annul all proceedings and decisions from the order issued at 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997, ordering the case file to be remitted to the Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo to process and finish it in accordance with the current procedural regulations. (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that this Chamber (Sala) is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by the majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, since the majority vote remits it to the contentious-administrative venue (sede contenciosa), as this Chamber is the superior of that subject matter in ordinary proceedings such as the one under analysis, it would be advancing a criterion, because if it later comes as a contentious-administrative proceeding, the point regarding the merits of the dispute would have already been resolved.\n\n**Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández**\n\nmja/gdc.-\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico ...36\n\nThe Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) was considered an intervening party; however, its representative did not appear. Mr. Nombre11468 seeks to have the farm known as “La Chanchita” vindicated, which is a material unit comprised of three properties registered in the Public Property Registry in his name: 1) folio real registration number 6608-000, with the following boundaries: north, the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south, Francisco Quintanilla; east, the Tirurí River, which divides it from Félix Pedro Duarte; and, west, Francisco Ortega, a public road in part and another. With an area of 2,000,000 square meters. 2) folio real registration number 5633, bordering on the north with Nombre11475 and another; south, with Juan Cruz González; east, with national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) and another; and, west, with a public road. It measures 1,500,000 square meters. 3) folio real registration number 5384-000, bounded on the north by an occupied vacant land (baldío ocupado) and Nombre11476; on the south, east, and west by vacant lands (baldíos). It has an area of 953,352 square meters. Consequently, the property sought to be vindicated presents the following boundaries: north: the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south: Francisco Quintanilla; east: the Tirurí River, with Félix Pedro Duarte on the other side; and, west: a public road that divides it from Francisco Ortega. Likewise, he requests that the defendants be ordered to pay the damages caused, as well as the costs of the proceeding. The defendants opposed and raised the defenses of lack of: right, cause, active and passive standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies; necessary passive joinder – they claimed that the IDA should be a party - and lis pendens. They also alleged the generic expression “sine actione agit”. The Court dismissed them. With regard to what is of interest, it granted the claim in the following terms: 1) it ordered the defendants, upon the finality of the judgment, to vacate the lands subject to this litigation, being the farms registered under the folio real system numbers 6608-000, 5633-000 and 5384-000, which form a single unit; 2) it ordered them to pay the damages caused, the amount of which would be determined in the judgment execution stage; and, 3) it imposed the costs of the proceeding upon them. The Tribunal confirmed. Disagreeing, the special judicial attorney-in-fact for the defendants filed a cassation appeal. Likewise, and as an interested party, the State Attorney does so, alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the agrarian jurisdiction to hear the sub judice, since, he indicates, the litigious property is located in the northern border zone, which forms the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, part of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), and administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), for which reason, besides being a public domain asset, the State must appear as a party, and not the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA). II.- The Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), number 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its reforms, provides in canon 7 subsection f) the following: “While the State, by its own will or by indication of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Agrarian Development Institute, considering reasons of national convenience, does not determine the lands that must remain under its domain, the following shall be considered inalienable and not susceptible to acquisition by denouncement or possession, except for those that were under private domain, with legitimate title: … f) Those comprised within a zone 2,000 meters wide along the borders with Nicaragua and with Panama …” (The underlining is supplied). For its part, Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM, of February 15, 1994 and its reforms, following that criterion, declares the border corridor comprised of lands situated along the border with Nicaragua, from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Pacific Ocean, a National Wildlife Refuge. In this sense, canon 1 provides: “The border corridor comprised of lands within a zone 2,000 m wide along the border with Nicaragua from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Pacific Ocean is declared a National Wildlife Refuge, as provided in the Cañas-Jerez Treaty of April 15, 1858.” As indicated in the preceding recital, the estate in litigation, on its north side, borders the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which is so stated by the plaintiff in fact 1 of his complaint – pages 1 verso and 2 -. This implies, without any doubt, that, at least in part, its location coincides with the protected area. Pursuant to article 2 of the aforementioned Executive Decree: “The lands whose title of ownership is legitimately registered before the Public Property Registry in the area comprised within the National Wildlife Refuge, shall only be considered part of the same until the State purchases or expropriates its right of ownership.” (The underlining is supplied). In the sub judice, the instance judges did not question, and therefore, did not analyze the legitimacy of the titles of ownership registered in the Public Registry in favor of Mr. Nombre11468. For the foregoing reason, given the possibility that a property subject to public domain is involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this proceeding is the Contentious-Administrative one. It must also be considered that ordinal 3 of the indicated Executive Decree establishes: “The administration of the Refuge corresponds to the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines”, now MINAE, a rule that must be related to the provisions of numerals 13, 14, 15, 18 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), number 7575 of February 5, 1996; 32 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), number 7554 of October 4, 1995; 22 and 28 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), number 7788 of April 30, 1998. Consequently, the proceeding must also be processed with the intervention of the State for the defense of public ownership and not with the IDA, which does not administer national wildlife refuges, and therefore lacks interest. III.- By virtue of what has been indicated, under the protection of the provisions of numerals 10 and 194 of the Civil Procedure Code, as the Agrarian jurisdiction is not competent to hear this litigation by reason of subject matter, it is necessary to annul everything acted upon and resolved as of the order of 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997 (page 15). In application of the principle of prompt and complete justice, it will be ordered that the record be sent to the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Tribunal to process and conclude it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), as it is only now that it will be heard in that venue.\"\n\nVoto salvado de la Magistrada Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\n“I.- With due respect for the decision of the other Members, the undersigned judge dissents from the conclusions reached by the majority ruling, specifically in recital identified as II, for which reason she separates from that criterion and issues a dissenting vote based on the following considerations. II.- The conflict presented is eminently of an agrarian nature, as three farms are at stake, which make up a single estate known as La Chanchita, dedicated to cattle and livestock as well as the raising of domestic animals, cultivation of grains and vegetables, among other tubers and roots. In turn, it has preserved mountainous areas, flora and fauna in danger of extinction, as stated by the plaintiff, who is a cattle rancher, which is also inferred from the judicial inspection carried out in the record. He adds that he acquired them through purchase since 1972 and they appear registered in his name for years in the respective Registry. But since they are located within a wildlife refuge created by Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM on February 15, 1994, the majority vote deems it to be within the knowledge of the contentious-administrative venue. III.- This matter was initiated in 1997, before the Agrarian Court of Liberia (page 12 verso, 1st volume); the properties in dispute should not even be considered part of the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, even though they are within its limits, because it is not inferred from the record that, to date, any of the three farms that make up the estate called La Chanchita have been expropriated. IV.- Ordinal 22 subsection ch) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria) provides: “In matters within the knowledge of the agrarian jurisdiction, the parties are: ch) The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), in all matters related to the protection of public domain and the exercise of the powers that the law confers upon it in this matter. The courts shall examine, on their own motion or at the request of the plaintiff or defendant, whether the direct interest alluded to actually exists. Thus amended by article 2 of law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982).” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). Subsection ch) is clear in establishing that in every case, the existence of this alluded interest must be examined. And in this litigation, the direct interest of the State has not been alleged, because these are farms that are still under private domain. In accordance with articles 22 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law recently transcribed and 7 of the Land and Colonization Law, this matter falls under agrarian jurisdiction, based on functional, objective, and subjective criteria. It should be noted that the Executive Decree that created the Refuge, 22962-MIRENEM, is from 1994; and precept 2 of that regulation states that they shall only be considered part of the referenced refuge until the State purchases or expropriates their right of ownership, which is not the case here. The State does not yet have the direct interest to be considered a party within this agrarian proceeding; this is because these are farms registered in the National Registry of Immovable Property, and therefore are still under private domain. Consequently, jurisdiction lies with the agrarian courts, as there are no evidentiary elements proving that the properties legally form part of the refuge. While it is true that this member shares the criterion that protected wildlife areas are State assets and therefore form part of the public domain, this is only when they have already been expropriated. In addition to the foregoing, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent the matter from being discussed in a specialized agrarian venue, due to its specialty, if it involves estates of such a nature, regardless of the obligated parties that must be considered as such, in this case the State given the interests it may have. The reproduced rule 22 subsection ch) provides for situations like the one under study, where in an agrarian venue the State can be considered a legally obligated party, in matters related to the protection of public domain, without providing that it must be heard in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. V.- And, regarding what was outlined in Recital identified as II. of the resolution corresponding to the majority vote, concerning it being a simple possibility, in this case, that a property subject to public domain is involved, which to date is not proven in the record, it must be noted that what is decided in this proceeding affects the State because the possibility remains intact to discuss now, in the contentious-administrative venue, with specific claims by the Attorney General's Office that the registration recorded in the respective Registry is not of a private nature but rather public domain, that is, belonging to the State, regardless of how the present litigation is resolved. Nor is it evident in this case that the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines is exercising any administration over the estate subject to dispute, registered as a private domain asset in the Public Registry, which reinforces agrarian jurisdiction, pursuant to the provisions of ordinal 108 of the Biodiversity Law. The claims of this proceeding are eminently private, without impugning or questioning any administrative act, so in my respectful estimation, the declared annulment is not appropriate. The estate in dispute called La Chanchita, according to the plaintiff's initial brief, is comprised of three farms that appear registered, one of them since 1982 and the remaining two in 1993 (pages 590, 597, 651 and 805 verso). That is, before the promulgation of Executive Decree 22962-MIRENEM of 2-7-1994. And, therefore, the property cannot be retroactively affected, unless expropriation proceedings had been carried out, leaving in any case the corresponding avenue open for the State to claim any eventual rights it deems to belong to it. VI.- In addition to the foregoing, it should be taken into consideration that this litigation began in 1997, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been evaluated and first and second instance judgments have been issued, in a specialized agrarian venue. In this case, the file already contains facts that are unreproducible, and annulment will practically leave the parties who provided such evidence defenseless. Hence, I do not share the majority decision to annul everything acted upon and resolved as of the order of 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997, ordering the record to be sent to the Contentious-Administrative Court to process and conclude it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code).”\n\nConsequently, the undersigned votes against the annulment, considering that the Chamber is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the annulment decreed by the majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, since the majority vote refers it to the contentious-administrative court, and as this Chamber is the superior of that jurisdiction in ordinary proceedings such as the one under analysis, it would be to anticipate a criterion because if it subsequently comes as a contentious-administrative proceeding, the point would already have been resolved with respect to the merits of the dispute.\"\n\nThe Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) was considered an intervening party, however, its representative did not appear. Mr. Nombre159947 seeks to have the farm known as “La Chanchita” recovered (reivindicada), which is a material unit comprised of three properties registered in the Public Registry of Property in his name: 1) real folio registration number Placa21263, with the following boundaries: north, the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south, Nombre216022; east, the Tirurí River, which divides it from Nombre216023; and, west, Nombre216024, a public road in part and another. With an area of 2,000,000 square meters. 2) real folio registration number Placa40853, bordering to the north with Nombre216025 and another; south, with Nombre216026; east, with national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) and another; and, west, with a public road. It measures 1,500,000 square meters. 3) real folio registration number Placa21267, bounded, on the north, by occupied vacant land and Nombre114672; on the south, east, and west by vacant lands. It has an area of 953,352 square meters. Consequently, the property sought to be recovered presents the following boundaries: north: the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; south: Nombre216022; east: the Tirurí River in the middle of Nombre216023; and, west: public road that divides it from Nombre216024. Likewise, he requests that the defendants be ordered to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused, as well as the costs of the proceeding. The defendants opposed and raised the defenses of lack of: right, cause, active and passive standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies; necessary passive joinder –they claimed that the IDA should be a party- and lis pendens. They also alleged the generic expression “sine actione agit”. The Court dismissed them. On the merits, it granted the claim in the following terms: 1) it ordered the defendants, once the judgment becomes final, to vacate the lands subject to this litigation, that is, the farms registered under the real folio system numbers 6608-000, 5633-000 and 5384-000, which form a single unit; 2) it ordered them to pay the damages and losses caused, the amount of which would be determined in the judgment enforcement stage; and, 3) it imposed the costs of the proceeding on them. The Chamber confirmed. Dissatisfied, the special judicial attorney for the defendants filed a cassation appeal. Likewise, and as an interested party, the Procurador does so, alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the agrarian jurisdiction to hear the sub júdice, since, according to him, the litigious property is located in the northern border zone, which forms the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, part of the State’s Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), and administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), for which reason, apart from being a public domain asset, the State must appear as a party, but not the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA).\n\nII.- The Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, provides in canon 7 subsection f) the following: “While the State, by its own will or upon indication of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, addressing reasons of national convenience, does not determine the lands that must be kept under its domain, the following shall be considered inalienable and not susceptible to acquisition by claim (denuncio) or possession, except those that are under private domain, with legitimate title: … f) Those comprised within a zone of 2,000 meters wide along the borders with Nicaragua and Panama …”(The underlining is supplied). For its part, Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM, of February 15, 1994, and its amendments, following that criterion, declares the border corridor comprised of the lands along the border with Nicaragua, from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Pacific Ocean, as a National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre). In this sense, canon 1 provides: “The border corridor comprised of lands within a 2,000 m wide zone along the border with Nicaragua from Punta Castilla on the Caribbean Sea to Bahía Salinas on the Nombre99660 Ocean is declared a National Wildlife Refuge, as provided in the Tratado Cañas-Jerez of April 15, 1858.” As indicated in the previous recital, the estate in litigation, on its northern course, borders the dividing line between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which is so indicated by the plaintiff in fact 1 of his claim –folios 1 verso and 2-. This implies, without any doubt, that, at least in part, its location coincides with the protected area. In accordance with article 2 of the aforementioned Decreto Ejecutivo: “The lands whose property title is legitimately registered before the Public Registry of Property in the area comprised within the National Wildlife Refuge, shall only be considered part thereof until the State buys or expropriates its property right.”(The underlining is supplied). In the sub júdice, the instance judges did not question and, therefore, did not analyze the legitimacy of the property titles registered in the Public Registry in favor of Mr. Nombre159947. Therefore, given the possibility that a property subject to public domain (dominio público) is involved, the competent jurisdiction to hear this proceeding is the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Contencioso Administrativa). It must also be considered that ordinal 3 of the indicated Decreto Ejecutivo establishes: “The administration of the Refuge corresponds to the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines,” today the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), a norm that must be related to the provisions in numerals 13, 14, 15, 18 of the Ley Forestal, number 7575 of February 5, 1996; 32 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, number 7554 of October 4, 1995; 22 and 28 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, number 7788 of April 30, 1998. Consequently, the proceeding must also be processed with the intervention of the State for the defense of public domain status (demanialidad) and not with the IDA, who does not administer the national wildlife refuges and therefore lacks interest.\n\nIII.- On the merits of the foregoing, under the protection of the provisions in numerals 10 and 194 of the Civil Procedure Code, since the Agrarian jurisdiction is incompetent to hear this litigation by reason of subject matter, it is necessary to annul everything that has been done and resolved from the order issued at 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997 (folio 15). In application of the principle of swift and complete justice, the case file shall be ordered to be remitted to the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) so that it may process and conclude it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as it is only now that it will be heard in that venue.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nEverything done and resolved from the order issued at 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997 (folio 15) is annulled. Remit the case file to the Administrative Litigation Court so that it may process and conclude it in accordance with the current procedural regulations (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\nAnabelle León Feoli\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga                                                                                                   Román Solís Zelaya\n\nNombre11387                                                                                                                     Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nDissenting Vote of Magistrada Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nI.- With due respect for the decision of the other Members, the undersigned judge dissents from the conclusions reached by the majority decision, specifically in recital identified as II, for which reason she departs from that criterion and dissents based on the following considerations.\n\nII.- The conflict presented is eminently agrarian in nature, as three rural properties (fundos) are at stake, which form a single estate known as La Chanchita; dedicated to cattle and livestock as well as the raising of domestic animals, cultivation of grains and vegetables, among other tubers and roots. In turn, it has preserved mountainous areas, endangered flora and fauna, as stated by the plaintiff, who is a cattle rancher, which is also deduced from the judicial inspection carried out in the case file. He adds that he acquired them through purchase since 1972 and they appear registered in his name years ago in the respective Registry. But being located within a wildlife refuge created by Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM on February 15, 1994, the majority vote deems it to be heard by the administrative litigation venue.\n\nIII.- This matter began in 1997, before the Juzgado Agrario de Liberia (folio 12 verso 1st volume). It does not even have to be considered that the disputed properties are part of the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo Norte, even if they are within its limits, because it is not inferred from the case file to date that any of the three farms that make up the estate named La Chanchita have been expropriated.\n\nIV.- Ordinal 22 subsection ch) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria provides: “In matters heard by the agrarian jurisdiction, the following are parties: ch) The Procuraduría General de la República, in all matters related to the protection of public domain (tutela del dominio público) and the exercise of the powers that the law confers upon it in this matter. The courts shall examine ex officio, or at the request of the plaintiff or defendant, whether the alleged direct interest actually exists. As amended by article 2 of law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982).” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). Subsection ch) is clear in establishing that in every case the existence of this alleged interest must be examined. And in this litigation, the direct interest of the State has not been alleged, because it concerns farms that are still in private domain. In accordance with articles 22 of the LJA, recently transcribed, and 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, this matter falls under agrarian jurisdiction, based on the functional, objective, and subjective criteria. Note that the Decreto Ejecutivo that created the Refuge 22962-MIRENEM is from 1994; and precept 2 of that regulation states that they will only be considered part of the referenced refuge until the State buys or expropriates its property right, which in this case has not occurred. The State as of today still does not have a direct interest to be held as a party within this agrarian proceeding; this, because it concerns farms registered in the National Property Registry (Registro Nacional de la Propiedad Inmueble), which means they are still in private domain. Consequently, jurisdiction is agrarian, as there are no evidentiary elements accrediting that the properties legally form part of the refuge. Although it is true that this member shares the criterion that protected wildlife areas are State assets and therefore form part of the public domain, this is so only when they have already been expropriated. In addition to the foregoing, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent that, due to specialization, the matter be discussed in a specialized agrarian venue if one is dealing with rural properties of such a nature, regardless of the obligated parties that must be held as such, in this case the State given the interests it may have.\n\nThe rule reproduced in subsection 22 ch) provides for situations such as the one under study, where in the agrarian jurisdiction the State can be considered a legally obligated party in matters relating to the protection of the public domain, without it being required that the matter be heard in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.\n\n**V.-** And, regarding what was outlined in the recital (Considerando) identified as **II.** of the resolution that corresponds to the majority vote, that it is a mere possibility, in this case, that a public domain asset is involved, which to date is not proven in the case file (autos), it must be stated that what is decided in this proceeding does not affect the State, since the possibility remains intact to now argue, in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, with specific claims by the Procuraduría General de la República, that the property registered in the respective Registry is not of a private nature but is public domain property (demanial), that is, belonging to the State, regardless of how this litigation is resolved. Nor is it established in this case that the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas is exercising any administration over the estate (fundo) that is the subject of the dispute, registered as a privately owned asset in the Public Registry, which reinforces the agrarian jurisdiction's competence, pursuant to the provisions of Article 108 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad). The claims in this proceeding are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act, and therefore I respectfully believe that the declared nullity is not appropriate. The property (heredad) under discussion, called la Chanchita, as the plaintiff alleges in its initial filing, is made up of three farms (fincas) that appear registered, one of them since 1982 and the remaining two in 1993. (Pages 590, 597, 651 and 805 verso). That is, before the promulgation of Decreto Ejecutivo 22962-MIRENEM of 7-2-1994. And, therefore, the property cannot be retroactively affected, unless the expropriation procedure had been carried out, leaving in any case the corresponding avenue open to the State to claim any eventual rights it deems to be its own.\n\n**VI.-** In addition to the foregoing, take into consideration that this litigation began in 1997, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been taken and first and second instance judgments have been issued in the specialized agrarian jurisdiction. In this case, the file (expediente) already contains irreproducible facts, meaning that if a nullity is declared, the parties who provided said evidence will be practically left defenseless. Hence, I do not agree with the majority's decision to annul everything acted upon and resolved from the order (auto) issued at 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 1997, ordering the case file to be sent to the Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo to be processed and concluded in accordance with the current procedural rules (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that this Chamber is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by the majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, as the majority vote sends it to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, since this Chamber is the superior of that matter in ordinary proceedings such as the one under analysis, it would be prejudging the issue because if it later comes as a contentious-administrative proceeding, the point regarding the merits of the dispute would have already been resolved.\n\n**Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández**\n\nmja/gdc.-\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico ...36"
}