IV.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING.The preliminary defense established in numeral 66 subsection 1 g) having been rejected in the terms set forth in Considering I, this proceeding is limited to hearing the alleged illegality of both the procedure followed by the Legislative Commission appointed by the Legislative Plenary to determine whether the plaintiff incurred ineptitude or incorrect procedures allowing his removal from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, and the final act by which the Legislative Assembly agreed to his removal from said position. It must also be determined whether the reinstatement of the plaintiff to the position is appropriate and the State should be ordered to pay, in abstracto, the damages caused as a consequence of the removal. Given the breadth and extension of the various statements that the litigating parties contribute in support of their controversial positions, in the following sections, for what is considered a better order, each of the thematic axes raised by the plaintiff in his grievances as well as the arguments of the defendants will be addressed, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with due analysis, of course, of everything argued.
V.- ON THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. The plaintiff accuses a series of substantial defects in the procedure followed in the Legislative Assembly that culminated in his removal from his position of Comptroller. Indeed, according to the third paragraph of article 183 of the Political Constitution, the Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller General of the Republic may be removed from their positions by the Legislative Assembly by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members, if in the case file created for that purpose, ineptitude or incorrect procedures are proven against them. The requirement to open a procedure to verify whether the grounds stated therein were incurred is clearly inferred from the text of the norm. It could not be otherwise, considering the independence in the exercise of their functions that the Constituent Power guaranteed to the Comptroller General of the Republic and that the final decision adopted may impose a repressive framework within the legal sphere of that official. It is an undisputed fact in this proceeding that our legal system does not regulate, neither in the Magna Carta, nor in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, nor in any other legal norm, what procedure should be followed to effect the removal. However, it is clear that, by the Principle of Hermeneutic Plenitude of the Legal System, this would not constitute an impossibility to carry it out, insofar as the Plenary, as a constitutional and sovereign body, may establish a procedural path (iter procesal) that conforms to all the constitutional and legal principles of due process established by our Legal System and that have been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. In the specific case, as listed in the list of proven facts, the Legislative Plenary entrusted a Special Investigative Commission with the instruction of a procedure for said purposes. Although neither the initial agreement appointing the Commission nor its subsequent expansion establishes the procedure to follow (probably due to the gap that exists in this regard), the truth is that the need for it to safeguard the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, especially due process, was emphasized. It also emerges from the Commission's own minutes and those of the Plenary that there was some discussion regarding the stages that said procedure should safeguard. The plaintiff claims a series of defects in the legislative procedure followed against him. Now, upon carefully reviewing the procedure followed both in the Commission and within the body of the Legislative Plenary, this Court notes that, although it is not regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, the truth is that some of its phases refer to and apply institutes typical of parliamentary procedures in general. Some of the defects criticized are oriented in that sense. For example, that the instruction was delegated to an Investigative Commission of those indicated in article 121 subsection 23) of the Constitution; the questioning of the nature and powers conferred on that type of commission, particularly in relation to due process; the incompatibility of political control commissions with guarantees such as the Principle of Independence and Impartiality; the content of the legislative agreement through which the plaintiff is exhorted to resign from his position and its impact on the Principle of Innocence; that the Commission did not issue a majority report nor were all the generated reports discussed in the Legislative Plenary, the type of voting by which the removal from office was agreed, and that this public conduct (conducta pública) was agreed upon by an order motion. It is the criterion of this Court that the examination of the indicated defects escapes the control that this jurisdiction can exercise, since our normative block entrusts it to the Constitutional Chamber. Indeed, numeral 73 subsection c) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates as a ground for filing an action of unconstitutionality the violation of substantial requirements or procedures provided in the Constitution or the Regulation of Order, Direction, and Internal Discipline of the Legislative Assembly in the formation of laws or legislative agreements. Thus, this Court could not proceed to hear the alleged defects that occur in or affect properly legislative actions or practices, governed by Parliamentary Law, and which fall under the exclusive purview of the Constitutional Chamber. Nevertheless, as explained in Considering I, the truth is that in the judgment of this collegiate body, the final decision adopted, by which the plaintiff was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, constitutes a public conduct that does not correspond to the legislative function but materially comes closer to the administrative function of that parliamentary body. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that, even if it were an act of government, the truth is that it was not excluded from the legality control exercised by this jurisdiction, as per article 3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Furthermore, the possibility of exercising legality control has been recognized even in acts of government, in their regulated aspects, protection of fundamental rights, and matters relating to compensation. Thus, it is clear that when analyzing the conformity of the challenged act with the legal system, the procedure will be examined as a formal element of that act to determine if there are legality defects that warrant being declared.
VI.- ON THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACT. A second claim is aimed at having the act adopted by the Legislative Assembly in ordinary session No. 115 held on December 13, 2004, by which the plaintiff was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, declared null. In general, defects are alleged in the elements of subject, procedure, grounds (motivo), and content; and violation of articles 11, 24, 35, 39, 41, 49, and 183 of the Political Constitution; numerals 1, 2, 8, 9, and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR), as well as articles 6 and 11 of the General Law of the Public Administration. It is reiterated once again that in the judgment of these adjudicators, it is viable to examine the challenged conduct in this jurisdiction by virtue of the broad spectrum guaranteed by numeral 49 of the Political Constitution. Indeed, control is guaranteed regarding all manifestations of public conduct that have not been expressly excluded from such oversight, whether by constitutional articles 10 and 48; numerals 1, 2, 29, and 73 subsection b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction or article 3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Furthermore, even if it were an act of government, the truth is that legality control is viable in relation to regulated elements and compensation. Finally, one cannot ignore that the plaintiff petitions for the protection of his subjective legal situation, alleging that it has been threatened and harmed by manifestations of public power, which, in consideration of the final paragraph of numeral 49 of the Constitution, is fully admissible, as these are controllable conducts not excluded from the competence of this jurisdiction. In this sense, it is insisted that in this case the challenged conduct does not correspond to a manifestation of the exercise of the legislative function of the Plenary but rather to a materially administrative and broadly regulated action. Nothing else can be concluded from reading constitutional numeral 183, which expressly regulates the subject competent to order the removal, the grounds (motivos) that must be proven for such purposes, and the requirement of opening a procedure in this sense. It is therefore necessary to examine the elements of the challenged public conduct to verify whether it conformed to the law. Regarding the subject, this Court finds no defect that warrants being declared. The removal act was issued by the competent subject in accordance with constitutional numeral 183 itself and article 129 of the General Law of the Public Administration. Regarding the procedure as a formal element of the administrative act, it must be indicated that it determines the path to be followed by the Public Administration to adopt a final decision.\n\n**VII.-** Now, it is evident from the record that the opinion or report issued by legislators Emilia Rodríguez Arias and Ronaldo Alfaro García is based on a new expert report from the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) concluded on October 19, 2004 (folios 2953 to 2965 of the administrative file), according to which \" (...) the false signatures of Nombre141715 , Nombre141716 and Nombre141713 , previously described, were made by Nombre66572 , which are products of free falsifications (...)\". However, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the aforementioned evidence cannot serve as the basis for issuing the final act, fundamentally because it was not subjected to adversarial proceedings. First, it must be considered that the aforementioned opinion was not discussed individually by the Plenary, an organ that limited itself to discussing the report of legislators González Alfaro and Ramírez Ramírez. Furthermore, it involves a new technical criterion, which is presented when the evidentiary instruction phase has already passed, so much so that it is presented with the opinion rendered to the Plenary. Since it introduces new elements of conviction, particularly burdensome for the plaintiff, express audience should have been granted to the plaintiff so that, in the exercise of the right of defense, he could offer opposing technical evidence. Otherwise, we are faced with a demonstrative element that cannot serve as the basis for the final act, because if it were so, it would violate a substantial formality of the procedure. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the five-day audience that the Plenary granted to the plaintiff does not materially remedy the omission committed. Although formally, the different opinions are brought to his attention, which includes the new expert report, the truth is that, because it involves a new evidentiary element that could have an impact on the final decision, its existence should have been expressly indicated so that it could be refuted with technical demonstrative elements. In this sense, the actions taken become insufficient to guarantee the plaintiff's right of defense. On the other hand, two of the other opinions (also not discussed individually in the Plenary) reach a similar conclusion to the first, but without indicating which evidentiary elements allow accrediting the existence of incorrect conduct. In general, these are associated with omissions of the rules for lawyers or notaries. Finally, the report of legislators Lilliana Salas Salazar and José Francisco Salas Ramos establishes that the file must first be sent to the Public Ministry for the knowledge and study of the conclusions of the criminalistic report (dictamen criminalístico) of the Judicial Investigation Agency so that the competent organs issue the pertinent judicial resolutions. As observed, in reality, the evidence gathered up to the moment of issuing the opinions does not allow proving, at that procedural stage, the existence of incorrect conduct (procederes incorrectos) or ineptitude (ineptitud). Even, if the content of the cited formal conduct is analyzed carefully, one can arrive at that conclusion. It is indicated that \" (...) With his response, Dr. Nombre66572 did not succeed in disproving the charges that he 'does not satisfy the suitability requirement to exercise the position of Comptroller General of the Republic'; nor the charges of 'ineptitude and incorrect conduct'.\" In respect of the presumption of innocence and the principle of legality itself, the constitutional norm requires that the conditions that may give rise to removal be proven in the procedure. In that sense, by the principle of the burden of proof, it corresponded to the Legislative Assembly to prove ineptitude or incorrect conduct, prior to ordering the removal. However, faced with the failure in that burden, the duty is reversed and the formal conduct assumes that the plaintiff did not disprove the imputed charges. Ergo, it was based on the existence of these presuppositions, when, it is insisted, the norm requires their verification.\n\n**VIII.-** Finally, the absence of that regulated motive at the time the Plenary issued the removal act is subsequently confirmed by other facts that for this collegiate body are fundamental. The first of these is that, in the corresponding instances, the procedures aimed at demonstrating the alleged falsifications and faults in the practice of the profession of lawyer and notary, which were the basis for concluding the existence of incorrect conduct, did not prosper. According to the evidence brought to the process, on December 2, 2008, the Acting Director of the Judicial Registry certified that in the records kept by that office, there are no entries in the name of the plaintiff (folio 139 of the judicial file). Likewise, the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados de Costa Rica) certified on December 3, 2008, that the plaintiff Nombre141713 had not been suspended or disciplinarily admonished in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer (folio 140 of the judicial file).\n\nThat same day, the Administrative Chief of the National Directorate of Notaries certified that in the last ten years the plaintiff had no suspensions or disqualifications in their records. (folio 141 of the judicial file). It is the opinion of these judges that if the competent bodies were unable to prove the actual existence of the alleged falsifications and misconduct in the exercise of the professions of lawyer and notary attributed to the plaintiff, their existence could not, and cannot, be presumed in order to classify it as incorrect conduct (proceder incorrecto) that then serves as a basis for ordering his removal from the office of Comptroller General. Moreover, it is noted that after his dismissal, some deputies introduced bills aimed at defining a procedure for these officials. It is noteworthy that the situation of the plaintiff is mentioned within the grounds of the cited bills. Specifically, one of them states that \" (...) That is, in the case of Mr. Nombre141713, it exposed a typical problem of a legal vacuum or gap (vacío o laguna legal), which must be corrected by the legislators themselves; may another situation of such confusion, legal uncertainty and danger to fundamental rights not be repeated, as was experienced with the aforementioned case of the former Comptroller General of the Republic (...)\" (folio 126 of the judicial file). In addition, a second bill indicates \" (...) What happened to Dr. Nombre66572, former Comptroller General of the Republic, must not be repeated in this country, which has always been characterized as respectful of human rights. It should concern all of us that the same deputies who removed him from his office—including the majority of the members of the commission that investigated him—three years later publicly accept that Mr. Nombre141713 did not incur the grounds for dismissal established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Constitution (...)\" (folio 136 of the judicial file). But the element of conviction that completely refutes the existence of the incorrect conduct and confirms that this reason could not be proven nor existed at the time the removal was ordered, is the expression of will of the Legislative Plenary itself, a body that in ordinary session No. 130, of January 26, 2009, agreed \"... Considering: 1. That in ordinary session No. 115, held on December 13, 2004, the Legislative Plenary agreed to dismiss Mr. Nombre66572 from his office of Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as to denounce him before the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the Directorate of the Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados), and the Directorate of Notaries (Dirección de Notariado) for having omitted important rules as a 'lawyer' and 'notary public' before assuming the office of Comptroller General. 2. That these facts could not be verified or were dismissed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Bar Association, and the Directorate of Notaries, in which case, no investigation was even opened against Mr. Nombre141713, as recorded in certifications issued by those entities and attached to this motion. 3. That in accordance with said certifications, Mr. Nombre66572 has never been sanctioned, suspended, admonished, or disqualified by the Directorate of Notaries, the Bar Association, or the courts of justice. 4. That subsequent to these events, many deputies of the 2002-2006 legislature have recognized the error incurred by the Legislative Assembly, as eloquently summarized by Deputy Nombre141714, former president of the Special Commission of Political Control (Comisión Especial de Control Político) formed by the Legislative Assembly to investigate his case: 'Thus, Mr. Nombre66572 was dismissed from his office of Comptroller General of the Republic, without having incurred any incorrect conduct in the performance of his duties. Furthermore, he was acquitted from an ethical, disciplinary, and legal standpoint, of the other facts attributed to him. That is, Mr. Nombre66572 was dismissed for nothing. And as if this were not in itself extremely serious in terms of human rights, it must also be recognized, consequently, that the Legislative Assembly breached, from beginning to end, his right to due process (debido proceso).' 5. That before this institution, Mr. Nombre66572 filed a contentious-administrative lawsuit against this Legislative Assembly, which was admitted according to notification received by the Presidency of this Assembly on January 13 of this year. In the order for response, the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), Second Judicial Circuit (San José) expressly states: 'Because the plaintiff has appeared directly before the jurisdictional route, a period of EIGHT BUSINESS DAYS is granted to Mr. Nombre44703, president of the Legislative Assembly as the supreme head of the body from which the contested conduct emanates, so that he may confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cause it to cease, for the benefit of the plaintiff. If within the indicated period the Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the questioned conduct, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated, without special ruling on costs (...).' 6. That it does not correspond to the Presidency of the Assembly to make the indicated decision because it was the Legislative Plenary that issued the cited agreement. 7. That procedurally, the act of removal in question has finality under the provisions of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, and, therefore, legally all its effects are consolidated, which makes it impossible for this Plenary to rule again on the same matter. 8. That this Legislative Assembly recognizes that the fate of Mr. Nombre66572 as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has wanted to say and do about him, so that, finally, it will correspond to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what is just and lawful. They make the following motion: So that based on the provisions of Article 153 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly and Article 119 of the Political Constitution, this Legislative Assembly agrees: 1. To refrain from ruling in the terms requested by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit. 2. To declare publicly, as many of the deputies of the previous legislature (2002-2006) have recognized, and as recorded in the certifications indicated in considering clauses two and three of this motion, that the Legislative Assembly of that period removed Mr. Nombre66572 from the office of Comptroller General of the Republic without him having incurred the grounds established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution, and therefore it is necessary to restore the good name of Mr. Nombre66572 for the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express wishes, so that in the future the Legislative Assembly be more careful when, as a consequence of its actions, the good name and honor of persons are at stake, in order to avoid incurring again in unjust acts that violate human rights. 4. To communicate this agreement to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Second Judicial Circuit...\" (folio 188 to 190 of the judicial file) (emphasis is ours). And it is in that agreement that the Legislative Plenary recognizes the existence of the flaws pointed out by this Court. Violations of due process (debido proceso) to the detriment of the plaintiff are admitted, and that the omission of the rules related to the exercise of the professions of lawyer and notary was not verified. But furthermore, that collegiate constitutional body accepts that the plaintiff was removed without having incurred the grounds established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution. This is serious because, it is reiterated, according to the constitutional text the plaintiff could only be removed from his office upon proof of the grounds indicated therein. As a last resort, some of the grounds indicated in numeral 48 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), which would have allowed his dismissal for serious misconduct, could have been demonstrated. Even considering and addressing the possibility of annulling his appointment due to a flaw in the will of those who elected him to that office, unaware that accusations (and only that) weighed upon his person that cast doubt on the requirement of honorability required for the appointment. However, the Plenary opted for his removal in accordance with numeral 183 of our Magna Carta, which imposed, unavoidably, proving the concrete existence of incorrect conduct (procederes incorrectos) or ineptitude (ineptitud). If none of these grounds were demonstrated, the removal was not proper. It is reiterated that, due to the independence that both the Political Constitution and the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic guarantee to the Comptroller General in the performance of their functions, the exercise of the power of removal attributed to the Legislative Assembly is not discretionary but rather regulated. Thus, having removed the plaintiff without ineptitude (ineptitud) or incorrect conduct (procederes incorrectos) being proven (as the Plenary itself accepts), constitutes an action contrary to law that violates the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) enshrined in Article 11 of both the Political Constitution and the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, that reprehensible manifestation of public conduct illegitimately harmed the legal situation of the plaintiff, a detriment for which the State must respond patrimonially in the terms that will be explained in a subsequent considering clause. The absence of the reason in the act under study directly affects its content, making it unlawful, since ineptitude (ineptitud) or incorrect conduct (procederes incorrectos) was not proven. For all the foregoing, the contested act is inconsistent with the legal system in accordance with the provisions of Articles 11, 128, 132, 133, 158, 166, 182, and 223 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and its absolute nullity must be declared.\n\n**IX.- ON THE NULLITY OF THE RELATED CONDUCT AND THE CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT.** In relation to the request that the invalidity of the related conduct be declared, the following must be indicated. In accordance with the provisions of subparagraph k) of Article 122 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the Court, when issuing a judgment, must suppress, even ex officio, all administrative conduct directly related to that submitted to the proceedings, when it is inconsistent with the legal system. Although it is an ex officio ruling, the truth is that such connection must emerge from the facts that are the object of the proceedings, so as not to exercise an abusive exercise of the ex officio sentencing powers granted by the cited Procedural Code. In the present case, from what was discussed in the preliminary hearing, it emerges that the only specific act sought to be annulled by connection is the appointment of the current Comptroller General of the Republic, appointed by the Plenary to replace the plaintiff, and who acts in this proceeding as the defendant. This is closely linked to the claim for reinstatement in the position that is also requested. In accordance with Article 171 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the declaration of absolute nullity shall have a declaratory and retroactive effect to the date of issuance of the invalidated act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. This Court considers that both the request for absolute nullity by connection of the appointment of the Comptroller General who replaced the plaintiff, and the reinstatement of the latter to the position, must be rejected for the following reasons. It must be kept in mind that the appointment of the current Comptroller General is an act presumed valid and whose legitimacy is not the object of analysis in this proceeding. It is evident that, as a consequence of that valid and effective appointment, the defendant Nombre71822 has been carrying out formal and material actions in her capacity as Comptroller General of the Republic. While the plaintiff's argument that the mere declaration of nullity of the act by which his removal was ordered has the immediate consequence of rendering the appointment of his substitute void is certainly respectable, it is the opinion of this Court that it is inapplicable to the present matter. Indeed, both the cited numeral 171 and Article 131 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) indicate that the retroactive effects of the declaration of absolute nullity must consider rights acquired in good faith. In the present matter, both the appointment and the actions that the defendant Nombre71822, in her capacity as Comptroller General, has been carrying out, have been so under the protection of said principle of good faith. Moreover, for situations such as this, the legislator in Article 131, third paragraph, ibidem, provided for the possibility that judges could graduate the effects of such declaration in time, space, or matter, when necessary to safeguard legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and social stability. In light of the foregoing, for this Court it is necessary to weigh the public and private interests at stake in light of criteria of public convenience, institutionality, and the good administration of the State. Granting the request and annulling the defendant's appointment would undoubtedly endanger the institutionality of the State, social peace, and would cause a serious dislocation of public interests as it would imply the invalidity, per se, of all the actions of the aforementioned public official, a situation that this Court cannot endorse. It is for this reason that, in application of the aforementioned canons 171 and 131, third paragraph, it is ordered to maintain the validity and effectiveness of the appointment and all the actions of the current Comptroller General of the Republic. In any event, given that the plaintiff also formulates a claim for damages, this Court finds no impediment whatsoever so that, by virtue of the public interests at stake, the claim for reinstatement (for the almost two years remaining in his appointment) be converted into and form part of the compensation claim being sought.\n\n**X.- ON THE DAMAGES.** Under the protection of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the Administration is responsible for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning. It should be noted that the reference made by the legislator is not simply to acts, but transcends to administrative functioning (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), a concept that reflects any form of expression of administrative will, whether formal or material, and that also encompasses dysfunction, i.e., administrative omissions. Said responsibility falls, therefore, within a preeminently objective regime, which bases its foundation on both the theory of damage and risk, as well as on the equilibrium of the patrimonial equation. This fundamentally seeks compensatory reparation for anyone who has experienced harm attributable to the public organization as a center of authority that proves to be unlawful in its basis. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of responsibility itself, as it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, whose legal situation, having been diminished, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except in what refers to their personal responsibility). This undoubtedly causes a shift in the very focus of its foundation, since the Administration shall be responsible whenever its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning causes damage that the victim does not have the duty to bear, whether patrimonial or extrapatrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, fulfilling, of course, the essential requirement of the causal nexus. On this subject, see the extensive development made in resolution no. 584 of 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. From this perspective, the legislation imposes unlawful or lawful conduct, as well as normal or abnormal functioning, as criteria for imputation. In the case of lawful conduct and normal functioning, the Legal System establishes requirements and conditions that determine its appropriateness, among them, the damage must be special or abnormal, which means it must fall upon a small proportion of affected persons or, in the second case, must have exceptional intensity. In these hypotheses, responsibility only covers the damage, but not the losses (Articles 194 and 195 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública). For its part, in unlawful conduct and abnormal functioning, responsibility is plenary. Nevertheless, before these criteria of imputability, it must be proven that the harm is a consequence of those actions or omissions, in order to establish the causal nexus that allows the attribution of responsibility to the center of public authority. In addition to this, in cases of abnormality and unlawfulness, the judge must undertake an examination of public functioning, in order to establish whether, effectively, a proceeding has occurred that departs from legality or, indeed, runs counter to the concepts of administrative efficiency. In such cases, it is decisive to clearly infer the existence of those criteria, because otherwise, the treatment and analysis of each case must be different, depending on the type of functioning to which the detriment is attributed. Causes that exonerate from such responsibility are the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, and force majeure. However, in each debate, the judge must examine whether the liberating effect of such circumstances is total or only partial, in which case it can only produce a reducing effect on the responsibility of the administrative unit. Again, the concurrence of these aspects falls upon the Administration. Now, it must be noted that in the dynamics of the compensation for damages sought to be claimed from Public Administrations, not any damage gives rise to the duty to repair, but only that which is effective, assessable, and individualizable. This indeed emerges from Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). The above eliminates mere expectations of right or aspirations of eventual profit, based on conjecture, ergo, on uncertain situations, from the compensation parameter. The effectiveness of the damage required in this type of claim avoids the consideration of hypothetical harms. The compensable damage can be of various types, whether material, bodily, objective moral, or subjective moral. However, it is reiterated that the harm must have these characteristics as a condition for its repairability. It should be noted at this point that as a derivation of the dynamic burden of proof (Articles 58, 82, 85 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, and 317 of the Civil Procedural Code, Código Procesal Civil), it corresponds to the victim to demonstrate the existence and amount of the damages they complain of. This duty is non-deferrable and constitutes an insurmountable requirement for the appropriateness of reparation. In the present case, the plaintiff requests that the State be ordered in the abstract to pay the damages caused. He indicates that these damages consist of \"..in the economic or material benefits such as salary in cash, in kind, years for my retirement, moral and emotional harm, which will be liquidated in execution of judgment...\". This Court considers that the abstract condemnation is proper. It must be kept in mind that Article 122, subparagraph m) iii, allows this type of condemnation when it is a consequence of the administrative conduct or legal relationship that is the object of the proceeding, allowing the concrete existence of the detriments and their quantification to be determined in the execution of judgment. The above finds its foundation in the doctrine of constitutional canon 41, by establishing the principle of integral reparation of the damage, which, as a right, is conferred upon persons in their individual framework, in their property, or in their moral interests. It concerns the due protection from infringements to the legal situation of the person, which includes their patrimonial assets, but also their inner sphere. The elements of conviction brought to the records allow us to establish, as a direct, precise, and logical consequence that the illegitimate conduct of the State that has been annulled here (by virtue of which the Legislative Assembly agreed to the removal of the plaintiff from his office of Comptroller General of the Republic without the special conditions required by our legal system for such purposes having been proven) becomes a parameter of imputability that allows attributing patrimonial responsibility to the State. This Court does not share the State's argument that responsibility cannot be attributed insofar as Article 194, third paragraph of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) indicates that responsibility shall be for damages caused directly by a Law, which is what occurs in the specific case. In the present matter, the declared responsibility is not for lawful conduct or for the Legislative State, which are the cases provided for in the cited Article 194. The declared responsibility is for illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of an administrative function.\n\nFor this collegiate body, the act of removal that the Legislative Assembly adopted contrary to the legal system constitutes a manifestation of illegitimate conduct that causes both material and moral detriment and suffering in the plaintiff’s internal sphere. Having been established that the plaintiff was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic without having incurred any of the grounds set forth in Article 183 of the Constitution (as the Legislative Assembly itself accepts), by human presumption (article 417 of the Civil Procedure Code) and an assessment under the rules of sound criticism, it can be inferred that this illegitimate removal caused damages in his subjective sphere. In the present matter, that illegitimate action by the State cut short the plaintiff’s possibility of exercising a public office for which he had been chosen. Moreover, serious accusations that were not duly substantiated were attributed to him, which cast doubt on his moral and functional integrity, with the consequences that this can generate in his family, social, and work environment and before the community in general. Note that the Legislative Plenary itself recognizes that its illegitimate conduct caused detriment to the plaintiff. In fact, in the aforementioned ordinary session No. 130, of January 26, 2009, it was agreed *\"... That this Legislative Assembly recognizes that the fate of Mr. Nombre66572 as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has wanted to say and do about him, so that, finally, it will be up to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what is just and lawful. (...) therefore it is necessary to restore the good name of Mr. Nombre66572 for the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express the hope that in the future the Legislative Assembly will be more careful, when the good name and honor of persons are at stake as a consequence of its actions, in order to avoid once again incurring unjust acts and violations of human rights...\"*. It must be borne in mind that even if the conduct had been excluded by the legislator in article 3, subsection b) of the CPCA (which, as already explained, was not the case), the matter of any applicable compensation (indemnizaciones) would be heard in this venue. From this perspective, the aforementioned article 122, subsection m) part iii), confers on the judge the power to assess this type of condition and, where appropriate, when it deems that the questioned conduct could have caused injuries, regardless of whether their existence or amount is not proven, to impose a judgment in the abstract (condena en abstracto) on the State regarding those aspects, so that it is in the execution phase of the judgment where their existence and quantification are discussed. In any case, it will be in the execution stage where this specific matter will be definitively aired, and where the parties will enjoy all the guarantees of intervention and defense granted by the administrative litigation procedural rules. Having said that, while article 110 of the Political Constitution states that a deputy is not responsible for the opinions they issue in the Legislative Assembly and regulates parliamentary immunity in criminal matters, the truth is that this provision must be interpreted in conformity with the entire Legal System, and its unlimited application should not be sought. This is derived even from the Constituent Assembly’s own records. Specifically, it is worth highlighting that in act No. 61, of the ordinary session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three-thirty in the afternoon on the fifth day of May, nineteen hundred forty-nine, under the presidency of Doctor Rodríguez and the presence of Deputies Vargas Fernández and Ortiz Martín, Secretaries; Nombre10040, González Luján, González Flores, González Herrán, Nombre5701, Nombre62894, Nombre9620, Herrero Montealegre, Volio Sancho, Volio Jiménez, Nombre49854, Dobles Segreda, Jiménez Núñez, Jiménez Ortiz, Nombre251, Nombre70983, Nombre141717, Nombre171, Nombre110253, Nombre141714, Nombre8730, Nombre141718, Nombre141719, Nombre5709, Nombre18695, Arias, Gómez, Nombre65461, Nombre9706, Nombre6248, Nombre6379, Nombre141720, Nombre54760, Nombre32221, Nombre1601 and the alternates Nombre141721, Nombre141722, Nombre110253, Nombre141723 and Nombre5205\n; the scope of the referred lack of responsibility for opinions and parliamentary immunity was discussed. It is indicated, for example, that Deputy Nombre5701 stated that *\" (...) In his judgment, the responsibility of deputies would appear and should be claimed by the Supreme Court of Justice, when with their votes they produce an irreparable violation of the Constitution. The responsibility for the violation should be the criterion for condemning the deputies. It would be the case, for example, of the Congress of March 1, 1948, in which a coerced and criminal majority, overriding law and ethics, disregarded the election that the people had made in the person of Nombre141724. In that case, the violation committed had no possible composition or amendment. It was an irreparable harm, a remedy-less injury to the Political Constitution. The latter did not offer ways to correct what had been done. It is in cases like that, in his judgment, where the responsibility of the deputies would be applicable. (...) Representative Arias intervened again in the debate to clarify several of his points of view. He said that Congress could fail in its duties in two very distinct cases: willfully and by error, when the Assembly has misapplied the Constitution, but not maliciously, when, for example, it has issued a law or decree contrary to the fundamental statute. For this case -he declared-, the provision involved in the motion under discussion cannot be maintained in any way. In cases of malicious violation of the Constitution, he said that the act should not go unpunished, but that it had to be clarified whether the corresponding sanction is to be individual, or whether a joint pronouncement from the majority of the Assembly, which produces the wrong, is required for responsibility to arise. (...)* *Deputy Nombre251 declared that he would vote for the motion under debate, as he had always found it monstrous that a Constitution would state that a Deputy is absolutely irresponsible for his votes and opinions issued in the Chamber. (...) In no way can a principle like this be maintained, so that in the future serious and malicious violations of the Constitution cannot occur without the respective sanction (...)\"*. In addition to the above, it must be borne in mind that in light of article 9 of the same Constitution and the reform introduced in Article 11 thereof, on June 8, 2000, the Principle of Responsibility of the Powers of the State and of public officials is strengthened. Moreover, in this regard, there is case law from both the Constitutional Chamber (Judgment No. Placa27635, of 14 hours 56 minutes of November 14, 2000) and the Third Chamber (Judgment No. 125-2004, of 11 hours 10 minutes of February 20, 2004) that address this issue. In light of the foregoing, it should be noted that if there is a specific pecuniary judgment against the State for the damages caused by the illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Legislative Assembly in exercising its administrative function, the logical and necessary consequence would be the immediate opening of internal or external procedures that make it possible to determine those responsible for the actions or omissions undertaken in derogation of the due procedures in that matter. Taking into account the particularities of this case, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that while the State must respond jointly and severally (solidariamente) in patrimonial terms to the plaintiff, the condemned Administration must assess the appropriateness of ordering the necessary actions aimed at recovering any amount that, for this charge, ends up being paid, in accordance with the provisions, where compatible, of articles 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205 and 209 of the General Law of Public Administration, and in order to protect the public interests.\n\n***XI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXCEPTIONS-COROLLARY.*** The defendants filed the preliminary exception (excepción previa) regulated by article 66, subsection g) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, which was rejected in accordance with what was set forth in Considering I. As substantive defenses, the defendant Nombre71822 asserted the defense of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. The first must be rejected. When seeking the annulment of the removal act and due to the consequences that, as a general rule, such a declaration would produce, in accordance with article 12, subsection 3) of the cited Procedure Code, the defendant had to be present in this proceeding. However, the exception of lack of right must be accepted. As explained in Considering IX, by virtue of article 171 of the General Law of Public Administration and article 131, subsection 3) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, it is necessary to dimension the scope of this annulment judgment so that the invalidity being declared does not affect the legitimacy, validity, and effectiveness of the appointment of the current Comptroller General of the Republic or any of her actions, which must remain unaffected (incólumes). As such, insofar as it concerns her, the lawsuit must be declared without merit. In relation to the State, the exception must be partially accepted only as regards the fact that the reinstatement of the plaintiff to the position of Comptroller General of the Republic is not applicable, nor are the appointment of the current Comptroller or her actions null. In all other respects it must be rejected, since in accordance with the reasons set forth in Considering VI, VII and VIII, the removal act issued by the Legislative Plenary and through which the plaintiff Nombre141713 was removed from his position is substantially inconsistent with the legal system. Consequently, the lawsuit must be partially granted in the following terms: **1)** Because it is substantially inconsistent with the legal system, the absolute nullity of the act issued by the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 114, of December 13, 2004, is declared. **2)** In accordance with article 122, subsection m iii), the State is condemned in the abstract (en abstracto) to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff as a consequence of the annulled public conduct, which shall be liquidated and verified in the execution of judgment.\n\n***XII.- REGARDING COSTS.*** Article 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code provides that procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Tribunal’s judgment, sufficient cause to litigate or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this specific case, with respect to the defendant Nombre71822, this Tribunal considers that, by virtue of the complexity of the matter, the nature of the debated issues, and the fact that it was the Processing Judge of this Office who, on its own motion, joined her to this proceeding, the matter must be resolved without a special pronouncement on costs. In relation to the State, this collegiate body finds no cause to apply the exceptions established by the applicable rules and to break the postulate of condemning the losing party. Therefore, both costs of this proceeding are imposed upon it.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe preliminary defense regulated in article 66, subsection 1 g) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, which was filed by both defendants, is rejected; as well as the exception of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) formulated by the defendant Nombre71822. The exception of lack of right raised by the defendant Nombre71822 is accepted, and regarding her, the lawsuit is declared without merit with no special pronouncement on costs. The defense of lack of right raised by the State is partially accepted only as regards the fact that reinstatement of the plaintiff to the position of Comptroller General of the Republic is not applicable, nor are the appointment of the current Comptroller or her actions null. In all other respects it must be rejected. Consequently, the lawsuit is partially granted in the following terms, understanding as denied that which is not expressly granted: **1)** Because it is substantially inconsistent with the legal system, the absolute nullity of the act issued by the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 114, of December 13, 2004, through which the plaintiff Nombre66572 was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, is declared.\n\nThe effects of this declaration of nullity are dimensioned in order to maintain the validity and efficacy of the act of appointment of the current Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as that of all her actions.\n\n**2)** In accordance with Article 122, subsection m iii), the State is abstractly ordered to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff as a consequence of the annulled public conduct, which shall be liquidated and verified during the execution of sentence phase (ejecución de sentencia).\n\n**3)** Both costs of this proceeding are imposed on the State.\n\n\n\n**Cynthia Abarca Gómez**\n\n\n\n**Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Otto González Vílchez**\n\n*EXPEDIENTE:08-001496-1027-CA*\n\n*PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO*\n\n*ACTOR: Nombre66572* \n\n*DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, Nombre71822* \n\nI.- ON THE PRELIMINARY DEFENSE REITERATED BY THE DEFENDANTS DURING THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENTS. As stated in the Fifth Whereas Clause, during the preliminary hearing, the Case Management Judge rejected the preliminary defense regulated by Article 66, subsection g), that is, that the claim is brought against an act not susceptible to challenge, which was filed by the representation of co-defendant Aguilar Montoya. However, during their closing arguments and exercising the power granted by Article 92, subsection 7) of the cited Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (CPCA), both defendants requested that this Tribunal re-examine the cited defense. The special judicial attorney of co-defendant Aguilar Montoya argues that the plaintiff's claims are typically related to the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Constitucional), both in what is sought and in the normative parameters on which it is based. He considers that the appointment of the Contralor General de la República is a constitutional act not susceptible to challenge in the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) venue because it is not subject to Administrative Law. He indicates that the fact that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declared itself incompetent to hear what the plaintiff seeks via the remedy of amparo in no way binds the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). For his part, the State attorney points out that we are facing a political act, of constitutional competence subject to Parliamentary Law, and that the venue for challenging these legislative agreements is the one indicated in Article 73, subsection c) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and not this jurisdiction. Finally, he mentions rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that have already demonstrated which is the venue for challenging this type of act. From the outset, it must be noted that by resolution No. 883-2009, at fourteen hundred hours on May 5, 2009, the Case Management Judge of this Court rejected the jurisdictional exception (excepción de incompetencia) that was filed by the State with arguments similar to those being put forward. Although it is clear from the record that none of the parties exercised the objection (inconformidad) that, as a means of challenge, is established by Article 5, subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the truth is that for a better analysis of the arguments raised by the defendants, in defense of their thesis that this is an act not susceptible to challenge in the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativa) jurisdiction, it is appropriate to note the following. Article 49 of the Constitución Política establishes that the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) is responsible for guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity, as well as the protection, at a minimum, of the subjective rights and legitimate interests of those administered against the arbitrariness of public power. This is a framework that protects the legal situations of individuals, whether they involve power, duty, advantage, or mixed situations. This constitutional norm is the basis for the procedural reform in this area that led to the approval of the current Law No. 8508, whose axis is based—as is clear from Article 1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo—on the one hand, on the full and effective protection of the person, that is, the effective protection of the legal situations of every person (subjective legality), which undoubtedly include their fundamental rights. On the other hand, it establishes objective control of the legality of the administrative function, seeking the reestablishment of legality, most often to prevent injuries to the aforementioned legal situations. This procedural reform is based on four ideological pillars, all of them of constitutional origin: distribution of functions, which allows the Judicial Branch to control public conduct (Articles 9, 49, 153), subjection of the State to the Law in fulfilling its functions or exercising its powers (Article 11 - the principle of legality in its dual vision), universal control of the administrative function, which eliminates any possibility of areas or enclaves of public conduct exempt from jurisdictional control (Article 49), and as a corollary of these statements, effective judicial protection (Articles 41 and 49). All these maxims converge to achieve prompt and complete justice, as the desideratum of this type of judicial proceeding, always bearing in mind that the purpose of this jurisdiction is to guarantee the legality of the administrative function and the protection of the legal situations that may be affected within the framework of administrative-legal relations. That being said, despite the breadth implied by Articles 1 and 2 of the cited Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the legislator established certain matters excluded from this ordinary legality control. Specifically, Article 3 of the cited normative body states that this jurisdiction will not hear claims related to administrative conduct in matters of public employment, nor those concerning acts of relations between Branches of the State or arising from international relations; without prejudice, in this last case, to the applicable compensation, the determination of which does fall under this jurisdiction. As explained supra, the defendants claim that the formal conduct whose annulment is sought in this proceeding are acts not susceptible to challenge because they are political and constitutional acts, subject directly to Constitutional or Parliamentary Law. As the defendants claim, national doctrine (Eduardo Ortíz Ortiz) refers to the constitutional or institutional act as a manifestation of a government act (acto de gobierno) that has particular characteristics. The first of these is that they are acts authorized and regulated directly by the Constitución, the supreme norm that establishes their basis and limits. Second, they generally involve a wide margin of discretion by virtue of the Constitución or the law, although they may exceptionally be regulated. It is noted that the constitutional act is normally discretionary in terms of motive, content, and even purpose, which distinguishes it from the administrative act, where although discretion may exist in motive or content, the purpose is a necessarily regulated element. Finally, they are acts that refer to and affect only the internal organization of the State or its existence. From this perspective, they do not directly affect or impact the subjective sphere of individuals and, therefore, are not injurious to their rights or interests. They are said to be acts of generally general scope, because they are directed at State bodies or the entire community, without reference to individuals. It is also admitted that, exceptionally, they may affect a specific individual, by virtue of a joint interest of the community and the state apparatus. In this case, their purpose is to integrate the constitutional organs necessary for the functioning of the State, which is of interest both to the State itself and to the community. Due to their general scope, they are not capable of directly and immediately harming rights or interests, which is why their challenge is inadmissible precisely due to the lack of interest and violated subjective rights, which generates a lack of standing. It is further admitted that the constitutional act may constitute a prerequisite or antecedent of common administrative acts, which do produce that injurious effect on the sphere of individuals. In these cases, it is said that this constitutional act is not challengeable at the moment it occurs, but rather after the administrative conduct based on it and with an injurious effect on the individual's legal sphere occurs.\n\nII.- Having carefully analyzed the defendants' arguments, this Tribunal must reject the defense reiterated during the closing arguments for the following reasons. As has been pointed out, three of the ideological pillars on which the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA) is based are the full subjection of the State to the legal system, the universal and plenary control of the administrative function, and effective judicial protection. In light of these principles, recognizing zones or areas of public conduct exempt from jurisdictional control is incompatible with a State of Law (Estado de Derecho). That is why the immunity from legality control that was previously granted to political acts, government acts, or acts of political direction of the State has been progressively reduced both at the level of Comparative Law and in our own legislation. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself already established this, considering that \"...in the current Costa Rican legal development, there is no disagreement whatsoever about the possibility that the constitutionality controller reviews this type of act issued by the Executive Branch, whatever its denomination or characterization, since—in principle—such acts are subject to the Constitución Política, or, to put it more precisely, to the so-called Law of the Constitución (Derecho de la Constitución), so they must operate within the framework set by its provisions, which vary in breadth and are often contained in norms and principles serving as general guidelines for action...\" (Judgment No. 9992-2004, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Corte Suprema de Justicia at 14 hours 31 minutes on September 8, 2004). Furthermore, Spanish doctrine, legislation, and jurisprudence (Santiago González Varas Ibáñez, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Vol. III, Vol. I, Editorial Civitas, 2008, Jesús Leguina Villa-Miguel Sánchez Morón and others, Comentarios a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, 2001) has opted for limited control by the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativa) jurisdiction regarding this type of act. While the existence of government acts is admitted as a negative zone vis-à-vis ordinary jurisdictional control over the actions of public powers, the existence of a negative zone regarding the negative zone of government acts is also accepted; an exception to the exception of control technically based on the theory of judicially manageable concepts, which limit and affect the theory of political or government acts, insofar as the limits and requirements to which they must be subject are regulated; which is why the jurisdictional body cannot be accused of intruding into the realm of discretion beyond strict jurisdictional control. Accordingly, this type of act is subject to control by the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) jurisdictional order in three aspects: the protection of fundamental rights, compliance with the regulated elements to which that State activity must adhere, and the determination of any applicable compensation. Furthermore, the recently repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa already excluded only two of these acts from legality control, namely, those concerning relations between Branches of the State and those regarding its international relations (Article 4, subsection b)), exclusions that are maintained in the CPCA, as previously explained. In the judgment of this Tribunal, consistent with the evolution in Comparative Law, these exceptions are the only political acts that our legislator excluded from the competence of this jurisdiction, precisely due to the margin of discretion, opportunity, or convenience surrounding this type of state decision. However, as has been stated, if regulated provisions exist for relations between branches or international relations, the conduct is closer to the administrative function, and therefore subject to ordinary jurisdictional control (In effect, Manrique Jiménez Meza, El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo, 2006, page 63). Moreover, Article 3, subsection b) of the CPCA itself subjects the adverse patrimonial legal effects that this type of act may produce on the party seeking justice to the legality control exercised by this jurisdiction, and leaves open the possibility of demanding compensation when the act, even a political one, causes legal injury to an administered party. In the specific case, the analysis must start precisely from the legislator's express will to exclude from the legality control of the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativa) jurisdiction only two manifestations of political acts, which are those indicated in Article 3, subsection b) ibidem, among which the act being challenged is not typified. Furthermore, this Tribunal considers that we are not in the presence of a constitutional act in the terms explained by our national doctrine. Note that in the present matter, the act by which the Asamblea Legislativa may remove the Contralor General de la República, while regulated in Article 183 of the Constitución Política, is not subject directly or exclusively to that supreme norm. On the contrary, it is also subject to law, specifically to the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Indeed, Article 48 of the cited norm regulates a series of prohibitions for the Contralor, which, if violated, constitute serious misconduct that will give rise to his dismissal for just cause. In addition, the procedure for dismissing him is regulated neither by the Constitución nor by the Regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa. Therefore, according to the delimitation of its competence that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has been establishing, among others, in Judgment No. 9992-2004 cited, as it is not subject directly to the Constitución, its control is not exclusive to that jurisdiction. Added to the above, the truth is that the indicated Article 183 has a very defined regulated content, which contrasts with the wide margin of discretion that characterizes this type of act. As relevant here, the third paragraph of the aforementioned constitutional norm provides that \"(...) The Contralor and Subcontralor are accountable to the Asamblea for the fulfillment of their duties and may be removed by it, by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members, if the proceeding created for that purpose demonstrates ineptitude or incorrect conduct (procederes incorrectos).\" As can be easily observed, the degree of discretion, as the freedom to choose from several valid options the one that best suits the fulfillment of the purpose, is quite limited (if not practically eliminated) because the norm imposes conditions for the removal of the Contralor: the opening of a proceeding, the verification of ineptitude and incorrect conduct, and the qualified vote of the Legislative Plenary. Compliance with these regulated aspects is amply justified considering the independence that, both constitutionally and legally, is recognized for this official. Although there are undefined legal concepts within the norm that could give some margin of freedom to the Asamblea, it is also true that there are parameters that allow their application and jurisdictional control in the specific case, such as Article 48 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Moreover, we are not facing an act that affects only the organization and functioning of the State. The dismissal act that was issued directly affects the subjective sphere of the plaintiff, especially when what is being claimed is that he was left in a state of defenselessness and violation of the regulated aspects imposed by the legal system.\n\nNow, it should be noted that we are also not dealing with acts that are subject to exclusive challenge before the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Constitucional). In this regard, an interpretation of Article 10 of our Magna Carta in relation to numerals 1 and 2 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), establishes that the constitutional jurisdiction, exercised exclusively by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), corresponds to: a) guaranteeing the rights and freedoms enshrined by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and the human rights recognized by International Law in force in Costa Rica; b) exercising control of the constitutionality of norms of any nature and of acts subject to Public Law, as well as the conformity of the internal legal order with International or Community Law; c) resolving conflicts of competence among the Branches of State, including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), and those of constitutional competence between these and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), the municipalities, the decentralized entities, and other persons of Public Law; and ch) the other matters that the Constitution or the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction itself attribute to it (canons 3 and 4 of the last legal body mentioned). Moreover, Article 73, subsection b) of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that it is the competence of that Chamber to hear, by way of a constitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), \"... the subjective acts of public authorities, when they infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle, if they are not susceptible to the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo.\" This implies that, a contrario sensu, when it is alleged that said acts violate or are susceptible to violating the fundamental rights of the claimant, they cannot be heard via the constitutionality action; but rather, and in principle, through the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo (See in this regard, judgments No. 2621-1995 and No. 358-99, issued by the Constitutional Chamber at 15 hours 53 minutes on May 23, 1995, and at 15 hours 45 minutes in 1999, respectively; as well as No. 14877, at 9 hours 3 minutes on October 7, 2008, through which the constitutionality action filed by the plaintiff himself was resolved). Having set forth the foregoing, it is worth mentioning that numeral 1 of the CPCA allows for control of the actions of the different Branches of State and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, when they perform an administrative function. It is therefore necessary to define whether the removal act challenged in this venue constitutes a legislative function (having originated from the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa)) or an administrative function. For this collegiate body, the public conduct whose validity is questioned in this venue does not correspond to the legislative function proper (in a material and organic sense). Nor does it correspond to acts or procedures regulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) or governed directly by Parliamentary Law. As will be analyzed in detail later, there is no constitutional or parliamentary provision that regulates the procedure to be followed to prove the ineptitude or incorrect conduct enabling the Plenary to dismiss the Comptroller. Furthermore, there are proposed laws (Law Projects) (expedientes No. 16011, of September 20, 2004, and No. 16914, of January 23, 2008, visible on folios 124 to 138 of the judicial file), in which the intention is to subject that procedure, not to the strictly parliamentary ones regulated by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, but rather to the ordinary one established from Title II of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This Court also does not agree that we are facing an act that, by parallelism of forms, should be assimilated to the act indicated by constitutional numeral 158 regarding the non-reelection of the Magistrates of the Judicial Branch. In this last case, unlike constitutional 183 ibidem, the Assembly can sovereignly and with a wide margin of freedom decide not to reelect a Magistrate, solely with the will of two-thirds of the totality of the Plenary, without requiring the opening of a procedure or the demonstration of any subjective condition.\n\nThus, given that we are not facing a political act exempt from control in this jurisdiction and that, in addition, it is an action of the Legislative Assembly that does not classify as a legislative function, we are facing public conduct of that Branch which, residually, constitutes a manifestation of an administrative function that can be controlled by this jurisdictional body. Even national doctrine (Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Manual of Administrative Law Volume I, page 95) admits that some legislative bodies perform an administrative function. Specifically mentioned as administrative acts of the Plenary are the designation of the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes) and of the Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller of the Republic, among others. If the appointment of these officials (which entails some degree of discretion on the part of the Legislative Assembly) constitutes a manifestation of the administrative function of that collegiate body, it is clear that their removal, particularly that of the Comptroller, is also one, especially if it is taken into account that it constitutes the exercise of a regulated power. The foregoing, together with the petition that, in pursuit of protection of his legal situation, the claimant puts forth, allows the challenged act to be reviewed in aspects specific to the legality control of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (from which, as has been stated, not even political acts entirely escape), particularly in relation to the regulated elements of the public power exercised by the Legislative Plenary and in relation to damages. This is in accordance with Article 36, subsection b) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). It must also be borne in mind that the Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling No. 13440-2004, issued at fourteen hours and thirty-one minutes on November thirtieth, two thousand four, indicated that some of the violations alleged by the claimant constituted \"(...) a matter that, as this chamber has repeatedly held in similar cases, must be discussed within the same procedure - in this case, before the Legislative Plenary at the time of responding to the final hearing granted for that purpose - and eventually in the ordinary venue, so that what corresponds in law is resolved. (...)\".\n\nThus, although the plaintiff did not make a request before the Plenary, the truth is that, under the protection of constitutional numeral 49, he resorted to this ordinary venue, in protection of his legal situation against what he considers an arbitrary and illegitimate action by the Legislative Branch in the exercise of its administrative function. It is the criterion of this Court that not exercising that legality control would imply broadening the exclusion criteria clearly defined by the legislator in ordinal 3 of the CPCA, to the detriment of the pillars on which this jurisdiction rests, namely, the Principles of Submission of the State to the Law and Universal and Plenary Control of the Administrative Function. But in addition, the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection (Tutela Judicial Efectiva) would be violated, especially if it is taken into account that the Constitutional Chamber itself, both in the amparo judgment just cited and in the one that resolved the constitutionality action filed by the claimant, resolved at the time (and each one of them separately) that what was alleged was not susceptible to being controlled through the amparo remedy, nor through the constitutionality action remedy. For the reasons stated, since the claim is directed against public conduct that is susceptible to being examined in this jurisdiction, the defense (excepción) raised is inadmissible and must be declared as such.\"\n\nIn that regard, a decision adopted in violation of those minimum rigors and formalities, which is also harmful to the legal situation of the final decision's addressee, would introduce a degree of invalidity into the act that could lead to its suppression. Now, note that this harmony must be substantial, because it is not satisfied when that procedure is only apparently covered, or when the public official's application of the norms disregards the very essence of that regulation to the detriment of the person's legitimate rights or interests, as well as when adversarial phases are suppressed, placing the individual in a state of defenselessness or disadvantage by preventing him from effectively combating the arguments outlined against him. Thus, the role of legality controller that Article 49 of the Magna Carta confers upon the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in the case of sanctioning procedures, entails verifying that all stages and formalities established in the legal source have been complied with, and in turn, that due process has been respected, as well as the set of guarantees offered in favor of the investigated subject, as is proper in control procedures.\n\nAs already explained, the specific case has the particularity that, since there is no special procedure regulated to dismiss the Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller of la República in la Constitución, the Regulations of la Asamblea, or any legal norm, the procedural path followed was characterized by combining aspects typical of the legislative procedures regulated in the Regulations of la Asamblea Legislativa with others derived from that which regulates la Ley General de la Administración Pública. In this sense, as explained in the preceding Considerando, this Court cannot hear violations of aspects proper to the legislative procedure, because that is exclusively vested in la Sala Constitucional, only for those cases of acts issued in exercise of the legislative function, such as the formation of laws and modifications to la Constitución Política. The dismissal of the Comptroller does not fit into any of those cases, as indicated in Considerandos I and VI. Ergo, this Court's examination is limited only to the defects of legality that may have occurred in the procedure. In this regard, it must be noted that the Plenary delegated the instructional work of the procedure to a Commission, which, regardless of its name or nature, is in accordance with the law. Subsequently, that Commission submitted reports to the Plenary, which ultimately adopted the act that the plaintiff considers harmful to his subjective legal situation. Furthermore, it is established that, at its core, the guarantees of due process and the right of defense were respected. Indeed, it was proven that the claimant was notified of a statement of charges that implicated and attributed a series of facts and charges to him, as well as the potential sanctions he would face if these were verified. It is worth noting that although initially the powers conferred on la Comisión were investigative, and in that regard the plaintiff's right of defense was limited in some procedural stages, it is true that subsequently the mandate granted to said commission was expanded to make it clear that it was a procedure aimed at verifying whether the claimant had incurred in any cause warranting his removal, in accordance with Article 183 of la Constitución. From the evidence brought to the process, it is established that from that moment on, la Comisión guaranteed the plaintiff his right of defense in the various hearings that were held. From the reports rendered, it is clear that the claimant even had the opportunity to offer technical evidence to refute that managed by the instructing body.\n\nSubsequently, the Legislative Plenary, prior to issuing the removal act, granted the claimant a period of five days to examine the reports rendered and argue what was appropriate under the law. For the foregoing reasons, at its core and with the precision that will be analyzed below, it is this Court's opinion that in the procedure followed, no substantial formalities were omitted, nor was the plaintiff left defenseless, which is why, in accordance with Article 223 of la Ley General de la Administración Pública, there is no reason whatsoever to declare the invalidity of what was done.\n\nThe last of the regulated aspects of the challenged public conduct is the motive, as a factual or legal prerequisite that makes the adoption of the act necessary. In this regard, Article 133 of the cited Ley General indicates that the motive must be legitimate and exist as it was taken into account to issue the act. As it pertains to the specific case, the factual prerequisite that the norm demands for the removal of the Comptroller is that ineptitude or incorrect behavior has been proven in the file that must be opened for that purpose, and that the decision be adopted by a qualified majority of the Legislative Plenary. It is, therefore, a regulated aspect, in that removal only proceeds if those conditions concur.\n\n**[…]** ***VIII.-*** Finally, the absence of that regulated motive at the time the Plenary issued the removal act is subsequently confirmed by other facts that are fundamental to this collegiate body. The first of these is that, in the corresponding instances, the procedures aimed at demonstrating the alleged falsifications and faults in the practice of the professions of lawyer and notary, which were the basis for concluding the existence of incorrect behavior, did not succeed. According to the evidence brought to the process, on December 2, 2008, the Acting Director of the Judicial Registry certified that there are no entries in the records kept by that office in the name of the plaintiff *(folio 139 of the judicial file).* Likewise, the Costa Rican Bar Association certified on December 3, 2008, that the claimant Solís Fallas had not been suspended or disciplined in the practice of his profession as a lawyer *(folio 140 of the judicial file).* That same day, the Administrative Head of the National Directorate of Notaries certified that in the last ten years, the plaintiff had no suspensions or disqualifications in its records. *(folio 141 of the judicial file).* It is the opinion of these judges that if the competent bodies failed to prove the real existence of the alleged falsifications and faults in the practice of the professions of lawyer and notary attributed to the plaintiff, their existence could not, nor can it be, presumed in order to qualify it as incorrect behavior that then serves as a prerequisite to decree his removal from the position of Comptroller.\n\nOn the other hand, it is shown that after his dismissal, some deputies presented bills of law aimed at defining a procedure for these officials. It is noteworthy that within the motives of the cited bills, mention is made of the claimant's situation. Specifically, one of them states that *\"(...) That is to say, in the case of Mr. Solís Fallas, it revealed a typical problem of a legal vacuum or gap, which must be corrected by the legislators themselves; lest another situation of such confusion, legal uncertainty, and danger to fundamental rights be repeated, as was experienced with the aforementioned case of the former Comptroller General of la República (...)\" (folio 126 of the judicial file).* On the other hand, a second bill of law indicates *\"(...) What happened to Dr. Alex Solís Fallas, former Comptroller General of la República, must not be repeated in this country, which has always been characterized as respectful of human rights. It should concern us all that the same deputies who removed him from his position—including the majority of the members of the commission that investigated him—three years later publicly accept that Mr. Solís Fallas did not incur in the grounds for dismissal established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Constitution (...)\" (folio 136 of the judicial file).*\n\nBut the element of conviction that completely refutes the existence of the incorrect behavior and confirms that this motive could not be proven nor did it exist at the time the removal was ordered, is the expression of will of the Legislative Plenary itself, the body that, in ordinary session No. 130 of January 26, 2009, agreed *\"... Considering: 1. That in ordinary session No. 115, held on December 13, 2004, the Legislative Plenary agreed to dismiss Mr. Alex Solís Fallas from his position of Comptroller General of la República, as well as to denounce him before the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Directorate of the Bar Association, and the Directorate of Notaries for having omitted important rules as a 'lawyer' and 'notary public' before assuming the position of Comptroller. 2.* ***That these facts could not be verified or were dismissed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Bar Association, and the Directorate of Notaries, in which case, no investigation was even opened against Mr. Solís Fallas, as recorded in certifications issued by those entities*** *and attached to this motion. 3. That in accordance with said certifications, Mr. Alex Solís Fallas has never been sanctioned, suspended, reprimanded, or disqualified by the Directorate of Notaries, the Bar Association, or the courts of justice. 4.* ***That subsequent to these events, many deputies of the 2002-2006 legislature have recognized the error incurred by la Asamblea Legislativa*** *, as eloquently summarized by Deputy Federico Vargas, former president of the Special Commission for Political Control formed by la Asamblea Legislativa to investigate his case: 'Thus, Don Alex was dismissed from his position of Comptroller General of la República, without having incurred in any incorrect behavior in the performance of his duties. Furthermore, he was cleared from an ethical, disciplinary, and legal standpoint of the other facts attributed to him. That is to say, Don Alex was dismissed for nothing. And as if this were not in itself extremely serious in terms of human rights, it must also be recognized, consequently, that la Asamblea Legislativa violated, from beginning to end, his right to due process.' 5. That before this institution, Mr. Alex Solís Fallas filed a contentious-administrative lawsuit against this Asamblea Legislativa, which was admitted according to notification received in the Presidency of this Asamblea on January 13 of this year. In the transfer order, the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Second Judicial Circuit (San José) expressly states that: 'Because the plaintiff has resorted directly to the jurisdictional route, a term of EIGHT WORKING DAYS is granted to Mr. Francisco Antonio Pacheco Fernández, president of la Asamblea Legislativa, as the supreme head of the body from which the challenged conduct emanates, to confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cause it to cease, for the benefit of the plaintiff. If within the indicated term, the Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the questioned conduct, the process shall be deemed terminated, without special condemnation for costs (...).' 6. That it does not correspond to the Presidency of la Asamblea to make the indicated decision because it was the Legislative Plenary that issued the cited agreement. 7. That procedurally, the removal act in question is firm under the provisions of the Regulations of la Asamblea Legislativa, and, therefore, all its effects are legally consolidated, which makes it impossible for this Plenary to rule on it again. 8.* ***That this Asamblea Legislativa recognizes that the fate of Mr. Alex Solís Fallas as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has willed to say and do of him*** *, so that, finally, it will be up to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what corresponds in justice and in law.* ***They make the following motion:*** *For the Asamblea Legislativa, based on the provisions of Article 153 of the Regulations of la Asamblea Legislativa and Article 119 of la Constitución Política, to agree: 1. To refrain from ruling in the terms requested by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit. 2.* ***To publicly declare, as many deputies of the previous legislature (2002-2006) have recognized, and as recorded in the certifications indicated in considerandos two and three of this motion, that la Asamblea Legislativa of that period removed Mr. Alex Solís Fallas from the position of Comptroller General of la República without him having incurred in the grounds established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of la Constitución Política, therefore it is necessary to vindicate the good name of Don Alex due to the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express the hope that in the future, la Asamblea Legislativa will be more careful when, as a consequence of its actions, the good name and honor of individuals are at stake, in order to avoid committing unjust acts and violations of human rights again.*** *4. To communicate this agreement to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Second Judicial Circuit...\"* *(folios 188 to 190 of the judicial file)* (emphasis is ours).\n\nAnd it is that in that agreement, the Legislative Plenary recognizes the existence of the defects that this Court points out. Violations of due process to the detriment of the claimant are admitted, and it is admitted that the omission of the rules related to the practice of the professions of lawyer and notary was not verified. But furthermore, that collegiate constitutional body accepts that the claimant was removed without having incurred in the grounds established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of la Constitución Política. This is serious because, it is insisted, according to the constitutional text, the plaintiff could only be removed from his position upon the verification of the grounds indicated therein. At the very least, any of the grounds indicated in Article 48 of la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, which could have allowed his dismissal for serious fault, could have been demonstrated. Even assessing and addressing the possibility of annulling his appointment due to a defect in the will of those who elected him to that position, ignoring that accusations (and only that) weighed upon his person that cast doubt on the requirement of honorability required for the appointment. However, the Plenary opted for his removal in accordance with Article 183 of our Magna Carta, which necessarily imposed the obligation to prove the concrete existence of incorrect behavior or ineptitude. If none of those grounds were demonstrated, the removal did not proceed. It is reiterated that, due to the independence that both la Constitución Política and la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República guarantee to the Comptroller General in the performance of his duties, the exercise of the power of removal attributed to la Asamblea Legislativa is not discretionary but rather regulated. Thus, having removed the plaintiff without ineptitude or incorrect behavior being proven (as the Plenary itself accepts), constitutes an action contrary to law that violates the Principle of Legality enshrined in Article 11 of both la Constitución Política and la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Furthermore, that reprehensible manifestation of public conduct illegitimately harmed the claimant's legal situation, detriment for which the State must respond financially under the terms that will be explained in a later considerando.\n\nThe absence of the motive in the act under study directly affects its content, making it unlawful, since the ineptitude or incorrect behavior was not proven.\n\nFor all of the foregoing, the challenged act is contrary to the legal order in accordance with the provisions of articles 11, 128, 132, 133, 158, 166, 182, and 223 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and its absolute nullity must be declared.\"\n\nIn the present case, \nthe plaintiff requests that the State be ordered in the abstract to pay the damages caused. He indicates that those damages consist \"...of the economic or material benefits such as salary in cash, in kind, years toward my pension, moral and emotional damages, which shall be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage...\". This Tribunal considers that an abstract award is appropriate. It must be borne in mind that Article 122, subsection m) iii, allows this type of award when it is a consequence of the administrative conduct or legal relationship that is the object of the proceeding, permitting the concrete existence of the detriments and their quantification to be determined in the enforcement of judgment stage. The foregoing finds its basis in the doctrine of constitutional canon 41, which establishes the principle of full reparation of harm (reparación integral del daño), which is conferred as a right upon individuals in their personal sphere, in their property or assets, or in their moral interests. This concerns the due protection against infringements of the legal situation of the person, which includes their patrimonial assets, but also their internal sphere. The elements of conviction brought to the case file allow establishing, as a direct, precise, and logical consequence, that the illegitimate conduct of the State that has been annulled here (by virtue of which the Legislative Assembly agreed to the removal of the plaintiff from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic without the special conditions required by our legal system for such purposes having been verified) becomes a parameter of imputability allowing the State to be held patrimonially liable. This Tribunal does not share the State's argument that liability cannot be attributed insofar as Article 194, third paragraph, of the General Law of Public Administration indicates that liability shall be for damages directly caused by a Law, which is what occurs in the specific case. In the present matter, the liability declared is not for lawful conduct or for the State as Legislator, which are the scenarios provided for in the cited Article 194. The liability declared is for illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of an administrative function. For this collegiate body, the act of removal that the Legislative Assembly adopted contrary to the legal system constitutes a manifestation of illegitimate conduct that causes detriments and sufferings, both material and moral, in the internal sphere of the plaintiff. Having been proven that the plaintiff was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic without having incurred in the grounds of constitutional Article 183 (as the Legislative Assembly itself accepts), through human presumption (Article 417 of the Civil Procedure Code) and an assessment under the rules of sound criticism, it can be inferred that this illegitimate removal caused damages in his subjective sphere. In the present matter, that illegitimate action by the State truncated the plaintiff's possibility of exercising a public office for which he had been chosen. Moreover, grave accusations were attributed to him that were not duly verified, which called into question his moral and functional integrity, with the consequences this can generate in his family, social, and work environment, and before the community in general. Note that the Legislative Plenary itself recognizes that its illegitimate conduct generated detriments to the plaintiff. Indeed, in the aforementioned ordinary session No. 130, of January 26, 2009, it was agreed \"... That this Legislative Assembly recognizes that the fate of Mr. Alex Solís Fallas as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has wanted to say and do about him, so that, finally, it will be up to the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what is just and lawful. (...) therefore, it is necessary to vindicate the good name of Mr. Alex for the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express the wish, that in the future the Legislative Assembly be more careful, when, as a consequence of its actions, the good name and honor of persons are at stake, in order to avoid incurring again in unjust acts and violations of human rights...\". It must be borne in mind that even if the conduct had been excluded by the legislator in Article 3, subsection b) of the CPCA (which, as has already been explained, was not the case), matters relating to the resulting indemnifications would reside in this venue. From this perspective, the aforementioned Article 122, subsection m), item iii), grants the judge the power to assess this type of conditions and, where appropriate, when they consider that the questioned conduct may have caused injuries, even if their existence or amount is not on record, to impose an abstract award on the State regarding those aspects, so that it is in the enforcement of judgment phase where their existence and quantification are discussed. In any case, it will be in the enforcement stage that this specific issue will be definitively aired, and where the parties will enjoy all the guarantees of intervention and defense granted by the administrative litigation procedural rules. Now, while Article 110 of the Political Constitution indicates that a deputy is not responsible for the opinions they issue in the Legislative Assembly and regulates parliamentary immunity in criminal matters, the truth is that this provision must be interpreted in accordance with the entire Legal System, and its unlimited application should not be intended. This derives even from the Constituent Assembly's own records. Specifically, it is worth highlighting that in record Nº 61, of the ordinary session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three thirty in the afternoon on May fifth, nineteen forty-nine, under the presidency of Doctor Rodríguez and the presence of Deputies Vargas Fernández and Ortiz Martín, Secretaries; Guido, González Luján, González Flores, González Herrán, Leiva, Facio, Fournier, Herrero Montealegre, Volio Sancho, Volio Jiménez, Trejos, Dobles Segreda, Jiménez Núñez, Jiménez Ortiz, Zeledón, Brenes Mata, Brenes Gutiérrez, Valverde, Vargas Castro, Vargas Vargas, Esquivel, Acosta Jiménez, Acosta Piepper, Arroyo, Monge Ramírez, Arias, Gómez, Desanti, Montiel, Gamboa, Madrigal, Baudrit González, Baudrit Solera, Oreamuno, Ruiz and the substitutes Castaing, Morúa, Castro, Rojas Espinoza and Monge Alfaro; the scope of the referred non-responsibility for opinions and parliamentary immunity was discussed. It is indicated, for example, that Deputy Leiva stated that \" (...) In his opinion, the responsibility of deputies would appear and should be claimed by the Supreme Court of Justice, when with their votes they produced an irreparable violation of the Constitution. The responsibility for the violation should be the criterion to condemn the deputies. It would be the case, for example, of the Congress of March 1, 1948, in which a criminal, mob-like majority, trampling over law and ethics, disregarded the election that the people had made in the person of Otilio Ulate. In that case, the violation committed had no possible settlement or amendment. It was an irreparable damage, an injury without remedy to the Political Constitution. It offered no ways to correct what had been done. In cases like that, it is where, in his opinion, the responsibility of deputies would fit. (...) Representative Arias intervened again in the debate to clarify several of his points of view. He said that Congress could fail in its duties in two very different cases: willfully and by error, when the Assembly has misapplied the Constitution, but not maliciously, when, for example, it has issued a law or decree contrary to the fundamental statute. For this case -he declared-, the provision involved in the motion under discussion cannot be maintained in any way. In cases of malicious violation of the Constitution, he said that the act should not go unpunished, but it must be clarified whether the corresponding sanction will be individual, or whether a joint pronouncement by the majority of the Assembly that produces the harm is required for liability to arise. (...) Deputy ZELEDON declared that he would vote for the motion under debate, since it always seemed monstrous to him that a Constitution should state that the Deputy is absolutely irresponsible for their votes and opinions issued in the Chamber. (...) In no way can a principle like this be maintained, so that in the future, grave and malicious violations of the Constitution cannot occur without the respective sanction (...) \". In addition to the above, it must be borne in mind that in light of Article 9 of the Constitution itself and the reform introduced to Article 11 of the same, on June 8, 2000, the Principle of Responsibility of the Branches of Government and of public officials is strengthened. Furthermore, there is jurisprudence in this regard from both the Constitutional Chamber (judgment No. 9685, of 14 hours 56 minutes of November 14, 2000) and the Third Chamber (judgment No. 125-2004, of 11 hours 10 minutes of February 20, 2004) that address this topic. In light of the above, it is worth noting that if a concrete pecuniary award were to exist against the State for those caused by the illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Legislative Assembly in the exercise of its administrative function, the logical and necessary consequence would be the immediate opening of internal or external procedures to determine those responsible for the actions or omissions undertaken in detriment of the due procedures in that matter. Taking into account the particularities of this case, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that while the State must respond jointly and severally in patrimonial terms to the plaintiff, the condemned Administration must assess the appropriateness of taking the necessary actions aimed at recovering any amount that, due to that charge, might eventually be paid, in accordance with what is provided, where compatible, in Articles 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, and 209 of the General Law of Public Administration, and in order to protect public interests.\"\n\nRESULTANDO\n\n1.- The plaintiff files this proceeding against the State and Mrs. Nombre71822, current Comptroller General of the Republic, in her personal capacity, formulating the following claims, as adjusted in the preliminary hearing: 1) The nullity of the procedure followed by the \"Investigative Commission to study and report on the facts denounced in the Plenary by deputy Nombre141711 on the occasion of the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic,\" through which he was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as the related acts. 2) The nullity of the act approved in ordinary session No. 114, of December 13, 2004, through which the Legislative Assembly removed him from the position of Comptroller, as well as the related acts and proceedings, which includes the act of appointment of the current Comptroller General of the Republic. 3) That he be reinstated in the position of Comptroller. 4) That the State be condemned in the abstract to pay the damages caused. 5) That the State be condemned to pay personal and procedural costs.\n\n2.- The State representation answered the complaint negatively. It raised the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction and expiration of the action regarding the indemnification claim; as well as the exception of lack of right. It requested that the complaint be declared without merit in all its aspects and that the plaintiff be condemned to pay both costs of this proceeding.\n\n3.- The special judicial representative of the defendant Nombre71822 opposed the complaint. She formulated the preliminary defense regulated by numeral 66 subsection 1 g) of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure, as well as the exceptions of lack of passive standing and lack of right. She requested that the complaint be declared without merit with respect to her client and, alternatively, in the event that the nullity of her appointment were eventually decreed, in accordance with article 131 paragraph 3) of the cited Procedural Code, the effects in time, space, and matter of the annulment be graded and dimensioned, in such a way that the actions of her client as Comptroller General of the Republic are not affected by the ruling, thus avoiding social dislocations and harm to legal certainty.\n\n4.- By resolution No. 883-2009, at fourteen hours on May fifth, two thousand nine, the Processing Judge of this Office rejected the exception of lack of jurisdiction that had been raised by the State. The case file does not show that any challenge was filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice against the cited resolution.\n\n5.- The preliminary hearing established in article 90 of the cited Procedural Code was held on November 12, 2009, and April 9, 16, and 23, 2010. In said hearing, the claims were set as described in the first Resultando. By resolution No. 1273-2010, the processing judge rejected the preliminary defenses of expiration and unchallengeability of the act raised by the State and the representation of the co-defendant Nombre71822, respectively. Likewise, the disputed facts were determined and the pertinent documentary evidence was admitted. Finally, in accordance with article 98 subsection 2) of the cited Code, as there were no testimonial or expert evidence to be heard, the Processing Judge declared this matter one of pure law and the parties presented conclusions.\n\n6.- The respective case file was remitted to the Sixth Section on May 6 of the current year, for the issuance of the pertinent ruling, as recorded in the transfer stamp visible on folio 459 verso of the judicial case file. In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities that should be corrected or that cause defenselessness have been observed. After deliberation, this judgment is issued within the period established in the second paragraph of article 98 of the cited Procedural Code in relation to numeral 82 subsection 4) of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of this jurisdiction and is notified within the period indicated by the Law of Judicial Notifications, with drafting by the reporting judge Abarca Gómez and the affirmative vote of the judges Álvarez Molina and González Vílchez.\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- ON THE PRELIMINARY DEFENSE THAT WAS REITERATED BY THE DEFENDANTS DURING THEIR CONCLUSIONS. As indicated in the fifth Resultando, during the preliminary hearing the Processing Judge rejected the preliminary defense regulated by article 66 subsection 1 g), that is, that the claim is brought against an act not susceptible to challenge, which was raised by the representation of the co-defendant Nombre71822. However, during their conclusions and using the power granted by numeral 92 subsection 7) of the cited Procedural Code, both defendants requested this Tribunal to re-examine the cited defense. The special judicial representative of the co-defendant Nombre71822 argues that the plaintiff's claims are typically related to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, both in what is requested and in the normative parameters on which they are based. She deems that the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic is a constitutional act not susceptible to challenge in the administrative contentious venue because it is not subject to Administrative Law. She indicates that the fact that the Constitutional Chamber declared itself incompetent to hear what was sought by the plaintiff through an amparo appeal, in no way binds the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction. For his part, the State representative points out that we are facing a political act, of constitutional competence subject to Parliamentary Law, and that the venue to challenge these legislative agreements is the one indicated by article 73 subsection c) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and not this jurisdiction. Finally, he mentions rulings of the Constitutional Chamber that have already indicated which is the venue to challenge this type of act. At the outset, it must be noted that by resolution No. 883-2009, at fourteen hours on May fifth, two thousand nine, the Processing Judge of this Office rejected the exception of lack of jurisdiction that had been raised by the State with arguments similar to those now being advanced. While it emerges from the case file that none of the parties exercised the challenge that, as a means of appeal, establishes article 5 subsection 4) of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure, the truth is that for a better analysis of the arguments raised by the defendants, in defense of their thesis that this is an act not susceptible to challenge in the administrative contentious jurisdiction, it is appropriate to point out what is set forth below. Article 49 of the Political Constitution establishes that it is up to the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity, as well as the protection, at least, of the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered against the arbitrariness of public power. This is a framework that protects the legal situations of persons, whether of power, duty, advantage, or mixed. This constitutional norm is the one that serves as the basis for the procedural reform in this matter that led to the approval of the current Law No. 8508, whose axis is based - as emerges from article 1 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure - on one hand, on the full and effective protection of the person, that is, the effective protection of the legal situations of every person (subjective legality), among which are, without any doubt, their fundamental rights. On the other, it establishes an objective control of the legality of the administrative function, seeking the reestablishment of legality, most of the time, for the purpose of avoiding injuries to the mentioned legal situations. This procedural reform is based on four ideological pillars, all of them, of constitutional basis, namely: distribution of functions, which allows the Judicial Branch to control public conduct (articles 9, 49, 153), submission of the State to the Law in the fulfillment of its functions or the exercise of its powers (article 11 -principle of legality in its dual vision-), universal control of the administrative function, which eliminates any possibility of areas or enclaves of public conduct exempt from jurisdictional control (article 49) and as a corollary of those statements, effective judicial protection (articles 41 and 49). All these maxims converge to achieve prompt and complete justice, as a desideratum of this type of judicial processes, always keeping in mind that the object of this jurisdiction is to guarantee the legality of the administrative function and the protection of legal situations that may be affected within the framework of legal-administrative relations. Now, despite the breadth that articles 1 and 2 of the cited Procedural Code imply, the legislator established some matters excluded from that ordinary legality control. Specifically, article 3 of the cited normative body indicates that this jurisdiction will not hear claims related to administrative conduct in matters of public employment nor those concerning acts of relations between Branches of the State or on the occasion of international relations; without prejudice, in this latter case, to the appropriate indemnifications, whose determination does correspond to this jurisdiction. As explained supra, the defendants claim that the formal acts whose nullity is sought in this proceeding are acts not susceptible to challenge because they are political, constitutional acts, directly subject to Constitutional or Parliamentary Law. As the defendants affirm, national doctrine (Nombre28) refers to the constitutional or institutional act as a manifestation of an act of government and that presents particular characteristics. The first of these is that they are acts authorized and regulated directly by the Constitution, the supreme norm that establishes their basis and limits. Second, they generally entail a wide margin of discretion by virtue of the Constitution or the law, although exceptionally they may be regulated. It is noted that the constitutional act is normally discretionary regarding motive, content, and even purpose, which distinguishes it from the administrative act, in which while there may be discretion in motive or content, the purpose is a necessarily regulated element. Finally, these are acts that refer to and affect only the internal organization of the State or its existence. From this perspective, they do not directly affect or have repercussions on the subjective sphere of individuals and, to that extent, are not harmful to their rights or interests. It is said that they are normally acts of general scope, because they are directed at State organs or the entire community, without reference to individuals. It is also admitted that, exceptionally, they may affect a specific individual, by virtue of a joint interest of the community and the state apparatus. In this case, their purpose is to integrate the constitutional organs necessary for the functioning of the State, which is of interest to both the State itself and the community. Due to their general scope, they are not capable of directly and immediately harming rights or interests by themselves, which is why their challenge is inadmissible precisely due to the lack of interest and violated subjective rights, which generates a lack of procedural standing. It is further admitted that the constitutional act can become a prerequisite or antecedent of common administrative acts, which do produce that harmful effect in the sphere of private individuals. In these cases, it is said that this constitutional act is not challengeable at the moment it is produced but after the administrative conduct based on it occurs and has a harmful effect on the legal sphere of the private individual.\n\nII.- Upon careful analysis of the defendants' arguments, this Tribunal must reject the defense reiterated during the conclusions for the following reasons. As has been pointed out, three of the ideological pillars on which the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure (hereinafter CPCA) is based are the full submission of the State to the legal order, the universal and plenary control of the administrative function, and effective judicial protection. In light of these principles, the recognition of zones or areas of public conduct exempt from jurisdictional control is incompatible with a Rule of Law State. That is why the immunity regarding the legality control that was being granted to political acts, acts of government, or acts of political direction of the State, has been gradually reduced both at the level of Comparative Law and in our own legislation. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber already established this, when considering that \"...in the current Costa Rican legal development there is no dissent whatsoever about the possibility that the constitutional controller review this type of act issued by the Executive Branch, whatever its denomination or characterization, because -in principle- such acts are subject to the Political Constitution, or, to be more precise, to the so-called Law of the Constitution, so that they must be carried out within the framework set by its provisions, wide in differing degrees and often embodied in norms and principles that serve as general guides for action...\" (Judgment No. 9992-2004, issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at 14 hours 31 minutes on September 8, 2004). On the other hand, Spanish doctrine, legislation, and jurisprudence (Santiago González Varas Ibáñez, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo III, Volumen I, Editorial Civitas, 2008, Nombre141141 Villa-Miguel Sánchez Morón and others, Comentarios a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, 2001) has opted for a limited control by the administrative contentious jurisdiction regarding this type of act.\n\nWhile the existence of government acts (actos de gobierno) as a negative zone vis-à-vis ordinary jurisdictional control over the actions of public authorities is admitted, the existence of a negative zone upon the negative zone of government acts is also accepted; an exception to the exception of control technically based on the theory of judicially ascertainable concepts, which limit and affect the theory of political or government acts, insofar as the limits and requirements to which they must be subjected are regulated; for which reason the jurisdictional body cannot be accused of intruding into the sphere of discretion beyond strict jurisdictional control. In accordance with this, this type of act is subject to the jurisdictional control of the administrative contentious jurisdiction in three aspects: the protection of fundamental rights, compliance with the regulated elements to which that State activity must be subjected, and the determination of any indemnifications that may be appropriate. Furthermore, since the recently repealed Law Regulating the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), only two of these acts were excluded from legality control, namely, those relating to relations between the Branches of State and those concerning its international relations (Article 4, subsection b), exclusions that are maintained in the CPCA as explained. In the judgment of this Tribunal, in accordance with the evolution in Comparative Law, these exceptions are the only political acts that our legislator excluded from the jurisdiction of this court, precisely because of the margin of discretion, opportunity, or convenience surrounding this type of State decision. However, as stated, if there are regulated provisions for inter-branch or international relations, the conduct more closely resembles an administrative function, subject, therefore, to ordinary jurisdictional control. (In this regard, Nombre40540, El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo, 2006, page 63). Furthermore, numeral 3(b) of the CPCA itself subjects the adverse pecuniary legal effects that this type of act may produce on the claimant to the legality control exercised by this jurisdiction and leaves open the possibility of claiming indemnifications when the act, even if political, causes a legal injury to an administered party.\n\nIn the specific case, the analysis must precisely begin with the legislator's express will to exclude from the legality control of the administrative contentious jurisdiction only two manifestations of political acts, which are those indicated in numeral 3(b) ibidem, within which the act being challenged is not classified. Moreover, this Tribunal considers that we are also not in the presence of a constitutional act in the terms explained by our national doctrine. It should be noted that in the present matter, the act by which the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) may remove the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), while regulated in numeral 183 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), is in fact not subjected directly or exclusively to that supreme norm. On the contrary, it is also subjected to the law, specifically to the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). Indeed, Article 48 of the cited norm regulates a series of prohibitions for the Comptroller, which, if disregarded, constitute serious misconduct that will give rise to his dismissal with just cause. In addition, the procedure for dismissing him is not regulated by the Constitution or by the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) itself. Therefore, in accordance with the delimitation regarding its competence that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has been establishing, among others, in judgment No. 9992-2004 cited, as it is not directly subjected to the Constitution, its control is not exclusive to that jurisdiction. Added to the above, it is true that the indicated Article 183 has a very defined regulated content, which contrasts with the broad margin of discretion that characterizes this type of act. Regarding the point of interest, the third paragraph of the aforementioned constitutional norm provides that \"(...) The Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller are accountable to the Assembly for the performance of their duties and may be removed by it, by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total membership, if in the proceeding created for this purpose ineptitude or improper conduct is proven against them.\" As can easily be observed, the degree of discretion, as the freedom to choose from several valid options the one that best fits the fulfillment of the objective, is quite limited (if not practically disappearing) because the norm imposes conditions for the removal of the Comptroller: the opening of a proceeding, the verification of ineptitude and improper conduct, and the qualified vote of the Legislative Plenary. Compliance with these regulated aspects is amply justified considering the independence that, both constitutionally and legally, is recognized for this official. Although within the norm there are indeterminate legal concepts that could give some margin of freedom to the Assembly, it is true that there are also parameters that allow their application and jurisdictional control in the specific case, such as numeral 48 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, we are not facing an act that affects only the organization and functioning of the State. The dismissal act that was issued directly impacts the subjective sphere of the claimant, especially when what is recriminated is that he was left defenseless and that the regulated aspects imposed by the legal system were violated.\n\nHaving said that, it must be pointed out that we are also not facing acts that are exclusively challengeable before the Constitutional Jurisdiction. In this sense, an interpretation of Article 10 of our Magna Carta (Carta Magna) in relation to numerals 1 and 2 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) allows establishing that it corresponds to the constitutional jurisdiction, exercised exclusively by the Constitutional Chamber, a) to guarantee the rights and freedoms enshrined by the Political Constitution and the human rights recognized by International Law in force in Costa Rica; b) to exercise control of the constitutionality of norms of any nature and of acts subject to Public Law, as well as the conformity of the internal legal order with International or Community Law; c) to resolve conflicts of competence between the Branches of State, including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), and those of constitutional competence between these and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the municipalities, decentralized entities, and other Public Law persons, and ch) the other matters that the Constitution or the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself attributes to it (canons 3 and 4 of the last-mentioned legal body). On the other hand, Article 73(b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that it is the competence of that Chamber to hear, via an unconstitutionality action, \"...subjective acts of public authorities, when they infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle, if they are not susceptible to the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo.\" This implies that, a contrario sensu, when it is alleged that such acts violate or are susceptible to violating the fundamental rights of the claimant, they cannot be heard through the unconstitutionality action channel; but rather, and in principle, through the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo (See in this regard, judgments No. 2621-1995 and No. 358-99, issued by the Constitutional Chamber at 15 hours 53 minutes on May 23, 1995, and at 15 hours 45 minutes in 1999, respectively; as well as No. 14877, at 9 hours 3 minutes on October 7, 2008, by which the unconstitutionality action filed by the claimant himself was resolved). Having set forth the above, it is worth mentioning that numeral 1 of the CPCA allows the control of the actions of the different Branches of State and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, when they perform an administrative function. It is therefore necessary, to define whether the removal act being challenged in this proceeding constitutes a legislative function (because it originates from the Legislative Assembly) or an administrative function. For this collegiate body, the public conduct whose validity is questioned in this proceeding does not correspond to the proper legislative function (in a material and organic sense). Nor does it correspond to acts or procedures regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly or governed directly by Parliamentary Law. As will be analyzed in detail later, there is no constitutional or parliamentary provision that regulates the procedure to be followed to verify the ineptitude or improper conduct that would enable the Plenary to dismiss the Comptroller. Moreover, there are bills (files No. 16011, of September 20, 2004, and No. 16914, of January 23, 2008, visible on folios 124 to 138 of the judicial file), which aim to subject that procedure, not to the strictly parliamentary ones regulated by the Regulations of the Assembly, but rather to the ordinary one established from Title II of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Nor does this Tribunal share the view that we are before an act which, by parallelism of forms, should be assimilated to the act indicated by constitutional numeral 158 regarding the non-reelection of the Magistrates of the Judicial Branch. In this last assumption, unlike 183 ibidem, the Assembly can sovereignly decide, with a broad margin of freedom, not to reelect a Magistrate, solely with the will of two-thirds of the entire Plenary, without requiring the opening of a proceeding or the demonstration of any subjective condition.\n\nThus, given that we are not facing a political act exempt from control in this jurisdiction and that, in addition, it concerns an action of the Legislative Assembly that does not classify as a legislative function, we are facing a public conduct of that Branch which, residually, constitutes a manifestation of an administrative function that can be controlled by this jurisdictional body. Even national doctrine (Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Manual de Derecho Administrativo Tomo I, page 95) admits that some legislative bodies perform an administrative function. Specifically mentioned as administrative acts of the Plenary are the appointment of the Defender of the Inhabitants (Defensor de los Habitantes) and of the Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller of the Republic, among others. If the appointment of these officials (which entails some degree of discretion on the part of the Legislative Assembly) constitutes a manifestation of an administrative function of that collegiate body, it is clear that their removal, particularly that of the Comptroller, is also such, especially if considering that it constitutes the exercise of a regulated power. The foregoing, coupled with the petition that, seeking protection of his legal situation, the claimant sets forth, allows the challenged act to be reviewed in aspects characteristic of the legality control of the administrative contentious jurisdiction (from which, as stated, even political acts do not entirely escape), particularly regarding the regulated elements of the public power exercised by the Legislative Plenary and matters relating to indemnifications. This is in accordance with Article 36(b) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). It must also be kept in mind that the Constitutional Chamber, in Voto No. 13440-2004, issued at fourteen hours and thirty-one minutes on November thirty, two thousand four, indicated that some of the violations that the claimant alleged constituted \"(...) a matter that, as this Chamber has repeatedly held in similar cases, must be discussed within the same proceeding – in this case, before the Legislative Plenary at the time of answering the final hearing granted for that purpose – and eventually in the ordinary venue, so that what is legally appropriate may be resolved. (...)\". Therefore, while the claimant did not file a motion before the Plenary, it is true that under the protection of constitutional numeral 49 he resorted to this ordinary venue, seeking protection of his legal situation against what he considers an arbitrary and illegitimate action of the Legislative Branch in the exercise of its administrative function. It is the criterion of this Tribunal that not exercising this legality control would imply expanding the exclusion criteria clearly defined by the legislator in ordinal 3 of the CPCA, to the detriment of the pillars upon which this jurisdiction rests, namely, the Principles of Subjection of the State to the Law and Universal and Plenary Control of the Administrative Function. But additionally, it would violate the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection, especially if one takes into account that the Constitutional Chamber itself, both in the writ of amparo (recurso de amparo) judgment just cited and in the one that resolved the unconstitutionality action filed by the claimant, resolved at the time (and each separately) that what was alleged was not susceptible to being controlled via the amparo remedy, nor via the unconstitutionality action. For the foregoing reasons, given that the claim is directed against public conducts that are susceptible to being examined in this jurisdiction, the defense filed is improper and must be so declared.\n\n**III.- PROVEN FACTS.** Of significance for the resolution of the present case are those set forth below: **1)** On June 2, 2004, the Legislative Assembly appointed Nombre66572 as Comptroller General of the Republic *(fact not controverted).* **2)** In the session of June 3, 2004, the then deputy Nombre141711 denounced before the Legislative Plenary the existence of grounds that disqualified the claimant from holding the position of Comptroller *(fact not controverted).* **3)** In Legislative Plenary Session No. 22 held on June 7, 2004, two motions were presented aimed at suspending the swearing-in act of the claimant as Comptroller General of the Republic, which were rejected. Ultimately, on that day the claimant was sworn into said public office *(fact not controverted).* **4)** On June 15, 2004, by virtue of a motion made by several deputies, the Legislative Plenary agreed that \"....in accordance with Article 121(23) of the Political Constitution, an investigative commission shall be formed to study and report on the facts denounced in this Plenary by deputy Nombre141711, regarding the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Commission shall be composed of 9 deputies, two from the Social Christian Unity Party, two from the National Liberation Party, one from the Citizen Action Party, one from the Patriotic Bloc, one from the Libertarian Movement Party, one from the Costa Rican Renewal Party, and independent deputy Salas Ramos. The Commission shall have a term of no more than 20 calendar days to render the corresponding report. The Commission must safeguard constitutional rights, especially due process.\" *(fact not controverted-folio 25 of the administrative file).* **5)** In the session of June 22, 2004, the President of the Commission appointed for this purpose stated that \"...we are going to investigate facts related to a person, to a conduct that could prove unlawful and bring some consequence. For that, I would propose the following working method: the idea is, I believe that the first who must appear is Mr. Nombre141711, he was the one who made the complaint and he speaks of having documents, several things; so that we hold the first session with the presentation of Mr. Nombre141711 and that we may question him about it. After that, I believe the most normal thing, and to guarantee the right of defense, is to transfer everything to Mr. Nombre66572; so that he may exercise his right of defense, and we would immediately begin to bring in the people who could clarify this, that is why I am proposing and we would go through this or can approve it today at once, that is to say, Mr. Nombre141712 would necessarily have to come, the National Director of Notaries (Directora Nacional de Notariado) will necessarily have to come, the Prosecutor of the Bar Association (Fiscal del Colegio de Abogados) and a criminal law expert, whom we could choose, we would hear suggestions from everyone. During these presentations, Mr. Nombre66572 may be present or may leave a lawyer to represent him here, so that he can ask questions and exercise the right of defense. That is the procedure I establish for you, I believe it is important so that it has no defect and we are not alleged of some fault that we might commit with respect to that. This is the procedure I am proposing to you...\" *(fact not controverted-transcript accepted by the State in the answer to fact eighteen).* **6)** On June 30, 2004, the Legislative Assembly approved the following agreement \"(..) **CONSIDERING: First:** That the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic is an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly essential for the oversight of the Public Treasury and the smooth running of all contractual activity of the State. **Second:** That Mr. Nombre66572, who took oath as the new Comptroller General on the past June 14, after his appointment has faced serious ethical-moral questions which, in the opinion of a broad majority of this Legislative Assembly, disqualify him from holding the position. **Third:** That, under Article 121 of the Constitution, subsection 23, a Special Legislative Commission has already begun an investigation into the complaints related to Mr. Nombre66572, within the framework of the powers granted by the Legislative Regulations. **Fourth:** That, in accordance with Article 183 of the Constitution, third paragraph, the procedure for the removal of the Comptroller General of the Republic involves a special procedure that would inevitably take several weeks. **Fifth:** That, amid such serious public questions, the continuity in the position of Mr. Nombre66572 for a prolonged period is highly damaging to the image, credibility, and normal functioning of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic itself. **Sixth:** That the Legislative Assembly, through the Appointments Commission, has already begun the process to appoint the Sub-Comptroller General of the Republic, which is being indirectly affected by the uncertainty arising around the continuity or not in the position of the Comptroller General. **Seventh:** That all the documentation supporting the complaints made before this Legislative Assembly by deputy Nombre141711, as well as the journalistic publications on these topics, are available to the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), the Bar Association of Costa Rica (Colegio de Abogados de Costa Rica), and the National Directorate of Notaries (Dirección Nacional de Notariado). The Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica **AGREES:** 1) To exhort Mr. Nombre66572 to, within a period of 24 hours, resign from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic and so communicate to the Legislative Assembly, in safeguarding the best national interests.\n\n2) In the event that this exhortation is not heeded within the prescribed period, modify the mandate granted to the Investigative Committee File No. 15.627 so that it analyzes and resolves whether Mr. Nombre66572 satisfies the suitability requirement to hold the office of Comptroller General of the Republic, in accordance with subsection c) of Article 39 of Law No. 7428 (Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic) and makes the corresponding recommendations to the Legislative Plenary, pursuant to Article 183 of the Political Constitution (sic), or establishes whether the annulment of his appointment is appropriate, due to constitutional or legal insufficiencies. 3) Formally request the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados de Costa Rica), and the National Directorate of Notaries to, within the scope of their competencies, investigate the reported facts in relation to Nombre66572 and communicate to this Legislative Assembly, at the appropriate time, the results of their proceedings (...) \" (undisputed fact) 7) By resolution at eight-thirty p.m. on July 5, 2004, the aforementioned Special Committee formally notified Mr. Nombre141713 of the charges. In general, the following charges were detailed: alleged forgeries of signatures on public deeds and documents filed before the Courts of Justice; possible irregularities in obtaining an administrative deed over a parcel from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario; alleged granting of credits used for the illegal movement of persons to other countries. This notification of charges was expanded on August 16 of the same year to include the charge of ineptitude and incorrect conduct for the statements made to the national press in relation to the reported facts (inferred from folios 2868 and following of the administrative file). 8) On July 22, 2004, the plaintiff petitioned the Plenary of the Legislative Assembly, among other things, for a declaration of nullity of the proceedings of the Committee and the revocation of the legislative agreement adopted on June 15, 2004 (folios 96 to 100 of the judicial file). 9) The plaintiff raised an action of absolute nullity of proceedings before the Special Legislative Committee, which was rejected by Motion No. 3-8 approved in the eighth session on August 3, 2004. (undisputed fact) 10) On August 10, 2004, the President of the Special Committee requested from the Legislative Plenary an extension of up to thirty parliamentary working days to render the corresponding report, because the deadline to issue findings would expire on August 12, 2004. This motion was approved by the Plenary on October 4, 2004 (folios 2866 to 2874 of the administrative file). 11) The plaintiff appeared before the already mentioned Special Committee on September 28 and 30, 2004 (folios 2709 to 2739 and 2759 to 2772 of the administrative file). 12) The deputies who comprised the Special Committee drafted five findings reports to present to the Legislative Plenary. The first was signed by deputies Álvaro González Alfaro and Luis Ramírez Ramírez, the second by legislator Emilia Rodríguez Arias and her counterpart Ronaldo Alfaro García, the third by deputy Marta Iris Zamora Castillo, and a fourth report by deputy Carlos Avendaño. These four reports recommended removing the plaintiff from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic. A fifth report was drafted by legislators Lilliana Salas Salazar and José Francisco Sala Ramos, which was not favorable to the removal of the Comptroller (folios 2863 to 2948, 2953 to 3122 of the administrative file). 13) In Extraordinary Session of the Legislative Plenary No. 3 on November 2, 2004, the affirmative minority report presented by legislators González Alfaro and Ramírez Ramírez was discussed. This discussion continued in Extraordinary Session No. 05 on November 4 of the same year, Plenary Session No. 99 and Extraordinary Session No. 6, both on November 9, 2004, and Extraordinary Session No. 8 on November 16, 2004. In this last extraordinary session, the Legislative Plenary agreed to grant the actor a period of five working days to respond in writing to the charges contained in the reports presented by the legislator members of the Special Committee. Subsequently, beginning with Extraordinary Session No. 9 on November 18, 2004, the Plenary resumed discussion of the affirmative minority report presented by legislators González Alfaro and Ramírez Ramírez, which continued in Extraordinary Session No. 10 on November 23, 2004, and Plenary Sessions No. 110, 111, 113 on November 30, December 1, and December 6, 2004 (folios 3297 to 3323, 3326 to 3371, 3396 to 3426, 3435 to 3472, 3512 to 3563 to 3613, 3638 to 3656, 3658 to 3709, 3714 to 3729, 3740 to 3798 of the administrative file). 14) The plaintiff responded to the five-day hearing granted by the Legislative Plenary (inferred from folios 3658 and 3659 of the administrative file) 16) In Agreement No. 6223-04-05, adopted in Ordinary Session No. 115 held on December 13, 2004, the Legislative Plenary ordered the removal of the plaintiff from the position of Comptroller General of the Republic. The aforementioned agreement stated: \"Considering: a) In Session No. 27 on Tuesday, June 15, 2004, the Legislative Plenary agreed: 'So that in accordance with Article 121 subsection 23) of the Political Constitution, an investigative committee be formed to study and report on the facts reported in this Plenary by Deputy Nombre141711, regarding the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Committee shall be composed of 9 deputies, two from the Social Christian Unity Party, two from the National Liberation Party, one from the Citizens' Action Party, one from the Patriotic Bloc, one from the Libertarian Movement Party, one from the Costa Rican Renewal Party, and the independent deputy Salas Ramos. The Committee shall have a period of no more than 20 calendar days to render the corresponding report. The committee must safeguard constitutional rights, especially due process.' b) On June 30, 2004, by a motion approved by the Legislative Plenary, which is recorded in Act No. 36, it agreed: 'Exhort Mr. Nombre66572 to, within a period of 24:00 hours, resign from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic and communicate this to the Legislative Assembly, in safeguarding the best national interests. In the event that this exhortation is not heeded within the prescribed period, modify the mandate granted to the Investigative Committee File No. 15.627 so that it analyzes and resolves whether Mr. Nombre66572 satisfies the suitability requirement to hold the office of Comptroller General of the Republic, in accordance with subsection c) of Article 39 of Law No. 7428 (Organic Law of the Comptroller's Office) and makes the corresponding recommendations to the Legislative Plenary, pursuant to Article 183 of the Political Constitution, or establishes whether the annulment of his appointment is appropriate, due to constitutional or legal insufficiencies.' (Vid. Draft Motion by Deputy Villanueva Monge). c) By virtue of the fact that the Comptroller General of the Republic did not accept the exhortation of this Parliament, the investigation ordered by the Legislative Plenary continued, and from that moment on it became the Special Committee that processed the file for the purposes of what the Political Constitution orders in the cited case. d) That on September 26, 2004, and September 30, 2004, as recorded in Acts No. 17 and No. 18 respectively of the 'Special Investigative Committee to study and report on the facts reported in the plenary by Deputy Nombre141711, regarding the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic,' the Comptroller General of the Republic, Dr. Nombre66572, was received in a hearing with his defense attorney so that he could present his defense, before the Committee rendered its reports. e) In accordance with and in safeguarding the constitutional rights of due process, as recorded in Act No. 008 on Tuesday, November 16, 2004, by a motion, the reports of the 'Special Investigative Committee to study and report on the facts reported in the plenary by Deputy Nombre141711, regarding the appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic,' were forwarded to Dr. Nombre66572, Comptroller General of the Republic, and a term of 5 working days, counted from the notification of the agreement, was granted for him to present his defense. 1. That the report of the Deputy to be named indicates that Dr. Nombre66572 omitted important rules as a lawyer and notary that violate subsection c) of Article 7 of the Notarial Code. (Vid. Report presented by Deputy Marta Zamora Castillo). 2. That the reports of the deputies to be named indicate that the reported facts indicate that Dr. Nombre66572 does not meet the honorability requirement stipulated in subsection c) of Article 39 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to continue in said position. It is also noted that the conduct followed by Dr. Nombre141713 does not make him worthy of holding the position; that he lacks the moral suitability that is required of an official at his level. (Vid. Reports presented by: a) Deputy Álvaro González Alfaro and Luis Ramírez Ramírez, b) Deputy Carlos Avendaño Calvo; c) Deputy Ronaldo Alfaro García.) 3. That the report of the Deputies to be named indicates that Dr. Nombre66572 lacks suitability for the position of Comptroller General of the Republic in that it indicates that the existence of irregular actions on his part as Comptroller General of the Republic, legal professional, and notary public has been demonstrated before the Investigative Committee, reflecting ineptitude and incorrect conduct to hold the office of Comptroller General. (Vid. Report by Deputy Nombre141714 and by Deputy Emilia María Rodríguez Arias). 4. Finally, it is indicated that the file should be sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office for knowledge and study of the conclusions of the criminalistic report from the Questioned Documents and Handwriting Analysis Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency, so that the competent bodies of the Judicial Branch issue the pertinent judicial resolutions. (Vid. Report by Deputy Lilliana Salas Salazar and Deputy José Francisco Salas Ramos). 5. That Dr. Nombre66572 in his response on Friday, November 26, to the charges brought by the Legislative Assembly, indicates that: 'My Defense has nothing to add to what has already been said, and with respect and dignity prepares to fight in other venues, if that were necessary.' With his response, Dr. Nombre66572 did not manage to refute the charges that 'he does not satisfy the suitability requirement to hold the office of Comptroller General of the Republic'; nor the charges of 'ineptitude and incorrect conduct'. Therefore, AGREES: 1st—To remove the Comptroller General of the Republic, Dr. Nombre66572, because ineptitude and incorrect conduct and a lack of suitability to hold the office were proven against him. 2nd—To send to the Public Prosecutor's Office, the National Directorate of Notaries, and the Costa Rican Bar Association a copy of File No. 15.627 for what may correspond. Let it be published..\" (undisputed fact-folios 3910, 3952 to 3955 of the administrative file). 17) The plaintiff held the office of Comptroller General of the Republic for a period of six months and eleven days (undisputed fact). 18) Through files No. 16011 (September 20, 2004) and 16914 (January 23, 2008), the then legislators María de los Ángeles Víquez, as well as Lorena Vásquez Badilla, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez Sibaja, and Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría respectively, presented to the Legislative Plenary two bills aimed at regulating the removal procedure for the Comptroller General of the Republic as well as for the Auxiliary Bodies of the Legislative Assembly. (folios 124 to 138 of the judicial file). 19) On December 2, 2008, the Acting Director of the Judicial Registry certified that in the records maintained by that office, no entries appear in the name of Nombre66572. (folio 139 of the judicial file). 20) As of December 3, 2008, the plaintiff Nombre141713 had not been suspended or disciplined in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer (folio 140 of the judicial file) 21) On December 3, 2008, the Administrative Chief of the National Directorate of Notaries certified that as of that date, the plaintiff Nombre141713 was duly suspended from performing notarial functions, a status he voluntarily acquired on June 21, 2004. Likewise, she certified that in the last ten years he had no suspensions or disqualifications in his records. (folio 141 of the judicial file). 22) In Ordinary Session No. 130, on January 26, 2009, the Legislative Plenary agreed \"... Considering: 1. That in Ordinary Session No. 115, held on December 13, 2004, the Legislative Plenum agreed to dismiss Mr. Nombre66572 from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as to report him to the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Bar Association, and the National Directorate of Notaries for having omitted important rules as a 'lawyer' and 'notary public', before assuming the office of Comptroller. 2. That these facts could not be verified or were dismissed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Costa Rican Bar Association, and the National Directorate of Notaries, in which case, they did not even open any investigation against Mr. Nombre141713, as evidenced in certifications issued by these entities that are attached to this motion. 3. That in accordance with said certifications, Mr. Nombre66572 has never been sanctioned, suspended, admonished, or disqualified by the National Directorate of Notaries, the Costa Rican Bar Association, or the courts of justice. 4. That subsequent to these events, many deputies of the 2002-2006 legislature have recognized the error incurred by the Legislative Assembly, as eloquently summarized by Deputy Nombre141714, former president of the Special Political Control Committee that the Legislative Assembly formed to investigate his case: 'Thus, Mr. Nombre66572 was dismissed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, without having incurred any incorrect conduct in the performance of his duties. Furthermore, he was acquitted from an ethical, disciplinary, and legal standpoint of the other acts attributed to him. That is, Mr. Nombre66572 was dismissed for nothing. And as if this were not in itself extremely serious in terms of human rights, it must also be recognized, consequently, that the Legislative Assembly violated, from beginning to end, his right to due process.' 5. That before this institution, Mr. Nombre66572 filed an administrative litigation lawsuit against this Legislative Assembly, which was admitted according to notification received by the Presidency of this Assembly on January 13 of this year. In the order granting a hearing, the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Court, Second Judicial Circuit (San José) expressly states: 'Because the plaintiff went directly to the jurisdictional route, a period of EIGHT WORKING DAYS is granted to Mr. Nombre44703, president of the Legislative Assembly as the supreme head of the body from which the challenged conduct emanates, so that he may confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cause it to cease, for the benefit of the plaintiff. If within the indicated period the Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the questioned conduct, the process shall be deemed terminated, with no special order regarding costs (...).' 6. That it does not correspond to the Presidency of the Assembly to make the indicated decision because it was the Legislative Plenary that issued the cited agreement. 7. That procedurally, the act of removal in question has finality under the provisions of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, and, therefore, all its legal effects are consolidated, which makes it impossible for this Plenum to rule on it again. 8. That this Legislative Assembly recognizes that the fate of Mr. Nombre66572 as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has wanted to say and do about him, and thus, it will ultimately correspond to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what is just and lawful. Make the following motion: So that based on the provisions of Article 153 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly and 119 of the Political Constitution, this Legislative Assembly agrees: 1. To refrain from ruling in the terms requested by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit. 2. To publicly declare, as many of the deputies of the previous legislature (2002-2006) have recognized and as recorded in the certifications indicated in considering clauses two and three of this motion, that the Legislative Assembly of that period removed Mr. Nombre66572 from the office of Comptroller General of the Republic without him having incurred the grounds established in the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution, and therefore it is necessary to vindicate the good name of Mr. Nombre66572 for the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express its wishes, that in the future the Legislative Assembly be more careful, when as a consequence of its actions, the good name and honor of persons are at stake, in order to avoid incurring again in unjust acts that violate human rights. 4.\n\nCommunicate this agreement to the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Second Judicial Circuit...\" (folios 188 to 190 of the judicial file) 23) By having dismissed the claimant from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, without him having incurred the grounds established in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Assembly caused moral and material damages to the claimant's subjective sphere. (Legislative Plenary Session No. 130 of January 26, 2009, visible at folios 188 to 190 of the judicial file).\n\nIV.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING. Having rejected the preliminary defense established in numeral 66, subsection 1, paragraph g) under the terms set forth in Considering I, this proceeding is limited to examining the alleged illegality of both the procedure followed by the Legislative Commission appointed by the Legislative Plenary to determine whether the claimant incurred ineptitude or improper conduct (procederes incorrectos) allowing his removal from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, and the final act through which the Legislative Assembly agreed to his removal from said position. It must also be determined whether the reinstatement of the claimant to the position is appropriate and whether the State should be ordered to pay, in the abstract, the damages caused as a consequence of the removal. Given the breadth and extent of the various statements that the litigating parties provide in support of their respective positions in the controversy, in the following sections, for what is considered a better order, each of the thematic axes raised by the claimant in his grievances, as well as the arguments of the defendants, will be addressed, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with the due analysis, of course, of everything argued.\n\nV.- ON THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. The plaintiff accuses a series of substantial defects in the procedure followed in the Legislative Assembly that culminated in his removal from his position as Comptroller. Indeed, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution, the Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller General of the Republic may be removed from their positions by the Legislative Assembly by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members, if, in the file created for that purpose, ineptitude or improper conduct (procederes incorrectos) is proven against them. From the text of the norm, the requirement to open a procedure for the purpose of verifying whether the grounds indicated therein were incurred is clearly inferred. It could not be otherwise, considering the independence in the exercise of their functions that the Constituent Power guaranteed to the Comptroller General of the Republic and that the final decision adopted may impose a punitive framework in the legal sphere of that official. It is an undisputed fact in this proceeding that our legal system does not regulate, neither in the Magna Carta, nor in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, nor in any other legal norm, what procedure must be followed to effect the removal. However, it is clear that, by the Principle of Hermeneutic Plenitude of the Legal System, this would not imply an impossibility of carrying it out, as the Plenary, as a constitutional and sovereign body, can establish a procedural path (iter procesal) that conforms to all the constitutional and legal principles of due process established by our Legal System and that have been extensively developed by the Constitutional Chamber. In the specific case, as listed in the body of proven facts, the Legislative Plenary entrusted a Special Investigative Commission with the instruction of a procedure for said purposes. Although neither the initial agreement appointing the Commission nor its subsequent extension establishes the procedure to follow (probably due to the existing gap in this regard), the truth is that the need for it to safeguard the constitutional rights of the claimant, especially due process, was emphasized. It also follows from the Commission's and the Plenary's own minutes that there was some discussion regarding the stages that said procedure needed to safeguard. The claimant alleges a series of defects in the legislative procedure followed against him. Now, having carefully reviewed the procedure followed both in the Commission and within the Legislative Plenary itself, this Court notes that, although it is not regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, the truth is that some of its phases refer to and apply institutions typical of parliamentary procedures in general. In this sense, some of the defects alleged are oriented. For example, that the instruction had been delegated to an Investigative Commission of those indicated in Article 121, subsection 23) of the Constitution; the questioning of the nature and powers conferred on that type of commission, particularly in relation to due process; the incompatibility of political control commissions with guarantees such as the Principle of Independence and Impartiality; the content of the legislative agreement through which the claimant is urged to resign from his position and its repercussion on the Principle of Innocence; that the Commission did not issue a majority opinion nor were all the reports generated discussed in the Legislative Plenary, the type of voting by which the removal from office was agreed, and that this public conduct was agreed upon by an order motion. It is this Court's criterion that the examination of the indicated defects escapes the control that this jurisdiction can exercise, since our normative block entrusts it to the Constitutional Chamber. Indeed, numeral 73, subsection c) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates as a ground for filing an unconstitutionality action the violation of substantial requirements or procedures (trámites sustanciales) provided for in the Constitution or the Regulations of Order, Direction, or Internal Discipline of the Legislative Assembly in the formation of laws or legislative agreements. This being so, this Court could not entertain the alleged defects that occur or have an impact on strictly legislative actions or practices, governed by Parliamentary Law, and falling exclusively under the purview of the Constitutional Chamber. However, as explained in Considering I, the truth is that in the judgment of this collegiate body, the final decision adopted, through which the claimant was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, constitutes a public conduct that does not correspond to the legislative function but rather is materially closer to the administrative function of that parliamentary body. This, coupled with the fact that, even if it were an act of government, it was not excluded from the legality control exercised by this jurisdiction, as follows from Article 3 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code. Moreover, the possibility of exercising legality control even over acts of government, in their regulated aspects, protection of fundamental rights, and matters relating to indemnifications, has been recognized. This being so, it is clear that when analyzing the conformity of the challenged act with the legal system, the procedure will be examined as a formal element thereof to determine if there are legality defects that merit being declared.\n\nVI.- ON THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACT. A second claim seeks a declaration of nullity of the act adopted by the Legislative Assembly in ordinary session No. 115 held on December 13, 2004, through which the claimant was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic. In general, defects are alleged in the elements of subject, procedure, grounds, and content; and violation of Articles 11, 24, 35, 39, 41, 49, and 183 of the Political Constitution; numerals 1, 2, 8, 9, and 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR), as well as ordinals 6 and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration. It is reiterated again that in the judgment of these adjudicators, it is viable to examine the challenged conduct in this jurisdiction by virtue of the broad spectrum guaranteed by numeral 49 of the Political Constitution. Indeed, control is guaranteed regarding all manifestations of public conduct that have not been expressly excluded from that oversight, whether by constitutional Articles 10 and 48; numerals 1, 2, 29, and 73 subsection b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, or ordinal 3 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code. Moreover, even if it were an act of government, the truth is that legality control is viable regarding regulated elements and indemnifications. Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the claimant seeks protection (tutela) of his subjective legal situation, alleging that it has been threatened and harmed by manifestations of public power, which, in view of the final paragraph of constitutional numeral 49, is fully addressable, as these are controllable conducts not excluded from the jurisdiction of this court. In this sense, it is insisted that in the case at hand, the challenged conduct does not correspond to a manifestation of the exercise of the Plenary's legislative function but rather to a materially administrative and extensively regulated action. No other conclusion can be drawn from reading constitutional numeral 183, which expressly regulates the subject competent to order the removal, the grounds that must be proven for such purposes, and the requirement to open a procedure in that regard. It is therefore necessary to examine the elements of the challenged public conduct to verify if it conformed to law. With respect to the subject, this Court finds no defect that merits being declared. The removal act was issued by the competent subject in accordance with constitutional numeral 183 itself and Article 129 of the General Law of Public Administration. With respect to the procedure as a formal element of the administrative act, it must be indicated that it determines the path for the Public Administration to follow to adopt a final decision. It is, therefore, a set of procedural acts, formalities, or internal actions, which, in a concatenated manner, enable the adoption of the administrative will, whether in the constitutive, appellate, or execution phase. With respect to its purpose, Article 214, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration indicates that the administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system. From this perspective, it constitutes, on the one hand, an instrument for the protection (tutela) of the rights of the administered parties to guarantee them an adequate defense of their position; and also a path (iter) so that the Administration can make a decision adequate to the legal system, having at its disposal all the necessary elements of judgment for this. The foregoing implies a balance between administrative efficiency and respect for constitutional and legal guarantees. It thus becomes a parameter for controlling administrative actions. Indeed, the procedure serves as a guarantee for the individual to verify that the administrative function is being carried out according to the parameters established by the normative framework for a specific public administration. In that regard, a decision adopted in violation of those minimum rigors and formalities, which is also harmful to the legal situation of the recipient of the final decision, would introduce a degree of invalidity into the act that could lead to its annulment (supresión). Now, note that this harmony must be substantial, for it is not satisfied when this procedure is covered only in appearance, or when the application of the norms by the public agent disregards the very essence of that regulation to the detriment of the person's rights or legitimate interests, as well as when phases of the adversarial process are suppressed, placing the individual in a state of defenselessness or disadvantage by preventing them from effectively contesting the arguments outlined against them. Thus, the role of legality controller that numeral 49 of the Magna Carta confers on the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in the case of sanctioning procedures entails verifying that all stages and formalities established in the legal source have been complied with, and in turn, that due process has been respected, as well as the set of guarantees offered in favor of the investigated subject, as is typical in control procedures. As already explained, the specific case has the particularity that, since there is no special procedure regulated to dismiss the Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller of the Republic in the Constitution, the Assembly's Regulations, or any legal norm, the procedural path (iter procedimental) followed was characterized by combining aspects typical of legislative procedures regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly with others derived from those regulated by the General Law of Public Administration. In this sense, as explained in the preceding Considering, this Court cannot hear violations of aspects proper to the legislative procedure, as this is exclusively reserved for the Constitutional Chamber, only for those cases of acts issued in the exercise of the legislative function such as the formation of laws and amendments to the Political Constitution. The dismissal of the Comptroller fits none of these cases, as indicated in Considerings I and VI. Ergo, this Court's examination is reduced solely to the legality defects that may have occurred in the procedure. To this effect, it must be noted that the Plenary delegated the investigative task of the procedure to a Commission, which, regardless of its denomination or nature, is lawful. Then, that Commission sent reports to the Plenary, which ultimately adopted the act that the claimant considers harmful to his subjective legal situation. It is also the case that, in its core aspects, the guarantees of due process and the right of defense were respected. Indeed, it was proven that the claimant was notified of a formal statement of charges (traslado de cargos) which detailed and charged a series of facts and charges; as well as the potential sanctions to which he would be subjected if these were proven. It is worth noting that, although the powers initially conferred on the Commission were investigative and to that extent the claimant's right of defense was limited in some procedural stages, the truth is that subsequently the mandate granted to the aforementioned commission was expanded so that it was clear that it was a procedure aimed at verifying whether the claimant had incurred any of the grounds that would warrant his removal, in accordance with numeral 183 of the Constitution. From the evidence brought to the proceeding, it follows that from that moment on, the Commission guaranteed the claimant his right of defense in the different hearings that were held. It follows from the reports rendered that the claimant even had the opportunity to offer technical evidence to refute that sought by the investigating body. Subsequently, prior to issuing the removal act, the Legislative Plenary granted the claimant a five-day period to review the reports rendered and to argue what was appropriate under the law. For the foregoing reasons, in its core aspects and with the precision to be analyzed below, it is this Court's criterion that in the procedure followed, there are no substantial formalities that have been omitted, nor was defenselessness generated for the claimant, which is why, in accordance with numeral 223 of the General Law of Public Administration, there is no reason whatsoever to declare the invalidity of the proceedings. The last of the regulated aspects in the challenged public conduct is the grounds (motivo), as the factual or legal prerequisite that makes the adoption of the act necessary. To this effect, numeral 133 of the aforementioned General Law indicates that the grounds (motivo) must be legitimate and exist as they were taken into account to issue the act. Regarding the specific case, the factual prerequisite that the norm requires for the removal of the Comptroller is that ineptitude or improper conduct (procederes incorrectos) has been proven in the file that must be opened for that purpose, and that the decision is adopted by a supermajority of the Legislative Plenary. It is, therefore, a regulated aspect, insofar as the removal is appropriate only if these conditions are met. In what is relevant, it must be noted that the act adopted by the Legislative Assembly in session No. 115 of December 13, 2004, within its grounds, generically refers to the five reports presented by the members of the Commission. Specifically, it indicates that the claimant \"1. (...) omitted important rules as a lawyer and notary that violate subsection c), of Article 7 of the Notarial Code. (See Report presented by Deputy Marta Zamora Castillo). 2. (...) that Dr. Nombre66572 does not meet the honorability requirement stipulated in subsection c), of Article 39 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic to continue in said position. It is further noted that the conduct followed by Dr. Nombre141713 does not make him worthy for the performance of the position; that he lacks the moral suitability that is required of an official of his level. (See Reports presented by: a) Deputy Álvaro González Alfaro and Luis Ramírez Ramírez, b) Deputy Carlos Avendaño Calvo; c) Deputy Ronaldo Alfaro García.) 3. (...) that Dr. Nombre66572 lacks suitability for the position of Comptroller General of the Republic as it indicates that the existence of irregular actions on his part as Comptroller General of the Republic, legal professional, and notary public reflecting ineptitude and improper conduct (procederes incorrectos) to exercise the position of Comptroller General has been demonstrated before the Investigative Commission. (See Report of Deputy Nombre141714 and Deputy Emilia María Rodríguez Arias). 4. (...) that the file must be referred to the Public Ministry for the knowledge and study of the conclusions of the criminalistic expert report from the Handwriting and Questioned Documents Analysis Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency, so that the competent bodies of the Judicial Branch can issue the pertinent judicial resolutions. (See Report of Deputy Lilliana Salas Salazar and Deputy José Francisco Salas Ramos)...\" By virtue thereof, it is concluded that one must \"(...) Remove the Mr. Comptroller General of the Republic, Dr. Nombre66572, as ineptitude and improper conduct (procederes incorrectos) and lack of suitability to perform the position were proven against him...\" Now, this collegiate body estimates that the assessment of the body of evidence admitted in this proceeding allows concluding that, at the time of the adoption of the cited act, the regulated grounds (motivo) that would allow the claimant to be removed from his position did not exist, neither factually nor legally. This is for the reasons set forth below. As indicated, the members of the Legislative Commission rendered five different reports to the Plenary. However, it follows from the record that the Plenary only discussed, individually, the first of them, which was rendered by Deputies Álvaro González Alfaro and Luis Ramírez Ramírez. Although some aspects of the other reports were taken up during the discussion in the Plenary, both the record and the State's own representative acknowledge that only the first was discussed, because the decision was adopted based on this one, making it unnecessary to hear the rest. Now, the analysis of that first opinion (visible at folios 2875 to 2927 of the administrative file admitted as evidence) states that for the recommendations set forth therein, the documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence gathered both by the Commission and by the claimant was assessed. Regarding the expert evidence examined, it is noted that \"...In this first handwriting analysis report, it is mentioned that there are thirty false signatures by impersonation out of the thirty-nine studied. All this after comparing the known signatures with the signatures that the signers had stamped in the Civil Registry on their identity card record. The conclusion is that there was forgery by impersonation in many of the related signatures. However, for the interest of the present investigation, said handwriting analysis report finally determines that none of the impersonated signatures was made by Dr.\n\nName66572, which gives a different connotation to the charges imputed to him in this matter (...) e) In addition to the above, it has been assessed that the analysis performed by the handwriting expert witnesses Dr. Name53280 and Dr. Name72267, presented by Mr. Name66572, who state that there are deficiencies in the study by the Judicial Branch officials due to the procedure used to conduct the examination, especially regarding their failure to use the required body of writing for this type of assessment (...)\"\n\nLikewise, in relation to an interview conducted by Channel 7 with the claimant, it is indicated that: \"(...) Mr. Name66572 admits to having signed at the request and with the consent of his brother Name141713. This matter will have to be ventilated in due time in another legal instance, to define if there is a fraudulent action that can be punished (...).\"\n\nFrom a reading of the opinion, it is clear that the assessment of the evidence by those who signed that opinion led them to conclude that the existence of the following charges should be dismissed: coyote activity or illegal trafficking of souls to other countries (folios 2902 and 2903 of the administrative file), nor the appropriation of a parcel of land in the town of Corpus Cristhy (folio 2904 of the administrative file). It is also indicated that the financial activity carried out by the Name141713 family does not necessarily represent an illicit activity, neither in criminal nor in civil matters (folios 2918 and 2919 of the administrative file). Regarding the charges of signature falsification, it is noted that with the elements provided by the experts, it cannot be determined that the claimant is the person who carried out the forgeries by impersonation (folios 2095 to 2913 of the administrative file). However, it is also noted that, by the claimant's own declaration, it has been demonstrated that he has indeed signed on behalf of his brother, which, regardless of whether or not it constitutes an illicit action (which, they indicate, will be for the Courts to determine), implies an incorrect action, leading us to \"(...) conclude that the crime of falsification is indeed true. However, the conditions and circumstances have not been verified due to the nature of the Commission (...). Therefore, signing for others does indeed result in a breach of ethics and morals according to our values...\" (folios 2922 to 2927 of the administrative file).\n\nThis assessment allows concluding to recommend that the Plenary certify documents and transfer them to the Public Ministry for its corresponding actions, and annul the appointment of the Comptroller, considering that there were deficiencies and a lack of information that caused a distortion in the will of the legislators. As indicated above, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that, if that opinion was the input discussed by the Plenary and served as the basis for issuing the final act, the truth is that the evidence assessed and processed does not allow demonstrating any of the charges that were brought, much less proves that the claimant incurred in ineptitude (ineptitud) or incorrect proceedings (procederes incorrectos). Note that the technical evidence rules out that any of the falsifications were carried out by the claimant. Then, it is a matter of accrediting the falsification of signatures by the declaration given by the claimant to the press. This Tribunal does not share that assessment, not only because it disregards and diminishes the probative value of the technical evidence processed, but also because it is never specified which signatures were supposedly falsified, which, in any case, also do not correspond to those that were imputed (falsifications that, it is insisted, were ruled out by the technical evidence). This violates the rules of sound criticism and the principle of congruence of the resolution, as it sanctions general and imprecise facts that do not correspond to those that were notified and upon which the claimant exercised his right to defense.\n\n**VII.-** Now, it is clear from the case file that the opinion or report issued by legislators Emilia Rodríguez Arias and Ronaldo Alfaro García is based on a new expert opinion from the Judicial Investigation Police concluded on October 19, 2004 (folios 2953 to 2965 of the administrative file), according to which \"(...) the false signatures of Name141715, Name141716 and Name141713, previously described, were made by Name66572, which are products of freehand forgeries (...).\" However, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the cited evidence cannot serve as a basis for issuing the final act, fundamentally because it was not subjected to adversarial proceedings. First, it must be considered that the cited opinion was not individually discussed by the Plenary, an organ that limited itself to discussing the report of legislators González Alfaro and Ramírez Ramírez. Furthermore, it concerns a new technical criterion, which is contributed once the evidentiary instruction phase has already passed, so much so that it is contributed with the opinion rendered to the Plenary. Given that it introduces new elements of conviction, particularly burdensome for the actor, an express hearing should have been granted to the claimant so that, in exercising his right to defense, he could offer counter-technical evidence. Otherwise, we are faced with a demonstrative element that cannot serve as a basis for the final act, because if it were, it would violate a substantial formality of the procedure. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the five-day hearing that the Plenary granted to the actor does not materially remedy the omission committed. Although formally, the different opinions were brought to his attention, which includes the new expert report, the truth is that, because it is a new evidentiary element that could have an impact on the final decision, its existence should have been expressly pointed out so that it could be refuted with technical demonstrative elements. In that sense, the actions taken become insufficient to guarantee the claimant's right to defense.\n\nOn the other hand, two of the other opinions (also not individually discussed in the Plenary) reach a similar conclusion to the first, but without indicating which evidentiary elements allow accrediting the existence of incorrect proceedings. In general, these are associated with omissions of the rules of a lawyer or notary. Finally, the report of legislators Lilliana Salas Salazar and José Francisco Salas Ramos establishes that the file must first be sent to the Public Ministry for the knowledge and study of the conclusions of the criminalistics opinion of the Judicial Investigation Police, so that the competent organs issue the pertinent judicial resolutions. As observed, in reality, the evidence gathered up to the moment of issuing the opinions does not allow proving, at that procedural stage, the existence of incorrect proceedings or ineptitude. Even if the content of the formal conduct cited is analyzed carefully, one can arrive at that conclusion. It is indicated that \"(...) With his response, Dr. Name66572 did not manage to refute the charges that 'he does not satisfy the suitability requirement to exercise the position of Comptroller General of the Republic'; nor the charges of 'ineptitude and incorrect proceedings'.\" In respect for the state of innocence and the principle of legality itself, the constitutional norm demands that the procedure prove the conditions that may give rise to the removal. In that sense, by the principle of the burden of proof, it corresponded to the Legislative Assembly to prove ineptitude or incorrect proceedings, prior to ordering the removal. However, faced with the deficiency in that burden, the duty was reversed, and the formal conduct assumes that the claimant did not refute the imputed charges. Ergo, it started from the existence of those presuppositions, when, it is insisted, the norm demands their verification.\n\n**VIII.-** Finally, the absence of that regulated motive at the moment the Plenary issued the act of removal is subsequently confirmed by other facts that, for this collegiate body, are fundamental. The first of these is that, in the corresponding instances, the procedures aimed at demonstrating the alleged falsifications and faults in the exercise of the profession of lawyer and notary, which were the basis for concluding the existence of incorrect proceedings, did not prosper. According to the evidence brought to the process, on December 2, 2008, the Acting Director of the Judicial Registry certified that in the records kept by that office, there are no annotations in the name of the claimant (folio 139 of the judicial file). Likewise, the Costa Rican Bar Association certified on December 3, 2008, that the claimant Name141713 had not been disciplined with suspension or reprimand in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer (folio 140 of the judicial file). That same day, the Administrative Chief of the National Directorate of Notaries certified that in the last ten years, the actor had no suspensions or disqualifications in their records (folio 141 of the judicial file). It is the criterion of these judges that if the competent organs did not manage to accredit the real existence of the alleged falsifications and faults in the exercise of the profession of lawyer and notary that were attributed to the actor, their existence could not and cannot be presumed to qualify them as an incorrect proceeding that then serves as a presupposition to agree to his removal from the position of Comptroller.\n\nOn the other hand, it is noted that after his dismissal, some deputies presented bills aimed at defining a procedure for these officials. It is striking that within the motives of the cited projects, mention is made of the claimant's situation. Specifically, one of them points out that \"(...) That is, in the case of Mr. Name141713, it exposed a typical problem of a legal vacuum or loophole, which must be corrected by the legislators themselves; lest another situation of such confusion, legal uncertainty, and danger to fundamental rights be repeated, as was experienced with the aforementioned case of the former Comptroller General of the Republic (...)\" (folio 126 of the judicial file). Moreover, a second bill indicates \"(...) What happened to Dr. Name66572, former Comptroller General of the Republic, must not be repeated in this country, which has always been characterized by being respectful of human rights. It should concern all of us that the same deputies who removed him from his position—including the majority of the members of the commission that investigated him—three years later publicly accept that Mr. Name141713 did not incur in the grounds for dismissal established by the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Constitution (...)\" (folio 136 of the judicial file).\n\nBut the element of conviction that comes to completely refute the existence of incorrect proceedings and to confirm that this motive could not be proven nor did it exist at the time the removal was ordered, is the manifestation of will of the Legislative Plenary itself, an organ that in ordinary session No. 130, of January 26, 2009, agreed \"... Considering: 1. That in ordinary session No. 115, held on December 13, 2004, the Legislative Plenary agreed to dismiss Mr. Name66572 from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as to denounce him before the Public Ministry, the Directorate of the Bar Association and the Directorate of Notaries for having omitted important rules as a 'lawyer' and 'notary public', before assuming the position of Comptroller. 2. **That these facts could not be verified or were dismissed by the Public Ministry, the Bar Association and the Directorate of Notaries, in which case, no investigation was even opened against Mr. Name141713, as stated in certifications issued by those entities** and which are attached to this motion. 3. That according to said certifications, Mr. Name66572 has never been sanctioned, suspended, reprimanded, or disqualified by the Directorate of Notaries, the Bar Association or the courts of justice. 4. **That subsequent to these events, many deputies of the 2002-2006 legislature have recognized the error incurred by the Legislative Assembly**, as eloquently summarized by Deputy Name141714, former president of the Special Commission of Political Control that the Legislative Assembly formed to investigate his case: 'So, Mr. Name66572 was dismissed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, without having incurred in any incorrect proceeding in the performance of his duties. Furthermore, he was acquitted from an ethical, disciplinary, and legal standpoint, of the other acts attributed to him. That is, Mr. Name66572 was dismissed for nothing. And as if this were not already extremely serious in terms of human rights, it must also be recognized, consequently, that the Legislative Assembly breached, from beginning to end, his right to due process.' 5. That before this institution, Mr. Name66572 filed a contentious-administrative lawsuit against this Legislative Assembly, which was admitted according to notification received at the Presidency of this Assembly on January 13 of the present year. In the order for transfer, the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Second Judicial Circuit (San José) expressly indicates that: 'Because the plaintiff has come directly to the jurisdictional route, a period of EIGHT WORKING DAYS is granted to Mr. Name44703, president of the Legislative Assembly as the supreme head of the organ from which the challenged conduct emanates, so that he may confirm, modify, annul, revoke it or cause it to cease, for the benefit of the plaintiff. If within the indicated period the Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends or corrects the questioned conduct, the process shall be considered terminated, with no special ruling on costs (...).' 6. That it does not correspond to the Presidency of the Assembly to make the indicated decision, given that it was the Legislative Plenary that issued the cited agreement. 7. That procedurally, the act of removal in question is final under the protection of the provisions of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, and, therefore, legally all its effects are consolidated, which makes it impossible for this Plenary to rule again on the same matter. 8. **That this Legislative Assembly recognizes that the fate of Mr. Name66572 as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political organ has wanted to say and do of him**, so that, finally, it will correspond to the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what corresponds in justice and in law. **They make the following motion:** That, based on the provisions of Article 153 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly and 119 of the Political Constitution, this Legislative Assembly agrees: 1. To refrain from ruling in the terms requested by the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit. 2. **To declare publicly, as many of the deputies of the previous legislature (2002-2006) have recognized and is recorded in the certifications indicated in considering clauses two and three of this motion, that the Legislative Assembly of that period removed Mr. Name66572 from the position of Comptroller General of the Republic without him having incurred in the grounds established by the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution, therefore it is necessary to vindicate the good name of Mr. Name66572 for the unjust manner in which he was removed.** 3. To express the wish, that in the future the Legislative Assembly be more careful, when as a consequence of its actions, the good name and honor of people are at stake, in order to avoid incurring again in unjust acts that violate human rights. 4. To communicate this agreement to the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Second Judicial Circuit...\" (folio 188 to 190 of the judicial file) (the highlighting is ours).\n\nAnd it is that in that agreement, the Legislative Plenary recognizes the existence of the defects that this Tribunal points out. Violations of due process to the detriment of the claimant and that the omission of the rules referring to the exercise of the profession of lawyer and notary were not verified are admitted. But moreover, that collegiate constitutional organ accepts that the claimant was removed without having incurred in the grounds established by the third paragraph of Article 183 of the Political Constitution. This is serious because, it is insisted, according to the constitutional text, the actor could only be removed from his position upon verification of the grounds indicated therein. As a last resort, one of the grounds indicated in Article 48 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic that would have allowed him to be dismissed for serious misconduct could have been demonstrated. Even assessing and addressing the possibility of annulling his appointment due to a defect in the will of those who elected him to that position, ignoring that accusations (and only that) weighed on him that called into question the requirement of honorability demanded for the appointment. However, the Plenary opted for his removal in accordance with Article 183 of our Magna Carta, which imposed, unfailingly, accrediting the concrete existence of incorrect proceedings or ineptitude. If none of these grounds were demonstrated, the removal was not appropriate. It is reiterated that, due to the independence that both the Political Constitution and the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic guarantee the Comptroller General in the performance of his duties, the exercise of the removal power attributed to the Legislative Assembly is not discretionary but rather regulated. Thus, having removed the actor without proving ineptitude or incorrect proceedings (as the Plenary itself accepts), constitutes an action contrary to law that violates the Principle of Legality enshrined in Article 11 of both the Political Constitution and the General Law of Public Administration.\n\nFurthermore, this reprehensible manifestation of public conduct illegitimately harmed the legal situation of the plaintiff, a detriment for which the State must respond patrimonially in the terms that will be explained in a subsequent recital (considerando). The absence of grounds (motivo) in the act under review directly impacts its content, insofar as it becomes unlawful, given that the ineptitude or incorrect procedures were not proven. For all the foregoing reasons, the challenged act is inconsistent with the legal system in accordance with the provisions of Articles 11, 128, 132, 133, 158, 166, 182, and 223 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and its absolute nullity must be declared.\n\nIX.- ON THE NULLITY OF THE CONNECTED CONDUCT AND THE REINSTATEMENT CLAIM. Regarding the request for a declaration of invalidity of the connected conduct, the following must be noted. Pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph k) of Article 122 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the Court, when issuing a judgment, must suppress, even on its own initiative (de oficio), any administrative conduct directly related to that subjected to the process, when it is inconsistent with the legal system. Although this is an ex officio condemnation, the truth is that such connection must arise from the facts that are the subject of the process, so as not to engage in an abusive exercise of the ex officio sentencing powers granted by the aforementioned Procedural Code. In the specific case, from what was discussed at the preliminary hearing, it emerges that the only specific act sought to be annulled by reason of connection is the appointment of the current Contralora General de la República, appointed by the Plenary to replace the plaintiff and who acts in this process as the defendant. This is closely linked to the reinstatement claim for the position that is also being requested. Pursuant to Article 171 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the declaration of absolute nullity shall have a declaratory and retroactive effect to the date of the issuance of the invalidated act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. This Court considers that both the request for absolute nullity by reason of connection of the appointment of the Contralora who replaced the plaintiff and the reinstatement of the latter to the position must be rejected for the following reasons. It must be borne in mind that the appointment of the current Contralora is an act presumed valid and whose legitimacy is not subject to analysis in this process. It is evident that, as a consequence of that valid and effective appointment, the defendant Nombre71822 has been performing formal and material actions in her capacity as Contralora General de la República. While the plaintiff's argument that the mere declaration of nullity of the act ordering his removal has the immediate consequence of rendering the appointment of his substitute without effect is inherently respectable, it is the criterion of this Court that it is inapplicable in the present matter. Indeed, both the aforementioned numeral 171 and Article 131 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo indicate that the retroactive effects of the declaration of absolute nullity must consider rights acquired in good faith. In the present matter, both the appointment and the actions that the defendant Nombre71822, in her capacity as Contralora General, has been performing, have been carried out under the protection of this principle of good faith. Moreover, for situations such as this, the legislator, in the third paragraph of the aforementioned Article 131, provided for the possibility for judges to graduate the effects of such declaration in time, space, or subject matter, when necessary to safeguard legal certainty and social stability. In light of the foregoing, for this Court, it is necessary to weigh the public and private interests at stake in light of criteria of public convenience, institutionality, and the good administration of the State. Granting the request and annulling the appointment of the defendant would undoubtedly endanger the institutionality of the State, social peace, and would cause a serious disruption of public interests, as it would entail the invalidity, per se, of all the actions of the aforementioned public official, a situation this Court cannot endorse. It is for this reason that, in application of the aforementioned canons 171 and 131, third paragraph, it is ordered to maintain the validity and effectiveness of the appointment and all actions of the current Contralora General de la República. In any event, since the plaintiff is also making a claim for damages, this Court finds no impediment for the reinstatement claim (for the almost two years remaining of his appointment) to be converted into and form part of the indemnification claim being sought, by virtue of the public interests at stake.\n\nX.- ON THE DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS). Under Article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the Administration is responsible for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning. It is worth highlighting that the legislator's reference is not simply to acts, but transcends to administrative functioning (Article 49 of the Constitución Política), a concept that reflects any form of manifestation of administrative will, whether formal or material, and that also encompasses dysfunction, that is, administrative omissions. Said responsibility is therefore framed within a preeminently objective regime, which includes in its foundation both the theory of damage and risk, as well as the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. This fundamentally seeks the compensatory reparation for anyone who has experienced an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority that proves to be unlawful at its base. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of the responsibility itself, as it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to position itself from the perspective of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except as regards their personal responsibility). This undoubtedly causes a shift in the very approach of its foundation, since there will be responsibility on the part of the Administration whenever its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning causes damage that the victim is not bound to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, clearly complying with the essential prerequisite of the causal link. On this subject, see the extensive development in resolution no. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes of August 11, 2005, of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. From this standpoint, legislation imposes unlawful or lawful conduct, as well as normal or abnormal functioning, as criteria for imputation. In the case of lawful conduct and normal functioning, the Legal System establishes prerequisites and requirements that determine its applicability, among them, the damage must be special or abnormal, which means it must fall upon a small proportion of affected individuals or, in the second case, must have exceptional intensity. In these hypotheses, liability only covers the damage, but not the lost profits or consequential damages (perjuicios) (Articles 194 and 195 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Meanwhile, in the case of unlawful conduct and abnormal functioning, liability is full. However, in the face of these criteria for imputability, it must be proven that the injury is a consequence of these actions or omissions, in order to establish the causal link that allows the attribution of liability to the center of public authority. In addition to this, in cases of abnormality and unlawfulness, the judge must undertake an examination of public functioning, in order to establish whether a procedure that deviates from legality has indeed occurred, or whether it contravenes the concepts of administrative efficiency. In such cases, it is decisive to clearly infer the existence of these criteria, since otherwise, the treatment and analysis of each case must be different, depending on the type of functioning to which the detriment is attributed. The fault of the victim, the act of a third party, and force majeure arise as exempting causes for such liability. However, in each dispute, the judge must examine whether the exonerating effect of such circumstances is total or only partial, a case in which it can only produce a reducing effect on the liability of the administrative unit. Again, the concurrence of these aspects lies with the Administration. Now, it must be noted that in the dynamic of the compensation for damages that is intended to be demanded from Public Administrations, not any damage gives rise to the duty of reparation, but only that which is effective, evaluable, and individualizable. This is derived from Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. The foregoing eliminates from the compensatory parameter mere expectations of law or aspirations of eventual profit, based on conjectures, ergo, on uncertain situations. The effectiveness of the damage required in this type of claim prevents the consideration of hypothetical injuries. Compensable damage can be of various types, whether material, bodily, objective moral, or subjective moral. However, it is reiterated that the injury must have these characteristics as a condition for its reparability. It should be noted at this point that, as a derivation of the dynamic burden of proof, (Articles 58, 82, 85 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, 317 of the Código Procesal Civil) it is up to the victim to demonstrate the existence and amount of the damages they claim. This duty is undelayable and constitutes an unbreachable prerequisite for the appropriateness of reparation. In the specific case, the plaintiff requests that the State be condemned in the abstract to pay the damages caused. He indicates that these damages consist *\"...in the economic or material benefits such as salary in cash, in kind, years for my retirement, moral and emotional damage (daño moral y afectivo), which will be liquidated in the execution of the judgment...\"*. This Court considers that the abstract condemnation is appropriate. It must be borne in mind that Article 122, subparagraph m) iii, allows this type of condemnation when it is a consequence of the administrative conduct or legal relationship that is the subject of the process, allowing the concrete existence of the detriments and their quantification to be determined in the execution of the judgment. The foregoing is based on the doctrine of constitutional canon 41, by establishing the principle of full reparation of the damage, which, as a right, is conferred to individuals within their individual framework, in their property, or in their moral interests. It concerns the due protection from violations of a person's legal situation, which includes their patrimonial assets, but also their internal sphere. The elements of conviction brought to the record allow us to establish, as a direct, precise, and logical consequence, that the illegitimate conduct of the State that has been annulled here (by virtue of which the Asamblea Legislativa agreed to the removal of the plaintiff from his position as Contralor General de la República without the special conditions that our legal system requires for such effects having been proven) becomes a parameter of imputability that allows us to attribute patrimonial liability to the State. This Court does not share the State's argument that liability cannot be attributed insofar as Article 194, third paragraph, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública indicates that liability will be for damages caused directly by a Law, which is what occurs in the specific case. In the present matter, the liability being declared is not for lawful conduct or for the State as Legislator, which are the scenarios provided for in the cited Article 194. The liability being declared is for illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Asamblea Legislativa, in the exercise of an administrative function. For this collegiate body, the act of removal that the Asamblea Legislativa adopted against the legal system constitutes a manifestation of illegitimate conduct that causes both material and moral detriments and sufferings in the internal sphere of the plaintiff. Having been proven that the plaintiff was removed from his position as Contralor General de la República without having incurred the grounds of Article 183 of the Constitution (as the Asamblea Legislativa itself accepts), by human presumption (Article 417 of the Código Procesal Civil) and an assessment under the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), it can be inferred that this illegitimate removal caused damage in his subjective sphere. In the present matter, this illegitimate action by the State cut short the plaintiff's possibility of exercising a public office for which he had been chosen. Moreover, serious accusations were attributed to him that were not duly proven, which called into question his moral and functional integrity, with the consequences this can generate in his family, social, and work environment and before the community in general. Note that the Legislative Plenary itself recognizes that its illegitimate conduct generated detriments to the plaintiff. Indeed, in the aforementioned ordinary session No. 130, of January 26, 2009, it was agreed *\"... That this Asamblea Legislativa recognizes that the fate of Mr. Nombre66572 as a human being, in his honor, his prestige, his dignity, and in his present and future, cannot be reduced to what a political body has wanted to say and do with him, so, finally, it will be up to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the Second Judicial Circuit to resolve what corresponds in justice and in law. (...) therefore, it is necessary to vindicate the good name of Don Nombre66572 due to the unjust manner in which he was removed. 3. To express the desire that in the future the Asamblea Legislativa be more careful, when as a consequence of its actions the good name and honor of persons are at stake, in order to avoid once again incurring in unjust acts and violations of human rights...\"*. It must be borne in mind that even if the conduct had been excluded by the legislator in Article 3, subparagraph b) of the CPCA (which, as has already been explained, was not the case), the matter relating to the resulting compensations would reside in this venue. From this standpoint, the aforementioned Article 122, subparagraph m), subsection iii), confers on the judge the power to assess this type of condition and, where appropriate, when the judge considers that the questioned conduct may have caused injuries, regardless of whether their existence or amount is recorded, to impose on the State an abstract condemnation on those aspects, so that it is in the judgment execution phase where their existence and quantification are discussed. In any event, it will be in the execution stage where this specific issue will be definitively resolved, and where the parties will enjoy all the guarantees of intervention and defense granted by the administrative contentious procedural rules. Now, although Article 110 of the Constitución Política states that the deputy is not responsible for the opinions they issue in the Asamblea Legislativa and regulates parliamentary immunity in criminal matters, the truth is that this provision must be interpreted in accordance with the entire Legal System, and its unlimited application cannot be claimed. This is derived even from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly itself. Specifically, it is worth highlighting that in record no. 61, of the ordinary session held by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente at fifteen thirty hours on the fifth day of May, nineteen forty-nine, under the presidency of Doctor Rodríguez and the presence of the Deputies Vargas Fernández and Ortiz Martín, Secretaries; Nombre10040, González Luján, González Flores, González Herrán, Nombre5701, Nombre62894, Nombre9620, Herrero Montealegre, Volio Sancho, Volio Jiménez, Nombre49854, Dobles Segreda, Jiménez Núñez, Jiménez Ortiz, Nombre251, Nombre70983, Nombre141717, Nombre171, Nombre110253, Nombre141714, Nombre8730, Nombre141718, Nombre141719, Nombre5709, Nombre18695, Arias, Gómez, Nombre65461, Nombre9706, Nombre6248, Nombre6379, Nombre141720, Nombre54760, Nombre32221, Nombre1601 and the substitutes Nombre141721, Nombre141722, Nombre110253, Nombre141723 and Nombre5205; the scope of the referred non-responsibility for opinions and parliamentary immunity was discussed. It is indicated, for example, that Deputy Nombre5701 stated that *\" (...) In his opinion, the responsibility of deputies would appear and should be demanded by the Corte Suprema de Justicia, when with their votes they caused an irreparable violation of the Constitution. The responsibility for the violation should be the criterion for condemning the deputies. An example would be the case of the Congress of March 1, 1948, where a rounded-up and criminal majority, overriding law and ethics, ignored the election that the people had made in the person of Nombre141724. In that case, the violation carried out had no possible composition or amendment. It was an irreparable damage, an injury without remedy to the Constitución Política. The latter offered no ways to correct what had been done. In cases like that, is where, in his opinion, the responsibility of the deputies would apply. (...) Representative Arias intervened again in the debate to clarify several of his points of view. He said that Congress could fail in its duties in two very different cases: maliciously and by error, when the Assembly has misapplied the Constitution, but not maliciously, when, for example, it has issued a law or decree contrary to the fundamental statute. For this case -he declared-, the provision involved in the motion under discussion cannot be maintained in any way. In cases of malicious violation of the Constitution, he said that the act should not go unpunished, but that it was necessary to clarify whether the corresponding sanction was going to be individual, or if a joint pronouncement of the majority of the Assembly, which produces the harm, was required for liability to arise. (...)* *Deputy Nombre251 declared that he would vote for the motion under debate, since it always seemed monstrous to him that a Constitution would state that the Deputy is absolutely irresponsible for their votes and opinions expressed in the Chamber. (...) In no way can a principle like this be maintained, so that in the future serious and malicious violations of the Constitution cannot occur without the respective sanction (...)\"*. In addition to the foregoing, it must be borne in mind that in light of Article 9 of the same Constitution and the reform introduced in Article 11 thereof, on June 8, 2000, the Principle of Responsibility of the Branches of Government and public officials is strengthened. Moreover, there is jurisprudence on this matter from both the Sala Constitucional (Sentencia No. Placa27635, of 14 hours 56 minutes of November 14, 2000) and the Sala Tercera (Sentencia No. 125-2004, of 11 hours 10 minutes of February 20, 2004) that address this issue. In light of the foregoing, it should be noted that should there be a concrete patrimonial condemnation against the State for the damages caused by the illegitimate conduct and abnormal functioning of the Asamblea Legislativa in the exercise of its administrative function, the logical and necessary consequence would be the immediate opening of internal or external procedures to determine the responsible parties for the actions or omissions undertaken to the detriment of the due procedures in this matter. Taking into account the particularities of this case, it is the criterion of this Court that while the State must respond patrimonially in a joint and several manner to the plaintiff, the condemned Administration must assess the relevance of ordering the necessary actions aimed at recovering any amount that, for this charge, might be paid, in accordance with the provisions, to the extent compatible, of Articles 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, and 209 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and in the interest of protecting public interests.\n\nXI.- ON THE ALLEGED DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES)-COROLLARY. The defendants filed the preliminary defense (excepción previa) regulated by Article 66, subparagraph g) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which was rejected in accordance with what was stated in Considerando I. As substantive defenses, the defendant Nombre71822 raised the defenses of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. The first must be rejected. Since the nullity of the removal act was being sought, and because of the consequences that, as a general rule, this declaration would produce, in accordance with Article 12, subsection 3) of the cited Procedural Code, the defendant had to be present in this process. However, the defense of lack of right must be upheld. As explained in Considerando IX, by virtue of Articles 171 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 131, subsection 3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it is necessary to measure the scope of this annulling judgment so that the invalidity being declared does not affect the legitimacy, validity, and effectiveness of the appointment of the current Contralora General de la República or any of her actions, which must remain unharmed. Thus, as far as she is concerned, the claim must be declared without merit. Regarding the State, the defense must be partially upheld only insofar as the plaintiff's reinstatement to the position of Contralor General de la República is not appropriate, and neither the appointment of the current Contralora nor her actions are null. In all other respects it must be rejected, since for the reasons set forth in Considerando VI, VII, and VIII, the act of removal issued by the Legislative Plenary and by which the plaintiff Nombre141713 was removed from his position is substantially inconsistent with the legal system. Consequently, the claim must be partially granted in the following terms: 1) As it is substantially inconsistent with the legal system, the absolute nullity of the act issued by the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 114, of December 13, 2004, is declared.\n\n**2)** Pursuant to Article 122, subsection m iii), the State is ordered in the abstract to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff as a consequence of the annulled public conduct, which shall be liquidated and proven in the sentence execution phase.\n\n**XII.- REGARDING COSTS.** Article 193 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) provides that procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this order is only viable when, in the judgment of the Tribunal, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, regarding the co-defendant Nombre71822, this Tribunal considers that, due to the complexity of the matter, the nature of the debated issues, and the fact that the Processing Judge of this Office joined her to this process on its own motion, the matter must be resolved without a special ruling on costs. Regarding the State, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the applicable regulations and to break the principle of imposing costs on the losing party. Therefore, both costs of this process are imposed on it.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe preliminary defense regulated in Article 66, subsection 1 g) of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which was filed by both defendants, is rejected; as is the defense of lack of passive capacity to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) filed by the co-defendant Nombre71822. The defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) filed by the co-defendant Nombre71822 is upheld, and regarding her, the lawsuit is declared without merit, without a special ruling on costs. The defense of lack of right filed by the State is partially upheld, solely regarding the fact that the reinstatement of the plaintiff to the position of Comptroller General of the Republic is not appropriate, nor are the appointment of the current Comptroller General or her actions null. In all other respects, it must be rejected. Consequently, the lawsuit is partially granted in the following terms, with the understanding that it is denied in what is not expressly granted: **1)** As it is substantially non-conforming with the legal system, the absolute nullity of the act issued by the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 114, of December 13, 2004, whereby the plaintiff Nombre66572 was removed from his position as Comptroller General of the Republic, is declared. The effects of this declaration of nullity are tailored to maintain the validity and effectiveness of the act appointing the current Comptroller General of the Republic, as well as that of all her actions. **2)** Pursuant to Article 122, subsection m iii), the State is ordered in the abstract to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff as a consequence of the annulled public conduct, which shall be liquidated and proven in the sentence execution phase. **3)** Both costs of this process are imposed on the State.\n\n**Cynthia Abarca Gómez**\n\n**Marianella Álvarez Molina**\n\n**Otto González Vílchez**\n\nEXPEDIENTE:08-001496-1027-CA\n\nPROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: Nombre66572\n\nDEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, Nombre71822" }