{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-608664",
  "citation": "Res. 00051-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Improcedencia de demanda de despido por falta de idoneidad de proveedora municipal",
  "title_en": "Dismissal of claim for unjustified termination of municipal procurement officer",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo desestimó íntegramente la demanda de una exfuncionaria de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia, quien había sido despedida sin responsabilidad patronal tras un procedimiento disciplinario. La actora alegó violación del debido proceso, despido injustificado y prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria. El Tribunal determinó que el plazo de prescripción aplicable era de cinco años conforme al artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, por tratarse de una funcionaria que manejaba fondos públicos. Asimismo, descartó infracciones al debido proceso, ya que se le notificó adecuadamente, tuvo oportunidad de defensa y el acto final de despido estuvo debidamente fundamentado en los informes de auditoría interna. Consideró que no se demostró la supuesta represalia por acoso laboral. Finalmente, rechazó las pretensiones indemnizatorias al no existir ilegitimidad en la actuación municipal, condenando a la actora al pago de costas.",
  "summary_en": "The Administrative Court dismissed in its entirety the lawsuit brought by a former employee against the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia. The plaintiff, who was terminated without employer liability following disciplinary proceedings, alleged violation of due process, unjustified dismissal, and prescription of the disciplinary power. The Court held that the applicable prescription period was five years under article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, since the plaintiff handled public funds. It found no due process violations: she was properly notified, had the opportunity to defend herself, and the termination was adequately grounded in internal audit reports. The alleged retaliation for a workplace harassment claim was not proven. Consequently, the claim for damages was denied given the lawfulness of the municipality's action, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII",
  "date": "22/08/2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria",
    "servidor de la hacienda pública",
    "LOCGR",
    "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
    "proveeduría municipal",
    "informe de auditoría interna",
    "debido proceso administrativo",
    "desviación de poder"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "despido sin responsabilidad patronal",
    "prescripción potestad sancionatoria",
    "artículo 71 LOCGR",
    "proveedora municipal",
    "Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia",
    "debido proceso disciplinario",
    "Código de Trabajo artículo 603",
    "hacienda pública",
    "manejo de fondos públicos",
    "falta de idoneidad",
    "desviación de poder",
    "costas procesales vencido",
    "sentencia denegatoria"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "dismissal without employer liability",
    "prescription of disciplinary power",
    "article 71 LOCGR",
    "municipal procurement officer",
    "Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia",
    "due process in disciplinary proceedings",
    "Labor Code article 603",
    "public treasury",
    "handling of public funds",
    "lack of suitability",
    "abuse of power",
    "costs to losing party",
    "denial judgment"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "En efecto, de haberse comprobado esa circunstancia, estaríamos ante una clara desviación de poder (ordinal 131.3 de la LGAP) que podría haber sustentado un pronunciamiento de carácter anulatorio en esta sede. Pero no fue así, de modo que el alegato resulta estéril y debe ser desestimado.\n\nEn la medida en que no se ha constatado actuación ilegítima alguna de la Administración, no se ha configurado tampoco una lesión que la accionante no esté obligada a soportar. La responsabilidad administrativa, en el régimen de la LGAP, exige que no solo se establezca la existencia de una conducta administrativa dañosa y una lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, sino además, que entre ambas se dé un nexo causal... No obstante, por todas las razones ya expuestas, este Tribunal no considera que la actuación de la Municipalidad accionada en este caso haya sido ilegítima, lo cual hace desaparecer irremediablemente uno de los enunciados elementos críticos para la configuración de una eventual responsabilidad administrativa extracontractual...",
  "excerpt_en": "Indeed, if such circumstance had been proven, we would be facing a clear abuse of power (article 131.3 of the LGAP) that could have supported an annulment in this court. But it was not so, therefore the argument is sterile and must be dismissed.\n\nTo the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been established, no injury that the plaintiff is not obliged to bear has arisen either. Administrative liability, under the LGAP regime, requires not only the existence of a harmful administrative conduct and a pecuniary or non‑pecuniary injury, but also a causal link between them... However, for all the above reasons, this Tribunal does not consider that the defendant Municipality’s action was illegitimate, which irremediably eliminates one of the critical elements for the configuration of any non‑contractual administrative liability...",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Declarada improcedente",
    "summary_en": "The Court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety, upheld the dismissal without employer liability, and ordered the plaintiff to pay both sets of legal costs.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal rechazó la demanda en todos sus extremos, confirmando la validez del despido sin responsabilidad patronal y condenando a la actora al pago de ambas costas procesales."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando XIII",
      "quote_en": "It is the view of this Chamber that the requirements of due process were properly observed in the disciplinary proceedings brought against the plaintiff.",
      "quote_es": "Es opinión de esta Cámara que las exigencias del debido proceso fueron adecuadamente observadas en la sustanciación del expediente disciplinario seguido contra la actora."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XII",
      "quote_en": "the applicable prescription period is not the generic one in article 603 of the Labor Code, but the special period in article 71 of the LOCGR",
      "quote_es": "el plazo de prescripción aplicable no es el genérico del numeral 603 del CT, sino el especial del ordinal 71 de la LOCGR"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XIV",
      "quote_en": "the imputation of lack of suitability, set out in the final act, is only a value judgment that summarises or describes the set of deficiencies –itemised in the statement of charges– which the procedure was aimed at verifying.",
      "quote_es": "la imputación de falta de idoneidad, hecha en el acto final, es tan solo un juicio de valor que resume o describe el conjunto de deficiencias –desglosadas en el traslado de cargos– hacia cuya comprobación iba dirigido el procedimiento."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XII",
      "quote_en": "the Attorney General’s Office has defined what is meant by a Public Treasury official: those who, in accordance with the legal system and their appointment, have among their duties the administration, administrative or accounting management, of public funds.",
      "quote_es": "la Procuraduría ha definido lo que debe entenderse por funcionario de la Hacienda Pública: aquéllos que de conformidad con el orden jurídico y de acuerdo con el acto de nombramiento tienen entre sus atribuciones el administrar, gestionar administrativa o contablemente, los fondos públicos."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-21629",
      "citation": "Ley 7428",
      "title_en": "Organic Law of the Comptroller General's Office",
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      "citation": "Ley 8131",
      "title_en": "Financial Administration and Public Budgets",
      "title_es": "Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "18/09/2001",
      "year": "2001"
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    {
      "id": "norm-49185",
      "citation": "Ley 8292",
      "title_en": "General Law on Internal Control",
      "title_es": "Ley General de Control Interno",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "31/07/2002",
      "year": "2002"
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    {
      "id": "norm-53738",
      "citation": "Ley 8422",
      "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office",
      "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública",
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      "date": "06/10/2004",
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      "id": "norm-47258",
      "citation": "Ley 8131",
      "title_en": "Financial Administration and Public Budgets",
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      "id": "norm-49185",
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    {
      "id": "norm-53738",
      "citation": "Ley 8422",
      "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office",
      "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "06/10/2004",
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  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-608664",
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  "body_es_text": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo\n\nII Circuito Judicial de San José – Dirección18225 \n\n \n\nCentral: 2545-0003 Ÿ Fax: 2545-0033 Ÿ Correo electrónico: ...01\n\n \n\nExpediente: 10-000639-0505-LA\n\nProceso: Conocimiento\n\nActora: Nombre128316 \n\nDemandada: Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia\n\nN° 51-2013-VII\n\nTRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA (SECCIÓN SÉTIMA). Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a las catorce horas con treinta minutos del veintidós de agosto del dos mil trece.-\n\nProceso de conocimiento seguido ante este Tribunal por Nombre128316 , divorciada, con cédula de identidad número CED117281 (f. 1); contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN RAFAEL DE HEREDIA, por la que comparece su Alcalde Nombre102691 , casado, sociólogo, con cédula de identidad número CED114249 (f. 52 y 53). Intervino también en el proceso, en representación de la accionada, su apoderada especial judicial Licda. Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, soltera, vecina de San José, con cédula de identidad número CED117282 (f. 77) y, como abogada directora de la accionante, la Licda. Nombre128317 . Las personas físicas citadas son mayores y, con las excepciones indicadas, abogadas y vecinos de San Rafael de Heredia.-\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n1.- Que la actora, con base en los hechos y citas de derecho que expuso, en escrito presentado el 30 de agosto del 2010 inicialmente ante el Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Heredia, formuló demanda en la que, en lo sustancial, pide: “PRETENSIÓN PRINCIPAL: (...) a) La nulidad del despido por ser violatorio del debido proceso y además injustificado. / b) La accionada tiene la obligación de reinstalarme en el puesto que ocupaba al momento del despido. / c) Pago salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios. / d) Debe pagar los reajustes salariales desde el momento del despido hasta el momento de ser reintegrada. / e) Pagar los aguinaldos que hubiere dejado de percibir producto del despido injustificado. / f) Deberá cancelar las vacaciones proporcionales no disfrutadas durante el tiempo que dure el proceso y hasta el reintegro a laborar. / g) Cuotas obreras patronales dejadas de pagar desde el momento del despido y hasta su efectivo pago. / h) DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO Y OBJETIVO: En cuanto al sufrimiento, las congojas que producto de un despido injustificado he tenido que sufrir, y no solo yo, sino mí (sic) familia. (...). Mí (sic) imagen, honor y estima, ha quedado en entredicho producto del despido, ocasionando daños irreparables a nivel moral, psicológico, espiritual, emocional, familiar, laboral y social. (...) Cuya valoración deberá ser realizada por un perito en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. / i) Pago de salarios escolares dejados de percibir. / j) Aumentos salariales de cualquier otra naturaleza que se hubiesen aprobado. / k) Intereses sobre las sumas adeudadas desde el momento del despido y hasta su efectivo pago. / l) Declárese con lugar la excepción de prescripción del despido. / m) Ambas costas del proceso. PRETENSIÓN SUBSIDIARIA: Que en caso de que el se niegue a el (sic) reintegro, queda obligada la parte accionada a pagarme los siguientes extremos: a) La nulidad del despido por ser violatorio del debido proceso y además injustificado, b) preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, c) que debe pagarme los reajustes salariales desde el momento del despido hasta el momento de su efectivo pago, d) cuotas obreras patronales dejadas de pagar desde el momento del despido y hasta que adquiera firmeza la sentencia, e) Pago salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios, f) DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO Y OBJETIVO: En cuanto al sufrimiento, las congojas que producto de un despido injustificado he tenido que sufrir, y no solo yo, sino mí (sic) familia. (...). Mí (sic) imagen, honor y estima, ha quedado en entredicho producto del despido, ocasionando daños irreparables a nivel moral, psicológico, espiritual, emocional, familiar, laboral y social. (...) Cuya valoración deberá ser realizada por un perito en etapa de ejecución de sentencia, i) Pago de salarios escolares dejados de percibir, j) Aumentos salariales de cualquier otra naturaleza que se hubiesen aprobado, k) Intereses sobre las sumas adeudadas desde el momento del despido y hasta su efectivo pago, l) Declárese con lugar la excepción de prescripción del despido, m) Ambas costas del proceso.” (f. 1-8).-\n\n2.- Mediante resolución N° 641-2010 de las 8:30 horas del 6 de setiembre del 2010 (f. 17-18), el Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Heredia se declaró incompetente y ordenó remitir el expediente a esta jurisdicción.-\n\n3.- Por resolución de las 9:48 horas del 27 de junio del 2012 (f. 34-39), el juez de trámite rechazó una falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa inicialmente apreciada de oficio y sobre la cual se había dado audiencia mediante auto de las 11:31 horas del 23 de febrero del 2011 (f. 20).-\n\n4.- La demandada contestó negativamente la acción y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y prescripción. Advirtió que esa Municipalidad suspendió cualquier nombramiento en propiedad en la plaza ocupada por la accionante y, finalmente, manifestó su negativa a conciliar en este asunto. (f. 53-55).-\n\n5.- En la audiencia preliminar efectuada a partir de las 13:30 horas del 14 de mayo del 2013, con asistencia de ambas partes, no hubo ajustes en las pretensiones, las cuales por ende se mantienen en los términos establecidos en la demanda. En esa misma diligencia, la apoderada de la Municipalidad demandada aclaró que no interpuso la excepción de prescripción, sino que simplemente se oponía al alegato que sobre ese mismo tema formulaba la actora. La jueza tramitadora, Licda. Ana Lía Umaña Salazar, admitió prueba testimonial ofrecida por la demandante y, al final, ordenó la remisión del expediente a la Sección de juicio correspondiente (audiencia grabada y que consta adjunta al expediente en su correspondiente soporte electrónico; minuta a f. 78 frente y vuelto).-\n\n6.- Por auto de las 10:00 horas del 4 de julio del 2013 (f. 79-80), esta Sección Sétima se arrogó el conocimiento de este asunto y citó a las partes para la audiencia complementaria.-\n\n7.- El juicio oral y público tuvo lugar a partir de las 8:45 horas del 7 de agosto del 2013, con la presencia de las dos partes, quienes expusieron sus argumentos iniciales. Seguidamente, la actora desistió de la testigo Nombre20335 . En cuanto a la segunda testigo admitida –conocida únicamente como “Dra. Ramírez”– la prueba fue declarada inevacuable por no encontrarse ésta presente, sin la debida justificación y teniendo en cuenta que no se expidió cédula de citación respecto de ella. Las partes rindieron entonces sus conclusiones y, finalmente, el Tribunal declaró el caso como complejo, conforme al numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) (audiencia grabada y que consta adjunta al expediente en su correspondiente soporte electrónico; minuta a f. 83-84).-\n\n8.- Esta resolución se dicta, previa deliberación, dentro del plazo de quince días hábiles estipulado en los artículos 111.1 del CPCA y 82.1 del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda. No se notan causales de nulidad capaces de invalidar lo actuado.-\n\nRedacta el juez Hess Araya, con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Fernández Brenes y del juez Córdoba Ramírez; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI.- HECHOS PROBADOS. Como tales se tiene los siguientes de relevancia (todas las referencias de foliatura corresponden al expediente administrativo, del cual cabe llamar la atención sobre la falta de claridad y desorden que presenta):\n\n1. Que la actora fue funcionaria de la Municipalidad accionada desde el 7 de junio del 2000, desempeñándose en los últimos siete años de la relación laboral como Proveedora Municipal (hecho 1 de la demanda, no controvertido).-\n\n2. Que por oficio Nº AIM 039-2008 de 22 de abril del 2008, la Auditoría Interna puso en conocimiento del Concejo Municipal un “Estudio sobre la gestión del Departamento de Proveeduría de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia”, el cual denuncia “dificultades reales en el trabajo” de ese despacho, “situación que afecta los intereses institucionales”; incumplimiento de funciones básicas, falta de planificación de sus actividades y obstaculización de las labores de otras dependencias municipales, recomendando la “total reestructuración” del citado Departamento (f. 377-393).-\n\n3. Que el informe recién citado fue conocido por el Concejo en sesión ordinaria N° 174-2008 del 19 de mayo del 2008, en la que se acordó –entre otros aspectos– “Ordenar al señor (...) Alcalde Municipal, el acatamiento y la ejecución de las recomendaciones giradas por la Auditoría Interna, ...”. Lo anterior fue comunicado a dicho jerarca mediante oficio SCM #0383-2008 del 20 del mismo mes y año, quien lo recibió al día siguiente (f. 394-397).-\n\n4. Que por oficio N° AIM 128-2008 del 8 de agosto del 2008, la Auditoría Interna se dirigió al Alcalde Municipal, indicando: “Esta Unidad de Auditoría le solicita nombrar un órgano director para que sea analizada la situación de la Proveeduría Institucional, ya que han sido reiterativos los problemas de incumplimiento en los plazos otorgados por la Alcaldía al Departamento de Proveeduría, para dar cumplimiento a las solicitudes que la Alcaldía le ha trasladado por incumplimiento de sus funciones, de conformidad con el Manual de Puestos de esta Municipalidad y la descripción de funciones que la misma Proveedora hizo en su Plan Anual Operativo 2008. Será competencia de dicho órgano analizar las justificaciones de la Proveeduría para no haber atendido en el plazo otorgado por la Alcaldía las solicitudes que se le trasladaron, según indico anteriormente. Este órgano director deberá nombrarse a la mayor brevedad posible, de ser posible antes de un mes calendario. Será muy importante la asesoría legal en este órgano.” El documento fue recibido en la Secretaría del Alcalde ese mismo día (f. 577-578).-\n\n5. Que mediante resolución N° 003-08-DAMSRH del 13 de noviembre del 2008, el Alcalde Municipal dispuso la “Separación con goce de salario de la señora Nombre128316 Proveedora Municipal de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia como medida cautelar provisional y apertura de órgano director del procedimiento administrativo para investigar hallazgos de informes de Auditoría números AIM-039-2008 y AIM-128-2008, así como el supuesto uso indebido de fondos públicos en perjuicio de la Administración”, designando al efecto al Lic. Giovanni Varela Dijeres como órgano director (hecho 5 de la demanda, no controvertido; f. 608-613).-\n\n6. Que a las 10:00 horas del 18 de agosto (sic) del 2008, el órgano director dictó auto de traslado de cargos dentro del procedimiento administrativo ordinario disciplinario Nº 0001-08-01, el cual fue notificado a la ahora actora el 28 de noviembre siguiente. El acto enumeró las conductas que se reprochaba a la investigada, del modo siguiente:\n\n“a) Que la señora Nombre128316 ha violentado presumiblemente la Norma 4.15 del Manual de Normas de Control Interno que se refiere a la exactitud de los registros sobre activos, así como a la comprobación periódica mediante la verificación y el recuento físico de esos activos; siendo que no ha realizado desde hace varios años la actualización de la información de los activos de cada departamento, ni el recuento físico de esos activos, aún y cuando es una de las funciones asignadas a la Proveeduría; / b) Que la señora Nombre128316 presumiblemente no planifica las compras institucionales conforme crece el presupuesto institucional, lo que va en detrimento de la organización, ejecución y seguimiento y control interno del Departamento; lo cual violenta la norma 3.2 del Manual de Normas Generales de Control Interno para la Contraloría General de la República y las entidades y órganos sujetos a su fiscalización; / c) Que la señora Nombre128316 presumiblemente no lleva un registro escrito de todos los procedimientos que realiza la Proveeduría, tales como: - Procedimientos de Administración del Registro de Proveedores; Procedimientos de Administración de Libros Legalizados (actas de apertura de ofertas y actas de adjudicación de ofertas); - Procedimientos de contratación directa; - Procedimiento de Licitación abreviada; - Procedimientos de Licitación Pública; - Procedimientos de Remate; - Procedimientos de Administración de Contratos; - Procedimientos de Control de Activos; - Procedimientos de Resumen de Compras Realizadas; - Procedimientos de Actualización del Sistema de Información de la Actividad Contractual, lo que aflora (sic) en un total desconocimiento técnico de la materia, pone en riesgo las arcas municipales e impide un adecuado control interno; conforme reza la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento; la Ley de Control Interno y las disposiciones de la Contraloría General de la República sobre la materia. Lo anterior violenta lo dispuesto en la Norma 4.8 y 4.9 del Manual de Normas Generales de Control Interno, que dice que todos los controles vigentes para los diferentes procesos y actividades de la institución, así como todas las transacciones y hechos significativos que se produzcan, deben documentarse y revisarse periódicamente para hacer las correcciones pertinentes; y que todos los funcionarios que ocupen puestos de jefatura deben ejercer una supervisión constante sobre el desarrollo de los procesos, transacciones y operaciones de la institución, con el propósito de asegurar que las labores se realicen de conformidad con la normativa y las disposiciones internas y externas vigentes. / d) Que supuesta (sic) la señora Nombre128316 desconoce las responsabilidades y las relaciones de coordinación que le asigna el Manual de Puestos de la Municipalidad y el código de ética vigente en la institución, el Plan Anual Operativo Institucional y las políticas institucionales que se han emitido a la fecha; lo cual deviene en inconcebible, ya que su actividad gira en torno a la ejecución de las metas propuestas en dicho Plan y se supone en que en (sic) proceso de planificación intervienen todos los departamentos municipales, con el objetivo de que todos trabajen por los mismos objetivos y proyectos de la institución, pues la Proveeduría debe ser uno de los departamentos que conozca con mayor detalle el presupuesto municipal, ya que es la herramienta de trabajo fundamental por la cual se debe dirigir en el desempeño de sus funciones. Lo anterior violenta el artículo 13 de la Ley General de Control Interno que dice que son deberes del jerarca y de los titulares subordinados mantener y demostrar valores éticos en el ejercicio de sus deberes y obligaciones, así como contribuir con sus acciones a promoverlos al resto de la organización, por lo que se hace indispensable conocer el Código de Ética vigente en la Municipalidad. / e) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 el día 28 de marzo del 2008 no había realizado la invitación anual a participar en el Registro de Proveedores, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa, artículo 116 y siguientes. / f) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 no ha cumplido con lo dispuesto en el artículo 122 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, lo que significa que la información de más del 40% de los expedientes que se encuentran en el Registro de Proveedores no tienen (sic) información actualizada, ya que la Proveeduría no les previno con un mes de anticipación a la fecha de vencimiento de su inscripción, situación que debería constar en el expediente, con suficiente antelación. / g) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 ha violentado lo dispuesto en la Directriz para el registro número D-4-2005-CO-DDI de la Contraloría General de la República, en los puntos 6 y los artículos 12 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y 3 y 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno; normas todas de acatamiento obligatorio, referentes a la obligación de registrar en forma diaria la información contractual. / h) Que supuestamente la señora Nombre128316 no ha cumplido con la obligación de controlar y custodiar los materiales de oficina, artículos de limpieza y cualquier tipo de herramientas menores y/o artículos de trabajo que adquieran (sic) en la Municipalidad, lo cual constituye una debilidad sustancial del control interno, pues no se lleva un inventario de ninguno de los artículos bajo su responsabilidad, lo cual violenta el artículo 107 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y la norma 4.15 del Manual de Normas de Control Interno. / i) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 ha violentado las disposiciones sobre compras que indica la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, tales como las realizadas a las Imprenta Lisara y al señor Nombre149762 , proveedor de artículos de limpieza, a quien se le han concretado dos compras en un mismo mes por un monto de C.200.000,00 que es monto aceptado de comprar (sic) sin necesidad de cotizar a tres proveedores. En el caso de Lisara pareciera más un problema de planificación, ya que ante la urgencia con la que cada departamento realiza la solicitud de formularios, papelería, sellos, etc violentad (sic) la obligación de atender cada una de las peticiones que hace cada departamento, en forma independiente. Lo anterior violenta lo dispuesto en el artículo 8 de la Ley de Control Interno. / j) Que la señora Nombre128316 presumiblemente ha violentado lo dispuesto en los artículos (sic) 15, inciso b) de la Ley General de Control Interno referente a las normas de seguridad relativas al espacio físico, archivos, materiales en custodia de la Proveeduría y a los sistemas de información computarizados, en donde se carece de documentación y procedimientos definidos. / k) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 ha violentado las disposiciones de ejecución de la Ley 8114 en los siguientes casos concretos: 1) En el expediente de la Mano de Obra y Herramientas para construcción del sistema de evacuación pluvial Dirección15696 (sic) al Oeste, segunda etapa, consta que el Ing. Herrera Solìs (sic) envió desde el 11 de octubre del 2006 las especificaciones técnicas del citado proyecto a la Proveeduría, sin embargo hasta el 29 de mayo del 2007 le traslada el Alcalde a la Proveedora el acuerdo para que haga el contrato. En julio se firma el contrato, y por atrasos con el contratista esta obra se fue iniciando en setiembre del 2007, con un adendum (sic) al contrato, y se terminó a finales de noviembre del 2007. Significa que el proceso de contratación se llevó aproximadamente nueve meses, y la ejecución dos meses más; 2) En el expediente de la Adquisición del Vehículo Doble Tracción para la Unidad Técnica Vial, consta que desde el 19 de marzo del 2007, el Alcalde le solicita a la Proveedora iniciar este proceso. El 20 de marzo del 2007 el sr. (sic) Tesorero hace la constancia de la existencia de contenido económico y se la traslada a la Proveedora. El 21 de marzo de ese mismo año, el ing. (sic) Nombre3841 adjunta las especificaciones. El 24 de abril del 2007 se publica en La Gaceta la invitación a participar con fecha límite al 11 de mayo del 2007. A esa fecha únicamente participa Purdy Motor. El 14 de mayo se le traslada la única oferta al Ing. Nombre3841 y ese mismo día el Ing-. (sic) Nombre3841 le comunica a la Proveedora que la oferta cumple con los requisitos. Hasta el 4 de junio la Proveedora traslada el expediente al Concejo para que procedan a la adjudicación, quienes toman el acuerdo de adjudicación en la sesión ordinaria No. 97-2007 celebrada el 11 de junio del 2007. Posteriormente hasta el 19 de julio, 2006 Purdy Motor presenta la garantía de cumplimiento. En agosto inician los trámites de exoneración y es hasta el 28 de setiembre del 2007, que entregan el vehículo, tardando el proceso más de seis meses; 3) En el expediente de compra de 71 toneladas de mezcla asfáltica y 5 estañones de emulsión para ejecutar el Proyecto frente a la plaza de Dirección18321 , se tardaron 4 meses; 4) Que se dan espacios de tiempo muy extensos entre la adjudicación, la elaboración de los contratos y la elaboración de la orden de compra respectiva, lo que evidencia que la Proveeduría no toma las previsiones del caso; no traslada los expedientes a la Asesoría Legal para la elaboración de los contratos con suficiente antelación, es lenta la formalización y elaboración de los carteles, y se omiten aspectos importantes de forma en los expedientes, como la numeración, la división de las etapas del proceso en el expediente, la presentación de las copias que se les deben incorporar y la falta de documentación final, en cuanto a la ejecución de los pagos parciales. Lo anterior pone en evidencia desconocimiento técnico para el cargo, lo cual es un requisito del Manual de Puestos para el desempeño del mismo; así como dificulta el control posterior a sus actuaciones materiales y técnicas. / I) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 elabora el cartel, iniciación (sic) el trámite de compra, realiza las cotizaciones, hace la orden de compra; introduce la información en el Sistema Integrado de Información Contractual (SIAC) y recibe la mercadería, lo que compromete la objetividad y la independencia de la institución; sin embargo nunca ha solicitado que dicha situación se modifique al amparo del código de ética institucional. / m) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 comete errores muy serios en la confección de los contratos concretamente en los siguientes: 1) En el contrato 05-2008 página 4 línea 5 consta en letras la suma de dieciocho millones cuatrocientos sesenta mil quinientos colones siendo lo correcto diecisiete millones ciento setenta y seis mil doscientos veinte; Página 4 líneas 10 y 11 se anota diecisiete millones ciento setenta y seis mil colones faltando la frece (sic) ‘doscientos veinte’; en esa misma página líneas 11 y 13 revisar el plazo de ejecución dice ‘un día hábil y sobre la palabra AD’ (sic); página 4 línea 15 faltó anotar: del, entro (sic) las palabras disposiciones y cartel; página 7 línea 3 se repite las palabras ‘Los, Página 10 dice abril, lo correcto es mayo’; 2) Documento al contrato 05-2008 en la página 4 línea 20 se anota ocho (1) día hábil; página 11 se anota abril en lugar de mayo. 2) En el contrato 06-2008 página 1 línea 19 se anota ‘Recaparteo (sic) de calle puente de piedra siendo lo correcto Pavimento Dirección15697 ; Página 2 línea 17 y 29 faltó anotar Calle entre las palabras pavimento y tierra; página 2 línea 31 se anota C.21.917.000,00 lo correcto es Placa23792 error que también se comete en letras; página 3 líneas 2 y 3 se anota en números Placa30266 siendo lo correcto Placa30267; página 4 línea 10 anotar calle entre las palabras pavimento y tierra, página 7 línea 12 se repite la palabra los; página 10 líneas 2 y 3 se anota en números y letras Placa30268. siendo lo correcto Placa30267; página 10 línea 18 léase mayo en lugar de abril. Lo anterior violenta el artículo 10 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. / n) Que presumiblemente proveedores como el Depósito El Rafaeleño se han negado a presentar documentación, sino es a la señora Nombre128316 , lo que violenta el código de ética institucional y los principios de transparencia. / o) Que la señora Nombre128316 presumiblemente en el manejo de los expedientes de la proveedora, incorpora a los mismos criterios y borradores de diferentes dependencia institucionales, lo que violenta el artículo 11 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. / p) Que presumiblemente la señora Nombre128316 ha enviado expedientes al Concejo Municipal y ha solicitado garantías de participación a oferentes que no son los adjudicatarios, como es el caso de la Licitación abreviada No. 2008LA-0001-01 ‘Compra de Mezcla asfáltica en boca de planta y emulsión para bacheo en el cantón de San Rafael de Heredia y Licitación abreviada número 2008-LA-00002-01 Recarpeto (sic) de calle punte (sic) de pieda (sic), en donde se solicito (sic) una garantía de cumplimiento a la empresa Conansa. / q) Que en el Informe final de hechos probados y no probados del anterior órgano director del procedimiento administrativo se amonesto (sic) en forma escrita a la funcionaría aquí investigada y se le advirtió que de incurrir en estas faltas se procedería (sic)”.\n\nEn adición a lo anterior, se especificó que el acto final que se dictaría podría conllevar el despido sin responsabilidad patronal o bien la suspensión sin goce de salario de la investigada. Allí mismo se le citó a comparecencia oral y privada para las 14:00 horas del 22 de diciembre del mismo año; se enumeró los documentos que obraban como prueba en el expediente y las personas que serían citadas como testigos; y se le advirtió acerca de los recursos que procedían contra esa resolución (f. 634-655; mediante acto dictado el 10 de diciembre siguiente, se rectificó el error material incurrido en la fecha del traslado de cargos, para que se leyera correctamente “noviembre” en vez de “agosto”: f. 668-669).-\n\n7. Que mediante memorial fechado 12 de enero del 2008 (sic), la aquí accionante se presentó “a contestar traslado de cargos”, en el que se refirió a las imputaciones hechas en su contra y alegó la nulidad del referido acto (f. 697-710).-\n\n8. Que la comparecencia oral y privada fue realizada debidamente, con recepción de prueba testimonial (no se localiza el acta correspondiente en el expediente administrativo, pero así se desprende de los memoriales a que refieren los dos hechos siguientes).-\n\n9. Que con documento fechado 16 de enero del 2009 y presentado ese mismo día, la interesada expuso sus “conclusiones sucintas en relación con la prueba debidamente recabada” (f. 745-751).-\n\n10. Que con resolución de las 10:00 horas del 1 de febrero del 2009, el órgano director del procedimiento emitió su “Informe final”, en el que hizo una relación del trámite seguido y los hechos probados y no probados con relación a los cargos formulados contra la investigada (f. 759-784).-\n\n11. Que el procedimiento concluyó con el dictado de la resolución N° 001-09 de las 8:00 horas del 11 de febrero del 2009, por parte del Alcalde Municipal, cuya parte dispositiva establece, en lo que interesa: “Acoger en todos sus extremos el Informe Final de Hechos Probados y No Probados dentro del proceso de investigación de la funcionaria Nombre128316 , Proveedora de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia y dada la falta de idoneidad para el cumplimiento del cargo respectivo se resuelve: Proceder al Despido Inmediato Sin Responsabilidad Patronal a la señora Nombre128316 , cédula de identidad número CED117283 - - , a partir del día 13 de febrero 2009. Cancélensele los extremos correspondientes a vacaciones y aguinaldo proporcionales. Igualmente se ordena el cese de la medida cautelar ordenada en contra la señora Nombre128316 por carecer de interés actual”. Lo anterior fue notificado a la hoy demandante, vía fax, el 13 del mismo mes y año (hecho 6 de la demanda, no controvertido; f. 785-813).-\n\n12. Por memorial presentado el 25 de febrero del 2009, la investigada interpuso “Recurso de revocatoria, apelación en subsidio, nulidad concomitante y suspensión de efectos del acto” contra el acto final del procedimiento, alegando la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, por no haber sido ejercida dentro del mes a que refiere el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (f. 814-839).-\n\n13. Mediante resolución Nº 002-2009 de las 14:50 horas del 2 de marzo del 2009, el Alcalde Municipal rechazó la revocatoria y admitió la apelación “ante el superior jerárquico impropio”. De ello se notificó a la recurrente el día 4 del mismo mes y año (f. 840-846).-\n\n14. Por resolución Nº 003-2009 de las 10:30 horas del 10 de marzo del 2009, el Alcalde Municipal rectificó el acto a que se refiere el hecho anterior, a los efectos de tener por admitida la apelación “ante el Concejo Municipal, el cual agotará la vía administrativa” (f. 849).-\n\n15. Que a través de libelo presentado el 25 de marzo del 2009, la interesada compareció ante el Concejo Municipal “a mantener y sostener el recurso de apelación oportunamente interpuesto” (f. 854).-\n\n16. Que el Concejo Municipal, en sesión ordinaria # 243-2009 del 30 de marzo del 2009, dispuso: “PRIMERO: Una vez conocido por el Concejo Municipal, el Recurso de Apelación formulado por la funcionaria Nombre128316 en contra de la Resolución 001-2009, de la Alcaldía Municipal, mediante la cual se dispusiera su despido sin responsabilidad patronal, verificados los diferentes argumentos y conforme la recomendación de la Asesora Legal contratada al efecto, este Concejo Municipal hace suyos los argumentos vertidos en la Resolución 002-2009 de las catorce y cincuenta horas del dos de marzo último que rechaza la Revocatoria por parte del Alcalde. En consecuencia este Concejo Municipal estima procedente el despido de la funcionaria, sin responsabilidad patronal. / SEGUNDO: Por lo anterior dispuesto se rechaza el Recurso de apelación en subsidio, nulidad concomitante y suspensión de efectos del acto, sub examine y se da por agota (sic) la vía administrativa. / TERCERO: Instruir a la Secretaria del Concejo Municipal para que transcriba este acuerdo a los interesados.” Para fundamentar dicha resolución, se indicó: “SOBRE LOS HECHOS DEL RECURSO: Que la Asesora Legal contratada al efecto, luego de estudiar detenidamente los hechos constitutivos de la investigación, la prueba recabada y la relación de hechos formulada por el Órgano Director, coincide plenamente con el instructor en el elenco de hechos probados y no probados que el informe final contiene. Analizada la Resolución de fondo vertida por el Alcalde, en donde dispone el despido con causa de la funcionaria, estimó que es una consecuencia necesaria de los hechos probados y no probados que la investigación arrojó, es decir que el despido se encuentra plenamente sustentado de hecho y de derecho. / Luego del estudio del libelo de recurso de revocatoria y apelación en subsidio y al verificar detenidamente cada argumento de la resolución que lo rechaza, es su consideración que efectivamente la resolución reprochada debió mantenerse y los argumentos de reproche no son de recibo. / Que según la Asesora Legal, del expediente levantado al efecto se desprende que se han observado todas las solemnidades y formalidades de ley, se han garantizado los principios de debido proceso y derecho a la defensa para la funcionaria y finalmente que la conclusión a la que ha arribado la Administración es concordante y proporcionada a los hechos probados y no probados.” Lo anterior fue notificado a la ahora actora mediante oficio SCM #00301-2009 del 31 de ese mes y año, vía fax, el mismo día (f. Placa30269 ).-\n\n17. Que la accionante interpuso recurso de amparo contra el Alcalde, el Presidente del Concejo Municipal y el órgano director del procedimiento, el cual fue tramitado bajo expediente Nº 09-005609-0007-CO de la Sala Constitucional y al cual se dio curso mediante auto de las 10:12 horas del 16 de abril del 2009. El recién referido recurso de amparo fue declarado sin lugar por la Sala Constitucional, en sentencia Nº 2009-014631 de las 12:21 horas del 18 de setiembre del 2009, en la que se expresó, en cuanto interesa: “Nombre6562.- Objeto del recurso. En el presente recurso de amparo se discute la violación del derecho al proceso debido y de defensa de la tutelada, con ocasión del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario que se ha instaurado en su contra, en cuya razón se ha dictado el cese de sus funciones en la Proveeduría de la Municipalidad del Cantón de San Rafael de Heredia. De acuerdo con la promovente, en el trámite de esa causa disciplinaria la autoridad recurrida dispuso su suspensión sin goce de salario, y omitió fijar un plazo para la medida cautelar; además, la autoridad accionada le negó la posibilidad de acceder a las piezas del expediente administrativo y omitió sustentar la resolución en que se dispuso su despido sin responsabilidad patronal. Esta situación, según la actora, es ilegítima y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución. (...) VI.- (sic) Finalmente, en cuanto acusa la promovente que la autoridad recurrida, al ordenar el despido sin responsabilidad patronal en el procedimiento disciplinario que se ha instaurado contra la recurrente, ha omitido sustentar su decisión, del contenido de la resolución dictada por la autoridad recurrida, N°001-09 de las 08:00 hrs. de 11 de febrero de 2009 (...) no se infiere, ni por asomo, esta situación, motivo por el cual no se aprecia en el caso concreto ninguna infracción del derecho al debido proceso de la tutelada, motivo por el cual se debe desestimar el amparo en lo que atañe a punto (sic). Por demás, se debe advertir que a este Tribunal Constitucional no le corresponde emitir juicio alguno, positivo o negativo, sobre el mérito de la causa disciplinaria que ha sido instaurada en su contra, lo cual más bien debe ser discutido en la Jurisdicción ordinaria. (...) Por tanto: Se declara sin lugar el recurso.-” (f. 895-899 y consulta del “Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica”).-\n\n18. Que, con anterioridad a los hechos relatados en los numerales previos, la aquí promovente ya había sido amonestada por escrito por el Alcalde Municipal dentro del procedimiento disciplinario Nº DAMSRH-01-2007, según resolución sin número de las 8:00 horas del 19 de noviembre del 2007, en la que se le atribuyó incumplimiento de sus responsabilidades como Proveedora Municipal, apercibiéndola “que en caso de reincidir en dicha falta se procederá en ejercicio de las facultades dispuestas en los numerales 149 y 150 del Código Municipal”. Allí mismo se le ordenó “implementar un plan de trabajo para mejorar la productividad dentro de su dependencia”, dentro del mes siguiente, así como rendir informes periódicos de los avances logrados (f. 16-27 del expediente administrativo).-\n\nII.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS. Por no haber prueba en el expediente que los sustente, se tiene por indemostrados los siguientes:\n\n1. Que en la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo seguido en contra de la actora se haya infringido las garantías del debido proceso.-\n\n2. Que el acto de despido de la actora carezca de fundamentación.-\n\n3. Que el motivo del acto de despido de la demandante resulte ilegítimo, por constituir una represalia originada en una denuncia por acoso laboral interpuesta previamente por ella contra un funcionario municipal.-\n\nIII.- ALEGATOS DE LAS PARTES. Arguye en la demanda la actora, resumidamente, que comenzó a trabajar para la Municipalidad accionada en junio del 2000, desempeñándose en los últimos siete años de la relación laboral como Proveedora Municipal. Que mediante resolución número 03-008-DAMSRH del 13 de noviembre del 2008, el Alcalde de esa corporación ordenó la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo en su contra y fue separada preventivamente de su puesto, con goce de salario. Que por resolución número 001-09 de las 8:00 horas del 11 de febrero del 2009, el Alcalde dispuso despedirla sin responsabilidad patronal, alegando falta de idoneidad para el desempeño del cargo. Agrega que en el procedimiento seguido se violentó el debido proceso, además de que el despido fue injustificado por no haberse acreditado la causal endilgada, obedeciendo más bien a una represalia originada en una denuncia que había interpuesto contra un funcionario municipal por acoso laboral. Manifiesta que “opongo la excepción de prescripción del despido” . Durante la audiencia de juicio oral y público, a lo anterior añadió que existe una incongruencia entre la intimación que se le formuló al inicio del procedimiento –en la que se adujo incumplimiento de sus funciones– y lo que establece el acto final como motivo para el despido –la falta de idoneidad para el desempeño del cargo–. Señaló además que las deficiencias que se le reprochó en realidad se originaban en otros departamentos de la Municipalidad; que el acto final se encuentra insuficientemente fundamentado; que fue incapacitada debido a razones psiquiátricas; que el Concejo Municipal no fundamentó adecuadamente el rechazo de su recurso de apelación, limitándose a acoger los argumentos de la asesora legal contratada para ello.-\n\nIV.- Por su parte, a los argumentos de la actora, responde la demandada, en síntesis, que en el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario abierto contra la accionante se cumplió con todas las exigencias del debido proceso. Que el alegato de prescripción debe ser rechazado puesto que se ejerció la potestad disciplinaria dentro de los plazos legales establecidos. Que en el expediente administrativo se acreditó ampliamente los motivos para el despido acordado. Posteriormente, en sus argumentos expuestos en el juicio oral y público, la apoderada del ente local demandado señaló que la potestad disciplinaria fue correctamente ejercida por el Alcalde, conforme al artículo 17, inciso a, del Código Municipal. Que debe considerarse que la actora había sido amonestada previamente, en otro procedimiento, por defectuoso cumplimiento de sus obligaciones. Que el segundo expediente fue iniciado a requerimiento de la auditoría interna, la cual emitió un informe en el que se documenta una serie de conductas de la ahora demandante que debilitaban e infringían el control interno. Que desconoce a qué se refiere aquélla al referirse a un supuesto acoso laboral o sexual. Reiteró además que el plazo de prescripción en este caso se rige por lo dispuesto en la Ley de Control Interno y la de la Contraloría General de la República. Que efectivamente se acreditó falta de idoneidad para el desempeño del cargo de Proveedora, haciendo referencia a lo estipulado en el numeral 119 del citado Código. Finalmente, acerca de las incapacidades debidas a problemas psiquiátricos, que la demandante nunca demostró que dicha patología fuese verdaderamente incapacitante para el desempeño de sus obligaciones.-\n\nV.- SOBRE EL FONDO. En la presente litis, el único hecho controvertido de la demanda resultó ser el sétimo, que señala:\n\n“SÉTIMO: En la tramitación del procedimiento disciplinario se violentó el debido proceso, y el despido resulta injustificado en virtud de que no se demostró la causal endilgada. Por el contrario, el despido injustificado no es más que una represalia por un proceso que con anterioridad interpuso (sic) en contra de un funcionario municipal por acoso laboral.”\n\nAdemás, en la parte considerativa se alegó la prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad sancionatoria, cuestión que fue igualmente rechazada por la entidad municipal accionada. Así las cosas, esas serán las únicas cuestiones que procederemos a examinar en este fallo, omitiendo incursionar en otros temas mencionados por la actora en la audiencia complementaria (por ejemplo, lo relativo a sus incapacidades por tratamientos psiquiátricos), pues tales cuestiones no fueron objeto de debate y no es posible introducirlas tardíamente, sin violentar con ello el derecho de defensa de la contraparte. Por conveniencia, iniciaremos con lo relativo a la supuesta prescripción del poder disciplinario.-\n\nVI.- ACERCA DE LA ALEGADA PRESCRIPCIÓN DEL EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA. Sobre este particular, la actora en la demanda se limita a apuntar, escuetamente, que “opongo la excepción de prescripción del despido” , sin abundar en detalles acerca de por qué considera que ello debe ser declarado así. Cabe comenzar recordando que la prescripción, en términos generales, supone la concurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio; b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico al efecto; y, c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, haciendo valer la prescripción. Ello supone que no existe efecto liberatorio si, pese a concurrir los dos primeros presupuestos, la articulación no se formula. Ello porque la prescripción atiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos procesales), no puede ser considerada de oficio. En lo que toca específicamente a las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a este factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se dirá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran imprescriptibles, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno –como el que se examina en este caso– están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de las cuales pueden fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo es el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica.-\n\nVII.- Ahora bien, para los efectos del presente caso es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este tipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, en los cuales aplican reglas de ejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, con matices diversos. Se trata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de demarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto de que se trate. En esta línea, ha de distinguirse el decurso temporal de etapas diversas. En primer término, cabe analizar la prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria , que se refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo admitido por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que constituye un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del ejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe solo con el dictado del acto final pues, como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga la apertura de una causa administrativa –se insiste– para establecer si corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297 y 308 de la LGAP. De manera genérica, el referido plazo se regula por el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo (CT), que indica que “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria”. Sin embargo, ha de advertirse que se trata de una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo. Es el caso, por ejemplo, de la Ley General de Policía, N° 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, cuyo numeral 83 fija un régimen de prescripción particular, a saber: “Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario”. Lo mismo se presenta en materia de fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Para este tipo de procedimientos, el plazo aplicable es el regulado por las leyes N° 8292 (en su artículo 43), 8422 (artículo 44) y 8131 (artículo 112). Se trata de un sistema normativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas concretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En lo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el ordinal 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, N° 7428, que señala en lo medular:\n\n“La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad– la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo.” (El subrayado es nuestro.)\n\nAhora bien, es claro que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el ordinal 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace el ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del CT. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción –que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo– solo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluído por inercia en su ejercicio. Con todo, se debe insistir en que la interrupción no se produce con el simple dictado del acto de apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la LGAP.-\n\nVIII.- Ahora bien, resulta determinante establecer con precisión el punto de partida del cómputo del plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular (y dejando momentáneamente a salvo los casos regulados por norma especial), el numeral 603 del CT señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Así las cosas, cuando las particularidades del caso exija la realización de una investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase, pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia dilatoria para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios sería necesaria esa investigación, sino solo en aquellos en que, por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio o bien para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no.-\n\nIX.- El segundo factor que cabe analizar es el de la prescripción de la potestad para acordar la sanción dentro del procedimiento, que se refiere al límite máximo temporal con que cuenta el titular de la potestad correctiva para adoptar la sanción, una vez que el expediente ha sido sometido a su conocimiento por el órgano director (es decir, cuando solo resta la emisión del acto final). En esta hipótesis y a menos que aplique la excepción del numeral 319 de la LGAP (relativa a la necesidad de celebrar una segunda comparecencia), el jerarca o titular nuevamente dispone del plazo máximo de un mes para decidir la sanción aplicable, contado desde el momento en que el órgano director de la causa le ponga formalmente en conocimiento de su recomendación; vencido el cual, ocurría indefectiblemente la prescripción de esa potestad y por ende, el acto final sería nulo por lesión al elemento competencial, condicionado en ese caso por factores de preclusión. Tal supuesto, en la dinámica concreta de los procedimientos de corte sancionatorio disciplinario, dado el contenido del ordinal 603 del CT, constituye un tratamiento especial que se sobrepone a lo estatuido por el canon 329.3 de la LGAP.-\n\nX.- En tercero término, la prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación o ejecución material de la sanción dictada. En este caso, por integración analógica, el plazo aplicable, salvo norma especial, sería de nuevo el plazo mensual previsto en el numeral 603 del CT. La negación de semejante plazo supondría la posibilidad perenne del jerarca de aplicar la sanción dispuesta de antemano, bajo el alegato de una suerte de imprescriptibilidad de esa potestad. Así, una cosa es el plazo para disponer el acto final una vez emitido el informe final del órgano director y otro el plazo para materializar la sanción firme dispuesta. En este punto, el plazo ha de computarse desde la firmeza de ese acto, lo que puede originarse por la confirmación de la sanción luego del ejercicio y resolución de los recursos ordinarios que quepan contra el acto según corresponda o bien si, transcurrido el plazo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico para formular esos recursos, no han sido planteados, en cuya eventualidad, la firmeza administrativa se produce por la inercia del destinatario de los efectos de la conducta.-\n\nXI.- Finalmente, otro elemento que se encuentra sujeto a reglas de temporalidad es el referente a la tramitación del procedimiento. Se refiere al tiempo máximo que puede demorar el procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema, salvo norma especial, se encuentra regulado por el ordinal 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340, todos de la LGAP. Sin embargo, el plazo bimensual que allí se dispone posee naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que desde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida (sobre el particular, puede verse el fallo N° 199-2011-VI de la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal, de las 16: 20 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2011). En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el ordinal 340 de la LGAP, que regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración instructora que lo inició lo someta a un estado de abandono por un plazo igual o superior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquélla. En este supuesto, la caducidad aplica incluso en los casos en que el procedimiento se encuentre listo para el dictado del acto final, pues la restricción del inciso 2 del citado artículo 340, en cuanto a la imposibilidad de la caducidad cuando el asunto se encuentra listo para el dictado de ese acto final, solo aplica cuando el procedimiento ha iniciado a instancia de parte, dado que la etapa siguiente solo compete a la Administración, la que no podría escudarse en su inercia. Esto no ocurre cuando se ha instruido de oficio, pues en ese caso, la dilación sí beneficia al administrado, en la medida en que se trataría en ese caso, de un retraso solo imputable a la instancia pública.-\n\nXII.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA EN EL CASO CONCRETO. Establecido lo anterior, cabe reiterar que, en el sub examine, la actora no especifica exactamente cuál de los supuestos de prescripción es el que estima aplicable en su caso. Del recurso de apelación presentado en sede administrativa (ver hecho probado 12), se infiriere que se trata del plazo para el inicio del procedimiento disciplinario en su contra, que ella considera regido por el numeral 603 del CT. Este Tribunal no observa el vencimiento del referido lapso ni, consecuentemente, el acaecimiento del efecto preclusivo que se arguye. Al efecto, debemos comenzar por establecer cuál es el lapso aplicable, tema en el cual se estima que lleva razón la Municipalidad demandada cuando alega que se trata del quinquenal contemplado en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), por tratarse la actora de una funcionaria a quien se reprocha la comisión de conductas antijurídicas que gira en torno al manejo de la hacienda pública municipal. En efecto, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a partir de su sentencia N° 6750-97 de las 11:12 horas del 17 de octubre de 1997, ha estimado “que la interpretación del concepto de servidor de la hacienda pública debe restringirse a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos”. Como se ha explicado (y este Tribunal comparte):\n\n“Recuérdese que si bien es cierto que en una dependencia pública pueden laborar muchas personas que tienen acceso al haber patrimonial de la oficina, no todos manejan y disponen de los fondos públicos. Y sólo en la medida en que aquél concepto se circunscriba únicamente a los ‘funcionarios que están directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos’, resulta justificable la diferencia de los plazos de prescripción de la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria, pues con un plazo de prescripción más largo como el que establece el citado artículo 71, ‘se pretende posibilitar al Estado un control mayor sobre sus funcionarios que están directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos, ello por indudable relevancia del tema y la gran necesidad de asegurar el manejo más sano y limpio posible de los fondos públicos’. (Criterio reafirmado en la sentencia N° 06843-98 de las 15:45 horas del 24 de setiembre de 1998, así como en la resolución N° 2001-07516 de las 14:49 horas del 1º de agosto del 2001, recientemente ratificada por la N° 2003-04367 de las 15:27 horas del 21 de mayo del 2003, todas de las Sala Constitucional).\n\nY con base en la jurisprudencia vinculante anteriormente referida, la Procuraduría ha definido lo que debe entenderse por funcionario de la Hacienda Pública, de la siguiente manera:\n\n‘Es opinión no vinculante de esta Procuraduría que debe entenderse por funcionarios que ‘manejan fondos públicos’ aquéllos que de conformidad con el orden jurídico y de acuerdo con el acto de nombramiento tienen entre sus atribuciones el administrar, gestionar administrativa o contablemente, los fondos públicos. Por consiguiente, el término gestión o manejo de fondos públicos no se aplica al uso de los fondos en sentido de haber patrimonial sino a la circunstancia de que, conforme la definición de competencia, corresponde tomar determinadas decisiones o acciones en relación con esos fondos. De allí que, efectivamente la circunstancia de que todo funcionario público utilice para el cumplimiento de sus funciones, por ejemplo, bienes públicos sean éstos un escritorio, computadora, lápiz, no puede conducir a estimar que por ese uso esté ‘manejando’ fondos públicos. Por el contrario, si se le reconoce jurídicamente la posibilidad de utilizar y disponer (jurídica o contablemente) de los fondos en cuestión, si su actuación está sumida a la fiscalización necesaria para verificar que ha respondido a las finalidades y objetivos por los cuales se conceden los fondos y, ante todo, conforme los procedimientos legalmente establecidos, habría que considerar que el funcionario está comprendido dentro de los supuestos del artículo 71 de la Ley de la Contraloría.’\n\nEs (sic) este orden de ideas, puede considerarse que, desde el punto de vista legal, el término ‘servidor de la Hacienda Pública’, se encuentra delimitado por el conjunto de disposiciones que integran el Capítulo V: ‘De las Sanciones y de las responsabilidades’ de la Ley de la Contraloría. En efecto, la prescripción regulada en el artículo 71 concierne las faltas a que genéricamente hace referencia el artículo 68 de la misma ley, faltas para cuya comisión se requiere una particular relación del servidor con la Hacienda Pública, como podría ser el hecho de que le corresponda actuar las prescripciones legales que la regulan (como es el caso de los órganos de control); o que disponen sobre la ejecución administrativa o contable del Presupuesto, sea quienes pueden comprometer el gasto u ordenar su pago, deben realizar inversiones con los recursos públicos o deben recaudar éstos, etc. participando directamente en la administración financiera pública. En ese sentido, cabría agregar que de los artículos 6 a 9 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera se pueden extraer criterios en orden a determinar quienes son funcionarios de la Hacienda Pública. En efecto, dichos numerales conciernen servidores que en virtud del orden competencial, participan directamente en la administración financiera en razón de que les corresponde recibir, administrar, custodiar o pagar bienes o valores; o bien porque tienen autoridad para contraer obligaciones o, en su caso, compromisos de pago, tomando decisiones en orden a los referidos fondos (...)\n\n(...) Servidor que maneja fondos públicos es aquél que por disposición del ordenamiento y conforme a su acto de nombramiento está en una particular relación con los citados fondos, que le permite participar en las distintas etapas de la ejecución presupuestaria de los ingresos y egresos, así como los que intervienen en el proceso de fiscalización y control de la ‘Hacienda Pública’ o en general, participan directamente en la administración financiera del organismo públicos de que se trate.’ (O.J.-107-98 de 17 de diciembre de 1998).\n\nAsí las cosas, tomando en consideración las especiales atribuciones que la Constitución Política le ha asignado a la Contraloría General de la República en lo que respecta a la vigilancia en el manejo de los fondos públicos y en la gestión financiera de la Administración Pública, y especialmente el control del personal que ‘recibe, custodia, paga o administra bienes o valores del Estado’ (Resolución N° 2000-06326 de las 16 horas con 18 minutos del 19 de julio del 2000, de la Sala Constitucional), podemos afirmar categóricamente que el artículo 71 de la citada Ley N° 7428, resulta única y exclusivamente aplicable en el caso concreto y específico de aquellos funcionarios o servidores de la Hacienda Pública, es decir, a los que tienen a su cargo el manejo y disposición de fondos públicos (Ver entre otras, las resoluciones N°s 6750-97, 06843-98, 2001-07516 y 2003-04367 op. cit., de la Sala Constitucional y las 2000-00949 de las 08:20 horas del 24 de noviembre del 2000, 2001-00283 de las 10:00 horas del 30 de mayo del 2001 y 2003-00669 de las 09:20 horas del 13 de noviembre del 2003, de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, así como los pronunciamientos C-340-2002 y C-344-2002 op. cit.).” (Procuraduría General de la República, “Manual de Procedimiento Administrativo”, San José, 2006, páginas 222-224; los subrayados son nuestros.)\n\nEn nuestro caso, está acreditado (hecho probado 1) que la demandante se desempeñaba en el cargo de Proveedora Municipal y, en ese sentido, las conductas que le fueron achacadas tenían que ver, precisamente, con aspectos propios de esa función y típicos de la gestión de los bienes y recursos institucionales, tales como el manejo de las contrataciones administrativas y el registro de activos municipales. De esta suerte, no hay duda de que el plazo de prescripción aplicable no es el genérico del numeral 603 del CT, sino el especial del ordinal 71 de la LOCGR. En particular, habiendo mediado en el caso la realización de una indagación previa por parte de la Auditoría Interna, debemos estarnos a lo preceptuado en el inciso b) de la citada norma, que señala que el inicio del plazo preclusivo ocurre a partir de la fecha en que el informe respectivo fue puesto en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. En este caso, el primer informe que describía la situación reinante en la Proveeduría Municipal llegó a conocimiento del Alcalde –quien es el titular de la potestad disciplinaria en este caso, conforme a los artículos 17 inciso k) y 149 del Código Municipal– el 21 de mayo del 2008 (hecho probado 3); mientras que el segundo –en el que se pedía la apertura del procedimiento administrativo que dio lugar al despido de la actora– lo hizo el 8 de agosto siguiente (hecho probado 4). Y considerando que el traslado de cargos respectivo fue notificado a aquélla el 28 de noviembre del mismo año 2008 (hecho probado 6), es palmario que no había vencido –siquiera lejanamente– el lapso de cinco años fijado al efecto. En consecuencia, este extremo de la demanda se deniega.-\n\nXIII.- SOBRE LAS SUPUESTAS VIOLACIONES AL DEBIDO PROCESO. Derivado esencialmente de los artículos 39 y 41 de la Carta Política, la Sala Constitucional ha reiterado la existencia de varias formalidades básicas, que garantizan los derechos fundamentales de los sujetos que pueden resultar perjudicados por el dictado de un acto administrativo. Así, desde la sentencia N° 15-90 de las 16:45 horas del 5 de enero de 1990, se han definido esos elementos constitutivos del debido proceso en sede administrativa, cuando se indicó:\n\n“[El] derecho de defensa garantizado por el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política y por consiguiente el principio del debido proceso, contenido en el artículo 41 de nuestra Carta Fundamental, o como suele llamársele en doctrina, principio de ‘bilateralidad de la audiencia’ del ‘debido proceso legal’ o ‘principio de contradicción’ (...) se ha sintetizado así: a) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; b) derecho de ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; d) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde y e) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada.\n\n(...)\n\n[El] derecho de defensa resguardado en el artículo 39 ibídem, no sólo rige para los procedimientos jurisdiccionales, sino también para cualquier procedimiento administrativo llevado a cabo por la administración pública; y que necesariamente debe dársele al accionante si a bien lo tiene, el derecho de ser asistido por un abogado, con el fin de que ejercite su defensa...”.\n\nEn el caso sub examine y no obstante que la demanda es absolutamente ayuna de elementos de juicio para establecer, con precisión, cuáles son las falencias supuestamente incurridas al respecto, es opinión de esta Cámara que las exigencias del debido proceso fueron adecuadamente observadas en la sustanciación del expediente disciplinario seguido contra la actora. En efecto, por medio del auto de traslado de cargos (hecho probado 6), se notificó a la interesada del carácter y fines del procedimiento, los hechos que se le imputaba y el tipo de sanción a la que podría hacerse acreedora. Allí mismo se le citó a comparecencia oral y privada; se enumeró los documentos que obraban como prueba en el expediente y las personas que serían citadas como testigos; y se le advirtió acerca de los recursos que procedían contra esa resolución. Luego, la investigada tuvo la oportunidad de ser oída, para lo cual presentó primero un documento de descargo (hecho probado 7), asistió a la comparecencia oral y privada (hecho probado 8) y aportó después una relación de lo que consideró como “conclusiones sucintas” del trámite (hecho probado 9). En cuanto al patrocinio letrado, cabe decir que la actora es abogada, de manera que no existe duda en cuanto a su defensa respecto de ese particular. El acto final fue debidamente fundamentado (véase al respecto lo que se expone más adelante) y notificado a la interesada (hecho probado 11). Finalmente, ésta tuvo oportunidad de recurrir la decisión (como se relata a partir del hecho probado 12). De toda suerte, es importante considerar que la cuestión de si se violentó o no el derecho de defensa de la ahora actora durante el procedimiento ya fue examinado y desestimado por la Sala Constitucional, ante la interposición de un recurso de amparo contra la jerarquía municipal y que fue declarado sin lugar por ese Alto Tribunal mediante sentencia Nº 2009-014631 de las 12:21 horas del 18 de setiembre del 2009 (hecho probado 17), pronunciamiento que, desde luego, está dotado del efecto vinculante erga omnes establecido en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.-\n\nXIV.- Una cuestión final, relativa al debido proceso, tiene que ver con el alegato que hizo la accionante en la fase de conclusiones, en el sentido de que existió incongruencia entre la intimación inicial del procedimiento (que le atribuyó una serie de incumplimientos en sus funciones como motivo para dar inicio al trámite) y el acto final (que señala como razón para el despido la falta de idoneidad para el desempeño del cargo). Este órgano colegiado rechaza dicha imputación. Analizado el traslado de cargos (véase el hecho probado 6), se aprecia que enumera una serie de falencias puntuales atribuidas a la demandante, varias de las cuales (y, estima esta Cámara, todas ellas también, tomadas en conjunto) apuntaban, justamente, hacia que ésta carecía de las condiciones de idoneidad comprobada para ejercer como Proveedora Municipal, incluyendo –solo para citar un ejemplo– cuando se le atribuyó que “desconoce las responsabilidades y las relaciones de coordinación que le asigna el Manual de Puestos de la Municipalidad”. En este sentido, la imputación de falta de idoneidad, hecha en el acto final, es tan solo un juicio de valor que resume o describe el conjunto de deficiencias –desglosadas en el traslado de cargos– hacia cuya comprobación iba dirigido el procedimiento. De esta suerte, no encuentra este órgano colegiado que entre una y otra cosa exista divergencia alguna capaz de viciar lo resuelto por incurrir en incongruencia. De modo que el alegato se rechaza.-\n\nXV.- SOBRE LOS MOTIVOS DEL DESPIDO Y LA FUNDAMENTACIÓN DEL ACTO FINAL DEL PROCEDIMIENTO Y DEL RECHAZO DE LA APELACIÓN. Acusa la accionante que la decisión de despido (contenida en el acto final del procedimiento) fue injustificada, por no haberse acreditado la causal endilgada, obedeciendo más bien a una represalia originada en una denuncia que había interpuesto contra un funcionario municipal por acoso laboral. Además, denuncia que tanto ese acto como el que resolvió su recurso de apelación carecen de la debida fundamentación. Acerca de lo primero, la revisión del expediente disciplinario conduce a este Tribunal a rechazar el argumento de la actora. En efecto, tanto el procedimiento en sí como el acuerdo de despido que le dio término estuvieron sustentados en dos exhaustivos informes rendidos nada menos que por la Auditoría Interna de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia, en los cuales se detalló una larga lista tanto de acciones como de omisiones que denotaban un defectuoso cumplimiento de las delicadas responsabilidades del Departamento de Proveeduría de ese ente local. Se tuvo también en cuenta, como elemento valorativo y como si fuera poco, que la ahora accionante había sido amonestada por faltas similares apenas un año antes de la apertura del segundo expediente disciplinario, ocasión en la que quedó apercibida acerca de las consecuencias de incurrir nuevamente en esas deficiencias (ver hecho probado 18). De manera que se estima que las faltas graves que condujeron a la decisión de despido sí fueron suficientemente acreditadas.-\n\nXVI.- En adición a lo anterior, en esta litis la actora no aportó prueba alguna que permitiera demostrar que en el procedimiento instaurado en su contra se persiguiera una finalidad diversa e ilegítima, cual fuera castigarla a raíz de una denuncia que formuló por un presunto acoso laboral y sexual (hecho no probado 3). El deber probatorio (que en esta jurisdicción deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil supletorio y los numerales 58 inciso f, 82 y 85 del CPCA) obliga a demostrar aquellos hechos que determinan el marco jurídico aplicable y le dan sustento a las pretensiones y defensas de las partes. Ciertamente, de haberse comprobado esa circunstancia, estaríamos ante una clara desviación de poder (ordinal 131.3 de la LGAP) que podría haber sustentado un pronunciamiento de carácter anulatorio en esta sede. Pero no fue así, de modo que el alegato resulta estéril y debe ser desestimado.-\n\nXVII.- Otro tanto ocurre con respecto al reproche relativo a una supuesta falta de fundamentación del acto final. En efecto, éste se apoya en el informe final de hechos probados y no probados presentado por el órgano director del procedimiento (véase hecho probado 10), que describe con claridad las falencias incurridas por la actora en el desempeño de sus funciones; y que, como se indicó, se origina a su vez en los dos informes de Auditoría relativos al mismo aspecto. Por su parte, el acuerdo del Concejo Municipal que resolvió acerca del recurso de apelación planteado (como correspondía con anterioridad a la reforma del artículo 150 del Código Municipal), contiene un desarrollo ciertamente escueto, pero suficiente, sobre las razones por las cuales acordó rechazarlo (véase el hecho probado 16), para lo cual incluso contó con el criterio de una asesora legal contratada al efecto.-\n\nXVIII.- Para concluir este apartado, no está demás reiterar que el alegato de falta de fundamentación del acto final también fue conocido y denegado por la Sala Constitucional en la resolución N° 2009-014631 a la que se aludió supra . Por esta y todas las razones ya enunciadas, no se acoge el reproche que se ha examinado.-\n\nXIX.- SOBRE LAS PRETENSIONES INDEMNIZATORIAS. Como consecuencia de la nulidad peticionada de su decisión de despido, la accionante solicita diversas repaciones pecuniarias, enunciadas tanto de modo principal como también subsidiario en el resultando 1 de este fallo y que comprenden tanto los daños materiales como los morales. En este sentido, el solo hecho de que el planteamiento de fondo de la demanda haya sido rechazado es base suficiente para denegar el reclamo económico formulado, en tanto resulta accesorio de aquél. En efecto, en la medida en que no se ha constatado actuación ilegítima alguna de la Administración, no se ha configurado tampoco una lesión que la accionante no esté obligada a soportar. La responsabilidad administrativa, en el régimen de la LGAP, exige que no solo se establezca la existencia de una conducta administrativa dañosa y una lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, sino además, que entre ambas se dé un nexo causal, es decir, que exista relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido; nexo que no debe verse roto por la presencia de alguna de las condiciones de exoneración previstas en el ordinal 190 ibídem. En este caso, por todas las razones ya expuestas, este Tribunal no considera que la actuación de la Municipalidad accionada en este caso haya sido ilegítima, lo cual hace desaparecer irremediablemente uno de los enunciados elementos críticos para la configuración de una eventual responsabilidad administrativa extracontractual, cual es la constatación de la existencia de una conducta dañosa originaria de una lesión material o moral que el administrado no esté obligado a soportar (artículo 194 de la LGAP).-\n\nXX.- ACERCA DE LAS EXCEPCIONES INTERPUESTAS: La accionada inicialmente opuso las de falta de derecho y prescripción, aclarando posteriormente en la audiencia preliminar que no haría uso de la segunda, según se relató en el resultando correspondiente. En cuanto a la primera, con apoyo en las razones de hecho y de derecho expuestas en los considerandos precedentes, la defensa debe ser acogida, declarando la demanda sin lugar en todos sus extremos.-\n\nXXI.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS. El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable: a) cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar; b) cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas que desconociera la parte contraria; o bien, c) cuando se incurra en plus petitio, esto es, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento (15%) o más, a no ser que las bases de la demanda sean expresamente consideradas provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos (ordinal 194 ibídem ). En la especie, no encuentra este órgano colegiado motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido. Por ende, se impone el pago de ambas costas a la actora.-\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nSe acoge la excepción de falta de derecho. Se declara IMPROCEDENTE en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta por Nombre128316 contra la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia. Son ambas costas a cargo de la accionante. NOTIFÍQUESE.-\n\nCHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA\n\nSILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ",
  "body_en_text": "CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL\n\nSecond Judicial Circuit of San José – Address 18225\n\n \n\nCentral: 2545-0003 Ÿ Fax: 2545-0033 Ÿ Email: ...01\n\n \n\nExpediente: 10-000639-0505-LA\n\nProcess: Conocimiento\n\nPlaintiff: Nombre128316\n\nDefendant: Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia\n\nNo. 51-2013-VII\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL (SEVENTH SECTION). Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at two thirty in the afternoon on the twenty-second of August, two thousand thirteen.-\n\nProceso de conocimiento heard before this Tribunal by Nombre128316, divorced, with identity card number CED117281 (f. 1); against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN RAFAEL DE HEREDIA, for which its Mayor Nombre102691 appears, married, sociologist, with identity card number CED114249 (f. 52 and 53). Also intervening in the process, on behalf of the defendant, is her special judicial attorney-in-fact Licda. Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, single, resident of San José, with identity card number CED117282 (f. 77) and, as lead attorney for the plaintiff, Licda. Nombre128317. The natural persons cited are of legal age and, with the exceptions indicated, attorneys and residents of San Rafael de Heredia.-\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- That the plaintiff, based on the facts and legal citations she set forth, in a brief filed on August 30, 2010, initially before the Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Heredia, filed a lawsuit in which, in substance, she requests: \"MAIN CLAIM: (...) a) The nullity of the dismissal for being a violation of due process and also unjustified. / b) The defendant has the obligation to reinstate me in the position I held at the time of dismissal. / c) Payment of lost wages as damages (daños y perjuicios). / d) Must pay salary adjustments from the time of dismissal until the time of reinstatement. / e) Pay the Christmas bonuses (aguinaldos) that I would have failed to receive as a result of the unjustified dismissal. / f) Shall pay the proportional unused vacations during the time the process lasts and until reinstatement to work. / g) Employer-worker contributions left unpaid from the time of dismissal and until their effective payment. / h) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: Regarding the suffering, the distress that as a result of an unjustified dismissal I have had to suffer, and not only me, but my (sic) family. (...). My (sic) image, honor and esteem, has been called into question as a result of the dismissal, causing irreparable damages on a moral, psychological, spiritual, emotional, family, labor and social level. (...) Whose valuation must be carried out by an expert in the sentence execution stage. / i) Payment of school bonuses (salarios escolares) left unreceived. / j) Salary increases of any other nature that may have been approved. / k) Interest on the sums owed from the time of dismissal and until their effective payment. / l) Grant the exception regarding the statute of limitations for the dismissal. / m) Both legal costs of the process. SUBSIDIARY CLAIM: That in the event that it refuses to (sic) reinstate, the defendant party is obliged to pay me the following items: a) The nullity of the dismissal for being a violation of due process and also unjustified, b) severance notice and unemployment assistance (preaviso y auxilio de cesantía), c) that it must pay me the salary adjustments from the time of dismissal until the time of its effective payment, d) employer-worker contributions left unpaid from the time of dismissal and until the judgment becomes final (firmeza), e) Payment of lost wages as damages (daños y perjuicios), f) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: Regarding the suffering, the distress that as a result of an unjustified dismissal I have had to suffer, and not only me, but my (sic) family. (...). My (sic) image, honor and esteem, has been called into question as a result of the dismissal, causing irreparable damages on a moral, psychological, spiritual, emotional, family, labor and social level. (...) Whose valuation must be carried out by an expert in the sentence execution stage, i) Payment of school bonuses (salarios escolares) left unreceived, j) Salary increases of any other nature that may have been approved, k) Interest on the sums owed from the time of dismissal and until their effective payment, l) Grant the exception regarding the statute of limitations for the dismissal, m) Both legal costs of the process.\" (f. 1-8).-\n\n2.- By means of resolution No. 641-2010 at 8:30 a.m. on September 6, 2010 (f. 17-18), the Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Heredia declared itself incompetent and ordered the expediente to be sent to this jurisdiction.-\n\n3.- By resolution at 9:48 a.m. on June 27, 2012 (f. 34-39), the procedural judge rejected a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) initially noted ex officio and regarding which a hearing had been granted by means of an order at 11:31 a.m. on February 23, 2011 (f. 20).-\n\n4.- The defendant answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations. It warned that this Municipality suspended any permanent appointment (nombramiento en propiedad) in the position occupied by the plaintiff and, finally, expressed its refusal to conciliate in this matter. (f. 53-55).-\n\n5.- In the preliminary hearing held starting at 1:30 p.m. on May 14, 2013, with the attendance of both parties, there were no adjustments in the claims, which therefore remain in the terms established in the lawsuit. In that same proceeding, the attorney-in-fact for the defendant Municipality clarified that she did not raise the defense of statute of limitations, but rather simply opposed the argument that the plaintiff was making on that same topic. The procedural judge, Licda. Ana Lía Umaña Salazar, admitted testimonial evidence offered by the plaintiff and, at the end, ordered the referral of the expediente to the corresponding Trial Section (audience recorded and attached to the expediente on its corresponding electronic support; minute at f. 78 front and back).-\n\n6.- By order at 10:00 a.m. on July 4, 2013 (f. 79-80), this Seventh Section assumed jurisdiction (se arrogó el conocimiento) over this matter and summoned the parties to the supplementary hearing.-\n\n7.- The oral and public trial took place starting at 8:45 a.m. on August 7, 2013, with the presence of both parties, who presented their initial arguments. Subsequently, the plaintiff desisted from the witness Nombre20335. Regarding the second admitted witness – known only as \"Dra. Ramírez\" – the evidence was declared unevacuable because she was not present, without due justification and considering that a summons (cédula de citación) was not issued regarding her. The parties then rendered their conclusions and, finally, the Tribunal declared the case as complex, in accordance with numeral 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) (audience recorded and attached to the expediente on its corresponding electronic support; minute at f. 83-84).-\n\n8.- This resolution is issued, following deliberation, within the period of fifteen business days stipulated in articles 111.1 of the CPCA and 82.1 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda. No grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the proceedings are noted.-\n\nDrafted by Judge Hess Araya, with the affirmative vote of Judge Fernández Brenes and Judge Córdoba Ramírez; and,\n\nWHEREAS:\n\nI.- PROVEN FACTS. The following are considered relevant as such (all folio references correspond to the administrative expediente, regarding which attention should be drawn to the lack of clarity and disorder it presents):\n\n1. That the plaintiff was a public employee (funcionaria) of the defendant Municipality since June 7, 2000, serving in the last seven years of the employment relationship as Municipal Procurement Officer (Proveedora Municipal) (fact 1 of the lawsuit, uncontested).-\n\n2. That by official communication No. AIM 039-2008 of April 22, 2008, the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna) brought to the attention of the Concejo Municipal a \"Study on the management of the Procurement Department (Departamento de Proveeduría) of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia,\" which reports \"real difficulties in the work\" of that office, \"a situation that affects institutional interests\"; non-compliance with basic functions, lack of planning of its activities and obstruction of the work of other municipal units, recommending the \"total restructuring\" of the cited Department (f. 377-393).-\n\n3. That the report just cited was heard by the Concejo in ordinary session No. 174-2008 of May 19, 2008, in which it was agreed – among other aspects – \"To Order the Municipal Mayor, compliance with and execution of the recommendations issued by the Internal Audit Office, ...\". The foregoing was communicated to said head official by official communication SCM #0383-2008 of the 20th of the same month and year, who received it the following day (f. 394-397).-\n\n4. That by official communication No. AIM 128-2008 of August 8, 2008, the Internal Audit Office addressed the Municipal Mayor, indicating: \"This Audit Unit requests you to appoint an órgano director to analyze the situation of the Institutional Procurement Department, since the problems of non-compliance within the deadlines granted by the Mayor's Office to the Procurement Department have been repetitive, to comply with the requests that the Mayor's Office has transferred to it for non-compliance with its functions, in accordance with the Manual de Puestos of this Municipality and the description of functions that the Procurement Officer herself made in her Annual Operating Plan (Plan Anual Operativo) 2008. It will be the responsibility of said body to analyze the justifications of the Procurement Department for not having attended within the period granted by the Mayor's Office to the requests that were transferred to it, as indicated previously. This órgano director must be appointed as soon as possible, if possible within one calendar month. Legal advice will be very important in this body.\" The document was received at the Mayor's Secretariat that same day (f. 577-578).-\n\n5. That by resolution No. 003-08-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Municipal Mayor ordered the \"Suspension with pay of Mrs. Nombre128316 Municipal Procurement Officer of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia as a provisional precautionary measure and opening of the órgano director of the administrative procedure to investigate findings of Audit reports numbers AIM-039-2008 and AIM-128-2008, as well as the alleged improper use of public funds to the detriment of the Administration,\" designating for this purpose Lic. Giovanni Varela Dijeres as órgano director (fact 5 of the lawsuit, uncontested; f. 608-613).-\n\n6. That at 10:00 a.m. on November 18, 2008, the órgano director issued an order of formulation of charges (auto de traslado de cargos) within the ordinary disciplinary administrative procedure No. 0001-08-01, which was notified to the now plaintiff on the following November 28. The act listed the conducts charged against the investigated person, as follows:\n\n\"a) That Mrs. Nombre128316 has presumably violated Standard 4.15 of the Manual de Normas de Control Interno which refers to the accuracy of records on assets, as well as to the periodic verification through physical verification and counting of those assets; considering that she has not updated for several years the information on the assets of each department, nor the physical counting of those assets, even though it is one of the functions assigned to the Procurement Department; / b) That Mrs. Nombre128316 presumably does not plan institutional purchases as the institutional budget grows, which is detrimental to the organization, execution and follow-up and internal control of the Department; which violates standard 3.2 of the Manual de Normas Generales de Control Interno for the Contraloría General de la República and the entities and bodies subject to its oversight; / c) That Mrs. Nombre128316 presumably does not keep a written record of all the procedures performed by the Procurement Department, such as: - Provider Registry Administration Procedures; Procedures for the Administration of Legalized Books (records of opening of bids and records of award of bids); - Direct contracting procedures; - Abbreviated Tender (Licitación abreviada) Procedure; - Public Tender (Licitación Pública) Procedures; - Auction Procedures; - Contract Administration Procedures; - Asset Control Procedures; - Summary of Purchases Made Procedures; - Procedures for Updating the Contractual Activity Information System, which results in a total technical ignorance of the subject matter, puts municipal coffers at risk and prevents adequate internal control; as set forth in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its regulations; the Ley de Control Interno and the provisions of the Contraloría General de la República on the matter. The foregoing violates the provisions of Standard 4.8 and 4.9 of the Manual de Normas Generales de Control Interno, which says that all controls in force for the different processes and activities of the institution, as well as all significant transactions and events that occur, must be documented and reviewed periodically to make the pertinent corrections; and that all officials who hold supervisory positions must exercise constant supervision over the development of the institution's processes, transactions and operations, with the purpose of ensuring that the work is carried out in accordance with the regulations and internal and external provisions in force. / d) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 is unaware of the responsibilities and coordination relationships assigned to her by the Municipality's Manual de Puestos and the code of ethics in force in the institution, the Institutional Annual Operating Plan (Plan Anual Operativo Institucional) and the institutional policies that have been issued to date; which becomes inconceivable, since her activity revolves around the execution of the goals proposed in said Plan and it is assumed that all municipal departments intervene in the planning process, with the objective that everyone works towards the same objectives and projects of the institution, because the Procurement Department should be one of the departments that knows the municipal budget in the greatest detail, since it is the fundamental work tool by which she must guide herself in the performance of her functions. The foregoing violates Article 13 of the Ley General de Control Interno which says that it is the duties of the head official and subordinate leaders to maintain and demonstrate ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as contribute with their actions to promote them to the rest of the organization, for which reason it is essential to know the Code of Ethics in force in the Municipality. / e) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 on March 28, 2008 had not made the annual invitation to participate in the Provider Registry (Registro de Proveedores), in accordance with the provisions of the Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa, Article 116 and following. / f) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 has not complied with the provisions of Article 122 of the Regulations to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, which means that the information in more than 40% of the files found in the Provider Registry does not have updated information, since the Procurement Department did not warn them one month in advance of the expiration date of their registration, a situation that should be recorded in the file, with sufficient advance notice. / g) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 has violated the provisions of the Directive for registration number D-4-2005-CO-DDI of the Contraloría General de la República, in points 6 and Articles 12 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República and 3 and 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno; all mandatory compliance norms, referring to the obligation to record contractual information on a daily basis. / h) That supposedly Mrs. Nombre128316 has not complied with the obligation to control and guard office materials, cleaning supplies and any type of minor tools and/or work items that are acquired in the Municipality, which constitutes a substantial weakness in internal control, since no inventory is kept of any of the items under her responsibility, which violates Article 107 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and standard 4.15 of the Manual de Normas de Control Interno. / i) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 has violated the provisions on purchases indicated in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, such as those made to Imprenta Lisara and to Mr. Nombre149762, supplier of cleaning supplies, with whom two purchases have been completed in the same month for an amount of C.200,000.00, which is the accepted amount to purchase without needing to quote three suppliers. In the case of Lisara it seems more a planning problem, since given the urgency with which each department makes the request for forms, stationery, stamps, etc., it violates the obligation to attend to each of the requests made by each department, independently. The foregoing violates the provisions of Article 8 of the Ley de Control Interno. / j) That Mrs. Nombre128316 has presumably violated the provisions of Articles 15, subsection b) of the Ley General de Control Interno referring to the security standards relating to the physical space, files, materials in custody of the Procurement Department and the computerized information systems, where there is a lack of documentation and defined procedures. / k) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 has violated the provisions for execution of Law 8114 in the following specific cases: 1) In the file for Labor and Tools for construction of the storm drainage system Dirección15696 (sic) West, second stage, it is recorded that Eng. Herrera Solìs (sic) sent on October 11, 2006 the technical specifications of the cited project to the Procurement Department, however, it was not until May 29, 2007 that the Mayor transferred the agreement to the Procurement Officer to prepare the contract. In July the contract is signed, and due to delays with the contractor this work was beginning in September 2007, with an addendum to the contract, and was completed at the end of November 2007. It means that the contracting process took approximately nine months, and execution two more months; 2) In the file for the Acquisition of the Four-Wheel Drive Vehicle for the Technical Road Unit (Unidad Técnica Vial), it is recorded that as of March 19, 2007, the Mayor requests the Procurement Officer to initiate this process. On March 20, 2007, the Treasurer makes the certification of the existence of economic content and transfers it to the Procurement Officer. On March 21 of that same year, Eng. Nombre3841 attaches the specifications. On April 24, 2007, the invitation to participate is published in La Gaceta with a deadline of May 11, 2007. By that date only Purdy Motor participates. On May 14, the sole offer is transferred to Eng. Nombre3841 and that same day Eng. Nombre3841 informs the Procurement Officer that the offer meets the requirements. Not until June 4 does the Procurement Officer transfer the file to the Concejo for them to proceed with the award, who take the award decision in ordinary session No. 97-2007 held on June 11, 2007. Later, not until July 19, 2006, Purdy Motor presents the performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento). In August the exemption procedures begin and it is not until September 28, 2007, that they deliver the vehicle, the process taking more than six months; 3) In the file for the purchase of 71 tons of asphalt mix and 5 barrels of emulsion to execute the Project in front of the plaza of Dirección18321, it took 4 months; 4) That very extensive periods of time occur between the award, the preparation of contracts and the preparation of the respective purchase order, which shows that the Procurement Department does not take the necessary precautions; does not transfer files to the Legal Advisory Office for the preparation of contracts with sufficient advance notice, the formalization and preparation of the tender documents (carteles) is slow, and important aspects of form are omitted in the files, such as numbering, the division of the process stages in the file, the presentation of the copies that must be incorporated and the lack of final documentation, regarding the execution of partial payments. The foregoing demonstrates technical ignorance for the position, which is a requirement of the Manual de Puestos for the performance thereof; as well as hinders subsequent control of her material and technical actions. / l) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 prepares the tender documents (cartel), initiates the purchase procedure, makes the quotes, makes the purchase order; enters the information in the Integrated Contractual Information System (Sistema Integrado de Información Contractual, SIAC) and receives the merchandise, which compromises the objectivity and independence of the institution; however, she has never requested that said situation be modified under the institutional code of ethics. / m) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 commits very serious errors in the drafting of contracts, specifically in the following: 1) In contract 05-2008 page 4 line 5 the sum of eighteen million four hundred sixty thousand five hundred colones is written in words, the correct amount being seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand two hundred twenty; Page 4 lines 10 and 11 note seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand colones missing the phrase 'two hundred twenty'; on that same page lines 11 and 13 review the execution period it says 'one business day and over the word AD' (sic); page 4 line 15 failed to note: of, between the words provisions and tender documents; page 7 line 3 the words 'Los' are repeated, Page 10 says April, the correct is May'; 2) Document to contract 05-2008 on page 4 line 20 notes eight (1) business day; page 11 notes April instead of May. 2) In contract 06-2008 page 1 line 19 notes 'Recapeteo (sic) de calle puente de piedra' the correct being Pavement Dirección15697; Page 2 line 17 and 29 failed to note Calle between the words pavement and dirt; page 2 line 31 notes C.21.917.000,00 the correct is Placa23792 error that is also made in words; page 3 lines 2 and 3 notes in numbers Placa30266 the correct being Placa30267; page 4 line 10 note calle between the words pavement and dirt, page 7 line 12 the word los is repeated; page 10 lines 2 and 3 notes in numbers and words Placa30268. the correct being Placa30267; page 10 line 18 read May instead of April. The foregoing violates Article 10 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. / n) That presumably suppliers such as Depósito El Rafaeleño have refused to submit documentation, except to Mrs. Nombre128316, which violates the institutional code of ethics and the principles of transparency. / o) That Mrs. Nombre128316 presumably in the handling of the procurement files, incorporates criteria and drafts from different institutional units, which violates Article 11 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. / p) That presumably Mrs. Nombre128316 has sent files to the Concejo Municipal and has requested participation bonds (garantías de participación) from bidders who are not the awardees, as is the case of Abbreviated Tender No. 2008LA-0001-01 'Purchase of Asphalt Mix at plant door and emulsion for pothole repair in the canton of San Rafael de Heredia and Abbreviated Tender number 2008-LA-00002-01 Recarpeto (sic) de calle punte (sic) de pieda (sic), where a performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento) was requested from the company Conansa. / q) That in the Final report of proven and unproven facts of the previous órgano director of the administrative procedure, the employee investigated here was admonished in writing and was warned that if she incurred these faults, action would be taken.\"\n\nIn addition to the foregoing, it was specified that the final act to be issued could entail dismissal without employer liability or the suspension without pay of the investigated person. Right there she was summoned to an oral and private hearing for 2:00 p.m. on December 22 of the same year; the documents that existed as evidence in the file and the persons who would be summoned as witnesses were listed; and she was warned about the remedies that were available against that resolution (f. 634-655; by act issued on the following December 10, the material error incurred in the date of the formulation of charges was rectified, so that it would correctly read \"November\" instead of \"August\": f. 668-669).-\n\n7. That by means of a brief dated January 12, 2009, the petitioner here appeared \"to answer the formulation of charges,\" in which she referred to the charges made against her and alleged the nullity of said act (f. 697-710).-\n\n8. That the oral and private hearing was duly conducted, with receipt of testimonial evidence (the corresponding record is not located in the administrative expediente, but it is thus inferred from the briefs referred to in the following two facts).-\n\n9. That with a document dated January 16, 2009 and submitted that same day, the interested party set forth her \"succinct conclusions in relation to the evidence duly gathered\" (f. 745-751).-\n\n10. That by resolution at 10:00 a.m. on February 1, 2009, the órgano director of the procedure issued his \"Final Report,\" in which he made an account of the processing followed and the proven and unproven facts in relation to the charges made against the investigated person (f. 759-784).-\n\n11. That the procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution No. 001-09 at 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 2009, by the Municipal Mayor, whose operative part establishes, as relevant: \"Accept in all its terms the Final Report of Proven and Unproven Facts within the investigation process of the employee Nombre128316, Procurement Officer of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia and given the lack of suitability for the fulfillment of the respective position, it is resolved: To Proceed with the Immediate Dismissal Without Employer Liability of Mrs. Nombre128316, identity card number CED117283 - - , effective February 13, 2009. Pay her the items corresponding to proportional vacations and Christmas bonus (aguinaldo). Likewise, the cessation of the precautionary measure ordered against Mrs. Nombre128316 is ordered for lacking current interest.\" The foregoing was notified to the now plaintiff, via fax, on the 13th of the same month and year (fact 6 of the lawsuit, uncontested; f. 785-813).-\n\n12. By brief submitted on February 25, 2009, the investigated person filed \"Recurso de revocatoria, apelación in subsidio, nulidad concomitante and suspension of effects of the act\" against the final act of the procedure, alleging the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power, for not having been exercised within the month referred to in Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo (f. 814-839).-\n\n13. By means of resolution No. 002-2009 at 2:50 p.m. on March 2, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rejected the revocatoria and admitted the apelación \"before the improper hierarchical superior.\" The appellant was notified thereof on the 4th of the same month and year (f. 840-846).-\n\n14. By resolution No. 003-2009 at 10:30 a.m. on March 10, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rectified the act referred to in the previous fact, for the purposes of having the apelación admitted \"before the Concejo Municipal, which will exhaust administrative remedies (agotará la vía administrativa)\" (f. 849).-\n\n15. That through a writ submitted on March 25, 2009, the interested party appeared before the Concejo Municipal \"to maintain and uphold the recurso de apelación timely filed\" (f. 854).-\n\n16. That the Concejo Municipal, in ordinary session # 243-2009 of March 30, 2009, ordered: \"FIRST: Once known by the Concejo Municipal, the Recurso de Apelación filed by the employee Nombre128316 against Resolution 001-2009, of the Municipal Mayor's Office, by means of which her dismissal without employer liability was ordered, having verified the different arguments and in accordance with the recommendation of the Legal Advisor contracted for this purpose, this Concejo Municipal makes its own the arguments set forth in Resolution 002-2009 at two fifty in the afternoon of last March two that rejects the Revocatoria by the Mayor. Consequently, this Concejo Municipal deems the dismissal of the employee without employer liability to be appropriate. / SECOND: By virtue of the foregoing ordered, the Recurso de apelación in subsidio, nulidad concomitante and suspension of effects of the act, sub examine, is rejected and administrative remedies (la vía administrativa) are deemed exhausted.\"\n\nTHIRD: Instruct the Secretary of the Municipal Council to transcribe this agreement to the interested parties.\" To support said resolution, it was stated: \"REGARDING THE FACTS OF THE APPEAL: That the Legal Advisor contracted for this purpose, after carefully studying the facts constituting the investigation, the evidence gathered, and the statement of facts formulated by the Directing Body, fully agrees with the instructor on the list of proven and unproven facts contained in the final report. Having analyzed the substantive Resolution issued by the Mayor, ordering the dismissal with cause of the official, she deemed it a necessary consequence of the proven and unproven facts that the investigation yielded, meaning that the dismissal is fully supported in fact and in law. / After studying the writ of appeal for reversal and appeal in subsidium and meticulously verifying each argument of the resolution rejecting it, it is her consideration that the challenged resolution should indeed have been upheld and the arguments for challenge are not admissible. / That according to the Legal Advisor, it is evident from the corresponding case file that all legal solemnities and formalities have been observed, the principles of due process (debido proceso) and the right to defense for the official have been guaranteed, and finally, the conclusion reached by the Administration is consistent and proportionate to the proven and unproven facts.\" The foregoing was notified to the now plaintiff via official letter SCM #00301-2009 dated the 31st of that month and year, by fax, the same day (f. Placa30269 ).-\n\n17. That the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal against the Mayor, the President of the Municipal Council, and the directing body of the procedure, which was processed under case file No. 09-005609-0007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and which was given course by order issued at 10:12 a.m. on April 16, 2009. The recently referenced amparo appeal was declared without merit by the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 2009-014631 at 12:21 p.m. on September 18, 2009, in which it was stated, as pertinent: \"Nombre6562.- Object of the appeal. The present amparo appeal discusses the violation of the right to due process (derecho al proceso debido) and defense of the protected party, on the occasion of the disciplinary administrative procedure that has been initiated against her, by reason of which the cessation of her functions in the Procurement Department of the Municipality of the Canton of San Rafael de Heredia has been ordered. According to the petitioner, in the processing of that disciplinary cause, the appealed authority ordered her suspension without pay, and omitted to set a term for the precautionary measure; furthermore, the respondent authority denied her the possibility of accessing the pieces of the administrative file and omitted to support the resolution ordering her dismissal without employer liability. This situation, according to the plaintiff, is illegitimate and injures the Right of the Constitution. (...) VI.- (sic) Finally, regarding the petitioner's accusation that the appealed authority, when ordering the dismissal without employer liability in the disciplinary procedure initiated against the appellant, has omitted to support its decision, this situation cannot be inferred, not even remotely, from the content of the resolution issued by the appealed authority, No. 001-09 at 08:00 hrs. on February 11, 2009 (...), which is why no infringement of the right to due process of the protected party is appreciated in the specific case, a reason for which the amparo must be dismissed concerning this point (sic). Furthermore, it must be warned that it does not correspond to this Constitutional Court to issue any judgment, positive or negative, on the merits of the disciplinary cause that has been initiated against her, which should rather be discussed in the ordinary Jurisdiction. (...) Therefore: The appeal is declared without merit.-\" (f. 895-899 and consultation of the \"Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica\").-\n\n18. That, prior to the events related in the preceding paragraphs, the petitioner herein had already been admonished in writing by the Municipal Mayor within disciplinary procedure No. DAMSRH-01-2007, according to an unnumbered resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on November 19, 2007, in which she was attributed with breach of her responsibilities as Municipal Procurement Officer, warning her \"that in case of recidivism in said fault, action will be taken in exercise of the powers provided in paragraphs 149 and 150 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal).\" She was also ordered therein \"to implement a work plan to improve productivity within her unit,\" within the following month, as well as to render periodic reports on the progress achieved (f. 16-27 of the administrative file).-\n\nII.- UNPROVEN FACTS. For lack of evidence in the case file to support them, the following are deemed unproven:\n\n1. That the guarantees of due process (debido proceso) were infringed in the processing of the administrative procedure followed against the plaintiff.-\n\n2. That the act of dismissal of the plaintiff lacks substantiation.-\n\n3. That the reason for the act of dismissal of the plaintiff is illegitimate, for constituting a reprisal originating from a complaint for workplace harassment (acoso laboral) previously filed by her against a municipal official.-\n\nIII.- ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. The plaintiff argues in the lawsuit, in summary, that she began working for the respondent Municipality in June 2000, serving in the last seven years of the employment relationship as Municipal Procurement Officer. That by resolution number 03-008-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Mayor of that corporation ordered the opening of an administrative procedure against her and she was preventively separated from her position, with pay. That by resolution number 001-09 at 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 2009, the Mayor decided to dismiss her without employer liability, alleging lack of suitability (idoneidad) for the performance of the position. She adds that due process (debido proceso) was violated in the procedure followed, besides the dismissal being unjustified because the attributed cause was not accredited, rather being a reprisal originating from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment (acoso laboral). She states that \"I raise the defense of the statute of limitations on the dismissal\". During the oral and public trial hearing, she added to the foregoing that there is an incongruence between the summons formulated to her at the beginning of the procedure –in which breach of her functions was alleged– and what the final act establishes as the reason for the dismissal –the lack of suitability (idoneidad) for the performance of the position–. She also pointed out that the deficiencies for which she was reproached actually originated in other departments of the Municipality; that the final act is insufficiently substantiated; that she was placed on medical leave due to psychiatric reasons; that the Municipal Council did not adequately substantiate the rejection of her appeal, limiting itself to accepting the arguments of the legal advisor contracted for that purpose.-\n\nIV.- For its part, the respondent replies to the plaintiff's arguments, in synthesis, that all the requirements of due process (debido proceso) were met in the disciplinary administrative procedure opened against the plaintiff. That the statute of limitations argument must be rejected since the disciplinary power was exercised within the established legal deadlines. That the reasons for the agreed dismissal were amply accredited in the administrative file. Subsequently, in her arguments presented at the oral and public trial, the attorney-in-fact for the respondent local entity pointed out that the disciplinary power was correctly exercised by the Mayor, in accordance with article 17, subsection a, of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal). That it must be considered that the plaintiff had been previously admonished, in another procedure, for defective fulfillment of her obligations. That the second file was initiated at the request of the internal audit, which issued a report documenting a series of conducts by the now plaintiff that weakened and infringed internal control. That she is unaware of what the former refers to when mentioning an alleged workplace or sexual harassment (acoso laboral o sexual). She further reiterated that the statute of limitations period in this case is governed by the provisions of the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno) and that of the General Comptrollership of the Republic. That a lack of suitability (idoneidad) for the performance of the Procurement Officer position was indeed accredited, making reference to what is stipulated in paragraph 119 of the cited Code. Finally, regarding the medical leaves due to psychiatric problems, that the plaintiff never demonstrated that said pathology was truly incapacitating for the performance of her obligations.-\n\nV.- ON THE MERITS. In the present litigation, the only contested fact of the lawsuit turned out to be the seventh, which states:\n\n\"SEVENTH: In the processing of the disciplinary procedure, due process (debido proceso) was violated, and the dismissal is unjustified by virtue of the fact that the attributed cause was not demonstrated. On the contrary, the unjustified dismissal is nothing more than a reprisal for a proceeding that she previously filed (sic) against a municipal official for workplace harassment (acoso laboral).\"\n\nFurthermore, in the consideration section, the statute of limitations on the exercise of the sanctioning power was alleged, a matter that was equally rejected by the respondent municipal entity. Thus, these will be the only issues we will proceed to examine in this ruling, omitting to delve into other topics mentioned by the plaintiff in the supplementary hearing (for example, matters relating to her medical leaves for psychiatric treatments), since such issues were not the subject of debate and cannot be introduced late, without thereby violating the right of defense of the counterparty. For convenience, we will begin with the matter relating to the alleged statute of limitations on the disciplinary power.-\n\nVI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER. On this particular, the plaintiff in the lawsuit limits herself to noting, succinctly, that \"I raise the defense of the statute of limitations on the dismissal\", without elaborating on details about why she considers that it should be declared so. It is fitting to begin by recalling that the statute of limitations, in general terms, supposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time fixed by the legal system for this purpose; and, c) allegation or defense by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the statute of limitations. This means that no liberatory effect exists if, despite the concurrence of the first two prerequisites, the articulation is not formulated. This is because the statute of limitations attends to a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. With regard specifically to employment relations with public officials, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to this temporality factor, after which, such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be stated, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and on the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relations. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of paragraph 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that for purposeful aspects are considered imprescriptible, those referring to the internal sanctioning exercise –such as the one examined in this case– are subject to rules of temporality by virtue of which they can lapse due to the passage of the time established by the legal system without being carried out. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after the expiration of which, their power to request the recognition of the loss of the hierarchical authority emerges.-\n\nVII.- Now then, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary procedure, in which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria allowing the approach to the discussed topics, according to the relevant scenario. In this line, the temporal course of diverse stages must be distinguished. Firstly, the statute of limitations for exercising the disciplinary power must be analyzed, which refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures for the case that allow them to issue the final decision. On this plane, this refers to the maximum period admitted by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, directed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks the establishment of the facts (material truth) serving as the basis for the reason for the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted only with the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process (debido proceso), it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative cause –it is insisted– to establish whether the sanction applies, as a derivation of what is established in paragraphs 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically, the referred period is regulated by clause 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo, CT), which indicates that \"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for the separation arose or, where appropriate, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known.\" However, it must be noted that it is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose paragraph 83 sets a particular statute of limitations regime, namely: \"Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated.\" The same occurs in matters of oversight of the public treasury. For this type of procedure, the applicable period is that regulated by laws No. 8292 (in its article 43), 8422 (article 44), and 8131 (article 112). This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectorial legal system containing specific rules, which, as special rules, prevail over general regulations. At its core, these regulations refer to the regime provided in paragraph 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic, No. 7428, which states at its core:\n\n\"The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal system, shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious –understood as that act requiring an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity– liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure.\" (The underlining is ours.)\n\nNow then, it is clear that the lapsing of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption set forth in paragraph 876 of the Civil Code, by remission made by paragraph 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It should be specified that the grounds for interruption –which cause the prescriptive period to start again– can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, for even if they occurred, if the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. However, it must be insisted that the interruption does not occur with the simple issuance of the act opening the procedure, but with the proper communication of the order that finds the cause has been initiated, in accordance with paragraphs 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.-\n\nVIII.- Now then, it is decisive to precisely establish the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive period. On this particular (and momentarily setting aside cases regulated by special rule), clause 603 of the CT indicates that the period runs from when the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is computed from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, consequently, of undertaking the exercise of their power. Thus, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a preliminary investigation, the alluded one-month period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure or to gather indications tending to clarify its necessity.-\n\nIX.- The second factor that should be analyzed is that of the statute of limitations on the power to order the sanction within the procedure, which refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for their knowledge by the directing body (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of paragraph 319 of the LGAP applies (relating to the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment in which the directing body of the cause formally brings its recommendation to their knowledge; after which expiration, the prescription of that power would inevitably occur, and therefore, the final act would be null and void for injury to the competence element, conditioned in that case by factors of preclusion (preclusión). Such scenario, in the concrete dynamic of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of clause 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overlays what is stated by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.-\n\nX.- Thirdly, the statute of limitations on the power to execute the imposed sanction refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application or material execution of the issued sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless there is a special rule, would again be the one-month period provided in clause 603 of the CT. Denying such a period would imply the perpetual possibility for the hierarchical superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be computed from the finality of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary remedies that apply against the act, as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to formulate those remedies has elapsed, they have not been filed, in which event, administrative finality occurs through the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.-\n\nXI.- Finally, another element subject to temporality rules is that referring to the processing of the procedure. It refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts allowing the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can take. This topic, unless there is a special rule, is regulated by paragraph 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the bi-monthly period established therein possesses an ordering, not peremptory, nature, which certainly does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this particular, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011). On this point, reference must also be made to what is stated in paragraph 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institution of the expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or exceeding six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited article 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage only corresponds to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would involve, in that case, a delay only attributable to the public entity.-\n\nXII.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. Having established the foregoing, it should be reiterated that, in the sub examine, the plaintiff does not exactly specify which of the statute of limitations scenarios she deems applicable in her case. From the appeal filed in administrative venue (see proven fact 12), it can be inferred that it concerns the period for initiating the disciplinary procedure against her, which she considers governed by clause 603 of the CT. This Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect that is argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing which period is applicable, a topic on which it is deemed that the respondent Municipality is correct when alleging that it is the five-year period contemplated in article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic (LOCGR), because the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful conducts revolving around the handling of the municipal public treasury. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, based on its judgment No. 6750-97 at 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, has deemed \"that the interpretation of the concept of servant of the public treasury (servidor de la hacienda pública) must be restricted to that person who is in charge of handling public funds.\" As has been explained (and this Court shares):\n\n\"Recall that while it is true that many people who have access to the patrimonial assets of an office may work in a public agency, not all handle and dispose of public funds. And only to the extent that that concept is circumscribed solely to the 'officials who are directly related to the handling and disposition of public funds', is the difference in the prescription periods for the disciplinary sanctioning power justifiable, since with a longer prescription period like the one established by the cited article 71, 'it is intended to enable the State to exercise greater control over its officials who are directly related to the handling and disposition of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the topic and the great need to ensure the soundest and cleanest possible handling of public funds'. (Criterion reaffirmed in judgment No. 06843-98 at 3:45 p.m. on September 24, 1998, as well as in resolution No. 2001-07516 at 2:49 p.m. on August 1, 2001, recently ratified by No. 2003-04367 at 3:27 p.m. on May 21, 2003, all from the Constitutional Chamber).\n\nAnd based on the binding jurisprudence previously referred to, the Attorney General's Office has defined what should be understood by official of the Public Treasury (funcionario de la Hacienda Pública), in the following manner:\n\n'It is the non-binding opinion of this Attorney General's Office that officials who 'handle public funds' should be understood as those who, in accordance with the legal order and according to the appointment act, have among their attributions administering, managing administratively or accounting-wise, public funds. Consequently, the term management or handling of public funds does not apply to the use of funds in the sense of patrimonial possession but to the circumstance that, according to the definition of competence, they are responsible for making certain decisions or taking actions in relation to those funds. Hence, indeed, the circumstance that every public official uses, for the fulfillment of their functions, for example, public goods, be they a desk, computer, pencil, cannot lead to considering that through that use they are 'handling' public funds. On the contrary, if the juridical possibility of using and disposing (juridically or accounting-wise) of the funds in question is legally recognized to them, if their action is subject to the oversight necessary to verify that it has responded to the purposes and objectives for which the funds are granted and, above all, according to the legally established procedures, one would have to consider that the official is included within the scenarios of article 71 of the Comptrollership's Law.'\n\nIn (sic) this order of ideas, it can be considered that, from the legal point of view, the term 'servant of the Public Treasury' (servidor de la Hacienda Pública), is delimited by the set of provisions that make up Chapter V: 'Of Sanctions and Responsibilities' of the Comptrollership's Law. Indeed, the statute of limitations regulated in article 71 concerns the faults to which article 68 of the same law generically refers, faults for whose commission a particular relationship of the servant with the Public Treasury is required, such as could be the fact that they are responsible for carrying out the legal prescriptions that regulate it (as is the case of the control bodies); or who decide on the administrative or accounting execution of the Budget, that is, those who can commit the expenditure or order its payment, must make investments with public resources or must collect them, etc., directly participating in public financial administration. In that sense, it could be added that from articles 6 to 9 of the Financial Administration Law, criteria can be extracted to determine who are officials of the Public Treasury.\n\nIndeed, these articles concern public employees who, by virtue of the jurisdictional order, directly participate in financial administration because they are responsible for receiving, administering, safeguarding, or paying assets or securities; or because they have the authority to contract obligations or, as the case may be, payment commitments, making decisions regarding the referred funds (...)\n\n(...) A public employee who handles public funds is one who, by provision of the legal system and in accordance with their appointment instrument, is in a particular relationship with the cited funds, which allows them to participate in the different stages of the budgetary execution of revenues and expenditures, as well as those who intervene in the oversight and control process of the ‘Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)’ or, in general, directly participate in the financial administration of the public body in question.’ (O.J.-107-98 of December 17, 1998).\n\nThis being the case, taking into consideration the special powers that the Political Constitution has assigned to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) regarding the supervision of the handling of public funds and the financial management of the Public Administration, and especially the control of personnel who ‘receive, safeguard, pay, or administer assets or securities of the State’ (Resolution No. 2000-06326 of 16:18 hours on July 19, 2000, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)), we can categorically affirm that Article 71 of the cited Law No. 7428, is solely and exclusively applicable in the concrete and specific case of those officials or public employees of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), that is, those who are in charge of the handling and disposal of public funds (See, among others, Resolutions Nos. 6750-97, 06843-98, 2001-07516 and 2003-04367 op. cit., of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and 2000-00949 of 08:20 hours on November 24, 2000, 2001-00283 of 10:00 hours on May 30, 2001, and 2003-00669 of 09:20 hours on November 13, 2003, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), as well as the pronouncements C-340-2002 and C-344-2002 op. cit.).” (Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), “Manual de Procedimiento Administrativo”, San José, 2006, pages 222-224; the underlining is ours.)\n\nIn our case, it is accredited (proven fact 1) that the plaintiff served in the position of Municipal Supplier (Proveedora Municipal) and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to her had to do, precisely, with aspects inherent to that function and typical of the management of institutional assets and resources, such as the handling of administrative contracting and the registration of municipal assets. Thus, there is no doubt that the applicable statute of limitations is not the generic one of numeral 603 of the CT, but the special one of ordinal 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, given that a preliminary inquiry by the Internal Audit Department (Auditoría Interna) had taken place in the case, we must adhere to the provisions of subsection b) of the cited norm, which indicates that the commencement of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was made known to the highest-ranking official or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, the first report describing the prevailing situation in the Municipal Supply Department (Proveeduría Municipal) came to the knowledge of the Mayor –who is the holder of disciplinary authority in this case, pursuant to Articles 17 subsection k) and 149 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)– on May 21, 2008 (proven fact 3); while the second –in which the opening of the administrative procedure that led to the plaintiff's dismissal was requested– did so on the following August 8 (proven fact 4). And considering that the respective notice of charges (traslado de cargos) was notified to the plaintiff on November 28 of the same year 2008 (proven fact 6), it is patent that the five-year period established for this purpose had not expired –not even remotely–. Consequently, this aspect of the claim is denied.-\n\nXIII.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS (debido proceso). Derived essentially from Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Charter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has reiterated the existence of several basic formalities that guarantee the fundamental rights of subjects who may be harmed by the issuance of an administrative act. Thus, since judgment No. 15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, those constitutive elements of due process (debido proceso) in the administrative forum have been defined, when it was stated:\n\n“[The] right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process (debido proceso), contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is often called in doctrine, the principle of ‘bilaterality of the hearing’ of ‘due process of law’ or ‘principle of contradiction’ (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the grounds on which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued.\n\n(...)\n\n[The] right of defense safeguarded in Article 39 ibidem, not only governs jurisdictional proceedings but also any administrative procedure carried out by the public administration; and the plaintiff must necessarily be given, if they so wish, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order for them to exercise their defense...”.\n\nIn the case sub examine and notwithstanding that the claim is absolutely devoid of evidentiary elements to establish, with precision, what the deficiencies allegedly incurred in this regard are, it is the opinion of this Chamber that the requirements of due process (debido proceso) were adequately observed in the conduct of the disciplinary file processed against the plaintiff. Indeed, by means of the ruling issuing the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) (proven fact 6), the interested party was notified of the nature and purposes of the procedure, the facts imputed to her, and the type of sanction to which she could become liable. Therein, she was summoned to an oral and private hearing; the documents serving as evidence in the file and the persons who would be summoned as witnesses were listed; and she was warned about the appeals applicable against that resolution. Subsequently, the investigated party had the opportunity to be heard, for which purpose she first presented a statement of defense document (proven fact 7), attended the oral and private hearing (proven fact 8), and later provided an account of what she considered “succinct conclusions” of the proceeding (proven fact 9). Regarding legal counsel, it must be said that the plaintiff is a lawyer, so there is no doubt concerning her defense regarding that particular. The final act was duly substantiated (see in this regard what is set forth below) and notified to the interested party (proven fact 11). Finally, she had the opportunity to appeal the decision (as related from proven fact 12 onward). In any event, it is important to consider that the question of whether or not the right of defense of the now plaintiff was violated during the procedure has already been examined and dismissed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), upon the filing of an amparo appeal against the municipal hierarchy, which was declared without merit by that High Court through judgment No. 2009-014631 of 12:21 hours on September 18, 2009 (proven fact 17), a pronouncement that, of course, is endowed with the erga omnes binding effect established in Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).-\n\nXIV.- A final issue, relating to due process (debido proceso), concerns the argument made by the plaintiff in the conclusions phase that there was inconsistency between the initial charge of the procedure (which attributed a series of breaches in her duties to her as a reason to initiate the proceeding) and the final act (which states as the reason for the dismissal the lack of suitability (idoneidad) for performing the position). This collegiate body rejects said imputation. Having analyzed the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) (see proven fact 6), it is observed that it lists a series of specific deficiencies attributed to the plaintiff, several of which (and, this Chamber deems, all of them as well, taken as a whole) pointed, precisely, toward her lacking the conditions of verified suitability to act as Municipal Supplier (Proveedora Municipal), including –just to cite one example– when it was attributed to her that she “is unaware of the responsibilities and coordination relationships assigned to her by the Municipality’s Job Manual”. In this sense, the imputation of lack of suitability (falta de idoneidad), made in the final act, is merely a value judgment that summarizes or describes the set of deficiencies –broken down in the notice of charges (traslado de cargos)– toward whose verification the procedure was directed. Therefore, this collegiate body does not find that there is any divergence between one and the other capable of vitiating the resolution by incurring in inconsistency. Hence, the argument is rejected.-\n\nXV.- REGARDING THE GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL AND THE SUBSTANTIATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE PROCEDURE AND THE REJECTION OF THE APPEAL. The plaintiff alleges that the dismissal decision (contained in the final act of the procedure) was unjustified, as the attributed cause was not substantiated, and it was rather due to retaliation originating from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment (acoso laboral). Furthermore, she complains that both that act and the one that resolved her appeal lack proper substantiation. Concerning the former, the review of the disciplinary file leads this Tribunal to reject the plaintiff's argument. Indeed, the procedure itself, as well as the dismissal agreement that ended it, were supported by two exhaustive reports rendered by none other than the Internal Audit Department (Auditoría Interna) of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, in which a long list of both actions and omissions denoting a defective fulfillment of the delicate responsibilities of the Supply Department (Departamento de Proveeduría) of that local entity was detailed. It was also taken into account, as an evaluative element, and as if that were not enough, that the now plaintiff had been reprimanded for similar faults barely a year before the opening of the second disciplinary file, an occasion on which she was warned about the consequences of incurring in those deficiencies again (see proven fact 18). Hence, it is deemed that the serious faults that led to the dismissal decision were sufficiently substantiated.-\n\nXVI.- In addition to the foregoing, in this litigation the plaintiff did not provide any evidence capable of demonstrating that the procedure instituted against her pursued a different and illegitimate purpose, namely, to punish her as a result of a complaint she filed for alleged workplace and sexual harassment (hecho no probado 3). The burden of proof (which in this jurisdiction derives from the provisions of Article 317 of the supplementary Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil supletorio) and numerals 58 subsection f, 82 and 85 of the CPCA) obligates the demonstration of those facts that determine the applicable legal framework and give support to the claims and defenses of the parties. Certainly, had that circumstance been proven, we would be facing a clear misuse of power (desviación de poder) (ordinal 131.3 of the LGAP) that could have sustained an annulment pronouncement in this forum. But it was not so, therefore the argument becomes futile and must be dismissed.-\n\nXVII.- The same occurs with respect to the reproach concerning an alleged lack of substantiation of the final act. Indeed, the latter relies on the final report of proven and unproven facts presented by the directing body of the procedure (see proven fact 10), which clearly describes the deficiencies incurred by the plaintiff in the performance of her duties; and which, as indicated, originates in turn from the two Audit reports relating to the same aspect. For its part, the Municipal Council agreement that resolved the appeal filed (as was appropriate prior to the reform of Article 150 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)), contains a development that is certainly brief, but sufficient, regarding the reasons why it agreed to reject it (see proven fact 16), for which purpose it even had the opinion of a legal advisor contracted for that purpose.-\n\nXVIII.- To conclude this section, it is worth reiterating that the argument of lack of substantiation of the final act was also heard and denied by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Resolution No. 2009-014631 referred to supra. For this and all the reasons already stated, the reproach that has been examined is not upheld.-\n\nXIX.- REGARDING THE COMPENSATORY CLAIMS. As a consequence of the requested annulment of her dismissal decision, the plaintiff requests various pecuniary compensations, stated both as a primary claim and also subsidiarily in resultando 1 of this judgment, which encompass both material and moral damages. In this sense, the mere fact that the substantive claim of the lawsuit has been rejected is sufficient basis to deny the formulated economic claim, as it is accessory to the former. Indeed, to the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been verified, neither has a harm that the plaintiff is not obligated to bear been configured. Administrative liability, under the regime of the LGAP, requires not only establishing the existence of harmful administrative conduct and a economic or non-economic injury, but also that a causal link exists between the two, that is, a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the imputed act and the damage caused; a link that must not be broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided for in ordinal 190 ibidem. In this case, for all the reasons already set forth, this Tribunal does not consider that the action of the sued Municipality in this case was illegitimate, which irrevocably eliminates one of the stated critical elements for the configuration of a potential non-contractual administrative liability, namely, the verification of the existence of harmful conduct originating a material or moral injury that the administered party is not obligated to bear (Article 194 of the LGAP).-\n\nXX.- REGARDING THE OBJECTIONS FILED: The defendant initially raised the objections of lack of legal standing (falta de derecho) and statute of limitations, later clarifying at the preliminary hearing that it would not assert the second, as related in the corresponding resultando. Regarding the first, based on the reasons of fact and law set forth in the preceding considerandos, the defense must be upheld, declaring the claim without merit in all its aspects.-\n\nXXI.- REGARDING COSTS. Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the sole fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to the provisions of the same norm, in accordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when there is, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when a plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibidem). In this instance, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemnation to the losing party. Therefore, the payment of both costs to the plaintiff is imposed.-\n\nTHEREFORE (POR TANTO):\n\nThe objection of lack of legal standing (falta de derecho) is upheld. The claim filed by Nombre128316 against the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiff. NOTIFY.-\n\nCHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA\n\nSILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ\n\n79-80), this Seventh Section assumed jurisdiction over this matter and summoned the parties to the supplementary hearing.-\n\n**7.-** The oral and public trial took place starting at 8:45 a.m. on August 7, 2013, with the presence of both parties, who presented their opening arguments. Subsequently, the plaintiff dismissed the witness Nombre20335. As for the second admitted witness –known only as “Dra. Ramírez”– the evidence was declared unproducible because she was not present, without proper justification and taking into account that no summons document was issued for her. The parties then delivered their closing arguments, and finally, the Court declared the case to be complex, pursuant to numeral 111 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) (hearing recorded and which is attached to the case file on its corresponding electronic medium; minute at f. 83-84).-\n\n**8.-** This ruling is issued, after deliberation, within the fifteen-business-day period stipulated in articles 111.1 of the CPCA and 82.1 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction. No grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the proceedings are noted.-\n\n*Drafted by Judge* ***Hess Araya***, *with the affirmative vote of Judge* ***Fernández Brenes*** *and Judge* ***Córdoba Ramírez***; *and,*\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**I.-** **PROVEN FACTS.** The following of relevance are deemed as such (all folio references correspond to the administrative case file, regarding which attention should be drawn to the lack of clarity and disorder it presents):\n\n1. That the plaintiff was an employee of the respondent Municipality from June 7, 2000, having served in the last seven years of the employment relationship as Municipal Provider (fact 1 of the complaint, not contested).-\n\n2. That by official letter No. AIM 039-2008 of April 22, 2008, the Internal Audit Office brought to the attention of the Municipal Council a “Study on the management of the Procurement Department of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia,” which denounces *“real difficulties in the work”* of that office, *“a situation that affects institutional interests”*; non-compliance with basic functions, lack of planning of its activities, and obstruction of the work of other municipal agencies, recommending the *“total restructuring”* of the aforementioned Department (f. 377-393).-\n\n3. That the recently cited report was heard by the Council in ordinary session No. 174-2008 of May 19, 2008, in which it was agreed –among other aspects– *“To order Mr. (...) Municipal Mayor, the compliance with and execution of the recommendations issued by the Internal Audit Office, ...”*. The foregoing was communicated to said head by official letter SCM #0383-2008 of the 20th of the same month and year, which he received the following day (f. 394-397).-\n\n4. That by official letter No. AIM 128-2008 of August 8, 2008, the Internal Audit Office addressed the Municipal Mayor, stating: *“This Audit Unit requests you to appoint a directing body to analyze the situation of the Institutional Procurement Office, since the problems of non-compliance with the deadlines granted by the Mayor’s Office to the Procurement Department to comply with the requests that the Mayor’s Office has forwarded to it for non-compliance with its functions, in accordance with the Position Manual of this Municipality and the description of functions that the Provider herself made in her 2008 Annual Operating Plan, have been repetitive. It shall be the competence of said body to analyze the Procurement Department’s justifications for not having attended to, within the deadline granted by the Mayor’s Office, the requests that were forwarded to it, as I indicated previously. This directing body must be appointed as soon as possible, if possible within one calendar month. Legal advice in this body will be very important.”* The document was received at the Mayor’s Secretariat that same day (f. 577-578).-\n\n5. That by resolution No. 003-08-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Municipal Mayor ordered the *“Separation with pay of Ms. Nombre128316   Municipal Provider of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia as a provisional precautionary measure and opening of the directing body of the administrative procedure to investigate findings of Audit reports numbers AIM-039-2008 and AIM-128-2008, as well as the alleged improper use of public funds to the detriment of the Administration”*, designating for this purpose Lic. Giovanni Varela Dijeres as the directing body (fact 5 of the complaint, not contested; f. 608-613).-\n\n6. That at 10:00 a.m. on August 18 (sic) 2008, the directing body issued an order of formal charges (auto de traslado de cargos) within ordinary disciplinary administrative procedure No. 0001-08-01, which was notified to the now plaintiff on the following November 28. The act listed the conducts reproached to the investigated party, as follows:\n\n*“a) That Ms. Nombre128316 has presumably violated Standard 4.15 of the Internal Control Standards Manual, which refers to the accuracy of records on assets, as well as the periodic verification through physical verification and counting of those assets; given that she has not updated the asset information for each department for several years, nor carried out the physical counting of those assets, even though it is one of the functions assigned to the Procurement Department; / b) That Ms. Nombre128316 presumably does not plan institutional purchases as the institutional budget grows, which is detrimental to the organization, execution, and follow-up and internal control of the Department; which violates standard 3.2 of the Manual of General Internal Control Standards for the Comptroller General of the Republic and the entities and bodies subject to its oversight; / c) That Ms. Nombre128316 presumably does not keep a written record of all the procedures carried out by the Procurement Department, such as: - Supplier Registry Administration Procedures; Legalized Book Administration Procedures (minutes of bid opening and minutes of bid award); - Direct contracting procedures; - Abbreviated Tender Procedure; - Public Tender Procedures; - Auction Procedures; - Contract Administration Procedures; - Asset Control Procedures; - Procedures for Summary of Purchases Made; - Procedures for Updating the Contractual Activity Information System, which reveals in a total technical ignorance of the matter, puts municipal coffers at risk and prevents adequate internal control; as stated in the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its regulations; the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno) and the provisions of the Comptroller General of the Republic on the matter. The foregoing violates the provisions of Standard 4.8 and 4.9 of the Manual of General Internal Control Standards, which states that all controls in force for the different processes and activities of the institution, as well as all significant transactions and events that occur, must be documented and periodically reviewed to make the pertinent corrections; and that all officials who hold management positions must exercise constant supervision over the development of the processes, transactions, and operations of the institution, with the purpose of ensuring that the work is carried out in accordance with the regulations and the internal and external provisions in force. / d) That supposedly Ms. Nombre128316 disregards the responsibilities and coordination relationships assigned to her by the Municipality’s Position Manual and the code of ethics in force in the institution, the Institutional Annual Operating Plan, and the institutional policies that have been issued to date; which becomes inconceivable, since her activity revolves around the execution of the goals proposed in said Plan and it is assumed that all municipal departments participate in the planning process, with the objective that everyone works towards the same objectives and projects of the institution, as the Procurement Department must be one of the departments that knows the municipal budget in greatest detail, since it is the fundamental working tool by which she must be guided in the performance of her functions. The foregoing violates article 13 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) which states that it is the duty of the head and subordinate holders to maintain and demonstrate ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as to contribute with their actions to promote them to the rest of the organization, for which reason it is essential to know the Code of Ethics in force in the Municipality. / e) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 on March 28, 2008, had not made the annual invitation to participate in the Supplier Registry, in accordance with the provisions of the General Public Procurement Law (Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa), article 116 and following. / f) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 has not complied with the provisions of article 122 of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), which means that the information of more than 40% of the files in the Supplier Registry does not have updated information, since the Procurement Department did not warn them one month in advance of the expiration date of their registration, a situation that should be recorded in the file, with sufficient advance notice. / g) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 has violated the provisions of the Directive for registration number D-4-2005-CO-DDI of the Comptroller General of the Republic, in points 6 and articles 12 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and 3 and 39 of the General Internal Control Law; all rules of mandatory compliance, concerning the obligation to register contractual information on a daily basis. / h) That supposedly Ms. Nombre128316 has not complied with the obligation to control and safeguard office materials, cleaning supplies, and any type of minor tools and/or work items that are acquired in the Municipality, which constitutes a substantial weakness of internal control, since no inventory is kept of any of the items under her responsibility, which violates article 107 of the Public Procurement Law and standard 4.15 of the Internal Control Standards Manual. / i) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 has violated the provisions on purchases indicated by the Public Procurement Law, such as those made to Imprenta Lisara and to Mr. Nombre149762  , supplier of cleaning supplies, with whom two purchases have been made in a single month for an amount of C.200,000.00, which is the accepted amount for purchasing without the need to request quotes from three suppliers. In the case of Lisara, it seems more of a planning problem, since given the urgency with which each department makes the request for forms, stationery, stamps, etc., it violates the obligation to attend to each of the requests made by each department, independently. The foregoing violates the provisions of article 8 of the Internal Control Law. / j) That Ms. Nombre128316 presumably has violated the provisions of article 15, subsection b) of the General Internal Control Law referring to security standards relating to physical space, files, materials in custody of the Procurement Department, and computerized information systems, where there is a lack of documentation and defined procedures. / k) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 has violated the execution provisions of Law 8114 in the following specific cases: 1) In the file for Labor and Tools for construction of the Dirección15696  storm drainage system to the West, second stage, it is recorded that Eng. Herrera Solìs (sic) sent the technical specifications of the cited project to the Procurement Department since October 11, 2006, however, it was not until May 29, 2007, that the Mayor forwarded the agreement to the Provider for her to draw up the contract. In July, the contract is signed, and due to delays with the contractor, this work was started in September 2007, with an addendum to the contract, and was completed at the end of November 2007. This means that the contracting process took approximately nine months, and the execution two more months; 2) In the file for the Acquisition of the Four-Wheel Drive Vehicle for the Road Technical Unit, it is recorded that since March 19, 2007, the Mayor requested the Provider to initiate this process. On March 20, 2007, the Treasurer makes the certification of the existence of economic content and forwards it to the Provider. On March 21 of that same year, Eng. Nombre3841 attaches the specifications. On April 24, 2007, the invitation to participate is published in La Gaceta with a deadline of May 11, 2007. By that date, only Purdy Motor participates. On May 14, the sole bid is forwarded to Eng. Nombre3841 and that same day, Eng. Nombre3841 informs the Provider that the bid meets the requirements. It is not until June 4 that the Provider forwards the file to the Council for them to proceed with the award, who adopt the award agreement in ordinary session No. 97-2007 held on June 11, 2007. Subsequently, not until July 19, 2006, Purdy Motor presents the performance bond. In August, the exemption procedures begin and it is not until September 28, 2007, that the vehicle is delivered, the process taking more than six months; 3) In the purchase file for 71 tons of asphalt mix and 5 barrels of emulsion to execute the Project in front of the Dirección18321  square, it took 4 months; 4) That very extensive periods of time occur between the award, the preparation of the contracts, and the issuance of the respective purchase order, which shows that the Procurement Department does not take the necessary precautions; it does not forward the files to the Legal Advisory Office for the preparation of the contracts with sufficient advance notice, the formalization and preparation of the tender documents (carteles) is slow, and important formal aspects are omitted in the files, such as numbering, the division of the process stages in the file, the presentation of the copies that must be incorporated into them, and the lack of final documentation, regarding the execution of partial payments. The foregoing reveals technical ignorance for the position, which is a requirement of the Position Manual for its performance; as well as hindering subsequent control of her material and technical actions. / I) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 prepares the tender document, initiates the purchase procedure, carries out the quotations, makes the purchase order; enters the information into the Integrated Contractual Information System (SIAC) and receives the merchandise, which compromises the objectivity and independence of the institution; however, she has never requested that said situation be modified under the protection of the institutional code of ethics. / m) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 makes very serious errors in the drafting of contracts, specifically in the following: 1) In contract 05-2008 page 4 line 5, the sum of eighteen million four hundred sixty thousand five hundred colones is recorded in letters, the correct amount being seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand two hundred twenty; Page 4 lines 10 and 11, seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand colones is recorded, missing the phrase ‘two hundred twenty’; on that same page lines 11 and 13, review the execution period, it says ‘one business day and over the word AD’ (sic); page 4 line 15, failed to record: of the, between the words provisions and tender document; page 7 line 3, the words ‘The’ are repeated, Page 10 says April, the correct is May’; 2) Document to contract 05-2008 on page 4 line 20, eight (1) business day is recorded; page 11, April is recorded instead of May. 2) In contract 06-2008 page 1 line 19, ‘Recarpeting of stone bridge street’ is recorded, the correct being Dirección15697  Pavement; Page 2 line 17 and 29, failed to record Street between the words pavement and dirt; page 2 line 31, C.21.917.000,00 is recorded, the correct is Placa23792, an error that is also made in letters; page 3 lines 2 and 3, Placa30266 is recorded in numbers, the correct being Placa30267; page 4 line 10, record street between the words pavement and dirt, page 7 line 12, the word the is repeated; page 10 lines 2 and 3, Placa30268 is recorded in numbers and letters,  the correct being Placa30267; page 10 line 18, read May instead of April. The foregoing violates article 10 of the Public Procurement Law. / n) That presumably suppliers such as Depósito El Rafaeleño have refused to submit documentation, except to Ms. Nombre128316, which violates the institutional code of ethics and the principles of transparency. / o) That Ms. Nombre128316 presumably, in the handling of the procurement files, incorporates into them criteria and drafts from different institutional agencies, which violates article 11 of the Public Procurement Law. / p) That presumably Ms. Nombre128316 has sent files to the Municipal Council and has requested participation bonds from bidders who are not the awardees, as is the case of Abbreviated Tender No. 2008LA-0001-01 ‘Purchase of Hot Asphalt Mix and Emulsion for Patching in the canton of San Rafael de Heredia and Abbreviated Tender number 2008-LA-00002-01 Recarpeting of stone bridge street, where a performance bond was requested from the company Conansa.*\n\n/ q) That in the Final Report of Proven and Unproven Facts of the former directing body of the administrative procedure, the official under investigation here was admonished (sic) in writing and warned that if she incurred in these faults, action would be taken (sic).”\n\nIn addition to the above, it was specified that the final act to be issued could entail dismissal without employer liability or the suspension without pay of the investigated party. At the same time, she was summoned to an oral and private hearing for 2:00 p.m. on December 22 of the same year; the documents serving as evidence in the case file and the persons to be called as witnesses were listed; and she was advised of the appeals available against that resolution (f. 634-655; by act issued on the following December 10, the material error incurred in the date of the statement of objections was rectified, so that it correctly read “November” instead of “August”: f. 668-669).-\n\n7. That by brief dated January 12, 2008 (sic), the plaintiff here appeared “to respond to the statement of objections” (a contestar traslado de cargos), in which she referred to the accusations made against her and alleged the nullity of the said act (f. 697-710).-\n\n8. That the oral and private hearing was duly conducted, with the receipt of testimonial evidence (the corresponding record is not located in the administrative case file, but this is evident from the briefs referred to in the following two facts).-\n\n9. That with a document dated January 16, 2009 and submitted that same day, the interested party presented her “concise conclusions in relation to the duly gathered evidence” (conclusiones sucintas en relación con la prueba debidamente recabada) (f. 745-751).-\n\n10. That by resolution at 10:00 a.m. on February 1, 2009, the directing body of the procedure issued its “Final Report”, in which it provided an account of the proceedings followed and the proven and unproven facts regarding the charges brought against the investigated party (f. 759-784).-\n\n11. That the procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution No. 001-09 at 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 2009, by the Municipal Mayor, whose operative part establishes, as relevant: “To accept in all its aspects the Final Report of Proven and Unproven Facts within the investigation process of the official Nombre128316 , Municipal Procurement Officer of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, and given the lack of suitability for fulfilling the respective position, it is resolved: To proceed with the Immediate Dismissal Without Employer Liability of Ms. Nombre128316 , identity card number CED117283 - - , as of February 13, 2009. Let the corresponding proportional vacation and Christmas bonus amounts be paid to her. Likewise, the cessation of the precautionary measure ordered against Ms. Nombre128316 is ordered for lack of current interest.” The foregoing was notified to the plaintiff today, via fax, on the 13th of the same month and year (fact 6 of the complaint, uncontested; f. 785-813).-\n\n12. By brief submitted on February 25, 2009, the investigated party filed a “Motion for Reversal, Appeal in the Alternative, Concomitant Nullity, and Suspension of Effects of the Act” (Recurso de revocatoria, apelación en subsidio, nulidad concomitante y suspensión de efectos del acto) against the final act of the procedure, alleging the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power, for not having been exercised within the month referred to in article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (f. 814-839).-\n\n13. By resolution No. 002-2009 at 2:50 p.m. on March 2, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rejected the reversal and admitted the appeal “before the improper hierarchical superior” (ante el superior jerárquico impropio). The appellant was notified of this on the 4th of the same month and year (f. 840-846).-\n\n14. By resolution No. 003-2009 at 10:30 a.m. on March 10, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rectified the act referred to in the previous fact, for the purposes of having the appeal admitted “before the Municipal Council, which will exhaust the administrative channel” (ante el Concejo Municipal, el cual agotará la vía administrativa) (f. 849).-\n\n15. That through a writ submitted on March 25, 2009, the interested party appeared before the Municipal Council “to maintain and sustain the appeal timely filed” (a mantener y sostener el recurso de apelación oportunamente interpuesto) (f. 854).-\n\n16. That the Municipal Council, in ordinary session # 243-2009 of March 30, 2009, ordered: “FIRST: Once the Municipal Council has become aware of the Appeal filed by the official Nombre128316 against Resolution 001-2009, of the Municipal Mayor's Office, by which her dismissal without employer liability was ordered, having verified the different arguments and in accordance with the recommendation of the Legal Advisor contracted for that purpose, this Municipal Council adopts the arguments set forth in Resolution 002-2009 at two-fifty p.m. on the second of March last, which rejects the Reversal by the Mayor. Consequently, this Municipal Council deems the dismissal of the official without employer liability to be appropriate. / SECOND: By reason of the foregoing, the alternative Appeal, concomitant nullity, and suspension of effects of the act, sub examine, are rejected, and the administrative channel is deemed exhauste (sic). / THIRD: To instruct the Secretary of the Municipal Council to transcribe this agreement to the interested parties.” To support said resolution, it was indicated: “REGARDING THE FACTS OF THE APPEAL: That the Legal Advisor contracted for that purpose, after carefully studying the facts constituting the investigation, the evidence gathered, and the statement of facts formulated by the Directing Body, fully agrees with the instructor in the list of proven and unproven facts contained in the final report. Having analyzed the substantive Resolution issued by the Mayor, ordering the dismissal with cause of the official, she considered it to be a necessary consequence of the proven and unproven facts that the investigation yielded, that is, that the dismissal is fully supported in fact and in law. / After studying the brief of the motion for reversal and appeal in the alternative and having carefully verified each argument of the resolution rejecting it, it is her consideration that the challenged resolution indeed had to be upheld and the objections are not admissible. / That according to the Legal Advisor, it is clear from the case file prepared for this purpose that all legal solemnities and formalities have been observed, the principles of due process and right to defense have been guaranteed for the official, and finally, that the conclusion reached by the Administration is consistent with and proportionate to the proven and unproven facts.” The foregoing was notified to the now plaintiff through official letter SCM #00301-2009 of the 31st of that month and year, via fax, on the same day (f. Placa30269 ).-\n\n17. That the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) against the Mayor, the President of the Municipal Council, and the directing body of the procedure, which was processed under case file No. 09-005609-0007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and was admitted by order at 10:12 a.m. on April 16, 2009. The aforementioned amparo appeal was declared without merit by the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 2009-014631 at 12:21 p.m. on September 18, 2009, in which it stated, as relevant: “Nombre6562.- Purpose of the appeal. This amparo appeal discusses the violation of the right to due process and defense of the protected party, on the occasion of the disciplinary administrative procedure that has been brought against her, in reason of which her cessation of duties in the Municipal Procurement Office of the Municipality of the Canton of San Rafael de Heredia has been ordered. According to the petitioner, in the processing of that disciplinary cause, the respondent authority ordered her suspension without pay, and omitted to set a term for the precautionary measure; furthermore, the respondent authority denied her the possibility of accessing the documents in the administrative case file and omitted to substantiate the resolution ordering her dismissal without employer liability. This situation, according to the petitioner, is illegitimate and violates the Right of the Constitution. (...) VI.- (sic) Finally, insofar as the petitioner accuses the respondent authority, when ordering the dismissal without employer liability in the disciplinary procedure brought against the appellant, of having omitted to substantiate its decision, this situation cannot be inferred, not even remotely, from the content of the resolution issued by the respondent authority, No. 001-09 at 08:00 hrs. on February 11, 2009 (...), for which reason no infringement of the right to due process of the protected party is appreciated in the specific case, for which reason the amparo must be dismissed with regard to this point (sic). Furthermore, it must be noted that this Constitutional Court is not responsible for issuing any judgment, positive or negative, on the merits of the disciplinary cause brought against her, which must rather be discussed in the ordinary Jurisdiction. (...) Therefore: The appeal is declared without merit.-” (f. 895-899 and consultation of the “Costa Rican Legal Information System” [Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica]).-\n\n18. That, prior to the facts related in the preceding numerals, the petitioner here had already been admonished in writing by the Municipal Mayor within disciplinary procedure No. DAMSRH-01-2007, according to an unnumbered resolution at 8:00 a.m. on November 19, 2007, in which she was accused of non-compliance with her responsibilities as Municipal Procurement Officer, warning her “that in the event of recidivism in said fault, action will be taken in exercise of the powers set forth in numerals 149 and 150 of the Municipal Code” (Código Municipal). In that same document, she was ordered to “implement a work plan to improve productivity within her unit” (implementar un plan de trabajo para mejorar la productividad dentro de su dependencia), within the following month, as well as to render periodic reports on the progress achieved (f. 16-27 of the administrative case file).-\n\n**II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.** Due to a lack of evidence in the case file to support them, the following are considered unproven:\n\n1. That in the processing of the administrative procedure conducted against the plaintiff, the guarantees of due process were infringed.-\n\n2. That the act of dismissal of the plaintiff lacks substantiation.-\n\n3. That the reason for the act of dismissal of the plaintiff is illegitimate, as it constitutes a reprisal arising from a complaint for workplace harassment previously filed by her against a municipal official.-\n\n**III.- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES.** The plaintiff argues in the complaint, in summary, that she began working for the defendant Municipality in June 2000, serving for the last seven years of the employment relationship as the Municipal Procurement Officer. That by resolution number 03-008-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Mayor of that corporation ordered the opening of an administrative procedure against her and she was preventively separated from her position, with pay. That by resolution number 001-09 at 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 2009, the Mayor ordered her dismissal without employer liability, alleging lack of suitability for the performance of the position. She adds that due process was violated in the procedure followed, in addition to the fact that the dismissal was unjustified because the alleged cause was not proven, and that it was rather a reprisal arising from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment. She states that “I raise the exception of the statute of limitations on dismissal” (opongo la excepción de prescripción del despido). During the oral and public trial hearing, she added to the foregoing that there is an inconsistency between the notification (intimación) given to her at the beginning of the procedure – in which non-compliance with her duties was alleged – and what the final act establishes as the reason for dismissal – the lack of suitability for the performance of the position. She also pointed out that the deficiencies she was reproached for actually originated in other departments of the Municipality; that the final act is insufficiently substantiated; that she was on medical leave due to psychiatric reasons; that the Municipal Council did not adequately substantiate the rejection of her appeal, limiting itself to adopting the arguments of the legal advisor hired for that purpose.-\n\n**IV.-** For its part, in response to the plaintiff's arguments, the defendant responds, in summary, that all the requirements of due process were complied with in the disciplinary administrative procedure opened against the plaintiff. That the statute of limitations argument must be rejected since the disciplinary power was exercised within the established legal deadlines. That the reasons for the agreed dismissal were amply demonstrated in the administrative case file. Subsequently, in her arguments presented at the oral and public trial, the legal representative of the defendant local entity pointed out that the disciplinary power was correctly exercised by the Mayor, in accordance with article 17, subsection a, of the Municipal Code. That it must be considered that the plaintiff had previously been admonished, in another procedure, for defective fulfillment of her obligations. That the second case file was initiated at the request of the internal audit office, which issued a report documenting a series of conducts by the now plaintiff that weakened and infringed internal control. That she is unaware of what the former is referring to when mentioning alleged workplace or sexual harassment. She also reiterated that the statute of limitations period in this case is governed by the provisions of the Law of Internal Control (Ley de Control Interno) and that of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). That lack of suitability for the performance of the position of Municipal Procurement Officer was indeed proven, referring to what is stipulated in numeral 119 of the aforementioned Code. Finally, regarding the medical leaves due to psychiatric problems, that the plaintiff never demonstrated that said pathology was truly incapacitating for the performance of her duties.-\n\n**V.- ON THE MERITS.** In the present dispute, the only contested fact of the complaint was the seventh, which states:\n\n“SEVENTH: In the processing of the disciplinary procedure, due process was violated, and the dismissal is unjustified by virtue of the fact that the alleged cause was not demonstrated. On the contrary, the unjustified dismissal is nothing more than a reprisal for a proceeding previously filed (sic) against a municipal official for workplace harassment.”\n\nFurthermore, in the recitals section, the statute of limitations on the exercise of the sanctioning power was alleged, an issue that was equally rejected by the defendant municipal entity. Thus, these will be the only issues we will proceed to examine in this ruling, omitting to delve into other topics mentioned by the plaintiff in the supplementary hearing (for example, matters related to her medical leaves for psychiatric treatments), as such issues were not subject to debate and cannot be introduced belatedly without violating the right of defense of the counterparty. For convenience, we will begin with the matter of the alleged statute of limitations on the disciplinary power.-\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER.** On this point, the plaintiff in the complaint merely points out, succinctly, that “I raise the exception of the statute of limitations on dismissal” (opongo la excepción de prescripción del despido), without elaborating on details regarding why she considers it must be so declared. It is worth recalling first that the statute of limitations, in general terms, requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time set by the legal system for that purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, invoking the statute of limitations. This implies that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two conditions, the claim is not formulated.-\n\nThis is because the statute of limitations (prescripción) adheres to a party-presentation principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered on the court's own motion. Regarding specifically employment relationships (relaciones funcionariales), the exercise of the hierarchical superior's corrective authority over employees who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to this time factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This time limit, as will be discussed, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that establishes particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary authority (which is based on the doctrine of Article 102 of the General Law on Public Administration, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that are considered imprescriptible due to finalistic aspects, those referring to internal sanctioning exercises—such as the one examined in this case—are subject to time rules by virtue of which they can lapse through the passage of the time established by the legal system without being carried out. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public employee, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective authority only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, their power to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical authority arises.-\n\n**VII.-** Now, for the purposes of this case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in which rules for the temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria that allow the topics discussed to be addressed according to the particular scenario. In this line, the temporal passage of different stages must be distinguished. Firstly, it is appropriate to analyze the statute of limitations on the exercise of disciplinary authority (prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria), which refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective authority to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. On this plane, it concerns the maximum period admitted by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking to establish the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the reason for the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that authority. It could not be considered that the aforementioned period for the exercise of the authority is interrupted only by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process (debido proceso), it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case—it is insisted—to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions in Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically, the referred period is regulated by Article 603 of the Labor Code (CT), which indicates that *\"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their offenses prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, in its case, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known.\"* However, it must be warned that this is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding this point. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose Article 83 sets a particular statute of limitations regime, namely: *\"Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated.\"* The same occurs in the area of public treasury (hacienda pública) oversight. For this type of procedure, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a normative system that is constituted as a sectoral ordering containing concrete rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulations. At its core, these norms refer to the regime provided for in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, which states in its essence:\n\n*\"The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations, shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious—understood as that fact which requires an investigation or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity—the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure.\"* (The underlining is ours.)\n\nNow, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective authority is subject to the grounds for interruption set by Article 876 of the Civil Code, by remission made by Article 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It must be specified that the grounds for interruption—which cause the prescriptive period to start anew—can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occurred after the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. Nonetheless, it must be insisted that the interruption is not produced by the simple issuance of the act opening the procedure, but by the proper communication of the order that considers the case to be instructed, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.-\n\n**VIII.-** Now, it is decisive to establish with precision the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive period. On this matter (and momentarily setting aside the cases regulated by special norm), Article 603 of the CT indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective authority is in an objective possibility of knowing the offense and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of their authority. Thus, when the particularities of the case require carrying out a preliminary investigation, the aforementioned one-month period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the hierarchical superior. Nonetheless, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not.-\n\n**IX.-** The second factor that should be analyzed is that of the statute of limitations on the authority to decree the sanction within the procedure (prescripción de la potestad para acordar la sanción dentro del procedimiento), which refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective authority to adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for their consideration by the directing body (órgano director) (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of Article 319 of the LGAP applies (concerning the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment when the directing body of the case formally makes their recommendation known to them; upon expiration of which, the statute of limitations on that authority would unfailingly occur, and therefore, the final act would be null due to injury to the competence (competencia) element, conditioned in that case by preclusion (preclusión) factors. Such a scenario, in the concrete dynamic of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of Article 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is stipulated by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.-\n\n**X.-** In third place, the statute of limitations on the authority to execute the imposed sanction (prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta) refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application or material execution of the dictated sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, barring special norm, would again be the one-month period provided for in Article 603 of the CT. The denial of such a period would suppose the perennial possibility of the hierarchical superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that authority. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be computed from the firmness (firmeza) of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary remedies applicable against the act, as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to file those remedies has elapsed, they have not been raised, in which eventuality, the administrative firmness is produced by the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.-\n\n**XI.-** Finally, another element that is subject to rules of temporality is that referring to the processing of the procedure (tramitación del procedimiento). It refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure instituted to establish the facts that allow the final decision of the holder of the public repressive power to be adopted may take. This topic, barring special norm, is regulated by Article 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period provided therein possesses an ordering nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include or allow procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for violating the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida) (on this matter, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, from 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011). On this point, reference must also be made to what is stipulated by Article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the mechanism of expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited Article 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage is solely the responsibility of the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been initiated on the Administration's own motion, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would involve a delay solely attributable to the public instance in that case.-\n\n**XII.-** **ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE SANCTIONING AUTHORITY IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the foregoing, it is worth reiterating that, in the sub examine case, the plaintiff does not exactly specify which of the statute of limitations scenarios she considers applicable to her case. From the appeal filed in the administrative venue (see proven fact 12), it is inferred that it concerns the period for initiating the disciplinary procedure against her, which she considers governed by Article 603 of the CT. This Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect that is argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing what the applicable period is, a topic in which it is considered that the defendant Municipality is correct when it alleges that it is the five-year period contemplated in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), because the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful conduct revolving around the management of the municipal public treasury (hacienda pública municipal). Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, based on its judgment No. 6750-97 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, has considered *\"that the interpretation of the concept of server of the public treasury (servidor de la hacienda pública) must be restricted to one who is in charge of managing public funds.\"* As has been explained (and this Court shares):\n\n*\"It should be remembered that while it is true that many people who have access to the office's patrimonial assets may work in a public agency, not all manage and dispose of public funds. And only to the extent that that concept is circumscribed solely to the 'officials who are directly related to the management and disposition of public funds,' is the difference in the statute of limitations periods for disciplinary sanctioning authority justifiable, because with a longer statute of limitations period, such as that established by the cited Article 71, 'the intention is to enable the State to exercise greater control over its officials who are directly related to the management and disposition of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the topic and the great need to ensure the most sound and cleanest possible management of public funds.' (Criterion reaffirmed in judgment No. 06843-98 of 3:45 p.m. on September 24, 1998, as well as in resolution No. 2001-07516 of 2:49 p.m. on August 1, 2001, recently ratified by No. 2003-04367 of 3:27 p.m. on May 21, 2003, all from the Constitutional Chamber).*\n\n*And based on the binding jurisprudence referred to above, the Attorney General's Office has defined what should be understood by official of the Public Treasury (funcionario de la Hacienda Pública), as follows:*\n\n*'It is the non-binding opinion of this Attorney General's Office that officials who 'manage public funds' must be understood as those who, in accordance with the legal order and according to the appointment act, have among their attributions the administration, administrative or accounting management, of public funds. Consequently, the term management or handling of public funds does not apply to the use of funds in the sense of patrimonial assets but to the circumstance that, according to the definition of competence, it corresponds to them to make certain decisions or actions in relation to those funds. Hence, indeed, the circumstance that every public official uses, for the fulfillment of their functions, for example, public goods, be it a desk, computer, pencil, cannot lead to the estimation that by that use they are 'managing' public funds. On the contrary, if they are legally recognized the possibility of using and disposing (legally or accountingly) of the funds in question, if their action is subject to the oversight necessary to verify that it has responded to the purposes and objectives for which the funds are granted and, above all, in accordance with the legally established procedures, it would have to be considered that the official is included within the scenarios of Article 71 of the Comptroller's Law.'*\n\n*It is (sic) this line of ideas, it can be considered that, from a legal point of view, the term 'server of the Public Treasury (servidor de la Hacienda Pública),' is delimited by the set of provisions that make up Chapter V: 'On Sanctions and Responsibilities' of the Comptroller's Law. Indeed, the statute of limitations regulated in Article 71 concerns the offenses generically referred to in Article 68 of the same law, offenses for whose commission a particular relationship of the server with the Public Treasury is required, such as the fact that they are responsible for executing the legal prescriptions that regulate it (as is the case with control bodies); or who decide on the administrative or accounting execution of the Budget, that is, those who can commit the expenditure or order its payment, must make investments with public resources or must collect them, etc., directly participating in the public financial administration. In that sense, it could be added that from Articles 6 to 9 of the Financial Administration Law, criteria can be extracted to determine who are officials of the Public Treasury. Indeed, said articles concern servers who, by virtue of the competence order, participate directly in the financial administration because they are responsible for receiving, administering, safeguarding, or paying goods or values; or because they have authority to contract obligations or, in their case, payment commitments, making decisions regarding the referred funds (...)*\n\n*(...) A server who manages public funds is one who, by provision of the legal system and according to their appointment act, is in a particular relationship with the cited funds, which allows them to participate in the different stages of the budgetary execution of income and expenditures, as well as those who intervene in the oversight and control process of the 'Public Treasury' (Hacienda Pública) or, in general, participate directly in the financial administration of the public entity in question.' (O.J.-107-98 of December 17, 1998).*\n\n*Thus, taking into consideration the special attributions that the Political Constitution has assigned to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic regarding vigilance in the management of public funds and in the financial management of the Public Administration, and especially the control of the personnel that 'receives, safeguards, pays, or administers goods or values of the State' (Resolution No. 2000-06326 of 4:18 p.m. on July 19, 2000, of the Constitutional Chamber), we can categorically affirm that Article 71 of the cited Law No. 7428 is solely and exclusively applicable in the concrete and specific case of those officials or servers of the Public Treasury, that is, those who are in charge of the management and disposition of public funds (See among others, resolutions Nos. 6750-97, 06843-98, 2001-07516 and 2003-04367 op. cit., of the Constitutional Chamber and 2000-00949 of 08:20 a.m. on November 24, 2000, 2001-00283 of 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2001 and 2003-00669 of 09:20 a.m. on November 13, 2003, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as pronouncements C-340-2002 and C-344-2002 op. cit.).\"* (Attorney General's Office of the Republic, *\"Manual de Procedimiento Administrativo\"*, San José, 2006, pages 222-224; the underlinings are ours.)\n\nIn our case, it is accredited (proven fact 1) that the plaintiff worked in the position of Municipal Provider (Proveedora Municipal) and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to her had to do, precisely, with aspects specific to that function and typical of the management of institutional goods and resources, such as the handling of administrative contracting and the registry of municipal assets. In this way, there is no doubt that the applicable statute of limitations period is not the generic one of Article 603 of the CT, but the special one of Article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, since a prior investigation by the Internal Audit Office occurred in the case, we must abide by what is prescribed in subsection b) of the cited norm, which indicates that the start of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was made known to the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, the first report describing the situation prevailing in the Municipal Provider's Office came to the knowledge of the Mayor—who is the holder of the disciplinary authority in this case, in accordance with Articles 17, subsection k) and 149 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)—on May 21, 2008 (proven fact 3); while the second—in which the opening of the administrative procedure that led to the plaintiff's dismissal was requested—did so on the following August 8 (proven fact 4). And considering that the respective notice of charges (traslado de cargos) was notified to her on November 28 of the same year 2008 (proven fact 6), it is obvious that the five-year period set for this purpose had not expired—not even remotely. Consequently, this aspect of the claim is denied.-\n\n**XIII.-** **ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS (DEBIDO PROCESO).** Derived essentially from Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated the existence of several basic formalities that guarantee the fundamental rights of subjects who may be harmed by the issuance of an administrative act.\n\nThus, since judgment No. 15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, those constitutive elements of due process in administrative proceedings have been defined, when it was stated:\n\n\"[The] right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is usually called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilaterality of the hearing' of 'due process of law' or 'adversarial principle' (...) has been summarized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the grounds on which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision rendered.\n(...)\n[The] right of defense safeguarded in Article 39 ibidem, not only governs for jurisdictional proceedings, but also for any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration; and that the claimant must necessarily be given, if they so wish, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise their defense...\".\n\nIn the case sub examine and despite the fact that the complaint is absolutely devoid of elements of judgment to establish, with precision, what the alleged deficiencies incurred in this regard are, it is the opinion of this Chamber that the requirements of due process were adequately observed in the substantiation of the disciplinary file followed against the plaintiff. In effect, by means of the order of notification of charges (proven fact 6), the interested party was notified of the nature and purposes of the proceeding, the acts imputed to her, and the type of sanction to which she could be liable. Therein, she was also summoned to an oral and private hearing; the documents existing as evidence in the file and the persons who would be called as witnesses were listed; and she was warned about the remedies that could be filed against that resolution. Subsequently, the investigated party had the opportunity to be heard, for which she first presented an exculpatory document (proven fact 7), attended the oral and private hearing (proven fact 8), and later provided an account of what she considered as \"succinct conclusions\" of the proceeding (proven fact 9). Regarding legal representation, it should be noted that the plaintiff is a lawyer, so there is no doubt as to her defense regarding that particular issue. The final act was duly reasoned (see in this regard what is set forth below) and notified to the interested party (proven fact 11). Finally, she had the opportunity to appeal the decision (as related from proven fact 12 onward). In any event, it is important to consider that the question of whether the right of defense of the now plaintiff was violated during the proceeding has already been examined and dismissed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), upon the filing of an amparo appeal against the municipal hierarchy, which was declared without merit by that High Court through judgment No. 2009-014631 of 12:21 hours on September 18, 2009 (proven fact 17), a pronouncement that, of course, is endowed with the erga omnes binding effect established in Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.-\n\nXIV.- A final issue, regarding due process, concerns the argument made by the claimant during the conclusions phase, to the effect that there was an inconsistency between the initial notice of the proceeding (which attributed a series of breaches in her duties as a reason for initiating the proceeding) and the final act (which indicates the lack of suitability for the performance of the position as the reason for the dismissal). This collegiate body rejects that charge. Having analyzed the notification of charges (see proven fact 6), it is observed that it lists a series of specific deficiencies attributed to the plaintiff, several of which (and, this Chamber considers, all of them also, taken together) pointed precisely to the fact that she lacked the conditions of proven suitability to serve as Municipal Provider (Proveedora Municipal), including –just to cite one example– when it was attributed to her that \"she is unaware of the responsibilities and coordination relationships assigned to her by the Municipality's Job Manual.\" In this sense, the charge of lack of suitability, made in the final act, is merely a value judgment that summarizes or describes the set of deficiencies –detailed in the notification of charges– towards whose verification the proceeding was directed. Thus, this collegiate body does not find that there is any divergence between one and the other capable of vitiating what was resolved by incurring in inconsistency. Therefore, the argument is rejected.-\n\nXV.- ON THE GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL AND THE REASONING OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE PROCEEDING AND OF THE DENIAL OF THE APPEAL. The plaintiff accuses that the dismissal decision (contained in the final act of the proceeding) was unjustified, not having accredited the alleged cause, but rather being a reprisal originating from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment. Furthermore, she denounces that both that act and the one that resolved her appeal lack due reasoning. Regarding the first issue, the review of the disciplinary file leads this Court to reject the plaintiff's argument. In effect, both the proceeding itself and the dismissal agreement that concluded it were supported by two exhaustive reports rendered by none other than the Internal Audit Office of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, in which a long list of both actions and omissions was detailed, denoting a defective fulfillment of the sensitive responsibilities of the Procurement Department (Departamento de Proveeduría) of that local entity. It was also taken into account, as an evaluative element and as if that were not enough, that the now plaintiff had been reprimanded for similar faults barely a year before the opening of the second disciplinary file, an occasion on which she was warned about the consequences of incurring those deficiencies again (see proven fact 18). Therefore, it is considered that the serious faults that led to the dismissal decision were sufficiently accredited.-\n\nXVI.- In addition to the foregoing, in this litigation, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence that would allow demonstrating that the proceeding instituted against her pursued a diverse and illegitimate purpose, namely, to punish her as a result of a complaint she filed for alleged workplace and sexual harassment (unproven fact 3). The burden of proof (which in this jurisdiction derives from the provisions of Article 317 of the supplementary Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) and numerals 58 subsection f, 82, and 85 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA)) obliges the demonstration of those facts that determine the applicable legal framework and provide support for the claims and defenses of the parties. Certainly, if that circumstance had been proven, we would be facing a clear deviation of power (misuse of power, desviación de poder) (ordinal 131.3 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP)) that could have sustained an annulment pronouncement in this venue. But that was not the case, so the argument is futile and must be dismissed.-\n\nXVII.- The same occurs with respect to the reproach concerning a supposed lack of reasoning in the final act. In effect, the latter is based on the final report of proven and unproven facts presented by the directing body of the proceeding (see proven fact 10), which clearly describes the deficiencies incurred by the plaintiff in the performance of her duties; and which, as indicated, originates, in turn, from the two Audit reports relating to the same aspect. For its part, the agreement of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) that resolved the filed appeal (as corresponded prior to the reform of Article 150 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)), contains a development that is certainly succinct, but sufficient, regarding the reasons why it agreed to reject it (see proven fact 16), for which it even had the opinion of a legal advisor contracted for this purpose.-\n\nXVIII.- To conclude this section, it is not superfluous to reiterate that the argument of lack of reasoning in the final act was also heard and denied by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in resolution No. 2009-014631 alluded to supra. For this and all the reasons already stated, the reproach that has been examined is not accepted.-\n\nXIX.- ON THE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES. As a consequence of the requested nullity of her dismissal decision, the plaintiff seeks various pecuniary reparations, set forth both in a principal manner and also subsidiarily in resultando 1 of this judgment, and which include both material and moral damages. In this sense, the mere fact that the substantive claim of the complaint has been rejected is sufficient grounds to deny the economic claim formulated, insofar as it is accessory to the former. In effect, to the extent that no illegitimate action on the part of the Administration has been verified, an injury that the plaintiff is not obligated to bear has not materialized either. Administrative liability, under the regime of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP), requires not only establishing the existence of harmful administrative conduct and a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury, but also that a causal link exists between the two, that is, that there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the alleged act and the harm produced; a link that should not be broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided for in ordinal 190 ibidem. In this case, for all the reasons already set forth, this Court does not consider that the action of the defendant Municipality in this case was illegitimate, which irremediably eliminates one of the stated critical elements for the configuration of possible extra-contractual administrative liability, which is the verification of the existence of harmful conduct originating in a material or moral injury that the administered party is not obligated to bear (Article 194 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP)).-\n\nXX.- REGARDING THE OBJECTIONS FILED: The defendant initially raised those of lack of right and statute of limitations, subsequently clarifying in the preliminary hearing that it would not use the second, as related in the corresponding resultando. Regarding the first, based on the factual and legal grounds set forth in the preceding recitals, the defense must be accepted, declaring the complaint without merit in all its aspects.-\n\nXXI.- ON COSTS. Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must even be made ex officio, pursuant to the provisions of that same norm, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was ultimately obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the complaint are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibidem). In the instant case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and break the principle of condemnation of the losing party. Therefore, payment of both costs is imposed on the plaintiff.-\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe objection of lack of right is accepted. The complaint filed by Nombre128316 against the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is declared IMPROCEDENTE (Without Merit) in all its aspects. Both costs are charged to the plaintiff.\n\nNOTIFY.-\n\n**CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA**\n\n**SILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES**                                                                                                                                                                             **FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ**\n\nIt could not be considered that the cited term for the exercise of the power is interrupted solely by the issuance of the final act, since, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary that the Administration order the opening of an administrative case –it is insisted– to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of what is established in articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically, the referred term is regulated by article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo, CT), which indicates that *\"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known.\"* However, it must be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose article 83 sets a particular statute of limitations (prescripción) regime, namely: *\"Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated.\"* The same situation arises in the area of public finance oversight. For this type of procedure, the applicable term is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its article 43), 8422 (article 44), and 8131 (article 112). This is a normative system constituted as a sectoral legal order containing specific rules, which as special rules, prevail over general regulations. In essence, these rules refer to the regime established in article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, which states at its core:\n\n*“The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal order shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious –understood as that fact that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity– the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure.”* (Our underlining.)\n\nNow then, it is clear that the expiration of the term granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established by article 876 of the Civil Code, by remission made by article 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It must be specified that the grounds for interruption –which cause the prescriptive period to begin anew– can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the term to be interrupted, since even if they occur, if it is after the term has expired, the mere allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. Nevertheless, it must be insisted that the interruption does not occur with the simple issuance of the act opening the procedure, but rather with the due communication of the order that initiates the hearing of a case (auto que tiene por instruida la causa), in accordance with articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.-\n\n**VIII.-**\n\nNow then, it is decisive to precisely establish the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive period. On this matter (and momentarily setting aside cases regulated by special rule), article 603 of the CT indicates that the term runs from when the cause for separation arose or failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility to know the fault and, therefore, undertake the exercise of their power. Thus, when the particularities of the case require the performance of a preliminary investigation, the referred monthly period runs from the moment when the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the head. However, the necessity or not of that phase must be discerned in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that this investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of the opening of the punitive procedure (procedimiento sancionatorio) or to gather evidence (indicios) tending to clarify its necessity or not.-\n\n**IX.-**\n\nThe second factor that must be analyzed is that of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to agree on the sanction within the procedure, which refers to the maximum temporal limit that the holder of the corrective power has to adopt the sanction, once the case file (expediente) has been submitted for their consideration by the directing organ (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis and unless the exception of article 319 of the LGAP applies (regarding the need to hold a second hearing), the head or holder again has a maximum term of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment when the directing organ of the case formally brings its recommendation to their attention; after which term expired, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of that power would inevitably occur and therefore, the final act would be null for injury to the element of jurisdiction, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such an assumption, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary punitive procedures (procedimientos sancionatorios), given the content of article 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is stipulated by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.-\n\n**X.-**\n\nIn the third place, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to execute the imposed sanction refers to the term that the administrative head has to order the application or material execution of the issued sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable term, unless a special rule applies, would again be the monthly period provided for in article 603 of the CT. The denial of such a term would imply the perennial possibility of the head to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the claim of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the term to order the final act once the final report of the directing organ is issued, and another is the term to materialize the firm sanction ordered. At this point, the term must be computed from the firmness of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals (recursos) that may be filed against the act as appropriate, or if, once the period established by the legal order for formulating those appeals has elapsed, they have not been filed, in which eventuality, administrative firmness occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.-\n\n**XI.-**\n\nFinally, another element that is subject to temporality rules is that referring to the processing of the procedure. This refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure established to determine the facts that will permit the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can take. This issue, unless a special rule applies, is regulated by article 261, in relation to articles 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the bimonthly period provided therein has an ordering nature, not a peremptory one, which of course does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this matter, see judgment No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011). At this point, reference must also be made to what is stipulated by article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of the lapsing of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this assumption, lapsing (caducidad) applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, since the restriction of subsection 2 of cited article 340, regarding the impossibility of lapsing (caducidad) when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure has been initiated at the instance of a party, given that the next stage only pertains to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been instructed ex officio, since in that case, the delay does benefit the individual subjected to it, to the extent that it would be, in that case, a delay solely attributable to the public instance.-\n\n**XII.-**\n\n**ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE PUNITIVE POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the foregoing, it must be reiterated that, in the sub examine, the plaintiff does not specify exactly which of the assumptions of statute of limitations (prescripción) she considers applicable in her case. From the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed in the administrative venue (see proven fact 12), it is inferred that it concerns the term for the initiation of the disciplinary procedure against her, which she considers governed by article 603 of the CT. This Court does not observe the expiration of the referred lapse nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect that is alleged. To this effect, we must begin by establishing which lapse is applicable, a matter in which it is considered that the defendant Municipality is correct when it alleges that it is the five-year period contemplated in article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic (LOCGR), given that the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for the commission of illegal conducts revolving around the management of the municipal public treasury. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, based on its judgment No. 6750-97 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, has considered *“that the interpretation of the concept of servant of the public treasury must be restricted to that person who is in charge of managing public funds.”* As has been explained (and this Court shares):\n\n*“Remember that although it is true that many people who have access to the patrimonial assets of the office may work in a public agency, not all of them manage and dispose of public funds. And only to the extent that the former concept is circumscribed solely to the ‘officials who are directly related to the management and disposition of public funds,’ is the difference in the statute of limitations periods for the disciplinary punitive power justifiable, since with a longer statute of limitations period such as that established by cited article 71, ‘the intention is to enable the State to have greater control over its officials who are directly related to the management and disposition of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the most sound and clean management possible of public funds.’ (Criterion reaffirmed in judgment No. 06843-98 of 3:45 p.m. on September 24, 1998, as well as in resolution No. 2001-07516 of 2:49 p.m. on August 1, 2001, recently ratified by No. 2003-04367 of 3:27 p.m. on May 21, 2003, all of the Constitutional Chamber).*\n\n*And based on the binding jurisprudence previously referred to, the Office of the Attorney General has defined what should be understood by official of the Public Treasury, in the following manner:*\n\n*‘It is the non-binding opinion of this Office of the Attorney General that officials who ‘manage public funds’ should be understood as those who, in accordance with the legal order and in accordance with the appointment act, have among their attributions administering, administratively or accounting-wise managing, public funds. Consequently, the term management or handling of public funds does not apply to the use of funds in the sense of patrimonial assets but to the circumstance that, according to the definition of competence, it corresponds to take certain decisions or actions in relation to those funds. Hence, effectively, the circumstance that every public official uses, for the fulfillment of their functions, for example, public goods be they a desk, computer, pencil, cannot lead one to consider that by that use they are ‘managing’ public funds. On the contrary, if the legal possibility to use and dispose (legally or accounting-wise) of the funds in question is recognized, if their action is subject to the necessary oversight to verify that it has responded to the purposes and objectives for which the funds are granted and, above all, according to the legally established procedures, it would have to be considered that the official is comprised within the assumptions of article 71 of the Law of the Comptrollership.’*\n\n*In (sic) this order of ideas, it can be considered that, from the legal point of view, the term ‘servant of the Public Treasury’ is delimited by the set of provisions that make up Chapter V: ‘Of Sanctions and responsibilities’ of the Law of the Comptrollership. Indeed, the statute of limitations (prescripción) regulated in article 71 concerns the faults generically referred to by article 68 of the same law, faults for whose commission a particular relationship of the servant with the Public Treasury is required, as could be the fact that it corresponds to them to act the legal prescriptions that regulate it (as is the case of control organs); or that they dispose over the administrative or accounting execution of the Budget, that is, those who can commit expenditure or order its payment, must make investments with public resources or must collect them, etc., directly participating in public financial administration. In that sense, it could be added that from articles 6 to 9 of the Law of Financial Administration, criteria can be extracted in order to determine who are officials of the Public Treasury. Indeed, said articles concern servants who, by virtue of the jurisdictional order, participate directly in financial administration because it corresponds to them to receive, administer, safeguard or pay goods or values; or because they have authority to contract obligations or, in their case, payment commitments, making decisions regarding the referred funds (...)*\n\n*(...) A servant who manages public funds is one who by provision of the legal order and according to their appointment act is in a particular relationship with the cited funds, which allows them to participate in the different stages of the budgetary execution of income and expenses, as well as those who intervene in the process of oversight and control of the ‘Public Treasury’ or in general, participate directly in the financial administration of the public organism in question.’ (O.J.-107-98 of December 17, 1998).*\n\n*Thus, taking into consideration the special attributions that the Political Constitution has assigned to the General Comptrollership of the Republic with respect to the vigilance in the management of public funds and in the financial management of the Public Administration, and especially the control of personnel who ‘receives, safeguards, pays, or administers goods or values of the State’ (Resolution No. 2000-06326 of 4:18 p.m. on July 19, 2000, of the Constitutional Chamber), we can categorically affirm that article 71 of cited Law No. 7428, is solely and exclusively applicable in the concrete and specific case of those officials or servants of the Public Treasury, that is, to those who are in charge of the management and disposition of public funds (See among others, resolutions No. 6750-97, 06843-98, 2001-07516 and 2003-04367 op. cit., of the Constitutional Chamber and 2000-00949 of 08:20 a.m. on November 24, 2000, 2001-00283 of 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2001 and 2003-00669 of 09:20 a.m. on November 13, 2003, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as pronouncements C-340-2002 and C-344-2002 op. cit.).”* (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, *“Manual de Procedimiento Administrativo”*, San José, 2006, pages 222-224; our underlining.)\n\nIn our case, it is accredited (proven fact 1) that the plaintiff held the position of Municipal Supplier (Proveedora Municipal) and, in that sense, the conducts attributed to her had to do, precisely, with aspects inherent to that function and typical of the management of institutional goods and resources, such as the handling of administrative contracting and the registration of municipal assets. Therefore, there is no doubt that the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period is not the generic one of article 603 of the CT, but rather the special one of article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, a prior inquiry having been conducted in the case by the Internal Audit Office, we must adhere to what is prescribed in subsection b) of the cited norm, which indicates that the beginning of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, the first report describing the prevailing situation in the Municipal Supply Department (Proveeduría Municipal) came to the attention of the Mayor –who is the holder of the disciplinary power in this case, pursuant to articles 17 subsection k) and 149 of the Código Municipal– on May 21, 2008 (proven fact 3); while the second –in which the opening of the administrative procedure that led to the plaintiff's dismissal was requested– did so on August 8 of the following year (proven fact 4). And considering that the respective statement of charges was notified to her on November 28 of the same year 2008 (proven fact 6), it is manifest that the five-year period set for this purpose had not –even remotely– expired.\n\nConsequently, this claim of the lawsuit is denied.\n\n\n\n\n\n**TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA (SECTION SEVEN).** Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at fourteen hundred thirty hours on August twenty-second, two thousand thirteen.-\n\nA declaratory proceeding brought before this Court by **Nombre128316**, divorced, with identity card number CED117281 (f. 1); against the **MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN RAFAEL DE HEREDIA**, represented by its Mayor, Nombre102691, married, sociologist, with identity card number CED114249 (f. 52 and 53). Also intervening in the proceeding, on behalf of the defendant, was its special judicial representative, Atty. Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, single, resident of San José, with identity card number CED117282 (f. 77), and as directing attorney for the plaintiff, Atty. Nombre128317. The individuals named are of legal age and, with the exceptions indicated, attorneys and residents of San Rafael de Heredia.-\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**1.-** That the plaintiff, based on the facts and legal citations she set forth, in a brief filed on August 30, 2010, initially before the Labor Court of Major Amount of Heredia, filed a lawsuit in which, in substance, she requests: *“PRINCIPAL CLAIM: (...) a) The nullity of the dismissal for being in violation of due process and also unjustified. / b) The defendant has the obligation to reinstate me to the position I held at the time of dismissal. / c) Payment of back pay as damages. / d) Must pay salary adjustments from the moment of dismissal until the moment of reinstatement. / e) Pay the year-end bonuses (aguinaldos) I would have failed to receive as a result of the unjustified dismissal. / f) Must pay proportional vacations not taken during the time the proceeding lasts and until reinstatement to work. / g) Employer and worker social security contributions left unpaid from the moment of dismissal until their effective payment. / h) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: Regarding the suffering and anguish that, as a result of an unjustified dismissal, I have had to endure, and not only I, but my (sic) family. (...). My (sic) image, honor and esteem have been called into question as a result of the dismissal, causing irreparable damages at a moral, psychological, spiritual, emotional, family, labor, and social level. (...) Whose valuation must be carried out by an expert in the sentence enforcement stage. / i) Payment of school bonuses (salarios escolares) left unearned. / j) Salary increases of any other nature that may have been approved. / k) Interest on the sums owed from the moment of dismissal until their effective payment. / l) Declare the exception of prescription of the dismissal as having merit. / m) Both costs of the proceeding. SUBSIDIARY CLAIM: That in the event that the (sic) reinstatement is denied, the defendant party is obligated to pay me the following items: a) The nullity of the dismissal for being in violation of due process and also unjustified, b) notice and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), c) that it must pay me the salary adjustments from the moment of dismissal until the moment of its effective payment, d) employer and worker social security contributions left unpaid from the moment of dismissal until the judgment becomes final, e) Payment of back pay as damages, f) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: Regarding the suffering and anguish that, as a result of an unjustified dismissal, I have had to endure, and not only I, but my (sic) family. (...). My (sic) image, honor and esteem have been called into question as a result of the dismissal, causing irreparable damages at a moral, psychological, spiritual, emotional, family, labor, and social level. (...) Whose valuation must be carried out by an expert in the sentence enforcement stage, i) Payment of school bonuses (salarios escolares) left unearned, j) Salary increases of any other nature that may have been approved, k) Interest on the sums owed from the moment of dismissal until their effective payment, l) Declare the exception of prescription of the dismissal as having merit, m) Both costs of the proceeding.”* (f. 1-8).-\n\n**2.-** By resolution No. 641-2010 of 8:30 a.m. on September 6, 2010 (f. 17-18), the Labor Court of Major Amount of Heredia declared itself without jurisdiction and ordered the case file to be sent to this jurisdiction.-\n\n**3.-** By resolution of 9:48 a.m. on June 27, 2012 (f. 34-39), the case management judge rejected a failure to exhaust administrative remedies initially noted ex officio and on which a hearing had been given by order of 11:31 a.m. on February 23, 2011 (f. 20).-\n\n**4.-** The defendant answered the action negatively and raised the exceptions of lack of right and prescription. It warned that said Municipality had suspended any permanent appointment (nombramiento en propiedad) to the position held by the plaintiff and, finally, expressed its refusal to conciliate in this matter. (f. 53-55).-\n\n**5.-** At the preliminary hearing held starting at 1:30 p.m. on May 14, 2013, with the attendance of both parties, there were no adjustments to the claims, which therefore remain in the terms established in the complaint. At that same proceeding, the representative of the defendant Municipality clarified that it did not raise the exception of prescription, but simply opposed the argument that the plaintiff was making on that same subject. The case management judge, Atty. Ana Lía Umaña Salazar, admitted testimonial evidence offered by the plaintiff and, at the end, ordered the case file to be sent to the corresponding Trial Section (hearing recorded and attached to the case file on its corresponding electronic medium; minutes at f. 78 front and back).-\n\n**6.-** By order of 10:00 a.m. on July 4, 2013 (f. 79-80), this Section Seven assumed jurisdiction over this matter and summoned the parties to the complementary hearing.-\n\n**7.-** The oral and public trial took place starting at 8:45 a.m. on August 7, 2013, with the presence of both parties, who presented their initial arguments. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew the witness Nombre20335. Regarding the second admitted witness – known only as \"Dra. Ramírez\" – the evidence was declared unevacuable because she was not present, without proper justification and taking into account that no summons was issued for her. The parties then presented their closing arguments and, finally, the Court declared the case as complex, pursuant to number 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) (hearing recorded and attached to the case file on its corresponding electronic medium; minutes at f. 83-84).-\n\n**8.-** This resolution is issued, after deliberation, within the period of fifteen business days stipulated in articles 111.1 of the CPCA and 82.1 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda. No grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the proceedings are noted.-\n\nDrafted by Judge **Hess Araya**, with the affirmative vote of Judge **Fernández Brenes** and Judge **Córdoba Ramírez**; and,\n\n**CONSIDERING:**\n\n**I.- PROVEN FACTS.** The following relevant facts are established as such (all folio references correspond to the administrative file, regarding which attention must be drawn to the lack of clarity and disorder it presents):\n\n1. That the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant Municipality from June 7, 2000, serving in the last seven years of the employment relationship as Municipal Procurement Officer (Proveedora Municipal) (fact 1 of the complaint, uncontested).-\n\n2. That by official letter No. AIM 039-2008 of April 22, 2008, the Internal Audit Office brought to the attention of the Municipal Council a \"Study on the management of the Procurement Department of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia,\" which denounces *\"real difficulties in the work\"* of that office, *\"a situation that affects institutional interests\"*; failure to perform basic functions, lack of planning of its activities, and obstruction of the work of other municipal departments, recommending the *\"total restructuring\"* of the aforementioned Department (f. 377-393).-\n\n3. That the report just cited was reviewed by the Council in ordinary session No. 174-2008 of May 19, 2008, in which it was agreed – among other aspects – *\"To order Mr. (...) Municipal Mayor, the compliance and execution of the recommendations issued by the Internal Audit Office, ...\"*. The foregoing was communicated to said official via official letter SCM #0383-2008 of the 20th of the same month and year, which he received the following day (f. 394-397).-\n\n4. That by official letter No. AIM 128-2008 of August 8, 2008, the Internal Audit Office addressed the Municipal Mayor, indicating: *\"This Audit Unit requests that you appoint a directing body (órgano director) to analyze the situation of the Institutional Procurement Department, since the problems of non-compliance within the deadlines granted by the Mayor's Office to the Procurement Department, to fulfill the requests that the Mayor's Office has forwarded to it for non-compliance with its functions, have been repetitive, in accordance with the Job Manual of this Municipality and the description of functions that the Procurement Officer herself made in her Annual Operating Plan 2008. It will be the responsibility of said body to analyze the justifications of the Procurement Department for not having addressed, within the deadline granted by the Mayor's Office, the requests that were forwarded to it, as I indicated previously. This directing body must be appointed as soon as possible, if possible within one calendar month. Legal counsel in this body will be very important.\"* The document was received by the Mayor's Secretariat that same day (f. 577-578).-\n\n5. That by resolution No. 003-08-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Municipal Mayor ordered the *\"Suspension with pay of Mrs. Nombre128316, Municipal Procurement Officer of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia as a provisional precautionary measure and opening of the directing body of the administrative procedure to investigate findings of Audit reports numbers AIM-039-2008 and AIM-128-2008, as well as the alleged improper use of public funds to the detriment of the Administration\"*, designating for this purpose Mr. Giovanni Varela Dijeres as the directing body (fact 5 of the complaint, uncontested; f. 608-613).-\n\n6. That at 10:00 a.m. on August 18 (sic), 2008, the directing body issued the order serving charges (auto de traslado de cargos) within the ordinary disciplinary administrative procedure No. 0001-08-01, which was notified to the now-plaintiff on the following November 28. The act listed the conduct with which the investigated party was charged, as follows:\n\n*\"a) That Mrs. Nombre128316 has presumably violated Standard 4.15 of the Manual of Internal Control Standards referring to the accuracy of records on assets, as well as the periodic verification through verification and physical count of those assets; given that she has not updated the asset information for each department for several years, nor the physical count of those assets, even though it is one of the functions assigned to the Procurement Department; / b) That Mrs. Nombre128316 presumably does not plan institutional purchases as the institutional budget grows, which is detrimental to the organization, execution, and monitoring and internal control of the Department; which violates standard 3.2 of the Manual of General Internal Control Standards for the Contraloría General de la República and the entities and bodies subject to its oversight; / c) That Mrs. Nombre128316 presumably does not keep a written record of all the procedures carried out by the Procurement Department, such as: - Supplier Registry Administration Procedures; Procedures for the Administration of Legalized Books (bid opening minutes and bid award minutes); - Direct contracting procedures; - Abbreviated Tender Procedure; - Public Tender Procedures; - Auction Procedures; - Contract Administration Procedures; - Asset Control Procedures; - Purchase Summary Procedures; - Procedures for Updating the Contractual Activity Information System, which emerges as a total technical ignorance of the matter, puts municipal funds at risk and prevents adequate internal control; as stated in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its regulations; the Ley de Control Interno and the provisions of the Contraloría General de la República on the matter. The foregoing violates the provisions of Standard 4.8 and 4.9 of the Manual of General Internal Control Standards, which states that all controls in force for the different processes and activities of the institution, as well as all significant transactions and events that occur, must be documented and periodically reviewed to make pertinent corrections; and that all officials holding supervisory positions must exercise constant supervision over the development of the institution's processes, transactions, and operations, with the purpose of ensuring that tasks are carried out in accordance with the regulations and internal and external provisions in force.\n\n/d) That the lady Nombre128316 allegedly (sic) does not know the responsibilities and coordination relationships assigned to her by the Municipality's Position Manual and the current code of ethics in the institution, the Institutional Annual Operating Plan, and the institutional policies that have been issued to date; which becomes inconceivable, since her activity revolves around the execution of the goals proposed in said Plan and it is assumed that in the (sic) planning process all municipal departments intervene, with the objective that everyone works towards the same objectives and projects of the institution, because the Procurement Department must be one of the departments that knows the municipal budget in greatest detail, since it is the fundamental work tool by which she must guide herself in the performance of her duties. The foregoing violates Article 13 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno) which states that the duties of the head and subordinate titleholders are to maintain and demonstrate ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as to contribute through their actions to promote them to the rest of the organization, for which reason it is essential to know the Code of Ethics in force in the Municipality. / e) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 on March 28, 2008, had not made the annual invitation to participate in the Suppliers Registry (Registro de Proveedores), in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa), article 116 and following. / f) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 has not complied with the provisions of article 122 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), which means that the information of more than 40% of the files that are in the Suppliers Registry does not have (sic) updated information, given that the Procurement Department did not warn them one month in advance of the expiration date of their registration, a situation that should be recorded in the file, with sufficient advance notice. / g) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 has violated the provisions of the Directive for the registry number D-4-2005-CO-DDI of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), in points 6 and articles 12 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) and 3 and 39 of the General Law of Internal Control; all norms of mandatory compliance, referring to the obligation to record contractual information on a daily basis. / h) That supposedly the lady Nombre128316 has not complied with the obligation to control and safeguard office materials, cleaning articles, and any type of minor tools and/or work articles that are acquired (sic) in the Municipality, which constitutes a substantial weakness of internal control (control interno), given that no inventory is kept of any of the articles under her responsibility, which violates article 107 of the Law of Administrative Contracting and standard 4.15 of the Manual of Internal Control Standards (Manual de Normas de Control Interno). / i) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 has violated the provisions on purchases indicated by the Law of Administrative Contracting, such as those made from Imprenta Lisara and from Mr. Nombre149762, provider of cleaning articles, with whom two purchases have been completed in the same month for an amount of C.200,000.00, which is an accepted purchase amount (sic) without needing to quote from three suppliers. In the case of Lisara, it seems more of a planning problem, since given the urgency with which each department makes the request for forms, stationery, stamps, etc., she violates (sic) the obligation to attend each of the petitions made by each department independently. The foregoing violates the provisions of article 8 of the Law of Internal Control (Ley de Control Interno). / j) That the lady Nombre128316 has presumably violated the provisions of article (sic) 15, subsection b) of the General Law of Internal Control referring to security standards related to physical space, files, materials in the custody of the Procurement Department, and computerized information systems, where there is a lack of documentation and defined procedures. / k) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 has violated the implementation provisions of Law 8114 (Ley 8114) in the following specific cases: 1) In the file for Labor and Tools for the construction of the stormwater drainage system Dirección15696 (sic) to the West, second stage, it is recorded that Ing. Herrera Solìs (sic) sent the technical specifications of the cited project to the Procurement Department on October 11, 2006; however, it was not until May 29, 2007, that the Mayor transferred the agreement to the Procurement Officer for her to make the contract. The contract was signed in July, and due to delays with the contractor, this work began in September 2007, with an addendum (adendum) to the contract, and was completed at the end of November 2007. This means that the contracting process took approximately nine months, and the execution took two more months; 2) In the file for the Acquisition of the Four-Wheel Drive Vehicle for the Road Technical Unit (Unidad Técnica Vial), it is recorded that on March 19, 2007, the Mayor requested the Procurement Officer to start this process. On March 20, 2007, Mr. (sic) Treasurer made the certification of the existence of economic content and transferred it to the Procurement Officer. On March 21 of that same year, Ing. (sic) Nombre3841 attached the specifications. On April 24, 2007, the invitation to participate was published in La Gaceta with a deadline of May 11, 2007. By that date, only Purdy Motor participated. On May 14, the single offer was transferred to Ing. Nombre3841, and that same day Ing. (sic) Nombre3841 communicated to the Procurement Officer that the offer met the requirements. Not until June 4 did the Procurement Officer transfer the file to the Council (Concejo) so they could proceed with the award; they took the award agreement in ordinary session No. 97-2007 held on June 11, 2007. Subsequently, not until July 19, 2006, did Purdy Motor present the performance guarantee. In August, the exoneration procedures began, and the vehicle was delivered on September 28, 2007, the process taking more than six months; 3) In the file for the purchase of 71 tons of asphalt mix and 5 barrels of emulsion to execute the Project in front of the plaza of Dirección18321, it took 4 months; 4) That very extensive periods of time occur between the award, the preparation of contracts, and the preparation of the respective purchase order, which shows that the Procurement Department does not take the necessary precautions; it does not transfer the files to the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Legal) for the preparation of contracts with sufficient advance notice; the formalization and preparation of tender documents (carteles) is slow, and important formal aspects are omitted in the files, such as numbering, the division of the process stages in the file, the presentation of the copies that must be incorporated into them, and the lack of final documentation regarding the execution of partial payments. The foregoing demonstrates technical lack of knowledge for the position, which is a requirement of the Position Manual (Manual de Puestos) for its performance; it also hinders subsequent control of her material and technical actions. / l) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 prepares the tender document (cartel), initiates (sic) the purchase procedure, carries out the quotations, makes the purchase order; enters the information into the Integrated System of Contractual Information (Sistema Integrado de Información Contractual, SIAC) and receives the merchandise, which compromises the objectivity and independence of the institution; however, she has never requested that this situation be modified under the protection of the institutional code of ethics. / m) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 makes very serious errors in the drafting of contracts, specifically in the following: 1) In contract 05-2008, page 4, line 5, the sum of eighteen million four hundred sixty thousand five hundred colones is stated in letters, the correct amount being seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand two hundred twenty; Page 4, lines 10 and 11, seventeen million one hundred seventy-six thousand colones is noted, missing the phrase ‘two hundred twenty’; on that same page, lines 11 and 13, review the execution period, it says ‘one business day and over the word AD’ (sic); page 4, line 15, failed to note: of the, betwen (sic) the words provisions and tender document; page 7, line 3, the word ‘Los’ is repeated; Page 10 says April, the correct word is May’; 2) Document to contract 05-2008 on page 4, line 20, eight (1) business day is noted; page 11, April is noted instead of May. 2) In contract 06-2008, page 1, line 19, ‘Recarpeteo (sic) de calle puente de piedra’ is noted, the correct term being Pavement Dirección15697; Page 2, lines 17 and 29, failed to note Calle between the words pavement and dirt; page 2, line 31, C.21.917.000.00 is noted, the correct term is Placa23792, an error also made in letters; page 3, lines 2 and 3, Placa30266 is noted in numbers, the correct term being Placa30267; page 4, line 10, note calle between the words pavement and dirt; page 7, line 12, the word los is repeated; page 10, lines 2 and 3, Placa30268 is noted in numbers and letters, the correct term being Placa30267; page 10, line 18, read May instead of April. The foregoing violates Article 10 of the Law of Administrative Contracting. / n) That presumably suppliers such as Depósito El Rafaeleño have refused to present documentation except to the lady Nombre128316, which violates the institutional code of ethics and the principles of transparency. / o) That the lady Nombre128316 presumably, in managing the procurement files (expedientes de la proveedora), incorporates criteria and drafts from different institutional dependencies into them, which violates Article 11 of the Law of Administrative Contracting. / p) That presumably the lady Nombre128316 has sent files to the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) and has requested participation guarantees (garantías de participación) from bidders who are not the awardees, as is the case of Abbreviated Bidding (Licitación abreviada) No. 2008LA-0001-01 ‘Purchase of Asphalt mix at plant outlet and emulsion for pothole patching in the canton of San Rafael de Heredia and Abbreviated Bidding number 2008-LA-00002-01 Recarpeteo (sic) de calle punte (sic) de pieda (sic), where a performance guarantee (garantía de cumplimiento) was requested from the company Conansa. / q) That in the final report (Informe final) of proven and unproven facts of the previous directing body of the administrative procedure, the official investigated here was admonished (sic) in writing and was warned that if she incurred these faults again, action would be taken (sic).\"\n\nIn addition to the foregoing, it was specified that the final act to be issued could lead to dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) or the suspension without pay of the investigated party. Therein, she was summoned to an oral and private hearing for 14:00 hours on December 22 of the same year; the documents held as evidence in the file and the persons who would be summoned as witnesses were listed; and she was advised of the remedies (recursos) available against that resolution (f. 634-655; by an act issued on the following December 10, the material error incurred in the date of the statement of objections (traslado de cargos) was rectified, so that it correctly read \"November\" instead of \"August\": f. 668-669).-\n\n7. That by means of a brief dated January 12, 2008 (sic), the plaintiff here appeared \"to answer the statement of objections (traslado de cargos)\", in which she referred to the charges made against her and alleged the nullity of the referred act (f. 697-710).-\n\n8. That the oral and private hearing was duly carried out, with the reception of testimonial evidence (the corresponding record is not located in the administrative file, but it is inferred from the briefs referred to in the following two facts).-\n\n9. That with a document dated January 16, 2009, and presented that same day, the interested party set forth her \"succinct conclusions in relation to the evidence duly gathered\" (f. 745-751).-\n\n10. That with a resolution at 10:00 hours on February 1, 2009, the directing body of the procedure issued its \"Final report (Informe final)\", in which it made a relation of the procedure followed and the proven and unproven facts in relation to the charges filed against the investigated party (f. 759-784).-\n\n11. That the procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution No. 001-09 at 8:00 hours on February 11, 2009, by the Municipal Mayor, whose operative part establishes, in what is relevant: \"To accept in all its extremes the Final Report of Proven and Unproven Facts within the investigation process of the official Nombre128316, Procurement Officer of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, and given the lack of suitability for the fulfillment of the respective position, it is resolved: To proceed with the Immediate Dismissal Without Employer Liability (Despido Inmediato Sin Responsabilidad Patronal) of the lady Nombre128316, identity card number CED117283, effective from February 13, 2009. Cancel the corresponding amounts for proportional vacation and Christmas bonus. Likewise, the cessation of the precautionary measure ordered against the lady Nombre128316 is ordered for lacking current interest.\" The foregoing was notified to the plaintiff today, via fax, on the 13th of the same month and year (fact 6 of the complaint, not controverted; f. 785-813).-\n\n12. By brief presented on February 25, 2009, the investigated party filed an \"Appeal for revocation (Recurso de revocatoria), appeal in subsidy (apelación en subsidio), concomitant nullity and suspension of the act's effects\" against the final act of the procedure, alleging the prescription of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), for not having been exercised within the month referred to in article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) (f. 814-839).-\n\n13. By means of resolution No. 002-2009 at 14:50 hours on March 2, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rejected the revocation and admitted the appeal \"before the improper hierarchical superior (superior jerárquico impropio)\". The appellant was notified of this on the 4th of the same month and year (f. 840-846).-\n\n14. By resolution No. 003-2009 at 10:30 hours on March 10, 2009, the Municipal Mayor rectified the act referred to in the previous fact, for the purpose of having the appeal admitted \"before the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), which will exhaust the administrative channel (vía administrativa)\" (f. 849).-\n\n15. That through a writ presented on March 25, 2009, the interested party appeared before the Municipal Council \"to maintain and uphold the appeal timely filed\" (f. 854).-\n\n16. That the Municipal Council, in ordinary session # 243-2009 of March 30, 2009, ordered: \"FIRST: Once known by the Municipal Council, the Appeal filed by the official Nombre128316 against Resolution 001-2009, of the Municipal Mayor's Office, through which her dismissal without employer liability was ordered, having verified the different arguments and according to the recommendation of the Legal Advisor (Asesora Legal) contracted for that purpose, this Municipal Council makes its own the arguments expressed in Resolution 002-2009 of fourteen fifty hours on March two last, which rejects the Revocation by the Mayor. Consequently, this Municipal Council considers the dismissal of the official without employer liability to be appropriate. / SECOND: By virtue of the foregoing provision, the Appeal in subsidy, concomitant nullity and suspension of effects of the act, sub examine, are rejected and the administrative channel is considered exhausted. / THIRD: Instruct the Secretary of the Municipal Council to transcribe this agreement to the interested parties.\" To support said resolution, it was indicated: \"REGARDING THE FACTS OF THE APPEAL: That the Legal Advisor contracted for the purpose, after carefully studying the facts constituting the investigation, the evidence gathered, and the relation of facts formulated by the Directing Body, fully agrees with the instructor in the list of proven and unproven facts contained in the final report. Having analyzed the substantive Resolution issued by the Mayor, ordering the dismissal for cause of the official, she considered that it is a necessary consequence of the proven and unproven facts that the investigation yielded, i.e., that the dismissal is fully supported in fact and in law. / After studying the writ of appeal for revocation and appeal in subsidy, and upon carefully verifying each argument of the resolution rejecting it, it is her consideration that effectively the reproached resolution should be maintained and the arguments of reproach are not receivable. / That according to the Legal Advisor, it is clear from the file compiled for the purpose that all legal solemnities and formalities have been observed, the principles of due process (debido proceso) and right to defense for the official have been guaranteed, and finally that the conclusion reached by the Administration is concordant and proportional to the proven and unproven facts.\" The foregoing was notified to the plaintiff now via official letter SCM #00301-2009 of the 31st of that month and year, via fax, on the same day (f. Placa30269).-\n\n17. That the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) against the Mayor, the President of the Municipal Council, and the directing body of the procedure, which was processed under file No. 09-005609-0007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and which was admitted for processing through an order at 10:12 hours on April 16, 2009. The recently referred amparo appeal was declared without merit by the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 2009-014631 at 12:21 hours on September 18, 2009, in which it was stated, as relevant: \"Nombre6562.- Purpose of the appeal. In the present amparo appeal, the violation of the right to due process (proceso debido) and defense of the protected party is discussed, on the occasion of the disciplinary administrative procedure that has been instituted against her, as a result of which the cessation of her duties in the Procurement Department of the Municipality of the Canton of San Rafael de Heredia has been ordered. According to the petitioner, in the processing of that disciplinary case, the appealed authority ordered her suspension without pay and omitted setting a term for the precautionary measure; furthermore, the accused authority denied her the possibility of accessing the pieces of the administrative file and omitted supporting the resolution ordering her dismissal without employer liability. This situation, according to the plaintiff, is illegitimate and injures the Law of the Constitution.\n\n(...) </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">VI.-</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\"> (sic) Finally, regarding the petitioner's accusation that the appealed authority, in ordering the dismissal without employer liability in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant, has failed to substantiate its decision, from the content of the resolution issued by the appealed authority, No. 001-09 of 08:00 hrs. on February 11, 2009 (...) this situation cannot be inferred, not even remotely, which is why no infringement of the protected party's right to due process is observed in this specific case, and therefore the amparo must be dismissed with respect to this point (sic). Furthermore, it should be noted that this Constitutional Court is not responsible for issuing any judgment, positive or negative, on the merits of the disciplinary case that has been initiated against her, which must instead be discussed in the ordinary Jurisdiction. (...) </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">Por tanto:</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\"> The appeal is dismissed.-”</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> (f. 895-899 and consultation of the “Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica”).-</span>\n\n18. That, prior to the events recounted in the previous paragraphs, the petitioner herein had already been reprimanded in writing by the Municipal Mayor within disciplinary proceeding No. DAMSRH-01-2007, according to an unnumbered resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on November 19, 2007, in which she was attributed with failure to fulfill her responsibilities as Municipal Procurement Officer, warning her <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“that in the event of a recurrence of said fault, proceedings will be undertaken in exercise of the powers set forth in numerals 149 and 150 of the Municipal Code”</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">. Therein, she was also ordered to </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“implement a work plan to improve productivity within her department”</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, within the following month, as well as to render periodic reports on the progress achieved (f. 16-27 of the administrative file).-\n\n**II.-** **FACTS NOT PROVEN.** For lack of evidence in the file to support them, the following are deemed unproven:\n\n1. That in the processing of the administrative proceeding brought against the plaintiff, the guarantees of due process were infringed.-\n\n2. That the act of dismissal of the plaintiff lacks a statement of reasons.-\n\n3. That the reason for the act of dismissal of the plaintiff is illegitimate, constituting a reprisal originating from a complaint for workplace harassment previously filed by her against a municipal official.-\n\n**III.-** **ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES.** <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">The plaintiff argues in the complaint</span>, in summary, that she began working for the respondent Municipality in June 2000, having served for the last seven years of the employment relationship as Municipal Procurement Officer (Proveedora Municipal). That by resolution number 03-008-DAMSRH of November 13, 2008, the Mayor of that corporation ordered the opening of an administrative proceeding against her, and she was preventively separated from her position, with pay. That by resolution number 001-09 of 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 2009, the Mayor ordered her dismissal without employer liability, alleging a lack of suitability for the performance of the position. She adds that the proceeding followed violated due process, and furthermore that the dismissal was unjustified because the alleged cause was not proven, rather obeying a reprisal originating from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment. She states that <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“I raise the defense of prescription (prescripción) of the dismissal”</span>. During the oral and public trial hearing, she added to the foregoing that there is an inconsistency between the statement of objections (intimación) made to her at the beginning of the proceeding – in which a breach of her duties was alleged – and what the final act establishes as the reason for dismissal – the lack of suitability for the performance of the position. She also pointed out that the deficiencies for which she was reproached actually originated in other departments of the Municipality; that the final act is insufficiently reasoned; that she was placed on medical leave due to psychiatric reasons; that the Municipal Council did not adequately justify the rejection of her appeal, limiting itself to accepting the arguments of the legal advisor contracted for that purpose.-\n\n**IV.-** <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">The respondent replies</span> to the plaintiff's arguments, in summary, that the disciplinary administrative proceeding opened against the plaintiff complied with all the requirements of due process. That the allegation of prescription (prescripción) must be rejected since the disciplinary power was exercised within the established legal deadlines. That the reasons for the agreed-upon dismissal were amply proven in the administrative file. Subsequently, in her arguments presented at the oral and public trial, the representative of the respondent local entity stated that the disciplinary power was correctly exercised by the Mayor, in accordance with Article 17, subsection a), of the Municipal Code. That it must be considered that the plaintiff had previously been reprimanded, in another proceeding, for defective fulfillment of her obligations. That the second file was initiated at the request of the internal audit, which issued a report documenting a series of behaviors by the now plaintiff that weakened and infringed upon internal control. That she is unaware of what the former refers to when referring to an alleged case of workplace or sexual harassment. She also reiterated that the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) in this case is governed by the provisions of the Law of Internal Control and that of the General Comptroller of the Republic. That a lack of suitability for the performance of the position of Municipal Procurement Officer was indeed proven, making reference to the stipulations of numeral 119 of the aforementioned Code. Finally, regarding the medical leaves due to psychiatric problems, that the plaintiff never demonstrated that said pathology was truly incapacitating for the performance of her duties.-\n\n**V.-** **ON THE MERITS.** In the present litigation, the only disputed fact of the complaint turned out to be the seventh, which states:\n\n<span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“SEVENTH: In the processing of the disciplinary proceeding, due process was violated, and the dismissal is unjustified by virtue of the fact that the alleged cause was not proven. On the contrary, the unjustified dismissal is nothing more than a reprisal for a proceeding that she previously filed (sic) against a municipal official for workplace harassment.”</span>\n\nFurthermore, in the recitals section, the prescription (prescripción) of the exercise of the sanctioning power was alleged, a matter that was equally rejected by the respondent municipal entity. As matters stand, these will be the only issues we will proceed to examine in this ruling, omitting to delve into other topics mentioned by the plaintiff in the supplementary hearing (for example, matters relating to her medical leaves for psychiatric treatments), since such issues were not the subject of debate and it is not possible to introduce them belatedly, without thereby violating the opposing party's right of defense. For convenience, we will begin with the matter of the alleged prescription (prescripción) of the disciplinary power.-\n\n**VI.-** **REGARDING THE ALLEGED PRESCRIPTION (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER.** On this particular point, the plaintiff in the complaint merely points out, succinctly, that <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“I raise the defense of prescription (prescripción) of the dismissal”</span>, without elaborating on details as to why she considers that this should be so declared. We should begin by recalling that prescription (prescripción), in general terms, presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inaction of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time set by the legal system for this purpose; and, c) allegation or defense by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the prescription (prescripción). This means that no liberatory effect exists if, despite the concurrence of the first two presuppositions, the articulation is not formulated. This is because prescription (prescripción) adheres to an adversarial principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding specifically public employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to this factor of temporality, after which, such exercise cannot be undertaken. This time limit, as will be discussed, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of numeral 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that are considered imprescriptible due to finalistic aspects, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise – like that examined in this case – are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they can lapse due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being implemented. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, their power to request recognition of the loss of hierarchical authority emerges.-\n\n**VII.-** Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary proceeding, in which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow for addressing the discussed topics, according to the scenario in question. In this line, the temporal course of various stages must be distinguished. First, it is appropriate to analyze the <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">prescription (prescripción) of the exercise of the disciplinary power</span>, which refers to the deadline set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the pertinent procedural measures allowing them to issue the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period allowed by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the relevant proceeding, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that notification of the opening of the proceeding seeking to establish the facts (substantive truth) that serve as the basis for the reason for the act generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted only by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case – it is reiterated – to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions in numerals 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically, the referred-to period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (CT), which indicates that <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known”</span>. However, it must be warned that this is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding this point. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 sets a particular prescription (prescripción) regime, namely: <span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious offenses, in two years. Prescription (prescripción) shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated”</span>. The same occurs in matters of oversight of the public treasury. For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral legal order containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over general regulations. At its core, these norms refer to the regime provided for in numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic, No. 7428, which states in essence:\n\n<span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">“The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal order, shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious – understood as that fact which requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">.”</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> (Emphasis ours.)</span>\n\nNow, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption set forth in numeral 876 of the Civil Code, by referral made by numeral 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It should be specified that the grounds for interruption – which cause the prescriptive period to start anew – can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiry of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription (prescripción negativa) leads to the loss of the exercise of the right foreclosed due to inaction in its exercise. Nevertheless, it must be insisted that the interruption is not produced by the simple issuance of the act opening the proceeding, but rather by the due communication of the order that formally initiates the case, in accordance with numerals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.-\n\n**VIII.-** Now, it is decisive to precisely establish the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive period. On this particular (and momentarily excepting cases regulated by special norm), numeral 603 of the CT states that the period runs from when the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know of the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their power. As matters stand, when the particularities of the case require carrying out a preliminary investigation, the mentioned one-month period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the hierarchical superior. However, the necessity or not of that phase must be determined in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a delaying tactic to evade prescription (prescripción), given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning proceeding or to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity or not.-\n\n**IX.-** The second factor that must be analyzed is that of the <span style=\\\"font-family:Helvetica; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">prescription (prescripción) of the power to order the sanction within the proceeding</span>, which refers to the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for their consideration by the directing body (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of numeral 319 of the LGAP applies (relating to the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment the directing body of the case formally informs them of its recommendation; after which, the prescription (prescripción) of that power would inevitably occur and, therefore, the final act would be null due to infringement of the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning proceedings, given the content of numeral 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides the provisions of canon 329.3 of the LGAP.-\n\n**X.-** Thirdly, the <span style=\\\"font-family:Helvetica; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">prescription (prescripción) of the power to execute the imposed sanction</span> refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application or material execution of the sanction imposed. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, save special norm, would again be the one-month period provided for in numeral 603 of the CT. Denying such a period would imply the perennial possibility for the hierarchical superior to apply the sanction previously ordered, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued is one thing, and the period to materialize the final ordered sanction is another. At this point, the period must be computed from the finality (firmeza) of that act, which can arise from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that may be filed against the act as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to file those appeals has elapsed, they have not been raised, in which event, administrative finality occurs due to the inaction of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.-\n\n**XI.-** Finally, another element that is subject to temporality rules is that referring to the <span style=\\\"font-family:Helvetica; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">processing of the proceeding</span>. It refers to the maximum time that the administrative proceeding initiated to establish the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision may take. This matter, unless a special norm applies, is regulated by numeral 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period provided for therein has an ordering nature, not a peremptory one, which of course does not include nor permit proceedings with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for infringement of the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this point, see judgment No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, issued at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011). At this point, reference must also be made to the provisions of numeral 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for reasons attributable to the former. In this scenario, expiration (caducidad) applies even in cases where the proceeding is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction in subsection 2 of the cited Article 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration (caducidad) when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the proceeding has been initiated at the request of a party, given that the following stage is solely incumbent upon the Administration, which could not shield itself in its own inaction.-\n\nThis does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, since in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would then be a delay solely attributable to the public body.-\n\n**XII.- CONCERNING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the foregoing, it should be reiterated that, in the *sub examine* case, the plaintiff does not specify exactly which of the statute of limitations scenarios she considers applicable in her case. From the appeal filed at the administrative stage (see proven fact 12), it can be inferred that it concerns the time limit for the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against her, which she considers governed by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (CT). This Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect that is argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing which time period is applicable, a topic on which it is considered that the defendant Municipality is correct when it argues that it is the five-year period contemplated in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), since the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful conduct revolving around the handling of municipal public finances. In effect, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, starting with its judgment N° 6750-97 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, has considered *\"that the interpretation of the concept of public finance servant must be restricted to one who is in charge of the management of public funds.\"* As has been explained (and this Court agrees):\n\n*\"It should be remembered that although it is true that many people who have access to the office's patrimonial assets may work in a public entity, not all of them manage and dispose of public funds. And only to the extent that said concept is circumscribed solely to the* ***'officials who are directly related to the management and disposal of public funds'*** *, the difference in the statute of limitations periods for the disciplinary sanctioning power is justifiable, since with a longer statute of limitations period such as that established in the cited Article 71,* ***'the aim is to enable the State to have greater control over its officials who are directly related to the management and disposal of public funds, this due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the most sound and clean management possible of public funds'*** *. (Criterion reaffirmed in judgment N° 06843-98 of 3:45 p.m. on September 24, 1998, as well as in resolution N° 2001-07516 of 2:49 p.m. on August 1, 2001, recently ratified by N° 2003-04367 of 3:27 p.m. on May 21, 2003, all of them from the Constitutional Chamber).*\n\n*And based on the binding jurisprudence referred to above, the Attorney General's Office has defined what should be understood as a Public Finance official, in the following manner:*\n\n*'It is the non-binding opinion of this Attorney General's Office that* <u>*officials who 'manage public funds' should be understood as those who, in accordance with the legal order and according to the appointment act, have among their powers the administration, administrative or accounting management, of public funds*</u>*. Consequently, the term management or handling of public funds does not apply to the use of funds in the sense of patrimonial assets but to the circumstance that, according to the definition of competence, taking certain decisions or actions in relation to those funds is their responsibility. Hence, indeed the circumstance that every public official uses, for the fulfillment of their duties, for example, public property be it a desk, computer, pencil, cannot lead to considering that through such use they are 'managing' public funds. On the contrary, if they are legally recognized the possibility of using and disposing (legally or accounting-wise) of the funds in question, if their actions are subject to the necessary oversight to verify that they have responded to the purposes and objectives for which the funds are granted and, above all, according to the legally established procedures, it would have to be considered that the official is included within the assumptions of Article 71 of the Law of the Office of the Comptroller General.'*\n\n*In this order of ideas, it can be considered that, from the legal point of view, the term 'public finance servant', is delimited by the set of provisions that make up Chapter V: 'Of Sanctions and Responsibilities' of the Law of the Office of the Comptroller General. In effect, the statute of limitations regulated in Article 71 concerns the faults generically referred to in Article 68 of the same law, faults for whose commission a particular relationship of the servant with the Public Finance is required, such as could be the fact that they are responsible for enforcing the legal provisions that regulate it (as is the case with control bodies); or who decide on the administrative or accounting execution of the Budget, that is, those who can commit expenditure or order its payment, must make investments with public resources or must collect these, etc. directly participating in public financial administration. In that sense,* <u>*servants who by virtue of the competence order, directly participate in financial administration because they are responsible for receiving, administering, guarding, or paying assets or securities; or because they have the authority to contract obligations or, as the case may be, payment commitments, taking decisions in relation to the referred funds*</u> *(...)*\n\n*(...) A servant who manages public funds is one who, by provision of the legal system and according to their appointment act, is in a particular relationship with the cited funds, which allows them to participate in the different stages of the budgetary execution of income and expenditure, as well as those who intervene in the process of oversight and control of the 'Public Finance' or in general, directly participate in the financial administration of the public body in question.' (O.J.-107-98 of December 17, 1998).*\n\n*Thus, taking into consideration the special powers that the Political Constitution has assigned to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic regarding the supervision of the management of public funds and the financial management of the Public Administration, and especially the control of personnel who 'receive, guard, pay, or administer assets or securities of the State' (Resolution N° 2000-06326 of 4:18 p.m. on July 19, 2000, of the Constitutional Chamber), we can categorically affirm that* <u>*Article 71 of the cited Law N° 7428, is solely and exclusively applicable in the concrete and specific case of those officials or servants of the Public Finance, that is, those who are in charge of the management and disposal of public funds*</u> *(See among others, resolutions N°s 6750-97, 06843-98, 2001-07516 and 2003-04367 op. cit., of the Constitutional Chamber, and 2000-00949 of 8:20 a.m. on November 24, 2000, 2001-00283 of 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2001, and 2003-00669 of 9:20 a.m. on November 13, 2003, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as pronouncements C-340-2002 and C-344-2002 op. cit.).\"* (Attorney General's Office of the Republic, *\"Manual of Administrative Procedure\"*, San José, 2006, pages 222-224; the underlining is ours.)\n\nIn our case, it is accredited (proven fact 1) that the plaintiff was serving in the position of Municipal Supplier and, in that sense, the conduct that was attributed to her had to do, precisely, with aspects specific to that function and typical of the management of institutional property and resources, such as the handling of administrative contract processes and the registration of municipal assets. In this way, there is no doubt that the applicable statute of limitations period is not the generic one of numeral 603 of the CT, but rather the special one of ordinal 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, since a prior inquiry was conducted in the case by the Internal Audit Office, we must abide by what is prescribed in subsection b) of the cited norm, which indicates that the start of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the attention of the head or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding. In this case, the first report describing the prevailing situation in the Municipal Supply Department came to the attention of the Mayor –who is the holder of the disciplinary power in this case, pursuant to Articles 17 subsection k) and 149 of the Municipal Code– on May 21, 2008 (proven fact 3); while the second –in which the opening of the administrative proceeding that led to the plaintiff's dismissal was requested– did so on the following August 8 (proven fact 4). And considering that the respective statement of charges was notified to her on November 28 of the same year 2008 (proven fact 6), it is obvious that the five-year period set for this purpose had not –even remotely– expired. Consequently, this part of the claim is denied.-\n\n**XIII.- CONCERNING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS.** Derived essentially from Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, the Constitutional Chamber has reiterated the existence of several basic formalities, which guarantee the fundamental rights of subjects who may be harmed by the issuance of an administrative act. Thus, since judgment N° 15-90 of 4:45 p.m. on January 5, 1990, these constitutive elements of due process in the administrative venue have been defined, when it was indicated:\n\n*\"[The] right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is usually called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilateral hearing' of 'due legal process' or 'principle of contradiction' (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued.*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*[The] right of defense safeguarded in Article 39 ibidem, not only governs jurisdictional proceedings, but also any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration; and that the claimant must necessarily be given, if they so wish, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise their defense...\"*.\n\nIn the *sub examine* case and notwithstanding that the claim is absolutely devoid of elements of judgment to establish, with precision, what the deficiencies allegedly incurred in this regard are, it is the opinion of this Chamber that the requirements of due process were adequately observed in the substantiation of the disciplinary file against the plaintiff. In effect, by means of the statement of charges order (proven fact 6), the interested party was notified of the nature and purposes of the proceeding, the facts imputed to her, and the type of sanction to which she could become liable. Therein, she was also summoned to an oral and private hearing; the documents existing as evidence in the file and the persons who would be summoned as witnesses were listed; and she was warned about the remedies available against that resolution. Later, the investigated party had the opportunity to be heard, for which purpose she first presented an exculpatory document (proven fact 7), attended the oral and private hearing (proven fact 8), and afterwards provided a summary of what she considered as \"succinct conclusions\" of the proceeding (proven fact 9). Regarding legal representation, it is worth noting that the plaintiff is a lawyer, so there is no doubt as to her defense on that particular point. The final act was duly reasoned (see in this regard what is set forth below) and notified to the interested party (proven fact 11). Finally, she had the opportunity to appeal the decision (as related starting from proven fact 12). In any event, it is important to consider that the question of whether or not the right of defense of the now plaintiff was violated during the proceeding has already been examined and dismissed by the Constitutional Chamber, upon the filing of an amparo remedy against the municipal hierarchy, which was declared without merit by that High Court through judgment Nº 2009-014631 of 12:21 p.m. on September 18, 2009 (proven fact 17), a pronouncement that, of course, is endowed with the binding effect *erga omnes* established in Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.-\n\n**XIV.-** A final question, relating to due process, has to do with the argument that the plaintiff made in the concluding phase, in the sense that there was an inconsistency between the initial charge forming the basis of the proceeding (which attributed to her a series of breaches in her duties as a reason to initiate the proceeding) and the final act (which indicates lack of suitability for the performance of the position as the reason for dismissal). This collegiate body rejects said imputation. Having analyzed the statement of charges (see proven fact 6), it is observed that it lists a series of specific deficiencies attributed to the plaintiff, several of which (and, it is the opinion of this Chamber, all of them as well, taken together) pointed, precisely, towards the fact that she lacked the conditions of proven suitability to serve as Municipal Supplier, including –just to cite one example– when it was attributed to her that she *\"is unaware of the responsibilities and coordination relations assigned to her by the Municipality's Job Manual\"*. In this sense, the imputation of lack of suitability, made in the final act, is merely a value judgment that summarizes or describes the set of deficiencies –broken down in the statement of charges– towards whose verification the proceeding was directed. In this way, this collegiate body does not find that between one thing and the other there exists any divergence capable of vitiating what was resolved by incurring in inconsistency. Hence, the argument is rejected.-\n\n**XV.- CONCERNING THE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL AND THE REASONING OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE PROCEEDING AND OF THE REJECTION OF THE APPEAL.** The plaintiff alleges that the dismissal decision (contained in the final act of the proceeding) was unjustified, since the cause attributed was not accredited, rather obeying a reprisal originating from a complaint she had filed against a municipal official for workplace harassment. Furthermore, she denounces that both that act and the one that resolved her appeal lack proper reasoning. Regarding the first point, the review of the disciplinary file leads this Court to reject the plaintiff's argument. In effect, both the proceeding itself and the dismissal agreement that ended it were supported by two exhaustive reports issued by none other than the Internal Audit Office of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, in which a long list of both actions and omissions was detailed that denoted a defective fulfillment of the delicate responsibilities of the Supply Department of that local entity. It was also taken into account, as an evaluative element and as if that were not enough, that the now plaintiff had been reprimanded for similar faults barely a year before the opening of the second disciplinary file, an occasion on which she was cautioned about the consequences of incurring again in those deficiencies (see proven fact 18). Consequently, it is considered that the serious faults that led to the dismissal decision were indeed sufficiently accredited.-\n\n**XVI.-** In addition to the foregoing, in this litigation the plaintiff did not provide any evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that a diverse and illegitimate purpose was pursued in the proceeding instituted against her, namely, to punish her as a result of a complaint she filed for alleged workplace and sexual harassment (unproven fact 3). The evidentiary duty (which in this jurisdiction derives from the provisions of Article 317 of the supplementary Code of Civil Procedure and numerals 58 subsection f, 82 and 85 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA)) obliges the demonstration of those facts that determine the applicable legal framework and give support to the claims and defenses of the parties. Certainly, had that circumstance been proven, we would be facing a clear misuse of power (ordinal 131.3 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP)) that could have supported a pronouncement of an annulment nature in this venue. But it was not so, rendering the argument futile and it must be dismissed.-\n\n**XVII.-** The same occurs with respect to the reproach relating to an alleged lack of reasoning of the final act. In effect, it is supported by the final report of proven and unproven facts presented by the directing body of the proceeding (see proven fact 10), which clearly describes the deficiencies incurred by the plaintiff in the performance of her duties; and which, as indicated, originates in turn from the two Audit reports relating to the same aspect. For its part, the agreement of the Municipal Council that resolved the filed appeal (as was appropriate prior to the reform of Article 150 of the Municipal Code), contains a certainly brief, but sufficient, exposition of the reasons why it agreed to reject it (see proven fact 16), for which it even had the opinion of a legal advisor contracted for this purpose.-\n\n**XVIII.-** To conclude this section, it is worth reiterating that the argument of lack of reasoning of the final act was also heard and denied by the Constitutional Chamber in resolution N° 2009-014631 alluded to *supra*. For this and all the reasons already stated, the reproach that has been examined is not upheld.-\n\n**XIX.- CONCERNING THE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES.** As a consequence of the requested nullity of her dismissal decision, the plaintiff requests various pecuniary reparations, stated both as a principal and also as a subsidiary claim in resultando 1 of this ruling, which include both material and moral damages. In this sense, the mere fact that the substantive claim of the lawsuit has been rejected is sufficient grounds to deny the economic claim formulated, as it is accessory to the former. In effect, to the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been verified, no injury that the plaintiff is not obligated to bear has been configured either. Administrative liability, under the regime of the LGAP, requires not only establishing the existence of harmful administrative conduct and a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury, but also, that between the two there is a causal nexus, that is, a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact imputed and the damage produced; a nexus that must not be seen broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided for in ordinal 190 *ibidem*. In this case, for all the reasons already stated, this Court does not consider that the action of the defendant Municipality in this case was illegitimate, which irremediably eliminates one of the stated critical elements for the configuration of a potential non-contractual administrative liability, namely, the verification of the existence of harmful conduct originating a material or moral injury that the administered party is not obligated to bear (Article 194 of the LGAP).-\n\n**XX.- REGARDING THE DEFENSES INTERPOSED:** The defendant initially opposed those of lack of right and statute of limitations, later clarifying at the preliminary hearing that it would not make use of the second, as related in the corresponding resultando. Regarding the first, based on the reasons of fact and law set forth in the preceding recitals, the defense must be upheld, declaring the claim without merit in all its aspects.-\n\n**XXI.- CONCERNING COSTS.** Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, in accordance with what is established in that same norm, in concordance with numeral 119.2 *ibidem*.\n\nThe waiver of this condemnation is only viable: a) when, in the judgment of the Court, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when there is *plus petitio* (minor claim), that is, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount ultimately obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 *ibidem*). In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemnation of the losing party. Therefore, payment of both types of costs is imposed on the plaintiff.-\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nThe objection of lack of right is upheld. The lawsuit filed by Nombre128316 against the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia is declared IMPROPER in all its terms. Both types of costs are borne by the plaintiff. NOTIFÍQUESE.-\n\nCHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA\n\nSILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES                                                                                                                                                                                    FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ"
}