{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-610135", "citation": "Res. 00056-2014 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Despido de policía por negligencia en control de ingreso", "title_en": "Police dismissal for negligence in entry control duties", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV resolvió un proceso de conocimiento interpuesto por un exoficial de la Fuerza Pública contra el Estado, solicitando la nulidad de su despido y reinstalación. El actor fue despedido sin responsabilidad patronal tras permitir el ingreso de un desconocido vestido de policía a una unidad donde se sustrajeron armas. El Tribunal determinó que el actor, como oficial de guardia, tenía la obligación clara de controlar ingresos y verificar identidades, conforme a manuales internos y la Ley General de Policía. Su omisión constituyó una falta grave por negligencia, violación del deber de probidad y puesta en riesgo del interés público. Se aplicó el principio de tipicidad relativa en materia disciplinaria, confirmando que no se requiere una tipificación exhaustiva de la conducta. El Tribunal rechazó la demanda, declaró sin lugar las pretensiones y condenó en costas al actor, validando la legalidad del acto administrativo de despido.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Court, Section IV, decided a lawsuit filed by a former Public Force officer against the State, seeking annulment of his dismissal and reinstatement. The plaintiff was dismissed without employer liability after allowing an unknown person dressed as a police officer to enter a security unit, leading to the theft of weapons. The Court found that the officer, as guard commander, had a clear duty to control entries and verify identities per internal manuals and the General Police Law. His omission constituted a serious fault due to negligence, breach of probity duty, and endangerment of public interest. The Court applied the principle of relative specificity in disciplinary matters, confirming no exhaustive criminal-type description is required. The lawsuit was dismissed; the Court upheld the legality of the administrative dismissal and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV", "date": "30/06/2014", "year": "2014", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "deber de probidad", "tipicidad relativa", "interés público", "oficial de guardia", "despido sin responsabilidad patronal" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "despido sin responsabilidad patronal", "oficial de guardia", "control de ingreso", "negligencia", "deber de probidad", "interés público", "tipicidad relativa", "fuerza pública", "procedimiento disciplinario", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo" ], "keywords_en": [ "dismissal without employer liability", "guard commander", "entry control", "negligence", "duty of probity", "public interest", "relative specificity", "public force", "disciplinary procedure", "Administrative Court" ], "excerpt_es": "El Oficial de Guardia deberá consignar todos los acontecimientos diarios... De igual manera deberá anotar, la hora de ingreso y salida a la Delegación Policial de cualquier persona y su cargo, aún si el tiempo de estadía es mínimo y sin importar que el motivo de la estancia del particular sea en carácter de visita, o bien que se trate de un compañero que está en su tiempo libre....\n\nEstima este Tribunal que de la prueba existente y de la naturaleza misma de la función realizada por el actor, es evidente que él como oficial de guardia, debió de haber al menos, solicitado la cédula de identidad de la persona que ingresaba a la unidad a su cargo y constatado su debida procedencia, determinando la razón de su presencia y máxime si ésta pretendía retirar armamento del lugar.\n\nEn el caso en examen, se ha tenido por demostrado que la falta grave que tuvo por demostrada, se traduce en una seria y comprobada violación del deber de probidad del actor, por cuanto éste, con su actuar no actúo conforme al interés público y no realizó, una conducta que pudiere estimarse acorde con la legalidad y eficacia, no pudiendo rendir cuentas de manera satisfactoria ante la confianza depositada en él.", "excerpt_en": "The Guard Officer must record all daily events... Likewise, they must note the time of entry and exit to the Police Station of any person and their position, even if the stay is minimal and regardless of whether the reason for the visit is personal or it involves a colleague who is off duty....\n\nThis Court considers that from the existing evidence and the nature of the function performed by the plaintiff, it is evident that as guard commander, he should have at least requested the ID of the person entering the unit under his charge and verified their proper origin, determining the reason for their presence, especially if they intended to remove weapons from the premises.\n\nIn the case under review, it has been demonstrated that the serious fault proven constitutes a serious and confirmed violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, since his conduct did not act in accordance with the public interest and did not perform a conduct that could be considered in line with legality and efficiency, failing to account satisfactorily for the trust placed in him.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The lawsuit was denied in all aspects, confirming the legality of the plaintiff's dismissal without employer liability for a serious fault in exercising his duties.", "summary_es": "Se declaró sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, confirmando la legalidad del despido sin responsabilidad patronal del actor por falta grave en el ejercicio de sus funciones." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV.II.II", "quote_en": "…the reproach of the conduct displayed in the present case is objectively aggravated by his negligence—understood as the omission of the diligence or care that the worker must have in the performance of his assigned duties—in the specific case as head of the Guard Office, the day of the events, he allowed the entry of an individual wearing a police uniform…", "quote_es": "…el reproche de las conductas desplegadas en el caso de marras, se agrava objetivamente por cuanto con su negligencia - entendida esta como la omisión de la diligencia o cuidado que debe tener el trabajador en el desempeño del cargo asignado- en el caso concreto como encargado de la Oficialía de Guardia, el día de los hechos, permitió el ingreso de un individuo que portaba el uniforme policial…" }, { "context": "Considerando IV.II.II", "quote_en": "In the case under review, it has been demonstrated that the serious fault proven constitutes a serious and confirmed violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, since his conduct did not act in accordance with the public interest…", "quote_es": "En el caso en examen, se ha tenido por demostrado que la falta grave que tuvo por demostrada, se traduce en una seria y comprobada violación del deber de probidad del actor, por cuanto éste, con su actuar no actúo conforme al interés público…" } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-48116", "citation": "Ley 8220", "title_en": "Protection of Citizens from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures", "title_es": "Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos", "doc_type": "law", "date": "04/03/2002", "year": "2002" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-134529", "citation": "Res. 04453-2000 Sala Constitucional", "title_en": "Collective bargaining agreements in the public sector: unconstitutionality for employees governed by public law", "title_es": "Convenciones colectivas en el sector público: inconstitucionalidad para servidores regidos por derecho público", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "date": "24/05/2000", "year": "2000" }, { "id": "norm-32708", "citation": "Ley 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute", "title_es": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/05/1953", "year": "1953" }, { "id": "norm-48116", "citation": "Ley 8220", "title_en": "Protection of Citizens from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures", "title_es": "Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos", "doc_type": "law", "date": "04/03/2002", "year": "2002" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-610135", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-32708", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953" }, { "doc_id": "norm-48116", "norm_num": "8220", "norm_name": "Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "04/03/2002" }, { "doc_id": "norm-53738", "norm_num": "8422", "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8975", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "16/01/1955" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO\n\nCentral 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01\n\nSegundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A ( Antiguo Edificio Motorola)\n\n \n\nEXPEDIENTE: 13-000828-1178-LA\n\nPROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO\n\nACTOR: Nombre24170 \n\nDEMANDADO: El Estado \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n56 -2014-IV \n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, Dirección04 , a las once horas con quince minutos del treinta de junio del año dos mil catorce .\n\n \n\nProceso de Conocimiento interpuesto por Nombre24170 , mayor de edad, soltero, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED87428 - - , vecino de Desamparados, representado por Nombre24171 , mayor de edad, soltera, vecina de Alajuela, abogada, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED87429- - contra el ESTADO, representado por Nombre1157 , mayor de edad, abogada, soltera, vecina de Mora, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED894- - , en su condición de Procuradora A.- \n\n \n\n RESULTANDO\n\n 1.- Que la parte actora interpone demanda contra el ente demandado y solicita en lo conducente, lo siguiente:\n\na) La nulidad de la resolución que da pie al despido del actor así como su consecuente reinstalación.\n\nb) El reconocimiento de salarios dejados de percibir\n\nc) El pago de costas e intereses\n\n 2.- Que corrido el traslado de rigor mediante resolución de once horas y treinta y siete minutos del veintiuno de agosto de dos mil trece, la representación del Estado, rechazó la demanda , opuso la defensa de fondo de falta de derecho y solicitó la condena en costas (folios 112 a 126 del expediente judicial) \n\n 3.- Que a las trece horas y treinta minutos del diecinueve de noviembre de dos mil trece, se realizó audiencia preliminar en el presente proceso con la presencia de los representantes de las partes. Se señala los hechos controvertidos. Se admite la prueba documental y testimonial. (folios 139 y 140 del expediente judicial)\n\n 4 .- Que a las ocho horas y treinta minutos del día dieciséis de junio de dos mil catorce se realizó audiencia oral y pública en el presente proceso, con la presencia de las partes y sus abogadas, y ante el mismo Tribunal que dicta la sentencia. En dicha audiencia se ordenó prueba para mejor resolver y se reservó el conocimiento de las conclusiones para cuando esta fuera aportada.\n\n 5.- Que a las nueve horas con quince minutos del día veinticinco de junio de dos mil catorce se realizó continuación de la audiencia oral en el presente proceso, se conoció de la prueba para mejor resolver solicitada y se escuchó las conclusiones de las partes. \n\n 6.- Que en el proceso ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido al efecto por el numeral 111.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, previa deliberación y por unanimidad.-\n\n \n\nRedacta el Juez Campos Hidalgo\n\n \n\n \n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- Sobre la teoría del caso de la parte actora y sus principales razonamientos: La parte actora funda su teoría del caso en los siguientes argumentos de fondo: \n\na.- Que el actor era un policía que el día de los hechos que se le imputan, realizaba funciones de oficial de guardia. \n\nb.- Que fue despedido por el ingreso de una persona uniformada a las instalaciones en donde laboraba, quien se llevó varias armas.\n\nc.- Que en su labor se da la inexistencia de protocolos para efectos de responsabilidad en identificación de personas\n\nd.- Que la responsabilidad de lo sucedido era del centinela.\n\ne.- Que el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública no contaba con un protocolo de actuación durante la época de los hechos, lo cual fue probado en la comparecencia oral en sede administrativa. \n\nf. Que en el procedimiento no se valoró de manera adecuada la prueba aportada. \n\ng. Que el equipo sustraído fue recuperado en su momento.\n\nh. Que en sede penal sólo se determinó la responsabilidad del centinela y del armero\n\ni. Que la sanción impuesta obedece a una situación mediática y hay responsabilidad de los altos mandos policiales por la falta de controles. \n\nII.- Sobre la teoría del caso de la representación del Estado y sus principales razonamientos: La representación del Estado funda su oposición a la demanda en los siguientes razonamientos:\n\na.- Que lo acaecido es falta grave, por cuanto él como oficial de guardia permitió el ingreso de un desconocido sin identificación alguna, quien retiró del lugar una subametralladora Uzi, otra marca Jericó y un chaleco antibalas. \n\nb.- Que el actor era el funcionario responsable de realizar el control de ingreso del personal, en un libro interno de entradas y salidas, siendo así que él tenía bien claras sus funciones. \n\nc.- Que el hecho pudo haber puesto en riesgo la seguridad y vida de personas, de haberse empleado de manera indebida las armas sustraídas.\n\nd.- Que las obligaciones del actor se encuentran debidamente establecidas en los manuales aplicables a su actividad.\n\ne.- Que el actor fue despedido por la comisión de una falta grave en el ejercicio de sus labores y no por su participación en un delito penal.\n\nf.- Que en el despido del actor se cumplió de manera debida e íntegra el debido proceso administrativo.\n\ng.- Que la conducta del actor permitió la salida de armamento en manos de un tercero, poniendo en riesgo el conglomerado social. \n\nh.- Que no se advierten vicios de nulidad en la conducta administrativa objetada por la parte actora. \n\nIII.- Del Objeto del proceso: De lo expresado por las partes, tanto en sus pretensiones como argumentos, el objeto del presente proceso estriba en determinar la conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico del acto sancionatorio dictado en contra de la parte actora. \n\nIV.- Razonamiento del Tribunal. \n\nIV.I.- En particular sobre los hechos probados: De esta naturaleza, y de importancia para la resolución del asunto, durante el proceso para este Tribunal han quedado demostrados los siguientes hechos: \n\n1. Que a las 19:50 minutos del día 15 de junio de 2011, encontrándose como oficial de guardia, el actor del presente proceso, hizo ingreso a la Dirección Primera Región Hatillo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, un sujeto, diciendo llamarse Nombre110641 y portando uniforme de la Fuerza Pública (folios 02, 03, 06, 09,010, 011, 018, 032 del expediente administrativo)\n\n2. Que el sujeto denominado Nombre110641 fue acompañado en su ingreso por el centinela en servicio, oficial Alex Fallas Fonseca, quien le indica al actor que áquel viene del puesto Delta Charly Tres. (folio 8 y 18 del expediente administrativo)\n\n3. Que como parte de las funciones del actor, le correspondía a él llevar el control y anotación de ingreso de terceros y funcionarios. (folio 10 del expediente administrativo, 10 y 11 de los Lineamientos generales para el manejo, uso, resguardo y archivo de los libros de control y registro policial, 13 del Manual del libro de novedades y registros, \n\n4. Que en el momento de ingresar el sujeto denominado Nombre110641 , el actor no le solicitó identificación alguna, limitándose a consignar únicamente su nombre y apellidos en el libro respectivo. (folio 09, 10, 28 del expediente administrativo)\n\n5. Que el sujeto que manifestó llamarse Nombre110641 , habiendo pasado el puesto de guardia respectivo, se dirigió la armería del lugar y retiró de manos del armero, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca un arma de reglamento Jerichó, 9mm patrimonio 175374, serie 96306150 con un cargador y 15 proyectiles, una sub ametralladora UZI serie 952712, patrimonio 174925 con un cargador y 25 proyectiles sin percutir y un chaleco antibalas, retirándose con posterioridad de la Dirección13069 . (folio 02, 03, 10, 30 del expediente administrativo) \n\n6. Que el sujeto que manifestó llamarse Nombre110641 no entregó ninguna identificación a la hora de retirar las indicadas armas (folio 11 del expediente administrativo)\n\n7. Que el actor consultó al puesto de procedencia del supuesto señor Nombre110641 y alertó con respecto a que el mismo no laboraba allí, cuando éste ya se había retirado de la Dirección13070 . (folio 28 del expediente administrativo)\n\n8. Que no existe ningún funcionario del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública llamado Nombre110641 (folio 27 del expediente administrativo) \n\n9. Que las funciones del oficial de guardia con respecto al control de ingreso y salida de personas, se encontraban reguladas en diferentes manuales emitidos por el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, siendo así que a él le correspondía el control en el ingreso y salida de personas de la respectiva unidad policial. (folios 10 y 11 del expediente de Lineamientos Generales sobre el Manejo, Resguardo, Archivo de los Libros de Control y Registro Policial, folios 11 a 14 del expediente del Manual del Libro de Novedades y Registros, folios 14 y 15 del Manual del Libro de Guardia, todos ordenados como prueba para mejor resolver, declaración testimonial de Nombre110642 y Milton Grijalba Valverde)\n\n10. Que mediante resolución de ocho horas del día diecisiete de junio de dos mil once se instauró procedimiento administrativo disciplinario al actor, con base en la siguiente imputación: \"Negligencia en sus funciones, como oficial de guardia de la Dirección Regional Uno de la Fuerza Pública, al permitir que un sujeto particular que andaba vestido con uniforme oficial de la fuerza pública permaneciera en las instalaciones de dicha base policial, sin corroborar efectivamente que el mismo fuera un funcionario policial adscrito a este Ministerio. Hechos ocurridos el día 15 de junio de 2011.\" (folio 170 del expediente administrativo) \n\n11. Que el día 13 de setiembre de dos mil once se realizó la comparecencia oral en el procedimiento administrativo instaurado al actor con la presencia de éste y su abogado (folios 199 a 214 del expediente administrativo) \n\n12. Que mediante resolución 0527-2011 CP de quince horas con treinta y cuatro minutos del catorce de diciembre de 2011 el Consejo de Personal del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública recomendó despedir por causa justificada al actor (folios 240 a 244 del expediente administrativo)\n\n13. Que mediante resolución 2012-1993 DM de 10:00 horas de 14 de mayo de 2012 se dispuso el despido sin responsabilidad patronal del actor. Dicha resolución fue confirmada por la 2012-3665 DM de trece horas del treinta de octubre del dos mil doce (folios 245 a 250, 281 a 283 del expediente administrativo) \n\n14. Que para la fecha en que sucedieron los hechos había señales de una especial amenaza a la seguridad por la eventualidad de un intento de liberación de una persona custodiada en el centro de detención de personas extranjeras ubicado en las cercanías de la unidad policial en donde sucedieron los hechos objeto del presente proceso. (declaración testimonial de Nombre110642 y Milton Grijalba Valverde) \n\nIV.I.I- Hechos no probados: No demostró la parte actora: \n\na.- Que la responsabilidad del control de ingreso y salida a la unidad administrativa en donde laboraba fuera imputable a otros funcionarios.\n\nb.- Que la conducta administrativa objetada estuviere viciada de nulidad.\n\nIV.II.- Sobre el análisis general del tema objeto de análisis : \n\nIV.II.I.- Consideraciones sobre el empleo público: En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas. Los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política es la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción, al establecer lo siguiente: “Artículo 191.- Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración” y “Artículo 192.- Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. De conformidad con las indicadas normas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus Instituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia, estabilidad en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio de la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con los demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de subordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas, huelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva, excluida por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional). Correlativo con las anteriores derechos, el servidor público posee una serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial, inherentes a los fines públicos buscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión, a fin de no incurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo público, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad, eficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno) d) deber de proteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art. 4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber de dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art. 5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) deber de obediencia (art. 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) deber de actuar con eficacia (art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) i) deber de guardar decoro y de brindar debida atención al usuario (art. 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y art. 39. d) y e) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j) deber de responder en caso de haber actuado con dolo o culpa grave (art. 199 y 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) deber de acatar la Constitución Política (art. 11 de dicho cuerpo normativo). Adicionalmente, de manera supletoria, con base en el artículo 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 51 del indicado Estatuto, le son aplicables a dicha relación de empleo público, las disposiciones propias del Código de Trabajo y demás disposiciones relacionadas con la relación de trabajo, como por empleo la Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, entre otras. En este orden de ideas, si bien en materia de empleo público no podemos hablar de una plena integración del ordenamiento jurídico y principios en materia laboral habida cuenta de la existencia de una relación estatutaria y no contractual, (artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), no puede obviarse la existencia de líneas generales de orientación de la relación que son comunes, como por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de buena fe entre ambas partes, contemplado en el artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. Con relación al régimen disciplinario a aplicar en caso de incumplimiento de dichos deberes, de conformidad con sendos votos de la Sala Constitucional, el principio de tipicidad se torna más laxo, por lo que no se requiere una específica tipificación legal de la conducta, dada la naturaleza misma de la situación jurídica de los servidores. En este sentido, el voto 2007-013903 de las quince horas y veinticinco minutos del tres de octubre del dos mil siete de la Sala Constitucional, indica lo siguiente: \"V.- Sobre el principio de tipicidad en el régimen disciplinario.- El principio de tipicidad es una aplicación del principio de legalidad que exige por un lado, la delimitación concreta de las conductas que se hacen reprochables a efectos de su sanción, y por otro lado, la delimitación concreta de las posibles sanciones a aplicar, pudiendo afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria. En cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la conducta reprochable, esta Sala ha sostenido en anteriores oportunidades (ver al respecto la resolución 2005-06616 de las veinte horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil cinco y 94-5594 de las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro) que aunque ciertamente este principio en esta materia no tiene la misma forma que en el ámbito jurídico- penal -ya que puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente- siempre debe entenderse que estas faltas están incluidas en el texto. Es decir, puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto y siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la sanción, a diferencia de lo que se viene de decir, ésta sí debe estar clara y previamente establecida, sin que pueda la Administración crear sanciones nuevas que no estén contempladas en las normas aplicables. En resumen, aunque se infiere que los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables -pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos- y que los principios \"nullum crimen sine lege\", \"nullum poena sine lege\" no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, siempre es necesario en materia disciplinaria, en atención al principio de tipicidad, que la conducta se infiera del texto normativo y que la sanción esté –está si- claramente preestablecida\". Lo anterior genera lo que en doctrina es conocido como el principio de tipificación relativa en el entendido que la falta debe estar prevista en el ordenamiento disciplinario, pero sin el nivel de rigurosidad propio de la materia penal en cuanto se derive de la relación de servicio en concreto. En razón de lo anterior, son sancionables, tanto el incumplimiento de los deberes funcionales generales, como las conductas tipificadas legalmente (a nivel de Estatuto de Servicio Civil, normas estatutarias propias del régimen o Código de Trabajo, por ejemplo), y aquellas que se encuentren contempladas en normas de carácter inferior, como las contenidas en los reglamentos autónomos de servicio o en los casos en los cuales la tipificación se de con respecto a la sanción a imponer. Esta tipificación relativa flexibiliza la necesidad de normas positiva en carácter de ley formal, siendo posible que su regulación se genere por norma positiva de menor rango. Las anteriores consideraciones, sin perjuicio de que existen una serie de principios del derecho sancionatorio derivados del derecho penal, de necesario cumplimiento en todos los casos, v.g. proporcionalidad, non bis in idem, inocencia, debido proceso, debida fundamentación de la resolución respectiva. En este orden de ideas, es de advertir que en materia de definición de conductas que pueden ser consideradas como parte de los deberes propios de los funcionarios públicos u objeto de sanción en caso de incumplimiento, nuestro país posee un sistema difuso, habida cuenta que las mismas no se encuentran detalladas en un solo cuerpo normativo, sino dispersas entre diferentes normas de distinto rango, privando mayor especificidad en las normas reglamentarias que cada ente opte por dictar, según el artículo 27 del Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Lo anterior, de conformidad con las potestades auto normativas de la Administración Pública, y habida cuenta de la imposibilidad de que por la vía legal se puedan normar todas y cada una de las conductas concretas en que incurren los servidores públicos, y en el entendido de que el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria se encuentra limitado por el marco general del ordenamiento supra legal. De manera transversal a este conjunto de principios y normas de diferente rango, en esta materia encontramos el interés público como un referente constante en la adopción de cualquier decisión o conducta formal o informal de la Administración con respecto a sus servidores. Dicho interés entendido de conformidad con el artículo 113 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispone: \"1. El servidor público deberá desempeñar sus funciones de modo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, el cual será considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados. 2. El interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración Pública cuando pueda estar en conflicto. 3. En la apreciación del interés público se tendrá en cuenta, en primer lugar, los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia para la comunidad y el individuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse la mera conveniencia\". En razón de lo anterior, todo análisis en materia de empleo público no debe obviar el análisis del cumplimiento del interés público en la adopción de la respectiva decisión administrativa, como fundamental referente de su motivación subyacente.\n\nIV.II.II.- Consideraciones sobre el fondo del presente proceso: En lo medular la parte actora en su demanda invoca que la verificación de la identidad de las personas que ingresaban al puesto en donde él laboraba, no era su responsabilidad, habida cuenta que en dicho lugar había un centinela, encargado de dicha función. De manera adicional indica la inexistencia de regulación interna con respecto de dicha obligación y por consiguiente rechaza el motivo de la responsabilidad disciplinaria que le fue imputada y que dio como base su despido sin responsabilidad patronal. El Estado en su respuesta, mantiene la legalidad de la conducta administrativa e indica que el actor era responsable de verificar el ingreso de cualquier persona, dado que estaba en el puesto de guardia, siendo así que sus obligaciones laborales como tal, eran suficientemente claras y definidas. Al respecto, y en concreto, sobre los hechos que dan origen a la presente demanda, este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que a las 19:50 minutos del día 15 de junio de 2011, hizo ingreso a la Dirección Primera Región Hatillo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, un sujeto, diciendo llamarse Nombre110641 y portando uniforme de la Fuerza Pública. Consta en autos que dicha persona fue acompañado en su ingreso por el centinela en servicio, oficial Alex Fallas Fonseca, siendo así que una vez que pasó por el puesto de guardia respectivo, se dirigió a la armería del lugar y retiró de manos del armero, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca un arma de reglamento Nombre110643, 9mm patrimonio 175374, serie 96306150 con un cargador y 15 proyectiles, una sub ametralladora UZI serie 952712, patrimonio 174925 con un cargador y 25 proyectiles sin percutir y un chaleco antibalas, retirándose con posterioridad de la Dirección Primera Región Hatillo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. Consta y no es controvertido, que la indicada persona no era oficial de la fuerza pública, por lo que se llevó de manera antijurídica el indicado armamento. Con respecto a las responsabilidades imputadas en el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario ordinario, se ha demostrado que los anteriores hechos ocurrieron, cuando la parte actora en el presente proceso se encontraba realizando funciones de oficial de guardia,siendo así que en el momento de ingresar el sujeto denominado Nombre110641 , el actor no le solicitó identificación alguna, limitándose a consignar únicamente su nombre y apellidos en el libro respectivo. De conformidad con lo anterior y de una revisión de la prueba documental y testimonial admitida y solicitada, estima este Tribunal que no lleva razón la parte actora. Lo anterior en tanto que consta en autos que el señor Nombre24170 , poseía unas serie de obligaciones claramente definidas como oficial de guardia, que fueron claramente incumplidas al momento de los hechos. En este sentido, existe prueba que como parte de las funciones del actor, le correspondía a él llevar el control y anotación de ingreso de terceros y funcionarios. En este orden de ideas, el propio actor en entrevista realizada el 16 de junio de 2011, indicó lo siguiente: \"... yo tengo que llevar un control de los ingresos a ciertos puestos, parte de mis funciones es anotar el ingreso de estos funcionarios....\" y además \".... yo no le solicité la identificación a este señor....\". De manera adicional, los Lineamientos generales para el manejo, uso, resguardo y archivo de los libros de control y registro policial, indican sobre dicha obligación, lo siguiente: \"El Libro de Entrada y Salida del Personal es una herramienta que se utiliza de forma exclusiva para llevar el control de ingreso y salida del personal de la dependencia policial. Corresponderá al oficial de guardia realizar la entrada y salida de los funcionarios, abocándose a los parámetros establecidos en este protocolo...\" Por otra parte, el Manual del libro de novedades y registros, indica al respecto, lo siguiente: \"El Oficial de Guardia deberá consignar todos los acontecimientos diarios... De igual manera deberá anotar, la hora de ingreso y salida a la Delegación Policial de cualquier persona y su cargo, aún si el tiempo de estadía es mínimo y sin importar que el motivo de la estancia del particular sea en carácter de visita, o bien que se trate de un compañero que está en su tiempo libre....\" En el mismo sentido, los folios 14 y 15 del Manual del Libro de Guardia indican similar disposición, así como las declaraciones testimoniales de los señores Nombre110642 y Milton Grijalba Valverde. Como se advierte, la parte actora no cumplió a cabalidad con sus obligaciones, habida cuenta que se limitó a anotar el nombre de la persona que decía llamarse Nombre110641 , mas sin llevar a plenitud el control impuesto por su cargo. Por otra parte, el articulo 8 de la Ley General de Policía, dispone, al respecto lo siguiente: \"Son atribuciones generales de todas las fuerzas de policía: .... l) Llevar los libros de registro necesarios, en los que constarán: las operaciones policiales, los responsables de esas actividades, la nómina completa del personal que intervenga en cada operativo, patrullaje o acción policial, los datos personales, las horas de ingreso y egreso de los detenidos, así como otr os datos que sirvan para el adecuado control de esas operaciones...\". Lo anterior se ve reforzado si atendemos a que el actor consultó al puesto de procedencia del supuesto señor Nombre110641 y alertó con respecto a que el mismo no laboraba allí, cuando éste ya se había retirado de la Dirección Primera Región Hatillo. Estima este Tribunal que de la prueba existente y de la naturaleza misma de la función realizada por el actor, es evidente que él como oficial de guardia, debió de haber al menos, solicitado la cédula de identidad de la persona que ingresaba a la unidad a su cargo y constatado su debida procedencia, determinando la razón de su presencia y máxime si ésta pretendía retirar armamento del lugar. La actividad de control esperada en un oficial que ocupaba el puesto del actor, era la diligencia media que podría presumirse de una persona que es la encargada de verificar el ingreso de propios y extraños a las instalaciones a su cargo. Esa actividad implicaba necesariamente constatar fehacientemente que la persona que accedía a dicho lugar no implicara un riesgo a la seguridad, lo cual tiene como presupuesto inicial, el requerimiento de una identificación par la constatación de la efectividad de los motivos alegados para ingresar al lugar. En este orden de ideas, debe advertirse que al actor no se le imputa una conducta dolosa o connivencia con la persona que sustrajo las armas, sino una actuación culposa, fundada en su actuación omisa o negligente al no cumplir deberes de cuidado básicos y acordes con sus funciones. La resolución administrativa objeto del presente proceso, indica al respecto lo siguiente: \".. el reproche de las conductas desplegadas en el caso de marras, se agrava objetivamente por cuanto con su negligencia - entendida esta como la omisión de la diligencia o cuidado que debe tener el trabajador en el desempeño del cargo asignado- en el caso concreto como encargado de la Oficialía de Guardia, el día de los hechos, permitió el ingreso de un individuo que portaba el uniforme policial, el cual dijo llamarse Nombre110641 , y que se dirijía a retirar el equipo de trabajo porque iba ser un relevo en la Delegación Policial de Hospital, sobre el particular, la conducta desplegada se agrava objetivamente, por cuanto su función lo era precisamente la seguridad de la Oficialía de Guardia, es decir, el ingreso a las instalaciones de la Dirección Regional, siendo que sin justificación alguna y apartándose totalmente de los procedimientos más elementales que dicta la razón la lógica, no exigió ni solicitó ningún elemento de identificación para cerciorarse de lo relatado por el sujeto...\" . En este sentido, la parte actora no ha demostrado que su actuar se haya apegado a un mínimo de diligencia en el hecho en concreto, dado que de haber realizado de manera correcta la actividad de control inherente a sus funciones, habría podido detectar que la persona que decía llamarse Nombre110641 Nombre110641, no provenía de la unidad policial, de la cual, él invocaba su procedencia y así pudo haber evitado la sustracción de las armas mencionadas. Como se ha indicado, todo servidor público posee una serie de deberes funcionariales inherentes a su cargo, que implican un actuar acorde con el interés público y el cumplimiento de los fines buscados en el ejercicio de las conductas administrativas que le son asignadas. En el caso concreto de las fuerzas policiales, tales obligaciones revisten especial intensidad, habida que son las encargadas de garantizar el orden y seguridad públicos. Por lo anterior, una persona que pertenezca a los cuerpos de policía tiene implícito con su nombramiento, el cautelar adecuadamente que no se produzca ni con su actuación ni con su omisión, un grave daño al interés de la colectividad en el tema del resguardo de su protección frente a terceros que opten por realizar conductas antijurídicas. En el caso del actor, de los autos se evidencia que el día de los hechos realizaba una función específica, que revestía de una trascendencia singular en cuanto al lugar en donde laboraba, habida cuenta que realizaba función de filtro para el ingreso y salida de personas en la unidad policial en donde labora y donde se custodiaba armamento. Si como se ha demostrado en autos, para la fecha en que sucedieron los hechos había señales de una especial amenaza a la seguridad por la eventualidad de un intento de liberación de una persona custodiada en las cercanías, el deber del actor era ser especialmente prudente en sus funciones de control, dado que un debilitamiento del mismo, podría contribuir a consecuencias serias en perjuicio del orden y seguridad pública. Es menester indicar que también le es aplicable al actor lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 y 4 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, en tanto disponen: \"Artículo 3º— Deber de probidad. El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente\". \"Artículo 4º— Violación al deber de probidad. Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades civiles y penales que procedan, la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada y previa defensa, constituirá justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal\". En el caso en examen, se ha tenido por demostrado que la falta grave que tuvo por demostrada, se traduce en una seria y comprobada violación del deber de probidad del actor, por cuanto éste, con su actuar no actúo conforme al interés público y no realizó, una conducta que pudiere estimarse acorde con la legalidad y eficacia, no pudiendo rendir cuentas de manera satisfactoria ante la confianza depositada en él con el motivo de la investidura como servidor público, en una actividad tan delicada y relevante como es la seguridad y control de ingreso a un lugar en donde se custodiaba armamento. Es por esta razón que con la conducta del actor se puso en riesgo de afectación al interés público y por consiguiente, resulta evidente la pérdida de confianza que ello significa como título legítimamente para su despido sin responsabilidad patronal. Por otra parte es menester indicar que no hay prueba en autos que demuestre que la responsabilidad de control haya recaído en el denominado centinela, el cual de la prueba testimonial evacuada fue designado como un mero custodio de la puerta de acceso al lugar, mas sin que por ello se entienda que se relevó al actor de sus obligaciones básicas como oficial de guardia. Por el contrario, sí se ha demostrado en autos la existencia de manuales y regulaciones con eficacia interna sobre las obligaciones de dicha función. Debe indicarse que el hecho de que con posterioridad se hayan recuperado los bienes sustraídos, no releva al actor de sus deberes funcionariales, habida cuenta que la falta al deber de cuidado en que incurrió se comete con el mero acaecimiento del hecho, indistintamente de si con posterioridad los efectos del mismo se ven menoscabados por la oportuna acción policial. Por otra parte, tampoco hay elementos probatorios aportados por el actor que hayan demostrado en sede jurisdiccional la existencia de vicio alguno de nulidad en el procedimiento instaurado y la comisión de violación a sus derechos legales o constitucionales. Tampoco se evidencia que la sanción impuesta obedezca a una situación mediática y que haya responsabilidad de los altos mandos policiales por la falta de controles, siendo así que lo indicado obedece a una simple afirmación de la parte actora, mas ayuna de toda prueba al respecto. En razón de lo anterior, en el caso en examen debe partirse de las consideraciones realizadas respecto a los presupuestos del daño como tal para que sea resarcible. En este sentido, se aplica el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, en tanto dispone: \" La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor\". Sobre la carga de la prueba se ha dicho en alguna otra oportunidad, que: “…, en orden a lo dispuesto en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil: “(…) La carga de la prueba no supone, pues, ningún derecho del adversario, sino un imperativo del propio interés de cada litigante; es una circunstancia de riesgo que consiste en que quien no prueba los hechos que ha de probar, pierde el pleito. Puede quitarse esta carga de encima, probando, es decir, acreditando la verdad de los hechos que la Ley señala. Y esto no crea, evidentemente, un derecho en el adversario, como si una situación jurídica personal atinente a cada parte; el gravamen de no restar creencia a las afirmaciones que era menester probar y no se probaron... es lo mismo no probar que no existir (…)” . (Voto número 262 de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Primera). Por otra parte, se considera que la sanción impuesta, no puede ser considerada ni como abusiva, ni injustificada ni desproporcionada, habida cuenta que el contenido discrecional de la conducta objetada, sea el alcance de la sanción, se ajusta a los hechos tomados como ciertos en la resolución administrativa objetada y a las normas aplicadas para los efectos sancionatorios. De conformidad con lo anterior, la mera invocación de la parte no es suficiente, si no existe un sólido fundamento probatorio que sirva de demostración de los hechos que se alegan. En razón de lo anterior, procede rechazar los indicados argumentos. \n\nIV.II.III.- De conformidad con los razonamientos hechos, estima este Tribunal que no se advierte vicio alguno de nulidad de la resolución 2012-1993 DM de 10:00 horas de 14 de mayo de 2012, confirmada por la 2012-3665 DM de trece horas del treinta de octubre del dos mil doce, y por consiguiente debe rechazarse la demanda en todos sus extremos, dado que las pretensiones declarativas hechas son accesorias a la determinación de legitimación de la conducta objetada. \n\nV.- Por los motivos indicados procede acoger la defensa de falta de derecho en todos sus extremos:\n\nVI.- Costas: El artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece que las costas procesales y personales se imponen al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor del numeral 119.2 ibídem. En razón de no encontrarse la parte actora dentro de los supuestos para que se le exonere de aquellas, procede su condena.\n\n \n\nPOR TANTO\n\n \n\nSe acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. Se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Son las costas a cargo de la parte actora. \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nRODRIGO ALBERTO CAMPOS HIDALGO\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nRODRIGO HUERTAS DURAN FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CHACON", "body_en_text": "TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO\n\nCentral 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email: ...01\n\nSecond Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A (Former Motorola Building)\n\n \n\nFILE: 13-000828-1178-LA\n\nORDINARY PROCEEDINGS\n\nPLAINTIFF: Nombre24170\n\nDEFENDANT: The State\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n56 -2014-IV\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL. FOURTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, Dirección04 , at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on June thirtieth, two thousand fourteen.\n\n \n\nOrdinary Proceedings filed by Nombre24170 , of legal age, single, bearer of identity card number CED87428 - - , resident of Desamparados, represented by Nombre24171 , of legal age, single, resident of Alajuela, attorney, bearer of identity card number CED87429- - against the STATE, represented by Nombre1157 , of legal age, attorney, single, resident of Mora, bearer of identity card number CED894- - , in her capacity as Attorney A.-\n\n \n\nWHEREAS\n\n1.- That the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant entity and requests, as relevant, the following:\n\na) The annulment of the resolution giving rise to the plaintiff's dismissal, as well as his consequent reinstatement.\n\nb) Recognition of lost wages\n\nc) Payment of costs and interest\n\n2.- That having completed the required procedural transfer by resolution at eleven hours and thirty-seven minutes on August twenty-first, two thousand thirteen, the State's representation rejected the claim, raised the substantive defense of lack of right, and requested a ruling of costs (folios 112 to 126 of the judicial file)\n\n3.- That at thirteen hours and thirty minutes on November nineteenth, two thousand thirteen, a preliminary hearing was held in this proceeding with the presence of the parties' representatives. The controverted facts are identified. Documentary and testimonial evidence is admitted. (folios 139 and 140 of the judicial file)\n\n4.- That at eight hours and thirty minutes on June sixteenth, two thousand fourteen, an oral and public hearing was held in this proceeding, with the presence of the parties and their attorneys, and before the same Tribunal issuing the judgment. In said hearing, evidence for a better resolution was ordered, and the Tribunal reserved consideration of the conclusions until it was provided.\n\n5.- That at nine hours and fifteen minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand fourteen, the continuation of the oral hearing was held in this proceeding, the evidence for a better resolution requested was considered, and the parties' conclusions were heard.\n\n6.- That in the proceedings before this Tribunal, no procedural defects (nulidades) that must be remedied have been observed, and the judgment is issued within the period established for this purpose by article 111.1 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, after prior deliberation and unanimously.-\n\n \n\nJudge Campos Hidalgo drafts\n\n \n\n \n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI.- Regarding the plaintiff's theory of the case and its main reasoning: The plaintiff bases their theory of the case on the following substantive arguments:\n\na.- That the plaintiff was a police officer who, on the day of the acts he is charged with, was performing the duties of guard officer.\n\nb.- That he was dismissed because of the entry of a uniformed person into the facilities where he worked, who took several weapons.\n\nc.- That in his work, there was a lack of protocols regarding responsibility for identifying persons.\n\nd.- That the responsibility for what happened lay with the sentry.\n\ne.- That the Ministry of Public Security did not have an action protocol at the time of the events, which was proven during the oral hearing (comparecencia oral) in the administrative venue.\n\nf.- That the procedure did not adequately assess the evidence provided.\n\ng.- That the equipment removed was recovered at the time.\n\nh.- That in the criminal venue, only the responsibility of the sentry and the armorer was determined.\n\ni.- That the sanction imposed was due to a media situation and that there is responsibility on the part of the high police command due to the lack of controls.\n\nII.- Regarding the theory of the case of the State's representation and its main reasoning: The State's representation bases its opposition to the claim on the following reasoning:\n\na.- That what occurred constitutes serious misconduct, since he, as the guard officer, allowed the entry of an unknown individual without any identification, who removed an Uzi submachine gun, another Jericho brand weapon, and a bulletproof vest from the site.\n\nb.- That the plaintiff was the official responsible for controlling personnel entry, in an internal entry and exit logbook, and that his duties were very clear to him.\n\nc.- That the act could have endangered the security and lives of individuals, had the removed weapons been used improperly.\n\nd.- That the plaintiff's obligations are duly established in the manuals applicable to his activity.\n\ne.- That the plaintiff was dismissed for committing serious misconduct in the exercise of his duties and not for his participation in a criminal offense.\n\nf.- That the plaintiff's dismissal fully and integrally complied with administrative due process.\n\ng.- That the plaintiff's conduct allowed the departure of weaponry into the hands of a third party, putting the social community at risk.\n\nh.- That no nullity defects are observed in the administrative conduct challenged by the plaintiff.\n\nIII.- Object of the proceedings: Based on what was expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of these proceedings is to determine the conformity with the legal system of the sanctioning act issued against the plaintiff.\n\nIV.- Reasoning of the Tribunal.\n\nIV.I.- Specifically regarding the proven facts: Of this nature, and of importance for the resolution of the matter, the following facts have been demonstrated during the proceedings before this Tribunal:\n\n1. That at 19:50 hours on June 15, 2011, while the plaintiff in this proceeding was the guard officer, an individual, stating his name was Nombre110641 and wearing a Public Force uniform, entered the First Region Directorate of Hatillo of the Ministry of Public Security (folios 02, 03, 06, 09, 010, 011, 018, 032 of the administrative file)\n\n2. That the individual named Nombre110641 was accompanied upon entry by the sentry on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, who told the plaintiff that the individual came from Delta Charly Tres post. (folio 8 and 18 of the administrative file)\n\n3. That as part of the plaintiff's duties, he was responsible for keeping the control and log of entries for third parties and officials. (folio 10 of the administrative file, 10 and 11 of the General Guidelines for the management, use, safeguarding, and filing of police control and registration logbooks, 13 of the Manual of the Logbook of Incidents and Registries)\n\n4. That at the moment the individual named Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification, merely limiting himself to recording only his first and last names in the respective logbook. (folio 09, 10, 28 of the administrative file)\n\n5. That the individual who stated his name was Nombre110641 , having passed the respective guard post, went to the armory and withdrew from the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation Jericho weapon, 9mm, property number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 rounds, an UZI submachine gun, series 952712, property number 174925 with one magazine and 25 unfired rounds, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from Dirección13069 . (folio 02, 03, 10, 30 of the administrative file)\n\n6. That the individual who stated his name was Nombre110641 did not provide any identification when withdrawing the indicated weapons (folio 11 of the administrative file)\n\n7. That the plaintiff consulted the post of origin of the supposed Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that he did not work there, only once the individual had already withdrawn from Dirección13070 . (folio 28 of the administrative file)\n\n8. That there is no official of the Ministry of Public Security named Nombre110641 (folio 27 of the administrative file)\n\n9. That the duties of the guard officer regarding control of entry and exit of persons were regulated in different manuals issued by the Ministry of Public Security, thus, he was responsible for controlling the entry and exit of persons from the respective police unit. (folios 10 and 11 of the file on General Guidelines on the Management, Safeguarding, and Filing of Police Control and Registration Logbooks, folios 11 to 14 of the file on the Manual of the Logbook of Incidents and Registries, folios 14 and 15 of the Manual of the Guard Logbook, all ordered as evidence for a better resolution, testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)\n\n10. That by resolution at eight hours on June seventeenth, two thousand eleven, an administrative disciplinary procedure was initiated against the plaintiff, based on the following charge: \"Negligence in his duties, as guard officer of the Regional Directorate One of the Public Force, by allowing a private individual dressed in an official public force uniform to remain in the facilities of said police base, without effectively verifying that he was a police official assigned to this Ministry. Events that occurred on June 15, 2011.\" (folio 170 of the administrative file)\n\n11. That on September thirteen, two thousand eleven, the oral hearing (comparecencia oral) was held in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff, with his presence and that of his attorney (folios 199 to 214 of the administrative file)\n\n12. That by resolution 0527-2011 CP at fifteen hours and thirty-four minutes on December fourteenth, 2011, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security recommended dismissing the plaintiff for justified cause (folios 240 to 244 of the administrative file)\n\n13. That by resolution 2012-1993 DM at 10:00 hours on May 14, 2012, the plaintiff's dismissal without employer liability was ordered. Said resolution was confirmed by 2012-3665 DM at thirteen hours on October thirtieth, two thousand twelve (folios 245 to 250, 281 to 283 of the administrative file)\n\n14. That on the date the events occurred, there were signs of a special security threat due to the possibility of an attempt to free a person held in the detention center for foreign nationals located near the police unit where the events that are the object of this proceeding occurred. (testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)\n\nIV.I.I- Unproven facts: The plaintiff did not demonstrate:\n\na.- That the responsibility for controlling entry and exit at the administrative unit where he worked was attributable to other officials.\n\nb.- That the administrative conduct challenged was tainted by nullity.\n\nIV.II.- Regarding the general analysis of the subject under analysis:\n\nIV.II.I.- Considerations on public employment: In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations flow. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: \"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and the public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration\" and \"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the justified dismissal causes set forth by labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.\" In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of their own regulatory framework, stability in employment – limiting the free dismissal regime characteristic of private labor regulation – and an administrative career, along with the other existing guarantees for persons protected under a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Court). Corresponding to the foregoing rights, the public servant possesses a series of official obligations, inherent to the public purposes pursued with their activity and which must always guide their management, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties characteristic of the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service – continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment – (Art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control), d) duty to protect the best interests of children and adolescents (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code), e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with efficiency (Art. 5 of the Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets), i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute), j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration), k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said regulatory body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis and based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and Article 51 of the indicated Statute, the specific provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law for the Regulation of Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this context, although we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles of labor law in public employment, given the existence of a statutory and not a contractual relationship (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general guiding lines for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with several votes of the Constitutional Court, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) becomes more flexible, so that a specific legal definition of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of public servants. In this regard, Vote 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven of the Constitutional Court, indicates the following: \"V.- Regarding the principle of specificity (tipicidad) in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for purposes of sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to apply, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Court has held on previous occasions (see resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although this principle certainly does not have the same form in this matter as in the criminal-legal field - since faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned at discretion - it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally provided for, but which are understood to be included in the text, can be sanctioned at discretion, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault through a procedure created for that purpose. However, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, and the Administration cannot create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable rules. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining acts of disciplinary faults are innumerable – as they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conducts – and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege,' 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and exigency that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity (tipicidad), that the conduct be inferred from the regulatory text and that the sanction be – this one yes – clearly pre-established.\" The foregoing generates what is known in doctrine as the principle of relative specificity (tipificación relativa), in the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters, as long as it derives from the specific service relationship. Consequently, both the non-compliance with general functional duties and legally defined conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, statutory norms of the specific regime, or the Labor Code, for example), and those found in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations, or in cases where the definition (tipificación) relates to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative specificity makes the need for positive norms in the form of formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, which must be complied with in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, presumption of innocence, due process, and due reasoning of the respective resolution. In this context, it should be noted that regarding the definition of conducts that can be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country has a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single regulatory body but dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility of legally regulating each and every one of the specific conducts incurred by public servants, and in the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we encounter public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct by the Administration regarding its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: \"1. The public servant must perform their duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, to which mere convenience can in no case be placed first.\" Consequently, any analysis regarding public employment must not overlook the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference point for its underlying motivation.\n\nIV.II.II.- Considerations on the merits of this proceeding: At the core, the plaintiff in his lawsuit argues that verifying the identity of persons entering the post where he worked was not his responsibility, given that there was a sentry at said place, responsible for that function. Additionally, he points to the non-existence of internal regulation regarding said obligation and, consequently, rejects the grounds for the disciplinary liability that was attributed to him and which served as the basis for his dismissal without employer liability. The State, in its response, maintains the legality of the administrative conduct and indicates that the plaintiff was responsible for verifying the entry of any person, given that he was at the guard post, so his work obligations as such were sufficiently clear and defined. In this regard, and specifically, regarding the facts giving rise to this claim, this Tribunal has deemed it proven that at 19:50 hours on June 15, 2011, an individual, stating his name was Nombre110641 and wearing a Public Force uniform, entered the First Region Directorate of Hatillo of the Ministry of Public Security. It is recorded in the case file that said person was accompanied upon entry by the sentry on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, such that once he passed through the respective guard post, he went to the armory and withdrew from the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation weapon Nombre110643, 9mm, property number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 rounds, an UZI submachine gun, series 952712, property number 174925 with one magazine and 25 unfired rounds, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from the First Region Directorate of Hatillo of the Ministry of Public Security. It is recorded, and is not disputed, that the indicated person was not an officer of the public force; therefore, he unlawfully removed the indicated weaponry. Regarding the responsibilities alleged in the ordinary administrative disciplinary procedure, it has been demonstrated that the foregoing events occurred while the plaintiff in this proceeding was performing the duties of guard officer, such that at the moment the individual named Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification, merely limiting himself to recording only his first and last names in the respective logbook. In accordance with the foregoing and upon review of the admitted and requested documentary and testimonial evidence, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff is not correct. The foregoing, insofar as it is recorded in the case file that Mr. Nombre24170 had a series of clearly defined obligations as a guard officer, which were clearly breached at the time of the events. In this regard, there is evidence that as part of the plaintiff's duties, he was responsible for keeping the control and log of entries for third parties and officials. In this sense, the plaintiff himself, in an interview conducted on June 16, 2011, stated the following: \"... I have to keep a control of entries to certain posts, part of my duties is to record the entry of these officials....\" and also \".... I did not request identification from this man....\". Additionally, the General Guidelines for the management, use, safeguarding, and filing of police control and registration logbooks, state regarding said obligation: \"The Personnel Entry and Exit Logbook is a tool used exclusively to keep control of the entry and exit of personnel from the police unit. The guard officer shall be responsible for logging the entry and exit of officials, adhering to the parameters established in this protocol...\" On the other hand, the Manual of the Logbook of Incidents and Registries indicates in this regard: \"The Guard Officer must record all daily events... Likewise, they must record the time of entry and exit of any person from the Police Station and their rank, even if the duration of stay is minimal and regardless of whether the reason for the individual's stay is as a visitor, or if it concerns a colleague who is off duty....\" In the same vein, folios 14 and 15 of the Manual of the Guard Logbook indicate a similar provision, as do the testimonial statements of Messrs. Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde. As can be seen, the plaintiff did not fully comply with his obligations, given that he merely recorded the name of the person who claimed to be Nombre110641 , but without fully exercising the control imposed by his position. On the other hand, Article 8 of the General Police Law provides the following in this regard: \"The general powers of all police forces are: .... l) Keep the necessary record books, in which shall be recorded: police operations, those responsible for those activities, the complete list of personnel involved in each operation, patrol, or police action, personal data, the time of entry and exit of detainees, as well as other data useful for the adequate control of these operations...\". The foregoing is reinforced if we consider that the plaintiff consulted the post of origin of the supposed Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that he did not work there, only once the individual had already withdrawn from the First Region Directorate of Hatillo. This Tribunal considers that from the existing evidence and the very nature of the function performed by the plaintiff, it is evident that he, as the guard officer, should have at least requested the identity card of the person entering the unit under his charge and verified their proper origin, determining the reason for their presence, especially if they intended to withdraw weaponry from the site. The control activity expected of an officer holding the plaintiff's post was the average diligence that could be presumed of a person who is responsible for verifying the entry of both staff and strangers into the facilities under their charge. That activity necessarily implied conclusively verifying that the person accessing said place did not pose a security risk, which has, as an initial prerequisite, the requirement of an identification to verify the effectiveness of the reasons alleged for entering the site. In this context, it must be noted that the plaintiff is not charged with intentional conduct (conducta dolosa) or connivance with the person who stole the weapons, but rather with a negligent act, based on his omitted or negligent conduct in failing to meet basic care duties consistent with his functions. The administrative resolution that is the object of this proceeding states the following in this regard: \"..\n\nthe reproach of the conduct displayed in the instant case is objectively aggravated insofar as his negligence—understood as the omission of the diligence or care that the worker must have in the performance of the assigned position—in the specific case as the person in charge of the Guard Office (Oficialía de Guardia), on the day of the events, allowed the entry of an individual who was wearing a police uniform, who said his name was Nombre110641, and that he was going to retrieve work equipment because he was going to be a relief at the Police Delegation of Hospital; in this regard, the conduct displayed is objectively aggravated, since his function was precisely the security of the Guard Office, that is, entry to the facilities of the Regional Directorate, and without any justification and completely departing from the most basic procedures dictated by reason and logic, he did not demand or request any identification element to verify what the subject reported...\". In this sense, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that his actions adhered to a minimum of diligence in the specific event, given that had he correctly carried out the control activity inherent to his functions, he would have been able to detect that the person who claimed to be called Nombre110641 Nombre110641 did not come from the police unit from which he invoked his origin, and thus could have prevented the theft of the mentioned weapons. As has been indicated, every public servant possesses a series of duties inherent to their position, which imply acting in accordance with the public interest and the fulfillment of the goals sought in the exercise of the administrative conducts assigned to them. In the specific case of police forces, such obligations are of special intensity, given that they are responsible for guaranteeing public order and security. Therefore, a person who belongs to the police forces has implicit with their appointment the duty to adequately ensure that neither through their action nor their omission, serious harm is caused to the collective interest regarding the protection against third parties who choose to carry out unlawful conducts. In the case of the plaintiff, the records show that on the day of the events, he was performing a specific function that was of singular transcendence regarding the place where he worked, taking into account that he performed a filtering function for the entry and exit of persons in the police unit where he works and where weaponry was guarded. If, as has been demonstrated in the records, on the date the events occurred there were signs of a special threat to security due to the possibility of an attempt to free a person held in custody nearby, the plaintiff's duty was to be especially prudent in his control functions, given that a weakening thereof could contribute to serious consequences to the detriment of public order and security. It is necessary to indicate that the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito) are also applicable to the plaintiff, as they provide: \"Article 3— Duty of probity. The public official shall be obliged to orient his management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions he adopts in the fulfillment of his attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution in which he serves, and, finally, by administering public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.\" \"Article 4— Violation of the duty of probity. Without prejudice to any civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a prior defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability.\" In the case under review, it has been proven that the serious fault which has been demonstrated translates into a serious and proven violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, insofar as he, through his actions, did not act in accordance with the public interest and did not perform conduct that could be considered in accordance with legality and effectiveness, being unable to render accounts satisfactorily for the trust placed in him by reason of the investiture as a public servant, in an activity as delicate and relevant as the security and entry control to a place where weaponry was guarded. It is for this reason that the plaintiff's conduct put the public interest at risk of being affected and, consequently, the loss of trust that this signifies is evident as legitimate grounds for his dismissal without employer liability. On the other hand, it is necessary to indicate that there is no evidence in the records that demonstrates that the control responsibility fell upon the so-called sentry, who, according to the testimonial evidence presented, was designated as a mere custodian of the access door to the site, but this does not imply that the plaintiff was relieved of his basic obligations as guard officer. On the contrary, the records have demonstrated the existence of manuals and regulations with internal effectiveness regarding the obligations of said function. It must be noted that the fact that the stolen goods were subsequently recovered does not relieve the plaintiff of his official duties, taking into account that the breach of the duty of care incurred was committed upon the mere occurrence of the event, regardless of whether its effects were subsequently diminished by timely police action. Furthermore, there are no evidentiary elements provided by the plaintiff that have demonstrated in the jurisdictional venue the existence of any defect of nullity in the procedure established or the commission of violations of his legal or constitutional rights. Nor is it evident that the sanction imposed responds to a media situation or that there is responsibility of the high police command for the lack of controls, as the foregoing merely constitutes a simple assertion by the plaintiff, devoid of any proof in this regard. By reason of the foregoing, the case under review must begin from the considerations made regarding the elements of damage as such for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) applies, as it provides: \"The burden of proof is incumbent upon: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the constitutive facts of his right. 2) Whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right.\" Regarding the burden of proof, it has been stated on another occasion that: \"…, in accordance with the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code: \"(…) The burden of proof does not suppose, therefore, any right of the adversary, but an imperative of the own interest of each litigant; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in that he who does not prove the facts he must prove, loses the lawsuit. He can lift this burden by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts that the Law indicates. And this does not create, evidently, a right in the adversary, as if a legal personal situation pertained to each party; the burden of not lending credence to the affirmations that it was necessary to prove and were not proven... not proving is the same as not existing (…)\". (Vote number 262 of nine hours forty minutes of June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-four, of the Second Civil Superior Tribunal, First Section). Moreover, it is considered that the sanction imposed cannot be considered abusive, unjustified, or disproportionate, taking into account that the discretionary content of the objected conduct, that is, the scope of the sanction, conforms to the facts taken as true in the objected administrative decision and the norms applied for the sanctioning effects. In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation by the party is not sufficient if there is no solid evidentiary foundation that serves to demonstrate the alleged facts. Therefore, it is appropriate to reject the indicated arguments.\n\nIV.II.III.- In accordance with the reasoning made, this Tribunal considers that no defect of nullity is observed in resolution 2012-1993 DM of 10:00 hours of May 14, 2012, confirmed by resolution 2012-3665 DM of thirteen hours of October thirty, two thousand twelve, and consequently, the lawsuit must be rejected in all its aspects, given that the declaratory claims made are accessory to the determination of the legitimacy of the objected conduct.\n\nV.- For the reasons indicated, it is appropriate to uphold the defense of lack of right in all its aspects:\n\nVI.- Costs: Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to numeral 119.2 ibidem. Since the plaintiff is not within the circumstances for exemption from those, his condemnation is appropriate.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe defense of lack of right is upheld. The lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Costs are to be borne by the plaintiff.\n\nRODRIGO ALBERTO CAMPOS HIDALGO\n\nRODRIGO HUERTAS DURAN FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CHACON\n\n**6.-** That in the proceeding before this Court, no nullities requiring correction have been observed, and the judgment is issued within the time limit established for that purpose by numeral 111.1 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, following deliberation and by unanimity.-\n\nDrafted by Judge **Campos Hidalgo**\n\n**CONSIDERING**\n\n**I.-** **Regarding the theory of the case of the plaintiff and its main reasonings**: The plaintiff bases its theory of the case on the following substantive arguments:\n\n**a.-** That the plaintiff was a police officer who, on the day of the acts attributed to him, was performing the duties of guard officer.\n\n**b.-** That he was dismissed because a uniformed person entered the facilities where he worked and took several weapons.\n\n**c.-** That in his work, there is an absence of protocols for the purpose of responsibility in identifying persons.\n\n**d.-** That the responsibility for what happened rested with the sentinel.\n\n**e.-** That the Ministry of Public Security did not have an action protocol during the time of the events, which was proven in the oral appearance in administrative proceedings.\n\n**f.** That the procedure did not properly assess the evidence provided.\n\n**g.** That the stolen equipment was recovered at the time.\n\n**h.** That in criminal proceedings, only the responsibility of the sentinel and the armorer was determined.\n\n**i.** That the imposed sanction responds to a media-driven situation, and there is responsibility on the part of the high police command due to the lack of controls.\n\n**II.-** **Regarding the theory of the case of the State's representation and its main reasonings: The State's representation bases its opposition to the claim on the following reasonings:**\n\n**a.-** That what occurred constitutes a serious fault, since he, as the guard officer, permitted the entry of an unknown individual without any identification, who removed from the place a Uzi submachine gun, another Jericho brand, and a bulletproof vest.\n\n**b.-** That the plaintiff was the official responsible for controlling personnel entry, in an internal logbook of entries and exits, thus he was very clear about his duties.\n\n**c.-** That the act could have put the safety and lives of persons at risk, had the stolen weapons been used improperly.\n\n**d.-** That the plaintiff's obligations are duly established in the manuals applicable to his activity.\n\n**e.-** That the plaintiff was dismissed for committing a serious fault in the exercise of his duties and not for his participation in a criminal offense.\n\n**f.-** That the plaintiff's dismissal complied duly and fully with administrative due process.\n\n**g.-** That the plaintiff's conduct allowed weaponry to be taken out into the hands of a third party, putting the general public at risk.\n\n**h.-** That no nullifying defects are observed in the administrative conduct challenged by the plaintiff.\n\n**III.-** **On the Object of the proceeding**: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of this proceeding lies in determining the conformity with the legal system of the sanctioning act issued against the plaintiff.\n\n**IV.-** **Reasoning of the Court**.\n\n**IV.I.- In particular, on the proven facts:** Of this nature, and of importance for the resolution of the matter, the following facts have been demonstrated during the proceeding before this Court:\n\n**1.** That at 19:50 on June 15, 2011, while serving as guard officer, the plaintiff in this proceeding allowed a subject into the First Region Hatillo Directorate of the Ministry of Public Security, who claimed his name was Nombre110641 and was wearing a uniform of the Fuerza Pública **(folios 02, 03, 06, 09, 010, 011, 018, 032 of the administrative file)**\n\n**2.** That the subject named Nombre110641 was accompanied upon entry by the sentinel on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, who told the plaintiff that he was coming from the Delta Charly Tres post. **(folio 8 and 18 of the administrative file)**\n\n**3.** That as part of the plaintiff's duties, it was his responsibility to control and record the entry of third parties and officials. **(folio 10 of the administrative file, 10 and 11 of the Lineamientos generales para el manejo, uso, resguardo y archivo de los libros de control y registro policial, 13 of the Manual del libro de novedades y registros,**\n\n**4.** That at the moment the subject named Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification from him, merely recording only his first and last names in the respective book. **(folio 09, 10, 28 of the administrative file)**\n\n**5.** That the subject who claimed to be named Nombre110641, having passed the respective guard post, went to the armory of the place and withdrew from the hands of the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation Jerichó weapon, 9mm, patrimony number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 projectiles, an UZI submachine gun series 952712, patrimony number 174925 with one magazine and 25 unspent projectiles, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from the Dirección13069. **(folio 02, 03, 10, 30 of the administrative file)**\n\n**6.** That the subject who claimed to be named Nombre110641 did not present any identification when withdrawing the indicated weapons **(folio 11 of the administrative file)**\n\n**7.** That the plaintiff consulted the post of origin of the alleged Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that he did not work there, when he had already withdrawn from the Dirección13070. **(folio 28 of the administrative file)**\n\n**8.** That no official of the Ministry of Public Security named Nombre110641 exists **(folio 27 of the administrative file)**\n\n**9.** That the duties of the guard officer regarding the control of entry and exit of persons were regulated in various manuals issued by the Ministry of Public Security, such that he was responsible for the control of persons entering and leaving the respective police unit. **(folios 10 and 11 of the file of Lineamientos Generales sobre el Manejo, Resguardo, Archivo de los Libros de Control y Registro Policial, folios 11 to 14 of the file of the Manual del Libro de Novedades y Registros, folios 14 and 15 of the Manual del Libro de Guardia, all ordered as evidence for better resolution, testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)**\n\n**10.** That by resolution at eight o'clock on June seventeenth, two thousand eleven, a disciplinary administrative procedure was initiated against the plaintiff, based on the following accusation: \"Negligence in his duties, as guard officer of the Regional Directorate One of the Fuerza Pública, by allowing a private subject who was dressed in an official uniform of the public force to remain in the facilities of said police base, without effectively verifying that he was a police official assigned to this Ministry. Events occurred on June 15, 2011.\" **(folio 170 of the administrative file)**\n\n**11.** That on September 13, two thousand eleven, the oral appearance was held in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff, with his presence and that of his lawyer **(folios 199 to 214 of the administrative file)**\n\n**12.** That by resolution 0527-2011 CP at fifteen thirty-four hours on December fourteenth, two thousand eleven, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security recommended dismissing the plaintiff for just cause **(folios 240 to 244 of the administrative file)**\n\n**13.** That by resolution 2012-1993 DM at 10:00 hours on May 14, 2012, the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff was ordered. Said resolution was confirmed by resolution 2012-3665 DM at thirteen hours on October thirtieth, two thousand twelve **(folios 245 to 250, 281 to 283 of the administrative file)**\n\n**14.** That at the time the events occurred, there were signs of a special security threat due to the possibility of an attempt to free a person held in custody at the detention center for foreign persons located near the police unit where the events object of this proceeding took place. **(testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)**\n\n**IV.I.I- Facts not proven:** The plaintiff did not demonstrate:\n\n**a.-** That the responsibility for controlling entry to and exit from the administrative unit where he worked was attributable to other officials.\n\n**b.-** That the challenged administrative conduct was vitiated by nullity.\n\n**IV.II.-** **On the general analysis of the topic under review:**\n\n**IV.II.I.-** **Considerations on public employment**: In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: *“Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration”* and *“Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of **proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal that **the labor legislation** expressly states,** or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof”.* In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own normative regulation, stability in employment - limiting the regime of free removal typical of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered under a regime of subordination, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber).\n\nCorrelative to the foregoing rights, the public servant possesses a series of duties of a functional nature, inherent to the public purposes sought through his activity and which must always guide his conduct, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service—continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime, and equality of treatment—(Art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) duty to safeguard an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno), d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, Art. 39.a of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) duty to act with effectiveness (Art. 5 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), j) duty to respond in the event of having acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (Art. 199 and 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública), k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said regulatory body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, pursuant to Article 9 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Article 51 of the indicated Estatuto, the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and not a contractual relationship (Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), the existence of general guidelines for the relationship that are common cannot be overlooked, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Código de Trabajo.\n\nRegarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in the event of a breach of said duties, in accordance with various rulings (votos) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of legality (tipicidad) becomes more flexible, meaning a specific legal definition of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, ruling (voto) 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), indicates the following:\n\n*\"V.- On the principle of legality in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of legality is an application of the principle of due process that requires, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied, it being possible to affirm that the principle of legality constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of fifteen hours and forty-eight minutes of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although it is true this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere—since faults not literally provided for may be sanctioned on a discretionary basis—it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally provided for, but which are understood to be included in the text, may be sanctioned on a discretionary basis, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. However, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clear and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable—since they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conducts—and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and demand that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in consideration of the principle of legality, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be—this one, yes—clearly pre-established\"*.\n\nThe foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative definition of offenses (tipificación relativa), on the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. By reason of the foregoing, sanctionable conduct includes both the breach of general functional duties and legally defined conducts (at the level of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, specific statutory norms of the regime, or the Código de Trabajo, for example), and those found contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the definition is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed. This relative definition of offenses makes the need for positive norms in the character of a formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lesser rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to there being a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, which must be complied with in all cases, e.g., proportionality, *non bis in idem*, presumption of innocence, due process, due substantiation of the respective resolution.\n\nIn this vein, it is to be noted that regarding the definition of conducts that may be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers (potestades auto normativas) of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that all and each of the specific conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated by law, and on the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal order. Crossing through this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest understood in accordance with Article 113 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, provides:\n\n*\"1. The public servant must perform his duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, account shall be taken, first of all, of the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience may in no case be preferred\"*.\n\nBy reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not overlook the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference for its underlying motivation.\n\n**IV.II.II.-** **Considerations on the merits of the present process:** At its core, the plaintiff party in its claim invokes that verifying the identity of the persons entering the post where he worked was not his responsibility, given that in said place there was a sentinel, responsible for said function. Additionally, he indicates the nonexistence of internal regulation regarding said obligation and consequently rejects the reason for the disciplinary liability that was attributed to him and that served as the basis for his dismissal without employer liability. The State, in its response, maintains the legality of the administrative conduct and indicates that the plaintiff was responsible for verifying the entry of any person, given that he was at the guard post, and thus his labor obligations as such were sufficiently clear and defined.\n\nIn this regard, and specifically, regarding the facts that give rise to the present claim, this Tribunal has deemed it proven that at 19:50 hours on June 15, 2011, a subject, claiming to be named Nombre110641 and wearing a Public Force uniform, entered the Dirección Primera Región Hatillo of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. The record shows that said person was accompanied in his entry by the sentinel on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, and that once he passed through the respective guard post, he proceeded to the armory of the place and withdrew from the hands of the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation weapon Nombre110643, 9mm, asset number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 projectiles, a UZI submachine gun series 952712, asset number 174925 with one magazine and 25 unfired projectiles, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from the Dirección Primera Región Hatillo of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. The record shows, and it is not disputed, that the indicated person was not a public force officer, for which reason he unlawfully took the indicated weaponry.\n\nRegarding the responsibilities attributed in the ordinary administrative disciplinary procedure, it has been proven that the foregoing facts occurred when the plaintiff party in the present process was performing the duties of guard officer, such that at the moment the subject named Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification from him, limiting himself to recording only his first and last names in the respective book. In accordance with the foregoing and from a review of the admitted and requested documentary and testimonial evidence, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff party is not correct. The foregoing, insofar as the record shows that Mr. Nombre24170 possessed a series of clearly defined obligations as a guard officer, which were clearly breached at the moment of the facts. In this sense, there is evidence that as part of the plaintiff's duties, he was responsible for keeping control and recording the entry of third parties and officials. In this vein, the plaintiff himself, in an interview conducted on June 16, 2011, indicated the following:\n\n*\"...I have to keep a control of the entries to certain posts, part of my duties is to record the entry of these officials....\" and also \"....I did not request identification from this gentleman....\".*\n\nAdditionally, the general guidelines (Lineamientos) for the management, use, safeguarding, and filing of police control and registration books, indicate the following regarding said obligation:\n\n*\"The Personnel Entry and Exit Book is a tool used exclusively to keep control of the entry and exit of personnel of the police unit. The guard officer shall be responsible for recording the entry and exit of officials, adhering to the parameters established in this protocol...\"*\n\nOn the other hand, the Manual of the Incident and Records Book (Manual del libro de novedades y registros) indicates the following in this regard:\n\n*\"The Guard Officer must record all daily events... Likewise, he must record the time of entry and exit to the Police Station of any person and their position, even if the stay time is minimal and regardless of whether the reason for the individual's stay is in the nature of a visit, or if it concerns a colleague who is on their free time....\"*\n\nIn the same sense, pages 14 and 15 of the Manual of the Guard Book indicate a similar provision, as well as the testimonial statements of Mr. Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde.\n\nAs is evident, the plaintiff party did not fully comply with his obligations, given that he limited himself to recording the name of the person who claimed to be named Nombre110641, but without fully carrying out the control imposed by his position. On the other hand, Article 8 of the Ley General de Policía provides the following in this regard:\n\n*\"The general powers of all police forces are: .... l) To keep the necessary registration books, in which shall be recorded: police operations, those responsible for these activities, the complete list of personnel intervening in each operation, patrol, or police action, personal data, the hours of entry and exit of detainees, as well as other data that serve for the adequate control of those operations...\"*.\n\nThe foregoing is reinforced if we consider that the plaintiff consulted the post of origin of the supposed Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that the same did not work there, when said person had already withdrawn from the Dirección Primera Región Hatillo.\n\nThis Tribunal considers that from the existing evidence and from the very nature of the duty performed by the plaintiff, it is evident that he, as a guard officer, should have at least requested the identity card of the person entering the unit under his charge and verified his proper origin, determining the reason for his presence, especially if he intended to withdraw weaponry from the premises. The control activity expected of an officer who occupied the plaintiff's post was the average diligence that could be presumed of a person who is responsible for verifying the entry of insiders and outsiders to the facilities under his charge. That activity necessarily implied reliably verifying that the person accessing said place did not imply a security risk, which has as its initial premise, the requirement of an identification to verify the effectiveness of the reasons alleged for entering the place.\n\nIn this vein, it must be noted that the plaintiff is not charged with willful conduct (conducta dolosa) or collusion with the person who stole the weapons, but rather a negligent action (actuación culposa), founded on his omission or negligent acting by failing to fulfill basic duties of care appropriate to and consistent with his duties. The administrative resolution that is the subject of the present process indicates the following in this regard:\n\n*\"... the reproach for the conducts deployed in the case at hand is objectively aggravated because with his negligence—understood as the omission of the diligence or care that the worker must have in the performance of the assigned position—in the specific case as the person in charge of the Guard Post (Oficialía de Guardia), on the day of the facts, he allowed the entry of an individual who was wearing the police uniform, who claimed to be named Nombre110641, and who was heading to withdraw work equipment because he was going to be a relief at the Hospital Police Station, on this point, the conduct deployed is objectively aggravated, because his function was precisely the security of the Guard Post, that is, the entry to the facilities of the Regional Directorate, and without any justification and completely departing from the most elementary procedures that reason and logic dictate, he did not demand or request any identification element to ascertain what was related by the subject...\"*.\n\nIn this sense, the plaintiff party has not demonstrated that his acting adhered to a minimum of diligence in the specific fact, given that had he correctly carried out the control activity inherent to his duties, he could have detected that the person claiming to be named Nombre110641 did not come from the police unit from which he invoked his origin, and thus could have avoided the theft of the mentioned weapons.\n\nAs has been indicated, every public servant possesses a series of functional duties inherent to his position, which imply acting in accordance with the public interest and the fulfillment of the purposes sought in the exercise of the administrative conducts assigned to him. In the specific case of police forces, such obligations take on special intensity, given that they are responsible for guaranteeing public order and security. Therefore, a person who belongs to the police forces has implicit with his appointment, the duty to adequately safeguard that neither through his action nor his omission, a serious harm to the interest of the community is produced in the matter of safeguarding its protection against third parties who choose to carry out unlawful conducts. In the plaintiff's case, the record shows that on the day of the facts, he was performing a specific function, which was of singular importance regarding the place where he worked, given that he performed a filtering function for the entry and exit of persons in the police unit where he worked and where weaponry was guarded. If, as has been proven in the record, on the date the facts occurred there were signs of a special threat to security due to the eventuality of an attempt to liberate a person in custody nearby, the plaintiff's duty was to be especially prudent in his control functions, given that a weakening of the same could contribute to serious consequences to the detriment of public order and security.\n\nIt is necessary to indicate that the provisions of Article 3 and 4 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito are also applicable to the plaintiff, as they provide:\n\n*\"Article 3.—Duty of Probity. The public official shall be obligated to orient his conduct toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; by ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with his attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution in which he serves and, finally, by administering public resources adhering to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.\"* *\"Article 4.—Violation of the Duty of Probity.*\n\nWithout prejudice to any applicable civil and criminal liabilities, the violation of the duty of probity (deber de probidad), duly proven and after a prior defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability.\" In the case under review, it has been taken as proven that the serious fault established translates into a serious and proven violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, in that the plaintiff, through his actions, did not act in accordance with the public interest and did not engage in conduct that could be considered consistent with legality and efficacy, and was unable to render a satisfactory account of the trust placed in him by virtue of his investiture as a public servant, in an activity as sensitive and relevant as the security and access control to a place where weaponry was guarded. It is for this reason that the plaintiff's conduct put the public interest at risk of being affected, and consequently, the loss of trust that this signifies is evident as a legitimate basis for his dismissal without employer liability. Furthermore, it is necessary to indicate that there is no evidence in the case file demonstrating that the responsibility for control fell upon the so-called sentinel, who, according to the testimonial evidence presented, was designated as a mere custodian of the access door to the location, without this meaning that the plaintiff was relieved of his basic obligations as the duty officer. On the contrary, the existence of internal manuals and regulations regarding the obligations of said function has been demonstrated in the case file. It must be noted that the fact that the stolen goods were subsequently recovered does not relieve the plaintiff of his official duties, given that the breach of the duty of care in which he incurred was committed by the mere occurrence of the event, regardless of whether its effects were subsequently diminished by timely police action. Moreover, there are also no evidentiary elements provided by the plaintiff that have demonstrated before the jurisdictional venue the existence of any defect of nullity in the instituted procedure and the commission of a violation of his legal or constitutional rights. Nor is there evidence that the imposed sanction was due to a media situation and that responsibility for the lack of controls lies with the police high command, as what has been stated is merely a simple assertion by the plaintiff, devoid of any proof in this regard. In light of the foregoing, in the case under review, one must begin from the considerations made regarding the prerequisites of damage as such in order for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code applies, as it provides: \"The burden of proof (carga de la prueba) falls upon: 1) The party who formulates a claim, with respect to the statements of the constitutive facts of their right. 2) The party who opposes a claim, with respect to the statements of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right.\" On the burden of proof, it has been stated on other occasions that: \"…, in accordance with the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code: ‘(…) The burden of proof does not, therefore, suppose any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of the self-interest of each litigant; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in that whoever does not prove the facts they must prove, loses the case. This burden can be shed by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts indicated by law. And this does not, evidently, create a right in the adversary, as if it were a personal legal situation pertaining to each party; the onus of not lending credence to the statements that were necessary to prove and were not proven... failing to prove is the same as the fact not existing (…).'\" (Vote number 262 of nine hours and forty minutes of June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-four, of the Superior Court, Second Civil Division, First Section). Furthermore, it is considered that the imposed sanction cannot be deemed abusive, unjustified, or disproportionate, given that the discretionary content of the sanctioned conduct—that is, the scope of the sanction—aligns with the facts taken as true in the challenged administrative resolution and the rules applied for sanctioning purposes. In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation by the party is not sufficient if there is no solid evidentiary basis that serves to demonstrate the facts alleged. For these reasons, the aforementioned arguments must be rejected.\n\n**IV.II.III.-** In accordance with the reasoning provided, this Court finds that no defect of nullity is perceived in resolution 2012-1993 DM of 10:00 hours of May 14, 2012, confirmed by resolution 2012-3665 DM of thirteen hours of October thirtieth, two thousand twelve, and consequently, the lawsuit must be dismissed in its entirety, given that the declaratory claims made are accessory to the determination of the legitimacy of the sanctioned conduct.\n\n**V.-** For the reasons indicated, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld in all its aspects.\n\n**VI.-** Costs (Costas): Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes that procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) are imposed upon the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a ruling that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to numeral 119.2 *ibidem*. Since the plaintiff is not within the circumstances for exemption from these costs, his condemnation to pay them is appropriate.\n\n\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe defense of lack of right is upheld. The lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Costs (Costas) are to be borne by the plaintiff.\n\nRODRIGO ALBERTO CAMPOS HIDALGO\n\nRODRIGO HUERTAS DURAN FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CHACON\n\n**IV.II.I.- Considerations regarding public employment:** In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, and from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate.\n\nArticles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by stating the following: \"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration\" and \"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.\" In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own regulatory framework, employment stability - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the previous rights, the public servant has a series of obligations of an official nature, inherent to the public purposes sought with his activity and that must always guide his management, in order not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the duties characteristic of the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime and equality of treatment - (Art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from the Excess of Administrative Requirements and Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with efficiency (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as, for example, the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law Regulating Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory relationship and not a contractual one, (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. In relation to the disciplinary regime applicable in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with various votes of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) becomes more lax, so a specific legal definition of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: \"V.- On the principle of specificity (tipicidad) in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity (tipicidad) is an application of the principle of legality which requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purpose of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity (tipicidad) constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although this principle in this matter certainly does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere - since faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally - it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and provided that they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now then, as for the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable - since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects - and that the principles \"nullum crimen sine lege,\" \"nullum poena sine lege\" do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity (tipicidad), for the conduct to be inferred from the normative text and for the sanction to be – this one, yes – clearly pre-established\". The foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative definition (tipificación relativa) in the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. By reason of the foregoing, both the non-compliance with general functional duties and legally defined conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, the specific statutory norms of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example), and those contemplated in norms of lower hierarchy, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases where the definition is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative definition (tipificación relativa) makes more flexible the need for positive norms in the character of a formal law, it being possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of necessary compliance in all cases, e.g. proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, due substantiation of the respective resolution. In this order of ideas, it should be noted that in matters of definition of conducts that can be considered as part of the duties proper to public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory (auto normativas) powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that through the legal route all and each one of the concrete conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated, and in the understanding that the exercise of the regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Crosswise to this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: \"1. The public servant must perform his functions in a way that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the appraisal of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, to which mere convenience can in no case be placed before\". By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not obviate the analysis of the fulfillment of the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference of its underlying motivation.\n\nIV.II.II.- Considerations on the merits of the present process: In its core, the plaintiff in his lawsuit invokes that the verification of the identity of the persons who entered the post where he worked was not his responsibility, given that in said place there was a sentinel, in charge of said function. Additionally, he indicates the non-existence of internal regulation regarding said obligation and consequently rejects the reason for the disciplinary liability that was attributed to him and that gave basis for his dismissal without employer liability. The State in its response, maintains the legality of the administrative conduct and indicates that the plaintiff was responsible for verifying the entry of any person, since he was at the guard post, it being so that his labor obligations as such were sufficiently clear and defined. In this regard, and specifically, on the facts that give rise to the present lawsuit, this Court has taken as proven that at 19:50 minutes on June 15, 2011, a subject, saying his name was Oscar Mora Mora and wearing a Public Force uniform, entered the First Region Hatillo Directorate of the Ministry of Public Security. It is recorded in the case file that said person was accompanied in his entry by the sentinel on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, it being so that once he passed the respective guard post, he went to the armory of the place and withdrew from the hands of the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation Jerichó 9mm weapon, asset number 175374, series 96306150 with a magazine and 15 projectiles, a UZI submachine gun series 952712, asset number 174925 with a magazine and 25 unspent projectiles and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from the First Region Hatillo Directorate of the Ministry of Public Security. It is recorded and is not controverted, that the indicated person was not an officer of the public force, for which the indicated weaponry was taken unlawfully. Regarding the responsibilities attributed in the ordinary administrative disciplinary procedure, it has been demonstrated that the previous facts occurred when the plaintiff in the present process was performing functions as guard officer, it being so that at the moment the subject named Oscar Mora Mora entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification from him, merely noting down only his name and surnames in the respective book. In accordance with the foregoing and from a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence admitted and requested, this Court considers that the plaintiff is not correct. The foregoing insofar as it is recorded in the case file that Mr. Brenes Martínez possessed a series of clearly defined obligations as guard officer, which were clearly breached at the moment of the facts. In this sense, there is evidence that as part of the plaintiff's functions, it was his responsibility to keep control and annotation of the entry of third parties and officials. In this order of ideas, the plaintiff himself in an interview conducted on June 16, 2011, indicated the following: \"... I have to keep a control of the entries to certain posts, part of my functions is to note down the entry of these officials....\" and additionally \".... I did not request identification from this gentleman....\". Additionally, the General Guidelines for the management, use, safeguarding and archiving of police control and registry books, indicate about said obligation, the following: \"The Personnel Entry and Exit Book is a tool used exclusively to keep control of the entry and exit of personnel of the police unit. It shall be the responsibility of the guard officer to record the entry and exit of the officials, referring to the parameters established in this protocol...\" On the other hand, the Manual of the novelties and records book indicates in this regard, the following: \"The Guard Officer must record all daily events... Likewise, he must note down the time of entry and exit to the Police Station of any person and their position, even if the stay time is minimal and regardless of whether the reason for the individual's stay is as a visitor, or whether it concerns a colleague who is on their free time....\" In the same sense, folios 14 and 15 of the Guard Book Manual indicate a similar provision, as well as the testimonial statements of Messrs. Juan Carlos Cárdenas Camareno and Milton Grijalba Valverde. As observed, the plaintiff did not fully comply with his obligations, given that he merely noted down the name of the person who said his name was Oscar Mora Mora, but without fully carrying out the control imposed by his position. On the other hand, Article 8 of the General Police Law, provides, in this regard, the following: \"The general powers of all police forces are: .... l) To keep the necessary record books, in which the following shall be recorded: police operations, those responsible for those activities, the complete list of personnel who intervene in each operation, patrol or police action, personal data, the hours of entry and exit of detainees, as well as other data that serve for the adequate control of those operations...\". The foregoing is reinforced if we consider that the plaintiff consulted the post from which the supposed Mr. Mora Mora originated and warned that he did not work there, when he had already left the First Region Hatillo Directorate. This Court considers that from the existing evidence and the very nature of the function performed by the plaintiff, it is evident that he, as guard officer, should have at least requested the identity card of the person entering the unit under his charge and verified his proper origin, determining the reason for his presence and even more so if this person intended to withdraw weaponry from the place. The control activity expected of an officer who occupied the plaintiff's post was the average diligence that could be presumed of a person who is in charge of verifying the entry of insiders and outsiders to the facilities under his charge. That activity necessarily implied reliably verifying that the person accessing said place did not imply a risk to security, which has as its initial premise, the request for an identification to verify the effectiveness of the reasons alleged for entering the place. In this order of ideas, it must be noted that the plaintiff is not imputed with intentional (dolosa) conduct or connivance with the person who stole the weapons, but rather a negligent (culposa) action, based on his omission or negligent action in failing to fulfill basic duties of care consistent with his functions. The administrative resolution that is the object of the present process, indicates in this regard, the following: \".. the reproach of the behaviors deployed in the case at hand is objectively aggravated because with his negligence - understood as the omission of the diligence or care that the worker must have in the performance of the assigned position - in the specific case as the person in charge of the Guard Office, on the day of the facts, he allowed the entry of an individual who was wearing the police uniform, who said his name was Oscar Mora Mora, and who was heading to withdraw work equipment because he was going to be a replacement at the Hospital Police Station, on this point, the deployed conduct is objectively aggravated, because his function was precisely the security of the Guard Office, that is, the entry to the facilities of the Regional Directorate, it being that without any justification and totally deviating from the most elementary procedures that reason and logic dictate, he did not require or request any identification element to ascertain what was related by the subject...\". In this sense, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that his actions adhered to a minimum of diligence in the specific event, given that if he had correctly performed the control activity inherent to his functions, he could have detected that the person who said his name was Oscar Mora Mora, did not come from the police unit from which he invoked his origin and thus could have avoided the theft of the mentioned weapons. As has been indicated, every public servant possesses a series of official duties inherent to his position, which imply acting in accordance with the public interest and the fulfillment of the purposes sought in the exercise of the administrative conducts assigned to him. In the specific case of police forces, such obligations are of special intensity, given that they are in charge of guaranteeing public order and security. Therefore, a person who belongs to police bodies has implicit with their appointment, the duty to adequately ensure that serious harm to the interest of the collectivity in terms of safeguarding its protection against third parties who choose to carry out unlawful conducts does not occur, neither through their action nor their omission. In the plaintiff's case, it is evident from the case file that on the day of the facts he was performing a specific function, which was of singular importance as to the place where he worked, given that he performed a filtering function for the entry and exit of persons in the police unit where he worked and where weaponry was guarded. If, as has been demonstrated in the case file, on the date the facts occurred there were signs of a special threat to security due to the eventuality of an attempt to release a person held in custody nearby, the plaintiff's duty was to be especially prudent in his control functions, since a weakening thereof could contribute to serious consequences to the detriment of public order and security. It is necessary to indicate that the provisions of Article 3 and 4 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment are also applicable to the plaintiff, as they provide: \"Article 3.— Duty of probity. The public official shall be obligated to orient his management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and in conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by law; ensuring that the decisions he adopts in fulfillment of his powers conform to impartiality and the specific objectives of the institution in which he serves and, finally, by administering public resources adhering to the principles of legality, efficiency, economy and effectiveness, rendering accounts satisfactorily\". \"Article 4.— Violation of the duty of probity. Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability\". In the case under examination, it has been taken as proven that the serious fault that was proven translates into a serious and proven violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, because he, through his actions, did not act in accordance with the public interest and did not carry out conduct that could be considered consistent with legality and efficiency, not being able to render accounts satisfactorily for the trust placed in him by reason of his investiture as a public servant, in an activity as delicate and relevant as security and entry control to a place where weaponry was guarded. It is for this reason that the plaintiff's conduct put the public interest at risk of being affected and, consequently, the loss of trust that this signifies is evident as a legitimate title for his dismissal without employer liability. On the other hand, it is necessary to indicate that there is no evidence in the case file demonstrating that the responsibility for control fell on the so-called sentinel, who, from the testimonial evidence given, was designated as a mere custodian of the access door to the place, but without it being understood that the plaintiff was thereby relieved of his basic obligations as guard officer. On the contrary, the existence of manuals and regulations with internal efficacy on the obligations of said function has indeed been demonstrated in the case file. It must be indicated that the fact that the stolen goods were subsequently recovered does not relieve the plaintiff of his official duties, given that the breach of the duty of care incurred was committed with the mere occurrence of the fact, regardless of whether subsequently the effects thereof are diminished by timely police action. On the other hand, there are also no evidentiary elements provided by the plaintiff that have demonstrated in the jurisdictional venue the existence of any defect of nullity in the established procedure and the commission of a violation of his legal or constitutional rights. Nor is it evidenced that the imposed sanction was due to a media situation and that the high police commands are responsible for the lack of controls, it being so that the indicated is merely an assertion by the plaintiff, but devoid of all proof in this regard. By reason of the foregoing, in the case under examination, one must start from the considerations made regarding the premises of the harm as such for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code is applied, as it provides: \" The burden of proof falls: 1) On whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constitutive of his right.\n\n2) Upon the party opposing a claim, regarding the statements of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the right of the plaintiff\". Regarding the burden of proof, it has been said on another occasion that: \"..., in accordance with the provisions of Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure: \"(…) The burden of proof does not, therefore, imply any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of each litigant's own interest; it is a circumstance of risk consisting in the fact that whoever does not prove the facts they must prove, loses the case. One can lift this burden from oneself by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts that the Law indicates. And this does not, evidently, create a right in the adversary, as if it were a personal legal situation pertaining to each party; the burden of not lending credence to the assertions that needed to be proven and were not proven... failing to prove is the same as not existing (…)\" . (Voto number 262 of nine hours forty minutes on June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-four, of the Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Primera). Furthermore, it is considered that the imposed sanction cannot be considered either abusive, unjustified, or disproportionate, given that the discretionary content of the objected conduct, that is, the scope of the sanction, conforms to the facts taken as true in the objected administrative decision and to the rules applied for the sanctioning effects. In accordance with the foregoing, the mere invocation by the party is not sufficient if there is no solid evidentiary basis that serves as a demonstration of the alleged facts. By reason of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the indicated arguments.        

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IV.II.III.- In accordance with the reasoning made, this Tribunal considers that no defect of nullity is observed in the decision 2012-1993 DM of 10:00 hours on May 14, 2012, confirmed by decision 2012-3665 DM of thirteen hours on October thirtieth, two thousand twelve, and consequently the claim must be rejected in all its aspects, given that the declaratory claims made are accessory to the determination of the legitimacy of the objected conduct.\" 

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\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nb.- That the plaintiff was the official responsible for controlling personnel entry, in an internal logbook of entries and exits, and thus he was very clear about his duties.\n\nc.- That the act could have put the safety and lives of people at risk, had the stolen weapons been used improperly.\n\nd.- That the plaintiff's obligations are duly established in the manuals applicable to his activity.\n\ne.- That the plaintiff was dismissed for committing a serious fault in the exercise of his duties and not for his participation in a criminal offense.\n\nf.- That in the plaintiff's dismissal, the administrative due process (debido proceso administrativo) was duly and fully complied with.\n\ng.- That the plaintiff's conduct allowed weaponry to leave in the hands of a third party, putting the social conglomerate at risk.\n\nh.- That no grounds for nullity are observed in the administrative conduct challenged by the plaintiff.\n\nIII.- Of the Object of the Process: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of the present process consists of determining the conformity with the legal system of the sanctioning act issued against the plaintiff.\n\nIV.- Reasoning of the Court.\n\nIV.I.- In particular regarding the proven facts: Of this nature, and of importance for the resolution of the matter, during the process this Court has found the following facts to be proven:\n\n1. That at 19:50 hours on June 15, 2011, while serving as the duty officer, the plaintiff in the present process permitted the entry into the First Region Directorate Hatillo of the Ministry of Public Security, of an individual, claiming to be named Nombre110641 and wearing a Fuerza Pública uniform (folios 02, 03, 06, 09, 010, 011, 018, 032 of the administrative file)\n\n2. That the individual named Nombre110641 was accompanied upon his entry by the sentry on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, who indicated to the plaintiff that the former came from the Delta Charly Tres post. (folio 8 and 18 of the administrative file)\n\n3. That as part of the plaintiff's duties, he was responsible for keeping the control and record of entry of third parties and officials. (folio 10 of the administrative file, 10 and 11 of the General Guidelines for the Management, Use, Safekeeping and Filing of Police Control and Registry Books, 13 of the Manual of the Logbook and Records,)\n\n4. That at the moment the individual named Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification from him, limiting himself to recording only his first and last names in the respective book. (folio 09, 10, 28 of the administrative file)\n\n5. That the individual who claimed to be named Nombre110641, having passed the respective guard post, went to the armory of the place and withdrew from the hands of the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation Jerichó weapon, 9mm, asset number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 projectiles, one UZI submachine gun series 952712, asset number 174925 with one magazine and 25 unfired projectiles, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently withdrawing from the Directorate13069. (folio 02, 03, 10, 30 of the administrative file)\n\n6. That the individual who claimed to be named Nombre110641 did not provide any identification when withdrawing the indicated weapons (folio 11 of the administrative file)\n\n7. That the plaintiff consulted the originating post of the supposed Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that said person did not work there, when the latter had already withdrawn from the Directorate13070. (folio 28 of the administrative file)\n\n8. That no official of the Ministry of Public Security named Nombre110641 exists (folio 27 of the administrative file)\n\n9. That the functions of the duty officer regarding the control of entry and exit of persons were regulated in different manuals issued by the Ministry of Public Security, and thus he was responsible for the control of entry and exit of persons from the respective police unit. (folios 10 and 11 of the file of General Guidelines on the Management, Safekeeping, and Filing of Police Control and Registry Books, folios 11 to 14 of the file of the Manual of the Logbook and Records, folios 14 and 15 of the Manual of the Guard Book, all ordered as evidence for better resolution, testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)\n\n10. That by resolution of eight o'clock on June seventeenth, two thousand eleven, a disciplinary administrative procedure was initiated against the plaintiff, based on the following accusation: \"Negligence in his duties, as duty officer of the Regional Directorate One of the Fuerza Pública, by allowing a private individual who was dressed in an official Fuerza Pública uniform to remain in the facilities of said police base, without effectively corroborating that said individual was a police official assigned to this Ministry. Events occurred on June 15, 2011.\" (folio 170 of the administrative file)\n\n11. That on September 13, two thousand eleven, the oral hearing was held in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff, with the presence of the latter and his lawyer (folios 199 to 214 of the administrative file)\n\n12. That through resolution 0527-2011 CP of fifteen thirty-four hours on December fourteenth, two thousand eleven, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security recommended dismissing the plaintiff for justified cause (folios 240 to 244 of the administrative file)\n\n13. That through resolution 2012-1993 DM of 10:00 hours on May 14, 2012, the dismissal of the plaintiff without employer liability was ordered. Said resolution was confirmed by 2012-3665 DM of thirteen hours on October thirtieth, two thousand twelve (folios 245 to 250, 281 to 283 of the administrative file)\n\n14. That on the date the events occurred, there were signs of a special threat to security due to the possibility of an attempted liberation of a person held in custody at the detention center for foreign persons located near the police unit where the events that are the object of this process took place. (testimonial statement of Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde)\n\nIV.I.I- Unproven Facts: The plaintiff did not prove:\n\na.- That the responsibility for controlling entry to and exit from the administrative unit where he worked was attributable to other officials.\n\nb.- That the administrative conduct challenged was tainted by nullity.\n\nIV.II.- On the general analysis of the topic under analysis:\n\nIV.II.I.- Considerations on public employment: In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: \"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration\" and \"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of verified suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.\" In accordance with the indicated constitutional-rank norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own normative regulation, employment stability - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative with the previous rights, the public servant has a series of official duties, inherent to the public purposes sought through their activity and which must always guide their management, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary responsibility. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties specific to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment - (Art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and related articles of the General Law of Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with effectiveness (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide proper attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to answer for actions taken with intent or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions specific to the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law Regulating Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others, are applicable to said public employment relationship. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and non-contractual relationship, (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general lines of orientation of the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with several votes of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of legality becomes more flexible, so a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: \"V.- On the principle of legality in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of legality is an application of the rule of law which requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for sanctioning purposes, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied, and it can be affirmed that the principle of legality constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of reproachable conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere -since faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally- it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and always provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, and the Administration cannot create new sanctions not contemplated in the applicable rules. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable -since they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conducts- and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of legality, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be –this one yes– clearly pre-established.\"\n\nThe foregoing gives rise to what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative classification, in the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. By reason of the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conduct (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, the statutory rules of the specific regime, or the Labor Code, for example) are punishable, as well as those contemplated in lower-ranking rules, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification relates to the sanction to be imposed. This relative classification makes the need for positive rules in the nature of formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a lower-ranking positive rule. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, which must be complied with in all cases, e.g., proportionality, *non bis in idem*, innocence, due process, and proper justification of the respective decision. In this line of thought, it should be noted that regarding the definition of conduct that may be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in the event of non-compliance, our country has a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single regulatory body but are dispersed among different rules of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory rules that each entity chooses to issue, pursuant to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility of regulating, through legal means, each and every one of the specific acts engaged in by public servants, and in the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal order. Across this set of principles and rules of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference point in the adoption of any formal or informal decision or conduct by the Administration regarding its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: \"*1. The public servant must perform his functions in such a way that they primarily satisfy the public interest, which will be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account first and foremost, to which mere convenience may in no case be preferred*\". By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in the matter of public employment must not omit the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference point of its underlying motivation.\n\n**IV.II.II.-** **Considerations on the merits of the present proceeding:** Essentially, the plaintiff in his complaint invokes that verifying the identity of persons entering the post where he worked was not his responsibility, given that there was a sentinel at said place, in charge of that function. Additionally, he indicates the non-existence of internal regulation regarding said obligation and consequently rejects the reason for the disciplinary responsibility that was attributed to him and that formed the basis for his dismissal without employer liability. The State, in its response, maintains the legality of the administrative conduct and indicates that the plaintiff was responsible for verifying the entry of any person, given that he was at the guard post, thus his work obligations as such were sufficiently clear and defined. In this regard, and specifically, regarding the facts giving rise to this complaint, this Court has found it proven that at 19:50 hours on June 15, 2011, a subject, claiming to be named Nombre110641 and wearing a Public Force uniform, entered the First Hatillo Region Directorate of the Ministry of Public Security. The record shows that said person was accompanied upon entry by the sentinel on duty, officer Alex Fallas Fonseca, such that once he passed the respective guard post, he went to the armory of the place and withdrew from the hands of the armorer, Franklin Ramírez Fonseca, a regulation weapon Nombre110643, 9mm, asset number 175374, series 96306150 with one magazine and 15 projectiles, a UZI submachine gun, series 952712, asset number 174925, with one magazine and 25 unfired projectiles, and a bulletproof vest, subsequently leaving the First Hatillo Region Directorate of the Ministry of Public Security. It is recorded and is not disputed that the indicated person was not a public force officer, whereby the indicated weaponry was taken unlawfully. Regarding the responsibilities attributed in the ordinary disciplinary administrative proceeding, it has been proven that the foregoing facts occurred when the plaintiff in the present proceeding was performing guard officer duties, such that at the moment the subject called Nombre110641 entered, the plaintiff did not request any identification from him, merely recording only his first and last names in the respective logbook. In accordance with the foregoing and from a review of the admitted and requested documentary and testimonial evidence, this Court considers that the plaintiff is not correct. The foregoing insofar as the record shows that Mr. Nombre24170 possessed a series of clearly defined obligations as a guard officer, which were clearly breached at the time of the facts. In this sense, there is evidence that, as part of the plaintiff's functions, it was his responsibility to keep the control and record of the entry of third parties and officials. In this line of thought, the plaintiff himself, in an interview conducted on June 16, 2011, stated the following: \"*... I have to keep a control of entries to certain posts, part of my duties is to record the entry of these officials....*\" and also \"*.... I did not request identification from this gentleman....*\". Additionally, the General guidelines for the handling, use, safekeeping, and filing of police control and registration logbooks indicate, regarding said obligation, the following: \"*The Personnel Entry and Exit Logbook is a tool used exclusively to keep control of the entry and exit of personnel of the police unit. The guard officer shall be responsible for recording the entry and exit of officials, adhering to the parameters established in this protocol...*\" On the other hand, the Incident and Records Logbook Manual indicates, in this regard, the following: \"*The Guard Officer must record all daily events... Likewise, he must record the time of entry and exit to the Police Station of any person and their position, even if the time of stay is minimal and regardless of whether the reason for the individual's stay is as a visitor, or whether it concerns a colleague who is on their free time....*\" In the same vein, folios 14 and 15 of the Guard Logbook Manual indicate a similar provision, as well as the testimonial statements of Messrs. Nombre110642 and Milton Grijalba Valverde. As noted, the plaintiff did not fully comply with his obligations, given that he merely recorded the name of the person claiming to be named Nombre110641, but without fully carrying out the control imposed by his position. On the other hand, Article 8 of the General Police Law provides, in this regard, the following: \"*The following are general powers of all police forces: .... l) Keep the necessary logbooks, in which shall be recorded: police operations, those responsible for these activities, the complete list of personnel involved in each operation, patrol, or police action, personal data, entry and exit times of detainees, as well as other data serving for the adequate control of those operations...*\". The foregoing is reinforced if we consider that the plaintiff consulted the post of origin of the supposed Mr. Nombre110641 and alerted that the same did not work there, when he had already left the First Hatillo Region Directorate. This Court considers that from the existing evidence and from the very nature of the function performed by the plaintiff, it is evident that he, as a guard officer, should have at least requested the identification card of the person entering the unit under his charge and verified their proper origin, determining the reason for their presence and especially if they intended to withdraw weaponry from the place. The control activity expected of an officer occupying the plaintiff's post was the average diligence that could be presumed of a person who is responsible for verifying the entry of insiders and outsiders to the facilities under their charge. That activity necessarily implied reliably verifying that the person accessing said place did not pose a risk to security, which has as its initial premise the requirement of identification to verify the effectiveness of the reasons alleged for entering the place. In this line of thought, it should be noted that the plaintiff is not accused of willful misconduct or connivance with the person who stole the weapons, but rather a negligent act, based on his omission or negligent conduct in failing to fulfill basic duties of care consistent with his functions. The administrative resolution subject to this proceeding indicates the following in this regard: \"*.. the reproach for the conduct displayed in the case at hand is objectively aggravated because through his negligence—understood as the omission of the diligence or care that the worker must have in the performance of the assigned position—in the specific case as the person in charge of the Guard Post, on the day of the facts, he allowed the entry of an individual wearing a police uniform, who claimed to be named Nombre110641, and who was going to withdraw work equipment because he was going to be a relief at the Hospital Police Station. Regarding this, the conduct displayed is objectively aggravated, because his function was precisely the security of the Guard Post, that is, entry to the facilities of the Regional Directorate, and without any justification and departing completely from the most elementary procedures dictated by reason and logic, he did not require or request any identification element to verify what was related by the subject...*\". In this sense, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that his actions adhered to a minimum of diligence in the specific fact, given that if he had correctly carried out the control activity inherent in his functions, he could have detected that the person claiming to be named Nombre110641 Nombre110641 did not come from the police unit from which he claimed his origin from, and thus could have avoided the theft of the mentioned weapons. As has been indicated, every public servant possesses a series of functional duties inherent in their position, which imply acting in accordance with the public interest and the fulfillment of the purposes sought in the exercise of the administrative conduct assigned to them. In the specific case of police forces, such obligations are particularly intense, given that they are responsible for guaranteeing public order and security. Therefore, a person belonging to the police forces has implicit in their appointment the duty to adequately safeguard that no serious harm to the interest of the community in the matter of safeguarding its protection against third parties who choose to carry out unlawful conduct occurs, either through their action or omission. In the plaintiff's case, the record shows that on the day of the facts he was performing a specific function, which was of singular importance regarding the place where he worked, given that he performed a filtering function for the entry and exit of persons in the police unit where he worked and where weaponry was guarded. If, as has been proven in the record, on the date the facts occurred there were signs of a special threat to security due to the possibility of an attempt to free a person held in custody nearby, the plaintiff's duty was to be especially prudent in his control functions, given that a weakening thereof could contribute to serious consequences to the detriment of public order and security. It is necessary to indicate that the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment are also applicable to the plaintiff, insofar as they provide: \"*Article 3.—**Duty of probity**. The public official shall be obliged to orient his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions he adopts in fulfillment of his attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives proper to the institution in which he serves, and, finally, by administering public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily*.\" \"*Article 4.—**Violation of the duty of probity**. Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the violation of the duty of probity, duly proven and after prior defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability*.\" In the case under review, it has been found proven that the serious fault that was found proven translates into a serious and proven violation of the plaintiff's duty of probity, because he, by his actions, did not act in accordance with the public interest and did not perform conduct that could be considered in accordance with legality and efficacy, failing to render accounts satisfactorily for the trust placed in him by reason of his investiture as a public servant, in an activity as delicate and relevant as the security and control of entry to a place where weaponry was guarded. It is for this reason that the plaintiff's conduct placed the public interest at risk of being affected and, consequently, the loss of confidence that this signifies is evident as a legitimate basis for his dismissal without employer liability. On the other hand, it is necessary to indicate that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the responsibility for control fell upon the so-called sentinel, who, from the testimonial evidence presented, was designated as a mere custodian of the access door to the place, but this does not mean that the plaintiff was relieved of his basic obligations as a guard officer. On the contrary, the existence of manuals and regulations with internal efficacy regarding the obligations of said function has been proven in the record. It should be noted that the fact that the stolen goods were subsequently recovered does not relieve the plaintiff of his functional duties, given that the breach of the duty of care he incurred is committed by the mere occurrence of the event, regardless of whether its effects are subsequently diminished by timely police action. On the other hand, there are also no evidentiary elements provided by the plaintiff that have demonstrated in the judicial venue the existence of any defect of nullity in the proceeding initiated or the commission of a violation of his legal or constitutional rights. Nor is it evident that the sanction imposed is due to a media situation and that there is responsibility on the part of the high police command for the lack of controls, such that what is indicated merely constitutes a statement by the plaintiff, but devoid of any proof in that regard. By reason of the foregoing, in the case under review, one must start from the considerations made regarding the requirements of the damage as such for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code applies, insofar as it provides: \"*The burden of proof falls: 1) Upon the party formulating a claim, regarding the statements of the facts constituting their right. 2) Upon the party opposing a claim, regarding the statements of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right*\". Regarding the burden of proof, it has been said on some other occasion that: \"*…, pursuant to the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code: \\\"(…) The burden of proof does not, therefore, suppose any right of the adversary, but rather an imperative of the own interest of each litigant; it is a circumstance of risk consisting of the fact that he who does not prove the facts he must prove loses the case. This burden can be shed by proving, that is, by accrediting the truth of the facts that the Law indicates. And this does not create, evidently, a right in the adversary, as if a personal legal situation pertaining to each party; the burden of not lending credence to the assertions that needed to be proved and were not proved... not proving is the same as not existing (…)*\" (Decision number 262 of nine hours forty minutes of June seventeen, nineteen hundred ninety-four, of the Second Civil Superior Court, First Section). On the other hand, it is considered that the imposed sanction cannot be considered abusive, unjustified, or disproportionate, given that the discretionary content of the objected conduct, that is, the scope of the sanction, conforms to the facts taken as true in the objected administrative decision and to the rules applied for sanctioning purposes.\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, the mere assertion of the party is insufficient, absent a solid evidentiary foundation serving to demonstrate the facts alleged. By reason of the foregoing, the indicated arguments must be rejected.\n\n**IV.II.III.-** In accordance with the reasoning set forth, this Tribunal considers that no nullity defect whatsoever is apparent in resolution 2012-1993 DM of 10:00 hours of May 14, 2012, confirmed by resolution 2012-3665 DM of thirteen hours of October thirty, two thousand twelve, and consequently the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety, given that the declaratory claims made are accessory to the determination of the legality of the conduct objected to.\n\n**V.-** For the reasons indicated, the defense of lack of right must be accepted in all its respects:\n\n**VI.- Costs:** Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must even be made ex officio, pursuant to numeral 119.2 *ibídem*. By reason of the plaintiff not being within the assumptions for exoneration therefrom, its condemnation is proper.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe defense of lack of right is accepted. The complaint is declared without merit in all its respects. Costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.\n\nRODRIGO ALBERTO CAMPOS HIDALGO\n\nRODRIGO HUERTAS DURAN FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CHACON" }