{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-664190", "citation": "Res. 00030-2016 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Falta de legitimación activa en demanda por anulación de permisos de gasolinera", "title_en": "Lack of active standing in claim for annulment of gas station permits", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección I, resuelve una demanda por daños y perjuicios presentada por Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. contra el Estado y la Municipalidad de Alajuela. La empresa actora reclamaba una indemnización de 505 millones de colones por la anulación de los permisos de construcción de una estación de servicio de combustible, ordenada por la Sala Constitucional en un recurso de amparo. El Tribunal realiza un extenso análisis de la legitimación ad causam activa como presupuesto material de la pretensión, concluyendo que la sociedad actora carecía de legitimación para demandar. Se determinó que el permiso de construcción fue otorgado a Financiera Acobo S.A. como propietaria fiduciaria de los inmuebles, y que la participación de la actora se limitó a la gestión de trámites administrativos, sin ser titular del derecho de construcción. Al no ser la titular del permiso anulado, los efectos de dicha anulación no recayeron sobre sus derechos e intereses. En consecuencia, se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación activa y se declara sin lugar la demanda, condenando a la parte actora al pago de ambas costas.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Contentious Court, Section I, decides a claim for damages filed by Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. against the State and the Municipality of Alajuela. The plaintiff sought compensation of ₡505 million for the annulment of construction permits for a fuel service station, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber in an amparo proceeding. The Court conducts a thorough analysis of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) as a substantive prerequisite for the claim, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The Court found that the construction permit was granted to Financiera Acobo S.A. as fiduciary owner of the properties, and that the plaintiff's role was limited to administrative permit processing, without holding the construction right. Therefore, the annulment's effects did not fall on the plaintiff's rights or interests. The Court upholds the lack-of-standing defense, dismisses the claim, and orders the plaintiff to pay costs.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I", "date": "2016", "year": "2016", "topic_ids": [ "procedural-environmental" ], "primary_topic_id": "procedural-environmental", "es_concept_hints": [ "legitimación ad causam", "falta de legitimación activa", "fideicomiso", "propietario fiduciario", "amparo", "Sala Constitucional", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "sentencia inhibitoria", "principio precautorio", "SETENA" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 193", "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo" }, { "article": "Art. 58.1", "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo" }, { "article": "Art. 190", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 196", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" } ], "keywords_es": [ "legitimación ad causam activa", "falta de legitimación", "daños y perjuicios", "anulación de permisos", "estación de servicio", "fideicomiso", "propietaria fiduciaria", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "presupuestos materiales", "sentencia inhibitoria", "constructora ACM", "Municipalidad de Alajuela", "Sala Constitucional", "amparo", "permiso de construcción" ], "keywords_en": [ "standing to sue", "lack of standing", "damages", "annulment of permits", "service station", "fiduciary trust", "fiduciary owner", "Administrative Contentious Court", "substantive prerequisites", "inhibitory judgment", "ACM construction company", "Municipality of Alajuela", "Constitutional Chamber", "amparo", "construction permit" ], "excerpt_es": "la actora no era la titular de la licencia de construcción otorgada por la Municipalidad de Alajuela, obsérvese que el permiso que consta en oficio N° MA SPU PA 338-2009 (f. 1 y 2 del exp. administrativo) con el que concluyó todo el procedimiento administrativo complejo, que involucró la participación de otras administraciones públicas, tales como SETENA, Ministerio de Salud, MOPT, MINAE. etc, está concedido a la Financiera Acobo S.A en su condición de propietaria fiduciaria de las fincas sobre las que se construiría el proyecto, de tal manera que los efectos de la anulación de dicho permiso no recayeron sobre los derechos e intereses de la actora, por no ser titular de dicho derecho, razón por la que no se encuentra legitimada para reclamar la reparación de los supuestos daños causados derivados de la anulación del permiso de construcción, al no ser la titular del mismo. Corolario, se deberá acoger la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y declarar sin lugar la demanda.", "excerpt_en": "The plaintiff was not the holder of the construction license issued by the Municipality of Alajuela. Note that the permit contained in official communication N° MA SPU PA 338-2009 (folios 1 and 2 of the administrative file), which concluded the entire complex administrative procedure involving the participation of other public authorities such as SETENA, the Ministry of Health, MOPT, MINAE, etc., was granted to Financiera Acobo S.A. in its capacity as fiduciary owner of the properties on which the project was to be built. Thus, the effects of the annulment of that permit did not fall upon the rights and interests of the plaintiff, as it was not the holder of that right. Consequently, it lacks standing to claim compensation for the alleged damages arising from the construction permit's annulment, not being its holder. Corollary: the defense of lack of standing ad causam must be upheld and the claim dismissed.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The court upholds the defense of lack of active standing and dismisses the claim for damages.", "summary_es": "Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación activa y se declara sin lugar la demanda por daños y perjuicios." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "Lack of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment; if the court becomes aware of it, it must be declared ex officio.", "quote_es": "La ausencia de legitimación en la causa constituye un impedimento sustancial, si el juzgador se percata de la falta de la misma, así debe declararlo de oficio." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "Active standing ad causam is the relationship of ownership that must exist between the right and the plaintiff; it concerns the ownership of the right claimed.", "quote_es": "La legitimación ad causam activa es la relación de pertenencia que debe existir entre el derecho y el demandante del mismo, se trata de la titularidad del derecho reclamado." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "The effects of the annulment of said permit did not fall upon the plaintiff's rights and interests, as it was not the holder of that right, which is why it lacks standing to claim.", "quote_es": "los efectos de la anulación de dicho permiso no recayeron sobre los derechos e intereses de la actora, por no ser titular de dicho derecho, razón por la que no se encuentra legitimada para reclamar." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-664190", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Voto N° 30 -2016- I\n\r\n\r\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN PRIMERA, San José, a las ocho\r\nhoras del veinte de abril del año dos mil dieciséis.\n\r\n\r\n\nProceso de conocimiento interpuesto por CONSTRUCTORA DE ALUMINIOS Y\r\nMETALES ACM S.A cédula jurídica tres- ciento uno-trescientos setenta y tres\r\nmil novecientos noventa y tres, representada por el señor Douglas Esquivel\r\nGonzález cédula de identidad número cuatro- ciento cincuenta y cinco-\r\nquinientos cuarenta y cinco y el Lic. Edgar Rainier Cordero Campos, abogado, en\r\nsu condición de Apoderado Especial Judicial, contra EL ESTADO,\r\nrepresentado por el Procurador Ronny Bassey Fallas y la MUNICIPALIDAD DE\r\nALAJUELA representada por el Alcalde Municipal Lic. Roberto Hernán Thompson\r\nChacón cédula de identidad número dos- trescientos cincuenta y uno-\r\ncuatrocientos ochenta y siete y el Lic. Juan Carlos Campos Monge, abogado, en\r\nsu condición de Apoderado Especial Judicial. Participa también como coadyuvante\r\nactivo la sociedad Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A, cédula\r\njurídica tres-ciento uno-trescientos setenta y cuatro mil- cuatrocientos\r\nsetenta y nueve bajo la misma representación y patrocinio letrado de la actora.\n\r\n\r\n\nRESULTANDO\n\r\n\r\n\n1.- Estimada\r\nen la suma de quinientos cinco millones de colones exactos, la demanda tiene\r\npor objeto que se determine en sentencia que las actuaciones y omisiones de las\r\ninstituciones demandadas, crearon serios daños y perjuicios a la actora que\r\nconsisten en que les presentaron un panorama legal para construir una Estación\r\nde Servicio de Combustible, haciéndole invertir enormemente y que después\r\nvinieran de manera arbitraria a anular los permisos, paralizando la\r\nconstrucción sin permitirles funcionar. Que se condene a los demandados al pago\r\nde daños materiales por la pérdida y/o lucro cesante por todo el tiempo\r\nque la actora no ha podido ejercer la actividad comercial de la estación de\r\nservicio, gastos extraordinarios incurridos a consecuencia del atraso por la\r\nparalización de la obra por un monto de doscientos millones de colones.\r\nDaño moral psicológico sufrido por los socios, accionistas, personeros,\r\nempleados, que pertenecen a la sociedad actora por un monto de quince millones\r\nde colones. Daño moral objetivo por el deterioro de la imagen de la sociedad\r\nfrente a la comunidad Alajuelense y en general, pues hasta en los medios de\r\ncomunicación se publicó de forma negativa, lo cual estimó en la suma de\r\ndoscientos millones de colones. Perjuicios por la pérdida de valor de utilidad\r\nneta y/o lucro cesante por el no ejercicio de la actividad de la estación de\r\nservicios en la suma de doscientos noventa millones de colones. Que se condene\r\na las demandadas al pago de ambas costas. (f.83.84, 251,252 exp. judicial\r\ny audiencia complementaria de juicio oral y público grabado en formado digital).\n\r\n\r\n\n2.- El\r\nEstado contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las excepciones de culpa de la\r\nvíctima, hecho de un tercero, falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam\r\npasiva, falta de legitimación ad causam activa, falta de interés actual,\r\ncaducidad, prescripción, acto no susceptible de ser impugnado, falta de\r\ncompetencia e inadmisibilidad de la acción, litis consorcio pasivo necesario y\r\nsolicitó declarar sin lugar la demanda, que se condena a la actora al\r\npago de ambas costas y sus intereses (f. 199-211exp. judicial).\n\r\n\r\n\n3.- La\r\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela contestó negativamente la demanda e interpuso las\r\nexcepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación y falta de\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa, caducidad y prescripción (f. 187-195,\r\n247-250 exp. judicial).\n\r\n\r\n\n4.- La\r\ndefensa de falta de competencia fue resuelta sin lugar mediante resolución\r\nN°1124-2014 de las 16:05 hrs. del 22 de mayo de 2014. La defensa de acto no\r\nsusceptible de impugnación fue resuelta y rechazada mediante resolución\r\nN°248-2015 de las 14:15 hrs. del 30 de enero de 2015. La defensa de litis\r\nconsorcio pasivo necesario fue resuelta y rechazada mediante resolución\r\nN°257-205 de las 16:30 hrs. del 30 de enero de 2015. La defensa de cosa juzgada\r\nfue resuelta y rechazada mediante resolución N°301-2015 de las 16:10 hrs. del\r\n04 de febrero de 2016 (f. 213 a 216, 253, 254, 255-257,258-262 exp. judicial). \n\r\n\r\n\n5.- La\r\naudiencia preliminar prevista en el numeral 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo se realizó los días 10 de octubre de 2014, 30 de enero de 2015 y\r\n20 de abril de 2015 ( f.234-236, 251,252, 272,273 exp. judicial así como\r\ngrabación en formato digital).\n\r\n\r\n\n6.- El\r\njuicio oral y público fue realizado el 12 de abril de 2016, disponiéndose su\r\ntramitación como compleja al amparo de los numerales ciento once del Código\r\nProcesal Contencioso Administrativo y cuarenta y siete del Reglamento, así como\r\nel dictado de la sentencia que corresponde de manera escrita. \n\r\n\r\n\n7.- En\r\nlos procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor y no se notan\r\ncausales de nulidad capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Esta sentencia se dicta\r\nprevia deliberación de rigor, por unanimidad y con la redacción del Juez\r\nFernández Loaiza.\n\r\n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI. DE LA BASE DEL PROCESO: La p arte actora manifestó\r\nque en julio del año 2008 las empresas Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A (en\r\nadelante Total Petróleo) y Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A (en adelante\r\nMCM) firmaron una opción de compra venta de la estación de servicio La Radial\r\nubicada en las fincas de la provincia de Alajuela n°424386-000 y \r\n13351-000. Que se firmó un contrato de fideicomiso de garantía entre los\r\ndueños de los inmuebles citados en su condición de fideicomitentes, la\r\nfinanciera Acobo como fiduciaria y Total Petróleo como fideicomisaria. Que la\r\nempresa actora fue la encargada de adquirir todos los permisos administrativos,\r\nasí, la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (Setena) mediante resolución\r\n2828-2008 SETENA otorgó la viabilidad ambiental. La Dirección General de\r\nTransporte y Comercialización de Combustible del MINAE, por resolución \r\nR-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET aprobó los lotes descritos en la fincas de la provincia\r\nde Alajuela 13351-000 y 424386-000 para la construcción de la Estación de\r\nServicio La Radial, así mismo mediante resolución R-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET se\r\notorgó la aprobación de planos de construcción de dicha estación. El 23 de\r\njulio de 2009 la Administración de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, Sanitario\r\nMunicipal aprobó un servicio de agua potable para la estación de servicio. El\r\n17 de junio de 2008 mediante oficio MA-SPU-TA0338-2009 del Departamento de\r\nSubproceso de Planificación Urbana de la Municipalidad de Alajuela \r\nconcedió el permiso de construcción de la estación de servicio de combustible\r\nN°3444, momento a partir del cual la actora inició la construcción de la\r\nestación de servicio. No obstante la Sala Constitucional mediante el voto\r\nN°11941-2010 correspondiente a un recurso de amparo interpuesto por terceros,\r\nanuló el permiso de construcción N°3444 de la Municipalidad de Alajuela y las\r\nresoluciones R DGTCC-269-2009 y R DGTCC325-2009 MINAE y condenó al Estado y la\r\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados\r\ncon los hechos que sirvieron de base al recurso. Cuestionó los fundamentos del\r\nvoto de la Sala Constitucional que según su criterio anuló de manera\r\ninoportuna, ilegal, arbitraria los permisos de la actora los cuales había\r\nobtenido de forma legal y oportuna cumpliendo cabalmente con todos los\r\nrequisitos de ley para la instalación, construcción y funcionamiento de la\r\nestación de servicio de combustible. Indicó que la estación de servicio La\r\nRadial no representa ningún peligro para vecinos o terceros, ya que está\r\nconstituida con los standard mas seguros a nivel internacional en su\r\nconstrucción, contó con los requisitos de ley y fiscalización de todas las\r\ninstituciones públicas competentes. Que la Sala Constitucional, el Estado y la\r\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela han realizado actos y omisiones que originaron serios\r\ndaños y perjuicios a la actora y que el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la\r\nAdministración Pública establece que la Administración Pública será siempre\r\nresponsable si en su funcionamiento produce un daño o perjuicio, sea la\r\nactuación, normal o anormal, legal o ilegal, que existe un nexo causal entre el\r\nfuncionamiento del Estado y el daño causado el cual no se rompe pues no\r\nse encuentran los presupuestos eximentes de responsabilidad como culpa de la\r\nvictima, hecho de un tercero y la fuerza mayor. Agregó que el voto de la Sala\r\nConstitucional referido violentó el límite al poder de policía de la necesidad\r\nde la medida adoptada pues la anulación de los permisos se basó en un supuesto\r\nnada serio y concreto ya que no existe peligro entre la estación de servicio y\r\nla empresa Molinos de Costa Rica que se encuentra a una distancia considerable.\r\nAdemás consideró que se transgredió el principio de reserva legal al regularse\r\nderechos humanos y fundamentales de la actora por medio de un reglamento.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela: indicó que para la construcción de\r\nuna estación de servicio se requiere el permiso de la Municipalidad y que fue\r\nla Actividad de Control Constructivo mediante oficio N° MA-SPU-PA-338-2009 que\r\nse otorgó a Financiera Acobo y Douglas Esquivel González el permiso de\r\nconstrucción de la estación de servicio, luego inició la construcción en\r\nla cual se realizó una parte en incumplimiento del permiso, pues se varió el\r\ndiseño de una de las edificaciones y se aumentó el área de construcción según\r\nse aprecia a folios 15,16 y 17 del expediente administrativo del Proceso de\r\nControl Urbano. Rechazó que las actuaciones municipales hayan sido\r\nabusivas, intransigentes o de alguna forma favorables a la empresa Molinos de\r\nCosta Rica, sino que se actuó con fundamento en las competencias y obligaciones\r\nlegales que le corresponden al municipio y que la anulación de los permisos fue\r\nuna orden constitucional y no una decisión administrativa de la municipalidad.\r\nExpresó que no es competencia de la Municipalidad verificar la\r\npeligrosidad o no de la construcción ya que es resorte de otras\r\ninstituciones públicas y que el permiso de construcción se otorgó en virtud de\r\nque se aportaron todos los documentos requeridos para ello. Que la\r\nMunicipalidad actuó conforme a sus competencias sin que la parte actora\r\ndetermine los actos u omisiones imputables al municipio para ejercer una clara\r\ndefensa, así también que no señala claramente lo que pretende de la\r\nMunicipalidad, lo cual afecta la prueba que pueda aportar. Insistió que la\r\nanulación de los permisos administrativos fue por una orden judicial sin que\r\nexista al momento una orden que retrotraiga lo indicado por la Sala\r\nConstitucional, lo cual hace que la solicitud del la actora se encuentre al\r\nmargen de la ley al ser la orden de dicha Sala vinculante erga omnes y por ello\r\nirresistibles e inaplicables por supremacía constitucional. En su criterio, de\r\nhaberse provocado algún daño lo hubiese sido contra las empresas financiera\r\nAcobo, Total Petróleo o las dueñas registrales de los inmuebles según consta en\r\nel contrato de fideicomiso suscrito entre dichas partes, siendo que la actora\r\nse comprometió dentro de dicho contrato a obtener los permisos a favor de Total\r\nPetróleo, a la cual trató de traer al proceso con el fin de legitimarse para\r\ndemandar al Estado, tratándose de una relación entre entes privados cuyas\r\ncontroversias deben definirse en la sede civil. Por ello la actora no es\r\nparte interesada y no se encuentra legitimada para demandar al municipio, los\r\npermisos de uso de suelo y de construcción no fueron otorgados a su nombre.\r\nInterpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación, falta de\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa, caducidad y prescripción.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEl Estado contestó negativamente la demanda, advirtió sobre la\r\ninadmisibilidad de las pretensiones de la actora al procurar impugnar mediante\r\nesta vía el voto de la Sala Constitucional lo cual es una actuación\r\njurisdiccional y no administrativa por lo que interpuso la excepción de acto no\r\nsusceptible de impugnación. Consideró que la anulación de los permisos\r\nadministrativos de la actora relacionados con la construcción de una estación\r\nde servicio de combustible se encuentra a derecho, por cuanto en aplicación del\r\nprincipio precautorio no es adecuado que una estación de este tipo se encuentre\r\ncerca de una fábrica como lo es la empresa Molinos de Costa Rica. Señaló que la\r\nactuación del Estado se ajustó a derecho, de ahí que no sea susceptible de ser\r\ngeneradora de daños y perjuicios a la parte actora, cuyo extremo debe ser\r\nrechazado por omitir la parte actora hacer referencia a los mismos, advirtió\r\nque no existe determinación clara y cierta de los daños y perjuicios ya que no\r\nse ajusta a los señalado en el artículo 58.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo, así como que la parte actora no acredita, demuestra o\r\nespecifica, la existencia de daños irreparables o irreversibles, potenciales o\r\nactuales, los daños no han sido individualizados, la parte actora reclama un\r\nmonto inexistente, sin ajustarse a los señalado en el artículo 196 de la Ley\r\nGeneral de la Administración Pública. Informó que es claro que no se demuestra\r\npalmariamente que con la anulación de los permisos por parte de la Sala\r\nConstitucional se le haya causado un daño ni perjuicio a la actora, por lo que\r\nno existe una relación de causa efecto entre la manifestación específica y\r\nrespectiva de la función administrativa y la lesión antijurídica que demuestra\r\nel daño o el perjuicio, lo cual además adolece de prueba al respecto. Interpuso\r\nla excepciones de culpa de la víctima, hecho de un tercero, falta de derecho,\r\nfalta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y activa, falta de interés actual,\r\ncaducidad y prescripción, acto no susceptible de impugnación, falta de\r\ncompetencia e inadmisibilidad de la acción. Solicitó declarar sin lugar la\r\ndemanda y condenar a la actora al pago de ambas costas.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nII. HECHOS PROBADOS:\r\nDe importancia para el dictado de esta sentencia, se tienen los siguientes\r\nhechos de relevancia: 1- Que el 12 de agosto del año 2008 las señoras\r\nOrietta Norza Hernández y María de los Angeles Norza Hernández, Financiera\r\nAcobo S.A y Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A suscribieron un contrato de\r\nfideicomiso denominado \"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de\r\nServicio La Radial\" las dos primeras personas en su condición de\r\nfideicomitentes de los inmuebles inscritos en la provincia de Alajuela\r\nN°424386-000 y 13351-000, el segundo como Fiduciario y el tercero en su\r\ncondición de Fideicomisario, cuyo objetivo era mantener las fincas y\r\ntodas sus mejoras, estructuras, avances de obra y/o obra terminada, en\r\npropiedad fiduciaria, para garantizar la entrega inmediata de dichos inmuebles\r\na la fideicomisaria, para ello, Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A (en\r\nadelante MCM) debía llevar a cabo todos los trámites para permisos, impuestos,\r\nautorizaciones, diseño, construcción de una gasolinera. Según la cláusula\r\ndécima octava de dicho contrato, las fideicomitentes cedieron irrevocablemente\r\ntodos sus derechos y obligaciones a MCM, quien figura como coadyuvante en este\r\nproceso (f. 1-9 exp. judicial). 2- Las fincas fideicomitidas de la\r\nprovincia de Alajuela n°13351-000 y 424386-000 se inscribieron el 27 de agosto\r\nde 2008 a nombre de Financiera Acobo S.A en su condición de fiduciario (f.27,28\r\nexp. administrativo). 3- Mediante oficio R- DGRCC- 320- 2008 del 12 de\r\njunio de 2008, reiterado en la resolución R-DGTCC- 269- 2009 MINAET del 9 de\r\njunio de 2009 y R- DGTCC- 325- 2009 del 7 de julio de 2009, la Dirección\r\nGeneral de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustibles del MINAET, otorgó la\r\naprobación del terreno y los planos constructivos y ampliación de la \r\nestación de servicio La Radial dentro de las fincas fideicomitidas (f.97-101\r\nexp. administrativo, 19-22,25-28 exp. judicial). 4- El 14 de enero de\r\n2009 el Fiduciario autorizó a Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A, para\r\nrealizar todos los trámites de construcción de una estación de servicio\r\n(gasolinera) ante la Municipalidad de Alajuela en las fincas fideicomitidas\r\n(f.10,11 exp. judicial). 5- Por resolución N°2828-2008 SETENA del 1 de\r\noctubre de 2008, la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental otorgó la Viabilidad\r\nAmbiental al proyecto para la construcción y operación de una estación de\r\nservicio de combustible, quedando abierta la etapa de Gestión Ambiental y en el\r\nentendido de cumplir con la cláusula de Compromiso Ambiental (f.50-55 exp.\r\nadministrativo). 6- Mediante oficios 1634/PU/U/08 y 1635/PU/U/08 ambos\r\ndel 7 de octubre de 2008, la Municipalidad de Alajuela otorgó el permiso de uso\r\nde suelo para la construcción de una Estación de Servicio en los inmuebles\r\nfideicomitidos (f. 31,38 exp. administrativo). 7- Por resolución N°\r\nMA-AAAA-305-2009-S del 23 de julio del año 2009, la Administración del\r\nAcueducto y Alcantarillado de la Municipalidad de Alajuela aprobó a la\r\nFinanciera Acobo S.A un servicio de agua potable y alcantarillado sanitario\r\npara una estación de servicio de combustible en las fincas fideicomitidas\r\n(f.32-34 exp. judicial). 8- La Municipalidad de Alajuela, Subproceso de\r\nPlanificación Urbana, mediante oficio N° MA- SPU-PA-0338-2009 del 17 de junio\r\nde 2009 otorgó a la fiduciaria Financiera Acobo permiso de construcción de la\r\nestación de servicio de combustible (f.1,2 exp. administrativo). 9- Que\r\nla Municipalidad de Alajuela Proceso de Control Fiscal y Urbano, el 24 de\r\nnoviembre de 2009 clausuró la construcción de la estación de servicio por\r\nincumplimiento a la ley y reglamento de construcciones (acta N°230-2009 f. 16\r\nexp. administrativo). 10- La Sala Constitucional mediante voto\r\nN°11941-2010 de las 11:21 hrs. del 9 de julio de 2010 declaró con lugar un\r\nrecurso de amparo interpuesto por el señor Sergio Ivan Alfaro Salas contra el\r\nMinisterio de Salud, la Municipalidad de Alajuela y la Secretaría Técnica\r\nNacional Ambiental por el otorgamiento ilegal de los permisos administrativos\r\npara la construcción y operación de la estación de servicio de combustible,\r\ndisponiendo la anulación del permiso de construcción otorgado por la\r\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela y las resoluciones R-DGTC-269-2009 Y R-DGTCC-325-2009\r\nMINAE de la Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustible\r\ndel Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (f.57-69 exp. judicial). \r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV. HECHOS\r\nNO PROBADOS: \r\nNinguno de relevancia para la resolución del presente asunto.\n\r\n\r\n\nV. ANÁLISIS DE LA LEGITIMACION AD CAUSAM: Los demandados opusieron la\r\nexcepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, siendo que la legitimación\r\nes el primer presupuesto básico estructural que debe cumplir toda demanda,\r\nconjuntamente con el interés y el derecho, su análisis resulta incluso oficioso\r\npor parte del juzgador, en razón de lo anterior se abordará enseguida el\r\nanálisis de dicha defensa, a partir de un fallo de l a Sección IV de este Tribunal que ya había analizado de manera muy clara y completa el\r\ninstituto de la legitimación, al respecto indicó:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"Sobre la base del claro razonamiento vertido por la\r\nSala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en su conocido voto No.\r\n2008-000317 de las nueve horas diez minutos del dos de mayo de dos mil ocho,\r\nindicado en múltiples ocasiones por este órgano jurisdiccional, es oportuno\r\nestablecer la diferencia que existe entre el instituto procesal de “excepción\r\nde fondo” y los presupuestos materiales de la acción, la cual resumiendo y\r\naplicándola al caso concreto conviene exponer. Para que una demanda pueda ser\r\ncursada, el órgano jurisdiccional debe revisar oficiosamente los presupuestos\r\nprocesales (capacidad procesal, competencia del tribunal y cumplimiento de los\r\nrequisitos de la demanda). Sin el cumplimiento de estos requisitos la demanda\r\nno podría ser cursada, en tanto no se presentan los requerimientos mínimos para\r\nque un proceso pueda ser conocido. Más adelante, cronológica y lógicamente\r\ndespués, al dictarse la sentencia para que la pretensión pueda ser acogida,\r\ntambién debe revisarse oficiosamente si se reúnen los presupuestos materiales.\r\nEstos son: el derecho, la legitimación y el interés actual. Si alguno de estos\r\n-o todos- no existen, la demanda no podrá encontrar respuesta positiva. De\r\nmanera que los primeros requerimientos son necesarios para que una demanda sea\r\nadmisible, validez o eficacia desde el plano formal, mientras que los segundos,\r\ncorresponden a requerimientos para una resolución favorable. No está demás\r\nagregar que el sistema romano - germano - latino, parte del presupuesto que el\r\njuez está imposibilitado para conocer por el fondo la pretensión hasta el\r\nmomento del dictado de la sentencia, so pena de incurrir en un adelantamiento\r\nde criterio; salvo los supuestos expresamente permitidos por el ordenamiento.\r\nSe trata de un iter lógico que debe seguir el proceso, hasta el dictado de la\r\nsentencia con la cual se resuelve el conflicto que une a las partes. Una\r\n“excepción de fondo”, técnicamente hablando es cuando existiendo derecho,\r\nlegitimación e interés en la pretensión del actor, ésta no es susceptible de\r\nser acogida porque también existen otros motivos diversos pero jurídicamente\r\nrelevantes que dan razón a la oposición que presenta el demandado. Ejemplos\r\nclaros de lo que es una excepción de fondo sería la prescripción o caducidad\r\n(ver, Vescovi, Enrique. Teoría General del Proceso. Editorial Temis. Bogotá,\r\nColombia. 1999). Estas tres carencias (de derecho, legitimación e interés\r\nactual), como se ha indicado, en realidad son presupuestos materiales no\r\nexcepciones de fondo en sentido estricto. Valga reiterar que aún en caso de que\r\nla parte demandada no oponga esas particulares “excepciones” si no existe\r\nderecho, legitimación y/o interés actual, la pretensión deberá ser rechazada\r\noficiosamente (Ver al respecto el voto 2008-000523, de la Sala Segunda de la\r\nCorte Suprema de Justicia). La ausencia de derecho es una patología de la\r\ndemanda, en virtud de la cual la pretensión no puede ser acogida en el\r\nentendido de que el ordenamiento jurídico no otorga un sustento para la misma;\r\nlo que naturalmente cambia según el Estado en el cual se encuentre. Las\r\nexcepciones técnicamente hablando, lo que hacen es matar el derecho, de suerte\r\nque una demanda que bien podría ser acogida en otra situación, frente al caso\r\nen concreto no resulta viable declarar el derecho a favor del promovente. Ahora\r\nbien, en lo que respecta a la legitimación activa, siempre en la\r\nconsideración de presupuesto material de una demanda, se tiene que constituye\r\nuno de los presupuestos esenciales del proceso, cuya comprobación debe hacerse\r\nen forma oficiosa por parte del juzgador, pues junto con el derecho y el\r\ninterés constituyen los pilares esenciales para que pueda ser declarada con\r\nlugar una demanda. La legitimación ad causam, junto con el derecho y el interés\r\nactual, constituyen, como se ha dicho, los tres presupuestos materiales de la\r\npretensión. Por tal razón, la misma, a diferencia de la legitimación ad\r\nprocessum, no constituye propiamente un presupuesto de admisibilidad de la\r\ndemanda, ni influye en la validez y eficacia del proceso, pero sí constituye\r\nuna condición necesaria para obtener una sentencia estimatoria. Esta figura se\r\nencuentra regulada en el numeral ciento cuatro del Código Procesal Civil\r\n(aplicable a al materia de conformidad con el artículo doscientos veinte del\r\nCódigo Procesal Contencioso Administrativo): “Parte Legítima: Es aquella que\r\nalega tener una determinada relación jurídica con la pretensión procesal”. Es\r\nde precisar que si bien el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece\r\nuna serie de normas complementarias en lo correspondiente a la legitimación\r\ncorporativa e incluso los intereses difusos, las mismas no resultan contrarias\r\ncon la relación jurídica procesal que debe existir entre las partes en los\r\ntérminos establecidos por el Código Procesal Civil. Así, el actor es aquella\r\npersona que, al tenor de la ley, formula las pretensiones de la demanda, y el\r\ndemandado, quien se opone a esa pretensión; de ahí surge precisamente el\r\nfundamento de la relación sustancial que se da entre ambos con relación al\r\nobjeto concreto del proceso. El vínculo entre las partes surge a partir de la\r\npretensión, de suerte que quien pretende sea la persona llamada a requerirlo y\r\nel demandado quien define si acepta esta o no; el rompimiento de la relación\r\njurídica procesal impediría que el vínculo se genere entre una y otra parte,\r\nllamando a un tercero, que aún cuando podría o no tener algún interés sobre el\r\nparticular, su criterio no resultaría definitorio sobre lo requerido. Al\r\nrespecto señala Andrés de la Oliva Santos: \"La tutela jurisdiccional debe\r\nser otorgada únicamente si obtenerla le corresponde a quien la solicita y, por\r\nsupuesto, si procede otorgarla frente al concreto sujeto demandado: el deudor,\r\nel vendedor. Que una sentencia otorgue la tutela pretendida depende también de\r\nuna precisa legitimación activa y pasiva. Y la legitimación activa significa\r\n-utilizando una vieja distinción puramente lógica- que no basta que exista un\r\nderecho, sino que es necesario que, existiendo, le corresponda o se le pueda\r\natribuir justamente a la persona que lo esgrime, o lo hace valer en el proceso.\r\nIgualmente, cuando se pretende una tutela jurisdiccional respecto de un\r\ndeterminado sujeto (y esta determinación pasiva sirve para identificar y\r\ndistinguir la acción afirmada o la pretensión, porque no hay acciones o\r\npretensiones sin sujeto titular y sin sujeto pasivo concretos), no importa sólo\r\nque esté fundada la exigencia de la prestación que la concesión de la tutela\r\ncomportaría (entregar un determinado bien o una cantidad de dinero, no hacer\r\nalgo, etc.), sino que es necesario, además, que el demandado o demandados sean\r\nprecisamente los sujetos a los que debe afectar aquella concesión, por ser los\r\nsujetos obligados o titulares del deber de realizar la prestación o, por mejor\r\ndecir, su equivalente […]. Se ha dicho, con razón, que la legitimación enseña\r\nalgo completamente elemental: que los derechos subjetivos no existen sin\r\nsujetos titulares ni sin sujetos pasivos y que, de ordinario, los derechos no\r\nse pueden hacer valer si no es por aquéllos y frente a éstos.\" (DE LA\r\nOLIVA SANTOS, Andrés, DIEZ-PICAZO GIMENEZ, Ignacio y otros, Comentarios a la\r\nley de enjuiciamiento civil, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, 2001, p. 95). La lógica\r\nde la legitimación es pretender algo para sí a partir de una relación jurídica\r\nprevia, es de recordar que quien actúa en nombre y por cuenta de otro\r\n(representación), lo hace en tal condición, de suerte que es como si esa\r\npersona lo estuviere haciendo en cuanto se le imputan los efectos de esa\r\ngestión. Sobre la legitimación activa y el interés actual, la Sala Primera de\r\nla Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto Nº 681-F-S1-2010 de las ocho horas\r\nquince minutos del nueve de junio de dos mil diez, se dijo: \"estima\r\nesta Sala que efectivamente el casacionista carece de legitimación activa.\r\nSegún ha dicho en forma reiterada esta Cámara (véase entre otros las sentencias\r\nno. 6, de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 6 de febrero de 1998 y no. 8 de las 15\r\nhoras 45 minutos del 5 de enero de 2000), en los asuntos sometidos a su\r\nconocimiento, el Juez está obligado a analizar, incluso de oficio, los\r\npresupuestos sustanciales o de fondo de toda relación procesal, a saber:\r\nderecho, legitimación e interés. Se trata de condiciones necesarias para el\r\ndictado de una sentencia de fondo, por lo que deben conservarse durante todo el\r\nproceso. De modo que si se detecta la ausencia de uno o más de ellos, el\r\nJuzgador no podrá pronunciarse sobre el fondo de litigio, generándose de esta\r\nforma lo que en doctrina se conoce como sentencia inhibitoria. Sobre el tema ha\r\ndicho este Órgano Colegiado: “V.- Sobre la legitimación activa y el interés\r\nactual esta Sala ha expresado: “…. Los .. materiales o sustantivos, se vinculan\r\ncon la procedencia de la pretensión. Son de fondo. Se refieren a la\r\nlegitimación en sus dos modalidades, el derecho e interés actual. Dentro de los\r\nrequisitos indispensables de una demanda, se exige la petitoria y su\r\nadmisibilidad en el fallo, luego de agotada la etapa del contradictorio, obliga\r\nal actor a conservar durante todo el proceso esos tres presupuestos. De lo\r\ncontrario, es impensable una sentencia estimatoria de haber perdido el\r\naccionante su titularidad e interés en lo reclamado. La decisión se tornaría\r\ninejecutable, de ahí que la jurisprudencia se haya inclinado por su análisis\r\noficioso. La Sala ha abordado el tema en otras ocasiones y se ha manifestado en\r\nlos siguientes términos: “X.-La legitimatio ad causam, no constituye una\r\ncondición o presupuesto de admisibilidad de la acción, ni condiciona su\r\nejercicio válido y eficaz, de ser así no podría ejercer la acción quien no\r\nestuviera legitimado en la causa Pero (sic) sí constituye una condición para\r\nque prospere la pretensión. Legitimado en la causa es quien puede exigir que se\r\nresuelvan las peticiones hechas en la demanda, es decir, la existencia o no del\r\nderecho material que se pretende, por medio de sentencia favorable o\r\ndesfavorable. Por ende cuando alguna de las partes no tiene esa legitimación el\r\njuzgador no puede adoptar una decisión de fondo, encontrándose inhibido para\r\nello. La legitimatio ad causam constituye, entonces condición para el dictado\r\nde la sentencia de fondo o mérito, pero no de la sentencia favorable. Al no\r\npoder el órgano jurisdiccional resolver la existencia o no del derecho material\r\npretendido, o al declarar que se encuentra inhibido para pronunciarse, no se\r\nproduce la cosa juzgada pues el punto de fondo no se ha decidido. La\r\nlegitimación constituye un presupuesto de la pretensión formulada en la demanda\r\ny de la oposición hecha por el demandado, para hacer posible la sentencia de\r\nfondo que las resuelve; consecuentemente la legitimación en la causa no\r\nconstituye un presupuesto procesal, en tanto no se refiere al procedimiento o\r\nal válido ejercicio de la acción, antes bien se refiere a la relación\r\nsustancial que debe existir entre actor y demandado y al interés sustancial que\r\nse discute en el proceso. La legitimación en la causa se refiere a la relación\r\nsustancial que se pretende existente entre las partes del proceso y el interés\r\nsustancial en litigio. El demandado debe ser la persona a quien le corresponde\r\npor la ley oponerse a la pretensión del actor o frente a la cual la ley permite\r\nque se declare la relación jurídica sustancial objeto de la demanda; y el actor\r\nla persona que a tenor de la ley puede formular las pretensiones de la demanda,\r\naunque el derecho sustancial pretendido no exista o le corresponda a otro. Lo\r\nanterior significa que no se precisa ser titular o sujeto activo o pasivo del\r\nderecho o relación jurídica material, sino del interés para que se decida si en\r\nefecto existe, esto es se trata de una legitimación para obtener sentencia de fondo\r\no mérito. De acuerdo al sujeto legitimado o a su posición en la relación\r\nprocesal se puede distinguir entre legitimación activa y pasiva, la primera le\r\ncorresponde al actor y a las personas que con posterioridad intervengan para\r\ndefender su causa, la segunda le pertenece al demandado y a quienes intervengan\r\npara discutir y oponerse a la pretensión del actor. La ausencia de\r\nlegitimación en la causa constituye un impedimento sustancial, si el juzgador\r\nse percata de la falta de la misma, así debe declararlo de oficio... La legitimación en la causa\r\ndemás de determinar quienes pueden actuar en el proceso con derecho a obtener\r\nsentencia de fondo, señala o determina a quiénes deben estar presentes para\r\nhacer posible la sentencia de fondo…” . (Resolución de las 15 horas 10 minutos\r\ndel 24 de septiembre de 1997, correspondiente al voto número 83). Entonces,\r\nsegún se ha visto, se debe entender la legitimación como un presupuesto de\r\nfondo necesario para la procedencia de la pretensión material, es decir, será\r\nparte legítima quien alega tener una determinada relación jurídica con la\r\npetitoria debatida. Ahora bien, según se ha visto, el vínculo entre la\r\nlegitimación y el interés actual es estrecho, siendo ambos presupuestos de\r\nfondo, los cuales deben ser revisados por los juzgadores en todo momento con el\r\nfin de verificar que pueda haber un pronunciamiento válido sobre lo debatido en\r\nel proceso y se deben mantener durante el desarrollo de todo el proceso” . No.\r\n604 de las 10 horas del 17 de agosto de 2007. En consecuencia, la legitimación\r\nes la aptitud para ser parte en un proceso concreto, puede ser activa o pasiva,\r\nlo cual dependerá de las condiciones que para tal efecto establezca la ley en\r\ncuanto la pretensión procesal. Así, la legitimación ad causam activa, que interesa\r\nen el caso en estudio, es la capacidad para demandar, carácter que nace de la\r\nposición en que se halle el sujeto, respecto a la pretensión procesal\r\npromovida. En suma, es la identidad necesaria que debe darse entre el actor y\r\nel derecho que pretenda en juicio” (no. 778 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 28\r\nde julio de 2009)\" .- La legitimación es la “consideración legal, respecto\r\ndel proceso, a las personas que se hallan en una determinada relación con el\r\nobjeto del litigio y en virtud de la cual se exige, para que la pretensión de\r\nfondo pueda ser examinada, que dichas personas figuren como tales partes en el\r\nproceso.” ( Enrique Vescovi. Teoría del Proceso Argentina\r\n1990).Para González Pérez, si bien es cierto se han dado grandes discusiones\r\nacerca del concepto, lo cierto es que tiene un claro significado en cuanto a\r\nque es “la aptitud de ser parte en un proceso concreto”. El autor nacional\r\nManrique Jiménez Meza, la define como \"una aptitud especial o una\r\ncapacidad cualificada de algún sujeto para ser parte en el procedimiento o\r\nproceso específico. Tal capacidad queda derivada en virtud de la relación\r\nexistente entre la esfera de intereses y derechos de ese sujeto con el acto o\r\nhecho realizado por otro sujeto que ilegítimamente invadió tal esfera.” (La\r\nlegitimación Administrativa. Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3 edición\r\nSan José, 2000). La legitimación activa se entiende como la idoneidad para\r\nrealizar actos de ejercicio del poder de acción, y se refiere al sujeto, que le\r\ncorrespondería la posibilidad de exigir la satisfacción de una determinada\r\nprestación u objeto. Por su parte, la legitimación pasiva es la aptitud para\r\nsoportar el ejercicio de dicho poder. Bajo tales consideraciones se procede a\r\ncotejar la \"excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva\" presentada por\r\nla representación estatal. De la lectura mesurada de las pretensiones\r\ndeducidas, es claro que todas ellas fueron presentadas en contra del Colegio\r\nProfesional, sin ser posible ubicar alguna conducta desplegada por El Estado en\r\ntanto persona jurídica. Incluso, en el razonamiento vertido en juicio oral y\r\npúblico, el actor se limitó a indicar que el ente público mayor había sido\r\nllamado a juicio por el solo hecho que él había determinado la generación del\r\nente público no estatal. Aceptar la posibilidad de derivar responsabilidad del\r\nEstado por cada ente público es negar la condición de persona jurídica de estos\r\ny convertirlos en meros órganos, lo que en efecto no procede. La relación con\r\nel Estado es indirecta, en cuanto haber promulgado la ley que permitió la\r\nexistencia del ente autárquico. Al respecto, bien señala la representación\r\nestatal, al señalar que este Tribunal indicó en su oportunidad: \"Los\r\nColegios Profesionales han sido definidos por la Sala Constitucional como\r\n“…Corporaciones de Derecho Público que, por delegación de funciones estatales,\r\ntienen como finalidad velar por la corrección y buen desempeño de las funciones\r\nprofesionales de los afiliados y corregirlos disciplinariamente cuando lesionen\r\na terceros, por ignorancia, impericia, desidia o conducta inmoral en su\r\ndesempeño”. ( Ver el Voto No 1386-90 de las 16:42 horas del 24 de octubre de\r\n1990). Se trata, de entidades corporativas, de interés público, y no de meras\r\nasociaciones, toda vez que son creadas por mandato de una ley específica, (\r\nacto legislativo concreto), para ejercer funciones públicas, concretamente en\r\nlo que respecta al control y regulación del ejercicio de las diversas\r\nprofesiones, por lo que constituyen una modalidad de descentralización de las\r\nfunciones del Estado. ( Ver Voto de la Sala Constitucional No 5483-95 de las\r\n9:33 horas del 6 de octubre de 1995). De esta manera, en el caso concreto,\r\ncompete al Colegio .... realizar las investigaciones contra sus funcionarios de\r\noficio o a instancia de parte, cuando incurran en el desempeño de sus funciones\r\nen una posible falta que amerite una posible sanción.\" (ver voto 16-2005\r\nde las 10:15 horas del 17 de marzo de 2005, de la Sección IV de este Tribunal).\"\r\n(Sentencia No. 10-2013 de las trece horas treinta minutos del dieciocho de\r\nfebrero de dos mil trece. El destacado en negrita es propio).\n\r\n\r\n\nDel criterio anterior, podemos derivar que la legitimación ad causam activa\r\nes la relación de pertenencia que debe existir entre el derecho y el\r\ndemandante del mismo, se trata de la titularidad del derecho reclamado, en cuya\r\npersona recaen los efectos jurídicos que la norma prescribe ante el\r\ncumplimiento de los hechos que sirven de base a la demanda, de tal manera que\r\nsolo el titular del derecho se encuentra plenamente facultado para ejercitar su\r\nreclamo, lo anterior responde a un principio de lógica y justicia en tanto uno\r\nde los fines del derecho en general es dar a cada quien lo que en derecho\r\ncorresponda, en este sentido, obviar la titularidad del derecho o legitimación\r\nen un proceso, conduciría eventualmente a reconocer derechos o imponer\r\nobligaciones a sujetos que no forman parte de la relación jurídico material,\r\ncontrariando el principio de justicia que toda sentencia conlleva\r\nimplícitamente.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA EN EL CASO CONCRETO. En el presente asunto la\r\nparte actora reclama el derecho a ser resarcido por los daños y perjuicios\r\nsufridos a causa de la anulación de los permisos de construcción de una\r\nestación de servicio de combustible, en la que supuestamente había invertido en\r\nsu construcción un 85%. Las partes demandadas opusieron la excepción de falta\r\nde legitimación ad causam activa. En criterio de este Tribunal, del elenco\r\nprobatorio tenido por demostrado, es importante para la resolución de este\r\nasunto valorar lo indicado en el contrato de fideicomiso denominado\r\n\"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial-\r\nFinanciera Acobo 2008\" suscrito por las señoras Orietta y\r\nMaria de los Angeles de apellidos Norza Hernandez en su calidad de\r\nfideicomitentes de los inmuebles de la provincia de Alajuela N°424-386-000\r\ny13351-000; Financiera Acobo S.A en su condición de fiduciario y Total Petróleo\r\nde Costa Rica S.A en su calidad de fideicomisario, con especial énfasis en lo\r\nestipulado en la cláusula décima octava, en la cual las fiduciarias cedieron\r\ntodos sus derechos y obligaciones a Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A cuya\r\nparticipación en dicho contrato consiste en llevar a cabo todos los trámites\r\npara permisos, impuestos, autorizaciones, diseño, construcción de una\r\ngasolinera, con relación al documento suscrito el 14 de enero de 2009 visible a\r\nfolio 10 y 11 del expediente judicial, en el cual la fiduciaria Acobo S.A\r\notorgó autorización a la empresa actora Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM\r\nS.A para realizar todos los trámites de construcción de una estación de\r\nservicio (gasolinera). Los anteriores documentos resultan medulares en este\r\nasunto en tanto de ellos se deriva el tipo de participación que cada uno de los\r\nsuscribientes tuvo con relación al presente asunto, en especial, el último\r\nresulta de importancia por cuanto es el único en donde consta la clase de\r\nparticipación que tuvo la sociedad actora en el negocio relacionado con la\r\nconstrucción de la estación de servicio de combustible, limitada a tramitar permisos\r\nadministrativos, actividad de la cual estima este Tribunal, es imposible\r\nderivar los daños y perjuicios pretendidos por la cancelación de los permisos\r\npara la construcción de la estación de gasolina, ello por tratarse de dos\r\nactividades disímiles, esto es, la tramitación de permisos es una actividad\r\npreparatoria y administrativa mas la construcción es ejecutoria y técnica, sin\r\nque conste prueba alguna de que la actora fuese también la encargada de ejercer\r\nla segunda, en cuyo caso, de serlo también, hubiese sido por cuenta del titular\r\ndel derecho de construcción, mas no por el suyo propio. En relación con esto,\r\nla actora no era la titular de la licencia de construcción otorgada por la\r\nMunicipalidad de Alajuela, obsérvese que el permiso que consta en oficio N° MA\r\nSPU PA 338-2009 (f. 1 y 2 del exp. administrativo) con el que concluyó todo el\r\nprocedimiento administrativo complejo, que involucró la participación de otras\r\nadministraciones públicas, tales como SETENA, Ministerio de Salud, MOPT, MINAE.\r\netc, está concedido a la Financiera Acobo S.A en su condición de propietaria\r\nfiduciaria de las fincas sobre las que se construiría el proyecto, de tal\r\nmanera que los efectos de la anulación de dicho permiso no recayeron sobre los\r\nderechos e intereses de la actora, por no ser titular de dicho derecho, razón\r\npor la que no se encuentra legitimada para reclamar la reparación de los\r\nsupuestos daños causados derivados de la anulación del permiso de construcción,\r\nal no ser la titular del mismo. Corolario, se deberá acoger la excepción de\r\nfalta de legitimación ad causam activa y declarar sin lugar la demanda. Por la\r\nforma en que se resuelve, se omite pronunciamiento respecto al fondo del asunto\r\ny las demás excepciones interpuestas por los demandados por innecesario.\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- COSTAS: En el presente asunto, resulta procedente la aplicación de la\r\ncláusula general de condenatoria en costas al vencido de conformidad con el\r\nnumeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, ya que no se\r\nobserva mérito alguno en el presente asunto para aplicar la excepción dispuesta\r\npor dicha norma, razón por la cual se deberá condenar a la actora al pago de\r\nambas costas de este proceso, en el caso del Estado además deberá reconocer\r\nintereses legales sobre las mismas. \n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO\n\r\n\r\n\nSe acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación activa. Se declara sin lugar\r\nla demanda interpuesta por Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A contra\r\nel Estado y la Municipalidad de Alajuela. Son ambas costas a cargo de la parte\r\nvencida, quien además deberá pagar intereses legales sobre las costas en favor\r\ndel Estado. Notifíquese.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nAdolfo Fernández Loaiza\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nClaudia Bolaños\r\nSalazar Otto\r\nGonzález Vílchez\n\r\n\r\n\nJueces Sección I\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nExp. 12-005263-1027 CA Constructora\r\nAluminios y Metales/ Estado y Municipalidad\r\nAlajuela. 3", "body_en_text": "Vote No. 30 -2016- I\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, FIRST SECTION, San José, at eight o'clock on the twentieth of April of the year two thousand sixteen.\n\nOrdinary proceeding filed by CONSTRUCTORA DE ALUMINIOS Y METALES ACM S.A, legal identification number three-one hundred-one-three hundred seventy-three thousand nine hundred ninety-three, represented by Mr. Douglas Esquivel González, identity card number four- one hundred fifty-five- five hundred forty-five and Lic. Edgar Rainier Cordero Campos, attorney, in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, against THE STATE, represented by Procurador Ronny Bassey Fallas and the MUNICIPALITY OF ALAJUELA represented by the Municipal Mayor Lic. Roberto Hernán Thompson Chacón, identity card number two- three hundred fifty-one- four hundred eighty-seven and Lic. Juan Carlos Campos Monge, attorney, in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact. Also participating as active coadjuvant is the company Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A, legal identification number three-one hundred-one-three hundred seventy-four thousand- four hundred seventy-nine under the same representation and legal counsel as the plaintiff.\n\nWHEREAS\n\n1.- Estimated in the exact sum of five hundred five million colones, the purpose of the lawsuit is to determine in judgment that the actions and omissions of the defendant institutions created serious damages and losses to the plaintiff consisting of having presented to them a legal framework to build a Fuel Service Station, causing them to invest enormously and then arbitrarily proceeding to annul the permits, paralyzing the construction without allowing them to operate. That the defendants be ordered to pay material damages for the loss and/or lost profits (lucro cesante) for all the time the plaintiff has been unable to carry out the commercial activity of the service station, extraordinary expenses incurred as a result of the delay due to the stoppage of the work in the amount of two hundred million colones. Psychological moral damages suffered by the partners, shareholders, officers, employees, who belong to the plaintiff company in the amount of fifteen million colones. Objective moral damages for the deterioration of the company's image before the Alajuela community and in general, since it was even published negatively in the media, which it estimated in the sum of two hundred million colones. Damages for the loss of net utility value and/or lost profits (lucro cesante) for the non-exercise of the service station activity in the sum of two hundred ninety million colones. That the defendants be ordered to pay both costs. (f.83.84, 251,252 judicial exp. and supplementary hearing of the oral and public trial recorded in digital format).\n\n2.- The State answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of contributory negligence (culpa de la víctima), act of a third party (hecho de un tercero), lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa), lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), expiry (caducidad), statute of limitations (prescripción), act not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de ser impugnado), lack of jurisdiction (falta de competencia) and inadmissibility of the claim (inadmisibilidad de la acción), necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) and requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs and their interest (f. 199-211 judicial exp.).\n\n3.- The Municipality of Alajuela answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), expiry (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) (f. 187-195, 247-250 judicial exp.).\n\n4.- The defense of lack of jurisdiction (falta de competencia) was resolved without merit by resolution No. 1124-2014 at 16:05 hrs. on May 22, 2014. The defense of act not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación) was resolved and rejected by resolution No. 248-2015 at 14:15 hrs. on January 30, 2015. The defense of necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) was resolved and rejected by resolution No. 257-205 at 16:30 hrs. on January 30, 2015. The defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) was resolved and rejected by resolution No. 301-2015 at 16:10 hrs. on February 4, 2016 (f. 213 to 216, 253, 254, 255-257, 258-262 judicial exp.).\n\n5.- The preliminary hearing provided for in numeral 90 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code was held on October 10, 2014, January 30, 2015, and April 20, 2015 (f.234-236, 251,252, 272,273 judicial exp. as well as recording in digital format).\n\n6.- The oral and public trial was held on April 12, 2016, with its processing ordered as complex under numeral one hundred eleven of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code and forty-seven of the Regulations, as well as the corresponding issuance of the judgment in writing.\n\n7.- In the proceedings, the required formalities have been observed and no grounds for nullity capable of invalidating what has been done are noted. This judgment is issued after the required deliberation, unanimously, and drafted by Judge Fernández Loaiza.\n\nCONSIDERING:\n\nI. THE BASIS OF THE PROCEEDING: The plaintiff party stated that in July 2008, the companies Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A (hereinafter Total Petróleo) and Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A (hereinafter MCM) signed a purchase-sale option for the La Radial service station located on the properties of the province of Alajuela No. 424386-000 and 13351-000. That a guarantee trust agreement (fideicomiso de garantía) was signed between the owners of the cited properties in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes), Financiera Acobo as trustee (fiduciaria), and Total Petróleo as beneficiary (fideicomisaria). That the plaintiff company was responsible for obtaining all administrative permits; thus, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) granted environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) through resolution 2828-2008 SETENA. The General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuel of MINAE, by resolution R-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET, approved the lots described in the properties of the province of Alajuela 13351-000 and 424386-000 for the construction of the La Radial Service Station, and likewise, through resolution R-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET, the approval of construction plans for said station was granted. On July 23, 2009, the Municipal Water and Sewer Administration approved a potable water service for the service station. On June 17, 2008, through official letter MA-SPU-TA0338-2009 from the Department of Urban Planning Subprocess of the Municipality of Alajuela, construction permit No. 3444 for the fuel service station was granted, a moment from which the plaintiff began construction of the service station. However, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through vote No. 11941-2010, corresponding to an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by third parties, annulled construction permit No. 3444 of the Municipality of Alajuela and resolutions R DGTCC-269-2009 and R DGTCC325-2009 MINAE, and ordered the State and the Municipality of Alajuela to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the acts that served as the basis for the appeal. It questioned the grounds of the Constitutional Chamber's vote, which, in its opinion, opportunelessly, illegally, and arbitrarily annulled the plaintiff's permits, which it had obtained legally and timely, fully complying with all legal requirements for the installation, construction, and operation of the fuel service station. It indicated that the La Radial service station does not represent any danger to neighbors or third parties, since it is built with the safest international standards in its construction, met the legal requirements, and underwent oversight by all competent public institutions. That the Constitutional Chamber, the State, and the Municipality of Alajuela have carried out acts and omissions that caused serious damages and losses to the plaintiff, and that article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that the Public Administration shall always be liable if its functioning produces damage or loss, whether the action is normal or abnormal, legal or illegal; that there is a causal link between the State's functioning and the damage caused, which is not broken because the exempting conditions of liability such as contributory negligence (culpa de la víctima), act of a third party (hecho de un tercero), and force majeure (fuerza mayor) are not present. It added that the referred vote of the Constitutional Chamber violated the limit on police power regarding the necessity of the adopted measure, since the annulment of the permits was based on a completely unserious and unsubstantiated assumption, given that there is no danger between the service station and the company Molinos de Costa Rica, which is located at a considerable distance. Furthermore, it considered that the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva legal) was violated by regulating the human and fundamental rights of the plaintiff through a regulation.\n\nMunicipality of Alajuela: indicated that for the construction of a service station, a Municipal permit is required, and that it was the Construction Control Activity, through official letter No. MA-SPU-PA-338-2009, that granted Financiera Acobo and Douglas Esquivel González the construction permit for the service station; construction then began, in which a part was carried out in breach of the permit, as the design of one of the buildings was changed and the construction area was increased, as seen at folios 15, 16, and 17 of the administrative file of the Urban Control Proceeding. It rejected that the municipal actions were abusive, intransigent, or in any way favorable to the company Molinos de Costa Rica; rather, it acted based on the competencies and legal obligations incumbent on the municipality, and that the annulment of the permits was a constitutional order and not an administrative decision of the municipality. It stated that it is not the competence of the Municipality to verify the safety or danger of the construction, as that belongs to other public institutions, and that the construction permit was granted because all the required documents were provided. That the Municipality acted in accordance with its competencies, without the plaintiff party determining the acts or omissions attributable to the municipality for asserting a clear defense, and also that it does not clearly indicate what it seeks from the Municipality, which affects the evidence it can provide. It insisted that the annulment of the administrative permits was by judicial order, without there currently being an order reversing what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, which means the plaintiff's request is outside the law, since the order of said Chamber is binding erga omnes and therefore irresistible and inapplicable due to constitutional supremacy. In its opinion, if any damage was caused, it would have been against the companies Financiera Acobo, Total Petróleo, or the registered owners of the properties, as stated in the trust agreement (fideicomiso) signed between those parties, given that the plaintiff undertook within said contract to obtain the permits in favor of Total Petróleo, which it tried to bring into the proceeding to gain standing to sue the State, this being a relationship between private entities whose disputes must be resolved in civil court. Therefore, the plaintiff is not an interested party and lacks standing to sue the municipality; the land use and construction permits were not granted in its name. It raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), expiry (caducidad), and statute of limitations (prescripción).\n\nThe State answered the lawsuit negatively, warned about the inadmissibility of the plaintiff's claims in seeking to challenge the Constitutional Chamber's vote through this means, which is a jurisdictional and not an administrative action, and therefore raised the defense of act not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación). It considered that the annulment of the plaintiff's administrative permits related to the construction of a fuel service station is lawful, since in application of the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), it is not appropriate for a station of this type to be located near a factory such as the company Molinos de Costa Rica. It pointed out that the State's action was lawful, hence it cannot generate damages and losses to the plaintiff party, which must be rejected because the plaintiff omitted to refer to them; it warned that there is no clear and certain determination of the damages and losses, as it does not conform to what is stated in article 58.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and that the plaintiff party does not credit, demonstrate, or specify the existence of irreparable or irreversible damages, potential or current; the damages have not been individualized; the plaintiff party claims a nonexistent amount, not conforming to article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration. It reported that it is clear that it is not manifestly demonstrated that the annulment of the permits by the Constitutional Chamber caused damage or loss to the plaintiff; therefore, there is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific and respective manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury that demonstrates the damage or loss, which also lacks evidence in this regard. It raised the defenses of contributory negligence (culpa de la víctima), act of a third party (hecho de un tercero), lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y activa), lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), expiry (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción), act not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación), lack of jurisdiction (falta de competencia), and inadmissibility of the claim (inadmisibilidad de la acción). It requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs.\n\nII. PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following relevant facts are found: 1- That on August 12, 2008, Mrs. Orietta Norza Hernández and Mrs. María de los Angeles Norza Hernández, Financiera Acobo S.A, and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A entered into a trust agreement (fideicomiso) called \"Property Guarantee Trust La Radial Service Station\" (\"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial\"), the first two persons in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes) of the properties registered in the province of Alajuela No. 424386-000 and 13351-000, the second as Trustee (Fiduciario), and the third in its capacity as Beneficiary (Fideicomisario), whose objective was to maintain the properties and all their improvements, structures, work progress and/or completed work, in fiduciary ownership, to guarantee the immediate delivery of said properties to the beneficiary (fideicomisaria); for this purpose, Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A (hereinafter MCM) had to carry out all procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, construction of a gas station. According to the eighteenth clause of said contract, the trustors (fideicomitentes) irrevocably assigned all their rights and obligations to MCM, which appears as coadjuvant in this proceeding (f. 1-9 judicial exp.). 2- The trust properties of the province of Alajuela No. 13351-000 and 424386-000 were registered on August 27, 2008, in the name of Financiera Acobo S.A in its capacity as trustee (fiduciario) (f.27,28 adm. exp.). 3- Through official letter R- DGRCC- 320- 2008 of June 12, 2008, reiterated in resolution R-DGTCC- 269- 2009 MINAET of June 9, 2009, and R- DGTCC- 325- 2009 of July 7, 2009, the General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuels of MINAET granted approval of the land and the construction plans and expansion of the La Radial service station within the trust properties (f.97-101 adm. exp., 19-22, 25-28 judicial exp.). 4- On January 14, 2009, the Trustee (Fiduciario) authorized Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A to carry out all construction procedures for a service station (gas station) before the Municipality of Alajuela on the trust properties (f.10,11 judicial exp.). 5- By resolution No. 2828-2008 SETENA of October 1, 2008, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat granted Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental) to the project for the construction and operation of a fuel service station, leaving the Environmental Management stage open and on the understanding of complying with the Environmental Commitment clause (f.50-55 adm. exp.). 6- Through official letters 1634/PU/U/08 and 1635/PU/U/08 both of October 7, 2008, the Municipality of Alajuela granted the land use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) for the construction of a Service Station on the trust properties (f. 31,38 adm. exp.). 7- By resolution No. MA-AAAA-305-2009-S of July 23, 2009, the Water and Sewer Administration of the Municipality of Alajuela approved for Financiera Acobo S.A a potable water and sanitary sewer service for a fuel service station on the trust properties (f.32-34 judicial exp.). 8- The Municipality of Alajuela, Urban Planning Subprocess, through official letter No. MA- SPU-PA-0338-2009 of June 17, 2009, granted the trustee (fiduciaria) Financiera Acobo a construction permit for the fuel service station (f.1,2 adm. exp.). 9- The Municipality of Alajuela, Fiscal and Urban Control Process, on November 24, 2009, closed down the construction of the service station due to non-compliance with the construction law and regulations (acta No. 230-2009 f. 16 adm. exp.). 10- The Constitutional Chamber, through vote No. 11941-2010 at 11:21 hrs. on July 9, 2010, granted an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by Mr. Sergio Ivan Alfaro Salas against the Ministry of Health, the Municipality of Alajuela, and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat for the illegal granting of administrative permits for the construction and operation of the fuel service station, ordering the annulment of the construction permit granted by the Municipality of Alajuela and resolutions R-DGTC-269-2009 and R-DGTCC-325-2009 MINAE of the General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuel of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (f.57-69 judicial exp.).\n\nIV. UNPROVEN FACTS: None relevant to the resolution of this matter.\n\nV. ANALYSIS OF STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM): The defendants raised the defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa). Since standing is the first basic structural requirement that every lawsuit must meet, together with interest and right, its analysis is even ex officio by the judge; by reason of the foregoing, the analysis of said defense will be addressed forthwith, based on a ruling by Section IV of this Tribunal that had already analyzed the concept of standing in a very clear and complete manner, in this regard indicated:\n\n\"On the basis of the clear reasoning set forth by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its well-known vote No. 2008-000317 at nine hours ten minutes on May second, two thousand eight, indicated on multiple occasions by this jurisdictional body, it is opportune to establish the difference that exists between the procedural concept of 'substantive defense' (excepción de fondo) and the substantive requirements of the action, which, summarizing and applying it to the specific case, is worth setting out. For a lawsuit to be processed, the jurisdictional body must review ex officio the procedural requirements (procedural capacity, court jurisdiction, and fulfillment of the lawsuit requirements). Without meeting these requirements, the lawsuit could not be processed, as the minimum requirements for a proceeding to be heard are not met. Later, chronologically and logically afterwards, upon rendering judgment, for the claim to be upheld, it must also be reviewed ex officio whether the substantive requirements are met. These are: right, standing (legitimación), and current interest (interés actual). If any of these -or all- do not exist, the lawsuit cannot find a positive response. Thus, the first requirements are necessary for a lawsuit to be admissible, valid, or effective from the formal standpoint, while the second correspond to requirements for a favorable resolution. It is worth adding that the Roman-Germanic-Latin system starts from the premise that the judge is unable to hear the merits of the claim until the moment of issuing the judgment, under penalty of prejudging; except for cases expressly permitted by the legal order. This is a logical sequence (iter lógico) that the proceeding must follow, until the judgment is rendered resolving the dispute that binds the parties. A 'substantive defense' (excepción de fondo), technically speaking, is when, although the plaintiff's claim has right, standing (legitimación), and interest, it cannot be upheld because there are also other diverse but legally relevant reasons that support the opposition presented by the defendant. Clear examples of a substantive defense would be the statute of limitations (prescripción) or expiry (caducidad) (see, Vescovi, Enrique. Teoría General del Proceso. Editorial Temis. Bogotá, Colombia. 1999). These three deficiencies (of right, standing, and current interest), as indicated, are in reality substantive requirements, not substantive defenses in the strict sense. It is worth reiterating that even if the defendant party does not raise those particular 'defenses,' if there is no right, standing (legitimación), and/or current interest (interés actual), the claim must be rejected ex officio (See in this regard vote 2008-000523, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). The absence of right is a pathology of the lawsuit, by virtue of which the claim cannot be upheld in the understanding that the legal system does not provide a basis for it; which naturally changes according to the State in which one finds oneself. Defenses, technically speaking, kill the right, such that a lawsuit that could well be upheld in another situation, in the specific case it is not viable to declare the right in favor of the plaintiff. Now, with respect to active standing (legitimación activa), always in the consideration of a substantive requirement of a lawsuit, it constitutes one of the essential requirements of the proceeding, whose verification must be made ex officio by the judge, since together with right and interest, they constitute the essential pillars for the lawsuit to be declared with merit. Standing (legitimación ad causam), along with right and current interest (interés actual), constitute, as stated, the three substantive requirements of the claim. For this reason, it, unlike standing to sue (legitimación ad processum), does not properly constitute a requirement for the admissibility of the lawsuit, nor does it influence the validity and effectiveness of the proceeding, but it does constitute a necessary condition for obtaining a favorable judgment. This concept is regulated in numeral one hundred four of the Civil Procedural Code (applicable to the matter in accordance with article two hundred twenty of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code): 'Legitimate Party: Is that which claims to have a certain legal relationship with the procedural claim.' It should be specified that although the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establishes a series of complementary rules regarding corporate standing and even diffuse interests, they are not contrary to the procedural legal relationship that must exist between the parties in the terms established by the Civil Procedural Code. Thus, the plaintiff is that person who, according to law, formulates the claims of the lawsuit, and the defendant, who opposes that claim; from this precisely arises the foundation of the substantial relationship that exists between both in relation to the specific object of the proceeding. The link between the parties arises from the claim, such that the person who claims must be the person called to request it, and the defendant the one who defines whether to accept it or not; the breaking of the procedural legal relationship would prevent the link from being generated between one and the other party, calling upon a third party who, even though they might or might not have some interest in the matter, their criterion would not be decisive regarding what is requested. In this regard, Andrés de la Oliva Santos points out: 'Jurisdictional protection must be granted only if the person requesting it is entitled to obtain it and, of course, if it is proper to grant it against the specific defendant: the debtor, the seller. That a judgment grants the requested protection also depends on a precise active and passive standing (legitimación). And active standing means -using an old purely logical distinction- that it is not enough that a right exists, but it is necessary that, existing, it belongs or can justly be attributed to the person who invokes it, or asserts it in the proceeding. Likewise, when jurisdictional protection is sought against a specific subject (and this passive determination serves to identify and distinguish the action asserted or the claim, because there are no actions or claims without a specific titleholder subject and without a specific passive subject), it matters not only that the demand for the obligation that the granting of the protection would entail is founded (deliver a specific good or sum of money, not to do something, etc.), but it is also necessary that the defendant or defendants are precisely the subjects who must be affected by that grant, for being the subjects obligated or the holders of the duty to perform the obligation or, rather, its equivalent [...]. It has been rightly said that standing (legitimación) teaches something completely elementary: that subjective rights do not exist without titleholder subjects or without passive subjects, and that, ordinarily, rights cannot be asserted save by the former and against the latter.' (DE LA OLIVA SANTOS, Andrés, DIEZ-PICAZO GIMENEZ, Ignacio and others, Comentarios a la ley de enjuiciamiento civil, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, 2001, p. 95). The logic of standing (legitimación) is to claim something for oneself based on a prior legal relationship; it should be remembered that one who acts in the name and on behalf of another (representation) does so in such capacity, so that it is as if that person were doing it, inasmuch as the effects of that action are attributed to them. On active standing and current interest (interés actual), the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 681-F-S1-2010 at eight hours fifteen minutes on June ninth, two thousand ten, stated: 'This Chamber considers that the appellant indeed lacks active standing (legitimación activa). As this Chamber has repeatedly stated (see among others judgments no. 6, at 14 hours 30 minutes on February 6, 1998, and no. 8 at 15 hours 45 minutes on January 5, 2000), in matters submitted to its knowledge, the Judge is obliged to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or substantive requirements of any procedural relationship, namely: right, standing (legitimación), and interest. These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, so they must be maintained throughout the proceeding. So that if the absence of one or more of them is detected, the Judge may not rule on the merits of the dispute, thereby generating what in doctrine is known as an inhibitory judgment. On the subject, this Collegiate Body has stated: \"V.- Regarding active standing (legitimación activa) and current interest (interés actual) this Chamber has expressed: \".... The … substantive or material requirements are linked to the propriety of the claim. They pertain to the merits. They refer to standing (legitimación) in its two modalities, right, and current interest (interés actual).\n\nAmong the indispensable requirements of a complaint, the prayer for relief is required, and its admissibility in the judgment, after the adversarial stage has been exhausted, obliges the plaintiff to maintain those three prerequisites throughout the entire proceeding. Otherwise, a favorable judgment is unthinkable if the plaintiff has lost standing and interest in what is claimed. The decision would become unenforceable, hence the case law has leaned toward its sua sponte analysis. This Chamber has addressed the issue on other occasions and has stated as follows: “X.- Legitimatio ad causam does not constitute a condition or prerequisite for the admissibility of the action, nor does it condition its valid and effective exercise; if that were the case, a person not having standing in the cause could not bring the action. But it does constitute a condition for the claim to succeed. One who has standing in the cause is the person who can demand that the requests made in the complaint be resolved, that is, the existence or non-existence of the substantive right sought, by means of a favorable or unfavorable judgment. Therefore, when one of the parties lacks such standing, the adjudicator cannot adopt a decision on the merits, being barred from doing so. Legitimatio ad causam thus constitutes a condition for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, but not of a favorable judgment. Since the jurisdictional body cannot resolve the existence or non-existence of the substantive right sought, or declares itself barred from ruling, res judicata does not arise because the merits have not been decided. Standing constitutes a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition raised by the defendant, to make possible a judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantive interest being disputed in the proceeding. Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in dispute. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the subject of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff, the person who under the law can formulate the claims of the complaint, even if the substantive right sought does not exist or belongs to another. The foregoing means that one need not be the holder or the active or passive subject of the right or material legal relationship, but rather must have the interest for it to be decided whether it indeed exists; that is, it is a matter of standing to obtain a judgment on the merits. According to the party with standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be drawn between active and passive standing; the former belongs to the plaintiff and to persons who subsequently intervene to defend their cause, the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantive impediment; if the adjudicator becomes aware of its lack, it must be so declared sua sponte… Standing in the cause, in addition to determining who may act in the proceeding with the right to obtain a judgment on the merits, indicates or determines who must be present to make a judgment on the merits possible…” (Decision of 15 hours 10 minutes on September 24, 1997, corresponding to Vote No. 83). Thus, as has been seen, standing must be understood as a substantive prerequisite necessary for the viability of the material claim; that is, a legitimate party is one who alleges having a certain legal relationship with the disputed prayer for relief. Now then, as has been seen, the link between standing and current interest is close, both being substantive prerequisites, which must be reviewed by adjudicators at all times in order to verify that a valid ruling can be made on what is being debated in the proceeding, and they must be maintained throughout the development of the entire proceeding.” No. 604 of 10 hours on August 17, 2007. Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific proceeding; it may be active or passive, depending on the conditions that the law establishes for such purpose regarding the procedural claim. Thus, active legitimatio ad causam, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position in which the subject finds themselves with respect to the procedural claim brought. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they seek in court” (No. 778 of 14 hours 50 minutes on July 28, 2009). Standing is the “legal consideration, with respect to the proceeding, of persons who are in a specific relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, for the substantive claim to be examined, that those persons appear as such parties in the proceeding.” (Enrique Vescovi. Teoría del Proceso, Argentina 1990). For González Pérez, although there has been considerable discussion about the concept, it clearly means “the aptitude to be a party in a specific proceeding.” National author Manrique Jiménez Meza defines it as “a special aptitude or a qualified capacity of some subject to be a party in the specific procedure or proceeding. Such capacity is derived by virtue of the relationship existing between that subject’s sphere of interests and rights and the act or fact carried out by another subject that illegitimately invaded that sphere.” (La legitimación Administrativa. Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3rd edition, San José, 2000). Active standing is understood as the suitability to perform acts exercising the power of action, and refers to the subject who would have the possibility of demanding satisfaction of a specific obligation or object. For its part, passive standing is the aptitude to bear the exercise of said power. Under such considerations, we proceed to examine the “exception (defense) of lack of passive standing” raised by the State’s representation. From a measured reading of the claims brought, it is clear that all of them were filed against the Professional Association (Colegio Profesional), without it being possible to identify any conduct carried out by the State as a legal entity. Even in the reasoning advanced during the oral and public hearing, the plaintiff merely indicated that the larger public entity had been sued solely because it had determined the creation of the non-state public entity. To accept the possibility of deriving liability from the State for each public entity is to deny those entities’ status as legal persons and to turn them into mere organs, which is indeed inappropriate. The relationship with the State is indirect, insofar as it promulgated the law that allowed the existence of the autonomous entity. In this regard, the State’s representation correctly points out that this Court previously indicated: “Professional Associations (Colegios Profesionales) have been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as ‘…Corporations of Public Law that, by delegation of state functions, have the purpose of ensuring the correctness and proper performance of the professional duties of their members and of disciplining them when they harm third parties through ignorance, incompetence, negligence, or immoral conduct in their performance.’ (See Vote No. 1386-90 of 16:42 hours on October 24, 1990). They are corporate entities of public interest, and not mere associations, since they are created by mandate of a specific law (a concrete legislative act) to exercise public functions, specifically with respect to the control and regulation of the practice of the various professions, thus constituting a form of decentralization of State functions. (See Vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 5483-95 of 9:33 hours on October 6, 1995). Thus, in the specific case, it is the responsibility of the Professional Association .... to conduct investigations against its officials, sua sponte or upon complaint by a party, when in the performance of their duties they incur a possible infraction warranting a possible sanction.” (See Vote 16-2005 of 10:15 hours on March 17, 2005, of Section IV of this Court).” (Judgment No. 10-2013 of thirteen hours thirty minutes on February eighteenth, two thousand thirteen. Bold emphasis is our own).\n\nFrom the foregoing criterion, we can derive that active legitimatio ad causam is the relationship of belonging that must exist between the right and the plaintiff thereof; it concerns the ownership of the claimed right, in whose person the legal effects that the rule prescribes upon the fulfillment of the facts serving as the basis for the complaint are vested, such that only the holder of the right is fully empowered to assert their claim. The foregoing responds to a principle of logic and justice insofar as one of the purposes of law in general is to give each person what in right corresponds to them. In this sense, disregarding the ownership of the right or standing in a proceeding would eventually lead to recognizing rights or imposing obligations on subjects who are not part of the material legal relationship, contradicting the principle of justice that every judgment implicitly entails.\n\nVI.- ON ACTIVE STANDING IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. In the present matter, the plaintiff claims the right to be compensated for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered due to the annulment of construction permits for a fuel service station, in which they had allegedly invested 85% of its construction. The defendants raised the exception (defense) of lack of active legitimatio ad causam. In the opinion of this Court, from the body of evidence deemed proven, it is important for resolving this matter to assess what is stated in the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso) called “Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial- Financiera Acobo 2008” signed by Ms. Orietta and Maria de los Angeles, last names Norza Hernandez, in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes) of the properties of the province of Alajuela No. 424-386-000 and 13351-000; Financiera Acobo S.A., in its capacity as trustee (fiduciario); and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A., in its capacity as beneficiary (fideicomisario), with special emphasis on the provisions of clause eighteen, in which the trustors assigned all their rights and obligations to Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A., whose participation in said contract consists of carrying out all the procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, and construction of a gas station, in relation to the document signed on January 14, 2009, visible on folios 10 and 11 of the judicial file, in which the trustee, Acobo S.A., granted authorization to the plaintiff company, Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. (Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A.), to carry out all the construction procedures for a service station (gas station). The foregoing documents are crucial in this matter insofar as the type of participation each of the signatories had in relation to this case is derived from them. In particular, the latter is important because it is the only one that records the kind of participation the plaintiff company had in the business related to the construction of the fuel service station, limited to processing administrative permits, an activity from which, this Court considers, it is impossible to derive the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) claimed from the cancellation of the permits for the construction of the gas station. This is because they are two dissimilar activities; that is, permit processing is a preparatory and administrative activity, whereas construction is executory and technical, without any evidence existing that the plaintiff was also in charge of performing the latter; in which case, even if it were, it would have been on behalf of the holder of the construction right, not for its own. In relation to this, the plaintiff was not the holder of the construction license granted by the Municipality of Alajuela (Municipalidad de Alajuela). Observe that the permit appearing in official communication No. MA SPU PA 338-2009 (f. 1 and 2 of the administrative file), which concluded the entire complex administrative procedure involving the participation of other public administrations, such as SETENA, Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), MOPT, MINAE, etc., is granted to Financiera Acobo S.A. in its capacity as fiduciary owner of the properties on which the project was to be built. Thus, the effects of the annulment of said permit did not fall upon the rights and interests of the plaintiff, as it was not the holder of said right. For this reason, it does not have standing to claim reparation for the alleged damages caused by the annulment of the construction permit since it was not the holder thereof. As a corollary, the exception (defense) of lack of active legitimatio ad causam must be upheld, and the complaint must be dismissed. Given the manner in which this matter is resolved, a ruling on the merits of the matter and the other exceptions (defenses) raised by the defendants is omitted as unnecessary.\n\nVIII.- COSTS (Costas): In the present matter, application of the general clause condemning the losing party to pay costs (costas) is appropriate in accordance with Article 193 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), since no merit is observed in this case for applying the exception provided by that rule. For this reason, the plaintiff must be ordered to pay both sets of costs (costas) of this proceeding; in the case of the State, it must also recognize legal interest on them.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe exception (defense) of lack of active standing is upheld. The complaint filed by Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. against the State and the Municipality of Alajuela (Municipalidad de Alajuela) is dismissed. Both costs (costas) shall be borne by the losing party, who must also pay legal interest on the costs (costas) in favor of the State. Notify.\n\nAdolfo Fernández Loaiza\n\nClaudia Bolaños\nSalazar Otto\nGonzález Vílchez\n\nJudges, Section I (Jueces Sección I)\n\nExp. 12-005263-1027 CA Constructora\nAluminios y Metales/ Estado y Municipalidad\nAlajuela. 3\n\nHe questioned the foundations of the Constitutional Chamber's ruling which, in his opinion, inopportunely, illegally, and arbitrarily annulled the plaintiff's permits that she had obtained legally and in a timely manner, fully complying with all legal requirements for the installation, construction, and operation of the fuel service station. He indicated that the La Radial service station does not represent any danger to neighbors or third parties, since it is built with the safest international standards in its construction, it met the legal requirements and oversight of all competent public institutions. That the Constitutional Chamber, the State, and the Municipality of Alajuela have performed acts and omissions that caused serious harm and damages (daños y perjuicios) to the plaintiff and that Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that the Public Administration shall always be liable if its operation produces a harm or damage, whether the action is normal or abnormal, legal or illegal; that there is a causal link between the operation of the State and the damage caused, which is not broken because the exonerating circumstances of liability, such as fault of the victim, act of a third party, and force majeure, are not present. He added that the referred ruling of the Constitutional Chamber violated the limit on police power regarding the necessity of the measure adopted, since the annulment of the permits was based on a supposition that is not at all serious or concrete, as there is no danger between the service station and the company Molinos de Costa Rica, which is at a considerable distance. Furthermore, he considered that the principle of legal reserve was violated by regulating the plaintiff's human and fundamental rights through a regulation.\n\n**Municipality of Alajuela**: indicated that for the construction of a service station, a permit from the Municipality is required, and that it was the Construction Control Activity through official letter No. MA-SPU-PA-338-2009 that granted the construction permit for the service station to Financiera Acobo and Douglas Esquivel González. Subsequently, construction began, a part of which was carried out in non-compliance with the permit, as the design of one of the buildings was changed and the construction area was increased, as seen on folios 15, 16, and 17 of the administrative file of the Urban Control Process. It rejected that the municipal actions were abusive, intransigent, or in any way favorable to the company Molinos de Costa Rica; rather, it acted based on the legal powers and obligations corresponding to the municipality, and the annulment of the permits was a constitutional order and not an administrative decision of the municipality. It expressed that it is not the Municipality's competence to verify the dangerousness or not of the construction, as this is the purview of other public institutions, and the construction permit was granted because all the required documents were provided. That the Municipality acted in accordance with its powers without the plaintiff determining the acts or omissions attributable to the municipality to exercise a clear defense, as well as that she does not clearly state what she seeks from the Municipality, which affects the evidence it can provide. It insisted that the annulment of the administrative permits was by a judicial order, and there is no order at this time that reverses what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, which means the plaintiff's request is outside the law, as the order of said Chamber is binding *erga omnes* and therefore irresistible and inapplicable by constitutional supremacy. In its view, if any damage occurred, it would have been against the companies Financiera Acobo, Total Petróleo, or the registered owners of the properties, as recorded in the trust agreement signed between those parties; the plaintiff committed within said agreement to obtain the permits in favor of Total Petróleo, which it tried to bring into the process in order to legitimize itself to sue the State, this being a relationship between private entities whose disputes must be resolved in civil court. Therefore, the plaintiff is not an interested party and is not legitimized to sue the municipality; the land-use (uso de suelo) and construction permits were not granted in her name. It interposed the exceptions of lack of right, lack of standing (falta de legitimación), failure to exhaust administrative remedies, expiration (caducidad), and statute of limitations (prescripción).\n\n**The State**: answered the lawsuit negatively, warned about the inadmissibility of the plaintiff's claims when attempting to challenge through this route the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, which is a jurisdictional and not an administrative action, therefore it interposed the exception of an act not susceptible to challenge. It considered that the annulment of the plaintiff's administrative permits related to the construction of a fuel service station is in accordance with the law, since by application of the precautionary principle it is not appropriate for a station of this type to be located near a factory such as the company Molinos de Costa Rica. It pointed out that the State's action was in accordance with the law, hence it is not susceptible to generating harm and damages to the plaintiff, an extreme that must be rejected because the plaintiff omits making reference to them; it warned that there is no clear and certain determination of the harm and damages since it does not conform to what is stated in Article 58.1 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, as well as that the plaintiff does not prove, demonstrate, or specify the existence of irreparable or irreversible, potential or current damages; the damages have not been individualized; the plaintiff claims a non-existent amount, without conforming to what is stated in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration. It reported that it is clear that the plaintiff does not manifestly demonstrate that the annulment of the permits by the Constitutional Chamber caused her any harm or damage (daño ni perjuicio), so there is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific and respective manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury (lesión antijurídica) that demonstrates the harm or damage, which moreover lacks evidence in this regard. It interposed the exceptions of fault of the victim, act of a third party, lack of right, lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y activa), lack of current interest, expiration and statute of limitations, act not susceptible to challenge, lack of competence, and inadmissibility of the action. It requested that the lawsuit be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both sets of costs.\n\n**II. PROVEN FACTS:**\nOf importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following relevant facts are established: **1-** That on August 12, 2008, Mrs. Orietta Norza Hernández and María de los Angeles Norza Hernández, Financiera Acobo S.A., and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A. signed a trust agreement called \"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial,\" the first two persons in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes) of the properties registered in the province of Alajuela under numbers 424386-000 and 13351-000, the second as Trustee (Fiduciario), and the third in its capacity as Beneficiary (Fideicomisario), the objective of which was to maintain the properties and all their improvements, structures, work progress, and/or completed work, in fiduciary ownership, to guarantee the immediate delivery of said properties to the beneficiary; for this, Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A. (hereinafter MCM) had to carry out all procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, and construction of a gas station. According to the eighteenth clause of said contract, the trustors irrevocably assigned all their rights and obligations to MCM, which appears as a coadjuvant in this proceeding (f. 1-9 judicial file). **2-** The trust properties of the province of Alajuela No. 13351-000 and 424386-000 were registered on August 27, 2008, in the name of Financiera Acobo S.A. in its capacity as trustee (f.27,28 administrative file). **3-** Through official letter R-DGRCC-320-2008 of June 12, 2008, reiterated in resolution R-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET of June 9, 2009, and R-DGTCC-325-2009 of July 7, 2009, the General Directorate of Transport and Fuel Commercialization of MINAET granted approval of the land and the constructive plans and expansion of the La Radial service station within the trust properties (f.97-101 administrative file, 19-22, 25-28 judicial file). **4-** On January 14, 2009, the Trustee authorized Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. to carry out all the construction procedures for a service station (gas station) before the Municipality of Alajuela on the trust properties (f.10,11 judicial file). **5-** By resolution N° 2828-2008 SETENA of October 1, 2008, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) granted Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental) to the project for the construction and operation of a fuel service station, opening the Environmental Management (Gestión Ambiental) stage and on the understanding of complying with the Environmental Commitment (Compromiso Ambiental) clause (f.50-55 administrative file). **6-** Through official letters 1634/PU/U/08 and 1635/PU/U/08, both of October 7, 2008, the Municipality of Alajuela granted the land-use (uso de suelo) permit for the construction of a Service Station on the trust properties (f. 31,38 administrative file). **7-** By resolution N° MA-AAAA-305-2009-S of July 23, 2009, the Administration of the Aqueduct and Sewer System of the Municipality of Alajuela approved for Financiera Acobo S.A. a potable water and sanitary sewer service for a fuel service station on the trust properties (f.32-34 judicial file). **8-** The Municipality of Alajuela, Urban Planning Sub-process, through official letter N° MA-SPU-PA-0338-2009 of June 17, 2009, granted the trustee Financiera Acobo a construction permit for the fuel service station (f.1,2 administrative file). **9-** That the Municipality of Alajuela, Fiscal and Urban Control Process, on November 24, 2009, shut down the construction of the service station for non-compliance with the construction law and regulations (record N°230-2009 f. 16 administrative file). **10-** The Constitutional Chamber, through ruling N° 11941-2010 of 11:21 a.m. on July 9, 2010, granted an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by Mr. Sergio Ivan Alfaro Salas against the Ministry of Health, the Municipality of Alajuela, and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat for the illegal granting of administrative permits for the construction and operation of the fuel service station, ordering the annulment of the construction permit granted by the Municipality of Alajuela and the resolutions R-DGTC-269-2009 and R-DGTCC-325-2009 MINAE of the General Directorate of Transport and Fuel Commercialization of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (f.57-69 judicial file). \n\n**IV. UNPROVEN FACTS:** None of relevance for the resolution of this matter.\n\n**V. ANALYSIS OF STANDING AD CAUSAM (LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM):** The defendants opposed the exception of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa); given that standing (legitimación) is the first basic structural requirement that every lawsuit must fulfill, together with interest and right, its analysis is even ex officio for the judge. By reason of the foregoing, the analysis of said defense will be addressed immediately, based on a ruling of Section IV of this Court that had already analyzed the concept of standing in a very clear and complete manner, with respect to which it indicated:\n\n\"On the basis of the clear reasoning provided by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its well-known ruling No. 2008-000317 of nine hours and ten minutes of May 2, 2008, indicated on multiple occasions by this jurisdictional body, it is opportune to establish the difference that exists between the procedural concept of 'defense on the merits (excepción de fondo)' and the substantive requirements (presupuestos materiales) of the action, which, summarizing and applying it to the specific case, it is convenient to expound. For a lawsuit to be processed, the jurisdictional body must ex officio review the procedural requirements (procedural capacity, court competence, and fulfillment of the lawsuit requirements). Without fulfilling these requirements, the lawsuit could not be processed, insofar as the minimum requirements for a process to be heard are not present. Later, chronologically and logically afterward, when the judgment is issued so that the claim may be granted, it must also be reviewed ex officio whether the substantive requirements are met. These are: the right, the standing (legitimación), and the current interest. If any of these –or all– do not exist, the lawsuit cannot find a positive response. So the first requirements are necessary for a lawsuit to be admissible, valid, or effective from a formal standpoint, while the second correspond to requirements for a favorable resolution. It is not superfluous to add that the Roman-Germanic-Latin system starts from the premise that the judge is prevented from hearing the merits of the claim until the moment of delivering the judgment, under penalty of incurring an anticipation of opinion; except in cases expressly permitted by the legal system. This is a logical path (iter lógico) that the process must follow, until the judgment is delivered that resolves the conflict binding the parties. A 'defense on the merits,' technically speaking, is when, the right, standing, and interest existing in the plaintiff's claim, it is not susceptible to being granted because other diverse but legally relevant reasons also exist that give reason to the opposition presented by the defendant. Clear examples of what a defense on the merits would be are the statute of limitations or expiration (see, Vescovi, Enrique. Teoría General del Proceso. Editorial Temis. Bogotá, Colombia. 1999). **These three lacks (of right, standing, and current interest), as has been indicated, are in reality substantive requirements, not defenses on the merits in the strict sense. It is worth reiterating that even in the case that the defendant does not oppose those particular 'exceptions,' if there is no right, standing, and/or current interest, the claim must be rejected ex officio (See in this regard ruling 2008-000523, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).** The absence of right is a pathology of the lawsuit, by virtue of which the claim cannot be granted in the understanding that the legal system does not provide a basis for it; which naturally changes according to the State in which one finds oneself. Defenses on the merits, technically speaking, kill the right, such that a lawsuit that could well be granted in another situation, in the specific case it is not viable to declare the right in favor of the plaintiff. Now then, **with respect to active standing, always under the consideration of a substantive requirement of a lawsuit, it is understood that it constitutes one of the essential requirements of the process, the verification of which must be made ex officio by the judge,** because together with the right and the interest, they constitute the essential pillars for a lawsuit to be granted. Standing ad causam, together with the right and the current interest, constitutes, as has been said, the three substantive requirements of the claim. For this reason, the same, unlike standing ad processum (legitimación ad processum), does not properly constitute a requirement for the admissibility of the lawsuit, nor does it influence the validity and effectiveness of the process, but it does constitute a necessary condition for obtaining an estimatory judgment. This figure is regulated in numeral one hundred four of the Civil Procedure Code (applicable to the matter in accordance with Article two hundred twenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code): 'Legitimate Party: Is that which alleges having a certain legal relationship with the procedural claim.' It must be specified that although the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes a series of complementary norms regarding corporate standing and even diffuse interests, these are not contrary to the procedural legal relationship that must exist between the parties under the terms established by the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the plaintiff is that person who, according to the law, formulates the claims of the lawsuit, and the defendant, who opposes that claim; from there precisely arises the foundation of the substantial relationship that exists between both in relation to the specific object of the process. The link between the parties arises from the claim, such that whoever claims should be the person called to require it, and the defendant who defines whether they accept it or not; the breaking of the procedural legal relationship would prevent the link from being generated between one party and another, calling upon a third party, who even though they could or could not have some interest in the matter, their opinion would not be defining regarding what is required. In this regard, Andrés de la Oliva Santos points out: 'Jurisdictional protection must be granted only if obtaining it corresponds to the person who requests it and, of course, if it is appropriate to grant it against the specific defendant: the debtor, the seller. That a judgment grants the protection sought also depends on precise active and passive standing. And active standing means –using an old purely logical distinction– that it is not enough that a right exists, but it is necessary that, existing, it corresponds to or can be attributed precisely to the person who asserts it, or asserts it in the process. Likewise, when jurisdictional protection is sought against a specific subject (and this passive determination serves to identify and distinguish the affirmed action or the claim, because there are no actions or claims without a specific titular subject and without a specific passive subject), it is not important only that the demand for the provision that the granting of protection would entail is justified (delivering a specific good or an amount of money, not doing something, etc.), but it is also necessary that the defendant or defendants be precisely the subjects whom that granting must affect, for being the obligated subjects or holders of the duty to perform the provision or, to better say, its equivalent [...]. It has been rightly said that standing teaches something completely elementary: that subjective rights do not exist without titular subjects nor without passive subjects and that, ordinarily, rights cannot be enforced except by the former and against the latter.' (DE LA OLIVA SANTOS, Andrés, DIEZ-PICAZO GIMENEZ, Ignacio and others, Comentarios a la ley de enjuiciamiento civil, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, 2001, p. 95). The logic of standing is to claim something for oneself based on a prior legal relationship; it must be remembered that whoever acts in the name and on behalf of another (representation), does so in such condition, such that it is as if that person were doing so insofar as the effects of that management are attributed to them. Regarding active standing and current interest, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling Nº 681-F-S1-2010 of eight hours fifteen minutes of June 9, 2010, stated: **'**This Chamber considers that indeed the appellant lacks active standing. As this Chamber has repeatedly stated (see among others judgments no. 6, of 14 hours 30 minutes of February 6, 1998, and no. 8 of 15 hours 45 minutes of January 5, 2000), in matters submitted to its knowledge, the Judge is obligated to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or material requirements (presupuestos sustanciales o de fondo) of every procedural relationship, namely: right, standing, and interest. **These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, so they must be preserved throughout the entire process.** Thus, if the absence of one or more of them is detected, the Judge will not be able to rule on the merits of the litigation, thus generating what in doctrine is known as an inhibitorial judgment (sentencia inhibitoria). On the subject, this Collegiate Body has said: 'V.- On active standing and current interest, this Chamber has expressed: '…. The ... material or substantive requirements are linked to the appropriateness of the claim. They relate to the merits. They refer to standing in its two modalities, the right, and current interest. Within the indispensable requirements of a lawsuit, the petition and its admissibility in the judgment are required; after completing the adversarial stage, the plaintiff is obliged to maintain these three requirements throughout the entire process. Otherwise, an estimatory judgment is unthinkable if the plaintiff has lost their ownership and interest in what is claimed. The decision would become unenforceable, hence jurisprudence has leaned towards its ex officio analysis. The Chamber has addressed the issue on other occasions and has expressed itself in the following terms: 'X.- Legitimatio ad causam does not constitute a condition or requirement for the admissibility of the action, nor does it condition its valid and effective exercise; if that were so, someone not legitimized in the cause could not exercise the action. But it does constitute a condition for the claim to prosper. Legitimized in the cause is one who can demand that the petitions made in the lawsuit be resolved, that is, the existence or not of the material right claimed, through a favorable or unfavorable judgment. Therefore, when any of the parties lacks that standing, the judge cannot adopt a decision on the merits, finding themselves inhibited from doing so. Legitimatio ad causam constitutes, then, a condition for the issuance of a judgment on the merits or substance, but not for a favorable judgment. As the jurisdictional body cannot resolve the existence or not of the material right claimed, or when declaring itself inhibited from ruling, res judicata (cosa juzgada) is not produced because the point on the merits has not been decided. Standing constitutes a requirement of the claim formulated in the lawsuit and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural requirement, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action; rather, it refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest discussed in the process. Standing in the cause refers to the substantial relationship that is claimed to exist between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person who by law must oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantial legal relationship object of the lawsuit to be declared; and the plaintiff is the person who according to the law can formulate the claims of the lawsuit, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or corresponds to another. The foregoing means that it is not necessary to be the holder or active or passive subject of the right or material legal relationship, but rather of the interest so that it is decided whether it indeed exists; that is, it is a standing to obtain a judgment on the merits or substance. According to the legitimized subject or their position in the procedural relationship, one can distinguish between active and passive standing; the former corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who subsequently intervene to defend their cause; the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. **The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment; if the judge notices the lack thereof, they must declare it ex officio...** *Legitimatio ad causam*, besides determining who can act in the process with the right to obtain a judgment on the merits, points out or determines who must be present to make a judgment on the merits possible...' (Resolution of 15 hours 10 minutes of September 24, 1997, corresponding to ruling number 83). Then, as has been seen, standing must be understood as a substantive requirement (presupuesto de fondo) necessary for the appropriateness of the material claim, that is, a legitimate party is one who alleges having a specific legal relationship with the debated petition. Now, as has been seen, the link between standing and current interest is close, both being substantive requirements, which must be reviewed by judges at all times in order to verify that a valid pronouncement on what is debated in the process can be made and must be maintained throughout the entire process' No. 604 of 10 hours of August 17, 2007. Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific process; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions established by law for such effect regarding the procedural claim. Thus, active standing ad causam, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character born from the position in which the subject finds themselves, with respect to the promoted procedural claim. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right claimed in court' (no. 778 of 14 hours 50 minutes of July 28, 2009). - Standing is the 'legal consideration, regarding the process, of the persons who find themselves in a specific relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, for the claim on the merits to be examined, that said persons appear as such parties in the process.' (Enrique Vescovi. *Teoría del Proceso* Argentina 1990). For González Pérez, although it is true that there have been great discussions about the concept, the truth is that it has a clear meaning insofar as it is 'the aptitude to be a party in a specific process.' The national author Manrique Jiménez Meza defines it as 'a special aptitude or a qualified capacity of some subject to be a party in the specific procedure or process. Such capacity is derived by virtue of the existing relationship between the sphere of interests and rights of that subject and the act or deed performed by another subject that illegitimately invaded such sphere.' (*La legitimación Administrativa.* Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3rd edition San José, 2000). Active standing is understood as the suitability to perform acts exercising the power of action, and it refers to the subject, who would correspond to the possibility of demanding the satisfaction of a specific provision or object.\n\nFor its part, passive standing is the capacity to bear the exercise of said power. Under these considerations, we proceed to examine the \"objection of lack of passive standing\" presented by the State representation. From a measured reading of the claims brought, it is clear that all of them were filed against the Professional Association (Colegio Profesional), without it being possible to locate any conduct carried out by the State as a legal person. Even in the reasoning expressed in the oral and public hearing, the plaintiff limited himself to indicating that the superior public entity had been called to trial for the sole fact that he had determined the creation of the non-state public entity. Accepting the possibility of deriving liability from the State for every public entity is to deny the condition of legal person of these and convert them into mere organs, which indeed is not proper. The relationship with the State is indirect, inasmuch as having enacted the law that allowed the existence of the self-governing entity (ente autárquico). In this respect, the State representation correctly points out, in noting that this Tribunal indicated in its opportunity: \"Professional Associations have been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as '…Public Law Corporations that, by delegation of state functions, have the purpose of ensuring the correctness and good performance of the professional functions of their members and disciplining them when they harm third parties, through ignorance, incompetence, negligence, or immoral conduct in their performance.' (See Voto No 1386-90 of 16:42 hours on October 24, 1990). They are corporate entities, of public interest, and not mere associations, given that they are created by mandate of a specific law, (a concrete legislative act), to exercise public functions, specifically with regard to the control and regulation of the exercise of the various professions, for which reason they constitute a form of decentralization of State functions. (See Voto of the Constitutional Chamber No 5483-95 of 9:33 hours on October 6, 1995). In this manner, in the specific case, it is incumbent upon the Colegio .... to conduct investigations against its officials ex officio or upon complaint by a party, when in the performance of their duties they incur a possible fault that merits a possible sanction.\" (see voto 16-2005 of 10:15 hours on March 17, 2005, of Section IV of this Tribunal).\"\n(Judgment No. 10-2013 of thirteen hours thirty minutes of February eighteen, two thousand thirteen. The bolding is our own).\n\nFrom the foregoing criterion, we can derive that active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) is the relationship of belonging that must exist between the right and the plaintiff thereof; it concerns the ownership of the claimed right, upon whose person the legal effects prescribed by the rule fall upon the fulfillment of the facts that serve as the basis for the claim, in such a way that only the holder of the right is fully empowered to exercise their claim. The foregoing responds to a principle of logic and justice, in that one of the ends of law in general is to give to each what in right corresponds to them. In this sense, ignoring the ownership of the right or standing in a proceeding would eventually lead to recognizing rights or imposing obligations on subjects who are not part of the substantive legal relationship, contradicting the principle of justice that every judgment implicitly entails.\n\n**VI.- ON ACTIVE STANDING IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** In the present matter, the plaintiff claims the right to be compensated for the damages and losses suffered because of the annulment of the construction permits for a fuel service station, in which they had supposedly invested 85% of its construction. The defendant parties raised the objection of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa). In this Tribunal's criterion, from the body of evidence taken as proven, it is important for the resolution of this matter to assess what is indicated in the trust agreement (fideicomiso) called \"Guarantee Trust for Properties Estación de Servicio La Radial-Financiera Acobo 2008\" signed by the ladies Orietta and Maria de los Angeles, last names Norza Hernandez, in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes) of the properties of the province of Alajuela No. 424-386-000 and 13351-000; Financiera Acobo S.A. in its condition as trustee (fiduciario); and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A. in its capacity as beneficiary (fideicomisario), with special emphasis on what is stipulated in the eighteenth clause, in which the trustors ceded all their rights and obligations to Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A., whose participation in said contract consists of carrying out all the procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, construction of a gas station. In relation to the document signed on January 14, 2009, visible at pages 10 and 11 of the judicial file, in which the trustee Acobo S.A. granted authorization to the plaintiff company Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. to carry out all the construction procedures for a service station (gas station). The foregoing documents are central in this matter insofar as the type of participation that each of the signatories had in relation to the present matter is derived from them. In particular, the last is important because it is the only one where the kind of participation that the plaintiff company had in the business related to the construction of the fuel service station is recorded, limited to processing administrative permits, an activity from which this Tribunal considers it is impossible to derive the damages and losses sought due to the cancellation of the permits for the construction of the gas station. This is because they are two dissimilar activities; that is, the processing of permits is a preparatory and administrative activity, while construction is executory and technical, without any proof on record that the plaintiff was also responsible for carrying out the second, in which case, if it were so, it would have been on behalf of the holder of the construction right, not on its own. In relation to this, the plaintiff was not the holder of the construction license granted by the Municipality of Alajuela. Observe that the permit recorded in official communication No. MA SPU PA 338-2009 (pages 1 and 2 of the administrative file), with which the entire complex administrative procedure concluded, which involved the participation of other public administrations, such as SETENA, Ministry of Health, MOPT, MINAE, etc., is granted to Financiera Acobo S.A., in its condition as fiduciary owner of the properties on which the project would be built. In such a way that the effects of the annulment of said permit did not fall upon the rights and interests of the plaintiff, for not being the holder of said right, which is the reason it lacks standing to claim the repair of the alleged damages caused derived from the annulment of the construction permit, not being the holder thereof. Corollary, the objection of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) must be upheld, and the claim dismissed. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, a ruling on the merits of the matter and the other objections raised by the defendants is omitted as unnecessary.\n\n**VIII.- COSTS:** In the present matter, the application of the general clause of condemnation to costs to the losing party is proper, in accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), since no merit whatsoever is observed in the present matter to apply the exception provided by said rule, which is why the plaintiff must be ordered to pay the costs of both parties in this process. In the case of the State, it must also recognize legal interest on said costs.\n\n**THEREFORE (POR TANTO)**\n\nThe objection of lack of active standing is upheld. The claim filed by Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. against the State and the Municipality of Alajuela is dismissed. Costs of both parties are charged against the losing party, who must also pay legal interest on the costs in favor of the State. Let it be notified.\n\n**Adolfo Fernández Loaiza**\n\n**Claudia Bolaños Salazar Otto González Vílchez**\n\n**Judges (Jueces) of Section I**\n\n*Exp. 12-005263-1027 CA Constructora Aluminios y Metales/ Estado y Municipalidad Alajuela. 3*\n\nNonetheless, the Constitutional Chamber, through vote No. 11941-2010 corresponding to an amparo appeal filed by third parties, annulled construction permit No. 3444 of the Municipality of Alajuela and resolutions R DGTCC-269-2009 and R DGTCC325-2009 MINAE, and ordered the State and the Municipality of Alajuela to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that served as the basis for the appeal. It questioned the grounds of the Constitutional Chamber's vote, which in its view untimely, illegally, and arbitrarily annulled the plaintiff's permits, which it had obtained legally and timely, fully complying with all legal requirements for the installation, construction, and operation of the fuel service station. It indicated that the La Radial service station does not represent any danger to neighbors or third parties, since it is built with the safest international standards in its construction, had the legal requirements, and was supervised by all competent public institutions. That the Constitutional Chamber, the State, and the Municipality of Alajuela have performed acts and omissions that caused serious damages and losses to the plaintiff, and that Article 190 of the General Public Administration Law establishes that the Public Administration shall always be liable if its functioning produces damage or loss, whether the action is normal or abnormal, legal or illegal, that there is a causal link between the functioning of the State and the damage caused, which is not broken because the exempting conditions of liability, such as fault of the victim, act of a third party, and force majeure, are not present. It added that the referred vote of the Constitutional Chamber violated the limit on police power regarding the necessity of the adopted measure, since the annulment of the permits was based on an unserious and unsubstantiated assumption, as there is no danger between the service station and the company Molinos de Costa Rica, which is located at a considerable distance. Furthermore, it considered that the principle of legal reserve was violated by regulating the human and fundamental rights of the plaintiff through a regulation.\n\n**Municipality of Alajuela**: indicated that for the construction of a service station, the Municipality's permit is required, and that it was the Construction Control Activity through official letter No. MA-SPU-PA-338-2009 that granted Financiera Acobo and Douglas Esquivel González the construction permit for the service station; construction then began, part of which was carried out in breach of the permit, since the design of one of the buildings was changed and the construction area was increased, as seen on folios 15, 16, and 17 of the administrative file of the Urban Control Process. It rejected that the municipal actions were abusive, intransigent, or in any way favorable to the company Molinos de Costa Rica; rather, they acted based on the legal powers and obligations corresponding to the municipality, and that the annulment of the permits was a constitutional order and not an administrative decision of the municipality. It stated that it is not the Municipality's competence to verify the dangerousness or otherwise of the construction, as that is the purview of other public institutions, and that the construction permit was granted by virtue of having provided all the required documents for it. That the Municipality acted in accordance with its powers without the plaintiff determining the acts or omissions attributable to the municipality to exercise a clear defense, and also that it does not clearly state what it seeks from the Municipality, which affects the evidence it could provide. It insisted that the annulment of the administrative permits was by judicial order, without there currently being an order that rolls back what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, which means that the plaintiff's request is outside the law, as said Chamber's order is binding *erga omnes* and therefore irresistible and inapplicable due to constitutional supremacy. In its view, if any damage had been caused, it would have been against the companies Financiera Acobo, Total Petróleo, or the registered owners of the properties, as stated in the trust agreement entered into by said parties, given that the plaintiff committed within said agreement to obtain the permits in favor of Total Petróleo, whom it attempted to bring into the process in order to legitimize itself to sue the State, dealing with a relationship between private entities whose disputes must be resolved in civil court. Therefore, the plaintiff is not an interested party and is not legitimized to sue the municipality; the land-use (uso de suelo) and construction permits were not granted in its name. It filed the exceptions of lack of right, lack of standing (legitimación), failure to exhaust administrative remedies, expiration, and statute of limitations.\n\n**The State** answered the complaint negatively, warned about the inadmissibility of the plaintiff's claims in attempting to challenge through this avenue the vote of the Constitutional Chamber, which is a jurisdictional and not an administrative action, for which reason it filed the exception of act not susceptible to challenge. It considered that the annulment of the plaintiff's administrative permits related to the construction of a fuel service station is lawful, because in application of the precautionary principle, it is not appropriate for a station of this type to be located near a factory such as the company Molinos de Costa Rica. It pointed out that the State's action was lawful, hence it cannot be liable for generating damages and losses to the plaintiff, an extremity that must be rejected because the plaintiff fails to refer to them; it warned that there is no clear and certain determination of the damages and losses, as it does not conform to what is indicated in Article 58.1 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, and also that the plaintiff does not accredit, demonstrate, or specify the existence of irreparable or irreversible damages, potential or actual; the damages have not been individualized; the plaintiff claims a nonexistent amount, without conforming to what is indicated in Article 196 of the General Public Administration Law. It reported that it is clear that it is not patently demonstrated that the annulment of the permits by the Constitutional Chamber caused any damage or loss to the plaintiff, thus there is no cause-effect relationship between the specific and respective manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury required to demonstrate the damage or loss, which also suffers from a lack of proof in this regard. It filed the exceptions of fault of the victim, act of a third party, lack of right, lack of passive and active standing (legitimación ad causam), lack of current interest, expiration and statute of limitations, act not susceptible to challenge, lack of competence, and inadmissibility of the action. It requested that the complaint be dismissed and the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs.\n\n**II. PROVEN FACTS:**\nOf importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following relevant facts are considered: **1-** That on August 12, 2008, Mrs. Orietta Norza Hernández and María de los Ángeles Norza Hernández, Financiera Acobo S.A., and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A. entered into a trust agreement called \"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial,\" the first two persons in their capacity as trustors of the properties registered in the province of Alajuela No. 424386-000 and 13351-000, the second as Trustee, and the third in its capacity as Beneficiary, whose objective was to maintain the properties and all their improvements, structures, construction progress, and/or completed work, in trust ownership, to guarantee the immediate delivery of said properties to the beneficiary; for this, Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A. (hereinafter MCM) had to carry out all the procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, and construction of a gas station. According to the eighteenth clause of said contract, the trustors irrevocably assigned all their rights and obligations to MCM, who appears as a coadjuvant in this process (f. 1-9 judicial file). **2-** The trust properties of the province of Alajuela No. 13351-000 and 424386-000 were registered on August 27, 2008, in the name of Financiera Acobo S.A. in its capacity as trustee (f. 27, 28 administrative file). **3-** Through official letter R-DGRCC-320-2008 of June 12, 2008, reiterated in resolution R-DGTCC-269-2009 MINAET of June 9, 2009, and R-DGTCC-325-2009 of July 7, 2009, the Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustibles of the MINAET granted approval of the land and constructive plans and expansion of the La Radial service station within the trust properties (f. 97-101 administrative file, 19-22, 25-28 judicial file). **4-** On January 14, 2009, the Trustee authorized Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A. to carry out all construction procedures for a service station (gas station) before the Municipality of Alajuela on the trust properties (f. 10, 11 judicial file). **5-** By resolution No. 2828-2008 SETENA of October 1, 2008, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental granted environmental viability (Viabilidad Ambiental) to the project for the construction and operation of a fuel service station, leaving open the Environmental Management stage and on the understanding of complying with the Environmental Commitment clause (f. 50-55 administrative file). **6-** Through official letters 1634/PU/U/08 and 1635/PU/U/08, both of October 7, 2008, the Municipality of Alajuela granted the land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) for the construction of a Service Station on the trust properties (f. 31, 38 administrative file). **7-** By resolution No. MA-AAAA-305-2009-S of July 23, 2009, the Administración del Acueducto y Alcantarillado of the Municipality of Alajuela approved for Financiera Acobo S.A. a potable water and sanitary sewer service for a fuel service station on the trust properties (f. 32-34 judicial file). **8-** The Municipality of Alajuela, Urban Planning Sub-process, through official letter No. MA-SPU-PA-0338-2009 of June 17, 2009, granted the trustee Financiera Acobo a construction permit for the fuel service station (f. 1, 2 administrative file). **9-** That the Municipality of Alajuela, Fiscal and Urban Control Process, on November 24, 2009, closed the construction of the service station for non-compliance with the construction law and regulations (record No. 230-2009 f. 16 administrative file). **10-** The Constitutional Chamber, through vote No. 11941-2010 at 11:21 hrs. on July 9, 2010, granted an amparo appeal filed by Mr. Sergio Ivan Alfaro Salas against the Ministry of Health, the Municipality of Alajuela, and the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental for the illegal granting of administrative permits for the construction and operation of the fuel service station, ordering the annulment of the construction permit granted by the Municipality of Alajuela and resolutions R-DGTC-269-2009 and R-DGTCC-325-2009 MINAE of the Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustible of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (f. 57-69 judicial file).\n\n**IV. UNPROVEN FACTS:**\nNone of relevance for the resolution of this matter.\n\n**V. ANALYSIS OF LEGITIMACIÓN AD CAUSAM:**\nThe defendants raised the exception of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa), as standing (legitimación) is the first basic structural prerequisite that every claim must meet, together with interest and right; its analysis is even ex officio by the judge. By reason of the foregoing, the analysis of said defense will be addressed immediately, based on a ruling from Section IV of this Court, which had already analyzed the institute of standing (legitimación) in a very clear and complete manner, in this regard, it stated:\n\n\"On the basis of the clear reasoning expressed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its well-known vote No. 2008-000317 at nine hours ten minutes on May two, two thousand eight, indicated on multiple occasions by this jurisdictional body, it is timely to establish the difference that exists between the procedural institute of 'material defense' and the material prerequisites of the action, which it is convenient to set out summarizing and applying it to the specific case. For a claim to be processed, the jurisdictional body must review ex officio the procedural prerequisites (procedural capacity, court competence, and fulfillment of the claim requirements). Without fulfilling these requirements, the claim could not be processed, as the minimum requirements for a process to be heard are not present. Later, chronologically and logically after, when issuing the judgment, so that the claim can be granted, it must also be reviewed ex officio whether the material prerequisites are met. These are: the right, the standing (legitimación), and the current interest. If any of these—or all—do not exist, the claim will not find a positive response. So, the first requirements are necessary for a claim to be admissible, valid, or effective from the formal plane, while the second correspond to requirements for a favorable resolution. It is not superfluous to add that the Roman-Germanic-Latin system starts from the premise that the judge is prevented from hearing the substance of the claim until the moment of issuing the judgment, under penalty of incurring an advancement of opinion; except for cases expressly permitted by the legal system. It is a logical path that the process must follow, up to the issuance of the judgment that resolves the conflict uniting the parties. A 'material defense', technically speaking, is when, even though the plaintiff's claim has right, standing (legitimación), and interest, it cannot be granted because there are also other different but legally relevant reasons that support the opposition presented by the defendant. Clear examples of what a material defense is would be statute of limitations or expiration (see, Vescovi, Enrique. Teoría General del Proceso. Editorial Temis. Bogotá, Colombia. 1999). **These three absences (of right, standing (legitimación), and current interest), as indicated, are in reality material prerequisites, not material defenses in the strict sense. It is worth reiterating that even in the event that the defendant does not raise these particular 'defenses,' if right, standing (legitimación), and/or current interest do not exist, the claim must be rejected ex officio (See in this regard vote 2008-000523, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).** The absence of right is a pathology of the claim, by virtue of which the claim cannot be granted, in the understanding that the legal system does not provide support for it; which naturally changes according to the State in which it is found. The defenses, technically speaking, kill the right, so that a claim that could very well be granted in another situation, in the specific case it is not viable to declare the right in favor of the promoter. Now then, **with respect to active standing (legitimación), always considering it a material prerequisite of a claim, it is established that it constitutes one of the essential prerequisites of the process, whose verification must be done ex officio by the judge,** because together with the right and the interest, they constitute the essential pillars for a claim to be granted. Standing ad causam (legitimación ad causam), together with the right and the current interest, constitute, as stated, the three material prerequisites of the claim. For this reason, it, unlike procedural standing (legitimación ad processum), does not properly constitute a prerequisite for the admissibility of the claim, nor does it influence the validity and efficacy of the process, but it does constitute a necessary condition to obtain an estimator judgment. This figure is regulated in numeral one hundred and four of the Civil Procedure Code (applicable to the matter in accordance with Article two hundred and twenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code): 'Legitimate Party: It is that which claims to have a certain legal relationship with the procedural claim.' It should be specified that although the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes a series of complementary norms regarding corporate standing (legitimación) and even diffuse interests, they are not contrary to the procedural legal relationship that must exist between the parties in the terms established by the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the plaintiff is that person who, according to the law, formulates the claims of the complaint, and the defendant, who opposes that claim; from there precisely arises the basis of the substantial relationship that exists between both in relation to the specific object of the process. The link between the parties arises from the claim, in such a way that the person claiming is the one called to request it, and the defendant is the one who defines whether to accept it or not; the breaking of the procedural legal relationship would prevent the link from being generated between one party and another, calling a third party who, even if they could or could not have some interest on the matter, their criterion would not be decisive on what is requested. In this regard, Andrés de la Oliva Santos states: 'Jurisdictional protection must be granted only if the person requesting it is entitled to obtain it and, of course, if it is appropriate to grant it against the specific defendant: the debtor, the seller. That a judgment grants the requested protection also depends on precise active and passive standing (legitimación). And active standing (legitimación) means—using an old purely logical distinction—that it is not enough that a right exists, but it is necessary that, existing, it corresponds or can be attributed precisely to the person who asserts it, or makes it count, in the process. Similarly, when jurisdictional protection is sought against a specific subject (and this passive determination serves to identify and distinguish the affirmed action or claim, because there are no actions or claims without a concrete holder subject and without a concrete passive subject), it is not only important that the demand for the performance that granting the protection would entail is well-founded (delivering a specific good or a sum of money, not doing something, etc.), but it is also necessary that the defendant or defendants be precisely the subjects that said granting should affect, because they are the subjects obligated or holders of the duty to perform the provision or, better said, its equivalent […]. It has been rightly said that standing (legitimación) teaches something completely elementary: that subjective rights do not exist without holder subjects or without passive subjects, and that, ordinarily, rights cannot be enforced except by the former and against the latter.' (DE LA OLIVA SANTOS, Andrés, DIEZ-PICAZO GIMENEZ, Ignacio and others, Comentarios a la ley de enjuiciamiento civil, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, 2001, p. 95). The logic of standing (legitimación) is to claim something for oneself based on a prior legal relationship; it is to be remembered that whoever acts in the name and on behalf of another (representation), does so in that capacity, so that it is as if that person were doing it, insofar as the effects of that action are attributed to them. On active standing (legitimación) and current interest, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 681-F-S1-2010 at eight hours fifteen minutes on June nine, two thousand and ten, stated: **'** this Chamber considers that the appellant indeed lacks active standing (legitimación). As this Chamber has stated repeatedly (see, among others, judgments no. 6, at 14 hours 30 minutes on February 6, 1998, and no. 8 at 15 hours 45 minutes on January 5, 2000), in matters submitted to its knowledge, the Judge is obliged to analyze, even ex officio, the substantial or material prerequisites of every procedural relationship, namely: right, standing (legitimación), and interest. **These are necessary conditions for the issuance of a judgment on the merits, so they must be preserved throughout the entire process.** So, if the absence of one or more of them is detected, the Judge cannot rule on the merits of the litigation, thus generating what in doctrine is known as an inhibitory judgment. On the subject, this Collegiate Body has stated: “V.- On active standing (legitimación) and current interest, this Chamber has expressed: “…. The material or substantive [prerequisites] are linked to the appropriateness of the claim. They are about the merits. They refer to standing (legitimación) in its two modalities, the right and current interest. Among the indispensable requirements of a claim, the petition is demanded, and its admissibility in the ruling, after depleting the adversarial stage, obliges the plaintiff to preserve these three prerequisites throughout the entire process. Otherwise, an estimator judgment is unthinkable if the plaintiff has lost their ownership and interest in what is claimed. The decision would become unenforceable, hence the case law has inclined toward its ex officio analysis. The Chamber has addressed the topic on other occasions and has stated in the following terms: “X.- The legitimatio ad causam does not constitute a condition or prerequisite for the admissibility of the action, nor does it condition its valid and effective exercise; if it were so, whoever was not legitimized in the cause could not exercise the action. But (sic) it does constitute a condition for the claim to prosper. Legitimized in the cause is the one who can demand that the petitions made in the complaint be resolved, that is, the existence or not of the material right claimed, by means of a favorable or unfavorable judgment. Therefore, when one of the parties does not have that standing (legitimación), the judge cannot issue a decision on the merits, being inhibited from doing so. The legitimatio ad causam constitutes, then, a condition for the issuance of a judgment on the merits or substance, but not of a favorable judgment. When the jurisdictional body cannot resolve the existence or not of the claimed material right, or declares that it is inhibited from ruling, res judicata is not produced because the fundamental point has not been decided. Standing (legitimación) constitutes a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing (legitimación) in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action; rather, it refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest discussed in the process. Standing (legitimación) in the cause refers to the substantial relationship that is claimed to exist between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantial legal relationship object of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff, the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims of the complaint, even if the claimed substantial right does not exist or corresponds to another. The foregoing means that it is not necessary to be the owner or active or passive subject of the right or material legal relationship, but rather of the interest so that it is decided whether it indeed exists; that is, it is a standing (legitimación) to obtain a judgment on the merits or substance. According to the legitimized subject or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing (legitimación); the former corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who subsequently intervene to defend their cause; the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to discuss and oppose the plaintiff's claim. **The absence of standing (legitimación) in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment; if the judge becomes aware of its lack, they must declare it ex officio** ... *Standing (legitimación) in the cause, besides determining who can act in the process with the right to obtain a judgment on the merits, points out or determines who must be present to make the judgment on the merits possible...\" (Resolution at 15 hours 10 minutes on September 24, 1997, corresponding to vote number 83). Then, as seen, standing (legitimación) must be understood as a material prerequisite necessary for the appropriateness of the material claim; that is, the legitimate party will be the one who claims to have a certain legal relationship with the debated petition. Now then, as seen, the link between standing (legitimación) and current interest is close, both being material prerequisites, which must be reviewed by the judges at all times in order to verify that there can be a valid pronouncement on what is debated in the process, and they must be maintained throughout the development of the entire process.\" No. 604 at 10 hours on August 17, 2007. Consequently, standing (legitimación) is the aptitude to be a party in a specific process; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions established for such effect by law regarding the procedural claim. Thus, active legitimación ad causam, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position in which the subject finds themselves, with respect to the promoted procedural claim. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they claim in court\" (no. 778 at 14 hours 50 minutes on July 28, 2009). Standing (legitimación) is the \"legal consideration, with respect to the process, of the persons who are in a specific relationship with the object of the litigation and by virtue of which it is required, for the claim on the merits to be examined, that said persons appear as such parties in the process.\" (Enrique Vescovi. Teoría del Proceso Argentina 1990). For González Pérez, although it is true that there have been great discussions about the concept, the truth is that it has a clear meaning in that it is \"the aptitude to be a party in a specific process.\" The national author Manrique Jiménez Meza, defines it as \"a special aptitude or a qualified capacity of a subject to be a party in the specific procedure or process.\"\n\nSuch capacity derives from the relationship between the sphere of interests and rights of that subject and the act or fact performed by another subject who illegitimately invaded such sphere.\" (La legitimación Administrativa. Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3 edition San José, 2000). Active standing (legitimación activa) is understood as the suitability to carry out acts of exercise of the power of action, and refers to the subject, who would have the possibility of demanding the satisfaction of a specific obligation or object. For its part, passive standing (legitimación pasiva) is the aptitude to endure the exercise of said power. Under these considerations, we proceed to examine the \"exception of lack of passive standing\" filed by the state representation. From a measured reading of the claims brought, it is clear that all of them were presented against the Professional Association (Colegio Profesional), without it being possible to identify any conduct displayed by the State as a legal entity. In fact, in the reasoning expressed in oral and public trial, the plaintiff limited himself to indicating that the major public entity had been called to trial for the sole reason that it had determined the creation of the non-state public entity. To accept the possibility of deriving liability from the State for each public entity is to deny the status of legal entity of these and turn them into mere organs, which indeed is not proper. The relationship with the State is indirect, in that it enacted the law that allowed the existence of the autonomous entity. In this regard, the state representation correctly points out, noting that this Court indicated at the time: \"Professional Associations have been defined by the Constitutional Chamber as '...Public Law Corporations that, by delegation of state functions, have as their purpose to ensure the correctness and proper performance of the professional functions of their members and to discipline them when they harm third parties through ignorance, incompetence, negligence, or immoral conduct in their performance.' (See Voto No 1386-90 of 16:42 hours on October 24, 1990). They are corporate entities, of public interest, and not mere associations, given that they are created by mandate of a specific law (specific legislative act), to exercise public functions, specifically with respect to the control and regulation of the exercise of various professions, which is why they constitute a modality of decentralization of the State's functions. (See Voto of the Constitutional Chamber No 5483-95 of 9:33 hours on October 6, 1995). Thus, in the specific case, it is the responsibility of the Association .... to carry out investigations against its officials ex officio or at the request of a party, when in the performance of their functions they incur a possible fault meriting a possible sanction.\" (see voto 16-2005 of 10:15 hours on March 17, 2005, of Section IV of this Court).\"\n(Sentencia No. 10-2013 of thirteen hours thirty minutes on February eighteen, two thousand thirteen. The bold highlighting is ours).\n\nFrom the foregoing criterion, we can derive that active standing ad causam (legitimación ad causam activa) is the relationship of belonging that must exist between the right and the plaintiff thereof; it concerns the ownership of the right claimed, on whose person fall the legal effects prescribed by the norm upon the fulfillment of the facts serving as the basis for the claim, such that only the owner of the right is fully empowered to exercise their claim. The foregoing responds to a principle of logic and justice, in that one of the aims of law in general is to give to each what in right corresponds to them. In this sense, disregarding the ownership of the right or standing in a proceeding would eventually lead to recognizing rights or imposing obligations on subjects who are not part of the substantive legal relationship, contravening the principle of justice that every judgment implicitly entails.\n\n**VI.- ON ACTIVE STANDING IN THE SPECIFIC CASE**. In the present matter, the plaintiff claims the right to be compensated for damages and losses suffered due to the annulment of the construction permits for a fuel service station, in which they had supposedly invested 85% of its construction. The defendants raised the exception of lack of active standing ad causam. In this Court's opinion, from the body of evidence held as proven, it is important for the resolution of this matter to assess what is indicated in the trust agreement (contrato de fideicomiso) called \"Fideicomiso de Garantía de Propiedades Estación de Servicio La Radial-Financiera Acobo 2008\" entered into by Ms. Orietta and Maria de los Angeles with surnames Norza Hernandez in their capacity as trustors (fideicomitentes) of the properties of the province of Alajuela No. 424-386-000 and 13351-000; Financiera Acobo S.A in its capacity as trustee (fiduciario); and Total Petróleo de Costa Rica S.A in its capacity as beneficiary (fideicomisario), with special emphasis on the stipulations in the eighteenth clause, in which the trustees ceded all their rights and obligations to Materiales Compuestos de Metal MCM S.A, whose participation in said contract consists of carrying out all the procedures for permits, taxes, authorizations, design, and construction of a gas station, in relation to the document executed on January 14, 2009, visible on folios 10 and 11 of the judicial file, in which the trustee, Acobo S.A, granted authorization to the plaintiff company, Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A, to carry out all the construction procedures for a service station (gas station). The foregoing documents are central to this matter, in that from them derives the type of participation that each of the signatories had in relation to the present matter. In particular, the last one is important because it is the only document recording the type of participation that the plaintiff company had in the business related to the construction of the fuel service station, limited to processing administrative permits. It is this activity from which, this Court deems, it is impossible to derive the damages and losses claimed from the cancellation of the permits for the construction of the gasoline station, because they are two dissimilar activities; that is, the processing of permits is a preparatory and administrative activity, whereas construction is executive and technical, without there being any evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff was also responsible for carrying out the latter, in which case, had it been so, it would have been on behalf of the owner of the construction right, and not on its own. In relation to this, the plaintiff was not the owner of the construction license granted by the Municipality of Alajuela. Note that the permit contained in official letter No. MA SPU PA 338-2009 (f. 1 and 2 of the administrative file), which concluded the entire complex administrative procedure involving the participation of other public administrations, such as SETENA, the Ministry of Health, MOPT, MINAE, etc., is granted to Financiera Acobo S.A in its capacity as fiduciary owner of the properties on which the project was to be built, such that the effects of the annulment of said permit did not fall upon the rights and interests of the plaintiff, because it was not the owner of said right. For this reason, it lacks standing to claim reparation for the alleged damages caused arising from the annulment of the construction permit, not being the owner thereof. As a corollary, the exception of lack of active standing ad causam must be upheld, and the claim dismissed. By the manner in which this is resolved, a pronouncement on the merits of the matter and the other exceptions raised by the defendants is omitted as unnecessary.\n\n**VIII.- COSTS:** In the present matter, the application of the general rule of awarding costs against the losing party is proper, in accordance with Article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, as no merit whatsoever is observed in the present matter to apply the exception provided by said norm. For this reason, the plaintiff must be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding. In the case of the State, it must also recognize legal interest on them.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe exception of lack of active standing is upheld. The claim filed by Constructora de Aluminios y Metales ACM S.A against the State and the Municipality of Alajuela is dismissed. Both costs are to be borne by the losing party, who must also pay legal interest on the costs in favor of the State. Notify.\n\n**Adolfo Fernández Loaiza**\n\n**Claudia Bolaños Salazar Otto González Vílchez**\n\n**Judges Section I**\n\nExp. 12-005263-1027 CA Constructora Aluminios y Metales/ Estado y Municipalidad Alajuela. 3" }