VI.- Nevertheless, it is insisted, the liability specific to the Judicial Branch in its jurisdictional exercise must not be confused with the other facets of its competencies, which do not conform to that category. On the one hand, the matter pertaining to the function of the administration of justice, viewed as a public service, arises. This concerns the duty to resolve conflicts objectively, promptly, and timely. Entering into this category are all those non-jurisdictional acts emanating from the offices that form part of what doctrine has termed \"Judicial Branch organization.\" That is, they are the organs and organizational support that enable the proper exercise of the jurisdictional function. It refers to the objective profiles of the jurisdictional function: organization and functioning of courts, efficient management of judicial offices, functions of administrative organs. Also to be included in this area are the jurisdictional organs that, by legal mandate, perform a non-hierarchical, improper oversight function of a biphasic nature, as currently done by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo regarding municipal matters, by mandate of article 189 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In this area, as it involves non-jurisdictional matters, the provisions on objective liability of the Ley General de la Administración Pública would be applicable. On a second level, there are the auxiliary units that do not perform typical administrative activity but which, ultimately, cannot be considered a jurisdictional procedure. These are the so-called judicial actions. This is the case of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ), Ministerio Público, Ciencias Forenses, the Defensa Pública, among others. These provide support and fulfill an auxiliary role to the jurisdictional function, but their acts are not considered jurisdictional insofar as they carry out the task of instruction and investigation. Their decisions are judicial acts stricto sensu. This distinction is evident in the regulations on criminal procedure. In precept 277 ibidem, its final paragraph clearly establishes the impossibility for prosecutors to perform jurisdictional acts, as well as the restriction on judges, except with legal authorization, from carrying out investigative acts. The same applies to the Ministerio Público, whose functions can be observed in numerals 62, 275, 289, 290, and 291 of the Código Procesal Penal, all related to its powers of investigation and complaint. This distinction has been noted by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 at 10 hours and 45 minutes on September 26, 2008. However, what is of interest in this matter is the liability specific to that jurisdictional exercise, when it has incurred judicial error. Thus, in this latter scenario (relevant to the present case), as long as there is an unlawful or illegitimate injury caused to the party seeking justice, produced as a consequence of these competencies, the objective liability of the State-Judge is imposed. As has been said, the foregoing is supported by numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Carta Magna, norms that lay the foundations for liability for judicial error, the abnormal or illicit functioning of the jurisdictional function.
VII.- Now then, apart from the discussion that may arise regarding whether or not the system of liability for the jurisdictional exercise requires specific legislative development, the fact of the matter is that in certain areas, the legislator has issued express norms dealing with the subject of that liability and its various presuppositions. It must be noted, however, that this Court, in resolution No. 765-2008 of October 2, 2008, has expressed that regardless of the content of precepts 154 and 166 of the Carta Magna, which presume the necessity of legislative output to be able to attribute liability for the jurisdictional function, that liability and its corresponding right to full reparation of the damage find support in the very law of the Constitution, in articles 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. Along these lines, the Sala Primera, in the aforementioned ruling 1011-2006, indicated on this point: \"It has already been pointed out that said liability derives from the very framework of Constitutional Law, as a relevant counterweight in the relations of the State with individuals and as a factor of high importance in the equation of the State of Law. Ultimately, a guarantee in favor of the party seeking justice, who turns to the Judicial Branch so that their conflict may be resolved in accordance with legality, thus placing their trust in that facet of Public Power. The principle of State liability that emanates, as a general rule, from constitutional precept 9 and finds protection in other norms that safeguard the guarantees of the individual, does not find frameworks of exception. While, in each sphere of that triple dimension of functions (executive, legislative, and judicial), nuances operate that require specific treatment in each context, the fact of the matter is that the Legal System does not incorporate frameworks of exemption, beyond the reasonable assumptions when an unlawful injury at its base is produced, linked to a public procedure. The principles arising from Constitutional Law give content to said liability; therefore, even the absence of legal regulation, which, although it may specify that regime, does not in any way limit the duty to indemnify, when pertinent in accordance with Law. Hence, one could not sustain an \"impunity\" of the State-Judge, on the grounds that it lacks legislative development, because the former is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, while at the same time it would entail a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Viewed this way, its recognition is not conditioned upon the existence of a legal mandate regulating it, ergo, the provisions of article 166 ibidem are not an obstacle. The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms and which seeks the control of the exercise of said function and the protection of the rights and interests of those seeking justice.\"
VIII.- Within that set of assumptions where there is legislative development on the subject, criminal law stands out, in which there are express rules, specifically, in numeral 271 of the Código Procesal Penal for the case of liability for the issuance of arbitrary precautionary measures and the assumption of pretrial detention in a proceeding where a definitive dismissal or acquittal with full demonstration of innocence is later ordered, canon 108 of the Código Penal which regulates the eventual subsidiary liability of the State when, by virtue of a motion for review, the innocence of the accused is declared when they obtain an acquittal, after having suffered more than one year of pretrial detention, and finally, in accordance with article 419 of the Código Procesal Penal, which establishes public liability for the existence of judicial error accredited in a judgment issued in a review proceeding. These last manifestations are especially relevant to the case, being those that are applicable to the specific case and which, therefore, will be addressed below. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify the scope of what is called judicial error. For this, what was explained by the Sala Primera in the aforementioned vote No. 654-2008 in the following sense must be brought up: \"Note that numeral 154 of the Carta Magna uses the term \"resolution,\" with which the different models that make up this category are included, be it a decree (providencia), interlocutory order (auto), interlocutory orders having the character of a judgment (autos con carácter de sentencia), and judgments (sentencias) (numeral 153 Código Procesal Civil). On the other hand, it can occur, it is insisted, in thesis of principle, both due to judicial error and due to abnormal functioning. The first is a species of the common genus of abnormal functioning, for, indeed, every judicial error theoretically supposes an abnormality in that functioning (ultimately, the most significant manifestation), but not the reverse. Judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their legitimate rights or interests and that is erroneous or contrary to law. Viewed this way, it is exclusive to the jurisdictional function, being, therefore, a modality of abnormal functioning that only fits in that dimension. The foregoing includes not only errors of fact (due to mistaken knowledge or assessment of the facts, a ruling is issued that does not conform to factual reality and which, as such, becomes unjust), but also errors of law (such as a violation of the Law due to its improper interpretation, erroneous application, or lack of application). At this point, despite the existence of an entire system of appeals against those decisions, the determining factor is that once the recognition of that judicial error has occurred, damages compensable under the Legal System must have been produced in the legal sphere of the person, as a consequence of those deficiencies (causal link). Ergo, the compensable error is not limited to the specific assumptions where the legal system provides for said consequence, nor to criminal matters, as in the present case, due to a precautionary measure that turns out to be improper, but on the contrary, its application transcends those circumstances to encompass the entirety of the jurisdictional function, that is, any resolution, regardless of the jurisdiction in which it is issued, may result in the duty of reparation chargeable to the State if it generates an unlawful damage.\" (Emphasis is ours)
IX.- On the scope of judicial error. Without prejudice to the aforementioned development, it is necessary to point out the following. Although judicial error allows the reparation of the damage caused, it is fundamental to establish the implications of that term. The reparability referred to depends, imperatively, on the proof of the existence of a judicial error in that jurisdictional decision that caused an unlawful injury at its base. For this, it must be clear that the simple fact that the addressee of the ruling does not share its content does not in any way imply the existence of that criterion of attribution referred to. Indeed, as is rightly pointed out, judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their legitimate rights or interests and that is erroneous or contrary to law. Note that this concept is different from abnormal functioning, for example, due to delay in resolving a specific case. In that latter variable, different rules apply than those specific to judicial error, which are not relevant in this proceeding. In the matter of interest (judicial error), it is essential that its existence has been demonstrated. The foregoing supposes a declaration within the proceeding itself, or, as part of it, within the appellate phases established by the legal system, which establishes the existence of an erroneous jurisdictional decision, contrary to law, whether due to indirect violation (of fact or of law), or direct violation (due to improper application, erroneous application, or defective interpretation), whether substantive or procedural. Nevertheless, the mere annulment or reversal of a resolution does not imply, per se, an error of this nature, much less a sort of automatic right to compensation. For this, several presuppositions arise that condition the reparability of the injury. On the one hand, the error must be gross, that is, it must be a glaring, serious, and substantial defect. At this point, it is reiterated, the existence of the irregularity must be expressed through a resolution of the authority itself (via reversal or ex officio nullity), or from an ordinary higher instance, that is, an appellate venue. A declaration is also feasible through the exercise of extraordinary remedies, whether through a cassation judgment or one issued by virtue of an extraordinary motion for review. In essence, it is essential that there be a jurisdictional declaration regarding a serious judicial error (within the same proceeding by the competent authority), detailing the aspects that determine that deficiency, an aspect that falls to each of the instances that, given that appellate scheme, is competent to hear the matter. For this, it is necessary that the jurisdictional remedies or recourses offered by the legal system have been utilized to challenge the resolution that, in the judgment of the addressee, causes them damages. This is decisive since the inertia in this right, despite the possibility granted by the normative plexus to cease the disturbance, means that the effects of said ruling become firm and, therefore, its implications in the legal sphere of the individual find support in a decision with the authority of material res judicata on which there has been no dispute within the proceeding, or at least not formally. It is clear that the absence of exercising an appeal against the decision alleged, whether through the appropriate ordinary remedies (criterion of taxativity for challenges) or through extraordinary ones, prevents, within the dynamic of the proceedings, another jurisdictional unit from reviewing the decision of the lower court (A quo), and, in protection of the rights of the party seeking justice, suppressing that error that affects them, all due to the tacit acquiescence of the supposedly affected party. At this point, it must be understood that the appellate scale, embodied in each procedural regime, is precisely a guarantee of due process and the tool that allows the party seeking justice to challenge the decision with which they do not agree. Along these lines, an error contained in a decision that has been challenged and that has not taken effect could not constitute a compensable error, but only one that has generated effective, assessable, and individualizable damage, thanks to a jurisdictional determination that has produced material effects with a harmful result to the addressee in the terms pointed out. Of course, those resolutions that produce direct effects, despite having been challenged through ordinary mechanisms (remedy with devolutive effect -e.g., numeral 569 of the Código Procesal Civil-), as long as a judicial error is proven, allow for that pecuniary reparation. The contrary, that is, supposing the possibility of alleging a judicial error in a State liability proceeding, without there being a ruling from a superior authority, or from the same authority that has recognized its error (reversal or ex officio nullity), would lead to allowing, through this type of civil Hacienda proceedings, an attempt to analyze the legality of firm jurisdictional decisions, with the authority of res judicata, going against the appellate system established by law and in complete disregard of the effects of that material res judicata. It must be remembered that resolutions with that hierarchy can only be analyzed through extraordinary remedies (review and cassation), so accepting the review of those conducts as a presupposition for a determination of the existence or not of a judicial error not only breaches the security and legal certainty of res judicata, but also invades the competencies that belong to the Casation Chambers, an aspect which, of course, this Court cannot share. It does not correspond to this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo to qualify the conduct of other jurisdictions in order to establish whether they were issued with judicial error or not. That would imply, it is insisted, the reflexive review of those criteria, a matter that is reserved to the competent appellate instances, and the exercise of a power that cannot be derived from the generic competence granted by article 2, subsection b) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo - which includes claims for liability against the Administration and in general against the State, in application of canon 49 of the Carta Magna-, therefore, without an enabling legal basis.
X.- It must be insisted, the error must be serious, evident, and gross. The mere circumstance that the appellate or cassation instance opts for a different legal criterion could not be considered a reparable judicial error. It is necessary that the decision be openly arbitrary, openly contrary to the legality of the case, and that this is expressed in the ruling that reverses or annuls the criterion of the lower court. The same applies when the new criterion is based on allegations not presented before the instance judge (provided they were issues that must be debated by the parties in application of the party presentation principle), or is based on new evidence provided in the appellate phase. In those cases, the existence of a judicial error could not be affirmed when the questioned judgment was issued without having those pieces of evidence or substantive arguments that can only be subject to pronouncement if debated by the parties (congruence), without this implying a disregard of the maxim iura novit curia. Therefore, the mere variation of a prior criterion does not, as a general rule, lead to a compensable judicial error. A meticulous and casuistic examination of the particularities of each proceeding is necessary, in order to establish whether that type of error has occurred that allows liability for the jurisdictional function to arise. For example, a ruling that orders the auction of an asset given as a guarantee for a credit obligation already canceled by compensation, a situation unknown to the judge despite the constant allegations of the alleged debtor and its accreditation within the case file, resolving that the debt is not canceled, ordering the auction of the real guarantee, does not merit the same treatment as the liability that may arise from the legal criterion of considering effective a certain power subject to a statute of limitations, which then, due to different legal assessments, the higher court considers to have expired. In the first case, it is clear that a compensable error may be configured due to the ignorance of a situation accredited in the court records, which ultimately produced the auction of the asset. In the second, it involves different criteria and normative assessments, ultimately, independence of the judge's criterion, unless the aforementioned expiration is evident. There is no compensable judicial error due solely to a dissonance of legal criterion; there must be a declaration of the existence of a serious mistake, generating damages to a third party. This is precisely the third aspect, that is, the proof that the criterion deemed mistaken produced concrete damage. More simply, it must be specified that the existence of that right to reparation is subject, on the one hand, to the condition that the resolution containing a possible judicial error has deployed its effects and, through them, a detriment has been produced in the legal sphere of the affected party. As an additional aspect, it must be clarified that the compensable error is not limited to the hypothesis of the motion for review, although it constitutes the scenario with the greatest probability from which it can arise. Nevertheless, in thesis of principle, what is usual is that it derives from a firm jurisdictional decision possessing the authority of res judicata. Nor is it exclusive to the criminal jurisdiction. It is clear that it permeates the other jurisdictions, for, even though criminal matters are where the legislative development of the figure is evident, that does not imply that it cannot occur in others. This criterion should not be confused with the abnormal functioning that occurs in the classic conception of lack of functioning, defective or erroneous provision. Viewed this way, it is a broader term, which covers the already discussed assumption of judicial error, but also the deficiencies that, in terms of deficient provision or delay of justice, are linked, in principle, with the facet of the administration of justice or the judicial function, therefore, regulated by the liability regime dealt with in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. (On that point, see the aforementioned judgment No. 654-2008 of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia)
XI.- On liability for judicial error accredited in a motion for review. Having specified the generalities of the liability system for judicial error and the scope of judicial error, the examination of the claims raised in the specific case is entered into. The plaintiff bases their claim on what they consider the liability of the State as judge for the judicial error committed by having declared them guilty of the crime of rape to the detriment of Nombre141372 , sentencing them to ten years in prison through ruling No. 327-2004 of the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José and then having been acquitted by resolution No. 2006-00565 of the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.\n\nAt its core, he argues, the penalty was imposed on him without having taken the testimonial evidence offered, consisting of the testimony of Nombre141373 and Nombre141374. He accuses that he was acquitted without taking into account the error committed by the judges. He says that when he was tried, the only existing evidence was a report from the Municipal Police and the testimony of the complainant. He indicates that the judgment that convicted him made no reference to the inability to take the offered testimonial evidence, leaving him in a state of defenselessness. He asserts that he suffered an assault with a bladed weapon while he was incarcerated on March 13, 2005. He accuses that he served preventive detention (prisión preventiva) without elements of proof indicating that he had committed the crime. He asserts that the criminalistic analysis report issued by the Department of Forensic Sciences of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) is Nombre9510, that no male cells were detected and concluded that no evidence of the presence of semen was found. He explains that those elements did not compromise him and were not sufficient grounds to impose preventive detention on him, much less to hold him as the responsible perpetrator of the reported acts. The summarized allegations require entering into the analysis of the figure of compensation for judicial error by virtue of the acquittal ordered upon a motion for review (recurso de revisión). As has been pointed out in the previous sections, the liability of the State in its jurisdictional function requires proof of abnormal functioning and, for what is relevant to the present process, the demonstration of a judicial error that has been declared by the competent authorities within the appeal process available against the resolution. Such a declaration is essential, considering that it is not within the purview of this Court to analyze the legality, appropriateness, or inappropriateness of the final judicial pronouncements of other jurisdictional bodies, a matter that falls outside the competence of this jurisdiction and concerns only the authorities to which such competence has been assigned. In this area, the criminal procedural rules regulate the issue of liability for judicial error, specifically, when in the extraordinary phase of review, it is determined that the conviction (sentencia condenatoria) involved an error of fact or law. On this particular point, Article 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) states: “When, as a result of the review of the procedure, a judicial error is recognized, as a consequence of which the sentenced person served a penalty they should not have served, or a greater or more severe one than corresponded to them, the court hearing the review may order the payment of compensation at the expense of the State at the request of the interested party, provided that the latter has not contributed through fraud or fault to producing the error./ The judges who issued the reviewed sentence shall be jointly liable with the State when they have acted arbitrarily or with gross fault under the terms of Article 199 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)./ Civil reparation may only be agreed upon in favor of the convicted person or their lawful heirs.” (Highlighting is not in the original). From the analysis of said regulation, the imperative need emerges that the authority competent to hear the motion for review, in this case, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, must have recognized the existence of a judicial error. However, from a meticulous analysis of the case file, it does not appear that said Chamber, in judgment number 2006-00565 of 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, decreed the existence of such a mistake, which is a prerequisite for the reparation being petitioned. In effect, the analysis expressed by that high Court reflects that the acquittal decreed was due to the acceptance of new testimonial evidence that was not weighed and taken in the trial phase or in the cassation review phase (sede casacional), that is, the deposition of Nombre141374, which, once received, led the Court to consider that, given the reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant had committed the crime attributed to him or not, the appropriate course was acquittal. In that sense, at its core it ordered: \"Confronting this testimonial evidence with the evidence for the prosecution examined in the sentence, from the two police officers who testified about what was narrated by the victim and what was said by the injured party when reporting that he had been the object of a sexual assault by a stranger, this Chamber finds that, although it is not conclusively demonstrated that the act did not exist or that the defendant did not carry it out, it does have the effect of generating significant doubt about the circumstances in which the act occurs. (...) Certainly, there is a medical-legal opinion that reveals that the victim has anal fissures, however, this in itself does not allow one to derive the circumstances in which they were caused. As a corollary of the foregoing, the evidence provided by the accused in the review does not make the act disappear, but it introduces a fundamental element that undermines the evidentiary bases that gave rise to the conviction, by casting doubt upon the statements of the victim in his report, regarding not knowing the accused party and regarding the veracity of the act attributed to the accused party, generating a doubt about what really happened. Our procedural and constitutional system requires that a conviction be supported by the certainty produced by the evidence, and as in this case, the evidence provided in the review, examined in relation to that received at trial, has left a doubt about the responsibility of the accused, it obliges the application of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which establishes that in the event of doubt on questions of fact, the ruling must be what is most favorable to the accused. Consequently, it is appropriate to accept the motion for review filed, to set aside the imposed conviction, and in its place to acquit the accused Nombre141371 of the crime of rape attributed to him to the detriment of Nombre141376. The freedom of the accused is ordered if no other cause prevents it.\" (Highlighting is not in the original). As can be observed, the result of acquittal was based on a criterion of reasonable doubt and in dubio pro reo, derived from the incorporation of a new element of conviction that was not taken into account in the previous phases of the process. Although the plaintiff claims that from the beginning of the criminal process he offered the testimony of Mr. Nombre141374, which can be verified in the record of the preliminary hearing held at 3:00 p.m. on February 27, 2004, pages 139-141 of the certification of criminal case file No. 03-013207-0042-PE, and that because such evidence was not taken, defenselessness and subsequently judicial error were caused, the truth of the matter is that in the order to proceed to trial (auto de apertura a juicio) of 4:04 p.m. on February 27, 2004, regarding those testimonial proofs, it was indicated: \"Testimonial. (...) While it is true the defense mentioned the interview of Messrs. Nombre141374 and Nombre141375 as the basis for the request for temporary dismissal of the case (sobreseimiento provisional), the truth is they did not offer them as testimonial evidence (...)\" (Page 144 of the criminal case file). No disagreement whatsoever was formulated against that decision, neither in the oral and public trial held at 8:40 a.m. on April 1, 2004 (pages 163-168 of the criminal case file), nor in the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) appearing on pages 181-200 of the criminal file. It was not until the motion for review that the plaintiff offered witness Nombre141374 as new evidence. In Resolution No. 2005-01525 of 9:35 a.m. on September 23, 2005, the Third Chamber admitted the motion for review regarding the aforementioned offer of new testimony (pages 308-310 of the criminal file). Ultimately, as has been stated, weighing the testimonial deposition together with the other evidence in the criminal court record, it ordered the acquittal of the accused on grounds of doubt, ordering his release. The foregoing implies that the plaintiff did not formally offer the evidence he later introduced in the review procedure, nor did he timely question the judge's criterion of not considering the statements of Nombre141374 and Nombre141375 as testimonial evidence. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the criterion for ordering the acquittal was the weighing of that new evidence offered and admitted (Article 408, subsection e of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, this does not imply, as the plaintiff claims, a judicial error. The new criterion is based on the assessment of evidentiary aspects that were not present in the conviction. Note that even the criterion of the Trial Court was confirmed by the Third Chamber through Resolution No. 2004-01100, reflecting that the factual and legal assessment carried out with the evidence existing in the file at that time was in accordance with the law. This demonstrates that in this case, there has been no declaration of the existence of a judicial error. The ruling of that high Court in the review procedure does not speak of such an error, nor can this Chamber derive it from the analysis of the case file. From that standpoint, the reparation requested is unfeasible, given the absence of the basic prerequisite for ordering it, that is, the essential criterion of imputation for such purposes.\n\nXII.- From that standpoint, in the absence of judicial error and by virtue of the cause for acquittal, it is the criterion of this Chamber that there is no compensation for the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was subjected, nor for the preventive detention imposed at the time. Regarding the former, it is clear that the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was subjected as a consequence of the conviction and its confirmation in cassation review cannot serve as a parameter for compensation under the terms he requests. This is because it was the reasonable doubt about the commission of the unlawful act that motivated his release, as a result of weighing evidence that was not available at the oral and public trial, so, in the terms already explained, the conviction was in accordance with the law. It was only upon the issuance of the ruling in the review phase, and as a consequence of assessments of new elements of evidence, that he was acquitted, which implies that the imprisonment ordered based on that first judgment, confirmed in cassation, was supported by a judicial ruling in which, ultimately, the concurrence of a judicial error was not demonstrated. From that standpoint, the imprisonment was the result of the application of a final jurisdictional ruling, which was endorsed by the same Third Chamber upon hearing the cassation appeal opposed by the plaintiff, and which therefore implies the effectiveness of a resolution in which no irregularity was detected in the factual, evidentiary, or legal analysis. Although the acquittal was subsequently ordered for the reasons already amply discussed, this does not mean that those decisions were erroneous with a clear judicial error, and to that extent, the imposed imprisonment, as an effect of those decisions, is not a basis for possible reparation under a criterion of liability for judicial error. Thus, it cannot constitute a parameter that would justify the intended compensation. The same applies to the aforementioned preventive detention. For the purposes of Article 108 of the Penal Code, the personal precautionary measure under consideration cannot be considered unfounded. It does not appear from the case file that the measures of preventive detention and their respective extensions were ordered arbitrarily. Quite the contrary, each of the resolutions issued in that sense, namely, the ruling of 11:40 a.m. on July 13, 2003, (Pages 8-14 of the criminal case file), and the resolution of 4:30 p.m. on October 13, 2003 (Pages 42-45 of the criminal case file), were confirmed by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by resolutions at 8:30 a.m. on August 1, 2003, and No. 999-03 of 2:30 p.m. on October 22, 2003, respectively. The determination of 3:45 p.m. on January 13, 2004, is equally substantiated; again, the Criminal Court of San José decreed the extension of preventive detention for a period of three months, expiring on April 13, 2004. All these resolutions present an analysis of the requirements that allow for this type of personal precautionary measure, in accordance with Articles 238 and 239, both of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this line of reasoning, the potential liability provided for in the previously mentioned Article 108 is only viable when the acquittal ordered in the review procedure has been based on criteria of full demonstration of innocence. Otherwise, that is, when it has been based on the presumption of innocence, national jurisprudence has understood that preventive detention constitutes an important tool for the dynamics of preliminary investigations and the proper conduct of the criminal process. In that line, Resolution No. 115 of 2:30 p.m. on November 11, 1998, of the First Chamber, cited in Ruling No. 1011-2006 of that high Court, analyzing the applicability of the liability referred to in Article 108 of the Penal Code, interpreted: “VIII.- The referenced article of the Penal Code, in light of the preceding recital (considerando), would only be applicable in the event of preventive detention and, subsequently, the full innocence of the accused is demonstrated. Only under this circumstance would the deprivation of liberty, stemming from a necessary judicial investigation, be considered unjustified and susceptible to reparation. Otherwise, the action of justice in terrains as rough and sinister for society as drug trafficking currently is, would be noticeably hindered. (...) When the acquittal is obtained, as occurs in this case, by virtue of the application of the principle 'in dubio pro reo,' obviously innocence has not been indubitably demonstrated. (...) Therefore, as stated in Recital IV, in those cases there are sufficient grounds to investigate the unlawful act and, consequently, to take all necessary measures provided for in our legal system for such purposes. Among them, preventive detention. Under those assumptions, such measures are not illegitimate, as the plaintiff alleges. Therefore, they cannot generate liability for the State or its servants.” Ergo, given the lack of proof of full demonstration of innocence and the non-concurrence of a judicial error in this case, reparation is inappropriate, also under this concept.\n\nXIII.- Finally, it is worth highlighting that the lawsuit dedicates itself to criticizing the conduct of the Trial Court regarding the alleged disregard of testimonial evidence offered at the preliminary hearing and which later, in the review procedure, allowed the acquittal to be ordered. The statements that the plaintiff makes in this sense do not allow for the proof of the concurrence of a judicial error that would lead to an estimation of his claims. It concerns a set of reproaches whose analysis, consistent with the foregoing, falls outside the scope of competence of this Court and is only proper to and claimable within the dynamic of the criminal process itself. The determining factor in this case is that the decision in the review phase was based on a comprehensive assessment of new evidence that, regardless of what the plaintiff asserts, was not formally offered in the trial phase or in the corresponding cassation appeal. This introduced a novel aspect, therefore, inaccessible to the sentencing court. From that standpoint, it is not determined that the prior criterion was arbitrary. In reality, ruling 2006-00565 of the Third Chamber makes a new assessment of the evidentiary array to reach a different decision, which does not imply, as the plaintiff erroneously claims, a judicial error that supports his petition. To understand this, it suffices that Article 408, subsection e of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes new evidence as a ground for review. The Third Chamber itself even expressly refers to that new evidence. Thus, the acquittal is not due to defects in the sentence, but due to a change in the procedural circumstances to support the ruling. This being the case, the damages claimed have no solid basis for being granted; on the contrary, the criterion of imputation on which the plaintiff bases them is non-existent, and in view of this, no causal link (nexo de causalidad) is discerned that would allow those alleged harmful consequences to be attributed to the State. Such an absence of causation (even an apparent one) dispenses with an examination of the existence or non-existence of the alleged damages, given that they are not attributable to the defendant party, and therefore, without further consideration, the lawsuit must be dismissed in its entirety.\n\nXIV.- Corollary. On the defenses raised. The State's representation raises the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción) and lapse of right (caducidad), as well as the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). As for the former, for the reasons stated in Recital III, they must be dismissed. Regarding the lack of right, as stated, it must be accepted. As has been explained, in this case, the existence of a judicial error that would allow laying the foundations to grant the requested reparation has not been proven. The acquittal decreed in the review phase addressed a novel aspect that precludes inferring a judicial error in the prior sentences. This being the case, what is appropriate is to order the dismissal of the lawsuit in its entirety.\n\nXV.- Costs (Costas). In accordance with Article 193 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so. The judge's pronouncement on this matter becomes an ex officio pronouncement, with the exception of the limited grounds provided for in Article 197 of the same Code. The waiver of this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth by the applicable rules and break the principle of awarding against the losing party. Therefore, both costs are imposed on the losing plaintiff.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe defenses of lapse of right and statute of limitations presented by the State's representation are dismissed. The defense of lack of right is accepted. The lawsuit brought by Nombre141371 against the State is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the losing plaintiff.\n\n**III.- Regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción).** In the closing arguments phase, the State representation reiterates the defenses of expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked in the preliminary hearing held on June 9, 2010, and which were rejected in the procedural stage by a resolution at 3:00 p.m. It points out that the expiration (caducidad) is evident given that if the plaintiff felt aggrieved by judicial actions, he should have filed the civil liability process against the judge provided for in canon 85 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). However, the 1-year period regulated by mandate 87 ibidem had expired at the time of filing the lawsuit. It points out, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), that more than four years have elapsed since the finality of the conviction, which exceeds the four years established by precept 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). In this regard, the following must be noted. In civil treasury proceedings, according to numeral 41 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the maximum period to initiate the process is the same that the legal system provides as the statute of limitations period for the substantive right. This requires an analysis in each case of the validity or not of the prescriptive period of the substantive right, so that as long as it is in force, the judicial route is available. From this perspective, it is clear that in this matter, expiration of the action does not apply, but rather the statute of limitations of the substantive right. The First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has expressed itself along these lines, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 of 10:05 a.m. on September 26, 2008. Therefore, the defense of expiration (caducidad) must be rejected. The same fate must befall the claim of expiration (caducidad) due to the expiry of the year provided for in numeral 87 of the aforementioned Code. The present process is not one of civil liability of the judge provided for in ordinals 85 to 95 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), but one of State liability for jurisdictional function, so the applicable rules are not those invoked by the State attorney, but those that will be stated below. Now then, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is clear that the applicable period for the statute of limitations of liability for the exercise of jurisdictional function is four years, by application to that matter of numeral 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Although in the specific case of this jurisdictional function, a special norm is not established that sets a concrete period for these effects, it is necessary to integrate the legal system. In this sense, in the dynamic, given this gap, one must resort to examining the nature of the debated legal relationship, in order to deduce the regulation that is most closely related. Thus, given the absence of an express norm in the concrete matter subject to this ruling, by virtue of the principles of plenitude and coherence of the legal system, one must resort to integration mechanisms to resolve said gap and establish the most appropriate period for this specialized matter. To do this, it must be clear that the type of liability alleged is of an extracontractual nature, which would make the application of statements regulating contractual prescription inviable. Dealing with the framework of State liability, one must consider, then, first the legal sources that regulate similar aspects. In that regard, among the different norms pertaining to the matter of the statute of limitations (prescripción), insofar as the point to be elucidated is the duty of reparation at the State's charge, the prescriptive space that the legal system defines for cases of State liability must be used, as an integration mechanism. For this, one must start from the maxim that public liability is based on the general liability clause established by constitutional canon 9. It is evident that the legislative development of this topic has been given with greater emphasis in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), a regulation that, apart from concrete regulations in judicial or legislative matters, has become the reference base for the treatment of the topic regarding the Legislative Branch and the Judicial Branch. Hence, due to the affinity of the matter, the closest rule that regulates the prescriptive period is precept 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes a four-year period for the statute of limitations of the right to claim indemnification. As the First Chamber (Sala Primera) indicated in the aforementioned ruling 654-2008: \"*Thus, if the legal system imposes, by special norm, a four-year period to claim from the State the indemnification of damage it has caused by its conduct, attending to the principle of equality, for aspects of certainty and legal security, that same period is the one applicable when the detriment arises from the exercise of its jurisdictional functions. Thus, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this collegiate body concludes that the applicable period is the four-year period indicated, as it corresponds to State extracontractual liability, and therefore, is usable in this case.*\" Now then, in the specific case, unlike what was argued by the State representative, the starting point of the cited prescriptive period is not conviction ruling No. 327-2004 of April 15, 2004, nor its confirmation by cassation ruling No. 2004-01100 of September 10, 2004. The commencement of the calculation of this period must be taken from the issuance and notification of the judgment issued in the review process that ordered the acquittal of the then accused, that is, ruling No. 2006-00565 of June 7, 2006, notified on June 29 of that same year.\n\nIt is with that jurisdictional determination that the plaintiff (accionante) is in a position to establish that the effects of the judicial precedents that found him guilty of the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay and ordered his imprisonment have caused him, as he claims, a damage due to judicial error that the State must indemnify. Before that factual circumstance, one cannot speak of the existence of an objective basis that would allow establishing the claim of liability now being settled in this litigation, so that making the four-year period run from dates prior to the proper notification of the ruling issued in the review phase is contrary to the rules arising from the cited article 198 of Law No. 6227 and exposes the person claiming a right to its expiration due to the passage of time, without having the objective possibility of knowing the source of the damage and claiming its reparation. Therefore, it is from June 29, 2006, that the cited prescription period must be computed, so its expiration would occur on June 30, 2010. From the review of the case file, it appears that the present claim was filed on October 21, 2009, and corrected on November 4, 2009 (folios 1 and 26 of the main file). The State was notified of this process on December 3, 2009, according to the notification record visible at folio 37 of the judicial file. The foregoing makes it evident that the liability claim was filed and notified before the expiration of the prescriptive period. Therefore, the defense of prescription raised by the State must be rejected.\n\nIV.- State Liability for the Jurisdictional Function. Basis of the Regime. The core object of this process revolves around determining the existence or not of liability that the plaintiff alleges arises from having served prison time due to ruling No. 327-2004 of 4:00 p.m. on April 15, 2004, of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared him responsible for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, for which he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, later confirmed by ruling No. 2004-01100 of 11:50 a.m. on September 10, 2004, of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). He indicates that, by ruling No. 2006-00565 of 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, that same Chamber, hearing an extraordinary motion for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión), ordered his acquittal for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, ordering his release, if not impeded by another cause. He seeks indemnification for the time he was imprisoned even though the aforementioned acquittal was later issued. Given this subject matter, it is necessary to make a brief reference to core aspects regarding the State's liability in its jurisdictional exercise, with special emphasis on that which may arise from a judicial error determined in a review process, under the terms of article 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). The relationships that occur between individuals and the centers of public authority are subject to a series of principles that configure the amalgam of rights and obligations that correspond to each of the involved parties. In this dynamic, within the framework of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), article 11 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) establishes as the governing criterion of public functioning the so-called principle of legality. It is a maxim that imposes the subjection of the State to the law, and by virtue of which, all public conduct must occur within the framework of legality, understood as the set of written and unwritten sources (according to the hierarchical scale of sources - article 7 ibidem) that regulate that functioning. The reference to the State is made in its broad dimension, that is, the set of units that make up the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Powers, which includes constitutionally relevant bodies. From this perspective of analysis, article 9 of the Constitution establishes the general clause of State liability, a norm that constitutes a basic guarantee that allows a person, who as a consequence of an action or omission of a center of public power that has caused them a harmful effect they have no legal duty to bear, to demand reparation for that harmful effect. Likewise, it finds development and complement in the principle of legality (article 11), equity in the distribution of public burdens (articles 18 and 33), protection of consolidated legal situations and rights (article 34), integral reparation of the damage (article 41), patrimonial indemnity (article 45), effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) (article 49), maxim of social solidarity (article 74 of the Constitution), responsibility of the presidential office (148 ibidem), responsibility of the Judicial Power (154 and 166 ejusdem), responsibility of autonomous institutions (article 188). These norms constitute the bases of the referred system, which demands the economic reparation of patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injuries occurring as a derivation of public conduct or omissions, which the victim has no duty to bear. The fundamental basis of that liability has been a topic of development by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its ruling no. 5981 of 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995. Indeed, such duty turns out to be the consequence of a constitutional regime of guarantees that the Legal System (Ordenamiento) grants to persons and forms the core structure of the rule of law (estado de Derecho), namely: legality, universal control of state conduct, distribution of functions, and a system of public liability. The empowerment (empoderamiento) granted to the State for the fulfillment of its purposes, within the framework of its diverse functions, executive, legislative, and judicial, brings as a direct consequence the creation of a liability system that permits the reparation of the harmful effects that its conduct may generate in the legal sphere of individuals, a protection that comprises, according to article 49 of the Constitution, subjective rights and legitimate interests. This subject matter has seen greater development in the case of the liability of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), a topic even regulated in articles 170.1, 190 to 213 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and with a broad evolution in national jurisprudence. On this matter, see, among many, ruling no. 584 of 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice. Even so, the same General Law referred to in article 194.3 addresses liability for the issuance of law, opening the regulation for the imputation of liability for the parliamentary exercise of creating laws. By parity of reasoning and based on those same constitutional norms already pointed out, the mentioned regime permits liability for legislative omission, law declared unconstitutional, and the approval of international treaties. Naturally, in each case, the affected party must prove the existence of an effective, assessable, and individualizable (individualizable) damage, as a prerequisite for the duty of reparation.\n\nV.- This broad scheme of public liability is complemented by that which may arise against the State for its jurisdictional function (which is not judicial). Fundamentally, this function is exercised mainly (not exclusively) by the Judicial Power. In accordance with what is established by article 153 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), by virtue of that jurisdictional function, it corresponds to the Judicial Power to resolve people's conflicts definitively, that is, with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and the force of legal truth. Such jurisdictional exercise can also be observed in the processes that correspond exclusively to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) to settle, in the so-called electoral jurisdiction. On this matter, article 220 of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral), Law No. 8765 assigns that jurisdictional competence in the following matters: a) The electoral amparo appeal (recurso de amparo electoral), b) The challenge of agreements of political party assemblies in the process of constitution and registration, c) The action for nullity of party agreements, d) The electoral appeal (recurso de apelación electoral), e) The claim for nullity regarding electoral results, f) The cancellation or annulment of credentials, and g) The complaint for partiality or political belligerence. Hence, all functions that the legal system attributes and assigns to the Judicial Power should not be included within the liability for jurisdictional exercise. From that plane, the core function of the judge is the legality control and the application of the Law for the resolution of specific cases in order to materialize the principles of prompt and complete justice and effective judicial protection. Ergo, if it holds that condition of guarantor of the Legal System, the Law must protect the necessary guarantees that allow the attribution of liability for judicial errors. It is clear that such typology of liability must not be confused with the civil liability of the judge for personal fault, which articles 85 to 95, both inclusive, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) regulate. In this case, it is a direct imputation to the official, therefore, it adheres, within the framework of that regulation, to a system of subjective orientation, which requires proof of malice (dolo) or gross negligence. The liability for jurisdictional exercise surpasses that criterion. It extends to a duty that involves the State as such. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in ruling 1011-2006, established that the jurisdictional function is subject to the unavoidable limits imposed by the Legal System, such that its exercise must be compatible and harmonious with the constitutional and legal precepts that, by virtue of its nature, it must apply to the specific cases being judged. The foregoing derives from that established by articles 11 and 154 of the Constitution. In this conduct, it is clear that its actions, as long as they are arbitrary and contrary to Law, can generate harm to persons, from which it derives and is justified, that it is liable for those eventual consequences, provided that within a framework of causality, it can be demonstrated that the damage is the result of arbitrary and unlawful conduct. This has even been established by the Constitutional Chamber itself, an instance that on the subject of the liability of the Judicial Power has indicated, among others, in ruling 5981 of 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995, the following: \"V. ON THE STRICT LIABILITY (RESPONSABILIDAD OBJETIVA) OF THE JUDICIAL POWER. PRINCIPLES. (...) The liability of the State derived from the exercise of the jurisdictional function must be governed in accordance with what is established in the Political Constitution itself and in the law, as provided in the Constitution (Carta Fundamental) in its article 154 (...): 'The Judicial Power is only subject to the Constitution and the Law, and the resolutions it issues in matters under its competence impose no other responsibilities upon it than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts.' From which two basic conclusions derive: 1.) In the first place, the direct liability of the State in cases of judicial error and abnormal functioning of the administration of justice constitutes a constitutional principle, which derives precisely from what is specifically provided in constitutional article 9, (...) in relation to constitutional articles 11, 33, 41, and 154, and which is congruent with the principles of the Social State of Law, precisely with that of the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers, that of legal certainty and equality of all citizens before the law. This liability is justified by the fact that the function of judging is the manifestation of a Power, one of the three of the State, which implies its condition as a public service, as an organization of material and personal means destined for the satisfaction of the social demand for justice. In this sense, in a rule of law, both the administrative function and the jurisdictional function constitute modes of execution of the law, and their only distinction lies in the effects; the courts of justice are responsible for the verification of the facts and the law through rulings that possess a special force, the proper legal value called 'res judicata', by virtue of which it cannot be modified, discussed, withdrawn, retracted, except through the remedies established in the law; the decision of the Administration (Administración) does not have this force of legal truth that is recognized for res judicata. It must be kept clear that they are two distinct functions, both responding to distinct purposes; while the administrative function is intended to meet the needs of the community, the jurisdictional function aims to consolidate public order through the resolution of disputes and the sanction of law violations; but that, equally, they are subject to the State's liability regime, insofar as the damage caused by the exercise of either of these functions is imputable to an act of the State, and therefore, capable of engaging its liability. By virtue of what is provided in the transcribed articles 9 in relation to constitutional article 153, in accordance with the general principle that 'anyone who causes harm must repair it,' the Judicial Power could not be exempted from liability for the 'judicial error' in the exercise of the jurisdictional function. It should be noted that this strict liability of the State is a complement to the civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability to which the judge is subject, as these are not sufficient to adequately guarantee the interests of the justiciable parties, which, due to the difficulties for their enforcement, turn the possible claim into a veritable obstacle course, and in most cases, leaves aside and without protection those situations in which it is not possible to appreciate the malice or negligence of the judge. The liability must come from malicious or negligent conduct of the jurisdictional body, whether or not it constitutes a crime (liability for fault).\" On this subject, one may also consult, from that same Chamber, resolution no. 5207-2004, of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004.\n\nVI.- However, it is insisted, the liability proper to the Judicial Power in jurisdictional exercise must not be confused with the other facets of its competencies, which do not conform to that category. On the one hand, that relating to the administration of justice function, viewed as a public service, arises. It concerns the duty to resolve conflicts objectively, promptly, and timely. Included within this category are all those non-jurisdictional acts emanating from the offices that form part of what in doctrine has been called \"Judicial Power organization.\" That is, they are the organizational bodies and support that allow the exercise of the jurisdictional function itself. It refers to the objective profiles of the jurisdictional function: organization and functioning of courts, efficient management of judicial offices, functions of administrative bodies. Also to be included in this space are the jurisdictional bodies that by legal imperative perform a function of non-hierarchical comptroller inappropriate to their two-phase nature, as currently the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) does with respect to municipal matters, by imperative of article 189 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). In this space, as it involves non-jurisdictional matters, the rules on strict liability of the General Law of Public Administration would be applicable. On a second level, are located the auxiliary units that do not carry out typical administrative activity, but that definitively, cannot be considered jurisdictional conduct. These are the so-called judicial actions. This is the case of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), Forensic Sciences, the Public Defender's Office (Defensa Pública), among others. These serve as support and fulfill an auxiliary role to the jurisdictional function, but their acts are not considered jurisdictional insofar as they carry out the task of investigation and inquiry. Their decisions are judicial acts stricto sensu. This distinction is evident in the regulations on criminal procedure. In article 277 ibidem, it is established very clearly in its final paragraph, the impossibility for prosecutors to carry out jurisdictional acts, as well as the restriction on judges, except for legal authorization, to carry out investigative acts. The same occurs with the Public Prosecutor's Office, whose functions can be observed in articles 62, 275, 289, 290, and 291 of the Criminal Procedure Code, all related to its investigative and reporting powers. This distinction has been noted by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 of 10:45 a.m. on September 26, 2008. However, what is of interest in this particular case is that which is proper to that jurisdictional exercise, when it has incurred a judicial error. Thus, in this latter scenario (relevant to the present case), as long as there exists an unlawful or illegitimate injury caused to the justiciable party, produced as a consequence of these competencies, the strict liability of the State as Judge is imposed. As has been said, the foregoing finds support in articles 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Constitution, norms that lay the foundations for liability for judicial error, the abnormal or illicit functioning of the jurisdictional function.\n\nVII.- Now, aside from the discussion that may arise regarding whether or not the liability system for jurisdictional exercise requires specific legal development, the fact of the matter is that in certain subject matters, the legislator has issued express norms addressing the theme of that liability and its various prerequisites. It should be noted, however, that this Court (Tribunal), in resolution No. 765-2008 of October 2, 2008, has stated that aside from the content of articles 154 and 166 of the Constitution, which presume the necessity of legislative production to be able to impute liability for the jurisdictional function, that liability and its corresponding right to integral reparation of the damage find support in the Constitution itself, in articles 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. In that line, the First Chamber, in the aforementioned ruling 1011-2006, indicated on this matter: \"It has already been pointed out that said liability derives from the very framework of the Constitution, as a relevant counterbalance in the State's relations with individuals and as a factor of high importance in the equation of the rule of law. Ultimately, a guarantee in favor of the justiciable party, who turns to the Judicial Power so that their conflict may be resolved according to legality, thus depositing trust in that aspect of Public Power. The principle of state liability that emanates, as a general rule, from constitutional article 9 and finds protection in other norms that protect the individual's guarantees, does not find frameworks of exception. Although, in each area of that triple dimension of functions (executive, legislative, and judicial) nuances operate that demand specific treatment in each context, the fact of the matter is that the Legal System does not incorporate dispensation frameworks, outside of the reasonable assumptions when an unlawful injury is produced at its base, linked to public conduct. The principles that arise from the Constitution give content to said liability, therefore, even in the absence of legal regulation, which, despite being able to specify that regime, in no way limits the duty to indemnify, when it is pertinent according to Law. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State as Judge, under the basis that it lacks legal development, since it is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, while it would also entail a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Thus seen, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it, ergo, what is provided in article 166 ibidem is not an obstacle. The referred liability is governed by what is established in the Constitution (Carta Fundamental), that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referred norms and which seeks the control of the exercise of said function and the protection of the rights and interests of justiciable parties.\"\n\nVIII.- Within that set of assumptions where there is legislative development on the subject, criminal law stands out, in which there are express rules, specifically, in article 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the case of liability for the issuance of arbitrary precautionary measures and the assumption of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) in a process where a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) or acquittal with full demonstration of innocence is later ordered; article 108 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), which regulates the eventual subsidiary liability of the State when by virtue of a motion for review (recurso de revisión) the accused’s innocence is declared when they obtain an acquittal, after having served more than one year of pretrial detention; and finally, pursuant to article 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which establishes public liability for the existence of a judicial error proven in a ruling issued in a review process. These last manifestations are especially relevant to the case, being those that are applicable to the specific case and which, therefore, will be addressed below. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify the scope of the so-called judicial error. To this end, the explanation by the First Chamber in the aforementioned ruling No. 654-2008 must be brought up in the following sense: \"Note that article 154 of the Constitution uses the term 'resolution,' with which the different models that make up this category are comprised, namely, orders (providencia), interlocutory judgments (autos), interlocutory judgments with the character of a final judgment, and final judgments (sentencias) (article 153 Civil Procedure Code). On the other hand, it can occur, it is insisted, in principle, both by judicial error and by abnormal functioning. The former is a species of the common genus of abnormal functioning, for indeed, every judicial error theoretically implies an abnormality in that functioning (ultimately, the most transcendent manifestation), but not the reverse. Judicial error comprises every jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that is erroneous or contrary to law. Thus seen, it is exclusive to the jurisdictional function, being then, a modality of abnormal functioning that only fits in that dimension. The foregoing includes not only error of fact (due to mistaken knowledge or assessment of the facts, a ruling not adjusted to the factual reality is issued and which, therefore, becomes unjust), but also error of law (as a breach of the Law due to its improper interpretation, erroneous application, or lack of application). At this point, despite the existence of an entire system of appeals against those decisions, what is decisive is that once the recognition of that judicial error has occurred, indemnifiable damages have been produced in the legal sphere of the person, as a consequence of those deficiencies (causal link), in accordance with the Legal System.\"\n\nTherefore, the indemnifiable error is not limited to the specific cases in which the legal system provides for such a consequence, nor to criminal matters, as in the present case, due to a precautionary measure that proves to be unfounded, but rather, on the contrary, its application transcends such circumstances to encompass the entirety of the jurisdictional function, that is, any decision, regardless of the jurisdiction in which it is issued, may give rise to the duty of reparation by the State if it generates an unlawful harm.\" (Emphasis added)
\n\n IX.- On the scope of judicial error (error judicial).