V.- ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW. In order to determine if, in the case under analysis, the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power could have occurred, the first aspect to be determined is the applicable period, since, as indicated, there is a general one (one month) and other special ones. In the context of the litigation, the plaintiff argues that the general period applies, and the defendant indicates that it is appropriate to consider the special period indicated by article 83 of the LGP, which establishes: \" Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated.\" The prerequisites for this provision to be applicable, regarding the two-year period, are two: (i) that it is intended to discipline the conduct incurred by a person subject to the special regime established in the LGP, that is, a person who forms part of a police force; and (ii) that the facts for which the person is intended to be sanctioned constitute a serious fault. The concurrence of both prerequisites will determine that the statute of limitations period in the case under analysis is two years, and therefore, that the plaintiff's thesis on the point is discarded. For purposes of applying the specific civil service regime, prescribed in the LGP, it must be taken into account that an administrative procedure was followed against the plaintiff in his capacity as an official of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad Nacional, an organ that, in accordance with what is established in the cited normative body (Title II, Chapter II, Section I), is a police force that forms part of the police forces of the Costa Rican State; in this sense, article 13 of the LGP establishes: \" The Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad Nacional is created, as an informative organ of the President of the Republic, in matters of national security. It shall function under the exclusive command of the President of the Republic, who may delegate, to the Ministry of the Presidency, the supervision of the fulfillment of the functions of this police force\". It must also be taken into consideration that it was proven that in the cited dependency (proven fact number 1), the plaintiff held a position of \"Officer 1\" and that his salary included, among other items, those of \"police career\" and \"police risk\". The two aspects presented prove the existence of the first prerequisite referred to, consequently, that the plaintiff is covered by the Police Statute established in Title III of the LGP, which, within its provisions, indicates specific norms on disciplinary matters for officials governed by that set of articles, among them the statute of limitations periods established in article 83 transcribed above. Regarding the categorization of the facts that allow deciding whether the applicable period should be one month or two years, the latter reserved for \"serious\" faults, one must resort to article 81 of the LGP: \"ARTICLE 81.- SERIOUS FAULTS. For the effects of this regime, the following shall be considered serious faults: a) The violation of the oath of loyalty to the Political Constitution, international treaties, and the laws of the Republic. b) Any conduct typified in criminal laws as an intentional crime (delito doloso). c) The repeated violation of procedures, time limits, or other procedural requirements demanded by the legal system for the protection of citizens' rights. d) Arbitrary, discriminatory, or actions clearly inspired by political-party positions, affecting citizen freedoms, the dignity of persons, or human rights. e) The indiscriminate, unnecessary, or excessive use of force in the performance of their duties. f) The violation of due discretion and professional secrecy in confidential matters. g) Any abuse of authority or mistreatment of persons, even if it does not constitute a crime. h) The reluctance to provide urgent assistance, in serious events and circumstances where their action is mandatory. i) Unjustified abandonment of service. j) The exercise of public or private activities incompatible with the performance of their functions. k) The manifest lack of collaboration with the Judicial Investigation Organism or other police forces. l) Habitual drunkenness or the use of unauthorized drugs during service. m) The carrying of a non-regulation weapon. n) The acceptance or receipt of any promise of benefit or benefit susceptible to pecuniary assessment, other than those that legally and regulatorily correspond to them from the State, coming from natural or legal persons, national or foreign, official or private. ñ) Any other conduct sanctioned with dismissal in the Labor Code\" (the underlining is not from the cited text). The various acts of the disciplinary procedure followed against the plaintiff, which at this point are analyzed solely from the perspective of their motivation, exclusively in relation to the indication of the fault that Mr. Nombre32295 would have committed, agree in pointing out the existence of alleged \"unjustified absences\" during the period between May 28, 2013, and June 13, 2013 (both dates inclusive). It is worth citing as an example, first, the resolution containing the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) (proven fact number 6), issued by the Directing Body (Órgano Director) on September 27, 2013, in whose Considering I, besides having cited the period of absenteeism attributed to the plaintiff, the pertinent provisions of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Presidency of the Republic and the Ministry of the Presidency were transcribed: \"As follows from memorandum DRHMEAD1272013, dated June 17, 2013, signed by Mrs. Nombre140233 , Acting Head a.i. of the Human Resources Division, the official Nombre32295 was unjustifiably absent from May 28, 2013, up to and including June 13. / Thus, if it is demonstrated in the corresponding procedure that the official did not timely justify his absences, there would be a breach of the following rules: Article 12.- In addition to the provisions in article 39 of the Civil Service Statute and 50 of its Regulation, in the General Law of Public Administration, and in the provisions of this Regulation, the obligations of the servants are: a) (...) n) Inform on the same day to their immediate superior, whether verbally or in writing, of their non-attendance at the workplace, as well as explain the cause that prevents them. Subsequently, they must justify their absence in accordance with what is established in Chapter XI of this Regulation. / Article 58.- Absence is considered the non-attendance of a full day of work (...) / Article 59.- Justified and unjustified absences, apart from the disciplinary sanctions they entail for the servant, imply the non-perception of salary during the corresponding period. / Article 60.- Every servant must communicate in the first hours of the corresponding workday, by the means they consider most suitable to their immediate superior, that during that workday they will be absent from their work, without prejudice to the provisions in the previous article. / Article 61.- In highly qualified cases, not contemplated in the Civil Service Statute and its Regulation, nor in this Regulation, immediate superiors may justify absences for up to two days, which are not due to the servant's illness, in order to avoid the disciplinary sanction, without such justification implying the payment of salaries. The justification of absences greater than two days that are not due to the servant's proven illness shall require the approval of the Vice Minister or the General Director, without prejudice to the provisions in the previous article. / Article 62.- Justified absences that do not imply payment of salary or subsidy, according to this Regulation and other legal texts, may be assimilated to vacations, at the request of the interested servant and with the approval of the immediate superior or respective Director, as appropriate / In this case, the salary must be paid and the number of vacation days to which the servant in question is entitled must be reduced. The corresponding processing for the provisions indicated in this article must be done within the term of the five business days following the absence. / Article 63.- Absences from work due to illness exceeding four days must be justified by the incapacitated servant with a certification issued by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. If the illness affects them only for up to four days, they may justify said absence by incapacity certificate issued by the insuring entity or, in its absence, by a private doctor'sopinion\". For its part, the termination agreement issued by the President of the Republic and the Minister of the Presidency on April 8, 2014 (proven fact number 20), took into consideration that: \"...having analyzed the file prepared to that effect, it is held as certain that the accused incurred in irregular conduct as a police official, by being absent from May 28, 2013, to June 13, 2013, without due justification\". Article 81, subsection g), of the Labor Code establishes: \"The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract (...) g) When the worker ceases to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause, for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month\". Therefore, and clarifying that the analysis of the existence of the attributed fault has not yet begun, it is evident that a disciplinary procedure was initiated against the plaintiff based on an alleged \"serious fault\" called \"unjustified absences,\" qualified as such by virtue of the provisions of article 81, subsection g), of the Labor Code, in relation to what is established in article 81, subsection ñ), of the LGP. As a consequence of the foregoing, the second prerequisite is met so that, in accordance with the provision contained in article 83 of the LGP, it is deemed that in the case under examination, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. In relation to the plaintiff's specific objections referred to the statute of limitations to which reference was made, the untimely initiation of the procedure and the late pronouncement of the Consejo de Personal (Personnel Council), both must be rejected. Regarding that the procedure was initiated after the period established to sanction the alleged fault committed by the plaintiff had elapsed, what is indicated lacks support, firstly, because as was previously stated, the applicable period in the hypothesis is two years, in accordance with what is established in articles 83 and 81, subsection ñ) of the LGP and 81, subsection g) of the Labor Code, and not the one-month period stipulated in article 603 ejusdem. In the specific case, the unjustified absences attributed to the actor occurred between May 28, 2013, and June 13, 2013, but the organ competent to initiate the procedure aimed at establishing disciplinary responsibility, the Consejo de Personal of the Ministry of the Presidency, learned of the alleged fault committed by the actor on June 18, 2013, by virtue of a communication from the Vice Minister of the Presidency and General Director of the DIS (proven fact number 4). The resolution that established the opening of the procedure against the plaintiff and designated the directing body was issued by the Consejo de Personal of the Ministry of the Presidency on August 30, 2013 (proven fact number 5) and on September 30, 2013, Mr. Nombre32295 was notified of the statement of charges relating to the facts that have been mentioned (proven fact number 6).\n\nIn accordance with the generally accepted criterion on the interruption of the statute of limitations for disciplinary power, previously developed, the action that allows the proceeding to be considered as initiated is, precisely, the notification of the statement of charges (intimación de faltas) that was directed at the plaintiff, and only this has the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations for disciplinary power. In the case under analysis, this event occurs exactly three months and twelve days after the body that can initiate the sanctioning proceeding was informed of the facts that constituted a possible fault. For this reason, the process does not begin, as the plaintiff argues, based on a time-barred cause that would nullify the various issued acts. Said statute of limitations would not be sustainable in light of the facts and the applicable legal term, not even based on the plaintiff's thesis, which considers that the limitation period should have begun to run even before his reinstatement to the position, when he reached the number of days that, in his opinion, could no longer be justified without a medical opinion, which he estimates occurred on June 3, 2013. Consequently, both the decision to open the process and the notification of the statement of charges to the defendant (an act that interrupted the statute of limitations) occur within the two-year period provided for in Article 83 of the LGP for serious faults. It should also not be overlooked that, although they do not affect the interruption of the limitation period, in the intermediate period between the beginning of the absences attributed to the plaintiff and the decision to initiate a proceeding against him, various actions necessary for its prosecution took place, including the official notification from the DIS human resources office to the direct hierarchical superior of Mr. Nombre32295 (proven fact number 3) and the referral of the case by the Vice Minister of the Presidency and General Director of the DIS to the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency (proven fact number 4). Nor is the plaintiff's thesis in any way admissible, insofar as the power to sanction him expired because: \"There is no personnel action issuing a warning or any sanction for this conduct (referring to the absences from work during the period between May 28 and June 13, both dates in 2013), neither before nor after it occurred, which reaffirms the strength of the statute of limitations regarding the forms and the term, as a cause to annul the actions taken by the Executive Branch.\" What has been stated is equivalent to pointing out that to avoid the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power, public authorities should sanction first and investigate later, which is totally incompatible, not only with the provisions of the public employment regime, but with the fundamental postulate of Prior Due Process derived, among other constitutional provisions, from numeral 39 of the Political Constitution, as well as from the applicable International Human Rights Instruments in the Republic (constitutional article 48). Regarding the other grievance formulated in relation to the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power, concerning the fact that the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency issued its opinion more than one month after having received the file with the procedure carried out by the designated Directing Body, the argument put forward must be rejected. Before that, it is pertinent to review in general terms the iter that the dismissal procedure for police officials must follow, which was summarized in Considerando IV of the resolution issued by Section I of this Court, at ten o'clock on October thirtieth, two thousand fourteen, Judgment No. 74-2014-I: \"...The General Police Law #7410 establishes that the joint powers of the President of the Republic and the Minister of the branch are (...) To appoint and remove members of the police forces, subject to the minimum principles established in this law and its regulations (numeral 53), that it corresponds to the Legal Department of the Ministry through a police inspection to conduct disciplinary proceedings (instruir los expedientes disciplinarios) for serious faults and to pass the report with the case recommendation to the Personnel Council (Article 57), a Personnel Council is created whose fundamental competence is public security (numeral 54), and it grants as powers; to hear original claims in provisions emanating from any head of police force dependencies, to determine the general policies of the respective Personnel Department, and 'to hear and resolve, in the first instance, the recommendations for dismissal and temporary suspensions, when applying the disciplinary regime, as well as to elevate the matter before the respective minister, whether or not the resolution in question is appealed' (the italics and underlining do not belong to the original text) (Article 55). For its part, Chapter VII refers specifically to the disciplinary regime regarding the type of faults and applicable sanctions, classifying them as minor and serious, the former sanctioned with warnings and the latter with suspension without pay or dismissal without employer liability (dismissal without employer responsibility) (numeral 78), which are duly described, also stating that any other conduct sanctioned with dismissal in the Labor Code shall be considered serious (numeral 81). Regarding the statute of limitations, one month is established for minor faults and two years for serious ones, providing that the statute of limitations is interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated (Article 83). Specifically, the procedure establishes that 'The legal department of the respective ministry shall be responsible for preliminarily investigating any accusation that implies the temporary suspension or dismissal of the server covered by this Statute. Once the corresponding report is prepared, the cited department shall recommend some measure and transfer the matter to the Personnel Council for it to resolve in the first instance. The person affected by a disciplinary measure of this type shall have the right to appeal to the minister of the branch, within the three days following the notification. If it is not appealed, the matter shall be remitted to the minister who will resolve definitively and will deem the administrative route exhausted' - the underlining does not belong to the original text- (numeral 84)\". Numeral 84 LGP constitutes a special provision with respect to the provisions of Book II of the LGAP, which, it must be highlighted, does not indicate a peremptory term to rule on the results of the procedure brought to the attention of the Personnel Council. On the other hand, Article 83 of the LGP, previously analyzed, establishes limitation periods of one month and two years according to the classification of the alleged disciplinary fault, but this term is for the initiation of the administrative proceeding, as has been said; thus, it does not contain a peremptory term for the pronouncement of the Personnel Council in its competence. In any case, it is not the body responsible for issuing the final act of the procedure in this type of matter, as what it adopts is a mere recommendation; that is, it is an intermediate act, prior to the adoption of the final act, which is the responsibility of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and Minister of the branch). Consequently, this Tribunal in no way supports arbitrariness and unjustified and indefinite prolongation of proceedings, which would be contrary to a proper interpretation of public law, particularly constitutional and legal provisions that tend to guarantee prompt administrative justice. But in the specific case, it is considered that the time taken by the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency was reasonable and also does not exceed six months, for which it must be taken into account that it is a collegiate body integrated in accordance with Article 54 of the LGP, so for its action it must comply with aspects such as a lawful call to a meeting, formulation of the agenda and others, and that, furthermore, its functions and those of the persons comprising it encompass the entire ministerial portfolio and not only the DIS. In this sense, the fact that the referred body concluded the procedure under its charge in one month and fourteen days is not disproportionate or unreasonable, especially if it is considered that it is proven that one day after the receipt of the file and the analysis prepared by the Directing Body, which occurs on November 4, 2012 (proven fact number 12), the General Director of the Ministry of the Presidency remits it to the Legal Director for its inclusion in the agenda of the Personnel Council (proven fact number 13). As previously stated, it is one month and fourteen days after the receipt of the records, namely on December 18, 2013 (proven fact number 14), that the Personnel Council composed of the General Director of the Ministry of the Presidency, the Legal Director of that portfolio, the Deputy General Director of the DIS, and the Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of the Presidency, issues its opinion as established in Article 84 of the LGP, and the preparatory act under its charge gives rise to the continuation of the disciplinary procedure. In the specific case, the plaintiff used the means of challenge (proven fact number 15), and even filed a proceeding called addition and clarification regarding the resolution of the Minister of the Presidency ruling on his appeal (proven fact number 18). Despite this, it is observed: (i) That from the notification to the plaintiff of the statement of charges against him, which has been referred to on August 30, September 30, 2013 (proven fact number 6), and until the pronouncement of the Minister of the Presidency established in Article 84 of the LGP, which occurred in this case by virtue of the appeal filed by the plaintiff, a resolution issued on February 17, 2014, and notified to the plaintiff on the 27th day of the same month and year (proven fact number 17), less than six months elapsed, including the time taken to resolve the appeal for reversal against the opinion of the Personnel Council, resolved through the pronouncement of January 17, 2014 (proven fact number 16); and (ii) That between the ruling on the so-called addition and clarification proceeding filed by the plaintiff and the pronouncement of the Minister of the Presidency, which occurs on March 24, 2014 (proven fact number 19), and the agreement of the Executive Branch that dismisses the plaintiff with just cause and without liability for the State, taken on April 8, 2014 (proven fact number 20), fifteen calendar days elapsed. By virtue of all the foregoing, it is concluded that the thesis of the plaintiff regarding the statute of limitations for the disciplinary power to sanction the unjustified absences from work that were charged against him and corresponded to the period between May 28, 2013, and June 13, 2013, has no legal basis. On the contrary, it is considered that the procedure followed against the plaintiff conforms to the specifically established temporal parameters that allow avoidance of the expiration (perención) of the sanctioning power of the Public Administration over its officials, and that even the total duration of the procedure is reasonable and proportionate in relation to the necessary processing and the incidents that arose during its course.\n\nVI.- ON THE ARGUMENTS REFERRED TO THE CONFIGURATION AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE FAULT COMMITTED. The plaintiff maintains that he could not be dismissed without applying the Labor Code, a norm of public order and mandatory application, and that to sanction him for an alleged abandonment of work, he should have been warned beforehand, citing jurisprudence issued by the competent courts in labor matters. The plaintiff also argues, which is reiterated with more emphasis during the conclusions presented at the preliminary hearing, that the Administration should have analyzed his case comprehensively, weigh his health problem and its effects, since public and private employers are obliged to take into consideration both the physical health and the mental state of their employees, whether in the public or private sector, so that his case could not be seen merely as unjustified absences. The state representation argues that in the administrative procedure, the absences of the plaintiff and the lack of justification in accordance with the applicable regulations were demonstrated, also that before his return, the plaintiff always claimed to have a stomach ailment, for which he was supposedly operated on, yet he never provided proof verifying his version. It adds that the alleged mental illness of the official is not related to the facts investigated, since it was verified that the disorder does not cause a loss of the sense of reality that affects him in his work and justifies the fault committed by being absent. The representative of the Attorney General's Office highlights that the documents provided and the criteria collected in no way change the fact that the plaintiff did not prove he received medical attention during the period he was absent and which was imputed to him as a serious fault, nor that an inability to work was issued to him during that period. In relation to the cause that motivated the plaintiff's dismissal, some aspects have already been advanced to evaluate the limitation period for the disciplinary power, recapitulating, in application of the provisions of numeral 81, subsection ñ), of the LGP, the plaintiff was charged and finally sanctioned for having incurred in unjustified absences, a fault that empowers dismissal without employer liability in accordance with Article 81, subsection g), of the Labor Code: \"The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract (...) g) When the worker ceases to attend work without the employer's permission, without a justified cause for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month\". The various acts of the procedure followed against the plaintiff are consistent in pointing out the cause (unjustified absences) and the norm that provides for it and its consequences (Labor Code, Article 81, subsection g). On June 17, 2013, Nombre140233, Acting Head of Human Resources of the DIS, addressed to Nombre140234, the plaintiff's direct hierarchical superior, memorandum DRGMEAD12722013, referring to \"Absences of Officer Nombre32295\" (proven fact number 3). One day later, the Vice Minister of the Presidency and General Director of the DIS remitted to Nombre140235, President of the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency, memorandum DRGMEAD12722013, so that the case of absences of Officer Nombre32295 would be analyzed by the cited collegiate body and proceed accordingly (proven fact number 4). By Resolution No. 018-2013-CP, of August 30, 2013, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency agreed to open disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff for alleged unjustified absences from May 28 through June 13, 2013, and designated the direct body for the procedure (proven fact number 5). On September 30, 2013, Mr. Nombre32295 was notified of the statement of charges against him, corresponding to alleged unjustified absences from May 28, 2013, to June 13, 2013, inclusive (proven fact number 6). On November 4, 2013, the Directing Body of the procedure followed against the plaintiff issued \"Analysis of the Case File (Análisis de los Autos del Expediente)\" through Resolution No. 002-OD-JCJH-2013, which in its operative part states as relevant: \"In accordance with the legal arguments and cited facts and assessed evidence, this Directing Body recommends: 1) Regarding disciplinary responsibility, the appropriate action is DISMISSAL WITHOUT EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR OFFICIAL Nombre32295, official of the Directorate of Intelligence and National Security, since it is proven that the absences are unjustified and that the official did not take the necessary precautions to justify them through inability to work or vacation leave\" (proven fact number 11). On December 18, 2013, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of the Presidency issued Resolution No. 031-2013-CP, by which it rules on the imputed disciplinary fault: \"In accordance with the legal arguments and cited facts and assessed evidence, this Deciding Body agrees: 1) Regarding disciplinary responsibility, TO RECOMMEND TO THE MINISTER, AS HEAD OF THIS MINISTRY, THAT OFFICIAL Nombre32295, an official of the Directorate of Intelligence and National Security, BE DISMISSED FOR JUSTIFIED CAUSE, since it is proven that the absences are unjustified and that the official did not take the necessary precautions to justify them through inability to work or vacation leave. This type of fault affects his relationship with the Administration, this in accordance with Articles 81 subsection i) and 88 of the General Police Law, Article 81, subsections g), l) of the Labor Code, 12 subsection n), Chapter XI and Chapter XXII of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Presidency of the Republic and the Ministry of the Presidency.\" (proven fact number 14), a pronouncement that was confirmed by the Minister of the Presidency through Resolution 002-2014 (proven fact number 17). Finally, on April 8, 2014, through Agreement No. 084-2014-MP signed by the President of the Republic and the Minister of the Presidency, and communicated to the plaintiff through official letter DRHMEAD1542014 issued by the Director of Human Resources of the DIS, it was resolved: \"ARTICLE 1: To dismiss with just cause and without liability for the State, server Nombre32295, identity card number CED26461, who works at the Central Offices of the Directorate of Intelligence and National Security, effective May 6, 2014. / ARTICLE 2: Notify the server and the Department of Human Resources of the Directorate of Intelligence and National Security. / ARTICLE 3: Effective as of May 6, 2014\". The referred pronouncement takes into consideration, as relevant: \"That analyzing the file prepared for this purpose, it is held as true that the accused incurred in irregular conduct as a police official, by being absent from May 28, 2013, to June 13, 2013, without the proper justification\". (proven fact number 20). The plaintiff failed to prove in the initiated disciplinary proceeding that he had reported to work during the period between May 28, 2013, and June 13, 2013 (see proven fact number 2), absences that the authorities of the DIS, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the Executive Branch in the strict sense considered verified, fundamentally, based on the attendance records of the unit in which the plaintiff worked before the justified termination of his appointment. Nor was it demonstrated that there was a justifying cause for those absences, an aspect that complements the requirements to proceed with the sanction of dismissal without employer liability in accordance with numeral 81, subsection g), of the Labor Code. In the administrative venue, excuses were put forward related first to a physical ailment (stomach) and subsequently to a psychological one (bipolarity 1 disorder), but a document was never presented proving ailments or health crises for any of these causes during the period in which the plaintiff did not report to work, not even proof of having attended a health establishment, public or private, on those dates, much less that Mr. Nombre32295 was granted an inability to work during that period or part of it, so that the cause that grounded his dismissal would not have been configured.\n\nHaving analyzed the administrative file and the remaining admitted documentary evidence, this Tribunal reaches the same conclusion that motivates the decision in the administrative venue, which can be summarized in three points: **(i)** the plaintiff did not prove having received medical attention, for any type of ailment, in public, private, or mixed medical services, during the period between May 28 and June 13, both dates in 2013; **(ii)** Mr. Nombre32295 did not demonstrate having presented to the competent authorities of the DIS a medical leave (incapacidad) issued by the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros corresponding to the period between May 28 and June 13, both dates in 2013; **(iii)** the plaintiff did not provide any reliable element to support that he presented at his workplace any document issued by a health sciences professional accrediting that he suffered a health problem, physical or mental, during the period between May 28 and June 13, both dates in 2013. In this regard, it is pertinent to cite the considerations contained in some of the opinions issued by the Administration, in which, on one hand, the analysis of the arguments presented by the plaintiff regarding the alleged justification of his absences is evident, and on the other, the deficiencies found in the evidentiary support of the excuses put forth by the plaintiff. This is the case of the “*Analysis of the Case File Proceedings*” (proven fact number 11) that the Investigating Body (Órgano Director) sent to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) of the Ministry of the Presidency. In the section “***a. Unjustified Absences*** *”*, the following is stated: “*In summary, from the investigated facts, the documentation provided, and the appearance, it can be inferred that the official was absent starting May 28, alleging stomach problems. At that time, he communicated via text message with his immediate boss and another coworker. 12 days passed before the official communicated with the Human Resources manager, only to tell her that he had undergone surgery and that his intention was to exchange the days of medical leave (incapacidad) for vacation days, to which the official responded that she would not approve it. However, it was not until June 14, after being exhorted by Mrs. Nombre140234 , Nombre140233 and Nombre140236 , that he appeared to prepare the vacation forms, despite knowing they would not be approved. / It is also important to emphasize that the investigated individual always claimed he had a stomach ailment, for which he was supposedly operated on; however, he never provided any medical certificate to verify his version. / For these reasons, not only the disinterest he maintained in justifying the absences is evident, but also the deceit in which he kept the staff, by assuring them that he was incapacitated due to his illness*”. The issued analysis also considers the plaintiff's allegations referring to other problems that would have affected his health and indicates: “***c. Psychiatric Condition*** *(...) the legal representative requests as evidence for a better resolution, that a medical diagnosis be evaluated, of which she attached photocopies. According to the documentation provided, Mr. **Nombre32295** suffers from 'bipolar type 1 disorder' and for the official and his lawyer, this could have had repercussions on the events, since the investigated individual sometimes lost track of time and sense of reality. / For this reason, this Investigating Body consulted psychologist Nombre140238 , an official of this Directorate and a professional who has occasionally provided care to the official, about the condition as such, its symptoms, and manifestations. In this way and according to the unnumbered official communication (folios 68 and 69), it is inferred that the bipolar type 1 disorder to which the official refers does not have memory loss (loss of track of time and reality) as a symptom, and its indicators are mania or depression. (...) For their part, the copies provided and certified only by his lawyer are not reliable proof that could change this Body's recommendation, since the documents provided are copies of a file that appears incomplete and are not duly certified by the issuing medical center. / For all the above and in accordance with the document prepared by a psychology professional, this Investigating Body considers that the official's alleged condition has no relation to the investigated facts, since it is proven that the disorder does not cause a loss of the sense of reality that affects his work and justifies the fault committed by being absent without justification*”. Additionally, and when the Personnel Council resolves the appeal for revocation (revocatoria) filed against its pronouncement of December 18, 2013, it expresses the following regarding the assessment of evidence concerning the topic under analysis (see proven fact number 16): “***9. Medical Reports*** *(...) It is relevant that the psychiatric care started in 2013 is requested by the official only on June 14 and 17, 2013, also, after the unjustified absences (...) according to the medical file provided by the official, from his last consultation in 2008, he returns to that medical center* (Clínica Marcial Fallas) *only on June 17 and 19, 2013, solely to request the certified copy of the file (folio 068 and last page of the 'Discharge Guide'). This is also evidenced by the discharge summary (epicrisis) issued on July 17, 2013, where the last condition was diagnosed in 2008*”. The remaining instances confirmed the resolution of the Personnel Council, and the dismissal agreement is based on these arguments. It must be added that, in connection with the last point analyzed, the plaintiff accused a violation of due process (debido proceso) for not having accepted his request that the evidence proposed as such in the oral and private hearing within the administrative procedure, corresponding to opinions from psychiatry and psychology professionals about the plaintiff's health condition, be gathered as evidence for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver). The alleged transgression must also be rejected, firstly, because the nature in which it was offered did not obligate its performance; and secondly, because it was demonstrated that the Investigating Body took steps in this regard immediately after the conclusion of the aforementioned hearing, the results of which were analyzed as indicated above when referring to \"bipolar type 1 disorder\" and the opinion of the psychology professional Nombre140238 . It is recorded that on the same day the oral and private hearing was held, the Investigating Body addressed Mrs. Nombre140238 , an official of the Training and Development Section of the DIS, an official communication in which it states: “*... upon request of the investigated party, I require that the following information be provided to me: 1. Clear definition of 'Bipolar Type 1 Disorder'. 2. Symptoms of this condition. 3. Can this disorder cause a loss of the track of time in the person who suffers from it? 4. What repercussions does this disorder have on the employment relationship of the person who suffers from it?* ” (proven fact number 8). On October 29, 2013, the professional answers the request directed to her in the following terms: “ *Bipolar type 1 disorder, according to the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria, refers to people who have had at least one episode of mania with periods of severe depression; it is a condition for placing a person within it. / There is no clear cause for manic or depressive triggers; some factors that can trigger episodes in people with this condition are life changes (debts, childbirth, or others), antidepressant medications or steroids, long periods of insomnia, or psychoactive drug use. / The phases in which mania is triggered are observed when it affects social areas and behaviors appear such as: * Being easily distracted * Little need for sleep * Impaired judgment * Poor temper control * Reckless behaviors and lack of self-control that can be observed when there is excessive eating, drinking, or drug use, promiscuity, making excessive expenses, very elevated moods, hyperactivity excesses, increased energy, racing thoughts, talking a lot, very high self-esteem (false beliefs about oneself or one's abilities) * Exaggerated commitment to activities * Very upset (agitated or irritated) / Regarding whether memory loss appears in this disorder, there are no indicators that it appears; the indicators are mania or depression as emotional states that affect social areas because they become difficult people to control. Consultation was made with Nombre140239. Psychiatrist in order to inquire if it was possible, to which he responded that he has not had such cases of bipolarity 1. / It is important within the treatment to be medicated by a psychiatrist, to face the symptoms, learn a healthy lifestyle that includes sleeping well, staying away from psychoactive drugs, involving the family environment in psychological treatment, linking to a therapeutic group can help since patients with this disorder frequently do not recognize their own manic symptoms* ” (proven fact number 10). The opinion received was valued in the analysis rendered by the Investigating Body, as analyzed above, so the argument of transgression of due process related to the disregard of the instance made is unfounded, since it is demonstrated that it was attended to in the pertinent part. To conclude, the plaintiff argues that labor regulations were breached by not having issued the plaintiff a warning (prevención) not to incur in his conduct again and sanctioning him in case of repetition, for which reference is made to pronouncements from labor courts regarding the cause for dismissal called abandonment of work (abandono de labores) (in this sense, the lawsuit brief, folios 332 to 334). This argument stems from a confusion that may be understandable and totally excusable in daily life and for people without legal training, but in contentious-administrative matters, legal representation (patrocinio letrado) is required, which is why an error of this type should not exist, much less attempting to resort to a misunderstanding to try to challenge an administrative action. Unjustified absences and abandonment of work are different and separate causes for dismissal without employer liability in accordance with labor legislation strictu sensu. Indeed, for the constitution of abandonment of work, a prior warning (apercibimiento) is required; in this sense, numeral 81, subsection i), of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes: “*The following are causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract (...) When the worker, after the employer warns him once, incurs in the causes provided for in subsections a), b), c), d), and e) of article 72*”. It is in the first of the indicated literals that it prescribes: “*Workers are totally prohibited from: a) Abandoning work during working hours without justified cause or without permission from the employer*”. Article 81, subsection i), of the Labor Code is not the basis for the sanction on the plaintiff, but rather that provision regarding subsection g) on unjustified absences, which has already been transcribed and does not establish anything in relation to a prior warning to be able to sanction the worker, nor is it required in the hypothesis of article 81, subsection i), of the LGP, whose terms are the following: “ *For the purposes of this regime, the following will be considered serious faults (...) i) Unjustified abandonment of service*”, a norm that does not provide for the necessary prior warning, nor can it be equated in terms of its content and requirements with the provision of the same nomenclature belonging to the Labor Code. In any case, as extensively set forth in this same recital (considerando), in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff and in the sanctioning act issued, reference was made at all times to unjustified absences in the terms of article 81, subsection g), of the Labor Code and not to what is provided in subsection i) of that provision. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Tribunal concludes that the constitutive elements of the cause for dismissal without employer liability attributed to the plaintiff were met, consequently, that none of the transgressions invoked by the plaintiff regarding what was resolved by the Administration in his case exist.\n\n**VII.- EFFECTS OF THE REJECTION OF THE INTENDED NULLITY**. The lawsuit, in accordance with the main claim being asserted, was filed to declare the nullity of the administrative sanctioning procedure and the dismissal act issued against the plaintiff, as well as to order his reinstatement in the position. In light of what was indicated in the previous sections, this Tribunal does not consider that any nullity exists regarding the questioned conduct, which leads to the rejection of the annulment claim. Regarding the request for reinstatement, this Tribunal considers that this legal effect is only possible had the requested invalidity been deemed, as well as referring to the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) and legal interest thereon. That is, the order to reintegrate the plaintiff to his position would suppose the retroactive effect of a suppression due to absolute pathology of the challenged act, in accordance with ordinal 171 of the LGAP in relation to 131 of the CPCA. However, in the absence of nullity to declare, it is not feasible to suppress the effects of the imposed sanction, as a result of which, the reinstatement must be rejected as well as the referred extremes of payment of back pay and interest.\n\n**VIII.- ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSED DEFENSES.** As a derivation of all the above, the full acceptance of the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) raised by the State representation must be ordered, given that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the basis for the claims filed against the administrative procedure and the resolution that ordered his termination without liability for the State.\n\n**IX.- COSTS.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this Tribunal does not observe any reason to exempt from the application of such maxim, therefore, what is due is to impose them on the plaintiff and losing party in favor of the State.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe defense of lack of right raised by the State is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by **Nombre32295** , identity card number CED26461, is declared without merit in all its extremes. Both costs of the lawsuit are borne by the plaintiff.\n\n**José Roberto Brenes Chinchilla**\n\n**Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Cynthia Abarca Gómez**\n\n**FILE NUMBER: 15-002058-1027-CA**\n**SUBJECT: COGNITION PROCESS (PURE LAW)**\n**PLAINTIFF: Nombre32295**\n**DEFENDANT: THE STATE**" }