V.- THE POSITION OF THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES.- Mr. Nombre140258 and the late Nombre140259 —now represented by his son, who acts as his executor— requested that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, for the following reasons: a.) that on the occasion of the sale option given to them by the plaintiffs here for the property with real property registration number (matrícula de Folio Real) —at that time— number Placa26912 of the Province of Puntarenas, which was subject to the limitations of Law number 2825, they accepted it pursuant to a transaction signed on December 9, 2005, at which time they paid forty-five million colones, on condition that the title of ownership be delivered to them, upon authorization by the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario or when the legal limitations expired; b.) That as of the date of that legal transaction —December 9, 2005— they have exercised possession (posesión) over the indicated property, with all the attributes of the right of ownership; c.) That that sale was real and concrete, according to the deed granted before the same professional (lawyer/notary) who now acts as the legal representative of the plaintiffs here; without warning them of the illegality of the transaction, insofar as the sale of the farm that is the object of this proceeding was made by the plaintiffs during the validity of the limitations of the referenced law; and subsequently, they even concealed from them the revocation and nullity procedure against the plaintiffs here; d.) That the foregoing situation forced them to file an ordinary agrarian complaint against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in order to find redress for their situation, first so that the plot be granted to them in ownership, and failing that, so that they be paid for the improvements made, as legally corresponds, for having worked it since the date they have exercised possession; e.) They reject that, in the administrative procedure against the plaintiffs here, the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) and lapse (caducidad) occurred; because the limitations of Law 2825 expired after the date on which they were notified of the administrative procedure against them, and there was no paralysis of the procedure in the terms of Article 340 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública); g.) Finally, they warned of the bad faith of the plaintiffs in this litigation, who in their complaint and allegations have concealed the sale they made to them of the property that is the object of the litigation, denoting that they want to take advantage of their own fraud (dolo), a circumstance that even demonstrates the lack of standing (legitimación activa) (of the plaintiffs), by claiming a right they do not have, given that they are not the legitimate owners —on the occasion of the sale of the property— nor possessors of the asset. (Brief of appearance in the proceedings on folios 201 front to 206 front of the scanned judicial case file and incorporated into the virtual case file, and statements of the representative and lead attorney, according to the digital backup on the attached compact disc.)
VI.- PRIOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WILL BE RESOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING.- Having seen the allegations supporting this complaint and those of the defendant institute and interested third parties, it is deemed necessary to specify that this proceeding will not address the situation of the latter regarding their right or expectations over the farm with real property registration number (matrícula de Folio Real) number Placa26915 of the Province of Puntarenas, derived from their possession since December 9, 2005, on the occasion of the acceptance of the sale option made to them by the plaintiffs here and the payment for that property —proven facts 4.) and 5.)—. The foregoing, because it has become clear that those claims (or pretensions) are being resolved in the agrarian proceeding processed under case file number 12-1601000-0642-AG-2, at the Agrarian Court of Puntarenas —proven fact 33.)—, whereby it exceeds the scope of competence of this Authority and the object of this proceeding to hear that situation. Consequently, the reference to that situation is solely insofar as it affects the pretensions that the plaintiffs formulate in this contentious administrative proceeding. Furthermore, it is clarified that the only thing to be analyzed in this ruling is the legality of the actions of the defendant Administration —Instituto de Desarrollo Rural—, in the manner in which it was raised in the complaint, so we will focus on whether or not there was a statute of limitations (prescripción) and/or lapse (caducidad) of the procedure processed under administrative case file 161-08-NUL. As previously warned, the other rulings that were requested are accessory to the statute of limitations (prescripción) and lapse (caducidad) that are requested to be declared.
VII.- THE DEFENSE OF LAPSE OF THE ACTION (CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN) REITERATED IN THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS PHASE.- It had already been indicated that, in the Preliminary Hearing held on May 13th last, the Procedural Judge in charge of the matter rejected the privileged preliminary defense (defensa previa privilegiada) that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural had formulated up to that point, regarding the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción). However, in the closing arguments phase, without adding any additional consideration, its proponent reiterated this exception. Regarding this aspect, we must remember that, under the provisions of Article 39 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), for the formulation of contentious proceedings concerning the review of the legality of administrative conduct, the legislator established the institution of the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción) —with the exception of what is expressly regulated in Article 41 of the same procedural code, cases in which the rule of the statute of limitations of the right (prescripción del derecho) applies—. This term was set at one year, regarding its application to the sub judice matter, starting from \"the day following notification\", when the contested act must be notified, as stated in subsection a) of the cited Article 39. In the case under study, even though the record does not contain the date on which the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) notified Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 of resolution 1163, of seven hours thirty-two minutes on September 20, 2012, which is a decision of the improper hierarch (jerarca impropio) and, by virtue thereof, exhausted the administrative channel —in accordance with canon 126 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—; it is possible to conclude that this proceeding was filed in time, that is, within the annual lapse (caducidad) term established in the regulations governing the matter. And this is so because the date of that decision was September 20, 2012, and the filing of this action was September 19, 2013 —proven fact 34.) —, that is, it did not even exceed that term. Consequently, the rejection of the privileged preliminary defense (defensa previa privilegiada) raised is appropriate. We therefore proceed with the analysis on the merits of the matter raised.
VIII.- AGRARIAN PROPERTY ORIGINATING IN CONTRACTS WITH THE INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL.- Since the object of the complaint refers to the analysis of the actions of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural in an administrative revocation (revocatoria) procedure of an award (adjudicación) of an (agrarian) plot and the nullity (nulidad) of the title (of ownership right), it is deemed pertinent, before hearing the claims in that procedural path, to understand the special legal nature of agrarian property originating in the land assignment contracts signed with the defendant institute; its mode of acquisition and the conditions that subject it; the foregoing, to understand the basis of the supervisory functions and instruments in charge of the institution that is sued in this proceeding, author and responsible for the contested conduct. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to make some brief clarifications regarding agrarian property. In this sense, it is useful to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling number 2006-1806, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on February 15, 2006, regarding these, in which it clarified the moment from which the beneficiary acquires the right of ownership, with all the attributes it comprises —in accordance with the regulation of Article 45 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental) and Article 264 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)—:
\"In the first place, it must be clear that ownership is not acquired with the delivery of the title, nor even at the moment when the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario transfers the plot to the beneficiary, but rather with the fulfillment of the conditions established in that article, namely, the passage of that period –the fifteen years established in the contested regulation–, the effective and real payment for the property, and the submission to the requirements stipulated for the proper use of that property. In the second place, it is typical of this type of contracts –of an agrarian nature– to stipulate a duration term, as a condition precedent (condición suspensiva), so that it is only at the moment when the beneficiary fulfills the requirements established both in the referenced law and in the award contract, that he definitively acquires that property. In light of the foregoing, the issue of the term established by law –and which is the object of challenge in this action– is a matter of the legislator's discretion; the alleged unconstitutionality resides in its alleged unreasonableness, an issue that will be addressed later. In the third place, it must be taken into account that the land award contract (contrato de adjudicación de tierras) can be revoked by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario –in accordance with the provisions of Article 66 of the same referenced law–, before the expiration of that period, if the beneficiary does not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) and in the award contract, because the property is delivered for a specific purpose, that is, to promote agrarian production, in accordance with the agricultural vocation recognized in these properties. ...\" (The highlighting is from the original.)
Furthermore, prior to this ruling, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) had already pronounced on the special legal nature of land award contracts, typical of Agrarian Law, which find their legal basis in subsections 5) and 6) of Article 1, Articles 4, 5, 55, 63 subsection 1), and 64 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), number 2825, of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, in the following terms:
\"VIII.- The assignment contract is a duration contract (contrato de duración) by which the agrarian entity awards to a beneficiary of the land provision programs, previously qualified according to the parameters established by its own regulations, an agrarian property, committing to transfer it, for an eventual price or free of charge, if the beneficiary demonstrates the technical capacity to develop the agrarian enterprise and fulfills the obligations imposed during a trial period; the transfer in ownership is verified subject to a multiplicity of obligations on the part of the beneficiary, whose breach allows the entity to revoke the award, during a term of 15 years or until there are no outstanding debts, and it cannot in any way be sold if prior express authorization from the Institute is not obtained, since by provision of the Law the assigning entity may recover the asset to award it to another beneficiary, always having to exercise direct control over the activity carried out by the awardee, even after the 15-year period has passed or the debts have been paid off, when the beneficiary has full and exclusive ownership.
IX.- From a causal point of view it cannot be maintained that the cause (causa) of the assignment transaction consists, as in a purchase-sale, of the exchange of a thing for a price, because that is not its social economic function, or social policy, in relation to the purpose of assigning land to those who have none or have it insufficiently; on the contrary, it seeks to contribute to a better distribution of wealth with a sense of social justice and to the increase of the country's production or productivity . From this point of view, when the Law refers to a sale, or the administrative practice of the entity leads to carrying out a purchase-sale legal transaction to register it in the Public Registry of Property, it does not allow ignoring that the assignment will be carried out through the execution of an agreement of the administrative entity whose existence goes beyond the agreement of the parties. But that administrative agreement also entails very important elements to differentiate the land assignment contract from the purchase-sale, or from the simple administrative contract, insofar as the clauses contained in the contract come from the Law, and their exercise does not derive from the power of authority (poder de imperio) or the interest of the parties, but from the State's own purposes that bind it to achieve a better distribution of land and raise the economic and social conditions of farmers, agricultural entrepreneurs, and land workers, especially if they do not have the means at their disposal to lead a dignified life. This is why land assignment has been classified as a typical contract of Agrarian Law.
X.- A very important characteristic of this contract established in the Law, and interpreted by doctrine, is that it is a duration contract (contrato de duración). Its perfection does not operate with the transfer of ownership of the property; on the contrary, it crystallizes as the beneficiary fulfills his obligations, during the time established by Law, and carries out the activity for which it was granted. Ownership is fully acquired only after the term has elapsed. In our case, this can be up to 30 years, as a grace period of 5 years is granted, prior to the issuance of the deed, and another period of up to 25 years for the payment of the price; but it can have two types of variations: increasing it, when by virtue of insufficient production not attributable to the plot holder, the Institute must readjust the form of payment; and another, decreasing it, by allowing early payment, once 15 years from the transfer of ownership have elapsed. In this sense, if the contract is for a determined price, or else free of charge, from the issuance of the deed there will be 15 years during which the Institute can revoke, rescind, or annul the contract in the event of the beneficiary's breach. (Articles 59, 67 and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law).\" (Ruling number 229-90, of fifteen hours on July 20, 1990, of the First Chamber. The underlining is not from the original.)
Furthermore, in the aforementioned constitutional ruling 2006-1806, it concludes the special purpose of this type of contracts, precisely in consideration of the conceptualization that governs our Costa Rican Social and Democratic Rule of Law State (Estado Social y Democrático), according to the design established in our Constitution (Constitución Política), based on the following considerations:
\"... the limitations on free disposal and the prohibition on land-use change (cambio de uso) originate in the social function recognized in this property, whose primary objective is its award —precisely— so that its holder may have a dignified way of life, through an activity previously determined by law and the contract through which it was acquired . Thus, the conditions imposed in the law and in the land award contract are fully justified in light of the Law of the Constitution, as their sole purpose is to ensure that the procedures for awarding land fulfill the purpose for which this program was created; which must never be understood as a simple program for delivering property titles to solve urgent squatting problems, but as a true instrument through which an adequate and just distribution of the land resource, the creation of self-sufficient family agrarian enterprises, and an effective increase in national production are achieved, allowing the farmer to raise his standard of living by making him a participant in the Nation's development . (In the same sense, rulings number 5363-95, of nine hours twenty-seven minutes on September 29, 1995, and 2004-9099, of eleven hours thirteen minutes on August 20, 2004, of this Chamber.) Allowing the contrary would imply the perversion of the parceling and colonization system for lands awarded by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.\" (The highlighting is from the original.)
Based on the foregoing guidelines, the analysis of what is debated in this matter proceeds, circumscribed to whether or not there was a statute of limitations (prescripción) of the supervisory power on the part of the Public Administration, in order to revoke the award of the agrarian plot in favor of the plaintiffs here, and whether or not there was a lapse (caducidad) in the administrative procedure followed to that effect.
IX.- THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE REVOCATION AND NULLITY OF TITLE PROCEDURE.- In relation to this point, and taking into consideration the special legal nature of agrarian plot award contracts, the point concerning the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the Administration's power to revoke the award and annul the conferred title must be elucidated. As indicated above, the plaintiffs claim that it is from the date of the Board of Directors' agreement in which the award was ordered, and for its part, the defendant institution claims that it is from the registration of that transfer in the Registry. Having assessed the situation, this Tribunal considers that neither date applies. Indeed, note that neither the award by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution, nor the registration in the Registry, confer the right of ownership, due to the fact that it is a right that is acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the obligations imposed, in the terms of Article 65 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 (and its amendments). Thus, with the act of \"award (adjudicación) \" of a plot, ownership is not transferred, and it is a unilateral act of the Administration, in which the beneficiary or beneficiaries do not participate, by which, it simply authorizes the sale of the property in their favor; and by virtue thereof, it is just the precondition to subsequently configure the respective contract, which is the individualized (particularized) deed in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries, in which, now, the conditions of that land provision are established, and in which the limitations established in articles 66, 67, and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, are fully comprised, as well as the effective transfer of the awarded plot, precisely from the date of its subscription. In this sense, that deed acquires the condition of a translative domain contract (contrato traslativo de dominio), which, in light of the provisions of Article 1007 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), insofar as it establishes obligations for the buyer -beneficiaries- is solemn, bilateral, consensual, and in relation to the legal limitations on this property, requires the consent or acceptance of the obligor, so that compliance can be compelled, in this case, in charge of the selling institution; whose breach, in the terms established precisely in Article 66 of the referenced Law (number 2825 and its amendments) and generically in Article 692 of the Civil Code, gives rise to the revocation (revocatoria) of the award and nullity (nulidad) of the title.
\n\nNote that the acquisition of the parcel by the beneficiary or beneficiaries occurs with and as of the signing of this deed, not before, and by virtue of this, numeral 67 of the Land and Colonization Law refers to the date of acquisition of the parcel as the parameter for computing the fifteen-year term for the limitations of that law, which in no way occurs with the (we repeat, unilateral) act of the Administration, but rather with and as of the signing of the corresponding deed. Finally, it must be remembered for this purpose that, pursuant to mandate 1022 of the Civil Code, the contract is law between the parties, and what is agreed binds its signatories, \"... both as to what is expressed in them, and as to the consequences that equity, usage, and the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature\", states subsection 1) of numeral 1023 of the cited Civil Code. Thus, the subjection to those legal limitations is for a period of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance of the party who is bound by them, and not before, as the plaintiffs propose, since there has been no acceptance on their part, nor legitimate occupation of that property. Given this situation, the term cannot be computed from the adjudication of parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement to Mr. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 , which occurred by agreement of Article Five of Session 73-93, on the twenty-sixth of September, nineteen ninety-three -proven fact 1.)-, nor from the registration of those rights in the Public Property Registry, after the signing of the corresponding deed, which occurred on the ninth of July of the year nineteen ninety-four -proven fact 3.)-, as the defendant institution alleged, but rather from the date of signing the corresponding deed of transfer of the real estate, the occasion on which the limitations of the law were also imposed, with the acceptance of the beneficiaries, which occurred on the first of October of the year nineteen ninety-three -proven fact 2.)-. In this sense, it is noteworthy that with the registration of those rights, the effective date of these limitations was noted, that is, from the first of October, nineteen ninety-three, to the first of October of the year two thousand eight, as recorded in the corresponding property certification that was held at that time under the Real Folio registration number Placa26912 - proven fact 3.)-; from which those who bring this action can neither claim ignorance nor attempt its modification. Due to the foregoing, the alleged statute of limitations (on the exercise of the supervisory power held by the Rural Development Institute) does not occur in this case, because the notification of the resolution of fourteen hundred hours on the twenty-fifth of September of the year two thousand eight, which ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and annulment of the title, was notified to the plaintiffs herein on the twenty-ninth of September, two thousand eight - proven fact 11.)-, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations. Likewise, the official communication sent to the Public Registry to notify the opening of this ruling was ordered in the resolution of sixteen hundred hours on the twenty-fifth of September, two thousand eight -proven fact 12.)-, without affecting its validity, the fact that it was brought to the attention of the Registry until the first of the following October, given that on that date, the plaintiffs herein had already been personally notified of the opening of the administrative proceeding against them, thereby interrupting the statute of limitations. Finally, on this aspect it must be indicated that the criterion set forth in this ruling on this point is not subject to the reasons or considerations of other judgments, such as the one alleged in the complaint, under the consideration that in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, judges are only subject to the Constitution and the laws (block of legality), under the terms of numeral 154 of the Political Constitution, such that a sphere of independence for judges is recognized, who are not even subject to or bound by precedents or jurisprudence, the latter understood as the reiterated criterion (at least three rulings) emanating from the Courts of Cassation, regarding a specific legal point (under the terms of numeral 9 of the Civil Code). By reason of the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed in what refers to this point.X.- OF THE LAPSE OF PROCEEDINGS (CADUCIDAD) IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR REVOCATION OF ADJUDICATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE AGRARIAN PROPERTY TITLE.- Regarding the second point to be analyzed, the first thing that must be elucidated is whether the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms provided in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, is applicable to the administrative procedures carried out by the Agrarian Development Institute in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it, and the second: should this institute be applicable, whether or not the alleged lapse of proceedings (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and annulment of the title, pursued by the defendant against the plaintiffs herein -Mr. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 , and processed under file number 161-08-NUL. As for the first , as the plaintiff correctly points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative procedures for the revocation of the adjudication of parcels by the Agrarian Development Institute. Thus, among others, one may consult judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes on the eighth of March, two thousand eleven, a criterion reiterated in number 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes on the ninth of March, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on the twenty-third of May, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours on the fourteenth of June, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours on the thirteenth of August, the last four from two thousand twelve, and number 210-2012-VI, of fourteen hours twenty minutes on the fourth of October, two thousand twelve. In all these rulings, it was concluded that the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms provided in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, is applicable to the procedures pursued by the defendant institution; a criterion that is shared based on the following considerations:
a.) It must be assumed that respect for due process and the elements that comprise it are applicable, not only in jurisdictional processes, but also in administrative procedures, without exception or distinction regarding the administrative body responsible for conducting it or the subject matter involved. Indeed, as has been repeatedly considered by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (in this sense, among others, one may consult judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96, and 2003-13140), respect for the elements that make up due process -which derive from the guarantees established in articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Political Constitution- is required in administrative procedures, especially when they are punitive or have ablatio effects -as in this case-, precisely because in them an obligation may be imposed, a subjective right or legitimate interest may be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction may be imposed (suspension, dismissal, economic, etc.), which have a punitive nature. In this regard, it must be noted that
\"[...] all those legal norms, derived from the Political Constitution as an ideological model, pursue nothing more nor less than the realization of the fundamental end of justice, which is the greatest of the principles protected by a State of Law, in which are included rules –general principles– that have full force and applicability to the administrative procedures of any body of the Administration, it is reiterated, therefore, the principles extracted from it are of strict observance by the authorities responsible for authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a sanctioning result.\" (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Constitutional Chamber. The highlighting is not from the original.)
It is thus that the guarantee of due process manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which demonstrates its instrumental character, insofar as it is arranged to guarantee the best resolution thereof, under the terms provided in article 215.1 of the General Law of Public Administration:
\"The administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system.\" (The highlighting is not from the original.)
The binding nature of the guarantees that make up due process holds such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that their non-observance produces the annulment of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.
b.) In accordance with the foregoing, it is worth recalling that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide the procedural activity, as also indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2004-13140, of fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on the twelfth of November, two thousand three. In this case, the principles of celerity and official impetus (oficiosidad) (linked to other principles of administrative procedures, such as the search for material truth (verdad real) and anti-formalism or informalism) are applicable, which entail a power-duty of the directing and decision-making bodies to compel the processing of the procedure until its resolution on the merits, which, pursuant to the provisions of articles 222.1 and 225 of the General Law of Public Administration, constitutes an obligation for the Administration to initiate or promote the procedure sua sponte, that is, without requiring action by the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, meaning it is processed without undue delays for the parties. This refers to the proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and for the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is in accordance with the principles of economy and procedural efficiency, in addition to the constitutional principle of reasonableness, leading to the sanctioning of procedural inactivity with the lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms set forth in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, a norm that was amended by canon 200, subsection 10) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in the following terms:
\"1) When the procedure is halted for more than six months due to a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, sua sponte or by complaint, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code.
2) The lapse of proceedings (caducidad) of a procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to act due to the operation of positive or negative silence, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act.
3) The lapse of proceedings (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are considered not to have been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.\" (Amendment effective as of the first of January of the year two thousand eight.)
Now, it is noted that in the interest of promoting an expeditious process, this cannot call into question or impair the guarantees that constitute due process, such as, failing to duly state the reasons for the resolution due to the lack of conducting expert examinations, appearances, or some piece of evidence of importance; or not respecting the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) provided for in the transcribed legal norm, it is justified as a means to avoid the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as in the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act -when the matter was initiated at the request of a party- and likewise, it becomes moot once that final act has been issued. For it to operate, according to the provisions of the aforementioned norm, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) requires the following prerequisites: first: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; second, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or else to the Administration, if it was instituted sua sponte; and third, that said state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a term that constitutes the minimum time limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure. This implies that in punitive procedures or those with possible effects on rights that are conducted sua sponte, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, notably stated on the institute under discussion, considering:
\"In the first place, it can be observed that the recently transcribed norm is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual prerequisites contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body responsible for processing. This implies that its effects occur as a matter of law (de pleno derecho), and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory, not constitutive, effects. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence –competence being, by definition, inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP)-, but rather, solely, as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred .\" (The highlighting is not from the original.)
From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to canon 66, both of the General Law of Public Administration, public powers (competencias) are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the extinguishment of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, public powers (competencias) are not extinguished by the passage of the term set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same ordinal when it indicates that there will be a limitation of the competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states emphatically that an act issued outside the time limit is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided otherwise by law, which does not occur here. It is clear that the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself describes as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, within the administrative procedure; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.
c.) We start from the \"principle-based\" (principista) and \"complementarity\" character of the General Law of Public Administration, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, insofar as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, since, although there are matters and procedures that by legal mandate -article 367 of the same reference Law- and determined by Executive Decree -number 8979-P and number 9469-P- have a specific and particular regulation, it is true that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the reference General Law, the application of the jurisprudence, principles, and values inherent to Administrative Law cannot be ignored. It is undeniable that the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is inherent to and part of Administrative Law. Moreover, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obliges the official and the Judge to interpret the norms, principles, and values \" in the way that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect for the rights and interests of the individual\" (article 10.1 of the General Law of Public Administration), which in this case, requires respect for the forms and constituent elements of due process; which is characteristic of a Social and Democratic State of Law.
d.) Due to the foregoing, the defendant's proposal to exclude the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) from the administrative procedures pursued by that entity is not acceptable, for lacking a specific regulation in the norms of the subject matter governing the procedures for revocation of adjudications and annulment of titles, that is, in the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 and its amendments, and in the Regulation for the Selection and Assignment of Land Applicants. On the contrary, bearing in mind that the determination of administrative procedures is a matter reserved to law -theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of liberty, which derives from article 28 of the Fundamental Charter, according to the jurisprudential development of the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, one may consult judgments number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on the twenty-fourth of November, nineteen ninety-two, number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on the sixth of July, nineteen, 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on the tenth of May, nineteen ninety-six, nineteen ninety-three)-; legal regulation obviously prevails over regulatory norms. In any case, as previously indicated, in the face of a regulatory gap or vacuum, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first within the Public Law branch (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider -as already indicated in the supra-cited precedents- that the Agrarian Development Institute's own regulation for this type of situation, in force at the time of the facts under analysis, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; from which the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provisions of numeral 364 of the General Law of Public Administration cannot be ignored, which fully provides for the \"prevalence\" of its principles and norms, \"over those of any other provisions of equal or lesser rank\", which it establishes as \"criteria for the interpretation of the entire administrative legal order of the country. \"
XI.- ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION REGARDING THE ALLEGED LAPSE OF PROCEEDINGS (CADUCIDAD) IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING PURSUED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.- Having determined the applicability of the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative proceeding pursued against the plaintiffs herein -Mr. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 -, we proceed with the analysis of the situation in the indicated matter. After a meticulous review of what occurred in said matter, it is possible to verify that the alleged inactivity of the procedure in question does not occur. Indeed, it is noted that the processing has been continuous, with multiple participation by the plaintiffs herein, in full exercise of the defense of their interests, and also by those participating in this matter as interested third parties. Thus, after the notification of the opening of the proceeding to the plaintiffs herein, which occurred on the twenty-ninth of September, two thousand eight -proven fact 11.)-, they responded by brief on the eighth of October, two thousand eight, an opportunity in which they accepted the alleged non-compliance (illegal sale of the parcel while the limitations were in force) -proven fact 13.)-. Subsequently, on the following second of December, the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate changed the date for conducting the site inspection to fourteen hundred thirty hours on the following third of December, two thousand eight, and postponed the appearance hearing to the fourth of December, starting at fourteen hundred hours - proven fact 14.)-. That same day (the second of December, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre140258 and Nombre140259 appeared in the proceeding, requesting to be considered interested third parties in the matter and that those proceedings be archived -proven fact 15.).\n\nThe plaintiffs here filed a note on December 3, 2008, in which they stated that at the appointed time and day, the officials of the respondent Institute had not appeared to carry out the on-site inspection — **proven fact 16.)** —; which inspection was carried out starting at 2:30 p.m. on that same day (December 3, 2008), with the presence of Licenciado Lewis Mac Laren, technician Jonathán Rodríguez, and engineer Francisco Molina Salas, and in which Mrs. Nombre140259 and her son were present, as recorded in the respective minutes — **proven fact 17.)** —. By reason of the foregoing, on December 12, 2008, the plaintiffs here — Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 — filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and resolutions, starting from the one issued at 8:40 a.m. on December 2 previously — **proven fact 18.)** —. Now then, the next procedural step that occurred in this procedural path was the filing, at 4:00 p.m. on June 3, 2009, of report DRCP-FCO 001-08 (which is dated December 3, 2008), which is the report that engineer Francisco Molina Salas sent to the Central Pacific Regional Directorate of the then Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario regarding the findings and conclusions of the inspection carried out at Dirección16883 — **proven fact 19.)** —. Subsequently, on July 7, 2009, Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 filed a motion for expiration (caducidad) of the procedure processed under file 161-08-NUL; a motion they reiterated on the 13th of that same month and year — **proven fact 20.)** —. By official communication JD-0457-2009, of August 3, 2009, the Secretary General of the Board of Directors referred the matter to the attention of the Central Pacific Regional Directorate of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, so that it could rule on the alleged expiration; and this unit, in turn, by official communication DRPC-581-2009, of August 25, 2009, referred it to the Regional Legal Advisory Office — **proven fact 21.)** —. Thus it was that, by resolution issued at 9:40 a.m. on October 22, 2009, the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Regional Directorate accepted the previous filings; granted a hearing on the inspection report, and referred the recusal to the Regional Director — **proven fact 22.)** —. On November 13, 2009, the plaintiffs here filed a new motion to nullify all proceedings, starting from December 3, 2008 — **proven fact 23.)** — and the pending motions were resolved in the resolution of 8:00 a.m. on December 14, 2009, of the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Regional Directorate, in which it rejected the alleged nullity, finding the inspection carried out on December 3, 2009, to be legitimate; rejected the motion for expiration (caducidad) — considering that this matter is governed by special regulations, to which the Ley General de la Administración Pública is not applicable —; and rejected the motion to include Mr. Nombre140258 and Mr. Nombre140259 as third parties; and finally summoned the investigated parties to the hearing to be held starting at 9:30 a.m. on January 27, 2010 — **proven fact 24.)** —. Against the foregoing decision, on January 6, 2010, the plaintiffs here filed an appeal with concomitant nullity; which was dismissed by official communication DRPC-024-2009, of January 25 following, issued by the Regional Director of the Central Pacific — **proven fact 25.)** —. Thus it was that on the appointed day and time (9:30 a.m. on January 27, 2010), the hearing in the proceeding for the extinguishment of the adjudication (extinción de adjudicación) and nullity of the title to parcel 57 of Asentamiento Lagunillas was held, without the presence of Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256, or their legal representative (Rigoberto Jiménez Vega), which was recorded along with the fact that there was no justification whatsoever; a proceeding in which the testimony of the witnesses, engineers Nombre140264 and Nombre140265, was received — **proven fact 26.)** —. Finally, on June 3, 2010, the Board of Directors of the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario received the final report of the proceeding for the extinguishment of the adjudication (extinción de adjudicación) and nullity of the title to parcel 57 of Asentamiento Lagunillas, given by Official Communication AJORO-17-10, of June 2 previously, prepared by the Legal Advisory Office of Legal Affairs of the Central Pacific Region, in which it found proven the breaches of the limitations of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización by Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 (\"*unjustified abandonment of the parcel by physically and permanently absenting themselves from the property for several years and without being in possession thereof, in which third persons, unrelated to them and their family, are living, working, and exploiting the land, and illegal sale, for having sold the parcel to these third-party occupants, grounds defined in articles 67 and 68, subsection 4) paragraph b) ibidem*, ...\"), in light of which it recommended declaring the extinguishment of rights with the revocation of the adjudication made by agreement of the institution's Board of Directors in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, with the subsequent nullity of the property title of the farm registered in the Real Estate Registry under Folio Real registration number Placa26912, of the Province of Puntarenas, free of annotations, canceling document 577-49-01, which is the judicial request (exhorto) for annotation of that proceeding, and requiring cancellation of the encumbrances under citations 407-06703-0178, as they correspond to the limitations of the Law, and citations 527-13.250-003, which is a mortgage that has been satisfied in its debt obligation and whose registry cancellation was requested by the creditor — according to the document annotated under citations 577-88.344; and that the Registry be notified by judicial request (exhorto), so that it reverts the property to the name of the institution (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario); finally, it advised that an appraisal of the improvements (mejoras) on the property must be made, in order to determine by whom they were made — **proven fact 27.)** —. In light of this report, by Agreement adopted unanimously in Article 72 of ordinary session 022-2010, held on July 19, 2010, the Board of Directors of the then-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the resolution issued at 3:00 p.m. on that same date, issued the final act in this administrative proceeding, on which occasion it ordered: **a.)** the extinguishment of rights with the revocation of the adjudication made by agreement of the institution's Board of Directors in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, with the subsequent nullity of the property title of the farm registered in the Real Estate Registry, under Folio Real registration number Placa26912, of the Province of Puntarenas, free of annotations and encumbrances; **b.)** the issuance of the appropriate judicial request (exhorto) to notify the Registry of the reversion of the property to the name of the institution; **c.)** to carry out the appraisal of improvements (mejoras) of the property and determine by whom they were made for their corresponding payment; **d.)** to the Subregional Office of Orotina to proceed with the prompt management of the eviction of the property, by means of the corresponding notices to the illegal occupants, so that they abandon it voluntarily, and to any other person who is illegally on the farm; and in the event of refusal, to proceed with the eviction through the Guardia Civil, and that in case of doubt regarding the claim for improvements (mejoras) by the occupants (buyers), a deposit of the corresponding amount be made in the account of the Agrarian Court under the file for proceedings of anticipatory evidence of judicial inspection and expert evidence, under file 09-160133-0642-AG-2. Finally, it advised the plaintiffs here of the availability of the appeal applicable against that decision (appeal before the improper hierarchical superior, Tribunal Agrario) — **proven fact 29.)** —. Thus, the appeal that was filed against the foregoing decision on November 16, 2010, was finally resolved by resolution 1163, of 7:32 a.m. on September 20, 2012, of the Tribunal Agrario — **proven fact 31.)** —. From the foregoing account, it is noted that there were no delays contrary to the legality framework, insofar as it is not even true that there was an inactivity of more than six months, attributable to the Administration, under the terms established in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and by reference for this matter. On the contrary, even if we were to count from the performance of the inspection of the parcel, which was done on December 3, 2008 — **proven fact 17.)** —, which does not seem appropriate, given that the interested parties here filed a motion for nullity of proceedings on December 12, 2008 — **proven fact 18.)** —, the truth is that on June 3, 2009, the report corresponding to that proceeding was filed in the case record — **proven fact 19.)** —, which was of importance for the resolution of this matter, to the extent that it was brought to the attention of the interested parties by resolution of October 22, 2009, of the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Regional Directorate — **proven fact 21.)** —. Thus, the motion for expiration (caducidad) filed by Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 did not \"*interrupt*\" the alleged inactivity of the procedure, given that previously, an administrative action important for the completion of this procedure had been produced. Thus, the alleged inactivity did not occur, and the action is also dismissed regarding this point.\n\n**XII.- RULING REGARDING THE CLAIMS FILED.-** In consideration of the foregoing, it is appropriate to review the claims that were filed in this proceeding, which include various pronouncements, in the following manner:\n\n**a.) Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) of the ordinary administrative proceeding processed against them in file 161-08:** In consideration of what was explained supra, the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) are dismissed.\n\n**b.) Of the claim for nullity of the Administration's actions in the administrative proceeding for revocation of adjudication and nullity of the title:** Given that the nullity alleged against the challenged conduct was conditioned upon the acceptance of the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) and/or expiration (caducidad); consequently, being ancillary to that also declaratory claim, this part of the lawsuit must be dismissed. Note that this nullity was directed against the following actions: *the resolution of the Board of Directors of 3:00 p.m. on July 19, 2010*, which revoked the adjudication that that body had made to them by agreement in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of Dirección16886 (Garabito) and the nullity of the property title that was registered in the Property Registry for the farm with Folio Real registration number Placa26912; *resolution number 1163-2012, of 7:32 a.m. on September 20, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Agrario*, in its capacity as improper hierarchical superior, and which confirmed that decision; *the judicial request (exhorto) that the respondent institution sent to the Public Property Registry*, with filing citations 2012-00333943-01, and in which it was ordered to revert the ownership of that farm to the respondent institution; and finally, the registration of the registration of the mentioned farm in favor of the respondent institute.\n\n**c.)** As a corollary of the acceptance of the nullities they requested to be declared — and also ancillary in nature to the main declaratory claim —, they formulated the **claim for condemnation**, consisting of ordering that the referenced farm be registered under their ownership (that of the plaintiffs) in equal shares. Regarding this point we must state the following. It becomes improper, not only because the first claim — of a declaratory nature — of the lawsuit was dismissed, upon whose acceptance this one depended, being ancillary. But furthermore, it is noted that regarding this claim, to the extent that the plaintiffs, prior to the termination of the validity of the limitations imposed by legal mandate on agrarian property arising from acts of adjudication by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, sold it to those who appear as interested third parties in this matter, and have not even exercised possession of the parcel that was adjudicated to them since December 9, 2005 — **proven fact 5.)** —. By virtue of this, this Chamber considers that in relation to this point, the plaintiffs lack standing ad causam activa to request the registration of that property in their name. Indeed, what has already been said regarding the special connotation of this type of property is recalled, over which an important social function weighs, which manifests in the obligation of the beneficiary to directly work and exploit the ceded parcel, as clearly and simply required by article 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, when it provides: \"*If the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and fulfilled all other obligations to its satisfaction, they shall have the right to be granted a property title*, ...\" and paragraph two of numeral 67 of the same legal body reinforces this, by establishing: \"*Once fifteen years have elapsed and the right of property has been acquired*, ...\" Thus, in this case, it is evident that the plaintiffs did not acquire ownership of the farm they claim, due to the breach of the limitations that were legally imposed on the cession in their favor, an adjudication that was revoked in accordance with the procedure followed for that purpose, in time, that is, prior to the expiration of those limitations. An interpretation different from what has been stated would imply distorting the raison d'être of these adjudications. The situation thus presented, this Authority considers that in this case, the plaintiffs have acted with evident recklessness, to such an extent that it can be regarded as an attempt at fraud of law (fraude de ley), under the terms regulated in numeral 20 of the Civil Code, which literally provides: \"*Acts performed under the shelter of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.*\"\n\n**XIII.- OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES OF THE LAWSUIT.-** The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit in its answer, and to that effect, requested that it be dismissed in all its parts, for which it raised the defenses of lack of interest and lack of right, and the interested third parties raised the defense of lack of standing. In this regard, we must note that standing, the current interest in the resolution of the matter, and the right are substantive prerequisites of every jurisdictional proceeding, which must be reviewed by every Judge, even ex officio and in that strict order. In this respect, the following should be indicated:\n\n**a.) Of standing in this proceeding:** On this aspect, it is worth recalling that a distinction must be made between *procedural standing* and *material standing or standing in the cause* (*legitimación ad causam*), insofar as the first (*procedural standing*) seeks the constitution or accreditation of a procedural relationship, while the second (*legitimación ad causam*) determines the existence of the relationship between the legal situation set forth by the plaintiff and the legitimate interest being debated, being a prerequisite for a favorable decision on the claim. Thus, the latter does not refer to an aspect of form (admissibility) in the proceeding, but rather to a substantive element that refers or alludes to the real existence of the material legal relationship and, with it, of the material subjective right and the obligation. On this matter, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated:\n\n\"*This Chamber has stated that standing is: ‘…a prerequisite of the claim set forth in the lawsuit and of the opposition raised by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantive interest at issue in the proceeding. Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the subject of the lawsuit to be declared; and the plaintiff must be the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims in the lawsuit, even if the substantive right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. …*\" (Judgment 000976-F-2006, of 7:40 a.m. on December 19, 2006).\n\nAnd more recently, the cited High Court, in judgment number 1042-F-SI-2013, of 8:50 a.m. on August 14, 2013, held:\n\n\"*(…) In accordance with procedural doctrine, the so-called '**legitimatio ad causam**' active or passive, or, as it is also called, standing in the cause or standing to act, refers to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and of being obligated to the performance (the defendant). That is, those persons who will be legally and directly affected in their rights by the judgment have standing in the cause. In this line of thought, this Chamber has stated that standing is: '(…) a prerequisite of the claim set forth in the lawsuit and of the opposition raised by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantive interest at issue in the proceeding. Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the subject of the lawsuit to be declared; and the plaintiff must be the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims in the lawsuit, even if the substantive right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. … According to the subject with standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing; the first corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who later intervene to defend their cause, and the second belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantive impediment; if the judge notices the lack thereof, they must declare it ex officio and issue an inhibitory judgment, which is not an obstacle to its being opportunely alleged as a preliminary exception. (…) Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific proceeding; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for such effect with respect to the procedural claim. Thus, legitimación ad causam activa, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position the subject holds regarding the procedural claim brought. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they seek in court. …' (Judgment number 976 of 7:40 a.m. on December 19, 2006).*\"\n\nIn the same vein, reference may be made, among others, to the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 89 of 14 hours 50 minutes of June 19, 1991, 83 of 15 hours 15 minutes of September 24, 1997, 604 of 10 hours of August 17, 2007, and 1023-A-S1-2009 of 14 hours 50 minutes of October 1, 2009)\\\". \n\nBy virtue of the foregoing, it can be concluded that in essence, active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) determines that the person appearing as plaintiff in a proceeding is the person who, under the law, may formulate the claims of the complaint, and by virtue thereof, be the holder of the right or legitimate interest sought to be recognized in their favor, and with respect to whom a ruling favorable to their claims may be issued; and for its part, passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) determines that the person who is sued is the person who, by law, is required to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits that the substantial legal relationship that is the subject of the complaint be declared. The absence of standing constitutes a substantial impediment to granting the complaint, and if the adjudicator becomes aware of the lack thereof, they must so declare sua sponte and issue a judgment accordingly, although it is no bar to it being raised timely as a preliminary exception. Therefore, standing is outlined as an elementary substantive prerequisite for issuing an estimatory judgment, since, should its absence go unnoticed, the judge could commit the error of granting a right to someone not entitled to it or imposing a obligation on someone not obligated, insofar as that would mean the judgment as such becomes unenforceable. In light of what has been said, it is deemed that the plaintiffs —Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 —, in their capacity as allottees of an agrarian parcel, according to an agreement to that effect issued by the competent body —at that time, the so-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario—, have active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) to request judicial review (control de legalidad) of the administrative conduct they challenged in this venue, all derived from the administrative procedure for the revocation of that allocation and annulment of the title. And accordingly, there is also passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) with respect to the institution sued in this proceeding. In relation to these aspects of the complaint (declaratory claims), it had already been declared —by resolution number 107-2015, of fifteen hours two minutes of March five, two thousand fifteen, of Section I of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda— that the gentlemen Nombre140258 and now the Estate of the late Nombre140259 , have an interest in the matter, in the character or position of interested third parties. However, as was alleged by the interested third parties, the defense of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) is properly granted, but only insofar as it refers to the claim for condemnation made in this proceeding, aimed at ordering the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915 to be registered again in the name of the plaintiffs, considering that since December nine, two thousand five, and as of the date of adopting this jurisdictional decision, the plaintiffs do not exercise possession over the property whose title they claim, having sold (illegally) that parcel to those who appear as interested third parties in this proceeding; accordingly, granting their request would constitute an evident abuse of rights (abuso de derecho), in light of the special nature of agrarian property (purposes and mode of acquisition), as explained supra.\n\n**b.) Regarding the lack of interest:** As is evident from what has occurred in relation to the conflict at hand, its resolution is of importance and legal transcendence for the participants in this proceeding, especially since there is another jurisdictional proceeding —in the agrarian venue— in which what is resolved here has relevance. Furthermore, there is no record that in this matter any of the mechanisms for early termination of the proceeding, nor any alternative conflict resolution mechanism, have been resorted to, and therefore there is indeed a current interest in relation to the action.\n\n**c.) Regarding the lack of right:** Finally, in light of what is considered in this pronouncement, it is evident that in relation to the claims as to which active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) were declared, those of a declaratory nature, the lack of right of the plaintiffs is evident, as their allegations are unfounded; which obliges this defense to be granted in relation to those aspects.\n\n**XIV.- OF COSTS.- ** Pursuant to numeral 193 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. Dispensation from this award is only viable when there was, in the Tribunal’s judgment, sufficient grounds to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and overturn the principle of awarding costs against the losing party. Therefore, the award against the plaintiffs for the payment of procedural and personal costs in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is imposed, which will be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. With regard to the interested third parties, Nombre140258 and the estate of the late Nombre140259 , they did not formulate their own claim; as to them, no special award of costs is declared.\n\n**POR TANTO:**\n\nThe preliminary defense of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), reiterated in the conclusions phase by the representation of the sued institution, is rejected. The defense of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) raised by the interested third parties is partially granted, that is, in relation to the final claim, for condemnation, aimed at ordering the registration of the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915, once again in favor of the plaintiffs, and in equal parts; and it is rejected with regard to the remaining claims. As to the rest, the substantive defense of lack of interest raised by the sued institution is rejected, and the defense of lack of right raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the interested third parties is granted. Consequently, the complaint filed by **Nombre140255** **AND Nombre140256** against the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL AND THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES, Nombre140258** **AND THE ESTATE OF THE LATE Nombre140259** is declared **WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS**. The award against the plaintiffs for the payment of procedural and personal costs in favor of the sued institution is imposed, which will be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. No special award of costs is declared with respect to the interested third parties.\n\n\n\n\n\n**Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n**Nombre136022** **Daniel Aguilar Méndez**\n\n\n\nExp. No. 13-006424-1027-CA\n\nProceso de conocimiento con trámite de puro derecho (art.\n\n98.2 of the CPCA)
Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 against INDER.
Interested third parties: Nombre140258 and the Succession of Nombre140259