{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-549712",
  "citation": "Res. 00096-2012 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Permiso de uso en bien demanial no genera relación inquilinaria ni responsabilidad por su revocación",
  "title_en": "Use permit on public-domain property does not create a leasehold or liability upon revocation",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Cuarta, rechaza una demanda de daños y perjuicios contra el Estado por la revocación de un permiso de uso para una cafetería en las instalaciones de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. El actor había ocupado el espacio desde 2005 bajo sucesivos permisos de uso, realizando mejoras y pagando un canon. Al cancelarse el permiso en 2011, alegó que el pago de canon y servicios transformaba el permiso en un arrendamiento, por lo que la revocatoria era arbitraria. El Tribunal determina que el espacio constituye un bien demanial, afectado a la prestación de un servicio público, y que el permiso de uso es un acto unilateral, precario y revocable por oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad, salvo que la revocación sea intempestiva o arbitraria. Precisa que el cobro de un canon no muta la naturaleza del permiso, pues no es un deber sino una carga jurídica voluntaria. Concluye que la revocatoria no fue intempestiva, ya que el permiso contemplaba esa posibilidad, y que no existe prueba de daño, nexo causal ni sacrificio especial. Acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y condena en costas al actor. La sentencia consolida doctrina sobre la distinción entre bienes demaniales y privados, los permisos de uso y la inexistencia de responsabilidad estatal por su revocación en condiciones normales.",
  "summary_en": "The Administrative Contentious Court, Fourth Section, denies a claim for damages against the State for revoking a use permit for a cafeteria within the offices of the General Directorate of Migration and Aliens. The plaintiff had occupied the space since 2005 under successive temporary use permits, made improvements, and paid a fee. When the permit was terminated in 2011, he argued that payment of the fee and utilities transformed the permit into a lease, rendering the revocation arbitrary. The Court finds the space to be public-domain property (bien demanial), dedicated to a public service, and that the use permit is a unilateral, precarious act revocable for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability, unless the revocation is abrupt or arbitrary. It clarifies that charging a fee does not change the permit's nature, since it is a voluntary legal burden, not an obligation. It concludes the revocation was not abrupt because the permit expressly allowed it, and there is no evidence of harm, causation, or special sacrifice. The State's lack-of-right defense is upheld and the plaintiff is ordered to pay costs. This ruling solidifies doctrine on the distinction between public and private property, use permits, and the absence of State liability for their ordinary revocation.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "date": "21/09/2012",
  "year": "2012",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "permiso de uso",
    "bien demanial",
    "dominio público",
    "precariedad",
    "revocación",
    "canon",
    "arrendamiento",
    "responsabilidad del Estado"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "permiso de uso",
    "bien demanial",
    "dominio público",
    "precariedad",
    "revocación",
    "responsabilidad del Estado",
    "canon",
    "servicio público",
    "arrendamiento",
    "excepción de falta de derecho"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "use permit",
    "public domain property",
    "precarious right",
    "revocation",
    "State liability",
    "fee",
    "public service",
    "leasehold",
    "lack of right defense"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "El concepto precario refiere a la posibilidad de revocación por razones de oportunidad, conveniencia o incluso de legalidad sin responsabilidad de por medio, en tanto no genera derecho subjetivo alguno para el permisionario. Es una mera facilitación de un área del espacio público para la generación de servicios accesorios a juicio de la Administración interesada, pero suprimible en cualquier momento en el mismo nivel de discrecionalidad que el acto que lo generó. Donde no existió concurso, contención alguna, presentación de garantías o en general algún mecanismo que le otorgará algún nivel de estabilidad para el interesado.\n(...) el cobro de un canon no convierte un permiso de uso en un arrendamiento como lo pretende ver la accionante, en el entendido que el primero no presenta como carácter consustancial la gratuidad. La lógica del canon se sustenta en que el interesado recibe un beneficio por su condición, lo que le permitiría generar un enriquecimiento a partir de un bien destinado a la colectividad, de manera que el pago permite compensar los intereses y evitar un lucro sin cancelar en algo a la colectividad.\n(...) al margen que el actor desistió en el juicio oral de discutir la ilegitimidad o anormalidad del acto de desalojo y sobre lo cual tampoco este prueba en ese sentido; no está demás indicar que el desalojo no fue intempestivo en la medida que el mismo documento en el cual se establece el acuerdo entre las partes fija con claridad la posibilidad de revocación en el momento que lo tenga a bien la Dirección en particular y con solo otorgar un plazo mínimo en días para el retiro del actor del bien, que en efecto fue satisfecho con creces; lo que impide que se consolide el supuesto del artículo ciento cincuenta y cuatro ya señalado de encontrarse ante una decisión carente de un tiempo razonable para el interesado.",
  "excerpt_en": "The precarious nature refers to the possibility of revocation for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or even legality, without liability, as it generates no subjective right for the permittee. It is a mere facilitation of a public space area for accessory services at the discretion of the interested Administration, but removable at any time at the same level of discretion as the act that created it. Where there was no competitive process, no opposition, no presentation of guarantees, or any mechanism granting any degree of stability to the interested party.\n(...) charging a fee does not turn a use permit into a lease as the plaintiff claims, given that the former does not have gratuitousness as an inherent characteristic. The logic of the fee is based on the fact that the interested party receives a benefit from his position, which would allow him to enrich himself from a property intended for the community; thus the payment compensates the interests and avoids profit without giving something back to the community.\n(...) moreover, even though the plaintiff withdrew in the oral hearing from challenging the illegitimacy or abnormality of the eviction order and also produced no proof in that regard, it is worth noting that the eviction was not abrupt since the very document establishing the agreement between the parties clearly sets forth the possibility of revocation at any time the Directorate sees fit, merely granting a minimum number of days for the plaintiff's removal, a condition that was amply satisfied, thus preventing the scenario under the aforementioned Article 154 from materializing, namely a decision lacking a reasonable timeframe for the interested party.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The claim for damages is dismissed, upholding the State's lack-of-right defense, and the plaintiff is ordered to pay costs, as the revocation of a use permit on public-domain property does not entail State liability.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar la demanda de daños y perjuicios, acogiendo la excepción de falta de derecho, y se condena en costas al actor, al considerar que la revocación del permiso de uso sobre un bien demanial no genera responsabilidad estatal."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V (cita del Artículo 154 LGAP)",
      "quote_en": "Permits for the use of public domain, and other acts recognizing an expressly and validly precarious right in favor of a citizen, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability for the Administration; however, the revocation shall not be untimely nor arbitrary and must in all cases grant a reasonable period to comply with the revocation.",
      "quote_es": "Los permisos de uso del dominio público, y los demás actos que reconozcan a un administrado un derecho expresa y válidamente a título precario, podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración; pero la revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V (cita del Voto 5976-93 Sala Constitucional)",
      "quote_en": "As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use may be acquired, though not a property right.",
      "quote_es": "Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V (jurisprudencia constitucional)",
      "quote_en": "The use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the individual is the beneficial domain of the property, the State always reserving direct ownership over the thing.",
      "quote_es": "El permiso de uso es un acto jurídico unilateral que lo dicta la Administración, en el uso de sus funciones y lo que se pone en manos del particular, es el dominio útil del bien, reservándose siempre el Estado, el dominio directo sobre la cosa."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "Thus, no concrete damage has been proven, nor a causal link; but more importantly, no evidence exists that would warrant considering we are facing a case of liability.",
      "quote_es": "De manera que no esta probado un daño en concreto, tampoco un nexo causal; pero más importante tampoco esta probado la existencia de una inducción que permita considerar que estemos frente a un supuesto de responsabilidad."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-58314",
      "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
      "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law",
      "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "doc_type": "executive_decree",
      "date": "27/09/2006",
      "year": "2006"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-114933",
      "citation": "Res. 02777-1998 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Constitutionality of Decree 26187-MINAE on fees for telecommunication posts in protected areas",
      "title_es": "Constitucionalidad del Decreto 26187-MINAE sobre cánones por puestos de telecomunicación en áreas protegidas",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "24/04/1998",
      "year": "1998"
    },
    {
      "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-87313",
      "citation": "Res. 02306-1991 Sala Constitucional",
      "title_en": "Revocation of street-vending permits requires due process",
      "title_es": "Revocación de permisos de ventas estacionarias debe respetar el debido proceso",
      "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
      "date": "06/11/1991",
      "year": "1991"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-58314",
      "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
      "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law",
      "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "doc_type": "executive_decree",
      "date": "27/09/2006",
      "year": "2006"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-549712",
  "tier": 2,
  "is_environmental": false,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
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  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-58314",
      "norm_num": "33411",
      "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo",
      "norm_fecha": "27/09/2006"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
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  "body_es_text": "Voto N° 096-2012\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN CUARTA, San José, a las ocho horas del veintiuno de septiembre de dos mil doce.-\n\nProceso de conocimiento del señor Nombre110961 , vecino de Moravia, comerciante y periodista, cédula de identidad número CED87646 - - , en contra del Estado, representado por la señora procuradora Andrea Bogantes Rivera, vecina de Alajuela, cédula de identidad número CED30613 - - . El actor actúa bajo el patrocinio del Lic. Mauricio Vargas Caravaca, soltero, cédula de identidad número CED45353 - - , y vecino de San José. Todas las personas físicas son mayores, casados, y abogados, con las excepciones indicadas.\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n1.- Que el actor concurrió ante este despacho jurisdiccional, solicitando: \"Se deje sin efecto la orden de desalojo ordenada por la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería en oficio AJO1821-ARV del veintidós de julio de dos mil once y se condene además al Estado al pago de las costas procesales y personales, además de los daños y perjuicios que llegare a causar en caso de desalojo de mi único puesto de trabajo, liquidando los mismos en ejecución de sentencia\". Es de precisar que en el juicio oral y público el actor desistió de la pretensión anulatoria y dejó únicamente vigente la de daños y perjuicios, al señalar que el primero de los aspectos había perdido interés al haberse ejecutado el desalojo. \n\n2.- El demandado se opuso a la pretensión y presentó la excepción de falta de derecho. \n\n3.- Que el juicio oral fue realizado el día diecisiete de septiembre de dos mil doce, disponiéndose la aplicación de los artículos ciento once del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y cuarenta y siete del Reglamento, a efectos -exclusivamente- del dictado de la sentencia que nos ocupa de manera escrita. \n\n4.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor y no se notan causales de nulidad capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Esta sentencia se dicta previo las deliberaciones de rigor y por unanimidad.\n\nRedacta el Juez Madrigal Jiménez; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI. BASE DEL CONFLICTO: Indica el actor que desde el quince de diciembre de dos mil cinco presenta un permiso de uso en la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, en la sala de espera del área de pasaportes, para la instalación de una venta de café, refrescos, y repostería. El permiso era por cinco meses, pero se prorrogó tácitamente por seis meses más, cancelando él agua, luz, impuestos nacionales y municipales; pero no canon. Que realizó mejoras en la infraestructura a solicitud de la Administración y en beneficio de los clientes, así como varias inversiones. El diecisiete de agosto de dos mil nueve, la Administración le comunicó que debía firmar un contrato y cancelar la suma de cincuenta mil colones por canon, suma que fue rebajada a treinta y cinco mil colones después de una negociación. El contrato era por seis meses, prorrogable por períodos iguales de manera automática. Mediante oficio DAF-368-07-11 del cinco de julio de dos mil once se le comunicó la cancelación del permiso a partir del cuatro de agosto de dos mil once. Presentó los recursos de ley, pero le fueron rechazados. Considera que el pago de los diferentes servicios más el canon convierte su contrato en alquiler, motivo por el cual el acto donde se le desaloja se torna arbitrario; siendo sobre esa base que deriva la responsabilidad que requiere. La representación del Estado sostiene que lo existente es un mero permiso de uso, revocable en cualquier momento, sin necesidad de procedimiento previo. Además de que en el caso por situaciones de seguridad y comodidad se hacía necesario tomar el espacio, lo que determina la lícitud de la conducta administrativa. Comparte en general el elenco de hechos probados, salvo en aquellos casos donde se utiliza el término de contrato u acuerdo a lo existente entre el administrado y la Dirección demandada, al no estar frente a un acuerdo propio del derecho privado. Solicita se declare la falta de derecho de la demanda y sin lugar esta en todos sus extremos.\n\nII. HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para el dictado de esta sentencia, se tienen los siguientes hechos de relevancia: 1) El quince de diciembre de dos mil cinco, mediante documento DAF-916-12- la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, otorgó el actor un permiso de uso para la instalación de venta de café, refresco y repostería, por un plazo de cinco meses, hasta el quince de mayo de dos mil seis, ubicado entre las puertas cinco y seis, parte externa de la sala de espera del área de pasaportes de esa dependencia gubernamental (hecho no controvertido, según folios 1 y 75 del expediente judicial, y folios del 12 al 14 del expediente administrativo). 2) El diecisiete de mayo de dos mil seis, se suscribe un nuevo permiso por el período que corre del diecisiete de mayo al dieciocho de septiembre, ambos de dos mil seis (ver folios del 22 al 24 del expediente administrativo). 3) El veintiuno de septiembre de dos mil seis, entre las partes de este proceso se suscribió un permiso de uso para la cafetería, con rige por tres meses a partir del veintiuno de septiembre y hasta el dieciocho de diciembre de dos mil seis, sin perjuicio que la Administración podrá cesar el permiso en cualquier momento, comunicando con cuarenta y ocho horas de antelación (ver folios del 77 y 78 del expediente administrativo). 4) Para finales del año dos mil ocho, el actor invirtió algunas sumas de dinero en la realización de reparaciones para la cafetería (ver folios del 48 al 53 del expediente judicial). 5) El diez de marzo de dos mil nueve el señor Nombre110961 invirtió la suma de trescientos cincuenta mil colones en la fabricación de muebles para la cafetería (ver folio 47 del expediente judicial). 6) El diecisiete de agosto de dos mil nueve, por oficio DG-2507-08-09, el Director General de Migración y Extranjería comunica que a fin de prorrogar el permiso de uso, debe el actor cancelar por canon la suma de cincuenta mil colones en una cuenta gubernamental, u otorgar servicios de cafetería, refrescos y repostería por un monto equivalente para las reuniones de la Dirección (hecho no controvertido, según folios 2 y 75 del expediente judicial). 7) A instancia del actor, la suma a cancelar por canon fue reducida a treinta y cinco mil colones (hecho no controvertido, según folios 2 y 75 del expediente judicial). 8) El veintidós de julio de dos mil nueve se generó una prorroga al permiso con vigencia por seis meses adicionales a partir del primero de agosto de dos mi nueve, renovable en forma automática por períodos iguales (hecho no controvertido, según folios 1 y 75 del expediente judicial). 9) Mediante oficio DAF-368-07-11 del cinco de julio de dos mil once, suscrito por el señor Agustín Barquero Acosta, Director Administrativo Financiero de la Dirección11 , se comunica al actor formalmente, que en aplicación del punto segundo del acuerdo de uso de bien de dominio público que los unía, la cancelación del permiso de uso relacionado a partir del cuatro de agosto de dos mil once (hecho no controvertido, según folios 2 y 75 del expediente judicial y 197 del expediente administrativo). 10) Frente a dicho acto el actor acreditó en vía administrativa oposición al acto contrario a sus intereses mediante escrito presentado el catorce de julio de dos mil once (hecho no controvertido, según folios 2 y 76 del expediente judicial y 198 al 199 del expediente administrativo). 11) Por oficio AJ-01821-2011-ARV del veintidós de julio de dos mil once, la Asesoría Legal de la administración demandada responde a gestión del señor Nombre110961 indicando la procedencia del acto de cancelación del permiso de uso ya dispuesto por la Administración demandada (ver folios del 204 al 208 del expediente judicial). 12) El veintisiete de julio de dos mil once, el actor presentó recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra lo resuelto por la Administración, el cual fue rechazado por resolución D. JUR. 392-2011 de las doce horas con diez minutos del diez de agosto de dos mil once, mientras que el de apelación también fue resuelto de manera negativa por resolución 298-2011-DMG de las once horas del veinte de septiembre de dos mil once (hecho no controvertido, según folios 3 y 76 del expediente judicial, folios 211 al 213, 217 al 221 y 228 al 230 del expediente administrativo). 13) El tres de octubre de dos mil once, por resolución DAF-531-10-11 la Dirección General de Migración Extranjería otorga cuarenta y ocho horas para proceder a desalojar el espacio ocupado dentro de las instalaciones públicas (hecho no controvertido, según folios 3 y 76 del expediente judicial). 14) Que el actor desocupó el espacio utilizado el veintidós de noviembre de dos mil once (hecho no controvertido, según folios 3, 76 y 135 del expediente judicial, así como el expediente de la medida cautelar).\n\nIII. SOBRE HECHOS NO PROBADOS: Se tienen como tales, los siguientes: 1) Que la conducta desplegada por la Administrativa sea ilegítima, ilegal o anormal (los autos). \n\nIV. CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES SOBRE LOS BIENES DEMANIALES: La Constitución Política en el artículo ciento veintiuno inciso catorce , señala: \" (...) Además de las otras atribuciones que le confiere esta Constitución, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa: (...) 14) Decretar la enajenación o la aplicación a usos públicos de los bienes propios de la Nación (...)\". Esta disposición constitucional ha sido desarrollada en el Código Civil, en los artículos 261 a 263; el artículo 261 indica: \"Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado o a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona\". Por su parte el artículo 262 menciona: \"Las cosas públicas están fuera del comercio; y no podrán entrar en él, mientras legalmente no se disponga así, separándolas del uso público a que estaban destinadas\". Así, como dominio público se entiende el conjunto de bienes sujeto a un régimen jurídico especial y distinto al que rige el dominio privado, que además de pertenecer o estar bajo la administración de personas jurídicas públicas, están afectados o destinados a fines de utilidad pública y que se manifiesta en el uso directo o indirecto que toda persona pueda hacer de ellos o por una utilidad especialmente reconocida por la utilidad. Conforme la normativa citada, el Estado posee tanto bienes de dominio público, como privado; los bienes públicos son aquéllos a los cuales una ley les da un destino para uso público o general, se les denomina \"demaniales\" y son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables e indenunciables. Sobre este concepto la Sala Constitucional expresó en su Sentencia No. 2306-91 de las 14:45 horas del seis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y uno lo siguiente: \n\n“El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público. Son los llamados bienes dominicales, bienes demaniales, bienes o cosas públicas o bienes públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres. Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación. En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio... En consecuencia, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, como las vías de la Ciudad Capital, sean calles municipales o nacionales, aceras, parques y demás sitios públicos, los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres...”.- \n\n \n\nEn el mismo sentido, la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2000-06903 de las 15:48 horas del 8 de agosto de 2000, estimó: \n\n\" ...II.- En cuanto a la naturaleza de los bienes demaniales o bienes públicos, esta Sala ha dicho en su jurisprudencia que: \" ... la naturaleza y régimen jurídicos son diferentes tratándose de propiedad privada o de propiedad pública o del Estado, ello por cuanto la primera es regulada de conformidad con el artículo 45 Constitucional y la normativa del Código Civil pertinente, de manera que se protege la inviolabilidad de la misma, introduciéndose el concepto de función social, de manera que no se puede privar a nadie de la suya si no es motivado en un interés social y mediante ley aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa con el voto de las dos terceras partes de sus miembros. Por su parte, la regulación de la propiedad demanial se fundamenta en el inciso 14.) Del artículo 121 Constitucional, como ya lo indicó esta Sala por resolución número 2306-91, de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de noviembre, de modo que su naturaleza jurídica es virtualmente diferente, la cual indicó que: \"El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público. Son llamados bienes dominicales, bienes demaniales, bienes o cosas públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres. Es decir, afectados por su naturaleza y vocación. En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos de Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdicto para recuperar el dominio. Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión...\".\n\n \n\nHasta aquí hemos tratado los bienes de demaniales en una sola clasificación cuando en realidad estamos en presencia de tres categorías diferentes, aún cuando directamente relacionadas. Un primer grupo de bienes lo componen aquellos destinados al uso general, como el caso de las calles, los parques, la playa, entre otros. No está por demás señalar que el listado de este tipo de bienes esta determinado tanto geográficamente, como históricamente, pues mientras en una sociedad un determinado bien encaja en esta categoría un bien , en otra la situación puede ser diametralmente opuesta. La determinación de esa afectación es una decisión jurídico - política a cargo del Estado; sin que sea un aspecto connatural al bien en si mismo. Se trata de una afectación directa al uso público, que justifica su pertinencia y utilidad en corresponder a esta clasificación. El segundo grupo de bienes demaniales lo componen aquellos cuyo uso público es indirecto, correspondiendo a todos aquellos afectos de manera directa a un servicio público. Para nadie es un secreto que el concepto de servicio público ha estado en cuestionamiento y reconstrucción en las últimas décadas a partir de una serie de procesos de liberalización y aperturas de mercado, en el entendido que esas actividades en el fondo no son más que económicas y muy lucrativas, lo que determina el interés privado en su participación. En todo caso y sin pretender entrar más en un concepto por demás frágil e s claro que al margen de la titularidad del servicio, en tanto público, satisface un interés general o colectivo; de manera que los bienes que lo componen le resultan indispensables para evitar una afectación a la colectividad. Por eso se indica que su relación con la sociedad es indirecto, en la medida que su uso colectivo no es por propia mano con las personas sino en el servicio propiamente dicho. De aquí que de manera reiterada este Tribunal ha señalado en ocasiones anteriores que estos bienes tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico diverso de los bienes privados, en tanto, por expresa voluntad del legislador se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad , sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada, de modo que están fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo cual, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado, en sentido estricto, por cuanto éste se limita a su administración y tutela. Así, lo que define la naturaleza jurídica de los bienes demaniales es su destino, en tanto se afectan y están al servicio del uso público, según lo ha reconocido la doctrina en la materia, así, Nombre33033, Miguel S., en su obra Tratado de Derecho Administrativo . Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25, consideró: \"Para que un bien o cosa sea considerado como dependencia del dominio público, y sea sometido al régimen pertinente, es menester que dicho bien o cosa estén afectados al «uso público», directo o indirecto, debiendo tratarse, en este «último» supuesto, de cosas afectadas directamente -como «bienes finales» o «bienes de uso»- a la utilidad o comodidad común, quedando excluidos de la dominialidad de los bienes el Estado que revistan carácter simplemente instrumental.\" Antes de retomar algunos de los conceptos indicados en esa definición se hace necesario incluir la tercera categoría de bienes de esa naturaleza y que corresponde a lo que se entiende como el patrimonio especial del Estado, de suerte que es posible ubicar una serie de bienes (enunciados en la misma Constitución Política pero sin que deba entenderse que esa lista es numerus clausus) son patrimonio del Estado sobre los cuales el comercio se realiza sin posibilidad de apropiación. Se trata del denominado patrimonio público, donde ciertos bienes no son objeto de comercio ordinario lícito. Una interpretación integral de la norma permite comprender que este retiro ordinario de la actividad económica debe ser para asegurar la distribución de la riqueza en los términos de los artículos cuarenta y cinco y cincuenta constitucional. En todo caso, y al margen de las tres categorías, nótese que el énfasis de la diferenciación de los bienes privados de los de dominio público se da en relación al destino del bien, sea, al hecho de estar afectos a un uso común o al servicio del bien común; tal y como lo consideró con anterioridad la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2301-91, de seis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y uno. Como ya se indicó, en razón de lo anterior, notas características de los bienes demaniales es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, e inembargables, es decir, que se trata de bienes que están fuera del comercio ordinario de los hombres, de manera que su dominio o posesión no puede ser traspasado, ni a título gratuito ni oneroso; no pueden perderse por prescripción, así como tampoco, pueden ganarse por usucapión, de modo que son bienes que conservan su vigencia jurídica permanentemente; y no son susceptibles de embargo. S e trata de bienes cuya titularidad ostenta el Estado en su condición de administrador, debe entenderse que se trata de bienes que pertenecen la \"Nación\", con lo cual, conforman parte del patrimonio público; y que, por su especial naturaleza jurídica, presentan los siguientes atributos: son imprescriptibles, lo cual implica que por el transcurso del tiempo, no puede adquirirse el derecho de propiedad sobre ellos, ni siquiera de mera posesión, es decir, no pueden adquirirse mediante la usucapión, así como tampoco pueden perderse por prescripción; motivo por el cual los permisos de uso que la Administración conceda sobre ellos, siempre tienen un carácter precario, lo cual hace que puedan ser revocadas por motivos de oportunidad o conveniencia en cualquier momento por la Administración –en los términos previstos en los artículos ciento cincuenta y cuatro y ciento cincuenta y cinco de la Ley General de la Administración Pública–; y las mismas concesiones que se otorguen sobre ellos para su aprovechamiento, pueden ser canceladas, mediante procedimiento al efecto; son inembargables lo que hace que no pueden ser objeto de ningún gravamen o embargo, ni por particulares, ni por la Administración; y son inalienables, lo que se traduce en la condición de que están fuera del comercio de los hombres; de donde no pueden ser enajenados, vendidos o adquiridos, ni a título gratuito ni oneroso, ni por particulares, ni por el Estado, de modo que están excepcionados del comercio los hombres y sujetos a un régimen jurídico especial y reforzado. Además su uso y aprovechamiento está sujeto al poder de policía, en tanto, por tratarse de bienes que no pueden ser objeto de posesión, y mucho menos de propiedad, su utilización y aprovechamiento es posible únicamente a través de actos debidamente autorizados, sea mediante concesión o permiso de uso, otorgado por la autoridad competente; y al control constante de parte de la Administración Pública. De manera que comprende bienes inmuebles que tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico virtualmente diverso a la propiedad privada, que deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo cuarenta y cinco constitucional. Un bien público puede ser natural o artificial, según se trate de bienes declarados públicos por el legislador considerándolos en el estado en que la naturaleza los presenta u ofrece (un río por ejemplo), o de bienes declarados públicos por el legislador pero cuya creación o existencia depende de un hecho humano (construcción de una calle o un parque público, por ejemplo). La afectación es el hecho o la manifestación de voluntad del poder público, en cuya virtud la cosa queda incorporada al uso y goce de la comunidad y puede efectuarse por ley o por acto administrativo. La doctrina hace la distinción entre “asignación del carácter público” a un bien con la “afectación” de ese bien al dominio público. La asignación del carácter público significa establecer que ese bien determinado tendría calidad demanial; así, por ejemplo, la norma jurídica general diría que todas las vías públicas son integrantes o dependientes del dominio público y ello quiere decir que lo son las actuales y las que se lleguen a construir. En cambio, la afectación significa que el bien declarado dominical queda efectivamente incorporado al uso público y esto tiene que ver con la aceptación y recibo de obras públicas cuando se construyen por administración o por la conclusión de las obras y su recibo oficial, cuando es un particular el que las realiza (construcción de una urbanización o fraccionamiento, por ejemplo).- Es por esto que se dice que la afectación puede ser declarada por ley en forma genérica, o bien por un acto administrativo, el cual, necesariamente, deberá conformarse con la norma jurídica que le sirve de referencia (principio de legalidad) ...” (Voto No. 3145-96 de 28 de junio de 1996) (...)\". Adicionalmente, existe la figura de la \"desafectación\", que se trata de \"la situación jurídica por la que un bien deja de pertenecer al dominio público (...) los bienes que son desafectados se convierten, en principio, en bienes patrimoniales de la Administración titular, que, en su caso, podrá enajenarlos (...)\"(voto 035-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). \n\nV.- SOBRE LAS AUTORIZACIONES Y PERMISOS: Contrario de lo que sucede en las concesiones administrativas, en las cuales la Administración transfiere ciertas potestades públicas en un particular, sea persona física o jurídica, en las autorizaciones, la Administración, hace un \"levantamiento de barreras\" para el ejercicio de un derecho que ya se tiene, pero que aún administrativamente no se declara a favor del solicitante y cumplidor con los requisitos que impone el ordenamiento jurídico como un todo. De allí que, siguiendo a Manrique Jiménez (JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVA, 1º edición, San José, Imprenta y Litografía Mundo Gráfico, 1997), la Administración que autoriza no delega potestades ni constituye derechos, simplemente los declara, pues los derechos ya existen antes de la respectiva declaración, en razón del cumplimiento del ordenamiento jurídico confirmado por quien solicita, en buen derecho, la autorización misma. Hay entonces, de parte de la Administración autorizante, una declaración de voluntad a favor de aquella persona pública o privada que haya cumplido con todos y cada uno de los requisitos normados, limitándose la Administración a ponderar la legalidad de lo solicitado en el ámbito del interés público que la misma Administración debe tutelar. Se trata en el mejor sentido de la palabra, de un acto constatativo una vez verificados una serie de requerimientos legales. Se sostiene, en principio, que frente al ejercicio de un derecho subjetivo, urgido para su realización de un acto de habilitación de la Administración, no cabe la discrecionalidad administrativa, toda vez que la Administración autorizante está jurídicamente obligada a dictarla, cuando el solicitante haya previamente cumplido con los requisitos normativos, por lo que, encontramos en la autorización, dos dimensiones de actos reglados: los relacionados con el contenido de la autorización y el acto de su declaración que debe ser congruente con los motivos y fines que la justifiquen. Sin embargo, la Administración no pierde por ello, una vez dictado el acto autorizante, las potestades de tutela y control en el uso y disfrute del permiso, de la licencia o autorización. Su prerrogativa originaria como Administración que debe satisfacer y velar por los intereses públicos no desaparece con la simple declaratoria, expresa o implícita de la autorización. En esencia, entonces, no desaparece de la Administración su potestad de revocar o anular licencias o aprobaciones, ante licencias sujetas a condición o licencias ilegalmente otorgadas; claro está, siempre que con ello se haya cumplido el procedimiento legal, que garantice la plena participación del interesado y en especial el derecho de defensa y el debido proceso en general. En efecto, el derecho subjetivo del solicitante de la autorización nace con el cumplimiento cabal del ordenamiento jurídico, sin que la Administración pueda rebatir o desconocer su declaratoria; pero tampoco es válido del solicitante pretender la aplicación individual de una declaratoria de su derecho cuando no haya cumplido con los requisitos normados para la generalidad. Por autorización se tiene como un acto de \"habilitación o permisión\", entendiéndose como el \"acto administrativo por el cual la administración pública le concede al administrado la potestad de ejercer derechos preexistentes después, de una apreciación discrecional de su oportunidad y utilidad respecto del interés general, la autorización, en tal supuesto, obedece a una petición expresa del administrado pero que, generalmente, es discrecional en cuanto a motivo y contenido. La diferencia entre este tipo de autorización y licencia, en sentido estricto, radica en que la última tiene un efecto similar a la autorización pero normado, esto es, su contenido es reglado.\" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. pág. 449) Por su parte, el permiso se entiende con aquel \"acto que autoriza a una persona -administrado- para el ejercicio de un derecho, en principio, prohibido por el propio ordenamiento jurídico. Es una exención especial respecto de una prohibición general en beneficio de quien lo solicita. Con el permiso se tolera o permite realizar algo muy específico y determinado. Su naturaleza consiste en remover un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder preexistente, se dice que es una concesión de alcance restringido, puesto que, otorga derechos de menor intensidad y de mayor precariedad\" y que además \"siempre se otorga un derecho debilitado nuevo que supone una excepción a una prohibición de orden público\" (JINESTA LOBO, Op Cit, págs. 456 y 457). En términos generales ambos vocablos suelen confundirse, mas los dos coinciden en que debe mediar un derecho preexistente, en cuanto a los permisos de uso, que es el tema que ahora nos trae, es conveniente señalar lo dispuesto por el artículo ciento cincuenta y cuatro de la Ley General de la Administración Pública que literalmente establece: “Artículo 154.- Los permisos de uso del dominio público, y los demás actos que reconozcan a un administrado un derecho expresa y válidamente a título precario, podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración; pero la revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación.” En igual sentido el canon ciento sesenta y uno del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, reza “Artículo 161.—Permiso de uso. En los bienes de dominio público la Administración podrá otorgar permisos de uso, los cuales serán motivados en razones de oportunidad o conveniencia para el interés general, siempre y cuando no implique una desmejora en la disposición del bien.// En todo caso se entenderán otorgados a título precario, por lo que podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración. La revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación.” Refiriéndose expresamente sobre el permiso de uso en bienes de dominio público, el Tribunal Constitucional ha señalado: “Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad. El permiso de uso es un acto jurídico unilateral que lo dicta la Administración, en el uso de sus funciones y lo que se pone en manos del particular, es el dominio útil del bien, reservándose siempre el Estado, el dominio directo sobre la cosa. La precariedad de todo derecho o permiso de uso, es consustancial a la figura y alude a la posibilidad que la administración, en cualquier momento lo revoque, ya sea por la necesidad del Estado de ocupar plenamente el bien, por la construcción de una obra pública al igual que por razones de seguridad, higiene, estética, todo ello en la medida que si llega a existir una contraposición de intereses entre el fin del bien y el permiso otorgado, debe prevalecer el uso natural de la cosa pública.” (Voto 5976-93 de las quince horas con cuarenta y dos minutos del dieciséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, de la Sala Constitucional). En el mismo sentido, señaló: “… están sujetos a un uso público determinado por ley, por lo que la detentación privada deviene en excepcional al destino por el que esos terrenos están afectados, requiriendo para legitimarla un acto expreso de la Administración, que en el presente caso consiste en un permiso de uso otorgado vía resolución administrativa. El derecho administrativo regula los permisos de uso en el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual establece que \"Los permisos de uso del dominio público, y los demás actos que reconozcan a un administrado un derecho expresa y válidamente a título precario, podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración; pero la revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación\", por lo que el permiso de uso constituye básicamente un acto de voluntad unilateral de la Administración Pública, que por razones de conveniencia y en forma temporal permite que un administrado disfrute a título precario de un bien de dominio público, no sometido al comercio de los hombres y que como tal, puede ser revocado por la misma Administración sin responsabilidad, siempre y cuando se cumpla con lo estipulado en el artículo citado. En ese sentido el permiso de uso se caracteriza por ser un acto esencialmente unilateral de la Administración justificado en circunstancias que se ubican dentro de la esfera del poder discrecional, que pone en manos del particular el dominio útil del bien, reservándose el Estado el dominio directo sobre la cosa. Tal y como esta Sala en forma reiterada ha dispuesto, los permisos de uso poseen una característica especial: la precariedad, que le es consustancial y que alude a la posibilidad de que la Administración lo revoque en cualquier momento, sin indemnización alguna, si llegare a existir una contraposición de intereses entre el fin del bien y el permiso otorgado, en cuyo caso debe prevalecer el uso dado por el ordenamiento o la necesidad del estado de ocupar plenamente el bien” (voto 2777-98 de las 11:27 horas del 24 de abril de 1998). La doctrina italiana tratando de hacer un poco más accesibles los conceptos ha señalado que el medio de facilitación de un bien público a manos privadas sin perder la titularidad se ubica en la figura de la concesión, realizado mediante concurso, por oposición y con plenas garantías administrativas de estarse tomando la persona idónea para cumplir esa labor; mientras que el permiso y la autorización, como figuras menores, la determinación es un acto absolutamente discrecional, ante la ausencia de concurso, lo que determina su precaridad. En consecuencia se trataría de figuras menores en degradación (al respecto es interesante el tratamiento otorgado por Nombre110962 al respecto). En teoría no debería conjugar las figura de la concesión, la autorización y el permiso; pero en nuestra realidad y bajo esa posición es posible que convivan, siendo el vivo ejemplo el caso del servicio público en modalidad taxi, donde es posible ubicar concesionarios (escogidos por concurso), permisionarios (personas que satisfacen los requisitos pero no fueron electos mediante concurso) y autorizados (cuando no se reúnen los requisitos, pero se permite el ejercicio de la actividad determinados por el interés público); fenómeno que de manera progresiva la cartera correspondiente ha estado erradicando.\n\nVI. EN CUANTO LA PRETENSIÓN EN CONCRETO: La base de la teoría del caso del actor se sustenta en que al haber cancelado un canon por el permiso de uso que presentaba, sumado al pago de servicios públicos se generó una mutación del instituto jurídico, para estar regido por el régimen inquilinario. Al respecto el Tribunal debe ser más que en enf á tico en rechazar esa posición. Tanto el artículo ciento cincuenta y cuatro de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, como el ordinal ciento sesenta y uno del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa ya transcritos resultan ser contestes con el carácter precario del permiso de uso, que en este caso sería sobre un bien demanial. Véase como se trata del edificio de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería dependencia pública que es bien demanial en cuanto está dedicada de manera directa a la prestación de un servicio públic o, a saber la emisión de pasaportes, cédulas de residencia, y en general lo referente al estatus migratorio de las personas extranjeras . Cualquier afectación a la dependencia lleva implícito una repercusión al servicio como un todo , lo que lleva aparejado el carácter demanial del bien . Siendo de esa naturaleza el bien, resultaba procedente el otorgamiento de permisos de uso, como en efecto se dispuso; los que como se ha venido señalando resulta manifiestamente precarios y revocables por imperio de ley sin asumir responsabilidad alguna, salvo en los supuestos de resultar intempestiva la orden o en los supuestos de sacrificio especial , singular e intenso que establece la misma Ley General de la Administración Pública (sin perjuicio de que alguna parte de la doctrina ha llegado a sostener que incluso en esos casos tampoco procede indemnización alguna por el carácter ilegal de cualquier reclamo en esas circunstancias) . El concepto precario refiere a la posibilidad de revocación por razones de oportunidad, conveniencia o incluso de legalidad sin responsabilidad de por medio, en tanto no genera derecho subjetivo alguno para el permisionario. Es una mera facilitación de un área del espacio público para la generación de servicios accesorios a juicio de la Administración interesada, pero suprimible en cualquier momento en el mismo nivel de discrecionalidad que el acto que lo generó. Donde no existió concurso, contención alguna, presentación de garantías o en general algún mecanismo que le otorgará algún nivel de estabilidad para el interesado. La posibilidad de revocar es una cláusula implícita en el acto ha dicho la doctrina (ver tesiario de Ortiz Ortiz, Nombre7411 y Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto), en cuando es consabido por el interesado . Advirtiendo que si bien cierto es normal que el acto autorizatorio se plasme en un documento firmado por el interesado y la A dministración no por ello se niega el carácter unilateral de la determinación , bajo ningún aspecto estaríamos frente a un acuerdo de voluntades en los términos del derecho privado, con negociación y efecto de ley entre ellos; estamos frente a una determinación unilateral del órgano administrativo que define la situación y en esas condiciones es aceptado por su contraparte; la existencia de un documento a semejanza de un contrato, es únicamente para establecer algunas condiciones básicas y así evitar problemas entre las partes pero no para generarle la condición de contrato. El canon para este caso es la contraprestación pecuniaria que efectuó el usuario del bien demanial a partir de la ventaja obtenida, con la característica que no es impuesta de manera coactiva sino a partir de la gestión voluntaria del interesado al requerir el permiso. Así a contrario del canon típico de los servicios públicos, donde el interesado que tiene un interés de recibir este, esta supeditado al pago de ese importe; en este caso, la persona cancela el rubro por su interés (acto de determinación personal) de seguir disfrutando del permiso de uso; se trata en efecto de una carga jurídica, no de un deber u obligación. Para el establecimiento del importe la Administración está supeditada a las reglas de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad propias de toda actividad pública , en el entendido que no existiendo parámetros es la prudencia administrativa la línea que orienta la conducta de forma tal que no genere un enriquecimiento exorbitante para el interesado, ni llegue a ahogar su actividad . En dicho marco el cobro de un canon no convierte un permiso de uso en un arrendamiento como lo pretende ver la accionante, en el entendido que el primero no presenta como carácter consustancial la gratuidad. La lógica del canon se sustenta en que el interesado recibe un beneficio por su condición, lo que le permitiría generar un enriquecimiento a partir de un bien destinado a la colectividad, de manera que el pago permite compensar los intereses y evitar un lucro sin cancelar en algo a la colectividad. Igual situación ocurre con respecto al pago de los demás servicios públicos, en el entendido que estos se generaban a partir de la actividad económica, no siendo lícito que la Administración los cancelara para generar un servicio particular con lucro hacia una persona ajena al servicio público. Se trata de dos institutos jurídicos totalmente diferentes, marcado por el bien que esta en consideración y las partes relacionadas; lo que las hace incompatible. Al margen que el actor desistió en el juicio oral de discutir la ilegitimidad o anormalidad del acto de desalojo y sobre lo cual tampoco este prueba en ese sentido; n o está demás indicar que el desalojo no fue intempestivo en la medida que el mismo documento en el cual se establece el acuerdo entre las partes fija con claridad la posibilidad de revocación en el momento que lo tenga a bien la Dirección en particular y con solo otorgar un plazo mínimo en días para el retiro del actor del bien, que en efecto fue satisfecho con creces; lo que impide que se consolide el supuesto del artículo ciento cincuenta y cuatro ya señalado de encontrarse ante una decisión carente de un tiempo razonable para el interesado. Véase como la cláusula dicha no fue incorporada en la última prorroga del permiso, sino que en los diferentes documentos de este es posible ubicar su existencia, así como la firma del señor Nombre110961 aceptando dicha estipulación . De manera que tampoco es posible sostener la existencia de una confianza legitima frente al referido señor en esas condiciones. S i bien el interesado realizó inversiones importantes, estas se realizaron al momento de iniciar el permiso que interesa, lo que evidencia que aún cuando fueran requeridas por la Dirección en cuestión, durante el tiempo del uso permitido debió recuperar su aporte, además de corresponder a parte de los insumos para desarrollar la actividad privada que nos ocupa. En la misma línea argumentativa no se satisface el artículo trescientos diecisiete del Código Procesal Civil con respecto al doscientos veinte del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo tampoco existe una sola evidencia probatoria que permita establecer que se esta generando un sacrificio singular, especial e intenso a partir de dichas reparaciones que permitan derivar responsabilidad alguna; a lo que se suma el desistimiento del interesado a considerar que estemos frente a una conducta anormal, ilegitima o ilegal. En consecuencia no es posible ubicar ninguno de los supuestos derivadores de responsabilidad administrativa, ni por falta en el servicio o por sacrificio singular, lo que haría ilegitimo el reclamo presentado. Por último, pero no menos relevante, debe recordarse que si bien la Administración presenta una doble capacidad de actuar y eventualmente podría utilizar esquemas propios del derecho privado, también es cierto que está supeditada al principio de legalidad, lo que lleva aparejado la imposibilidad de considerar un inquilinato frente al caso, máxime tratándose de un bien demanial. Como regla general el sector público utiliza los institutos propios del derecho público y el uso del derecho privado se únicamente queda para cuando el Estado se somete a ese esquema de derecho, no por mutación, sino plasmado de esa manera con claridad por los interesas. La mutación jurídica es una figura que solo en sucesos aislados puede presentar alguna aplicación en este área del derecho. De manera que no esta probado un daño en concreto, tampoco un nexo causal; pero más importante tampoco esta probado la existencia de una inducción que permita considerar que estemos frente a un supuesto de responsabilidad. Así las cosas, no existe el derecho que reclama el actor, debiendo acogerse la excepción de falta de derecho y declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.\n\nVII- SOBRE LAS COSTAS: En lo que al caso corresponde es criterio del Tribunal que no se configura una de las excepciones del artículo ciento noventa y tres del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, lo que obliga a condenar al vencido al pago de las costas de esta acción. \n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nSe acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Son las costas a cargo del vencido. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nRicardo A. Madrigal Jiménez\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nGrace Loaiza Sánchez Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo\n\n \n\n \n\nPromueve: Nombre110961 \n\nContra: El Estado\n\nExpediente: 11-005603-1027-CA\n\nProceso de Conocimiento",
  "body_en_text": "Vote No. 096-2012\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, FOURTH SECTION, San José, at eight o'clock on the twenty-first of September of two thousand twelve.-\n\nOrdinary proceeding (Proceso de conocimiento) of Mr. Nombre110961, resident of Moravia, merchant and journalist, identity card number CED87646 - - , against the State, represented by the prosecutor Ms. Andrea Bogantes Rivera, resident of Alajuela, identity card number CED30613 - - . The plaintiff acts under the sponsorship of Lic. Mauricio Vargas Caravaca, single, identity card number CED45353 - - , and resident of San José. All natural persons are of legal age, married, and lawyers, with the exceptions indicated.\n\nWHEREAS (RESULTANDO):\n\n1.- That the plaintiff appeared before this jurisdictional office, requesting: \"That the eviction order issued by the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería in official communication AJO1821-ARV of the twenty-second of July of two thousand eleven be annulled and that the State also be ordered to pay procedural and personal costs, in addition to the damages (daños y perjuicios) that it may cause in the event of eviction from my sole workplace, to be liquidated during the execution of judgment.\" It is necessary to clarify that during the oral and public trial, the plaintiff withdrew the annulment claim and kept only the claim for damages effective, noting that the first aspect had lost its purpose as the eviction had already been carried out.\n\n2.- The defendant opposed the claim and raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho).\n\n3.- That the oral trial was held on the seventeenth of September of two thousand twelve, with the application of articles one hundred eleven of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code and forty-seven of the Regulations being ordered, exclusively for the purpose of issuing the judgment at hand in written form.\n\n4.- In the proceedings, the mandatory prescriptions have been observed, and no grounds for nullity capable of invalidating what has been done are noted. This judgment is issued after the mandatory deliberations and unanimously.\n\nJudge Madrigal Jiménez drafts; and,\n\nWHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):\n\nI. BASIS OF THE CONFLICT: The plaintiff states that since the fifteenth of December of two thousand five, he has held a use permit (permiso de uso) in the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, in the waiting room of the passport area, for the installation of a coffee, refreshment, and pastry stand. The permit was for five months, but it was tacitly extended for six more months, with him paying for water, electricity, national and municipal taxes, but not a fee (canon). He made improvements to the infrastructure at the Administration's request and for the benefit of clients, as well as various investments. On the seventeenth of August of two thousand nine, the Administration informed him that he had to sign a contract and pay the sum of fifty thousand colones as a fee, a sum that was reduced to thirty-five thousand colones after a negotiation. The contract was for six months, automatically renewable for equal periods. By official communication DAF-368-07-11 of the fifth of July of two thousand eleven, he was notified of the permit's cancellation effective from the fourth of August of two thousand eleven. He filed the legal remedies, but they were rejected. He considers that the payment of the various services plus the fee converted his contract into a lease, which is why the act evicting him becomes arbitrary; it is on that basis that he derives the liability he claims. The State's representation maintains that what exists is a mere use permit, revocable at any time, without the need for prior procedure. Furthermore, in this case, for safety and comfort reasons, it was necessary to take the space, which determines the lawfulness of the administrative conduct. It generally shares the list of proven facts, except in those cases where the term contract or agreement is used for what exists between the individual and the defendant Directorate, as it is not facing an agreement specific to private law. It requests that the lack of right of the claim be declared and that it be dismissed in all its aspects.\n\nII. PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following relevant facts are established: 1) On the fifteenth of December of two thousand five, by document DAF-916-12- the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería granted the plaintiff a use permit for the installation of a coffee, refreshment, and pastry stand, for a term of five months, until the fifteenth of May of two thousand six, located between doors five and six, external part of the waiting room of the passport area of that government agency (uncontested fact, according to folios 1 and 75 of the judicial file, and folios 12 to 14 of the administrative file). 2) On the seventeenth of May of two thousand six, a new permit is signed for the period running from the seventeenth of May to the eighteenth of September, both of two thousand six (see folios 22 to 24 of the administrative file). 3) On the twenty-first of September of two thousand six, between the parties to this proceeding, a use permit for the cafeteria was signed, effective for three months from the twenty-first of September until the eighteenth of December of two thousand six, without prejudice that the Administration may terminate the permit at any time, communicating with forty-eight hours' notice (see folios 77 and 78 of the administrative file). 4) By the end of the year two thousand eight, the plaintiff invested some sums of money in carrying out repairs for the cafeteria (see folios 48 to 53 of the judicial file). 5) On the tenth of March of two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre110961 invested the sum of three hundred fifty thousand colones in the manufacture of furniture for the cafeteria (see folio 47 of the judicial file). 6) On the seventeenth of August of two thousand nine, by official communication DG-2507-08-09, the Director General of Migración y Extranjería communicates that in order to extend the use permit, the plaintiff must pay a fee of fifty thousand colones into a government account, or provide cafeteria, refreshment, and pastry services for an equivalent amount for the Directorate's meetings (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file). 7) At the plaintiff's request, the sum to be paid as a fee was reduced to thirty-five thousand colones (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file). 8) On the twenty-second of July of two thousand nine, an extension to the permit was generated, with a validity of six additional months starting from the first of August of two thousand nine, automatically renewable for equal periods (uncontested fact, according to folios 1 and 75 of the judicial file). 9) By official communication DAF-368-07-11 of the fifth of July of two thousand eleven, signed by Mr. Agustín Barquero Acosta, Director Administrativo Financiero of the Directorate11, the plaintiff is formally notified, in application of the second point of the public domain use agreement binding them, of the cancellation of the related use permit effective from the fourth of August of two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file and 197 of the administrative file). 10) Against this act, the plaintiff asserted in the administrative channel opposition to the act contrary to his interests by means of a writing filed on the fourteenth of July of two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 76 of the judicial file and 198 to 199 of the administrative file). 11) By official communication AJ-01821-2011-ARV of the twenty-second of July of two thousand eleven, the Legal Advisory Office of the defendant administration responds to the petition of Mr. Nombre110961, stating the appropriateness of the act of cancellation of the use permit already ordered by the defendant Administration (see folios 204 to 208 of the judicial file). 12) On the twenty-seventh of July of two thousand eleven, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against the Administration's decision, which was rejected by resolution D. JUR. 392-2011 of twelve hours and ten minutes on the tenth of August of two thousand eleven, while the appeal was also resolved negatively by resolution 298-2011-DMG of eleven hours on the twentieth of September of two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 3 and 76 of the judicial file, folios 211 to 213, 217 to 221, and 228 to 230 of the administrative file). 13) On the third of October of two thousand eleven, by resolution DAF-531-10-11, the Dirección General de Migración Extranjería grants forty-eight hours to proceed to vacate the occupied space within the public facilities (uncontested fact, according to folios 3 and 76 of the judicial file). 14) That the plaintiff vacated the used space on the twenty-second of November of two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 3, 76, and 135 of the judicial file, as well as the file for the interim measure).\n\nIII. ON FACTS NOT PROVEN: The following are considered as such: 1) That the conduct displayed by the Administration is illegitimate, illegal, or abnormal (the records).\n\nIV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS: The Political Constitution in article one hundred twenty-one, paragraph fourteen, states: \" (...) In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (...) 14) To decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own assets (...)\". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in articles 261 to 263; article 261 states: \"Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can use because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and the object of private property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in such a case, as civil persons, are not different from any other person.\" For its part, article 262 mentions: \"Public things are outside commerce; and they may not enter it, while this is not legally provided for, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.\" Thus, public domain (dominio público) is understood as the set of assets subject to a special legal regime, distinct from that governing private domain, which, besides belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for public utility purposes and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that any person may make of them or by a utility specially recognized for the utility. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public domain and private domain assets; public assets are those to which a law gives a destination for public or general use, they are called \"demanial\" (demaniales), and they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, and undeniable. On this concept, the Constitutional Chamber expressed in its Judgment No. 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on the sixth of November of nineteen ninety-one the following:\n\n“The public domain is made up of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. They are the so-called dominical goods, demanial goods (bienes demaniales), public goods or things, or public goods, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action replaces possessory interdicts to recover the domain... Consequently, the nation's regime for public domain goods, such as the roads of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...”.-\n\nIn the same sense, the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000, held:\n\n\"...II.- Regarding the nature of public property or public assets, this Chamber has said in its jurisprudence that: '... the legal nature and regime are different when dealing with private property or public or State property, because the former is regulated in accordance with Constitutional Article 45 and the pertinent Civil Code regulations, so that its inviolability is protected, introducing the concept of social function, so that no one can be deprived of their own unless motivated by a social interest and through a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of public domain property is based on paragraph 14.) Of Constitutional Article 121, as this Chamber already indicated by resolution number 2306-91, of fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on November sixth, so its legal nature is virtually different, which indicated that: \"The public domain is made up of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. They are called dominical goods, demanial goods, public goods or things, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor susceptible to encumbrance under Civil Law terms, and administrative action replaces possessory interdicts to recover the domain. As they are outside commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession...\".\n\nUp to here we have treated demanial goods in a single classification when in reality we are in the presence of three different categories, even though they are directly related. A first group of goods is composed of those destined for general use, such as streets, parks, beaches, among others. It is worth noting that the list of this type of good is determined both geographically and historically, because while in one society a certain good fits into this category, in another the situation may be diametrically opposed. The determination of that affectation is a juridical-political decision belonging to the State; it is not an aspect connatural to the good itself. It is a direct affectation to public use, which justifies its relevance and utility in corresponding to this classification. The second group of public domain goods is composed of those whose public use is indirect, corresponding to all those directly affected to a public service. It is no secret to anyone that the concept of public service has been in question and reconstruction in recent decades as a result of a series of liberalization processes and market openings, understanding that these activities are basically nothing more than economic and very lucrative, which determines private interest in their participation. In any case, and without intending to go further into a concept that is otherwise fragile, it is clear that regardless of the ownership of the service, insofar as it is public, it satisfies a general or collective interest; so that the goods that compose it are indispensable to avoid affecting the community. That is why it is indicated that their relationship with society is indirect, to the extent that their collective use is not by people's own hand but through the service itself. Hence, this Tribunal has repeatedly pointed out on previous occasions that these goods have a legal nature and regime different from private goods, insofar as, by the express will of the legislator, they are destined for a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that therefore, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, whereby they cannot belong individually to private individuals, nor to the State, strictly speaking, since the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demanial goods is their purpose, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use, as recognized by the doctrine on the matter, thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Treatise on Administrative Law. Volume V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pg. 25, considered: \"For a good or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be affected to «public use», direct or indirect, and, in this «last» case, it must be things directly affected—as «final goods» or «use goods»—to common utility or comfort, goods of the State that are of a merely instrumental nature being excluded from domain status.\" Before taking up some of the concepts indicated in that definition, it is necessary to include the third category of goods of that nature, which corresponds to what is understood as the special patrimony of the State, so that it is possible to locate a series of goods (stated in the Political Constitution itself but without it being understood that this list is numerus clausus) that are the property of the State over which commerce is carried out without the possibility of appropriation. This is the so-called public heritage, where certain goods are not the object of ordinary lawful commerce. A comprehensive interpretation of the norm allows us to understand that this ordinary withdrawal from economic activity must be to ensure the distribution of wealth under the terms of constitutional articles forty-five and fifty. In any case, and aside from the three categories, note that the emphasis of the differentiation of private goods from those of public domain occurs in relation to the purpose of the good, that is, to the fact of being affected to a common use or to the service of the common good; just as the Constitutional Chamber previously considered in judgment number 2301-91, of November sixth, nineteen ninety-one. As already indicated, for this reason, characteristic notes of demanial goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable; that is, they are goods that are outside the ordinary commerce of men, so their ownership or possession cannot be transferred, neither for free nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by adverse possession (usucapión), thus they are goods that permanently retain their legal validity; and they are not susceptible to seizure. They are goods whose ownership the State holds in its capacity as administrator; it must be understood that they are goods belonging to the \"Nation\", with which they form part of the public patrimony; and which, due to their special legal nature, present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that over time, property rights over them cannot be acquired, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired by adverse possession, nor can they be lost by prescription; for which reason the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious nature, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration—in the terms provided in articles one hundred fifty-four and one hundred fifty-five of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—; and the same concessions that are granted over them for their use can be canceled, through the corresponding procedure; they are unattachable, meaning they cannot be the object of any encumbrance or seizure, either by private parties or by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; hence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, whether for free or for consideration, neither by private parties nor by the State, so they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Furthermore, their use and exploitation are subject to police power, insofar as they are goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, so their utilization and exploitation are possible only through duly authorized acts, that is, by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration. Therefore, it comprises real estate that has a legal nature and regime virtually different from private property, which derives from the provisions of constitutional article forty-five. A public good can be natural or artificial, depending on whether it concerns goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state in which nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). Affectation is the act or manifestation of the will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing is incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and can be carried out by law or by administrative act. Doctrine makes the distinction between “assignment of public character” to a good and the “affectation” of that good to the public domain. The assignment of public character means establishing that said specific good would have public domain status; thus, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public roads are integral parts of or dependents of the public domain, and this means that the current ones and those that may eventually be built are included. In contrast, affectation means that the good declared public domain is effectively incorporated into public use, and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are constructed by administration or with the completion of the works and their official receipt, when it is a private party that carries them out (construction of a housing development or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- This is why it is said that affectation can be declared by law in a generic form, or by an administrative act, which must necessarily conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality)...” (Vote No. 3145-96 of June 28, 1996) (...).\"  In addition, there is the concept of \"disaffectation\", which is \"the legal situation by which a good ceases to belong to the public domain (...) goods that are disaffected become, in principle, patrimonial goods of the owning Administration, which, as the case may be, may alienate them (...)\" (vote 035-2009-SVII, Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal).\n\nV.- ON APPROVALS AND PERMITS: Contrary to what occurs in administrative concessions, in which the Administration transfers certain public powers to a private individual, whether a natural or legal person, in approvals (autorizaciones), the Administration carries out a \"lifting of barriers\" for the exercise of a right that is already held, but which has not yet been administratively declared in favor of the applicant who complies with the requirements imposed by the legal system as a whole. Hence, following Manrique Jiménez (JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVA, 1st edition, San José, Imprenta y Litografía Mundo Gráfico, 1997), the authorizing Administration does not delegate powers nor constitute rights, it simply declares them, since the rights already exist before the respective declaration, by reason of compliance with the legal system confirmed by the person who, in good law, requests the approval itself. There is then, on the part of the authorizing Administration, a declaration of will in favor of that public or private person who has fulfilled each and every one of the regulated requirements, with the Administration limiting itself to weighing the legality of what is requested within the scope of the public interest that the Administration itself must protect. It is, in the best sense of the word, a declaratory act once a series of legal requirements have been verified. It is maintained, in principle, that when facing the exercise of a subjective right, which for its realization requires an enabling act from the Administration, administrative discretion is not appropriate, since the authorizing Administration is legally obliged to issue it, when the applicant has previously complied with the regulatory requirements, therefore, we find in the approval, two dimensions of regulated acts: those related to the content of the approval and the act of its declaration which must be consistent with the motives and purposes that justify it. However, the Administration does not thereby lose, once the authorizing act has been issued, the powers of guardianship and control over the use and enjoyment of the permit, license, or approval. Its original prerogative as an Administration that must satisfy and ensure public interests does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implicit, of the approval. In essence, then, the Administration does not lose its power to revoke or annul licenses or approvals, in the case of licenses subject to conditions or licenses illegally granted; clearly, provided that the legal procedure has been followed, guaranteeing the full participation of the interested party and especially the right of defense and due process in general. Indeed, the subjective right of the applicant for the approval is born with full compliance with the legal system, without the Administration being able to refute or disregard its declaration; but it is also not valid for the applicant to claim the individual application of a declaration of their right when they have not fulfilled the requirements regulated for the generality. An approval is considered an act of \"habilitation or permission\", understood as the \"administrative act by which the public administration grants the administered person the power to exercise pre-existing rights after a discretionary assessment of its opportunity and utility regarding the general interest; the approval, in such a case, responds to an express request from the administered person but is generally discretionary regarding motive and content. The difference between this type of approval and a license, strictly speaking, lies in the fact that the latter has an effect similar to the approval but is regulated, that is, its content is regulated.\" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Treatise on Administrative Law, Volume I. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. pg. 449) For its part, the permit is understood as that \"act that authorizes a person - administered - for the exercise of a right that is, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption from a general prohibition for the benefit of the person requesting it. With the permit, something very specific and determined is tolerated or allowed. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle for the exercise of a pre-existing power; it is said to be a concession of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness\" and that furthermore \"it always grants a new, weakened right that supposes an exception to a prohibition of public order\" (JINESTA LOBO, Op Cit, pgs. 456 and 457).\n\nIn general terms, both terms are often confused, but they both coincide in that a pre-existing right must be involved. Regarding use permits (permisos de uso), which is the issue that now concerns us, it is appropriate to note the provisions of Article 154 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which literally states: “Article 154.- Use permits (permisos de uso) of the public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right for an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary, and in all cases, a reasonable period must be given for compliance with the act of revocation.” In the same vein, Canon 161 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Act (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) reads: “Article 161.—Use permit (Permiso de uso). On public domain property, the Administration may grant use permits (permisos de uso), which shall be motivated by reasons of opportunity or convenience for the general interest, provided it does not imply a deterioration in the disposition of the property.// In all cases, they shall be understood as granted under a precarious title, and therefore may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration. The revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary, and in all cases, a reasonable period must be given for compliance with the act of revocation.” Referring expressly to the use permit (permiso de uso) on public domain property, the Constitutional Court has stated: “As they are outside commerce, these properties cannot be subject to possession, although a right to use can be acquired, though not a right to ownership. The use permit (permiso de uso) is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the individual is the useful domain of the property, with the State always reserving the direct domain over the thing. The precariousness of any right or use permit (permiso de uso) is inherent to the figure and refers to the possibility that the administration may revoke it at any time, whether due to the State's need to fully occupy the property, for the construction of a public work, as well as for reasons of security, hygiene, or aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the property and the granted permit, the natural use of the public thing must prevail.” (Voto 5976-93 of fifteen hours and forty-two minutes on the sixteenth of November, nineteen ninety-three, of the Constitutional Court (Sala Constitucional)). In the same sense, it stated: “… they are subject to a public use determined by law, so private possession becomes exceptional to the purpose for which those lands are designated, requiring an express act of the Administration to legitimize it, which in the present case consists of a use permit (permiso de uso) granted via administrative resolution. Administrative law regulates use permits (permisos de uso) in Article 154 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes that \\\"Use permits (permisos de uso) of the public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right for an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary, and in all cases, a reasonable period must be given for compliance with the act of revocation\\\", such that the use permit (permiso de uso) basically constitutes an act of unilateral will by the Public Administration, which, for reasons of convenience and temporarily, allows an administered party to enjoy, under precarious title, a public domain property not subject to commerce among men, and as such, can be revoked by the same Administration without liability, as long as the stipulations of the cited article are complied with. In this sense, the use permit (permiso de uso) is characterized by being an essentially unilateral act of the Administration, justified by circumstances located within the sphere of discretionary power, which places the useful domain of the property in the hands of the individual, with the State reserving the direct domain over the thing. As this Chamber has repeatedly held, use permits (permisos de uso) possess a special characteristic: precariousness, which is inherent to them and refers to the possibility that the Administration may revoke them at any time, without any compensation, if a conflict of interests should arise between the purpose of the property and the granted permit, in which case the use given by the legal system or the State's need to fully occupy the property must prevail” (voto 2777-98 of 11:27 hours on April 24, 1998). Italian doctrine, attempting to make the concepts somewhat more accessible, has indicated that the means of facilitating a public property into private hands without losing ownership lies in the figure of the concession (concesión), carried out through a competitive process, by merit-based competition, and with full administrative guarantees that the suitable person to perform that task is being chosen; whereas for the permit (permiso) and the authorization (autorización), as lesser figures, the determination is an absolutely discretionary act, in the absence of a competitive process, which determines their precariousness. Consequently, these would be lesser figures in degradation (in this regard, the treatment given by Nombre110962 on the subject is interesting). In theory, the figures of concession (concesión), authorization (autorización), and permit (permiso) should not be combined; but in our reality and under that position, it is possible for them to coexist, a living example being the case of public service in the taxi modality, where it is possible to locate concessionaires (concesionarios) (chosen by competitive process), permitholders (permisionarios) (persons who meet the requirements but were not elected through a competitive process), and authorized parties (autorizados) (when the requirements are not met, but the exercise of the activity is permitted as determined by the public interest); a phenomenon that the corresponding ministry has been progressively eradicating.\n\nVI. REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CLAIM: The basis of the plaintiff's theory of the case rests on the fact that having paid a fee (canon) for the use permit (permiso de uso) he held, combined with the payment of public services, generated a mutation of the legal institute, so that it became governed by the landlord-tenant regime. In this regard, the Court must be more than emphatic in rejecting that position. Both Article 154 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and article 161 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Act (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), already transcribed, are consistent with the precarious nature of the use permit (permiso de uso), which in this case would be over public domain property. Note how it concerns the building of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, a public agency that is public domain property insofar as it is directly dedicated to the provision of a public service, namely the issuance of passports, residence cards, and in general matters relating to the migratory status of foreign persons. Any encumbrance on the agency implicitly carries a repercussion on the service as a whole, which entails the public domain character of the property. The property being of that nature, the granting of use permits (permisos de uso) was appropriate, as indeed was ordered; these, as has been noted, are manifestly precarious and revocable by operation of law without assuming any liability, except in cases where the order is untimely or in cases of special, singular, and intense sacrifice established by the same General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (without prejudice to the fact that some part of the doctrine has even maintained that in such cases, no compensation is due either, due to the illegal nature of any claim under those circumstances). The concept of precarious refers to the possibility of revocation for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or even legality, without any liability involved, as it generates no subjective right for the permitholder (permisionario). It is a mere facilitation of an area of public space for the generation of accessory services at the discretion of the interested Administration, but suppressible at any time at the same level of discretion as the act that created it. Where there was no competitive process, no contention, no presentation of guarantees, or in general any mechanism that would grant any level of stability for the interested party. The possibility of revoking is an implicit clause in the act, doctrine has said (see the thesis of Ortiz Ortiz, Nombre7411 and Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto), as it is known to the interested party. Noting that while it is certainly normal for the authorizing act to be embodied in a document signed by the interested party and the Administration, this does not deny the unilateral nature of the determination; under no aspect would we be facing a meeting of the minds in terms of private law, with negotiation and effect of law between them; we are facing a unilateral determination of the administrative body that defines the situation, and under those conditions it is accepted by its counterpart; the existence of a document resembling a contract is only to establish some basic conditions and thus avoid problems between the parties, but not to create the condition of a contract for it. The fee (canon) for this case is the monetary consideration made by the user of the public domain property based on the advantage obtained, with the characteristic that it is not imposed in a coercive manner but rather from the voluntary action of the interested party when requesting the permit. Thus, unlike the typical fee (canon) for public services, where the interested party who has an interest in receiving the service is subject to paying that amount; in this case, the person pays the amount due to their own interest (an act of personal determination) to continue enjoying the use permit (permiso de uso); it is indeed a legal burden, not a duty or obligation. For the establishment of the amount, the Administration is subject to the rules of reasonableness and proportionality inherent to all public activity, on the understanding that in the absence of parameters, it is administrative prudence that guides the conduct in such a way that it does not generate exorbitant enrichment for the interested party, nor stifle their activity. Within this framework, the charging of a fee (canon) does not convert a use permit (permiso de uso) into a lease as the plaintiff seeks to view it, understanding that the former does not have gratuitousness as inherent characteristic. The logic of the fee (canon) rests on the fact that the interested party receives a benefit due to their condition, which would allow them to generate enrichment from a property destined for the community, so that payment allows compensating the interests and preventing profit without paying something back to the community. The same situation occurs regarding the payment of other public services, on the understanding that these were generated from the economic activity, and it would not be lawful for the Administration to pay for them to generate a private service for profit towards a person external to the public service. These are two totally different legal institutes, marked by the property under consideration and the related parties; which makes them incompatible. Aside from the fact that the plaintiff desisted during the oral trial from discussing the illegitimacy or abnormality of the eviction act, and regarding which he also provides no evidence in that sense; it is not superfluous to indicate that the eviction was not untimely, insofar as the same document in which the agreement between the parties is established clearly sets forth the possibility of revocation at the time the Directorate in particular deems appropriate, and by merely granting a minimum period in days for the plaintiff's removal from the property, which was indeed more than satisfied; this prevents the consolidation of the assumption established in Article 154, already mentioned, of being faced with a decision lacking a reasonable time for the interested party. Note how this clause was not incorporated only in the last extension of the permit, but rather its existence can be located in the different documents thereof, along with the signature of Mr. Nombre110961 accepting said stipulation. Thus, neither is it possible to uphold the existence of legitimate expectation towards the said gentleman under those conditions. While the interested party made significant investments, these were made at the time of initiating the relevant permit, which shows that even if they were required by the Directorate in question, during the permitted time of use he should have recovered his contribution, besides corresponding to part of the inputs to develop the private activity at hand. Along the same line of argument, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is not satisfied; regarding Article 220 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), there is not a single piece of evidentiary proof that allows establishing that a singular, special, and intense sacrifice is being generated from said repairs that would allow deriving any liability; added to this is the interested party's desistance from considering that we are facing abnormal, illegitimate, or illegal conduct. Consequently, it is not possible to locate any of the assumptions that give rise to administrative liability, neither for failure in service nor for singular sacrifice, which would make the presented claim illegitimate. Finally, but no less relevantly, it must be remembered that while the Administration presents a dual capacity to act and could eventually use schemes proper to private law, it is also true that it is subject to the principle of legality, which entails the impossibility of considering a landlord-tenant situation in this case, especially when dealing with public domain property. As a general rule, the public sector uses the institutes proper to public law, and the use of private law is only reserved for when the State submits itself to that legal scheme, not by mutation, but clearly embodied in that manner by the interests involved. Legal mutation is a figure that only in isolated events can have some application in this area of law. Therefore, a specific damage has not been proven, nor a causal link; but more importantly, the existence of an inducement that would allow considering that we are facing an assumption of liability has also not been proven. Thus, the right claimed by the plaintiff does not exist, so the exception of lack of right must be upheld, and the lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its aspects.\n\nVII- ON COSTS: As relevant to the case, it is the Court's view that none of the exceptions of Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) are configured, which obliges condemning the losing party to pay the costs of this action.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe exception of lack of right is upheld, and the lawsuit is without merit in all its aspects. Costs are to be borne by the losing party.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nRicardo A. Madrigal Jiménez\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nGrace Loaiza Sánchez Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo\n\n \n\n \n\nFiled by: Nombre110961 \n\nAgainst: El Estado\n\nExpediente: 11-005603-1027-CA\n\nProceeding of Ordinary Process\n\n13) On October third, two thousand eleven, by resolution DAF-531-10-11 the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería granted forty-eight hours to proceed to vacate the occupied space within the public facilities (uncontested fact, according to folios 3 and 76 of the judicial file). 14) That the plaintiff vacated the space used on November twenty-second, two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 3, 76 and 135 of the judicial file, as well as the file of the precautionary measure).\n\nIII. REGARDING UNPROVEN FACTS: The following are considered as such: 1) That the conduct displayed by the Administration is illegitimate, illegal, or abnormal (the case file).\n\nIV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS (BIENES DEMANIALES): The Political Constitution in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: \" (...) In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (...) 14) To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own assets (...)\". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in articles 261 to 263; article 261 indicates: \"Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined to any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can take advantage because they are delivered to public use. All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, are not different from any other person.\" For its part, article 262 mentions: \"Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter into it, as long as it is not legally so provided, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.\" Thus, public domain is understood as the set of assets subject to a special and distinct legal regime from that which governs private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that any person may make of them or for a utility especially recognized by utility. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public domain and private domain assets; public assets are those to which a law gives a destination for public or general use, they are called \"demaniales\" and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, and cannot be claimed by adverse possession. On this concept, the Constitutional Chamber expressed in its Judgment No. 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one, the following:\n\n“The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. They are the called dominical assets, demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public assets or things, or public goods, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law and the administrative action substitutes the injunctions to recover possession... Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the thoroughfares of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...”.-\n\nIn the same sense, the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000, considered:\n\" ...II.- Regarding the nature of demanial assets (bienes demaniales) or public assets, this Chamber has stated in its jurisprudence that: \" ... the nature and legal regimes are different when dealing with private property or public or State property, this because the former is regulated in accordance with Constitutional article 45 and the relevant Civil Code regulations, such that the inviolability of the same is protected, introducing the concept of social function, so that no one can be deprived of his own except if motivated by a social interest and through a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of demanial property is based on subsection 14.) of Constitutional article 121, as this Chamber already indicated by resolution number 2306-91, of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on November sixth, so that its juridical nature is virtually different, which indicated that: \"The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. They are called dominical assets, demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public assets or things, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law and the administrative action substitutes the injunctions to recover possession. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession...\".\n\nUp to this point, we have treated demanial assets in a single classification when in reality we are in the presence of three different categories, even though directly related. A first group of assets consists of those destined for general use, as in the case of streets, parks, the beach, among others. It is not unnecessary to point out that the list of this type of assets is determined both geographically and historically, for while in one society a certain asset fits into this category, in another the situation can be diametrically opposed. The determination of that designation is a legal-political decision by the State; it is not an aspect inherent to the asset itself. It involves a direct designation to public use, which justifies its relevance and utility in corresponding to this classification. The second group of demanial assets (bienes demaniales) consists of those whose public use is indirect, corresponding to all those directly assigned to a public service. It is no secret that the concept of public service has been under questioning and reconstruction in recent decades due to a series of liberalization and market opening processes, in the understanding that these activities are ultimately nothing more than economic and very lucrative, which determines private interest in their participation. In any case, and without seeking to delve further into a concept that is otherwise fragile and unclear that, regardless of the ownership of the service, as long as it is public, it satisfies a general or collective interest; such that the assets that comprise it are indispensable to avoid an impact on the community. That is why it is indicated that their relationship with society is indirect, insofar as their collective use is not by the people's own hand but in the service itself. Hence, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated on previous occasions that these assets have a nature and legal regime different from that of private assets, inasmuch as, by the express will of the legislator, they are assigned to a special destiny to serve the community, that is, the public interest, and because of that, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, for which reason they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, strictly speaking, since the latter is limited to its administration and stewardship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demanial assets (bienes demaniales) is their destiny, inasmuch as they are assigned to and are at the service of public use, as has been recognized by doctrine on the matter, thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25, considered: \"For a good or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and to be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that such good or thing is assigned to 'public use', direct or indirect, and in this 'latter' case, it must involve things directly assigned - as 'final goods' or 'use goods' - to common utility or comfort, excluding from public ownership the State's assets that are merely instrumental in character.\" Before returning to some of the concepts indicated in that definition, it is necessary to include the third category of assets of that nature and which corresponds to what is understood as the special patrimony of the State, so that it is possible to locate a series of assets (enunciated in the Political Constitution itself, but without it being understood that this list is numerus clausus) are the patrimony of the State over which commerce is carried out without the possibility of appropriation. This is the so-called public patrimony, where certain assets are not the object of ordinary lawful commerce. An integral interpretation of the norm allows us to understand that this ordinary withdrawal from economic activity must be to ensure the distribution of wealth in the terms of constitutional articles forty-five and fifty. In any case, and regardless of the three categories, note that the emphasis of the differentiation of private assets from those of the public domain is given in relation to the destiny of the asset, that is, the fact of being assigned to a common use or to the service of the common good; as the Constitutional Chamber previously considered in judgment number 2301-91, of November sixth, nineteen ninety-one. As already indicated, for this reason, characteristic notes of demanial assets (bienes demaniales) are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable; that is, they are assets that are outside the ordinary commerce of men, such that their ownership or possession cannot be transferred, neither for free nor for a consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by adverse possession (usucapión), so that they are assets that permanently conserve their legal validity; and they are not subject to seizure. They are assets whose ownership the State holds in its capacity as administrator; it must be understood that these are assets belonging to the \"Nation\", with which they form part of the public patrimony; and that, due to their special legal nature, they present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that through the passage of time, the right of property over them cannot be acquired, not even of mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through adverse possession (usucapión), nor can they be lost by prescription; for which reason the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious character, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration – in the terms provided in articles one hundred fifty-four and one hundred fifty-five of the General Law of Public Administration –; and the same concessions that are granted over them for their exploitation can be canceled, through the appropriate procedure; they are unattachable, which means they cannot be the object of any encumbrance or seizure, neither by private parties, nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; whence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither for free nor for a consideration, neither by private parties, nor by the State, so that they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Moreover, their use and exploitation is subject to police power, inasmuch as, being assets that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether through a concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration. Thus, it includes real estate that has a nature and legal regime virtually different from private property, which derives from the provisions in constitutional article forty-five. A public asset can be natural or artificial, depending on whether it involves assets declared public by the legislator considering them in the state that nature presents or offers them (a river for example), or assets declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). Designation (afectación) is the fact or the manifestation of will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing is incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and can be effected by law or by administrative act. Doctrine makes the distinction between \"assignment of public character\" to an asset and the \"designation\" (afectación) of that asset to the public domain. The assignment of public character means establishing that such determined asset would have demanial quality; thus, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public thoroughfares are integral parts or dependencies of the public domain and this means that they include both current ones and those that will be built. In contrast, designation (afectación) means that the asset declared demanial is effectively incorporated into public use and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are built by administration or by the conclusion of the works and their official receipt, when it is a private party that carries them out (construction of an urbanization or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- It is for this reason that it is said that the designation (afectación) can be declared by law generically, or by an administrative act, which, necessarily, must conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality) ...” (Vote No. 3145-96 of June 28, 1996) (...). Additionally, there is the figure of \"de-designation\" (desafectación), which is \"the legal situation by which an asset ceases to belong to the public domain (...) the assets that are de-designated become, in principle, patrimonial assets of the holding Administration, which, in its case, may alienate them (...)\"(vote 035-2009-SVII, Contentious Administrative Tribunal).\n\nV.- REGARDING AUTHORIZATIONS AND PERMITS: Contrary to what happens in administrative concessions, in which the Administration transfers certain public powers to a private party, be it a natural person or legal entity, in authorizations, the Administration performs a \"lifting of barriers\" for the exercise of a right that is already held, but which has not yet been administratively declared in favor of the applicant who complies with the requirements imposed by the legal system as a whole. Hence, following Manrique Jiménez (JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVA, 1st edition, San José, Imprenta y Litografía Mundo Gráfico, 1997), the authorizing Administration does not delegate powers nor constitute rights, it simply declares them, since the rights already exist before the respective declaration, by reason of compliance with the legal system confirmed by the person who requests, in good law, the authorization itself. There is, then, from the authorizing Administration, a declaration of will in favor of that public or private person who has complied with each and every one of the regulated requirements, with the Administration limiting itself to weighing the legality of what is requested within the scope of the public interest that the same Administration must protect. It is, in the best sense of the word, a confirmatory act once a series of legal requirements have been verified. It is maintained, in principle, that against the exercise of a subjective right, urged for its realization by an enabling act of the Administration, administrative discretion is not applicable, since the authorizing Administration is legally obliged to issue it, when the applicant has previously complied with the regulatory requirements, so that, in the authorization, we find two dimensions of regulated acts: those related to the content of the authorization and the act of its declaration which must be congruent with the motives and purposes that justify it. However, the Administration does not thereby lose, once the authorizing act is issued, the powers of stewardship and control over the use and enjoyment of the permit, license, or authorization. Its original prerogative as an Administration that must satisfy and watch over public interests does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implied, of the authorization. In essence, then, the Administration's power to revoke or annul licenses or approvals does not disappear, in the case of licenses subject to conditions or licenses illegally granted; of course, provided that the legal procedure has been complied with to do so, which guarantees the full participation of the interested party and especially the right of defense and due process in general. Indeed, the subjective right of the authorization applicant is born with the full compliance with the legal system, without the Administration being able to refute or ignore its declaration; but neither is it valid for the applicant to claim the individual application of a declaration of his right when he has not complied with the requirements regulated for the generality. By authorization, it is understood as an act of \"habilitation or permission\", meaning the \"administrative act by which the public administration grants the administered party the power to exercise pre-existing rights after a discretionary appreciation of its opportunity and utility with respect to the general interest, the authorization, in such a case, stems from an express request by the administered party but is, generally, discretionary regarding motive and content. The difference between this type of authorization and a license, in the strict sense, lies in the fact that the latter has an effect similar to the authorization but is regulated, that is, its content is regulated.\" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké.\n\npág. 449) For its part, the permit is understood as that \"act that authorizes a person—the administered party—to exercise a right, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption from a general prohibition for the benefit of the applicant. The permit tolerates or allows something very specific and determined to be done. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle to the exercise of a pre-existing power; it is said to be a grant of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness\" and also that it \"always grants a new, weakened right that constitutes an exception to a public-order prohibition\" (JINESTA LOBO, Op Cit, pp. 456 and 457). In general terms, both terms are often confused, but both coincide in that a pre-existing right must mediate; regarding use permits (permisos de uso), which is the topic at hand, it is appropriate to note the provisions of Article one hundred fifty-four of the Ley General de la Administración Pública which literally states: \"Article 154.- Use permits for public domain, and other acts that recognize to an administered party a right expressly and validly under lifetime tenure (a título precario), may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the act of revocation must be given in all cases.\" In the same sense, canon one hundred sixty-one of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa reads: \"Article 161.—Use Permit (Permiso de uso). On public domain property (bienes de dominio público), the Administration may grant use permits, which shall be motivated by reasons of opportunity or convenience for the general interest, provided it does not imply a deterioration in the disposition of the property.// In all cases, they shall be understood as granted under lifetime tenure (a título precario), and therefore may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration. The revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the act of revocation must be given in all cases.\" Referring expressly to the use permit on public domain property, the Constitutional Court has stated: \"As they are outside of commerce, these goods cannot be subject to possession, although one can acquire a right to their exploitation (aprovechamiento), though not a right to property. The use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain of the property, with the State always reserving the direct domain over the thing. The precariousness of any right or use permit is inherent to the figure and alludes to the possibility that the administration may revoke it at any time, whether due to the State's need to fully occupy the property, for the construction of a public work, as well as for reasons of safety, hygiene, aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the property and the permit granted, the natural use of the public thing must prevail.\" (Voto 5976-93 of fifteen hours and forty-two minutes of November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, of the Sala Constitucional). In the same vein, it stated: \"… they are subject to a public use determined by law, so private detention becomes exceptional to the purpose for which those lands are designated, requiring an express act of the Administration to legitimize it, which in the present case consists of a use permit granted via administrative resolution. Administrative law regulates use permits in Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which establishes that 'Use permits for public domain, and other acts that recognize to an administered party a right expressly and validly under lifetime tenure (a título precario), may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the act of revocation must be given in all cases,' so the use permit basically constitutes a unilateral act of will by the Public Administration, which for reasons of convenience and temporarily allows an administered party to enjoy, under lifetime tenure, a public domain property, not subject to the commerce of men and which, as such, can be revoked by the same Administration without liability, provided the stipulations of the cited article are met. In that sense, the use permit is characterized by being an essentially unilateral act of the Administration justified by circumstances that fall within the sphere of discretionary power, which places the useful domain of the property in the hands of the private individual, with the State reserving the direct domain over the thing. As this Chamber has repeatedly held, use permits possess a special characteristic: precariousness, which is inherent to it and which refers to the possibility that the Administration may revoke it at any time, without any compensation, if a conflict of interests should arise between the purpose of the property and the permit granted, in which case the use dictated by the legal system or the State's need to fully occupy the property must prevail\" (Voto 2777-98 of 11:27 hours on April 24, 1998).\n\nItalian doctrine, in trying to make the concepts somewhat more accessible, has indicated that the means of facilitating a public good into private hands without losing ownership lies in the figure of the concession (concesión), carried out through competition, by examination, and with full administrative guarantees that the suitable person is selected to perform that task; while the permit and the authorization, as lesser figures, the determination is an absolutely discretionary act, given the absence of competition, which determines its precariousness. Consequently, they would be lesser figures in degradation (in this regard, the treatment given by Nombre110962 is interesting). In theory, the figures of concession, authorization, and permit should not be combined; but in our reality and under that position, it is possible for them to coexist, the living example being the case of public service in taxi mode, where it is possible to locate concessionaires (selected by competition), permitholders (permisionarios) (persons who satisfy the requirements but were not elected through competition), and authorized persons (when the requirements are not met, but the exercise of the activity is permitted determined by public interest); a phenomenon that the corresponding ministry has been progressively eradicating.\n\nVI. REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CLAIM: The basis of the plaintiff's theory of the case rests on the assertion that, having paid a fee (canon) for the use permit held, combined with the payment of public services, a mutation of the legal institute was generated, causing it to be governed by the tenancy (inquilinario) regime. In this regard, the Tribunal must be more than emphatic in rejecting that position. Both Article one hundred fifty-four of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and numeral one hundred sixty-one of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, already transcribed, are consistent with the precarious nature of the use permit, which in this case would be over a public domain asset (bien demanial). Observe that it concerns the building of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, a public office that is a public domain asset inasmuch as it is directly dedicated to the provision of a public service, namely the issuance of passports, residency cards, and in general matters relating to the migratory status of foreign persons. Any affectation to the office implicitly carries a repercussion to the service as a whole, which entails the public domain nature of the asset. The asset being of that nature, the granting of use permits was appropriate, as indeed was ordered; which, as has been noted, are manifestly precarious and revocable by operation of law without assuming any liability, except in cases where the order is untimely or in cases of special, singular, and intense sacrifice established by the same Ley General de la Administración Pública (without prejudice to the fact that some part of the doctrine has even maintained that even in those cases, no compensation is due either, due to the illegal nature of any claim under those circumstances). The precarious concept refers to the possibility of revocation for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or even legality without liability involved, as it does not generate any subjective right for the permitholder. It is a mere facilitation of an area of public space for the generation of accessory services in the judgment of the interested Administration, but removable at any time at the same level of discretion as the act that generated it. Where there was no competition, no contention whatsoever, no presentation of guarantees, or in general, any mechanism that would grant some level of stability for the interested party. The possibility of revoking is an implicit clause in the act, the doctrine has said (see thesis compilation of Ortiz Ortiz, Nombre7411 and Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto), as it is well known by the interested party. Noting that while it is indeed normal for the authorizing act to be embodied in a document signed by the interested party and the Administration, this does not deny the unilateral nature of the determination; under no aspect are we facing a meeting of the minds in the terms of private law, with negotiation and the effect of law between them; we are facing a unilateral determination by the administrative body that defines the situation and under those conditions is accepted by its counterpart; the existence of a document resembling a contract is solely to establish some basic conditions and thus avoid problems between the parties, but not to generate the condition of a contract for it. The fee (canon) in this case is the pecuniary consideration that the user of the public domain asset made based on the advantage obtained, with the characteristic that it is not imposed coercively but stems from the voluntary action of the interested party when requesting the permit. Thus, contrary to the typical fee of public services, where the interested party who has an interest in receiving it is subject to the payment of that amount; in this case, the person pays the sum due to their interest (act of personal determination) in continuing to enjoy the use permit; it is indeed a legal burden, not a duty or obligation. For the establishment of the amount, the Administration is bound by the rules of reasonableness and proportionality inherent to all public activity, on the understanding that in the absence of parameters, it is administrative prudence that guides the conduct in such a way that it does not generate exorbitant enrichment for the interested party, nor come to stifle their activity. Within this framework, the charging of a fee does not convert a use permit into a lease agreement as the plaintiff wishes to see it, on the understanding that the former does not present gratuitousness as an inherent characteristic. The logic of the fee is based on the fact that the interested party receives a benefit from their condition, which would allow them to generate enrichment from an asset destined for the community, so the payment compensates the interests and avoids profiting without paying something to the community. The same situation occurs with respect to the payment of other public services, on the understanding that these were generated from the economic activity, it not being lawful for the Administration to pay them to generate a private service with profit for a person outside the public service. These are two totally different legal institutes, marked by the asset under consideration and the related parties; which makes them incompatible. Aside from the fact that the plaintiff abandoned arguing, in the oral trial, the illegitimacy or abnormality of the eviction act and on which there was also no evidence in that sense; it is not superfluous to indicate that the eviction was not untimely to the extent that the same document in which the agreement between the parties is established clearly sets forth the possibility of revocation at the moment the Directorate in particular sees fit and with only granting a minimum period in days for the plaintiff's withdrawal from the asset, which was indeed amply satisfied; which prevents the consolidation of the assumption under Article one hundred fifty-four already cited, of being faced with a decision lacking a reasonable time for the interested party. Observe how said clause was not incorporated only in the last extension of the permit, but that in the different documents thereof it is possible to locate its existence, as well as the signature of Mr. Nombre110961 accepting said stipulation. Thus, it is also not possible to uphold the existence of legitimate expectations (confianza legitima) regarding the mentioned gentleman under those conditions. Even though the interested party made significant investments, these were made at the time the permit in question began, which demonstrates that even if they were required by the Directorate in question, during the time of the permitted use, they should have recovered their contribution, in addition to corresponding to part of the inputs for developing the private activity at hand. In the same line of argument, Article three hundred seventeen of the Código Procesal Civil is not satisfied; with respect to Article two hundred twenty of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, there is also not a single piece of probative evidence that allows establishing that a singular, special, and intense sacrifice is being generated from said repairs that would allow deriving any liability; to which is added the interested party's abandonment of considering that we are facing abnormal, illegitimate, or illegal conduct. Consequently, it is not possible to locate any of the assumptions deriving administrative liability, neither for lack of service nor for singular sacrifice, which would make the claim presented illegitimate. Lastly, but no less relevantly, it must be remembered that while the Administration presents a dual capacity to act and could eventually use private law schemes, it is also true that it is bound by the principle of legality, which entails the impossibility of considering a tenancy in this case, especially dealing with a public domain asset. As a general rule, the public sector uses the institutes of public law, and the use of private law is reserved only for when the State subjects itself to that legal scheme, not by mutation, but clearly established in that manner by the interests involved. Legal mutation is a figure that only in isolated events can have some application in this area of law. Thus, a concrete damage is not proven, nor is a causal link; but more importantly, neither is the existence of an inducement proven that would allow us to consider that we are facing an assumption of liability. This being the case, the right the plaintiff claims does not exist, the exception of lack of right must be upheld, and the lawsuit must be dismissed in all its aspects.\n\nVII- REGARDING COSTS: In the case at hand, it is the Tribunal's criterion that one of the exceptions of Article one hundred ninety-three of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is not configured, which obliges condemning the losing party to pay the costs of this action.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nThe exception of lack of right is upheld, and the lawsuit is dismissed in all its aspects. Costs are to be borne by the losing party.\n\n**IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS (BIENES DEMANIALES):** The Political Constitution (Constitución Política) in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: \"(...) *In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, the following corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa): (...) 14) To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the assets belonging to the Nation (la Nación)* (...)\". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code (Código Civil), in articles 261 to 263; article 261 indicates: \"*Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which everyone can take advantage of because they are delivered to public use. All other things are private and subject to individual ownership, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in such cases, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person*\". For its part, article 262 mentions: \"*Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter into it, as long as this is not legally provided, separating them from the public use to which they were destined*\". Thus, public domain (dominio público) is understood as the set of assets subject to a special legal regime distinct from that which governs private domain, which in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal entities, are affected or destined for public utility purposes and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that any person can make of them or by a utility specially recognized by the utility. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public domain and private domain assets; public domain assets (bienes demaniales) are those to which a law gives a destination for public or general use, they are called \"demaniales\" and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, and not subject to adverse possession (indenunciables).\n\nRegarding this concept, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) expressed in its Judgment No. 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on the sixth of November of nineteen ninety-one the following:\n\n\"Public domain (dominio público) is comprised of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. These are the so-called dominical goods, demanial goods, public goods or things, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for a public use and subjected to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes the interdicts to recover the domain... Consequently, the national regime of public domain goods, such as the thoroughfares of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...\" .-\n\nIn the same vein, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment number 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000, held:\n\n\" ...II.- Regarding the nature of demanial goods or public goods, this Chamber has stated in its jurisprudence that: \" ... the legal nature and regime are different when dealing with private property or public property or property of the State, because the former is regulated in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution and the pertinent norms of the Civil Code, such that its inviolability is protected, introducing the concept of social function, so that no one can be deprived of their own except for a social interest and by means of a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of demanial property is based on subsection 14.) of Article 121 of the Constitution, as this Chamber already indicated in resolution number 2306-91, of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on the sixth of November, such that its legal nature is virtually different, indicating that: \"Public domain is comprised of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. They are called dominical goods, demanial goods, public goods or things, that do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for a public use and subjected to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes the interdicts to recover the domain. As they are outside of commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession...\".\"\n\nUp to this point, we have treated demanial goods in a single classification when in reality we are in the presence of three different categories, even though they are directly related. A first group of goods is composed of those destined for general use, such as streets, parks, the beach, among others. It is not superfluous to point out that the list of this type of goods is determined both geographically and historically, because while in one society a certain good fits into this category, in another the situation can be diametrically opposed. The determination of that affectation is a legal-political decision under the responsibility of the State; without it being an aspect connatural to the good in itself. It is a direct affectation to public use, which justifies its relevance and utility in corresponding to this classification. The second group of demanial goods is composed of those whose public use is indirect, corresponding to all those directly affected to a public service. It is no secret to anyone that the concept of public service has been in question and reconstruction in recent decades due to a series of liberalization processes and market openings, in the understanding that those activities are fundamentally nothing more than economic and very lucrative, which determines private interest in their participation. In any case, and without pretending to delve further into a concept that is otherwise fragile and it is clear that, regardless of the ownership of the service, insofar as it is public, it satisfies a general or collective interest; so that the goods that compose it are indispensable to prevent an affectation to the community. That is why it is indicated that their relationship with society is indirect, to the extent that their collective use is not directly by the persons themselves but in the service proper. Hence, this Court has repeatedly indicated on previous occasions that these goods have a diverse legal nature and regime from private goods, inasmuch as, by the express will of the legislator, they are affected to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that for this reason, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, for which reason, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, in the strict sense, because the latter is limited to its administration and tutelage. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demanial goods is their purpose, insofar as they are affected to and at the service of public use, as recognized by the doctrine on the matter, thus, Marienhoff, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., p. 25, considered: \"For a good or thing to be considered as a dependency of public domain, and be subjected to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be affected to 'public use', direct or indirect, and it must be, in this 'latter' case, things directly affected -as 'final goods' or 'use goods'- to common utility or comfort, excluding from the domaniality of the State's goods those that have a simply instrumental character.\" Before retaking some of the concepts indicated in that definition, it is necessary to include the third category of goods of that nature and that corresponds to what is understood as the special patrimony of the State, so that it is possible to locate a series of goods (enunciated in the Political Constitution itself but without it being understood that this list is numerus clausus) are patrimony of the State over which commerce is carried out without the possibility of appropriation. This is the so-called public patrimony, where certain goods are not the object of ordinary lawful commerce. An integral interpretation of the norm allows us to comprehend that this ordinary withdrawal from economic activity must be to ensure the distribution of wealth under the terms of constitutional Articles forty-five and fifty. In any case, and aside from the three categories, note that the emphasis of the differentiation of private goods from those of public domain lies in relation to the purpose of the good, that is, the fact of being affected to a common use or at the service of the common good; just as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) previously considered in judgment number 2301-91, of November sixth of nineteen ninety-one. As already indicated, for the above reason, characteristic notes of demanial goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable, that is, they are goods that are outside the ordinary commerce of men, so that their domain or possession cannot be transferred, neither free of charge nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by usucapion, so they are goods that conserve their legal validity permanently; and they are not susceptible to seizure. These are goods whose ownership is held by the State in its capacity as administrator, it must be understood that they are goods that belong to the \"Nation\", with which they form part of the public patrimony; and which, due to their special legal nature, present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that by the passage of time, the right of property over them cannot be acquired, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through usucapion, nor can they be lost by prescription; this being the reason why the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious character, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration –under the terms provided in articles one hundred fifty-four and one hundred fifty-five of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)–; and the same concessions granted over them for their use can be cancelled, by means of the corresponding procedure; they are unattachable which means they cannot be the object of any encumbrance or seizure, neither by private parties nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; whereby they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither free of charge nor for consideration, neither by private parties nor by the State, so that they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Moreover, their use and exploitation is subject to police power, inasmuch as, being goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration. So it includes real property that has a legal nature and regime virtually diverse from private property, which derives from the provisions of constitutional Article forty-five. A public good can be natural or artificial, depending on whether they are goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state that nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). The affectation is the act or the manifestation of will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing is incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and it can be effected by law or by administrative act. The doctrine makes the distinction between \"assignment of the public character\" to a good and the \"affectation\" of that good to public domain. The assignment of the public character means establishing that said specific good would have demanial quality; so, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public thoroughfares are integrant parts or dependencies of public domain and that means they are current ones and those that come to be built. In contrast, affectation means that the good declared dominical is effectively incorporated into public use and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are built by public administration or by the conclusion of the works and their official receipt, when it is a private party that carries them out (construction of an urbanization or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- It is for this reason that it is said that affectation can be declared by law in a generic form, or else by an administrative act, which must necessarily conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality) ...\" (Voto No. 3145-96 of June 28, 1996) (...) \". Additionally, there exists the figure of \"deaffectation (desafectación)\", which deals with \"the legal situation by which a good ceases to belong to public domain (...) goods that are deaffected are converted, in principle, into patrimonial goods of the holder Administration, which, in its case, may alienate them (...) \" (voto 035-2009-SVII, Administrative Contentious Tribunal).\n\nV.- ON AUTHORIZATIONS AND PERMITS: Contrary to what happens in administrative concessions, in which the Administration transfers certain public powers to a private party, whether a natural or legal person, in authorizations, the Administration makes a \"lifting of barriers\" for the exercise of a right that one already has, but that administratively is not yet declared in favor of the applicant who complies with the requirements imposed by the legal system as a whole. Hence, following Manrique Jiménez (JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVA, 1st edition, San José, Imprenta y Litografía Mundo Gráfico, 1997), the Administration that authorizes does not delegate powers nor constitute rights, it simply declares them, because the rights already exist before the respective declaration, by reason of compliance with the legal system confirmed by whoever requests, in good law, the authorization itself. There is then, on the part of the authorizing Administration, a declaration of will in favor of that public or private person who has fulfilled each and every one of the regulated requirements, the Administration being limited to weighing the legality of what is requested within the scope of the public interest that the same Administration must protect. It is, in the best sense of the word, a confirmatory act once a series of legal requirements have been verified. It is maintained, in principle, that before the exercise of a subjective right, which urgently requires a habilitation act from the Administration for its realization, administrative discretion is not applicable, since the authorizing Administration is legally obligated to issue it, when the applicant has previously complied with the regulatory requirements, therefore, we find in the authorization two dimensions of regulated acts: those related to the content of the authorization and the act of its declaration that must be congruent with the motives and purposes that justify it. However, the Administration does not lose thereby, once the authorizing act is issued, the powers of tutelage and control in the use and enjoyment of the permit, license, or authorization. Its original prerogative as an Administration that must satisfy and watch over public interests does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implicit, of the authorization. In essence, then, the Administration does not lose its power to revoke or annul licenses or approvals, in the case of licenses subject to conditions or licenses illegally granted; of course, always provided that the legal procedure has been complied with, guaranteeing the full participation of the interested party and especially the right of defense and due process in general. In effect, the subjective right of the applicant for the authorization is born with the full compliance with the legal system, without the Administration being able to refute or disregard its declaration; but it is also not valid for the applicant to claim the individual application of a declaration of their right when they have not complied with the requirements regulated for the generality. An authorization is considered an act of \"habilitation or permission\", understood as the \"administrative act by which the public administration grants the administered party the power to exercise pre-existing rights after a discretionary assessment of its opportunity and utility with respect to the general interest, the authorization, in such a case, obeys an express request from the administered party but is, generally, discretionary as to motive and content. The difference between this type of authorization and a license, in the strict sense, lies in the fact that the latter has an effect similar to authorization but is regulated, that is, its content is regulated.\" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. p. 449) For its part, a permit is understood as that \"act that authorizes a person - administered party - for the exercise of a right, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption regarding a general prohibition for the benefit of the one who requests it. With the permit, something very specific and determined is tolerated or permitted. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle for the exercise of a pre-existing power, it is said that it is a concession of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness\" and which moreover \"always grants a new weakened right that supposes an exception to a prohibition of public order\" (JINESTA LOBO, Op Cit, pp. 456 and 457). In general terms, both terms are often confused, but both coincide in that a pre-existing right must be involved, as for use permits, which is the topic that now concerns us, it is advisable to point out the provisions of article one hundred fifty-four of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) which literally establishes: \"Article 154.- The use permits of public domain, and other acts that recognize an administrated party a right expressly and validly under precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability for the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a prudential period for compliance with the revocation act shall be granted in all cases.\" In the same vein, canon one hundred sixty-one of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), states \"Article 161.—Use Permit. On public domain goods, the Administration may grant use permits, which shall be motivated by reasons of opportunity or convenience for the general interest, provided that it does not imply a deterioration in the disposition of the good.// In any case, they shall be understood as granted under precarious title, so they may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability for the Administration. The revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a prudential period for compliance with the revocation act shall be granted in all cases.\" Referring expressly to the use permit on public domain goods, the Constitutional Court has indicated: \"As they are outside of commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession, although one can acquire a right to their use, although not a right to property.\n\nThe use permit (permiso de <span\\r\\nclass=GramE>uso</span>) is a unilateral legal act issued by <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName>, in\\r\\nthe exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:State>\\r\\nindividual is the beneficial ownership <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:place></st1:State>\\r\\nproperty, with the State always reserving direct ownership over the thing. The\\r\\nprecariousness of any right or use permit is inherent to the figure and\\r\\nalludes to the possibility that the administration may revoke it at any time,\\r\\nwhether due to the State's need to fully occupy the property, for the\\r\\nconstruction of a public work, as well as for reasons of security,\\r\\nhygiene, or aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests\\r\\nshould arise between the purpose of the property and the permit granted, the\\r\\nnatural use of the public thing must prevail</i>.” (Voto 5976-93 of fifteen\\r\\nhours forty-two minutes <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\"><span\\r\\n  class=GramE>of the</span></st1:place></st1:State> sixteenth of November of one thousand\\r\\nnine hundred ninety-three, of <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Sala Constitucional\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Constitutional Chamber</st1:PersonName>).\\r\\nIn the same vein, it stated: “… <i>they are subject to a public use determined\\r\\nby law, so that private possession becomes exceptional to the purpose\\r\\nfor which those lands are designated, requiring to legitimize it an express\\r\\nact of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName>,\\r\\nwhich in the present case consists of a use permit granted via administrative\\r\\nresolution. Administrative law regulates use permits in\\r\\narticle 154 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Ley General\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the General\\r\\n Law</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración Pública\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Public Administration</st1:PersonName>,\\r\\nwhich establishes that &quot;Use permits for the public domain, and other\\r\\nacts that recognize a right expressly and validly for an administered party on a\\r\\nprecarious basis, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience\\r\\nwithout liability on the part of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n Administration</st1:PersonName>; but the revocation must not be untimely\\r\\nnor arbitrary and a prudent period for the fulfillment of the revocation act\\r\\nmust be given in all cases&quot;, so that the use permit\\r\\nbasically constitutes a unilateral act of will of <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración Pública\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Public Administration</st1:PersonName>,\\r\\nwhich for reasons of convenience and temporarily allows an administered party to\\r\\nenjoy on a precarious basis a public domain property, not subject to\\r\\ncommerce among men, and which as such, can be revoked by the same\\r\\nAdministration without liability, provided that the stipulations in the cited article are fulfilled. In that sense, the use permit is\\r\\ncharacterized by being an essentially unilateral act of <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName>\\r\\njustified by circumstances that fall within the sphere of discretionary power,\\r\\nwhich places in the hands of the individual the beneficial ownership of the property, with the\\r\\nState reserving direct ownership over the thing. As this Chamber has repeatedly\\r\\nheld, use permits possess a special characteristic:\\r\\nprecariousness, which is inherent to them and which alludes to the possibility that <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName> may\\r\\nrevoke it at any time, without any compensation, should a conflict\\r\\nof interests arise between the purpose of the property and the permit granted, in\\r\\nwhich case the use given by the legal system or the need of the\\r\\nstate to fully occupy the property must prevail”</i> (voto 2777-98 of 11:27 hours on\\r\\nApril 24, 1998).</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\\r\\n150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp; Italian doctrine,\\r\\ntrying to make the concepts a little more accessible, has pointed out that the means\\r\\nof facilitating a public good into private hands without losing ownership\\r\\nis located in the figure of the concession, carried out through a competitive process, by\\r\\nmerit-based competition, and with full administrative guarantees that the suitable\\r\\nperson is being taken on to fulfill that task; while the permit and the authorization, as\\r\\nminor figures, the determination is an absolutely discretionary act, in the\\r\\nabsence of a competitive process, which determines its precariousness.&nbsp; <span\\r\\nclass=GramE>Consequently, these would be minor figures in degradation (in this\\r\\nregard, the treatment given by Sayagues Lazo on the matter is interesting).</span>&nbsp;\\r\\nIn theory, the figures of the concession, the authorization, and the\\r\\npermit should not be combined; but in our reality and under that position, it is possible that they coexist,\\r\\nthe prime example being the case of the public taxi service, where it is\\r\\npossible to locate concessionaires (chosen by competitive process), permit holders\\r\\n(persons who satisfy the requirements but were not elected through a\\r\\ncompetitive process), and authorized parties (when the requirements are not met, but the\\r\\nexercise of the activity is permitted, determined by public interest); a phenomenon that\\r\\nthe corresponding ministry has been progressively eradicating.</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\\r\\n\\r\\n<p style='margin-top:5.05pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.05pt;margin-left:\\r\\n0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\\r\\n150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>VI.<span class=GramE>&nbsp; REGARDING</span>\\r\\nTHE SPECIFIC CLAIM:</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;\\r\\nfont-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> The basis of the theory <st1:State\\r\\nw:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:State> case <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:State> plaintiff is\\r\\nsupported by the notion that having paid a fee for the use permit that\\r\\nhe held, added to the payment of public services, a mutation <st1:State\\r\\nw:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:place></st1:State> legal institution was generated,\\r\\nso as to be governed by the tenancy regime.&nbsp; <span class=GramE>In this\\r\\nregard, the Tribunal must be more than emphatic in rejecting that position.</span>&nbsp; Both article one hundred and fifty-four</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Ley General\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n General Law</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración Pública\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Public Administration</st1:PersonName>,\\r\\nand ordinal one hundred and sixty-one</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:\\r\\nCambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>of the Regulation to <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Ley\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Law</st1:PersonName> of Administrative Contracting\\r\\nalready transcribed, prove to be consistent with the precarious nature of the use\\r\\npermit, which in this case would be over a demanial property.&nbsp; See how it concerns\\r\\nthe building of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Dirección General\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n General Directorate</st1:PersonName> of Migration and Immigration, a public\\r\\noffice that is demanial property insofar as it is directly dedicated to the\\r\\nprovision of a public service, namely, the issuance of\\r\\npassports, residence cards, and in general everything relating to the migratory\\r\\nstatus of foreign persons</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:\\r\\nCambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>. Any\\r\\naffectation of the office implicitly carries a repercussion for the service as\\r\\na <span class=GramE>whole<span style='font-size:12.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%'> </span>,</span> which entails the demanial nature <st1:State\\r\\nw:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:place></st1:State> property</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>. The property being of that nature, the granting of\\r\\nuse permits was appropriate, as indeed was ordered; which, as has been indicated,\\r\\nare manifestly precarious and revocable by operation of law without incurring\\r\\nany liability, except in cases where the\\r\\norder proves untimely or in cases of special, singular, and intense sacrifice</span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>established by the same General Law of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Administración Pública\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n Public Administration</st1:PersonName></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:\\r\\nCambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>(without prejudice to\\r\\nthe fact that some part of the doctrine has even maintained that in those cases\\r\\nno compensation is appropriate either due to the illegal nature of any\\r\\nclaim in those circumstances)</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>.&nbsp; The precarious concept\\r\\nrefers to the possibility of revocation for reasons of opportunity, convenience,\\r\\nor even legality without liability being involved, as it does not generate\\r\\nany subjective right for the permit holder. It is a mere facilitation of an\\r\\narea of the public space for the generation of accessory services at the discretion of\\r\\n<st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName>\\r\\nconcerned, but suppressible at any time at the same level of\\r\\ndiscretion as the act that generated it.&nbsp; <span class=GramE>Where there\\r\\nwas no competitive process, any contention, presentation of guarantees, or in general\\r\\nany mechanism that would grant some level of stability for the interested party.</span>\\r\\nThe possibility of revocation is an implicit clause in the act</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>as the doctrine has said (see thesis compilations of Ortiz Ortiz, Eduardo and Jinesta Lobo,\\r\\nErnesto), insofar as it is known to the <span class=GramE>interested party<span\\r\\nstyle='font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%'> </span>.&nbsp;</span> Noting\\r\\nthat while it is indeed common for the authorizing act to be reflected in a\\r\\ndocument signed by the interested party and <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la A\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n A</st1:PersonName></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\\r\\nCambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>dministration, this does not negate the unilateral\\r\\ncharacter of the determination</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>, in no respect are we\\r\\nfacing a meeting of wills in the terms of private law, with\\r\\nnegotiation and the effect of law between them; we are facing a unilateral\\r\\ndetermination of the administrative body that defines the situation and in those\\r\\nconditions is accepted by its counterpart; the existence of a document\\r\\nresembling a contract is solely to establish some basic\\r\\nconditions and thus avoid problems between the parties, but not to grant it the\\r\\nstatus of a contract.</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>The fee for this case is the\\r\\npecuniary consideration made by the user of the demanial property based on\\r\\nthe advantage obtained, with the characteristic that it is not imposed in a\\r\\ncoercive manner but rather based on the voluntary action of the interested party when requesting the\\r\\npermit. Thus, contrary to the typical fee for public services, where the\\r\\ninterested party who has an interest in receiving it is subject to the payment of that\\r\\namount; in this case, the person pays the sum out of their own interest (an act of\\r\\npersonal determination) in continuing to enjoy the use permit; it is\\r\\nindeed a legal burden, not a duty or obligation.</span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>For the establishment <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:State> amount, <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName> is\\r\\nsubject to the rules of reasonableness and proportionality inherent in all\\r\\npublic <span class=GramE>activity<span style='font-size:12.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%'> </span>,</span> on the understanding that, in the absence of parameters, it is administrative\\r\\nprudence <st1:City w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">the line</st1:place></st1:City>\\r\\nthat guides the conduct in such a way that it does not generate an exorbitant\\r\\nenrichment for the interested party, nor does it suffocate their activity</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>. Within this <span class=GramE>framework</span>, the charging of a fee does not convert\\r\\na use permit into a lease as\\r\\nthe claimant seeks to view it, on the understanding that the former does not have gratuitousness as an\\r\\ninherent characteristic.&nbsp; The logic of the fee is based on the fact that the\\r\\ninterested party receives a benefit by virtue of their condition, which would allow them to generate\\r\\nan enrichment from a property intended for the community, in such a\\r\\nway that the payment allows compensating the interests and preventing a profit without paying\\r\\nsomething to the community. The same situation occurs regarding the payment of\\r\\nother public services, on the understanding that these were generated by virtue of the\\r\\neconomic activity, and it is not lawful for <st1:PersonName\\r\\nProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName> to\\r\\npay them to generate a private service with\\r\\nprofit for a person outside the public service.</span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>&nbsp; <span class=GramE>These are two totally different\\r\\nlegal institutions, marked by the property under consideration and the related\\r\\nparties; which makes them incompatible.</span></span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>Aside from the fact that the plaintiff abandoned in the oral hearing the discussion of the illegitimacy\\r\\nor abnormality of the eviction act and on which matter there is also no evidence in that\\r\\nsense; it</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\\r\\nCambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>is not superfluous to indicate that the eviction was not\\r\\nuntimely, to the extent that the same document in which the\\r\\nagreement between the parties is established clearly sets forth the possibility of revocation at\\r\\nthe moment that <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Dirección\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n Directorate</st1:PersonName> in particular sees fit and with only the granting of a minimum period in\\r\\ndays for the withdrawal of the plaintiff from the property, which was indeed satisfied by\\r\\nfar; which prevents the consolidation of the assumption of article one hundred\\r\\nfifty-four already indicated</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\\r\\nline-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'>of being faced with a decision\\r\\nlacking a reasonable time for the interested party.&nbsp; See how\\r\\nthe said clause was not incorporated in the last extension <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:State>\\r\\npermit, but rather that in the different documents for it, it is possible to locate its\\r\\nexistence, as well as the signature <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place\\r\\n w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:place></st1:State> Mr. Salazar Rojas accepting said <span\\r\\nclass=GramE>stipulation<span style='font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%'> </span>.</span>\\r\\n<span class=GramE>Thus, it is also not possible to sustain the existence of\\r\\nlegitimate expectation on the part of the referred-to gentleman under those conditions.</span> A</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>lthough the interested party made significant investments, these were made\\r\\nat the time of initiating the concerned permit, which shows that even though they\\r\\nwere required by <st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Dirección\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the\\r\\n Directorate</st1:PersonName> in question, <span class=GramE>during</span> the\\r\\ntime <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">of the</st1:place></st1:State>\\r\\npermitted use, he must have recovered his contribution, in addition to corresponding to part of the\\r\\ninputs for developing the private activity at hand.</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\\r\\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:\\r\\nEN'>&nbsp; Along the same argumentative line, article\\r\\nthree hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code is not satisfied, and with respect to two hundred\\r\\ntwenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, there is also not a single\\r\\nitem of evidentiary proof that allows establishing that a singular,\\r\\nspecial, and intense sacrifice is being generated from said repairs that would allow\\r\\nderiving any liability; to which must be added the\\r\\ninterested party's abandonment of considering that we are facing abnormal, illegitimate, or\\r\\nillegal conduct.</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Cambria;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Cambria;\\r\\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>Consequently, it is not possible to locate any of the\\r\\nassumptions that give rise to administrative liability, <span class=GramE>neither</span>\\r\\nfor fault in the service nor for singular sacrifice, which would make the\\r\\nclaim presented illegitimate. Finally, but no less relevantly, it must be remembered that although\\r\\n<st1:PersonName ProductID=\\\"la Administración\\\" w:st=\\\"on\\\">the Administration</st1:PersonName>\\r\\npossesses a dual capacity to act and could potentially use schemes\\r\\ntypical <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\"><span class=GramE>of</span></st1:place></st1:State>\\r\\nprivate law, it is also true that it is subject to the principle of\\r\\nlegality, which entails the impossibility of considering a tenancy\\r\\nin this case, especially as it concerns a demanial property. As a\\r\\ngeneral rule, the public sector uses the institutions typical <st1:State\\r\\nw:st=\\\"on\\\"><span class=GramE>of</span></st1:State> public law, and the use <st1:State\\r\\nw:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place w:st=\\\"on\\\">of</st1:place></st1:State> private law is\\r\\nsolely reserved for when the State submits itself to that legal scheme, not\\r\\nby mutation, but rather as clearly expressed in that way by the interested parties. The\\r\\nlegal mutation is a figure that only in isolated events can have\\r\\nsome application in <span class=GramE>this</span> area <st1:State w:st=\\\"on\\\"><st1:place\\r\\n w:st=\\\"on\\\">of</st1:place></st1:State> law. Thus, a specific damage is not proven,\\r\\nnor is a causal link; but more\\r\\nimportantly, the existence of an inducement that would allow\\r\\nconsidering that we are facing an assumption of liability is also not proven. Therefore,\\r\\nthe right that the plaintiff claims does not exist, and the exception of\\r\\nlack of right must be upheld, and the claim must be declared without merit in all its aspects.”</span><span\\r\\nlang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\\r\\n\\r\\n<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>\\r\\n\\r\\n</div>\\r\\n\\r\\n</body>\\r\\n\\r\\n</html>\\r\\n\"\n\nOn August seventeenth, two thousand nine, the Administration notified him that he had to sign a contract and pay the sum of fifty thousand colones as a fee (canon), a sum that was reduced to thirty-five thousand colones after negotiation. The contract was for six months, automatically renewable for equal periods. By official letter DAF-368-07-11 of July fifth, two thousand eleven, he was notified of the cancellation of the permit effective August fourth, two thousand eleven. He filed the legal remedies, but they were rejected. He considers that the payment of the different services plus the fee (canon) turns his contract into a lease, which is why the act evicting him becomes arbitrary; it being on that basis that he derives the liability he claims. The State's representation maintains that what exists is a mere use permit, revocable at any time, without the need for prior procedure. In addition to the fact that in this case, for safety and convenience reasons, it was necessary to take the space, which determines the lawfulness of the administrative conduct. It generally shares the list of proven facts, except in those cases where the term contract or agreement is used regarding what exists between the administered party and the defendant Directorate, as it is not a matter of an agreement typical of private law. It requests that the claim be declared lacking in right and dismissed in all its aspects.\n\n**II. PROVEN FACTS:** Of importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following relevant facts are established: **1)** On December fifteenth, two thousand five, through document DAF-916-12-, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería granted the plaintiff a use permit for the installation of a coffee, refreshment, and pastry sales stand, for a term of five months, until May fifteenth, two thousand six, located between doors five and six, on the external part of the waiting room of the passports area of that government agency (uncontested fact, according to folios 1 and 75 of the judicial file, and folios 12 through 14 of the administrative file). **2)** On May seventeenth, two thousand six, a new permit was signed for the period running from May seventeenth to September eighteenth, both of two thousand six (see folios 22 through 24 of the administrative file). **3)** On September twenty-first, two thousand six, the parties to this proceeding signed a use permit for the cafeteria, effective for three months starting September twenty-first until December eighteenth, two thousand six, without prejudice that the Administration may terminate the permit at any time, upon forty-eight hours' notice (see folios 77 and 78 of the administrative file). **4)** Towards the end of two thousand eight, the plaintiff invested some sums of money in making repairs to the cafeteria (see folios 48 through 53 of the judicial file). **5)** On March tenth, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre110961 invested the sum of three hundred fifty thousand colones in the manufacture of furniture for the cafeteria (see folio 47 of the judicial file). **6)** On August seventeenth, two thousand nine, by official letter DG-2507-08-09, the Director General of Migración y Extranjería communicated that in order to extend the use permit, the plaintiff must pay as a fee (canon) the sum of fifty thousand colones into a government account, or provide cafeteria, refreshment, and pastry services for an equivalent amount for the meetings of the Directorate (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file). **7)** At the plaintiff's request, the sum to be paid as a fee (canon) was reduced to thirty-five thousand colones (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file). **8)** On July twenty-second, two thousand nine, an extension to the permit was generated with a validity of six additional months starting August first, two thousand nine, renewable automatically for equal periods (uncontested fact, according to folios 1 and 75 of the judicial file). **9)** By official letter DAF-368-07-11 of July fifth, two thousand eleven, signed by Mr. Agustín Barquero Acosta, Director Administrativo Financiero of the Dirección11, the plaintiff was formally notified of, in application of the second point of the public domain property use agreement that bound them, the cancellation of the related use permit effective August fourth, two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 75 of the judicial file and 197 of the administrative file). **10)** Faced with this act, the plaintiff demonstrated in the administrative venue opposition to the act contrary to his interests through a brief filed on July fourteenth, two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 2 and 76 of the judicial file and 198 to 199 of the administrative file). **11)** By official letter AJ-01821-2011-ARV of July twenty-second, two thousand eleven, the Legal Advisory Office of the defendant Administration responded to the petition of Mr. Nombre110961, indicating the propriety of the act of cancellation of the use permit already ordered by the defendant Administration (see folios 204 to 208 of the judicial file). **12)** On July twenty-seventh, two thousand eleven, the plaintiff filed a revocation appeal with a subsidiary appeal against the Administration's decision, which was rejected by resolution D. JUR. 392-2011 of twelve hours and ten minutes on August tenth, two thousand eleven, while the appeal was also resolved negatively by resolution 298-2011-DMG of eleven hours on September twentieth, two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 3 and 76 of the judicial file, folios 211 to 213, 217 to 221, and 228 to 230 of the administrative file). **13)** On October third, two thousand eleven, by resolution DAF-531-10-11, the Dirección General de Migración Extranjería granted forty-eight hours to proceed to vacate the occupied space within the public facilities (uncontested fact, according to folios 3 and 76 of the judicial file). **14)** The plaintiff vacated the space used on November twenty-second, two thousand eleven (uncontested fact, according to folios 3, 76, and 135 of the judicial file, as well as the precautionary measure file).\n\n**III. REGARDING UNPROVEN FACTS:** The following are deemed as such: **1)** That the conduct displayed by the Administration is illegitimate, illegal, or abnormal (the court records).\n\n**IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON DEMANIAL ASSETS (BIENES DEMANIALES):** The Political Constitution in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: \"(...) In addition to the other powers conferred upon it by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly to: (...) 14) Decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the Nation's own property (...)\". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in Articles 261 to 263; Article 261 states: \"Public things (cosas públicas) are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can avail themselves by being given over to public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or to the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, are no different from any other person.\" Meanwhile, Article 262 states: \"Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter it, until legally so provided, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.\" Thus, the public domain (dominio público) is understood as the set of assets subject to a special legal regime, distinct from that governing private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifest in the direct or indirect use that every person can make of them or through a utility especially recognized by the public interest. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public domain assets and private domain assets; public assets are those to which a law gives a destination for public or general use, they are called \"demanial\" and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, and unreportable. On this concept, the Constitutional Chamber expressed in its Sentence No. 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one, the following:\n\n“The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. They are the so-called dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public assets or things (bienes o cosas públicas), which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, those assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, they cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes for the possessory interdicts to recover the domain... Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roadways of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...”.-\n\nIn the same vein, the Constitutional Chamber in sentence number 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000, held:\n\n\" ...II.- Regarding the nature of demanial assets (bienes demaniales) or public assets, this Chamber has stated in its jurisprudence that: ' ... the nature and legal regimes are different when dealing with private property or public or State property, this because the former is regulated in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution and the pertinent regulations of the Civil Code, so that its inviolability is protected, introducing the concept of social function, such that no one can be deprived of their own except if motivated by a social interest and by means of a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of demanial property (propiedad demanial) is based on subsection 14.) of Constitutional Article 121, as this Chamber already indicated by resolution number 2306-91, of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on November sixth, so that its legal nature is virtually different, in which it indicated that: \"The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. They are called dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public assets or things, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, those assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, they cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes for the possessory interdicts to recover the domain. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession...\".\n\nUp to this point we have treated demanial assets in a single classification when in reality we are in the presence of three different categories, even though directly related. A first group of assets is composed of those destined for general use, such as the case of streets, parks, the beach, among others. It is not superfluous to point out that the list of this type of assets is determined both geographically and historically, because while in one society a certain asset fits into this category, in another the situation can be diametrically opposed. The determination of that affectation is a legal-political decision undertaken by the State; it is not an aspect connatural to the asset in itself. It is a direct affectation to public use, which justifies its pertinence and utility in belonging to this classification. The second group of demanial assets is composed of those whose public use is indirect, corresponding to all those assets directly affected to a public service. It is no secret to anyone that the concept of public service has been in question and reconstruction in recent decades following a series of liberalization and market-opening processes, on the understanding that those activities are fundamentally economic and very lucrative, which determines private interest in their participation. In any case and without seeking to delve further into a concept that is, moreover, fragile, it is clear that regardless of the ownership of the service, insofar as it is public, it satisfies a general or collective interest; such that the assets that compose it are indispensable to it to avoid an affectation to the community. That is why it is indicated that its relationship with society is indirect, to the extent that its collective use is not by the people's own hand but through the service itself. From this, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated on previous occasions that these assets have a nature and legal regime diverse from private assets, inasmuch as, by the express will of the legislator, they are affected to a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest, and for that reason, they cannot be the object of private property, so that they are outside the commerce of men, therefore, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, strictly speaking, because the State is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demanial assets is their destiny, insofar as they are affected to and are at the service of public use, as doctrine on the matter has recognized, thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25, held: \"For an asset or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and to be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said asset or thing be affected to 'public use', direct or indirect, having to be, in this 'latter' scenario, things directly affected -as 'final assets' or 'use assets'- to common utility or comfort, excluding from the demanial character those assets of the State that have a merely instrumental character.\" Before taking up again some of the concepts indicated in that definition, it is necessary to include the third category of assets of that nature, which corresponds to what is understood as the special heritage of the State, such that it is possible to locate a series of assets (enunciated in the Political Constitution itself but without it being understood that this list is numerus clausus) that are the heritage of the State over which commerce is carried out without the possibility of appropriation. This is the so-called public heritage, where certain assets are not the object of ordinary lawful commerce. A comprehensive interpretation of the norm allows understanding that this ordinary withdrawal from economic activity must be to ensure the distribution of wealth in the terms of constitutional articles forty-five and fifty. In any case, and regardless of the three categories, note that the emphasis of the differentiation between private assets and those of the public domain is given in relation to the destiny of the asset, that is, to the fact of being affected to a common use or to the service of the common good; just as the Constitutional Chamber previously considered in sentence number 2301-91, of November sixth, nineteen ninety-one. As already indicated, for this reason, characteristic notes of demanial assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable, that is, they are assets that are outside the ordinary commerce of men, so that their domain or possession cannot be transferred, neither gratuitously nor for valuable consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by usucapion, so that they are assets that permanently retain their legal validity; and they are not subject to seizure. They are assets whose ownership is held by the State in its condition as administrator; it must be understood that they are assets belonging to the \"Nation\", thereby forming part of the public heritage; and which, due to their special legal nature, present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that by the passage of time, ownership rights over them cannot be acquired, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through usucapion, nor can they be lost by prescription; which is why the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious character, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration –in the terms provided in articles one hundred fifty-four and one hundred fifty-five of the Ley General de la Administración Pública–; and the same concessions granted over them for their exploitation can be cancelled, through a procedure to that effect; they are unseizable, which means they cannot be the object of any encumbrance or seizure, neither by private parties nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; hence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither gratuitously nor for valuable consideration, neither by private parties nor by the State, so that they are exempted from commerce among men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Furthermore, their use and exploitation are subject to police power, inasmuch as, being assets that cannot be the object of possession, much less property, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration. So it comprises real estate assets that have a nature and legal regime virtually diverse from private property, derived from the provisions of constitutional article forty-five. A public asset can be natural or artificial, depending on whether it is an asset declared public by the legislator considering it in the state that nature presents or offers it (a river, for example), or an asset declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). Affectation (afectación) is the act or manifestation of the will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing becomes incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and can be effected by law or by administrative act. Doctrine makes the distinction between the \"assignment of the public character\" to an asset and the \"affectation\" of that asset to the public domain. The assignment of the public character means establishing that said determined asset would have demanial quality; thus, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public roadways are integral parts or dependencies of the public domain and that means that both the current ones and those that come to be built are so. In contrast, affectation means that the asset declared dominical effectively becomes incorporated into public use and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are constructed by administration or by the conclusion of the works and their official receipt, when it is a private party who carries them out (construction of a development or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- It is for this reason that it is said that affectation can be declared by law in a generic form, or else by an administrative act, which, necessarily, must conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality) ...” (Voto No. 3145-96 of June 28, 1996) (...)\". Additionally, there exists the figure of \"de-affectation\" (desafectación), which is \"the legal situation by which an asset ceases to belong to the public domain (...) the assets that are de-affected become, in principle, patrimonial assets of the owning Administration, which, in its case, may alienate them (...)\"(voto 035-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo).\n\n**V.- REGARDING AUTHORIZATIONS AND PERMITS:** Contrary to what occurs in administrative concessions, in which the Administration transfers certain public powers to a private party, whether a natural or legal person, in authorizations, the Administration performs a \"lifting of barriers\" for the exercise of a right that is already held, but which administratively has not yet been declared in favor of the applicant who complies with the requirements imposed by the legal system as a whole. Hence, following Manrique Jiménez (JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVA, 1st edition, San José, Imprenta y Litografía Mundo Gráfico, 1997), the Administration that authorizes does not delegate powers nor constitute rights, but simply declares them, since the rights already exist before the respective declaration, by reason of compliance with the legal system confirmed by he who requests, in good law, the authorization itself.\n\nThere is, then, from the authorizing Administration, a declaration of intent in favor of that public or private person who has fulfilled each and every one of the regulatory requirements, the Administration limiting itself to weighing the legality of what is requested within the sphere of the public interest that the Administration itself must protect. It is, in the best sense of the word, a declaratory act once a series of legal requirements have been verified. It is held, in principle, that in the face of the exercise of a subjective right, which requires an enabling act from the Administration for its realization, administrative discretion is not applicable, since the authorizing Administration is legally obliged to issue it when the applicant has previously complied with the regulatory requirements; thus, we find in the authorization two dimensions of regulated acts: those related to the content of the authorization and the act of its declaration, which must be congruent with the motives and purposes that justify it. However, the Administration does not thereby lose, once the authorizing act has been issued, its powers of protection and control over the use and enjoyment of the permit, license, or authorization. Its original prerogative as an Administration that must satisfy and safeguard public interests does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implied, of the authorization. In essence, then, the Administration does not lose its power to revoke or annul licenses or approvals, in the case of licenses subject to conditions or illegally granted licenses; of course, provided that the legal procedure has been followed, guaranteeing the full participation of the interested party and especially the right of defense and due process in general. Indeed, the subjective right of the applicant for the authorization arises with the full compliance with the legal system, without the Administration being able to refute or disregard its declaration; but it is also not valid for the applicant to seek the individual application of a declaration of their right when they have not complied with the requirements established for the generality. An authorization is understood as an act of \"habilitation or permission,\" defined as an \"administrative act by which the public administration grants the administered party the power to exercise pre-existing rights after a discretionary assessment of its opportunity and utility regarding the general interest; the authorization, in such case, responds to an express request from the administered party but is, generally, discretionary as to motive and content. The difference between this type of authorization and a license, in the strict sense, lies in the fact that the latter has an effect similar to an authorization but is regulated, that is, its content is regulated.\" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. p. 449) For its part, a permit (permiso) is understood as that \"act that authorizes a person—the administered party—for the exercise of a right, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption from a general prohibition for the benefit of the person who requests it. With the permit, something very specific and determined is tolerated or allowed to be done. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle to the exercise of a pre-existing power; it is said to be a concession of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness,\" and furthermore, it \"always grants a new, weakened right that constitutes an exception to a public order prohibition\" (JINESTA LOBO, Op Cit, pp. 456 and 457). In general terms, both terms are often confused, but both agree that a pre-existing right must be involved. Regarding use permits, which is the issue at hand, it is appropriate to note the provisions of Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which literally states: “Article 154.- Use permits for public domain property, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right for an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the revocation act must be granted in all cases.” In the same vein, Article 161 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa reads: “Article 161.—Use permit. On public domain property, the Administration may grant use permits, which shall be motivated by reasons of opportunity or convenience for the general interest, provided it does not imply a deterioration in the disposition of the property. // In any case, they shall be understood as granted under a precarious title, and may therefore be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration. The revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the revocation act must be granted in all cases.” Referring expressly to the use permit on public domain property, the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has stated: “As they are outside of commerce, these properties cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use can be acquired, but not a right to property. The use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the individual is the useful domain of the property, the State always reserving direct domain over the thing. The precariousness of any right or use permit is inherent to the figure and alludes to the possibility that the administration may revoke it at any time, whether due to the State's need to fully occupy the property, the construction of a public work, or for reasons of safety, hygiene, or aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the property and the granted permit, the natural use of the public thing must prevail.” (Voto 5976-93 of fifteen hours and forty-two minutes on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three, from the Constitutional Chamber, Sala Constitucional). In the same sense, it stated: “… they are subject to a public use determined by law, so private possession becomes exceptional to the purpose for which those lands are designated, requiring an express act from the Administration to legitimize it, which in this case consists of a use permit granted via an administrative resolution. Administrative law regulates use permits in Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which establishes that 'Use permits for public domain property, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right for an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the revocation act must be granted in all cases,' therefore, the use permit basically constitutes a unilateral act of will by the Public Administration, which for reasons of convenience and temporarily allows an administered party to enjoy, under a precarious title, a public domain property, not subject to commerce among men, and which as such, can be revoked by the same Administration without liability, provided the stipulations of the cited article are met. In this sense, the use permit is characterized by being an essentially unilateral act of the Administration justified by circumstances within the sphere of discretionary power, placing the useful domain of the property in the hands of the individual, with the State reserving direct domain over the thing. As this Chamber has repeatedly held, use permits possess a special characteristic: precariousness, which is inherent to them and alludes to the possibility that the Administration may revoke them at any time, without any compensation, if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the property and the granted permit, in which case the use provided by the legal system or the State's need to fully occupy the property must prevail” (Voto 2777-98 of 11:27 hours on April 24, 1998). Italian doctrine, attempting to make the concepts somewhat more accessible, has indicated that the means of facilitating a public good into private hands without losing ownership lies in the figure of the concession, carried out through a competitive process (concurso), by competitive examination, and with full administrative guarantees that the suitable person to perform that task is being chosen; whereas for the permit and the authorization, as lesser figures, the determination is an absolutely discretionary act, given the absence of a competitive process, which determines their precariousness. Consequently, they would be lesser figures in degradation (the treatment provided by Nombre110962 in this regard is interesting). In theory, the figures of the concession, the authorization, and the permit should not be combined; but in our reality and under that position, it is possible for them to coexist, the living example being the case of the taxi-mode public service, where it is possible to locate concessionaires (chosen by competitive process), permit holders (persons who satisfy the requirements but were not selected through competitive process), and authorized persons (when the requirements are not met, but the exercise of the activity is allowed determined by the public interest); a phenomenon that the corresponding ministry has been progressively eradicating.\n\n**VI. REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CLAIM:** The basis of the plaintiff's theory of the case rests on the notion that having paid a fee for the use permit they held, coupled with the payment of public utilities, a mutation of the legal institute occurred, so that it would be governed by the tenancy regime. In this regard, the Court must be more than emphatic in rejecting that position. Both Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Article 161 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, already transcribed, are consistent with the precarious nature of the use permit, which in this case would pertain to a public domain asset (bien demanial). Note that this concerns the building of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, a public agency that is a public domain asset insofar as it is directly dedicated to the provision of a public service, namely the issuance of passports, residence cards, and generally matters concerning the immigration status of foreign persons. Any affectation of the agency implicitly entails a repercussion on the service as a whole, which carries with it the public domain character of the asset. The asset being of that nature, the granting of use permits was appropriate, as indeed occurred; these, as has been indicated, are manifestly precarious and revocable by operation of law without assuming any liability, except in cases where the order is untimely or in cases of special, singular, and intense sacrifice established by the same Ley General de la Administración Pública (without prejudice to the fact that some part of the doctrine has even held that in those cases no compensation is applicable either, due to the illegal nature of any claim under those circumstances). The concept of \"precarious\" refers to the possibility of revocation for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or even legality without liability involved, as it does not generate any subjective right for the permit holder. It is a mere facilitation of an area of public space for the generation of accessory services at the discretion of the interested Administration, but removable at any time at the same level of discretion as the act that created it. There was no competitive process, no contention, no presentation of guarantees, or generally any mechanism that would have granted some level of stability for the interested party. The possibility of revocation is an implicit clause in the act, the doctrine has said (see thesis of Ortiz Ortiz, Nombre7411 and Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto), as it is known to the interested party. Warning that, while it is certainly normal for the authorizing act to be embodied in a document signed by the interested party and the Administration, this does not negate the unilateral character of the determination; under no aspect would we be facing a meeting of minds in terms of private law, with negotiation and binding effect between them; we are facing a unilateral determination by the administrative body that defines the situation, and under those conditions it is accepted by its counterpart. The existence of a document resembling a contract is solely to establish some basic conditions and thus avoid problems between the parties, but not to confer the condition of a contract upon it. The fee (canon) in this case is the pecuniary consideration paid by the user of the public domain asset based on the advantage obtained, with the characteristic that it is not imposed coercively but rather arises from the voluntary action of the interested party when requesting the permit. Thus, contrary to the typical fee for public utilities, where the interested party who has an interest in receiving them is subject to the payment of that amount; in this case, the person pays the charge due to their interest (an act of personal determination) in continuing to enjoy the use permit; it is indeed a legal burden, not a duty or obligation. For the establishment of the amount, the Administration is bound by the rules of reasonableness and proportionality inherent in all public activity, understanding that, in the absence of parameters, administrative prudence is the line that guides conduct so as not to generate exorbitant enrichment for the interested party, nor to stifle their activity. Within this framework, the charging of a fee does not convert a use permit into a lease, as the plaintiff seeks to see it, understanding that the former does not have gratuitousness as an inherent characteristic. The logic of the fee is based on the fact that the interested party receives a benefit due to their condition, which would allow them to generate enrichment from an asset destined for the community, so the payment allows the interests to be balanced and prevents profit without some payment to the community. The same situation occurs with respect to the payment of other public utilities, understanding that these were generated from the economic activity, it not being lawful for the Administration to pay for them to generate a private service for profit by a person unconnected to the public service. These are two totally different legal institutes, marked by the asset under consideration and the related parties, making them incompatible. Aside from the fact that the plaintiff desisted during the oral trial from discussing the illegitimacy or abnormality of the eviction act, and on which they also provided no evidence in that sense; it is not unnecessary to indicate that the eviction was not untimely, insofar as the same document in which the agreement between the parties is established clearly sets forth the possibility of revocation at the moment the Directorate deems appropriate and merely by granting a minimum period in days for the removal of the plaintiff from the asset, which was indeed more than satisfied; this prevents the consolidation of the situation described in Article 154, already mentioned, of being faced with a decision lacking a reasonable time for the interested party. Note how said clause was not incorporated only in the last extension of the permit, but rather its existence can be located in the different documents thereof, as well as the signature of Mr. Nombre110961 accepting said stipulation. Therefore, it is also not possible to uphold the existence of legitimate reliance (confianza legitima) on the part of the aforementioned gentleman under those conditions.\n\nAlthough the interested party made significant investments, these were made at the time the permit in question was initiated, which shows that even if they were required by the Directorate in question, during the time of the permitted use they should have recovered their contribution, in addition to corresponding to part of the inputs for carrying out the private activity before us.\n\nIn the same line of argument, Article three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is not satisfied; with respect to Article two hundred twenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), there is also not a single piece of probative evidence that allows establishing that a singular, special, and intense sacrifice (sacrificio singular, especial e intenso) is being generated from said repairs that would permit deriving any liability; to which is added the interested party's withdrawal from considering that we are facing abnormal, illegitimate, or illegal conduct.\n\nConsequently, it is not possible to locate any of the grounds giving rise to administrative liability, neither for lack of service (falta en el servicio) nor for singular sacrifice (sacrificio singular), which would make the claim filed illegitimate. Lastly, but no less relevant, it must be remembered that while the Administration has a dual capacity to act and could eventually use legal frameworks proper to private law, it is also true that it is subject to the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), which entails the impossibility of considering a leasehold against the case, especially since it involves a public domain asset (bien demanial). As a general rule, the public sector uses the institutes proper to public law, and the use of private law is solely reserved for when the State submits to that legal framework, not by mutation (mutación), but clearly established as such by the interests involved. Legal mutation (mutación jurídica) is a figure that only in isolated events may have some application in this area of law. Thus, a concrete damage is not proven, nor is a causal link; but more importantly, neither is the existence of an inducement that would allow considering that we are facing a basis for liability. That being the case, the right claimed by the claimant does not exist, and the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be upheld, and the lawsuit must be dismissed in all its parts.\n\n**VII- ON COSTS:** As is relevant to the case, it is the Tribunal's criterion that one of the exceptions of Article one hundred ninety-three of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) is not configured, which requires condemning the losing party to pay the costs of this action.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld, and the lawsuit is dismissed in all its parts. Costs are charged to the losing party.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n**Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez**\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n**Grace Loaiza Sánchez**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    **Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo**\n\n \n\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     \n\n**Filed by: Nombre110961**   \n\n**Against: El Estado**\n\n**Expediente: 11-005603-1027-CA**\n\n**Ordinary Proceeding (Proceso de Conocimiento)** \n\n\\"
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