{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-596840", "citation": "Res. 00022-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Municipalidad no puede cobrar patente a concesionario de servicio portuario sobre bien nacional", "title_en": "Municipality cannot charge patent tax to port service concessionaire on national property", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, actuando como jerarca impropio, anuló la resolución del Alcalde de Esparza que había rechazado la apelación de la Sociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera (SPGC, S.A.) contra el cobro del impuesto de patente municipal. La empresa opera el Muelle de Caldera bajo un contrato de concesión de gestión de servicios públicos otorgado por el Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, un bien de dominio público nacional. El Tribunal determinó que, al tratarse de un servicio público de trascendencia nacional explotado sobre un bien estatal, la actividad escapa del ámbito de competencia municipal definido en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, limitado a los intereses y servicios locales. En consecuencia, la Municipalidad carece de potestad tributaria para gravar dicha actividad con el impuesto de patente. Se ordenó la devolución de los montos pagados por ese concepto entre 2006 y 2011, así como la multa impuesta. El fallo aclara que la obligación de obtener licencia municipal no aplica cuando el título habilitante de concesión estatal ya autoriza la actividad, y que la naturaleza jurídica del contrato es de concesión de servicios públicos, no de obra pública, por lo que no le es aplicable la Ley 7762.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Appeals Court, acting as improper superior, annulled the decision of the Mayor of Esparza that had rejected the appeal of Sociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera (SPGC, S.A.) against the municipal patent tax charge. The company operates the Caldera Dock under a public service management concession granted by the Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports, a national public domain asset. The Court held that, being a public service of national significance operated on state property, the activity falls outside the municipal competence defined in Article 169 of the Constitution, which is limited to local interests and services. Consequently, the Municipality lacks the tax authority to levy the patent tax on such activity. It ordered the refund of the amounts paid on that account between 2006 and 2011, as well as the imposed fine. The judgment clarifies that the obligation to obtain a municipal license does not apply when the enabling state concession already authorizes the activity, and that the legal nature of the contract is a public service concession, not a public works concession, so Law 7762 is not applicable.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III", "date": "22/01/2013", "year": "2013", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "impuesto de patente municipal", "concesión de gestión de servicios públicos", "bien demanial", "artículo 169 Constitución Política", "ARESEP", "jerarca impropio" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "impuesto de patente municipal", "muelle de Caldera", "concesión de servicio público", "bien de dominio público", "competencia municipal", "artículo 169 Constitución Política", "tributación municipal", "servicio portuario" ], "keywords_en": [ "municipal patent tax", "Caldera dock", "public service concession", "public domain property", "municipal competence", "Article 169 Constitution", "municipal taxation", "port service" ], "excerpt_es": "En virtud de todo lo expuesto, procede acoger el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., en contra de la resolución administrativa del dos de setiembre de dos mil once dictada por Alcalde Municipal de Esparza, la cual se anual, y en su lugar se ordena la devolución de los montos pagados por concepto de impuesto de patente municipal del período 2006-2011, así como la multa impuesta, la cual se liquidará en sede municipal, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa.\n\nEn consecuencia, dado que el bien objeto de la concesión se encuentra dentro del ámbito de competencia del Estado, las actividades ejercidas por la empresa agraviada en su condición de concesionaria, escapan del poder tributario de la Municipalidad de Esparza, en el tanto exceden el concepto de lo “local” previsto en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, por lo que, la Municipalidad de Esparza no podría cobrar impuesto de patente sobre la actividad portuaria que se desarrolla en el Muelle de Caldera, ni tampoco crear –en principio- ningún impuesto derivado del desarrollo de la misma.", "excerpt_en": "By virtue of all the above, it is appropriate to uphold the appeal filed by SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative decision of September 2, 2011, issued by the Municipal Mayor of Esparza, which is annulled, and in its place the refund of the amounts paid as municipal patent tax for the period 2006-2011 is ordered, as well as the imposed fine, which shall be liquidated at the municipal venue, with the administrative remedy being exhausted.\n\nConsequently, given that the property subject to the concession falls within the competence of the State, the activities carried out by the injured company in its capacity as concessionaire escape the tax authority of the Municipality of Esparza, as they exceed the concept of \"local\" provided for in Article 169 of the Political Constitution, therefore, the Municipality of Esparza could not charge patent tax on the port activity carried out at the Caldera Dock, nor could it – in principle – create any tax derived from its development.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar", "summary_en": "The municipal decision was annulled and the refund of patent taxes charged by the Municipality of Esparza to a port service concessionaire at the Caldera Dock was ordered, as it is an activity of a national nature that falls outside local tax jurisdiction.", "summary_es": "Se anuló la resolución municipal y se ordenó la devolución de los impuestos de patente cobrados por la Municipalidad de Esparza a una concesionaria de servicio portuario en el Muelle de Caldera, por ser una actividad de naturaleza nacional que escapa a la competencia tributaria local." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "it is not legitimate for municipal taxes to be imposed on activities that fall outside the constitutionally assigned, defined, and delimited sphere of the local", "quote_es": "no resulta legítimo que los impuestos municipales se impongan sobre actividades que escapan a la competencia constitucionalmente asignada, definida y delimitada a la esfera de lo local" }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "docks are property of the nation that cannot definitively leave the domain and control of the State. Given the special nature of the property and the legal quality of the services provided at the Complex, this port activity cannot be municipal under the terms of the legislation currently regulating its operation, and therefore the taxes that the legislator has conceived for the use of that national property are not municipal.", "quote_es": "los muelles son bienes propios de la nación que no pueden salir definitivamente del dominio y control del Estado. Dada la especial naturaleza del bien y la calidad jurídica de los servicios que se prestan en el Complejo, esa actividad portuaria no puede ser municipal en los términos de la legislación que actualmente regula su funcionamiento y por ello los tributos que el legislador ha concebido por la utilización de ese bien nacional, no es municipal." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the property subject to the concession in the specific case is a public domain asset of a state nature, namely, the Caldera Dock, which was granted in concession by the Granting Authority (Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports) to the appellant company for the purpose of providing the maritime services referred to in Article 5 of Law 7593.", "quote_es": "el bien objeto de la concesión en el caso concreto, lo constituye un bien de dominio público de carácter estatal, como lo es, el Muelle de Caldera, el cual fue dado en concesión por la Administración Concedente (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), a la empresa recurrente con el objetivo de prestar los servicios marítimos a que se refiere el artículo 5 de la Ley 7593." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-26314", "citation": "Ley 7593", "title_en": "Public Services Regulatory Authority Law", "title_es": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/08/1996", "year": "1996" }, { "id": "norm-30464", "citation": "Ley 7762", "title_en": "General Law on Public Works Concessions with Public Services", "title_es": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos", "doc_type": "law", "date": "14/04/1998", "year": "1998" }, { "id": "norm-47762", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 30064", "title_en": "Regulation for Public Port Services Management Concession Contracts", "title_es": "Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de los Servicios", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "04/12/2001", "year": "2001" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-26314", "citation": "Ley 7593", "title_en": "Public Services Regulatory Authority Law", "title_es": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/08/1996", "year": "1996" }, { "id": "norm-30464", "citation": "Ley 7762", "title_en": "General Law on Public Works Concessions with Public Services", "title_es": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos", "doc_type": "law", "date": "14/04/1998", "year": "1998" }, { "id": "norm-47762", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 30064", "title_en": "Regulation for Public Port Services Management Concession Contracts", "title_es": "Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de los Servicios", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "04/12/2001", "year": "2001" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-596840", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-26314", "norm_num": "7593", "norm_name": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP)", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/08/1996" }, { "doc_id": "norm-30464", "norm_num": "7762", "norm_name": "Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "14/04/1998" }, { "doc_id": "norm-47762", "norm_num": "30064", "norm_name": "Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de los Servicios", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "04/12/2001" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "11-005029-1027-CA\n\nN° 22-2013\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA. II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, EDIFICIO ANEXO A, Dirección01 , a las quince horas cuarenta minutos del veintidós de enero de dos mil trece. \n\nConoce este Tribunal, como jerarca impropio, del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., representada por el señor Nombre103579 , de nacionalidad colombiana, mayor, casado, Administrador de Empresas, cédula de residencia número CED79683, vecino de Alajuela, en contra de la resolución administrativa del dos de setiembre de dos mil once dictada por Alcalde Municipal de Esparza.- \n\nRedacta el Juez Muñoz Chacón , y: \n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\nI.- Para una correcta resolución del presente asunto, se tiene por probado los siguientes antecedentes y hechos: 1) Que mediante escrito fechado veintitrés de agosto de dos mil once, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., presentó ante la MUNICIPALIDAD DE ESPARZA, un reclamo administrativo en contra del cobro del impuesto de patente municipal por el servicio de muelle para granos que presta (ver folios 29 a 37 del expediente); 2) Que mediante oficio DFT-109-2011 del doce de agosto de dos mil once, de la Dirección Financiera Tributaria de la Municipalidad de Esparza, resolvió rechazar el reclamo administrativo y la devolución de los dineros requeridos, así como la devolución de la multa cancelada bajo protesta (ver folios 38 a 42); 3) Que mediante escrito fechado veintitrés de agosto de dos mil once, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., interpuso recurso de apelación ante el Alcalde Municipal de Esparza en contra del acto administrativo contenido en el oficio DFT-109-2011 del doce de agosto de dos mil once, de la Dirección Financiera Tributaria de esa Municipalidad (ver folios 43 a 52); 4) Que mediante resolución sin número ni hora fechada dos de setiembre de dos mil once, el Alcalde Municipal de Esparza rechazó en todos sus extremos el recurso de apelación interpuesto en contra del acto administrativo contenido en el oficio DFT-109-2011 del doce de agosto de dos mil once, de la Dirección Financiera Tributaria de esa Municipalidad (ver folios 55 a 59); 5) Que mediante escrito recibido el día ocho de setiembre de dos mil once, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., interpuso recurso de apelación en contra de la resolución sin número ni hora fechada dos de setiembre de dos mil once, del Alcalde Municipal de Esparza (ver folios 68 a 79); 6) Que mediante auto de las quince horas y cincuenta y seis minutos del nueve de noviembre de dos mil once, de esta Sección, se confiere audiencia escrita por cinco días hábiles a la recurrente para que exprese agravios y al Alcalde Municipalidad de Esparza para que haga las alegaciones que estime pertinentes (folio 112).- \n\nII.- Agravios de la apelación: A manera de síntesis, sin perjuicio de la lectura integral que se ha hecho del total de las argumentaciones vertidas, los motivos de impugnación a modo de expresión de agravios, son los siguientes: 1) La actividad escapa de la competencia municipal. Refiere que de acuerdo con el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, la autonomía municipal para crear y cobrar impuestos se encuentra estrictamente delimitada al ámbito de lo local. Indica que conforme al artículo 121 inciso 14 Constitucional, los muelles son bienes \"nacionales\", que no pueden salir del dominio del Estado. Que ante la naturaleza demanial del bien explotado, la actividad otorgada en concesión y ejercida por la recurrente escapa de la competencia municipal, por ser el poder tributario estatal el que prevalece. Cita en su favor jurisprudencia constitucional como criterios de la Procuraduría General de la República. Sostiene que en virtud del origen demanial del Muelle de Caldera, la concesión le fue otorgada, en nombre del Estado, por parte del mismo Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, autoridad portuaria superior del Litoral Pacífico. Señala que la improcedencia del cobro de patente municipal, no deviene de una exención, sino de la inexistencia de la obligación tributaria por incompetencia en razón de la naturaleza de la actividad que desarrolla. Dice que la Municipalidad de Esparza carece de competencia para cobrar el impuesto de patentes debido a que la actividad portuaria trasciende lo local, al tratarse de la operación y explotación de un bien de naturaleza nacional. 2) Naturaleza de los contratos suscritos con el Estado. Cita parcialmente la resolución número 2584 de las once horas del ocho de julio de dos mil diez de esta Sección que resolvió que la Municipalidad de Santa Ana no se encontraba facultada para cobrar el impuesto de patentes, en virtud de la naturaleza del contrato de concesión y de la forma de retribución en él establecida. Sosteniendo que dada la similitud de la figura contractual ahí analizada y la de los contratos de concesión por ellos suscritos con el Estado, el criterio expuesto le resulta de plena aplicación para el caso en particular. 3) Violación al Principio de Reserva de Ley. Indica, luego de citar los artículos 31 y 32 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, y el 1º de la Ley de Impuestos Municipales de Esparza, número 7562 (hoy en día derogada), que en virtud del principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, para considerar que la actividad a ellos concesionada, se encuentra sujeta al impuesto de de patente, deberá estar expresamente gravada por ley. 4) La actividad del Almacén Fiscal. Inicia indicando que reconocieron ante la Municipalidad de Esparza que la única actividad ejercida por ellos, susceptible de sujeción al impuesto de patente municipal, es la relacionada con la operación del almacén fiscal, a partir de diciembre de dos mil ocho, actividad que es accesoria al objeto del \"Contrato de Gestión de Servicios Públicos de la Terminal de Puerto Caldera\" suscrito con el Estado. Afirman que el impuesto de patente correspondiente a la actividad relacionado con la operación del Almacén Fiscal ha sido declarada por ellos, desde diciembre de dos mil ocho, por lo que sostienen que no adeudan monto alguno por ese concepto, y que por lo tanto, no existe actividad lucrativa que se encuentre sin declarar, como manifiesta la Dirección Financiera y Tributaria de la Municipalidad de Esparza y ratifica la Alcaldía. Subraya que aportaron al expediente administrativo una certificación emitida por contador público autorizado, en que se determinan los ingresos brutos facturados por la actividad del almacén fiscal a partir del uno de diciembre de dos mil ocho al treinta y uno de diciembre de dos mil diez, para efectos del cálculo del impuesto de patente municipal de los períodos 2008, 2009, 2010 y 2011, solicitando la nulidad de cualquier trámite tendente al cobro de dicho impuesto por ser improcedente. Por su parte, el ente municipal solicita el rechazo del recurso de apelación, alegando que el artículo 44 de la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos, número 7762, del catorce de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, contempla los beneficios tributarios a los que el concesionario tendrá derecho a acogerse, entre los que en el inciso 4) no contempla a los impuestos municipales. Cita el dictamen C-268-2009 de la Procuraduría General de la República, en que se sostiene que la exención tributaria concedida en el artículo 44 de la Ley 7762, no alcanza al impuesto de patente municipal. Menciona la importancia en la interpretación literal y el espíritu del legislador, respecto a lo dispuesto en el artículo 68 del Código Municipal, transcribiendo citas parciales de jurisprudencia constitucional sobre dicho artículo. Manifiesta que debe considerarse que la recurrente solicitó voluntariamente las licencias que hoy pretende no pagar, además de la devolución de los impuestos y multas pagados del período 2006 al período 2011.- \n\nIII.- LA NATURALEZA DE LA CONCESIÓN DE GESTIÓN DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS DE LA TERMINAL DE PUERTO CALDERA: Un primer aspecto que resulta de trascendental importancia para la resolución de este asunto, estriba en aclarar la naturaleza jurídica de la concesión otorgada a la recurrente, lo que permitirá a su vez, valorar la procedencia del recurso interpuesto. Para ello, debe tenerse presente que, de acuerdo con los artículos 74 y 75 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y del Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de Servicios Públicos Portuarios, la Administración podrá gestionar, indirectamente y por concesión, los servicios de su competencia que, por su contenido económico, sean susceptibles de explotación empresarial, siempre y cuando, la prestación del servicio no implique el ejercicio de potestades de imperio o actos de autoridad. La Administración concedente, conservará siempre los poderes de supervisión e intervención, necesarios para garantizar la buena marcha de los servicios. La concesión de gestión de servicios públicos no podrá tener carácter indefinido. Según la naturaleza del servicio, en el Reglamento se fijará su duración, que no podrá exceder de veinticinco años. Los concesionarios de gestión de servicios públicos responderán, directamente, ante terceros, como como consecuencia de la operación propia de la actividad, excepto cuando el daño producido sea imputable a la Administración. A nivel doctrinario, la figura de la concesión de gestión de servicios públicos, ha sido definida como el “acto de derecho público por el cual la Administración encarga temporalmente a una persona la ejecución de un servicio público, transmitiéndole ciertos poderes jurídicos y efectuándose la explotación bajo su vigilancia y control, pero por cuenta y riesgo del concesionario” (Vid. Sayagüez Laso, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Uruguay, 1988. Quinta edición puesta al día por Daniel Martins, Tomo II, p.12). A su vez, se ha sostenido que dicha figura constituye “un contrato en la función administrativa en virtud del cual un ente estatal encomienda o delega a una persona, temporalmente, la ejecución de un servicio público, otorgándole el ejercicio de cierta potestad pública para asegurar su funcionamiento, efectuándose la explotación a costa y riesgo del concesionario, bajo la vigilancia y control del ente concedente”. (Jorge Sarmiento García, Concesión de Servicios Públicos, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1999). En el caso de la gestión de servicios públicos, se ha entendido que esa figura constituye una forma de gestión indirecta, la cual implica que la titularidad del servicio es inherente a la Administración Pública contratante, que asume la actividad como propia, conservando los poderes de fiscalización e intervención, necesarios para garantizar la buena marcha de los servicios. La Sala Constitucional en el Voto No. 5651-2005 sostuvo que la concesión de gestión de servicios públicos es una modalidad de concesión y como tal posee elementos comunes, a saber: La transmisión de los poderes de explotación de obras o servicios públicos es temporal y la explotación en general reserva a la Administración sus facultades de autorización, control y vigilancia. La titularidad del derecho de propiedad y/o del servicio público se mantiene en cabeza de la Administración. La prestación del servicio público por parte del concesionario se subordina a los principios de conveniencia nacional, legalidad, generalidad, continuidad, eficiencia, adaptabilidad y justa retribución. Los derechos y obligaciones del concesionario no pueden ser cedidos, fideicometidos o gravados, ni puede celebrarse ningún convenio de usufructo, arrendamiento, administración total o parcial sobre el objeto de la concesión sin el consentimiento previo y expreso de la Administración concedente y la aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República, consentimiento y aprobación que ha de entenderse necesariamente que no pueden darse si hay límites constitucionales o legales que lo impidan. La concesión se extingue, entre otras causales, mediante el rescate por causa de interés público. A su vez, el Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de Servicios Públicos Portuarios (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30064-MOPT), define la Concesión de Gestión de Servicios Públicos Portuarios como aquella “ figura contractual mediante la cual la Administración gestiona indirectamente y por concesión, aquellos servicios portuarios de su competencia que, por su contenido económico, sean susceptibles de explotación empresarial, siempre y cuando la prestación del servicio no implique el ejercicio de potestades de imperio o de actos de autoridad y conservando la Administración los poderes de supervisión e intervención, necesarios para garantizar la eficacia y eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios públicos...” (véase artículo 2). El concesionario responderá directamente ante terceros de sus actos u omisiones, que sean consecuencia directa o indirecta de las actividades de la gestión de los servicios dados en concesión (artículo 9). Asimismo, la Administración concedente mantendrá en todo momento la titularidad de los servicios contratados y velará porque el concesionario cumpla con las obligaciones adquiridas en el contrato y legislación vigente (artículo 13), mantendrá los poderes de supervisión e intervención necesarios para garantizar la buena marcha de los servicios portuarios (artículo 16), y podrá ordenar el rescate de la prestación por razones de interés público (artículo 23). El contrato no implica traspaso alguno de las instalaciones, mejoras y derechos de la Administración a favor del concesionario, ni la venta de los puertos, su arrendamiento, ni la imposición de gravámenes sobre él (artículo 15). Finalmente, establece que la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP) regulará las tarifas aplicables a los servicios portuarios según los términos de la Ley No. 7593 (artículo 24). Por lo que, podemos concluir, que a la SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., se les otorgó la gestión de servicios en el Puerto de Caldera, lo que constituye una figura de concesión de servicios públicos, lo que implica que no le resulte aplicable las disposiciones de la Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos, número 7762, en especial el artículo 44, respecto de los beneficios tributarios, pero tal conclusión preliminar no implica de por sí, el rechazo o la improcedencia del recurso interpuesto, como se verá más adelante.\n\nIV.- SOBRE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS: Que la SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., sea prestador de un servicio público, trae aparejado a su vez, una serie de implicaciones de orden jurídico, económico y social que deben ser puestos de manifiesto en aras de la correcta resolución de este asunto. La Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), número 7593, del nueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y seis, define como SERVICIO PUBLICO, el que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país, sea calificado como tal por la Asamblea Legislativa, con el fin de sujetarlo a las regulaciones de esa ley, indicando que será prestador de un servicio público, el sujeto público o privado, que presta dicho servicio por concesión, permiso o ley (artículo 3º, incisos a y c). En concordancia con lo expuesto, el artículo 9 ibídem, en lo que aquí interesa, dispone: \n\n“En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son:\n\n(...) \n\ng) Los servicios marítimos y aéreos en los puertos nacionales.\n\n (...) \n\nLa autorización para prestar el servicio público será otorgada por los entes citados a continuación:\n\n(...)\n\nInciso g): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica e Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectivamente. \n\n (...) ”\n\nb.- Características del servicio público: El servicio público implica una cuestión de orden público, al estar inmerso un conjunto de principios que atañen a la organización del Estado y a su funcionamiento (en palabras de la Corte Plena, sesión extraordinaria del veintiséis de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, que la Sala Constitucional ha hecho suyas, Voto No. Placa17543), por lo que el prestador debe estar sujeto a las reglas que sobre su prestación establezca el Estado. Para Nombre32650 (Derecho Administrativo. Ed.Astrea, Buenos Aires, Tomo I, págs 40-41) \"el servicio público se refiere a las prestaciones o servicios de interés comunitario, los cuales no deben ser necesariamente prestados por el Estado en forma directa. Esto posibilita que la ejecución sea compartida facilitando el pluralismo social y en razón del principio de la función subsidiaria, mediante el cual los poderes públicos ayudan y complementan las iniciativas privadas y de los cuerpos intermedios, en la economía principalmente. El servicio público pertenece a la categoría de las funciones estatales de ejecución exclusiva o concurrente y se constituye en un fin próximo o un medio para un fin mediato (el bien común), que se exterioriza en forma de servicio público, sujeto a un régimen jurídico ordinario y común de derecho administrativo.\" Nombre32650 piensa que el Estado es quien debe declarar hic et nunc, qué objetivos son de interés o de utilidad pública (se refiere a cuáles servicios merece la pena declararles como públicos), haciéndolos fines propios, pero no estando obligado a prestarlo en forma exclusiva. Esta última afirmación parece coincidir con Nombre103580, citado por SARMIENTO GARCÍA. Noción y elementos del servicio público. En los Servicios Públicos. Régimen jurídico actual. Ed. Depalma. Buenos Aires, pág. 14, quien indica que “la presencia o la ausencia del servicio público depende por entero de una decisión legal, latu sensu, que puede ser expresa o tácita”, decisión que, a criterio de Nombre103581, citado por Sarmiento García. Op. Cit, pág. 14, significa encuadrar determinada actividad en el ámbito de la función administrativa. En síntesis y reiterando, el servicio público se trata de prestaciones esenciales para la satisfacción de necesidades colectivas, de carácter industrial o comercial, brindados por el Estado o por medio de particulares mediante la figura de la concesión (gestión directa e indirecta), cuyas características, son: a-Principio de la licitación (libre concurrencia, igualdad de participación, publicidad, eficiencia), b-No otorga derechos subjetivos sobre el servicio público (la titularidad siempre es el Estado), sólo se reconoce el derecho subjetivo a ejercer la actividad de conformidad con los términos concesionados, c-No opera el silencio positivo, se requiere de acto administrativo expreso de la Administración concedente, d- La potestad tarifaria es intrínseca. Desde vieja data, la jurisprudencia constitucional, a partir de la emisión de la Ley número 7593, se ha encargado de perfilar y aclarar las potestades estatales frente a los prestadores de servicios público. Respecto al reconocimiento de la potestad estatal frente a sus servicios públicos se ha indicado que:\n\n“Tal y como lo apunta la Autoridad recurrida, la Constitución Política consagra el principio de protección a los intereses de los consumidores o usuarios, frente a aquellos que venden bienes o prestan servicios. De esta forma, el numeral 46 Constitucional dispone que: ‘... Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección y a un trato equitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la defensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias...’ Entratándose de los servicios públicos, la legislación ordinaria al desarrollar el mandato del precepto constitucional supra citado, ha procurado encontrar un punto de equilibrio entre los prestatarios de esta clase de servicios y los usuarios de los mismos. En tal sentido la Ley número 7593, Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, responde a este principio constitucional, pues como órgano es el encargado de conjugar los diversos intereses sociales referidos al fin público del estado, a los intereses de los prestatarios de los servicios públicos y a los usuarios de éstos, de tal suerte que es dicha autoridad la llamada a resolver todos aquellos asuntos en que se ven envueltas las materias confiadas a su administración. Señala la Ley 7593 en los ordinales que interesan, que son objetivos fundamentales de la Autoridad Reguladora el armonizar los intereses de los que se defina en el futuro, procurar el equilibrio entre las necesidades de los usuarios y los intereses de los prestatarios de los servicios públicos. (artículo 4:a): b)). El artículo 5 por su parte establece que en sus funcionar en los servicios públicos definidos en ese artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, contabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esa ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son: a) Suministro de energía eléctrica en las etapas de generación, transmisión, distribución y comercialización. b) Los servicios de telecomunicaciones cuya regulación esté autorizada por ley ... Además, corresponden a la Autoridad Reguladora las siguientes obligaciones: b) Realizar inspecciones técnicas de la propiedad, plantas y equipos destinados a prestar el servicio público, cuando lo estime conveniente para verificar la calidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, los costos, precios y las tarifas del servicio público. Siendo que toda disposición que se emita en relación con las materias a que se refiere ese artículo, será de acatamiento obligatorio (Artículo 6) El ordinal 14 dispone que son obligaciones de los prestatarios: a) Cumplir con las disposiciones que dicte la Autoridad Reguladora en materia de prestación del servicio, de acuerdo con lo establecido en las leyes y los reglamentos respectivos, j) Brindar el servicio en condiciones adecuadas y con la regularidad y seguridad que su naturaleza, la concesión o el permiso indiquen; fija además que para los efectos de la actuación de la Autoridad Reguladora, tratándose del control de la calidad en la cual se presta un servicio público, desde la manera en que recibe el usuario ese servicio, hasta la forma en que se le cobra el mismo, el ente regulador debe procurar determinar la existencia de factores que ameriten un pronunciamiento acerca de las medidas adecuadas para corregir cualquier aspecto, claro está, siempre que se encuentre dentro de su competencia. En la normativa citada tales pronunciamientos tienen carácter obligatorio para los prestatarios de los servicios regulados, entendiéndose que de no cumplirse lo establecido, el Órgano Regulador puede acudir a otros mecanismos para obligar al prestatario al cumplimiento de lo acordado.” (Voto No. 5713-97)\n\nEsta jurisprudencia, como es evidente, responde a los principios generales del servicio público, en el entendido de que el Estado es el titular de tales servicios y debe controlarlos o fiscalizarlos como parte de su actividad primaria, de su organización y funcionamiento, y con mucha más razón cuando son prestados por particulares. Más aún, en función de la propia Constitución se imponen mecanismos de garantía no sólo por interés del Estado respecto a sus propios servicios sino por los derechos fundamentales a que son acreedores los usuarios, como fundamenta el párrafo in fine del precepto 46 de dicha Carta.-\n\nV.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO: En virtud de los artículos 79 del Código Municipal y 1º de la Ley 7562, Tarifa de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza, del veintiocho de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco (hoy en día derogada por la Ley 9111 del veinte de diciembre de dos mil doce, Licencias para actividades lucrativas y no lucrativas del Cantón de Esparza, pero aplicable por la fecha en que inició operaciones la apelante), en principio, la licencia municipal se requiere para el ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa, ya sea de carácter industrial, comercial o de servicios (artículo 14 de la Ley 7562 ), la cual consiste en el permiso o habilitación previa por parte de los gobiernos locales que se concreta a través del pago de la respectiva patente (impuesto). En sentido inverso, se puede indicar que nadie puede ejercer actividad lucrativa, si no ha obtenido la licencia municipal, ni ha pagado la respectiva patente, lo que sigue, que no es dable ejercer una actividad comercial, solamente con la licencia, pero sin pagar el impuesto respectivo (ver en tal sentido, la resolución número 318-2011 dictada por esta Sección del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, a las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del nueve de setiembre del dos mil once). Recuérdese que el objeto de la licencia municipal , no sólo consiste en percibir un monto por concepto del impuesto sobre los ingresos brutos anuales que tengan las personas físicas o jurídicas por el desarrollo de la actividad autorizada; sino también, en fiscalizar que el ejercicio de una determinada actividad lucrativa, no resulte contraria al ordenamiento jurídico, en los términos expuestos por el artículo 81 del Código Municipal. Ahora bien, tal obligación de obtener la licencia municipal, para el ejercicio de una actividad lucrativa, debe entenderse para todos aquellas que no impliquen el conferimiento de una condición de prestador de un servicio público de trascendencia nacional, ya que dicho acto de otorgamiento de la concesión, impone al concesionario del título habilitante suficiente que le permita desarrollar la actividad, por lo que la empresa agraviada no requiere de licencia municipal para el cumplimiento de los términos de la concesión otorgada por la Administración competente. Ello implica, que el supuesto de hecho en que se encuentra la recurrente, no encuadra en el hecho generador tipificado en los artículos 1 y 14 de la Ley 7562 ; por cuanto, la prestación del servicio portuario que realiza la empresa agraviada, consiste en una actividad sometida al régimen de servicio público, con la connotaciones y características reseñadas, que se presta sobre un bien de dominio público nacional y no municipal. Ahora bien, sin perjuicio de lo anteriormente expuesto, este Tribunal considera que “…no resulta legítimo que los impuestos municipales se impongan sobre actividades que escapan a la competencia constitucionalmente asignada, definida y delimitada a la esfera de lo local; de tal suerte que no puede pretenderse el establecimiento de un tributo de tal naturaleza –de orden municipal- sobre hechos imponibles o gravables por el Estado, debiendo, en consecuencia, limitarse a la competencia municipal, cuyo ámbito o esfera fue delimitado por la voluntad del constituyente…” (sentencia número 1997-6469 dictada por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del 8 de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y siete), al establecer en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, que la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal. En ese sentido, el bien objeto de la concesión en el caso concreto, lo constituye un bien de dominio público de carácter estatal, como lo es, el Muelle de Caldera, el cual fue dado en concesión por la Administración Concedente (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), a la empresa recurrente con el objetivo de prestar los servicios marítimos a que se refiere el artículo 5 de la Ley 7593. En consecuencia, dado que el bien objeto de la concesión se encuentra dentro del ámbito de competencia del Estado, las actividades ejercidas por la empresa agraviada en su condición de concesionaria, escapan del poder tributario de la Municipalidad de Esparza, en el tanto exceden el concepto de lo “local” previsto en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, por lo que, la Municipalidad de Esparza no podría cobrar impuesto de patente sobre la actividad portuaria que se desarrolla en el Muelle de Caldera, ni tampoco crear –en principio- ningún impuesto derivado del desarrollo de la misma. En tal sentido, se ha manifestado que \"los muelles son bienes propios de la nación que no pueden salir definitivamente del dominio y control del Estado. Dada la especial naturaleza del bien y la calidad jurídica de los servicios que se prestan en el Complejo, esa actividad portuaria no puede ser municipal en los términos de la legislación que actualmente regula su funcionamiento y por ello los tributos que el legislador ha concebido por la utilización de ese bien nacional, no es municipal.\" (Voto número 4268-95 de las dieciocho horas y veintisiete minutos del uno de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cinco de la Sala Constitucional). En virtud de todo lo expuesto, procede acoger el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., en contra de la resolución administrativa del dos de setiembre de dos mil once dictada por Alcalde Municipal de Esparza, la cual se anual, y en su lugar se ordena la devolución de los montos pagados por concepto de impuesto de patente municipal del período 2006-2011, así como la multa impuesta, la cual se liquidará en sede municipal, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa.-\n\n POR TANTO:\n\nSe declara con lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la sociedad denominada SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., en contra de la resolución administrativa del dos de setiembre de dos mil once dictada por Alcalde Municipal de Esparza, la cual se anual, y en su lugar se ordena la devolución de los montos pagados por concepto de impuesto de patente municipal del período 2006-2011, así como la multa impuesta, la cual se liquidará en sede municipal, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa.- NOTIFÍQUESE. \n\n \n\n \n\nEvelyn Solano Ulloa \n\n \n\n \n\n Marianella Álvarez Molina Francisco J. Muñoz Chacón \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nExp: 11-005029-1027-CA\n\nRecurso de Apelación Municipal\n\nSociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera, SPGC, S.A., contra la Municipalidad de Esparza.", "body_en_text": "11-005029-1027-CA\n\nN° 22-2013\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ, ANEXO A BUILDING, Dirección01, at fifteen hours forty minutes on January twenty-second, two thousand thirteen.\n\nThis Tribunal hears, as improper hierarch, the appeal filed by SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., represented by Mr. Nombre103579, of Colombian nationality, of legal age, married, Business Administrator, residence ID number CED79683, resident of Alajuela, against the administrative resolution of September second, two thousand eleven, issued by the Municipal Mayor of Esparza.-\n\nDrafted by Judge Muñoz Chacón, and:\n\nWHEREAS:\n\nI.- For a proper resolution of this matter, the following background and facts are deemed proven: 1) That by written submission dated August twenty-third, two thousand eleven, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., filed with the MUNICIPALITY OF ESPARZA an administrative claim against the collection of the municipal business license tax for the grain dock service it provides (see folios 29 to 37 of the file); 2) That by official letter DFT-109-2011 of August twelfth, two thousand eleven, from the Tax Finance Directorate of the Municipality of Esparza, it resolved to reject the administrative claim and the refund of the monies requested, as well as the refund of the fine paid under protest (see folios 38 to 42); 3) That by written submission dated August twenty-third, two thousand eleven, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., filed an appeal before the Municipal Mayor of Esparza against the administrative act contained in official letter DFT-109-2011 of August twelfth, two thousand eleven, from the Tax Finance Directorate of that Municipality (see folios 43 to 52); 4) That by resolution without number or time, dated September second, two thousand eleven, the Municipal Mayor of Esparza rejected in all its aspects the appeal filed against the administrative act contained in official letter DFT-109-2011 of August twelfth, two thousand eleven, from the Tax Finance Directorate of that Municipality (see folios 55 to 59); 5) That by written submission received on September eighth, two thousand eleven, SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., filed an appeal against the resolution without number or time, dated September second, two thousand eleven, of the Municipal Mayor of Esparza (see folios 68 to 79); 6) That by order of fifteen hours and fifty-six minutes of November ninth, two thousand eleven, of this Section, a written hearing of five business days is granted to the appellant to state its grievances and to the Municipal Mayor of Esparza to make the allegations it deems pertinent (folio 112).-\n\nII.- Grounds of the Appeal: By way of summary, without prejudice to the comprehensive reading that has been made of all the arguments put forward, the grounds for challenge as a statement of grievances are as follows: 1) The activity falls outside municipal competence. It states that according to Article 169 of the Political Constitution, municipal autonomy to create and collect taxes is strictly limited to the local sphere. It indicates that pursuant to Article 121, subsection 14 of the Constitution, docks are \"national\" assets, which cannot leave the domain of the State. That given the public domain nature of the exploited asset, the activity granted in concession and exercised by the appellant falls outside municipal competence, because it is the state tax power that prevails. It cites in its favor constitutional jurisprudence and opinions of the Procuraduría General de la República. It maintains that by virtue of the public domain origin of the Muelle de Caldera, the concession was granted to it, on behalf of the State, by the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico itself, the superior port authority of the Pacific Coast. It notes that the impropriety of the municipal business license tax collection does not stem from an exemption, but from the non-existence of the tax obligation due to lack of competence by reason of the nature of the activity it carries out. It says the Municipality of Esparza lacks the competence to collect the business license tax because the port activity transcends the local sphere, as it involves the operation and exploitation of an asset of a national nature. 2) Nature of the contracts signed with the State. It partially cites resolution number 2584 of eleven hours on July eighth, two thousand ten, of this Section, which resolved that the Municipality of Santa Ana was not empowered to collect the business license tax, by virtue of the nature of the concession contract and the form of remuneration established therein. Maintaining that given the similarity of the contractual figure analyzed there and that of the concession contracts signed by them with the State, the criterion expressed is fully applicable to the particular case. 3) Violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve. It indicates, after citing Articles 31 and 32 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and Article 1 of the Law of Municipal Taxes of Esparza, number 7562 (now repealed), that by virtue of the principle of legal reserve in tax matters, for the activity granted to them under concession to be considered subject to the business license tax, it must be expressly taxed by law. 4) The Customs Warehouse Activity. It begins by indicating that they acknowledged before the Municipality of Esparza that the only activity exercised by them susceptible to being subject to the municipal business license tax is that related to the operation of the customs warehouse (almacén fiscal), as of December two thousand eight, an activity that is accessory to the object of the \"Public Services Management Contract for the Puerto Caldera Terminal\" signed with the State. They affirm that the business license tax corresponding to the activity related to the operation of the Customs Warehouse has been declared by them since December two thousand eight, therefore they maintain they do not owe any amount for that concept, and that, consequently, there is no lucrative activity that remains undeclared, as stated by the Tax and Finance Directorate of the Municipality of Esparza and ratified by the Mayor's Office. It emphasizes that they provided to the administrative file a certification issued by an authorized public accountant, determining the gross income invoiced for the customs warehouse activity from December first, two thousand eight, to December thirty-first, two thousand ten, for purposes of calculating the municipal business license tax for the 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 periods, requesting the annulment of any proceeding aimed at collecting said tax as being improper. For its part, the municipal entity requests the rejection of the appeal, arguing that Article 44 of the General Law on the Concession of Public Works with Public Services, number 7762, of April fourteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, contemplates the tax benefits to which the concessionaire shall be entitled, among which subsection 4) does not contemplate municipal taxes. It cites Opinion C-268-2009 of the Procuraduría General de la República, which maintains that the tax exemption granted in Article 44 of Law 7762 does not extend to the municipal business license tax. It mentions the importance of literal interpretation and the spirit of the legislator, regarding the provisions of Article 68 of the Municipal Code, transcribing partial citations of constitutional jurisprudence on said article. It states that it must be considered that the appellant voluntarily requested the licenses it now seeks not to pay, in addition to the refund of taxes and fines paid from the 2006 period to the 2011 period.-\n\nIII.- THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES MANAGEMENT CONCESSION FOR THE PUERTO CALDERA TERMINAL: A first aspect of transcendental importance for the resolution of this matter lies in clarifying the legal nature of the concession granted to the appellant, which will in turn allow an assessment of the admissibility of the appeal filed. For this, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Articles 74 and 75 of the Law on Administrative Procurement and the Regulation for Public Port Services Management Concession Contracts, the Administration may manage, indirectly and by concession, the services within its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business exploitation, provided that the provision of the service does not imply the exercise of powers of authority or acts of authority. The granting Administration shall always retain the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the services. The public services management concession (concesión de gestión de servicios públicos) may not have an indefinite character. According to the nature of the service, its duration shall be set in the Regulation, which may not exceed twenty-five years. The public services management concessionaires shall be directly liable to third parties for the consequences of the operation inherent to the activity, except when the damage caused is attributable to the Administration. At the doctrinal level, the figure of the public services management concession has been defined as the \"act of public law by which the Administration temporarily entrusts a person with the execution of a public service, transmitting certain legal powers to them and the exploitation being carried out under its supervision and control, but at the account and risk of the concessionaire\" (See Sayagüez Laso, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Uruguay, 1988. Fifth edition updated by Daniel Martins, Volume II, p.12). In turn, it has been maintained that said figure constitutes \"a contract in the administrative function by virtue of which a state entity entrusts or delegates to a person, temporarily, the execution of a public service, granting them the exercise of certain public authority to ensure its operation, the exploitation being carried out at the cost and risk of the concessionaire, under the supervision and control of the granting entity.\" (Jorge Sarmiento García, Concesión de Servicios Públicos, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1999). In the case of public services management, it has been understood that this figure constitutes a form of indirect management, which implies that the ownership of the service is inherent to the contracting Public Administration, which assumes the activity as its own, retaining the powers of inspection and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the services. The Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling No. 5651-2005, held that the public services management concession is a type of concession and as such possesses common elements, namely: The transmission of the powers to exploit public works or services is temporary and the exploitation generally reserves to the Administration its powers of authorization, control, and supervision. The ownership of the property right and/or the public service remains with the Administration. The provision of the public service by the concessionaire is subordinated to the principles of national convenience, legality, generality, continuity, efficiency, adaptability, and fair remuneration. The rights and obligations of the concessionaire may not be assigned, placed in trust, or encumbered, nor may any agreement for usufruct, lease, or total or partial administration of the object of the concession be entered into without the prior and express consent of the granting Administration and the approval of the Contraloría General de la República, consent and approval which must necessarily be understood as not being able to be given if there are constitutional or legal limits that prevent it. The concession is extinguished, among other causes, by means of rescue for reasons of public interest. In turn, the Regulation for Public Port Services Management Concession Contracts (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30064-MOPT) defines the Public Port Services Management Concession as that \"contractual figure by which the Administration indirectly manages and by concession, those port services within its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business exploitation, provided that the provision of the service does not imply the exercise of powers of authority or acts of authority and the Administration retaining the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of public services...\" (see Article 2). The concessionaire shall be directly liable to third parties for its acts or omissions, which are a direct or indirect consequence of the activities of managing the services granted under concession (Article 9). Likewise, the granting Administration shall at all times maintain ownership of the contracted services and shall ensure that the concessionaire fulfills the obligations acquired in the contract and current legislation (Article 13), shall maintain the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the port services (Article 16), and may order the rescue of the provision for reasons of public interest (Article 23). The contract does not imply any transfer of the facilities, improvements, and rights of the Administration in favor of the concessionaire, nor the sale of the ports, their lease, or the imposition of encumbrances upon them (Article 15). Finally, it establishes that the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP) shall regulate the rates applicable to port services according to the terms of Law No. 7593 (Article 24). Consequently, we can conclude that SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., was granted the management of services at Puerto Caldera, which constitutes a figure of public services concession, which means that the provisions of the General Law on the Concession of Public Works with Public Services, number 7762, are not applicable to it, especially Article 44, regarding tax benefits, but this preliminary conclusion does not in itself imply the rejection or inadmissibility of the appeal filed, as will be seen later.\n\nIV.- REGARDING PUBLIC SERVICES: The fact that SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., is a provider of a public service entails, in turn, a series of legal, economic, and social implications that must be highlighted for the proper resolution of this matter. The Law of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), number 7593, of August ninth, nineteen ninety-six, defines as PUBLIC SERVICE that which, due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly, for the purpose of subjecting it to the regulations of that law, indicating that a provider of a public service shall be the public or private subject who provides said service by concession, permit, or law (Article 3, subsections a and c). In accordance with the foregoing, Article 9 ibidem, as relevant here, provides:\n\n\"In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:\n\n(...)\n\ng) Maritime and air services in national ports.\n\n(...)\n\nThe authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:\n\n(...)\n\nSubsection g): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica and Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectively.\n\n(...)\"\n\nb.- Characteristics of the public service: The public service implies a matter of public order, as a set of principles relating to the organization of the State and its operation are involved (in the words of the Full Court, extraordinary session of August twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-two, which the Constitutional Chamber has adopted, Ruling No. Placa17543), therefore the provider must be subject to the rules that the State establishes regarding its provision. For Nombre32650 (Derecho Administrativo. Ed. Astrea, Buenos Aires, Volume I, pp. 40-41) \"the public service refers to provisions or services of community interest, which should not necessarily be provided by the State directly. This makes it possible for the execution to be shared, facilitating social pluralism and by reason of the principle of the subsidiary function, through which public authorities assist and complement private initiatives and those of intermediate bodies, mainly in the economy. The public service belongs to the category of state functions of exclusive or concurrent execution and constitutes an immediate end or a means for a mediate end (the common good), which is externalized in the form of a public service, subject to an ordinary and common legal regime of administrative law.\" Nombre32650 believes that the State is the one that must declare hic et nunc which objectives are of public interest or utility (referring to which services are worth declaring as public), making them its own ends, but without being obligated to provide them exclusively. This last assertion seems to coincide with Nombre103580, cited by SARMIENTO GARCÍA. Notion and elements of the public service. In Los Servicios Públicos. Régimen jurídico actual. Ed. Depalma. Buenos Aires, p. 14, who indicates that \"the presence or absence of the public service depends entirely on a legal decision, lato sensu, which may be express or tacit,\" a decision which, in the view of Nombre103581, cited by Sarmiento García. Op. Cit, p. 14, means placing a specific activity within the scope of the administrative function. In summary and reiterating, the public service consists of essential provisions for the satisfaction of collective needs, of an industrial or commercial nature, provided by the State or by private parties through the figure of concession (direct and indirect management), whose characteristics are: a-Principle of bidding (free competition, equality of participation, publicity, efficiency), b-Does not grant subjective rights over the public service (ownership is always the State's), only the subjective right to exercise the activity in accordance with the conceded terms is recognized, c-Positive silence does not operate; an express administrative act from the granting Administration is required, d- The rate-setting power is intrinsic. For a long time, constitutional jurisprudence, since the issuance of Law number 7593, has been responsible for outlining and clarifying state powers vis-à-vis public service providers. Regarding the recognition of state power over its public services, it has been indicated that:\n\n\"As pointed out by the appealed Authority, the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of protection of the interests of consumers or users, against those who sell goods or provide services. Thus, Article 46 of the Constitution provides that: '... Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they establish for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters...' In the case of public services, ordinary legislation, in developing the mandate of the aforementioned constitutional precept, has sought to find a balance between the providers of this type of services and their users. In this sense, Law number 7593, Law Creating the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, responds to this constitutional principle, as the body is responsible for combining the various social interests related to the public purpose of the state, the interests of the providers of public services, and their users, such that said authority is the one called upon to resolve all matters in which the subjects entrusted to its administration are involved. Law 7593 states in the relevant articles, that fundamental objectives of the Regulatory Authority are to harmonize the interests of those defined in the future, and to seek balance between the needs of users and the interests of the providers of public services (Article 4:a): b)). Article 5, for its part, establishes that in its functions, in the public services defined in that article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, accountability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of that law. The aforementioned public services are: a) Supply of electric power in the stages of generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization. b) Telecommunications services whose regulation is authorized by law ... In addition, the following obligations correspond to the Regulatory Authority: b) Carry out technical inspections of the property, plants, and equipment intended to provide the public service, when it deems it convenient to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and rates of the public service. Given that any provision issued in relation to the matters referred to in that article shall be mandatory (Article 6). Article 14 provides that the obligations of providers are: a) Comply with the provisions issued by the Regulatory Authority in matters of service provision, in accordance with the provisions of the respective laws and regulations, j) Provide the service under adequate conditions and with the regularity and security that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate; it also establishes that for the purposes of the Regulatory Authority's action, in the case of controlling the quality in which a public service is provided, from the manner in which the user receives that service, to the way in which they are charged for it, the regulatory body must seek to determine the existence of factors that warrant a pronouncement regarding the appropriate measures to correct any aspect, provided, of course, that it falls within its competence. In the cited regulations, such pronouncements are mandatory for the providers of regulated services, it being understood that if the established provisions are not complied with, the Regulatory Body may resort to other mechanisms to compel the provider to comply with what has been agreed.\" (Ruling No. 5713-97)\n\nThis jurisprudence, as is evident, responds to the general principles of public service, on the understanding that the State is the owner of such services and must control or supervise them as part of its primary activity, its organization and operation, and even more so when they are provided by private parties. Furthermore, by virtue of the Constitution itself, guarantee mechanisms are imposed not only for the interest of the State regarding its own services but also for the fundamental rights to which users are entitled, as the final paragraph of Article 46 of said Charter establishes.-\n\nV.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE: By virtue of Articles 79 of the Municipal Code and 1 of Law 7562, Municipal Tax Tariff of the Canton of Esparza, of November twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five (now repealed by Law 9111 of December twentieth, two thousand twelve, Licenses for lucrative and non-lucrative activities of the Canton of Esparza, but applicable due to the date on which the appellant began operations), in principle, the municipal license is required for the exercise of any lucrative activity, whether of an industrial, commercial, or service nature (Article 14 of Law 7562), which consists of the prior permit or authorization by local governments, materialized through the payment of the respective business license tax (patente). Conversely, it can be stated that no one may exercise a lucrative activity if they have not obtained the municipal license and paid the respective business license tax; it follows that it is not permissible to exercise a commercial activity solely with the license but without paying the respective tax (see in this regard, resolution number 318-2011 issued by this Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, at nine hours forty minutes on September ninth, two thousand eleven). It must be remembered that the purpose of the municipal license is not only to receive an amount for the tax on the annual gross income of individuals or legal entities from the development of the authorized activity; but also, to supervise that the exercise of a specific lucrative activity is not contrary to the legal system, under the terms set forth in Article 81 of the Municipal Code. However, such obligation to obtain the municipal license for the exercise of a lucrative activity must be understood for all those activities that do not imply the conferral of the status of a provider of a public service of national significance, since said act of granting the concession imposes on the concessionaire a sufficient enabling title that allows it to carry out the activity, and therefore the aggrieved company does not require a municipal license for the fulfillment of the terms of the concession granted by the competent Administration. This implies that the factual situation in which the appellant finds itself does not fit the taxable event (hecho generador) typified in Articles 1 and 14 of Law 7562; since the provision of the port service carried out by the aggrieved company consists of an activity subject to the public service regime, with the connotations and characteristics described, which is provided on an asset belonging to the national public domain and not the municipal one. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that \"...it is not legitimate for municipal taxes to be imposed on activities that fall outside the constitutionally assigned competence, defined and delimited to the local sphere; such that the establishment of a tax of such nature – of a municipal nature – cannot be sought on taxable events or matters taxable by the State, and must, consequently, be limited to municipal competence, whose scope or sphere was delimited by the will of the constituent power...\" (judgment number 1997-6469 issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at sixteen hours twenty minutes on October 8, nineteen ninety-seven), upon establishing in Article 169 of the Political Constitution that the administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. In this sense, the asset subject to the concession in the specific case constitutes an asset of public domain of a state nature, such as the Muelle de Caldera, which was granted under concession by the Granting Administration (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico) to the appellant company with the objective of providing the maritime services referred to in Article 5 of Law 7593. Consequently, given that the asset subject to the concession falls within the sphere of competence of the State, the activities carried out by the aggrieved company in its capacity as concessionaire fall outside the taxing power of the Municipality of Esparza, insofar as they exceed the concept of \"local\" provided for in Article 169 of the Political Constitution, and therefore, the Municipality of Esparza could not collect a business license tax on the port activity carried out at the Muelle de Caldera, nor could it create – in principle – any tax derived from its development. In this regard, it has been stated that \"docks are assets belonging to the nation that cannot permanently leave the domain and control of the State. Given the special nature of the asset and the legal quality of the services provided at the Complex, that port activity cannot be municipal under the terms of the legislation that currently regulates its operation and, therefore, the taxes that the legislator has conceived for the use of that national asset are not municipal.\" (Ruling number 4268-95 of eighteen hours and twenty-seven minutes on August first, nineteen ninety-five of the Constitutional Chamber).\n\nBy virtue of all the foregoing, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative resolution of September 2, 2011, issued by the Mayor of Esparza, is hereby granted. Said resolution is annulled, and in its place, the refund of the amounts paid for municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) for the 2006-2011 period, as well as the imposed fine, is ordered. The fine shall be settled at the municipal level, and the administrative channel is hereby exhausted.-\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nThe appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the company named SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative resolution of September 2, 2011, issued by the Mayor of Esparza, is declared with merit. Said resolution is annulled, and in its place, the refund of the amounts paid for municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) for the 2006-2011 period, as well as the imposed fine, is ordered. The fine shall be settled at the municipal level, and the administrative channel is hereby exhausted.- NOTIFY.\n\n\nEvelyn Solano Ulloa\n\n\nMarianella Álvarez Molina Francisco J. Muñoz Chacón\n\n\n\n\n\n\nExp: 11-005029-1027-CA\n\nRecurso de Apelación Municipal\n\nSociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera, SPGC, S.A., contra la Municipalidad de Esparza.\n\n(...)”\n\n**b.- Characteristics of the public service:** The public service implies a matter of public order, as it involves a set of principles that pertain to the organization of the State and its functioning (in the words of the Full Court, extraordinary session of August twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-two, which the Constitutional Chamber has adopted as its own, **Voto No. Placa17543**), meaning the provider must be subject to the rules established by the State regarding its provision. For Nombre32650 (Derecho Administrativo. Ed.Astrea, Buenos Aires, Tomo I, págs 40-41) \"*the public service refers to the benefits or services of community interest, which need not necessarily be provided by the State directly. This allows execution to be shared, facilitating social pluralism and based on the principle of subsidiarity, through which public authorities help and complement private initiatives and those of intermediate bodies, mainly in the economy. The public service belongs to the category of state functions of exclusive or concurrent execution and is constituted as a proximate end or a means to a mediate end (the common good), which is externalized in the form of a public service, subject to an ordinary and common legal regime of administrative law.*\" Nombre32650 thinks that the State is the one that must declare *hic et nunc*, which objectives are of public interest or utility (referring to which services are worth declaring as public), making them its own ends, but not being obligated to provide them exclusively. This last affirmation seems to coincide with Nombre103580, cited by SARMIENTO GARCÍA. Noción y elementos del servicio público. En los Servicios Públicos. Régimen jurídico actual. Ed. Depalma. Buenos Aires, pág. 14, who indicates that *“the presence or absence of the public service depends entirely on a legal decision, lato sensu, which can be express or tacit”*, a decision that, in the opinion of Nombre103581, cited by Sarmiento García. Op. Cit, pág. 14, means framing a certain activity within the scope of the administrative function. In summary and reiterating, the public service involves essential benefits for the satisfaction of collective needs, of an industrial or commercial nature, provided by the State or through private parties via the figure of a concession (direct and indirect management), whose characteristics are: **a-** Principle of bidding (free competition, equality of participation, publicity, efficiency), **b-** Does not grant subjective rights over the public service (ownership always belongs to the State), only the subjective right to exercise the activity in accordance with the concession terms is recognized, **c-** Positive silence does not operate, an express administrative act from the granting Administration is required, **d-** The tariff-setting power is intrinsic. For a long time, constitutional jurisprudence, since the issuance of Law number 7593, has been responsible for outlining and clarifying state powers regarding public service providers. Regarding the recognition of state power over its public services, it has been indicated that:\n\n“As pointed out by the appealed Authority, the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of protecting the interests of consumers or users, against those who sell goods or provide services. Thus, Constitutional provision 46 states that: ‘... Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice and to equitable treatment. The State will support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters...’ Regarding public services, ordinary legislation, in developing the mandate of the above-cited constitutional precept, has sought to find a point of balance between the providers of this class of services and the users thereof. In this sense, Law number 7593, the Law Creating the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, responds to this constitutional principle, since as an organ it is responsible for combining the diverse social interests regarding the public purpose of the state, the interests of public service providers, and the users thereof, such that it is said authority that is called upon to resolve all those matters in which the subjects entrusted to its administration are involved. Law 7593 indicates in the relevant provisions that the fundamental objectives of the Regulatory Authority are to harmonize the interests of those defined in the future, to seek balance between the needs of the users and the interests of the public service providers. (article 4:a): b)). Article 5 for its part establishes that in its functioning, in the public services defined in that article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; moreover, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to article 25 of that law. The aforementioned public services are: a) Supply of electrical energy in the stages of generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization. b) Telecommunications services whose regulation is authorized by law ... Furthermore, the following obligations correspond to the Regulatory Authority: b) Carry out technical inspections of the property, plants, and equipment destined to provide the public service, when it deems it convenient to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and rates of the public service. Given that any provision issued in relation to the matters referred to in that article shall be of mandatory compliance (Article 6). Provision 14 states that the obligations of the providers are: a) Comply with the provisions issued by the Regulatory Authority regarding the provision of the service, in accordance with what is established in the respective laws and regulations, j) Provide the service under adequate conditions and with the regularity and safety that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate; it also establishes that for the purposes of the Regulatory Authority's action, regarding the control of the quality with which a public service is provided, from the manner in which the user receives that service, up to the way in which the user is charged for it, the regulatory entity must seek to determine the existence of factors that warrant a pronouncement on the appropriate measures to correct any aspect, of course, provided that it falls within its competence. In the cited regulations, such pronouncements are mandatory for the providers of the regulated services, it being understood that if what is established is not complied with, the Regulatory Body may resort to other mechanisms to compel the provider to comply with what was agreed.” (Voto No. 5713-97)\n\nThis jurisprudence, as is evident, responds to the general principles of the public service, in the understanding that the State is the owner of such services and must control or supervise them as part of its primary activity, its organization and functioning, and with even more reason when they are provided by private parties. Furthermore, by virtue of the Constitution itself, guarantee mechanisms are imposed not only due to the State's interest regarding its own services but also due to the fundamental rights to which the users are entitled, as grounds in the final paragraph of provision 46 of said Charter.-\n\n**V.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE:** By virtue of articles 79 of the Código Municipal and 1 of Law 7562, Tarifa de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza, of November twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five (now repealed by Law 9111 of December twentieth, two thousand twelve, Licencias para actividades lucrativas y no lucrativas del Cantón de Esparza, but applicable due to the date on which the appellant began operations), in principle, the municipal license (licencia municipal) is required for the exercise of any for-profit activity, whether industrial, commercial, or service oriented (article 14 of Law 7562), which consists of the permit or prior authorization by the local governments, materialized through the payment of the respective patent (patente) (tax). Conversely, it can be stated that no one may exercise a for-profit activity if they have not obtained the municipal license (licencia municipal), nor paid the respective patent (patente), it follows that it is not permissible to exercise a commercial activity solely with the license, but without paying the respective tax (see in this regard, resolution number **318-2011** issued by this Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, at nine hours forty minutes on September ninth, two thousand eleven). It should be remembered that the purpose of the municipal license (licencia municipal) does not only consist of receiving an amount for the tax on the annual gross income that natural or legal persons have from the development of the authorized activity; but also, in supervising that the exercise of a determined for-profit activity is not contrary to the legal system, in the terms expressed by article 81 of the Código Municipal. However, such obligation to obtain the municipal license (licencia municipal) for the exercise of a for-profit activity must be understood for all those that do not imply the conferral of the status of a provider of a public service of national significance, since said act of granting the concession imposes upon the concessionaire the sufficient authorizing title that allows them to develop the activity, meaning that the aggrieved company does not require a municipal license (licencia municipal) for the fulfillment of the terms of the concession granted by the competent Administration. This implies that the factual situation in which the appellant finds itself does not fit into the taxable event typified in articles 1 and 14 of Law 7562; given that the provision of the port service carried out by the aggrieved company consists of an activity subject to the public service regime, with the connotations and characteristics outlined, which is provided on property of national public domain and not municipal. Now, notwithstanding the aforementioned, this Tribunal considers that *“…it is not legitimate for municipal taxes to be imposed on activities that fall outside the constitutionally assigned competence, defined and delimited to the local sphere; such that the establishment of a tribute of such nature –of a municipal order– on taxable events or events taxable by the State cannot be attempted, and must, consequently, be limited to municipal competence, whose scope or sphere was delimited by the will of the constituent…”* (judgment number 1997-6469 issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at sixteen hours twenty minutes on October 8th, nineteen ninety-seven), when establishing in article 169 of the Political Constitution, that the administration of **local interests and services** in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. In that sense, **the property object of the concession in the specific case,** is constituted by a state public domain property, namely, the Muelle de Caldera, which was granted in concession by the Conceding Administration (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), to the appellant company with the objective of providing the maritime services referred to in article 5 of Law 7593. Consequently, given that the property object of the concession falls within the sphere of State competence, the activities exercised by the aggrieved company in its capacity as concessionaire, escape the taxing power of the Municipality of Esparza, insofar as they exceed the concept of “local” provided for in article 169 of the Political Constitution, therefore, the Municipality of Esparza could not charge a patent tax (impuesto de patente) on the port activity carried out at the Muelle de Caldera, nor create –in principle– any tax derived from its development. In this sense, it has been stated that *\"the docks are properties belonging to the nation that cannot definitively leave the domain and control of the State. Given the special nature of the property and the legal status of the services provided in the Complex, that port activity cannot be municipal under the terms of the legislation that currently regulates its operation and therefore the tributes that the legislator has conceived for the use of that national property are not municipal.\"* (Voto number **4268-95** of eighteen hours and twenty-seven minutes on August first, nineteen ninety-five of the Constitutional Chamber). By virtue of all the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the appeal filed by **SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A.**, against the administrative resolution of September second, two thousand eleven, issued by the Municipal Mayor of Esparza, which is annulled, and in its place, the return of the amounts paid for the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) for the 2006-2011 period is ordered, as well as the imposed fine, which shall be liquidated at the municipal level, with the administrative route being exhausted.-\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe appeal filed by the company named **SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A.** is granted, against the administrative resolution of September second, two thousand eleven, issued by the Municipal Mayor of Esparza, which is annulled, and in its place, the return of the amounts paid for the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) for the 2006-2011 period is ordered, as well as the imposed fine, which shall be liquidated at the municipal level, with the administrative route being exhausted.- **NOTIFÍQUESE.**\n\n**Evelyn Solano Ulloa**\n\n**Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Francisco J. Muñoz Chacón**\n\nExp: 11-005029-1027-CA\nRecurso de Apelación Municipal\nSociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera, SPGC, S.A., contra la Municipalidad de Esparza.\n\n\"III.- THE NATURE OF THE MANAGEMENT CONCESSION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AT THE PUERTO CALDERA TERMINAL: A first aspect of transcendental importance for the resolution of this matter lies in clarifying the legal nature of the concession (concesión) granted to the appellant, which will, in turn, allow the admissibility of the filed appeal to be assessed. To this end, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Articles 74 and 75 of the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and the Regulation for Management Concession Contracts for Port Public Services (Reglamento para los Contratos de Concesión de Gestión de Servicios Públicos Portuarios), the Public Administration may indirectly manage, by concession, services within its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business exploitation, provided that the provision of the service does not involve the exercise of sovereign powers or acts of authority. The granting Administration shall always retain the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper operation of the services. The management concession of public services may not have an indefinite character. Depending on the nature of the service, the Regulation shall establish its duration, which may not exceed twenty-five years. Concessionaires managing public services shall be directly liable to third parties for the operation of the activity, except when the damage caused is attributable to the Administration. At the doctrinal level, the figure of the management concession of public services has been defined as the “act of public law by which the Public Administration temporarily entrusts a person with the execution of a public service, transferring certain legal powers to them, with the exploitation carried out under the Administration's supervision and control, but at the concessionaire's own account and risk” (Vid. Sayagüez Laso, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Uruguay, 1988.\n\nFifth edition updated by Daniel Martins, Volume II, p.12). In turn, it has been held that this figure constitutes “a contract in the administrative function by virtue of which a state entity entrusts or delegates to a person, temporarily, the execution of a public service, granting them the exercise of certain public authority to ensure its functioning, with the operation carried out at the cost and risk of the concessionaire, under the supervision and control of the granting entity.” (Jorge Sarmiento García, Concesión de Servicios Públicos, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1999). In the case of the management of public services, it has been understood that this figure constitutes a form of indirect management, which implies that the ownership of the service is inherent to the contracting Public Administration, which assumes the activity as its own, retaining the powers of inspection and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the services. The Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. **5651-2005** held that the management concession of public services is a type of concession and as such possesses common elements, namely: The transmission of the powers to operate public works or services is temporary, and the operation generally reserves to the Administration its powers of authorization, control, and supervision. The ownership of the property right and/or the public service remains with the Administration. The provision of the public service by the concessionaire is subordinated to the principles of national convenience, legality, generality, continuity, efficiency, adaptability, and fair compensation. The rights and obligations of the concessionaire cannot be assigned, placed in trust, or encumbered, nor can any agreement for usufruct, lease, or total or partial administration be entered into regarding the object of the concession without the prior and express consent of the granting Administration and the approval of the Comptroller General of the Republic, consent and approval that must necessarily be understood as not possible if constitutional or legal limits prevent it. The concession is extinguished, among other causes, through rescue for reasons of public interest. In turn, the Regulation for Port Public Service Management Concession Contracts (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30064-MOPT), defines the Port Public Service Management Concession as that “contractual figure through which the Administration indirectly manages, by concession, those port services under its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business operation, provided that the provision of the service does not imply the exercise of sovereign powers or acts of authority and while the Administration retains the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of public services...” (see article 2). The concessionaire will be directly liable to third parties for its acts or omissions that are a direct or indirect consequence of the activities of managing the services granted under concession (article 9). Likewise, the granting Administration will at all times retain the ownership of the contracted services and will ensure that the concessionaire complies with the obligations acquired in the contract and current legislation (article 13), will retain the powers of supervision and intervention necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the port services (article 16), and may order the rescue of the provision for reasons of public interest (article 23). The contract does not imply any transfer of the facilities, improvements, and rights of the Administration in favor of the concessionaire, nor the sale of the ports, their lease, nor the imposition of liens on them (article 15). Finally, it establishes that the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (ARESEP) will regulate the rates applicable to port services according to the terms of Law No. 7593 (article 24). Therefore, we can conclude that **SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A.**, was granted the management of services at the Port of Caldera, which constitutes a figure of public service concession, implying that the provisions of the General Law on Concession of Public Works with Public Services, number 7762, are not applicable to it, especially article 44, regarding tax benefits, but this preliminary conclusion does not in itself imply the rejection or inadmissibility of the appeal filed, as will be seen later.\n\n**IV.- ON PUBLIC SERVICES:** That **SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A.**, being a provider of a public service, brings with it, in turn, a series of legal, economic, and social implications that must be highlighted for the correct resolution of this matter. The Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (ARESEP), number 7593, of August ninth, nineteen ninety-six, defines **PUBLIC SERVICE** as that which, due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly, for the purpose of subjecting it to the regulations of that law, indicating that a public service provider shall be the public or private entity that provides such service by concession, permit, or law (article 3, sections a and c). In accordance with the above, article 9 ibidem, in what is relevant here, provides:\n\n**“**In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:\n\n(...)\n\ng) Maritime and air services in national ports.\n\n     \n(...)    \n\nThe authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities listed below:\n\n(...)\n\nSection g): Ministry of Public Works and Transport; Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Vertiente Atlántica and Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectively.\n\n            \n(...) **”**\n\n**b.- Characteristics of the public service:** The public service implies a matter of public order, as a set of principles concerning the organization of the State and its functioning are involved (in the words of the Full Court, extraordinary session of August twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-two, which the Constitutional Chamber has adopted as its own, **Vote No. 3550-92**), so the provider must be subject to the rules that the State establishes regarding its provision. For Dromi (Derecho Administrativo. Ed.Astrea, Buenos Aires, Volume I, pages 40-41) “the public service refers to provisions or services of community interest, which need not necessarily be provided by the State directly. This allows execution to be shared, facilitating social pluralism and in accordance with the principle of the subsidiary function, through which public authorities assist and complement private initiatives and intermediate bodies, mainly in the economy. The public service belongs to the category of state functions of exclusive or concurrent execution and constitutes an immediate end or a means to a mediate end (the common good), which is externalized in the form of a public service, subject to an ordinary and common legal regime of administrative law.” Dromi thinks that the State is the one who must declare hic et nunc, which objectives are of public interest or utility (referring to which services are worth declaring as public), making them its own ends, but not being obligated to provide them exclusively. This last assertion seems to coincide with Oyhanarte, cited by SARMIENTO GARCÍA. Noción y elementos del servicio público. In Los Servicios Públicos. Régimen jurídico actual. Ed. Depalma. Buenos Aires, p. 14, who indicates that “the presence or absence of the public service depends entirely on a legal decision, lato sensu, which may be express or tacit”, a decision that, in the opinion of Cassagne, cited by Sarmiento García. Op. Cit, p. 14, means framing a certain activity within the scope of the administrative function. In summary and reiterating, the public service involves essential provisions for the satisfaction of collective needs, of an industrial or commercial nature, provided by the State or by private parties through the figure of the concession (direct and indirect management), whose characteristics are: **a-** Principle of bidding (free competition, equality of participation, publicity, efficiency), **b-** Does not grant subjective rights over the public service (ownership always belongs to the State), only the subjective right to exercise the activity is recognized in accordance with the concession terms, **c-** Positive silence does not operate, an express administrative act from the granting Administration is required, **d-** The tariff power is intrinsic. For a long time, constitutional jurisprudence, starting from the issuance of Law number 7593, has been responsible for outlining and clarifying state powers vis-à-vis public service providers. Regarding the recognition of state power over its public services, it has been indicated that:\n\n“As the appealed Authority points out, the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of protecting the interests of consumers or users against those who sell goods or provide services. In this way, Constitutional numeral 46 provides that: ‘... Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters...’ In the case of public services, ordinary legislation, in developing the mandate of the aforementioned constitutional precept, has sought to find a point of equilibrium between the providers of this class of services and their users. In this sense, Law number 7593, Law Creating the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, responds to this constitutional principle, since as an organ it is responsible for combining the diverse social interests related to the public purpose of the state, the interests of the public service providers, and the users thereof, such that it is this authority that is called upon to resolve all those matters in which the subjects entrusted to its administration are involved. Law 7593 states in the relevant ordinals that fundamental objectives of the Regulatory Authority are to harmonize the interests of those defined in the future, to seek a balance between the needs of users and the interests of the public service providers. (article 4:a): b)). Article 5, for its part, establishes that in its functioning regarding the public services defined in that article, the Regulatory Authority shall fix prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with standards of quality, quantity, accountability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to article 25 of that law. The aforementioned public services are: a) Supply of electrical energy in the stages of generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization. b) Telecommunications services whose regulation is authorized by law ... Furthermore, the following obligations correspond to the Regulatory Authority: b) Carry out technical inspections of the property, plants, and equipment destined to provide the public service, when it deems it convenient to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and rates of the public service. It being understood that any provision issued in relation to the matters referred to in that article shall be of mandatory compliance (Article 6). Ordinal 14 provides that the obligations of the providers are: a) Comply with the provisions issued by the Regulatory Authority regarding the provision of the service, in accordance with what is established in the respective laws and regulations, j) Provide the service in adequate conditions and with the regularity and safety that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate; it also establishes that for the purposes of the Regulatory Authority's actions, in the case of controlling the quality in which a public service is provided, from the manner in which the user receives that service, to the way in which they are charged for it, the regulatory entity must seek to determine the existence of factors that warrant a pronouncement regarding the appropriate measures to correct any aspect, provided, of course, that it is within its competence. In the cited regulations, such pronouncements are mandatory for the providers of the regulated services, it being understood that if the established provisions are not complied with, the Regulatory Body may resort to other mechanisms to compel the provider to comply with what has been agreed upon.” (Vote No. 5713-97)\n\nThis jurisprudence, as is evident, responds to the general principles of public service, on the understanding that the State is the owner of such services and must control or inspect them as part of its primary activity, its organization and functioning, and with even more reason when they are provided by private parties. Furthermore, in accordance with the Constitution itself, guarantee mechanisms are imposed not only in the interest of the State with respect to its own services but also for the fundamental rights to which users are entitled, as the final paragraph of precept 46 of said Charter substantiates.\n\n**V.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE:** By virtue of articles 79 of the Municipal Code and 1 of Law 7562, Municipal Tax Tariff of the Canton of Esparza, of November twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five (nowadays repealed by Law 9111 of December twentieth, two thousand twelve, Licenses for lucrative and non-lucrative activities of the Canton of Esparza, but applicable due to the date on which the appellant began operations), in principle, the municipal license is required for the exercise of any lucrative activity, whether of an industrial, commercial, or service nature (article 14 of Law 7562), which consists of the prior permit or authorization by local governments that is consummated through the payment of the respective patent (tax). Conversely, it can be stated that no one may exercise a lucrative activity if they have not obtained the municipal license, nor paid the respective patent, meaning it is not permissible to exercise a commercial activity solely with the license, but without paying the respective tax (see in this regard, resolution number **318-2011** issued by this Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, at nine hours forty minutes on September ninth, two thousand eleven). It should be remembered that the purpose of the municipal license is not only to collect an amount for the tax on the annual gross income received by individuals or legal entities for the development of the authorized activity; but also, to supervise that the exercise of a certain lucrative activity is not contrary to the legal system, in the terms set forth by article 81 of the Municipal Code. Now, such obligation to obtain the municipal license for the exercise of a lucrative activity must be understood for all those that do not imply the conferral of the status of a provider of a public service of national significance, since said act of granting the concession imposes on the concessionaire the sufficient enabling title that allows them to develop the activity, therefore the aggrieved company does not require a municipal license to comply with the terms of the concession granted by the competent Administration. This implies that the factual situation in which the appellant finds itself does not fit within the taxable event typified in articles 1 and 14 of Law 7562; because the provision of the port service carried out by the aggrieved company consists of an activity subject to the public service regime, with the connotations and characteristics outlined, which is provided on a national public domain asset, not a municipal one. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that “…it is not legitimate for municipal taxes to be imposed on activities that fall outside the constitutionally assigned competence, defined and delimited to the local sphere; such that the establishment of a tax of such nature – of municipal order – cannot be sought on taxable or chargeable events by the State, and consequently, it must be limited to municipal competence, whose scope or sphere was delimited by the will of the constituent…” (judgment number 1997-6469 issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at sixteen hours twenty minutes on October 8, nineteen ninety-seven), by establishing in article 169 of the Political Constitution that the administration of the **local interests and services** in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government. In that sense, **the asset object of the concession in the specific case** is a state public domain asset, such as the Muelle de Caldera, which was given in concession by the Granting Administration (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), to the appellant company with the objective of providing the maritime services referred to in article 5 of Law 7593. Consequently, given that the asset object of the concession falls within the sphere of competence of the State, the activities carried out by the aggrieved company in its capacity as concessionaire escape the taxing power of the Municipality of Esparza, insofar as they exceed the concept of “local” provided for in article 169 of the Political Constitution, therefore, the Municipality of Esparza could not charge patent tax on the port activity carried out at the Muelle de Caldera, nor could it – in principle – create any tax derived from the development thereof. In this sense, it has been stated that “docks are assets proper to the nation that cannot definitively leave the domain and control of the State.\n\nGiven the special nature of the property and the legal quality of the services provided at the Complex, this port activity cannot be municipal under the terms of the legislation that currently regulates its operation, and therefore, the taxes that the legislator has conceived for the use of that national property are not municipal.\" (Voto number 4268-95 of eighteen hours and twenty-seven minutes of the first of August of nineteen ninety-five of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). By virtue of all the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative resolution of September two, two thousand eleven, issued by the Municipal Mayor of Esparza, which is hereby annulled, and in its place, the refund of the amounts paid for the municipal patent tax for the 2006-2011 period is ordered, as well as the imposed fine, which shall be liquidated at the municipal seat, with the administrative channel being exhausted.-\n\nThe previously mentioned public services are:\n\n(...)\n\ng) Maritime and air services in national ports.\n\nAuthorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:\n\n(...)\n\nSubsection g): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica and Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, respectively.\n\n(...) ”\n\nb.- Characteristics of the public service: The public service implies a matter of public order, as it involves a set of principles concerning the organization of the State and its operation (in the words of the Corte Plena, extraordinary session of August twenty-sixth, nineteen eighty-two, which the Sala Constitucional has adopted as its own, Voto No. Placa17543), therefore the provider must be subject to the rules regarding its provision established by the State. For Nombre32650 (Derecho Administrativo. Ed.Astrea, Buenos Aires, Tomo I, págs 40-41) \"the public service refers to provisions or services of community interest, which need not necessarily be provided directly by the State. This enables execution to be shared, facilitating social pluralism and, by reason of the principle of the subsidiary function, whereby public authorities assist and complement private initiatives and those of intermediate bodies, mainly in the economy. The public service belongs to the category of state functions of exclusive or concurrent execution and is constituted as a proximate end or a means to a mediate end (the common good), which is externalized in the form of a public service, subject to an ordinary and common legal regime of administrative law.\" Nombre32650 believes that the State is the one that must declare hic et nunc, which objectives are of public interest or public utility (referring to which services are worth declaring as public), making them its own ends, but is not obliged to provide them exclusively. This last assertion seems to coincide with Nombre103580, cited by SARMIENTO GARCÍA. Noción y elementos del servicio público. En los Servicios Públicos. Régimen jurídico actual. Ed. Depalma. Buenos Aires, pág. 14, who indicates that “the presence or absence of the public service depends entirely on a legal decision, latu sensu, which may be express or tacit”, a decision which, according to Nombre103581, cited by Sarmiento García. Op. Cit, pág. 14, means framing a particular activity within the scope of the administrative function. In summary and reiterating, the public service concerns essential provisions for the satisfaction of collective needs, of an industrial or commercial nature, provided by the State or through private parties by means of the concession (concesión) figure (direct and indirect management), whose characteristics are: a-Principle of bidding (free competition, equality of participation, publicity, efficiency), b-It does not grant subjective rights over the public service (ownership always belongs to the State), only the subjective right to exercise the activity in accordance with the concession terms is recognized, c-Positive silence does not operate; an express administrative act from the granting Administration is required, d- The tariff power is intrinsic. Since ancient times, constitutional jurisprudence, starting from the issuance of Law number 7593, has been tasked with outlining and clarifying state powers vis-à-vis public service providers. Regarding the recognition of state power over its public services, it has been indicated that:\n\n“As the appealed Authority points out, the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of protecting the interests of consumers or users against those who sell goods or provide services. In this way, constitutional numeral 46 provides that: ‘... Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State will support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters...’ In the case of public services, ordinary legislation, in developing the mandate of the aforementioned constitutional precept, has sought to find a balance point between the providers of this class of services and their users. In this sense, Law number 7593, Law Creating the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, responds to this constitutional principle, since as an organ it is responsible for combining the various social interests related to the public purpose of the state, the interests of public service providers, and the users thereof, such that said authority is the one called upon to resolve all matters in which the subjects entrusted to its administration are involved. Law 7593 states in the relevant ordinals that fundamental objectives of the Autoridad Reguladora are to harmonize the interests of those defined in the future, to seek balance between the needs of users and the interests of public service providers. (article 4:a): b)). Article 5, for its part, establishes that in its functioning regarding the public services defined in that article, the Autoridad Reguladora shall set prices and tariffs; furthermore, it shall ensure compliance with quality, quantity, accounting, continuity, opportunity, and optimal provision standards, according to article 25 of that law. The previously mentioned public services are: a) Supply of electrical energy in the stages of generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization. b) Telecommunications services whose regulation is authorized by law ... In addition, the following obligations correspond to the Autoridad Reguladora: b) Carry out technical inspections of the property, plants, and equipment intended to provide the public service, when it deems appropriate to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and tariffs of the public service. Given that any provision issued in relation to the matters referred to in that article shall be of obligatory compliance (Article 6) Ordinal 14 provides that the obligations of providers are: a) Comply with the provisions issued by the Autoridad Reguladora regarding service provision, in accordance with that established in the respective laws and regulations, j) Provide the service in adequate conditions and with the regularity and security that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate; it further establishes that for the purposes of the Autoridad Reguladora’s action, regarding quality control in the provision of a public service, from the manner in which the user receives that service, up to the manner in which the user is charged for it, the regulatory entity must endeavor to determine the existence of factors that warrant a pronouncement on the appropriate measures to correct any aspect, clearly, provided it falls within its competence. In the cited regulations, such pronouncements are binding for the providers of the regulated services, it being understood that if what is established is not complied with, the Regulatory Body may resort to other mechanisms to compel the provider to comply with what was agreed.” (Voto No. 5713-97)\n\nThis jurisprudence, as is evident, responds to the general principles of public service, with the understanding that the State is the owner of such services and must control or supervise them as part of its primary activity, its organization and operation, and with even more reason when provided by private parties. Furthermore, by virtue of the Constitution itself, guarantee mechanisms are imposed not only in the interest of the State regarding its own services but also for the fundamental rights to which users are entitled, as substantiated by the final paragraph of precept 46 of said Charter.-\n\nV.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE: By virtue of articles 79 of the Código Municipal and 1 of Law 7562, Tarifa de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Esparza, of November twenty-eight, nineteen ninety-five (now repealed by Law 9111 of December twenty, two thousand twelve, Licencias para actividades lucrativas y no lucrativas del Cantón de Esparza, but applicable due to the date the appellant began operations), in principle, the municipal license (licencia municipal) is required for the exercise of any for-profit activity, whether of an industrial, commercial, or service nature (article 14 of Law 7562), which consists of the prior permit or authorization by local governments, formalized through the payment of the respective patent (patente) (tax). Conversely, it can be stated that no one may exercise a for-profit activity if they have not obtained the municipal license nor paid the respective patent, which follows that it is not possible to carry out a commercial activity solely with the license but without paying the respective tax (see in this regard, resolution number 318-2011 issued by this Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, at nine hours and forty minutes on September nine, two thousand eleven). Let it be remembered that the purpose of the municipal license not only consists of receiving an amount for the tax on the annual gross income that natural or legal persons obtain from developing the authorized activity; but also, of supervising that the exercise of a specific for-profit activity does not prove contrary to the legal system, under the terms set forth in article 81 of the Código Municipal. Now, this obligation to obtain the municipal license for the exercise of a for-profit activity must be understood to apply to all activities that do not entail the conferral of the status of provider of a public service of national significance, since said act of granting the concession imposes on the concessionaire a sufficient enabling title that allows it to develop the activity; therefore, the aggrieved company does not require a municipal license to fulfill the terms of the concession granted by the competent Administration. This implies that the factual situation in which the appellant finds itself does not fit the taxable event (hecho generador) typified in articles 1 and 14 of Law 7562; because the provision of the port service carried out by the aggrieved company consists of an activity subject to the public service regime, with the connotations and characteristics reviewed, which is provided on property of national public domain and not municipal domain. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that “… it is not legitimate for municipal taxes to be imposed on activities that fall outside the constitutionally assigned competence, defined and delimited to the local sphere; in such a way that the establishment of a tax of such a nature –of a municipal nature- cannot be sought on taxable events or events taxable by the State, and must, consequently, be limited to municipal competence, whose scope or sphere was delimited by the will of the constituent power…” (judgment number 1997-6469 issued by the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on October 8, nineteen ninety-seven), when establishing in article 169 of the Political Constitution that the administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be in charge of the Municipal Government. In that sense, the property (bien) that is the subject of the concession in this specific case constitutes property of public domain of a state nature, as is the Muelle de Caldera, which was granted in concession by the Granting Administration (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico) to the appellant company with the objective of providing the maritime services referred to in article 5 of Law 7593. Consequently, given that the property subject to the concession falls within the scope of State competence, the activities carried out by the aggrieved company in its capacity as concessionaire fall outside the taxing power of the Municipalidad de Esparza, insofar as they exceed the concept of “local” provided for in article 169 of the Political Constitution, therefore, the Municipalidad de Esparza could not charge the patent tax on the port activity developed at the Muelle de Caldera, nor create –in principle- any tax derived from the development thereof. In this regard, it has been stated that \"the docks (muelles) are property of the nation that cannot definitively leave the domain and control of the State. Given the special nature of the property and the legal quality of the services provided at the Complex, this port activity cannot be municipal under the terms of the legislation currently regulating its operation, and therefore the taxes that the legislator has conceived for the use of that national property are not municipal.\" (Voto número 4268-95 of eighteen hours and twenty-seven minutes on August one, nineteen ninety-five of the Sala Constitucional). By virtue of all the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the recurso de apelación filed by SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative resolution of September two, two thousand eleven issued by the Alcalde Municipal de Esparza, which is annulled, and in its place the refund of the amounts paid for the municipal patent tax for the 2006-2011 period is ordered, as well as the fine imposed, which shall be liquidated at the municipal level, thereby exhausting the administrative channel.-\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe recurso de apelación filed by the company named SOCIEDAD PORTUARIA GRANELERA DE CALDERA, SPGC, S.A., against the administrative resolution of September two, two thousand eleven issued by the Alcalde Municipal de Esparza is granted, which is annulled, and in its place the refund of the amounts paid for the municipal patent tax for the 2006-2011 period is ordered, as well as the fine imposed, which shall be liquidated at the municipal level, thereby exhausting the administrative channel.- NOTIFÍQUESE.\n\nEvelyn Solano Ulloa\n\nMarianella Álvarez Molina\n\nFrancisco J. Muñoz Chacón\n\nExp: 11-005029-1027-CA\n\nRecurso de Apelación Municipal\n\nSociedad Portuaria Granelera de Caldera, SPGC, S.A., contra la Municipalidad de Esparza." }