“It is evident that it is not a matter of taking away powers or attributions from the municipalities, but rather of the due coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, as the maintenance of the national road network does not imply its administration or regulation; for this reason, this provision is also not unconstitutional, under the terms challenged.” (...)
V.- Conclusion. The rights-of-way (derechos de vía) adjacent to highways and roads that form part of the national road network do not partake of the “local” character indicated by Article 169 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the regulation of advertising –in general–, on “public or private lands” as indicated by Article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in Article 2 of the Regulation, it must be understood that the authority of the MOPT falls upon those lands facing highways or roads that form part of the national road network only. The Court considers that this does not form part of the “local services and interests” over which the Municipality has jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore the action is unfounded and must be rejected on its merits. Judge Nombre300 dissents and orders the action to proceed.
X.- The length of the citation is justified by how illuminating it is for the purposes of this proceeding, and the conclusions expressed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) must be highlighted, to the effect that the matter under examination exceeds local powers, which is why it observes no injury whatsoever in Decree No. 29253-MOPT insofar as it confers the power for the regulation of administrative authorizations for the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices that are on lands adjacent to the right-of-way (derecho de vía) of the national road network to the MOPT. As was the position of this Court in the aforementioned judgment No. 14-2014 of this Section VI, that decision of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) endorses the delimitation of powers carried out by the Decree in question, which, incidentally, is supported, as has been stated, by the provisions of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos). In this sense, this judgment of this Court made clear that the criterion set forth herein has been applied even by Section III of this Administrative Contentious Court in its legal functions as non-hierarchical comptroller in municipal matters (Arts. 173 of the Political Constitution and 189-192 CPCA). Thus, in that vein it was stated in the previously referenced judgment 14-2014-VI: \"3.- The delimitation of powers claimed in the lawsuit and objected to in the answer, was already defined by Executive Decree, by a regulatory norm, endorsed by the constitutional jurisdiction in its precedent. This is how Section III of this Court has understood it in its precedents acting as an improper hierarch in municipal matters (Cf. Resolution #141-2013 of 16:50 hours on April 4, 2013, file #11-6999-1027-CA, and #419-2013 of 14:10 hours on October 22, 2013, file #12-002049-1027-CA). To harmonize the first part of Article 29 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), whose text reads: 'To place or fix advertisements, signs, posters, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. ...', with the constitutional precedent, it would have to be understood that this subsists insofar as it is applied to the local sphere, that is, to the cantonal road network and other aspects pertaining to the municipality, but that it has been tacitly modified, in the sense that in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or in front of national routes, the power to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT, and not to the Municipality.\" On the other hand, the foregoing is not obstructed by the fact that on the date of issuance of the cited judgment 2003-2127, the Canton (Cantón) of Nombre14994 did not have a current Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), since the criteria on which the Constitutional Chamber based its opinion are binding even in the face of the current existence of this planning instrument. Certainly, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in several of its precedents that Regulatory Plans have a normative hierarchy of material law, to the extent that they constitute a regulatory instrument that conditions the exercise of real property rights, by establishing the land-use permissibility regime, through the ordering of zonings and permitted land uses within the Canton. From that level, as an initial thesis, using that position regarding its legal nature, it is clear that it would prevail over normative instruments of lower rank. However, as has been noted, the cited Decree No. 29253-MOPT is a norm that is properly supported by the executive regulatory power that subsection 19 of Article 140 of the Magna Carta grants to the Executive Branch and that finds support in the legal norms that establish the MOPT's power to regulate matters relating to outdoor advertising on the national road network, specifically, the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), and the Organic Law of the MOPT (Ley Orgánica del MOPT). Even, again, as this Section VI highlighted in the discussed precedent 14-2014-VI, a criterion that is maintained in this judgment, the disregard for the validity declared by the Constitutional Chamber of Decree 29253-MOPT and of the distribution of powers established in that norm (as a reproduction of the indicated laws), makes it evident that when enacting the Regulatory Plan of Escazú, the local entity did not conform to that decision of the Constitutional Chamber, and on the contrary, opted to depart from that criterion (which it clearly knew beforehand). A relevant aspect at this point is that the issue of outdoor advertising signs on roads is a matter that was included within the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial), No. Placa1086, a norm in which Article 227 reiterates the exclusive power of the MOPT to regulate this aspect. Specifically, in what is relevant to the case the norm states: \"ARTICLE 227.- Prohibition of signs or advertisements in the right-of-way and exceptions. Placing advertisements or signs for exclusively advertising purposes within the right-of-way is prohibited. The MOPT shall establish, via regulation, the cases in which structures such as road nomenclature, informational signs for tourist destinations, activities and services, transit stops, and others shall be installed. Advertisements and signs for exclusively advertising purposes may be placed only on private property, keeping the alignment distance in front of national routes. It shall be the responsibility of the MOPT to determine and grant the respective alignment for each case, for which a period of up to ten business days is granted. (...) Structures illegally placed within the right-of-way shall be removed by the MOPT. For the purposes of compliance with the provisions established in this article, the respective agencies must create, for each case, a duly ordered and paginated administrative file, detailing at least the type of advertising structure that violates this provision, the exact location, the content, the alleged offender, and any other data available in view of the National Registry. (...) Any advertising that, in contravention of the provisions established in this law and its technical regulation, is placed within the right-of-way shall be confiscated by the competent agencies of the MOPT, and shall only be returned to the offender if they appear for its removal within the thirty calendar days following the notification of confiscation, upon prior payment of the imposed fine. (...)\" As can be observed, the norm reiterates the power alluded to in the case of the cantonal road network, a division that is reiterated in Article 231 ejusdem. On the other hand, the validity of the cited Decree as a regulatory norm for the placement of outdoor advertising can be seen in Transitory Provision XIII of that same Law No. 9078 insofar as it indicates: \"Until such time as special legislation is enacted regulating outdoor visual communication on private property in front of national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT called 'Regulation of Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising' is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits that are processed, within a maximum period of thirty calendar days from their application. The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning the matter in front of national routes.\" In the opinion of this Court, the norm in question makes evident a clear intention of the legislator to reiterate (and assign) the MOPT's powers to regulate matters pertaining to the placement of outdoor advertising on the national road network, being an additional reason to maintain the criterion already expressed in this sense by this Section VI. Nor does the local entity's claim that, through decision No. 2008-1569 of January 30, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber rejected an action filed against the Regulatory Plan insofar as it prevented the construction of billboards and structures for the placement of advertising within the Canton, constitute a forceful element of rebuttal. If one looks closely, the arguments and grounds for reproach formulated in that action are entirely different from the issues being analyzed in this judicial dispute. The analysis of that constitutional judgment allows us to establish that the grounds analyzed were the following: 1. That the Plan's norms contravene Article 46 of the Constitution, because they are so severe and arbitrary that they constitute an «absolute barrier» to the exercise of freedom of commerce; 2. That the limitations are contrary to the right to property, protected by Article 45 of the Constitution, since they «destroy the possibilities of land use, without providing for compensation to their owners»; 3. That in accordance with Article 28 of the Political Constitution, actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are beyond the reach of the law. Outdoor advertising does not harm morals, public order, or third parties; consequently, it is beyond the reach of the law and, to a greater extent, beyond the reach of a regulatory plan, and 4. That the regulatory plan retroactively disregards the existence and ownership of the right to offer outdoor advertising services (Considerando V of the judgment). A derivation of this is that it is evident that what was resolved in that judgment does not have the virtue of establishing the validity of the Regulatory Plan of Nombre14994 in what is the reason and object of reproach in this proceeding, as these are different issues that have no relation, not even a remote one, such as to infer that the acquiescence given by the Constitutional Court covers the object of this proceeding. Hence, that precedent is not pertinent to this case, nor does it permit a change in the criterion held on this point.
XI.- On the validity of the accused norms of the Regulatory Plan. Having said the above, it is now appropriate to analyze whether the provisions of the Regulatory Plan of Nombre14994 that have been challenged are substantially in conformity with the Legal System or not, considering the allegations of the complaining party. In this regard, it should be noted that the analysis of the lawsuit and the counterclaim must be carried out in a unified manner because the counter-lawsuit seeks a declaration of invalidity of Decree No. 29253-MOPT, such that there is an evident and undeniable relationship between both topics, which prevents them from being addressed separately. In that sense, the annulment is claimed of Articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Regulatory Plan of Escazú, (chapter IV-INSTALLATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING), in relation to Executive Decree 29253-MOPT \"Regulation of Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising\" and the laws that support it. To address these requests, it is necessary to refer to the content of these provisions, which state in their literal tenor: “ Article 29. Objectives and legal bases. The objective of this chapter is to regulate and control everything related to outdoor advertising and signs in the canton of Escazú, in order to achieve a balance between the urban-architectural work, the advertising message, and the landscape environment as a means of communication, information, and identification./ This regulation is issued in accordance with Article 4, subsection “a”, in relation to Article 13, subsection “d” of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), chapters VII and VIII and Articles 29, 78 and 79 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), Article IV.15, subsections 1.3 and 4 of the Construction Regulation (Reglamento de Construcciones), Articles 15 and 70 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), as well as Article 14 of Law No. 6890.” “Article 31. Application. The outdoor display of advertisements, signs, posters, notices, advertising banners, or billboards (hereinafter “signs”) is regulated in the present chapter, which applies to the entire canton of Escazú. It includes not only public roads, but also front garden areas and any space where a sign is located that can be seen from the public road./ Excluded from the application of this regulation is the display of official road signaling signs approved by the MOPT and the Municipality, and signs that cannot be seen from the public road.” The annulment of the word “entire” is requested from these norms. In addition to those two norms, the partial annulment is also requested of Articles 32, subsection j) and 33 of the same Plan, regarding the powers granted to the Municipality concerning outdoor advertising in rights-of-way and lands in front of national routes. These norms state:“ Article 32. Prohibitions. The display of signs is prohibited in the following cases: (...) b) On the public road, except those attached to urban furniture and previously authorized by the Municipality (bus stops, road signaling, etc.), and those included in Article 36 of this regulation; likewise, perpendicular signs on facades over sidewalks are excepted, but only in the urban quadrants of the three districts of the canton defined as such in this regulation, placed no more than 50 cm inward from the curb and gutter. These perpendicular signs may not be more than one meter and twenty centimeters long by 70 centimeters high, and the vertical distance between the lower edge of the sign and the sidewalk may not be less than 2.60 m. Only one sign of this type shall be allowed per commercial premises. (...) j) On billboards that do not comply with the setback from neighboring adjoining properties, which at a minimum must be equal to the total height of the advertising billboard. k) On structures such as advertising walls for lot enclosure, with the exception of those used to close them during the construction process, for which the corresponding approved construction permit must be submitted. They may be built on the property line and placed solely and exclusively when the construction phase of the project approved by the Municipality begins, and must be removed upon completion of the work. They shall be admitted only in projects of 500 m2 or more of construction area, and only panels at sidewalk level with no more than 3 meters of total height shall be admitted. In cases where the wall panels have lighting, the reflectors may only be placed within the property line, and the interested party must make the necessary adjustments.” Finally, Article 33 states: “Article 33. Licenses. To place or fix any sign, with the exception of those listed in Article 36 of this regulation, authorization must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the commercial patent holder of the business or activity where the sign is to be fixed and by the owner of the property where the notice shall be located. / In the case of operational signs, the respective permit shall be granted within the business patent procedure and shall not be charged for separately, but shall be included within the cost of the patent. / When the sign is attached to urban furniture (in cases expressly permitted by the Municipality), the permit shall be requested by the direct interested party. The requirements to obtain the license are the following: a) Complete the permit application form. b) Copy of the cadastral plan of the lot where the sign is to be located, with the official alignment granted by the Municipality or the MOPT. c) Sketch of the sign, including the art of the propaganda or advertisement. d) Construction plan of the sign, if it requires a support structure or special anchoring and if it has more than 6 m2 of advertising area. The plan must also indicate the anchoring or support structure, the construction materials, and the lighting system, if included, with technical specifications and electrical design, with the signature of the responsible professional (Architect or Engineer). e) For signs attached to the facade and forming part of it, a survey of the facade with scaled measurements must be attached, specifying the exact location and a sketch of the content of the sign's message or image. f) For signs with independent support, a location plan must be included showing the distance to the boundaries and the official alignment, as well as to the building, if any exists. g) For signs that require a construction plan, according to point “d” above, an insurance policy to cover damages to third parties shall be required. The amount of the policy shall be determined by the Urban Development Department, considering the size, height, and complexity of the sign./ All signs must present a satisfactory aesthetic appearance and shall not contain obscene expressions or expressions contrary to morality, public order, or good customs, nor terms that directly damage or injure the rights enshrined in the Constitution or the laws.”
XII.- Having analyzed these norms in light of the considerations made in the previous sections of this judgment, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the norms in question are not inherently null in their entirety, even though it is necessary that they be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines and content of legal and regulatory norms already discussed above. Indeed, having analyzed their content, this Chamber considers that based on the establishment of a dual jurisdiction regime in matters of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way, which confers on the MOPT the powers to regulate this matter in the national road network and on the Municipalities, in the cantonal road network, the indicated norms are not illegal to the extent that their framework of application and coverage is subordinated to the powers of the Local Corporation for the roads that form part of the cantonal road network, within its exclusive jurisdiction. Reiterating the criterion established in judgment 14-2014-VI on this point, and there being no merit to vary that line, it is the judgment of this collegiate body that the dilemma that arises regarding these precepts is one of coordination in their application, in attention to their scope or field of validity. However, under the stated considerations, it is an aspect that is surmountable through the harmonious and integrative interpretation of those urban planning provisions, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 6.2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) and the interpretive guidelines imposed by Article 10 of that same legal source. This means that the aforementioned municipal norms can coexist with the norms of Executive Decree #29253-MOPT, insofar as they are interpreted and applied in the sense that what is provided in the latter is an exception to the Regulatory Plan, in the matter referring to the scope of application of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way of the national road network. This implies that, given the primary and special power conferred by Law (General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), Law Creating the MOPT (Ley de Creación del MOPT), Law on Transit on Public Land Routes and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial) -already cited in this judgment-) and by executive regulation (Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT) to the ministerial portfolio discussed, the provisions of the Regulatory Plan of Escazú, nor Article 29 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), apply in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or in front of national routes, since in this case, the power to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT and not to the Municipality. The foregoing leads, in order to determine the validity of the cited regulatory provisions, to the need to delimit in their framework of application (and interpretation) that they are valid to the extent that it is understood that they refer to the Municipality's own powers that the Law (and the same Decree) grant it regarding local roads, but not regarding national roads, an area in which the power has been attributed exclusively to the MOPT. Therefore, the lawsuit must be partially admitted, but without ordering any annulment of any norm, with the necessary modifications that shall be stated in the operative part of the judgment, and that refer to this delimitation of the jurisdictional content of the questioned norms. This pronouncement makes it unnecessary to refer to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs regarding violations of Law No.\n\n8220, since, at bottom, they are aimed at combating the inefficiency and double processing that would result from accepting the thesis of the respondent Municipality, to the effect that without prejudice to the powers of the MOPT to grant permits for the placement of outdoor advertising, the municipality is the competent entity to issue construction licenses. As it is considered that jurisdiction in these areas belongs to the MOPT, with respect to the national road network, that analysis becomes futile, and therefore that approach is omitted.
XIII.- Regarding the counterclaim. As noted, the local entity filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of invalidity of Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT, alleging injury to municipal autonomy and the provisions of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) and the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) that grant them regulatory powers in building matters. The grounds supporting that counterclaim have already been the subject of analysis due to their affinity with the reasons weighed to determine the appropriateness or not of the claims of the plaintiff. In the preceding sections of this judgment, it has been determined that jurisdiction over matters of outdoor advertising regulation, in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or facing national routes, because it involves the right-of-way of the national road network, the jurisdiction to grant the respective permit or license belongs to the MOPT, and not to the Municipality. This has led this Court to declare that the articles canons 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulating Plan (Plan Regulador de Escazú), are valid, to the extent (if and only if) they are interpreted to mean that the jurisdiction contained therein refers to the local road network, and not to the national network. This criterion entails the rejection of the counterclaim, since, consistent with the foregoing development, the rules of Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT are supported by the jurisdiction that the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), the Law Creating the MOPT (Ley de Creación del MOPT), and the Law of Traffic on Public Land Routes and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial) confer upon the MOPT in this regard. For such purposes, and in order to fulfill the duty to state reasons imposed by article 57 of the CPCA, the counterclaiming respondent party is referred to the development set forth in the prior recitals (considerandos), which contain the entire foundation of this decision.
XIV.- Regarding the claim for compensation. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a claim for damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), requesting that they be granted in the abstract, to be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase. Regarding this aspect, the following should be noted. The compensability of damages that may arise from the administrative liability regime governed by article 190 of the LGAP is conditioned, as a primary matter, on the existence of an unlawful injury (daño antijurídico) at its base that is imputable (attributable) to the public administration to which it is alleged, or to which the claim for civil redress is directed. In light of article 196 of the LGAP, this injury must be effective (must have occurred), assessable (capable of economic measurement), and individualizable (suffered by an identified person or group), but must also have the particularity that, when contrasted with the Legal System, the person suffering it has no legal duty to bear it. The injury and its accreditation are essential to enable the causation analysis that allows determining the existence (or not) of a causal link between the injury actually suffered and an administrative function (or dysfunction) that is considered the adequate cause of that harmful effect. In accordance with article 58 subsection e) of the CPCA in relation to article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), proving the injury is a matter whose demonstration falls exclusively on the claimant. Although in certain cases, the same Legal System establishes the possibility of proving the amount of the injury in later phases, in which case, the right to compensation is declared and its liquidation is reserved for the judgment enforcement phase, according to the parameters that the adjudicating Court must set for such purposes, pursuant to articles 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 163 and 122 subsection m) of the CPCA, it is at least necessary to prove the existence of the injury. Note that the same article 58 subsection e) of the CPCA establishes as a requirement of the complaint, when damages and losses are sought accessory, that the cause of their generation, what they consist of, and a prudential estimate thereof must be indicated. The plaintiffs merely request damages but do not specify in any way particular damages that may have been generated to each of the claimant companies. No objective element is provided that would allow considering any injury to the claimants' patrimony accredited, and in those terms, it is not feasible to declare any right to compensation, not even in the abstract, since there is no parameter whatsoever that allows this collegiate body to at least conjecture the existence of patrimonial relationships that could have been affected by the conduct subject to this proceeding. This being the case, due to the absence of basic elements that would allow granting what is requested, the dismissal of the complaint regarding this particular must be ordered.
XV.- Corollary. The respondent Municipality did not raise defenses on the merits. Regarding the counterclaim, the State raised the defense of lack of right. Based on the factual and legal analysis set forth in the preceding recitals, the complaint filed by the Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A. against the Municipality of Escazú must be declared partially with merit, in the following terms, it being understood denied as to anything not expressly indicated: 1) That articles 29, 31, 32, subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulating Plan are valid with respect to the regulation of outdoor advertising, provided they are interpreted and applied to mean that in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or facing national routes, the jurisdiction to grant the respective permit or license belongs to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), and not to the Municipality of Nombre14994, and that the jurisdiction of the Local Corporation in this matter pertains to public roads that are part of the cantonal road network. 2) Consequently, said articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulating Plan, Chapter IV Outdoor Advertising Installation (Instalación de Publicidad Exterior), solely and exclusively regulate the matter of outdoor advertising on lands facing cantonal roads that have been classified as such in the Canton's Regulating Plan (Plan Regulador del Cantón). 3) The complaint is dismissed regarding the compensation claim made. 4) Regarding the counterclaim filed by the Municipality of Nombre14994 against the State, the defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the counterclaim filed is dismissed in all its aspects.
XVI.- Regarding costs (costas). Pursuant to article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. Exemption from this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party did not know. In the case at hand, this Court does not observe any reason to exempt the application of this maxim; therefore, the proper course is to impose them on the party that is the loser of both the complaint and the counterclaim, i.e., the Municipality of Escazú. In the case of the State, this award grants payment of legal interest( réditos legales) at the rate provided for in article 1163 of the Civil Code, calculated from the finality of this jurisdictional decision, a matter to be resolved in the judgment enforcement phase.
POR TANTO.
The complaint filed by the Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A. against the Municipality of Escazú is declared PARTIALLY WITH MERIT, in the following terms, it being understood denied as to anything not expressly indicated: 1) That articles 29, 31, 32, subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulating Plan are valid with respect to the regulation of outdoor advertising, provided they are interpreted and applied to mean that in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or facing national routes, the jurisdiction to grant the respective permit or license belongs to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), and not to the Municipality of Nombre14994, and that the jurisdiction of the Local Corporation in this matter pertains to public roads that are part of the cantonal road network. 2) Consequently, said articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulating Plan, Chapter IV Outdoor Advertising Installation, solely and exclusively regulate the matter of outdoor advertising on lands facing cantonal roads that have been classified as such in the Canton's Regulating Plan. 3) The complaint is dismissed regarding the compensation claim made. 4) REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM filed by the Municipality of Nombre14994 against the State, the defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the counterclaim filed is dismissed in all its aspects. 5) Both personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), for both the complaint and the counterclaim, are borne by the respondent-counterclaiming party, i.e., the Municipality of Escazú. In the case of the State, at the express request of a party, on these items payment of legal interest( réditos legales) is granted at the rate provided for in article 1163 of the Civil Code, calculated from the finality of this jurisdictional decision, a matter to be resolved in the judgment enforcement phase. 6) Pursuant to article 130.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, once this decision becomes final, it must be published in its entirety in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, at the expense of the Municipality of Escazú.
\n\n
José Roberto Garita Navarro
Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Judith Reyes Castillo
EXPEDIENTE: 12-006718-1027-CA.
PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO
ACTOR: Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A.
DEMANDADO-RECONVENTOR: Municipalidad de Nombre14994
RECONVENIDO: Estado.
IGWT.HUP.JRGN.2015
\n\n**VII.- On the powers regarding the regulation of outdoor advertising on the national road network.** Now, regarding the matter of the regulation of outdoor advertising in the right-of-way (derecho de vía) and areas adjacent to it, referring to national roads, the following must be stated. This particular matter has been regulated by Decree No. 29253-MOPT, called “Reglamento de Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior”, published in La Gaceta No. 25 of February 5, 2001. This regulation has as its scope of regulation: “*... to administer, fiscalize, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as everything concerning the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses) on public or private land, or in the rights-of-way that are under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), which shall be the sole competent authority in this matter, such powers shall also apply to vehicles that provide any type of public service, as well as to any kind of outdoor advertising in accordance with the distribution of powers established by Article 1 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, and Reglamento Nº13041 on the functional classification of public roads, for the purpose of protecting the road investment, promoting the safety of drivers and users in general, maintaining their creative value, and preserving the landscape from visual pollution.*” – Art. 1-. The underlining is not in the original. In this regard, Article 3 clarifies the public domain (demanialidad) of the rights-of-way of the national road network, warning that their occupation is prohibited without authorization from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), which may grant temporary permits for the occupation of rights-of-way or land with public vocation, when such a permit serves an evident and manifest public interest. Following that, in articles 4 and 5, it indicates the competence of the MOPT to issue the administrative enabling act for the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses), on public or private land, or in the rights-of-way. These rules state in their literal text: “ *Article 4—**General Provisions:** The party interested in obtaining a temporary use or occupation permit for a right-of-way, as established in Article Three of this regulation, as well as the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses), on public or private land, or in the rights-of-way under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), must request it from the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions (Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones) of the Directorate of Engineering (Dirección de Ingeniería) of the Division of Public Works (División de Obras Públicas), complying with the requirements established in this regulation. (Thus amended by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 30063 of October 25, 2001, regarding the hierarchical unit which changed from the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the Directorate of Traffic Police (Dirección de Policía de Tránsito) to the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the Directorate of Engineering of the Division of Public Works).”*\n\n\"Article 5—Regulation: The installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices located on lands adjacent to the right-of-way of the national road network shall be governed by the provisions of this regulation.\" With regard to the allegations in this proceeding, it is necessary to clarify that the recital section of this Executive Decree establishes that it is issued in accordance with the powers conferred upon MOPT by Articles 11 and 14 of the Ley de Administración Vial; Article No. 2, subsection a) of the Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; numeral 125 in fine in relation to Article 206 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres; Articles 1, 2, and 19 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, regarding the proper use of the rights-of-way of the national road network. As has been indicated, the relativization of municipal powers in the treatment and management of local services and interests is conditional upon the existence of a power (or authority) conferred by law upon a public entity in matters that concern a national interest and which, therefore, transcends the sphere of local satisfaction. In a proceeding similar to the present one, in which the validity of the Escazú Regulatory Plan was precisely debated in terms of its conferring upon the Municipality the power to regulate everything related to outdoor advertising, through ruling No. 14-2014-VI of ten hours on January thirty, two thousand fourteen, this Section VI indicated at its core regarding the local or national character of this subject: \"It is important to bear in mind that this Decree is based on cross-cutting aspects that transcend the merely local and are embedded in the national or general interest. On one hand, there is the need to regulate the use and exploitation of the right-of-way, as a public domain asset; on the other, there is the road safety component; the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and the right of private parties to carry out advertising activities. As a consideration of special relevance, there is the need to establish policies to minimize traffic accidents on roads that, due to their operational characteristics and high vehicle volume, require it.\" This panel shares this criterion and sees no merit to dissent. Indeed, as the Decree itself states, the regulation of outdoor advertising that may be placed within the territorial space comprising the right-of-way corresponding to the national road network is a matter that far exceeds the localist vision that legitimizes municipal autonomy and jurisdiction. The same Decree recognizes that in the case of the cantonal road network, the local entity is the competent authority to grant authorizations for the use, placement, construction, and remodeling of billboards; however, in the case of the national road network, it is evident that this is a matter that cannot be considered exclusive to municipal powers. In this sense, the Ley General de Caminos Públicos itself forcefully establishes that the administration of the national road network concerns MOPT, imposing a special jurisdiction by reason of subject matter and under the consideration that this road network pertains to aspects that cannot refer to an eminently local, but rather a national, scope. This is inferred from the first article of that legal source. Likewise, numeral 2 of that legislation establishes the declaration of public domain status (demanialidad) for lands occupied by existing public roads and highways or those to be constructed in the future, specifying that they are owned by the State with respect to national highways, and by the Municipalities for the streets under their jurisdiction. For its part, article 19 ejusdem indicates, in relevant part: \"No constructions or buildings of any kind may be erected in front of existing or planned highways without prior authorization from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, nor in front of local roads and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality. The Municipalities shall coordinate alignments in front of local roads with the Ministry, which shall be the entity to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest. On restricted-access or unidirectional highways, adjoining owners may only access the highway in sectors previously designated for that purpose or via marginal roads approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Persons who fail to comply with this article shall be subject to the fines indicated in this law and shall have a non-extendable period of 15 days to remove the completed work on their own; after which time the Ministry of Public Works and Transport may remove the constructions made, without thereby being obliged to recognize any sum for damages. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport may remove, and even confiscate, placing it at the disposal of the competent authorities, any good found within the right-of-way for the purpose of making improper use thereof. (...)\" These norms reveal that what concerns the regulation of outdoor advertising in the zones constituting the right-of-way of national highways is a matter falling under MOPT. The fact that under the Ley de Construcciones, the municipal councils are the entities responsible for verifying that buildings and constructions meet safety, health, comfort, and beauty conditions is not an obstacle to this, since the first article of that same Law establishes that such jurisdiction is held without prejudice to the powers that other laws confer upon other administrative bodies. Indeed, precisely the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, in the cited article 19, confers upon MOPT a special jurisdiction in these fields of outdoor advertising on the national road network, which empowers it to regulate and manage everything related to the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices located on lands adjacent to said right-of-way. Thus, this Court does not observe an invasion of the regime of local autonomy with what is regulated in that Decree No. 29253-MOPT, since, upon close examination, it is merely the reiteration and clarification of powers that Law No. 5060 already grants to the cited Ministry.\n\nVIII.- On the other hand, the allegations of invasion of this regime of powers and the autonomy constitutionally conferred upon local entities, as the involved parties rightly note, were already a subject of examination in the constitutional venue. Precisely, the same Municipality of Escazú, through its Mayor, filed an action of unconstitutionality against the cited Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT, essentially for the same reasons advanced in this proceeding, an aspect that was processed under expediente 01-010761-0007-CO, finally resolved by vote No. 2003-2127 of 13:37 hours on March 14, 2003. In that ruling, the Chamber summarizes the grounds for challenge supporting said action. Specifically, the first recital of that decision indicates: \"... He alleges that this Decree violates the powers and jurisdictions enshrined in favor of the Municipality, both in the Political Constitution and in the Ley de Planificación Urbana, Ley de Construcciones and its Regulations, and those recognized by the Constitutional Chamber. The conflict of norms arises because, although the Ley General de Caminos establishes the division of traffic routes into national highways, regional roads, and local roads, assigning the administration of national highways to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (M.O.P.T.) and the rest to the municipalities, a circumstance that serves as the basis for the challenged Regulation, other laws establish that the jurisdiction to regulate the matter of signs on properties adjacent to national highways corresponds to local governments. He requests the Chamber to declare the challenged Decree unconstitutional and define that the administration of activities relating to outdoor advertising on properties adjacent to highways corresponds entirely to local governments, excluding the M.O.P.T. from the administration of activities carried out on them. Article 11 of the challenged Decree states that to carry out the activity of installing, placing, or fixing advertisements, signs, and notices, a license must be obtained, which shall be issued by the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions of the General Directorate of Traffic Police of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. With this, it creates a conflict of jurisdictions since such provision clashes with the Ley de Construcciones, the Regulations to the Ley de Construcciones, and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which require obtaining a municipal license to place or fix advertisements and establish, among other things, that it is the Municipality's task to oversee the works built within its jurisdiction. The challenged Decree removes from the Municipality the powers granted by the Ley General de Planificación Urbana, since in accordance with its provisions, it shall be the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that issues licenses without considering whether the procedure before the Municipality has been complied with. This creates a conflict of interests for the administered party, who, having the license issued by the M.O.P.T., refuses to comply with the provisions of the Municipality promulgated via regulations and in accordance with the laws governing the matter, that is, the Ley de Planificación Urbana and the Ley de Construcciones. In accordance with several judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber, the Municipalities have absolute jurisdiction to regulate local affairs (judgment 5445-99 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, judgment 2153-93 of nine hours twenty-one minutes on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, judgments 4205-96 and 5445-99). Through these judgments, the Constitutional Chamber reaffirmed the obligation of the municipalities, in their condition as local governments, to ensure the harmonious development of the city in protection of both the general and individual interests of the population. Precisely Article 169 of the Political Constitution provides the legal framework for the development of the activities to be carried out by local governments, which in such condition are called upon to regulate the interests and services of that community. The challenged Decree violates the powers and jurisdictions established in favor of the municipalities, both in the Political Constitution and in the Ley de Planificación Urbana and Ley de Construcciones and its Regulations, and creates a conflict of jurisdictions due to the friction that arises between the provisions of that Decree and the cited laws.\" As evident from reading that transcription, the arguments supporting the Municipality's position and theory of the case are, at their core, the same reasons given as the basis for the referenced action of unconstitutionality. In that sense, upon close examination, the grounds put forward by the local entity rest on references to circumstances that, in essence, seek to reproach violations of the Law of the Constitution which, under its understanding (that of the municipality), grant local entities a level of autonomy that it deems violated by the Decree in question. However, the substantial conformity of that infra-legal norm, in light of the arguments indicated, was declared by the Constitutional Chamber in the aforementioned judgment No. 2003-2127 of 13:37 hours on March 14, 2003.\n\nIX.- For greater clarity of this matter, it is necessary to highlight some considerations expressed by that high Court in that vote, which reveal that the regulation of outdoor advertising signs in areas corresponding to the national right-of-way is under the jurisdiction of MOPT because it exceeds the matter of \"the local\":\n\n\"IV.- Analysis of Decree 29253-M.O.P.T..\n\nThe claimant states that the challenged Decree allows the M.O.P.T. to authorize, control, and regulate the urban growth and development of public and private properties adjoining national highways, in accordance with the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, which in his opinion violates the principle of municipal autonomy.\n\nHaving analyzed the content of the challenged Regulation, it is concluded that it authorizes the M.O.P.T. to administer, supervise, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses) on public or private lands. Such public or private lands are, as defined by the same regulation, properties adjacent or not to a right-of-way. The Regulation regulates activities and tasks to be carried out on the rights-of-way that form part of the national road network, ownership of which belongs to the State, but whose administration is granted to the M.O.P.T. This does not imply any interference with the constitutional powers assigned to the Municipalities, which retain the authority to administer the rights-of-way over the roads that form part of the cantonal road network. The principle of municipal autonomy is not harmed, as this Court already indicated in judgment 5445-99, that Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution grant autonomy to municipal governments regarding 'the administration of local interests and services in each canton':\n\n'X.- (...) The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material jurisdiction in favor of local governments and their regulations to define \"the local,\" a scope that can only be reduced by law—since it involves constitutional matter and a genuine right in favor of these institutions—in such a way as to lead to the maintenance of the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited supra. A conflict cannot, then, be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter that integrates the general purpose of \"local interests and services\" and \"national\" or \"state\" public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which are in reality called to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may be, potentially, intermingled and rather, it is common that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to broadening the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as the previously cited jurisprudence has expressed, it shall ultimately correspond to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to constitutional sizing. Having defined the material jurisdiction of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be considered national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; from which it follows that the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require.' (judgment No. 5445-99).\n\nThe Ley General de Caminos Públicos grants the M.O.P.T. the administration of the rights-of-way of the national road network and to the municipalities the administration of the cantonal road network. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Ley Orgánica of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, it is responsible for: '...a) Planning, building, and improving highways and roads. Maintaining highways and collaborating with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. Regulating and controlling the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways and roads. Regulating, controlling, and supervising traffic and transport on public roads.' This function is part of its role as governing body in matters of road infrastructure. For its part, Article 2 of the cited Law provides that it is the responsibility of that Ministry to regulate and control the rights-of-way over national highways.\n\nThe challenged Regulation establishes that its objective is to grant the M.O.P.T. administration powers –in a broad sense– over the rights-of-way of the national road network and over lands, public or private, or on rights-of-way under the care of the M.O.P.T. Its provisions do not violate Article 169 of the Constitution, which guarantees municipal autonomy, since none curtails the regulatory powers that have been granted to the municipalities in matters of urban planning and construction. The Regulation clearly determines which roads form part of the cantonal road network, following the distinction contained in that sense in the Ley de Caminos Públicos. Thus, it establishes that streets, local streets, unclassified roads, and local roads are subject to municipal jurisdiction. In this way, both the Municipality and the M.O.P.T. have jurisdiction over public roads; by concurring in a specific space, their execution requires coordination between the public and private institutions involved, so that the planned objectives and purposes are met. On the other hand, when the Regulation indicates that the M.O.P.T. shall exercise its administration powers on 'public or private lands' and defines these as those properties 'adjacent or not to the rights-of-way...', it is evident that it must be understood that they are lands located on or in front of national highways or in front of rights-of-way that form part of the national road network, not the cantonal road network, over which the only competent entity shall be the corresponding Municipality.\n\nThe M.O.P.T. is the governing entity in matters of road infrastructure and the competent body to issue the general road policies to be applied. In relation to the scope of the M.O.P.T.'s powers in terms of road infrastructure, this Court pronounced in judgment 5445-99, in which it stated:\n\n'Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic rights, and everything concerning the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) are specific tasks that derive from the general ordering of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal), matters, and consequently, it is the Executive Branch's responsibility to carry out their regulation; so it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the ordering concerning concessions of remunerated public transport of persons, defines the location of bus stops, and the signaling of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what is stated in Recital X of this judgment, this is a task that MOPT must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Código Municipal and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the ordering of public roads is dictated, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which is equivalent in this matter, that it must be done in accordance with the regulatory plans issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most suitable, in jurisdictions where no regulatory plans exist. In consideration of the foregoing, Article 2 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres does not violate municipal autonomy, and the action must be declared without merit, also on this point.'\n\nIn relation to road planning, in the same cited judgment, the Chamber stated:\n\n'...For its part, urban planning is closely related to the planning of public land roads that are intended for general public service and use, a matter that by legal definition has been assigned to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; according to the definition in its own Ley de Creación, when it indicates, in relevant part:\n\n\"The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has as its purpose:\n\na) [...] To regulate and control the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways.\"\n\nregulate, control, and monitor transit and transport on public roads.\"\n\n
Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on roadways, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines and transit fees, and matters concerning the ownership of motor vehicles (article 1 of the Traffic on Public Land Routes Law) are specific tasks deriving from the general regulation of public roadways, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and consequently correspond to the Executive Branch to carry out their regulation; such that it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that issues and implements the regulations concerning concessions for remunerated public passenger transport, defines the location of bus stops, and the signage of public roadways, for example. However, in accordance with what is indicated in Considerando X of this judgment, this is a task that the M.O.P.T. must develop in coordination with local functions, under the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and article 7 of the new legal body, such that when the regulation of public roadways is issued, it must be done respecting local legal order, which in this matter is equivalent to it being done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most suitable, in jurisdictions where regulatory plans do not exist. In light of the foregoing considerations, article 2 of the Traffic on Public Land Routes Law is not a violation of municipal autonomy…”.
\n\nThe notion of \"coordination\" thus becomes a key element in inter-institutional relations. In judgment No. 6706-93 of fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, and in relation to the subject, this Court indicated:
\n\n“It is evident that it is not a matter of taking away competencies or powers from the municipalities, but rather of the due coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, since the maintenance of the national road network does not imply their administration or regulation; for this reason, this provision is also not unconstitutional, in the challenged terms.” (...)
\n\nV.- Conclusion. Rights-of-way that border highways and roads that form part of the national road network do not participate in the \"local\" character indicated by article 169 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the regulation of advertising –in general–, on \"public or private land\" as indicated by article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in article 2 of the Regulation, it must be understood that the power of the M.O.P.T. falls upon those lands that face highways or roads that form part of the national road network only. The Court considers that this does not form part of the “local services and interests” over which the Municipality has competence. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, therefore the action is without merit and must be rejected on the merits. Judge Vargas dissents and orders the action to proceed.
\n\nX.-\nThe length of the quote is justified by how clarifying it is for the purposes of this proceeding, and the conclusions reached by the Constitutional Chamber must be highlighted, in the sense that the matter under examination exceeds local competencies, which is why it does not observe any harm in Decree No. 29253-MOPT as it confers the competence for regulating administrative authorizations for the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices, that are on land adjacent to the right-of-way of the national road network to the MOPT. As was the position of this Court in the aforementioned ruling No. 14-2014 of this Section VI, that vote of the Constitutional Court endorses the delineation of competencies carried out by the Decree in question, which, it should be said, is based, as has been set forth, on the norms of the General Public Roads Law. In that sense, this judgment of this Court made it clear that the criterion expressed herein has been applied even by Section III of this Administrative Litigation Court in its legal functions as non-hierarchical comptroller in municipal matters (arts. 173 of the Political Constitution and 189-192 CPCA). Thus, in that order it was indicated in ruling 14-2014-VI of prior reference: \"3.- The delineation of competencies claimed in the lawsuit and objected to in the reply, was already defined by Executive Decree, by regulatory norm, endorsed by the constitutional jurisdiction in its precedent. This is how Section III of this Court has understood it in its precedents acting as improper hierarch in municipal matters (Cfr. Resolution #141-2013 of 16.50 hours of April 4, 2013, file #11-6999-1027-CA, and #419-2013 of 14.10 hours of October 22, 2013, file #12-002049-1027-CA). To harmonize the first part of article 29 of the Constructions Law, whose text reads: “To place or affix advertisements, signs, notices, or announcements, a license must be requested from the Municipality. ...”, with the constitutional precedent, it would have to be understood that this subsists as long as it is applied to the local sphere, that is, to the cantonal road network and other aspects specific to the municipality, but that it has been tacitly modified, in the sense that regarding the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on land adjacent to or facing national routes, the competence to grant the respective permit or license, corresponds to the MOPT, and not to the Municipality.\" On the other hand, for the above, it is not an obstacle that at the date of issuance of the cited ruling 2003-2127, the Canton of Escazú did not have a current Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), because the criteria upon which the Constitutional Chamber based its criterion are opposable even in the face of the current existence of that planning instrument. Certainly, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in several of its precedents, that the Regulatory Plans have a normative hierarchy of material law, to the extent that they constitute a regulatory instrument that conditions the exercise of real estate ownership rights, by providing the permissibility regime for land use, through the regulation of zoning and permitted uses of the land within the Canton. From that level, in preliminary thesis, using this stance of its legal nature, it is clear that it would prevail over normative instruments of lower rank. However, as has been indicated, the cited Decree No. 29253-MOPT is a norm that is properly based on the executive regulatory power that article 140, subsection 19 of the Magna Carta grants to the Executive Branch and which finds support in the legal norms that fix the competence of the MOPT to regulate matters relating to outdoor advertising on the national road network, specifically, the General Public Roads Law, and the Organic Law of the MOPT. Even again, as this Section VI made clear in the commented precedent 14-2014-VI, a criterion that is maintained in this ruling, the disregard of the validity declared by the Constitutional Chamber of Decree 29253-MOPT and of the regime of competencies established in that norm (as a reproduction of the indicated laws), reveals that when promulgating the Regulatory Plan of Escazú, the local entity did not adjust to that ruling of the Constitutional Chamber and on the contrary, chose to deviate from that criterion (which it clearly knew in advance). A relevant aspect at this point is that the subject of outdoor advertising signs on highways is an issue that was included in the Traffic on Public Land Routes and Road Safety Law, No. 9078, a norm in which, in article 227, the exclusive competence of the MOPT to regulate this aspect is reiterated. Specifically, in what is relevant to the case, the norm states: \"ARTICLE 227.- Prohibition of signs or advertisements in the right-of-way and exceptions. Placing exclusively advertising signs or advertisements within the right-of-way is prohibited. The MOPT shall set by regulation the cases in which structures such as road nomenclature, informative advertisements for tourist destinations, activities and services, transit stops, and others will be installed. Exclusively advertising advertisements and signs may only be placed on private property, maintaining the alignment distance in front of national routes. It shall be the responsibility of the MOPT to determine and grant for each case the respective alignment, and for this purpose it is granted a period of up to ten business days. (...) Structures illegally placed within the right-of-way shall be removed by the MOPT. For the purposes of complying with the provisions of this article, the respective agencies must create, for each case, a duly organized and paginated administrative file, detailing at least the type of advertising structure that violates this provision, the exact location, the content, the presumed offender, and any other data available in view of the National Registry. (...) Any advertising that in contravention of the provisions of this law and its technical regulation is placed within the right-of-way shall be confiscated by the competent agencies of the MOPT, and shall only be returned to the offender if they appear for its removal within the thirty calendar days following the notification of the confiscation, after payment of the imposed fine. (...)\" As can be observed, the norm reiterates the competence alluded to in the case of the cantonal road network, a split that is reiterated in canon 231 of the same legal body. On the other hand, the validity of the cited Decree as a regulatory norm for the placement of outdoor advertising can be seen in transitory article XIII of that same Law No. 9078 as it indicates: \"Until such time as special legislation is enacted to regulate outdoor visual communication on private property in front of national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT called \"Regulation of Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising\" is repealed or not, the MOPT shall be in charge of approving or denying the permits that are processed, within a maximum period of thirty calendar days from their request. The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning the matter in front of national routes.\" In the judgment of this Court, the norm in question reveals a clear intention of the legislator to reiterate (and assign) the competencies of the MOPT to regulate matters relating to the placement of outdoor advertising on the national road network, being an additional reason to maintain the criterion already expressed in this regard by this Section VI. Nor does the local entity's argument constitute a forceful refutation element, that through vote No. 2008-1569 of January 30, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber rejected an action filed against the Regulatory Plan as it prevented constructions of billboards and structures for placing advertising within the Canton. Upon closer inspection, the arguments and grounds for reproach formulated in that action are totally different from the issues analyzed in this judicial dispute. The analysis of that constitutional ruling allows establishing that the reasons analyzed were the following: 1. That the norms of the Plan are contrary to article 46 of the Constitution, because they are so severe and arbitrary that they constitute an “absolute barrier” to the exercise of freedom of commerce; 2. That the limitations are contrary to property rights, protected by article 45 of the constitution, since they “destroy the possibilities of land use, without providing for compensation to its owners”; 3. That in accordance with article 28 of the Political Constitution, actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the action of the law. Outdoor advertising does not harm public morals, nor public order, nor third parties; therefore, it is outside the action of the law and, with greater reason, outside the action of a regulatory plan, and 4. That the regulatory plan retroactively disregards the existence and ownership of the right to offer outdoor advertising services (Considerando V of the ruling). A derivation of this is that it is evident that what was resolved in that ruling does not have the virtue of establishing the validity of the Regulatory Plan of Escazú in what is the motive and object of reproach in this proceeding, since these are diverse questions that are not related, not even reflectively, so as to conclude that the consent given by the Constitutional Tribunal covers the object of this proceeding. Ergo, that precedent is not pertinent to this case, nor does it allow varying the criterion held on this particular.
\n\nXI.- On the validity of the challenged norms of the Regulatory Plan. Having said the foregoing, we must now analyze whether the provisions of the Regulatory Plan of Escazú that have been challenged are substantially in conformity with the Legal Order or not, considering the allegations of the claimant party. In this sense, it is necessary to specify that the analysis of the lawsuit and the counterclaim must be carried out in a unified manner because the counter-lawsuit seeks the declaration of invalidity of Decree No. 29253-MOPT, such that there is an evident and undeniable relationship between both topics, which prevents them from being addressed separately. In that sense, the nullity is claimed of articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j) and 33 of the Regulatory Plan of Escazú, (chapter IV-INSTALLATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING), in relation to Executive Decree 29253-MOPT \"Regulation of Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising\" and the laws that support it. To address these requests, it is necessary to refer to the content of those provisions, which state in their literal wording: “ Article 29. Objectives and legal bases. The objective of this chapter is to regulate and control everything relating to outdoor advertising and signs in the canton of Escazú, with the aim of achieving a balance between the urban-architectural work, the advertising message, and the landscape environment as a means of communication, information, and identification./ This regulation is issued in accordance with article 4, subsection “a”, in relation to article 13, subsection “d” of the Municipal Code, chapters VII and VIII and articles 29, 78 and 79 of the Constructions Law, article IV.15, subsections 1.3 and 4 of the Constructions Regulation, articles 15 and 70 of the Urban Planning Law and article 71 of the Organic Environmental Law, as well as article 14 of the Law No. 6890.” “Article 31. Application. The outdoor display of advertisements, signs, notices, announcements, advertising banners, or billboards (hereinafter “signs”) is regulated in this chapter, which governs the entire canton of Escazú. It includes not only public roadways, but also front yard areas and any space where a sign is located that can be seen from the public road./ Excluded from the application of this regulation is the display of official road signage signs approved by the MOPT and the Municipality, and signs that cannot be seen from the public road.” Of these norms, the nullity of the word “entire” is requested. In addition to those two norms, the partial nullity is also requested of articles 32, subsection j) and 33 of the same Plan, regarding the competencies granted to the Municipality in respect of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way and lands in front of national routes. Said norms indicate:“ Article 32. Prohibitions. The display of signs is prohibited in the following cases: (...) b) On the public road, except for those attached to urban furniture and that have been previously authorized by the Municipality (bus shelters, road signage, etc.), and those included in article 36 of this regulation; likewise, perpendicular signs on facades over sidewalks are excepted, but only in the urban quadrants of the three districts of the canton defined as such in this regulation, placed no more than 50 cm inward from the curb and gutter. These perpendicular signs may not be more than one meter and twenty centimeters long by 70 centimeters high, and the vertical distance between the lower edge of the sign and the sidewalk may not be less than 2.60 m. Only one sign of this type will be permitted per commercial establishment. (...) j) On billboards that do not maintain the setback with neighboring adjoining properties, which as a minimum must be equal to the total height of the advertising billboard. k) On structures such as advertising hoardings for enclosing lots, with the exception of those used to close them during the construction process, for which they must present the corresponding approved construction permit. They may be built on the property line and placed solely and exclusively when the construction stage of the project approved by the Municipality begins, and must be removed upon completion of the work. They will be permitted only in projects of 500 m2 or more of construction area, and only panels at sidewalk level no more than 3 meters in total height will be permitted. In cases where the hoarding panels have illumination, the reflectors may only be placed within the property line, and the interested party must make the necessary adjustments.” Finally, article 33 indicates:\n“Article 33. Licenses. To place or affix any sign, with the exception of those listed in article 36 of this regulation, authorization must be requested from the Municipality. The license will be requested by the commercial licensee of the business or activity where the sign is to be affixed and by the owner of the property where the notice will be located. / In the case of operating signs, the respective permit will be granted within the business license procedure and will not be charged for separately, but will be included within the cost of the license. / When the sign is attached to urban furniture (in cases expressly permitted by the Municipality), the permit will be requested by the direct interested party. The requirements to obtain the license are the following: a) Fill out the permit application form. b) Copy of the cadastral plan of the lot where the sign is to be located, with the official alignment granted by the Municipality or the MOPT. c) Sketch of the sign, including the art of the advertisement or announcement. d) Construction plan of the sign, if this requires a support structure or special anchoring and if it has more than 6 m2 of advertising area. The plan must indicate, in addition to the anchoring or support structure, the construction materials and the illumination system, if included, with technical specifications and electrical design, with the signature of the responsible professional (Architect or Engineer). e) For signs attached to the facade and that form part of it, a survey of the facade with scaled measurements must be attached, specifying the exact location and a sketch of the content of the message or image of the sign. f) For signs with independent support, a location plan must be included showing the distance to the boundaries and the official alignment, as well as to the building, if it exists. g) For signs that require a construction plan, in accordance with point “d” above, an insurance policy to cover damages to third parties will be required. The amount of the policy will be determined by the Urban Development Department, taking into account the size, height, and complexity of the sign./ All signs must present a satisfactory aesthetic aspect and shall not contain obscene expressions or expressions contrary to public morals, public order, or good customs, nor terms that directly harm or injure the rights enshrined in the Constitution or in the laws.”
\n\nXII.- The analysis of these norms in light of the considerations made in the preceding sections of this ruling leads this collegiate body to the criterion that the norms in question are not in themselves entirely null, even though they must be interpreted according to the guidelines and content of the legal and regulatory norms already discussed above. In effect, having analyzed their content, this Chamber ponders that from the establishment of a dual competency regime in matters of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way, which confers on the MOPT the powers to regulate this matter on the national road network and on the Municipalities, on the cantonal road network, the norms indicated are not illegal to the extent that their framework of application and coverage is subordinated to the competencies of the Local Corporation over the roads that form part of the cantonal road network, within its exclusive competence. Reiterating the criterion established in ruling 14-2014-VI on this point, and there being no merit to vary that line, it is the judgment of this collegiate body that the dilemma that arises regarding these precepts is one of coordination in their application, in consideration of their scope or field of validity. However, under the aforementioned considerations, this is an aspect that is surmountable through the harmonious and integrative interpretation of those urban planning provisions, in accordance with the doctrine of article 6.2 of the General Law of Public Administration and the interpretive guidelines imposed by article 10 of that same legal source. This means that the aforementioned municipal norms can coexist with the norms of Executive Decree #29253-MOPT, as long as they are interpreted and applied in the sense that what is provided therein is an exception to the Regulatory Plan, in the matter referring to the scope of application of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way of the national road network. This implies that, given the original and special competence conferred by Law (General Public Roads Law, Law of Creation of the MOPT, Traffic on Public Land Routes and Road Safety Law -already cited in this ruling-) and by executive regulation (Executive Decree No.\n\n29253-MOPT) to the ministerial portfolio mentioned, the provisions of the Escazú Regulatory Plan, nor Article 29 of the Construction Law, are applicable in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on land adjacent to or facing national routes, since in this case, the authority to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT and not to the Municipality. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that, in order to determine the validity of the aforementioned regulatory provisions, their scope of application (and interpretation) must be delineated; they are valid insofar as they are understood to refer to the Municipality's own powers that the Law (and the same Decree) grant it with respect to local roads, but not with respect to national roads, a sphere in which authority has been attributed exclusively to the MOPT. The claim must therefore be partially admitted, but without ordering the annulment of any rule, with the necessary modifications that will be stated in the operative part of the ruling, and which refer to this delineation of the jurisdictional content of the challenged rules. This pronouncement makes it unnecessary to address the allegations raised by the petitioners concerning the violations of Law No. 8220, since, in essence, they are directed at combating the inefficiency and double procedures that would result from accepting the defendant Municipality's thesis, to the effect that without prejudice to the MOPT's powers to grant permits for the placement of outdoor advertising, the municipality is the competent authority to issue construction licenses. Given that it is determined that authority in these areas lies with the MOPT, with regard to the national road network, that analysis is futile, and therefore that approach is omitted.\"\n\n(Undisputed fact) **3)** That by resolution number 2003-02127 of 1:37 p.m. on March 14, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber ordered the rejection of the unconstitutionality action referred to in the previous sections and indicated as support for that decision: \"*V.- Conclusion. The rights-of-way that adjoin roads and highways that form part of the national road network do not share the 'local' character indicated by Article 169 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the regulation of advertising –in general–, on 'public or private land' as indicated by Article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in Article 2 of the Regulation, it shall be understood that the power of the M.O.P.T. falls upon those lands that face roads or highways that form part of the national road network only. The Tribunal considers that this is not part of the 'local services and interests' over which the Municipality has jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, therefore the action is unfounded and must be rejected on the merits. Judge Nombre300 dissents and orders the action to proceed....*\" (Undisputed fact, consultation of the SCIJ electronic consultation system carried out on November 17, 2015, at 1:54 p.m.) **4)** That the Regulatory Plan of the Canton of Escazú was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2005. **5)** That the cited Regulatory Plan of the Canton of Nombre14994 was amended according to publication made in La Gaceta No. 90 of May 11, 2006. (Undisputed fact) **6)** That in the following zones determined in the Regulatory Plan of the Canton of Escazú: 1) low-density residential zone, article 11.2.5 subsection f); ii) medium-density residential zone, article 11.3.5 subsection f); iii) medium-high density residential zone, article 11.4 non-conforming uses subsection e); iv) high-density residential zone, article 11.5.5 Non-conforming uses subsection f); v) linear commercial zone, article 12.2.6 subsection b); vi) Guachipelín center commercial zone, specifically, article 12.3.4 subsection b); vii) Multiplaza specific commercial zone, specifically article 12.3.5.6, subsection a); viii) San Rafael Center specific commercial zone which refers to article 12.2, which in turn indicates in article 12.2.6 non-conforming uses in subsection b) that of billboards; ix) Guachipelín Center specific commercial zone, article 12.3.4 non-conforming uses subsection b); x) Trejos Montealegre specific commercial zone, article 12.3.7 non-conforming uses subsection b), national roads exist. (Undisputed fact) **7)** That the Regulatory Plan of Nombre14994 in article 30 \"Glossary of terms\" establishes and recognizes the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport on national roads. Likewise, article 19 of the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Escazú delimits and recognizes the jurisdictions of the MOPT and the Municipality. (Undisputed fact) **8)** That ordinance 29 of the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Nombre14994 establishes: \"***Article 29.** Objectives and legal bases. The objective of this chapter is to regulate and control everything related to outdoor advertising and signs in the canton of Escazú, in order to achieve a balance between the urban-architectural work, the advertising message and the landscape environment as a means of communication, information and identification. This regulation is issued in accordance with Article 4, subsection a, in relation to Article 13, subsection d of the Municipal Code, Chapters VII and VIII and Articles 29, 78 and 79 of the Construction Law, Article IV.15, subsections 1.3 and 4 of the Construction Regulation, Articles 15 and 70 of the Urban Planning Law and Article 71 of the Organic Environmental Law, as well as Article 14 of Law No. 6890.*\" For its part, numeral 31 indicates in relevant part: \"***Article 31. Application.** *The outdoor display of announcements, signs, notices, advertisements, advertising banners or billboards (hereinafter 'signs') is regulated in this chapter, which governs the entire canton of Escazú. It includes not only public roads, but also front yard areas and any space where a sign is located that can be seen from the public road. Excluded from the application of this regulation are the display of official traffic signs approved by the MOPT and the Municipality, and signs that cannot be seen from the public road.*\" (Consultation of the text of the cited Plan) **9)** That in article 32 subsection j) of the referenced Regulatory Plan it is established: \"***Article 32. Prohibitions.** *The display of signs is prohibited in the following cases: (...) j) On billboards that do not comply with the setback from neighboring adjoining properties, which must at a minimum be equal to the total height of the billboard. k) On structures such as advertising walls for closing off lots, with the exception of those used to close them during the construction process, for which the corresponding approved construction permit must be submitted. They may be built on the property line and placed solely and exclusively when the construction phase of the project approved by the Municipality begins, and must be removed upon completion of the work. They shall only be allowed in projects of 500 m2 or more of construction area and only sidewalk-level panels with a total height of no more than 3 meters shall be allowed. In cases where the wall panels have lighting, the reflectors may only be placed within the property line, and the interested party must make the necessary adjustments.*\" (Consultation of the text of the cited Plan) **10)** That ordinance 33 of the cited Regulatory Plan stipulates that, with the exceptions contemplated by ordinance 36 of that urban planning instrument, authorization must be requested from the Municipality to place or affix any sign. (Consultation of the text of the Regulatory Plan). **11)** That despite obtaining an outdoor advertising permit issued by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Municipality of Escazú, in the process of requiring the construction license to erect the structure, denies said license for not being in accordance with the Zoning Regulation of the local entity's Regulatory Plan. (Undisputed fact) **12)** That in cases where the structure on which the billboard is placed does not have the construction license granted by the Municipality of Escazú, the latter proceeds to close down the outdoor advertising. (Undisputed fact)\n\n**II. Unproven facts. Sole.** That the plaintiffs have suffered damages arising from the issuance of the public conduct subject to challenge.\n\n**III.- Object of the process.** From the analysis of the lawsuit, it appears that the request for a declaration of substantial non-conformity with the legal system regarding the challenged norms of the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Escazú is based on several core axes of argument, namely: **a) Aspects associated with municipal autonomy and subjection to legal norms.** This point addresses the difference between local autonomy and sovereignty, referring to multiple votes of the Constitutional Chamber, among them, numbers 5445-1999, 2007-013577, 2127-2003. On this point, based on that last ruling, it is highlighted that the roads and highways that form part of the national road network do not constitute part of the powers constitutionally attributed to the Municipalities, being a field of action in which the local entity has no involvement whatsoever. **b) Hierarchy of norms.** In this regard, the plaintiffs state that local powers regarding urban planning must be reconciled with the general interests established in higher-ranking norms. It emphasizes that the Regulatory Plan is a local source, while Executive Decree 29253-MOPT is of national application, that competence being delimited to the roads that form part of the national road network, so that generically regulating everything related to outdoor advertising in the Regulatory Plan without delimiting that its powers are at the local level, invades the powers of the MOPT. It highlights that the powers of the MOPT embodied in Executive Decree 29253-MOPT derive from the Roads Law, the Road Administration Law, the MOPT Creation Law, as well as the Law of Traffic on Public Land Roads. **c) Position of the Constitutional Chamber.** It relates that in 2001 the then-Mayor Nombre14994 filed an unconstitutionality action against the Executive Decree in question, processed under file 01-010761-0007-CO and resolved by vote 2127-03. It says, that action alleged that the cited Decree violated the powers and competencies enshrined in the Political Constitution, Urban Planning Law, Construction Law and its regulation. It refers again to ruling 2127-2003 of the Constitutional Chamber on the powers of the MOPT regarding that regulation of advertising on national roads. **d) The duty of coordination among State institutions.** In this allegation, it points out that the Constitutional Chamber has expounded on the duty of coordination of public entities when it comes to the satisfaction of public interests to avoid the collision of competencies. It criticizes that in the procedure for drafting the Regulatory Plan, the Municipality of Nombre14994 did not take the MOPT into consideration and regulates generically without excluding fields outside its powers. It considers that the local entity should have requested the MOPT to comment on what was regulated by the regulatory plan regarding rights-of-way and outdoor advertising. **e) Challenged norms.** At another point, it sets out the norms of the Regulatory Plan of Nombre14994 that, in its judgment, exceed the scope of local competence, citing ordinances 29, 31, 32 subsection j), 33 of that planning instrument. It considers that those norms are illegal insofar as they make no reservation as to the fact that the Local Corporation's competence in matters of outdoor advertising is with respect to cantonal roads, as national roads are the responsibility of the MOPT. **f) Duplication of requirements and invasion of competencies**. In this particular, it denounces that the regulation of everything related to outdoor advertising by the Municipality of Nombre14994 without differentiating the national from the local causes the administered party to incur a double investment of time and money, since the same requirements that must be submitted to the MOPT (art. 26, 27 of DE-29253-MOPT) are those that must be provided to the local entity (art. 33 Regulatory Plan). It considers that the City Council's stance violates mandate 3 of Law No. 8220. It highlights that precept 8 of that Law 8220 establishes an inter-institutional coordination procedure, while canon 9 ejusdem imposes the maxim of a single administrative instance. **g) Improper transfer of competencies.** It accuses that there is no norm authorizing the transfer of competencies in the subject matter of the regulation on Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising, nor any act by virtue of which it can be concluded that the MOPT and the Municipality have coordinated, in accordance with Law No. 8220, any action to implement a procedure for outdoor advertising procedures on the national road network. It refers to the norms of Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT that, in its judgment, assign the aforementioned competence to the MOPT.\n\n**IV.- Allegations of the respondent Municipality and its counterclaim.** For its part, the local entity points out that it has proceeded within its constitutional powers. It considers that Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT cannot be understood to be granting a construction permit, as that would be an intrusion into municipal powers. It cites ordinances 1, 2, 29 and 74 of the Construction Law. It considers that the only entity competent to grant a construction permit is the local entity. It considers that the erection of a structure such as that used by advertising companies requires a construction permit that they have not requested. It states that the Regulatory Plan is a norm of higher hierarchy than the Decree in question, which implies that urban planning is eminently local. It cites precedents from the Constitutional Chamber in this regard, namely, 6419-96, 4957-96, 6706-93, 5306-93 and 5097-93. It considers that the Regulatory Plan is a higher-ranking norm and therefore cannot cease to be applied, such that its compliance is mandatory for the administered party or any entity that has a direct commercial relationship with the canton of Nombre14994 because it regulates construction activity and everything corresponding to signs and billboards, this type of structures not being permitted by said regulations. It highlights the autonomy that the Political Constitution confers on local entities, a topic developed by the Constitutional Tribunal in ruling No. 6706-93. It continues with a detail of the legal nature of regulatory plans, citing vote 13330-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber as support for affirming that it is a law in the material sense. Regarding the content of ruling 2003-2127 of the Constitutional Chamber that ordered the rejection of the unconstitutionality action filed by the Municipality against Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT, it highlights that at that time Nombre14994 did not have a Regulatory Plan. It states that the issue of the validity of the Regulatory Plan's norms on outdoor advertising was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 2008-001569, a vote in which that Tribunal endorsed said regulations and reinforces the prohibition of placing billboards, signs, advertising walls or any other, considering that excessive and uncontrolled signage infringes the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. It notes that a distinction must be made between the license for the structure or billboard that will support the advertisement and the advertising itself. It refers to ordinance 29 and 74 of the Construction Law. It states that, independently of whether the structure is erected facing a public street, it is the Municipality's competence to grant the construction permit and the MOPT only authorizes the outdoor advertising. It mentions that Article 32 of the Regulatory Plan imposes the prohibition of signs in the cases referred to therein (it cites subsection j). In turn, Article 33 of that Plan establishes the duty to obtain a license for the placement of that type of structure. The closure of the billboards was ordered based on the regulations in force. On these same allegations, it bases its counterclaim against the State, considering that ordinances 4, 5, 7 subsection c), 10, 11 of the cited Executive Decree 29253-MOPT are illegal for being contrary to the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 24, 74 of the Construction Law, 169 of the Magna Carta and 15 of the Urban Planning Law.\n\n**V.- Allegations of the State.** Finally, the State considers that there is no illegality whatsoever in norms 4, 5, 7 subsection c), 10, 11 of the cited Executive Decree 29253-MOPT, since the MOPT has sufficient powers to authorize the installation and construction of billboards or other outdoor advertising systems. It says that from its first numeral, the General Law of Public Roads makes the difference between national and cantonal roads, their main difference being the competent body for their administration. The powers of the Municipalities regarding the road network are residual, as they are limited to cantonal roads. It refers to ordinance 19 of the Law of Public Roads concerning construction on the right-of-way and adjacent zones, which reiterates the existing difference between the powers of the MOPT and the Municipalities according to the type of road. It highlights that even on local roads, the Municipalities must coordinate with the MOPT the guidelines to follow on these roads, therefore insisting that in this field the City Council's competence is residual. It relates that Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT derives from the Law of Public Roads and the MOPT Creation Law, an instrument that does no more than develop and regulate the competence legally granted to the MOPT, so that administered parties can have certainty of what the requirements and procedures will be to install outdoor advertising. Regarding the allegation of injury to municipal autonomy, it refers to vote 13577-2013 in which the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that when the issue goes beyond the territorial district, the competencies can be exercised by national State institutions. It affirms that the controversy ventilated in this process was already analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in vote 2003-02127. It emphasizes that it cannot be ignored that there is already a prior pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber in relation to the competencies that the MOPT has in matters of national roads and regarding the content of that decree, which takes effect between the parties. Municipal autonomy cannot be understood as absolute, obviating the competencies of other State entities. It highlights that Article 1 of the Construction Law itself establishes that municipal powers in building matters are without prejudice to the powers that other laws grant to other administrative bodies. Regarding the legal nature of the Regulatory Plan, it points out, it is not a source that can be applicable to the rights-of-way and zones adjacent to national roads, as this constitutes the exclusive competence of the MOPT. Regarding the nature of those plans, it refers to ruling 13330-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber. Even if it is understood that those plans are laws in the material sense, it cannot be affirmed that it has a higher rank than the Law of Public Roads, nor the MOPT Creation Law, to regulate matters relating to national roads. It expresses that there is abundant regulation establishing the competence of the MOPT with respect to the rights-of-way of national roads. It argues that Law No. 9078, Law of Traffic on Public Land Roads and Road Safety of October 4, 2012, details both the competence and the procedure to follow in case of installation of outdoor advertising on national roads. It cites Articles 227 and 231 of that law, as well as Transitory Provision III. It considers that the questioned Decree conforms fully to legality. The examination of the debated aspects is then entered into.\n\n**VI.- On the autonomy of the Municipalities.** Under the protection of the provisions of numeral 169 of the Political Constitution, local corporations have autonomy for the administration and satisfaction of the so-called local services and interests. It is moreover a legal concept of an indeterminate nature, which, in the initial thesis, assumes the primacy of the powers of the local entity to regulate and manage the matters typical of interests or services that are related to the satisfaction of a determined group of people, that is, the residents, as well as the development and benefit of the municipality, the territorial district, i.e., the cantonal one, being a substantial element. Constitutional jurisprudence has confirmed such autonomy, on the understanding that it coexists with, and does not eliminate, the possibility of regulation and assignment of competencies to other public entities, by criteria of specialty or subject matter, as well as the competencies proper to administrative units whose scope of action transcends the local sphere and expands to general (national) interests. Based on this, municipal competencies over the satisfaction of local interests must find support in the law, and always on the understanding that intrusion into that field of action, when it includes the concept of local interest, must be restricted, under penalty of violating the constitutional norm that confers autarchy in its exercise, but it is also necessary to state that this autonomy is exercised within a unitary concept and model of State, for which reason a principle of coordination and complementarity of competencies is imposed, which implies that local autonomy is far from being a conferral of power of sovereign exercise in that field. The Constitutional Chamber in vote 13577-2007, resolving a matter of competencies between local entities and the Executive Branch on waste management, that high Tribunal stated: \"***II. On local and national competencies in the case of waste management.** *This Chamber on previous occasions has carried out a balancing between national competencies and local competencies, understanding in principle, that a conflict due to antagonism between the two cannot be created, because the matter that integrates the general purpose of 'local interests and services' must coexist with 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, above all in protection of the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the municipalities vis-à-vis the central power. It is for this reason, as indicated, that* *it is indispensable that a relationship of coordination exists between municipal entities and other public bodies, including the Executive Branch.* *In that line, the Chamber indicated in ruling 005445-99 of two thirty p.m. on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, as pertinent: 'From the political point of view, the municipalities are representative governments with jurisdiction over a determined territory (canton), with their own legal personality and public powers vis-à-vis their residents (inhabitants of the canton); they operate in a decentralized manner vis-à-vis the Government of the Republic, and enjoy constitutionally guaranteed and reinforced autonomy that manifests itself in political matters, by determining their own goals and the normative and administrative means in fulfillment of all types of public service for the satisfaction of the common good in their community.*'\n\nIn summary, it can be said that municipalities or local governments are territorial entities of a corporate and public, non-state nature, endowed with independence in matters of government and operation, which means, for example, that municipal autonomy involves tax aspects, which for their validity require legislative authorization, the contracting of loans, and the preparation and disposition of their own revenues and expenditures, with generic powers. All of this necessarily implies that in order to correctly define the conformation of the Costa Rican State, there must be an exact assembly in the sum of the Municipal Governments as a whole and individually, in order to achieve coordinated relations and functioning with the Government of the Republic, to avoid the simultaneous coexistence of spheres of power of different origin and essence, the duplication of national and local efforts, and the confusion of rights and obligations among the various parties involved.” Now, this autonomy of the Municipalities granted by the Constituent Assembly in Article 170 of the Fundamental Norm, while formally constituting a limit to the interference of the Executive Branch, cannot be understood as being full or unlimited autonomy, since it is always subject to certain limits, given that the territorial decentralization of the municipal regime does not imply the elimination of the competencies assigned to other organs and entities of the State. It is for this reason that there are local interests whose custody corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional and legal protection is attributed to other public organs, among them the Executive Branch. For this reason, this Chamber has recognized that when the problem overflows the territorial circumscription to which local governments are subject, the competencies can be exercised by national institutions of the State, since the actions of the former are integrated within the general guidelines that have been drawn up within the national development plan, without this signifying a violation of their autonomy. (...)\" The highlighting is not from the original. Regarding the content of that autonomy, it is the Constitutional Chamber itself that is the jurisdictional body that has performed the greatest analytical development on this particular point. Thus, it has indicated, in ruling 5445-1999, that from the legal-doctrinal perspective, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity that Municipalities have to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything pertaining to the organization of a specific locality – referring to the respective canton –, understanding that it includes political, normative, tax, and administrative autonomy. It is worth highlighting what that high Court stated in the cited ruling to the effect that: \"Our doctrine, for its part, has said that the Political Constitution (Article 170) and the Municipal Code (Article 7 of the previous Municipal Code, and 4 of the current one) have not been limited to attributing to municipalities the capacity to manage and promote local interests and services, but rather have expressly provided that this municipal management is and must be autonomous, which is defined as freedom vis-à-vis the other entities of the State for the adoption of their fundamental decisions.\" (The highlighting is our own) Notwithstanding this development, as has been pointed out, it is clear that this autonomy is rooted in the criterion of legitimization of local services and interests, such that it is not opposable to those matters in which, by law (or higher norm), competencies and powers are conferred upon other Public Administrations for the protection of general interests, which overflow and transcend the local sphere, and which are related to service coverage or attention to national situations. In these hypotheses, as they are situations and assumptions regarding which it cannot be considered that the incidence is particularized to a specific group of persons linked by interests common to a cantonal territory, but rather they expand to an indeterminate set of subjects proper to matters of national relevance, that autonomy is not an obstacle for those other units of public power to deploy their actions, which also affect the residents of the various territories that compose the country. In such cases, although the powers of those entities have local incidence, it is because they aim to cover national interests, a concept that also includes, by reflection, an effective framework in territorial circumscriptions. Nor is such autonomy disregarded by the creation of entities whose competence refers to addressing situations of specific subject matter, even when limited to a territory, as is the case of Japdeva, Incoop, Judesur, among others, entities whose competence is of a technical nature but with local subordination. It is a model that, according to the Constitutional Chamber, requires, for the proper protection of the public interest, the implementation of the duty of administrative coordination. It is ultimately an aspect that must be weighed in each specific case, because only in cases where the public entity's competence finds legal basis supported by those indicated issues, will there be no invasion of the local autonomy regime. All in all, the Constitutional Chamber itself has highlighted the relevance of the principle of coordination that must prevail between public entities and the State (and among those same entities), in order to harmonize the competencies that each one holds and the public interests they are called to protect. Thus, in ruling No. 5445-1999, on the matter, it clearly stated: \"Having defined the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription, it becomes clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be considered national or state-related; therefore, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it results that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional territory, to the extent that circumstances require it. That is, municipalities can share their competencies with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must be developed under the terms as defined in the law (Article 5 of the previous Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of 'coordination' between the municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their competencies, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy, as it is its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature – in many cases – of interests surrounding a concrete matter. In doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, and potentially discrepant; despite this, there must be a community of purposes by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the recipient object of the final results of the activity and acts of each one is common. So that coordination is the ordering of relations between these various independent activities, which takes charge of that concurrence on a common object or entity, to make it useful for a global public plan, without suppressing the reciprocal independence of the acting subjects. Since there is no hierarchical relationship of the decentralized institutions, nor of the State itself in relation to the municipalities, it is not possible to impose specific conduct on them, thus giving rise to the indispensable inter-institutional 'concert', in a strict sense, insofar as the autonomous and independent centers of action agree on that preventive and global scheme, in which each one plays a role with a view to a mission entrusted to the others. Thus, the relations of municipalities with other public entities can only be carried out on a plane of equality, resulting in agreed-upon forms of coordination, excluding any imperative form to the detriment of their autonomy, which would allow subjecting corporate entities to a coordination scheme without their will or against it; but which does admit the necessary subordination of these entities to the State and in the interest of the State (through the 'administrative tutelage' of the State, and specifically, in the function of legality control that falls to it, with general oversight powers over the entire sector). The defined cooperative relationship has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber, which has repeatedly indicated that for projects of the various public institutions to be carried out, it must be done with respect for the legal system: first, constitutional norms, and then, legal and regulatory norms, in such a way that, for the Executive Branch or other public entities to carry out projects on their own initiative in a specific locality, they must have the respective municipal permits and licenses, if applicable, as indicated in amparo judgment number 02231-96, transcribed, in what is relevant, in Considerando VIII of this judgment. This obligation of coordination between State institutions and municipalities is implicit in the Political Constitution itself; thus, for example, regarding municipal tax power, insofar as the initiative must come from the Councils themselves, both for their approval by the Legislative Assembly and for the exemption of taxes, even when dealing with the economic policy of the State, as indicated in judgment number 2311-95, cited above; thereby, it is being said that there must be due and obligatory coordination between the State and local corporate entities, thus fulfilling what is ordered by this provision, without this implying an invasion of municipal autonomy. Equally, the Chamber considers that in urban planning matters this same coordination relationship must occur, even though it has been defined – by constitutional provision – that urban planning is the competence of local governments, it should be ordered in accordance with the general directives and guidelines of the National Urban Development Plan prepared by the Executive Branch (on the proposal of the Urban Development Directorate of the INVU and the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy) and integrated into the National Development Plan referred to in the National Planning Law, on the understanding that this Plan must be approved by an ordinary law. With this frame of reference, the questioned norms are analyzed.\" -The highlighting is not our own-. This is a fundamental element to consider in areas of public interest satisfaction that intermix local and national issues.\n\nVII.- On the competencies in exterior advertising regulation on the national road network. Now, on the subject of the regulation of exterior advertising in the right-of-way and areas adjacent to it, referring to national roads, it is worth indicating what is set out below. This particular matter has been regulated by Decreto No. 29253-MOPT, called \"Reglamento de Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior\", published in La Gaceta No. 25 of February 5, 2001. That norm has as its scope of regulation: \"... to administer, supervise, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as matters concerning the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters on public or private lands, or in the rights-of-way that are under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport which will be the sole competent authority in this matter, such competencies will also be applicable to vehicles that provide some type of public service, as well as to any class of exterior advertising, attending to the distribution of competencies established by Article 1 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, and Reglamento Nº13041 on the functional classification of Public Roads, with the purpose of protecting the road investment, promoting the safety of drivers and users in general, maintaining its creative value, and preserving the landscape from visual contamination.\" -art. 1-. The underlining does not correspond to the original. In this sense, Article 3 clarifies the public domain character of the rights-of-way of the national road network, warning that their occupation is prohibited without authorization from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), which may grant temporary permits for occupation of the rights-of-way or lands with a public vocation, when an evident and manifest public interest mediates in said permit. Subsequently, in ordinals 4 and 5, it indicates the competence of the MOPT to issue the administrative enabling act for the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters, on public or private lands, or in the rights-of-way. Those norms state in their literal text: \"Artículo 4º—Disposiciones Generales: The party interested in obtaining a permit for temporary use or occupation of a right-of-way, as established in article three of this regulation, as well as the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters, on public or private lands, or in the rights-of-way under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, must request it before the Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones of the Dirección de Ingeniería of the División de Obras Públicas, in compliance with the requirements established in this regulation. (Thus amended by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 30063 of October 25, 2001, regarding the hierarchical dependency which changed from Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones of the Dirección de Policía de Tránsito to Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones of the Dirección de Ingeniería of the División de Obras Públicas).” “Artículo 5º—Regulación: The installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices, that are located on lands adjacent to the right-of-way of the national road network, shall be governed by the provisions of this regulation.” In view of what is alleged in this process, it is necessary to specify that in the recitals part of this Decreto Ejecutivo, it is established that it is issued in accordance with the competencies conferred upon the MOPT by Articles 11 and 14 of the Ley de Administración Vial; Article No.2, subsection a) of the Law of Creation of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; numeral 125 in fine in relation to Article 206 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres; Articles 1, 2, and 19 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, regarding the appropriate use of the rights-of-way of the national road network. As has been indicated, the relativization of municipal competencies in the treatment and management of local services and interests is conditioned on the existence of a competence (or power) conferred by law to a public entity in aspects that concern a national interest and that, therefore, transcend the sphere of local satisfaction. In a process similar to the present one, in which precisely the validity of the Plan Regulador of Nombre14994 was debated insofar as it granted the Municipality competence to regulate everything related to exterior advertising matters, through ruling No. 14-2014-VI of ten hours on January thirtieth, two thousand fourteen, this Section VI indicated in its core regarding the local or national character of this subject matter: \"It is important to keep in mind that that Decreto is based on transversal aspects that transcend the merely local and that are embedded in the national or of general interest. On one hand is the need to regulate the use and exploitation of the right-of-way, as a public domain asset it is; on the other, there is the road safety component; the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and the right of individuals to carry out advertising activities. As a consideration of special relevance is the need to establish policies to minimize traffic accidents on roads that, due to their operational characteristics and high volume of vehicles, require it.\" This Panel shares this criterion and observes no merit to dissent. Indeed, as the Decreto itself states, the regulation of exterior advertising that may be placed within the territorial space comprising the right-of-way corresponding to the national road network, is an issue that far exceeds the localist vision that legitimizes municipal autonomy and competence. The same Decreto recognizes that in the case of the cantonal road network, it is the local entity that is competent to grant authorizations for the use, placement, construction, and remodeling of advertising billboards, however, dealing with the national road network, it is evident that it is a matter that cannot be considered as exclusive to municipal powers. In this sense, the same Ley General de Caminos Públicos establishes forcefully that the administration of the national road network concerns the MOPT, imposing a special competence by reason of the matter and under the consideration that that road network concerns aspects that cannot be referred to an eminently local scope, but rather national. This follows from the first ordinal of that legal source. Likewise, numeral 2 of that legislation establishes the declaration of public domain of the lands occupied by existing public highways and roads or those built in the future, specifying that they are the property of the State with regard to national highways, and of the Municipalities for the streets in their jurisdiction. For its part, ordinal 19 of the same law indicates in relevant part: \"No constructions or buildings of any type may be made in front of existing or planned highways without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, nor in front of local roads and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality. The Municipalities shall coordinate alignments in front of local roads with the Ministry which shall be the one to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest. On restricted-access or one-way highways, adjacent property owners may only have access to the highway in sectors previously indicated for that purpose or through marginal roads approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Persons who fail to comply with this article shall be subject to the fines indicated in this law and shall have a non-extendable period of 15 days to remove at their own expense the work carried out, after which the Ministry of Public Works and Transport may eliminate the constructions made, without for that reason having to recognize any sum for damages and losses. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport may remove, and even seize, placing it at the order of the competent authorities, any asset that is found within the right-of-way for the purpose of making undue use of it. (...)\" These norms reveal that matters related to the regulation of exterior advertising in the zones that constitute the right-of-way in the case of national highways is an aspect that falls to the MOPT. To the foregoing, it is not an obstacle that under the terms of the Ley de Construcciones, the town councils are the bodies in charge of verifying that buildings and constructions meet the conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty, since the same first ordinal of that Law establishes that such competence is held without prejudice to the powers that other laws confer on other administrative bodies. Well, precisely the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, in the cited ordinal 19, confers upon the MOPT a special competence in these fields of exterior advertising on the national road network, which empowers it to regulate and manage everything relating to the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices found on lands adjacent to said right-of-way. In this way, this Court does not observe an invasion of the local autonomy regime with what is regulated in that Decreto No. 29253-MOPT, because if looked at closely, it is nothing other than the reiteration and precision of competencies that Law No. 5060 already grants to the cited Ministry.\n\nVIII.- On the other hand, the allegations of invasion of this competency regime and of the autonomy constitutionally conferred upon local entities, as the involved parties correctly note, was already a matter for examination in a constitutional venue. Precisely, the same Municipality of Escazú, through its Mayor, filed an unconstitutionality action against the cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29253-MOPT, essentially, for the same reasons that are raised in this process, an aspect that was processed under expediente 01-010761-0007-CO, definitively resolved by vote No. 2003-2127 of 13:37 hours on March 14, 2003. In that ruling, the Chamber summarizes the grounds for challenge that support said action. Specifically, in the first resultando of that decision, the following are indicated: \"...\n\nIt alleges that this Decree undermines the powers and competencies enshrined in favor of the Municipality, both in the Political Constitution and in the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) and its Regulations, and those recognized by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). The conflict of norms arises because, although the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos) establishes the division for traffic routes into national highways, regional roads, and local roads, assigning the competence for administration of national highways to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) and of the remaining roads to the municipalities—a circumstance that serves as the basis for the challenged Regulation—other laws establish that the competence to regulate the matter of signs on properties adjacent to national highways corresponds to local governments. It requests the Chamber to declare that the challenged Decree is unconstitutional and to define that the administration of activities relating to outdoor advertising on properties adjacent to highways corresponds entirely to local governments, excluding the MOPT from the administration of the activities carried out on them. Article 11 of the challenged Decree provides that to carry out the activity of installing, placing, or fixing advertisements, signs, and billboards, a license must be obtained, which shall be issued by the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions (Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones) of the General Directorate of Traffic Police (Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. By doing so, it creates a conflict of competencies because this provision clashes with the Construction Law, the Regulations to the Construction Law, and the Urban Planning Law, which require obtaining a municipal license to place or fix advertisements and provide, among other things, that the Municipality is responsible for the task of overseeing works constructed within its jurisdiction. The challenged Decree removes from the Municipality competencies granted by the General Urban Planning Law, since in accordance with its provisions, it will be the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that issues licenses without considering whether or not the procedure before the Municipality has been completed. This creates a conflict of interests for the administered party, who, upon having the license issued by the MOPT, refuses to comply with the Municipality's provisions enacted via regulation and in accordance with the laws governing the matter, that is, the Urban Planning Law and the Construction Law. In accordance with several rulings issued by the Constitutional Chamber, Municipalities have absolute competence to regulate local affairs (ruling 5445-99 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, ruling 2153-93 of nine hours twenty-one minutes on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, rulings 4205-96 and 5445-99). Through those rulings, the Constitutional Chamber reaffirmed the obligation of municipalities, in their capacity as local governments, to ensure the harmonious development of the city in protection of both the general and individual interests of the population. Precisely, Article 169 of the Political Constitution provides the legal framework for the development of the activities to be carried out by local governments, which in that capacity are called upon to regulate the interests and services of that community. The challenged Decree undermines the powers and competencies established in favor of municipalities, both in the Political Constitution and in the Urban Planning Law and Construction Law and its Regulations, and creates a conflict of competencies as a result of the friction that arises between the provisions of that Decree and the cited laws.\" As can be deduced from reading that transcription, the arguments supporting the Municipality's position and theory of the case are, at their core, the same reasons given as the basis for the referenced action of unconstitutionality. In that sense, upon close examination, the foundations argued by the local entity rest on references to circumstances that essentially seek to reproach injuries to the Law of the Constitution which, under its understanding (that of the municipality), grant local entities a level of autonomy that it deems violated by the Decree in question. However, the substantial conformity of that infralegal norm, in light of the arguments indicated, was declared by the Constitutional Chamber in the aforementioned ruling No. 2003-2127 of 13:37 hours on March 14, 2003.\n\nIX.- For greater clarity on the present matter, it is necessary to highlight some considerations expressed by that high Court in that vote, in which it is revealed that the regulation of outdoor advertising signs in the zones corresponding to the national right-of-way (derecho de vía) is the competence of the MOPT because it exceeds the matter of \"the local\":\n\n\"IV.- Analysis of Decree 29253-MOPT.\n\nThe petitioner points out that the challenged Decree allows the MOPT to authorize, control, and regulate the growth and urban development of public and private properties that border national highways, in accordance with the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, which in his opinion violates the principle of municipal autonomy.\n\nHaving analyzed the content of the challenged Regulation, it is concluded that it authorizes the MOPT to administer, oversee, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way of the national road network, as well as the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, and bus stop shelters on public or private land. Such public or private lands are, as defined by the regulation itself, properties adjacent or not to a right-of-way. The Regulation regulates activities and tasks to be executed on the rights-of-way that form part of the national road network, the ownership of which corresponds to the State, but whose administration is granted to the MOPT. This does not imply any interference with the constitutional competencies assigned to the Municipalities, which retain the power to administer the rights-of-way on the roads that form part of the cantonal road network. The principle of municipal autonomy is not harmed, since this Court already indicated in ruling 5445-99, that Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution grant autonomy to municipal governments regarding “the administration of local interests and services in each canton”:\n\n“X.- (...) The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define 'the local,' a sphere that can only be reduced by law—since it involves constitutional matters and a true right in favor of these institutions—in such a way that it leads to the maintenance of the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in ruling number 06469-97, cited above. A conflict cannot, therefore, be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter that integrates the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are called to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest can, eventually, be intermingled, and rather, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as the jurisprudence cited above has expressed, it will ultimately be up to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning. Once the material competence of the municipality is defined in a determined territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be considered national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that becomes inevitable, since the public capacity of municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it follows that the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require it.” (ruling No. 5445-99).\n\nThe Ley General de Caminos Públicos grants the MOPT the administration of the rights-of-way of the national road network and to the municipalities the administration of the cantonal road network. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), it corresponds to this Ministry to: “...a) Plan, construct, and improve highways and roads. Maintain highways and collaborate with Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. Regulate and control the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways and roads. Regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transport on public roads.” Such a function is part of its work as the governing body in matters of road infrastructure. For its part, Article 2 of the cited Law provides that it is the responsibility of that Ministry to regulate and control the rights-of-way on national highways.\n\nThe challenged Regulation establishes that its objective is to grant the MOPT administrative powers—in a broad sense—over the rights-of-way of the national road network and over land, public or private, or on rights-of-way under the care of the MOPT. Its provisions do not violate Constitutional Article 169, which guarantees municipal autonomy, since none curtails the regulatory powers granted to municipalities in matters of urban planning and construction. The Regulation clearly determines which roads form part of the cantonal road network, following the distinction made in that regard by the Ley de Caminos Públicos. Thus, it establishes that streets, local streets, unclassified roads, and local roads are subject to municipal jurisdiction. In this way, both the Municipality and the MOPT have competence over public roads; by concurring in a determined space, their execution requires coordination between the public and private institutions involved, so that the intended objectives and purposes are met. On the other hand, when the Regulation indicates that the MOPT will exercise its administrative powers on “public or private land” and defines these as those properties “adjacent or not to the rights-of-way...”, it is evident that it must be understood as referring to land located on or facing national highways or on or facing rights-of-way that form part of the national road network, not the cantonal road network, over which the sole competent authority will be the corresponding Municipality.\n\nThe MOPT is the governing entity in matters of road infrastructure and the competent body to dictate the general road policies to be applied. In relation to the scope of the powers of the MOPT in matters of road infrastructure, this Court pronounced in ruling 5445-99, in which it stated:\n\n“Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic rights, and matters relating to the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) are specific tasks that derive from the general regulation of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and whose regulation consequently corresponds to the Executive Branch; so that it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the regulation concerning concessions for paid public transportation of persons, defines the location of bus stops, and the signage of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was indicated in Considering X of this ruling, this is a task that the MOPT must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when dictating the regulation of public roads, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which is equivalent, in this matter, to having it done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) dictated by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to decide what is most appropriate, in jurisdictions where no regulatory plans exist. In consideration of the foregoing, Article 2 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres does not violate municipal autonomy, and therefore the action must be declared without merit, also in this respect.”\n\nIn relation to road planning, in the same cited ruling, the Chamber stated:\n\n“...For its part, urban planning is closely related to the regulation of public terrestrial roads that are intended for general public service and use, a matter that by legal definition has been assigned to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; according to the definition of the Law of its creation itself, when it indicates, in the relevant part:\n\n‘The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the following purpose:\n\na) [...] Regulate and control the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways. Regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transport on public roads.’\n\nTherefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic rights, and matters relating to the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) are specific tasks that derive from the general regulation of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and whose regulation consequently corresponds to the Executive Branch; so that it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the regulation concerning concessions for paid public transportation of persons, defines the location of bus stops, and the signage of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was indicated in Considering X of this ruling, this is a task that the MOPT must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when dictating the regulation of public roads, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which is equivalent, in this matter, to having it done in accordance with the regulatory plans dictated by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to decide what is most appropriate, in jurisdictions where no regulatory plans exist. In consideration of the foregoing, Article 2 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres does not violate municipal autonomy…”.\n\nThe notion of “coordination” thus becomes a key element in inter-institutional relations. In ruling No. 6706-93 of fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, and in relation to the issue, this Court indicated:\n\n“It is evident that it is not a matter of removing competencies or attributions from the municipalities, but rather of the due coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, insofar as the maintenance of the national road network does not imply its administration or regulation; for this reason, this provision is not unconstitutional either, in the terms challenged.” (...)\n\nV.- Conclusion. The rights-of-way that border highways and roads that form part of the national road network do not partake of the “local” character indicated by Article 169 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the regulation of advertising –in general– on “public or private land” as indicated in Article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in Article 2 of the Regulation, it must be understood that the power of the MOPT falls upon those lands that face highways or roads that form part of the national road network only. The Court considers that this does not form part of the “local services and interests” over which the Municipality has competence. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore the action is unfounded and must be rejected on its merits. Judge Nombre300 dissents and orders that the action proceed.\"\n\nX.- The length of the quotation is justified by how illuminating it is for the purposes of this proceeding, and the conclusions reached by the Constitutional Chamber must be highlighted, to the effect that the matter under examination exceeds local competencies, for which reason it observes no injury whatsoever in Decree No. 29253-MOPT insofar as it confers the competence for regulating administrative authorizations for the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition, and placement of advertisements, signs, and notices located on land adjacent to the right-of-way of the national road network to the MOPT. Just as this Court's position was in the aforementioned ruling No. 14-2014 of this Section VI, that vote of the Constitutional Court adopts the delimitation of competencies carried out by the Decree in question, which, it should be noted, is supported, as has been stated, by the norms of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos. In that sense, this ruling of this Court revealed that the criterion set forth herein has been applied even by Section III of this Contentious-Administrative Court in its legal functions as non-hierarchical controller in municipal matters (Articles 173 of the Political Constitution and 189-192 CPCA). Thus, it was indicated in that regard in the aforementioned ruling 14-2014-VI: \"3.- The delimitation of competencies claimed in the lawsuit and objected to in the response was already defined by Executive Decree, by regulatory norm, endorsed by the constitutional jurisdiction in its precedent. This has been understood by Section III of this Court in its precedents acting as improper hierarchy in municipal matters (Cf. Resolution #141-2013 of 16:50 hours on April 4, 2013, file #11-6999-1027-CA, and #419-2013 of 14:10 hours on October 22, 2013, file #12-002049-1027-CA). To harmonize the first part of Article 29 of the Construction Law, whose text reads: ‘To place or fix advertisements, signs, billboards, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. ...’, with the constitutional precedent, it would have to be understood that this provision subsists insofar as it applies to the local sphere, that is, to the cantonal road network and other aspects pertaining to the municipality, but that it has been tacitly modified, in the sense that in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on land adjacent to or facing national routes, the competence to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT, and not to the Municipality.\" On the other hand, the foregoing is not hindered by the fact that on the date of issuance of the cited ruling 2003-2127, the Canton of Nombre14994 did not have a Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) in force, since the criteria on which the Constitutional Chamber based its criterion are opposable even given the current existence of that planning instrument. Certainly, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in several of its precedents that Regulatory Plans have a normative hierarchy of material law, to the extent that they constitute a regulatory instrument that conditions the exercise of real estate ownership rights, by providing the regime of permissibility of land use, through the ordering of zonifications and permitted uses of land within the Canton. From that standpoint, as an initial thesis, using this position regarding its legal nature, it is clear that it would prevail over normative instruments of lower rank. However, as has been indicated, the cited Decree No. 29253-MOPT is a norm that is properly based on the executive regulatory power that Article 140, section 19 of the Magna Carta grants to the Executive Branch and that finds support in the legal norms that establish the MOPT's competence to regulate matters relating to outdoor advertising on the national road network, specifically, the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, and the Organic Law of the MOPT. Even, once again, as this Section VI revealed in the previously mentioned precedent 14-2014-VI, a criterion that is maintained in this ruling, the disregard of the validity declared by the Constitutional Chamber of Decree 29253-MOPT and of the regime of competencies established in that norm (as a reproduction of the indicated laws), reveals that when enacting the Escazú Regulatory Plan, the local entity did not conform to that ruling of the Constitutional Chamber and, on the contrary, chose to depart from that criterion (which it knew clearly in advance). A relevant aspect at this point is that the issue of outdoor advertising signs on highways is a matter that was included within the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial, No. Placa1086, a norm in which, in Article 227, the exclusive competence of the MOPT to regulate this aspect is reiterated. Specifically, in what is relevant to the case, the norm states: \"ARTICLE 227.- Prohibition of signs or advertisements in the right-of-way and exceptions. The placement of advertisements or signs for exclusively advertising purposes within the right-of-way is prohibited. The MOPT shall establish, via regulation, the cases in which structures such as road nomenclature, informative signs for tourist destinations, activities and services, transit stops, and others shall be installed. Advertisements and signs for exclusively advertising purposes may only be placed on private property, observing the alignment distance from national routes.\"\n\nIt shall be the responsibility of the MOPT to determine and grant the respective alignment for each case, for which a period of up to ten business days is granted. (...) Structures placed illegally within the right-of-way (derecho de vía) shall be removed by the MOPT. For the purposes of compliance with the provisions of this article, the respective offices must, for each case, prepare a duly organized and foliated administrative file (expediente administrativo), detailing at least the type of advertising structure that violates this provision, the exact location, the content, the alleged infringer, and any other data available from the National Registry. (...) Any advertising that, in contravention of the provisions of this law and its technical regulation, is placed within the right-of-way (derecho de vía) shall be confiscated (decomisada) by the competent offices of the MOPT, and shall only be returned to the infringer if they appear for its removal within thirty calendar days following the notification of the confiscation, upon prior payment of the imposed fine. (...) As observed, the provision reiterates the competence referred to in the case of the cantonal road network, a division that is reiterated in article 231 of the same law. On the other hand, the validity of the aforementioned Decree as a regulatory norm for the placement of outdoor advertising can be seen in Transitory Provision XIII of that same Law No. 9078, which states: \"Until such time as special legislation is enacted to regulate outdoor visual communication on private property facing national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT called 'Reglamento de los derechos de vía y publicidad exterior' is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits processed, within a maximum period of thirty calendar days from their application. The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning the matter in relation to national routes.\" In the opinion of this Court, the provision in question reveals a clear intention of the legislator to reiterate (and assign) the powers of the MOPT to regulate matters pertaining to the placement of outdoor advertising on the national road network, constituting an additional reason to maintain the criterion already expressed in this regard by this Section VI. Nor does the local entity's argument constitute a compelling refutation, that through ruling No. 2008-1569 of January 30, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber rejected an action filed against the Regulatory Plan as it prevented the construction of billboards and structures for advertising placement within the Canton. Looked at closely, the arguments and grounds for reproach formulated in that action are entirely different from the issues analyzed in this judicial dispute. The analysis of that constitutional ruling allows for the establishment that the reasons analyzed were the following: 1. That the Plan's provisions oppose Article 46 of the Constitution, because they are so severe and arbitrary that they constitute an \"absolute barrier\" to the exercise of freedom of commerce; 2. That the limitations are contrary to the right to property, protected by Constitutional Article 45, since they \"destroy the possibilities for land use, without providing for compensation to its owners\"; 3. That in accordance with Article 28 of the Political Constitution, actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm third parties, are outside the scope of the law. Outdoor advertising does not harm morals, public order, or third parties; therefore, it is outside the scope of the law and, with greater reason, outside the scope of a regulatory plan, and 4. That the regulatory plan retroactively ignores the existence and ownership of the right to offer outdoor advertising services (Considering V of the ruling). Derived from this, it is evident that the matter resolved in that ruling does not have the virtue of establishing the validity of the Nombre14994 Regulatory Plan regarding the matter and purpose of reproach in this process, as these are different issues that bear no relation, not even a slight one, to conclude that the approval given by the Constitutional Court covers the object of this process. Therefore, that precedent is not pertinent to this case, nor does it allow for a change in the criterion held on this particular matter.\n\nXI.- On the validity of the challenged provisions of the Regulatory Plan. Having said the above, it is now appropriate to analyze whether the challenged provisions of the Nombre14994 Regulatory Plan are substantially compliant with the Legal System or not, considering the allegations of the claimant. In this regard, it is necessary to specify that the analysis of the lawsuit and the counterclaim must be carried out in a unified manner, because the counterclaim seeks the declaration of invalidity of Decree No. 29253-MOPT, such that there is an evident and undeniable relationship between both subjects, which prevents them from being addressed separately. In that sense, the nullity of articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan (chapter IV-INSTALLATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING) is claimed, in relation to Executive Decree 29253-MOPT \"Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior\" and the laws that support it. To address these requests, it is necessary to refer to the content of those provisions, which state in their literal text: \"Article 29. Objectives and legal bases. The objective of this chapter is to regulate and control everything related to outdoor advertising and signs in the canton of Escazú, in order to achieve a balance between the urban-architectural work, the advertising message, and the landscape environment as a means of communication, information, and identification. / This regulation is issued in accordance with article 4, subsection 'a', in relation to article 13, subsection 'd' of the Código Municipal, chapters VII and VIII and articles 29, 78, and 79 of the Ley de Construcciones, article IV.15, subsections 1.3 and 4 of the Reglamento de Construcciones, articles 15 and 70 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana and article 71 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, as well as article 14 of Law No. 6890.\" \"Article 31. Application. The outdoor display of advertisements, signs, notices, billboards, advertising banners, or billboards (hereinafter 'signs') is governed by this chapter, which applies to the entire canton of Escazú. It includes not only public roads but also front garden areas and any space where a sign is located that can be seen from the public road. / Excluded from the application of this regulation is the display of official road signaling signs approved by the MOPT and the Municipality, and signs that cannot be seen from the public road.\" The nullity of the word \"toda\" (all) is requested from these norms. In addition to those two norms, the partial nullity of articles 32, subsection j), and 33 of the same Plan is also requested, regarding the powers granted to the Municipality concerning outdoor advertising in rights-of-way (derechos de vía) and land facing national routes. Said norms state: \"Article 32. Prohibitions. The display of signs is prohibited in the following cases: (...) b) On the public road, except for those attached to urban furniture and previously authorized by the Municipality (bus stops, road signaling, etc.), and those included in article 36 of this regulation; likewise, signs perpendicular to facades over sidewalks are excepted, but only in the urban quadrants of the three districts of the canton defined as such in this regulation, placed no more than 50 cm inward from the curb and gutter. These perpendicular signs may not be more than one meter twenty centimeters long by 70 centimeters high, and the vertical distance between the lower edge of the sign and the sidewalk may not be less than 2.60 m. Only one such sign per commercial premises shall be permitted. (...) j) On billboards that do not meet the setback from the neighboring bordering properties, which as a minimum must be equal to the total height of the advertising billboard. k) On advertising wall-type structures for enclosing lots, with the exception of those used to enclose them during the construction process, for which the corresponding approved construction permit must be submitted. They may be built on the property line and placed solely and exclusively when the construction stage of the project approved by the Municipality begins, and must be removed upon completion of the work. They shall only be permitted in projects of 500 m2 or more of construction area, and only panels at sidewalk level with no more than 3 meters in total height shall be permitted. In cases where the wall panels have lighting, the reflectors may only be placed within the property line, and the interested party must make the necessary adjustments.\" Finally, article 33 states: \"Article 33. Licenses. To place or affix any sign, with the exception of those listed in article 36 of this regulation, authorization must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the commercial patent holder of the business or activity where the sign is to be fixed and by the owner of the property where the notice is to be located. / In the case of operating signs, the respective permit shall be granted within the business patent process and shall not be charged separately, but shall be included within the cost of the patent. / When the sign is attached to urban furniture (in cases expressly permitted by the Municipality), the permit shall be requested by the directly interested party. The requirements to obtain the license are as follows: a) Fill out the permit application form. b) Copy of the cadastral plan of the lot where the sign is to be located, with the official alignment granted by the Municipality or the MOPT. c) Sketch of the sign, including the art of the advertisement or announcement. d) Construction plan of the sign, if it requires a support structure or special anchoring and if it has more than 6 m2 of advertising area. The plan must also indicate the anchoring or support structure, construction materials, and the lighting system, if included, with technical specifications and electrical design, bearing the signature of the responsible professional (Architect or Engineer). e) For signs attached to the facade and forming part of it, a survey of the facade with measurements to scale must be attached, specifying the exact location and a sketch of the content of the message or image of the sign. f) For signs with an independent support, a location plan must be included showing the distance to the boundaries and the official alignment, as well as to the building, if it exists. g) For signs requiring a construction plan, in accordance with point 'd' above, an insurance policy to cover third-party damages shall be required. The amount of the policy shall be determined by the Urban Development Department, taking into account the size, height, and complexity of the sign. / All signs must present a satisfactory aesthetic appearance and shall not contain obscene expressions or those contrary to morality, public order, or good customs, nor terms that directly damage or injure the rights enshrined in the Constitution or in the laws.\"\n\nXII.- Having analyzed those norms in light of the considerations made in the preceding sections of this ruling, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that the norms in question are not themselves entirely null, even though they must be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines and content of legal and regulatory provisions already discussed above. Indeed, having analyzed their content, this Chamber considers that based on the establishment of a dual competence regime in matters of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way (derechos de vía), which confers upon the MOPT the powers to regulate this matter on the national road network and upon the Municipalities, on the cantonal road network, the indicated norms are not illegal insofar as their framework of application and coverage is subordinated to the Corporation's powers over the roads that form part of the cantonal road network, which fall under its exclusive competence. Reiterating the criterion established in ruling 14-2014-VI on this point, and there being no merit to vary that line, it is the judgment of this collegiate body that the dilemma arising from these precepts is one of coordination in their application, in attention to their scope or field of validity. However, under the said considerations, this is an aspect that can be overcome through a harmonious and integrative interpretation of those urban planning provisions, in accordance with the doctrine of article 6.2 of the Ley General de Administración Pública and the interpretative guidelines imposed by article 10 of that same legal source. This means that the aforementioned municipal norms can coexist with the norms of Executive Decree #29253-MOPT, as long as they are interpreted and applied in the sense that the provisions thereof constitute an exception to the Regulatory Plan, in the matter referring to the scope of application of outdoor advertising in rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network. This implies that, given the original and special competence conferred by Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos, Law Creating the MOPT, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial -already cited in this ruling-) and by executive decree (Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT) to the ministerial office in question, the provisions of the Escazú Regulatory Plan, nor article 29 of the Ley de Construcciones, do not apply in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on land adjacent to or in front of national routes, because in this case, the competence to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT and not to the Municipality. The foregoing leads to the determination that, in order to establish the validity of the cited regulatory provisions, their framework of application (and interpretation) must be delimited, understanding that they are valid to the extent that they are understood to refer to the Municipality's own powers that the Law (and the Decree itself) grant it regarding local roads, but not regarding national roads, an area in which competence has been exclusively attributed to the MOPT. Therefore, the lawsuit must be partially admitted, but without ordering any nullity of any provision, with the necessary modifications to be stated in the operative part of the ruling, and which refer to this delimitation of the jurisdictional content of the questioned norms. This pronouncement makes it unnecessary to refer to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs concerning violations of Law No. 8220, as in essence, they are aimed at combating the inefficiency and double processing that would result from accepting the defendant Municipality's thesis, namely that, without prejudice to the MOPT's powers to grant authorizations for the placement of outdoor advertising, it is the municipality that is competent to issue construction licenses. Given that it is considered that the competence in these areas belongs to the MOPT, with respect to the national road network, that analysis becomes futile, and such an approach is therefore omitted.\n\nXIII.- On the counterclaim. As has been indicated, the local entity files a counterclaim seeking a declaration of invalidity of Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT, citing harm to municipal autonomy and the precepts of the Ley de Construcciones and the Ley de Planificación Urbana that confer regulatory powers in building matters. The grounds supporting that counterclaim have already been subject to analysis due to their affinity with the reasons weighed to define the relevance or not of the plaintiff's claims. In the previous sections of this judgment, it has been defined that the powers in matters of regulating outdoor advertising, in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, display, and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on land adjacent to or in front of national routes, because they pertain to the right-of-way (derecho de vía) of the national road network, the competence to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the MOPT, and not to the Municipality. This has led this Court to declare that articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j), and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan are valid, to the extent (if and only if) they are interpreted to mean that the competence contained therein refers to the local road network, and not to the national one. This criterion entails the rejection of the counterclaim, because consistent with the preceding development, the norms of Executive Decree No. 29253-MOPT are based on the competence that the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, the Law Creating the MOPT, and the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial confer upon the MOPT in this regard. For such purposes, and in order to fulfill the duty to provide reasoning imposed by article 57 of the CPCA, the counterclaiming defendant is referred to the development set forth in the previous considerandos, which contain the entire foundation for this decision.\n\nXIV.- On the claim for damages. The plaintiffs expanded their lawsuit to include a claim for damages, requesting that they be granted in the abstract, to be liquidated in the enforcement phase of the judgment. On this aspect, the following should be noted. The reparability of damages that may arise from the administrative liability regime regulated under article 190 of the LGAP is conditioned, as a primary aspect, on the existence of an unlawful injury (daño antijurídico) at its base that is attributable to the Public Administration to which it is imputed, or towards which the civil compensation claim is directed. In light of article 196 of the LGAP, this injury must be effective (it must have occurred), assessable (capable of economic measurement), and individualizable (suffered by an identified person or group), but it must also have the particularity that, when contrasted with the Legal System, the one who suffers it does not have a legal duty to bear it. The injury and its accreditation are essential to enable the analysis of causality that allows for establishing the existence (or not) of a causal link (nexo causal) between the lesion actually suffered and an administrative function (or dysfunction) that is considered the adequate cause of that harmful effect. In accordance with article 58 subsection e) of the CPCA in relation to article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the accreditation of the injury is an aspect whose demonstration falls exclusively upon the one who claims it. Although in certain cases, the Legal System itself establishes the possibility of accrediting the amount of the injury in subsequent phases, in which case, the right to compensation is declared and its liquidation is reserved for the enforcement phase of the judgment, according to the parameters that the sentencing Court must set for such purposes, in accordance with articles 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 163 and 122 subsection m) of the CPCA, it is at least necessary to prove the existence of the injury. It is noteworthy that article 58 subsection e) of the CPCA itself establishes as a requirement of the lawsuit, when damages are claimed accessorily, the cause of their generation, what they consist of, and a prudent estimate thereof must be indicated. The plaintiffs limit themselves to requesting damages, but do not specify in any way the particular injuries that may have been generated for each of the claimant companies. No objective element has been provided that allows for establishing some lesion to the petitioners' assets, and in those terms, it is not feasible to declare any right to compensation, not even in the abstract, since there is no parameter whatsoever that allows this collegiate body to at least conjecture the existence of patrimonial relationships that could have been affected by the conduct that is the subject of this process. Thus, due to the absence of basic elements that would allow the request to be granted, the rejection of the lawsuit must be ordered with respect to this particular.\n\nXV.- Corollary. The defendant Municipality did not raise substantive defenses. With respect to the counterclaim, the State raised the exception of lack of right. Based on the analysis of facts and law set forth in the preceding considerandos, the lawsuit filed by the Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A. must be declared partially with merit.\n\nagainst the Municipality of Escazú, in the following terms, it being understood as denied in whatever is not expressly indicated: 1) That Articles 29, 31, 32, subsection j) and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador de Escazú) are valid regarding the regulation of outdoor advertising, provided they are interpreted and applied in the sense that, in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or facing national routes, the competence to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), and not to the Municipality of Nombre14994, and that the competence of the Local Corporation in this matter is with respect to public roads that form part of the cantonal road network. 2) Consequently, said Articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j) and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan, Chapter IV Installation of Outdoor Advertising, solely and exclusively regulate the matter of outdoor advertising on lands facing cantonal roads that have been classified as such in the Cantonal Regulatory Plan. 3) The claim is rejected regarding the compensation claim formulated. 4) Regarding the counterclaim (reconvención) formulated by the Municipality of Nombre14994 against the State, the defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the counterclaim filed is rejected in its entirety.\n\nXVI.- On costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), both procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's opinion, sufficient reason to litigate or else, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the instant case, this Court does not observe any reason to exempt the application of such maxim, so the proper course is to impose them on the losing party of both the claim and the counterclaim, that is, on the Municipality of Escazú. In the case of the State, on this condemnation, the payment of legal interest (réditos legales) is granted at the rate provided for by ordinal 1163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), calculated from the finality of this jurisdictional decision, an aspect to be resolved in the judgment enforcement phase.\n\nPOR TANTO.\n\nThe claim filed by Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A. against the Municipality of Escazú is declared PARTIALLY WITH MERIT, in the following terms, it being understood as denied in whatever is not expressly indicated: 1) That Articles 29, 31, 32, subsection j) and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan are valid regarding the regulation of outdoor advertising, provided they are interpreted and applied in the sense that, in the case of the installation, construction, reconstruction, exhibition and placement of advertisements, signs, billboards, etc., on lands adjacent to or facing national routes, the competence to grant the respective permit or license corresponds to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), and not to the Municipality of Nombre14994, and that the competence of the Local Corporation in this matter is with respect to public roads that form part of the cantonal road network. 2) Consequently, said Articles 29, 31, 32 subsection j) and 33 of the Escazú Regulatory Plan, Chapter IV Installation of Outdoor Advertising, solely and exclusively regulate the matter of outdoor advertising on lands facing cantonal roads that have been classified as such in the Cantonal Regulatory Plan. 3) The claim is rejected regarding the compensation claim formulated. 4) REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM formulated by the Municipality of Nombre14994 against the State, the defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the counterclaim filed is rejected in its entirety. 5) Both personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), of both the claim and the counterclaim, are borne by the defendant-counterclaimant party, that is, the Municipality of Escazú. In the case of the State, by express request of a party, on these items the payment of legal interest (réditos legales) is granted at the rate provided for by ordinal 1163 of the Civil Code, calculated from the finality of this jurisdictional decision, an aspect to be resolved in the judgment enforcement phase. 6) In accordance with Article 130.3 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, once this resolution is final, it must be published in its entirety in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta), at the expense of the Municipality of Escazú.\n\nJosé Roberto Garita Navarro\n\nSilvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Judith Reyes Castillo\n\nEXPEDIENTE: 12-006718-1027-CA.\nPROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\nACTOR: Asociación Cámara de Publicidad Exterior, Colite Costa Rica S.A., Industrial Panorama S.A., Interamericana Medios de Comunicación S.A., Kavial S.A., PL Móvil Exteriores de Costa Rica S.A., Publicarteles S.A., Vallas y Gigantografías Costa Rica S.A.\nDEMANDADO-RECONVENTOR: Municipalidad de Nombre14994\nRECONVENIDO: Estado.\nIGWT.HUP.JRGN.2015" }