{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-422456",
  "citation": "Res. 00277-2008 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Derecho de ocupación en zona marítimo terrestre no es transmisible ni puede forzar concesión por sentencia civil",
  "title_en": "Occupation right in maritime terrestrial zone is not transferable and cannot compel concession through civil judgment",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo analiza la pretensión de la sucesión de ocupantes históricos de un terreno en la zona marítimo terrestre (ZMT) de Playas del Coco, quienes, tras una sentencia civil que anuló una venta simulada entre particulares, solicitaron a la Municipalidad de Carrillo el traspaso de una supuesta concesión y patente de licores. El tribunal revoca la sentencia de primera instancia que había dado lugar a la demanda. Determina que los causantes nunca tuvieron una concesión o arrendamiento formal sobre la ZMT, sino un mero derecho de ocupación precaria, el cual es intuito personae, no transmisible a terceros ni herederos, y no genera derechos subjetivos. Señala que la orden del juez civil que inicialmente compelía al municipio fue revocada por el mismo órgano, y que el municipio no fue parte en ese proceso. Concluye que la denegatoria municipal al traspaso es conforme a derecho, pues la ocupación es una tolerancia temporal que no puede transformarse en concesión por vía judicial si no se cumplen los requisitos de la Ley 6043, especialmente la continuidad y la pacificidad de la ocupación. Acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y declara improcedente la acción.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious Administrative Court addresses the claim by the heirs of historical occupiers of a plot in the maritime terrestrial zone (ZMT) of Playas del Coco, who, following a civil judgment that annulled a simulated sale between private parties, requested the Municipality of Carrillo to transfer an alleged concession and liquor license. The court overturns the lower court ruling that had granted the claim. It finds that the predecessors never held a formal concession or lease over the ZMT, but merely a precarious right of occupation, which is intuito personae, non-transferable to third parties or heirs, and does not generate subjective rights. It notes that the civil court order initially compelling the municipality was revoked by the same court, and that the municipality was not a party to those proceedings. It concludes that the municipal denial of the transfer is lawful, as occupation is a temporary tolerance that cannot be transformed into a concession through judicial means without meeting the requirements of Law 6043, particularly continuous and peaceful occupation. The defense of lack of right is upheld and the action is declared inadmissible.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección II",
  "date": "28/08/2008",
  "year": "2008",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": null,
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "zona marítimo terrestre",
    "ocupante",
    "concesión",
    "precario",
    "intuito persona",
    "transitorio VII",
    "dominio público"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "zona marítimo terrestre",
    "ocupación",
    "concesión",
    "Ley 6043",
    "precario",
    "derecho de ocupación",
    "intuito persona",
    "no transmisible",
    "sentencia civil",
    "Municipalidad de Carrillo",
    "patente de licores",
    "improcedencia",
    "falta de derecho",
    "herencia",
    "playas del coco",
    "dominio público"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "maritime terrestrial zone",
    "occupation",
    "concession",
    "Law 6043",
    "precarious right",
    "occupation right",
    "intuito personae",
    "non-transferable",
    "civil judgment",
    "Municipality of Carrillo",
    "liquor license",
    "inadmissibility",
    "lack of right",
    "inheritance",
    "Playas del Coco",
    "public domain"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Al ser el derecho de ocupación que tenían Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, en su momento, no trasmisible a terceros, no puede venir su sucesión a pretender un derecho subjetivo que no tiene, y menos aún que tal situación sujete a la Municipalidad de Carrillo, al dictado de actos contrarios al ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que la denegatoria realizada por parte del ente territorial, en cuanto al traspaso de un derecho de concesión sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, así como la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros numero Placa11511, es conforme al ordenamiento juridico, no hay vicio alguno, en su motivo contenido y fin. No siendo para este Tribunal de recibo la pretensión de la sucesión actora, aceptar lo contrario implica ordenar actuaciones contrarias a la Ley y los reglamentos que rigen la materia sometida a escrutinio de esta autoridad judicial.\n\nCon certeza jurídica, se establece que los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, lo que ostentaban en vida, era la condición de ocupantes dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, derecho que no es susceptible de transmisión a terceros, por consiguiente, todo acto jurídico tendiente a traspasarla deviene en absolutamente nulo, que al ser un derecho en precario, no confiere derechos subjetivos, ergo carece de derecho la sucesión actora sobre sus pretensiones, aceptar lo contrario implicaría quebrantar el bloque de legalidad que cubre la conducta administrativa, por lo que debe acogerse el recurso formulado en este sentido.",
  "excerpt_en": "Since the right of occupation held by the deceased at the time was non-transferable to third parties, their successors cannot claim a subjective right they do not possess, much less force the Municipality of Carrillo to issue acts contrary to the legal order. Consequently, the municipality’s denial of the transfer of a concession right over the maritime terrestrial zone, as well as the national and foreign liquor license, is in accordance with the law and contains no defect in its grounds, content, or purpose. This Court cannot accept the petitioners’ claim; doing otherwise would entail ordering actions contrary to the law and regulations governing the matter under scrutiny.\n\nIt is legally certain that the deceased held only the condition of occupants within the maritime terrestrial zone during their lifetime, a right that is not transferable to third parties. Therefore, any legal act intended to transfer it is absolutely null and void. Being a precarious right, it confers no subjective rights; ergo, the petitioning succession lacks any right to its claims. Accepting the contrary would breach the legal framework governing administrative conduct, so the appeal filed to this effect must be granted.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Reversed",
    "label_es": "Revocada",
    "summary_en": "The lower court's ruling is reversed; the defense of lack of right is upheld, and the action brought by the succession is declared inadmissible, confirming the municipality's denial of the transfer of occupation and license in the maritime terrestrial zone.",
    "summary_es": "Se revoca la sentencia de primera instancia, acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y declara improcedente la acción de la sucesión actora, confirmando la denegatoria municipal del traspaso de la ocupación y patente en la zona marítimo terrestre."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "the condition of occupier cannot generate any right of property or possession, since the maritime terrestrial zone is part of the public domain; it cannot be the object of possession nor be acquired by positive prescription over time, as provided by Article 7 of Law 6043.",
      "quote_es": "la condición de ocupante no puede generar derecho de propiedad ni de posesión alguno, ya que al ser la zona marítimo terrestre parte del dominio publico, no puede ser objeto de posesión ni prescribirse positivamente con el transcurso del tiempo, conforme lo dispone el articulo 7 de la Ley 6043."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "the occupier is that person who was located in the restricted area of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and who, at the time Law 6043 of March 2, 1977 came into force, did not hold a lease contract in their favor.",
      "quote_es": "el ocupante, es aquella persona que se encontraba ubicada en la zona restringida de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre y que al momento de entrar en vigencia la Ley 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, no contaba con un contrato de arrendamiento a su favor."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "use permits (precarious occupation) are unilateral administrative acts... The condition of occupier may in no case be transferred to third parties...",
      "quote_es": "los permisos de uso (ocupación en precario) son actos administrativos unilaterales... No pueden ser transmisible de manera alguna, a terceros, la condición de ocupante..."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "any legal act intended to transfer it becomes absolutely null and void.",
      "quote_es": "todo acto jurídico tendiente a traspasarla deviene en absolutamente nulo."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-32006",
      "citation": "Ley 6043",
      "title_en": "Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law",
      "title_es": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "02/03/1977",
      "year": "1977"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-18579",
      "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 7841",
      "title_en": "Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law Regulation",
      "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "executive_decree",
      "date": "16/12/1977",
      "year": "1977"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-32840",
      "citation": "Ley 2825",
      "title_en": "Land and Colonization Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Tierras y Colonización",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "14/10/1961",
      "year": "1961"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-6549",
      "citation": "Ley 4558",
      "title_en": "Tourism Development Law for the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone",
      "title_es": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "22/04/1970",
      "year": "1970"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-139211",
      "citation": "Res. 00270-2011 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III",
      "title_en": "Concession in maritime-terrestrial zone and coastal regulatory plan",
      "title_es": "Concesión en zona marítimo terrestre y plan regulador costero",
      "doc_type": "court_decision",
      "date": "29/07/2011",
      "year": "2011"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-80200",
      "citation": "Res. 00447-1991 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Constitutionality of the Maritime Zone Law",
      "title_es": "Constitucionalidad de la Ley de Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "21/02/1991",
      "year": "1991"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-87313",
      "citation": "Res. 02306-1991 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Revocation of street-vending permits requires due process",
      "title_es": "Revocación de permisos de ventas estacionarias debe respetar el debido proceso",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "06/11/1991",
      "year": "1991"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-32006",
      "citation": "Ley 6043",
      "title_en": "Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law",
      "title_es": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "02/03/1977",
      "year": "1977"
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    {
      "id": "norm-32840",
      "citation": "Ley 2825",
      "title_en": "Land and Colonization Law",
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      "date": "14/10/1961",
      "year": "1961"
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      "title_es": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "22/04/1970",
      "year": "1970"
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    {
      "id": "pgr-16725",
      "citation": "OJ-033-2011",
      "title_en": "PGR Observations on the Wildlife Conservation Bill",
      "title_es": "Observaciones de la PGR al proyecto de Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre",
      "doc_type": "legal_opinion",
      "date": "13/06/2011",
      "year": "2011"
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  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422456",
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  "body_es_text": "Expediente Nº 02-100332-388-CI\n\n \n\nExpediente Nº 02-100332-388-CI \n\nProceso/ Ordinario \n\nActor/ Nombre65838 , Sucesión de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 \n\nNotificaciones/ Lic. Carlos Montero Barrantes fax 2665-08-28 \n\nDemandado/Municipalidad de Carrillo \n\nNotificaciones/ Lic. Jorge Chavarría Ordóñez casillero 136 \n\nInteresado/ Nombre70707 \n\nNotificaciones/ Lic. William Mora Rojas fax Telf1083 \n\n \n\nNº 277- 2008 \n\nSECCIÓN SEGUNDA TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, GOICOECHEA, a las quince horas diez minutos del veintiocho de agosto del dos mil ocho.- \n\n Proceso ORDINARIO tramitado ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, por SUCESIONES ACUMULADAS de Nombre70705 Y Nombre70706 ambos Nombre70706 , representadas por su Nombre9362 Nombre65838 , soltera, ama de casa, cédula de identidad numero CED52822, vecina de Dirección7903 , , contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARRILLO GUANACASTE, en la persona del señor Alcalde Nombre62280 , casado, abogado, cédula de identidad numero CED46087 vecino de Santa Ana.- Como interesado el señor Nombre70707 , casado, comerciante, cédula de identidad numero CED52823, vecino de Playas del Coco. \n\nRESULTANDO \n\n 1.- Con base en los hechos narrados, se estableció demanda ordinaria, cuya cuantía se fijó en diez millones de colones, para que en sentencia se declare:\"Que en la sentencia firme que se ejecuta en el expediente referido, se anuló la venta con pacto de retroventa hecha en los términos indicados y se restituyeron las cosas a su estado original, o sea que la concesión en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores Nº C-46, siguen perteneciendo a los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , ahora sus sucesiones, la Municipalidad de Carrillo, mediante su representante legal y el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, para dar cumplimiento y ejecutoriedad a la sentencia firme referida, están en la obligación de traspasar, mediante mandamiento del Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, a mis representadas, las sucesiones acumuladas de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, la concesión en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros Nº C-46, de lo contrario incurrirán en el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, y el Juzgado ordenará directamente dicho traspaso, debiendo la demandada anular en el expediente administrativo que llevan, el traspaso de la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente C-46, hecho a los demandados, en el expediente referido de ejecución de sentencia: Nombre70707 , Nombre70708 y Nombre70709 , . . 2.- Que la Municipalidad de Carrillo está, a través de su representante legal, y ella misma a través del Concejo Municipal, en la obligación de hacer a sus representadas, los traspasos referidos en el tanto que sus representadas adquirieron la concesión en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente C-46, antes de que entrara en vigencia la Ley sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, Nº 6043 del 16 de diciembre de 1977, por lo que tienen un derecho adquirido, el cual no puede serles anulado o revocado por la Municipalidad demandada. 3.- Que la obligación de la Municipalidad de traspasar a las sucesiones acumuladas de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, la concesión en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores Placa11511, deviene como acto necesario y obligatorio para darle ejecutoriedad a la sentencia de primera instancia firme antes referida, y 4.- Que la Municipalidad demandada debe ser condenada al pago de las costas de este proceso\". \n\n 2.- Que la demandada, contestó negativamente, e interpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de interés legítimo y directo, y sine actione agit; solicita acoger esas excepciones y se condene a la actora al pago de daños, perjuicios y costas personales y procesales. \n\n 3.- Que el Licenciado José Paulino Hernández, por resolución de las \" diez horas treinta minutos del quince de diciembre del dos mil cinco, dispuso:\"POR TANTO\" Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de interés legítimo y directo, sine actione agit en lo que las comprende, y falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, lo mismo que la solicitud de condenar al pago de daños y perjuicios e intereses. Se declara con lugar la demanda ORDINARIA de SUCESIONES ACUMULADAS de Nombre70705 Y Nombre70706 ﻿, representadas por su Nombre9362, señora Nombre65838 contra MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARRILLO, GUANACASTE, en los siguientes términos: Primero: Que en la sentencia firme que se ejecuta, dictada por el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, se anuló la venta con pacto de retroventa hecha en los términos indicados, y se restituyeron las cosas a su estado original, o sea que el contrato de arrendamiento en la zona marítimo terrestre, y la patente de licores Nº C-46, siguen perteneciendo a los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , ahora sus sucesiones, por lo que la Municipalidad demandada, mediante su representante legal y el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, para dar cumplimiento a la sentencia firme referida, están en la obligación de traspasar, mediante mandamiento de este Juzgado, a favor de la parte actora, las sucesiones acumuladas de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, el contrato de arrendamiento en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros Nº C-46; de lo contrario incurrirán en el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, y el Juzgado ordenará directamente dicho traspaso, debiendo la demandada anular en el expediente administrativo que llevan, el traspaso de la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente C-46, hecho a los señores Nombre70707 , Nombre70708 y Nombre70709 , . . Segundo: Que la Municipalidad demandada está, a través de su representante legal, y ella misma a través del Concejo Municipal, en la obligación de hacer los traspasos referidos en el tanto que la parte actora adquirieron el contrato de arrendamiento en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente C-46, antes de que entrara en vigencia la Ley sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, Nº 6043 de 2 de marzo de 1977, por lo que tienen un derecho adquirido. Tercero: Que la obligación de la Municipalidad de traspasar a las sucesiones acumuladas de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706, el contrato de arrendamiento en la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores Placa11511, deviene como acto necesario y obligatorio para darle ejecutoriedad a la sentencia de primera instancia firme antes referida, y Cuarto: Que el pago de las costas personales y procesales den este asunto, es a cargo de la demandada. \n\n 4.- Que inconforme con lo resuelto, la parte demandada apeló, recurso que fue admitido y en virtud del cual se dicta esta resolución.- \n\n 5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de Ley, se dicta esta resolución dentro del término legal y previa deliberación, y: \n\nRedacta la Jueza Jiménez Quesada; y, \n\nCONSIDERANDO \n\n I.- SOBRE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS: Se sustituye la lista de hechos probados que contiene el fallo en estudio por la siguiente: 1- Que el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, por sentencia de 8.00 horas del 16 de marzo de 1998, dispuso: POR TANTO: Por lo expuesto, artículos 28, 39, 41, 45 Constitucional, 10, 11, 20, 21 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil, 328, 330, 627, 837 siguientes, 1007, 1008, 1022, 1023, 1034 del Código Civil, 1, 102, 221 del Código Procesal Civil, artículo 536 del Código de Comercio se declara lo siguiente: A) DEMANDA ORDINARIA DE SUCESORIOS ACUMULADOS DE Nombre70706 Y Nombre70705 representados por Nombre65838 contra Nombre70707 , Nombre70710 y Nombre70709 . . representada por los primeros: Se rechazan las excepciones falta de derecho y prescripción opuesta por los demandados y se declara CON LUGAR DEMANDA ORDINARIA de la siguiente forma: PRIMERO) El contrato llevado a cabo en escritura otorgada en Playas del Coco ante el notario Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro a las siete horas del veintiocho de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco entre Nombre70705 , Nombre70706 por una parte y por la otra Nombre70707 no es una venta con pacto de retroventa sino un arrendamiento de dinero por la suma de doscientos cincuenta mil colones. SEGUNDO) En la escritura anterior en la cual se vende con pacto de retroventa por la suma indicada, el derecho de arrendamiento en la zona marítimo terrestre de Playas del Coco y la patente municipal de licores número c-cuarenta y seis, es una garantía de cumplimiento del contrato de préstamo de dinero suscrito entre las partes. TERCERO) Por tratarse de un acto negocial simulado, carente de voluntad, el contrato de venta con pacto de retroventa entre las partes esta viciado de nulidad absoluta. CUARTO) Los codemandados Nombre70707 , Nombre70710 en lo personal y como representantes de Nombre70709 . . están obligados a devolver a la sucesión actora mediante el otorgamiento de escritura pública, la concesión en la zona marítima terrestre de Playas del Coco, ubicada en Dirección7904 , , linda al norte con calle pública, sur con terreno municipal, bar Bohio y oeste con Bar Papagayo en donde hoy se encuentra el establecimiento Bar y Marisquería Cocos, así como la patente municipal de licores nacionales- extranjeros y restaurante número c-cuarenta y seis, otorgada inicialmente a nombre de Nombre70706 en el término de UN MES de la firmeza de esta sentencia, bajo el apercibimiento que en caso de omisión se hará mediante ejecutoria o mandamiento por este despacho. QUINTO) Los demandados están obligados a pagar solidariamente los perjuicios ocasionados a la Sucesión actora, consistente en el no uso y aprovechamiento de la concesión mencionada y patente municipal de licores, así como la ganancia dejada de percibir administrado el negocio con mediana diligencia desde la fecha del acto declarado nulo hasta a su efectivo pago a determinar en ejecución de sentencia. SEXTO) La sociedad demandada Nombre70709 . . esta obligada a entregar a la sucesión actora el lote que ocupa como arrendataria identificado en el hecho segundo de la demanda y en caso de oposición lo ejecutara este despacho judicial. SEPTIMO) Son las costas personales y procesales a cargo de los demandados. Lo no expresamente concedido esta denegado. B) RECONVENCION DE Nombre70707 , Nombre70710 Y Nombre70709 . . representada por Nombre70707 y Nombre70710 contra SUCESORIOS ACUMULADOS DE Nombre70705 Y Nombre70706 representada por Nombre65838 . Se rechaza la falta de personería ad causam activa y pasiva y se acoge parcialmente la falta de derecho únicamente en cuanto a la petición SUBSIDIARIA de la contrademanda. Se declara parcialmente con lugar reconvención de la siguiente forma: Se rechazan todas las pretensiones principales de la reconvención, y se acogen PARCIALMENTE las subsidiarias así: PRIMERO) La sucesión actora esta obligada a devolver a Nombre70709 , actual propietaria del negocio Bar y Marisquería Cocos, la suma de doscientos cincuenta mil colones junto con los intereses al tipo de ley desde la firmeza de esta sentencia a su efectivo pago. SEGUNDO) La sucesión actora esta obligada a pagar las mejoras útiles y necesarias realizadas en el establecimiento ubicado en el inmueble objeto de la concesión en litigio por los demandados a la fecha de notificación de esta demanda, a determinar en ejecución de sentencia. TERCERO) La sucesión actora deberá reconocer a los dueños del establecimiento Bar y Marisquería Nombre70709 el valor de imagen, clientela, calidad y nombre a la fecha de notificación de esta demanda, tasable mediante pericial en ejecución de sentencia. CUARTO) Sobre la reconvención se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. Lo no expresamente concedió en la reconvención esta denegado. (ver fotocopias certificadas de folios 8 a 44, escrito de demanda, folios 307 a 314, y su contestación, folios 363 a 376); 2- Que el Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda de San José, por sentencia Nº 192 de 14.20 horas de 19 de junio de 1998, al conocer en apelación la sentencia citada en el hecho que antecede, confirmó lo resuelto; y la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia Nº 491-F-00 de 15.25 horas de 28 de junio de 2000, declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación, con sus costas a cargo del perdidoso (ver escrito de demanda, su contestación, y fotocopia certificadas de folios 45 a 96); 3- Que en sesión ordinaria Nº 126, del 11 de marzo de 1986, acuerdo Nº 7, el Concejo Municipal, dispuso traspasar a los señores Nombre70707 y Nombre70711 , un derecho de ocupación dentro de la zona pública de Playas del Coco, a nombre de Nombre70706 o Nombre70706 , relativa al terreno donde se encuentra en funcionamiento el negocio denominado Bar y Marisquería Cocos. (ver constancia de 24 de junio de 2003, folio 360 del expediente principal y declaración del testigo Nombre70712 , a folios 473 y 474 ambos frente); 4- Que el establecimiento ubicado en zona pública a que se refiere este asunto, denominado \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" destinado a la venta de licor y comida, cuenta con una patente de licores a nombre de Nombre70705 , desde antes de 16 de enero de 1978 (misma prueba); 5- Que el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, en sesión ordinaria N° 125, celebrada el 06 de marzo de 1986, acuerdo N° 5, aprobó solicitud de traspaso de patente de licores y restaurante, de Nombre70705 a favor de Nombre70707 y Nombre70710 , referida al negocio denominado \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (ver folios 1 a 4 y 50 del expediente administrativo); 6- que mediante documento fechado 13 de junio del 2001, Nombre65838 , solicitó al demandado que conforme lo dispuso el Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, por auto de las ocho horas del dos de febrero del dos mil uno, que el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, debe traspasar a su nombre la concesión y patente de licores, referente el terreno y local que ocupa el negocio denominado \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (ver folio 441 del expediente principal y 660 legajo de segunda instancia); 7- Que en sesión ordinaria N° 12-2001, celebrada el 20 de marzo, acuerdo N° 4, inciso 1, el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo dispuso enviar a Asesoría Legal, la solicitud presentada por la parte actora para traspasar a su nombre la concesión y patente de licores (ver folio 446); 8- Que mediante resolución de las quince horas diez minutos del veintiséis de marzo del año dos mil uno, el Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, revoca la resolución indicada en el hecho 6, indicando entonces que debe el señor Nombre70707 , conforme al fallo que se ejecuta, comparecer dentro de ocho días, ante Notario Público con el fin de verificar los traspasos requeridos ( ver folio 669 del legajo de segunda instancia); 9.- que el 13 de junio de 2001, la actora presentó nuevamente ante la Secretaría General de la Municipalidad de Carrillo, solicitud para que se diera cumplimiento a lo ordenado en sentencia por el Juzgado de Santa Cruz (ver folios 436 a 442): 10.- que el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, en sesión ordinaria N° 36-01, celebrada el 11 de septiembre del 2001, acuerdo N° 5, inciso 5, dispuso denegar la solicitud de la actora (ver folios 229 a 232); 11.- Que en fecha 12 de enero de 1998, el contribuyente 01813 (Nombre70707 ), pagó a la Municipalidad de Carrillo por concepto de ocupación lote zona marítima, la suma de veintidós mil seiscientos noventa y un colones con sesenta céntimos (ver recibo de dinero numero 49682 de folio 9 del legajo administrativo); 12.- Que la Municipalidad de Carrillo, no fue parte (demandada) dentro del proceso ordinario Nº93-100184-388-CI, tramitado en el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (ver folio 545 del legajo de segunda instancia).- \n\n II.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: Se tienen como tales para la resolución de este litigio: a) que en el Departamento de Zona Marítimo Terrestre de la Municipalidad de Carrillo, exista registro de un contrato concesión o arrendamiento dentro de la zona pública de Playas del Coco, distrito Sardinal, Cantón Carrillo, provincia de Guanacaste, a nombre de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 (no se procuró prueba); b) Que la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros Nº C-46 se encuentre a nombre de los fallecidos Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 o de su sucesión (los autos) \n\n III.- CUESTIONES PROCESALES: Debe, este Tribunal antes de realizar el análisis final del presente asunto, indicar que este proceso contrario a lo interpretado por el señor Juez de Primera Instancia, no es un proceso de ejecución de una sentencia, aún y cuando la base del reclamo de la actora sea un fallo judicial, sino que nos encontramos frente a un juicio ordinario en donde lo que se requiere por parte de la actora, es el traspaso de un supuesto derecho de \"concesión o arrendamiento” de un lote ubicado sobre la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licor numero (c-46) que se explota en el Bar y Restaurante los Nombre70709 ubicado en el lote. Por lo que la litis versa sobre la denegatoria realizada por el ente Municipalidad demando, ante el requerimiento de la sucesión accioante, derivado del derecho otorgado por Sentencia Judicial, dentro del proceso Civil tramitado ante el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, en nunca se tuvo como parte demandada o interesado a la Municipalidad de Carrillo. Será entonces éste el objeto del presente proceso. \n\n IV.- SOBRE LOS AGRAVIOS DEL APELANTE: Estima el inconforme, que la sentencia recurrida contiene vicios tales como: a) errónea apreciación y valoración de la prueba, b) de falta de correlación entre la demanda y la sentencia apelada, ya que ésta ordena la devolución de una concesión a los titulares Nombre70706 y Nombre70705 ; c) insuficiente o deficiente fundamentación del fallo, ya que las pretensiones son propias de un proceso de ejecución y no de un ordinario. Que no existe una concesión ni un arrendamiento a nombre de la actora, por lo que no puede traspasarse un derecho que no existe; lo resuelto por el Juzgador es con infracción al derecho de fondo que rige la materia; d) que el Juez en la sentencia confunde los términos concesión con arrendamiento, que son institutos jurídicos completamente diferentes, de manera que el Juez constituye un derecho nuevo a favor de la sucesión al margen de la Ley.- \n\n V.- ANÁLISIS DE LA PRETENSIÓN PRINCIPAL: Se tiene que la actora solicita dentro de este proceso que la \"Municipalidad de Carrillo se encuentra obligada a traspasar mediante mandamiento del Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz a las sucesiones acumuladas de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , la concesión de la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros numero C-46\". Basa la accionante su derecho y exigencia al ente territorial, en una Sentencia Judicial de Primera Instancia dictada por el Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, confirmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, la cual anula un contrato realizado entre los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 y el aquí interesado Nombre70707 . Solicita la actora, que la Municipalidad demandada, conforme lo dispuso el órgano judicial citado mediante resolución de las ocho horas del dos de febrero del dos mil uno, (folio 660 Legajo de segunda instancia) traspase a nombre de la sucesión la concesión y patente de licores a nombre de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , referente el terreno y local que ocupa el negocio denominado \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\". Pretende de esta forma la actora, hacer incurrir en error no solo al ente territorial, sino a esta autoridad judicial, al indicar que su derecho se deriva de la sentencia firme dictada en primera instancia en sede Civil, base del presente reclamo, que a la hora de ser ejecutada, esa misma autoridad judicial es la que ordena que la Municipalidad cumpla, y consecuentemente ordene el traspaso de un derecho que concesión a su nombre. Pero omite la sucesión accionante así como su director legal, a este Despacho, datos de suma importancia, como, que dentro del proceso de ejecución civil numero 93-100184-388-CI, el ente Municipalidad demandado nunca fue parte, no existiendo un nexo de causalidad, que la obligue a cumplir con lo indicado en ese fallo jurisdiccional, ya que la conducta ordenada debe ser cumplida por particulares y no por la administración territorial. Solapa su derecho las actoras en lo dispuesto por el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, por auto de las ocho horas del dos de febrero del dos mil uno, (folio 660 Legajo de segunda instancia), donde se le ordena al Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, que debe traspasar a su nombre la concesión y patente de licores, referente el terreno y local que ocupa el negocio denominado \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (ver folio 441 del expediente principal), derecho que efectivamente no puede ser otorgado por el ente Municipal y menos aún por este órgano colegiado, ya que aún y cuando es una verdad irrefutable que el auto antes indicado, ordena realizar una conducta a la Municipalidad, es lo cierto también que según consta en autos, con posterioridad al dictado de dicha orden y ante los recursos formulados por el demandado dentro del proceso de ejecución (señor Nombre70707 ), esa autoridad jurisdiccional, enmienda el yerro producido, revocando la resolución dicha por auto de las \"quince horas diez minutos del veintiséis de marzo del año dos mil uno\", indicando que es el señor Nombre70707 , conforme al fallo que se ejecuta, él que debe comparecer dentro del término de ocho días, ante Notario Público, a fin de verificar los traspasos requeridos en la sentencia judicial, dejando con ello sin efecto ni contenido legal lo ordenado a la Municipalidad de Carrillo, en un inicio a saber: el traspaso del derecho de concesión, ya que para que este trámite se diera conforme lo indica el pronunciamiento judicial base de este proceso, debía la contraparte o sea la sucesión de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , pagar lo pactado (devolver a Nombre70709 , actual propietaria del negocio Bar y Marisquería Cocos, la suma de doscientos cincuenta mil colones junto con los intereses al tipo de ley desde la firmeza de esta sentencia a su efectivo pago, pagar las mejoras útiles y necesarias realizadas en el establecimiento ubicado en el inmueble objeto de la concesión en litigio por los demandados a la fecha de notificación de esta demanda), situaciones o verificaciones que no son propias de este litigio, sino del proceso de Ejecución que se tramita ante el Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, no siendo posible, para este Tribunal emitir criterio respecto de su cumplimiento. Se tiene que la orden judicial, sobre la cual la actora, solicita a la Municipalidad realizar el traspaso, según fue debidamente demostrado en autos, (folio 669 del legajo de segunda instancia) fue revocada, y por tanto no se encuentra la Municipalidad demanda en obligación legal de realizar un traspaso que no ha sido ordenado por un órgano judicial. Deviene, entonces esta petitoria de improcedente, ya que la actora, pretende hacer incurrir en error al ente Municipal, al afirmar que por resolución firme u orden judicial, se encontraba obligada a realizar el traspaso de una supuesta concesión, cuando en verdad dicha orden fue revocada por el mismo órgano jurisdiccional, situación que en ningún momento, le es comunicada al gobierno local, (al menos no se tiene constancia de ello), con el único fin de que se realizará el traspaso en forma ilegal, no puede este órgano colegiado, cobijar con el velo de la legalidad la actuación realizada por la actora y disponer contrario a lo ordenado por otro órgano jurisdiccional y menos aún ordenar una actuación contra derecho, según se dirá: \n\n VI.- DEL TRASPASO PRETENDIDO: Solicitan las accionantes, que debe \"la Municipalidad de Carrillo anular en el expediente administrativo que llevan el traspaso realizado de la zona marítimo terrestre y la patente Placa11511. Que la Municipalidad se encuentra obligada a realizar el traspaso referido ya que la concesión en la zona marítimo terrestre fue antes de que entrará en vigencia la Ley Sobre la Zona marítimo Terrestre, por lo que tiene un derecho adquirido el cual no puede ser anulado o revocado por la Municipalidad de Carrillo. Que el traspaso referido es un acto necesario y obligatorio para darle ejecutoriedad a la sentencia de primera instancia firme.- Refiere la representación de las sucesiones actoras, un supuesto derecho de concesión sobre parte de la zona marítimo terrestre, sin embargo dentro de este proceso, ha quedado demostrado sin duda alguna, por medio de la prueba documental y testimonial que lo que existía a nombre de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , era un derecho de ocupación dentro de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, ello según constancia de la Municipalidad de Carrillo, visible a folio 360 del expediente principal, (la cual no ha sido de argüida de falsa o inexacta), situación que es ratificada por la declaración testimonial de Nombre70712 (folio 473 y 474), donde no ha demostrado la parte actora, que lo que tenía era un derecho de concesión. Se constata que en la sesión ordinaria Nº 126, del 11 de marzo de 1986, acuerdo Nº 7, el Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, conforme lo solicitó en su momento la señora Nombre70706 , ordena traspasar a nombre de los señores Nombre70707 y Nombre70711 , un derecho de ocupación que ostentaba en ese momento dentro de la zona pública de Playas del Coco, relativa al terreno donde se encuentra funcionando el negocio denominado Bar y Marisquería Cocos. Entonces no existe, ni ha existido un derecho de concesión a nombre de la sucesión actora, con lo que doña Nombre70706 contaba, en ese entonces, era con una mera ocupación en la zona pública, y no con un derecho de concesión como han pretendido los actores, que entienda este Tribunal, derecho que como se indico se inscribió a favor de Nombre70707 y Nombre70711 , ante el negocio contractual realizado entre ambos. En su oportunidad, y por situaciones ajenas a este proceso, el Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, por sentencia anula el contrato, debiendo el derecho de ocupación volver al propietario original, previo cumplimiento de obligaciones inherentes a la sucesión actora. Siendo así, lo único que puede discutirse ante la Municipalidad de Carrillo es precisamente, valga la redundancia el derecho que pueden tener la sucesión actora sobre ese derecho de ocupación que ostentó en su momento Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , pero nunca derecho alguno sobre un contrato de concesión o arrendamiento, ya que como se insiste, en autos se ha demostrado hasta la saciedad que los fallecidos, no contaban con una concesión o contrato de arrendamiento dentro de la zona pública a su nombre. Efectivamente, tal y como lo indica el apelante, el Juez de instancia, confunde el derecho de ocupación con una concesión, situación inviable y que procede enmendar esta autoridad, ya que efectivamente la concesión es la forma legal de hacer uso de la zona pública, mientras que la ocupación es tan solo un derecho en precario que se da por mera tolerancia de la administración territorial, con el fin de dar resguardo a los derechos no subjetivos, que puede pretender un ocupante dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre y ante la gran variedad de instrumentos jurídicos que se han promulgado sobre la ocupación y planificación de la zona marítimo terrestre. Situación que se analizará en el siguiente considerando, teniendo como premisa que lo único que se puede discutir en este estadio, es el derecho de ocupación que tenían Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 en aquel momento, así como los beneficios que de éste pueden derivarse. \n\n VII.- SOBRE LA ZONA MARÍTIMO TERRESTRE: El régimen dominical de la zona marítimo terrestre aunque comienza a gestarse desde la época colonial con la Real Cédula del 15 de octubre de 1754, en Costa Rica como país independiente, inicia en el siglo antepasado, con la promulgación del Decreto Ley Nº 162 del 28 de junio de 1828, cuya afectación al patrimonio del Estado surge solo como un medio de fomento y protección de las actividades: pesqueras, marineras y salinas del país. En ese mismo sentido se promulgan el Reglamentos Generales de la Hacienda Pública de 1839, 1858 y 1868, distinguiéndose entre los tres, la Ley Nº 7 del 31 de agosto de 1868, que reafirma el carácter irrenunciable de los terrenos de la milla marítima. A pesar de que es con el Código General de 1841, que se refirió a la dominialidad de la franja de la zona marítimo terrestre, no se había dado una regulación tendiente a estipular expresamente su demanialidad, lo cual se logra con la Ley de Aguas, de 1884, propiamente por su artículo 20. Afectación dominical que va a ser confirmada y desarrollada por regulaciones posteriores, hasta llegar a la Ley Nº 6043, de 2 de marzo de 1977, norma que rige en la actualidad, la cual en su artículo primero declara el sometimiento de la zona marítimo terrestre al dominio público. No obstante, esta alusión histórica de la franja en estudio al dominio público es también homologada por pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General de la República y la jurisprudencia nacional, en diversas resoluciones tanto de la Sala Constitucional como de la Sala I y el Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo en el siguiente sentido y que para los efectos se transcriben así: \n\n“Así es como, ya desde las primeras décadas del siglo pasado, y bajo la denominación de milla marítima, existe en Costa Rica un resguardo de esta faja de terreno, dándosele incluso el carácter de dominio público...” (Dictamen C-100-95 emitido por la PGR el 10 de mayo de 1995). \n\n \n\n\"La Sala acoge la tesis de que en efecto, la zona marítimo terrestre es un bien de dominio público, en los términos del artículo 261 del Código Civil que dispone: \"Son cosas públicas las que por ley están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. El carácter demanial de la zona marítimo terrestre (o ribera marina como se le denominó antiguamente) se reconoce desde tiempo inmemorial, y el Derecho Romano mismo recoge ese status, como \"res communes\" y \"extra comercium\". En nuestro medio, con toda claridad desde el siglo pasado se ha reconocido el carácter público de esa franja, como una prolongación de la propiedad del Estado en la zona marina adyacente al territorio nacional, en la que ejerce su soberanía. Debe tenerse presente que la Constitución Política, en su artículo 121 inciso 14), aunque utilizando el término sociológico de \"nación\" que venía desde la Constitución de 1871, otorga a la Asamblea Legislativa la facultad de \"afectar\" bienes del Estado al uso público, de manera que cobija claramente la situación de examen, desde que bajo su amparo se dictó la legislación impugnada, no sólo está última (No. 6043), sino todas las que en el pasado regularon esta materia.” (Sala Constitucional, voto Nº 447-91 de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintiuno de febrero de 1991). \n\nIV.- La zona marítimo terrestre es y siempre ha sido, se repite, de dominio público. Su actual régimen jurídico es el establecido por la Ley No. 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, sus reformas, y su reglamento...” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución Nº 007-93 de las quince horas cinco minutos del 20 de enero de 1993). \n\n \n\n\"VI.- Correlativamente a lo dicho, la zona marítimo terrestre constituye parte del patrimonio nacional, pertenece al Estado y es inalienable e imprescriptible. Su protección es obligación del Estado y sus instituciones –incluidas por supuesto las Municipalidades correspondientes- e incluso de todos los habitantes del país. Su uso y aprovechamiento están sujetos a las disposiciones de la Ley No. 6043 sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre.\" (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera en sentencia Nº 128-2001, de las 08:00 horas del 16 de febrero del 2001). \n\n \n\nEn lo que respecta al desarrollo normativo de la prolongación territorial de la zona marítimo terrestre, se destaca que desde el Decreto Ley Nº 162 del 28 de junio de 1828, se ha estipulado que la franja de protección o la afectada al dominio público tendrá una longitud de una milla desde la costa. Sin embargo es a partir de la reforma al Código Fiscal mediante la Ley Nº 11 del 22 de octubre de 1926, que se precisa por primera vez la extensión en mil seiscientos setenta y dos metros a partir de la pleamar ordinaria a lo largo de las costas de ambos mares y de quinientos metros a lo largo de ambos márgenes de los ríos. Esta medida se mantuvo hasta 1942, en donde por medio de la Ley Nº 19 del 11 de noviembre, se desafectó el área protegida a doscientos metros a partir de la pleamar ordinaria para la costa del Atlántico; y por motivos de paridad normativa se hizo lo mismo en el Pacifico, mediante la Ley No 201 del 26 de agosto de 1943, en su artículo primero, lo que significó la desafectación de mil cuatrocientos setenta y dos metros del régimen dominical, siendo en ese momento susceptibles de ser apropiables por particulares. Tal modificación se ratificó en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización del 14 de octubre de 1961, y en la Ley Forestal del 25 de noviembre de1969. Con la promulgación de la Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre del 22 de abril de 1970, se debilitó aún más la protección dominical sobre esta franja, al fomentar la apropiación de tierras dentro de los ciento cincuenta metros de la faja que actualmente se conoce como zona restringida, dejando solo los cincuenta metros contados desde la pleamar ordinaria como inalienable. Es precisamente con la Ley 6043 que se retoma y se consolida la medida de los doscientos metros de protección, mediante lo estipulado en su artículo 9, que además incluye bajo el régimen de zona marítimo terrestre a las islas, islotes y peñascos marítimos, así como toda tierra o formación natural que sobresalga del nivel del océano dentro del mar territorial del país. Como se ha podido denotar son varias las regulaciones que se han efectuado entorno a esta zona dominical, sin embargo, no siempre esta afectación ha sido orientada de la misma forma o con los mismos fines. Así tenemos que en la época colonial, la dominicalidad de la zona marítimo terrestre nace fundamentalmente por un interés de resguardar el territorio y proteger quienes como ocupación habitual se dedicaban a extraer productos marinos. Debemos recordar que en aquella época las invasiones piratas en territorio americano eran frecuentes, siendo el nuestro sensiblemente afectado en varias ocasiones. Por lo que con las difusiones de la Real Cédula del 15 de octubre de 1754, y la Ley del 4 de enero de 1813, se busca afectar al dominio público a la franja en estudio para proteger de una forma más eficiente al territorio -que en ese momento formaba parte de la Corona Española y promover las actividades extracción marina. En Costa Rica como República, las primeras normas que trataron el tema, le dieron preponderancia al uso agropecuario, ello según la Ley 162 de 28 de junio de 1828, posteriormente los artículos 6 y 62 de la Ley sobre Terrenos Baldíos de 1939, en los que se puede denotar que la totalidad de la franja pública, salvo los doscientos metros contiguos a la pleamar ordinaria, estaba dedicada a uso agropecuario. El artículo 7 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización de 1961, considera también a la zona marítimo terrestre como parte de la propiedad agrícola del Estado. Es hasta finales de los años sesenta, que empieza a gestarse un mayor interés por el desarrollo urbano y turístico de esta franja dominical, lo que se manifestó con la propagación de contratos para estos usos, otorgados en ese entonces, por el Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (actualmente se le conoce como Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario). Pero no es sino con la promulgación de la Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre de 1970, en su artículo primero, que se logra darle este uso urbano-turístico a la franja en estudio. Sin lugar a dudas con la Ley 4558, se busco darle un giro al marcado uso agropecuario que tenía la zona marítimo terrestre y darle un sentido turístico a la misma. Esta Ley tuvo grandes consecuencias negativas en su aplicación dándose la apropiación particular de la zona marítimo terrestre de forma indiscriminada y abusiva en su titulación. Por lo que surgió un gran desasosiego por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa ante la posibilidad de perder el dominio Estatal sobre este bien dominical, lo que llevó a suspender la Ley 4558, la derogatoria de su transitorio III y su abolición definitiva se da mediante la Ley Nº 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, que es la legislación vigente. Esta ley junto con su Reglamento, en términos generales apuntan más a un desarrollo turístico de forma planificada y sostenible con el ambiente, explotando las bellezas naturales de nuestras costas atrayendo inversión tanto en infraestructura de recreo y habitación, como de turistas. Por lo que se observa gran diferencia respecto con la normativa anterior, puesto que la Ley 4558 como se pudo denotar presentaba un uso aunque turístico era más encaminado en la población o urbanización de la zona, mientras que la regulación vigente intenta prácticamente hacer olvidar esta posibilidad o por lo menos de la forma como se dio, rescatando solo la posibilidad de clasificar las zonas conforme a su disposición turística o no turística, generando la posibilidad de realizar un desarrollo ya sea turístico o predominantemente agropecuario, pesquero o industrial, según las características intrínsecas de cada lugar. Es Nombre40338 la intención del legislador de que la zona marítimo terrestre es un bien de dominio público, por ende no es susceptible de apropiación particular de ninguna forma y su régimen de aprovechamiento se encuentra circunscrito a lo que establezca la normativa vigente. Al respecto se puede citarse los artículos 1, 7, 20, 23 y 53 de la citada Ley. Otra situación que refleja esta normativa es el sentido de pertenencia que posee, en donde se evidencia una preferencia porque el manejo y el aprovechamiento de la zona marítimo terrestre sea ejecutado de forma prioritaria por nacionales, alejando aun más la posibilidad de que extranjeros, en razón de sus condiciones económicas puedan en algún grado adueñarse de nuestras playas. Evidencia de ello son los artículos 31, 47, 57 y 70 de la Ley. Por lo que si algo ha reflejado la legislación actual en relación a sus antecesoras es que se ha aprendido de los errores cometidos y de la necesidad que existe de adaptar la normativa a la situación actual que vive cada región costera, cuyas necesidades varían de un lugar a otro, sin dejar de lado la coyuntura mundial en la que estamos inmersos. \n\n VIII.- SOBRE EL DERECHO DE OCUPACIÓN EN LA ZONA MARÍTIMO TERRESTRE: La posición dominante de la doctrina establece que los permisos de uso (ocupación en precario) son actos administrativos unilaterales. Algunos autores, como Nombre33033, van más allá, concluyendo, que el mismo, como acto jurídico es bilateral, puesto que su difusión es producto de las voluntades expresas del solicitante y de la Administración; y como negocio jurídico es unilateral, debido a que el permisiario carece de derechos frente al Estado. Asimismo, dichos permisos poseen un carácter precario, aludiendo a la posibilidad de que la Administración en cualquier momento revoque unilateralmente dicho permiso u ocupación, por razones de necesidad o de interés general (en este sentido ver sentencia de Sala Constitucional, Nº 2306-91, de las 14:45 horas del 6 de noviembre de 1991). Tal precariedad se funda en que el permiso de uso u ocupación solo constituye una tolerancia de la Administración, por lo que puede ser revocado en cualquier momento. De acuerdo con el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, esta revocación no generará cobro indemnizatorio a la Administración, cuando se haga por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia debidamente demostradas. Además, el acto revocatorio no debe ser intempestivo ni arbitrario y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para su cumplimiento. Es aceptado por la doctrina que los permisos de uso u ocupaciones dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre no generan a favor de sus beneficiarios un derecho subjetivo sino más bien un interés legitimo. Se debe dejar claro, que estos permisos son solo autorizaciones para realizar actos sencillos cuyos efectos no incidan de manera significativa en el bien utilizado, por lo que solo deben consentirse obras menores cuyas condiciones permitan su fácil y rápida remoción, no se permiten construcciones con carácter de adherencia permanente al terreno, por cuanto dichas instalaciones vendrían a obstaculizar la implementación efectiva del ordenamiento planificado. La Procuraduría General de la República, mediante oficio Nº C-100-95, emitido el 10 de mayo de 1995, en este sentido concluyó: \n\n“De manera que, para la zona marítimo terrestre de nuestro país, solamente podrían admitirse permisos de uso que reúnan dos características esenciales: a) que no afecten las condiciones naturales de la zona ni entorpezcan el libre aprovechamiento de la zona pública, y b) su ejecución no limite en absoluto la futura implementación de un plan regulador”. \n\n \n\nAhora bien, el acto administrativo por el que se concede el permiso u ocupación debe ser motivado, al igual que la resolución que lo deniega; dicha motivación debe girar en torno al interés público por el cual se llego a tal decisión. En lo tocante a los contratos de arrendamiento con anterioridad a su promulgación, estipula que estos son válidos, en los mismos términos y condiciones en que fueron convenidos, pero a su vencimiento, o de acordarse su prórroga éstos deberán modificarse con arreglo a la nueva normativa vigente, según su transitorio primero, lo anterior siempre y cuando hayan sido remitidos al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo dentro de los seis meses posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de cita, caso contrario se tendrán por extinguidos conforme al transitorio segundo. Diferentes es la situación de los ocupantes, ya que en nuestra legislación la condición de ocupante nace dirigida a aquellas personas que se encontraban ubicadas en la zona marítimo terrestre y que no contaban con un contrato de arrendamiento al momento de dictarse la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre Nº 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, sin que exista un acto de la Administración en el que se reconozca tal situación. A los llamados ocupantes de la zona pública,(restringida) la ley les otorga un tratamiento especial de preferencia (pero en igualdad de condiciones) para convertir esa ocupación en un derecho de concesión, siempre y cuando el ocupante del terreno lo haya poseído en forma pública, quieta, pacifica, continua sobre la cosa restringida de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre y sin implicar mejoras. El legislador no pretendió consolidar tal figura de forma permanente, sino una simple tolerancia, en el tanto se produce su conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico, en otras palabras, la categoría de ocupante se utiliza de forma temporal mientras sea jurídicamente posible el otorgamiento de la concesión. Esta figura (ocupante) ha sido objeto de múltiples interpretaciones, ya que no se encuentra ajustada en armonía con la Ley de cita, lo que ha dado lugar a prácticas viciadas y negocios ilícitos. La naturaleza jurídica del ocupante, es de un derecho en precario y por tanto jamás podrían confundirse ni pretenderse derechos que solo puede tener quién es propietario, ya que estos por su condición no requieren de una concesión. Tampoco pueden tratarse como arrendatarios de la zona marítimo terrestre, ya son sujeto expreso de regulación conforme al transitorio I y II de la norma supra citada, ya que en su caso, no se habla del contrato de concesión sino de la prorroga, de contratos de arrendamiento anteriores a su promulgación, los cuales deben ser modificados en concordancia con las leyes vigentes. Tampoco puede ni deben confundirse con aquellas personas que se introdujerón en la zona demanial de manera clandestina, ya que con posterioridad a esta Ley, dicha actuación se encuentra prohibida conforme a su artículo 12. Entonces debemos, concluir que el ocupante, es aquella persona que se encontraba ubicada en la zona restringida de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre y que al momento de entrar en vigencia la Ley 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, no contaba con un contrato de arrendamiento a su favor. La norma legal en estudio también crea una figura muy parecida al ocupante denominada \"poblador\", que conforme al numeral 70, es persona costarricense por nacimiento, con mas de 10 años de residencia continua en la zona, con certificación del Registro Electoral, siempre y cuando se demuestre que es su única propiedad, figura que para los efectos no es de importancia y por tanto no se realiza un análisis de fondo. Continuando la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, hace referencia aunque no de forma expresa al ocupante en su artículo 48 al indicar: \n\n\" El reglamento de esta Ley establecerá la forma de tramitar la solicitud, las modalidades de concesión, el canon a pagar en cada zona de acuerdo con sus circunstancias y en forma especial, con las diferentes situaciones de los pobladores o habitantes de la zona, y quienes no lo sean, así como cualesquiera otras disposiciones que se estimen necesarias, para regular las relaciones entre las Municipalidades y los concesionarios\". \n\nDe lo anterior puede extraerse que tanto los ocupantes como los pobladores constituyen el régimen excepcional de Ley 6043. El reglamento de la norma citada (Decreto 7841-P), dispuso en su numeral 45 párrafo tercero, quienes podían ostentar la condición de ocupantes de la siguiente forma: “quienes no siendo pobladores hayan construido o edificado en la zona en predios ilegalmente poseídos, (aquellos que no tienen un contrato de arrendamiento a su nombre, extendido con anterioridad a la Ley 5602), pero además suprime el pago de mejoras, sin embargo retoma el privilegio otorgado mediante el articulo 44 de su Ley. Dicho lo anterior se tiene que la condición de ocupante no puede generar derecho de propiedad ni de posesión alguno, ya que al ser la zona marítimo terrestre parte del dominio publico, no puede ser objeto de posesión ni prescribirse positivamente con el transcurso del tiempo, conforme lo dispone el articulo 7 de la Ley 6043. Esta característica de imprescriptibilidad redunda en la imposibilidad jurídica de ejercer posesión sobre la franja de terreno inalienable, por lo que esta norma, cuando otorga la preeminencia, para otorgar una concesión, se refiere en forma Nombre40338 y expresa al ocupante del terreno que hubiera poseído, éste en forma quieta, pública, pacífica y continúa. Requisitos, que para el caso que nos ocupa, son de fácil constatación. Entonces puede afirmarse que la ocupación de la sucesión de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 no ha sido continua, por cuanto esa condición fue trasladada al señor Nombre70707 , quién a su vez ejercitó actos sobre la misma, tal y como se demuestra por medio de uno de los pagos realizados a la Municipalidad de Carrillo con fecha 12 de enero de 1998, como contribuyente 01813, donde cancela por concepto de ocupación lote zona marítima, la suma de veintidós mil seiscientos noventa y un colones con sesenta céntimos (ver recibo de dinero numero 49682 de folio 9 del legajo administrativo); y menos aún pacífica, ello se demuestra por medio de la gran actividad litigiosa, de que ha sido objeto, en los diferentes procesos judiciales, incluyendo el que nos ocupa, además de los recursos de amparo y reclamos administrativos que versan a su alrededor. Ante estas circunstancias, no le es aplicable la condición de ocupante a la sucesión de Nombre40338 y Nombre70706 . Ahora bien, tal y como se indico líneas atrás, el legislador al crear la figura del ocupante, no pretende consolidar su situación precaria de forma permanente, por el contrario se da como una solución alterna, de mera tolerancia mientras se produce la respectiva planificación por parte del ente Municipal, por medio del instrumento legal denominado Plan Regulador de la zona, ello conforme al transitorio VII, de la Ley en tratamiento, el cual dispone: “Las municipalidades con jurisdicción en la zona marítimo terrestre cobraran un canon que establece la Ley para los ocupantes de la misma. El cobro se hará de acuerdo al uso y con el avalúo actual de la dirección General de Tributación Directa. Esta autorización tendrá el carácter de provisional hasta tanto no entre en vigencia el plan de desarrollo para la respectiva zona y no produce derecho alguno para los ocupantes en lo que a concesión se refiere”. El fin de la norma es extinguir la ocupación precaria de la zona marítimo terrestre, obtenidas al margen de la Ley (sin contar con los contratos de arrendamiento como es el caso que nos ocupa en donde no se ha demostrado, mas que un derecho de ocupación) para que estas porciones de terreno, cumplan su destino demanial, y para que en aquellos casos que se dese obtener un beneficio de ella, se realice conforme a la Ley, o sea por el único medio legal posible (contrato de concesión). Por su parte el artículo 75 de la tan mencionada Ley, establece también que los ocupantes, ni siquiera tienen derecho a las mejoras, si el uso de la parcela no esta conforme al plan regulador local, lo que conlleva a decir que cualquier edificación que se haya realizado sin este amparo de legalidad, es clasificada como contraria a ella, por cuanto solo pueden ser permitidas en forma lícita, aquellas que se deriven de un contrato de arrendamiento previo a la suspensión de la Ley 4558 (Ley de la Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre de 22 de abril de 1970) o prórroga de este, ya que con la puesta en vigencia la Ley 6043, del 2 de marzo de 1977, se decreta su ilicitud, si no ha sido emitido el plan regulador local o en su defecto si no son realizadas al amparo de un contrato de concesión de la zona pública. A mayor, abundamiento, se tiene que todo acto realizado antes de la vigencia de la norma de cita, en terrenos de la zona marítimo terrestre no sujetos a contrato de arrendamiento, carecen de validez, conforme al numeral 71, al indicar: que son absolutamente nulos todos los actos, contratos, acuerdos y disposiciones realizados o tomados a partir de la promulgación de la Ley 5602 y que fueren contrario a sus disposiciones (de 4 de noviembre de 1974). De mas esta decir entonces que cualquier actuación realizada después de esta fecha a la referida la zona marítimo terrestre, carece de toda validez, incluyendo el otorgamiento de patentes. Ya que sobre, estas, se ha establecido claramente que el medio para otorgarlas es el remate público y que es soporte del ente Municipal fijar el número de establecimientos de licores que pueden ser autorizados dentro de su circunscripción. Si bien el otorgamiento de licencias de comercio y para la venta de licores al menudeo con expedición de patentes es atribución de la Municipalidad, ello no procede cuando la solicitud tiene por fin una actividad a desarrollar dentro de la Zona Pública, de uso común, en la cual por regla esta prohibido a los particulares ejercer cualquier derecho u ocupación. El articulo 63 en relación con el 20 de la Ley 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, sanciona al funcionario que otorgare concesiones o permisos de ocupación contra sus disposiciones o Leyes conexas, situación que a la vez se enmarca dentro de los supuestos de denegatoria de licencias que prevé el Código Municipal, por ser una actividad no permitida por Ley, dada la ubicación física, titularidad de pública y destino del bien. (Sobre la responsabilidad de los gobiernos locales en el uso indebido de las patentes puede verse la sentencia Constitucional numero 6469-97). Siendo así, no puede alegar la actora como lo hace un derecho subjetivo adquirido sobre un derecho de ocupación en precario, y sobre una patente obtenida bajo las circunstancias indicadas, el único derecho subjetivo con que cuenta un ocupante, sería el de prioridad sobre una solicitud de concesión, siempre y cuando se reúnan los requisitos y el uso sea compatible con el predeterminado por el Plan Regulador del sector. Privilegio otorgado por la Ley, que ha causado un efecto nocivo, ya que desde entonces se ha dado una indiscriminada venta de los derechos de ocupación, sin que se tenga claro, por parte de los adquirentes que estos derechos de ocupación no son sujeto de transmisión alguna. Como se dijo la meta de la Ley 6043 del 2 de marzo de 1977, es darle un trato especial a quiénes reúnen la condición de ocupantes o pobladores, con el fin de extinguir estas figuras, no para perpetuarlas en el tiempo, no es posible entonces, que terceros ajenos a la particularidad de ocupante, puedan continuar hacia el futuro con esa condición. No es posible aplicar a terceros las condiciones propias del ocupante, ya que el interés que provocó su nacimiento, dejó de existir desde el momento en que se dió la transmisión de la ocupación. Los permisos de ocupación se otorgan intuito persona, como se dijo en razón de las calidades y condiciones personales, no existiendo norma expresa que autorice su traspaso a herederos. No puede ser transmisible de manera alguna, a terceros, la condición de ocupante, por lo expuesto, pero además por la ilícitud acaecida en su nacimiento (inexistencia de un contrato de arrendamiento), amén de que la Ley 6043 no preceptúa que pueda darse comercio sobre la condición de ocupante, como si lo hace sobre los derechos del contrato de concesión. El ejercicio anterior conlleva ineludiblemente a decir que la condición de ocupante no puede ser transmisible, es Nombre70705 que la sucesión actora, no puede alegar derechos sobre una ocupación y patente que nunca ha tenido, ya que la condición de ocupante, quién la ostentaba, en su momento fueron los hoy fallecidos Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , y al no ser ésta transmisible ni a los herederos, deja de existir con el deceso de los ocupantes, siendo así, todo acto jurídico tendiente a trasmitirla es completamente nulo ya que los supuestos terceros adquirentes no pueden sustituir esa condición especial de ocupante. Amén de ello, no hay prueba alguna, de que exista o haya existido una concesión a nombre de la sucesión actora o de Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , por lo que se hace imposible que en forma licita, la Municipalidad demandada, pueda crear un derecho subjetivo (contrato de concesión), aún al amparo de una sentencia judicial, proveniente de un derecho de ocupación no transmisible, a favor de personas, que no cumplen como se demostró con la condición de ocupantes. No puede la actora, alegar derechos sucesorios sobre una concesión inexistente, ya que nadie puede trasmitir por actos inter-vivos y menos aún por mortis causa- lo que no se tiene. En el sub-lite, esta más que demostrado que los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , nunca tuvieron un contrato de concesión a su favor sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, que lo que obtentaban en vida era un derecho de ocupación y al no ser este susceptible de transmisión, no puede este Tribunal otorgar un derecho que no se posee, en contrario a toda la normativa existente y referente al tema de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre. Para mayor abundamiento, sobre lo resuelto debe citarse la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, numero 317-F-2008, de las nueve horas diez minutos del dos de mayo de dos mil ocho, que en lo que interesa manifiesta: \n\n \"..... Siguiendo con el análisis del aludido artículo legal, en caso de no existir ningún ocupante, resulta de aplicación el postulado de mérito. De conformidad con lo expuesto, cobra importancia cardinal determinar a quién debe considerarse “ocupante” del terreno ubicado en la zona restringida. ¿Debe equipararse tal concepto al de poseedor? Esta Sala, después de analizar la norma en estudio, de manera conjunta y armónica con el resto del articulado de la susodicha Ley, y lo dispuesto en su Reglamento, concluye que la respuesta debe ser negativa. De conformidad con el artículo primero de la Ley en estudio, la zona marítima terrestre constituye parte del patrimonio nacional, pertenece al Estado y es inalienable e imprescriptible. Sólo por medio de concesiones, se reitera, los particulares pueden aprovecharse de la zona restringida (artículo 39). En este sentido, a tenor del numeral 12, la tenencia no autorizada de terrenos ahí ubicados es prohibida: “En la zona marítimo terrestre es prohibido, sin la debida autorización legal, explotar la flora y fauna existentes, deslindar con cercas, carriles o en cualquier otra forma, levantar edificaciones o instalaciones, cortar árboles, extraer productos o realizar cualquier otro tipo de desarrollo, actividad u ocupación.” El ordinal 13 sanciona la posesión o tenencia ilegítima de la siguiente forma: “ Las autoridades de la jurisdicción correspondiente y las municipalidades respectivas, tan pronto tengan noticia de las infracciones a que se refieren los dos artículos anteriores, procederán, previa información levantada al efecto, si se estimare necesaria, al desalojo de los infractores y a la destrucción o demolición de las construcciones, remodelaciones o instalaciones realizadas por aquellos, sin responsabilidad alguna para la autoridad o la municipalidad. El costo de la demolición o destrucción se cobrará al dueño de la construcción o instalación. Todo lo anterior sin perjuicio de las sanciones penales que procesan. ” Empero, al socaire de su ordinal 6, se reconoce la propiedad privada, legítimamente adquirida, en la zona marítimo terrestre: “ Las disposiciones de esta ley no se aplicarán a las áreas de las ciudades situadas en los litorales, ni a las propiedades inscritas, con sujeción a la ley, a nombre de particulares, ni a aquellas cuya legitimidad reconozcan las leyes. ”; sin embargo, según lo dispone el canon 8, esos terrenos son declarados de utilidad pública para efectos de expropiación: “ Se declara de utilidad pública la zona marítimo terrestre a efecto de que los lotes, parcelas o mejoras ubicados en ella, que hubieren sido vendidos, adquiridos o poseídos en propiedad, por particulares, puedan rescatarse para el patrimonio nacional por medio de expropiación. ” Asimismo, la Ley de comentario, en sus transitorios I y II, mantiene la validez y vigencia de los contratos de arrendamiento celebrados al amparo de la anterior legislación, siempre que se cumplan con algunos requisitos: “ Transitorio I.- Las concesiones o contratos de arrendamiento otorgados con fundamento en leyes anteriores, salvo las excepciones aquí establecidas, pasarán a control de las municipalidades respectivas y continuarán en los mismos términos y condiciones en que fueron convenidos, pero a su vencimiento y si fuere acordada su prórroga, se modificarán con arreglo a las normas de esta ley. Lo anterior referido a la zona marítimo terrestre. Transitorio II.- Las municipalidades y el Instituto de Tierras y Colonización deberán remitirle al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo dentro de los seis primeros meses de la vigencia de esta ley, copias de los contratos o concesiones que hubieren otorgado en zona marítimo terrestre, sin perjuicio de que los interesados presenten, también en ese plazo, sus contratos a este Instituto, todo para efectos de su registro en el mismo. Vencido ese término sin haberse presentado dichos contratos, carecerán de validez y se tendrán como extinguidos./ Si no se hubieren extendido contratos deberán presentarse los comprobantes que existieren./ En todo caso deberá adjuntarse constancia de que se está al día en el pago de los cánones respectivos. La ausencia de esa constancia será comprobación de que los cánones no se han satisfecho./ Para los efectos de este transitorio podrán presentarse los originales de los documentos o copias fotostáticas de los mismos, suscritas por el interesado o por el representante de la entidad correspondiente. ” La figura del ocupante, señalada en el artículo 44 de comentario, por consiguiente, no hace alusión a los propietarios, pues éstos no necesitan de una concesión para usufructuar sus terrenos; tampoco a los arrendatarios de inmuebles ubicados en la zona marítimo terrestre, cuyo contrato fue otorgado de conformidad con la normativa anterior, puesto que, como se acaba de analizar, existen disposiciones específicas que los regulan, en el entendido de que se trata de prórrogas de los convenios; menos aún, se refiere a personas introducidas en dicha zona de manera ilícita, por estar expresamente prohibido por el artículo 12, según se apuntó. La interpretación válida es la de considerar “ocupante” a todas aquellas personas que, asentadas en la zona restringida, no contaban con una concesión al momento de promulgarse la Ley 6043. Se trata, en consecuencia, de un régimen especial o de excepción, el cual no es el único en esa normativa. Al respecto, según se apuntó, en el trascrito artículo 6, fueron excluidas las áreas de las ciudades situadas en los litorales; además, en el ordinal 70 se creó la figura del poblador, a quien se le brinda la posibilidad de permanecer en las heredades por ellos ocupados, hasta que se produzca la planificación de la zona, momento en el cual pueden ser reubicados e indemnizadas sus mejoras. Dispone dicho artículo: “ Los pobladores de la zona marítimo terrestre, costarricenses por nacimiento, con más de diez años de residencia en ella, según información de la autoridad de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural local o certificación del Registro Electoral sobre el domicilio del solicitante, podrán continuar en posesión de sus respectivos lotes siempre que fuere su única propiedad. Sin embargo, deberán sujetarse a la planificación de la zona, a cuyo efecto podrán ser reubicados e indemnizadas su mejoras de acuerdo con esta ley. En todo caso deberá respetarse la zona pública. ” La conclusión indicada, de que con la expresión “ocupante” la Ley hace referencia a un régimen especial, es confirmado por lo dispuesto en el numeral 48: “ Las concesiones se otorgarán por un plazo no menor de cinco ni mayor de veinte años y deberán indicar el canon a pagar y su forma de pago. Ese canon sustituye el impuesto territorial./ El reglamento de esta ley establecerá la forma de tramitar la solicitud, las modalidades de la concesión, el canon a pagar en cada zona de acuerdo con sus circunstancias y, en forma especial, con la diferente situación de los pobladores o habitantes y quienes no lo sean , así como cualesquiera otras disposiciones que se estimaren necesarias para regular las relaciones entre las municipalidades y los concesionarios. ”(Lo subrayado no es del original); al indicar dicha disposición: “... y quienes no lo sean ...” alude a los ocupantes. Más explícito resulta el numeral 75 del Reglamento, al desarrollar la anterior disposición legal: “ Los pobladores de la zona marítimo terrestre, costarricenses por nacimiento, con más de diez años de residencia continua en ella, según información de la autoridad de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural local o certificación del Registro Electoral sobre el domicilio del solicitante podrán continuar en posesión de sus respectivos lotes siempre que fuere su única propiedad, pudiendo ser reubicados de acuerdo con la planificación de la zona, previa indemnización de las mejoras. En todo caso deberá respetarse la zona pública. / Cuando el período de residencia sea inferior a diez años, los pobladores podrán solicitar concesión sobre el predio, siempre que no se incluya parte alguna de la zona pública. Si existieren mejoras en la zona pública, se aplicará lo dispuesto en el inciso e), artículo 73 del reglamento, y las disposiciones del artículo 74 del reglamento si las mejoras estuvieren ubicadas en la zona restringida. / Quienes no siendo pobladores hayan construido o edificado en la zona restringida en predios ilegalmente poseídos, no tendrán derecho al pago de mejoras. / Sin embargo podrán solicitar concesión sobre el predio y, si se les otorgare, no se les cobrará por el uso y disfrute de esas mejoras. Las solicitudes de concesiones que hagan los ocupantes de la zona marítimo terrestre tendrán prioridad sobre los demás. ” Cuando esta disposición, en su párrafo tercero, hace referencia a “ predios ilegalmente poseídos ”, según se ha apuntado, debe entenderse que la persona se encuentra en la zona marítimo terrestre sin contrato de arrendamiento o concesión que la legitime, es decir, como ocupante. Es importante hacer notar que esta norma reitera lo preceptuado en el ordinal 44 de la Ley, en el sentido de que “... Las solicitudes de concesiones que hagan los ocupantes de la zona marítimo terrestre tendrán prioridad sobre los demás .”, lo cual abona a favor de la tesis sustentada. Asimismo, el transitorio VII de la Ley es diáfano al establecer el carácter provisional, o precario, de la ocupación, la cual puede ser equiparada a la mera tolerancia del derecho común: “ Transitorio VII.- Las municipalidades con jurisdicción en la zona marítimo terrestre cobrarán el canon que establece esta ley para los ocupantes de la misma./ El cobro se hará de acuerdo con el uso y con el avalúo actual de la Dirección General de la Tributación Directa. Esta autorización tendrá carácter provisional, hasta tanto no entre en vigencia el plan de desarrollo para la respectiva zona y no produce derecho alguno para los ocupantes en lo que a concesión se refiere. ”(Lo subrayado no es del original). A la luz de lo expuesto en esta norma transitoria, es Nombre70705 que el Estado permite la permanencia de esas personas –ocupantes- en la zona costera hasta tanto sea posible el otorgamiento de concesiones, sea, cuando se emita el plan regulador de la zona (artículos 70, Transitorio VII de la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre; y 57 de su Reglamento). Su condición es tan precaria que, de conformidad con el artículo 75 reglamentario, no tienen derecho al pago de las mejoras, aunque sí el de prioridad de sus solicitudes de concesión, siempre que el uso proyectado en el terreno sea compatible con el previsto en la planificación del sector. Por otro lado, al constituir la zona marítimo terrestre parte del patrimonio nacional perteneciente al Estado, inalienable e imprescriptible, lo cual es recogido por el numeral 7 de la ley, al indicar que los terrenos ubicados en la zona marítimo terrestre “ ... no pueden ser objeto de informaciones posesorias y los particulares no podrán apropiarse de ellos ni legalizarlos a su nombre, por éste u otro medio. ”; implica la imposibilidad jurídica de derivar derechos posesorios sobre dicha zona. En consecuencia, la terminología utilizada por el artículo 44 de la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre es la adecuada, es decir, se refiere al mero ocupante y no al poseedor. Además, dicha condición de ocupante no puede ser transmitida a terceros, por cuanto reviste especiales condiciones que sólo esas personas –los ocupantes- tienen; por consiguiente, todo acto jurídico tendiente a traspasarla deviene en absolutamente nulo. Aceptar lo contrario implicaría quebrantar lo dispuesto por los artículos antes indicados de la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre y su reglamento. \n\nXXII.- En autos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los hechos probados antecedidos con los números 9, 10 y 12, los señores Nombre34289 y Nombre70713 presentaron ante la Municipalidad de Nicoya su solicitud de concesión sobre el terreno en litigio el día 12 de julio; por su parte la sociedad actora lo hizo el día 28 de septiembre y don Nombre70713 el 23 de octubre, todas las fechas de 1989. Por otro lado, aunque no se tuvo por acreditado, los juzgadores de segunda instancia, en el considerando X de la sentencia recurrida (folio 1029), señalan que ambas partes plantean el mismo tipo de uso para el terreno en litigio, el cual consiste en la actividad agropecuaria; además, que la zona en donde se ubica el terreno en litigio es no turística (lo cual fue aceptado por la sociedad actora a folios 17 vuelto, 176 y 185, y por los demandados en su contestación a la demanda a folio 232). A la luz de lo expuesto en el considerando anterior, al haberse presentado dos solicitudes de concesión sobre el mismo terreno ubicado en la zona marítimo terrestre y con el mismo uso o destino, enmarcado dentro de las prioridades establecidas por el Reglamento a la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre (artículo 57 inciso b) apartado 1), se deberá analizar si alguno de los solicitantes puede ser considerado como ocupante. En este sentido, es Nombre70705 que la sociedad actora no reúne las condiciones necesarias, pues, según se desprende de lo consignado en su demanda –hechos identificados como segundo, tercero, cuarto, quinto y noveno- lo aducido por ella es haber adquirido de los demandados Nombre34289 y Nombre70713 el derecho de posesión sobre el terreno en litigio el día 21 de febrero de 1989, negocio jurídico que, según se anotó en el apartado anterior, resulta absolutamente nulo; además, según lo acreditado en el hecho demostrado antecedido con el número 7, su ingreso en el terreno en litigio se produjo, aproximadamente, en el mes de marzo de 1989. Por su parte, dichos accionados tampoco reúnen tal característica; ello por cuanto, se reitera, con base en los indicados hechos probados, y según fue analizado en considerandos precedentes, al momento de presentar su solicitud de concesión ya no se encontraban ocupando el terreno; ergo, no reúnen la condición de “posesión” continua, según lo previsto en el artículo 44 de la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre. \n\n \n\nAl ser el derecho de ocupación que tenían Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , en su momento, no trasmisible a terceros, no puede venir su sucesión a pretender un derecho subjetivo que no tiene, y menos aún que tal situación sujete a la Municipalidad de Carrillo, al dictado de actos contrarios al ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que la denegatoria realizada por parte del ente territorial, en cuanto al traspaso de un derecho de concesión sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, así como la patente de licores nacionales y extranjeros numero Placa11511, es conforme al ordenamiento juridico, no hay vicio alguno, en su motivo contenido y fin. No siendo para este Tribunal de recibo la pretensión de la sucesión actora, aceptar lo contrario implica ordenar actuaciones contrarias a la Ley y los reglamentos que rigen la materia sometida a escrutinio de esta autoridad judicial. \n\n IX.- CONCLUSIONES: Con certeza jurídica, se establece que los señores Nombre70705 y Nombre70706 , lo que ostentaban en vida, era la condición de ocupantes dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, derecho que no es susceptible de transmisión a terceros, por consiguiente, todo acto jurídico tendiente a traspasarla deviene en absolutamente nulo, que al ser un derecho en precario, no confiere derechos subjetivos, ergo carece de derecho la sucesión actora sobre sus pretensiones, aceptar lo contrario implicaría quebrantar el bloque de legalidad que cubre la conducta administrativa, por lo que debe acogerse el recurso formulado en este sentido. \n\n X.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS: Estima este Tribunal, que nos encontramos en presencia de los supuestos del 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, por lo que se dicta sin especial condenatoria en costas. \n\nPOR TANTO \n\n En lo que es objeto de recurso se REVOCA la resolución recurrida, únicamente en cuanto rechazó la defensa de falta de derecho, declaró con lugar la demanda y condenó a la Municipalidad de Carrillo al pago de ambas costas, para en su lugar, acoger la falta de derecho y decretar la IMPROCEDENCIA de la acción en todos sus extremos. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. En lo demás se confirma. NOTIFÍQUESE.- \n\n \n\n \n\nCristina Víquez Cerdas \n\n \n\nNombre66641 Sady Jiménez Quesada",
  "body_en_text": "Case File No. 02-100332-388-CI\n\n \n\nCase File No. 02-100332-388-CI\n\nProcess/ Ordinary\n\nPlaintiff/ Nombre65838 , Estate of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706\n\nNotifications/ Lic. Carlos Montero Barrantes fax 2665-08-28\n\nDefendant/ Municipalidad de Carrillo\n\nNotifications/ Lic. Jorge Chavarría Ordóñez casillero 136\n\nInterested Party/ Nombre70707\n\nNotifications/ Lic. William Mora Rojas fax Telf1083\n\n \n\nNo. 277- 2008\n\nSECOND SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GOICOECHEA, at fifteen hours ten minutes on the twenty-eighth of August of two thousand eight.-\n\nORDINARY process processed before the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, by the JOINT ESTATES of Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706 both Nombre70706 , represented by their Nombre9362 Nombre65838 , single, homemaker, identity card number CED52822, resident of Dirección7903 , , against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARRILLO GUANACASTE, in the person of the Mayor Nombre62280 , married, lawyer, identity card number CED46087 resident of Santa Ana.- As interested party, Mr. Nombre70707 , married, merchant, identity card number CED52823, resident of Playas del Coco.\n\nWHEREAS\n\n 1.- Based on the facts narrated, an ordinary lawsuit was established, the amount of which was set at ten million colones, so that the judgment may declare: \"That in the final judgment being executed in the referenced case file, the sale with a right of repurchase made under the indicated terms was annulled and things were restored to their original state, that is, that the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license No. C-46 continue to belong to Mr. Nombre70705 and Mr. Nombre70706 , now their estates, the Municipalidad de Carrillo, through its legal representative and the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, in order to comply with and enforce the referenced final judgment, are obligated to transfer, by writ of the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, to my represented parties, the joint estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the license for domestic and foreign liquors No. C-46, otherwise they will incur the crime of disobedience to authority, and the Court will directly order said transfer, with the defendant being required to annul, in the administrative file they maintain, the transfer of the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46 made to the defendants in the referenced judgment execution file: Nombre70707 , Nombre70708 and Nombre70709 , . . 2.- That the Municipalidad de Carrillo is, through its legal representative, and itself through the Concejo Municipal, obligated to make the referenced transfers to its represented parties insofar as its represented parties acquired the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46 before Law No. 6043 on the maritime-terrestrial zone of December 16, 1977, entered into force, for which reason they have an acquired right, which cannot be annulled or revoked by the defendant Municipality. 3.- That the obligation of the Municipality to transfer to the joint estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license Placa11511 arises as a necessary and mandatory act to enforce the aforementioned final first-instance judgment, and 4.- That the defendant Municipality must be ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding\".\n\n 2.- That the defendant answered negatively and interposed the defenses of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, lack of legitimate and direct interest, and sine actione agit; it requests that these defenses be accepted and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay damages, losses, and personal and procedural costs.\n\n 3.- That Licenciado José Paulino Hernández, by resolution of \"ten hours thirty minutes on December fifteenth, two thousand five,\" ordered: \"THEREFORE:\" The defenses of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, lack of legitimate and direct interest, sine actione agit insofar as it encompasses them, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are rejected, as is the request to order payment of damages, losses, and interest. The ORDINARY lawsuit of the JOINT ESTATES of Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706 , represented by their Nombre9362, Mrs. Nombre65838, against MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARRILLO, GUANACASTE, is granted in the following terms: First: That in the final judgment being executed, handed down by the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, the sale with a right of repurchase made under the indicated terms was annulled, and things were restored to their original state, that is, that the lease contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license No. C-46 continue to belong to Mr. Nombre70705 and Mr. Nombre70706 , now their estates, for which reason the defendant Municipality, through its legal representative and the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, in order to comply with the referenced final judgment, is obligated to transfer, by writ of this Court, in favor of the plaintiff, the joint estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, the lease contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the license for domestic and foreign liquors No. C-46; otherwise they will incur the crime of disobedience to authority, and the Court will directly order said transfer, with the defendant being required to annul, in the administrative file they maintain, the transfer of the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46 made to Mr. Nombre70707 , Nombre70708 and Nombre70709 , . . Second: That the defendant Municipality is, through its legal representative, and itself through the Concejo Municipal, obligated to make the referenced transfers insofar as the plaintiff acquired the lease contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46 before Law No. 6043 on the maritime-terrestrial zone of March 2, 1977 entered into force, for which reason they have an acquired right. Third: That the obligation of the Municipality to transfer the lease contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license Placa11511 to the joint estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 arises as a necessary and mandatory act to enforce the aforementioned final first-instance judgment, and Fourth: That the payment of personal and procedural costs in this matter is borne by the defendant.\n\n 4.- That dissatisfied with the decision, the defendant appealed, an appeal that was admitted and by virtue of which this resolution is issued.-\n\n 5.- That the procedures have observed the prescriptions of Law, this resolution is issued within the legal term and after prior deliberation, and:\n\nJudge Jiménez Quesada drafts the opinion; and,\n\nWHEREAS\n\n I.- ON THE PROVEN FACTS: The list of proven facts contained in the judgment under review is replaced by the following: 1- That the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, by judgment at 8:00 a.m. on March 16, 1998, ordered: THEREFORE: For the reasons stated, articles 28, 39, 41, 45 Constitutional, 10, 11, 20, 21 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, 328, 330, 627, 837 et seq., 1007, 1008, 1022, 1023, 1034 of the Civil Code, 1, 102, 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, article 536 of the Commercial Code, the following is declared: A) ORDINARY LAWSUIT OF THE JOINT SUCCESSIONS OF Nombre70706 AND Nombre70705 represented by Nombre65838 against Nombre70707 , Nombre70710 and Nombre70709 . . represented by the former: The defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations interposed by the defendants are rejected and the ORDINARY LAWSUIT is GRANTED in the following manner: FIRST) The contract executed in the public deed granted in Playas del Coco before notary Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro at seven o'clock on November twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-five, between Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 on the one hand, and Nombre70707 on the other, is not a sale with a right of repurchase but rather a loan of money for the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones. SECOND) In the aforementioned public deed, in which the lease right in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco and the municipal liquor license number c-forty-six are sold with a right of repurchase for the indicated sum, this constitutes a guarantee of performance of the money loan contract entered into between the parties. THIRD) Because it is a simulated negotiating act, lacking consent, the sale contract with a right of repurchase between the parties is vitiated by absolute nullity. FOURTH) The co-defendants Nombre70707 and Nombre70710 , personally and as representatives of Nombre70709 . . , are obligated to return to the plaintiff estate, through the granting of a public deed, the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco, located at Dirección7904 , , bounded to the north by a public street, south by municipal land, Bar Bohio, and west by Bar Papagayo, where the establishment Bar y Marisquería Cocos is currently located, as well as the municipal license for domestic and foreign liquors and restaurant number c-forty-six, originally granted in the name of Nombre70706 , within the term of ONE MONTH from the finality of this judgment, under warning that in case of omission it will be done by writ or order from this office. FIFTH) The defendants are obligated to jointly and severally pay the losses caused to the plaintiff Estate, consisting of the non-use and non-enjoyment of the aforementioned concession and municipal liquor license, as well as the profits left unperceived from administering the business with ordinary diligence, from the date of the act declared null until its effective payment, to be determined in the execution of judgment. SIXTH) The defendant company Nombre70709 . . is obligated to deliver to the plaintiff estate the lot it occupies as lessee, identified in fact two of the complaint, and in case of opposition, this judicial office will execute it. SEVENTH) Personal and procedural costs are borne by the defendants. That not expressly granted is denied. B) COUNTERCLAIM of Nombre70707 , Nombre70710 AND Nombre70709 . . represented by Nombre70707 and Nombre70710 against the JOINT SUCCESSIONS OF Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706 represented by Nombre65838 . The defense of lack of active and passive capacity ad causam is rejected, and the defense of lack of right is partially accepted only with respect to the SUBSIDIARY petition of the counterclaim. The counterclaim is declared partially granted in the following manner: All principal claims of the counterclaim are rejected, and the SUBSIDIARY claims are PARTIALLY accepted as follows: FIRST) The plaintiff estate is obligated to return to Nombre70709 , current owner of the business Bar y Marisquería Cocos, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until its effective payment. SECOND) The plaintiff estate is obligated to pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in dispute by the defendants as of the date of notification of this lawsuit, to be determined in the execution of judgment. THIRD) The plaintiff estate must recognize to the owners of the establishment Bar y Marisquería, Nombre70709 , the value of image, clientele, quality, and name as of the date of notification of this lawsuit, assessable by expert appraisal in the execution of judgment. FOURTH) Regarding the counterclaim, it is resolved without special condemnation for costs. That not expressly granted in the counterclaim is denied. (see certified photocopies from folios 8 to 44, statement of claim, folios 307 to 314, and its answer, folios 363 to 376); 2- That the Second Superior Civil Court, Second Section of San José, by judgment No. 192 at 2:20 p.m. on June 19, 1998, upon hearing on appeal the judgment cited in the preceding fact, confirmed the decision; and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 491-F-00 at 3:25 p.m. on June 28, 2000, declared the cassation appeal without merit, with costs borne by the losing party (see statement of claim, its answer, and certified photocopy from folios 45 to 96); 3- That in ordinary session No. 126, of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Concejo Municipal ordered the transfer to Mr. Nombre70707 and Nombre70711 of a right of occupation within the public zone of Playas del Coco, in the name of Nombre70706 or Nombre70706 , regarding the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is in operation. (see certification of June 24, 2003, folio 360 of the main file and declaration of witness Nombre70712 , on folios 473 and 474, both front); 4- That the establishment located in the public zone referred to in this matter, called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos,\" intended for the sale of liquor and food, has a liquor license in the name of Nombre70705 , from before January 16, 1978 (same evidence); 5- That the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 125, held on March 6, 1986, agreement No. 5, approved the request for transfer of the liquor and restaurant license from Nombre70705 in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70710 , referring to the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folios 1 to 4 and 50 of the administrative file); 6- that by document dated June 13, 2001, Nombre65838 requested the defendant that, in accordance with what was ordered by the Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, by decree at eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one, the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo must transfer in her name the concession and liquor license referring to the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folio 441 of the main file and 660 of the second instance file); 7- That in ordinary session No. 12-2001, held on March 20, agreement No. 4, subparagraph 1, the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo ordered that the request presented by the plaintiff to transfer the concession and liquor license in her name be sent to Legal Counsel (see folio 446); 8- That by resolution of fifteen hours ten minutes on March twenty-sixth, two thousand one, the Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz revokes the resolution indicated in fact 6, indicating then that Mr. Nombre70707 must, in accordance with the judgment being executed, appear within eight days before a Notary Public for the purpose of verifying the required transfers (see folio 669 of the second instance file); 9.- that on June 13, 2001, the plaintiff again submitted to the General Secretariat of the Municipalidad de Carrillo a request for compliance with what was ordered in the judgment by the Juzgado de Santa Cruz (see folios 436 to 442): 10.- that the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 36-01, held on September 11, 2001, agreement No. 5, subparagraph 5, ordered the denial of the plaintiff's request (see folios 229 to 232); 11.- That on January 12, 1998, taxpayer 01813 (Nombre70707) paid the Municipalidad de Carrillo, for the concept of occupation of a lot in the maritime zone, the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones and sixty céntimos (see money receipt number 49682 from folio 9 of the administrative file); 12.- That the Municipalidad de Carrillo was not a party (defendant) in the ordinary proceeding No. 93-100184-388-CI processed in the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (see folio 545 of the second instance file).-\n\n II.- UNPROVEN FACTS: The following are deemed as such for the resolution of this dispute: a) that in the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Department of the Municipalidad de Carrillo, there exists a registry of a concession or lease contract within the public zone of Playas del Coco, Sardinal district, Carrillo Canton, Guanacaste province, in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 (no evidence was provided); b) That the license for domestic and foreign liquors No. C-46 is in the name of the deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 or their estate (the records).\n\n III.- PROCEDURAL MATTERS: This Court, before conducting the final analysis of this matter, must indicate that this proceeding, contrary to what was interpreted by the First Instance Judge, is not a judgment execution proceeding, even though the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a judicial ruling; rather, we are faced with an ordinary trial where what is requested by the plaintiff is the transfer of an alleged \"concession or lease\" right over a lot located on the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license number (c-46) operated in the Bar y Restaurante los Nombre70709 located on the lot. Therefore, the dispute concerns the denial made by the defendant Municipal entity regarding the request of the plaintiff estate, derived from the right granted by Judicial Judgment within the Civil proceeding processed before the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, in which the Municipalidad de Carrillo was never included as a defendant or interested party. This, then, shall be the subject of this proceeding.\n\n IV.- ON THE GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT: The dissatisfied party considers that the appealed judgment contains defects such as: a) erroneous assessment and valuation of evidence, b) lack of correlation between the complaint and the appealed judgment, since it orders the return of a concession to the holders Nombre70706 and Nombre70705; c) insufficient or deficient reasoning of the judgment, since the claims are characteristic of an execution proceeding and not an ordinary one. That there is no concession or lease in the name of the plaintiff, so a right that does not exist cannot be transferred; the Judge's decision violates the substantive law governing the matter; d) that in the judgment, the Judge confuses the terms concession and lease, which are completely different legal institutions, such that the Judge creates a new right in favor of the estate outside the Law.-\n\n V.- ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM: It is noted that the plaintiff requests within this proceeding that the \"Municipalidad de Carrillo is obligated to transfer by writ of the Civil Court of Santa Cruz to the joint estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the license for domestic and foreign liquors number C-46.\" The plaintiff bases her right and demand against the territorial entity on a First Instance Judicial Judgment handed down by the Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which annuls a contract entered into between Mr. Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 and the interested party here, Nombre70707. The plaintiff requests that the defendant Municipality, in accordance with what was ordered by the cited judicial body by resolution at eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one (folio 660 Second Instance File), transfer in the name of the estate the concession and liquor license in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos.\" In this way, the plaintiff attempts to cause error not only to the territorial entity but also to this judicial authority, by indicating that her right derives from the final judgment handed down in the first instance in the Civil venue, the basis of this claim, which at the time of execution, that same judicial authority orders the Municipality to comply with and consequently order the transfer of a concession right in its name. But the plaintiff estate and its legal counsel omit from this Office data of utmost importance, such as that within the civil execution proceeding number 93-100184-388-CI, the defendant Municipal entity was never a party, and there exists no causal nexus that obligates it to comply with what is indicated in that jurisdictional ruling, since the ordered conduct must be complied with by private individuals and not by the territorial administration. The plaintiff's right is concealed in what was ordered by the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, by decree at eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one (folio 660 Second Instance File), where it orders the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo that it must transfer in her name the concession and liquor license, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folio 441 of the main file), a right that effectively cannot be granted by the Municipal entity and even less by this collegiate body, since, although it is an irrefutable truth that the aforementioned decree orders the Municipality to perform an action, it is also true, as evidenced in the records, that subsequent to the issuance of said order and in response to the appeals filed by the defendant within the execution proceeding (Mr. Nombre70707), that jurisdictional authority corrects the error produced, revoking the said resolution by decree of \"fifteen hours ten minutes on March twenty-sixth, two thousand one,\" indicating that it is Mr. Nombre70707, in accordance with the judgment being executed, who must appear within the term of eight days before a Notary Public to verify the transfers required in the judicial judgment, thereby rendering without effect or legal content what was originally ordered to the Municipalidad de Carrillo, namely: the transfer of the concession right, since for this procedure to occur as indicated by the judicial pronouncement that is the basis of this proceeding, the counterparty, that is, the estate of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, had to pay what was agreed upon (return to Nombre70709, current owner of the business Bar y Marisquería Cocos, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until its effective payment, pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in dispute by the defendants as of the date of notification of this lawsuit), situations or verifications that are not characteristic of this dispute, but rather of the Execution proceeding being processed before the Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, and it is not possible for this Court to issue a criterion regarding compliance with them. It follows that the judicial order upon which the plaintiff requests the Municipality make the transfer, as was duly demonstrated in the records (folio 669 of the second instance file), was revoked, and therefore the defendant Municipality is not under a legal obligation to make a transfer that was not ordered by a judicial body. This petition therefore becomes inadmissible, since the plaintiff attempts to cause the Municipal entity to err by asserting that, by final resolution or judicial order, it was obligated to make the transfer of an alleged concession, when in truth said order was revoked by the same jurisdictional body, a situation that at no time was communicated to the local government (at least there is no evidence of this), with the sole purpose of effecting the transfer illegally. This collegiate body cannot shelter the action carried out by the plaintiff under the veil of legality and order contrary to what was ordered by another jurisdictional body, and even less order an action contrary to law, as will be stated:\n\n VI.- ON THE INTENDED TRANSFER: The plaintiffs request that \"the Municipalidad de Carrillo must annul in the administrative file they maintain the transfer made of the maritime-terrestrial zone and license Placa11511. That the Municipality is obligated to make the referenced transfer since the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone was granted before the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone entered into force, for which reason they have an acquired right which cannot be annulled or revoked by the Municipalidad de Carrillo. That the referenced transfer is a necessary and mandatory act to enforce the final first-instance judgment.- The representation of the plaintiff estates refers to an alleged concession right over part of the maritime-terrestrial zone; however, within this proceeding, it has been demonstrated beyond any doubt, through documentary and testimonial evidence, that what existed in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 was a right of occupation within the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, according to a certification from the Municipalidad de Carrillo, visible on folio 360 of the main file (which has not been alleged as false or inaccurate), a situation confirmed by the testimonial statement of Nombre70712 (folio 473 and 474), where the plaintiff has not demonstrated that what they had was a concession right. It is confirmed that in ordinary session No. 126 of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Concejo Municipal de Carrillo, as requested at the time by Mrs. Nombre70706, orders the transfer in the name of Mr. Nombre70707 and Nombre70711 of a right of occupation that she held at that time within the public zone of Playas del Coco, relating to the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is operating. Therefore, there neither exists nor has there existed a concession right in the name of the plaintiff estate; what Mrs. Nombre70706 had at that time was merely an occupation in the public zone, and not a concession right as the plaintiffs have attempted to have this Court understand, a right that, as indicated, was registered in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70711, pursuant to the contractual business carried out between them. In due time, and for reasons unrelated to this proceeding, the Juzgado Mixto de Santa Cruz, by judgment, annuls the contract, and the right of occupation must return to the original owner, subject to prior fulfillment of obligations incumbent upon the plaintiff estate. This being the case, the only thing that can be discussed before the Municipalidad de Carrillo is precisely, redundantly, the right that the plaintiff estate may have over that right of occupation that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 once held, but never any right whatsoever over a concession or lease contract, since, as is insisted, it has been demonstrated to the point of saturation in the records that the deceased did not have a concession or lease contract within the public zone in their name. Indeed, as the appellant indicates, the trial-level Judge confuses the right of occupation with a concession, an unviable situation that this authority proceeds to correct, since indeed the concession is the legal form of using the public zone, while occupation is merely a precarious right granted by mere tolerance of the territorial administration, for the purpose of safeguarding the non-subjective rights that an occupant within the maritime-terrestrial zone may claim, given the wide variety of legal instruments that have been promulgated regarding the occupation and planning of the maritime-terrestrial zone. A situation that will be analyzed in the following considering clause, taking as a premise that the only thing that can be discussed at this stage is the right of occupation that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 had at that time, as well as the benefits that may derive from it.\n\n VII.- ON THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE: The public domain regime of the maritime-terrestrial zone, although it began to develop from the colonial era with the Real Cédula of October 15, 1754, in Costa Rica as an independent country commenced in the century before last, with the promulgation of Decreto Ley No. 162 of June 28, 1828, whose designation as part of the State's patrimony arose only as a means of promoting and protecting activities: fishing, maritime, and salt-related activities of the country. In that same sense, the General Regulations of the Public Treasury of 1839, 1858, and 1868 were promulgated, distinguishing among the three, Law No. 7 of August 31, 1868, which reaffirms the inalienable character of the lands of the maritime mile. Despite the fact that it was with the General Code of 1841 which referred to the public ownership of the maritime-terrestrial zone strip, no regulation had been enacted tending to expressly stipulate its public domain status, which was achieved with the Water Law of 1884, specifically through its article 20. A public domain designation that would be confirmed and developed by subsequent regulations, culminating in Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, the law currently in force, which in its first article declares the subjection of the maritime-terrestrial zone to the public domain.\n\nHowever, this historical reference of the strip under study to the public domain is also confirmed by pronouncements of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and national jurisprudence, in various resolutions from both the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and Chamber I (Sala I) and the Contentious-Administrative Superior Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo) in the following sense, and for the relevant purposes are transcribed as follows:\n\n“Thus, since the first decades of the last century, under the name of maritime mile, a safeguard of this strip of land has existed in Costa Rica, even being given the character of public domain…” (Legal Opinion C-100-95 issued by the PGR on May 10, 1995).\n\n\"The Chamber accepts the thesis that indeed, the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) is a public domain asset, under the terms of article 261 of the Civil Code which provides: \"Public things are those that by law are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone can benefit by being entrusted to public use. The demanial character of the maritime-terrestrial zone (or marine shore as it was formerly called) has been recognized since time immemorial, and Roman Law itself encompasses that status, as 'res communes' and 'extra comercium'. In our environment, the public character of that strip has been recognized with complete clarity since the last century, as an extension of State property in the marine zone adjacent to the national territory, over which it exercises its sovereignty. It must be kept in mind that the Political Constitution, in its article 121 subsection 14), although using the sociological term 'nation' that came from the Constitution of 1871, grants the Legislative Assembly the power to 'affect' State assets to public use, so that it clearly covers the situation under examination, since under its protection the challenged legislation was enacted, not only the latter (No. 6043), but all those that in the past regulated this matter.\" (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 447-91 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of February twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one).\n\nIV.- The maritime-terrestrial zone is and always has been, it is repeated, of public domain. Its current legal regime is that established by Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, its reforms, and its regulations...\" (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 007-93 of fifteen hours five minutes of January 20, 1993).\n\n\"VI.- Correlatively to the foregoing, the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions –including of course the corresponding Municipalities- and even of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.\" (Contentious-Administrative Superior Tribunal, Third Section in judgment No. 128-2001, of 08:00 hours of February 16, 2001).\n\nRegarding the regulatory development of the territorial extension of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is highlighted that since Decree Law No. 162 of June 28, 1828, it has been stipulated that the protection strip or the one affected to the public domain shall have a length of one mile from the coast. However, it is from the reform to the Fiscal Code by means of Law No. 11 of October 22, 1926, that the extension is specified for the first time at one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters from the ordinary high tide along the coasts of both seas and five hundred meters along both banks of the rivers. This measurement was maintained until 1942, when by means of Law No. 19 of November 11, the protected area was disaffected to two hundred meters from the ordinary high tide for the Atlantic coast; and for reasons of regulatory parity, the same was done on the Pacific, through Law No. 201 of August 26, 1943, in its first article, which meant the disaffectation of one thousand four hundred seventy-two meters from the dominical regime, being at that moment susceptible to appropriation by private individuals. Such modification was ratified in the Law of Lands and Colonization of October 14, 1961, and in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) of November 25, 1969. With the enactment of the Law of Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970, the dominical protection over this strip was further weakened, by promoting the appropriation of lands within the one hundred fifty meters of the strip currently known as the restricted zone, leaving only the fifty meters counted from the ordinary high tide as inalienable. It is precisely with Law 6043 that the measurement of two hundred meters of protection is retaken and consolidated, through the provisions of its article 9, which also includes under the maritime-terrestrial zone regime the islands, islets and maritime rocks, as well as any land or natural formation that protrudes from the ocean level within the country's territorial sea. As has been able to be denoted, several regulations have been enacted regarding this dominical zone, however, this affectation has not always been oriented in the same way or with the same purposes. Thus we have that in the colonial era, the domaniality of the maritime-terrestrial zone arises fundamentally from an interest in safeguarding the territory and protecting those whose habitual occupation was dedicated to extracting marine products. We must remember that in that era, pirate invasions in American territory were frequent, ours being significantly affected on several occasions. Therefore, with the dissemination of the Royal Decree (Real Cédula) of October 15, 1754, and the Law of January 4, 1813, the aim was to affect the strip under study to the public domain in order to protect the territory –which at that time formed part of the Spanish Crown– more efficiently and to promote marine extraction activities. In Costa Rica as a Republic, the first norms that addressed the issue gave preponderance to agricultural use, according to Law 162 of June 28, 1828, and subsequently articles 6 and 62 of the Law on Public Lands (Terrenos Baldíos) of 1939, in which it can be denoted that the entirety of the public strip, except for the two hundred meters contiguous to the ordinary high tide, was dedicated to agricultural use. Article 7 of the Law of Lands and Colonization of 1961 also considers the maritime-terrestrial zone as part of the agricultural property of the State. It is not until the late sixties that a greater interest in urban and tourist development of this dominical strip begins to brew, which manifested itself with the spread of contracts for these uses, granted at that time by the Institute of Lands and Colonization (currently known as the Institute of Agrarian Development (INDER)). But it is only with the enactment of the Law of Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of 1970, in its first article, that this urban-tourist use is achieved for the strip under study. Without a doubt, with Law 4558, the aim was to give a turn to the marked agricultural use that the maritime-terrestrial zone had and to give it a tourist sense. This Law had great negative consequences in its application, with the private appropriation of the maritime-terrestrial zone occurring in an indiscriminate and abusive manner in its titling. Therefore, great unease arose on the part of the Legislative Assembly before the possibility of losing State dominion over this dominical asset, which led to the suspension of Law 4558, the repeal of its Transitory III, and its definitive abolition is given through Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, which is the current legislation. This law together with its Regulations, in general terms, point more towards planned and environmentally sustainable tourist development, exploiting the natural beauties of our coasts, attracting investment in both recreational and residential infrastructure, as well as tourists. Thus, a great difference is observed with respect to the previous regulations, since Law 4558, as could be denoted, presented a use that, although tourist, was more directed at the population or urbanization of the zone, while the current regulation practically tries to make this possibility forgotten, or at least in the way it occurred, rescuing only the possibility of classifying zones according to their tourist or non-tourist disposition, generating the possibility of carrying out development whether tourist or predominantly agricultural, fishing, or industrial, according to the intrinsic characteristics of each place. It is the legislator's intention that the maritime-terrestrial zone is a public domain asset, therefore it is not susceptible to private appropriation in any form, and its exploitation regime is circumscribed to what the current regulations establish. In this regard, articles 1, 7, 20, 23, and 53 of the cited Law can be cited. Another situation that reflects these regulations is the sense of belonging they possess, where a preference is evidenced for the management and exploitation of the maritime-terrestrial zone to be executed primarily by nationals, further distancing the possibility that foreigners, by reason of their economic conditions, could to some degree take ownership of our beaches. Evidence of this are articles 31, 47, 57, and 70 of the Law. Therefore, if current legislation has reflected something in relation to its predecessors, it is that lessons have been learned from the mistakes made and from the need that exists to adapt the regulations to the current situation that each coastal region is experiencing, whose needs vary from one place to another, without neglecting the global juncture in which we are immersed.\n\nVIII.- ON THE RIGHT OF OCCUPATION (DERECHO DE OCUPACIÓN) IN THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE: The dominant position of the doctrine establishes that use permits (precarious occupation) are unilateral administrative acts. Some authors, such as Nombre33033, go further, concluding that it, as a legal act, is bilateral, since its issuance is a product of the express wills of the applicant and the Administration; and as a legal business, it is unilateral, because the permit holder lacks rights against the State. Likewise, said permits possess a precarious character, alluding to the possibility that the Administration may at any time unilaterally revoke said permit or occupation, for reasons of necessity or general interest (in this sense see judgment of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 2306-91, of 14:45 hours of November 6, 1991). Such precariousness is based on the fact that the use or occupation permit only constitutes a tolerance of the Administration, so it can be revoked at any time. In accordance with article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, this revocation will not generate a compensation claim against the Administration, when done for reasons of opportunity and convenience duly demonstrated. In addition, the revocatory act must not be untimely nor arbitrary and must grant in all cases a reasonable period for its compliance. It is accepted by the doctrine that use permits or occupations within the maritime-terrestrial zone do not generate a subjective right in favor of their beneficiaries but rather a legitimate interest. It must be made clear that these permits are only authorizations to carry out simple acts whose effects do not significantly affect the asset used, so only minor works should be allowed whose conditions permit their easy and rapid removal; constructions with permanent adherence to the land are not permitted, as said installations would hinder the effective implementation of planned zoning. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, through official letter No. C-100-95, issued on May 10, 1995, concluded in this sense:\n\n\"So that, for the maritime-terrestrial zone of our country, only use permits that meet two essential characteristics could be admitted: a) that they do not affect the natural conditions of the zone nor hinder the free use of the public zone, and b) their execution does not limit in any way the future implementation of a regulatory plan (plan regulador).\"\n\nNow, the administrative act by which the permit or occupation is granted must be motivated, as must the resolution that denies it; said motivation must revolve around the public interest for which such decision was reached. Regarding lease contracts prior to its enactment, it stipulates that these are valid, under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration, or if their extension is agreed, they must be modified in accordance with the new current regulations, according to its first transitory, the above provided they have been submitted to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) within six months following the entry into force of the cited Law, otherwise they will be deemed extinguished according to the second transitory. Different is the situation of the occupants, since in our legislation the condition of occupant arises directed at those persons who were located in the maritime-terrestrial zone and who did not have a lease contract at the time Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, was enacted, without there being an act of the Administration in which such situation is recognized. To the so-called occupants of the (restricted) public zone, the law grants them special preferential treatment (but under equal conditions) to convert that occupation into a concession right, provided that the occupant of the land has possessed it in a public, quiet, peaceful, and continuous manner over the restricted area of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and without implying improvements. The legislator did not intend to consolidate such figure permanently, but rather a simple tolerance, as long as its conformity with the legal system is produced; in other words, the category of occupant is used temporarily while the granting of the concession is legally possible. This figure (occupant) has been the object of multiple interpretations, since it is not harmoniously adjusted with the cited Law, which has given rise to corrupt practices and illicit businesses. The legal nature of the occupant is of a precarious right and therefore their rights could never be confused with nor could they claim rights that only a property owner can have, since these, by their condition, do not require a concession. Nor can they be treated as lessees of the maritime-terrestrial zone, as they are an express subject of regulation according to Transitory I and II of the aforementioned rule, since in their case, it does not speak of a concession contract but of the extension of lease contracts prior to its enactment, which must be modified in accordance with the laws in force. Nor can or should they be confused with those persons who entered the demanial zone clandestinely, since subsequently to this Law, such action is prohibited according to its article 12. We must then conclude that the occupant is that person who was located in the restricted zone of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and who, at the time Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, came into force, did not have a lease contract in their favor. The legal norm under study also creates a figure very similar to the occupant called \"settler (poblador)\", who according to numeral 70, is a Costa Rican person by birth, with more than 10 years of continuous residence in the zone, with certification from the Electoral Registry, provided it is demonstrated to be their only property, a figure which for these purposes is not of importance and therefore an in-depth analysis is not performed. Continuing, the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone refers, although not expressly, to the occupant in its article 48 by indicating:\n\n\"The regulations of this Law shall establish the manner of processing the application, the modalities of concession, the canon to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and in a special manner, with the different situations of the settlers or inhabitants of the zone, and those who are not, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary, to regulate the relations between the Municipalities and the concessionaires.\"\n\nFrom the above, it can be extracted that both the occupants and the settlers constitute the exceptional regime of Law 6043. The regulation of the cited norm (Decree 7841-P), provided in its numeral 45, third paragraph, who could hold the condition of occupants as follows: “those who, not being settlers, have constructed or built in the zone on illegally possessed lots (those who do not have a lease contract in their name, issued prior to Law 5602), but also suppresses the payment of improvements, however retakes the privilege granted by article 44 of its Law. Having said the above, it is understood that the condition of occupant cannot generate any right of property or possession, since the maritime-terrestrial zone being part of the public domain, it cannot be an object of possession nor be prescribed positively with the passage of time, as provided by article 7 of Law 6043. This characteristic of imprescriptibility results in the legal impossibility of exercising possession over the inalienable strip of land, so this norm, when it grants pre-eminence to grant a concession, expressly refers to the occupant of the land who had possessed it in a quiet, public, peaceful, and continuous manner. Requirements that, for the case at hand, are easy to verify. So it can be affirmed that the occupation of the succession of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 has not been continuous, because that condition was transferred to Mr. Nombre70707, who in turn exercised acts over it, as demonstrated by one of the payments made to the Municipality of Carrillo dated January 12, 1998, as taxpayer 01813, where he pays for the concept of occupation maritime zone lot, the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones with sixty cents (see money receipt number 49682 on folio 9 of the administrative file); and even less peaceful, this is demonstrated by the great litigious activity of which it has been the object, in the different judicial processes, including the one at hand, in addition to the amparo appeals and administrative claims that revolve around it. Given these circumstances, the condition of occupant is not applicable to the succession of Nombre40338 and Nombre70706. Now, as indicated earlier, the legislator, upon creating the figure of the occupant, does not intend to consolidate their precarious situation permanently; on the contrary, it is given as an alternative solution of mere tolerance while the respective planning is produced by the Municipal entity, through the legal instrument called the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) of the zone, in accordance with Transitory VII of the Law under discussion, which provides: “The municipalities with jurisdiction over the maritime-terrestrial zone shall collect a canon established by Law for the occupants thereof. The collection shall be made according to the use and with the current appraisal of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation. This authorization shall have a provisional character until the development plan for the respective zone comes into force and does not produce any right for the occupants regarding concession.” The purpose of the norm is to extinguish the precarious occupation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, obtained outside the Law (without having lease contracts, as is the case at hand where nothing more than a right of occupation has been demonstrated), so that these portions of land fulfill their demanial destiny, and so that in those cases where one wishes to obtain a benefit from it, it is done in accordance with the Law, that is, by the only legally possible means (concession contract). For its part, article 75 of the oft-mentioned Law also establishes that occupants do not even have the right to improvements, if the use of the parcel is not in accordance with the local regulatory plan, which leads to saying that any edification that may have been carried out without this protection of legality is classified as contrary to it, inasmuch as only those derived from a lease contract prior to the suspension of Law 4558 (Law of Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970) or its extension can be lawfully permitted, since with the entry into force of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, their illegality is decreed, if the local regulatory plan has not been issued or, failing that, if they are not carried out under the protection of a concession contract for the public zone. For greater emphasis, any act carried out before the validity of the cited norm on lands of the maritime-terrestrial zone not subject to a lease contract are void, according to numeral 71, when indicating: that absolutely null are all acts, contracts, agreements, and dispositions carried out or taken as from the enactment of Law 5602 and which were contrary to its provisions (of November 4, 1974). It goes without saying then that any action carried out after this date on the referred maritime-terrestrial zone is completely void, including the granting of licenses. Since it has been clearly established that the means to grant them is public auction and that it is the responsibility of the Municipal entity to set the number of liquor establishments that may be authorized within its circumscription. While the granting of commercial licenses and for the retail sale of liquors with the issuing of licenses is the attribution of the Municipality, this does not proceed when the application is for an activity to be developed within the Public Zone, for common use, in which, as a rule, it is prohibited for private individuals to exercise any right or occupation. Article 63 in relation to Article 20 of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, sanctions the official who grants concessions or occupation permits contrary to its provisions or related Laws, a situation that at the same time falls within the assumptions for denial of licenses provided by the Municipal Code, for being an activity not permitted by Law, given the physical location, public ownership, and destination of the asset. (On the responsibility of local governments in the undue use of licenses, see Constitutional Judgment number 6469-97). This being so, the plaintiff cannot allege, as they do, an acquired subjective right over a right of precarious occupation, and over a license obtained under the indicated circumstances; the only subjective right that an occupant has would be that of priority over a concession application, provided the requirements are met and the use is compatible with that predetermined by the Regulatory Plan of the sector. A privilege granted by Law that has caused a harmful effect, since since then there has been an indiscriminate sale of occupation rights, without it being clear to the acquirers that these occupation rights are not subject to any transfer. As stated, the goal of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, is to give special treatment to those who meet the condition of occupants or settlers, in order to extinguish these figures, not to perpetuate them over time; it is therefore not possible for third parties outside the particularity of occupant to be able to continue with that condition into the future. It is not possible to apply the own conditions of the occupant to third parties, since the interest that caused its birth ceased to exist from the moment the transmission of the occupation occurred. Occupation permits are granted intuitu personae, as said, by reason of personal qualities and conditions, there being no express norm that authorizes their transfer to heirs. The condition of occupant cannot be transmissible in any way to third parties, for the reasons stated, but also due to the illegality that occurred at its birth (nonexistence of a lease contract), besides the fact that Law 6043 does not prescribe that commerce may occur over the condition of occupant, as it does over the rights of a concession contract. The foregoing exercise inevitably leads to saying that the condition of occupant cannot be transmissible; the plaintiff succession cannot claim rights over an occupation and license it has never had, since the condition of occupant was held at the time by the now deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, and since this is not transmissible even to heirs, it ceases to exist with the decease of the occupants; this being so, any legal act aimed at transmitting it is completely null, since the supposed third-party acquirers cannot substitute that special condition of occupant. Besides this, there is no proof whatsoever that a concession exists or has existed in the name of the plaintiff succession or of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, making it impossible for the defendant Municipality to lawfully create a subjective right (concession contract), even under the protection of a judicial ruling, deriving from a non-transmissible occupation right, in favor of persons who, as demonstrated, do not meet the condition of occupants. The plaintiff cannot claim succession rights over a nonexistent concession, since no one can transmit through inter-vivos acts, and even less mortis causa, what they do not have. In the sub-lite, it is more than demonstrated that Messrs. Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 never had a concession contract in their favor over the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone; what they held in life was an occupation right, and since this is not susceptible to transmission, this Tribunal cannot grant a right that is not possessed, contrary to all existing regulations concerning the subject of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone. For greater emphasis on what has been resolved, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, number 317-F-2008, of nine hours ten minutes of May second, two thousand eight, must be cited, which in what is of interest states:\n\n\"..... Continuing with the analysis of the alluded legal article, in case there is no occupant, the merit postulate is applicable. In accordance with the foregoing, cardinal importance is gained by determining who should be considered an “occupant” of the land located in the restricted zone. Should such concept be equated to that of possessor? This Chamber, after analyzing the norm under study, jointly and harmonically with the rest of the articles of the aforementioned Law, and the provisions of its Regulations, concludes that the answer must be negative. In accordance with the first article of the Law under study, the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Only through concessions, it is reiterated, may private individuals exploit the restricted zone (article 39). In this sense, according to numeral 12, the unauthorized tenancy of lands located there is prohibited: “In the maritime-terrestrial zone it is prohibited, without due legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, tracks or in any other way, to erect buildings or installations, to cut trees, extract products or carry out any other type of development, activity or occupation.” Ordinal 13 sanctions illegitimate possession or tenancy as follows: “ The authorities of the corresponding jurisdiction and the respective municipalities, as soon as they have notice of the infractions referred to in the two previous articles, shall proceed, following information gathered for this purpose, if deemed necessary, to the eviction of the offenders and to the destruction or demolition of the constructions, remodelings or installations carried out by them, without any responsibility for the authority or the municipality. The cost of the demolition or destruction shall be charged to the owner of the construction or installation. All the foregoing without prejudice to the criminal sanctions that may proceed. ” However, under the protection of its ordinal 6, private property, legitimately acquired, in the maritime-terrestrial zone is recognized: “ The provisions of this law shall not apply to the areas of cities situated on the coastlines, nor to properties registered, in accordance with the law, in the name of private individuals, nor to those whose legitimacy is recognized by the laws. ”; nevertheless, as provided by canon 8, those lands are declared of public utility for expropriation purposes: “ The maritime-terrestrial zone is declared of public utility so that the lots, parcels or improvements located in it, that may have been sold, acquired or possessed in property by private individuals, may be rescued for the national patrimony through expropriation.”\n\n\" Likewise, the Law under comment, in its Transitory Provisions I and II, maintains the validity and effectiveness of lease contracts entered into under the previous legislation, provided certain requirements are met: \" Transitorio I.- The concessions or lease contracts granted based on prior laws, except for the exceptions established herein, shall pass to the control of the respective municipalities and shall continue under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration and if their extension is agreed, they shall be modified in accordance with the norms of this law. The foregoing refers to the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre). Transitorio II.- The municipalities and the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización) must send to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo) within the first six months of the effectiveness of this law, copies of the contracts or concessions they have granted in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), without prejudice to the interested parties also submitting, within that period, their contracts to this Institute, all for the purposes of their registration therein. Once that term has expired without said contracts having been submitted, they shall be null and void and shall be deemed extinguished./ If contracts have not been issued, any existing supporting documents must be submitted./ In all cases, proof of being up to date in the payment of the respective fees (cánones) must be attached. The absence of such proof shall be verification that the fees have not been paid./ For the purposes of this transitory provision, the originals of the documents or photostatic copies thereof, signed by the interested party or by the representative of the corresponding entity, may be submitted. \" The figure of the occupier (ocupante), indicated in Article 44 under comment, consequently, does not allude to owners, since they do not need a concession to usufruct their lands; nor to the lessees of properties located in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), whose contract was granted in accordance with the previous regulations, since, as just analyzed, there are specific provisions that regulate them, on the understanding that these involve extensions of the agreements; even less does it refer to persons introduced into said zone in an illicit manner, as this is expressly prohibited by Article 12, as noted. The valid interpretation is to consider \"occupier (ocupante)\" as all those persons who, settled in the restricted zone (zona restringida), did not have a concession at the time of the enactment of Law 6043. It is, consequently, a special or exceptional regime, which is not the only one in that regulation. In this regard, as noted, in the transcribed Article 6, the areas of cities located on the coastlines were excluded; furthermore, in Article 70, the figure of the settler (poblador) was created, who is provided the possibility of remaining on the properties occupied by them, until the planning of the zone occurs, at which time they may be relocated and compensated for their improvements (mejoras). Said article provides: \" Settlers of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry (Registro Electoral) regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must submit to the planning of the zone, for which purpose they may be relocated and compensated for their improvements (mejoras) in accordance with this law. In all cases, the public zone (zona pública) must be respected. \" The indicated conclusion, that with the term \"occupier (ocupante)\" the Law refers to a special regime, is confirmed by the provision in Article 48: \" Concessions shall be granted for a term of no less than five nor more than twenty years and must indicate the fee (canon) to be paid and its method of payment. That fee substitutes the territorial tax./ The regulations (reglamento) of this law shall establish the procedure for processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the fee (canon) to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and, in a special manner, with the different situation of the settlers or inhabitants (pobladores o habitantes) and those who are not such , as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate the relations between the municipalities and the concessionaires. \"(The underlining is not from the original); by stating said provision: \"... and those who are not such ...\" it alludes to the occupiers (ocupantes). Article 75 of the Regulations (Reglamento) is more explicit, when developing the previous legal provision: \" The settlers (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry (Registro Electoral) regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated in accordance with the planning of the zone, upon prior compensation for the improvements (mejoras). In all cases, the public zone (zona pública) must be respected. / When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession over the property, provided no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the regulations shall apply, and the provisions of Article 74 of the regulations if the improvements are located in the restricted zone (zona restringida). / Those who, not being settlers, have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties, shall not have the right to payment for improvements. / However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if it is granted to them, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. The concession applications made by the occupiers (ocupantes) of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over all others. \" When this provision, in its third paragraph, refers to \" illegally possessed properties \", as noted, it must be understood that the person is in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) without a lease contract or concession that legitimizes them, that is, as an occupier (ocupante). It is important to note that this norm reiterates the provision in Article 44 of the Law, in the sense that \"... The concession applications made by the occupiers (ocupantes) of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over all others .\", which supports the thesis sustained. Likewise, Transitory Provision VII of the Law is clear when establishing the provisional, or precarious, nature of the occupation, which can be equated to mere tolerance under common law: \" Transitorio VII.- The municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) shall collect the fee (canon) established by this law for the occupiers (ocupantes) thereof./ The collection shall be made according to the use and the current appraisal of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de la Tributación Directa). This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan for the respective zone enters into force and does not produce any right for the occupiers with respect to a concession. \"(The underlining is not from the original). In light of what is stated in this transitory norm, it is Nombre70705 that the State allows the permanence of those persons –occupiers (ocupantes)– in the coastal zone until the granting of concessions is possible, that is, when the regulatory plan (plan regulador) for the zone is issued (Articles 70, Transitory Provision VII of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre); and 57 of its Regulations (Reglamento)). Their condition is so precarious that, in accordance with Article 75 of the Regulations, they do not have the right to payment for improvements, although they do have the right of priority for their concession applications, provided the projected use of the land is compatible with that foreseen in the planning of the sector. On the other hand, as the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) constitutes part of the national heritage belonging to the State, inalienable and imprescriptible, which is set forth in Article 7 of the law, by indicating that the lands located in the maritime-terrestrial zone \" ... cannot be the object of possessory claims (informaciones posesorias) and private individuals may not appropriate them nor legalize them in their name, by this or any other means. \"; this implies the legal impossibility of deriving possessory rights over said zone. Consequently, the terminology used by Article 44 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) is adequate, that is, it refers to the mere occupier (ocupante) and not to the possessor. Furthermore, said condition of occupier cannot be transmitted to third parties, as it involves special conditions that only those persons –the occupiers– possess; consequently, any legal act intended to transfer it becomes absolutely null. To accept the contrary would imply violating the provisions of the previously indicated articles of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) and its regulations.\n\nXXII.- In the case file, in accordance with the provisions in the proven facts preceded by numbers 9, 10, and 12, Messrs. Nombre34289 and Nombre70713 submitted their concession application for the land in dispute to the Municipality of Nicoya on July 12; for its part, the plaintiff company did so on September 28, and Mr. Nombre70713 on October 23, all dates in 1989. On the other hand, although it was not proven, the second-instance judges, in the tenth whereas clause (Considerando X) of the appealed judgment (folio 1029), state that both parties propose the same type of use for the land in dispute, which consists of agricultural activity; furthermore, that the zone where the land in dispute is located is non-touristic (which was accepted by the plaintiff company at folios 17 verso, 176, and 185, and by the defendants in their response to the lawsuit at folio 232). In light of what was stated in the previous whereas clause, when two concession applications have been submitted for the same land located in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) and with the same use or purpose, framed within the priorities established by the Regulations to the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Reglamento a la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) (Article 57, subsection b) section 1), it must be analyzed whether any of the applicants can be considered an occupier (ocupante). In this sense, it is Nombre70705 that the plaintiff company does not meet the necessary conditions, since, as is clear from what is stated in its lawsuit –facts identified as second, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth– what it alleges is having acquired from the defendants Nombre34289 and Nombre70713 the right of possession over the land in dispute on February 21, 1989, a legal transaction which, as noted in the previous section, is absolutely null; furthermore, according to what is accredited in the proven fact preceded by number 7, its entry onto the land in dispute occurred, approximately, in the month of March 1989. For their part, said defendants also do not meet such characteristic; this is because, it is reiterated, based on the indicated proven facts, and as analyzed in preceding whereas clauses, at the time of submitting their concession application they were no longer occupying the land; ergo, they do not meet the condition of continuous \"possession\", as provided in Article 44 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre).\n\nGiven that the right of occupation held by Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 , at the time, was non-transferable to third parties, their succession cannot come to claim a subjective right that it does not have, and even less so that such a situation binds the Municipality of Carrillo to the issuance of acts contrary to the legal order, which is why the denial made by the territorial entity, regarding the transfer of a concession right over the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), as well as the license for national and foreign liquors number Placa11511, is in accordance with the legal order, and there is no defect whatsoever in its motive, content, and purpose. The claim of the plaintiff succession is not receivable by this Tribunal, as accepting the contrary implies ordering actions contrary to the Law and the regulations governing the matter submitted to this judicial authority's scrutiny.\n\nIX.- CONCLUSIONS: With legal certainty, it is established that what Messrs. Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 held in life was the condition of occupiers (ocupantes) within the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), a right that is not susceptible to transmission to third parties; consequently, any legal act intended to transfer it becomes absolutely null, and as it is a precarious right, it does not confer subjective rights; ergo, the plaintiff succession lacks standing (derecho) for its claims; accepting the contrary would imply violating the body of legality (bloque de legalidad) that covers administrative conduct, which is why the appeal formulated in this regard must be upheld.\n\nX.- ON COSTS: This Tribunal considers that we are in the presence of the assumptions of Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), which is why the ruling is issued without a special order as to costs.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nIn the matter under appeal, the appealed ruling is REVOKED, only insofar as it rejected the defense of lack of standing (falta de derecho), declared the lawsuit admissible, and ordered the Municipality of Carrillo to pay both costs; and in its place, the lack of standing is upheld and it is decreed that the action is IMPROPER (IMPROCEDENCIA) in all its aspects. The matter is resolved without a special order as to costs. In all other respects, it is affirmed. NOTIFY.-\n\nCristina Víquez Cerdas\n\nNombre66641 Sady Jiménez Quesada\n\nThird: That the obligation of the Municipality to transfer to the accumulated probate estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 the lease contract in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license Placa11511, arises as a necessary and mandatory act to give enforceability to the referenced final first-instance judgment; and Fourth: That the payment of personal and procedural costs in this matter is the responsibility of the defendant.\n\n4.- That, disagreeing with the ruling, the defendant party appealed, an appeal that was admitted and by virtue of which this decision is issued.-\n\n5.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of the Law have been observed, this decision is issued within the legal term and after deliberation, and:\n\nDrafted by Judge Jiménez Quesada; and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- ON THE PROVEN FACTS: The list of proven facts contained in the judgment under review is replaced by the following: 1- That the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, by judgment at 8:00 a.m. on March 16, 1998, ordered: POR TANTO: By virtue of the foregoing, articles 28, 39, 41, 45 of the Constitution, 10, 11, 20, 21 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, 328, 330, 627, 837 et seq., 1007, 1008, 1022, 1023, 1034 of the Civil Code, 1, 102, 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, article 536 of the Commercial Code, the following is declared: A) ORDINARY LAWSUIT OF THE ACCUMULATED ESTATES OF Nombre70706 AND Nombre70705 represented by Nombre65838 against Nombre70707, Nombre70710 and Nombre70709 . . represented by the former: The defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations raised by the defendants are rejected, and the ORDINARY LAWSUIT IS GRANTED as follows: FIRST) The contract executed by public deed granted in Playas del Coco before notary Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro at seven o'clock on November twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-five between Nombre70705, Nombre70706 on one part and on the other Nombre70707 is not a sale with repurchase agreement but rather a loan of money for the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones. SECOND) In the previous deed, in which the lease right in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco and municipal liquor license number c-forty-six is sold with a repurchase agreement for the indicated sum, it constitutes a performance guarantee for the loan contract executed between the parties. THIRD) Because it is a simulated transactional act, lacking intent, the sale contract with repurchase agreement between the parties is vitiated by absolute nullity. FOURTH) The co-defendants Nombre70707, Nombre70710 personally and as representatives of Nombre70709 . . are obligated to return to the plaintiff probate estate, through the granting of a public deed, the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco, located at Dirección7904, , bounded north by public street, south by municipal land, Bar Bohio, and west by Bar Papagayo where the establishment Bar y Marisquería Cocos is currently located, as well as the municipal license for national and foreign liquors and restaurant number c-forty-six, initially granted in the name of Nombre70706, within a term of ONE MONTH from the finality of this judgment, under warning that in case of omission, it shall be done through enforcement order or writ by this court. FIFTH) The defendants are jointly obligated to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff Probate Estate, consisting of the non-use and deprivation of the enjoyment of the mentioned concession and municipal liquor license, as well as the lost profits from administering the business with ordinary diligence from the date of the act declared null and void to its effective payment, to be determined in the enforcement of judgment phase. SIXTH) The defendant company Nombre70709 . . is obligated to deliver to the plaintiff probate estate the lot it occupies as lessee, identified in fact two of the complaint, and in case of opposition, this judicial court shall enforce it. SEVENTH) Personal and procedural costs are the responsibility of the defendants. What has not been expressly granted is denied. B) COUNTERCLAIM OF Nombre70707, Nombre70710 AND Nombre70709 . . represented by Nombre70707 and Nombre70710 against THE ACCUMULATED PROBATE ESTATES OF Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706 represented by Nombre65838 . The defense of lack of capacity standing to sue and be sued is rejected, and the defense of lack of right is partially granted only regarding the SUBSIDIARY petition of the counterclaim. The counterclaim is declared partially granted in the following manner: All principal claims of the counterclaim are rejected, and the SUBSIDIARY claims are PARTIALLY granted as follows: FIRST) The plaintiff probate estate is obligated to return to Nombre70709 , current owner of the business Bar y Marisquería Cocos, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until its effective payment. SECOND) The plaintiff probate estate is obligated to pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in dispute by the defendants as of the date of notification of this lawsuit, to be determined in the enforcement of judgment phase. THIRD) The plaintiff probate estate must recognize in favor of the owners of the establishment Bar y Marisquería Nombre70709 the value of image, clientele, quality, and name as of the date of notification of this lawsuit, assessable by expert appraisal in the enforcement of judgment phase. FOURTH) The counterclaim is decided without special condemnation regarding costs. What has not expressly been granted in the counterclaim is denied. (see certified photocopies from folios 8 to 44, statement of claim, folios 307 to 314, and its answer, folios 363 to 376); 2- That the Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda of San José, by judgment No. 192 at 2:20 p.m. on June 19, 1998, upon hearing the appeal of the judgment mentioned in the preceding fact, confirmed the ruling; and the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment No. 491-F-00 at 3:25 p.m. on June 28, 2000, declared the cassation appeal without merit, with its costs payable by the losing party (see statement of claim, its answer, and certified photocopies from folios 45 to 96); 3- That in ordinary session No. 126, of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Municipal Council ordered the transfer to Messrs. Nombre70707 and Nombre70711, a right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) within the public zone of Playas del Coco, in the name of Nombre70706 or Nombre70706, related to the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is in operation. (see certification of June 24, 2003, folio 360 of the main file and statement of witness Nombre70712, on folios 473 and 474, both front); 4- That the establishment located in the public zone referred to in this matter, called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" intended for the sale of liquor and food, holds a liquor license in the name of Nombre70705, from before January 16, 1978 (same evidence); 5- That the Municipal Council of Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 125, held on March 06, 1986, agreement No. 5, approved a request for transfer of liquor and restaurant license, from Nombre70705 in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70710, referring to the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folios 1 to 4 and 50 of the administrative file); 6- that by document dated June 13, 2001, Nombre65838, requested the defendant that as ordered by the Juzgado Mixto of Santa Cruz, by order at eight o'clock on February two, two thousand one, that the Municipal Council of Carrillo must transfer to his name the concession and liquor license, concerning the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folio 441 of the main file and 660 second instance brief); 7- That in ordinary session No. 12-2001, held on March 20, agreement No. 4, subsection 1, the Municipal Council of Carrillo ordered that the request submitted by the plaintiff party to transfer the concession and liquor license to its name be sent to Legal Counsel (see folio 446); 8- That by resolution at three ten p.m. on March twenty-six, two thousand one, the Juzgado Mixto of Santa Cruz revoked the order indicated in fact 6, stating then that Mr. Nombre70707, pursuant to the judgment being enforced, must appear within eight days before a Notary Public in order to verify the required transfers (see folio 669 of the second instance brief); 9.- that on June 13, 2001, the plaintiff again submitted to the Secretaría General of the Municipality of Carrillo, a request for compliance with what was ordered in judgment by the Court of Santa Cruz (see folios 436 to 442): 10.- that the Municipal Council of Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 36-01, held on September 11, 2001, agreement No. 5, subsection 5, ordered the denial of the plaintiff's request (see folios 229 to 232); 11.- That on January 12, 1998, taxpayer 01813 (Nombre70707), paid to the Municipality of Carrillo for the concept of occupation of maritime zone lot (ocupación lote zona marítima), the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones and sixty céntimos (see money receipt number 49682 from folio 9 of the administrative brief); 12.- That the Municipality of Carrillo was not a party (defendant) in the ordinary proceeding No. 93-100184-388-CI, processed in the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (see folio 545 of the second instance brief).\n\nII.- UNPROVEN FACTS: The following are considered as such for the resolution of this litigation: a) that in the Maritime Terrestrial Zone Department of the Municipality of Carrillo, there exists a record of a concession or lease contract (contrato concesión o arrendamiento) within the public zone of Playas del Coco, Sardinal district, Cantón Carrillo, province of Guanacaste, in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 (no evidence was provided); b) That the license for national and foreign liquors No. C-46 is in the name of the deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 or their probate estate (the court records).\n\nIII.- PROCEDURAL MATTERS: This Tribunal, before conducting the final analysis of this matter, must indicate that this proceeding, contrary to what was interpreted by the First Instance Judge, is not an enforcement proceeding for a judgment, even though the basis for the plaintiff's claim is a judicial ruling; rather, we are faced with an ordinary lawsuit where what is being required by the plaintiff party is the transfer of an alleged right of \"concession or lease (concesión o arrendamiento)\" of a lot located on the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license number (c-46) that is operated in the Bar and Restaurant los Nombre70709 located on the lot. Therefore, the litigation concerns the denial issued by the defendant Municipality entity, in response to the request of the plaintiff probate estate, derived from the right granted by Judicial Judgment, within the Civil proceeding processed before the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, in which the Municipality of Carrillo was never included as a defendant or interested party. This will then be the object of this proceeding.\n\nIV.- ON THE GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT: The dissatisfied party considers that the appealed judgment contains defects such as: a) erroneous assessment and valuation of evidence, b) lack of correlation between the complaint and the appealed judgment, since it orders the return of a concession to the holders Nombre70706 and Nombre70705; c) insufficient or deficient substantiation of the ruling, since the claims are typical of an enforcement proceeding and not an ordinary one. That there is no concession or lease in the name of the plaintiff, and therefore a right that does not exist cannot be transferred; the Judge's ruling contravenes the substantive law governing the matter; d) that the Judge in the judgment confuses the terms concession with lease, which are completely different legal concepts, so the Judge creates a new right in favor of the probate estate outside the margins of the Law.-\n\nV.- ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM: It is noted that the plaintiff seeks in this proceeding that the \"Municipality of Carrillo is obligated to transfer, by writ from the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, to the accumulated probate estates of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the national and foreign liquor license number C-46\". The plaintiff bases its right and demand against the territorial entity on a First Instance Judicial Judgment issued by the Juzgado Mixto of Santa Cruz, confirmed by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, which annuls a contract executed between Messrs. Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 and the interested party here, Nombre70707. The plaintiff requests that the defendant Municipality, as ordered by the cited judicial body through a resolution at eight o'clock on February two, two thousand one, (folio 660 Second instance brief) transfer to the name of the probate estate the concession and liquor license in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\". In this way, the plaintiff seeks to mislead not only the territorial entity but also this judicial authority, by indicating that its right derives from the firm judgment issued in the first instance in the Civil court, the basis of this claim, which at the time of being enforced, that same judicial authority is the one that orders the Municipality to comply, and consequently order the transfer of a right of concession in its name. But the plaintiff probate estate, as well as its legal counsel, omits from this Court crucial data, such as that within the civil enforcement proceeding number 93-100184-388-CI, the defendant Municipality entity was never a party, lacking a causal link that obligates it to comply with what is stated in that jurisdictional ruling, as the ordered conduct must be fulfilled by private parties and not by the territorial administration.\n\nThe plaintiffs base their claim on the order issued by the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, by decree of eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one, (folio 660 of the second instance file), which orders the Municipal Council of Carrillo to transfer to their name the concession and liquor license, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called *\"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\"* (see folio 441 of the main case file), a right that cannot effectively be granted by the Municipal entity, much less by this collegiate body, since even though it is an irrefutable truth that the aforementioned decree orders the Municipality to perform an action, it is also true that, as evidenced in the case file, subsequent to the issuance of said order and following the appeals filed by the defendant within the execution process (Mr. Nombre70707), that jurisdictional authority corrects the error made, revoking said resolution by decree of \"*fifteen hours ten minutes of March twenty-sixth, year two thousand one*\", indicating that it is Mr. Nombre70707, in accordance with the judgment being executed, who must appear within a term of eight days before a Notary Public to verify the transfers required in the judicial sentence, thereby rendering without effect or legal substance what was initially ordered to the Municipality of Carrillo, namely: the transfer of the concession right, since for this procedure to occur as indicated by the underlying judicial pronouncement of this process, the counterparty, that is, the estate of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, had to pay what was agreed (*to return to Nombre70709, current owner of the business Bar y Marisquería Cocos, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this sentence until its effective payment, pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in dispute by the defendants as of the date of notification of this lawsuit*), situations or verifications that are not pertinent to this litigation, but rather to the Execution process being processed before the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, it not being possible for this Tribunal to issue a criterion regarding its compliance. It is thus held that the judicial order, based on which the plaintiff requests the Municipality to carry out the transfer, as was duly demonstrated in the case file (folio 669 of the second instance file), was revoked, and therefore the defendant Municipality is not under a legal obligation to carry out a transfer that has not been ordered by a judicial body. Consequently, this petition becomes inadmissible, since the plaintiff attempts to mislead the Municipal entity by affirming that, by firm resolution or judicial order, it was obligated to carry out the transfer of an alleged concession, when in truth said order was revoked by the same jurisdictional body, a situation that was at no time communicated to the local government (at least there is no record of it), with the sole purpose of having the transfer carried out illegally. This collegiate body cannot cloak with the veil of legality the action taken by the plaintiff and rule contrary to what was ordered by another jurisdictional body, much less order an action against the law, as will be stated below:\n\n**VI.- OF THE INTENDED TRANSFER:** The plaintiffs request that \"the Municipality of Carrillo must annul, in its administrative file, the transfer made of the maritime terrestrial zone and the license Placa11511. That the Municipality is obligated to carry out the referred transfer since the concession in the maritime terrestrial zone was granted before the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone came into effect, for which reason they have an acquired right which cannot be annulled or revoked by the Municipality of Carrillo. That the referred transfer is a necessary and obligatory act to give enforceability to the firm first instance judgment.\" The representation of the plaintiff estates refers to an alleged concession right over part of the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre); however, within this process, it has been demonstrated without any doubt, through documentary and testimonial evidence, that **what existed in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 was an occupation right (derecho de ocupación) within the Maritime Terrestrial Zone**, according to a certification from the Municipality of Carrillo, visible at folio 360 of the main case file (which has not been alleged to be false or inaccurate), a situation ratified by the testimonial statement of Nombre70712 (folio 473 and 474), where the plaintiff party has not demonstrated that they held a concession right. It is verified that in ordinary session No. 126, of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Municipal Council of Carrillo, as requested at the time by Mrs. Nombre70706, orders the transfer to the name of Messrs. Nombre70707 and Nombre70711 of ***an*** ***occupation right*** that she held at that time within the public zone of Playas del Coco, relating to the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is operating. Therefore, there does not exist, nor has there ever existed, a concession right in the name of the plaintiff estate. What Mrs. Nombre70706 had at that time was a mere **occupation in the public zone,** and not a concession right as the plaintiffs have claimed this Tribunal should understand, a right that, as indicated, was registered in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70711, following the contractual business conducted between them. In due course, and due to situations beyond this process, the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, by judgment, annulled the contract, with the ***occupation*** right having to return to the original owner, prior to the fulfillment of inherent obligations by the plaintiff estate. This being so, the only thing that can be discussed before the Municipality of Carrillo is precisely, at the risk of redundancy, the right that the plaintiff estate may have over that **occupation right that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 once held**, but never **any right** over a **concession or lease contract**, since, as is insisted, it has been amply demonstrated in the case file that the deceased did not have a concession or lease contract within the public zone in their name. Effectively, as indicated by the appellant, the trial court Judge confuses the occupation right with a concession, an unviable situation that this authority proceeds to amend, since the concession is indeed the legal way to make use of the public zone, while the occupation is merely a precarious right (derecho en precario) granted by mere tolerance of the territorial administration, with the purpose of safeguarding the non-subjective rights that an occupant may claim within the maritime terrestrial zone, and given the great variety of legal instruments that have been promulgated regarding the occupation and planning of the maritime terrestrial zone. A situation that will be analyzed in the following considering, having as a premise that the only thing that can be discussed at this stage is the **occupation right** that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 had at that time, as well as the benefits that may derive from it.\n\n**VII.- REGARDING THE MARITIME TERRESTRIAL ZONE:** The domain regime of the maritime terrestrial zone, although it began to develop from the colonial era with the Royal Decree of October 15, 1754, in Costa Rica as an independent country, began in the century before last, with the promulgation of Decree Law No. 162 of June 28, 1828, whose affectation to the State's patrimony arose only as a means of promoting and protecting the country's fishing, marine, and salt activities. In that same sense, the General Regulations of the Public Treasury of 1839, 1858, and 1868 were promulgated, distinguishing among the three, Law No. 7 of August 31, 1868, which reaffirmed the inalienable nature of the lands of the maritime mile. Although it was with the General Code of 1841 that the dominiality of the strip of the maritime terrestrial zone was referred to, no regulation had been established tending to expressly stipulate its demaniality, which was achieved with the Water Law of 1884, specifically by its Article 20. This domain affectation was to be confirmed and developed by subsequent regulations, culminating in Law No. 6043, of March 2, 1977, which is the norm currently in force, and which in its first article declares the maritime terrestrial zone to be subject to the public domain. However, this historical allusion of the study strip to the public domain is also endorsed by pronouncements from the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and national jurisprudence, in various resolutions from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as well as Chamber I (Sala I) and the Superior Contentious Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo) in the following sense, and which for these purposes are transcribed as follows:\n\n“Thus it is that, since the first decades of the last century, and under the denomination of maritime mile, there exists in Costa Rica a protection of this strip of land, even being given the character of public domain...” (Opinion C-100-95 issued by the PGR on May 10, 1995).\n\n\"The Chamber accepts the thesis that in effect, the maritime terrestrial zone is a public domain asset, in the terms of Article 261 of the Civil Code which provides: 'Those things which, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can take advantage by being open to public use, are public things.' The demanial character of the maritime terrestrial zone (or marine shore as it was formerly called) has been recognized since time immemorial, and Roman Law itself collects that status, as 'res communes' and 'extra comercium'. In our environment, with complete clarity since the last century, the public character of that strip has been recognized, as an extension of the State's property in the marine zone adjacent to the national territory, over which it exercises its sovereignty. It must be kept in mind that the Political Constitution, in its Article 121 subsection 14), although using the sociological term 'nation' which came from the Constitution of 1871, grants the Legislative Assembly the power to 'affect' State assets to public use, so that it clearly covers the situation under examination, since under its protection the challenged legislation was enacted, not only the latest (No. 6043), but all the laws that in the past regulated this matter.” (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 447-91 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of February twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one).\n\n“IV.- The maritime terrestrial zone is and has always been, it is repeated, of the public domain. Its current legal regime is that established by Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, its amendments, and its regulation...” (Chamber I of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 007-93 of fifteen hours five minutes of January 20, 1993).\n\n\"**VI.-** Correlatively to what has been said, the maritime terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions –including of course the corresponding Municipalities– and even of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone.\" (Superior Contentious Administrative Tribunal, Section Three in judgment No. 128-2001, at 08:00 hours on February 16, 2001).\n\nRegarding the normative development of the territorial extension of the maritime terrestrial zone, it is highlighted that since Decree Law No. 162 of June 28, 1828, it has been stipulated that the protection strip or that affected to the public domain would have a length of one mile from the coast. However, it is from the reform to the Fiscal Code by means of Law No. 11 of October 22, 1926, that the extent is first specified as one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters from the ordinary high tide along the coasts of both seas and five hundred meters along both margins of rivers. This measure was maintained until 1942, when by means of Law No. 19 of November 11, the protected area was de-affected to two hundred meters from the ordinary high tide for the Atlantic coast; and for reasons of normative parity, the same was done in the Pacific, through Law No. 201 of August 26, 1943, in its first article, which meant the de-affectation of one thousand four hundred seventy-two meters from the domain regime, making them susceptible at that moment to being appropriable by private individuals. This modification was ratified in the Lands and Colonization Law of October 14, 1961, and in the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) of November 25, 1969. With the promulgation of the Tourist Urbanization Law of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970, domain protection over this strip was further weakened by promoting the appropriation of lands within the one hundred fifty meters of the strip currently known as the restricted zone (zona restringida), leaving only the fifty meters counted from the ordinary high tide as inalienable. It is precisely with Law 6043 that the measure of two hundred meters of protection is retaken and consolidated, through what is stipulated in its Article 9, which also includes under the maritime terrestrial zone regime the islands, islets, and maritime rocks, as well as any land or natural formation that protrudes above the ocean level within the country's territorial sea. As can be noted, various regulations have been enacted regarding this domain zone; however, this affectation has not always been oriented in the same way or with the same purposes. Thus we see that in the colonial era, the dominiality of the maritime terrestrial zone was born fundamentally out of an interest to protect the territory and protect those who, as a habitual occupation, were dedicated to extracting marine products. We must remember that at that time, pirate invasions in American territory were frequent, ours being significantly affected on several occasions. Therefore, with the dissemination of the Royal Decree of October 15, 1754, and the Law of January 4, 1813, the aim was to affect the study strip to the public domain to protect the territory more efficiently—which at that moment formed part of the Spanish Crown—and promote marine extraction activities. In Costa Rica as a Republic, the first norms that dealt with the topic gave preponderance to agricultural use, according to Law 162 of June 28, 1828. Subsequently, Articles 6 and 62 of the Law on Public Lands of 1939 showed that the entirety of the public strip, except for the two hundred meters contiguous to the ordinary high tide, was dedicated to agricultural use. Article 7 of the Lands and Colonization Law of 1961 also considers the maritime terrestrial zone as part of the State's agricultural property. It was not until the late sixties that greater interest in the urban and tourist development of this domain strip began to emerge, which was manifested by the proliferation of contracts for these uses, granted at that time by the Institute of Lands and Colonization (currently known as the Institute of Agrarian Development, INDER). But it was only with the promulgation of the Tourist Urbanization Law of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone of 1970, in its first article, that this urban-tourist use was successfully given to the strip under study. Without a doubt, with Law 4558, the aim was to shift the marked agricultural use that the maritime terrestrial zone had and give it a tourist sense. This Law had significant negative consequences in its application, resulting in the particular appropriation of the maritime terrestrial zone in an indiscriminate and abusive manner in its titling. This caused great unease on the part of the Legislative Assembly given the possibility of losing State domain over this domain asset, which led to the suspension of Law 4558, the repeal of its Transitory III, and its definitive abolition through Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, which is the legislation in force. This law, together with its Regulation, generally points more towards a planned and environmentally sustainable tourist development, exploiting the natural beauties of our coasts by attracting investment in both recreational and accommodation infrastructure and tourists. Thus, a large difference is observed with respect to the previous norm, since Law 4558, as could be noted, presented a use that, although tourist-oriented, was more directed at the population or urbanization of the zone, whereas the current regulation practically tries to make this possibility forgotten, or at least the way it occurred, rescuing only the possibility of classifying the zones according to their tourist or non-tourist disposition, generating the possibility of carrying out a development that is either tourist or predominantly agricultural, fishing, or industrial, according to the intrinsic characteristics of each place. **It is Nombre40338 the intention of the legislator that the maritime terrestrial zone is a public domain asset, therefore it is not susceptible to particular appropriation in any form, and its exploitation regime is circumscribed to what the current norm establishes.** In this regard, Articles 1, 7, 20, 23, and 53 of the cited Law can be mentioned. Another situation reflected in this norm is the sense of belonging it possesses, where a preference is evident for the management and exploitation of the maritime terrestrial zone to be executed on a priority basis by nationals, further distancing the possibility that foreigners, by reason of their economic conditions, might to some degree take possession of our beaches. Evidence of this are Articles 31, 47, 57, and 70 of the Law.\n\nThus, if current legislation has reflected anything in relation to its predecessors, it is that lessons have been learned from past mistakes and from the need to adapt the regulations to the current situation of each coastal region, whose needs vary from one place to another, without neglecting the global context in which we are immersed.\n\n**VIII.- ON THE RIGHT OF OCCUPATION IN THE MARITIME TERRESTRIAL ZONE:** The dominant doctrinal position establishes that use permits (precarious occupation) are unilateral administrative acts. Some authors, such as Nombre33033, go further, concluding that the same, as a legal act, is bilateral, since its issuance is the product of the express will of the applicant and the Administration; and as a legal transaction, it is unilateral, because the permit holder lacks rights against the State. Likewise, said permits possess a precarious nature, alluding to the possibility that the Administration may at any time unilaterally revoke said permit or occupation, for reasons of necessity or general interest (in this regard, see judgment of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 2306-91, of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991). Such precarity is based on the fact that the use or occupation permit only constitutes a tolerance by the Administration, so it can be revoked at any time. In accordance with Article 154 of the General Public Administration Law, this revocation shall not generate any indemnity payment against the Administration, when done for duly demonstrated reasons of opportunity and convenience. Furthermore, the revocatory act must not be untimely or arbitrary, and a reasonable period for compliance must be granted in all cases. It is accepted by the doctrine that use permits or occupations within the maritime terrestrial zone do not generate a substantive right (derecho subjetivo) in favor of their beneficiaries but rather a legitimate interest. It must be made clear that these permits are only authorizations to carry out simple acts whose effects do not significantly impact the used property; therefore, only minor works whose conditions allow for their easy and rapid removal should be permitted; constructions with the character of permanent adherence to the land are not allowed, because such installations would hinder the effective implementation of planned land-use management (ordenamiento planificado). The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), through official communication No. C-100-95, issued on May 10, 1995, concluded in this regard:\n\n*“Thus, for the maritime terrestrial zone of our country, only use permits meeting two essential characteristics could be admitted: a) that they do not affect the natural conditions of the zone nor hinder the free use of the public zone, and b) their execution does not limit in any way the future implementation of a regulatory plan.”*\n\nNow then, the administrative act by which the permit or occupation is granted must be reasoned, as must the resolution denying it; said reasoning must revolve around the public interest by which such a decision was reached. Regarding lease contracts (contratos de arrendamiento) prior to its enactment, it stipulates that these are valid, under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration, or if their extension is agreed upon, they must be modified in accordance with the new regulations in force, according to its first transitory provision, provided they have been submitted to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) within six months following the entry into force of the cited Law; otherwise, they shall be deemed extinguished according to the second transitory provision. The situation of occupants is different, since in our legislation the status of occupant arises directed at those persons who were located in the maritime terrestrial zone and who did not have a lease contract at the time the Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, was enacted, without there being an act of the Administration recognizing such a situation. The Law grants so-called occupants of the public (restricted) zone special preferential treatment (but under equal conditions) to convert that occupation into a concession right (derecho de concesión), provided that **the occupant of the land has possessed it in a public, quiet, peaceful, continuous manner over the restricted area of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and without involving improvements**. The legislator did not intend to consolidate such a figure permanently, but rather a simple tolerance, as long as its conformity with the legal order is produced, in other words, **the category of occupant is used temporarily while the granting of the concession is legally possible**. This figure (occupant) has been the subject of multiple interpretations, as it is not harmoniously aligned with the cited Law, which has led to flawed practices and illicit business. The legal nature of the occupant is that of a precarious right, and therefore they could never be confused with nor claim rights that only a property owner can have, since property owners, due to their status, do not require a concession. Nor can they be treated as lessees of the maritime terrestrial zone, since lessees are expressly subject to regulation pursuant to transitory provisions I and II of the aforementioned rule, as in their case, the discussion is not about the concession contract but about the extension of lease contracts predating its enactment, which must be modified in accordance with current laws. Nor can or should they be confused with those persons who entered the public domain zone clandestinely, since after this Law, such action is prohibited pursuant to its Article 12. We must therefore conclude that the **occupant is that person who was located in the restricted zone of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and who, at the time Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, came into force, did not have a lease contract in their favor.** The legal norm under study also creates a figure very similar to the occupant called \"**settler (poblador)**\", which, according to numeral 70, is a Costa Rican person by birth, with more than 10 years of continuous residence in the zone, with certification from the Electoral Registry, provided it is demonstrated that it is their only property, a figure that for these purposes is not relevant and therefore no in-depth analysis is carried out. Continuing, the Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law refers, although not expressly, to the occupant in its Article 48, stating:\n\n*\"The regulation of this Law shall establish the procedure for processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the fee to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances, and specifically, the different situations of the settlers (pobladores) or inhabitants of the zone, and those who are not, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate the relations between the Municipalities and the concessionaires.\"*\n\n**From the foregoing, it can be deduced that both occupants and settlers constitute the exceptional regime of Law 6043.** The regulation of the cited norm (Decree 7841-P), provided in its numeral 45, third paragraph, who could hold the status of occupants as follows: \"*those who, not being settlers, have built or constructed in the zone on illegally possessed plots* (those who do not have a lease contract in their name, issued prior to Law 5602), but it also suppresses the payment for improvements, yet it retakes the privilege granted by Article 44 of its Law. Having said that, the **status of occupant cannot generate any right of property or possession, since the maritime terrestrial zone, being part of the public domain, cannot be the object of possession nor be acquired positively by adverse possession with the passage of time, as provided by Article 7 of Law 6043.** This characteristic of imprescriptibility results in the legal impossibility of exercising possession over the inalienable strip of land; therefore, this norm, when granting the preeminence to award a concession, refers in a Nombre40338 and express manner to **the occupant** of the land who would have possessed it quietly, publicly, peacefully, and continuously. Requirements, which for the case at hand, are easily verifiable. Thus, it can be affirmed that **the occupation of the succession of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 has not been continuous**, since that status was transferred to Mr. Nombre70707, who in turn exercised acts over the same, as demonstrated by one of the payments made to the Municipality of Carrillo dated January 12, 1998, as taxpayer 01813, where he pays for the concept of **marine zone lot occupation**, the sum of *twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones and sixty cents* (see receipt of money number 49682 on folio 9 of the administrative file); and even less peaceful, this is demonstrated by the extensive litigious activity to which it has been subject, in the different judicial processes, including the one at hand, in addition to the amparo appeals and administrative claims concerning it. Under these circumstances, **the status of occupant is not applicable to the succession of Nombre40338 and Nombre70706.** Now then, as indicated above, the legislator, when creating the figure of the occupant, does not intend to consolidate their precarious situation permanently; on the contrary, it is given as an alternative solution, of mere tolerance while the respective planning is carried out by the Municipal entity, through the legal instrument called the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) of the zone, in accordance with transitory provision VII of the Law under discussion, which states: “*The municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime terrestrial zone shall collect a fee established by the Law for the occupants thereof. The collection shall be made according to the use and with the current appraisal of the Dirección General de Tributación Directa. This authorization shall have a provisional character until the development plan for the respective zone comes into force and shall produce no right whatsoever for the occupants regarding a concession.*” The purpose of the norm is to extinguish the precarious occupation of the maritime terrestrial zone, obtained outside the Law (*without having the lease contracts as is the case at hand, where nothing more than a right of occupation has been demonstrated*), so that these portions of land fulfill their public domain purpose, and so that in those cases where one wishes to obtain a benefit from it, it is done in accordance with the Law, that is, by the only possible legal means (concession contract). For its part, Article 75 of the oft-mentioned Law also establishes that occupants do not even have a right to improvements if the use of the parcel is not in accordance with the local regulatory plan, which leads to the conclusion that any construction carried out without this legality protection is classified as contrary to it, since only those derived from a lease contract prior to the suspension of Law 4558 (Law of Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970) or an extension thereof can be legally permitted; with the entry into force of Law 6043, of March 2, 1977, their illegality is decreed if the local regulatory plan has not been issued, or failing that, if they are not carried out under a concession contract for the public zone. Furthermore, it is held that any act performed before the validity of the cited norm, on lands of the maritime terrestrial zone not subject to a lease contract, lacks validity, pursuant to numeral 71, which indicates: ***that all acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions made or taken after the enactment of Law 5602 and which are contrary to its provisions are absolutely null*** (of November 4, 1974). It goes without saying then that any action carried out after this date in the referred maritime terrestrial zone lacks all validity, including the granting of licenses. Since, regarding these, it has been clearly established that the means to grant them is public auction and that it is the responsibility of the Municipal entity to determine the number of liquor establishments that may be authorized within its circumscription. Although the granting of business licenses and licenses for the retail sale of liquor with the issuance of permits is an attribution of the Municipality, this does not proceed when the application is for an activity to be developed within the Public Zone, of common use, in which private individuals are, as a rule, prohibited from exercising any right or occupation. Article 63 in relation to Article 20 of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, sanctions the official who grants concessions or occupation permits contrary to its provisions or related laws, a situation that also falls within the grounds for license denial provided for in the Municipal Code, for being an activity not permitted by Law, given the physical location, public ownership, and purpose of the property. (*Regarding the responsibility of local governments in the improper use of licenses, see Constitutional judgment number 6469-97*). This being so, the plaintiff cannot allege, as she does, a substantive right acquired over a precarious right of occupation, and over a license obtained under the indicated circumstances; the only substantive right an occupant has would be that of **priority** over a concession application, provided the requirements are met and the use is compatible with that predetermined by the Regulatory Plan of the sector. A privilege granted by the Law that has caused a harmful effect, since ever since there has been an indiscriminate **sale of occupancy rights**, without it being clear to the acquirers that these **occupancy rights are not subject to any transmission**. As stated, the goal of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, is to give special treatment to those meeting the condition of occupants or settlers, in order to extinguish these figures, not to perpetuate them over time; it is therefore not possible for third parties outside the particular situation of the occupant to continue with that condition into the future. It is not possible to apply the occupant’s own conditions to third parties, since the interest that caused its creation ceased to exist from the moment the transmission of the occupation occurred. Occupation permits are granted ***intuito personae***, as said, by reason of personal qualities and conditions, there being no express norm authorizing **their transfer to heirs.** The status of occupant cannot be transmissible in any way, to third parties, for the reasons stated, but also because of the illegality occurring at its inception (lack of a lease contract), besides the fact that Law 6043 does not stipulate that commerce may occur over the status of occupant, as it does regarding the rights of the concession contract. The foregoing exercise inevitably leads to stating that **the status of occupant cannot be transmissible**; that the plaintiff succession cannot claim rights over an occupation and license it has never had, since the status of occupant, whoever held it at the time, was the now deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, and as this is not transmissible even to heirs, it ceases to exist with the death of the occupants; this being so, ***all legal acts aimed at transmitting it are completely null***, since the supposed third-party acquirers cannot substitute that special condition of occupant. Besides this, there is no proof whatsoever that a concession exists or has existed in the name of the plaintiff succession or of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, making it impossible for the defendant Municipality to **lawfully** create a substantive right (concession contract), even under the protection of a judicial ruling, originating from a non-transmissible occupancy right, in favor of persons who, as demonstrated, do not meet the condition of occupants.\n\nThe plaintiff cannot claim inheritance rights over a nonexistent concession, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">since no one can transmit, by acts inter vivos and even less by mortis causa, that which they do not have.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> In the case at bar, it is more than demonstrated that Mr. Nombre70705 and Mr. Nombre70706</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> never held a concession contract in their favor over the Zona Marítimo Terrestre; what they held in life was a right of occupation and, since this is not susceptible to transmission, this Tribunal cannot grant a right that is not possessed, contrary to all existing regulations concerning the subject of the Zona Marítimo Terrestre. For greater amplification regarding what has been decided, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, number 317-F-2008, of nine hours ten minutes on the second of May of two thousand eight, must be cited, which, in what is relevant, states:</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">\\\"..... </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">Continuing with the analysis of the aforementioned legal article, in the event that no occupant exists, the postulate of merit is applicable. In accordance with the foregoing, it is of cardinal importance to determine who should be considered the “occupant” of the land located in the restricted zone. Should this concept be equated with that of a possessor? This Chamber, after analyzing the rule under study, jointly and harmoniously with the rest of the articles of the aforementioned Law and the provisions of its Reglamento, concludes that the answer must be negative. According to the first article of the Law under study, the zona marítima terrestre constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Only by means of concessions, it is reiterated, may private parties make use of the restricted zone (Article 39). In this sense, pursuant to numeral 12, unauthorized tenure of lands located there is prohibited: “In the zona marítimo terrestre it is prohibited, without due legal authorization, to exploit existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, lanes, or in any other form, to erect buildings or installations, to cut down trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.” Ordinal 13 sanctions illegitimate possession or tenure in the following manner: “The authorities of the corresponding jurisdiction and the respective municipalidades, as soon as they are notified of the infractions referred to in the two preceding articles, shall proceed, after gathering information for that purpose, if deemed necessary, to the eviction of the offenders and the destruction or demolition of the constructions, remodelings, or installations carried out by them, without any liability whatsoever for the authority or the municipalidad. The cost of the demolition or destruction shall be charged to the owner of the construction or installation. All of the foregoing without prejudice to the criminal sanctions that may proceed.” However, under the shelter of its ordinal 6, private property, legitimately acquired, in the zona marítimo terrestre is recognized: “The provisions of this law shall not apply to the areas of cities situated on the coastlines, nor to properties registered, in accordance with the law, in the name of private individuals, nor to those whose legitimacy is recognized by the laws.”; nevertheless, as provided by canon 8, those lands are declared of public utility for expropriation purposes: “The zona marítimo terrestre is declared of public utility so that the lots, parcels, or improvements located therein, which have been sold, acquired, or possessed in property by private individuals, may be rescued for the national patrimony by means of expropriation.” Likewise, the Law under discussion, in its Transitorios I and II, maintains the validity and effectiveness of lease contracts entered into under the protection of previous legislation, provided that certain requirements are met: “</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Transitorio I.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">The concessions or lease contracts granted based on previous laws, except for the exceptions established herein, shall pass to the control of the respective municipalidades and shall continue under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration and if their extension is agreed upon, they shall be modified in accordance with the rules of this law. The foregoing referring to the zona marítimo terrestre. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Transitorio II.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">The municipalidades and the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización must send to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, within the first six months of the effectiveness of this law, copies of the contracts or concessions they have granted in the zona marítimo terrestre, without prejudice to the interested parties also presenting, within that same term, their contracts to this Instituto, all for the purposes of their registration therein. Once that term has expired without said contracts having been presented, they shall lack validity and shall be deemed extinguished./ If contracts have not been issued, any existing supporting documents must be presented./ In all cases, certification of being up to date in the payment of the respective cánones must be attached. The absence of such certification shall be proof that the cánones have not been satisfied./ For the purposes of this transitorio, the originals of the documents or photostatic copies thereof, signed by the interested party or by the representative of the corresponding entity, may be presented.” The figure of the occupant, indicated in Article 44 under discussion, therefore, does not allude to the owners, since they do not need a concession to usufruct their lands; nor to the lessees of properties located in the zona marítimo terrestre, whose contract was granted in accordance with the previous regulations, since, as has just been analyzed, there are specific provisions that regulate them, on the understanding that these are extensions of the agreements; even less so does it refer to persons introduced into said zone illicitly, as this is expressly prohibited by Article 12, as noted. The valid interpretation is to consider as “occupant” all those persons who, settled in the restricted zone, did not have a concession at the time Law 6043 was enacted. It is, consequently, a special or exceptional regime, which is not the only one in that regulation. In this regard, as noted, in transcribed Article 6, the areas of cities situated on the coastlines were excluded; in addition, in ordinal 70 the figure of the dweller (poblador) was created, who is given the possibility of remaining on the properties occupied by them, until zoning planning occurs, at which time they may be relocated and compensated for their improvements. Said article provides: “The dwellers (pobladores) of the zona marítimo terrestre, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Guardia de Asistencia Rural or certification from the Registro Electoral regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must submit to the planning of the zone, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements indemnified in accordance with this law. In all cases, the public zone must be respected.” The indicated conclusion, that with the expression “occupant” the Law refers to a special regime, is confirmed by what is provided in numeral 48: “Concessions shall be granted for a term of no less than five nor more than twenty years and shall indicate the canon to be paid and its form of payment. This canon substitutes the territorial tax./ The reglamento of this law shall establish the manner of processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the canon to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\\\">in a special manner, with the different situation of the dwellers (pobladores) or inhabitants and those who are not </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate the relations between the municipalidades and the concessionaires.”(The underlining is not from the original); by indicating said provision: “... and those who are not ...” it alludes to the occupants. More explicit is numeral 75 of the Reglamento, in developing the preceding legal provision: “The dwellers (pobladores) of the zona marítimo terrestre, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Guardia de Asistencia Rural or certification from the Registro Electoral regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated according to the planning of the zone, upon prior indemnification of the improvements. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. / When the period of residence is less than ten years, the dwellers (pobladores) may apply for a concession on the property, provided that no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the reglamento shall apply, and the provisions of Article 74 of the reglamento shall apply if the improvements are located in the restricted zone. / </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\\\">Those who, not being dwellers (pobladores), have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties, shall have no right to payment for improvements. / However, they may apply for a concession on the property and, if granted, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Applications for concessions made by the occupants of the zona marítimo terrestre shall have priority over others. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">” When this provision, in its third paragraph, refers to “illegally possessed properties”, as has been noted, it must be understood that the person is in the zona marítimo terrestre without a lease contract or concession that legitimizes them, that is, as an occupant. It is important to note that this rule reiterates what is prescribed in ordinal 44 of the Law, in the sense that “... Applications for concessions made by the occupants of the zona marítimo terrestre shall have priority over others.”, which supports the thesis sustained. Likewise, Transitorio VII of the Law is diaphanous in establishing the provisional, or precarious, character of the occupation, which can be equated to mere tolerance under common law: “</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Transitorio VII.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">The municipalidades with jurisdiction in the zona marítimo terrestre shall collect the canon established by this law from the occupants thereof./ The collection shall be made according to the use and the current appraisal by the Dirección General de la Tributación Directa. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\\\">This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan for the respective zone comes into effect, and it does not produce any right for the occupants regarding a concession. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">”(The underlining is not from the original). In light of what is set forth in this transitory rule, it is Nombre70705 that the State permits the permanence of these persons –occupants– in the coastal zone until the granting of concessions is possible, that is, when the regulatory plan for the zone is issued (Articles 70, Transitorio VII of the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre; and 57 of its Reglamento). Their condition is so precarious that, in accordance with Article 75 of the Reglamento, they have no right to payment for improvements, although they do have the right of priority for their concession applications (solicitudes de concesión), provided that the projected use of the land is compatible with that foreseen in the planning of the sector. On the other hand, since the zona marítimo terrestre constitutes part of the national patrimony belonging to the State, inalienable and imprescriptible, which is collected by numeral 7 of the law, in indicating that the lands located in the zona marítimo terrestre “... cannot be the object of possessory informations and private individuals may not appropriate them nor legalize them in their name, by this or any other means.”; it implies the legal impossibility of deriving possessory rights over said zone. Consequently, the terminology used by Article 44 of the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre is adequate, that is, it refers to the mere occupant and not to the possessor. Furthermore, said condition of occupant cannot be transmitted to third parties, as it possesses special conditions that only those persons –the occupants– have; consequently, any legal act tending to transfer it becomes absolutely null. To accept the contrary would imply breaching what is provided by the previously indicated articles of the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre and its reglamento. </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">XXII.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">In the case record, in accordance with what is provided in the proven facts preceded by numbers 9, 10, and 12, Mr. Nombre34289</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">and Mr. Nombre70713</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">filed their concession application (solicitud de concesión) for the land in dispute before the Municipalidad de Nicoya on July 12; for its part, the plaintiff corporation did so on September 28, and Mr. Nombre70713</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">on October 23, all dates in 1989. On the other hand, although it was not considered accredited, the second-instance judges, in Considerando X of the appealed judgment (folio 1029), indicate that both parties propose the same type of use for the land in dispute, which consists of agricultural and livestock activity; furthermore, that the zone where the land in dispute is located is non-touristic (which was accepted by the plaintiff corporation at folios 17 verso, 176, and 185, and by the defendants in their answer to the complaint at folio 232). In light of what is set forth in the preceding considerando, as two concession applications (solicitudes de concesión) were filed for the same land located in the zona marítimo terrestre and with the same use or destination, framed within the priorities established by the Reglamento to the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre (Article 57, subsection b) paragraph 1), it must be analyzed whether any of the applicants can be considered as an occupant. In this sense, it is Nombre70705 that the plaintiff corporation does not meet the necessary conditions, since, as is inferred from what is stated in its complaint –facts identified as second, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth– what it alleges is having acquired from the defendants Mr. Nombre34289</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">and Mr. Nombre70713</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">the right of possession over the land in dispute on February 21, 1989, a legal transaction that, as noted in the preceding section, is absolutely null; furthermore, according to what is accredited in the demonstrated fact preceded by number 7, its entry onto the land in dispute occurred, approximately, in the month of March 1989. For their part, said defendants do not meet this characteristic either; this is because, it is reiterated, based on the indicated proven facts, and as analyzed in preceding considerandos, at the time of filing their concession application (solicitud de concesión) they were no longer occupying the land; ergo, they do not meet the condition of continuous “possession”, as provided in Article 44 of the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">As the right of occupation that Mr. Nombre70705 and Mr. Nombre70706</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> held, at the time, was not transferable to third parties, their succession cannot come to claim a subjective right that they do not have, and even less so that such a situation subjects the Municipalidad de Carrillo to the issuance of acts contrary to the legal system, so the denial made by the territorial entity, regarding the transfer of a concession right over the zona marítimo terrestre, as well as the </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">license (patente) for national and foreign liquors number Placa11511, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">is in accordance with the legal system</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">there is no defect whatsoever in its motive, content, and purpose. The claim of the plaintiff succession not being receivable for this Tribunal, to accept the contrary implies ordering actions contrary to the Law and the regulations governing the matter submitted to the scrutiny of this judicial authority.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">IX.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\\\">CONCLUSIONS:</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> With legal certainty, it is established that what Mr. Nombre70705 and Mr. Nombre70706</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> held in life</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> was the condition of occupants within the zona marítimo terrestre, a right that is not susceptible to transmission to third parties</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">,</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> consequently, any legal act tending to transfer it becomes absolutely null, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">that being a right in precario, it does not confer subjective rights, ergo the plaintiff succession lacks right regarding its claims, to accept the contrary would imply breaching the block of legality that covers administrative conduct, so the appeal formulated in this sense must be upheld. </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">X.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\\\">REGARDING</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\\\">COSTS</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">: </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">This Tribunal considers that we are in the presence of the assumptions of Article 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, therefore, it is decided without special condemnation as to costs.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\\\">POR TANTO</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">Regarding what is the object of the appeal, the appealed resolution is </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">REVOKED</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">, only insofar as it rejected the defense of lack of standing, declared the complaint admissible, and condemned the Municipalidad de Carrillo to the payment of both costs, in order to, in its place, admit the lack of standing and decree the </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\">IMPROCEDENCIA</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\"> of the action in all its extremes. It is resolved without special condemnation as to costs.</span>\n\nIn all other respects, it is affirmed.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\\\"> NOTIFY</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma\\\">.-</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Cristina Víquez Cerdas</span><span> </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">Nombre66641</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\\\"> Sady Jiménez Quesada </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>\n\nIn Costa Rica as a Republic, the first rules addressing the subject gave preponderance to agricultural use, according to Law 162 of June 28, 1828, and subsequently Articles 6 and 62 of the Law on Vacant Lands (Terrenos Baldíos) of 1939, in which it can be noted that the entirety of the public strip, except for the two hundred meters contiguous to the ordinary high tide line, was dedicated to agricultural use. Article 7 of the Law of Lands and Colonization of 1961 also considers the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) as part of the State’s agricultural property. It is not until the end of the 1960s that a greater interest in the urban and tourist development of this public domain strip began to emerge, which was manifested by the spread of contracts for these uses, granted at that time by the Institute of Lands and Colonization (currently known as the Institute of Agrarian Development, INDER). But it is only with the enactment of the Law on Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone of 1970, in its first article, that this urban-tourist use is given to the strip under study. Without a doubt, with Law 4558, a shift was sought from the marked agricultural use that the maritime terrestrial zone had and to give it a tourist sense. This Law had great negative consequences in its application, resulting in the private appropriation of the maritime terrestrial zone in an indiscriminate and abusive manner in its titling. Therefore, great unease arose on the part of the Legislative Assembly in the face of the possibility of losing State domain over this public domain asset, which led to suspending Law 4558, the repeal of its Temporary Provision III, and its definitive abolition by Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, which is the current legislation. This law, together with its Regulations, generally points more toward planned and environmentally sustainable tourist development, exploiting the natural beauties of our coasts by attracting investment in both recreational and accommodation infrastructure, as well as tourists. Thus, a great difference is observed with respect to the prior regulations, since Law 4558, as could be denoted, presented a use that, although tourist, was more directed toward the population or urbanization of the zone, while the current regulation practically attempts to make this possibility forgotten, or at least in the way it occurred, rescuing only the possibility of classifying zones according to their tourist or non-tourist disposition, generating the possibility of carrying out a development that is either tourist or predominantly agricultural, fishing, or industrial, according to the intrinsic characteristics of each place. **The legislator’s intention is clear that the maritime terrestrial zone is a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), therefore it is not susceptible to private appropriation in any form, and its use regime is circumscribed to what the current regulations establish.** In this regard, Articles 1, 7, 20, 23, and 53 of the cited Law can be cited. Another situation reflected by this regulation is the sense of belonging it possesses, where a preference is evidenced for the management and use of the maritime terrestrial zone to be carried out primarily by nationals, further distancing the possibility that foreigners, by reason of their economic conditions, could in some measure take ownership of our beaches. Evidence of this is found in Articles 31, 47, 57, and 70 of the Law. Thus, if anything has been reflected by the current legislation in relation to its predecessors, it is that lessons have been learned from the mistakes made and from the need that exists to adapt the regulations to the current situation experienced by each coastal region, whose needs vary from one place to another, without neglecting the global juncture in which we are immersed. **VIII.- ON THE RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY (DERECHO DE OCUPACIÓN) IN THE MARITIME TERRESTRIAL ZONE:** The dominant doctrinal position establishes that use permits (precarious occupancy, ocupación en precario) are unilateral administrative acts. Some authors, such as Marienhoff, go further, concluding that it, as a juridical act, is bilateral, since its issuance is a product of the express wills of the applicant and the Administration; and as a juridical transaction, it is unilateral, because the permit holder lacks rights against the State. Likewise, said permits possess a precarious nature, alluding to the possibility that the Administration may unilaterally revoke said permit or occupancy at any moment, for reasons of necessity or general interest (**in this sense, see the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 2306-91, at 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991**). Such precariousness is based on the fact that the use or occupancy permit only constitutes a tolerance by the Administration, and therefore it can be revoked at any moment. In accordance with Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), this revocation will not generate compensatory charges to the Administration when done for duly demonstrated reasons of opportunity and convenience. Furthermore, the revocatory act must not be untimely or arbitrary, and a prudential period for its compliance must be granted in all cases. It is accepted by doctrine that use or occupancy permits within the maritime terrestrial zone do not generate a subjective right in favor of their beneficiaries, but rather a legitimate interest. It must be made clear that these permits are only authorizations to carry out simple acts whose effects do not significantly impact the asset used, and therefore only minor works whose conditions allow for their easy and rapid removal should be consented to; constructions with a character of permanent adherence to the land are not permitted, insofar as said installations would hinder the effective implementation of planned zoning. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), through official communication No. C-100-95, issued on May 10, 1995, concluded in this sense: *“Thus, for the maritime terrestrial zone of our country, only use permits that meet two essential characteristics could be admitted: a) that they do not affect the natural conditions of the zone nor hinder the free enjoyment of the public zone, and b) that their execution absolutely does not limit the future implementation of a regulatory plan (plan regulador).”* Now, the administrative act by which the permit or occupancy is granted must be reasoned, just as the resolution that denies it; said reasoning must revolve around the public interest for which such decision was reached. Regarding lease contracts (contratos de arrendamiento) prior to its enactment, it stipulates that these are valid under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration, or if their extension is agreed, they must be modified in accordance with the new current regulations, according to its first temporary provision, the foregoing provided they have been submitted to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) within six months following the entry into force of the cited Law, otherwise they will be deemed extinguished according to the second temporary provision. Different is the situation of the occupants (ocupantes), since in our legislation the condition of occupant is created and directed at those persons who were located in the maritime terrestrial zone and who did not have a lease contract at the time Law of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 of March 2, 1977 was issued, without there being an act of the Administration that recognizes such situation. To the so-called occupants of the (restricted) public zone, the law grants special preferential treatment (but under equal conditions) to convert that occupancy into a concession right, provided that **the occupant of the land has possessed it in a public, quiet, peaceful, continuous manner over the restricted thing of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and without implying improvements**. The legislator did not intend to consolidate such figure permanently, but rather a simple tolerance, insofar as its conformity with the juridical order is produced; in other words, **the category of occupant is used temporarily while the granting of the concession is legally possible**. This figure (occupant) has been the object of multiple interpretations, since it is not adjusted in harmony with the cited Law, which has given rise to corrupt practices and illicit transactions. The juridical nature of the occupant is that of a precarious right (derecho en precario), and therefore the rights that only an owner can have could never be confused or claimed, since these, by their condition, do not require a concession. Neither can they be treated as lessees of the maritime terrestrial zone, as they are an express subject of regulation in accordance with Temporary Provisions I and II of the aforementioned rule, since in their case, it is not about the concession contract but about the extension of lease contracts prior to its enactment, which must be modified in accordance with current laws. Nor should they be confused with those persons who entered the public domain zone (zona demanial) clandestinely, since after this Law, such action is prohibited pursuant to its Article 12. Therefore, we must conclude that the **occupant is that person who was located in the restricted zone of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and who, at the time Law 6043 of March 2, 1977 came into effect, did not have a lease contract in their favor.** The legal rule under study also creates a figure very similar to the occupant called **\"inhabitant (poblador)\"** , who, pursuant to numeral 70, is a Costa Rican person by birth, with more than 10 years of continuous residence in the zone, with certification from the Electoral Registry, provided it is demonstrated as their only property, a figure that for these purposes is not of importance and therefore no in-depth analysis is performed. Continuing, the Law of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone refers, although not expressly, to the occupant in its Article 48 by indicating: *“ The regulation of this Law shall establish the manner of processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the canon (canon) to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and in a special manner, with the different situations of the inhabitants or residents of the zone, and those who are not, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate the relations between the Municipalities and the concessionaires (concesionarios).”* **From the foregoing, it can be extracted that both the occupants and the inhabitants constitute the exceptional regime of Law 6043.** The regulation of the cited norm (Decree 7841-P) provided in its numeral 45, third paragraph, who could hold the condition of occupants in the following manner: “*those who, not being inhabitants, have constructed or built in the zone on illegally possessed lands* (those who do not have a lease contract in their name, extended prior to Law 5602), but it also suppresses the payment of improvements, yet retakes the privilege granted through Article 44 of its Law. Having said the foregoing, it is held that the **condition of occupant cannot generate any property or possession right whatsoever, since, as the maritime terrestrial zone is part of the public domain, it cannot be the object of possession nor be positively prescribed (prescribirse) with the passage of time, as provided in Article 7 of Law 6043.** This characteristic of imprescriptibility results in the legal impossibility of exercising possession over the inalienable strip of land, so that this rule, when granting preeminence to grant a concession, clearly and expressly refers to **the occupant** of the land who had possessed it in a quiet, public, peaceful, and continuous manner. Requirements that, for the case at hand, are easy to verify. It can then be affirmed that **the occupancy of the succession of Claro and Graciela García García has not been continuous**, because that condition was transferred to Mr. Villegas Castro, who in turn exercised acts over the same, as demonstrated by one of the payments made to the Municipality of Carrillo dated January 12, 1998, as taxpayer 01813, where he pays for the concept of **occupancy of maritime zone lot**, the sum of *twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones with sixty cents* (see receipt of money number 49682 on folio 9 of the administrative file); and even less peaceful; this is demonstrated through the great litigious activity of which it has been the object, in the different judicial processes, including the one at hand, in addition to the amparo remedies and administrative claims revolving around it. Under these circumstances, **the condition of occupant is not applicable to the succession of Clara and Gabriela García García**. Now, as indicated above, the legislator, when creating the figure of the occupant, does not intend to consolidate their precarious situation permanently; on the contrary, it is given as an alternative solution, of mere tolerance while the respective planning is produced by the Municipal entity, through the legal instrument called the Regulatory Plan of the zone, in accordance with Temporary Provision VII of the Law under discussion, which provides: “*The municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime terrestrial zone shall collect a canon established by Law for the occupants thereof. The collection shall be made according to use and with the current appraisal of the Directorate General of Direct Taxation. This authorization shall have a provisional character until the development plan for the respective zone enters into force and does not produce any right for the occupants regarding the concession*.” The purpose of the rule is to extinguish the precarious occupancy of the maritime terrestrial zone, obtained outside of the Law (*without having the lease contracts, as is the case at hand where nothing more than a right of occupancy has been demonstrated*) so that these portions of land fulfill their public domain destiny, and so that in those cases where one wishes to obtain a benefit from it, it is carried out in accordance with the Law, that is, by the only legally possible means (concession contract). For its part, Article 75 of the oft-mentioned Law also establishes that occupants do not even have a right to improvements if the use of the parcel is not in conformity with the local regulatory plan, which leads one to say that any building that has been constructed without this cover of legality is classified as contrary to it, insofar as only those derived from a lease contract prior to the suspension of Law 4558 (Law on Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970) or an extension thereof can be permitted lawfully, since with the entry into force of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, its unlawfulness is decreed if the local regulatory plan has not been issued or, failing that, if they are not carried out under the protection of a concession contract for the public zone. Furthermore, it is held that any act carried out before the validity of the cited norm, on lands of the maritime terrestrial zone not subject to a lease contract, lacks validity, in accordance with numeral 71, when indicating: ***that all acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions carried out or taken as of the enactment of Law 5602 and that are contrary to its provisions** (of November 4, 1974) are absolutely null.* Needless to say, then, that any action carried out after this date on the referred maritime terrestrial zone lacks all validity, including the granting of licenses (patentes). Since, regarding these, it has been clearly established that the means for granting them is public auction and that it is the support of the Municipal entity to fix the number of liquor establishments that can be authorized within its circumscription. Even though the granting of trade licenses and licenses for the retail sale of liquors with the issuance of patents is an attribution of the Municipality, this does not proceed when the application is for an activity to be developed within the Public Zone, of common use, in which as a rule individuals are prohibited from exercising any right or occupancy. Article 63 in relation to Article 20 of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, sanctions the official who grants concessions or occupancy permits against its provisions or connected Laws, a situation that at the same time falls within the assumptions for denial of licenses provided for in the Municipal Code, as an activity not permitted by Law, given the physical location, public ownership, and destination of the asset. (*On the responsibility of local governments in the improper use of patents, see Constitutional ruling number 6469-97*). This being so, the plaintiff cannot allege, as she does, an acquired subjective right over a precarious right of occupancy, and over a patent obtained under the indicated circumstances; the only subjective right that an occupant has would be that of **priority** over a concession application, provided the requirements are met and the use is compatible with that predetermined by the Regulatory Plan of the sector. A privilege granted by Law that has caused a harmful effect, since ever since, there has been an indiscriminate **sale of occupancy rights (derechos de ocupación)**, without it being clear, on the part of the acquirers, that these **occupancy rights are not subject to any transmission.** As stated, the goal of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977 is to give special treatment to those who meet the condition of occupants or inhabitants, with the purpose of extinguishing these figures, not to perpetuate them over time; it is not possible, then, for third parties alien to the particularity of occupant to continue with that condition into the future. It is not possible to apply the conditions proper to the occupant to third parties, since the interest that caused its birth ceased to exist from the moment the transmission of the occupancy occurred. Occupancy permits are granted **intuito persona**, as said, by reason of personal qualities and conditions, there being no express rule that authorizes **their transfer to heirs.** The condition of occupant cannot be transmissible in any way whatsoever to third parties, for the reasons stated, but also due to the unlawfulness that occurred at its birth (inexistence of a lease contract), besides the fact that Law 6043 does not prescribe that commerce may occur over the condition of occupant, as it does over the rights of the concession contract. The foregoing analysis inevitably leads to saying that **the condition of occupant cannot be transmissible**; it is clear that the plaintiff succession cannot claim rights over an occupancy and patent that it has never had, since the condition of occupant, who held it at the time, was the now deceased Claro and Graciela García García, and since this is not transmissible even to the heirs, it ceases to exist with the decease of the occupants; thus, **any juridical act tending to transmit it is completely null**, since the supposed third-party acquirers cannot substitute that special condition of occupant. Besides this, there is no proof whatsoever that a concession exists or has existed in the name of the plaintiff succession or of Claro and Graciela García García, making it impossible for the defendant Municipality to **lawfully** create a subjective right (concession contract), even under the protection of a judicial ruling, arising from a non-transmissible occupancy right, in favor of persons who do not fulfill, as was demonstrated, the condition of occupants. The plaintiff cannot claim succession rights over a non-existent concession, **since no one can transmit by acts inter-vivos and even less by mortis causa what one does not have.** In the sub-lite, it is more than demonstrated that Messrs. Claro and Graciela García García never had a concession contract in their favor over the Maritime Terrestrial Zone, that what they held in life was a right of occupancy, and since this is not susceptible to transmission, this Tribunal cannot grant a right that is not possessed, contrary to all existing regulations referring to the subject of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone. For further elaboration on what has been decided, the ruling of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), number 317-F-2008, at nine hours ten minutes on May 2, 2008, which states what is of interest, must be cited: “..... *Continuing with the analysis of the alluded legal article, in case no occupant exists, the merit postulate becomes applicable. In accordance with the foregoing, it is of cardinal importance to determine who should be considered an “occupant” of the land located in the restricted zone. Should such concept be equated to that of possessor? This Chamber, after analyzing the rule under study, jointly and harmoniously with the rest of the articles of the aforementioned Law, and what is provided in its Regulation, concludes that the answer must be negative. In accordance with the first article of the Law under study, the maritime terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national heritage, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Only by means of concessions, it is reiterated, can private individuals take advantage of the restricted zone (Article 39). In this sense, in accordance with numeral 12, the unauthorized tenure of lands located there is prohibited: “In the maritime terrestrial zone, it is prohibited, without the due legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, trails, or in any other form, to erect buildings or installations, to cut trees, to extract products, or to carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupancy.” Numeral 13 sanctions illegitimate possession or tenure in the following manner: “ The authorities of the corresponding jurisdiction and the respective municipalities, as soon as they have notice of the infractions referred to in the two previous articles, shall proceed, after information gathered for the purpose, if deemed necessary, to the eviction (desalojo) of the offenders and to the destruction or demolition of the constructions, remodelings, or installations made by them, without any responsibility for the authority or the municipality. The cost of the demolition or destruction shall be charged to the owner of the construction or installation. All the foregoing without prejudice to the penal sanctions that may proceed. ” However, under the shelter of its numeral 6, private property, legitimately acquired, in the maritime terrestrial zone is recognized: “ The provisions of this law shall not apply to the areas of the cities situated on the littorals, nor to properties registered, subject to the law, in the name of private individuals, nor to those whose legitimacy is recognized by the laws.*\n\n”; however, as provided in canon 8, those lands are declared of public utility for expropriation purposes: “The maritime-terrestrial zone is declared of public utility so that the lots, parcels, or improvements located therein, which have been sold, acquired, or possessed in ownership by private individuals, may be recovered for the national patrimony through expropriation.” Likewise, the Law under discussion, in its Transitorio I and II, maintains the validity and effectiveness of lease contracts executed under the prior legislation, provided certain requirements are met: “**Transitorio I.-** Concessions or lease contracts granted based on previous laws, except for the exceptions established herein, shall pass to the control of the respective municipalities and shall continue under the same terms and conditions as agreed, but upon their expiration and if their extension is agreed upon, they shall be modified in accordance with the rules of this law. The foregoing refers to the maritime-terrestrial zone. **Transitorio II.-** The municipalities and the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización must send to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, within the first six months of the effectiveness of this law, copies of the contracts or concessions they have granted in the maritime-terrestrial zone, without prejudice to the interested parties also presenting their contracts to this Institute within that period, all for the purposes of their registration therein. Once that term has expired without said contracts having been presented, they shall lack validity and shall be deemed extinguished./ If contracts have not been issued, any existing receipts must be presented./ In any case, proof of being up to date on the payment of the respective fees (cánones) must be attached. The absence of such proof shall be verification that the fees (cánones) have not been satisfied./ For the purposes of this transitional provision, originals of the documents or photocopies thereof, signed by the interested party or by the representative of the corresponding entity, may be presented.” The figure of the occupant (ocupante), indicated in article 44 under discussion, therefore, does not refer to owners, since they do not need a concession to usufruct their lands; nor to lessees of properties located in the maritime-terrestrial zone, whose contract was granted in accordance with the prior regulations, since, as just analyzed, there are specific provisions that regulate them, on the understanding that these are extensions of the agreements; even less so does it refer to persons introduced into said zone illicitly, as this is expressly prohibited by article 12, as noted. The valid interpretation is to consider “occupant (ocupante)” as all those persons who, settled in the restricted zone, did not have a concession at the time the Law 6043 was enacted. It involves, consequently, a special or exceptional regime, which is not the only one in that regulation. In this regard, as noted, in the transcribed article 6, the areas of the cities located on the coastlines were excluded; furthermore, in article 70, the figure of the settler (poblador) was created, who is given the possibility of remaining on the properties they occupy, until the planning of the zone takes place, at which time they may be relocated and their improvements indemnified. Said article provides: “The settlers (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their sole property. However, they must subject themselves to the planning of the zone, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements indemnified in accordance with this law. In any case, the public zone must be respected.” The indicated conclusion, that by the expression “occupant (ocupante)” the Law refers to a special regime, is confirmed by the provisions of numeral 48: “ Concessions shall be granted for a term of no less than five nor more than twenty years and must indicate the fee (canon) to be paid and its method of payment. That fee (canon) replaces the territorial tax./ The regulations of this law shall establish the procedure for processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the fee (canon) to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and, *especially, regarding the different situation of the settlers (pobladores) or inhabitants and those who are not*, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate relations between the municipalities and the concessionaires. ” (The underlining is not from the original); by stating said provision: “... and those who are not...” it alludes to the occupants (ocupantes). More explicit is numeral 75 of the Regulations, when developing the previous legal provision: “The settlers (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their sole property, and may be relocated according to the planning of the zone, prior indemnification of the improvements. In any case, the public zone must be respected. / When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers (pobladores) may apply for a concession over the property, provided that no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), article 73 of the regulations shall apply, and the provisions of article 74 of the regulations if the improvements are located in the restricted zone. / *Those who, not being settlers (pobladores), have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties, shall not have the right to payment for improvements. / However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if it is granted to them, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Applications for concessions made by occupants (ocupantes) of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.*” When this provision, in its third paragraph, refers to “ illegally possessed properties ”, as has been noted, it must be understood that the person is in the maritime-terrestrial zone without a lease contract or concession that legitimizes them, that is, as an occupant (ocupante). It is important to note that this rule reiterates the precept in article 44 of the Law, in the sense that “... Applications for concessions made by occupants (ocupantes) of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.”, which supports the thesis argued. Likewise, Transitorio VII of the Law is clear in establishing the provisional, or precarious, nature of the occupation, which can be equated to mere tolerance under common law: “**Transitorio VII.-** The municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone shall charge the fee (canon) established by this law for the occupants (ocupantes) thereof./ The charge shall be made according to the use and the current appraisal of the Dirección General de la Tributación Directa. *This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan for the respective zone comes into effect and does not produce any right for the occupants (ocupantes) regarding a concession.*” (The underlining is not from the original). In light of the provisions of this transitional rule, it is clear that the State allows the permanence of these persons –occupants (ocupantes)– in the coastal zone until the granting of concessions is possible, that is, when the regulatory plan for the zone is issued (articles 70, Transitorio VII of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone; and 57 of its Regulations). Their condition is so precarious that, in accordance with regulatory article 75, they have no right to payment for improvements, although they do have priority for their concession applications, provided that the use projected on the land is compatible with that foreseen in the planning of the sector. On the other hand, as the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony belonging to the State, inalienable and imprescriptible, which is recognized by numeral 7 of the law, by indicating that the lands located in the maritime-terrestrial zone “... may not be the object of possessory informations and private individuals may not appropriate them nor legalize them in their name, by this or any other means.”; this implies the legal impossibility of deriving possessory rights over said zone. Consequently, the terminology used in article 44 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone is appropriate, that is, it refers to the mere occupant (ocupante) and not to the possessor. Furthermore, said condition of occupant (ocupante) cannot be transferred to third parties, as it involves special conditions that only those persons –the occupants (ocupantes)– have; consequently, any legal act aimed at transferring it becomes absolutely null. Accepting the contrary would imply breaching the provisions of the aforementioned articles of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and its regulations. **XXII.-** In the case file records, in accordance with the provisions of the proven facts preceded by numbers 9, 10, and 12, Mrs. Gloria Medina Caravaca and Mr. Rafael Ángel Ugarte Medina presented their concession application for the land in dispute to the Municipalidad de Nicoya on July 12; for their part, the plaintiff corporation did so on September 28, and Mr. Wilberth Ugarte Medina on October 23, all dates in 1989. On the other hand, although it was not held as accredited, the second-instance judges, in considerando X of the appealed judgment (folio 1029), state that both parties propose the same type of use for the land in dispute, which consists of agricultural activity; furthermore, that the zone where the land in dispute is located is non-touristic (which was accepted by the plaintiff corporation at folios 17 verso, 176, and 185, and by the defendants in their response to the lawsuit at folio 232). In light of the provisions of the preceding considerando, as two concession applications have been presented for the same land located in the maritime-terrestrial zone and with the same use or purpose, framed within the priorities established by the Regulations to the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (article 57 subsection b) section 1), it must be analyzed whether any of the applicants can be considered an occupant (ocupante). In this sense, it is clear that the plaintiff corporation does not meet the necessary conditions, since, as deduced from what is stated in its lawsuit –facts identified as second, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth– what it alleged is having acquired from the defendants Medina Caravaca and Ugarte Medina the right of possession over the land in dispute on February 21, 1989, a legal transaction which, as noted in the previous section, is absolutely null; furthermore, according to what is accredited in the proven fact preceded by number 7, its entry onto the land in dispute occurred, approximately, in the month of March 1989. For their part, said defendants also do not meet such characteristic; this is so because, it is reiterated, based on the indicated proven facts, and as was analyzed in preceding considerandos, at the time of presenting their concession application they were no longer occupying the land; ergo, they do not meet the condition of continuous “possession”, as provided in article 44 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.”\n\nThe claim is granted in favor of the ORDINARY lawsuit of the CONSOLIDATED SUCCESSIONS of Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706, represented by their Nombre9362, Mrs. Nombre65838, against the MUNICIPALITY OF CARRILLO, GUANACASTE, in the following terms: First: That in the final and binding judgment being executed, issued by the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, the sale with a right of repurchase (pacto de retroventa) made under the terms indicated was annulled, and matters were restored to their original state, meaning that the lease agreement (contrato de arrendamiento) in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), and the liquor license (patente de licores) No. C-46, continue to belong to Messrs. Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, now their successions; therefore, the defendant Municipality, through its legal representative and the Municipal Council of Carrillo, in order to comply with the referenced final judgment, is obligated to transfer, by order of this Court, in favor of the plaintiff, the consolidated successions of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, the lease agreement in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the national and foreign liquor license No. C-46; otherwise, they will incur the crime of disobedience to authority, and the Court will directly order said transfer, and the defendant must annul in the administrative file that they maintain, the transfer of the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46, made to Messrs. Nombre70707, Nombre70708, and Nombre70709. . Second: That the defendant Municipality is, through its legal representative, and the Municipality itself through the Municipal Council, obligated to make the referenced transfers insofar as the plaintiff acquired the lease agreement in the maritime-terrestrial zone and license C-46 before the entry into force of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, and therefore they have an acquired right. Third: That the Municipality's obligation to transfer to the consolidated successions of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 the lease agreement in the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license ID Placa11511, arises as a necessary and obligatory act to give enforceability to the final first-instance judgment referenced above, and Fourth: That the payment of personal and procedural costs in this matter is the responsibility of the defendant.\n\n4.- Dissatisfied with the ruling, the defendant appealed, a remedy that was admitted and by virtue of which this decision is issued.-\n\n5.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of the Law have been observed, this decision is issued within the legal term and after deliberation, and:\n\nDrafted by Judge Jiménez Quesada; and,\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS: The list of proven facts contained in the judgment under review is replaced by the following: 1- That the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, by judgment at 8:00 a.m. on March 16, 1998, ordered: POR TANTO: Based on the foregoing, articles 28, 39, 41, 45 of the Constitution, 10, 11, 20, 21 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, 328, 330, 627, 837 et seq., 1007, 1008, 1022, 1023, 1034 of the Civil Code, 1, 102, 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 536 of the Commercial Code, the following is declared: A) ORDINARY LAWSUIT OF THE CONSOLIDATED SUCCESSIONS OF Nombre70706 AND Nombre70705 represented by Nombre65838 against Nombre70707, Nombre70710, and Nombre70709. . represented by the first: The defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations (prescripción) filed by the defendants are dismissed, and the ORDINARY LAWSUIT IS GRANTED in the following manner: FIRST) The contract executed in a deed granted in Playas del Coco before Notary Public Wilber Villavicencio Pizarro at seven o'clock in the morning on November twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-five, between Nombre70705, Nombre70706 on one part, and on the other part Nombre70707, is not a sale with a right of repurchase but a loan of money in the amount of two hundred fifty thousand colones. SECOND) In the previous deed, in which the lease right in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco and the municipal liquor license number c-forty-six are sold with a right of repurchase for the indicated sum, this is a guarantee of performance of the monetary loan contract signed between the parties. THIRD) As it is a simulated commercial act, lacking in consent, the sale contract with a right of repurchase between the parties is vitiated by absolute nullity. FOURTH) The co-defendants Nombre70707, Nombre70710 personally and as representatives of Nombre70709. . are obligated to return to the plaintiff succession, by granting a public deed, the concession (concesión) in the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playas del Coco, located at Dirección7904, bounded on the north by a public street, south by municipal land, Bar Bohio, and west by Bar Papagayo, where the establishment Bar y Marisquería Cocos is currently located, as well as the municipal license for national and foreign liquors and restaurant number c-forty-six, initially granted in the name of Nombre70706, within a term of ONE MONTH from the finality of this judgment, under the warning that in case of omission, it shall be done via an enforceable order or writ by this office. FIFTH) The defendants are jointly obligated to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff Succession, consisting of the non-use and non-enjoyment of the mentioned concession and municipal liquor license, as well as the profits lost from not administering the business with reasonable diligence from the date of the act declared null until its effective payment, to be determined in the enforcement of judgment. SIXTH) The defendant company Nombre70709. . is obligated to deliver to the plaintiff succession the lot it occupies as lessee, identified in the second fact of the complaint, and in case of opposition, this judicial office will enforce it. SEVENTH) Personal and procedural costs are borne by the defendants. Anything not expressly granted is denied. B) COUNTERCLAIM of Nombre70707, Nombre70710, AND Nombre70709. . represented by Nombre70707 and Nombre70710 against the CONSOLIDATED SUCCESSIONS OF Nombre70705 AND Nombre70706 represented by Nombre65838. The defense of lack of active and passive standing is dismissed, and the defense of lack of right is partially upheld only regarding the SUBSIDIARY petition of the counterclaim. The counterclaim is declared partially granted in the following manner: All main claims of the counterclaim are dismissed, and the SUBSIDIARY claims are PARTIALLY UPHELD as follows: FIRST) The plaintiff succession is obligated to return to Nombre70709, the current owner of the business Bar y Marisquería Cocos, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until its effective payment. SECOND) The plaintiff succession is obligated to pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in dispute, made by the defendants up to the date of notification of this lawsuit, to be determined in the enforcement of judgment. THIRD) The plaintiff succession must recognize to the owners of the establishment Bar y Marisquería Nombre70709 the value of goodwill, clientele, quality, and commercial name as of the date of notification of this lawsuit, assessable by expert appraisal in the enforcement of judgment. FOURTH) The counterclaim is resolved without special award of costs. Anything not expressly granted in the counterclaim is denied. (see certified photocopies from folios 8 to 44, complaint, folios 307 to 314, and its response, folios 363 to 376); 2- That the Second Civil Superior Court, Second Section of San José, by judgment No. 192 at 2:20 p.m. on June 19, 1998, upon hearing the appeal of the judgment cited in the preceding fact, confirmed the ruling; and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 491-F-00 at 3:25 p.m. on June 28, 2000, declared the cassation appeal without merit, with costs charged to the losing party (see complaint, its response, and certified photocopies from folios 45 to 96); 3- That in ordinary session No. 126, of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Municipal Council ordered the transfer to Messrs. Nombre70707 and Nombre70711 of an occupancy right (derecho de ocupación) within the public zone (zona pública) of Playas del Coco, in the name of Nombre70706 or Nombre70706, regarding the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is operating. (see certification dated June 24, 2003, folio 360 of the main file and testimony of witness Nombre70712, on folios 473 and 474 both front sides); 4- That the establishment located in the public zone referred to in this matter, called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos,\" intended for the sale of liquor and food, holds a liquor license in the name of Nombre70705, since before January 16, 1978 (same evidence); 5- That the Municipal Council of Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 125, held on March 6, 1986, agreement No. 5, approved the request for transfer of the liquor and restaurant license from Nombre70705 in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70710, referring to the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folios 1 to 4 and 50 of the administrative file); 6- that by document dated June 13, 2001, Nombre65838 requested the defendant that, as ordered by the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, by order at eight o'clock on February 2, two thousand one, the Municipal Council of Carrillo must transfer to her name the concession and liquor license, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folio 441 of the main file and 660 of the second instance file); 7- That in ordinary session No. 12-2001, held on March 20, agreement No. 4, item 1, the Municipal Council of Carrillo ordered that the request presented by the plaintiff to transfer the concession and liquor license to her name be sent to Legal Advisory (see folio 446); 8- That by resolution at three ten p.m. on March twenty-sixth, two thousand one, the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz revoked the resolution indicated in fact 6, then indicating that Mr. Nombre70707, in accordance with the judgment being enforced, must appear within eight days before a Notary Public to effect the required transfers (see folio 669 of the second instance file); 9.- that on June 13, 2001, the plaintiff again filed a request with the General Secretariat of the Municipality of Carrillo for compliance with what was ordered in the judgment by the Court of Santa Cruz (see folios 436 to 442): 10.- that the Municipal Council of Carrillo, in ordinary session No. 36-01, held on September 11, 2001, agreement No. 5, item 5, ordered the denial of the plaintiff's request (see folios 229 to 232); 11.- That on January 12, 1998, taxpayer 01813 (Nombre70707) paid the Municipality of Carrillo the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones and sixty cents for the concept of maritime zone lot occupation (ocupación lote zona marítima) (see money receipt number 49682 from folio 9 of the administrative file); 12.- That the Municipality of Carrillo was not a party (defendant) in the ordinary proceeding No. 93-100184-388-CI, processed in the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste (see folio 545 of the second instance file).-\n\nII.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: The following are held as such for the resolution of this litigation: a) that in the Department of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Departamento de Zona Marítimo Terrestre) of the Municipality of Carrillo, a record exists of a concession or lease contract (contrato de concesión o arrendamiento) within the public zone of Playas del Coco, Sardinal District, Carrillo Canton, province of Guanacaste, in the names of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 (no evidence was provided); b) That the national and foreign liquor license No. C-46 is in the name of the deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 or of their succession (the case file)\n\nIII.- PROCEDURAL ISSUES: Before conducting the final analysis of this matter, this Court must indicate that this proceeding, contrary to what was interpreted by the First Instance Judge, is not an enforcement proceeding of a judgment, even though the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a judicial ruling; rather, we are facing an ordinary lawsuit where what is required by the plaintiff is the transfer of an alleged right of \"concession or lease (concesión o arrendamiento)\" of a lot located on the maritime-terrestrial zone and the liquor license number (c-46) that is exploited in the Bar and Restaurant los Nombre70709 located on the lot. Therefore, the dispute concerns the denial made by the defendant Municipality entity, following the requirement of the plaintiff succession, derived from the right granted by a Judicial Judgment, within the Civil proceeding processed before the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, in which the Municipality of Carrillo was never considered a defendant or interested party. This shall then be the object of the present proceeding.\n\nIV.- REGARDING THE APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES: The dissatisfied party contends that the appealed judgment contains defects such as: a) erroneous appreciation and assessment of the evidence, b) lack of correlation between the complaint and the appealed judgment, since the latter orders the return of a concession to the holders Nombre70706 and Nombre70705; c) insufficient or deficient substantiation of the ruling, since the claims are typical of an enforcement proceeding and not an ordinary one. That there is no concession or lease in the name of the plaintiff, so a right that does not exist cannot be transferred; the Judge's decision is in violation of the substantive law governing the matter; d) that the Judge in the judgment confuses the terms concession with lease, which are completely different legal institutions, such that the Judge creates a new right in favor of the succession outside the boundaries of the Law.-\n\nV.- ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN CLAIM: It is noted that the plaintiff requests within this proceeding that the \"Municipality of Carrillo is obligated to transfer, by order of the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, to the consolidated successions of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, the concession of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the national and foreign liquor license number C-46.\"\n\nThe plaintiff bases her right and demand against the territorial entity on a First Instance Judicial Judgment issued by the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which annuls a contract entered into between Mr. Nombre70705 and Mrs. Nombre70706 and the interested party here, Mr. Nombre70707. The plaintiff requests that the defendant Municipality, in accordance with the ruling of the aforementioned judicial body by resolution of eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one, (folio 660 Legajo de segunda instancia), transfer to the name of the estate the concession and liquor license in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\". In this way, the plaintiff seeks to induce error not only in the territorial entity, but also in this judicial authority, by indicating that her right derives from the final judgment issued in the first instance in the Civil Court, the basis of this claim, which at the time of its execution, that same judicial authority ordered the Municipality to comply, and consequently order the transfer of a concession right to her name. But the plaintiff estate, as well as its legal representative, omits from this Court highly important data, such as that within civil execution process number 93-100184-388-CI, the defendant Municipality was never a party, lacking a causal link that obligates it to comply with what is indicated in that jurisdictional ruling, since the ordered conduct must be fulfilled by private individuals and not by the territorial administration. The plaintiffs conceal their right under the provisions of the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, by order of eight o'clock on February second, two thousand one, (folio 660 Legajo de segunda instancia), where the Municipal Council of Carrillo is ordered to transfer to their name the concession and liquor license, regarding the land and premises occupied by the business called \"Bar y Marisquería Cocos\" (see folio 441 of the main file), a right that effectively cannot be granted by the Municipal entity and even less so by this collegiate body, since even though it is an irrefutable truth that the aforementioned order requires the Municipality to perform a conduct, it is also true that, as stated in the record, subsequent to the issuance of said order and given the appeals filed by the defendant within the execution process (Mr. Nombre70707), that jurisdictional authority corrects the error produced, revoking said resolution by order of \"fifteen hours ten minutes on March twenty-sixth, year two thousand one\", indicating that it is Mr. Nombre70707, pursuant to the judgment being executed, who must appear within a period of eight days before a Notary Public in order to verify the transfers required in the judicial judgment, thereby rendering null and void and without legal effect what was originally ordered to the Municipality of Carrillo, namely: the transfer of the concession right, since for this procedure to occur as indicated by the judicial pronouncement that is the basis of this process, the counterparty, that is, the estate of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, had to pay what was agreed upon (return to Nombre70709, current owner of the Bar y Marisquería Cocos business, the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones together with interest at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until its effective payment, pay for the useful and necessary improvements made to the establishment located on the property subject to the concession in litigation by the defendants as of the date of notification of this claim), situations or verifications that are not proper to this litigation, but rather to the Execution process being processed before the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, and it is not possible for this Tribunal to issue an opinion regarding their fulfillment. It is thus that the judicial order, upon which the plaintiff requests the Municipality to carry out the transfer, as was duly demonstrated in the record, (folio 669 of the second instance file), was revoked, and therefore the defendant Municipality is not legally obligated to carry out a transfer that has not been ordered by a judicial body. This petition therefore becomes inadmissible, since the plaintiff seeks to induce error in the Municipal entity by affirming that by final resolution or judicial order, it was obligated to carry out the transfer of a supposed concession, when in truth said order was revoked by the same jurisdictional body, a situation that at no time was communicated to the local government (at least there is no evidence of it), with the sole purpose of having the transfer carried out illegally. This collegiate body cannot cloak with the veil of legality the action carried out by the plaintiff and rule contrary to what was ordered by another jurisdictional body, and even less order an action against the law, as will be stated:\n\nVI.- OF THE INTENDED TRANSFER: The plaintiffs request that \"the Municipality of Carrillo annul in the administrative file they maintain, the transfer carried out of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the license Placa11511. That the Municipality is obligated to carry out the referred transfer since the concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone existed before the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone came into effect, therefore having an acquired right which cannot be annulled or revoked by the Municipality of Carrillo. That the referred transfer is a necessary and obligatory act to grant enforceability to the final first-instance judgment.\" The representation of the plaintiff estates refers to a supposed concession right over part of the maritime-terrestrial zone; however, within this process, it has been demonstrated without any doubt, through documentary and testimonial evidence, that what existed in the name of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 was a right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) within the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, according to a certification from the Municipality of Carrillo, visible at folio 360 of the main file (which has not been alleged as false or inaccurate), a situation that is ratified by the testimonial declaration of Nombre70712 (folio 473 and 474). It has not been demonstrated by the plaintiff party that what they had was a concession right. It is verified that in ordinary session No. 126, of March 11, 1986, agreement No. 7, the Municipal Council of Carrillo, as requested at the time by Mrs. Nombre70706, orders the transfer to the name of Mr. Nombre70707 and Mr. Nombre70711 of a right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) that she held at that moment within the public zone of Playas del Coco, related to the land where the business called Bar y Marisquería Cocos is operating. Therefore, there does not exist, nor has there ever existed, a concession right in the name of the plaintiff estate; what Mrs. Nombre70706 had at that time was a mere occupation (ocupación) in the public zone, and not a concession right as the plaintiffs have intended this Tribunal to understand, a right which, as indicated, was registered in favor of Nombre70707 and Nombre70711, through the contractual business conducted between them. In due course, and for reasons beyond this process, the Mixed Court of Santa Cruz, by judgment, annuls the contract, and the right of occupation (ocupación) must return to the original owner, prior fulfillment of obligations inherent to the plaintiff estate. This being so, the only thing that can be discussed before the Municipality of Carrillo is precisely, it bears repeating, the right the plaintiff estate may have over that right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 held at one time, but never any right over a concession or lease contract, since, as insisted, the record has amply demonstrated that the deceased did not have a concession or lease contract within the public zone in their name. Indeed, as indicated by the appellant, the Trial Court Judge confuses the right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) with a concession, an unviable situation that this authority proceeds to correct, since effectively the concession is the legal form for making use of the public zone, while the occupation (ocupación) is merely a precarious right given by mere tolerance of the territorial administration, for the purpose of safeguarding the non-subjective rights that an occupant within the maritime-terrestrial zone might claim, given the wide variety of legal instruments that have been enacted regarding the occupation and planning of the maritime-terrestrial zone. A situation that will be analyzed in the following recital, based on the premise that the only thing that can be discussed at this stage is the right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 had at that time, as well as the benefits that may derive from it.\n\nVII.- ON THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE: The dominical regime of the maritime-terrestrial zone, although beginning to develop since the colonial era with the Royal Decree of October 15, 1754, in Costa Rica as an independent country, starts in the century before last, with the enactment of Decree Law No. 162 of June 28, 1828, whose affectation to the State's patrimony arises only as a means of fostering and protecting the fishing, maritime, and salt-related activities of the country. In the same vein, the General Regulations of the Public Treasury of 1839, 1858, and 1868 were enacted, distinguishing among the three, Law No. 7 of August 31, 1868, which reaffirms the inalienable character of the lands of the maritime mile. Although it was with the General Code of 1841 that reference was made to the domaniality of the maritime-terrestrial zone strip, a regulation tending to expressly stipulate its demaniality had not been given, which was achieved with the Water Law of 1884, specifically by its Article 20. This dominical affectation would be confirmed and developed by subsequent regulations, until reaching Law No. 6043, of March 2, 1977, the norm currently in force, which in its first article declares the subjection of the maritime-terrestrial zone to the public domain. However, this historical allusion of the strip under study to the public domain is also homologated by pronouncements of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic and national jurisprudence, in various resolutions of both the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber and the Superior Administrative Litigation Tribunal, in the following sense, transcribed for the record:\n\n\"It is thus how, since the first decades of the last century, and under the denomination of maritime mile, there exists in Costa Rica a safeguard of this strip of land, endowing it even with the character of public domain...\" (Opinion C-100-95 issued by the PGR on May 10, 1995).\n\n\"The Chamber accepts the thesis that indeed, the maritime-terrestrial zone is a public domain asset, in the terms of article 261 of the Civil Code which provides: 'Public things are those that by law are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which everyone can benefit from by being turned over to public use.' The demanial character of the maritime-terrestrial zone (or marine riparian zone as it was formerly called) has been recognized since time immemorial, and Roman Law itself includes that status, as 'res communes' and 'extra commercium'. In our environment, with complete clarity since the last century, the public character of that strip has been recognized, as an extension of the State's property in the marine zone adjacent to the national territory, over which it exercises its sovereignty. It must be kept in mind that the Political Constitution, in its article 121 subsection 14), although using the sociological term 'nation' which came from the 1871 Constitution, grants the Legislative Assembly the power to 'affect' State assets for public use, in a way that clearly covers the situation under examination, since under its protection the challenged legislation was enacted, not only the latter (No. 6043), but all those that in the past regulated this matter.\" (Constitutional Chamber, Voto 447-91 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on February twenty-first, 1991).\n\n\"IV.- The maritime-terrestrial zone is and always has been, it is repeated, of public domain. Its current legal regime is that established by Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, its amendments, and its regulation...\" (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 007-93 of fifteen hours five minutes on January 20, 1993).\n\n\"VI.- Correlatively to what has been said, the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions –including, of course, the corresponding Municipalities– and even of all inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.\" (Superior Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Third Section in judgment No. 128-2001, of 08:00 hours on February 16, 2001).\n\nRegarding the normative development of the territorial extension of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is noted that since Decree Law No. 162 of June 28, 1828, it has been stipulated that the protection strip or that affected to the public domain would have a length of one mile from the coast. However, it is from the reform to the Fiscal Code by Law No. 11 of October 22, 1926, that the extension is first specified as one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters from the ordinary high tide along the coasts of both seas, and five hundred meters along both banks of the rivers. This measurement was maintained until 1942, when by means of Law No. 19 of November 11, the protected area was disaffected to two hundred meters from the ordinary high tide for the Atlantic coast; and for reasons of normative parity, the same was done in the Pacific, by Law No. 201 of August 26, 1943, in its first article, which meant the disaffection of one thousand four hundred seventy-two meters from the dominical regime, making them susceptible at that time to being appropriable by private individuals. Such modification was ratified in the Land and Colonization Law of October 14, 1961, and in the Forest Law of November 25, 1969. With the enactment of the Law for the Tourism Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970, the dominical protection over this strip was further weakened, by promoting the appropriation of lands within the one hundred fifty meters of the strip currently known as the restricted zone, leaving only the fifty meters counted from the ordinary high tide as inalienable. It is precisely with Law 6043 that the measure of two hundred meters of protection is retaken and consolidated, through the provisions of its Article 9, which also includes under the maritime-terrestrial zone regime the islands, islets, and maritime rock formations, as well as any land or natural formation that protrudes from the ocean level within the country's territorial sea. As can be noted, several regulations have been enacted regarding this dominical zone; however, this affectation has not always been oriented in the same way or with the same ends. Thus, we have that in the colonial era, the domaniality of the maritime-terrestrial zone arises fundamentally from an interest in safeguarding the territory and protecting those whose habitual occupation was extracting marine products. We must remember that in that era, pirate invasions of American territory were frequent, ours being significantly affected on several occasions. Therefore, with the diffusions of the Royal Decree of October 15, 1754, and the Law of January 4, 1813, the aim was to affect the strip under study to the public domain to protect the territory—which at that time formed part of the Spanish Crown—more efficiently and to promote marine extraction activities. In Costa Rica as a Republic, the first norms that addressed the topic gave preponderance to agricultural and livestock use, according to Law 162 of June 28, 1828, and subsequently articles 6 and 62 of the Law on Vacant Lands of 1939, in which it can be noted that the entirety of the public strip, except for the two hundred meters contiguous to the ordinary high tide, was dedicated to agricultural and livestock use. Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law of 1961 also considers the maritime-terrestrial zone as part of the State's agricultural property. It is not until the late sixties that a greater interest in the urban and tourism development of this dominical strip begins to take shape, which was manifested with the propagation of contracts for these uses, granted at that time by the Institute of Lands and Colonization (currently known as the Institute of Agrarian Development). But it is only with the enactment of the Law for the Tourism Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of 1970, in its first article, that this urban-tourism use is given to the strip under study. Without a doubt, with Law 4558, the aim was to change the marked agricultural and livestock use that the maritime-terrestrial zone had and to give it a tourism orientation. This Law had great negative consequences in its application, resulting in the indiscriminate and abusive private appropriation of the maritime-terrestrial zone in its titling. Thus, great unease arose within the Legislative Assembly regarding the possibility of losing State dominion over this dominical asset, which led to the suspension of Law 4558, the derogation of its Transitory III, and its definitive abolition by Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, which is the current legislation. This law, together with its Regulation, in general terms points more towards a planned and environmentally sustainable tourism development, exploiting the natural beauties of our coasts by attracting investment both in recreational and residential infrastructure, as well as tourists. Thus, a great difference is observed compared to the previous regulations, since Law 4558, as could be noted, presented a use that, although touristic, was more directed at the population or urbanization of the zone, while the current regulation practically attempts to make this possibility forgotten, or at least in the way it occurred, rescuing only the possibility of classifying the zones according to their tourism or non-tourism suitability, generating the possibility of carrying out a development that is either touristic or predominantly agricultural/livestock, fishing, or industrial, according to the intrinsic characteristics of each place.\n\nIt is the legislator's intention that the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) is a public domain asset, therefore it is not susceptible to private appropriation in any form and its regime of use is circumscribed to what the current regulations establish. In this regard, articles 1, 7, 20, 23, and 53 of the cited Law can be mentioned. Another situation that reflects this regulation is the sense of belonging it possesses, where a preference is evidenced for the management and use of the maritime-terrestrial zone to be executed primarily by nationals, further distancing the possibility that foreigners, by reason of their economic conditions, could to some degree take ownership of our beaches. Evidence of this are articles 31, 47, 57, and 70 of the Law. Therefore, if anything has been reflected by the current legislation in relation to its predecessors, it is that lessons have been learned from past mistakes and from the need that exists to adapt the regulations to the current situation experienced by each coastal region, whose needs vary from place to place, without neglecting the global juncture in which we are immersed.\n\nVIII.- ON THE RIGHT OF OCCUPATION IN THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE: The dominant doctrinal position establishes that use permits (occupation in precariousness, ocupación en precario) are unilateral administrative acts. Some authors, like Nombre33033, go further, concluding that it, as a juridical act, is bilateral, since its issuance is the product of the express wills of the applicant and the Administration; and as a legal transaction, it is unilateral, because the permit holder lacks rights against the State. Likewise, such permits possess a precarious nature, alluding to the possibility that the Administration may at any time unilaterally revoke said permit or occupation, for reasons of necessity or general interest (in this sense, see ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 2306-91, from 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991). Such precariousness is based on the fact that the use or occupation permit only constitutes a tolerance by the Administration, and therefore can be revoked at any time. In accordance with article 154 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), this revocation shall not generate an indemnity charge to the Administration, when done for duly demonstrated reasons of opportunity and convenience. Furthermore, the revocatory act must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for its compliance must be granted in all cases. It is accepted by doctrine that use permits or occupations within the maritime-terrestrial zone do not generate a subjective right in favor of their beneficiaries but rather a legitimate interest. It must be made clear that these permits are only authorizations to carry out simple acts whose effects do not significantly impact the property used, so only minor works whose conditions allow for their easy and rapid removal should be consented to; constructions with the character of permanent attachment to the land are not permitted, since such installations would hinder the effective implementation of planned zoning. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), through official communication No. C-100-95, issued on May 10, 1995, concluded in this regard:\n\n\"Thus, for the maritime-terrestrial zone of our country, only use permits could be admitted that meet two essential characteristics: a) that they do not affect the natural conditions of the zone nor hinder the free use of the public zone, and b) their execution in no way limits the future implementation of a regulatory plan (plan regulador).\"\n\nNow then, the administrative act by which the permit or occupation is granted must be reasoned, just like the resolution that denies it; said reasoning must revolve around the public interest for which such decision was reached. Regarding lease contracts (contratos de arrendamiento) existing prior to its enactment, it stipulates that these are valid, under the same terms and conditions in which they were agreed, but upon their expiration, or if their extension is agreed upon, these must be modified in accordance with the new current regulations, according to its first transitional provision, the foregoing provided they have been remitted to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo) within six months following the entry into force of the cited Law, otherwise they shall be deemed extinguished according to the second transitional provision. The situation of occupants is different, since in our legislation, the condition of occupant is created for those persons who were located in the maritime-terrestrial zone and who did not have a lease contract at the time the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, was issued, without there being an act of the Administration recognizing such situation. The so-called occupants of the public (restricted) zone are granted a special preferential treatment (but under equal conditions) by the law to convert that occupation into a concession right (derecho de concesión), provided that the occupant of the land has possessed it in a public, quiet, peaceful, continuous manner over the restricted property of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and without implying improvements. The legislator did not intend to consolidate such figure permanently, but rather a simple tolerance, while its conformity with the legal system is achieved, in other words, the category of occupant is used temporarily while the granting of the concession is legally possible. This figure (occupant) has been the subject of multiple interpretations, as it is not harmoniously adjusted to the cited Law, which has given rise to flawed practices and illicit businesses. The legal nature of the occupant is that of a right in precariousness and therefore they could never be confused with or claim rights that only a property owner can have, since these by their condition do not require a concession. Nor can they be treated as lessees of the maritime-terrestrial zone, as they are an express subject of regulation under transitional provisions I and II of the aforementioned rule, since in their case, it speaks not of the concession contract but of the extension, of lease contracts prior to its enactment, which must be modified in accordance with the laws in force. Nor can or should they be confused with those persons who entered the public domain zone clandestinely, since after this Law, such action is prohibited according to its article 12. We must, therefore, conclude that the occupant is that person who was located in the restricted zone of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and who at the time of the entry into force of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, did not have a lease contract in their favor. The legal norm under study also creates a figure very similar to the occupant called \"settler (poblador)\", who, according to numeral 70, is a Costa Rican person by birth, with more than 10 years of continuous residence in the zone, with certification from the Electoral Registry, provided it is demonstrated that it is their only property, a figure that for these purposes is not important and therefore a substantive analysis is not performed. Continuing, the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law makes reference, although not expressly, to the occupant in its article 48 when indicating:\n\n\"The regulation of this Law shall establish the procedure for processing the application, the modalities of concession, the canon to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances and in a special manner, with the different situations of the settlers or inhabitants of the zone, and those who are not, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary, to regulate the relations between the Municipalities and the concessionaires.\"\n\nFrom the foregoing it can be extracted that both occupants and settlers constitute the exceptional regime of Law 6043. The regulation of the cited norm (Decree 7841-P), provided in its numeral 45, third paragraph, who could hold the condition of occupants in the following way: “those who not being settlers have constructed or built on the zone on illegally possessed parcels, (those who do not have a lease contract in their name, issued prior to Law 5602), but also suppresses the payment for improvements, however it retakes the privilege granted through article 44 of its Law. Having said the foregoing, we have that the condition of occupant cannot generate any right of property or possession, since the maritime-terrestrial zone, being part of the public domain, cannot be the object of possession nor be positively acquired by prescription with the passage of time, as provided for by article 7 of Law 6043. This characteristic of imprescriptibility results in the juridical impossibility of exercising possession over the inalienable strip of land, therefore this norm, when it grants preeminence for granting a concession, refers Nombre40338 and expressly to the occupant of the land who had possessed it, this in a quiet, public, peaceful, and continuous manner. Requirements, which for the case at hand, are easily verifiable. It can then be affirmed that the occupation of the succession of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 has not been continuous, because that condition was transferred to Mr. Nombre70707, who in turn exercised acts over the same, as demonstrated by means of one of the payments made to the Municipality of Carrillo on January 12, 1998, as taxpayer 01813, where he pays for the concept of occupation lot maritime zone, the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred ninety-one colones and sixty céntimos (see money receipt number 49682 on folio 9 of the administrative file); and even less peaceful, this is demonstrated by means of the great litigious activity, to which it has been subject, in the different judicial processes, including the one at hand, in addition to the amparo appeals and administrative claims that revolve around it. Before these circumstances, the condition of occupant is not applicable to the succession of Nombre40338 and Nombre70706. Now then, as indicated above, the legislator, upon creating the figure of the occupant, does not intend to consolidate their precarious situation permanently; on the contrary, it is given as an alternative solution, of mere tolerance while the respective planning is produced by the Municipal entity, by means of the legal instrument called Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) of the zone, this according to transitional provision VII, of the Law under discussion, which provides: “The municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone shall collect a canon established by the Law for the occupants thereof. The collection shall be made according to the use and with the current appraisal of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation. This authorization shall have the character of provisional until the development plan for the respective zone enters into force and does not produce any right for the occupants as far as concession is concerned.” The purpose of the norm is to extinguish the precarious occupation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, obtained outside the Law (without having the lease contracts as is the case at hand where nothing more than a right of occupation has been demonstrated) so that these portions of land, fulfill their public domain destiny, and so that in those cases where one wishes to obtain a benefit from it, it is done in accordance with the Law, that is, by the only possible legal means (concession contract). For its part, article 75 of the oft-mentioned Law, also establishes that occupants do not even have a right to improvements, if the use of the parcel is not in accordance with the local regulatory plan, which leads to saying that any building that has been carried out without this legal coverage, is classified as contrary to it, since only those derived from a lease contract prior to the suspension of Law 4558 (Law of Tourism Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone of April 22, 1970) or an extension thereof, can be permitted in a lawful manner, since with the entry into force of Law 6043, of March 2, 1977, their unlawfulness is decreed, if the local regulatory plan has not been issued or failing that, if they are not carried out under the protection of a concession contract for the public zone. To further elaborate, we have that any act carried out before the validity of the cited norm, on lands of the maritime-terrestrial zone not subject to a lease contract, lacks validity, according to numeral 71, when indicating: that all acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions carried out or taken as of the enactment of Law 5602 and that are contrary to its provisions (of November 4, 1974), are absolutely null. It goes without saying then that any action carried out after this date regarding the aforementioned maritime-terrestrial zone, lacks all validity, including the granting of licenses (patentes). Because regarding these, it has been clearly established that the means to grant them is the public auction and that it is the responsibility of the Municipal entity to set the number of liquor establishments that can be authorized within its jurisdiction. Although the granting of business licenses and the license for the retail sale of liquor with the issuance of licenses is an attribution of the Municipality, this does not proceed when the application is for an activity to be developed within the Public Zone, of common use, in which by rule it is prohibited for private individuals to exercise any right or occupation. Article 63 in relation to article 20 of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, sanctions the official who grants concessions or occupation permits against its provisions or related Laws, a situation that at the same time falls within the assumptions for denial of licenses foreseen by the Municipal Code, for being an activity not permitted by Law, given the physical location, public ownership, and destination of the asset. (On the responsibility of local governments in the improper use of licenses, see Constitutional ruling number 6469-97). This being so, the plaintiff cannot allege, as they do, an acquired subjective right over a right of occupation in precariousness, and over a license obtained under the indicated circumstances; the only subjective right that an occupant has, would be that of priority over a concession application, provided the requirements are met and the use is compatible with that predetermined by the Regulatory Plan of the sector. A privilege granted by the Law, which has caused a harmful effect, since an indiscriminate sale of occupation rights has since occurred, without it being clear, on the part of the acquirers, that these rights of occupation are not subject to any transmission. As stated, the goal of Law 6043 of March 2, 1977, is to give special treatment to those who meet the condition of occupants or settlers, in order to extinguish these figures, not to perpetuate them over time; it is not possible, therefore, that third parties unrelated to the particularity of occupant, can continue that condition into the future. It is not possible to apply the occupant's own conditions to third parties, since the interest that prompted its creation ceased to exist from the moment the transmission of the occupation occurred. Occupation permits are granted intuito personae, as stated, by reason of personal qualities and conditions, there being no express rule that authorizes their transfer to heirs. The condition of occupant cannot be transmissible in any way, to third parties, for the reasons stated, but also because of the illegality that occurred in its creation (non-existence of a lease contract), besides the fact that Law 6043 does not prescribe that commerce can occur over the condition of occupant, as it does over the rights of the concession contract. The foregoing exercise inevitably leads to stating that the condition of occupant cannot be transmissible; it is Nombre70705 that the plaintiff succession cannot claim rights over an occupation and license it has never had, since the condition of occupant, who held it, in their time were the now deceased Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, and as it is not transmissible even to the heirs, it ceases to exist with the decease of the occupants, this being so, any juridical act tending to transmit it is completely null since the supposed third-party acquirers cannot substitute that special condition of occupant.\n\nMoreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that a concession exists or ever existed in the name of the plaintiff succession or of Nombre70705 and Nombre70706, making it impossible for the defendant Municipality to lawfully create a subjective right (concession contract), even under the protection of a judicial ruling, derived from a non-transferable right of occupation (derecho de ocupación), in favor of persons who, as demonstrated, do not meet the condition of occupants. The plaintiff cannot claim inheritance rights over a non-existent concession, *since no one can transfer by inter vivos acts, and even less by mortis causa, that which they do not have.* In the sub-lite, it is more than demonstrated that Mr. Nombre70705 and Mrs. Nombre70706 never held a concession contract in their favor over the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre); what they held in life was a right of occupation (derecho de ocupación), and since this right is not susceptible to transmission, this Court cannot grant a right that is not possessed, contrary to all existing regulations regarding the Maritime Terrestrial Zone. For further elaboration on this ruling, the judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, number 317-F-2008, at nine hours and ten minutes on May second, two thousand eight, should be cited, which, in relevant part, states:\n\n\"..... *Continuing with the analysis of the aforementioned legal article, in the event no occupant exists, the merit principle is applicable. In accordance with the foregoing, determining who should be considered an “occupant” of land located in the restricted zone (zona restringida) takes on cardinal importance. Should this concept be equated with that of a possessor? This Chamber, after analyzing the rule under study, jointly and harmoniously with the rest of the articles of the aforementioned Law, and its Regulations, concludes that the answer must be negative. According to the first article of the Law under study, the maritime terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Only through concessions, it is reiterated, may private parties exploit the restricted zone (Article 39). In this sense, according to numeral 12, unauthorized tenancy of lands located there is prohibited: “In the maritime terrestrial zone, without the due legal authorization, it is prohibited to exploit the existing flora and fauna, demarcate with fences, tracks, or in any other form, erect buildings or installations, cut trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.” Ordinal 13 sanctions illegitimate possession or tenancy as follows: “ The authorities of the corresponding jurisdiction and the respective municipalities, as soon as they have notice of the infractions referred to in the two previous articles, shall proceed, upon information gathered to that effect, if deemed necessary, to the eviction of the offenders and the destruction or demolition of the constructions, remodelings, or installations made by them, without any liability for the authority or the municipality. The cost of the demolition or destruction shall be charged to the owner of the construction or installation. All the foregoing without prejudice to any criminal sanctions that may apply. ” However, under the shelter of its ordinal 6, private property, legitimately acquired, in the maritime terrestrial zone is recognized: “ The provisions of this law shall not apply to the areas of cities situated on the coastlines, nor to properties inscribed, in accordance with the law, in the name of private parties, nor to those whose legitimacy is recognized by law. ”; nevertheless, according to canon 8, those lands are declared of public utility for expropriation purposes: “ The maritime terrestrial zone is declared of public utility so that lots, parcels, or improvements located therein, which may have been sold, acquired, or possessed in ownership by private parties, may be rescued for the national patrimony through expropriation. ” Likewise, the Law under comment, in its Transitory Provisions I and II, maintains the validity and effectiveness of lease contracts celebrated under the protection of prior legislation, provided certain requirements are met: “ **Transitorio I.-** *Concessions or lease contracts granted based on prior laws, save for the exceptions established herein, shall pass to the control of the respective municipalities and shall continue under the same terms and conditions under which they were agreed, but upon their expiration and if their extension is agreed upon, they shall be modified in accordance with the rules of this law. The foregoing referring to the maritime terrestrial zone.* **Transitorio II.-** *The municipalities and the Institute of Lands and Colonization must send to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute within the first six months of this law's effectiveness, copies of the contracts or concessions they may have granted in the maritime terrestrial zone, without prejudice to the interested parties also submitting, within that same period, their contracts to this Institute, all for purposes of their registration therein. Once that term has expired without said contracts having been submitted, they shall lack validity and shall be deemed extinguished./ If contracts have not been executed, any existing receipts must be presented./ In all cases, certification of being up-to-date with the payment of the respective fees must be attached. The absence of this certification shall be proof that the fees have not been satisfied./ For the purposes of this transitory provision, the originals of the documents or photostatic copies thereof, signed by the interested party or by the representative of the corresponding entity, may be submitted. ” The figure of the occupant, indicated in Article 44 under comment, consequently, does not allude to owners, as they do not need a concession to usufruct their lands; nor to lessees of properties located in the maritime terrestrial zone, whose contract was granted in accordance with prior regulations, since, as just analyzed, there are specific provisions regulating them, on the understanding that it concerns extensions of those agreements; still less does it refer to persons introduced into said zone in an illicit manner, as this is expressly prohibited by Article 12, as noted. The valid interpretation is to consider as an “occupant” all those persons who, settled in the restricted zone, did not hold a concession at the time Law 6043 was enacted. This is, consequently, a special or exception regime, which is not the only one in that legislation. In this regard, as noted, in the transcribed Article 6, the areas of cities situated on the coastlines were excluded; furthermore, in ordinal 70, the figure of the settler (poblador) was created, who is given the possibility of remaining on the properties occupied by them, until the planning of the zone occurs, at which time they may be relocated and compensated for their improvements. Said article provides: “ Settlers of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must subject themselves to the planning of the zone, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements compensated according to this law. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. ” The indicated conclusion, that the expression “occupant” in the Law refers to a special regime, is confirmed by the provisions of numeral 48: “ Concessions shall be granted for a term of not less than five nor more than twenty years and must indicate the fee to be paid and its payment method. This fee substitutes the territorial tax./ The regulations to this law shall establish the procedure for processing the application, the modalities of the concession, the fee to be paid in each zone according to its circumstances, and, *in a special manner, with the differing situation of the settlers or inhabitants and those who are not*, as well as any other provisions deemed necessary to regulate the relations between the municipalities and the concessionaires. ”(Underlining not in original); by stating said provision: “... and those who are not ...” it alludes to occupants. More explicit is numeral 75 of the Regulations, in developing the previous legal provision: “ Settlers of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated according to the planning of the zone, upon prior indemnification for improvements. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. / When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession over the property, provided no part of the public zone is included. If improvements exist in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the regulations shall apply, and the provisions of Article 74 of the regulations if the improvements are located in the restricted zone. / *Those who, not being settlers, have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties, shall not be entitled to payment for improvements. / However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if granted, they will not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Applications for concessions made by occupants of the maritime terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.* ” When this provision, in its third paragraph, refers to “ illegally possessed properties ”, as has been pointed out, it must be understood that the person is within the maritime terrestrial zone without a lease contract or concession legitimizing them, i.e., as an occupant. It is important to note that this rule reiterates what is prescribed in ordinal 44 of the Law, in the sense that “... Applications for concessions made by occupants of the maritime terrestrial zone shall have priority over others .”, which supports the thesis held. Likewise, Transitory Provision VII of the Law is clear in establishing the provisional, or precarious, nature of the occupation, which can be equated to mere tolerance under common law: “ **Transitorio VII.-** *The municipalities with jurisdiction over the maritime terrestrial zone shall charge the fee established by this law for its occupants./ The charge shall be made according to use and the current appraisal by the General Directorate of Direct Taxation.* *This authorization shall be of a provisional nature, until the development plan for the respective zone comes into effect and it does not produce any right whatsoever for the occupants regarding a concession. *(Underlining not in original). In light of what is set forth in this transitory rule, it is Nombre70705 that the State permits the permanence of those persons –occupants– in the coastal zone until the granting of concessions is possible, that is, when the regulatory plan for the zone is issued (Articles 70, Transitorio VII of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone; and 57 of its Regulations). Their condition is so precarious that, according to regulatory Article 75, they are not entitled to payment for improvements, although they do have priority for their concession applications, provided the use projected for the land is compatible with that foreseen in the sector's planning. Moreover, as the maritime terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony belonging to the State, inalienable and imprescriptible, which is recognized by numeral 7 of the law, indicating that lands located in the maritime terrestrial zone “ ... cannot be subject to possessory informations and private parties may neither appropriate them for themselves nor legalize them in their name, by this or any other means. ”; this implies the juridical impossibility of deriving possessory rights over said zone. Consequently, the terminology used by Article 44 of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone is appropriate, that is, it refers to the mere occupant and not to the possessor. Furthermore, said condition of occupant cannot be transmitted to third parties, as it is clothed with special conditions that only those persons –the occupants– possess; therefore, any juridical act intended to transfer it becomes absolutely null. Accepting the contrary would imply violating the provisions of the previously indicated articles of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and its regulations.*\n\n**XXII.-** *In the case file, according to the provisions of the proven facts numbered 9, 10, and 12, Mr. Nombre34289 and Mrs. Nombre70713 submitted their application for a concession over the disputed land to the Municipality of Nicoya on July 12; the plaintiff corporation submitted theirs on September 28, and Mr. Nombre70713 on October 23, all dates in 1989. On the other hand, although it was not held as proven, the second-instance judges, in Considerando X of the appealed judgment (folio 1029), state that both parties propose the same type of use for the disputed land, which is agricultural and livestock activity; furthermore, that the zone where the disputed land is located is non-touristic (which was accepted by the plaintiff corporation on folios 17 vuelto, 176, and 185, and by the defendants in their answer to the complaint on folio 232). In light of what is set forth in the preceding considerando, since two concession applications were filed for the same land located in the maritime terrestrial zone and for the same use or purpose, framed within the priorities established by the Regulations to the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Article 57, subsection b) paragraph 1), an analysis must be made to determine whether any of the applicants can be considered an occupant. In this sense, it is Nombre70705 that the plaintiff corporation does not meet the necessary conditions, as, according to what emerges from its complaint – facts identified as second, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth – what it alleges is having acquired from the defendants Nombre34289 and Nombre70713 the possession right over the disputed land on February 21, 1989, a legal transaction which, as noted in the preceding section, is absolutely null; moreover, according to what is established in the demonstrated fact numbered 7, its entry onto the disputed land occurred, approximately, in March 1989. For their part, those defendants also do not meet such characteristic; this is because, it is reiterated, based on the indicated proven facts, and as analyzed in preceding considerandos, at the time of filing their concession application, they were no longer occupying the land; ergo, they do not meet the condition of continuous “possession”, as provided for in Article 44 of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone.*\n\nGiven that the right of occupation (derecho de ocupación) that Nombre70705 and Nombre70706 held at the time was not transferable to third parties, their succession cannot come forward to claim a subjective right it does not have, and even less so that such a situation binds the Municipality of Carrillo to the issuance of acts contrary to the legal system. Thus, the denial issued by the territorial entity regarding the transfer of a concession right over the maritime terrestrial zone, as well as the national and foreign liquor license (patente de licores) number Placa11511, is in accordance with the legal system; there is no defect whatsoever in its grounds, content, and purpose. The claim of the plaintiff succession is not acceptable to this Court; accepting the contrary implies ordering actions contrary to the Law and the regulations governing the matter subjected to scrutiny by this judicial authority.\n\n**IX.-** CONCLUSIONS: With juridical certainty, it is established that Mr. Nombre70705 and Mrs. Nombre70706, what they held in life was the condition of occupants within the maritime terrestrial zone, a right that is not susceptible to transmission to third parties; **consequently, any juridical act intended to transfer it becomes absolutely null**, and as it is a precarious right (derecho en precario), it confers no subjective rights, ergo the plaintiff succession lacks the right to its claims; accepting the contrary would imply violating the body of law that covers administrative conduct, and therefore the appeal filed in this regard must be granted.\n\n**X.**- **ON COSTS:** This Court considers that we are in the presence of the circumstances of Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), therefore it is ruled without special condemnation for costs.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nIn what is the object of the appeal, the appealed decision is **REVERSED**, solely insofar as it rejected the defense of lack of right, declared the complaint admissible, and condemned the Municipality of Carrillo to pay both costs, in order to instead, uphold the lack of right and decree the **IMPROCEDENCIA** of the action in all its aspects. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs. In all other respects, it is affirmed. NOTIFÍQUESE.-\n\n***Cristina Víquez Cerdas***\n\n***Nombre66641***    ***Sady Jiménez Quesada***"
}