{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-459155", "citation": "Res. 00081-2009 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VIII", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Confirmación de demanialidad de plazoleta municipal usurpada por particular", "title_en": "Municipal square's public-domain status upheld against encroachment by private party", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo confirma la sentencia de primera instancia que declaró sin lugar la demanda ordinaria interpuesta contra la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia. La actora pretendía la anulación del procedimiento administrativo municipal por supuesta ilegalidad en la recuperación de un terreno que constituía el lindero norte de su propiedad. El tribunal determinó que el terreno en disputa es un bien demanial (plazoleta municipal o zona verde), de uso público, y que la actora se apropió indebidamente de él mediante construcciones y ampliaciones de linderos, pasando su propiedad de 99 m² a más de 150 m². Se aplica la presunción iuris tantum de demanialidad sobre áreas destinadas a parques o facilidades comunales, conforme al Art. 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. El tribunal subraya que los bienes demaniales son inembargables, inalienables e imprescriptibles, y que la Administración tiene el privilegio de recuperarlos de oficio cuando su carácter público es indubitable, sin necesidad de acudir a un juez. La sentencia confirma la condenatoria en costas a la actora.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Appeals Court upholds the lower court's ruling dismissing the ordinary lawsuit filed against the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia. The plaintiff sought annulment of the municipal administrative procedure, alleging illegality in the recovery of land that formed the northern boundary of her property. The court found that the disputed land is a public domain asset (municipal square or green zone) for public use, and that the plaintiff had improperly appropriated it through construction and boundary expansions, increasing her property from 99 m² to over 150 m². The iuris tantum presumption of public ownership applies to areas designated as parks or communal facilities under Art. 40 of the Urban Planning Law. The court emphasizes that public domain assets are unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, and that the Administration holds the privilege of recovering them ex officio when their public character is beyond doubt, without resorting to the courts. The judgment confirms that costs are borne by the plaintiff.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VIII", "date": "30/11/2009", "year": "2009", "topic_ids": [ "property-and-titling" ], "primary_topic_id": "property-and-titling", "es_concept_hints": [ "bien demanial", "presunción iuris tantum", "plazoleta", "zona verde", "usurpación", "recuperación posesoria de oficio" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "bien demanial", "dominio público", "plazoleta municipal", "zona verde", "usurpación", "presunción iuris tantum", "Ley de Planificación Urbana 4240", "Art. 40", "recuperación posesoria", "inalienable", "imprescriptible", "inembargable", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "costas procesales" ], "keywords_en": [ "public domain", "demanial assets", "municipal square", "green zone", "encroachment", "iuris tantum presumption", "Urban Planning Law 4240", "Art. 40", "recovery of possession", "inalienable", "imprescriptible", "unseizable", "Administrative Appeals Court", "procedural costs" ], "excerpt_es": "los bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público son tales cuando una ley así los ha declarado o bien cuando por su uso o destino están dedicados al servicio de la comunidad o colectividad, aplicándose en su determinación la presunción iuris tantum de naturaleza demanial. En ese sentido, no es necesario su inscripción registral, en el tanto en que la demanialidad sea manifiesta e indubitable, por el uso directo e indirecto que toda persona puede hacer de ellos y por su vocación y afectación a un uso común (...) en el caso de ser discutida su naturaleza en la vía judicial, se deberá probar su condición por quien la alegue o desvirtúe...\n\n...hay suficiente prueba conteste e indubitable en autos, de que el terreno objeto de litigio es un bien de dominio público en administración de la Municipalidad, dedicado como plazoleta o zona verde para el recreo de las personas y que paulatinamente la aquí gestionante la ha ido invadiendo, realizando diversas ampliaciones a su propiedad...", "excerpt_en": "public domain, demanial, or dominical assets are those declared as such by law or are, by their use or destination, dedicated to serving the community or the collective, applying in their determination the iuris tantum presumption of a demanial nature. In that sense, registration is not necessary, as long as the public character is manifest and beyond doubt, given the direct and indirect use that anyone may make of them and their vocation and allocation to common use (...) if their nature is disputed in court, their status must be proven by whoever alleges or rebuts it...\n\n...there is sufficient, consistent, and undeniable evidence in the case file that the land in dispute is a public domain asset under the Municipality's administration, used as a square or green zone for public recreation, and that the petitioner has gradually encroached upon it, making various expansions to her property...", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The lower court ruling is upheld, dismissing the ordinary lawsuit and imposing costs on the plaintiff, after finding that the encroached-upon land is a public domain asset belonging to the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia.", "summary_es": "Se confirma la sentencia que declaró sin lugar la demanda ordinaria y condenó en costas a la actora, al determinarse que el terreno usurpado es un bien demanial de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "Public domain, demanial, or dominical assets or public things are those permanently allocated by law to a public utility service or delivered to public use so that everyone may benefit from them (Article 261 of the Civil Code).", "quote_es": "Los bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público o cosas públicas son aquellos que se encuentran afectos por ley de un modo permanente a un servicio de utilidad pública o entregados al uso público de modo que todos pueden aprovecharse (artículo 261 del Código Civil)." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "public domain, demanial, or dominical assets are those declared as such by law or are, by their use or destination, dedicated to serving the community or the collective, applying in their determination the iuris tantum presumption of a demanial nature.", "quote_es": "los bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público son tales cuando una ley así los ha declarado o bien cuando por su uso o destino están dedicados al servicio de la comunidad o colectividad, aplicándose en su determinación la presunción iuris tantum de naturaleza demanial." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "the privilege of ex officio recovery of possession of the affected asset, by virtue of which the Administration may recover disturbed possession of its property without resorting to the courts, without prejudice to the better right being discussed in jurisdictional proceedings.", "quote_es": "el privilegio de la recuperación posesoria de oficio del bien afectado, en virtud del cual, la Administración puede recobrar la posesión perturbada de sus bienes sin necesidad de acudir al juez y sin perjuicio de que el mejor derecho se discuta en la vía jurisdiccional." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-375098", "citation": "Res. 03145-1996 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Presumption of public domain over public roads", "title_es": "Presunción de demanialidad de las vías públicas", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "28/06/1996", "year": "1996" }, { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-375283", "citation": "Res. 02408-2007 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Constitutional challenge to title deadline in Cahuita and Puerto Viejo denied", "title_es": "Inconstitucionalidad del plazo de titulación en Cahuita y Puerto Viejo rechazada", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "21/02/2007", "year": "2007" }, { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-87313", "citation": "Res. 02306-1991 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Revocation of street-vending permits requires due process", "title_es": "Revocación de permisos de ventas estacionarias debe respetar el debido proceso", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "06/11/1991", "year": "1991" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-459155", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Nº 81-2009-S-VIII\n\n \n\nNº 81-2009-S-VIII \n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCION OCTAVA. II Circuito Judicial. San José, a las trece horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de noviembre del año dos mil nueve.-\n\nProceso Ordinario contencioso, tramitado en el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, interpuesto por Nombre128582 , mayor, casada, oficios del hogar, cédula de identidad número CED114248 fungiendo como su abogado director el Licenciado Rodolfo Arroyo Porras, contra la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia, representada por su Alcalde Nombre102691 , mayor, casado en primeras nupcias, sociólogo, vecino de Santiago, San Rafael de Heredia, cédula de identidad número CED114249, y actuando como apoderado especial judicial el Licenciado Saúl González Vargas, mayor, soltero, abogado, vecino de San Isidro de Heredia, cédula de identidad número CED114250. Todo ello tramitado bajo el expediente número 04-1180-163-CA.\n\nRESULTANDO\n\nI.- Estimada en la suma de un millón de colones, con la presente acción ordinaria, pretende la actora declarar sin lugar el procedimiento administrativo incoado en su contra, así como la ilegalidad y anulación de los actos y disposiciones contenidas en la resolución del Alcalde Municipal que fueron motivo del recurso de reposición planteado y se condene a la accionada al pago de ambas costas, tanto administrativas como judiciales. \n\nII.- La demandada se opuso a la acción y solicitó se declaren sin lugar las pretensiones de la actora por carecer de fundamento legal.\n\nIII.- La jueza Claudia Elena Bolaños Salazar, Juez del Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, mediante sentencia número 1670-2009 de las dieciséis horas del 31 de julio del 2009, dispuso: \"POR TANTO: De conformidad con los hechos que informan el proceso y citas legales y jurisprudenciales mencionadas, se resuelve: Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor proveer. Se declara sin lugar la demanda. Son las costas a cargo de la actora. Notifíquese a las partes en el lugar señalado.\".\n\nIV. Inconforme con lo resuelto, la actora formuló apelación dentro del término de ley contra dicho fallo, recurso que le fue admitido, y en virtud del cual conoce este Tribunal en alzada. \n\nV. A la apelación se les ha dado el trámite debido, y no se observan vicios u omisiones susceptibles de producir nulidad de lo actuado o indefensión a las partes. Se dicta esta resolución previa deliberación dentro del margen de tiempo que las labores de este Despacho lo permiten.\n\nRedacta el juez Espinoza Salas; y\n\n C O N S I DE R A N D O\n\nI.1)- HECHOS PROBADOS: Se aprueban los hechos probados que contiene el fallo venido en alzada por ser fiel reflejo de lo que informan los autos, corresponder a los elementos de prueba que constan en los mismos y por tener pleno respaldo en los elementos de convicción que se cita.\n\nI.2)- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: Se aprueban los hechos no probados que contiene el fallo venido en alzada por no haberse logrado demostrar en el proceso.\n\nII)- MOTIVOS DE INCONFORMIDAD DE LA ACTORA: Estriban los agravios de la gestionante en contra de la sentencia número 1670-2009 de las dieciséis horas del 31 de julio del 2009, manifestando que el fallo impugnado se sustenta en la presunción de demanialidad del bien objeto de esta litis y en el principio de inmatriculación de los bienes de dominio público, argumentando que la demanialidad de un bien no se presume sino que debe probarse por justo título o la tolerancia del anterior propietario, en que la vía pública existe, se usa y está integrada al dominio estatal o municipal, tal y como se desprende del voto de la Sala Constitucional número 3145 de las 9:27 horas del 28 de junio de 1996 y de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, número 61-2007 de las 10:00 horas del 16 de febrero de 2007. Así las cosas, sostiene que la Municipalidad demandada no posee documento idóneo mediante el cual demuestre la existencia del bien público y no logró determinar que hubiera usurpación al no haberse acreditado que parte de lo construido se encontrara ubicada sobre la zona pública en terrenos municipales, lo cual consta en documento al que se le restó valor probatorio y en que hay contradicción entre el testimonio de la señora Nombre128583 y de Nombre128584 , debiendo entonces condenarse a la Municipalidad al pago de las costas del proceso.\n\nIII)- EN CUANTO AL EL REGIMEN JURIDICO DE LOS BIENES DEMANIALES: Los bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público o cosas públicas son aquellos que se encuentran afectos por ley de un modo permanente a un servicio de utilidad pública o entregados al uso público de modo que todos pueden aprovecharse (artículo 261 del Código Civil). Este tipo de bienes inmuebles propiedad de la Administración Pública Central y descentralizada (Municipalidades) gozan de las características de ser inembargables, inalienables e imprescriptibles, razón por la cual no podrán ser objeto de posesión por parte de los particulares, sólo de permiso o concesión. En ese sentido se ha establecido que \"Para que un bien o cosa sea considerado como dependencia del dominio público, y sea sometido al régimen pertinente, es menester que dicho bien o cosa estén afectados al «uso público», directo o indirecto, debiendo tratarse, en este «último» supuesto, de cosas afectadas directamente -como «bienes finales» o «bienes de uso»- a la utilidad o comodidad común, quedando excluidos de la dominialidad de los bienes el Estado que revistan carácter simplemente instrumental.\". (Marienhoff, Miguel S., en su obra Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25). Sobre este particular, se ha pronunciado la Sala Constitucional en el voto N° 2306-91 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del seis de noviembre de 1999, sosteniendo que: \"El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público.- Son los llamados bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales, bienes o cosas públicas o bienes públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres.- Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación.- En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio.- Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad.\". Así las cosas, los bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público son tales cuando una ley así los ha declarado o bien cuando por su uso o destino están dedicados al servicio de la comunidad o colectividad, aplicándose en su determinación la presunción iuris tantum de naturaleza demanial. En ese sentido, no es necesario su inscripción registral, en el tanto en que la demanialidad sea manifiesta e indubitable, por el uso directo e indirecto que toda persona puede hacer de ellos y por su vocación y afectación a un uso común (Sala Constitucional, voto número 3145 de las 9.27 horas del 28 de junio de 1996, y 2408 de las 16:13 horas del 21 de febrero del 2007) y en el caso de ser discutida su naturaleza en la vía judicial, se deberá probar su condición por quien la alegue o desvirtúe, como lo dispuso la supracitada Sala en el voto 5628-2002, de las 14:37 horas del 12 de junio del 2002. En dicho voto, se estableció que \" La especial categoría de los bienes demaniales, hace que sean excluidos del ordenamiento jurídico común de la propiedad ordinaria, como ha quedado dicho en los considerandos anteriores, lo que implica la existencia de un régimen jurídico propio, singular y privativo, regulado por el Derecho administrativo y dentro de ese contenido se desarrolla el principio del privilegio de la recuperación posesoria de oficio del bien afectado, en virtud del cual, la Administración puede recobrar la posesión perturbada de sus bienes sin necesidad de acudir al juez y sin perjuicio de que el mejor derecho se discuta en la vía jurisdiccional. A este principio pertenecen las figuras jurídicas que se encuentran en los artículos que se cuestionan en esta acción; es decir, la presunta afectación e incorporación del bien al servicio público, que implica también la presunción de la demanialidad del bien, y como consecuencia de ello, la posibilidad de la exclusión del deber de registrar esos bienes y todo ello, como parte del derecho-deber del Estado de la tutela o protección del dominio público. El ejercicio efectivo de la tutela debe tener como fin hacer cesar cualquier avance indebido de los particulares contra el dominio público, pudiendo la Administración utilizar la fuerza -poder de policía sobre el dominio público- en su defensa. Pero este principio general, por lo extraordinario y privilegiado que es, y por tener que convivir con el enunciado fundamental de la inviolabilidad de la propiedad (artículo 45 constitucional), supone, cuando menos, o que el derecho de propiedad sobre el bien sea manifiesto o que el carácter público del bien sea indubitable, de tal modo que no es posible utilizar el privilegio cuando existan cuestiones patrimoniales razonables sobre el bien, sea que se estén debatiendo en la vía administrativa o en la jurisdiccional. Es decir, la presunción de la dominialidad del bien tiene íntima relación con los modos que tiene la Administración disponibles para adquirir bienes y derechos, que en términos muy generales, son los mismos medios que tiene el particular para hacerlo con relación a la propiedad común, salvo lo ya dicho sobre la necesidad de una ley ordinaria para crear la categoría de que se trate y de la necesaria voluntad para dictar la afectación al uso público. Todo esto conduce al examen particular del régimen de privilegio que está inmerso en los textos de las normas cuestionadas. Lo que se ha dicho hasta ahora, está dirigido a señalar que, a juicio de la Sala, el privilegio que protege la demanialidad, puede y debe ser utilizado por la Administración cuando no existe ninguna duda sobre el carácter público del bien involucrado.\". \n\nIV)- SOBRE LOS AGRAVIOS DE LA ACTORA: Acorde a lo indicado, corresponde referirse a los agravios expuestos por la gestionante en contra de la sentencia impugnada, manifestándose que no lleva razón en sus argumentaciones, por cuanto el fallo impugnado tiene por probado en el hecho sexto, octavo y once, en forma fehaciente que el terreno objeto de disputa que constituye el lindero norte de la propiedad de la actora, número 71.517 de la Provincia de Heredia, es utilizado como plazoleta municipal y que sobre el mismo se fue apropiando en forma indebida mediante construcciones y corriendo los linderos la señora Nombre128582 . Así las cosas, devienen en improcedentes las acciones incoadas por la actora con el objeto de declarar sin lugar el procedimiento administrativo incoado en su contra, así como la ilegalidad y anulación de los actos y disposiciones contenidas en la resolución del Alcalde Municipal que fueron motivo del recurso de reposición planteado. Sobre dicho particular se debe indicar, que la señora Nombre128582 , tal y como se demostró en los hechos probados segundo al quinto del fallo de instancia, mediante el trámite de rectificación de medida se intentó apoderar de la zona pública colindante, pasando de tener una propiedad con una cabida de noventa y nueve metros cuadrados a una de ciento cincuenta metros con treinta y dos decímetros, en razón de lo cual las acciones municipales tendentes a la recuperación de la porción de terreno público aludida se encuentran ajustadas a derecho y deviene en improcedente la presente acción incoada que pretende impedirlas, así como anular las decisiones administrativas que procuran tal objetivo, las que en todo caso como se indicó acertadamente en el fallo recurrido no son actos administrativos definitivos y firmes, sino de mero trámite y sin que se hayan acreditado los vicios de nulidad endilgados. Si bien es cierto, que a folios 19 a 21 del subjudice consta que la Jefatura de Administración Tributaria no encuentra elementos para determinar la usurpación, el mencionado informe no es definitivo, o concluyente como pretende hacerlo ver la gestionante. De allí que, devienen en infundas las afirmaciones de la actora, sosteniendo que la entidad municipal no logró determinar que hubiera usurpación al no haberse acreditado que parte de lo construido se encontrara ubicada sobre la zona pública en terrenos municipales, y que indica constan en dicho documento al que se le restó valor probatorio. Sin embargo, tal documento municipal afirma más bien la necesidad de recabar más prueba, de modo que ello no desvirtúa la veracidad de lo determinado en el expediente administrativo y en la vía judicial civil sobre el terreno objeto de disputa. Sobre este particular se debe indicar, que los testigos aportados por la actora, cuyas declaraciones constan a folios 108 a 109 del principal, no logran deslegitimar la demanialidad del lindero norte y más bien indican que es un terreno municipal, donde jugaban los niños. Sostienen también que que tales terrenos se vendieron, lo cual en todo caso no se desprende del mérito de los autos, y el resto de sus deposiciones no logran legitimar la forma como se expandió la propiedad de la señora Nombre128582 de tener noventa y nueve metros a más de ciento cincuenta metros, ni generar duda sobre el carácter público de la zona ocupada. En ese sentido, también es contundente la confesional que rola a folios 114 a 115 de los autos, manifestando la actora que su propiedad al comprarla medía 99 metros, y que la colindancia norte es un terreno municipal. Además, los testimonios de folios 124 a 125 y de 133 a 134 del principal con claros en que la cerca del lindero norte de la propiedad de la señora Nombre128582 se fue ampliando paulatinamente, realizaron muros he hicieron construcciones invadiendo la zona pública o plazoleta en la que juegan los niños y que la propiedad era de noventa y nueve metros y actualmente es más, situación que se denunció ante la Municipalidad. En virtud de ello, no lleva razón la recurrente en sus razonamientos al afirmar que el fallo de instancia se sustenta únicamente en la presunción de demanialidad del bien objeto de esta litis y en el principio de inmatriculación de los bienes de dominio público, porque hay suficiente prueba conteste e indubitable en autos, de que el terreno objeto de litigio es un bien de dominio público en administración de la Municipalidad, dedicado como plazoleta o zona verde para el recreo de las personas y que paulatinamente la aquí gestionante la ha ido invadiendo, realizando diversas ampliaciones a su propiedad, sin que se observe la aludida contradicción entre los testimonios de Nombre128584 y de Nombre128583 , porque independientemente del nombre que se le de a dicho terreno es de naturaleza demanial, tal y como lo dispone el ordinal 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, número 4240 del 15 de noviembre de 1968, al tratarse de espacios o áreas destinadas a parque, zona verde o para facilidades comunales. Se sostiene además, que la demanialidad de un bien no se presume sino que debe probarse por justo título o la tolerancia del anterior propietario, en que la vía pública existe, se usa y está integrada al dominio estatal o municipal, tal y como se desprende del voto de la Sala Constitucional número 3145 de las 9:27 horas del 28 de junio de 1996 y de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, número 61-2007 de las 10:00 horas del 16 de febrero de 2007 y que la Municipalidad demandada no posee documento idóneo mediante el cual demuestre la existencia del bien público, lo cual se deniega debido a que la prueba que echa de menos se observa evacuada en los autos y ratifica en forma clara que tal zona es pública por destino, y uso común. Finalmente, se omite pronunciamiento sobre el argumento no expresado en el escrito de apelación sobre la denegación de la prueba para mejor resolver del testimonio de Nombre106492 , el cual no fue motivo de alegación en tiempo, sino tardíamente hasta que se expresó agravios. Y en cuanto al pago de las costas del proceso se mantiene su condenatoria, acorde al ordinal 221 del Código Procesal Civil y artículo 59 inciso segundo de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa que sustenta su imposición al vencido. \n\nV)- COROLARIO: De conformidad con los argumentos de hecho y derecho expuestos se debe confirmar en lo impugnado, al tenor del numeral 565 del Código Procesal Civil, la sentencia recurrida.\n\n P O R T A N T O\n\nEn lo impugnado se confirma la sentencia apelada. NOTIFIQUESE.-\n\n \n\n \n\nCarlos Espinoza Salas\n\n \n\n \n\nNombre72025 Sergio Alonso Valverde Alpízar\n\n \n\nExp Nº 04-0001180-163-CA\n\nProceso Ordinario.\n\nActor: Nombre128582 . \n\nContra: Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia.", "body_en_text": "Nº 81-2009-S-VIII\n\n\nNº 81-2009-S-VIII\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCION OCTAVA. II Circuito Judicial. San José, at thirteen hours and forty-five minutes on the thirtieth of November of the year two thousand nine.-\n\nOrdinary Administrative Proceeding, processed in the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, filed by Nombre128582, of legal age, married, homemaker, identity card number CED114248, with her directing attorney Licenciado Rodolfo Arroyo Porras, against the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia, represented by its Mayor Nombre102691, of legal age, married in first nuptials, sociologist, resident of Santiago, San Rafael de Heredia, identity card number CED114249, and acting as special judicial representative Licenciado Saúl González Vargas, of legal age, single, attorney, resident of San Isidro de Heredia, identity card number CED114250. All of this processed under case file number 04-1180-163-CA.\n\nRESULTANDO\n\nI.- Estimated in the sum of one million colones, with this ordinary action, the plaintiff seeks to have the administrative proceeding initiated against her declared without merit, as well as the illegality and annulment of the acts and provisions contained in the resolution of the Municipal Mayor that were the subject of the filed petition for reconsideration, and that the defendant be ordered to pay both costs, both administrative and judicial.\n\nII.- The defendant opposed the action and requested that the plaintiff's claims be declared without merit for lacking legal basis.\n\nIII.- Judge Claudia Elena Bolaños Salazar, Judge of the Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, by means of judgment number 1670-2009 at sixteen hours on the 31st of July, 2009, ordered: \"POR TANTO: In accordance with the facts informing the process and the legal and jurisprudential citations mentioned, it is resolved: The evidence offered for better provision is rejected. The lawsuit is declared without merit. Costs are to be borne by the plaintiff. Notify the parties at the designated place.\".\n\nIV. Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal within the legal term against said ruling, an appeal that was admitted, and by virtue of which this Court hears it on appeal.\n\nV. The appeal has been given the proper procedure, and no defects or omissions susceptible of producing nullity of the proceedings or defenselessness to the parties are observed. This resolution is issued after deliberation within the margin of time that the work of this Office allows.\n\nJudge Espinoza Salzas drafts; and,\n\nC O N S I D E R A N D O\n\nI.1)- PROVEN FACTS: The proven facts contained in the appealed ruling are approved as they are a faithful reflection of what the records inform, correspond to the elements of evidence contained therein, and have full support in the elements of conviction cited.\n\nI.2)- UNPROVEN FACTS: The unproven facts contained in the appealed ruling are approved as they could not be demonstrated in the proceeding.\n\nII)- GROUNDS FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S DISAGREEMENT: The grievances of the petitioner against judgment number 1670-2009 at sixteen hours on the 31st of July, 2009, lie in stating that the challenged ruling is based on the presumption of public domain status (demanialidad) of the property subject to this litigation and on the principle of first registration (inmatriculación) of public domain property, arguing that the public domain status (demanialidad) of a property is not presumed but must be proven by just title or the tolerance of the previous owner, in that the public road exists, is used, and is integrated into the state or municipal domain, as can be deduced from ruling of the Sala Constitucional number 3145 at 9:27 hours on the 28th of June, 1996, and of the Sección Primera of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, number 61-2007 at 10:00 hours on the 16th of February, 2007. Thus, she maintains that the defendant Municipalidad does not possess a suitable document by which to demonstrate the existence of the public property and failed to determine that there was usurpation since it was not proven that part of what was built was located on the public zone on municipal lands, which is recorded in a document whose evidentiary value was diminished, and that there is a contradiction between the testimony of Mrs. Nombre128583 and Nombre128584, therefore the Municipalidad must be ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding.\n\nIII)- REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME OF PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY (BIENES DEMANIALES): Public domain property (bienes demaniales, dominicales or de dominio público) or public things are those that are permanently affected by law to a public utility service or given over to public use so that everyone can benefit from them (article 261 of the Civil Code). This type of real estate owned by the Central and Decentralized Public Administration (Municipalidades) enjoys the characteristics of being unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, for which reason they cannot be the object of possession by private individuals, only of permit or concession. In this sense, it has been established that \"For a property or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and be subjected to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said property or thing be affected to «public use», direct or indirect, dealing, in this «latter» case, with things directly affected —as «final goods» or «use goods»— to common utility or comfort, excluding from the public domain status (dominialidad) State property that is of a merely instrumental nature.\" (Marienhoff, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25). On this particular, the Sala Constitucional has pronounced itself in ruling N° 2306-91 at 14 hours 45 minutes on the sixth of November, 1999, holding that: \"The public domain is composed of property that manifests, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest.- They are the so-called public domain property (bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales, bienes o cosas públicas or bienes públicos), which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for a public use and subjected to a special regime, outside the commerce of men.- That is, affected by their own nature and vocation.- Consequently, these properties belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of express norm. Characteristic notes of these properties are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes interdicts to recover dominion.- As they are outside commerce, these properties cannot be the object of possession, although a right of use can be acquired, although not a right to property.\". Thus, public domain property (bienes demaniales, dominicales or de dominio público) are such when a law has declared them so or when by their use or destination they are dedicated to the service of the community or collectivity, applying the iuris tantum presumption of public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) in their determination. In this sense, their registry inscription is not necessary, insofar as the public domain status (demanialidad) is manifest and indubitable, due to the direct and indirect use that every person can make of them and due to their vocation and affectation to a common use (Sala Constitucional, ruling number 3145 at 9.27 hours on the 28th of June, 1996, and 2408 at 16:13 hours on the 21st of February, 2007) and in the case of their nature being disputed in the judicial venue, their condition must be proven by whoever alleges or disproves it, as the above-cited Chamber decided in ruling 5628-2002, at 14:37 hours on the 12th of June, 2002. In said ruling, it was established that \"The special category of public domain property (bienes demaniales), means they are excluded from the common legal system of ordinary property, as has been stated in the preceding considering paragraphs, which implies the existence of a proper, singular, and exclusive legal regime, regulated by Administrative Law, and within that content the principle of the privilege of possessory recovery ex officio of the affected property is developed, by virtue of which, the Administration can recover the disturbed possession of its property without needing to resort to a judge and without prejudice to the better right being discussed in the jurisdictional venue. To this principle belong the legal figures found in the articles challenged in this action; that is, the presumed affectation and incorporation of the property into public service, which also implies the presumption of the public domain status (demanialidad) of the property, and as a consequence of this, the possibility of excluding the duty to register those properties, all this as part of the State's right-duty of guardianship or protection of the public domain. The effective exercise of guardianship must aim to stop any undue advance by private parties against the public domain, the Administration being able to use force —police power over the public domain— in its defense. But this general principle, as extraordinary and privileged as it is, and for having to coexist with the fundamental enunciation of the inviolability of property (article 45 of the Constitution), supposes, at least, either that the property right over the property is manifest or that the public character of the property is indubitable, in such a way that it is not possible to use the privilege when there are reasonable patrimonial questions about the property, whether they are being debated in the administrative or jurisdictional venue. That is, the presumption of the public domain status (dominialidad) of the property is intimately related to the means the Administration has available to acquire property and rights, which in very general terms, are the same means the private party has to do so in relation to common property, except for what has already been said about the need for an ordinary law to create the category in question and the necessary will to dictate the affectation to public use. All this leads to the particular examination of the privilege regime that is immersed in the texts of the questioned norms. What has been said up to now is aimed at pointing out that, in the Chamber's judgment, the privilege that protects public domain status (demanialidad) can and should be used by the Administration when there is no doubt about the public character of the property involved.\".\n\nIV)- REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S GRIEVANCES: In accordance with what has been indicated, it is appropriate to refer to the grievances set forth by the petitioner against the challenged judgment, stating that her arguments are not reasonable, inasmuch as the challenged ruling reliably holds as proven in facts six, eight, and eleven, that the land in dispute, which constitutes the northern boundary of the plaintiff's property, number 71.517 of the Province of Heredia, is used as a municipal small square (plazoleta municipal) and that Mrs. Nombre128582 was unduly appropriating it through constructions and moving boundaries. Thus, the actions filed by the plaintiff with the object of declaring the administrative proceeding initiated against her without merit become inadmissible, as well as the illegality and annulment of the acts and provisions contained in the resolution of the Municipal Mayor that were the subject of the filed petition for reconsideration. On this particular, it must be noted that Mrs. Nombre128582, as demonstrated in proven facts two through five of the first instance ruling, through the procedure of measurement rectification attempted to take possession of the adjacent public zone, going from owning a property with an area of ninety-nine square meters to one of one hundred fifty meters and thirty-two decimeters, therefore the municipal actions aimed at recovering the aforementioned portion of public land are in accordance with the law, and the present action filed trying to prevent them becomes inadmissible, as well as annulling the administrative decisions that seek that objective, which in any case, as correctly indicated in the appealed ruling, are not final and firm administrative acts, but merely procedural and without the nullity defects alleged having been proven. While it is true that on folios 19 to 21 of this case it is recorded that the Jefatura de Administración Tributaria does not find elements to determine usurpation, the mentioned report is not definitive, or conclusive as the petitioner tries to make it appear. Hence, the plaintiff's assertions become unfounded, maintaining that the municipal entity failed to determine that there was usurpation since it was not proven that part of what was built was located on the public zone on municipal lands, and which she indicates appears in said document whose evidentiary value was diminished. However, such municipal document rather affirms the need to gather more evidence, so that this does not detract from the truthfulness of what was determined in the administrative file and in the civil judicial venue regarding the land in dispute. On this particular, it must be noted that the witnesses provided by the plaintiff, whose statements are recorded on folios 108 to 109 of the main file, fail to delegitimize the public domain status (demanialidad) of the northern boundary and rather indicate that it is municipal land, where the children played. They also hold that such lands were sold, which in any case does not emerge from the merits of the records, and the rest of their depositions fail to legitimize the way in which Mrs. Nombre128582's property expanded from ninety-nine meters to more than one hundred fifty meters, nor generate doubt about the public character of the occupied zone. In this sense, the confession that appears on folios 114 to 115 of the records is also conclusive, with the plaintiff stating that her property when she bought it measured 99 meters, and that the northern boundary is municipal land. Moreover, the testimonies on folios 124 to 125 and 133 to 134 of the main file are clear that the fence on the northern boundary of Mrs. Nombre128582's property was gradually expanded, walls were built, and constructions were made invading the public zone or small square (plazoleta) where the children play, and that the property was ninety-nine meters and currently is more, a situation that was reported to the Municipalidad. By virtue of this, the appellant is not correct in her reasoning when affirming that the first instance ruling is based solely on the presumption of public domain status (demanialidad) of the property subject to this litigation and on the principle of first registration (inmatriculación) of public domain property, because there is sufficient consistent and indubitable evidence in the records that the land subject to litigation is a public domain property (bien de dominio público) administered by the Municipalidad, dedicated as a small square (plazoleta) or green zone for people's recreation, and that the petitioner here has gradually been invading it, making various expansions to her property, without the alleged contradiction between the testimonies of Nombre128584 and Nombre128583 being observed, because regardless of the name given to said land, it is of a public domain nature (naturaleza demanial), as provided by article 40 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, number 4240 of the 15th of November, 1968, when dealing with spaces or areas destined for a park, green zone, or community facilities. It is further held that the public domain status (demanialidad) of a property is not presumed but must be proven by just title or the tolerance of the previous owner, in that the public road exists, is used, and is integrated into the state or municipal domain, as can be deduced from ruling of the Sala Constitucional number 3145 at 9:27 hours on the 28th of June, 1996, and of the Sección Primera of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, number 61-2007 at 10:00 hours on the 16th of February, 2007, and that the defendant Municipalidad does not possess a suitable document by which to demonstrate the existence of the public property, which is denied because the evidence it misses is observed to have been evacuated in the records and clearly ratifies that such zone is public by destination and common use. Finally, no ruling is made on the argument not expressed in the appeal brief regarding the denial of the evidence for better judgment of the testimony of Nombre106492, which was not the subject of allegation in time, but rather belatedly until grievances were expressed. And as for the payment of costs of the proceeding, the order to pay is maintained, in accordance with article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure and article 59, second paragraph, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, which supports its imposition on the losing party.\n\nV)- COROLLARY: In accordance with the arguments of fact and law set forth, the challenged aspects of the appealed judgment must be confirmed, pursuant to provision 565 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nP O R T A N T O\n\nIn the challenged aspects, the appealed judgment is confirmed. NOTIFY.-\n\n\n\nCarlos Espinoza Salas\n\n\n\nNombre72025 Sergio Alonso Valverde Alpízar\n\n\n\nExp Nº 04-0001180-163-CA\n\nOrdinary Proceeding.\n\nPlaintiff: Nombre128582.\n\nAgainst: Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia.\n\nThis resolution is issued after prior deliberation within the margin of time that the work of this Office so permits.\n\nDrafted by Judge Espinoza Salas; and\n\nC O N S I D E R I N G\n\nI.1)- PROVEN FACTS: The proven facts contained in the judgment under appeal are approved, as they are a faithful reflection of what the case file reports, correspond to the evidentiary elements contained therein, and have full support in the evidence cited.\n\nI.2)- UNPROVEN FACTS: The unproven facts contained in the judgment under appeal are approved, as they could not be demonstrated in the proceedings.\n\nII)- GROUNDS FOR DISAGREEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF: The grievances of the petitioner against judgment number 1670-2009 of sixteen hundred hours on July 31, 2009, rest on her claim that the challenged judgment is based on the presumption of public domain nature (demanialidad) of the property subject to this litigation and on the principle of first registration (inmatriculación) of public domain assets. She argues that the public domain nature of an asset is not presumed but must be proven by proper title or the tolerance of the previous owner, in that the public way exists, is used, and is integrated into state or municipal domain, as follows from Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) vote number 3145 of 9:27 hours on June 28, 1996, and from the First Section of the Administrative Appeals Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), number 61-2007 of 10:00 hours on February 16, 2007. Thus, she maintains that the defendant Municipality does not possess a suitable document to demonstrate the existence of the public property and failed to determine that there was usurpation because it was not proven that part of what was built was located on the public zone on municipal lands, which is recorded in a document that was stripped of evidentiary weight, and that there is a contradiction between the testimony of Mrs. Nombre128583 and that of Nombre128584, therefore the Municipality must be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.\n\nIII)- REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME OF PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS: Public domain assets (bienes demaniales, dominicales o de dominio público), or public things, are those that are permanently assigned by law to a public utility service or delivered for public use so that everyone can benefit (Article 261 of the Civil Code). These types of immovable property owned by Central and decentralized Public Administration entities (Municipalities) possess the characteristics of being non-seizable (inembargables), inalienable (inalienables), and imprescriptible (imprescriptibles). For this reason, they cannot be subject to possession by private individuals, only to permit or concession. In that sense, it has been established that \"For an asset or thing to be considered a dependency of the public domain and be subject to the relevant regime, it is necessary that said asset or thing be assigned to 'public use,' direct or indirect, and it must be, in this 'latter' scenario, things directly assigned—as 'final assets' or 'use assets'—to common utility or comfort, thereby excluding from public domain status those State assets that are of a merely instrumental nature.\" (Marienhoff, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Vol. V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., p. 25). On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber has ruled in vote No. 2306-91 of 14 hours 45 minutes on November 6, 1999, holding that: \"The public domain is composed of assets that express, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose to serve the community, the public interest. They are the so-called public domain assets (bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales), public things, or public goods, which do not belong individually to private parties and are intended for public use and subject to a special regime, outside ordinary commerce. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are assigned to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, non-seizable; they cannot be mortgaged or be subject to liens under Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes judicial possessory actions to recover domain. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use may be acquired, though not a right to property.\" Thus, public domain assets are such when a law has declared them so, or when by their use or purpose they are dedicated to the service of the community or collectivity, applying in their determination the iuris tantum presumption of public domain nature. In that sense, their registration is not necessary, insofar as the public domain nature is manifest and indubitable, due to the direct and indirect use that any person can make of them and by their vocation and assignment to a common use (Constitutional Chamber, vote number 3145 of 9:27 hours on June 28, 1996, and 2408 of 16:13 hours on February 21, 2007), and if their nature is disputed in court, the party alleging or rebutting it must prove its condition, as the aforementioned Chamber provided in vote 5628-2002 of 14:37 hours on June 12, 2002. In said vote, it was established that \"The special category of public domain assets means they are excluded from the common legal system of ordinary property, as stated in previous considerations, which implies the existence of a proper, singular, and exclusive legal regime, regulated by Administrative law, and within that content, the principle of the privilege of ex officio possessory recovery of the affected asset is developed, by virtue of which the Administration can recover the disturbed possession of its assets without needing to go to court, without prejudice to the better right being litigated in the jurisdictional venue. To this principle belong the legal figures found in the articles questioned in this action; that is, the presumed assignment and incorporation of the asset to public service, which also implies the presumption of the public domain nature of the asset, and as a consequence, the possibility of excluding the duty to register those assets, all as part of the State's right-duty of guardianship or protection of the public domain. The effective exercise of guardianship must aim to stop any undue advance of private parties against the public domain, and the Administration may use force—police power over the public domain—in its defense. But this general principle, as extraordinary and privileged as it is, and because it must coexist with the fundamental principle of the inviolability of property (Article 45 of the Constitution), assumes, at the very least, that either the right of property over the asset is manifest, or that the public character of the asset is indubitable, such that it is not possible to use the privilege when there are reasonable patrimonial questions about the asset, whether they are being debated in administrative or judicial venues. That is, the presumption of the public domain nature of the asset is closely related to the means available to the Administration to acquire assets and rights, which, in very general terms, are the same means available to the private individual to do so with respect to ordinary property, except as already stated regarding the need for an ordinary law to create the category in question and the necessary will to decree the assignment to public use. All this leads to the particular examination of the privilege regime embedded in the texts of the questioned norms. What has been said up to now is intended to indicate that, in the Court's opinion, the privilege that protects public domain nature can and should be used by the Administration when there is no doubt about the public character of the asset involved.\"\n\nIV)- REGARDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF: In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to address the grievances raised by the petitioner against the challenged judgment, stating that she is not correct in her arguments, given that the challenged judgment considers proven in facts six, eight, and eleven, in a reliable manner, that the land in dispute, which constitutes the northern boundary of the plaintiff's property, number 71.517 of the Province of Heredia, is used as a municipal square (plazoleta municipal) and that Mrs. Nombre128582 was progressively and improperly appropriating it through constructions and moving the boundaries. Thus, the actions filed by the plaintiff aiming to declare the administrative proceeding brought against her without merit are improper, as is the challenge to the legality and annulment of the acts and provisions contained in the resolution of the Municipal Mayor that were the subject of the reconsideration appeal (recurso de reposición) filed. On this particular point, it must be stated that Mrs. Nombre128582, as demonstrated in proven facts two through five of the lower court's judgment, attempted, through the boundary rectification (rectificación de medida) procedure, to seize the adjacent public zone, transitioning from owning a property with an area of ninety-nine square meters to one of one hundred fifty square meters and thirty-two decimeters, which is why the municipal actions aimed at recovering the mentioned portion of public land are lawful and the present action, which seeks to prevent them and annul the administrative decisions pursuing that objective, is improper. In any case, as correctly indicated in the appealed judgment, these are not definitive and final administrative acts, but merely procedural acts, without the alleged nullity defects having been proven. Although it is true that at folios 19 to 21 of the case file, the Tax Administration Office (Jefatura de Administración Tributaria) did not find elements to determine the usurpation, the aforementioned report is not definitive or conclusive, as the petitioner seeks to make it appear. Hence, the plaintiff's assertions are unfounded, maintaining that the municipal entity failed to determine usurpation because it was not proven that part of what was built was located on the public zone on municipal lands, and which she indicates is recorded in said document that was stripped of evidentiary weight. However, such municipal document rather affirms the need to gather more evidence, so this does not detract from the veracity of what was determined in the administrative file and in the civil judicial venue regarding the land in dispute. On this particular point, it must be stated that the witnesses presented by the plaintiff, whose statements are recorded at folios 108 to 109 of the main file, fail to delegitimize the public domain nature of the northern boundary and rather indicate that it is municipal land, where children played. They also maintain that such lands were sold, which in any case does not follow from the merits of the file, and the rest of their statements fail to legitimize the manner in which Mrs. Nombre128582's property was expanded from ninety-nine square meters to over one hundred fifty square meters, nor do they generate doubt about the public character of the occupied zone. In that sense, the confession (confesional) recorded at folios 114 to 115 of the file is also convincing, with the plaintiff stating that her property, when she bought it, measured 99 square meters, and that the northern boundary is municipal land. Furthermore, the testimonies at folios 124 to 125 and 133 to 134 of the main file clearly indicate that the fence on the northern boundary of Mrs. Nombre128582's property was gradually extended, walls were built, and constructions were made invading the public zone or square where children play, and that the property was ninety-nine square meters and is currently more, a situation that was reported to the Municipality. By virtue of this, the appellant is not correct in her reasoning when she affirms that the lower court's judgment is based solely on the presumption of public domain nature of the property subject to this litigation and on the principle of first registration of public domain assets, because there is sufficient, unanimous, and indubitable evidence in the file that the land subject to litigation is a public domain asset under the Municipality's administration, designated as a square or green zone for the recreation of people and that the petitioner here has been gradually invading it, carrying out various expansions to her property, without observing the alleged contradiction between the testimonies of Nombre128584 and Nombre128583, because regardless of the name given to this land, it is of a public domain nature, as provided by Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), number 4240 of November 15, 1968, as they are spaces or areas destined for a park, green zone, or community facilities. She further maintains that the public domain nature of an asset is not presumed but must be proven by proper title or the tolerance of the previous owner, in that the public way exists, is used, and is integrated into state or municipal domain, as follows from Constitutional Chamber vote number 3145 of 9:27 hours on June 28, 1996, and from the First Section of the Administrative Appeals Court number 61-2007 of 10:00 hours on February 16, 2007, and that the defendant Municipality does not possess a suitable document to demonstrate the existence of the public asset. This is denied because the evidence she considers lacking is found to have been produced in the file and clearly ratifies that such zone is public by destination and common use. Finally, no ruling is made on the argument, not expressed in the appeal brief, regarding the denial of the better-providing evidence (prueba para mejor resolver) of the testimony of Nombre106492, which was not a subject of timely allegation, but was raised belatedly only when grievances were expressed. And regarding the payment of the costs of the proceedings, their imposition is upheld, in accordance with Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) and Article 59, subsection two, of the Law Regulating the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), which supports their imposition on the losing party.\n\nV)- COROLLARY: In accordance with the arguments of fact and law presented, the appealed judgment must be confirmed in what is challenged, pursuant to numeral 565 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nP O R T A N T O\n\nIn what is challenged, the appealed judgment is confirmed. NOTIFY.-\n\nCarlos Espinoza Salas\n\nNombre72025 Sergio Alonso Valverde Alpízar\n\nExp Nº 04-0001180-163-CA\n\nOrdinary Proceeding (Proceso Ordinario).\n\nPlaintiff: Nombre128582 .\n\n**III)- REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME OF PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS (BIENES DEMANIALES):** Public domain assets (bienes demaniales), dominical assets (bienes dominicales) or assets of public domain, or public things are those that are permanently assigned by law to a public utility service or given over for public use in such a way that everyone may benefit from them (Article 261 of the Civil Code). These types of immovable property belonging to the Central Public Administration and decentralized bodies (Municipalidades) enjoy the characteristics of being unseizable (inembargables), inalienable (inalienables) and imprescriptible (imprescriptibles), which is why they cannot be the object of possession by private individuals, only of a permit or concession. In this regard, it has been established that: \"For a good or thing to be considered a dependency of the public domain, and to be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be assigned to 'public use,' direct or indirect; in this 'latter' case, this must involve things directly assigned—as 'final goods' or 'use goods'—to common utility or comfort, excluding from the public domain nature (dominialidad) of assets held by the State those that are merely instrumental in nature.\" (Marienhoff, Miguel S., in his work *Tratado de Derecho Administrativo*. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25). On this particular matter, the Sala Constitucional has ruled in vote No. 2306-91 of 14 hours 45 minutes of November 6, 1999, holding that: \"The public domain is composed of goods that express, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest.- They are the so-called dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets (bienes dominiales), public goods or things, or public assets, which do not belong individually to private parties and which are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men.- That is to say, assigned by their own nature and vocation.- Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are assigned to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable (inalienables), imprescriptible (imprescriptibles), unseizable (inembargables), they cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover domain.- As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use (aprovechamiento) may be acquired, though not a right of ownership.\" So it is, public domain assets (bienes demaniales), dominical assets (bienes dominicales) or assets of public domain are such when a law has declared them so or when by their use or purpose they are dedicated to the service of the community or collectivity, applying in their determination the *iuris tantum* presumption of their public domain nature (naturaleza demanial). In this regard, their registry inscription is not necessary, insofar as their public domain nature (demanialidad) is manifest and indubitable, due to the direct and indirect use that every person can make of them and due to their vocation and assignment (afectación) to a common use (Sala Constitucional, vote number 3145 of 9.27 hours of June 28, 1996, and 2408 of 16:13 hours of February 21, 2007) and in the event their nature is disputed in the judicial sphere, its condition must be proven or refuted by whoever alleges it, as the aforementioned Sala ruled in vote 5628-2002, of 14:37 hours of June 12, 2002. In said vote, it was established that \"The special category of public domain assets (bienes demaniales) means they are excluded from the common legal framework of ordinary property, as has been stated in the preceding recitals, which implies the existence of a unique and exclusive legal regime (régimen jurídico propio), regulated by Administrative Law, and within that content the principle of the privilege of the ex officio recovery of possession of the affected asset is developed, by virtue of which the Administration may recover the disturbed possession of its assets without needing to go before a judge, and without prejudice to the better right being discussed in the jurisdictional sphere. To this principle belong the legal figures found in the articles challenged in this action; that is, the presumed assignment (afectación) and incorporation of the asset to public service, which also implies the presumption of the public domain nature (demanialidad) of the asset, and as a consequence thereof, the possibility of the exclusion of the duty to register those assets, all of this as part of the State's right-duty of tutelage or protection of the public domain.\"\n\nThe effective exercise of the protection (tutela) must have as its end the cessation of any undue advance by private individuals against the public domain (dominio público), the Administration (Administración) being able to use force—police power over the public domain (dominio público)—in its defense. But this general principle, because of how extraordinary and privileged it is, and because it must coexist with the fundamental statement of the inviolability of property (article 45 of the Constitution), presupposes, at the very least, either that the right of ownership over the asset is manifest or that the public character of the asset is indubitable, such that it is not possible to use the privilege when reasonable patrimonial questions exist regarding the asset, whether they are being debated in the administrative channel or in the jurisdictional channel. That is to say, the presumption of the dominiality (dominialidad) of the asset is intimately related to the means available to the Administration (Administración) to acquire assets and rights, which, in very general terms, are the same means available to the private individual to do so in relation to common property, except for what has already been said regarding the need for an ordinary law to create the category in question and the necessary will to issue the designation (afectación) for public use. All of this leads to the particular examination of the privilege regime that is immersed in the texts of the challenged norms. What has been said up to now is aimed at pointing out that, in the judgment of the Chamber (Sala), the privilege that protects demaniality (demanialidad) can and must be used by the Administration (Administración) when there is no doubt whatsoever about the public character of the asset involved.\".\n\nIV)- REGARDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF: In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to address the grievances raised by the applicant against the contested judgment, stating that she is not correct in her arguments, inasmuch as the contested ruling holds as proven in facts six, eight, and eleven, reliably, that the disputed land constituting the northern boundary of the plaintiff's property, number 71.517 of the Province of Heredia, is used as a municipal small plaza (plazoleta municipal) and that Mrs. Nombre128582 was improperly appropriating it through constructions and moving the boundaries. Therefore, the actions brought by the plaintiff seeking to declare the administrative procedure initiated against her unfounded, as well as the illegality and annulment of the acts and provisions contained in the Municipal Mayor's resolution that were the subject of the filed motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición), become inadmissible. On this particular matter, it must be noted that Mrs. Nombre128582, as demonstrated in proven facts two through five of the trial court's ruling, attempted to seize the adjacent public zone through a measure rectification (rectificación de medida) proceeding, going from owning a property with an area of ninety-nine square meters to one of one hundred fifty meters and thirty-two decimeters, by reason of which the municipal actions aimed at recovering the aforementioned portion of public land are in accordance with law, and the present action brought to prevent them becomes inadmissible, as does the attempt to annul the administrative decisions seeking that objective, which in any case, as correctly indicated in the appealed ruling, are not final and firm administrative acts, but rather mere preliminary proceedings (mero trámite) and without the alleged nullity defects having been proven. While it is true that on folios 19 to 21 of the sub judice, it is recorded that the Tax Administration Department (Jefatura de Administración Tributaria) finds no elements to determine usurpation, the mentioned report is not definitive or conclusive as the applicant seeks to portray it. Hence, the plaintiff's assertions become unfounded, holding that the municipal entity failed to determine that there was usurpation because it was not proven that part of what was built was located on the public zone on municipal lands, and which she indicates are recorded in that document whose probative value was diminished. However, such a municipal document rather affirms the need to gather more evidence, so that this does not detract from the veracity of what was determined in the administrative record and in the civil judicial proceedings regarding the disputed land. On this particular matter, it must be noted that the witnesses provided by the plaintiff, whose statements are recorded on folios 108 to 109 of the main file, fail to delegitimize the public domain nature (demanialidad) of the northern boundary and rather indicate that it is a municipal land, where children used to play. They also maintain that such lands were sold, which in any case does not emerge from the merits of the case file, and the rest of their depositions fail to legitimize the manner in which Mrs. Nombre128582's property expanded from ninety-nine meters to more than one hundred fifty meters, nor to cast doubt on the public character of the occupied zone. In that sense, the confession (confesional) on folios 114 to 115 of the case file is also conclusive, with the plaintiff stating that her property, when she bought it, measured 99 meters, and that the northern adjacency is municipal land. Furthermore, the testimonies from folios 124 to 125 and from 133 to 134 of the main file are clear that the fence on the northern boundary of Mrs. Nombre128582's property was gradually expanded, walls were built and constructions were made invading the public zone or small plaza (plazoleta) where children play, and that the property used to be ninety-nine meters and is currently larger, a situation that was reported to the Municipality. By virtue of this, the appellant is incorrect in her reasoning when asserting that the trial court's ruling is based solely on the presumption of public domain nature (demanialidad) of the property at issue in this litigation and on the principle of inmatriculation of public domain assets, because there is sufficient concurrent and unquestionable evidence in the case file that the land subject to litigation is a public domain asset under the administration of the Municipality, dedicated as a small plaza (plazoleta) or green zone for the recreation of people and that the applicant here has been gradually invading it, making various expansions to her property, without the alleged contradiction between the testimonies of Nombre128584 and Nombre128583 being observed, because regardless of the name given to said land, it is of a public domain nature, as provided by Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), number 4240 of November 15, 1968, as it involves spaces or areas destined for a park, green zone, or community facilities. It is further maintained that the public domain nature (demanialidad) of an asset is not presumed but must be proven by just title or the tolerance of the previous owner, in that the public thoroughfare exists, is used, and is integrated into the state or municipal domain, as emerges from Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruling number 3145 at 9:27 a.m. on June 28, 1996, and from Section One of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal (Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), number 61-2007 at 10:00 a.m. on February 16, 2007, and that the defendant Municipality does not possess a suitable document demonstrating the existence of the public asset, which is denied because the evidence found lacking is observed as having been introduced in the case file and clearly ratifies that such a zone is public by destination and common use. Finally, a ruling is omitted on the argument not expressed in the appeal brief regarding the denial of the evidence for better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) of the testimony of Nombre106492, which was not the subject of a timely allegation, but rather belatedly until grievances were expressed. And regarding the payment of the costs (costas) of the proceeding, the ruling imposing them is upheld, in accordance with Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) and Article 59, second paragraph, of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) which supports their imposition on the losing party.\n\nV)- COROLLARY: In accordance with the arguments of fact and law presented, the contested portion of the appealed judgment must be confirmed, pursuant to Article 565 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil).\n\nP O R T A N T O\n\nThe contested portion of the appealed judgment is confirmed. NOTIFY.-\n\nCarlos Espinoza Salas\n\nNombre72025 Sergio Alonso Valverde Alpízar\n\nExp Nº 04-0001180-163-CA\nOrdinary Proceeding.\nPlaintiff: Nombre128582.\nAgainst: Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia." }