{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-589090",
  "citation": "Res. 01195-2013 Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Naturaleza de las guardias médicas y ausencia de derechos adquiridos",
  "title_en": "Nature of on-call medical shifts and absence of acquired rights",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia analiza un recurso de un médico especialista contra la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. El actor fue sancionado en un procedimiento disciplinario con la prohibición de realizar guardias médicas; aunque la Gerencia Médica anuló la sanción por falta de sustento legal, el médico reclamó judicialmente diferencias salariales y restitución en las guardias. La Sala rechaza los agravios contra la sentencia de primera instancia por ser inadmisibles según los artículos 556 y 559 del Código de Trabajo. En cuanto al fondo, establece que las guardias médicas constituyen una modalidad de jornada extraordinaria, de naturaleza excepcional y ajena al nombramiento, por lo que no generan derechos adquiridos. Su disponibilidad depende de las necesidades del servicio y la Administración puede variarla según convenga a los intereses institucionales, conforme al artículo 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al no haberse acreditado la prestación efectiva de guardias después del procedimiento, las pretensiones indemnizatorias son improcedentes. La Sala confirma la sentencia recurrida.",
  "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice reviews an appeal by a psychiatrist against the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The plaintiff had been sanctioned in a disciplinary proceeding with a ban on performing on-call shifts; although the Medical Directorate overturned the sanction for lack of legal basis, the doctor judicially claimed salary differentials and reinstatement. The Chamber rejects the challenges to the first-instance ruling as inadmissible under Articles 556 and 559 of the Labor Code. On the merits, it holds that medical on-call shifts are a form of overtime work, exceptional in nature and not inherent to the position, therefore they do not create acquired rights. Their availability depends on service needs and the Administration may modify them as institutional interests require, under Article 4 of the General Public Administration Law. Since the plaintiff did not prove having worked shifts after the proceeding, the compensation claims are unfounded. The Chamber upholds the appealed decision.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "date": "18/10/2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "guardias médicas",
    "jornada extraordinaria",
    "ius variandi",
    "derechos adquiridos",
    "Código de Trabajo",
    "sana crítica",
    "apreciación de la prueba en conciencia",
    "CCS"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "guardias médicas",
    "jornada extraordinaria",
    "derechos adquiridos",
    "CCSS",
    "ius variandi",
    "Código de Trabajo",
    "Sala Segunda",
    "servicio público",
    "hora extra",
    "médico psiquiatra",
    "sanción disciplinaria",
    "debido proceso",
    "apreciación de la prueba",
    "sana crítica"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "medical on-call shifts",
    "overtime",
    "acquired rights",
    "CCSS",
    "ius variandi",
    "Labor Code",
    "Second Chamber",
    "public service",
    "extra hours",
    "psychiatrist",
    "disciplinary sanction",
    "due process",
    "evidence assessment",
    "sound judgment"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "V.- DE LA NATURALEZA DE LAS GUARDIAS MÉDICAS: Esta Sala ha tenido ocasión de estudiar la naturaleza de las guardias médicas, dentro del contrato de trabajo y se ha determinado que estas son una modalidad de labor en tiempo extraordinario y en consecuencia, no son parte de la jornada ordinaria del actor y como tal, no integran un derecho propio y consustancial al cargo. Reiteradamente se ha dicho que la naturaleza propia de la labor en tiempo extraordinario es, como su propio nombre lo indica, una jornada excepcional, pues lo que debe imperar en toda contratación laboral es el respeto a los límites horarios dispuestos como un derecho fundamental de las personas trabajadoras. [...] En concreto, por su excepcionalidad, la disponibilidad de las horas extra al igual que las guardias médicas puede ser variada cuando así convenga a los intereses institucionales, sin que pueda hablarse de derechos adquiridos. Desde la sentencia número 144, de 9:30 horas de 3 de mayo de 1995 se dijo que: “Respecto de las horas extra la jurisprudencia ha sido reiterada en el sentido de que las horas extras no conceden más derecho que al de su pago, sin que se pueda argumentar derechos adquiridos en relación con la posibilidad de realizarlas,…”.",
  "excerpt_en": "V.- ON THE NATURE OF MEDICAL ON-CALL SHIFTS: This Chamber has had occasion to study the nature of medical on-call shifts within the employment contract and has determined that they are a form of overtime work and consequently are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary working day and as such do not constitute an inherent right of the position. It has repeatedly been stated that the very nature of overtime work is, as its name implies, an exceptional working day, since what must prevail in all employment relationships is respect for the working time limits established as a fundamental right of workers. [...] Specifically, due to their exceptional nature, the availability of overtime and on-call shifts may be changed when it suits institutional interests, without any acquired rights arising. Since judgment number 144, of 9:30 a.m. on May 3, 1995, it has been held that: “Regarding overtime, case law has been consistent in that overtime only gives entitlement to its payment, and acquired rights cannot be claimed with regard to the possibility of working it,…”.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The sentence denying the physician's claims for salary differences and reinstatement of on-call shifts is upheld.",
    "summary_es": "Se confirma la sentencia que declaró sin lugar las pretensiones del médico de diferencias salariales y restitución de guardias."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "medical on-call shifts are a form of overtime work and consequently are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary working day, and as such do not constitute an inherent right of the position.",
      "quote_es": "las guardias médicas son una modalidad de labor en tiempo extraordinario y en consecuencia, no son parte de la jornada ordinaria del actor y como tal, no integran un derecho propio y consustancial al cargo."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "due to their exceptional nature, the availability of overtime and on-call shifts may be changed when it suits institutional interests, without any acquired rights arising.",
      "quote_es": "por su excepcionalidad, la disponibilidad de las horas extra al igual que las guardias médicas puede ser variada cuando así convenga a los intereses institucionales, sin que pueda hablarse de derechos adquiridos."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "On-call shift work is separate from the appointment; it is exceptional work – like overtime – that the defendant, as service administrator, provides to best fulfill its purposes.",
      "quote_es": "La labor en guardias médicas es ajena al nombramiento; es una labor excepcional -al igual que las horas extra- que la demandada, en su función de administradora del servicio dispone para lograr el mejor cumplimiento de sus fines."
    }
  ],
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      "id": "norm-13231",
      "citation": "Ley 6227",
      "title_en": "General Law of Public Administration",
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      "citation": "Ley 8343",
      "title_en": "Fiscal Contingency Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Contingencia Fiscal",
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      "date": "18/12/2002",
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      "id": "norm-6199",
      "citation": "Ley 6955",
      "title_en": "Public Sector Financial Balance Law",
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      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
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  "body_es_text": "*100006880929LA*\n\n*100006880929LA*\n\n \n\nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\nSALA SEGUNDA\n\n \n\nExp: 10-000688-0929-LA \n\nRes: 2013-001195\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del dieciocho de octubre de dos mil trece.\n\n Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, sede Guápiles, por [Nombre1] , médico y vecino de Limón, contra la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, representada por su apoderada general judicial la licenciada Rita Arias González, vecina de Alajuela. Ambos mayores y casados. \n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n 1.- El actor, en escrito presentado el cinco de agosto de dos mil diez, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condenara a la demandada a reconocerle retroactivamente las diferencias salariales correspondientes de la eliminación de las guardias médicas desde febrero 2006 hasta su efectiva restitución tomando en cuenta un promedio de 4 guardias médicas por mes, pago de diferencias de aguinaldo, salario escolar, vacaciones, restitución de las cuatro guardias que laboro en el servicio de psiquiatría, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.\n\n 2.- La apoderada general judicial de la institución demandada contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha cinco de octubre de dos mil diez y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho.\n\n 3.- El Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, sede Guápiles, por sentencia de las trece horas cincuenta minutos del ocho de julio de dos mil once, dispuso: \"En virtud de lo expuesto en la parte considerativa de la presente resolución, así como de las normas legales citadas, se declara SIN LUGAR el presente proceso ordinario laboral interpuesto por el señor [Nombre1] contra la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas (artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil de aplicación supletoria en la presente materia)...\". (Sic).\n\n 4.- La parte actora apeló y el Tribunal de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, sede Guápiles, por sentencia de las siete horas cincuenta y ocho minutos del doce de setiembre de dos mil doce, resolvió: \"En los procedimientos no se han observado yerros que hubieren causado nulidad o indefensión y en lo que fue objeto de impugnación se CONFIRMA el fallo recurrido\".\n\n5.- El accionante formuló recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial presentado el dieciséis de octubre de dos mil doce, el cual se fundamenta en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.\n\n 6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.\n\nRedacta la Magistrada Rojas Espinoza; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\nI.- ANTECEDENTES: El actor manifestó que laborando como médico asistente especialista en psiquiatría del Hospital de Guápiles, fue objeto de un procedimiento administrativo que se inició el 07 de marzo de 2006 y que finalizó con la decisión del órgano decisor –mediante oficio [Nombre2] 698-06 del 05 de setiembre de 2006-, de aplicar una sanción consistente en no autorizarle más guardias médicas de permanencia. Señaló que tal castigo fue impuesto sin respetar el debido proceso y su ejecución le acarreó daños en su patrimonio salarial, pues en promedio realizaba cuatro guardias mensuales en el área de su desempeño. Indicó que mediante resolución nº 29175-5-A-J, de la Gerencia Médica de la demandada, se acogió el criterio de la Dirección Jurídica de la entidad, donde se puntualizó que la no autorización de realizar guardias médicas de permanencia, no podía constituirse en una sanción administrativa disciplinaria, pues adolecía de sustento legal y en consecuencia ésta se dejó sin efecto. Adujo que la actuación de la dirección del hospital puso en riesgo la atención de las personas que requerían de ese servicio, criterio que fue compartido por la Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales, según oficio [Nombre3]. 044-07 del 05 de marzo de 2007, suscrito por ese órgano. Alegó que aun y cuando la sanción relativa a la no autorización de realizar guardias, se eliminó, le fue impuesta una de amonestación verbal, lo que catalogó de ultra petita o incongruencia del pronunciamiento. Esbozó que nunca se le restituyó en la ejecución de las guardias médicas, lo que consideró como un serio abuso del ius variandi, ya que sufrió una lesión a su ingreso salarial. Por lo anterior, solicitó que en sentencia se obligara a la accionada, al reconocimiento retroactivo de las diferencias salariales resultantes de la eliminación de las guardias médicas desde febrero de 2006 y hasta su efectiva restitución, para lo que se debía tomar en cuenta 4 guardias médicas mensuales, así como las diferencias que tal reconocimiento generara en el aguinaldo, salario escolar y vacaciones. Peticionó los intereses correspondientes a las sumas a que fuera condenada la demandada y la restitución inmediata en la ejecución de las 4 guardias mensuales que en promedio realizaba. Demandó la eliminación de la sanción de amonestación verbal impuesta y que se condenara en costas a la accionada (demanda de folios 10 a 15). La apoderada general judicial de la accionada contestó en forma negativa la demanda, interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho, solicitó denegar las pretensiones de la demanda y que la condenatoria en costas, recayera sobre el actor (contestación de demanda de folios 22 a 30). En primera instancia se declaró sin lugar la demanda y se resolvió el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas (folios 127 a 132 ftes y vtos). Dicho fallo fue recurrido por el accionante y Tribunal de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, confirmó la sentencia (folios 156 a 160). \n\nII - . AGRAVIOS DEL RECURRENTE : Ante la Sala, el actor recurre la sentencia del tribunal. Estima que en la sentencia impugnada se valoró incorrectamente el cuadro fáctico de este asunto, pues no se tomó en cuenta el hecho de la Gerencia Médica de la accionada, determinó que la dirección del hospital, había actuado al margen de la ley dentro del procedimiento administrativo incoado en su contra y tal circunstancia fue la motivación de esta demanda, mas todos estos no fueron correctamente apreciados. Arguye que lo peticionado, fueron diferencias salariales, no obstante, el órgano de alzada resolvió que las guardias médicas no son un componente salarial implícito y por ende no era obligación de la dirección del hospital, restablecerlo en la ejecución de las guardias, de lo que discrepa pues considera que fue la propia Gerencia Médica de la demandada, quien determinó que lo actuado por el órgano decisor en el procedimiento disciplinario seguido en su contra, fue ilegal y tal proceder lesivo a sus intereses, debe ser objeto de indemnización. Estima que en su caso, existió una violación del ius variandi, pero el tribunal equivocó el análisis al concluir que había perdido las guardias producto de su labor negligente, sin embargo señala que ese tema no fue objeto de debate ni formó parte de los hechos probados de la sentencia de primera instancia, porque en ese último lo que se tuvo por acreditado fue que las guardias se suprimieron por falta de contenido presupuestario para ese servicio. Esboza que el fallo impugnado se fundamentó en lo relacionado a los derechos adquiridos lo que en criterio no es aplicable a este caso, pues lo discutido versa sobre el ejercicio abusivo del ius variandi que cometió la entidad patronal. Señala que lo correcto es la aplicación de los principios propios del derecho público, ya que se le sancionó por no haber presentado el rol de guardias correspondiente al mes de enero de 2006, pero no se le exigió al director del hospital que debía girar por escrito, las instrucciones sobre el otorgamiento o supresión de las guardias médicas, lo que contraría todo el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. Reclama que en el apartado de hechos probados de la sentencia de primera instancia, no se indicara que el hospital no contaba con contenido presupuestario para dar el servicio de guardias médicas en psiquiatría, de lo que en todo caso, no consta prueba en autos que acredite tal circunstancia, porque no fue un aspecto debatido en el proceso y el hecho de justificar los fallos en ese punto, le genera un estado de indefensión ya que hubiera aportado prueba al respecto. Acusa una errónea valoración de las probanzas, ya que en la resolución de la Gerencia Médica de la accionada, nunca se le restituyó en la ejecución de las guardias y por ello debió acudir a estrados judiciales pero las autoridades judiciales, interpretaron que fue restituido en ese ejercicio, de lo que no consta prueba en autos. Por estas razones, solicita se acoja este recurso, se anule el pronunciamiento del tribunal, se declare el ejercicio abusivo del ius variandi y se le restituya en el ejercicio de las guardias y se le pague este extremo, desde marzo de 2006 a la fecha (folios 164 a 177). \n\nIII.- IMPROCEDENCIA DEL RECURSO CONTRA LA SENTENCIA DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA: Quien recurre, realiza una serie de manifestaciones en torno a la sentencia de primera instancia, no obstante es menester indicar que los agravios planteados en relación con dicho pronunciamiento, son inadmisibles, por las consideraciones que de seguido se exponen. El artículo 556 de la legislación laboral –ya citado- dispone que ante esta Sala solo son recurribles las sentencias dictadas por los Tribunales Superiores, norma que se complementa con lo dispuesto en el numeral 559 ídem, que ordena el rechazo de plano si el recurso se ha interpuesto contra lo resuelto en el fallo de primer instancia (ordinal 556) (en ese sentido, consúltense, entre muchos otros, los votos n°s 337 de las 10:40 horas y 340 de las 11:05 horas, ambas del 18 de abril; 387 de las 10:05 horas, del 2 de mayo; 424 de las 10:15 horas, del 14 de mayo; 470 de las 10:15 horas, del 29 de mayo; 755 de las 9:55 horas, del 5 de setiembre; 1051 de las 8:30 horas y 1061 de las 9:20 horas, ambas del 19 de diciembre, todas de 2008 así como las números 103 de las 9:35 horas, del 30 de enero y 118 de las 9:40 horas, del 6 de febrero, ambas de 2009). En concreto, reclama que el fallo dictado por el juzgado, se fundamentó –en buena medida-, en la imposibilidad de que el hospital no contaba con contenido presupuestario para dar el servicio de guardias médicas en psiquiatría, pero tal circunstancia no se consignó en el apartado de hechos probados ni se contó con prueba para acreditar ese hecho. Esta Sala, no encuentra la indefensión alegada, no solo por ser un vicio que se circunscribe a la decisión de primera instancia sino también en razón de su naturaleza procesal, resulta legalmente imposible que la Sala lo admita para su análisis, por lo que los agravios en ese sentido, deben rechazarse. \n\nIV.- DE LA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA EN MATERIA LABORAL: Manifiesta el recurrente que existió una inadecuada valoración del acervo probatorio, pues el tribunal interpretó que mediante resolución de la Gerencia Médica de la accionada, se le había restituido en la ejecución de las guardias, lo que no fue así. Es importante señalar que la prueba, en los procesos laborales, debe analizarse conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica y valorarse, a la luz de lo previsto en el artículo 493 del Código de Trabajo. Dicha norma establece que: “Salvo disposición expresa en contrario de este Código, en la sentencia se apreciará la prueba en conciencia, sin sujeción a las normas de Derecho Común; pero el Juez, al analizar la que hubiere recibido, está obligado a expresar los principios de equidad o de cualquier otra naturaleza en que funde su criterio”. De lo transcrito se colige una mayor flexibilidad a la que se pueda dar en el proceso civil, pues existe libertad de apreciación, claro está, dentro de los parámetros establecidos en los principios de equidad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad y objetividad. De manera que como bien señaló la Sala Constitucional cuando realizó el examen constitucional a la norma en cuestión, \n\n“(…) la apreciación de la prueba en conciencia no implica resolver en forma arbitraria, por cuanto todo juez -como funcionario público que es- se encuentra sujeto al principio de legalidad, el cual constituye un imperativo de adecuación de la acción pública, no sólo de las normas específicas sobre un objeto determinado, sino a todo el bloque de legalidad; por lo que no puede fallar con desprecio de los principios y derechos constitucionales, ya que está limitado por las reglas de la sana crítica y principios de razonabilidad, que debidamente aplicados conducen a la armonía de la apreciación jurisdiccional con la Constitución Política (…)” (ver voto n° 4448, de las 9:00 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996. Destacado no es del original).\n\nResulta claro entonces que las facultades de las personas juzgadoras, de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, no desembocan en decisiones que nazcan del arbitrio mismo, sino que se combinan con la obligación de fundamentar sus fallos, pues esto es parte fundamental del debido proceso y el correcto derecho de defensa tutelado tanto a nivel nacional como por los instrumentos internacionales que nuestro país ha suscrito. De tal forma que no es inconstitucional la apreciación de la prueba en conciencia, siempre y cuando se dicte un fallo fundamentado, a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica y en estricto respeto de los principios señalados líneas atrás. Por ello y en aplicación del principio de unidad de la prueba (contenido en el ordinal 493 de estudio), las persona juzgadora deberá apreciar el conjunto de pruebas aportadas por las partes, no de manera aislada o individual, sino conjuntamente para así poder otorgarles, a partir de las reglas mencionadas, el valor probatorio correspondiente. Es así como los hechos probados, no se llegarán a establecer tomando cada uno de los elementos de prueba, en sí mismos considerados, sino en atención a todos los que consten en autos y sean de trascendencia para el litigio en cuestión. En ese sentido, ha sido la posición tanto del órgano constitucional como de esta Sala, que no se lesiona el principio de sana crítica el no acreditarle credibilidad a un testigo o el otorgamiento de mayor valor a una deposición, en detrimento de la otra, toda vez que ello forma parte de la potestad discrecional de éste, en aplicación del principio de plena libertad probatoria. Así que, partiendo de las premisas apuntadas, se hará el análisis de si la prueba aportada dentro de este asunto, fue correctamente valorada en sentencia o si por el contrario debe acogerse el reclamo del impugnante.\n\nV.- DE LA NATURALEZA DE LAS GUARDIAS MÉDICAS: Esta Sala ha tenido ocasión de estudiar la naturaleza de las guardias médicas, dentro del contrato de trabajo y se ha determinado que estas son una modalidad de labor en tiempo extraordinario y en consecuencia, no son parte de la jornada ordinaria del actor y como tal, no integran un derecho propio y consustancial al cargo. Reiteradamente se ha dicho que la naturaleza propia de la labor en tiempo extraordinario es, como su propio nombre lo indica, una jornada excepcional, pues lo que debe imperar en toda contratación laboral es el respeto a los límites horarios dispuestos como un derecho fundamental de las personas trabajadoras. Tanto la Constitución Política, como los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos de carácter económico social, la normativa interna, y la jurisprudencia reafirman el respeto a los límites de la jornada diaria de las personas trabajadoras como parte integrante del derecho a una vida saludable. Su establecimiento, responde a una necesidad de atención de las personas aseguradas y a la continuidad del servicio público que se brinda, que, por naturaleza, tiene condiciones variables que exigen adecuaciones y mejoras continuas. En el sector público, la labor en tiempo extraordinario ha sido objeto de una amplia regulación limitadora debido a que por la forma de su remuneración exige un mayor gasto para los fondos públicos. Así por ejemplo, la Ley para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público n° 6955 de 24 de febrero de 1984, dispuso en su artículo 31: “Cuando en los poderes del Estado, en las instituciones descentralizadas y en las empresas públicas se haya consolidado situaciones laborales, en que un solo individuo trabaja en forma permanente la jornada ordinaria y una jornada extraordinaria, su superior jerárquico inmediato, deberá tomar inmediatamente las medidas correspondientes para que cese tal situación, so pena de ser responsable directo ante el Estado del monto de las jornadas extraordinarias que así se pagaren. De inmediato, también, se tomarán medidas por parte del Poder, institución o empresa, para que las funciones que originaron la jornada extraordinaria permanente se asignen a un empleado o funcionario específicamente nombrado para desempeñarlas, cuando tales funciones fueren de carácter indispensable”. En igual sentido, referido a la limitación que en principio existe en el sector público para laborar en tiempo extraordinario, se ubica 6 de la Ley de Contingencia Fiscal n° 8343, de 18 de diciembre de 2002 que dispone que: “No podrán autorizarse jornadas extraordinarias a una misma persona en forma sucesiva durante más de tres meses, en virtud de que desnaturaliza el carácter extraordinario de este tipo de jornada. Salvo justificación expresa y conforme a dichos criterios, la autorización de los pagos de horas extras por parte de las instancias de recursos humanos y los jerarcas de cada institución del Estado, deberá realizarse con estricto apego a los criterios de necesidad, razonabilidad y racionalización del gasto público”.\n\nAdemás, innegablemente, contar con un turno ordinario más, con un funcionario o funcionaria que inicia a partir de ese momento sin cargar con el cansancio propio de quien ha cumplido una jornada anterior, le otorga a la demandada mayor posibilidad de ampliar sus servicios y de ofrecerlos de mejor calidad, con un funcionario que hasta ese momento asume su jornada diaria de trabajo. Autorizar o mantener el desempeño en jornadas dobles o ampliadas, más allá de los límites ordinarios, es inadvertir los principios constitucionales sobre la jornada de trabajo, contrariar las leyes y administrar los recursos públicos en detrimento de la salud de los propios funcionarios y funcionarias. A la Administración le corresponde, en atención a sus fines, establecer la organización y las condiciones del servicio que presta, sin que tales aspectos puedan ser producto de la autonomía de la voluntad entre partes. Las entidades que como la demandada prestan un servicio público, tienen la potestad de reorganizar sus recursos y servicios en procura de la más adecuada y eficiente prestación del servicio; y mejores ventajas en el costo económico de su operación y funcionamiento (artículo 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). La labor en guardias médicas es ajena al nombramiento; es una labor excepcional -al igual que las horas extra- que la demandada, en su función de administradora del servicio dispone para lograr el mejor cumplimiento de sus fines. El funcionario o la funcionaria conocen que su atribución es totalmente disponible por parte de la administración patronal, según convenga a una más eficiente y ventajosa operación de los recursos y atención de las necesidades. En este caso, la razón de ser de la C.C.S.S. es la prestación del servicio público de salud. La administración y disposición de las guardias médicas, al igual que las horas extra, constituyen un recurso excepcional del que se vale la institución para ajustarse a esas necesidades excepcionales o a la garantía, que debe rendir, de la continuidad en el servicio. Ese carácter excepcional es de pleno conocimiento del funcionario o funcionaria porque el puesto tiene una jornada ordinaria bien definida y a la que sí tiene derecho irrestricto. En concreto, por su excepcionalidad, la disponibilidad de las horas extra al igual que las guardias médicas puede ser variada cuando así convenga a los intereses institucionales, sin que pueda hablarse de derechos adquiridos. Desde la sentencia número 144, de 9:30 horas de 3 de mayo de 1995 se dijo que: “Respecto de las horas extra la jurisprudencia ha sido reiterada en el sentido de que las horas extras no conceden más derecho que al de su pago, sin que se pueda argumentar derechos adquiridos en relación con la posibilidad de realizarlas,…”. Por otra parte, no debe perderse de vista la finalidad inherente al límite en las jornadas de trabajo, que se ha mencionado. El artículo 58 de la Constitución Política dice: \"La jornada de trabajo diurno no podrá exceder de ocho horas diarias y cuarenta y ocho a la semana. La jornada ordinaria de trabajo nocturno no podrá exceder de seis horas diarias y treinta y seis a la semana. El trabajo en horas extraordinarias deberá ser remunerado con un cincuenta por ciento más de los sueldos o salarios estipulados. Sin embargo, estas disposiciones no se aplicarán en los casos de excepción muy calificados, que determine la ley\". El límite a la jornada ordinaria de trabajo opera también en contra del interés económico de quienes pretenden ganar más recurriendo a las dobles jornadas que excedan tales restricciones horarias. El sistema de guardias médicas evidentemente da al traste con esas restricciones horarias, es por ello que estas deben responder estrictamente a criterios de oportunidad y necesidad, en beneficio de la persona usuaria de los servicios de salud. De manera que a la luz de lo dicho, se analizarán las inconformidades del recurrente. \n\nVI.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO: El actor estima violentados sus derechos laborales, en virtud de que en la resolución de la Gerencia Médica de la accionada, no se le reinstaló en su derecho al disfrute de guardias médicas, lo que tampoco ha conseguido en las instancias judiciales precedentes. El agravio no puede prosperar pues, como se desprende de los autos, el recurrente fue sancionado dentro de un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario que se instauró en su contra, por no haber presentado oportunamente, los roles de guardias médicas. Se le impuso como sanción, la prohibición de laborar bajo esta modalidad, pero tal decisión fue revocada por la Gerencia Médica de la demandada, al no encontrar sustento normativo para lo resuelto. Si bien es cierto, no existe en el ordenamiento jurídico, una norma que establezca como sanción, la imposibilidad de realizar guardias médicas y como consecuencia de la nulidad de la sanción, el accionante se encontraba en capacidad de laborar más tiempo de su jornada ordinaria, no obstante, de conformidad con lo dicho en el considerando anterior, las guardias médicas no integran un derecho propio y consustancial al cargo, por lo que bien hicieron tanto las autoridades administrativas como judiciales, en no otorgar una reinstalación vitalicia en este tipo de servicio médico, pues su implementación responde –como se dijo-, a la necesidad que en ese determinado momento, se presente en el centro de salud. En todo caso, se ha acreditado , dentro de este asunto , que al actor si se le tomó en cuenta para realizar guardias médicas, pues así se desprende del acta de Consejo Médico ampliado celebrado el 12 de julio de 2007, donde se le propuso al impugnante la realización de tres guardias médicas, a lo que manifestó su anuencia y solicitó quedara tal propuesta por escrito (folio 40 vto), situación que es ratificada por el testigo [Nombre4] quien declaró: “Luego en un Consejo ampliado, el Dr. [Nombre5] en el Consejo Técnico ampliado le ofreció darle guardias. Lo que recuerdo es que Dr. [Nombre1] le dijo que si se las daba por escrito, estaría bien” (acta de prueba testimonial de folio 97) y el deponente [Nombre5] , en su declaración indicó: “Posterior a la resolución de la gerencia médica en el cual se sancionó al Dr. [Nombre1] por haber abandona (sic) las guardias médicas, se hizo una reunión general de médicos especialistas, en donde se tocan temas generales, ahí se tocó el tema, en esa reunión en un acto de buena fe le dije al Dr, que se acercara a mi oficina para que él pudiera seguir haciendo tres guardias mensuales por lo que restaba del año, y ahí la respuesta fue que se lo hiciera por escrito. Esa propuesta consta por escrito con la firma de los presentes de esa reunión y la del Dr. [Nombre1]. (…) El Dr [Nombre1] nunca se acercó a mi oficina por la propuesta que le hice” (actas de prueba testimonial de folio 1 06 fte y vto). De estas probanzas queda claro que al actor no se le negó la posibilidad de realizar guardias médicas y en ese sentido también se debe desestimar el agravio en relación con la obligatoriedad que tenía la dirección del hospital, de comunicar por escrito, que podía volver a realizar labores en jornada extraordinaria, pues el asunto quedó plasmado en el acta que rola a folio 40 vuelto, de la cual ya se hizo mención. Ahora bien, en cuanto al reclamo porque el tribunal fundamentó la denegatoria de las pretensiones en la teoría de los derechos adquiridos, tampoco lleva razón el recurrente, pues como se analizó anteriormente, la labor en la denominada guardia médica, únicamente genera un beneficio salarial por el trabajo efectivamente realizado, pero por la naturaleza que reviste esa prestación del servicio, no puede considerarse como una condición ordinaria del contrato de trabajo, sino que esta dependerá de las necesidades que se presenten en el centro de salud, con el fin de brindar un correcto servicio público. Como el propio accionante acepta en su declaración, no ejecutó más guardias después de que acaeciera el procedimiento administrativo, de manera que no habiendo realizado las jornadas extraordinarias, no existe deber de la demandada, de resarcir económicamente al accionante, por lo que las pretensiones por diferencias salariales devienen en improcedentes. De todo lo dicho se concluye que lo resuelto en segunda instancia, se encuentra ajustado a derecho.\n\nVII.- DISPOSICIONES FINALES: Como corolario de lo expuesto, procede confirmar el fallo impugnado.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nEn lo que fue objeto de recurso, se confirma la sentencia recurrida. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez \n\n \n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert \n\n \n\n \n\nEva María Camacho Vargas Milagro Rojas Espinoza \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n[Nombre6]\n\n 2 \n\nEXP: 10-000688-0929-LA\n\n \n\n Teléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2257-55-94. Correos Electrónicos: [...]. y mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "*100006880929LA*\n\n*100006880929LA*\n\n \n\nSupreme Court of Justice\n\nSECOND CHAMBER\n\n \n\nExp: 10-000688-0929-LA \nRes: 2013-001195\n\nSECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours thirty minutes on October eighteenth, two thousand thirteen.\n\n Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by [Nombre1], a physician and resident of Limón, against the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, represented by its general judicial attorney, licensed Rita Arias González, resident of Alajuela. Both of legal age and married.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n 1.- The plaintiff, in a brief filed on August fifth, two thousand ten, promoted this action so that in judgment the defendant be ordered to retroactively recognize the corresponding salary differences from the elimination of the medical shifts (guardias médicas) from February 2006 until their effective restitution, considering an average of 4 medical shifts per month, payment of differences in the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school bonus (salario escolar), vacations, restitution of the four shifts that he worked in the psychiatry service, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n 2.- The general judicial attorney of the defendant institution answered in the terms she indicated in the brief dated October fifth, two thousand ten, and raised the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho).\n\n 3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by judgment at thirteen hours fifty minutes on July eighth, two thousand eleven, ordered: \"By virtue of the foregoing recitals of this resolution, as well as of the cited legal norms, the present ordinary labor proceeding filed by [Nombre1] against the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL is declared WITHOUT MERIT. It is resolved without special award of costs (Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application in this matter)...\" (Sic).\n\n 4.- The plaintiff appealed and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by judgment at seven hours fifty-eight minutes on September twelfth, two thousand twelve, resolved: \"In the proceedings, no errors have been observed that would have caused nullity or defenselessness, and with respect to that which was the object of challenge, the appealed ruling is CONFIRMED.\"\n\n5.- The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief presented on October sixteenth, two thousand twelve, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the recitals section.\n\n 6.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\nMagistrate Rojas Espinoza writes; and,\n\nRECITALS:\n\nI.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff stated that while working as a specialist assistant physician in psychiatry at the Hospital de Guápiles, he was the subject of an administrative procedure that began on March 7, 2006, and concluded with the decision of the deciding body – by official letter [Nombre2] 698-06 of September 5, 2006 – to apply a sanction consisting of no longer authorizing him for on-call medical shifts (guardias médicas de permanencia). He pointed out that such punishment was imposed without respecting due process, and its execution caused damage to his salary assets, since on average he performed four monthly shifts in his area of performance. He indicated that through resolution no. 29175-5-A-J, from the Medical Management (Gerencia Médica) of the defendant, the criterion of the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) of the entity was accepted, where it was specified that the non-authorization to perform on-call medical shifts could not constitute a disciplinary administrative sanction, as it lacked legal support, and consequently it was annulled. He argued that the hospital management's actions put the care of people requiring that service at risk, a criterion shared by the National Board of Labor Relations (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales), according to official letter [Nombre3]. 044-07 of March 5, 2007, signed by that body. He alleged that even though the sanction regarding the non-authorization to perform shifts was eliminated, a verbal reprimand (amonestación verbal) was imposed on him, which he categorized as ultra petita or an incongruity in the ruling. He outlined that he was never restored to the performance of medical shifts, which he considered to be a serious abuse of ius variandi, since he suffered harm to his salary income. For the foregoing, he requested that the defendant be ordered in judgment to retroactively recognize the salary differences resulting from the elimination of the medical shifts from February 2006 until their effective restitution, for which an average of 4 monthly medical shifts should be considered, as well as the differences that such recognition would generate in the year-end bonus, school bonus, and vacations. He petitioned for the corresponding interest on the sums to which the defendant be condemned, and the immediate restitution in the performance of the 4 monthly shifts he performed on average. He demanded the elimination of the imposed sanction of verbal reprimand and that the defendant be ordered to pay costs (complaint on folios 10 to 15). The general judicial attorney of the defendant answered the complaint in a negative manner, raised the defense of lack of right, requested that the claims of the complaint be denied, and that the award of costs fall upon the plaintiff (answer to the complaint on folios 22 to 30). In the first instance, the complaint was declared without merit, and the matter was resolved without a special award of costs (folios 127 to 132 front and back). Said ruling was appealed by the plaintiff, and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone confirmed the judgment (folios 156 to 160).\n\nII - . GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT: Before this Chamber, the plaintiff appeals the tribunal's judgment. He considers that the factual framework of this matter was incorrectly assessed in the challenged judgment, because the fact that the Medical Management of the defendant determined that the hospital management had acted outside the law within the administrative procedure initiated against him was not taken into account, and such circumstance was the motivation for this complaint, yet all of this was not correctly appreciated. He argues that what was petitioned were salary differences; however, the appeals body resolved that medical shifts are not an implicit salary component, and therefore it was not the hospital management's obligation to restore him to the performance of the shifts, with which he disagrees because he considers that it was the defendant's own Medical Management that determined that what was done by the deciding body in the disciplinary procedure followed against him was illegal, and such conduct, harmful to his interests, must be subject to compensation. He considers that in his case, there was a violation of ius variandi, but the tribunal erred in its analysis by concluding that he had lost the shifts as a product of his negligent work; however, he points out that this topic was not the subject of debate nor formed part of the proven facts of the first instance judgment, because in that latter one, what was held as accredited was that the shifts were suppressed due to a lack of budgetary content for that service. He outlines that the challenged ruling was based on matters related to acquired rights, which in his view is not applicable to this case, as what is discussed concerns the abusive exercise of ius variandi committed by the employer entity. He points out that the correct approach is the application of the principles inherent to public law, since he was sanctioned for not having presented the shift schedule corresponding to the month of January 2006, but the hospital director was not required to issue written instructions on the granting or suppression of medical shifts, which contradicts the entire administrative legal system. He claims that in the proven facts section of the first instance judgment it was not indicated that the hospital lacked budgetary content to provide the medical shift service in psychiatry, for which, in any case, there is no proof in the case file that accredits such circumstance, because it was not a debated aspect in the process, and justifying the rulings on that point generates a state of defenselessness for him, as he would have provided evidence in that regard. He accuses an erroneous assessment of the evidence, since in the resolution of the defendant's Medical Management, he was never restored to the performance of the shifts, and for that reason he had to resort to judicial courts, but the judicial authorities interpreted that he was restored to that practice, for which there is no proof in the file. For these reasons, he requests that this appeal be upheld, the tribunal's ruling be annulled, the abusive exercise of ius variandi be declared, and he be restored to the performance of shifts and paid this item, from March 2006 to date (folios 164 to 177).\n\nIII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPEAL AGAINST THE FIRST INSTANCE JUDGMENT: The appellant makes a series of statements regarding the first instance judgment; however, it is necessary to indicate that the grievances raised in relation to said ruling are inadmissible, for the considerations set forth below. Article 556 of the labor legislation – already cited – provides that only judgments issued by the Superior Tribunals are appealable before this Chamber, a norm that is complemented by the provisions of numeral 559, ibid, which orders outright rejection if the appeal has been filed against what was resolved in the first instance ruling (ordinal 556) (in that sense, consult, among many others, votes no. 337 at 10:40 hours, and 340 at 11:05 hours, both of April 18; 387 at 10:05 hours, of May 2; 424 at 10:15 hours, of May 14; 470 at 10:15 hours, of May 29; 755 at 9:55 hours, of September 5; 1051 at 8:30 hours and 1061 at 9:20 hours, both of December 19, all of 2008; as well as numbers 103 at 9:35 hours, of January 30, and 118 at 9:40 hours, of February 6, both of 2009). Specifically, he claims that the ruling issued by the court was based – to a large extent – on the impossibility of the hospital lacking budgetary content to provide the medical shift service in psychiatry, but such circumstance was not recorded in the proven facts section, nor was there evidence to accredit that fact. This Chamber does not find the alleged defenselessness, not only because it is a defect that is circumscribed to the first instance decision, but also due to its procedural nature, it is legally impossible for the Chamber to admit it for analysis, so the grievances in that regard must be rejected.\n\nIV.- OF THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE IN LABOR MATTERS: The appellant states that there was an inadequate assessment of the evidentiary collection, because the tribunal interpreted that through a resolution of the defendant's Medical Management, he had been restored to the performance of shifts, which was not the case. It is important to point out that evidence, in labor processes, must be analyzed according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and assessed in light of the provisions of Article 493 of the Labor Code. Said norm establishes that: “Unless expressly provided otherwise in this Code, in the judgment the evidence shall be appreciated in conscience, without subjection to the rules of Common Law; but the Judge, when analyzing that which has been received, is obliged to express the principles of equity or of any other nature on which their criterion is based.” From the transcribed text, a greater flexibility is inferred than that which may exist in the civil process, since there is freedom of appreciation, of course, within the parameters established in the principles of equity, proportionality, reasonableness, and objectivity. So that, as the Constitutional Chamber well pointed out when it performed the constitutional review of the norm in question,\n\n\"(…) the appreciation of evidence in conscience does not imply resolving arbitrarily, since every judge – as a public official that they are – is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adequacy of public action, not only to specific norms on a determined object, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, they cannot rule with disregard for constitutional principles and rights, as they are limited by the rules of sound criticism and principles of reasonableness, which, duly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional appreciation with the Political Constitution (…)\" (see vote no. 4448, at 9:00 hours on August 30, 1996. Emphasis is not from the original).\n\nIt is clear then that the powers of the judging persons, to appreciate evidence in conscience, do not lead to decisions born from arbitrariness itself, but are combined with the obligation to ground their rulings, since this is a fundamental part of due process and the correct right of defense protected both nationally and by the international instruments our country has signed. Thus, the appreciation of evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, provided that a reasoned ruling is issued, in light of the rules of sound criticism and in strict respect of the principles indicated above. Therefore, and in application of the principle of the unity of evidence (contained in ordinal 493 under study), the judging person must appreciate the set of evidence provided by the parties, not in an isolated or individual manner, but jointly in order to thus be able to grant them, from the mentioned rules, the corresponding evidentiary value. This is how the proven facts will not be established by taking each piece of evidence considered by itself, but in attention to all that are in the case file and are of transcendence for the litigation in question. In that sense, the position of both the constitutional body and this Chamber has been that the principle of sound criticism is not harmed by not accrediting credibility to a witness or by granting greater value to one deposition over another, since all of that forms part of their discretionary power, in application of the principle of full evidentiary freedom. So, starting from the noted premises, the analysis will be made of whether the evidence provided within this matter was correctly assessed in the judgment or if, on the contrary, the claim of the challenger must be upheld.\n\nV.- OF THE NATURE OF MEDICAL SHIFTS: This Chamber has had occasion to study the nature of medical shifts (guardias médicas) within the employment contract, and it has been determined that these are a modality of work in overtime (tiempo extraordinario) and, consequently, they are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary working day (jornada ordinaria) and as such, they do not integrate a right inherent and consubstantial to the position. It has been repeatedly stated that the inherent nature of work in overtime is, as its name indicates, an exceptional working day, so what must prevail in every labor contract is respect for the hourly limits established as a fundamental right of working persons. Both the Political Constitution, international instruments on economic and social human rights, internal regulations, and jurisprudence reaffirm respect for the limits of the daily working day of working persons as an integral part of the right to a healthy life. Its establishment responds to a need for attention to insured persons and to the continuity of the public service provided, which, by nature, has variable conditions that require continuous adaptations and improvements. In the public sector, work in overtime has been the subject of broad limiting regulation because, due to the way it is remunerated, it demands greater expenditure from public funds. For example, Law for the Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector No. 6955 of February 24, 1984, provided in its Article 31: \"When in the branches of the State, in the decentralized institutions, and in public companies, labor situations have been consolidated in which a single individual permanently works the ordinary working day and an extraordinary working day, their immediate hierarchical superior must immediately take the corresponding measures so that such situation ceases, under penalty of being directly liable before the State for the amount of the extraordinary working days thus paid. Immediately, also, measures shall be taken by the Branch, institution, or company, so that the functions that gave rise to the permanent extraordinary working day are assigned to an employee or official specifically appointed to perform them, when such functions are of an indispensable nature.\" In the same sense, referring to the limitation that in principle exists in the public sector for working in overtime, is Article 6 of the Fiscal Contingency Law No. 8343 of December 18, 2002, which provides that: \"Extraordinary working days may not be authorized for the same person successively for more than three months, by virtue that it distorts the extraordinary nature of this type of working day. Unless expressly justified and in accordance with said criteria, the authorization of overtime payments by the human resources instances and the heads of each State institution must be carried out in strict adherence to the criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and rationalization of public spending.\"\n\nFurthermore, undeniably, having one more ordinary shift, with an official who begins from that moment without carrying the fatigue of someone who has completed a previous working day, grants the defendant a greater possibility to expand its services and to offer them with better quality, with an official who just then assumes their daily work day. Authorizing or maintaining performance in double or extended working days, beyond the ordinary limits, is to ignore the constitutional principles on the working day, contravene the laws, and administer public resources to the detriment of the health of the officials themselves. The Administration is responsible, in attention to its purposes, for establishing the organization and conditions of the service it provides, without such aspects being able to be a product of the autonomy of will between parties. Entities that, like the defendant, provide a public service have the power to reorganize their resources and services in pursuit of the most adequate and efficient provision of the service; and better advantages in the economic cost of its operation and functioning (Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration). The work in medical shifts is foreign to the appointment; it is an exceptional labor – like overtime (horas extra) – that the defendant, in its function as administrator of the service, uses to achieve the best fulfillment of its purposes. The official knows that their attribution is fully available to the employer administration, as it suits a more efficient and advantageous operation of resources and meeting of needs. In this case, the raison d'être of the C.C.S.S. is the provision of the public health service. The administration and disposal of medical shifts, like overtime, constitute an exceptional resource that the institution uses to adjust to those exceptional needs or to the guarantee of continuity in service that it must render. That exceptional nature is fully known to the official because the position has a well-defined ordinary working day to which they indeed have an unrestricted right. Specifically, due to their exceptionality, the availability of overtime, as well as medical shifts, can be varied when it suits institutional interests, without being able to speak of acquired rights. Since judgment number 144, at 9:30 hours on May 3, 1995, it was stated that: \"Regarding overtime, jurisprudence has been reiterated in the sense that overtime does not grant any right other than to its payment, without it being possible to argue acquired rights in relation to the possibility of performing them,…\" On the other hand, the inherent purpose of the limit on working days, which has been mentioned, must not be lost sight of. Article 58 of the Political Constitution states: \"The ordinary daytime working day may not exceed eight hours a day and forty-eight a week. The ordinary nighttime working day may not exceed six hours a day and thirty-six a week. Work in overtime hours must be remunerated with fifty percent more of the stipulated wages or salaries. However, these provisions shall not apply in very qualified exception cases, determined by law.\" The limit on the ordinary working day also operates against the economic interest of those who intend to earn more by resorting to double working days that exceed such hourly restrictions. The system of medical shifts evidently undermines those hourly restrictions, which is why these must strictly respond to criteria of opportunity and necessity, for the benefit of the user of the health services. So that, in light of what has been said, the appellant's objections will be analyzed.\n\nVI.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE: The plaintiff considers his labor rights violated, by virtue of the fact that in the resolution of the defendant's Medical Management, he was not reinstated in his right to the enjoyment of medical shifts, which he has also not achieved in the preceding judicial instances. The grievance cannot prosper because, as is evident from the case file, the appellant was sanctioned within a disciplinary administrative procedure established against him for not having timely submitted the medical shift schedules. The sanction imposed was the prohibition of working under this modality, but such decision was revoked by the defendant's Medical Management, as it found no normative support for what was resolved. While it is true that there does not exist in the legal system a norm establishing as a sanction the impossibility of performing medical shifts, and as a consequence of the nullity of the sanction, the plaintiff was able to work more time than his ordinary working day; however, in accordance with what was stated in the preceding recital, medical shifts do not constitute a right inherent and consubstantial to the position, and therefore the administrative as well as judicial authorities acted correctly in not granting a lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) in this type of medical service, because its implementation responds – as was said – to the need that presents itself at that particular moment in the health center. In any case, it has been proven, within this matter, that the plaintiff was indeed considered to perform medical shifts, as is evident from the minutes of the Extended Medical Council held on July 12, 2007, where the challenger was proposed to perform three medical shifts, to which he expressed his consent and requested that such proposal be put in writing (folio 40 back), a situation that is ratified by witness [Nombre4] who declared: \"Later in an Extended Council, Dr. [Nombre5] in the Extended Technical Council offered to give him shifts. What I remember is that Dr. [Nombre1] told him that if he gave them to him in writing, it would be fine\" (witness testimony record on folio 97), and the deponent [Nombre5], in his declaration, indicated: \"Subsequent to the medical management resolution in which Dr. [Nombre1] was sanctioned for having abandoned the medical shifts, a general meeting of specialist physicians was held, where general topics are discussed, the topic was addressed there, in that meeting, in an act of good faith I told the Dr. to come to my office so that he could continue doing three monthly shifts for the remainder of the year, and the response there was to do it in writing. That proposal is documented in writing with the signatures of those present at that meeting and that of Dr. [Nombre1]. (…) Dr [Nombre1] never came to my office for the proposal I made to him\" (witness testimony records on folio 106 front and back). From this evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff was not denied the possibility of performing medical shifts, and in that sense, the grievance in relation to the hospital management's obligation to communicate in writing that he could return to work in an extraordinary working day must also be dismissed, since the matter was recorded in the minutes found on folio 40 back, to which mention has already been made. Now, regarding the claim that the tribunal based the denial of the claims on the theory of acquired rights, the appellant is also not correct, because as analyzed previously, the work in what is called a medical shift only generates a salary benefit for the work actually performed, but due to the nature of that service provision, it cannot be considered an ordinary condition of the employment contract, but rather will depend on the needs arising in the health center, for the purpose of providing correct public service. As the plaintiff himself accepts in his declaration, he did not execute more shifts after the administrative procedure occurred, so that, not having performed the extraordinary working days, there is no duty on the part of the defendant to financially compensate the plaintiff; therefore, the claims for salary differences become improper. From all that has been said, it is concluded that what was resolved in the second instance is in accordance with the law.\n\nVII.- FINAL PROVISIONS: As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to confirm the challenged ruling.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nIn that which was the subject of the appeal, the appealed judgment is confirmed.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez\n\n \n\n \n\nJulia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert\n\n \n\n \n\nEva María Camacho Vargas Milagro Rojas Espinoza\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n[Nombre6]\n\n 2\n\nEXP: 10-000688-0929-LA\n\n \n\n Phones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Fax: 2257-55-94. Emails: [...]\n\n*100006880929LA*\n\n**Supreme Court of Justice**\n**SECOND CHAMBER**\n\n**Exp: 10-000688-0929-LA**\n**Res: 2013-001195**\n**SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE**. San José, at nine hours thirty minutes on the eighteenth of October of two thousand thirteen.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by **[Nombre1]**, physician and resident of Limón, against the **COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL)**, represented by its general judicial attorney, licensed Rita Arias González, resident of Alajuela. Both of legal age and married.\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**1.-** The plaintiff, in a brief filed on the fifth of August of two thousand ten, brought this action so that the judgment would order the defendant to retroactively recognize the corresponding salary differentials from the elimination of medical on-call shifts from February 2006 until their effective reinstatement, taking into account an average of 4 medical on-call shifts per month, payment of differentials in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), vacations, reinstatement of the four on-call shifts worked in the psychiatry service, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n**2.-** The general judicial attorney of the defendant institution answered in the terms indicated in her brief dated the fifth of October of two thousand ten and raised the defense of lack of right.\n\n**3.-** The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by judgment at thirteen hours fifty minutes on the eighth of July of two thousand eleven, **ordered**: \"By virtue of the foregoing in the reasoning part (parte considerativa) of this decision, as well as the cited legal norms, this ordinary labor proceeding filed by Mr. [Nombre1] against the COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL) is declared **WITHOUT MERIT**. It is resolved without special award of costs (article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, applied supplementarily in this matter)...\". (Sic).\n\n**4.-** The plaintiff appealed, and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by judgment at seven hours fifty-eight minutes on the twelfth of September of two thousand twelve, **resolved**: \"No errors have been observed in the proceedings that would have caused nullity or defenselessness, and regarding what was challenged, the appealed judgment is **CONFIRMED**\".\n\n**5.-** The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief submitted on the sixteenth of October of two thousand twelve, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the reasoning part (parte considerativa).\n\n**6.-** The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\n**Magistrate Rojas Espinoza writes for the Court; and,**\n\n**CONSIDERING:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND:** The plaintiff stated that, while working as an attending physician specializing in psychiatry at the Hospital of Guápiles, he was subjected to an administrative proceeding that began on March 7, 2006, and concluded with the decision of the deciding body – through official letter [Nombre2] 698-06 of September 5, 2006 – to apply a penalty consisting of no longer authorizing him to perform on-call medical shifts (guardias médicas de permanencia). He indicated that such punishment was imposed without respecting due process and its execution caused damage to his salary assets, since on average he performed four on-call shifts per month in his area of practice. He indicated that through resolution no. 29175-5-A-J, from the defendant's Medical Management (Gerencia Médica), the criterion of the entity's Legal Directorate was upheld, where it was specified that the non-authorization to perform on-call medical shifts could not constitute a disciplinary administrative penalty, as it lacked legal basis, and consequently it was rendered void. He argued that the hospital management's actions put at risk the care of people who required that service, a criterion that was shared by the National Board of Labor Relations (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales), according to official letter [Nombre3]. 044-07 of March 5, 2007, signed by that body. He alleged that even though the penalty related to the non-authorization to perform on-call shifts was eliminated, a verbal reprimand was imposed on him, which he classified as *ultra petita* or an incongruity in the pronouncement. He outlined that he was never reinstated to the performance of medical on-call shifts, which he considered a serious abuse of *ius variandi*, as he suffered an injury to his salary income. For the foregoing, he requested that the judgment obligate the defendant to the retroactive recognition of the salary differentials resulting from the elimination of medical on-call shifts from February 2006 until their effective reinstatement, for which 4 monthly medical on-call shifts should be taken into account, as well as the differentials that such recognition would generate in the Christmas bonus, school salary, and vacations. He requested the corresponding interest on the sums to which the defendant would be ordered to pay and the immediate reinstatement to the performance of the 4 monthly on-call shifts that he performed on average. He demanded the elimination of the imposed penalty of verbal reprimand and that the defendant be ordered to pay costs (complaint on folios 10 to 15). The general judicial attorney of the defendant answered the complaint negatively, raised the defense of lack of right, requested denial of the complaint's claims, and that the award of costs fall upon the plaintiff (complaint answer on folios 22 to 30). In the first instance, the complaint was declared without merit and the matter was resolved without a special award of costs (folios 127 to 132 front and back). Said judgment was appealed by the plaintiff, and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone confirmed the judgment (folios 156 to 160).\n\n**II.- GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT:** Before the Chamber, the plaintiff appeals the tribunal's judgment. He considers that the challenged judgment incorrectly assessed the factual framework of this matter, as the fact that the defendant's Medical Management determined that the hospital management had acted outside the law within the administrative proceeding initiated against him was not taken into account, and such circumstance was the basis of this complaint, yet all of this was not correctly appreciated. He argues that what was requested were salary differentials; however, the appellate body resolved that medical on-call shifts are not an implicit salary component and therefore it was not the hospital management's obligation to reinstate him to the performance of the on-call shifts, which he disagrees with as he considers that it was the defendant's own Medical Management that determined that what was done by the deciding body in the disciplinary proceeding brought against him was illegal, and such conduct, harmful to his interests, must be subject to compensation. He considers that in his case, there was a violation of *ius variandi*, but the tribunal erred in its analysis by concluding that he had lost the on-call shifts as a result of his negligent work; however, he notes that this topic was not the subject of debate nor did it form part of the proven facts of the first instance judgment, because in that latter judgment what was deemed accredited was that the on-call shifts were eliminated due to a lack of budgetary allocation for that service. He outlines that the challenged judgment was based on what relates to acquired rights, which in his opinion is not applicable to this case, since what is discussed concerns the abusive exercise of *ius variandi* committed by the employer entity. He points out that the correct approach is the application of the principles inherent to public law, since he was penalized for not having presented the on-call shift roster for the month of January 2006, but the hospital director was not required to issue, in writing, the instructions regarding the granting or elimination of medical on-call shifts, which contradicts the entire administrative legal order. He claims that the section of proven facts of the first instance judgment did not indicate that the hospital did not have the budgetary allocation to provide the medical on-call shift service in psychiatry, for which, in any case, there is no evidence in the file to prove such a circumstance, because it was not a debated aspect in the proceeding, and the fact of basing the judgments on that point creates a state of defenselessness for him since he would have provided evidence in this regard. He accuses an erroneous assessment of the evidence, since in the defendant's Medical Management resolution, he was never reinstated to the performance of the on-call shifts, and for this reason he had to come before judicial courts, but the judicial authorities interpreted that he was reinstated to that exercise, of which there is no evidence in the file. For these reasons, he requests that this appeal be admitted, the tribunal's pronouncement be annulled, the abusive exercise of *ius variandi* be declared, and he be reinstated to the performance of the on-call shifts and be paid for this item from March 2006 to date (folios 164 to 177).\n\n**III.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPEAL AGAINST THE FIRST INSTANCE JUDGMENT:** The party appealing makes a series of statements concerning the first instance judgment; however, it is necessary to indicate that the grievances raised in relation to that pronouncement are inadmissible, for the considerations set forth below. Article 556 of the labor legislation – already cited – provides that only judgments handed down by the *Superior Tribunals (Tribunales Superiores)* are appealable before this Chamber, a provision that is complemented by what is set forth in article 559 idem, which orders summary rejection if the appeal has been filed against what was resolved in the first instance judgment (article 556) (in that regard, consult, among many others, votes no. 337 at 10:40 hours and 340 at 11:05 hours, both of April 18; 387 at 10:05 hours of May 2; 424 at 10:15 hours of May 14; 470 at 10:15 hours of May 29; 755 at 9:55 hours of September 5; 1051 at 8:30 hours and 1061 at 9:20 hours, both of December 19, all of 2008, as well as numbers 103 at 9:35 hours of January 30 and 118 at 9:40 hours of February 6, both of 2009). Specifically, he claims that the judgment issued by the court was based – to a large extent – on the impossibility that the hospital did not have the budgetary allocation to provide the psychiatric medical on-call shift service, but such a circumstance was not recorded in the proven facts section nor was there evidence to prove that fact. This Chamber does not find the alleged defenselessness, not only because it is a defect that is confined to the first instance decision but also because, due to its procedural nature, it is legally impossible for the Chamber to admit it for analysis, therefore the grievances in this regard must be rejected.\n\n**IV.- OF THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE IN LABOR MATTERS:** The appellant states that there was an inadequate assessment of the body of evidence, because the tribunal interpreted that through the defendant's Medical Management resolution, he had been reinstated to the performance of on-call shifts, which was not the case. It is important to point out that evidence in labor proceedings must be analyzed according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) and assessed in light of the provisions of article 493 of the Labor Code. Said provision establishes that: *\"Unless expressly provided to the contrary in this Code, in the judgment **the evidence shall be assessed in conscience, without subjection to the rules of Common Law**; but the Judge, when analyzing the evidence received, is obligated to express the principles of equity or of any other nature on which their criterion is based.\"* From the foregoing, a greater flexibility can be inferred than what might occur in civil proceedings, as there is freedom of assessment, of course, within the parameters established by the principles of equity, proportionality, reasonableness, and objectivity. Thus, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) rightly pointed out when it conducted the constitutional review of the provision in question,\n\n*\"(…) **the assessment of evidence in conscience does not imply resolving in an arbitrary manner**, given that every judge – as a public official – is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative for adapting public action, not only to the specific norms on a given object, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, **they cannot rule with disregard for constitutional principles and rights**, since they are limited by the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) and principles of reasonableness, which, duly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional assessment with the Political Constitution (…)\"* (see vote no. 4448, at 9:00 hours on August 30, 1996. Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nIt is clear then that the faculties of the judging persons to assess evidence in conscience do not lead to decisions born from mere discretion, but rather are combined with the obligation to provide the basis for their judgments, as this is a fundamental part of due process and the correct right of defense protected both nationally and by the international instruments that our country has signed. Therefore, the assessment of evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, provided that a substantiated judgment is issued, in light of the rules of sound judgment and in strict respect for the principles indicated above. Consequently, and in application of the principle of the unity of evidence (contained in article 493 under study), the judging person must assess the set of evidence provided by the parties, not in an isolated or individual manner, but jointly, in order to grant them, based on the mentioned rules, the corresponding probative value. This is how the proven facts are not established by taking each of the evidentiary elements considered in themselves, but in attention to all those contained in the file that are of importance for the litigation in question. In this regard, it has been the position of both the constitutional body and this Chamber that the principle of sound judgment is not harmed by not granting credibility to a witness or by granting greater value to one deposition over another, since this forms part of the discretionary power of the judge, in application of the principle of full evidentiary freedom.\n\nThus, based on the premises noted, an analysis will be made of whether the evidence provided in this matter was correctly weighed in the judgment or whether, on the contrary, the challenger's claim must be upheld.\n\n**V.- OF THE NATURE OF ON-CALL MEDICAL SHIFTS (GUARDIAS MÉDICAS):** This Chamber has had occasion to study the nature of on-call medical shifts (guardias médicas) within the employment contract, and it has been determined that these are a modality of overtime work (labor en tiempo extraordinario) and, consequently, are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary working day (jornada ordinaria) and, as such, do not constitute a right inherent and essential to the position. It has been repeatedly stated that the very nature of overtime work is, as its name indicates, an exceptional working day, since what must prevail in all labor contracting is respect for the hourly limits established as a fundamental right of working people. The Political Constitution, international human rights instruments of an economic and social nature, internal regulations, and case law all reaffirm respect for the limits of the daily working day of working people as an integral part of the right to a healthy life. Its establishment responds to a need for attention to insured persons and to the continuity of the public service provided, which, by nature, has variable conditions that require constant adjustments and improvements. In the public sector, overtime work has been subject to extensive limiting regulation because, due to its form of remuneration, it demands greater expenditure of public funds. Thus, for example, the Law for the Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector No. 6955 of February 24, 1984, provided in its article 31: \"*When in the branches of government, in decentralized institutions, and in public companies, labor situations have become consolidated in which a single individual permanently works the ordinary working day and an extraordinary working day, their immediate hierarchical superior must immediately take the corresponding measures to cease such a situation, under penalty of being directly responsible to the State for the amount of the extraordinary working days thus paid. Immediately, also, measures will be taken by the Branch, institution, or company so that the functions that originated the permanent extraordinary working day are assigned to an employee or official specifically appointed to perform them, when such functions are of an indispensable nature*\". In the same vein, referring to the limitation that in principle exists in the public sector for working overtime, is Article 6 of the Fiscal Contingency Law No. 8343, of December 18, 2002, which provides that: \"*Extraordinary working days may not be authorized for the same person successively for more than three months, by virtue of the fact that it denatures the extraordinary character of this type of working day. Except with express justification and in accordance with said criteria, the authorization of payments for overtime hours by the human resources instances and the heads of each State institution must be carried out in strict adherence to the criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and rationalization of public spending*\".\n\nFurthermore, undeniably, having one more ordinary shift, with an official who starts from that moment without bearing the fatigue typical of someone who has completed a previous working day, gives the defendant a greater possibility of expanding its services and offering them with better quality, with an official who is just beginning their daily working day at that moment. To authorize or maintain performance in double or extended working days, beyond ordinary limits, is to overlook the constitutional principles on the working day, to contravene the laws, and to administer public resources to the detriment of the health of the officials themselves. It is the Administration's responsibility, in attention to its purposes, to establish the organization and conditions of the service it provides, without such aspects being able to be the product of the autonomy of the will between parties. Entities that, like the defendant, provide a public service, have the power to reorganize their resources and services in pursuit of the most adequate and efficient provision of the service; and better advantages in the economic cost of its operation and functioning (article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration). The work in on-call medical shifts is separate from the appointment; it is an exceptional task—like overtime hours—that the defendant, in its function as service administrator, arranges to achieve the best fulfillment of its purposes. The official knows that their assignment is entirely available to the employer administration, as it suits a more efficient and advantageous operation of resources and attention to needs. In this case, the raison d'être of the C.C.S.S. is the provision of the public health service. The administration and disposition of on-call medical shifts, like overtime hours, constitute an exceptional resource that the institution uses to adjust to those exceptional needs or to the guarantee, which it must provide, of continuity in the service. That exceptional character is fully known to the official because the position has a well-defined ordinary working day to which they do have an unrestricted right. Specifically, due to its exceptionality, the availability of overtime hours, like on-call medical shifts, can be varied when it suits institutional interests, without one being able to speak of acquired rights. Since judgment number 144, of 9:30 a.m. on May 3, 1995, it has been said that: \"*Regarding overtime hours, the case law has been reiterated in the sense that overtime hours grant no right other than to their payment, without one being able to argue acquired rights in relation to the possibility of working them,…*\". On the other hand, the purpose inherent to the limit on working days, which has been mentioned, must not be lost sight of. Article 58 of the Political Constitution states: \"*The daytime working day may not exceed eight hours daily and forty-eight weekly. The ordinary nighttime working day may not exceed six hours daily and thirty-six weekly. Work in overtime hours must be remunerated at fifty percent more than the stipulated salaries or wages. However, these provisions shall not apply in the very qualified cases of exception determined by law*\". The limit on the ordinary working day also operates against the economic interest of those who seek to earn more by resorting to double working days that exceed such hourly restrictions. The on-call medical shifts system evidently undermines those hourly restrictions, which is why these must strictly respond to criteria of opportunity and necessity, for the benefit of the user of health services. So, in light of what has been said, the appellant's disagreements will be analyzed.\n\n**VI.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The plaintiff considers his labor rights violated, by virtue of the fact that in the resolution of the Medical Management of the defendant, he was not reinstated in his right to the enjoyment of on-call medical shifts, which he has also not achieved in the preceding judicial instances. The grievance cannot prosper because, as is evident from the case file, the appellant was sanctioned within a disciplinary administrative procedure that was initiated against him, for not having timely presented the on-call medical shift schedules. The sanction imposed on him was the prohibition of working under this modality, but such decision was revoked by the Medical Management of the defendant, upon finding no regulatory basis for what was resolved. While it is true that there is no rule in the legal system that establishes the impossibility of performing on-call medical shifts as a sanction, and as a consequence of the nullity of the sanction, the plaintiff was able to work more time than his ordinary working day, nevertheless, in accordance with what was said in the preceding recital (considerando), on-call medical shifts do not constitute a right inherent and essential to the position, so both the administrative and judicial authorities acted correctly in not granting a lifetime reinstatement in this type of medical service, since its implementation responds—as stated—to the need that, at that specific moment, arises in the health center. In any case, it has been proven, within this matter, that the plaintiff was indeed taken into account to perform on-call medical shifts, as is evident from the minutes of the extended Medical Council held on July 12, 2007, where the performance of three on-call medical shifts was proposed to the challenger, to which he expressed his consent and requested that such proposal be made in writing (folio 40 verso), a situation that is ratified by the witness [Name4] who declared: \"*Later in an extended Council, Dr. [Name5] in the extended Technical Council offered to give him shifts. What I remember is that Dr. [Name1] told him that if he gave them to him in writing, it would be fine*\" (witness evidence record at folio 97) and the deponent [Name5], in his declaration indicated: \"*Subsequent to the resolution of the medical management in which Dr. [Name1] was sanctioned for having abandoned (sic) the on-call medical shifts, a general meeting of specialist doctors was held, where general topics are discussed, the topic was discussed there, at that meeting in an act of good faith I told the Dr. to come to my office so that he could continue doing three monthly shifts for the remainder of the year, and the response was to put it in writing. That proposal is in writing with the signature of those present at that meeting and that of Dr. [Name1]. (…) Dr. [Name1] never came to my office for the proposal I made to him*\" (witness evidence records at folio 106 front and verso). From this evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff was not denied the possibility of performing on-call medical shifts, and in that sense, the grievance must also be dismissed in relation to the obligation the hospital management had to communicate in writing that he could return to working overtime (jornada extraordinaria), since the matter was recorded in the minutes on file at folio 40 verso, which has already been mentioned.\n\nNow, regarding the claim that the court based the denial of the claims on the theory of acquired rights, the appellant is also incorrect, because, as analyzed previously, the work in the so-called on-call medical shift only generates a salary benefit for the work actually performed, but due to the nature of that service provision, it cannot be considered an ordinary condition of the employment contract, but rather this will depend on the needs that arise in the health center, in order to provide a correct public service. As the plaintiff himself accepts in his declaration, he did not execute more shifts after the administrative procedure occurred, so that, not having performed the extraordinary working days, there is no duty of the defendant to economically compensate the plaintiff, and therefore the claims for salary differences become inadmissible. From all that has been said, it is concluded that what was resolved in the second instance is in accordance with the law.\n\n**VII.- FINAL PROVISIONS:** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed ruling.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nIn that which was the subject of the appeal, the appealed judgment is confirmed.\n\n\n\n***Orlando Aguirre Gómez***\n\n***Julia Varela Araya***                                                                                                      ***Rolando Vega Robert***\n\n***Eva María Camacho Vargas***                                                                                          ***Milagro Rojas Espinoza***\n\n[Name6]\n2\nEXP: 10-000688-0929-LA\n\n**V.- THE NATURE OF MEDICAL ON-CALL DUTIES:** This Chamber has had occasion to study the nature of medical on-call duties, within the employment contract, and it has been determined that these are a form of work in overtime and consequently, are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary workday and as such, do not constitute a right inherent and consubstantial to the position. It has been repeatedly stated that the inherent nature of overtime work is, as its name indicates, an exceptional workday, since what must prevail in every employment contract is respect for the hourly limits established as a fundamental right of workers. The Political Constitution, international human rights instruments of an economic and social nature, internal regulations, and jurisprudence reaffirm respect for the limits on the daily workday of workers as an integral part of the right to a healthy life. Its establishment responds to a need for care of insured persons and the continuity of the public service provided, which, by nature, has variable conditions requiring continuous adjustments and improvements. In the public sector, overtime work has been subject to broad limiting regulation because, due to its form of remuneration, it requires greater expenditure from public funds. Thus, for example, the Ley para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público No. 6955 of February 24, 1984, provided in its Article 31: “*When in the branches of the State, in decentralized institutions, and in public companies, work situations have been consolidated in which a single individual permanently works the ordinary workday and an extraordinary workday, their immediate hierarchical superior must immediately take the corresponding measures to cease such a situation, under penalty of being directly responsible to the State for the amount of the extraordinary workdays thus paid. Measures shall also be taken immediately by the Branch, institution, or company, so that the functions that originated the permanent extraordinary workday are assigned to an employee or official specifically appointed to perform them, when such functions are indispensable in nature*”. In the same vein, referring to the limitation that in principle exists in the public sector for working overtime, is Article 6 of the Ley de Contingencia Fiscal No. 8343, of December 18, 2002, which states: “*Extraordinary workdays may not be authorized for the same person successively for more than three months, because this distorts the extraordinary nature of this type of workday. Unless expressly justified and in accordance with these criteria, the authorization of overtime payments by human resources departments and the heads of each State institution must be carried out in strict adherence to the criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and rationalization of public spending*”.\n\nFurthermore, undeniably, having one more ordinary shift, with an official who begins at that moment without carrying the fatigue inherent to someone who has completed a previous workday, gives the defendant a greater possibility to expand its services and offer them with better quality, with an official who only at that moment assumes their daily workday. Authorizing or maintaining performance in double or extended workdays, beyond ordinary limits, is to disregard the constitutional principles on the workday, to contravene the laws, and to administer public resources to the detriment of the health of the officials themselves. The Administration has the responsibility, in view of its purposes, to establish the organization and conditions of the service it provides, without such aspects being the product of the autonomy of will between the parties. Entities that, like the defendant, provide a public service, have the power to reorganize their resources and services in pursuit of the most adequate and efficient provision of the service; and better advantages in the economic cost of its operation and functioning (Article 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Work in medical on-call duties is extrinsic to the appointment; it is an exceptional task—like overtime—that the defendant, in its role as service administrator, arranges to achieve the best fulfillment of its purposes. The official knows that their assignment is fully available to the employer's administration, as it suits a more efficient and advantageous operation of resources and attention to needs. In this case, the reason for being of the C.C.S.S. is the provision of the public health service. The administration and disposition of medical on-call duties, like overtime, constitute an exceptional resource that the institution uses to adjust to those exceptional needs or to the guarantee, which it must provide, of continuity in service. This exceptional nature is fully known to the official because the position has a well-defined ordinary workday to which they do have an unrestricted right. Specifically, due to their exceptional nature, the availability of overtime, like medical on-call duties, can be varied when it suits institutional interests, without one being able to speak of acquired rights. Since ruling number 144, at 9:30 a.m. on May 3, 1995, it has been stated: “*Regarding overtime, jurisprudence has been reiterated in the sense that overtime grants no right other than to its payment, and one cannot argue acquired rights in relation to the possibility of performing them,…* ”. Moreover, the inherent purpose of the limit on workdays, as mentioned, should not be lost sight of. Article 58 of the Political Constitution states: “*The ordinary daytime workday may not exceed eight hours per day and forty-eight per week. The ordinary nighttime workday may not exceed six hours per day and thirty-six per week. Work in overtime hours must be remunerated at fifty percent more than the stipulated wages or salaries. However, these provisions shall not apply in highly qualified cases of exception, as determined by law*\". The limit on the ordinary workday also operates against the economic interest of those who seek to earn more by resorting to double workdays that exceed such hourly restrictions. The system of medical on-call duties evidently defeats those hourly restrictions; it is for this reason that they must respond strictly to criteria of opportunity and necessity, for the benefit of the user of health services. Therefore, in light of what has been said, the appellant's disagreements will be analyzed.\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The plaintiff considers his labor rights violated, by virtue of the fact that in the resolution of the defendant's Medical Management, he was not reinstated in his right to avail himself of medical on-call duties, which he has also not achieved in the preceding judicial instances. The grievance cannot prosper because, as is evident from the case file, the appellant was sanctioned within a disciplinary administrative proceeding instituted against him for not having timely submitted the medical on-call duty rosters. A sanction was imposed, prohibiting him from working under this modality, but such a decision was revoked by the defendant's Medical Management, finding no regulatory basis for what was resolved. While it is true there is no norm in the legal system establishing the impossibility of performing medical on-call duties as a sanction, and as a consequence of the nullity of the sanction, the plaintiff was able to work more time than his ordinary workday, however, in accordance with what was stated in the previous recital, medical on-call duties do not constitute a right inherent and consubstantial to the position. Therefore, both the administrative and judicial authorities acted correctly in not granting a lifetime reinstatement in this type of medical service, as its implementation responds—as stated—to the need that, at that specific moment, arises at the health center. In any case, it has been proven within this matter that the plaintiff was indeed considered for performing medical on-call duties, as is evident from the extended Medical Council minutes held on July 12, 2007, where the appellant was offered the performance of three medical on-call duties, to which he expressed his consent and requested that such proposal remain in writing (folio 40 vto). This situation is ratified by witness [Nombre1] [Nombre2] who declared: “***Later in an extended Council, Dr. [Nombre3] in the extended Technical Council offered him on-call duties. What I remember is that Dr. [Nombre4] told him that if he gave them to him in writing, it would be fine***” (witness proof record from folio 97), and the deponent [Nombre3], in his statement indicated: “***Following the medical management resolution in which Dr. [Nombre4] was sanctioned for having abandoned (sic) medical on-call duties, a general meeting of medical specialists was held where general topics are discussed; the topic was brought up there. In that meeting, as an act of good faith, I told the Dr. to come to my office so he could continue doing three monthly on-call duties for the remainder of the year, and his response was to do it in writing. This proposal is recorded in writing with the signatures of those present at that meeting and that of Dr. [Nombre4]. (…) Dr. [Nombre4] never came to my office regarding the proposal I made to him***” (witness proof records from folio 106 front and back). From this evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff was not denied the possibility of performing medical on-call duties and, in that sense, the grievance must also be dismissed regarding the obligation the hospital management had to communicate in writing that he could return to work in an extraordinary workday, since the matter was recorded in the minutes filed at folio 40 vto, which has already been mentioned.\n\nNow, regarding the claim that the court based the denial of the claims on the theory of acquired rights, the appellant is also not correct, since, as analyzed previously, the work in the so-called medical on-call duty only generates a salary benefit for the work actually performed. However, by the nature of that service provision, it cannot be considered an ordinary condition of the employment contract. Instead, it will depend on the needs that arise at the health center in order to provide a proper public service. As the plaintiff himself accepts in his statement, he did not perform any more on-call duties after the administrative procedure occurred, so not having performed the extraordinary workdays, the defendant has no duty to compensate the plaintiff economically, rendering the claims for salary differences inadmissible.\n\nFrom all that has been said, it is concluded that the decision rendered at second instance is in accordance with the law.\"\n\nExp: 10-000688-0929-LA\nRes: 2013-001195\n\nSALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine thirty in the morning on the eighteenth of October, two thousand and thirteen.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, by [Nombre1], physician and resident of Limón, against the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, represented by its general judicial attorney, licensed Rita Arias González, resident of Alajuela. Both of legal age and married.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- The plaintiff, in a brief filed on the fifth of August, two thousand and ten, initiated this action so that in the judgment the defendant be ordered to retroactively recognize the corresponding salary differences from the elimination of medical on-call shifts (guardias médicas) from February 2006 until their effective restitution, taking into account an average of 4 medical on-call shifts per month, payment of differences in year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), vacations, restitution of the four on-call shifts that he works in the psychiatry service, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n2.- The general judicial attorney of the defendant institution responded in the terms indicated in the brief dated the fifth of October, two thousand and ten, and raised the defense of lack of right.\n\n3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, in a judgment at thirteen fifty hours on the eighth of July, two thousand and eleven, ordered: \"By virtue of what was stated in the recitals section of this decision, as well as the cited legal norms, the present ordinary labor proceeding filed by Mr. [Nombre1] against the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL is declared WITHOUT MERIT. The matter is resolved without a special award of costs (article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applied supplementarily in this matter)...\". (Sic).\n\n4.- The plaintiff appealed, and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, Guápiles venue, in a judgment at seven fifty-eight hours on the twelfth of September, two thousand and twelve, resolved: \"No errors have been observed in the proceedings that would have caused nullity or defenselessness, and regarding what was the object of the challenge, the appealed judgment is CONFIRMED.\"\n\n5.- The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief submitted on the sixteenth of October, two thousand and twelve, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the recitals section.\n\n6.- The prescriptions of the law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\nDrafted by Judge Rojas Espinoza; and,\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff stated that while working as an attending physician specializing in psychiatry at the Hospital de Guápiles, he was subject to an administrative proceeding that began on March 7, 2006, and ended with the decision of the deciding body – by official letter [Nombre2] 698-06 of September 5, 2006 – to impose a sanction consisting of not authorizing further medical on-call shifts (guardias médicas) of permanence. He indicated that such punishment was imposed without respecting due process and its execution caused damage to his salary-related assets, since he performed an average of four on-call shifts per month in his area of performance. He indicated that through resolution no. 29175-5-A-J, from the Medical Management (Gerencia Médica) of the defendant, the criterion of the entity's Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) was accepted, which pointed out that the non-authorization to perform on-call shifts of permanence could not constitute a disciplinary administrative sanction, as it lacked legal support, and consequently, it was annulled. He argued that the hospital management's actions put at risk the care of people who required that service, a criterion shared by the National Board of Labor Relations (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales), according to official letter [Nombre3]. 044-07 of March 5, 2007, signed by that body. He alleged that even though the sanction regarding the non-authorization to perform on-call shifts was eliminated, a verbal reprimand was imposed on him, which he characterized as ultra petita or an inconsistency in the pronouncement. He outlined that he was never reinstated in the performance of medical on-call shifts, which he considered a serious abuse of ius variandi, as he suffered harm to his salary income. Therefore, he requested that the judgment compel the defendant to retroactively recognize the salary differences resulting from the elimination of medical on-call shifts from February 2006 until their effective restitution, for which 4 monthly medical on-call shifts should be taken into account, as well as the differences that such recognition would generate in the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and vacations. He petitioned for the interest corresponding to the sums to which the defendant was ordered and the immediate reinstatement in the performance of the 4 monthly on-call shifts he performed on average. He demanded the elimination of the imposed sanction of verbal reprimand and that the defendant be ordered to pay costs (complaint on folios 10 to 15). The defendant's general judicial attorney responded negatively to the complaint, raised the defense of lack of right, requested that the claims of the complaint be denied, and that the award of costs fall upon the plaintiff (response to the complaint on folios 22 to 30). In the first instance, the complaint was declared without merit, and the matter was resolved without a special award of costs (folios 127 to 132 front and back). This judgment was appealed by the plaintiff, and the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone confirmed the sentence (folios 156 to 160).\n\nII.- GRIEVANCES OF THE APPELLANT: Before the Chamber, the plaintiff appeals the tribunal's judgment. He considers that in the appealed judgment, the factual framework of this case was incorrectly assessed, as it did not take into account the fact that the defendant's Medical Management (Gerencia Médica) determined that the hospital management had acted outside the law within the administrative proceeding initiated against him, and this circumstance was the motivation for this lawsuit, yet all of this was not correctly appreciated. He argues that what was requested were salary differences; however, the appellate body resolved that medical on-call shifts are not an implicit salary component and therefore it was not an obligation of the hospital management to reinstate him in the performance of on-call shifts, from which he disagrees because he considers that it was the defendant's own Medical Management (Gerencia Médica) that determined that the actions taken by the deciding body in the disciplinary proceeding against him were illegal, and such conduct, which was harmful to his interests, must be subject to compensation. He considers that in his case, there was a violation of the ius variandi, but the tribunal erred in its analysis by concluding that he had lost the on-call shifts as a result of his negligent work; however, he points out that this issue was not subject to debate nor part of the proven facts of the first-instance judgment, because in the latter, what was accredited was that the on-call shifts were suppressed due to a lack of budgetary content for that service. He outlines that the challenged judgment was based on matters related to acquired rights, which in his opinion is not applicable to this case, since what is being discussed concerns the abusive exercise of the ius variandi committed by the employing entity. He points out that the correct approach is the application of the principles of public law, since he was sanctioned for not presenting the on-call shift roster for January 2006, but the hospital director was not required to issue written instructions on the granting or suppression of medical on-call shifts, which contradicts the entire administrative legal system. He complains that the proven facts section of the first-instance judgment did not indicate that the hospital did not have budgetary content to provide the medical on-call shift service in psychiatry, for which, in any case, there is no evidence in the record to accredit such a circumstance, because it was not an aspect debated in the proceeding, and the fact of justifying the judgments on that point generates a state of defenselessness for him since he would have provided evidence in that regard. He accuses an erroneous assessment of the evidence, since in the resolution of the defendant's Medical Management (Gerencia Médica), he was never reinstated in the performance of on-call shifts, and for this reason he had to resort to judicial courts, but the judicial authorities interpreted that he was reinstated in that performance, for which there is no evidence in the record. For these reasons, he requests that this appeal be granted, that the tribunal's pronouncement be annulled, that the abusive exercise of the ius variandi be declared, and that he be reinstated in the performance of on-call shifts and be paid for this item, from March 2006 to date (folios 164 to 177).\n\nIII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPEAL AGAINST THE FIRST-INSTANCE JUDGMENT: The appellant makes a series of statements regarding the first-instance judgment; however, it is necessary to indicate that the grievances raised in relation to that pronouncement are inadmissible, for the considerations set forth below. Article 556 of the labor legislation – already cited – provides that before this Chamber, only judgments issued by the Superior Tribunals are appealable, a rule that is complemented by the provision in numeral 559 of the same code, which orders outright rejection if the appeal has been filed against what was resolved in the first-instance judgment (numeral 556) (in this sense, consult, among many others, votes no. 337 at 10:40 hours and 340 at 11:05 hours, both of April 18; 387 at 10:05 hours, of May 2; 424 at 10:15 hours, of May 14; 470 at 10:15 hours, of May 29; 755 at 9:55 hours, of September 5; 1051 at 8:30 hours and 1061 at 9:20 hours, both of December 19, all from 2008, as well as numbers 103 at 9:35 hours, of January 30 and 118 at 9:40 hours, of February 6, both from 2009). Specifically, he claims that the judgment issued by the court was based – to a large extent – on the impossibility that the hospital did not have budgetary content to provide the medical on-call shift service in psychiatry, but this circumstance was not recorded in the proven facts section nor was there evidence to accredit that fact. This Chamber does not find the alleged defenselessness, not only because it is a defect that is limited to the first-instance decision but also because of its procedural nature, it is legally impossible for the Chamber to admit it for analysis, and therefore the grievances in that regard must be rejected.\n\nIV.- ON THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE IN LABOR MATTERS: The appellant states that there was an inadequate assessment of the body of evidence, because the tribunal interpreted that through a resolution of the defendant's Medical Management (Gerencia Médica), he had been reinstated in the performance of on-call shifts, which was not the case. It is important to point out that evidence, in labor proceedings, must be analyzed according to the rules of sound judgment and assessed in light of the provisions of article 493 of the Labor Code. That norm establishes that: \"Except for express provision to the contrary in this Code, in the judgment evidence shall be assessed in conscience, without subjection to the norms of Common Law; but the Judge, when analyzing the evidence received, is obliged to express the principles of equity or any other nature on which they base their criterion.\" From the transcribed text, a greater flexibility is inferred than what may occur in civil proceedings, as there is freedom of assessment, clearly within the parameters established in the principles of equity, proportionality, reasonableness, and objectivity. So that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) well pointed out when it carried out the constitutional review of the norm in question,\n\n\"(...) the assessment of evidence in conscience does not imply deciding arbitrarily, since every judge – as a public official that they are – is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adaptation of public action, not only to the specific norms on a determined object, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, they cannot rule with contempt for constitutional principles and rights, since they are limited by the rules of sound judgment and principles of reasonableness, which, duly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional assessment with the Political Constitution (...)\" (see vote no. 4448, at 9:00 hours on August 30, 1996. Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nIt is clear then that the powers of the judging persons to assess evidence in conscience do not lead to decisions that arise from discretion itself, but rather are combined with the obligation to substantiate their judgments, as this is a fundamental part of due process and the correct right of defense protected both nationally and by the international instruments that our country has signed. In such a way, the assessment of evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, as long as a substantiated judgment is issued, in light of the rules of sound judgment and in strict respect for the principles indicated above.\n\nTherefore, and in application of the principle of unity of evidence (contained in paragraph 493 of the study), the adjudicator must assess the set of evidence provided by the parties, not in an isolated or individual manner, but jointly, in order to grant it, based on the aforementioned rules, the corresponding probative value. It is thus that proven facts will not be established by taking each element of evidence, considered in themselves, but in consideration of all those that appear in the record and are of significance for the litigation in question. In this sense, the position of both the constitutional body and this Chamber has been that the principle of sound criticism is not infringed by not granting credibility to a witness or by granting greater value to one deposition to the detriment of another, since this forms part of the judge's discretionary power, in application of the principle of full evidentiary freedom. Therefore, based on the premises noted, an analysis will be made as to whether the evidence provided in this matter was correctly assessed in the judgment, or if, on the contrary, the appellant's claim must be upheld.\n\n**V.- THE NATURE OF MEDICAL ON-CALL DUTIES:** This Chamber has had occasion to study the nature of medical on-call duties (guardias médicas) within the employment contract, and it has been determined that these are a form of overtime work and, consequently, they are not part of the plaintiff's ordinary working day and, as such, do not constitute a right inherent and consubstantial to the position. It has been repeatedly stated that the very nature of overtime work is, as its name indicates, an exceptional working day, since what must prevail in every employment contract is respect for the time limits established as a fundamental right of workers. The Political Constitution, international human rights instruments of an economic and social nature, internal regulations, and jurisprudence all reaffirm respect for the limits of the daily working day of workers as an integral part of the right to a healthy life. Its establishment responds to a need for care of insured persons and to the continuity of the public service provided, which, by nature, has variable conditions that require continuous adaptations and improvements. In the public sector, overtime work has been the subject of extensive limiting regulation because, due to the manner of its remuneration, it requires greater expenditure of public funds. Thus, for example, Law for the Financial Balance of the Public Sector No. 6955 of February 24, 1984, provided in its article 31: \"*When in the branches of government, in decentralized institutions, and in public companies, work situations have been consolidated in which a single individual permanently works the ordinary working day and an overtime working day, their immediate hierarchical superior must immediately take the corresponding measures so that such situation ceases, under penalty of being directly liable to the State for the amount of the overtime working days thus paid. Measures shall also be taken immediately by the Branch, institution, or company so that the functions that gave rise to the permanent overtime working day are assigned to an employee or official specifically appointed to perform them, when such functions are of an indispensable nature*\". In the same sense, referring to the limitation that in principle exists in the public sector for working overtime, is Article 6 of the Fiscal Contingency Law No. 8343, of December 18, 2002, which provides that: \"*Overtime working days may not be authorized for the same person successively for more than three months, by virtue of the fact that it denatures the overtime nature of this type of working day. Except with express justification and in accordance with said criteria, the authorization of overtime payments by the human resources bodies and the heads of each State institution must be carried out with strict adherence to the criteria of necessity, reasonableness, and rationalization of public expenditure*\".\n\nFurthermore, undeniably, having one more ordinary shift, with an official who begins from that moment without carrying the fatigue of someone who has completed a previous working day, gives the defendant a greater possibility of expanding its services and offering them with better quality, with an official who at that moment assumes their daily work shift. Authorizing or maintaining performance in double or extended shifts, beyond ordinary limits, is to disregard the constitutional principles on the working day, to contravene the laws, and to administer public resources to the detriment of the health of the officials themselves. It corresponds to the Administration, in accordance with its purposes, to establish the organization and the conditions of the service it provides, without such aspects being able to be the product of the autonomy of will between parties. Entities that, like the defendant, provide a public service, have the power to reorganize their resources and services in pursuit of the most adequate and efficient provision of the service; and better advantages in the economic cost of its operation and functioning (article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration). Work in medical on-call duties is external to the appointment; it is an exceptional task—like overtime—that the defendant, in its function as administrator of the service, arranges to achieve the best fulfillment of its purposes. The official knows that their assignment is totally available to the employer's administration, as it suits a more efficient and advantageous operation of resources and attention to needs. In this case, the raison d'être of the C.C.S.S. is the provision of the public health service. The administration and arrangement of medical on-call duties, like overtime, constitute an exceptional resource that the institution uses to adjust to those exceptional needs or to the guarantee of continuity in service that it must provide. This exceptional nature is fully known to the official because the position has a well-defined ordinary working day to which they do have an unrestricted right. Specifically, due to their exceptionality, the availability of overtime just like medical on-call duties can be varied when it suits institutional interests, without there being any talk of acquired rights. From judgment number 144, at 9:30 a.m. on May 3, 1995, it was stated that: \"*Regarding overtime, jurisprudence has been reiterated in the sense that overtime grants no right other than to its payment, and acquired rights cannot be argued in relation to the possibility of working them,…*\". On the other hand, the inherent purpose of the limit on working days, which has been mentioned, should not be lost sight of. Article 58 of the Political Constitution says: \"*The ordinary daytime working day may not exceed eight hours a day and forty-eight a week. The ordinary nighttime working day may not exceed six hours a day and thirty-six a week. Work in overtime hours must be remunerated at fifty percent more than the stipulated wages or salaries. However, these provisions shall not apply in very qualified exceptional cases, as determined by law*\". The limit on the ordinary working day also operates against the economic interest of those who seek to earn more by resorting to double shifts that exceed such time restrictions. The medical on-call duty system evidently overturns those time restrictions, which is why these must strictly respond to criteria of opportunity and necessity, for the benefit of the user of health services. Therefore, in light of what has been said, the appellant's objections will be analyzed.\n\n**VI.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The plaintiff considers his labor rights violated, by virtue of the fact that in the resolution of the Medical Management of the defendant, he was not reinstated in his right to work medical on-call duties, a right he has also not obtained in the preceding judicial instances. The grievance cannot prosper because, as is evident from the record, the appellant was sanctioned within a disciplinary administrative procedure that was initiated against him, for not having timely submitted the medical on-call duty rosters. The sanction imposed on him was the prohibition of working under this modality, but such decision was revoked by the Medical Management of the defendant, upon finding no normative basis for what was decided. While it is true that there is no rule in the legal system that establishes as a sanction the impossibility of working medical on-call duties, and as a consequence of the nullity of the sanction, the plaintiff was capable of working more time beyond his ordinary working day, however, in accordance with what was stated in the preceding considerando, medical on-call duties do not constitute a right inherent and consubstantial to the position, so both the administrative and judicial authorities acted correctly in not granting a lifetime reinstatement in this type of medical service, because its implementation responds –as stated– to the need that, at that specific moment, arises at the health center. In any case, it has been proven, within this matter, that the plaintiff was indeed taken into account for working medical on-call duties, as this is evident from the minutes of the expanded Medical Council held on July 12, 2007, where the appellant was proposed to work three medical on-call duties, to which he expressed his consent and requested that such proposal be given in writing (folio 40 verso), a situation that is ratified by the witness [Nombre4] who declared: “*Later in an expanded Council, Dr. [Nombre5] in the expanded Technical Council offered to give him on-call duties. What I remember is that Dr. [Nombre1] told him that if he gave it to him in writing, it would be fine*” (witness testimony record at folio 97) and the deponent [Nombre5], in his declaration indicated: “*Subsequent to the resolution of the medical management in which Dr. [Nombre1] was sanctioned for having abandoned the medical on-call duties, a general meeting of medical specialists was held, where general topics were discussed, the issue was touched upon there, at that meeting in an act of good faith I told the Doctor to come to my office so that he could continue doing three monthly on-call duties for the remainder of the year, and the response was for me to put it in writing. That proposal is recorded in writing with the signatures of those present at that meeting and that of Dr. [Nombre1]. (…) Dr [Nombre1] never came to my office regarding the proposal I made to him*” (witness testimony records at folio 106 front and back). From this evidence it is clear that the plaintiff was not denied the possibility of working medical on-call duties, and in that sense, the grievance regarding the obligation of the hospital management to communicate in writing that he could return to work in an overtime capacity must also be dismissed, as the matter was recorded in the minutes on file at folio 40 verso, which have already been mentioned. Now then, regarding the claim that the court based the denial of the claims on the theory of acquired rights, the appellant is also incorrect, because as analyzed previously, work in so-called medical on-call duty only generates a salary benefit for the work actually performed, but due to the nature of that service provision, it cannot be considered an ordinary condition of the employment contract, rather it will depend on the needs that arise at the health center, in order to provide a correct public service. As the plaintiff himself accepts in his declaration, he did not perform more on-call duties after the administrative procedure occurred, so that, not having performed the overtime working days, there is no duty on the part of the defendant to economically compensate the plaintiff, therefore the claims for salary differences become improper. From all that has been said, it is concluded that what was decided in the second instance is in accordance with the law.\n\n**VII.- FINAL PROVISIONS:** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed decision.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nIn what was the subject of the appeal, the appealed judgment is confirmed.\n\n\n\n\n\n***Orlando Aguirre Gómez***\n\n\n\n***Julia Varela Araya***                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ***Rolando Vega Robert***\n\n\n\n***Eva María Camacho Vargas***                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ***Milagro Rojas Espinoza***\n\n\n\n***[Nombre6]***\n\n 2 \n\nEXP: 10-000688-0929-LA\n\n \nTelephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mails: [...]. and mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr"
}