{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-663071",
  "citation": "Res. 00410-2016 Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Daño moral por despido arbitrario de empleada con prisión preventiva",
  "title_en": "Moral damages for arbitrary dismissal of employee under pretrial detention",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conoció el recurso contra la sentencia del Tribunal de Trabajo que denegó el daño moral a una empleada bancaria despedida. La actora fue detenida preventivamente por legitimación de capitales y el banco la despidió alegando ausencias. La mayoría de la Sala revocó la denegatoria y fijó el daño moral en ₡3,000,000, al considerar que el despido fue ilegítimo, intempestivo y desproporcionado, y que causó un sufrimiento adicional a la situación judicial de la trabajadora. Se fundamentó en el artículo 41 constitucional, el 1045 del Código Civil y los artículos 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Los magistrados Allón y Blanco salvaron el voto, pues consideraron que no se demostró el nexo causal entre el despido y el daño, ya que el perjuicio derivó de la prisión preventiva y no de la actuación del banco. El magistrado Olaso emitió una nota separada en la que argumenta que la responsabilidad del banco es objetiva, con base en el artículo 190 de la LGAP, por ser un ente público, y no subjetiva del 1045 civil.",
  "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice heard an appeal against a Labor Court decision that denied moral damages to a bank employee who was dismissed. The plaintiff had been placed in pretrial detention for money laundering, and the bank fired her claiming unexcused absences. The majority of the Chamber reversed the denial and awarded moral damages of ₡3,000,000, finding the dismissal was illegitimate, untimely, and disproportionate, causing additional distress to the worker's legal situation. The decision was based on Article 41 of the Constitution, Article 1045 of the Civil Code, and Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration. Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissented, arguing that no causal link was proven between the dismissal and the harm, which derived from the pretrial detention and not the bank's conduct. Magistrate Olaso filed a separate opinion arguing that the bank's liability is objective under Article 190 of the LGAP, as it is a public entity, rather than subjective under Civil Code Article 1045.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "date": "29/04/2016",
  "year": "2016",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "daño moral",
    "despido sin responsabilidad patronal",
    "prisión preventiva",
    "nexo causal",
    "responsabilidad objetiva",
    "artículo 41 Constitución",
    "artículo 1045 Código Civil",
    "artículo 190 LGAP",
    "Banco Popular",
    "Sala Segunda"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "daño moral",
    "despido arbitrario",
    "prisión preventiva",
    "responsabilidad objetiva",
    "artículo 41 Constitución",
    "artículo 1045 Código Civil",
    "artículo 190 LGAP",
    "nexo causal",
    "Banca Pública",
    "Sala Segunda",
    "voto salvado",
    "resarcimiento"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "moral damages",
    "wrongful dismissal",
    "pretrial detention",
    "objective liability",
    "Article 41 Constitution",
    "Article 1045 Civil Code",
    "Article 190 LGAP",
    "causation",
    "public banking",
    "Second Chamber",
    "dissenting opinion",
    "compensation"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Así las cosas, a criterio de esta Sala, al sufrimiento que venía experimentando la demandante, en virtud de la situación judicial por la que atravesaba, se le añadió la angustia de quedarse sin trabajo justo al salir de prisión. Si bien esa lesión se encuentra restañada, por cuanto se declaró la nulidad del despido y se ordenó el pago de los salarios caídos, el banco debe compensar el desconsuelo que le ocasionó a la trabajadora con su actuación, el cual vino a sumarse a la pesadumbre que venía soportando. Esto, por así disponerlo los artículos 41 de la Constitución Política y 1045 del Código Civil. El primero de ellos, a texto expreso, estipula: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”. Y el segundo reza: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. Además, son fuente de responsabilidad para el Banco demandado los asrtículos 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.",
  "excerpt_en": "Thus, in the opinion of this Chamber, to the suffering that the plaintiff was already experiencing due to the legal situation she was going through, was added the anguish of finding herself without a job just after being released from prison. Even though that harm has been remedied by declaring the dismissal void and ordering payment of back wages, the bank must compensate the distress that its actions caused the worker, which added to the sorrow she was already bearing. This, pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitution and Article 1045 of the Civil Code. The former, in express terms, provides: 'By resorting to the law, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have suffered in their person, property or moral interests. They must be provided prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the law.' And the latter states: 'Anyone who, through fraud, fault, negligence or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it along with the losses.' Furthermore, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration are also a basis for the defendant Bank's liability.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Chamber reverses the appellate decision only insofar as it denied payment for moral damages and, in its place, affirms the lower court ruling modifying the amount to ₡3,000,000. Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissent.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala revoca la sentencia de alzada únicamente en cuanto denegó el pago por daño moral y, en su lugar, confirma el fallo de primera instancia modificando la cuantía a ₡3.000.000. Los magistrados Allón y Blanco salvan el voto."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando III - Sobre el caso concreto",
      "quote_en": "The position of this Chamber, since ruling no. 481 of 10:40 a.m. on June 11, 2004, has been that in labor matters it is possible to compensate for moral damages when caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power; that is, when there are specially qualified circumstances.",
      "quote_es": "La posición de este órgano, a partir del voto n.º 481, de las 10:40 horas del 11 de junio de 2004, ha sido la de que en sede laboral es factible indemnizarlo cuando sea causado por actos que extralimiten el poder sancionador del patrono; es decir, cuando se esté ante circunstancias especialmente calificadas."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando III - cita de resolución n.º 1151 de 2006",
      "quote_en": "Undoubtedly, the imposition of any unfair disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not always available; they are only appropriate when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.",
      "quote_es": "Indudablemente, toda imposición de una medida disciplinaria injusta causa un sufrimiento moral, mas no en todo caso es procedente el daño moral, sino tan solo cuando la sanción haya estado rodeada de situaciones realmente excepcionales y graves."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V - Nota del Magistrado Olaso, cita del art. 190 LGAP",
      "quote_en": "1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except in cases of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party...",
      "quote_es": "1. La administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal a anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero…"
    }
  ],
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      "id": "norm-13231",
      "citation": "Ley 6227",
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      "title_es": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
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      "title_en": "Civil Code of Costa Rica",
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      "year": "1888"
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      "citation": "Ley 7472",
      "title_en": "Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection",
      "title_es": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
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      "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)",
      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
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      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
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  "body_es_text": "*110040861027CA* \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n*110040861027CA* \n\r\n \n \n\r\n \nCorte Suprema de Justicia\n\r\n \nSALA SEGUNDA\n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nExp:\r\n11-004086-1027-CA \n\r\n\r\n\nRes:\r\n2016-000410\n\r\n\r\n\nSALA SEGUNDA\r\nDE LA CORTE SUPREMA\r\nDE JUSTICIA. San José,\r\na las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintinueve de abril de dos mil\r\ndieciséis.\n\r\n\r\n\nProceso\r\nordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial\r\nde San José (oral-electrónico), por [Nombre 001], [...], contra el BANCO\r\nPOPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, representado por su apoderado general\r\njudicial el licenciado GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, casado, vecino de\r\nHeredia. Actúa como apoderado especial judicial de la actora el licenciado\r\nEsteban Calvo Rodríguez, soltero, vecino de San José. Todos mayores, abogados,\r\ncon la excepción indicada. \n\r\n\r\n\nRESULTANDO:\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- La actora, en escrito de demanda de\r\nfecha dieciocho de julio de dos mil once, promovió la presente acción para que\r\nen sentencia se declarara la nulidad del acto administrativo de despido que\r\nejecutó el banco en su contra, como a restituirla en su puesto de trabajo con\r\nel pleno goce de sus derechos laborales; así como al pago de salarios caídos y\r\ndemás derechos laborales dejados de percibir, incluidos los referidos a la\r\nseguridad social, indemnización de los daños psicológico y moral ocasionados,\r\nintereses y ambas costas del proceso.\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- El demandado contestó la acción en los\r\ntérminos que indica en el memorial de fecha primero de febrero de dos mil doce\r\ny opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual y falta de\r\nlegitimación activa.\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- El Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo\r\nCircuito Judicial de San José (oral-electrónico), por sentencia de las trece\r\nhoras del veintisiete de mayo de dos mil trece, dispuso: “ Conforme\r\nlo expuesto, normativa aplicable y artículo 492 siguientes y concordantes del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de\r\ninterés actual y falta de legitimación activa, declarándose CON LUGAR la\r\npresente demanda ordinaria laboral establecida por la señora [Nombre 001] ,\r\ncontra BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, representado por su\r\nApoderado General Judicial señor GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, razón\r\npor la cual se declara lo siguiente: que el despido sin responsabilidad\r\npatronal ejecutado en contra de la actora por parte de la demandada, fue\r\ncompletamente ilegal y nulo por la violación al debido proceso, y materialmente\r\ninjustificado, razón por la cual, los efectos de esta declaratoria deben\r\nretrotraerse al momento o fecha de dicho acto ilegal, de manera que las cosas\r\ndeben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de su emisión. En\r\nconsecuencia, lo procedente es reinstalar a la actora en su cargo de manera\r\ninmediata, confirmándose así la medida cautelar dictada interlocutoriamente, a\r\nmenos de que alguna otra causa legal o administrativa lo impidiera. Debiendo\r\npagar la demandada a la actora, a título de daños todos los salarios caídos y\r\ndemás derechos laborales que hubiese dejado de percibir, incluyendo los\r\nderechos referidos a la seguridad social, durante el tiempo que ha estado o\r\nestuvo fuera de la institución bancaria, aclarando que estos salarios caídos y\r\ndemás derechos que deberá cancelar y reconocer la demandada a la actora, son\r\ndel tiempo que efectivamente hubiese estado fuera de la institución sin\r\npercibirlos o sin habérsele reconocido por parte de la entidad bancaria. Rubros\r\nque deberán liquidarse administrativamente, esto sin perjuicio de que en caso\r\nde inconformidad acuda la parte actora, a la respectiva ejecución de sentencia\r\nen esta vía judicial, a excepción del daño moral, extremo que se acoge y deberá\r\ncancelar la demandada a la actora en la suma prudencial de quince millones de\r\ncolones, a razón de cinco millones de colones por daño moral subjetivo, y diez\r\nmillones de colones por daño moral objetivo; y a título de perjuicios, los\r\nintereses legales sobres dichas sumas a partir del momento en que cada una fue\r\nhaciéndose exigible y hasta su efectivo pago, según la tasa prevista en el\r\nartículo 1163 del Código Civil, que corresponde a la que paga el Banco Nacional\r\nde Costa Rica por los certificados de depósito a seis meses plazo; rubros que\r\ncomo ya se indicó podrán liquidarse administrativamente, sin perjuicio que en\r\ncaso de inconformidad se pueden determinará en la etapa de ejecución de\r\nsentencia. Además, sobre los montos a pagar deberá hacerse el rebajo de las\r\ncargas sociales en lo que sea legalmente procedente. Se condena a la parte\r\ndemandada al pago de ambas costas del juicio, fijándose las personales en la\r\nsuma prudencial de tres millones de colones...” (Sic).\n\r\n\r\n\n4.- Ambas partes apelaron y el Tribunal de\r\nTrabajo, Sección Tercera, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por\r\nsentencia de las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de\r\nsetiembre de dos mil quince, resolvió: “No existiendo errores\r\nni omisiones capaces de producir nulidad o indefensión, es con lugar\r\nparcialmente el recurso de apelación promovido por el demandado, de modo que se\r\ndeclara sin lugar la aspiración de la actora para que el Banco accionado le\r\nindemnice el daño moral. Es sin lugar la apelación adhesiva presentada por la\r\nactora. Salvo lo indicado, en lo que es objeto de impugnación, se confirma la\r\nsentencia de primera instancia…” \n\r\n\r\n\n5.-\r\nLa parte actora\r\nformuló recurso para ante esta Sala, en memorial fechado veinte de noviembre de\r\ndos mil quince, el cual se fundamenta en las razones que de seguido se dirán en\r\nla parte considerativa.\n\r\n\r\n\n6.- En los procedimientos se han observado\r\nlas prescripciones de ley.\n\r\n\r\n\nRedacta el\r\nMagistrado Aguirre Gómez; y,\n\r\n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO: \n\r\n\r\n\nI.-\r\nANTECEDENTES. La\r\nactora afirmó que laboró para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal del 18\r\nde enero de 2001 al 4 de abril de 2011, día en que fue despedida sin\r\nresponsabilidad patronal. Según lo indicó, la relación laboral cesó porque el\r\ndía 15 de marzo de 2011 fue detenida en casa de sus padres, por orden del\r\nJuzgado Penal de San Ramón, por supuesta legitimación de capitales; hecho que\r\nse hizo de dominio público. Mencionó que en su contra se dictó, como medida\r\ncautelar, prisión preventiva por un año. Según lo apuntó, el Director del Área\r\nJurídica del banco declaró ante la prensa que dicha entidad fue la que denunció\r\nlas supuestas irregularidades y coordinó con las autoridades judiciales su\r\ndetención. Aseveró que, a pesar de que el banco conocía su situación, le pidió\r\na su hermano que se apersonara a la sucursal de San Ramón y le informara al\r\nGerente General, quien era su jefe inmediato, lo sucedido. Señaló que el 8 de\r\nabril de 2011 se dictó orden de libertad a su favor y que ese mismo día dos\r\nfuncionarios del banco se presentaron en la casa de sus padres para notificarle\r\nla carta de despido; la cual su madre se negó a recibir porque ella no vive\r\nahí. Según lo relató, el 12 de abril de 2011 (día hábil siguiente a su\r\nliberación) se presentó a su lugar de trabajo y fue en ese momento cuando se le\r\nentregó la carta de despido; en la cual se estableció como causal sus ausencias\r\na laborar. Refirió que en su pueblo, San Ramón, se decía que a ella la habían\r\ncesado por estar “ligada con una banda de narcos”, por lo cual,\r\nsocialmente, su despido se ha visto como una sanción. Solicitó la nulidad\r\nabsoluta, evidente y manifiesta del acto administrativo de despido y la\r\nreinstalación en su puesto. Pidió, además, el pago de salarios caídos y demás\r\nderechos laborales dejados de percibir –incluidos los de seguridad social-;\r\ndaños y perjuicios, intereses y ambas costas (documento incorporado el 28 de\r\noctubre de 2011 a\r\nlas 03:58:11 p.m.). El apoderado general judicial del banco contestó en\r\ntérminos negativos y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de\r\ninterés actual y falta de legitimación activa (documento adjuntado el 6 de\r\nfebrero de 2012 a\r\nlas 03:10:23 p.m.). El juez de primera instancia declaró con lugar la demanda y\r\ndispuso reinstalar a la demandante en su cargo de manera inmediata. Condenó al\r\naccionado –a título de daños- al pago de salarios caídos y demás derechos\r\nlaborales (incluidos los de seguridad social) dejados de percibir durante todo\r\nel tiempo que la trabajadora ha estado o estuvo fuera de la entidad bancaria;\r\nasí como al rebajo de las cargas sociales. Ordenó pagar la suma de ₡15.000.000,00 por concepto de daño\r\nmoral, intereses –a título de perjuicios- y ambas costas del proceso, fijó las\r\npersonales en la suma prudencial de ₡3.000.000,00 (sentencia incluida el 27 de mayo de 2013 a las 02:47:23 p.m.). Ambas\r\npartes apelaron lo resuelto (documentos incorporados el 4 de junio de 2013 a las 04:24:39 p.m. y\r\nel 27 de agosto de 2013 a\r\nlas 02:57:32 p.m.). El Tribunal revocó el fallo en cuanto condenó al demandado\r\nal pago de daño moral, el cual denegó, y en lo demás lo confirmó (sentencia\r\nadjuntada el 1º de octubre de 2015\r\n a las 07:43:37 a.m.). \n\r\n\r\n\nII.-\r\nAGRAVIOS. La\r\naccionante se muestra disconforme con lo dispuesto por el Ad-quem respecto del\r\ndaño moral. Considera que el fallo impugnado no está debidamente fundamentado.\r\nArgumenta que los hechos tenidos por probados por las instancias precedentes\r\ndemuestran que el banco la despidió de manera arbitraria e intempestiva, justo\r\ncuando el Ministerio Público llevaba a cabo sus actuaciones investigativas y\r\nlos medios de comunicación masiva mantenían interés por informar sobre el caso;\r\nel cual se dio en San Ramón, lugar donde trabaja y habita. Alega que el banco\r\nla buscó hasta en casas de familiares para notificarle el cese de la relación\r\nlaboral. Refiere que el nexo causal entre el daño moral reclamado y el acto\r\narbitrario del banco se evidencia con la conexión entre el despido sin\r\nresponsabilidad patronal y la publicidad que sobre el caso existía para esa\r\népoca. Señala que las instancias precedentes establecieron que la conducta del\r\nbanco fue irregular y reprochable por haberla cesado de manera ilegal. Destaca\r\nque si el banco hubiera tramitado el despido de conformidad con el\r\nprocedimiento establecido en la convención colectiva, este se hubiera dictado\r\nfuera de la exposición pública y mediática, con lo cual los efectos gravosos de\r\neste hubieran podido ser menores. Aduce que lo sucedido dañó su nombre y buena\r\nimagen (documento incluido el 23 de noviembre de 2015 a las 11:24:21 a.m.).\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- SOBRE\r\nEL CASO CONCRETO. El\r\núnico punto sometido al análisis de esta Sala es el relacionado con el daño\r\nmoral. La posición de este órgano, a partir del voto n.º 481, de las 10:40\r\nhoras del 11 de junio de 2004,\r\n ha sido la de que en sede laboral es factible\r\nindemnizarlo cuando sea causado por actos que extralimiten el poder sancionador\r\ndel patrono; es decir, cuando se esté ante circunstancias especialmente\r\ncalificadas. Así, en la resolución n.º 1151, de las 9:45 horas del 20 de\r\ndiciembre de 2006, se señaló: “Indudablemente, toda imposición de una medida\r\ndisciplinaria injusta causa un sufrimiento moral, mas no en todo caso es\r\nprocedente el daño moral, sino tan solo cuando la sanción haya estado rodeada\r\nde situaciones realmente excepcionales y graves”. En similar orientación,\r\ncabe citar la sentencia n.º 359, de las 9:40 horas del 19 de marzo de 2010: “De\r\nmodo que el daño moral que puede ser indemnizado en la vía laboral (cuando este\r\nse produce durante la vigencia del contrato de trabajo e incluso al momento del\r\ndespido) es aquel irrogado por abusos del derecho del empleador, quien en el\r\nejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se excede causando un daño distinto a\r\nlos efectos naturales del despido justificado”. En el caso concreto, la\r\nactora requirió el pago de este rubro, pues estima que el despido ejecutado por\r\nel banco fue arbitrario y lesionó su reputación social, lo que representa un\r\ndaño a su honor e imagen (folio 15 del documento incorporado el 28 de octubre\r\nde 2011 a\r\nlas 03:58:11 p.m.). En primera instancia este extremo fue concedido; sin\r\nembargo, el órgano de alzada lo denegó, por considerar que no se estableció el\r\nnexo causal entre el menoscabo alegado y la conducta del accionado. Esta Sala\r\ndifiere de ese razonamiento. Revisados los autos, se tiene que la entidad\r\nbancaria incurrió en un acto ilegítimo e intempestivo de despido, que dio lugar\r\na que en esta sede se dictara su nulidad, por ser lesivo de derechos. Luego, es\r\nfuente de daño moral. No cabe duda de que el hecho de que la demandante haya\r\nsido cesada el 12 de abril de 2011, día en que esta se presentó -en la sucursal\r\ndel demandado ubicada en San Ramón- para reincorporarse a su trabajo, después\r\nde que la autoridad judicial competente autorizara su liberación, la afectó\r\nmoralmente. Obsérvese que el término de la relación laboral, según se consignó\r\nen la carta de despido, se debió a que la trabajadora no se presentó a laborar\r\ndesde el 15 de marzo de 2011 (imagen 2 del documento incorporado el 15 de\r\ndiciembre de 2011 a\r\nlas 04:04:42 p.m.). No obstante, según el material probatorio que consta en el\r\nexpediente, para ese entonces se estaba llevando a cabo una investigación\r\njudicial en su contra, por supuesta legitimación de capitales, y ese día fue\r\ndetenida y presentada ante el Juzgado Penal de San Ramón, donde se le impuso\r\n–como medida cautelar- prisión preventiva por un año (imágenes 13 y 14 del\r\ndocumento adjuntado el 15 de diciembre de 2011 a las 04:04:42 p.m.). Este\r\núltimo hecho le impidió, por razones obvias, cumplir con su obligación de\r\nprestar sus servicios al banco; circunstancia que era bien conocida por la\r\nparte empleadora. Véase que, según se advierte de la declaración de ambos\r\ntestigos, al día siguiente de la detención, el hermano de la accionante fue\r\npersonalmente donde el jefe de esta a ponerlo en conocimiento de lo sucedido. Además,\r\ncomo dichas actuaciones investigativas resultaron de interés de la prensa, esta\r\ndio noticia de lo acontecido (imágenes 62-67 del documento incorporado el 15 de\r\ndiciembre de 2011 a\r\nlas 04:04:42 p.m.). De conformidad con lo anterior, las ausencias reprochadas a\r\nla actora, al ser consecuencia directa de un acto ajeno a su voluntad, del cual\r\nsu patrono sabía, resultan justificadas y, por ende, la decisión tomada por el\r\naccionado fue desproporcionada y arbitraria. Así las cosas, a criterio de esta\r\nSala, al sufrimiento que venía experimentando la demandante, en virtud de la\r\nsituación judicial por la que atravesaba, se le añadió la angustia de quedarse\r\nsin trabajo justo al salir de prisión. Si bien esa lesión se encuentra\r\nrestañada, por cuanto se declaró la nulidad del despido y se ordenó el pago de\r\nlos salarios caídos, el banco debe compensar el desconsuelo que le ocasionó a\r\nla trabajadora con su actuación, el cual vino a sumarse a la pesadumbre que\r\nvenía soportando. Esto, por así disponerlo los artículos 41 de la Constitución Política\r\ny 1045 del Código Civil. El primero de ellos, a texto expreso, estipula: “Ocurriendo\r\na las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que\r\nhayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles\r\njusticia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las\r\nleyes”. Y el segundo reza: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia\r\no imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los\r\nperjuicios”. Además, son fuente de responsabilidad para el Banco demandado\r\nlos asrtículos 190 y 191 de la\r\n Ley General de la Administración Pública.\r\nEn consecuencia, procede revocar el fallo que se conoce en cuanto denegó el\r\ndaño moral y confirmar en ese extremo el de primera instancia. No obstante, a\r\njuicio de este órgano la cuantía otorgada debe ser modificada. Con base en un\r\ncriterio de prudencia y tomando en consideración las circunstancias descritas,\r\nla angustia y aflicción sufridas por la accionante, procede fijarlo en la suma\r\nde ₡3.000.000,00;\r\npor estimarse que esta resulta suficiente como retribución al aporte del daño\r\natribuible al demandado.\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA ALLÓN\r\nZÚÑIGA Y DEL MAGISTRADO BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:. Nos apart amos del\r\ncriterio de mayoría por las razones que a continuación exponemos. En sede\r\nlaboral, es factible la indemnización del daño moral causado por actos que\r\nextralimiten el poder sancionador del patrono, es decir, cuando se esté ante\r\ncircunstancias especialmente calificadas. Así, en la resolución n.º 1151, de las\r\n9:45 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2006, se señaló: “Indudablemente, toda\r\nimposición de una medida disciplinaria injusta causa un sufrimiento moral, mas\r\nno en todo caso es procedente el daño moral, sino tan solo cuando la sanción\r\nhaya estado rodeada de situaciones realmente excepcionales y graves”. En\r\nsimilar orientación, cabe citar la sentencia n.º 359, de las 9:40 horas del 19\r\nde marzo de 2010: “De modo que el daño moral que puede ser indemnizado en la\r\nvía laboral (cuando este se produce durante la vigencia del contrato de trabajo\r\ne incluso al momento del despido) es aquel irrogado por abusos del derecho del\r\nempleador, quien en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se excede\r\ncausando un daño distinto a los efectos naturales del despido justificado”. En\r\nestos casos, corresponde a la víctima -de conformidad con el artículo 317 del\r\nCódigo Procesal Civil- demostrar la existencia de hechos dañosos llevados a\r\ncabo por el empleador, más allá del despido mismo (Voto n.º 385, de las 10:20\r\nhoras del 12 de abril de 2013). En el caso concreto, alega la actora que el\r\ndespido fue arbitrario y lesionó su reputación social, lo que representa un\r\ndaño a su honor e imagen (folio 15 del documento incorporado el 28 de octubre\r\nde 2011 a\r\nlas 03:58:11 p.m.). En primera instancia este extremo fue concedido; sin\r\nembargo, el órgano de alzada lo denegó, por considerar que “[…] si bien es\r\ndable asumir que toda la situación vivida por la actora le haya generado una\r\nlesión moral tanto en lo subjetivo como en lo objetivo, sobre todo por la\r\ndifusión que se le dio a lo acaecido, no es factible establecer el nexo causal\r\nentre ese menoscabo y la conducta de la demandada” (imagen 19 de la\r\nsentencia adjuntada el 1º de octubre de 2015 a las 07:43:37 a.m.). Revisada\r\nla prueba allegada a los autos, compartimos lo dispuesto por el Tribunal al\r\nrespecto. La demandante no acreditó, tal y como le correspondía, el nexo causal\r\nentre el despido y el daño moral reclamado. Según se extrae del expediente, la\r\nentidad bancaria notificó a la trabajadora la carta de despido el 12 de abril\r\nde 2011, día en que esta se presentó para reincorporarse a su trabajo,\r\nnotificación que se hizo de manera personal y sin llevar a cabo un “despliegue\r\nexcesivo”, como lo apuntó el Ad-quem, por lo que no puede afirmarse que\r\neste comportamiento ocasionara algún perjuicio a la accionante que deba ser\r\nindemnizado. La parte recurrente aduce que los medios de comunicación colectiva\r\ntuvieron conocimiento de su despido; sin embargo no aportó elemento probatorio\r\nalguno de que el demandado motivara la publicidad en ese hecho. Véase que las\r\nnotas periodísticas ofrecidas como prueba, aluden a la detención de la actora y\r\nsu supuesta participación en el delito de legitimación de capitales, mas no\r\nhacen mención al cese de labores (imágenes 62-67 del documento incorporado el\r\n15 de diciembre de 2011 a\r\nlas 04:04:42 p.m.). No se demostró que fuera el propio accionado el que brindó\r\ndicha información a la prensa. Aunque se alega que el despido ocurrió cuando la\r\nactora estaba siendo expuesta públicamente por los medios de comunicación y\r\nante la comunidad de San Ramón, estas circunstancias no pueden ser atribuidas a\r\nla parte empleadora pues le resultan ajenas. Tómese en cuenta que el banco no\r\ntiene injerencia sobre lo que publique la prensa, ni lo que conozcan las\r\npersonas que habitan en dicho cantón, por consiguiente, no puede afirmarse que\r\nestos factores sean su responsabilidad. Analizadas las declaraciones de los\r\ntestigos, se concluye que las aflicciones sufridas por la accionante derivaron,\r\nprincipalmente, por la prisión preventiva dictada en su contra y no propiamente\r\npor el despido. La actuación del banco no causó a la actora un menoscabo,\r\ndistinto a los efectos naturales del despido, que deba ser indemnizado. Las\r\nafectaciones expuestas derivan de la investigación penal en la cual ella se vio\r\ninvolucrada, y no por la acción de despido. Por consiguiente, concluimos que\r\nlos alegatos planteados por la recurrente para justificar el pago del daño\r\nmoral no resultan de recibo y, lo resuelto al respecto por el órgano de alzada,\r\ndebe confirmarse . \n\r\n\r\n\nV.- NOTA DEL\r\nMAGISTRADO OLASO: Independientemente\r\nde compartir el criterio de los estimables compañeros y de las compañeras, en\r\ncuanto determinan la existencia de un actuar ilegítimo del banco accionado que\r\ngenera un resarcimiento a favor de la actora. Considero importante determinar\r\nque el fundamento de ese resarcimiento no puede derivar de una norma fundada en\r\nel criterio de imputación subjetiva como el regulado por el artículo 1045 del\r\nCódigo Civil, debido a las razones que a continuación expondré. \n\r\n\r\n\nGENERALIDADES\r\nSOBRE LA\r\n RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL: Los autores Diez Picazo y De León establecen que la\r\nsemilla inicial de la responsabilidad civil se encuentra en el derecho romano\r\nclásico (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis y DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial\r\nCivitas, pág. 41), lo cual nos lleva a plantear la posibilidad de solicitar un\r\nresarcimiento dentro del ámbito de la acción delictiva. Así por ejemplo, se\r\nrelacionaba la acción civil con el “furtum”, que era una acción de naturaleza\r\npenal que se ejercitaba con ocasión de infracciones a los derechos o una cosa. Por\r\notro lado, otra acción era la “damnun innuria datum” la cual gracias al\r\nTribuno Aquilino, dio origen a la llamada “ Lex Aquilia”. Dentro de las\r\nnormas más importantes de dicha ley tenemos la posibilidad de solicitar un\r\nresarcimiento ante la pérdida de los esclavos o de algún cuadrúpedo, por lo\r\nque, definitivamente, dicha acción deriva de un daño material causado (Digesto\r\n9, 2, 2).Otro elemento importante para la evolución de este tipo de\r\nacción civil lo constituye el derecho pretoriano, dada que por su naturaleza\r\nera un derecho menos formal y en que la equidad comienza a tener un contenido\r\nimportante, a fin de determinar la naturaleza y cuantificación del daño.En el\r\nmarco de estas fuentes normativas podemos concluir que en el Derecho Romano\r\n“clásico” existían las siguientes acciones: 1) acciones ante la lesión o\r\ndestrucción de las cosas, esto daba pauta para ejercer la llamada “inuiria” que\r\nera una acción ejercida siempre y cuando existiera un nexo causal del daño; 2)\r\nacciones por lesiones corporales y daños causados a la persona; 3) acciones por\r\ndaños causados por animales o por negligencia de la persona (por ejemplo, daños\r\nal cabalgar); 4) acción de dolo, o sea haber actuado con intención de generar\r\nun daño; 5) por último, la “inuiria” evoluciona hasta convertirse en una acción\r\nque tutela los derechos de la personalidad, pero también sigue tutelando\r\ninfracciones al derecho de posesión y de propiedad. También, la influencia de\r\nlos glosadores y de los comentaristas iusnaturalistas, resulta determinante\r\ndentro de la evolución de la responsabilidad civil, principalmente por dos\r\naspectos. El primero radica en el hecho de que se amplía el espectro de la\r\nresponsabilidad ante situaciones generadas ya no solo por el agente, sino\r\ntambién ante actuaciones desplegadas por los esclavos, los cuales generaban la\r\nresponsabilidad de su amo –inicios de la culpa “in vigilando”- (lo que en este\r\ncaso es de suma importancia). El segundo aspecto tiene que ver con la\r\nlegitimación para cobrar el resarcimiento, debido a que esta etapa se permitía\r\nque los herederos o herederas de la víctima cobrasen indemnizaciones ante la\r\nmuerte, tal y como podrán ser los alimentos. Dentro del marco evolutivo de la responsabilidad\r\ntiene una importante influencia autores como Hugo Grocio y Domat, los cuales\r\nconformaban la\r\n Escuela Naturalista que influencio el Code. El aporte del\r\nprimero de ellos consiste en derivar la acción civil de un hecho “ilícito” que\r\npodía ser ocasionado con dolo o por actuar culposo o negligente. Bajo esta\r\nmisma línea, Domat, clasifica los tres tipos de causas de las que podrían\r\nderivarse el derecho a solicitar un resarcimiento, entre éstas tenemos, los\r\ncuasicontratos, los incumplimientos contractuales y los crímenes o delitos. La\r\ninfluencia de estas escuelas determina que el año 1792 se estatuya en el Código\r\nPrusiano una norma que establece lo siguiente: “Todo daño causado por\r\ndolo o por negligencia grave que genere una enfermedad personal grave o la\r\nmuerte debe ser punible”. También el Code toma esta misma orientación\r\nal establecer: “Artículo 1382. “De los delitos y cuasidelitos. “Cualquier\r\nhecho del hombre, que causa a otro un daño, obliga a repararlo a aquél por cuya\r\nculpa ha ocurrido”.Artículo 1383. Es responsable no solo del daño\r\ncausado por hecho propio, sino también por el hecho de las personas que deba\r\nresponder o de las cosas que uno tiene bajo su guarda”. Evidentemente,\r\ntoda esta codificación tiene una influencia en nuestra normativa nacional, de\r\nlo que haré mención a lo largo de esta nota, lo que sí considero importante es\r\nestablecer cuáles son las características propias de una legislación derivada\r\ndel Code, porque evidentemente nuestra normativa civil entra dentro de estas\r\ncaracterísticas. La influencia de esa normativa dentro de nuestra legislación\r\ncivil es evidente. Basta hacer lectura del numeral 1045 del Código Civil para\r\npercibir esto, no obstante es necesario destacar cómo la perspectiva acerca de\r\nla naturaleza de la responsabilidad civil no puede agotarse tan solo dentro de\r\nesta norma. La norma en cuestión parte, al igual que la legislación\r\nNapoleónica, de un actuar ya no solo doloso sino también negligente e\r\nimprudente de parte del agente que genera el daño. También como fruto de los\r\nmomentos históricos y sociales que rodeaban a Francia en el siglo XVIII, se\r\nparte de una relación individualista entre el agente y la víctima, dado que ni\r\nsiquiera en la mentalidad del legislador de esa época se valoran los efectos de\r\nla teoría del riesgo propia de la actividad industrial o comercial en masa, ni\r\nmucho menos que se pudiera responsabilizar al Estado por ser actuar en\r\ndisconformidad con el ordenamiento. Esto lo afirmó ya que debemos recordar que\r\nen el año 1804, en Francia, lo que se desarrolla es una economía agrícola o\r\nartesanal, por lo que era difícil prever los cambios introducidos por la Revolución Industrial,\r\nde igual forma, nos encontrábamos en un momento histórico en el que era difícil\r\nprever la responsabilidad del orden estatal por un actuar ilegítimo. Otro\r\naspecto importante para explicar la normativa de la cual deriva la nuestra, es\r\nla importancia influencia que tiene el Derecho Canónico. Evidentemente, normas\r\ncomo el artículo 1045, parten de una premisa de la que deriva la obligación de\r\nla víctima de acreditar cuál fue la persona que generó la acción dolosa o\r\nculposa que a fin de cuentas causo el daño. Cuando la víctima se encontraba\r\nante supuestos en los que no podía acreditar estas situaciones, ya sea por\r\nfalta de prueba o imposibilidad de conseguirla –debido a la imposibilidad de\r\nconseguirla de parte del agente-, se indicaba que estábamos en presencia de\r\n“actos de Dios” de aquéllos que se ejecutaban como castigo ante la víctima por\r\nlo tanto no resarcibles. De esta manera el resarcimiento del daño era\r\nvisualizado como el “pago de un pecado” y no como una indemnización para la\r\nvíctima. Usualmente, y tal como lo hace la Sala en este voto, se ha indicado que la\r\nresponsabilidad civil encuentra su asidero legal en el artículo 1045 del Código\r\nCivil, el que, como lo indiqué anteriormente, prescribe la obligación de\r\nreparar los daños junto con los perjuicios, que fueren ocasionados por dolo,\r\nculpa, negligencia o imprudencia. En realidad, y de acuerdo al principio de\r\njerarquización de las fuentes, el fundamento constitucional de la\r\nresponsabilidad se encuentra en el numeral 41 de la Carta Magna, en cuanto\r\nestablece: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación\r\npara las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o\r\nintereses morales. Deberá hacérseles justicia pronta y cumplida, sin denegación\r\ny en estricta conformidad con las leyes”.Ahora bien, normas como el\r\nartículo 1045 complementan este principio general, dado que establecen\r\ncriterios de imputación que resultan esenciales para poder determinar aspectos\r\nsustantivos y procesales, tales como la legitimación, el nexo causal y la carga\r\nde la prueba. Tal y como lo ha establecido la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia, el daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad\r\ncivil. Esto debido a que el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha\r\nmediado un hecho dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante,\r\nsusceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico (Voto número 112 de\r\nlas catorce horas quince minutos del quince de junio de mil novecientos noventa\r\ny cinco). Para esa Sala “daño” es todo menoscabo, pérdida o deterioro de la\r\nesfera jurídica patrimonial o extra patrimonial de la persona (damnificado) que\r\nprovoca la privación de un bien jurídico tutelado por el ordenamiento. Bajo\r\nesta tesitura, el primer elemento esencial de la responsabilidad civil lo\r\nconstituye el daño. En cuanto a las características del daño, encontramos: 1)\r\ndebe ser cierto; real y efectivo y no hipotético); 2) debe mediar lesión a un\r\ninterés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo; 3) debe mediar una\r\nrelación de causalidad entre el hecho generador y el daño. Otro de los\r\nelementos que configura la responsabilidad civil, lo constituye la relación de\r\ncausalidad directa o eficiente que debe existir entre el comportamiento o\r\nconducta antijurídica y el daño, siendo este último el presupuesto de cualquier\r\ntipo de responsabilidad ya sea contractual o extracontractual por lo que su\r\ndemostración también constituye un requisito sine quo non para que\r\nprospere la pretensión resarcitoria. La noción de culpabilidad es otro de los\r\nelementos más importante dentro de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual,\r\nya que debe existir culpa por parte de la persona que causa el daño. La\r\nculpabilidad constituye un juicio de reproche, mediante el cual se imputa la\r\nresponsabilidad de esa persona. Sin la existencia de la culpa no se puede\r\nconceder la indemnización de daños y perjuicios a favor de la víctima ya que es\r\nnecesario que este demostrado que el daño se ha ocasionado por un acto u\r\nomisión imputable a una persona. Es necesario entonces que el daño sea\r\natribuido al agente productor, sea porque se hizo con intención o sea porque\r\npudo haberlo evitado y no lo hizo, al actuar negligente o imprudente. Este\r\nrequisito de culpabilidad es cuestionado por el autor nacional Juan Marco\r\nRivero Sánchez, quien señala que tal requisito no constituye un elemento\r\ndeterminante para establecer la responsabilidad. Para fundamentar su\r\nargumentación, se basa en lo establecido por los artículos que van del 38 al 40\r\ndel Código Civil, relativos a la capacidad de las personas. Explica el autor\r\nque, si la culpabilidad fuera un requisito de la responsabilidad civil no sería\r\nposible exigirle ningún tipo de responsabilidad a las personas menores de\r\nquince años y, por ende, se extinguiría toda posibilidad de solicitar un\r\nresarcimiento. Sin embargo, esto no ocurre pues se mantiene la posibilidad de\r\ncobrar el daño a los padres del menor de quince años, siempre y cuando habite\r\nen la casa de éstos (1047 del Código Civil) doce años –de acuerdo al artículo 6\r\nde la Ley de\r\nJusticia Penal Juvenil-, pero la norma aún así mantiene la responsabilidad\r\ncivil, desplazándola a otros sujetos, conforme al numeral 1048 del Código\r\nCivil. La antijuridicidad constituye un comportamiento contrario al\r\nordenamiento jurídico, lo cual que el actuar de la persona que genera el daño\r\ndebe ser calificado como una conculcación al ordenamiento jurídico. Esta\r\nantijuridicidad genera distintas posiciones en el caso de los daños provocados\r\npor una falta al deber de cuidado –negligencia, imprudencia e impericia-, dado\r\nque al encontrarnos ante estos supuestos, evidentemente, existen causas de\r\njustificación que eliminen esta condición, como por ejemplo, el caso fortuito o\r\nla fuerza mayor. Este requisito, como elemento esencial de la responsabilidad\r\ncivil, es discutido por parte de la doctrina. Específicamente, el autor Rivero\r\nSánchez, señala que la antijuridicidad, dentro del marco del derecho civil\r\ncostarricense, no es un requisito para la procedencia de la responsabilidad\r\ncivil, en virtud que existen normas del Código Civil que generan la obligación\r\nde resarcir el daño, a pesar de que la conducta no pueda ser calificada como\r\nantijurídica, dado la existencia de alguna causal que elimine esta\r\nantijuridicidad. Este supuesto legislativo lo encontramos en el 1043 del Código\r\nCivil, que dispone: “Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también,\r\nsin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto\r\naprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas”. Bajo la tesis de Rivero\r\nSánchez, por ejemplo, en el caso del cuento de “Risitos de oro”, cuando la niña\r\nse pierde en el bosque e irrumpe en la casa de los osos, se come su sopa y\r\ndescansa en sus camas, perfectamente podríamos ubicar esta conducta como un\r\nactuar antijurídico, propio de la violación de domicilio (artículo del 204 del\r\nCódigo Penal). No obstante, dicha antijuridicidad desaparece, dada la\r\nexistencia del estado de necesidad, como causal de justificación, según el\r\nartículo 27 ibídem, dado que la niña se encuentra perdida en el bosque y con\r\nmucha hambre. A pesar de esto, según dicho autor, en aplicación del numeral\r\n1043 del Código Civil, existiría una obligación de resarcir el daño a favor de\r\nlos osos, ya que los hechos lícitos también generan responsabilidad. El\r\ndualismo entre la responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual ha sido objeto\r\nde discusión, por parte de la doctrina a través del tiempo. Autores como\r\nYzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil\r\ncontractual y extracontractual” Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, página\r\n87), indican que dicho dualismo debe de ser superado, en virtud de las\r\nsiguientes razones: a) de orden sustantivo, debido a que el daño es el mismo en\r\ncualquiera de los dos campos, por lo que no existe ninguna razón lógica para\r\ndar un diverso tratamiento al daño “contractual” y “extracontractual”; b)\r\nsistemático, en razón de que en ambas existe una conducta u omisión que genera\r\nel daño, únicamente que en la contractual dicha conducta se da en razón del\r\nincumplimiento; c) prácticas, dado que no resulta sencillo muchas veces ubicar\r\nsi nos encontramos ante un caso de responsabilidad contractual o\r\nextracontractual. Por ejemplo, en los casos de aplicación del numeral 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa\r\nefectiva del consumidor. En el derecho romano, tal y como lo explique\r\nanteriormente, esta diferencia se encontraba marcada, puesto que la\r\nresponsabilidad derivaba de la ley de las XII Tablas y era de tipo contractual,\r\nmientras que la que se derivaba de la Lex Aquilia era de tipo extracontractual. Nuestro\r\nCódigo Civil también diferencia entre una responsabilidad civil derivada de un\r\ncontrato (artículos 701 y siguientes), y una responsabilidad civil de tipo\r\nextracontractual (artículos 1045 y siguientes). Para las personas que apoyan la\r\ndivisión entre ambos tipos de responsabilidad, la extracontractual, está\r\nconstituida por una conducta activa u omisiva, refiriéndose ésta a la ausencia\r\nde un contrato previo, es decir surge cuando se causa un daño sin que exista un\r\nvínculo o contrato u obligación anterior. Pérez Vargas, en su obra “Principios\r\nde Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indica que, para que se dé la\r\nresponsabilidad extracontractual es necesaria la presencia de dos elementos: “…Un\r\ncomportamiento que sirva de criterio de imputación, sea un dañar culpable o un\r\ndaño derivado de la creación de un riesgo y un resultado lesivo de interés\r\njurídicamente relevante o lo que sería un daño en sentido amplio, material o\r\nmoral…”. Igualmente, el citado autor, nos explica que para que la persona\r\ncausante del daño esté obligada a su reparación, se hace necesario un nexo de\r\ncausalidad entre su conducta y el daño producido, lo que significa que el daño\r\ndebe ser la consecuencia directa e inmediata de la conducta. Los artículos\r\n1045, 1046 y 1048 del Código Civil, hacen referencia a la responsabilidad civil\r\nextracontractual. Este tipo de responsabilidad no nace del incumplimiento de un\r\nvínculo determinado, sino a raíz de una violación al deber general de no dañar\r\na las otras personas. En cuanto a la responsabilidad contractual la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia ha considerado: “… la responsabilidad contractual presupone la\r\nexistencia de una obligación jurídica determinada, convenida libremente por las\r\npartes y además el hecho de que tal obligación haya sido incumplida\r\nculpablemente por el obligado. La carga de la prueba corresponde al acreedor…\r\nsi el acreedor alega dolo, no basta con demostrar el incumplimiento, sino que\r\nel dolo debe ser probado para que genere las consecuencias jurídicas\r\ncorrespondientes (artículos 701 y 702 del Código Civil). El incumplimiento es\r\ndoloso cuando el deudor incumple voluntaria e intencionalmente su obligación,\r\ncausando un daño a su acreedor. El dolo según lo dispone el artículo 701 del\r\nCódigo Civil no se presume y quien lo cometa queda siempre obligado a\r\nindemnizar los daños y perjuicios que con él se ocasione aunque se hubiere\r\npactado lo contrario”. Otra de las diferencias conceptuales, según la Sala Primera, se\r\nencuentra en la carga de la prueba. En la contractual basta con demostrar el\r\nincumplimiento para que exista la culpa, en cambio en la responsabilidad civil\r\nextracontractual subjetiva debe necesariamente demostrarse la culpa\r\n(negligencia, imprudencia, impericia) o el dolo, en los cuales se sustenta la\r\nresponsabilidad de la persona que causa el daño (Voto número 320, de las trece\r\nhoras del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa). \n\r\n\r\n\nLOS\r\nCRITERIOS DE IMPUTACIÓN OBJETIVOS Y SUBJETIVOS PARA LA DETERMINACIÓN DEL\r\nDAÑO. Los criterios de\r\nimputación subjetivos u objetivos constituyen marcos de referencia que se\r\nutilizan para imputar la responsabilidad de la persona que genera el daño. En\r\nel caso de los primeros –subjetivos-, son aquellos que se basan en aspectos\r\ncomo el dolo o culpa, por lo que, frente a la verificación de un comportamiento\r\nilícito – doloso o culposo – surge la obligación de reparo. La imputación a tal\r\nconducta puede ser por un comportamiento propio o bien por una conducta de\r\notro, sea por un hecho ajeno. Es por lo anterior que en doctrina se habla de\r\nresponsabilidad subjetiva directa e indirecta, consagrada la última en el\r\nnumeral 1048 de nuestro Código Civil, “culpa in eligendo “ y “ culpa in vigilando”.\r\nAhora bien, la culpa y el dolo no son necesarios para fundamentar el proceso de\r\nresponsabilidad civil. Si ello fuera así, en muchos casos se daría una\r\ndenegación del acceso a la justicia, sobre todo en aquellos supuestos en que la\r\nvíctima se ve imposibilitada para demostrar la negligencia o impericia de la\r\npersona que causo el daño. Es por esto que, los tribunales y la doctrina, han\r\nelevado los estándares de diligencia a criterios objetivos, como por ejemplo en\r\nlos casos de los artículos 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública\r\ny el numeral 35 de la Ley\r\nde Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. En cuanto a los\r\ncriterios de imputación objetiva, los parámetros para imputar la\r\nresponsabilidad se fundamentan en la denominada “teoría del riesgo” o en el\r\nactuar de una parte que, por sus características jurídicas, debe asumir un\r\ngrado mayor de responsabilidad que el común denominador, por ejemplo, en el\r\ncaso del Estado y su responsabilidad por la actuación desplegada por sus funcionarios\r\no funcionarias. En el supuesto de la teoría del riesgo, se parte de la premisa\r\nde que aquella persona física o jurídica que ejerce o se aprovecha de una\r\nactividad con elementos potencialmente peligrosos, debe también soportar sus\r\ninconveniencias. Esta teoría también es conocida con el nombre de “el daño\r\ncreado” cuyo paradigma de imputación estriba en atribuir el daño a toda\r\npersona que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo, y se\r\nprescinde de la subjetividad del agente. En consecuencia la fuente de las\r\nobligaciones en la responsabilidad objetiva, no es la culpa, la negligencia ni\r\nel dolo, sino más bien la actividad riesgosa desplegada por el agente lo cual\r\nprovoca que, ante cualquier resultado lesivo de intereses jurídicamente relevantes\r\n–llámese vida, seguridad, salud, etcétera-, surge una necesidad de reparar el\r\ndaño (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Pág. 70).\n\r\n\r\n\nEN EL CASO\r\nQUE NOS OCUPA ES APLICABLE EL CRITERIO DE IMPUTACIÓN OBJETIVA DEL NUMERAL 190\r\nDE LA LEY GENERAL\r\nDE LA\r\n ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA Y NO EL ARTÍCULO 1045 DEL CÓDIGO\r\nCIVIL. Una vez\r\nexplicada la diferencia entre ambos criterios de imputación, es evidente que en\r\neste caso es de aplicación la imputación objetiva prevista por el numeral 190\r\nde la Ley General\r\nde la Administración\r\n Pública. Esa normativa es aplicable al banco accionado, tal y\r\ncomo lo establece el artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica de dicho banco que, aunque dispone\r\nque es una entidad de derecho público no estatal (con personería jurídica y\r\npatrimonio propio y a su vez con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional),\r\npero recalca que su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del derecho público.\r\nEn ese sentido, el inciso 1° del artículo 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública\r\ndispone que lo dispuesto por esa normativa se aplicará a los otros entes\r\npúblicos, en ausencia de norma especial para éstos. Volviendo a la Ley Orgánica del\r\nBanco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, su artículo 47, regula que ese banco\r\ntendrá las mismas responsabilidades y obligaciones que les corresponden a los\r\nbancos, conforme a la Ley\r\n Orgánica del Banco Central y a la Ley Orgánica del\r\nSistema Bancario Nacional. La primera de estas leyes no cuenta con una\r\ndisposición general en torno a la responsabilidad bancaria por actuaciones ilegítimas\r\nde la entidad. En tanto que, los numerales 27 y 28 de la segunda si establecen\r\nsupuestos de responsabilidad subjetiva solidaria para los miembros de las junta\r\ndirectivas de los bancos, pero no regulan lo concerniente a la responsabilidad\r\ndel banco como entidad por los actos propios de su funcionamiento. En lo que\r\nnos interesa el numeral 27 estipula: “ Cada Junta Directiva ejercerá sus\r\nfunciones con absoluta independencia y bajo su exclusiva responsabilidad,\r\ndentro de las normas establecidas por las leyes, reglamentos aplicables y\r\nprincipios de la técnica. Los miembros de las juntas directivas tendrán la más\r\ncompleta libertad para proceder en el ejercicio de sus funciones conforme con\r\nsu conciencia y con su propio criterio, por cuya razón serán personalmente\r\nresponsables de su gestión en la dirección general del respectivo banco. Sobre\r\nellos pesará cualquier responsabilidad que conforme con las leyes pueda\r\natribuírseles por dolo, culpa o negligencia. Quienes no hubieren hecho constar\r\nsu voto disidente, responderán personalmente con sus bienes de las pérdidas que\r\nle irrogue al Banco, por la autorización de operaciones prohibidas por la ley,\r\no que hayan sido autorizados mediante dolo, culpa o negligencia…”. De\r\nigual forma el artículo 28 de esa misma ley dispone que “Todo acto,\r\nresolución u omisión de una Junta Directiva que contravenga las disposiciones\r\nlegales y reglamentarias o que signifique empleo de los fondos del banco en\r\nactividades distintas de las inherentes a sus funciones, hará incurrir a todos\r\nlos presentes en la sesión respectiva en responsabilidad personal y solidaria\r\npara con el banco, el Estado y terceros afectados, por los daños y perjuicios\r\nque con ello se produjeren. De tal responsabilidad quedarán exentos únicamente\r\nlos asistentes que hubieren hecho constar su voto disidente o su objeción en el\r\nacta de la sesión correspondiente. Todo ello sin perjuicio de las otras\r\nsanciones legales que pudiera corresponderles. “. Por ende, al no existir\r\nuna disposición general que responsabilice a las entidades bancarias estatales\r\npor actuaciones ilegítimas tomadas en el ejercicio de sus funciones, resulta de\r\naplicación la Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública como régimen de responsabilidad\r\nobjetiva para este tipo de entidades. Ha quedado demostrado que la demandante\r\nlaboró para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, hasta que fue despedida\r\nsin responsabilidad patronal. Dicho cese se justificó porque la actora fue\r\ndetenida en casa de sus padres, por orden de una autoridad jurisdiccional de la\r\nmateria penal, por supuesta legitimación de capitales. Fue el Director del área\r\njurídica del banco empleador quien hizo ese hecho de conocimiento público. Posteriormente,\r\nse dictó una orden de libertad a su favor y, a pesar de ello ese mismo día, dos\r\nfuncionarios bancarios le comunicaron el despido, el cual su madre no recibió\r\nsino que fue al presentarse al laborar –el 12 de abril de 2011-, que\r\nformalmente se le entregó la carta respectiva, basándose en las ausencias para\r\npresentarse a laborar. Señala como causal de resarcimiento que, a raíz del\r\nactuar ilegítimo de la administración, en su pueblo San Ramón se decía que\r\nhabía despedida por estar ligada a una banda de narcos. Es por este motivo que,\r\nentre otras pretensiones, la accionante solicita un resarcimiento por el daño\r\nmoral generado por la acción de despido. Con respecto a los daños, el juez de\r\nprimera instancia los acoge, pero recurriendo al parámetro objetivo de seis\r\nmeses de salarios establecido por el numeral 82 del Código de Trabajo. Sin\r\nembargo, en su análisis nunca justificó su decisión en un actuar negligente o\r\nimprudente de los funcionarios que intervinieron en el despido de la\r\ndemandante. En otras palabras, no se recurrió a un criterio de imputación\r\nsubjetiva previsto por el artículo 1045 del Código Civil –ello a pesar de que\r\nse hace mención de la norma en el fallo, pero sin fundar por qué es de\r\naplicación al caso-. A pesar de esto, el juzgado de instancia le concedió un\r\nresarcimiento de quince millones de colones a la demandante, por daño moral. Esa\r\ncondena fue revocada por el Tribunal. En su recurso, la accionante, no plantea\r\nningún esbozo en torno a un criterio de imputación subjetiva de parte de los\r\nfuncionarios públicos del banco, sino que justifica su decisión en lo que\r\ndenomina un “despido arbitrario e intempestivo” de parte de la entidad\r\nbancaria, tanto así que el a-quo determinó que esa sanción había sido ilegal,\r\nprecisamente por haber infringido las disposiciones contenidas en la convención\r\ncolectiva, ya que de haber seguido el trámite establecido en la convención, se\r\nhubiera tramitado el despido sin exposición pública y mediática. En otras\r\npalabras, el daño moral se funda en un criterio de imputación objetivo previsto\r\npor el inciso 1° del numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.\r\nEsta norma establece: “1. La administración responderá por todos los\r\ndaños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal a anormal, salvo\r\nfuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero…”. En este\r\ncaso, al acreditarse el acto intempestivo e infundado de despido, la parte\r\ndemandada debe de ser condenada porque su actuar fue ilegítimo, ya que ese\r\nactuar se funda en no haber respetado las normas de la convención colectiva que\r\nordenan guardar secreto de las acciones de despido tramitadas. La aplicación\r\ndel criterio de imputación objetiva derivado de esa norma, implica que basta\r\nque la actora demuestre ese daño y el nexo causal provocado por ese despido\r\narbitrario e ilegítimo para que tenga derecho al resarcimiento, independiente\r\nde que demuestre un actuar negligente o imprudente de los funcionarios\r\nvinculados con el acto de despido. Nótese que tanto los juzgadores de instancia\r\ncomo la mayoría de la Sala\r\nlo entendemos así, ya que en el voto no se analiza ni por asomo la falta al\r\ndeber de cuidado ni el dolo de los funcionarios, sino que las razones se\r\ncentran en un actuar ilegítimo e intempestivo de despido, o sea ni más ni menos\r\nque un criterio de imputación objetivo del párrafo primero del numeral 190\r\nibídem. \n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\r\n\r\n\nEn\r\nlo que ha sido objeto de impugnación, se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada\r\núnicamente en cuanto denegó el pago por daño moral. En su lugar, a este\r\nrespecto, se confirma el fallo de primera instancia, modificándose la cuantía\r\nde este extremo, la cual se fija en la suma de tres millones de colones. Los\r\nMagistrados Allón y Blanco salvan el voto y confirman la sentencia recurrida.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique\r\nOlaso Álvarez\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nFlora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis\r\nBlanco González\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nRes: 2016-000410\n\r\n\r\n\nPROJASM/Iva \n\r\n\r\n\n2 \n\r\n\r\n\nEXP:\r\n11-004086-1027-CA\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3671,\r\n2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2257-55-94. Correos Electrónicos:\r\nimoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. y mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "*110040861027CA*\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*110040861027CA*\n \nSupreme Court of Justice\n \nSECOND CHAMBER\n \n \n \n\n\nExp:\n11-004086-1027-CA\n\nRes:\n2016-000410\n\nSECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine forty-five on the twenty-ninth of April, two thousand sixteen.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by [Name 001], [...], against BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, represented by its general judicial attorney, licensed GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, married, resident of Heredia. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is licensed Esteban Calvo Rodríguez, single, resident of San José. All of legal age, attorneys, with the indicated exception.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- The plaintiff, in the complaint dated July eighteenth, two thousand eleven, brought this action so that the judgment would declare the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal executed by the bank against her, and order her reinstatement to her job with full enjoyment of her labor rights; as well as the payment of lost wages and other labor rights not received, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n2.- The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February first, two thousand twelve, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing.\n\n3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at thirteen hundred hours on May twenty-seventh, two thousand thirteen, ordered: \"Pursuant to the foregoing, applicable regulations, and article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing are rejected, and the present ordinary labor lawsuit filed by [Name 001] against BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, represented by its General Judicial Attorney, Mr. GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, is GRANTED, and therefore the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability executed against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified, and therefore the effects of this declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said illegal act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, it is appropriate to reinstate the plaintiff to her position immediately, thus confirming the precautionary measure ordered interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevented it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all lost wages and other labor rights that she would have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these lost wages and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff are for the time she effectively would have been outside the institution without receiving them or without having them recognized by the banking entity. Items that must be liquidated administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff resorting, in case of disagreement, to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, with the exception of moral damages (daño moral), an item which is granted and the defendant must pay to the plaintiff the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, broken down as five million colones for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), and ten million colones for objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo); and as consequential damages (perjuicios), the legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due and until its effective payment, at the rate provided in article 1163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which corresponds to that which the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica pays for six-month certificates of deposit; items that, as already indicated, may be liquidated administratively, without prejudice to the fact that, in case of disagreement, they may be determined in the execution of judgment stage. In addition, on the amounts to be paid, the corresponding social security contributions must be deducted as legally appropriate. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the trial, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of three million colones...\" (Sic).\n\n4.- Both parties appealed and the Labor Tribunal, Third Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at eight forty-five on September twenty-eighth, two thousand fifteen, resolved: \"In the absence of errors or omissions capable of producing nullity or defenselessness, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially granted, so that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant Bank to compensate her for moral damages is dismissed. The cross-appeal filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. Except as indicated, in what is the subject of challenge, the first instance judgment is confirmed…\"\n\n5.- The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the reasons that will be stated below in the considering part.\n\n6.- The procedures prescribed by law have been observed.\n\nDrafted by Judge Aguirre Gómez; and,\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI.- BACKGROUND. The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was arrested at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales); a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that, as a precautionary measure, pretrial detention for one year was ordered against her. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Area of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her arrest with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, despite the bank knowing her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate boss, of what had happened. She pointed out that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter, which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she recounted, on April 12, 2011 (the first business day after her release), she appeared at her workplace and it was at that moment that she was handed the dismissal letter, which established her absences from work as the cause. She stated that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been fired for being \"linked with a gang of narcos\", and therefore, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative act of dismissal and reinstatement to her position. She also requested payment of lost wages (salarios caídos) and other labor rights not received –including those of social security–; damages, interest, and both costs (document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney answered in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing (document attached on February 6, 2012, at 03:10:23 p.m.). The first instance judge granted the lawsuit and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the plaintiff to her position. He ordered the defendant –as damages– to pay lost wages and other labor rights (including those of social security) not received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity; as well as the deduction of social security contributions. He ordered payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest –as consequential damages– and both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment included on May 27, 2013, at 02:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents incorporated on June 4, 2013, at 04:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013, at 02:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal revoked the judgment insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and otherwise confirmed it (judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 07:43:37 a.m.).\n\nII.- GRIEVANCES. The plaintiff disagrees with what the Ad-quem decided regarding moral damages. She considers that the challenged judgment is not duly substantiated. She argues that the facts deemed proven by the preceding instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and unexpectedly, just when the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) was carrying out its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case; which occurred in San Ramón, where she works and lives. She alleges that the bank even sought her at relatives' houses to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She states that the causal link between the claimed moral damages and the bank's arbitrary act is evidenced by the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity that existed about the case at that time. She points out that the preceding instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having dismissed her illegally. She emphasizes that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), it would have been ordered outside of public and media exposure, whereby the harmful effects thereof could have been lesser. She argues that what happened damaged her name and good image (document included on November 23, 2015, at 11:24:21 a.m.).\n\nIII.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. The only point submitted to this Chamber's analysis is that related to moral damages. The position of this body, since ruling no. 481, at 10:40 on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor jurisdiction it is feasible to compensate it when it is caused by acts that exceed the employer's sanctioning power; that is, when faced with especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution no. 1151, at 9:45 on December 20, 2006, it was stated: \"Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.\" In a similar orientation, judgment no. 359, at 9:40 on March 19, 2010, can be cited: \"So that the moral damages that may be compensated in the labor jurisdiction (when it occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that caused by abuses of the employer's right, who in the exercise of disciplinary authority exceeds it, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.\" In the specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she estimates that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents damage to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). This item was granted in the first instance; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged impairment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber differs from that reasoning. Having reviewed the case file, it is found that the banking entity incurred in an illegitimate and unexpected act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue, for being injurious to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was dismissed on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared –at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón– to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the termination of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was due to the worker's failure to report to work from March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). However, according to the evidentiary material in the file, a judicial investigation was being carried out against her at that time for alleged money laundering, and on that day she was arrested and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where she was placed –as a precautionary measure– under pretrial detention for one year (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known to the employer. Note that, as can be seen from the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the arrest, the plaintiff's brother went personally to her boss to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, as these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what happened (images 62-67 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences attributed to the plaintiff, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified and, therefore, the decision taken by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in the opinion of this Chamber, to the suffering that the plaintiff was already experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was going through, was added the distress of losing her job just upon leaving prison. While that injury is remedied, as the nullity of the dismissal was declared and payment of lost wages was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress its action caused the worker, which added to the sorrow she had been enduring. This, by provision of articles 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 1045 of the Civil Code. The first of them, expressly, stipulates: \"Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.\" And the second reads: \"Anyone who through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the consequential damages.\" Additionally, articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, the judgment under review must be revoked insofar as it denied moral damages, and the first instance decision must be confirmed on that point. However, in the judgment of this body, the amount awarded must be modified. Based on a criterion of prudence and taking into consideration the described circumstances, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00; as it is estimated that this is sufficient as recompense for the attributable damage caused by the defendant.\n\nIV.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND JUDGE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:. We depart from the majority opinion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor jurisdiction, compensation is feasible for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's sanctioning power, that is, when faced with especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution no. 1151, at 9:45 on December 20, 2006, it was stated: \"Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.\" In a similar orientation, judgment no. 359, at 9:40 on March 19, 2010, can be cited: \"So that the moral damages that may be compensated in the labor jurisdiction (when it occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that caused by abuses of the employer's right, who in the exercise of disciplinary authority exceeds it, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.\" In these cases, it corresponds to the victim –in accordance with article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)– to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Vote no. 385, at 10:20 on April 12, 2013). In the specific case, the plaintiff alleges that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents damage to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). This item was granted in the first instance; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that \"[…] although it is feasible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have caused her moral injury both subjectively and objectively, especially due to the dissemination of what happened, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that impairment and the defendant's conduct\" (image 19 of the judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 07:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the evidence brought to the case file, we share what the Tribunal decided in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her burden, the causal link between the dismissal and the claimed moral damages. As can be extracted from the file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, a notification that was made personally and without carrying out an \"excessive display,\" as the Ad-quem noted, so it cannot be affirmed that this behavior caused any harm to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant argues that the mass media had knowledge of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element that the defendant motivated the publicity of that fact. It is observed that the journalistic notes offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's arrest and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but do not mention the cessation of work (images 62-67 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). It was not proven that it was the defendant itself that provided said information to the press. Although it is alleged that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employer because they are unrelated to it. It should be considered that the bank has no influence over what the press publishes, nor what the people who live in said canton know, and therefore it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff derived, principally, from the pretrial detention ordered against her and not strictly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff an impairment, distinct from the natural effects of dismissal, that must be compensated. The stated effects derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the dismissal action. Therefore, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify payment of moral damages are not receivable, and what was decided on this point by the appellate body must be confirmed.\n\nV.- NOTE BY JUDGE OLASO: Regardless of sharing the opinion of my esteemed colleagues, as they determine the existence of an illegitimate act by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for that compensation cannot derive from a norm founded on the criterion of subjective imputation such as that regulated by article 1045 of the Civil Code, for the reasons I will now set forth.\n\nGENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY: The authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce \"Derecho de daños\". Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to consider the possibility of requesting compensation within the scope of tortious action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to \"furtum,\" which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was \"damnum iniuria datum\" which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called \"Lex Aquilia.\" Among the most important norms of said law is the possibility of requesting compensation for the loss of slaves or a quadruped, so said action definitively derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was less formal law and in which equity began to have significant content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in \"classical\" Roman Law the following actions existed: 1) actions for injury or destruction of things, this provided the basis for exercising the so-called \"iniuria,\" which was an action exercised provided there was a causal link of the damage; 2) actions for bodily injuries and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by negligence of the person (for example, damages while riding); 4) action of deceit, that is, having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) lastly, the \"iniuria\" evolved to become an action protecting personality rights, but also continued to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of glossators and commentators on natural law is decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by acts carried out by slaves, which generated their master's liability –beginnings of \"culpa in vigilando\"– (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with standing to claim compensation, because in this stage the heirs of the victim were allowed to claim compensation for death, such as could be for maintenance. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, the influence of authors such as Hugo Grotius and Domat, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code, is significant. The contribution of the former consists of deriving civil action from an \"illicit\" fact that could be caused with deceit or by culpable or negligent action. Along these same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to request compensation could derive; among these are quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or delicts. The influence of these schools determined that in 1792 a norm was enacted in the Prussian Code establishing the following: \"Any damage caused by deceit or gross negligence that generates serious personal illness or death must be punishable.\" The Code also took this same orientation by establishing: \"Article 1382. “Of delicts and quasi-delicts. Any act of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one through whose fault it occurred to repair it.” Article 1383. One is responsible not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also by the act of persons for whom one must answer or of things one has under one's guard.\" Evidently, all this codification has an influence on our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the characteristics of legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation within our civil legislation is evident. One need only read numeral 1045 of the Civil Code to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this norm. The norm in question starts, like the Napoleonic legislation, from an act no longer only deceitful but also negligent and imprudent on the part of the agent that generates the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments that surrounded France in the 18th century, it starts from an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that not even in the mind of the legislator of that era were the effects of the theory of risk characteristic of industrial or mass commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I state this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; likewise, we were at a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an illegitimate act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the significant influence of Canon Law. Evidently, norms like article 1045 start from a premise from which the victim's obligation derives to prove who the person was who generated the deceitful or culpable action that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim was faced with situations in which they could not prove these situations, whether due to lack of evidence or impossibility of obtaining it –due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent–, it was indicated that we were in the presence of \"acts of God,\" those that were executed as punishment for the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was viewed as the \"payment for a sin\" and not as a compensation for the victim. Usually, and as the Chamber does in this vote, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I previously indicated, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with consequential damages, that were caused by deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence.\n\nIn reality, and in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of sources, the constitutional basis for liability is found in Article 41 of the Magna Carta, which establishes: \"Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.\" Now, norms such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish imputation criteria that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link, and the burden of proof.\n\nAs established by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), damage (daño) constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability (responsabilidad civil). This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful event has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Voto número 112 de las catorce horas quince minutos del quince de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). For that Chamber, \"damage (daño)\" is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (aggrieved party) that causes the deprivation of a legal right protected by the legal system. Under this reasoning, the first essential element of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) is damage (daño). Regarding the characteristics of the damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage (daño). Another element that configures civil liability (responsabilidad civil) is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage (daño), the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extra-contractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the claim for compensation to succeed.\n\nThe notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extra-contractual civil liability, since there must be fault (culpa) on the part of the person who causes the damage (daño). Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which the liability of that person is imputed. Without the existence of fault (culpa), compensation for damages cannot be awarded in favor of the victim, as it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage (daño) was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage (daño) be attributed to the producing agent, whether it was done with intention or because they could have avoided it and did not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argument, he relies on the provisions of articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code, regarding the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of requesting compensation would be extinguished. However, this does not occur because the possibility of claiming the damage from the parents of the minor under fifteen years remains, provided they live in the parents' home (Article 1047 of the Civil Code) twelve years – according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil) –, but the norm still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with Article 1048 of the Civil Code.\n\nUnlawfulness constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, which means that the act of the person causing the damage (daño) must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care – negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill –, given that when we find ourselves before these scenarios, evidently, there are grounds for justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, act of God (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), is discussed by part of the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the finding of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), by virtue of the fact that there are norms of the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for the damage (daño), even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of some cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. This legislative scenario is found in Article 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: \"Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.\" Under Rivero Sánchez's thesis, for example, in the case of the story of \"Goldilocks,\" when the girl gets lost in the woods and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, typical of a violation of domicile (Article 204 of the Criminal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a ground for justification, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the woods and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of Article 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate for the damage (daño) in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability.\n\nThe dualism between contractual and extra-contractual liability has been the subject of discussion by doctrine over time. Authors such as Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. \"Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual\" Madrid, Spain, Editorial Reus, Volume I, page 87), indicate that said dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage (daño) is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to \"contractual\" and \"extra-contractual\" damage; b) systematic, by reason that in both there is a conduct or omission that generates the damage (daño), only that in the contractual one said conduct occurs by reason of the breach; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extra-contractual liability. For example, in cases of application of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor). In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the law of the XII Tables and was contractual in nature, while that which derived from the Lex Aquilia was extra-contractual in nature. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability (responsabilidad civil) derived from a contract (articles 701 et seq.), and extra-contractual civil liability (articles 1045 et seq.). For persons who support the division between both types of liability, extra-contractual liability is constituted by active conduct or an omission, the latter referring to the absence of a prior contract, meaning it arises when damage is caused without there being a prior link or contract or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work \"Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual,\" indicates that for extra-contractual liability to arise, the presence of two elements is necessary: \"…A behavior that serves as an imputation criterion, be it culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of a legally relevant interest or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…\". Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal link between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, which means that the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extra-contractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but as a result of a violation of the general duty not to harm other persons.\n\nRegarding contractual liability, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has considered: \"… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific juridical obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that said obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges fraud (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, but rather the fraud (dolo) must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is fraudulent when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Fraud (dolo), as provided in Article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to compensate the damages and losses caused thereby, even if the contrary was agreed upon.\"\n\nAnother conceptual difference, according to the First Chamber (Sala Primera), lies in the burden of proof. In contractual cases, it is enough to demonstrate the breach for fault (culpa) to exist, whereas in subjective extra-contractual civil liability, the fault (culpa) (negligence, imprudence, lack of skill) or fraud (dolo), on which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be demonstrated (Voto número 320, de las trece horas del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa).\n\nOBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.\n\nObjective or subjective imputation criteria constitute reference frameworks used to impute the liability of the person causing the damage (daño). In the case of the former – subjective – they are those based on aspects such as fraud (dolo) or fault (culpa), so that, upon verification of an illicit behavior – fraudulent or culpable – the obligation to repair arises. Imputation for such conduct may be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for an act of a third party. It is for this reason that doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in Article 1048 of our Civil Code, \"culpa in eligendo\" and \"culpa in vigilando.\" Now, fault and fraud (dolo) are not necessary to base the process of civil liability (responsabilidad civil). If that were so, in many cases there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios where the victim finds it impossible to prove the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage (daño). It is for this reason that the courts and doctrine have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as, for example, in the cases of Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor).\n\nRegarding objective imputation criteria, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called \"theory of risk\" or on the act of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a greater degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions performed by its officials. In the case of the theory of risk, the starting premise is that that individual or legal entity that exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of \"the created damage,\" whose imputation paradigm lies in attributing the damage to every person who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it, and the subjectivity of the agent is disregarded. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault (culpa), negligence, or fraud (dolo), but rather the risky activity deployed by the agent, which causes that, before any injurious result to legally relevant interests – be it life, security, health, etcetera –, a need arises to repair the damage (daño) (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Page 70).\n\nIN THE CASE AT HAND, THE OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERION OF ARTICLE 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA) APPLIES, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE.\n\nOnce the difference between both imputation criteria is explained, it is evident that in this case, the objective imputation provided for in Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) applies. This regulation is applicable to the defendant bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and equity and also with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation will be governed by the rules of public law. In that sense, subsection 1 of Article 2 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special norm for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same liabilities and obligations that correspond to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central) and the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding banking liability for illegitimate actions of the entity. Meanwhile, Articles 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of joint and several subjective liability for the members of the boards of directors of the banks, but they do not regulate what concerns the liability of the bank as an entity for the acts proper to its operation. In what interests us, Article 27 stipulates: \"Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive liability, within the norms established by the laws, applicable regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own criteria, for which reason they shall be personally liable for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Upon them shall fall any liability that according to the laws may be attributed to them for fraud (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall be personally liable with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, for the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through fraud (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence…\". Similarly, Article 28 of that same law provides that \"Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes the legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies employment of the bank's funds in activities different from those inherent to its functions, shall cause all present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability towards the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses that are thereby produced. From such liability, only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt. All of the foregoing without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them. \" Therefore, in the absence of a general provision that holds state banking entities liable for illegitimate actions taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) applies as an objective liability regime for this type of entity.\n\nIt has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability. Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was arrested at her parents' home, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made that fact public knowledge. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor and, despite that, on that same day, two bank officials notified her of the dismissal, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself at work – on April 12, 2011 – that she was formally handed the respective letter, based on absences to report for work. She indicates as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the illegitimate action of the administration, in her town of San Ramón, it was said that she was dismissed for being linked to a narco-trafficking ring. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) caused by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by Article 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent act of the officials involved in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, a subjective imputation criterion provided for in Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not used – this despite the fact that the norm is mentioned in the judgment, but without providing a basis for why it is applicable to the case –. Despite this, the lower court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage (daño moral). That ruling was overturned by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not set forth any outline regarding a subjective imputation criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she calls an \"arbitrary and untimely dismissal\" on the part of the banking entity, so much so that the a-quo determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage (daño moral) is based on an objective imputation criterion provided for in subsection 1 of Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This norm establishes: \"1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party…\". In this case, upon accrediting the untimely and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant party must be condemned because its act was illegitimate, since that act is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement which order secrecy for the dismissal actions processed. The application of the objective imputation criterion derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that damage (daño) and the causal link caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she proves a negligent or imprudent act of the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the lower court judges and the majority of this Chamber (Sala) understand it this way, since in the vote, the breach of the duty of care or fraud (dolo) of the officials is not analyzed in the slightest, but rather the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than an objective imputation criterion from the first paragraph of Article 190 ibidem.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nIn what has been the subject of appeal, the judgment on appeal is reversed only insofar as it denied the payment for moral damage (daño moral). In its place, in this regard, the first instance judgment is confirmed, modifying the amount of this claim, which is set at the sum of three million colones. Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez\n\nEva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nFlora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González\n\nRes: 2016-000410\n\nPROJASM/Iva\n\n2\n\nEXP: 11-004086-1027-CA\n\nTeléfonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2257-55-94. Correos Electrónicos: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr. y mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**1.-** The plaintiff, in the complaint filed on July eighteenth, two thousand eleven, brought this action seeking a judgment declaring the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal executed against her by the bank, and ordering her reinstatement to her job position with full enjoyment of her labor rights; as well as the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n**2.-** The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February first, two thousand twelve, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (falta de legitimación activa).\n\n**3.-** The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at one o'clock in the afternoon of May twenty-seventh, two thousand thirteen, **ordered**: “ *Pursuant to the foregoing, applicable regulations, and Article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code, the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue are rejected, and the present ordinary labor claim filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against* **BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL,** *represented by its General Judicial Attorney Mr.* **GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS,** *is declared* **WITH MERIT** *. For this reason, the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability executed against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified; therefore, the effects of this declaration must retroact to the time or date of said illegal act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, it is appropriate to reinstate the plaintiff to her position immediately, thus confirming the precautionary measure issued interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevents it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all back pay and other labor rights she would have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these back pay and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff correspond to the time she effectively was outside the institution without receiving them or without them having been recognized by the banking entity. These items must be settled administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff, in case of disagreement, resorting to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, except for moral damages, an item which is upheld, and the defendant must pay the plaintiff the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, at a rate of five million colones for subjective moral damages, and ten million colones for objective moral damages; and as damages, the legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due and until its effective payment, at the rate provided in Article 1163 of the Civil Code, which corresponds to the rate paid by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit; items which, as already indicated, may be settled administratively, without prejudice to being determined in the judgment execution stage in case of disagreement. Furthermore, social security contributions must be deducted from the amounts to be paid to the extent legally applicable. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the trial, with personal costs set at the prudential sum of three million colones...*” (Sic).\n\n**4.-** Both parties appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Section Three, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at eight forty-five in the morning of September twenty-eighth, two thousand fifteen, **resolved**: *“No errors or omissions capable of causing nullity or defenselessness existing, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially granted, such that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant Bank to compensate her for moral damages is dismissed. The cross-appeal (apelación adhesiva) filed by the plaintiff has no merit. Except as indicated, regarding the matters objected to, the first-instance judgment is confirmed…”*\n\n**5.-** The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the reasons to be set forth below in the recitals section.\n\n**6.-** The procedural actions have observed the prescriptions of law.\n\n**Drafted by Magistrate Aguirre Gómez; and,**\n\n**RECITALS:**\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND.** The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was detained at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering; a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that pre-trial detention (prisión preventiva) for one year was ordered against her as a precautionary measure. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Department of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her detention with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, even though the bank knew her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate boss, of what had happened. She indicated that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day, two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter; which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she recounted, on April 12, 2011 (the next business day after her release), she appeared at her workplace and it was at that moment that the dismissal letter was given to her, in which her absences from work were established as the cause. She stated that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been fired for being *“linked to a gang of narcos”*, therefore, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative act of dismissal and reinstatement to her position. She also requested the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights –including those for social security–; damages, interest, and both costs (document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney responded in negative terms and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (document attached on February 6, 2012 at 03:10:23 p.m.). The first-instance judge declared the claim with merit and ordered the plaintiff's immediate reinstatement to her position. The judge ordered the defendant –as damages– to pay back pay and other labor rights (including those for social security) not received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity; as well as the deduction of social security contributions. He ordered the payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest –as damages– and both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment filed on May 27, 2013 at 02:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents filed on June 4, 2013 at 04:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013 at 02:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal reversed the ruling insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and confirmed it in all other respects (judgment attached on October 1, 2015 at 07:43:37 a.m.).\n\n**II.- GRIEVANCES.** The plaintiff disagrees with the decision of the Ad-quem regarding moral damages. She considers that the challenged ruling is not duly reasoned. She argues that the facts held as proven by the previous instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and untimely, precisely when the Public Prosecutor's Office was carrying out its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case; which occurred in San Ramón, the place where she works and resides. She claims that the bank even sought her out at relatives' homes to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She argues that the causal link between the moral damages claimed and the bank's arbitrary act is evidenced by the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity that existed about the case at that time. She points out that the previous instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having terminated her illegally. She highlights that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement, it would have been ordered outside of public and media exposure, whereby its onerous effects could have been less. She alleges that what happened damaged her name and good image (document filed on November 23, 2015 at 11:24:21 a.m.).\n\n**III.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The only point submitted for this Chamber's analysis is that related to moral damages. The position of this body, since vote No. 481, of 10:40 a.m. on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor venue it is feasible to compensate it when caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power; that is, when facing especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, of 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not applicable in every case, but only when the sanction has been surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar direction, judgment No. 359, of 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, should be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when these occur during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) are those inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary power, goes too far, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of justified dismissal.”* In the specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she believes that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this item was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged detriment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber differs from that reasoning. Having reviewed the case file, it is clear that the banking entity incurred in an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue for being harmful to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was terminated on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared –at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón– to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the termination of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was due to the worker's failure to report to work since March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). Nevertheless, according to the evidentiary material in the case file, a judicial investigation was being conducted against her at that time for alleged money laundering, and that day she was detained and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where pre-trial detention for one year was imposed on her –as a precautionary measure– (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide her services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known by the employer. Note that, as evidenced by the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the detention, the plaintiff's brother personally went to her boss to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, as these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what occurred (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences attributed to the plaintiff, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified and, therefore, the decision made by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in this Chamber's opinion, the suffering the plaintiff was already experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was going through was compounded by the anguish of becoming unemployed just upon leaving prison. While that injury is repaired, given that the nullity of the dismissal was declared and the payment of back pay was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress it caused the worker with its action, which added to the grief she was already enduring. This, as provided by Articles 41 of the Political Constitution and 1045 of the Civil Code. The first of these expressly stipulates: *“By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered promptly, fully, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.”* And the second reads: *“Anyone who, by fraud, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the consequential damages (perjuicios).”* Furthermore, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, it is appropriate to reverse the judgment under review insofar as it denied moral damages, and to confirm the first-instance judgment on that point. However, in this body's judgment, the amount awarded must be modified. Based on prudential criteria and taking into consideration the circumstances described, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00, as this is deemed sufficient as compensation for the portion of the harm attributable to the defendant.\n\n**IV.-** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND MAGISTRATE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:** We respectfully disagree with the majority opinion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor venue, compensation for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power is feasible, that is, when facing especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, of 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not applicable in every case, but only when the sanction has been surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar direction, judgment No. 359, of 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, should be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when these occur during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) are those inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary power, goes too far, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of justified dismissal.”* In these cases, it is up to the victim –in accordance with Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code– to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Vote No. 385, of 10:20 a.m. on April 12, 2013). In the specific case, the plaintiff claims that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this item was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that *“[…] while it is plausible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have caused her moral injury both subjectively and objectively, especially due to the dissemination given to what happened, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that detriment and the defendant's conduct”* (image 19 of the judgment attached on October 1, 2015 at 07:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the evidence provided in the case file, we share the Tribunal's decision in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her responsibility, the causal link between the dismissal and the moral damages claimed. As extracted from the case file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, a notification made personally and without carrying out an *“excessive deployment”*, as the Ad-quem noted, so it cannot be said that this behavior caused any injury to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant alleges that the mass media learned of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element showing that the defendant motivated the publicity on that fact. Note that the journalistic reports offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's detention and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but make no mention of the termination of employment (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). It was not demonstrated that it was the defendant itself that provided such information to the press. Although it is claimed that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employing party as they are unrelated to it. It must be considered that the bank has no control over what the press publishes, nor what the people residing in that canton know; consequently, it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff stemmed mainly from the pre-trial detention ordered against her and not strictly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff a detriment, distinct from the natural effects of dismissal, that must be compensated. The effects described derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the act of dismissal. Consequently, we conclude that the arguments made by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not admissible, and the decision made on this matter by the appellate body should be confirmed.\n\n**V.- NOTE FROM MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of agreeing with the esteemed colleagues' opinion, in determining the existence of an illegitimate act by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for such compensation cannot derive from a rule founded on the criterion of subjective attribution, such as the one regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code, for the reasons I will set forth below.\n\n**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY:** The authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to pose the possibility of requesting compensation within the scope of a delictual action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to the “furtum,” which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the “damnun *innuria datum”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia.”* Among the most important rules of said law, we have the possibility of requesting compensation for the loss of slaves or some quadrupeds, therefore, this action definitely derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was a less formal law and in which equity began to have an important content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for the injury or destruction of things, which allowed the exercise of the so-called “inuiria,” an action exercised provided there was a causal nexus for the damage; 2) actions for bodily harm and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by a person's negligence (for example, damages while riding); 4) action for fraud, meaning having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) finally, the “inuiria” evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the Glossators and the Natural Law commentators is decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master –the beginnings of culpa “in vigilando”– (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect relates to the standing to claim compensation, because this stage allowed the victim's heirs to collect compensation for death, such as might be maintenance payments. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors like Hugo Grotius and Domat have an important influence, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code. The contribution of the first of them consists of deriving the civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by fraud or by culpable or negligent action. Along these same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to request compensation could be derived; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or delicts.\n\nThe influence of these schools determined that, in the year 1792, a provision was established in the Prussian Code stating the following: \"<b><i>Any damage caused by malice (dolo) or gross negligence (negligencia grave) resulting in serious personal illness or death must be punishable</i></b>\". The Code also follows this same orientation by establishing: \"<i>Article 1382. “</i>Of offenses and quasi-offenses. “<b><i>Any act of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the person by whose fault it occurred to repair it</i></b>”.Article 1383. <b><i>A person is responsible not only for the damage caused by their own act, but also for that caused by the acts of persons for whom they must answer, or by things they have under their guard</i></b>”. Evidently, all of this codification has an influence on our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the specific characteristics of legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation within our civil law is evident. A mere reading of numeral 1045 of the Civil Code suffices to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this provision. The provision in question originates, just like Napoleonic legislation, from an act that is not only malicious (doloso) but also negligent (negligente) and imprudent (imprudente) on the part of the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it is based on an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that not even in the mind of the legislator of that era were the effects of the risk theory inherent to mass industrial or commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I assert this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; likewise, we were in a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an illegitimate act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, provisions like Article 1045 start from a premise from which the obligation of the victim derives to demonstrate who the person was that generated the malicious (dolosa) or fault-based (culposa) action that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim found themselves in situations where they could not prove these circumstances, either due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it –due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent–, it was indicated that we were in the presence of \"acts of God,\" those executed as punishment upon the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for the damage was viewed as the \"payment of a sin\" and not as an indemnification for the victim. Usually, and as Chamber I (la Sala) does in this decision, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I indicated previously, prescribes the obligation to repair damages, together with lost profits, that were caused by malice (dolo), fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). In reality, and according to the principle of hierarchy of sources, the constitutional foundation of liability is found in numeral 41 of the Magna Carta, which establishes: \"<b><i>By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws</i></b>\". Now then, provisions such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish attribution criteria that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link (nexo causal), and the burden of proof. As established by Chamber I (la Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (la Corte Suprema de Justicia), damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful event has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Decision (Voto) number 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Chamber, \"damage\" is any diminution, loss, or deterioration of the person's (the injured party's) patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere that causes the deprivation of a legal right protected by the system. Under this framework, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage. Another element configuring civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a conditio sine qua non for the compensation claim to succeed. The notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, as fault must exist on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which that person's liability is attributed. Without the existence of fault, the indemnification for damages and lost profits cannot be granted in favor of the victim, since it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, whether because it was done intentionally or because they could have avoided it and did not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argumentation, he bases it on the provisions of articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code, concerning the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of seeking compensation would be extinguished. However, this does not occur, as the possibility of recovering the damage from the parents of the minor under fifteen years remains, provided the minor lives in their home (1047 of the Civil Code) –twelve years, according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law–, but the provision nonetheless maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with numeral 1048 of the Civil Code. Unlawfulness (antijuricidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, which means the act of the person generating the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in cases of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care –negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill (impericia)–, given that when we encounter these scenarios, evidently, there are causes of justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, fortuitous event or force majeure. This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is discussed by the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the applicability of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are provisions in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate the damage, even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of a cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative scenario in 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: \"<b><i>Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties</i></b>\". Under Rivero Sánchez's thesis, for example, in the case of the story of \"Goldilocks,\" when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as unlawful behavior, typical of violation of domicile (article 204 of the Penal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a cause of justification, according to article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate the damage in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been a subject of discussion by the doctrine over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. \"Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual\" Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, página 87), indicate that this dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) substantive, because the damage is the same in either field, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to \"contractual\" and \"extracontractual\" damage; b) systematic, because in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, except that in contractual liability, such conduct arises due to non-compliance; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the law of the XII Tables and was of a contractual type, while that derived from the Lex Aquilia was of an extracontractual type. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (articles 701 and following), and civil liability of an extracontractual type (articles 1045 and following). For those who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by an active or omissive conduct, referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without there being a prior link, contract, or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual,” indicates that the presence of two elements is necessary for extracontractual liability to occur: “…<i>A behavior that serves as an attribution criterion, whether culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…</i>”. Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal nexus (nexo de causalidad) between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, meaning that the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific obligation, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm other persons. Regarding contractual liability, Chamber I (la Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has considered: <i>“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that such obligation was culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges malice (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach; rather, the malice must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). Breach is malicious (doloso) when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Malice (dolo) as provided in Article 701 of the Civil Code is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to indemnify the damages and lost profits caused, even if the contrary has been agreed”</i>. Another conceptual difference, according to Chamber I (la Sala Primera), lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is enough to demonstrate the breach for fault to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, the fault (negligencia, imprudencia, impericia) or malice (dolo), upon which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be proven (Decision (Voto) number 320, of thirteen hours of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).\n\nTHE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE. Subjective or objective attribution criteria constitute reference frameworks used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former –subjective–, they are those based on aspects such as malice (dolo) or fault (culpa), so that, upon verification of unlawful behavior – malicious or fault-based – the obligation to repair arises. Attribution to such conduct can be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for the act of a third party. This is why doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, \"culpa in eligendo\" and \"culpa in vigilando\". Now then, fault and malice are not necessary to ground the civil liability process. If that were the case, in many instances, there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios where the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill (impericia) of the person who caused the damage. This is why the courts and doctrine have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as for example in the cases of articles 190 of the General Law of Public Administration and numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. Regarding the criteria of objective attribution, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called \"risk theory\" or on the act of a party which, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a greater degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions carried out by its public servants. In the scenario of the risk theory, the premise is that the natural or legal person who carries out or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its drawbacks. This theory is also known by the name of \"<i>created damage</i>,\" whose paradigm of attribution lies in assigning the damage to any person who introduces into society a virtual element for producing it, disregarding the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or malice (dolo), but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which means that, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests –be it life, safety, health, etc.–, a need to repair the damage arises (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Pág. 70).\n\nIN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE OBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTION CRITERION OF NUMERAL 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Once the difference between the two attribution criteria is explained, it is evident that in this case, the objective attribution provided for by numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the sued bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with legal personality and its own patrimony and, in turn, with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation will be governed by the rules of public law. In that sense, subsection 1° of Article 2 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same responsibilities and obligations corresponding to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Banco Central and the Organic Law of the National Banking System. The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding banking liability for illegitimate actions by the entity. Meanwhile, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of solidary subjective liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but they do not regulate matters concerning the liability of the bank as an entity for the acts proper to its operation. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “<b><u>Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by laws, applicable regulations, and principles of technique. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Upon them shall fall any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for malice (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence (negligencia). Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall respond personally with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, due to the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through malice (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence (negligencia)…”</u></b>. In the same way, Article 28 of that same law provides that “<b>Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies use of the bank's funds in activities other than those inherent to its functions, shall make all those present at the respective session incur personal and solidary liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and lost profits produced thereby. Only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt from such liability. All of this without prejudice to the other legal sanctions that may correspond to them. “</b>. Therefore, since there is no general provision holding state banking entities liable for illegitimate actions taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of Public Administration is applicable as an objective liability regime for this type of entity. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, until she was dismissed without employer liability. Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' home, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made this fact publicly known. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor and, despite this, on that same day, two bank officials communicated the dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself to work –on April 12, 2011– that the respective letter was formally delivered to her, based on absences to present herself for work. She points out as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the administration's illegitimate action, in her town of San Ramón it was said that she had been dismissed for being linked to a drug gang. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision on a negligent or imprudent act by the officials who intervened in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, a subjective attribution criterion provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not resorted to –this despite the fact that the provision is mentioned in the ruling, but without justifying why it is applicable to the case–. Despite this, the trial court awarded the plaintiff compensation of fifteen million colones for moral damage. That ruling was overturned by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not raise any outline regarding a subjective attribution criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision in what she calls an \"arbitrary and untimely dismissal\" by the banking entity, so much so that the lower court (a-quo) determined that this sanction had been illegal, precisely for having violated the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since, had the procedure established in the agreement been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on an objective attribution criterion provided for by subsection 1° of numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. This provision establishes: “<b><i>1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”</i></b>. In this case, upon proving the untimely and unfounded dismissal act, the defendant party must be ordered to pay because its action was illegitimate, since that action is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy regarding the dismissal actions processed. The application of the objective attribution criterion derived from that provision implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that damage and the causal link (nexo causal) caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal for her to have the right to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates a negligent or imprudent act by the officials linked to the act of dismissal. Note that both the instance judges and the majority of Chamber I understand it this way, since the decision does not analyze, not even remotely, a breach of the duty of care or malice (dolo) on the part of the officials; rather, the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, i.e., nothing more and nothing less than an objective attribution criterion of the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.\n\nTHEREFORE:\n\nRegarding what has been the subject of appeal, the appealed judgment is reversed solely insofar as it denied payment for moral damage (daño moral). In its place, in this respect, the first instance ruling is confirmed, modifying the amount of this claim, which is set at the sum of three million colones.\n\nMagistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.\n\nOrlando Aguirre Gómez\n\nEva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez\n\nFlora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González\n\nRes: 2016-000410\n\nPROJASM/Iva\n\n2\n\nEXP: 11-004086-1027-CA\n\nTelephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Emails: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr and mbrenesm@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nConsequently, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not receivable and, what was decided in this regard by the appellate body, must be confirmed.”\n\n**V.- NOTE BY MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of sharing the criterion of my esteemed colleagues, inasmuch as they determine the existence of illegitimate conduct by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis of this compensation cannot derive from a rule founded on the criterion of subjective imputation, such as that regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), for the reasons I will set forth below.\n\n**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY:** Authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and [Name1], Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to consider the possibility of seeking compensation within the scope of tortious action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to *“furtum,”* which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the *“damnum iniuria datum,”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia.”* Among the most important rules of that law, we have the possibility of seeking compensation for the loss of slaves or any quadruped; therefore, this action definitively derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that, by its nature, it was less formal law and in which equity began to have important content for determining the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for the injury or destruction of things, which gave rise to the exercise of the so-called *“iniuria,”* which was an action exercised provided there was a causal nexus of the damage; 2) actions for bodily injury and damage caused to the person; 3) actions for damage caused by animals or by negligence of the person (for example, damage when riding); 4) action of malice, that is, having acted with the intention to cause damage; 5) finally, the *“iniuria”* evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the glossators and natural law commentators is decisive within the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability was broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master – the beginnings of fault *“in vigilando”* – (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with the standing to claim compensation, because at this stage, the heirs of the victim were allowed to collect compensation for death, such as maintenance. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors such as [Name2] and [Name3], who made up the Naturalist School that influenced the *Code*, have an important influence. The contribution of the first of them consists in deriving the civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by malice or by faulty or negligent conduct. Along the same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to seek compensation could derive; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or offenses. The influence of these schools determined that in 1792, a rule was established in the Prussian Code stating the following: *“**Every damage caused by malice or gross negligence that generates serious personal illness or death must be punishable**.”* The *Code* also took this same orientation when establishing: *“Article 1382.* Of offenses and quasi-offenses. ***Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to repair it**.” Article 1383. **One is liable not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also by the act of persons for whom one is responsible, or of things which one has in one's keeping**.”* Evidently, all this codification has an influence on our national regulations, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the characteristics inherent to legislation derived from the *Code*, because our civil regulations clearly fall within these characteristics. The influence of that regulation within our civil legislation is evident. A reading of Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is sufficient to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this norm. The rule in question is based, like the Napoleonic legislation, on conduct that is no longer only malicious but also negligent and imprudent on the part of the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it is based on an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that, not even in the mentality of the legislator of that era were the effects of the risk theory inherent to mass industrial or commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I affirm this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; similarly, we were at a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for illegitimate conduct. Another important aspect for explaining the regulations from which ours derive is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, rules such as Article 1045 are based on a premise from which the victim's obligation to prove who was the person who generated the malicious or faulty action that ultimately caused the damage derives. When the victim faced scenarios where they could not prove these situations, whether due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it – due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent – it was indicated that we were in the presence of “acts of God,” those executed as punishment of the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was visualized as the “payment of a sin” and not as an indemnity for the victim. Usually, and as this Chamber does in this ruling, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which, as I indicated previously, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with losses, that were caused by malice, fault, negligence, or imprudence. In reality, and according to the principle of the hierarchy of sources, the constitutional basis of liability is found in Article 41 of the Magna Carta, inasmuch as it establishes: *“**By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered to them promptly and fully, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws**.”* Now then, rules such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish criteria for imputation that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, causal nexus, and the burden of proof. As established by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful event that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Ruling number 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Chamber, “damage” is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the injured party) that causes the deprivation of a legal asset protected by the legal system. Under this approach, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical); 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage. Another element that configures civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite of any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a *sine qua non* requirement for the compensatory claim to prosper. The notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, since there must be fault on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which the liability of that person is imputed. Without the existence of fault, the compensation of damages and losses cannot be granted in favor of the victim, since it is necessary that it be demonstrated that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is therefore necessary that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, whether because it was done with intent or because it could have been avoided and was not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that this requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argument, he relies on what is established by Articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), related to the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of seeking compensation would be extinguished.\n\nHowever, this does not occur because the possibility of claiming damages from the parents of a minor under fifteen years of age is maintained, provided the minor lives in their home ([Address1]) twelve years –according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil)–, but the norm still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with numeral 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, meaning the actions of the person causing the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care –negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill–, given that when we encounter such scenarios, evidently, there are grounds for justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, acts of God (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is debated by legal scholars. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the applicability of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are norms in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for the damage, even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of some circumstance that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative scenario in Article 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: “*Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties*”. Under the thesis of [Name4], for example, in the case of the story of “Goldilocks”, when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears’ house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, specifically a home invasion (article 204 of the Penal Code (Código Penal)). However, said unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a ground for justification, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate for the damage in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been a subject of discussion by legal scholars over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual” Madrid, Spain, Editorial Reus, Volume I, page 87), indicate that said dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to “contractual” and “extracontractual” damage; b) systematic, because in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, only that in the contractual one said conduct occurs due to breach of contract; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor). In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the Law of the XII Tables and was contractual in nature, while that derived from the Lex Aquilia was extracontractual in nature. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (articles 701 and following), and extracontractual civil liability (articles 1045 and following). For those who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by an active or omissive conduct, the latter referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without a prior bond, contract, or obligation existing. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indicates that, for extracontractual liability to arise, the presence of two elements is necessary: “…*Conduct that serves as a criterion for imputation, be it culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of a legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral*…”. Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obliged to repair it, a causal nexus between his conduct and the damage produced is necessary, which means the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm other people. Regarding contractual liability, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and additionally the fact that such obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges fraud (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, rather the fraud must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is fraudulent when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches his obligation, causing damage to his creditor. Fraud, according to the provisions of article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obliged to indemnify the damages and losses caused by it, even if the contrary had been agreed”*. Another of the conceptual differences, according to the First Chamber, lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is sufficient to demonstrate the breach for fault (culpa) to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, the fault (negligence, imprudence, lack of skill) or fraud, upon which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be demonstrated (Vote number 320, at one o'clock in the afternoon on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).\n\n**THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.** Subjective or objective imputation criteria constitute frames of reference used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former –subjective–, these are those based on aspects such as fraud or fault, such that, upon verification of an illicit behavior –fraudulent or culpable– the obligation to repair arises. The imputation of such conduct may be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for the act of another. This is why legal scholars speak of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, “culpa in eligendo” and “culpa in vigilando”. Now, fault and fraud are not necessary to ground the process of civil liability. If that were the case, in many cases there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios in which the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage. This is why courts and legal scholars have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, such as in the cases of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. Regarding objective imputation criteria, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called “risk theory” or on the actions of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a higher degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions carried out by its officials. In the scenario of the risk theory, it starts from the premise that the natural or legal person who engages in or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of “*the created damage*”, whose imputation paradigm consists of attributing the damage to every person who introduces into society a virtual element of producing it, dispensing with the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault, negligence, or fraud, but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which causes that, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests –be it life, security, health, etc.–, a need to repair the damage arises ([Name4], Op. Cit. Pg. 70).\n\n**IN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERION OF NUMERAL 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE [LicensePlate1] OF THE CIVIL CODE.** Having explained the difference between both imputation criteria, it is evident that in this case the objective imputation provided for by numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the respondent bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) of said bank, which, although it states that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and assets and, in turn, with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation shall be governed by the norms of public law. In that sense, subsection 1 of Article 2 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that the provisions of that regulation shall apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank shall have the same responsibilities and obligations that correspond to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank and the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding bank liability for illegitimate acts of the entity. Whereas, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of joint and several subjective liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but do not regulate what concerns the bank's liability as an entity for the acts inherent to its operation. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “**Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by laws, applicable regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions in accordance with their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for fraud, fault, or negligence shall weigh upon them. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall personally respond with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, for the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through fraud, fault, or negligence…”.** Likewise, Article 28 of that same law provides that “**Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that implies use of the bank's funds in activities different from those inherent to its functions, shall cause all those present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses caused thereby. Only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt from such liability. All of this without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them.** \" Therefore, given the absence of a general provision holding state banking entities liable for illegitimate acts taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of Public Administration applies as the objective liability regime for this type of entity. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability (sin responsabilidad patronal). Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' house, by order of a criminal jurisdictional authority, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employing bank who made this fact public knowledge. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor, and, despite this, on that same day, two bank officials communicated the dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive; rather, it was upon reporting to work –on April 12, 2011– that the respective letter was formally delivered to her, based on absences from work. She points out as grounds for compensation that, as a result of the administration's illegitimate actions, it was said in her town of San Ramón that she had been fired for being linked to a drug gang. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but by resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent conduct by the officials who intervened in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, the subjective imputation criterion provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not used –and this despite the fact that the norm is mentioned in the ruling, but without founding why it is applicable to the case–. Despite this, the trial court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage. That order was revoked by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not outline any sketch regarding a subjective imputation criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she terms an “arbitrary and untimely dismissal” on the part of the banking entity, so much so that the lower court judge determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on an objective imputation criterion provided for by subsection 1 of numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. This norm establishes: “***1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”.*** In this case, by proving the untimely and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant party must be condemned because its action was illegitimate, since that action is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy regarding the processed dismissal actions. The application of the objective imputation criterion derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that damage and the causal nexus caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates negligent or imprudent conduct by the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the trial judges and the majority of the Chamber understand it this way, since the vote does not analyze even remotely the breach of the duty of care or the fraud of the officials, but rather the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than an objective imputation criterion from the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.”\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n**1.-** The plaintiff, in a complaint dated July 18, 2011, brought this action seeking a judgment declaring the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal carried out against her by the bank, as well as reinstating her to her position with the full enjoyment of her labor rights; along with the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.\n\n**2.-** The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February 1, 2012, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue.\n\n**3.-** The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at 1:00 p.m. on May 27, 2013, **ordered:** “*In accordance with the foregoing, applicable regulations, and Article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code, the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue are dismissed, and the present ordinary labor claim filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against* **BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL,** *represented by its General Judicial Attorney, Mr.* **GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS,** *is declared* **WITH MERIT,** *for which reason the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability carried out against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified; therefore, the effects of this declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said illegal act, such that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appropriate course is to immediately reinstate the plaintiff in her position, thus confirming the precautionary measure ordered interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevents it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all back pay and other labor rights that she may have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these back pay and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff are for the time she was effectively outside the institution without receiving them or without them having been recognized by the banking entity. These amounts must be settled administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff, in case of disagreement, resorting to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, with the exception of moral damages, a claim which is granted and the defendant must pay to the plaintiff in the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, apportioned as five million colones for subjective moral damages, and ten million colones for objective moral damages; and as damages, legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due until its effective payment, according to the rate provided in Article 1163 of the Civil Code, which corresponds to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit; amounts that, as already indicated, may be settled administratively, without prejudice to them being determined in the judgment execution stage in case of disagreement. Furthermore, social charges must be deducted from the amounts to be paid to the extent legally applicable. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the lawsuit, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of three million colones...*” (Sic).\n\n**4.-** Both parties appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Section Three, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at 8:45 a.m. on September 28, 2015, **resolved:** *“There being no errors or omissions capable of causing nullity or defenselessness, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially with merit, such that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant bank to indemnify her for moral damages is denied. The cross-appeal filed by the plaintiff is without merit. Except as indicated, and in what is the subject of challenge, the first-instance judgment is confirmed...”*\n\n**5.-** The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November 20, 2015, which is based on the reasons set forth in the considering part below.\n\n**6.-** The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.\n\n**Magistrate Aguirre Gómez writes; and,**\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\n**I.- BACKGROUND.** The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was detained at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering; a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that pretrial detention for one year was ordered against her as a precautionary measure. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Area of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her detention with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, even though the bank knew her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate superior, of what had happened. She indicated that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day, two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter, which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she related, on April 12, 2011 (the next business day after her release), she showed up at her workplace and it was at that moment that the dismissal letter was given to her, which established her absences from work as the cause. She recounted that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been terminated for being *“linked to a drug gang”*, which is why, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative dismissal act and reinstatement in her position. She also requested payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights – including social security – damages, interest, and both costs (document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney answered in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (document attached on February 6, 2012, at 3:10:23 p.m.). The first-instance judge declared the claim with merit and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the plaintiff in her position. The judge ordered the defendant – as damages – to pay back pay and other labor rights (including social security) ceased to be received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity, as well as the deduction of social charges. He ordered payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest – as damages – and both costs of the proceeding, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment filed on May 27, 2013, at 2:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents filed on June 4, 2013, at 4:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013, at 2:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal revoked the ruling insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and confirmed it in all other respects (judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 7:43:37 a.m.).\n\n**II.- GRIEVANCES.** The plaintiff disagrees with what was ordered by the Ad-quem regarding moral damages. She considers that the contested judgment is not duly reasoned. She argues that the facts held as proven by the previous instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and suddenly, precisely when the Public Prosecutor's Office was conducting its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case, which occurred in San Ramón, where she works and lives. She alleges that the bank sought her out even at relatives' houses to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She states that the causal link between the claimed moral damages and the bank's arbitrary act is evident from the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity surrounding the case at that time. She points out that the previous instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having terminated her illegally. She stresses that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement, it would have been issued outside of public and media exposure, whereby its harmful effects could have been lesser. She claims that what happened damaged her name and good image (document filed on November 23, 2015, at 11:24:21 a.m.).\n\n**III.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The only point submitted for this Chamber's analysis is the one related to moral damages. This body's position, since ruling No. 481, at 10:40 a.m. on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor venue it is feasible to indemnify it when it is caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power; that is, when facing specially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, at 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar vein, judgment No. 359, at 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, can be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when this occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary authority, exceeds it, causing a damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.”* In this specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she believes that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this aspect was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged impairment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber disagrees with that reasoning. Upon reviewing the case record, it is evident that the banking entity engaged in an illegitimate and sudden act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue for being harmful to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was terminated on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the end of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was because the worker failed to report to work from March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). However, according to the evidentiary material in the record, at that time a judicial investigation was being conducted against her for alleged money laundering, and on that day she was detained and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where pretrial detention for one year was imposed as a precautionary measure (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known to the employer. Note that, as can be seen from the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the detention, the plaintiff's brother personally went to her superior to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, since these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what had occurred (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences for which the plaintiff was blamed, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified, and therefore, the decision made by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in the judgment of this Chamber, the suffering the plaintiff had been experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was undergoing was compounded by the anguish of losing her job just upon leaving prison. Although that injury has been repaired, since the dismissal was declared null and the payment of back pay was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress it caused the worker by its action, which added to the grief she had been enduring. This is so, as provided by Article 41 of the Political Constitution and Article 1045 of the Civil Code. The former expressly stipulates: *“By resorting to the laws, all are to find reparation for injuries or damages received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.”* And the latter reads: *“Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obliged to repair it together with the damages.”* Furthermore, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of the Public Administration are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, it is appropriate to revoke the known judgment insofar as it denied moral damages and to confirm on this point the first-instance judgment. However, in the judgment of this body, the amount granted must be modified. Based on a criterion of prudence and taking into consideration the described circumstances, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00, as it is estimated that this is sufficient as retribution for the harm attributable to the defendant.\n\n**IV.-** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND MAGISTRATE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:** We depart from the majority's criterion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor venue, indemnification for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power is feasible, that is, when facing specially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, at 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar vein, judgment No. 359, at 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, can be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when this occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary authority, exceeds it, causing a damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.”* In these cases, it is incumbent upon the victim – in accordance with Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure – to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Ruling No. 385, at 10:20 a.m. on April 12, 2013). In this specific case, the plaintiff alleges that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this aspect was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that *“[…] although it is feasible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have generated a moral injury both subjectively and objectively, above all due to the dissemination given to what occurred, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that impairment and the defendant's conduct”* (image 19 of the attached judgment on October 1, 2015, at 7:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the proof provided in the record, we share the Tribunal's decision in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her burden, the causal link between the dismissal and the moral damages claimed. As can be extracted from the case file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, notification that was made personally and without carrying out an *“excessive display”*, as the Ad-quem pointed out, so it cannot be affirmed that this behavior caused any injury to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant argues that the mass media learned of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element that the defendant prompted publicity regarding that fact. Note that the newspaper articles offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's detention and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but do not mention the termination of employment (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). It was not demonstrated that it was the defendant itself who provided that information to the press. Although it is alleged that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employer as they are alien to it. It must be considered that the bank has no influence over what the press publishes, nor what the people living in that canton know; consequently, it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff derived mainly from the pretrial detention ordered against her and not directly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff an impairment, distinct from the natural effects of the dismissal, which should be compensated. The reported effects derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the dismissal action. Consequently, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not admissible, and what was resolved in this regard by the appellate body must be confirmed.\n\n**V.- NOTE FROM MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of sharing the criterion of the esteemed colleagues, in determining the existence of an illegitimate action by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for that compensation cannot derive from a norm founded on the criterion of subjective imputation, such as that regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code, due to the reasons I will set forth below.\n\n**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY:** Authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to raise the possibility of seeking compensation within the scope of delictual action. For example, civil action was related to *“furtum”*, which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the *“damnun iniuria datum”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilius, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia”*. Among the most important norms of that law, we have the possibility of seeking compensation for the loss of slaves or a quadruped, so that, definitively, said action derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was a less formal law and in which equity began to have an important content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for injury or destruction of things, this gave grounds for exercising the so-called *“iniuria”*, which was an action exercised provided there was a causal link for the damage; 2) actions for bodily injuries and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by a person's negligence (for example, damages while riding); 4) action of deceit, that is, having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) lastly, the *“iniuria”* evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the glossators and the natural law commentators proves decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly due to two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master – beginnings of *culpa “in vigilando”* (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with the standing to collect compensation, because this stage allowed the heirs of the victim to collect compensation upon death, such as could be support payments. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors such as Hugo Grotius and Domat have an important influence, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code. The contribution of the first of them consists of deriving civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by deceit or by culpable or negligent action. Along the same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to seek compensation could derive; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or felonies.\n\nThe influence of these schools led to the establishment, in 1792, of a provision in the Prussian Code that states the following: “<b><i>Any damage caused by malice or gross negligence resulting in serious personal injury or death must be punishable</i></b>”. The Code also adopts this same orientation, establishing: “<i>Article 1382. “</i>Of offenses and quasi-offenses. “<b><i>Any act of man that causes damage to another obliges the one through whose fault it occurred to repair it</i></b>”. Article 1383. <b><i>One is responsible not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also for the act of persons for whom one must answer or of things one has under one's guard</i></b>”. Evidently, all this codification influences our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note. What I do consider important is to establish the characteristics inherent to legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation on our civil law is evident. A simple reading of numeral 1045 of the Civil Code suffices to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) cannot be exhausted solely within this provision. The provision in question, like the Napoleonic legislation, starts from an act that is not only malicious but also negligent and imprudent by the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it starts from an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that the legislator's mentality of that era did not even consider the effects of the risk theory inherent in massive industrial or commercial activity, much less that the State could be held liable for acting contrary to the legal system. I state this because one must remember that in 1804, France was developing an agricultural or artisanal economy, making it difficult to foresee the changes introduced by <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Revolución Industrial\" w:st=\"on\">la Revolución Industrial</st1:PersonName>. Likewise, we were at a historical moment when it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an unlawful act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, provisions like Article 1045 start from a premise from which derives the obligation of the victim to prove who the person was that generated the malicious or culpable act that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim faced situations where they could not prove these facts, either due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it —due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent—, it was indicated that we were in the presence of “acts of God” of those executed as punishment upon the victim, therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was viewed as the “payment of a sin” and not as indemnification for the victim. Usually, and as <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala</st1:PersonName> does in this vote, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I indicated earlier, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with losses, which were caused by malice (dolo), fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). In reality, and according to the principle of the hierarchy of sources, the constitutional foundation of liability is found in numeral 41 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Carta Magna\" w:st=\"on\">la Carta Magna</st1:PersonName>, as it establishes: “<b><i>By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict accordance with the laws</i></b>”. Now, provisions like Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish criteria of imputation (criterios de imputación) that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link (nexo causal), and the burden of proof. As established by <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala Primera\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"LA CORTE SUPREMA\" w:st=\"on\">la Corte Suprema</st1:PersonName> de Justicia, damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful event that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to protection by the legal system (Voto número 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Sala, “damage” is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party, damnificado) that causes the deprivation of a legal good protected by the legal system. Under this approach, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship (relación de causalidad) between the generating event and the damage. Another element that configures civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the behavior or unlawful conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual (contractual o extracontractual), meaning its demonstration is also a *sine qua non* requirement for the compensation claim to succeed. The notion of culpability (culpabilidad) is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, since there must be fault on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which that person's liability is imputed. Without the existence of fault, the award of damages and losses (indemnización de daños y perjuicios) in favor of the victim cannot be granted, as it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, either because it was done with intent or because it could have been avoided and was not, through negligent or imprudent action. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To base his argument, he relies on the provisions of Articles 38 through 40 of the Civil Code, relating to the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age, and, therefore, any possibility of requesting compensation would be extinguished. However, this is not the case because the possibility of collecting damages from the parents of the minor under fifteen years of age remains, provided the minor lives in their home (1047 of the Civil Code) twelve years – according to Article 6 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Justicia Penal Juvenil—, but the provision still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, pursuant to numeral 1048 of the Civil Code. Unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, meaning the action of the person generating the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care —negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill (impericia)—, given that when we find ourselves in these situations, evidently, there are justification causes that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, fortuitous event (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is disputed by part of the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the admissibility of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are provisions in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for damage, even though the conduct cannot be qualified as unlawful, given the existence of some cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative assumption in 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: “<b><i>Licit and voluntary acts also produce, without the need of an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or prejudice third parties”</i></b>. Under the thesis of Rivero Sánchez, for example, in the case of the tale of “Goldilocks”, when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, characteristic of violation of domicile (Article 204 of the Penal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a justification cause, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate the damage in favor of the bears, since licit acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been the subject of discussion by doctrine over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual” Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, page 87) indicate that this dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to “contractual” and “extracontractual” damage; b) systematic, by reason that in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, only that in contractual liability said conduct occurs by reason of non-compliance; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Promoción de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Competencia\" w:st=\"on\">la Competencia</st1:PersonName> y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. In Roman law, as I explained earlier, this difference was marked, since liability deriving from the law of the XII Tables was contractual, while that deriving from <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Lex Aquilia\" w:st=\"on\">la Lex Aquilia</st1:PersonName> was extracontractual. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (Articles 701 et seq.), and extracontractual civil liability (Articles 1045 et seq.). For persons who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by active or omissive conduct, referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without an existing prior link, contract, or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indicates that for extracontractual liability to occur, the presence of two elements is necessary: “…<i>A behavior that serves as a criterion of imputation, be it culpable harm or harm derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result impacting a legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…”</i>. Likewise, the cited author explains that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal link (nexo de causalidad) between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, meaning the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm others. Regarding contractual liability, <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala Primera\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"LA CORTE SUPREMA\" w:st=\"on\">la Corte Suprema</st1:PersonName> de Justicia has considered: <i>“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that such obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof lies with the creditor… if the creditor alleges malice (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, but rather the malice must be proven in order for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (Articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is malicious when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Malice, as provided by Article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to indemnify the damages and losses caused thereby, even if the contrary had been agreed”</i>. Another of the conceptual differences, according to <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala Primera\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName>, lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is sufficient to demonstrate the breach for fault to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, it is necessarily required to demonstrate fault (negligence (negligencia), imprudence (imprudencia), lack of skill (impericia)) or malice (dolo), on which the liability of the person causing the damage is based (Voto número 320, of thirteen hours on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).\n\n**THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA OF IMPUTATION FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.** The subjective or objective criteria of imputation constitute frames of reference used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former – subjective – they are those based on aspects such as malice or fault, so that, upon the verification of unlawful behavior – malicious or culpable – the obligation to repair arises. The imputation for such conduct can be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, i.e., for an act of a third party (hecho ajeno). This is why doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter being enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, “culpa in eligendo” and “culpa in vigilando”. Now, fault and malice are not necessary to ground the process of civil liability. If that were the case, in many instances there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those situations where the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage. This is why the courts and doctrine have elevated the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as for example in the cases of Article 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> and numeral 35 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. As for the criteria of objective imputation, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called “risk theory” or on the action of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a higher degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions performed by its officials. In the case of the risk theory, the premise is that a natural or legal person who exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of “<i>created damage”</i> the paradigm of imputation of which consists in attributing the damage to any person who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it, dispensing with the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault, negligence, or malice, but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which causes, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests —be it life, security, health, etcetera— a need to repair the damage (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Page 70).\n\n**IN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE CRITERION OF OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION OF NUMERAL 190 OF LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE.** Having explained the difference between both criteria of imputation, it is evident that in this case, the objective imputation provided for by numeral 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública.\" w:st=\"on\">la Administración Pública.</st1:PersonName> is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the sued bank, as established by Article 2 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Orgánica\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and patrimony and with full administrative and functional autonomy<u>), emphasizes that its functioning will be governed by public law norms</u>. In that sense, subsection 1° of Article 2 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special norm for them. Returning to <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Orgánica\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same responsibilities and obligations that correspond to banks, pursuant to <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Orgánica\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Banco Central and <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Orgánica\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Sistema Bancario Nacional. The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding bank liability for the entity's unlawful actions. Meanwhile, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of subjective joint and several liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but do not regulate what concerns the bank's liability as an entity for the actions inherent to its functioning. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “ <b><u>Each Board of Directors will exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by applicable laws, regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for malice, fault, or negligence shall fall upon them. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall respond personally with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank by the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through malice, fault, or negligence…”. </u></b>Similarly, Article 28 of that same law provides that “<b>Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies the use of the bank's funds in activities other than those inherent to its functions, shall cause all those present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses produced thereby. From such liability, only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt. All of the foregoing without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them. “. </b>Therefore, in the absence of a general provision that holds state banking entities liable for unlawful actions taken in the exercise of their functions, <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> results applicable as the regime of objective liability for this type of entities. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability. This dismissal was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' house, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering. It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made that fact publicly known. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor, and, despite this, on the same day, two bank officials communicated her dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself for work – on April 12, 2011 – that she was formally given the respective letter, based on absences from attending work. She points out as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the administration's unlawful action, in her town of San Ramón it was said that she had been dismissed for being linked to a gang of drug traffickers. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding damages, the trial judge grants them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent action by the officials involved in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, no recourse was made to a criterion of subjective imputation provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code – this despite the provision being mentioned in the judgment, but without grounding why it is applicable to the case—. Despite this, the trial court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage. That judgment was overturned by the Tribunal (Tribunal). In her appeal, the plaintiff does not raise any outline regarding a criterion of subjective imputation on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she calls an “arbitrary and unannounced dismissal (despido arbitrario e intempestivo)” by the banking entity, so much so that the a-quo court determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on a criterion of objective imputation provided for by subsection 1° of numeral 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública.\" w:st=\"on\">la Administración Pública.</st1:PersonName> This norm establishes: “<b><i>1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its licit or illicit, normal or abnormal functioning, except force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”. </i></b>In this case, by proving the unannounced and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant must be ordered to pay damages because its action was unlawful, since that action is based on not having respected the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy to be maintained regarding the dismissal actions processed. The application of the criterion of objective imputation derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate said damage and the causal link caused by that arbitrary and unlawful dismissal in order to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates negligent or imprudent action by the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the instance judges and the majority of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala</st1:PersonName> understand it this way, since the vote does not analyze even remotely the breach of the duty of care or the malice of the officials, but rather the reasons center on an unlawful and unannounced act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than a criterion of objective imputation from the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nIn what has been the subject of appeal, the judgment under review is overturned solely with regard to its denial of payment for moral damage. In its place, in this regard, the first instance judgment is confirmed, modifying the amount of this item, which is set at the sum of three million colones.\n\nThe\nMagistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.\n\n**Orlando Aguirre Gómez**\n\n**Eva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez**\n\n**Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González**\n\n**Res: 2016-000410**\n\nPROJASM/Iva\n\n2\n\nEXP: 11-004086-1027-CA\n\nTelephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Emails: imoralesl@poder-judicial.go.cr and mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr"
}