{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-727877",
  "citation": "Res. 00743-2017 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Absolución por error de tipo en invasión de zona de protección de naciente y quebrada",
  "title_en": "Acquittal for mistake of fact in invasion of spring and stream protection zone",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela (San Ramón) confirma la sentencia absolutoria del Tribunal de Juicio de Grecia, que había absuelto a tres agricultores acusados del delito de invasión de área de protección de una naciente y una quebrada, previsto en el artículo 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal. La Procuraduría General de la República, como actora civil, apeló la sentencia alegando falta de fundamentación y errónea valoración de la prueba, argumentando que los imputados conocían la existencia de las áreas de protección y actuaron con dolo. El Tribunal de Apelación analiza dogmáticamente la distinción entre error de tipo y error de prohibición. Concluye que el Tribunal de Juicio valoró correctamente la prueba al determinar que no se acreditó con certeza que los acusados supieran que los cultivos de café y tomate se encontraban dentro de las zonas de protección, configurándose así un error de tipo que excluye el dolo. Subsidiariamente, considera que aun si hubiera existido dolo, se habría configurado un error de prohibición invencible, pues los imputados fueron asesorados por funcionarios del MAG sin que se les advirtiera de la ilegalidad de su conducta. También rechaza la solicitud de restitución al estado anterior por falta de integración de los propietarios registrales al proceso. La apelación se declara sin lugar.",
  "summary_en": "The Sentence Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (San Ramón) upholds the acquittal issued by the Trial Court of Grecia, which had absolved three farmers charged with invading the protection zone of a spring and a stream under Article 58(a) of the Forestry Law. The Office of the Attorney General, as civil plaintiff, appealed the judgment, claiming insufficient reasoning and erroneous weighing of evidence, arguing that the defendants knew about the protection areas and acted with intent. The Appeals Court dogmatically analyzes the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. It concludes that the Trial Court correctly assessed the evidence by finding that it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the coffee and tomato crops were within the protection zones, thus establishing a mistake of fact that excludes intent. Alternatively, even if intent were assumed, the court finds that an insurmountable mistake of law would apply, since the defendants received technical advice from Ministry of Agriculture officials without being warned of the illegality of their conduct. It also rejects the request for restitution to the prior state due to the failure to join the registered property owners in the proceedings. The appeal is dismissed.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón",
  "date": "2017",
  "year": "2017",
  "topic_ids": [
    "criminal-environmental",
    "forestry-law-7575"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "criminal-environmental",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "error de tipo",
    "error de prohibición",
    "dolo",
    "invasión de área de protection",
    "Ley Forestal",
    "procuraduría",
    "absolutoria",
    "juicio de reenvío"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 58",
      "law": "Ley 7575"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 33",
      "law": "Ley 7575"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "error de tipo",
    "error de prohibición invencible",
    "invasión de área de protección",
    "Art. 58 Ley Forestal",
    "Art. 33 Ley Forestal",
    "zona de protección de naciente y quebrada",
    "absolutoria",
    "procuraduría",
    "apelación penal",
    "dolo"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "mistake of fact",
    "insurmountable mistake of law",
    "invasion of protection area",
    "Forestry Law Art. 58",
    "Forestry Law Art. 33",
    "spring and stream protection zone",
    "acquittal",
    "Attorney General's Office",
    "criminal appeal",
    "intent"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "La conclusión a la que arribó la Cámara de Juicio es compartida por este Tribunal de Apelación, toda vez que de la prueba y en especial de las declaraciones de los imputados (...) y de los relatos de los testigos (...), se extrae que los encausados recibieron asesoría técnica, por parte de funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería durante la realización de sus actividades atinentes al cultivo de dichos productos. (...) Si se admitiera que los acusados obraron de forma dolosa, no sería factible concluir, que ellos actuaron conociendo que su conducta estaba prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico (error de prohibición), ya que como lo declararon los imputados y no existe prueba que desacredite su dicho, ellos fueron asesorados por funcionarios públicos, al momento de realizar los cultivos de café y tomate, y de ahí que no era posible conocer que su acción estaba prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico, situación que resultaba invencible de superar, ya que fueron las mismas autoridades estatales las que los asesoraron para que realizaran dichas actividades agrícolas.",
  "excerpt_en": "The conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber is shared by this Appeals Court, given that it follows from the evidence — especially the statements of the defendants (...) and the accounts of the witnesses (...) — that the accused received technical advice from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock while carrying out their crop-related activities. (...) Even if one were to accept the appellant's argument that the defendants acted intentionally, it would not be possible to conclude that they acted knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the legal system (mistake of law), since, as the defendants stated, and there is no evidence to discredit their claim, they were advised by public officials at the time they planted the coffee and tomato crops, and therefore it was not possible for them to know that their action was prohibited; a situation that was insurmountable, as it was the very state authorities who advised them to carry out those agricultural activities.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Attorney General's appeal is denied and the acquittal is upheld due to the existence of a mistake of fact.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de la Procuraduría y se confirma la sentencia absolutoria por existir error de tipo."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando III, cita doctrinal",
      "quote_en": "\"a mistake of fact arises when the actor errs regarding a circumstance necessary to complete the legal type.\"",
      "quote_es": "\"se presenta un error de tipo cuando el autor se equivoca sobre una circunstancia que sea necesaria para completar el tipo legal.\""
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando III, definición de error de prohibición",
      "quote_en": "\"when the actor, knowing all the circumstances that fully complete the legal type, does not derive from them the conclusion regarding a legal prohibition, but rather believes that their conduct is permitted.\"",
      "quote_es": "\"cuando el autor, al conocer todas las circunstancias que complementan en su totalidad el tipo legal, no extrae sin embargo de ellas la conclusión referida a una prohibición legal, sino que cree que su conducta está permitida.\""
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando III, razonamiento del tribunal",
      "quote_en": "The conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber is shared by this Appeals Court, given that it follows from the evidence that the accused received technical advice from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock while carrying out their activities.",
      "quote_es": "La conclusión a la que arribó la Cámara de Juicio es compartida por este Tribunal de Apelación, toda vez que de la prueba (...) se extrae que los encausados recibieron asesoría técnica, por parte de funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería durante la realización de sus actividades."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando III, argumentación subsidiaria",
      "quote_en": "Even if one were to accept that the defendants acted intentionally, it would not be possible to conclude that they acted knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the legal system (mistake of law).",
      "quote_es": "Si se admitiera que los acusados obraron de forma dolosa, no sería factible concluir, que ellos actuaron conociendo que su conducta estaba prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico (error de prohibición)."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-41661",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7575  Art. 58"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-727877",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-41661",
      "norm_num": "7575",
      "norm_name": "Ley Forestal",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "13/02/1996"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "PODERJUDICIAL\n\nTRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA, III CIRCUITO JUDICIAL ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN\n\n Tel 2456-9069 ó [Telf1] tapelacion-sra@Poder-Judicial.go.cr Fax 2456-90-29\n\n_______________________________________________________________________________________\n\nExp: 11-000461-0331-PE\n\nRes: 2017-00743\n\n TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SECCIÓN [Dirección1]. San Ramón, a las trece horas veinte minutos (01:20 p.m.) del veintiséis de octubre de dos mil diecisiete.\n\n RECURSO DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1] , mayor, costarricense, cédula CED1, [Nombre2] , mayor, costarricense, cédula CED2, conocido como [Nombre3] y [Nombre4] , mayor, costarricense, cédula CED3, por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL POR INVASIÓN A LA ZONA PROTECTORA DE UNA NACIENTE y UNA QUEBRADA en perjuicio del PATRIMONIO FORESTAL. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas Adriana Escalante Moncada [Nombre5] y Yadira Godínez Segura. Se apersonan en apelación de sentencia, la licenciada [Nombre6] , Procuradora y el licenciado [Nombre7] , defensor particular del imputado [Nombre8] .\n\n RESULTANDO:\n\n I.- Que mediante sentencia número 33-TGRE-2016 de las once horas del once de marzo de dos mil dieciséis, el Tribunal de Juicio de Grecia, resolvió: \"POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto y artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 8 incisos 1 y 2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 10 y 11 inciso 1 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 9 inciso 2 y 14 inciso 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 32, 42, 142, 184, 265, 267, 360 a 366 del Código Procesal Penal; 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 34, 45, del Código Penal; 33 inciso a) y 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal N° 7575; SE RESUELVE: a) declarar sin lugar la prescripción alegada por el Lic. [Nombre9] ; b) en aplicación del Principio de In Dubio Pro Reo se absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre1] , [Nombre2] y [Nombre4] por UN DELITO INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL POR INVASIÓN A LA ZONA PROTECTORA DE UNA NACIENTE Y UNA QUEBRADA que se acusó como cometido en daño de LOS RECURSOS FORESTALES; y c) declarar improcedente la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior, al no haberse brindado durante el proceso, a las copropietarias registrales de dos de los inmuebles, ni al titular de otro de ellos, la posibilidad de hacer valer sus derechos como terceros interesados. Se ordena levantar cualquier medida cautelar que pese sobre los imputados con ocasión de este proceso. Para la lectura integral de la sentencia se señalan las 16:00 del próximo viernes 18 de marzo de dos mil dieciséis. Notifíquese\" (sic).\n\n II.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, la licenciada [Nombre6] , Procuradora, interpuso recurso de apelación de sentencia.\n\n III.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón, procedió a conocer del recurso.\n\n IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.\n\n Redacta la jueza de apelación de sentencia [Nombre10] ; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO:\n\nI. La licenciada [Nombre11] , Procuradora de la República, en su carácter de actora civil, interpuso recurso de apelación de sentencia contra el fallo número 33-TGRE-2016, emitido a las 11:00 horas del 11 de marzo de 2016, dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Grecia, mediante la cual se absolvió de toda pena y responsabilidad a los encartados [Nombre1] , [Nombre2] y [Nombre4] . \n\n \n\nII. Mediante resolución de las 10:25 horas del 14 de setiembre de 2016, esta Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia, suspendió el trámite de la presente causa, en virtud de la acción de constitucionalidad que se ventila ante la Sala Constitucional, bajo la sumaria número 16-3607-0007-CO . Luego, la Sala Constitucional mediante voto número voto 16967-2016, declaró sin lugar la acción interpuesta, sin embargo, todavía no se encuentra redactado el fallo integral emitido por el alto Tribunal Constitucional. No obstante, a pesar que resta la redacción integral del voto antes reseñado, analizado el recurso planteado y por la forma en que se resolverá el mismo, se ordena reactivar el trámite de la presente sumaria. \n\nIII. En el primer motivo del recurso, la Procuradora invoca una insuficiente fundamentación e inobservancia de las reglas de la sana crítica. Detalla que en este caso ya se había realizado un primer debate y que en aquella ocasión el Tribunal de Juicio dictó una sentencia absolutoria en favor de los encartados, decisión que fue impugnada por la Procuraduría ante la Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia y como resultado de dicha gestión se anuló el primer fallo y se ordenó un nuevo juicio. Refiere que, en esta segunda ocasión, el Tribunal de Juicio de Grecia, volvió a dictar una sentencia absolutoria en favor de los imputados. Indica que en la decisión impugnada, el cuerpo juzgador, hizo una descripción somera de las declaraciones de los testigos [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] , Eliden Alc á [Nombre14] y [Nombre15] . Sostiene que a partir de esos testimonios, el Colegio de Jueces derivó que los funcionarios del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (en adelante IDA), no le informaron a los justiciables que los terrenos adjudicados a estos tenían algún tipo de limitación. También ataca que las personas juzgadoras de instancia hicieron un breve análisis de las declaraciones de [Nombre16] y [Nombre17] , funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura de Ganadería (en adelante MAG), para señalar que los encartados desconocían sobre la existencia de limitaciones para realizar siembras en las zonas de protección tanto de la quebrada como de la naciente. Añade que el Tribunal de Juicio volvió a dictar una sentencia absolutoria, decisión que a criterio de la recurrente adolece de falta de fundamentación por dos razones esenciales: i) El hecho de que las tierras hayan sido adjudicadas por el IDA , no significa que los encartados tuvieran que haberse representado falsamente un convencimiento de encontrarse en aptitud legal para trabajar la totalidad de la tierra, esto por cuanto no resulta válido alegar ignorancia de la ley. Además, detalla que los planos de dichas parcelas, que constan como prueba en el expediente , especifican que dichos terrenos están afectados a la Ley Forestal y sobre ese elemento de prueba no existe ponderación por parte de los jueces. Asimismo, estima que la prueba testimonial y documental, es conteste en señalar que era de conocimiento de los acusados la existencia de una naciente en el lugar de los hechos. Afirma que los testigos de [Nombre18] y [Nombre19] , indicaron que los propios imputados procuraron la supervivencia del citado cuerpo de agua, a través de trabajos de reforestación y de captación, destinados a que no solo el afloramiento continuara con brote de agua, sino que se hiciera más grande, a efectos de brindarle ese líquido a varias casas que se ubicaban en ese sector. Refiere que las anteriores circunstancias, permiten sostener que los justiciables conocían de su actuar ilícito y descarta el citado desconocimiento aludido por los encartados. ii) fustiga que en este caso se reitera el argumento de que los imputados recibieron asesoría de funcionarios del MAG dirigida exclusivamente a la actividad de agricultura y que no se les advirtió por parte de estos servidores públicos de alguna situación irregular, en relación con los cultivos existentes en las parcelas. Sostiene que el anterior razonamiento no se deriva de la prueba ya que el testigo [Nombre16] hizo alusión a la necesidad de proteger la quebrada y la naciente. Objeta que la sentencia no desarrolla porqué a partir de la prueba se deriva la existencia de un error de prohibición. Indica que la sentencia carece de una debida fundamentación, y por ello lo procedente es anularla y ordenar el juicio de reenvío. Sin lugar el reclamo. Una vez analizado el fallo y el reproche formulado por la apelante, estas juzgadoras de alzada constatan que el mismo tiene una adecuada fundamentación y una correcta valoración de la prueba. En el caso sometido a examen, se tiene que conforme lo afirma la recurrente, el Tribunal de Juicio tuvo por demostrado los siguientes hechos de interés: \"PRIMERO: En Trojas de San Pedro de Valverde Vega, Grecia, se sitúa la finca conocida como La Cooperativa o Virgencita, la cual corresponde a parcelas adjudicadas por el IDA. En dicha propiedad existe una naciente captada para consumo humano y la quebrada afluente del río Trojas. SEGUNDO: La parcela número 3 cuyo folio real es CED4, fue adjudicada al encartado [Nombre1] y a la señora [Nombre20] ; y la parcela número 4 cuyo folio real es CED4, fue adjudicada al endilgado [Nombre2] , conocido como [Nombre3] y la señora [Nombre21] . TERCERO: Sin determinarse fecha y hora exacta, pero sí antes del 10 de marzo del 2011, los encartados [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] , invadieron el área de protección de la naciente captada para consumo humano y de la quebrada del río Trojas. CUARTO: Los imputados [Nombre22] y [Nombre8] , sembraron cultivos de café y tomate dentro del área de protección de la naciente y la quebrada indicadas, realizando labores de mantenimiento de dichos cultivos, limpieza de mala hierba, amarre y atomizando con aplicación de productos químicos y naturales, entre otras actividades, invadiendo en total un área de 4.989 metros cuadrados dentro de la zona de protección de la naciente y 4.265 metros cuadrados en el área de protección de la quebrada, para un total de 9.264 metros cuadrados invadidos. QUINTO: El encartado [Nombre23] , sembró cultivos de tomate en un área total de 2.760 metros cuadrados, dentro de los 100 metros de protección de la naciente captada, invadiendo así su zona de protección, lo cual hizo sin contar con permisos para tal actividad. Además, posee otra parcela por donde pasa la quebrada afluente del río Trojas, la cual se origina de las quebradas Chico Cubero y Julio, la cual también fue invadida en su área de protección por el endilgado, ya que sembró cultivos de tomate dentro de ésta, con una extensión de 3.540 metros cuadrados. SÉXTO: El endilgado [Nombre2] , sembró cultivos de tomate y una hielera de frijol, invadiendo el área de protección de la quebrada afluente del río Trojas, afectando con dicha siembra un área de 1.720 metros cuadrados. Esos cultivos se encuentran a escasos 48 metros de distancia del cauce y hay otros que sembró el imputado [Nombre24] a 43 metros de distancia. SÉTIMO: El área total fue invadida por las actividades de siembra y cultivo de café y tomate realizados por los encartados [Nombre22] y [Nombre8] fue de 9.264 metros cuadrados.\" (Copia textual de folio 217 frente y vuelto del expediente principal). Del anterior cuadro fáctico, así como de la fundamentación intelectiva del fallo, se extrae con claridad que el Tribunal de Juicio tuvo por acreditado, la existencia de una naciente y de una quebrada en la finca conocida como \"La Cooperativa\". También se tuvo por demostrado que los encartados [Nombre1] , [Nombre2] y [Nombre4] , tenían conocimiento de que en dicha finca existía una naciente y una quebrada. De igual manera, el fallo es amplio en explicar que, a partir de la prueba documental, pericial y las declaraciones de los funcionarios [Nombre12] , [Nombre13] y Eliden Alc á [Nombre14] , se demostró que los encartados [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] , sembraron en las parcelas adjudicadas por el IDA, cultivos de café y tomate, los cuales se encuentran en el área de protección de la naciente y de la quebrada del [Dirección2] Trojas. También, el cuerpo juzgador tuvo por demostrado que en un sector aledaño a la naciente y dentro del área de protección de la misma, fueron plantados árboles, los cuales conforman un pequeño bosque. Sobre estos aspectos, el fallo es claro en expresar -y así se deriva de la prueba- que los tres encartados reconocieron la existencia de la naciente, de la quebrada y de los sembradíos de café y tomate. Lo anterior permite deducir que en relación con estos eventos no existe controversia alguna. El punto de conflicto y atacado por la apelante, es la decisión que tomó la Cámara de Juicio, al estimar que en la especie existía un error de tipo. Para efectos de resolver adecuadamente este aspecto, es necesario hacer un repaso dogmático en lo atinente al error de tipo y su diferencia con el error de prohibición. En este sentido, es pacífica la postura dogmática al indicar que el desconocimiento o error sobre la existencia de uno o algunos de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal excluye el dolo. El tratadista [Nombre25] ha expresado que \"se presenta un error de tipo cuando el autor se equivoca sobre una circunstancia que sea necesaria para completar el tipo legal.\" (Roxin [Nombre26]. La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. Editorial Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2007, 1 edición, página 195). De igual manera al estar conformado el tipo penal, por elementos normativos y descriptivos, se ha establecido que un error sobre alguna de estas dos categorías de elementos constituye un error de tipo. Aquí merece una atención especial, la distinción entre elementos descriptivos y normativos del tipo penal. El primer grupo está conformado por aquellos que pueden ser percibidos por los sentidos, es decir la forma de conocimiento es la percepción sensorial, mientras que en la segunda categoría entran aquellos elementos que solo pueden ser apre he ndidos por una valoración. En relación con este segundo grupo , [Nombre25] detalla que la comprensión intelectual que caracteriza el dolo típico en los elementos normativos no significa una subsunción jurídica exacta en los conceptos empleados por la ley, sino que basta con que el contenido del significado social haya sido aprehendido por el autor. Sin embargo, también añade dicho autor que hay casos en los que el contenido del sentido social no puede ser entendido sin una determinada calificación jurídica. En estos casos , la calificación jurídica correcta pertenece a la comprensión intelectual de la circunstancia del hecho de que se trate y es requisito del dolo (En tal sentido [Nombre27] , Derecho Penal, Parte General tomo I. Editorial Civitas, 2 edición, 1997, páginas 459-462). Por su parte, y en lo que nos interesa para la resolución correcta del caso sometido a examen, [Nombre25] ha indicado que se configura un error de prohibición, \"cuando el autor, al conocer todas las circunstancias que complementan en su totalidad el tipo legal, no extrae sin embargo de ellas la conclusión referida a una prohibición legal, sino que cree que su conducta está permitida.\" ([Nombre26] [Nombre28], La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. ibid, página 195). Una vez precisados los anteriores conceptos es necesario abordar la construcción del tipo penal analizado por el Tribunal de Juicio. Según consta en la acusación a los encartados se les imputó el delito previsto y sancionado en el artículo 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal, que establece lo siguiente: “Se impondrá prisión de tres meses a tres años a quien: a) Invada un área de conservación o protección, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, u otras áreas de bosques o terrenos sometidos al régimen forestal, cualquiera que sea el área ocupada; independientemente de que se trate de terrenos privados del Estado u otros organismos de la Administración Pública o de terrenos de dominio particular. Los autores o partícipes del acto no tendrán derecho a indemnización alguna por cualquier construcción u obra que hayan realizado en los terrenos invadidos.” La acción típica contemplada en este tipo pena [Nombre29] es invadir, sin embargo, dicho verbo no cuenta con una definición legal en la Ley Forestal, ni en su reglamento, por lo que su definición debe buscarse en otras fuentes. Al respecto el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, señala que invadir se entiende como “1. Irrumpir, entrar por la fuerza; 2. tr. Ocupar anormal o irregularmente un lugar. Las aguas invadieron la autopista; 3. tr. Dicho de una cosa: Entrar y propagarse en un lugar o medio determinados…”. A partir de la anterior precisión conceptual se tiene entonces, que la acción que sanciona el inc iso a) del artículo 58 de la Ley Forestal, es la de ocupar, irrumpir en un área de conservación o protección, independientemente de que se trate de terrenos estatales o privados, es decir, invadir implica actos de ocupación del sitio. Adicionalmente, del análisis del citado tipo penal se concluye que el concepto de área de protección o zona de conservación constituye un elemento normativo, ya que su comprensión no se da por medio de los sentidos, sino que su contenido requiere de una compresión social de su significado. Además, estiman estas juzgadoras de alzada, que dicho elemento normativo, no puede ser entendido sin una determinada calificación jurídica, es decir, para comprender el significado de dicho elemento normativo, se debe recurrir a la definición legal que se estableció en la Ley Forestal. Es así como la normativa en comentario indica en su artículo 33 lo siguiente: “Áreas de protección. Se declararan áreas de protección las siguientes: a) Las áreas que bordeen nacientes permanentes, definidas en un radio de cien metros medidos de modo horizontal. b) Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado.” De las precisiones realizadas hasta ahora, y volviendo al análisis del caso concreto, se puede concluir que para efectos de la tipicidad objetiva, la acción típica que se les atribuyó a los encartados fue la de invadir las áreas que bordean las nacientes permanentes en un radio de cien metros horizontales, o una franja de quince metros -zona rural- o de diez metros horizontales -zona urbana-, en las riberas de los ríos. Para una resolución del caso, el análisis de la conducta desplegada por los encartados no se agota en el examen de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal, sino que también se debe analizar el elemento subjetivo, conformado por el dolo. Este fue el aspecto que se abocó a analizar el Tribunal de Juicio y a partir de dicha ponderación concluyó que existía un error de tipo al no poderse acreditar con la certeza requerida, que los encartados tuvieran conocimiento , de que las acciones que estaban ejecutando las hacían en el área de protección de una ribera o de una naciente. La conclusión a la que arribó la Cámara de Juicio es compartida por este Tribunal de Apelación, toda vez que de la prueba y en especial de las declaraciones de los imputados [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] , y de los relatos de los testigos [Nombre16] y [Nombre30] , se extrae que los encausados recibieron asesoría técnica , por parte de funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería durante la realización de sus actividades atinentes al cultivo de dichos productos. Como se deduce del sumario de prueba, los testigos [Nombre31] y [Nombre32] , relataron el tipo de asesoría que [Nombre29] e brindaron a los encartados . E n este sentido los funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería indicaron que brindaron información atinente a las técnicas y procedimientos para sembrar tomate y café y realizaron las supervisiones respectivas . A diferencia de lo que propone la apelante, de dichos testimonios no se deriva con la fuerza suficiente, que esos servidores públicos, le explicaran a los encartados cuál era el área de protección de la naciente, o de la quebrada y hasta d ó nde llegaba dicha zona de protección. Tampoco se deduce de dichos relatos, que esos funcionarios les informaran o advirtieran a los acusados , que en ciertas áreas de las parcelas adjudicadas no podían sembrar por constituir dichas zonas áreas de protección. En este caso en particular, cobra relevancia lo que declaró el testigo [Nombre33] , quien hizo alusión a que las parcelas que son objeto de examen en esta causa, pertenecen a una finca conocida como “La Cooperativa”, terrenos que han sido dedicados a la siembra de diferentes productos a lo largo de 30 años. Lo dicho hasta aquí permite deducir, que la tesis expuesta por la Cámara de instancia, para absolver a los encartados se circunscribía a que de la prueba no se derivaba con la certeza requerida , que los imputados hayan actuado conociendo que las zonas en las que se realizaron los sembradíos de tomate y café constituían áreas de protección, elemento que es indispensable para efectos de la tipicidad subjetiva. Sobre este particular, es necesario precisar que la comprobación del dolo es otro de los elementos que debe quedar acreditado a partir de la prueba y el cual se deriva de las circunstancias de hecho que rodearon un caso en particular. Como se lleva dicho, la asesoría técnica que recibieron los imputados en este caso, no permite concluir que los mismos actuaron conociendo que invadían la zona de protección de la naciente y de la quebrada con los sembradíos de café y tomate que plantaron en las parcelas que eran trabajadas por ellos. Pero, aun así, si se admitiera la tesis de la recurrente, en el sentido que los encartados actuaron con dolo -extremo que no ha sido demostrado con la certeza requerida-, lo cierto es que a criterio de estas juzgadoras de alzada, en la especie también se podría configurar un error de prohibición invencible, por las siguientes razones. Si se admitiera que los acusados obraron de forma dolosa, no sería factible concluir, que ellos actuaron conociendo que su conducta estaba prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico (error de prohibición), ya que como lo declararon los imputados y no existe prueba que desacredit e su dicho, ellos fueron asesorados por funcionarios públicos, al momento de realizar los cultivos de café y tomate, y de ahí que no era posible conocer que su acción estaba prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico, situación que resultaba invencible de superar, ya que fueron las mismas autoridades estatales las que los asesoraron para que realizaran dich a s actividades agrícolas . El error en el que incurre la apelante, es que plantea su reclamo únicamente a partir de un análisis de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal, desconociendo que la tipicidad también abarca el componente del dolo. Adicionalmente y como se ha desarrollado en este fallo, el análisis de la tipicidad en el delito objeto de examen, implica que el juzgador para efectos de determinar si una conducta encuadra en dicha figura penal, deba realizar una serie de valoraciones e interpretaciones, que incluye el análisis de la definición jurídica que existe en nuestro ordenamiento en relación con el concepto de área de protección. Es decir, el examen de la tipicidad requiere todo un proceso intelectivo, que torna a esta figura en un tipo penal complejo y de ahí que la demostración tanto de los elementos objetivos como del subjetivo, requiere de una valoración diversa, a la de aquellas otras conductas delictivas que están descritas únicamente a partir de elementos descriptivos o de elementos normativos de sencilla compresión a partir de su sentido social. De ahí que, en este caso, el abordaje que realizó la Cámara de Juicio es el correcto y por ende se debe desestimar el reclamo planteado. \n\nIV. En el segundo motivo, la apelante alega falta de fundamentación de la sentencia respecto de la denegatori a a emitir una orden de restitución de las cosas a su estado anterior. Detalla que en la decisión impugnada, el cuerpo colegiado rechazó la solicitud de la Procuraduría, en la cual peticionaba que se eliminaran los sembradíos existentes en las zonas de protección. Fustiga la postura del Tribunal de Juicio, ya que estima que en la sentencia se tuvo por demostrada la existencia de una naciente, y de una quebrada, además se tuvo por acreditado que los encartados efectuaron sembradíos en las zonas de protección de esos cuerpos de agua. Especifica que, si bien los predios en los que se encuentran dichos sembradíos no pertenecen a los imputados, sino a terceros propietarios de buena fe, lo cierto es que lo que se defiende y se querella es la invasión de la zona de protección de esos mantos de agua, áreas que aunque están enclavadas en propiedades privadas, los terceros no ostentan un derecho sobre esos terrenos y nadie puede detentar esas zonas o áreas de protección. Estima que no es indispensable tener a los dueños de esos fundos como terceros intervinientes en el proceso, ya que estas personas no tendrían la posibilidad de reclamación con respecto a las decisiones que en sentencia se tomen sobre dichas áreas de protección. Asimismo, ni los propietarios ni los imputados pueden alegar beneficios derivados de una situación ilícita, por lo que no dictar la restitución de las cosas a su estado anterior, no es sino perpetuar el delito. Refiere que los dueños de esos terrenos, debido al parentesco que los une con los imputados, no pueden alegar desconocimiento de las actividades agrícolas que se desarrollaban en esas tierras. Para sustentar este reproche, la apelante cita diversos votos de los Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia. Solicita se anule la sentencia y se ordene el juicio de reenvío. Sin lugar el reclamo. El punto objeto de discusión en alzada, también fue analizado por el Tribunal de Juicio en la sentencia y la decisión del Tribunal de Juicio es acertada. Como bien se estableció en el fallo y no es objeto de debate ante esta Cámara de Apelación, se tuvo por demostrado que en el área de protección de la naciente y de la quebrada existen sembradíos de café y tomate. Ahora bien, conforme lo dispuso el Tribunal de Juicio, se negó la gestión de la Procuraduría de que se ordenara eliminar dichos cultivos de esas áreas, con base en el siguiente razonamiento: “Si bien en el presente asunto, la señora Procuradora solicitó al Tribunal el restablecimiento de la zona a su estado anterior al delito, ello al tenor de lo dispuesto entre otros por el numeral 140 del Código Procesal Penal y 50 de la Constitución Política, esta Cámara estima que en el presente caso, existe una imposibilidad de ordenarlo, ello por cuanto tal y como se infiere de la prueba documental referida a las certificaciones registrales incorporadas en el debate, dos de las propiedades, tienen copropietarias registrales que en ningún momento fueron traídas al proceso, ni se les dio audiencia sobre la existencia del mismo, a fin de que como propietarias del 50 por ciento de los inmuebles, pudiesen intervenir como terceras interesadas en el proceso en defensa de sus intereses patrimoniales; y más aún en la tercera de las propiedades, sea la que aparece a nombre de un hijo del encartado [Nombre4] , tampoco a éste, se le dio la oportunidad de hacer valer sus derechos como propietario del 100 por ciento de la finca; sin duda alguna, se estima que de haberse acogido la petición indicada, se habría violentado flagrantemente el debido proceso, al haberse dispuesto una situación en detrimento de las propiedades y derechos de esos propietarios registrales indefensos. En todo caso, tal y como claramente se hizo saber a los encartados al momento de exponer la lectura de la parte dispositiva; ellos al día de hoy, tienen claro, comprenden y conocen perfectamente que respecto de la naciente existente y las quebradas que aparecen en sus terrenos, éstos tiene un área de protección que deben respetarse, y saben que no pueden llevar a cabo ninguna acción o cultivo dentro de esas partes de los terrenos, por cuanto con ello podrían invadir el área de protección; siendo que además, ese desconocimiento que manifestaron en el presente proceso, saben no lo pueden volver a utilizar en su favor, al saber las consecuencias legales a los que se podrían ver expuestos en caso de violentar las áreas de protección de la indicadas naciente y quebradas que existen en esas parcelas; en razón de ello, el Tribunal, imposibilitado por las razones indicadas a ordenar el levantamiento de los sembradíos ubicados dentro de las áreas de protección, apela a la conciencia ambiental que se espera debe imperar en personas agricultoras y trabajadoras como lo son cada uno de los endilgados, que viven de sus los productos que da sus tierras, para proceder, voluntariamente a cumplir cabalmente con el respeto que debe existir sobre las áreas de protección de la nacientes y quebradas, máxime que incluso, hacen uso de la primera de éstas; procurando NO afectar el medio ambiente, para lo cual incluso podrían recurrir a los mismos funcionarios del Sistema de Control de Áreas de Protección del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en procura de asesoría para esos efectos, a fin de tener claramente delimitadas cada una de las áreas de protección, fijándolas en sus parcelas, para velar por el respeto e integridad de las mismas.” (copia textual folios 230 vuelto y 231 frente ). En anterior razonamiento del Tribunal de Juicio es correcto, ya que quedó acreditado que existen otras personas con un derecho de propiedad pleno sobre dichos inmuebles y ellos no fueron llamados al proceso a efectos de hacer valer sus derechos. Si bien, es cierto, las áreas de protección no pueden ser detentadas por ninguna persona, también es claro que la pretensión de la Procuraduría conlleva a que se emita una orden con una obligación de hacer, específicamente eliminar los cultivos de las zonas protegidas. En virtud de dicha pretensión resultaba necesario que la misma fuera girada a las personas que con ocasión a la titularidad del derecho de propiedad que ostentan sobre dichos terrenos, tienen la posibilidad real y legal de ejecutar las acciones dispuestas en esa orden. Tómese en consideración lo desproporcionado que resultaría ordenarle a una persona que elimine los cultivos que se encuentran en un área de protección, si dicha persona no puede acceder al terreno ni ejecutar actos en el mismo, por no poseer sobre dicho bien un derecho que le faculte a ejercer esas acciones. En esta inteligencia, con la finalidad de que la orden impartida por una autoridad judicial sea efectiva y eficaz, es necesario girarla a la persona que tiene la legitimidad para cumplirla y de ahí, la necesidad de haber traído al proceso a los dueños de esos fundos. Adicionalmente, como bien lo indicó el cuerpo colegiado de instancia, a partir del fallo emitido por el a quo¸ los encartados deberán abstenerse de realizar cualquier tipo de labor de aprovechamiento, labranza, mantenimiento o cultivo en las áreas de protección que se encuentran en dichas parcelas, porque ahora ellos sí tienen el conocimiento de que en dichas zonas no se pueden realizar ese tipo de actividades y le corresponderá a la autoridad pública respectiva, por el cumplimiento de la Ley . En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar el reclamo planteado. \n\nPOR TANTO\n\nSe declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de sentencia interpuesto por la Procuraduría General de la República.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nAdriana Escalante Moncada\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nYadira Godínez Segura [Nombre5] \n\nJuezas de Apelación de Sentencia\n\n \n\n \n\nExp: 11-000461-0331-PE\n\nContra: [Nombre1] \n\nDelito: INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL\n\nOfendido: LOS RECURSOS NATURALES\n\n[Nombre34]",
  "body_en_text": "PODERJUDICIAL\n\nSENTENCING APPEALS COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN\n\n Tel 2456-9069 or [Telf1] tapelacion-sra@Poder-Judicial.go.cr Fax 2456-90-29\n\n_______________________________________________________________________________________\n\nExp: 11-000461-0331-PE\n\nRes: 2017-00743\n\n SENTENCING APPEALS COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, [Dirección1] SECTION. San Ramón, at one twenty in the afternoon (01:20 p.m.) on the twenty-sixth of October, two thousand seventeen.\n\n SENTENCE APPEAL filed in the present case against [Nombre1], adult, Costa Rican, ID CED1, [Nombre2], adult, Costa Rican, ID CED2, also known as [Nombre3], and [Nombre4], adult, Costa Rican, ID CED3, for the crime of VIOLATION OF THE FOREST LAW FOR INVASION OF THE PROTECTION ZONE OF A SPRING and A CREEK to the detriment of the FOREST PATRIMONY. Participating in the decision on the appeal are Judges Adriana Escalante Moncada, [Nombre5], and Yadira Godínez Segura. Appearing in the sentence appeal are Attorney [Nombre6], Procuradora, and Attorney [Nombre7], private defense counsel for the accused [Nombre8].\n\n WHEREAS:\n\n I.- That through judgment number 33-TGRE-2016 at eleven hours on the eleventh of March, two thousand sixteen, the Trial Court of Grecia resolved: \"THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing and articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 8 sections 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 10 and 11 section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 9 section 2 and 14 section 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 32, 42, 142, 184, 265, 267, 360 to 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code; 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 34, 45, of the Penal Code; 33 section a) and 58 section a) of the Forest Law No. 7575; IT IS RESOLVED: a) to reject the statute of limitations defense alleged by Attorney [Nombre9]; b) in application of the In Dubio Pro Reo Principle, [Nombre1], [Nombre2], and [Nombre4] are acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for A CRIME OF VIOLATION OF THE FOREST LAW FOR INVASION OF THE PROTECTION ZONE OF A SPRING AND A CREEK that was charged as having been committed to the detriment of THE FOREST RESOURCES; and c) to declare inadmissible the restitution of things to their prior state, since during the process the registered co-owners of two of the properties and the titleholder of another were not given the opportunity to assert their rights as interested third parties. Any precautionary measure imposed on the accused as a result of this process is ordered lifted. For the integral reading of the sentence, 16:00 hours on Friday, March 18, two thousand sixteen, is set. Notify\" (sic).\n\n II.- That against the preceding pronouncement, Attorney [Nombre6], Procuradora, filed a sentence appeal.\n\n III.- That having verified the respective deliberation, in accordance with the provisions of article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Sentencing Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón, proceeded to hear the appeal.\n\n IV.- That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.\n\n Judge of Sentencing Appeals [Nombre10] writes the opinion; and,\n\nWHEREAS:\n\nI. Attorney [Nombre11], Procuradora of the Republic, in her capacity as civil plaintiff, filed a sentence appeal against judgment number 33-TGRE-2016, issued at 11:00 hours on March 11, 2016, handed down by the Trial Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Grecia seat, through which the defendants [Nombre1], [Nombre2], and [Nombre4] were acquitted of all penalty and responsibility.\n\nII. By resolution at 10:25 hours on September 14, 2016, this Sentencing Appeals Chamber suspended the processing of the present case, by virtue of the constitutional complaint being aired before the Constitutional Chamber, under docket number 16-3607-0007-CO. Subsequently, the Constitutional Chamber, through vote number voto 16967-2016, rejected the filed complaint; however, the integral judgment issued by the high Constitutional Court has not yet been drafted. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the integral drafting of the aforementioned vote remains pending, having analyzed the appeal filed and due to the manner in which it will be resolved, it is ordered that the processing of this docket be reactivated.\n\nIII. In the first ground of the appeal, the Procuradora alleges insufficient reasoning and failure to observe the rules of sound judgment. She details that in this case a first trial had already been held and that on that occasion the Trial Court issued an acquittal in favor of the defendants, a decision that was challenged by the Procuraduría before the Sentencing Appeals Chamber, and as a result of that challenge, the first judgment was annulled and a new trial was ordered. She states that, on this second occasion, the Trial Court of Grecia once again issued an acquittal in favor of the accused. She indicates that in the challenged decision, the judging body made a brief description of the statements of witnesses [Nombre12], [Nombre13], Eliden Alcá [Nombre14], and [Nombre15]. She maintains that from these testimonies, the panel of judges concluded that the officials of the Agrarian Development Institute (hereinafter IDA) did not inform the accused that the lands adjudicated to them had any type of limitation. She also criticizes that the instance judges made a brief analysis of the statements of [Nombre16] and [Nombre17], officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (hereinafter MAG), to point out that the defendants were unaware of the existence of limitations on planting in the protection zones of both the creek and the spring. She adds that the Trial Court once again issued an acquittal, a decision that in the appellant's opinion suffers from a lack of reasoning for two essential reasons: i) The fact that the lands were adjudicated by the IDA does not mean that the defendants had to have falsely represented to themselves a belief that they were legally entitled to work the entire land, since claiming ignorance of the law is not valid. Furthermore, she details that the plans for said parcels, which are evidence in the case file, specify that those lands are subject to the Forest Law, and there is no evaluation by the judges regarding that piece of evidence. Likewise, she considers that the testimonial and documentary evidence is consistent in pointing out that the existence of a spring at the location of the events was known to the accused. She asserts that the witnesses of [Nombre18] and [Nombre19] indicated that the accused themselves sought the survival of the cited body of water, through reforestation and capture works, aimed at ensuring not only that the outcrop continued to yield water but also that it became larger, for the purpose of supplying that liquid to several houses located in that sector. She states that the foregoing circumstances allow one to maintain that the accused knew of their unlawful conduct and rule out the cited ignorance alluded to by the defendants. ii) She criticizes that in this case the argument is reiterated that the accused received advice from MAG officials directed exclusively to agricultural activity and that they were not warned by these public servants of any irregular situation in relation to the existing crops on the parcels. She maintains that the foregoing reasoning does not derive from the evidence since witness [Nombre16] alluded to the need to protect the creek and the spring. She objects that the judgment does not develop why an error of prohibition derives from the evidence. She indicates that the judgment lacks proper reasoning, and therefore the appropriate action is to annul it and order a new trial. The claim is rejected. Having analyzed the judgment and the reproach formulated by the appellant, these appellate judges verify that it possesses adequate reasoning and a correct evaluation of the evidence. In the case under review, it is determined that, as the appellant asserts, the Trial Court considered the following facts of interest as proven: \"FIRST: In Trojas de San Pedro de Valverde Vega, Grecia, the estate known as La Cooperativa or Virgencita is located, which corresponds to parcels adjudicated by the IDA. On said property there exists a spring captured for human consumption and the creek tributary of the Trojas river. SECOND: Parcel number 3, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to defendant [Nombre1] and Mrs. [Nombre20]; and parcel number 4, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to the accused [Nombre2], known as [Nombre3], and Mrs. [Nombre21]. THIRD: Without determining an exact date and time, but certainly before March 10, 2011, the defendants [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] invaded the protection area of the spring captured for human consumption and the creek tributary of the Trojas river. FOURTH: The accused [Nombre22] and [Nombre8] planted coffee and tomato crops within the protection area of the indicated spring and creek, performing maintenance work on those crops, weeding, tying, and spraying with chemical and natural product applications, among other activities, invading a total area of 4,989 square meters within the protection zone of the spring and 4,265 square meters in the protection area of the creek, for a total of 9,264 square meters invaded. FIFTH: Defendant [Nombre23] planted tomato crops in a total area of 2,760 square meters, within the 100 meters of protection of the captured spring, thereby invading its protection zone, which he did without having permits for such activity. Additionally, he possesses another parcel through which the creek tributary of the Trojas river passes, which originates from the Chico Cubero and Julio creeks, whose protection area was also invaded by the accused, since he planted tomato crops within it, with an extension of 3,540 square meters. SIXTH: Defendant [Nombre2] planted tomato crops and a bean cooler, invading the protection area of the creek tributary of the Trojas river, affecting with said planting an area of 1,720 square meters. These crops are located a scant 48 meters from the water channel and there are others that accused [Nombre24] planted at 43 meters distance. SEVENTH: The total area invaded by the planting and cultivation activities of coffee and tomato carried out by defendants [Nombre22] and [Nombre8] was 9,264 square meters.\" (Verbatim copy from folio 217 front and back of the main file). From the factual account above, as well as from the intellectual reasoning of the judgment, it is clearly extracted that the Trial Court considered the existence of a spring and a creek on the estate known as \"La Cooperativa\" as proven. It was also considered proven that defendants [Nombre1], [Nombre2], and [Nombre4] had knowledge that a spring and a creek existed on that estate. Likewise, the judgment is extensive in explaining that, from the documentary evidence, expert evidence, and the statements of officials [Nombre12], [Nombre13], and Eliden Alcá [Nombre14], it was proven that defendants [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] planted coffee and tomato crops on the parcels adjudicated by the IDA, which are located within the protection area of the spring and the creek of [Dirección2] Trojas. Also, the judging body considered it proven that in a sector adjacent to the spring and within its protection area, trees were planted, which form a small forest. On these aspects, the judgment is clear in expressing—and this is derived from the evidence—that the three defendants acknowledged the existence of the spring, the creek, and the coffee and tomato crops. The foregoing allows one to deduce that there is no controversy whatsoever regarding these events. The point of conflict, and what is challenged by the appellant, is the decision the Trial Chamber made in deeming that an error of type existed in this case. For the purpose of properly resolving this aspect, it is necessary to carry out a dogmatic review concerning the error of type and its difference from error of prohibition. In this sense, the dogmatic position is unanimous in indicating that ignorance or error regarding the existence of one or more of the objective elements of the criminal type excludes intent. Legal scholar [Nombre25] has expressed that \"an error of type occurs when the perpetrator is mistaken about a circumstance that is necessary to complete the legal type.\" (Roxin [Nombre26]. La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. Editorial Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2007, 1st edition, page 195). Likewise, given that the criminal type is composed of normative and descriptive elements, it has been established that an error about any of these two categories of elements constitutes an error of type. Special attention is warranted here for the distinction between descriptive and normative elements of the criminal type. The first group consists of those that can be perceived by the senses, i.e., the form of knowledge is sensory perception, while the second category encompasses those elements that can only be apprehended through an evaluation. Regarding this second group, [Nombre25] details that the intellectual comprehension characterizing typical intent regarding normative elements does not mean a precise legal subsumption in the concepts used by the law; rather, it suffices that the content of the social meaning has been apprehended by the perpetrator. However, this author also adds that there are cases in which the content of the social meaning cannot be understood without a specific legal classification. In these cases, the correct legal classification belongs to the intellectual comprehension of the factual circumstance in question and is a requirement of intent (In this regard [Nombre27], Derecho Penal, Parte General tomo I. Editorial Civitas, 2nd edition, 1997, pages 459-462). For his part, and what concerns us for the correct resolution of the case under review, [Nombre25] has indicated that an error of prohibition occurs \"when the perpetrator, knowing all the circumstances that fully complete the legal type, does not, however, draw from them the conclusion referring to a legal prohibition, but instead believes that their conduct is permitted.\" ([Nombre26] [Nombre28], La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. ibid, page 195). Having clarified the foregoing concepts, it is necessary to address the construction of the criminal type analyzed by the Trial Court. According to the accusation, the defendants were charged with the crime provided for and sanctioned in article 58 section a) of the Forest Law, which establishes the following: \"A prison sentence of three months to three years shall be imposed on anyone who: a) Invades a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category may be, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the occupied area may be; regardless of whether these are privately-owned lands, lands of the State or other Public Administration bodies, or privately-owned lands. The perpetrators or participants in the act shall not be entitled to any compensation for any construction or work they may have carried out on the invaded lands.\" The typical action contemplated in this criminal type is to invade; however, said verb does not have a legal definition in the Forest Law or its regulations, therefore its definition must be sought in other sources. In this regard, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy states that to invade is understood as \"1. To burst in, enter by force; 2. tr. To occupy a place abnormally or irregularly. Las aguas invadieron la autopista; 3. tr. Said of a thing: To enter and spread in a determined place or medium…\". Based on the foregoing conceptual clarification, the action sanctioned by subsection a) of article 58 of the Forest Law is that of occupying, bursting into a conservation or protection area, regardless of whether these are state or private lands, i.e., invading implies acts of occupation of the site. Additionally, from the analysis of the cited criminal type, it is concluded that the concept of protection area or conservation zone constitutes a normative element, since its comprehension does not occur through the senses; rather, its content requires a social understanding of its meaning. Furthermore, these appellate judges consider that this normative element cannot be understood without a specific legal classification; that is, to understand the meaning of said normative element, one must resort to the legal definition established in the Forest Law. Thus, the regulation under consideration indicates in its article 33 the following: \"Protection areas. The following shall be declared protection areas: a) The areas bordering permanent springs, defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, creeks, or streams, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty meters horizontally, if the terrain is broken.\" From the clarifications made thus far, and returning to the analysis of the specific case, it can be concluded that for purposes of objective typicality, the typical action attributed to the defendants was that of invading the areas bordering permanent springs within a radius of one hundred meters horizontally, or a strip of fifteen meters—rural area—or ten meters horizontally—urban area—on the banks of rivers. For a resolution of the case, the analysis of the conduct displayed by the defendants is not exhausted by examining the objective elements of the criminal type; rather, the subjective element, comprised of intent, must also be analyzed. This was the aspect that the Trial Court undertook to analyze, and based on that evaluation, it concluded that an error of type existed, as it could not be proven with the required certainty that the defendants had knowledge that the actions they were carrying out were within the protection area of a riverbank or a spring. The conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber is shared by this Appeals Court, since from the evidence, and especially from the statements of the accused [Nombre1] and [Nombre2], and from the accounts of witnesses [Nombre16] and [Nombre30], it can be extracted that the defendants received technical advice from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock while carrying out their activities related to the cultivation of said products. As deduced from the summary of evidence, witnesses [Nombre31] and [Nombre32] related the type of advice they provided to the defendants. In this sense, the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock indicated that they provided information concerning techniques and procedures for planting tomato and coffee and carried out the respective supervisions. Contrary to what the appellant proposes, it cannot be derived with sufficient force from those testimonies that these public servants explained to the defendants what the protection area of the spring or the creek was and how far said protection zone extended. Nor can it be deduced from those accounts that these officials informed or warned the accused that they could not plant in certain areas of the adjudicated parcels because those zones constituted protection areas. In this particular case, what witness [Nombre33] declared gains relevance. He alluded to the fact that the parcels being examined in this case belong to a farm known as \"La Cooperativa,\" lands that have been dedicated to planting different products for over 30 years. What has been stated thus far allows the deduction that the thesis presented by the instance Chamber to acquit the defendants was confined to the fact that it could not be derived from the evidence with the required certainty that the accused acted knowing that the zones where the tomato and coffee crops were planted constituted protection areas, an element that is indispensable for purposes of subjective typicality. On this particular, it is necessary to clarify that the verification of intent is another of the elements that must be proven from the evidence and which is derived from the factual circumstances surrounding a specific case. As has been stated, the technical advice the accused received in this case does not allow the conclusion that they acted knowing they were invading the protection zone of the spring and the creek with the coffee and tomato crops they planted on the parcels they worked. But, even so, if the appellant's thesis were accepted, in the sense that the defendants acted with intent—an extreme that has not been proven with the required certainty—the truth is that, in the opinion of these appellate judges, an insurmountable error of prohibition could also be configured in this case, for the following reasons. If it were accepted that the accused acted in a willful manner, it would not be feasible to conclude that they acted knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the legal system (error of prohibition), since, as the accused declared, and there is no evidence to discredit their account, they were advised by public officials at the time they carried out the planting of coffee and tomato crops, and hence it was not possible to know that their action was prohibited by the legal system, a situation that was insurmountably impossible to overcome, since it was the same state authorities who advised them to carry out those agricultural activities. The error made by the appellant is that she presents her claim solely based on an analysis of the objective elements of the criminal type, ignoring that typicality also encompasses the component of intent. Additionally, and as has been developed in this judgment, the analysis of typicality in the crime under review implies that the judge, for purposes of determining whether a conduct fits within said criminal figure, must carry out a series of evaluations and interpretations, which includes the analysis of the legal definition existing in our legal system in relation to the concept of protection area. That is, the examination of typicality requires a complete intellectual process, which turns this figure into a complex criminal type, and hence the demonstration of both the objective and subjective elements requires a different evaluation from those other criminal conducts that are described solely based on descriptive elements or normative elements of simple comprehension based on their social meaning. Hence, in this case, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber is correct, and therefore the filed claim must be dismissed.\n\nIV. In the second ground, the appellant alleges lack of reasoning in the judgment regarding the denial of an order for the restitution of things to their prior state. She details that in the challenged decision, the collegiate body rejected the request of the Procuraduría, in which it petitioned that the existing crops in the protection zones be eliminated. She criticizes the position of the Trial Court, as she considers that the judgment considered the existence of a spring and a creek proven, and it was also considered accredited that the defendants carried out planting in the protection zones of those bodies of water. She specifies that, although the properties where those crops are located do not belong to the accused but to third-party good-faith owners, the truth is that what is being defended and prosecuted is the invasion of the protection zone of those water sources, areas that, although located within private properties, third parties do not hold a right over those lands, and no one can claim possession of those zones or protection areas. She considers that it is not essential to have the owners of those properties as third-party intervenors in the process, since these persons would not have the possibility of claiming against the decisions made in the judgment regarding said protection areas. Likewise, neither the owners nor the accused can claim benefits derived from an unlawful situation; therefore, failing to order the restitution of things to their prior state is nothing other than perpetuating the crime. She states that the owners of those lands, due to the family relationship connecting them to the accused, cannot claim ignorance of the agricultural activities being carried out on those lands. To support this reproach, the appellant cites various votes from the Sentencing Appeals Courts. She requests that the judgment be annulled and a new trial be ordered. The claim is rejected. The point under discussion on appeal was also analyzed by the Trial Court in the judgment, and the Trial Court's decision is correct. As was well established in the judgment, and is not the subject of debate before this Appeals Chamber, it was considered proven that coffee and tomato crops exist in the protection area of the spring and the creek. Now, as ordered by the Trial Court, the Procuraduría's request to order the removal of those crops from those areas was denied, based on the following reasoning: \"Although in the present matter, the Madam Procuradora requested the Court to restore the area to its state prior to the crime, this pursuant to the provisions of articles such as numeral 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code and 50 of the Political Constitution, this Chamber considers that in the present case there is an impossibility of ordering it, because, as is inferred from the documentary evidence referring to the registry certifications incorporated in the trial, two of the properties have registered co-owners who were at no time brought into the process, nor were they given a hearing about its existence, so that, as 50 percent owners of the properties, they could intervene as interested third parties in the process in defense of their property interests; and even more so, in the third of the properties, which is the one that appears in the name of a son of defendant [Nombre4], neither was he given the opportunity to assert his rights as 100 percent owner of the property; without any doubt, it is considered that had the indicated petition been granted, due process would have been flagrantly violated, a situation having been ordered to the detriment of the properties and rights of those defenseless registered owners. In any case, just as was clearly made known to the defendants at the time the operative part was read; they, to this day, are clear, understand, and know perfectly well that regarding the existing spring and the creeks that appear on their lands, these have a protection area that must be respected, and they know that they cannot carry out any action or cultivation within those parts of the land, because by doing so they could invade the protection area; it being the case, moreover, that the ignorance they asserted in the present process, they know they cannot use again in their favor, knowing the legal consequences to which they could be exposed should they violate the protection areas of the indicated spring and creeks existing on those parcels; for this reason, the Court, unable for the indicated reasons to order the removal of the crops located within the protection areas, appeals to the environmental conscience that is expected should prevail in persons who are farmers and workers, as each of the accused is, who live from the products their lands yield, to proceed voluntarily to fully comply with the respect that must exist regarding the protection areas of the springs and creeks, especially since they even make use of the first of these; endeavoring NOT to affect the environment, for which they could even turn to the same officials of the Protection Area Control System of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, seeking advice for those purposes, in order to have each of the protection areas clearly delineated, fixing them on their parcels, to ensure their respect and integrity.\" (verbatim copy folios 230 back and 231 front).\n\nThe prior reasoning of the Trial Court is correct, since it was proven that there are other persons with full ownership rights over those properties and they were not called to the proceedings for the purpose of asserting their rights. While it is true that protection areas cannot be held by any person, it is also clear that the Attorney General's Office's claim entails the issuance of an order with an obligation to act, specifically to eliminate the crops in the protected zones. By virtue of said claim, it was necessary that the order be directed to the persons who, by reason of their ownership rights over said lands, have the real and legal possibility of executing the actions set forth in that order. Consider how disproportionate it would be to order a person to eliminate crops located in a protection area if that person cannot access the land or perform acts upon it, because they do not possess a right over said property that empowers them to carry out those actions. In this understanding, in order for the order issued by a judicial authority to be effective and efficient, it is necessary to direct it to the person who has the standing to comply with it, and hence the need to have brought the owners of those parcels into the proceedings. Additionally, as the collegiate body of the lower court correctly indicated, as of the judgment issued by the court of first instance (a quo), the defendants must refrain from carrying out any type of exploitation, tillage, maintenance, or cultivation work in the protection areas located on said plots, because they now have knowledge that such activities cannot be conducted in those zones, and it will be the responsibility of the respective public authority for compliance with the Law. Consequently, the claim raised is declared without merit.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal of the judgment filed by the Procuraduría General de la República is declared without merit.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAdriana Escalante Moncada\n\n\n\n\n\n\nYadira Godínez Segura [Nombre5]\n\nSentencing Appeals Judges\n\n\n\n\n\n\nExp: 11-000461-0331-PE\n\nContra: [Nombre1]\n\nDelito: INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL\n\nOfendido: LOS RECURSOS NATURALES\n\n[Nombre34]\n\nIt maintains that the foregoing reasoning does not derive from the evidence, since the witness [Name16] alluded to the need to protect the stream and the spring (naciente). It objects that the judgment does not develop why an error of prohibition derives from the evidence. It indicates that the judgment lacks proper reasoning, and therefore the appropriate course is to annul it and order a retrial. The claim is dismissed. Having analyzed the ruling and the reproach formulated by the appellant, these appellate judges verify that it has adequate reasoning and a correct assessment of the evidence. In the case under examination, it is established that, as the appellant affirms, the Trial Court found the following relevant facts to be proven: \"FIRST: In Trojas de San Pedro de Valverde Vega, Grecia, the property known as La Cooperativa or Virgencita is located, which corresponds to parcels adjudicated by the IDA. On said property, there is a spring (naciente) that is captured for human consumption and a stream that is a tributary of the Trojas River. SECOND: Parcel number 3, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to the defendant [Name1] and Mrs. [Name20]; and parcel number 4, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to the defendant [Name2], known as [Name3], and Mrs. [Name21]. THIRD: Without a specific date and exact time being determined, but before March 10, 2011, the defendants [Name1] and [Name2] invaded the protection area of the spring (naciente) captured for human consumption and of the Trojas River stream. FOURTH: The accused [Name22] and [Name8] planted coffee and tomato crops within the protection area of the indicated spring (naciente) and stream, carrying out maintenance work on said crops, weeding, tying, and spraying with chemical and natural products, among other activities, invading a total area of 4,989 square meters within the protection zone of the spring (naciente) and 4,265 square meters in the protection area of the stream, for a total of 9,264 square meters invaded. FIFTH: The defendant [Name23] planted tomato crops in a total area of 2,760 square meters, within the 100 meters of protection of the captured spring (naciente), thus invading its protection zone, which he did without having permits for such activity. In addition, he possesses another parcel through which the tributary stream of the Trojas River passes, which originates from the Chico Cubero and Julio streams, the protection area of which was also invaded by the defendant, since he planted tomato crops within it, over an extent of 3,540 square meters. SIXTH: The defendant [Name2] planted tomato crops and a bean crop, invading the protection area of the tributary stream of the Trojas River, affecting an area of 1,720 square meters with said planting. Those crops are located just 48 meters away from the watercourse, and there are others that the accused [Name24] planted 43 meters away. SEVENTH: The total area invaded by the planting and cultivation activities of coffee and tomatoes carried out by the defendants [Name22] and [Name8] was 9,264 square meters.\" (Verbatim copy from folio 217 front and back of the main file). From the foregoing factual picture, as well as from the intellectual reasoning of the ruling, it is clearly extracted that the Trial Court found the existence of a spring (naciente) and a stream on the property known as \"La Cooperativa\" to be accredited. It was also demonstrated that the defendants [Name1], [Name2], and [Name4] knew that a spring (naciente) and a stream existed on said property. Likewise, the ruling is extensive in explaining that, based on the documentary evidence, expert evidence, and the statements of officials [Name12], [Name13], and Eliden Alcá [Name14], it was demonstrated that the defendants [Name1] and [Name2] planted coffee and tomato crops on the parcels adjudicated by the IDA, which are located in the protection area of the spring (naciente) and the stream of [Address2] Trojas. Also, the judging body found it proven that in a sector adjacent to the spring (naciente) and within its protection area, trees were planted, which form a small forest. Regarding these aspects, the ruling is clear in expressing—and thus it derives from the evidence—that the three defendants acknowledged the existence of the spring (naciente), the stream, and the coffee and tomato plantations. The foregoing allows us to deduce that there is no controversy regarding these events. The point of conflict and the one attacked by the appellant is the decision made by the Trial Chamber in considering that, in this case, a mistake of fact existed. In order to properly resolve this aspect, a dogmatic review regarding mistake of fact and its difference from an error of prohibition is necessary. In this sense, the dogmatic position is settled in indicating that ignorance or error regarding the existence of one or some of the objective elements of the criminal definition excludes intent. The scholar [Name25] has expressed that \"a mistake of fact occurs when the perpetrator is mistaken about a circumstance that is necessary to complete the legal definition.\" (Roxin [Name26]. The Theory of Crime in the Current Discussion. Editorial Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2007, 1st edition, page 195). Likewise, since the criminal definition is composed of normative and descriptive elements, it has been established that an error regarding any of these two categories of elements constitutes a mistake of fact. Here, the distinction between descriptive and normative elements of the criminal definition deserves special attention. The first group is composed of those that can be perceived by the senses, i.e., the form of knowledge is sensory perception, while the second category includes those elements that can only be apprehended through an evaluation. Regarding this second group, [Name25] details that the intellectual comprehension that characterizes typical intent in normative elements does not mean an exact legal subsumption into the concepts used by the law, but rather it suffices that the content of the social meaning has been apprehended by the perpetrator. However, said author also adds that there are cases in which the content of the social meaning cannot be understood without a specific legal qualification. In these cases, the correct legal qualification belongs to the intellectual comprehension of the factual circumstance in question and is a requirement of intent (In this sense, [Name27], Criminal Law, General Part Volume I. Editorial Civitas, 2nd edition, 1997, pages 459-462). For his part, and in what concerns us for the correct resolution of the case under examination, [Name25] has indicated that an error of prohibition is configured \"when the perpetrator, knowing all the circumstances that fully complete the legal definition, does not, however, draw from them the conclusion referring to a legal prohibition, but rather believes that their conduct is permitted.\" ([Name26] [Name28], The Theory of Crime in the Current Discussion. ibid, page 195). Once the previous concepts have been clarified, it is necessary to address the construction of the criminal definition analyzed by the Trial Court. According to the accusation, the defendants were charged with the crime provided for and sanctioned in Article 58, subsection a) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), which establishes the following: “A prison term of three months to three years shall be imposed on whoever: a) Invades a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forestry regime, whatever the area occupied; regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other Public Administration bodies or privately owned lands. The perpetrators or participants in the act shall have no right to any compensation for any construction or work they have carried out on the invaded lands.” The typical action contemplated in this criminal offense [Name29] is to invade; however, said verb does not have a legal definition in the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), nor in its regulations, so its definition must be sought from other sources. In this regard, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy states that invadir is understood as “1. To irrupt, enter by force; 2. tr. To occupy a place abnormally or irregularly. The waters invaded the highway; 3. tr. Said of a thing: To enter and spread in a place or specific medium…”. Based on the foregoing conceptual clarification, it is thus established that the action sanctioned by section a) of Article 58 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) is that of occupying or irrupting into a conservation or protection area, regardless of whether it involves state or private lands; i.e., invading implies acts of occupying the site. Additionally, from the analysis of the cited criminal definition, it is concluded that the concept of a protection area or conservation zone constitutes a normative element, since its comprehension is not achieved through the senses, but rather its content requires a social understanding of its meaning. Furthermore, these appellate judges consider that said normative element cannot be understood without a specific legal qualification; i.e., to understand the meaning of said normative element, one must resort to the legal definition established in the Forest Law (Ley Forestal). Thus, the regulation in question indicates in its Article 33 the following: “Protection areas. The following shall be declared protection areas: a) The areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural areas and ten meters in urban areas, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams (quebradas), or creeks, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is uneven.” From the clarifications made so far, and returning to the analysis of the specific case, it can be concluded that for the purposes of objective definition, the typical action attributed to the defendants was that of invading the areas bordering permanent springs (nacientes) within a radius of one hundred horizontal meters, or a strip of fifteen meters—rural zone—or ten horizontal meters—urban zone—on the banks of rivers. For a resolution of the case, the analysis of the conduct deployed by the defendants is not exhausted by examining the objective elements of the criminal definition, but rather the subjective element, consisting of intent, must also be analyzed. This was the aspect that the Trial Court focused on analyzing, and based on said assessment it concluded that a mistake of fact existed, as it could not be established with the required certainty that the defendants had knowledge that the actions they were carrying out were being done within the protection area of a riverbank or a spring (naciente). The conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber is shared by this Appellate Tribunal, given that from the evidence, and especially from the statements of the accused [Name1] and [Name2], and from the accounts of witnesses [Name16] and [Name30], it is extracted that the defendants received technical advice from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock during the performance of their activities related to the cultivation of said products. As deduced from the summary of evidence, witnesses [Name31] and [Name32] related the type of advice that [Name29] provided to the defendants. In this sense, the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock indicated that they provided information concerning the techniques and procedures for planting tomatoes and coffee and carried out the respective supervisions. Contrary to what the appellant proposes, it does not derive from said testimonies with sufficient force that those public servants explained to the defendants what the protection area of the spring (naciente) or the stream was, and how far said protection zone extended. Neither is it deduced from said accounts that those officials informed or warned the accused that in certain areas of the adjudicated parcels they could not plant because said zones constituted protection areas. In this particular case, the statement of witness [Name33] becomes relevant, as he alluded to the fact that the parcels under examination in this case belong to a property known as “La Cooperativa”, lands that have been dedicated to planting various products for over 30 years. What has been stated so far allows us to deduce that the thesis put forth by the lower Chamber to acquit the defendants was limited to the fact that it was not derived from the evidence with the required certainty that the accused acted knowing that the zones where the tomato and coffee plantations were carried out constituted protection areas, an element that is indispensable for the purposes of subjective definition. On this point, it is necessary to clarify that the verification of intent is another of the elements that must be accredited from the evidence and which derives from the factual circumstances surrounding a particular case. As previously stated, the technical advice the accused received in this case does not allow for the conclusion that they acted knowing that they were invading the protection zone of the spring (naciente) and the stream with the coffee and tomato plantations they planted on the parcels they worked. But even so, if the thesis of the appellant were admitted, in the sense that the defendants acted with intent—an extreme that has not been proven with the required certainty—the truth is that, in the opinion of these appellate judges, an insurmountable error of prohibition could also be configured in this case, for the following reasons. If it were admitted that the accused acted intentionally, it would not be feasible to conclude that they acted knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the legal order (error of prohibition), since, as the accused declared, and there being no evidence to discredit their statements, they were advised by public officials when carrying out the coffee and tomato cultivation, and hence it was not possible to know that their action was prohibited by the legal order, a situation that was insurmountable, given that it was the very state authorities who advised them to carry out said agricultural activities. The error incurred by the appellant is that she raises her claim solely based on an analysis of the objective elements of the criminal definition, ignoring that the definition also encompasses the component of intent. Additionally, and as has been developed in this ruling, the analysis of the definition in the crime under examination implies that, for the purposes of determining whether conduct fits said criminal figure, the judge must carry out a series of evaluations and interpretations, which include the analysis of the legal definition that exists in our legal system in relation to the concept of a protection area. In other words, the examination of the definition requires a whole intellectual process, which makes this figure a complex criminal offense, and hence the demonstration of both the objective and subjective elements requires a different assessment from that of other criminal conducts that are described solely based on descriptive elements or normative elements that are easily understood based on their social sense. Hence, in this case, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber is correct, and therefore the claim raised must be dismissed.\n\nIV. In the second ground, the appellant alleges a lack of reasoning in the judgment with respect to the denial to issue an order for the restitution of things to their prior state. She details that in the contested decision, the collegiate body rejected the request of the Attorney General's Office, in which it petitioned for the elimination of the existing plantations in the protection zones. She criticizes the position of the Trial Court, as she considers that the judgment found the existence of a spring (naciente) and a stream to be proven, and also found it proven that the defendants carried out plantings in the protection zones of those bodies of water. She specifies that, although the properties where said plantations are located do not belong to the accused, but to third-party owners in good faith, the truth is that what is being defended and prosecuted is the invasion of the protection zone of those water bodies, areas that, although they are located on private properties, the third parties do not hold a right over those lands, and no one can hold those protection zones or areas. She considers that it is not essential to have the owners of those properties as intervening third parties in the process, since these persons would not have the possibility of claiming regarding the decisions taken in the judgment with respect to said protection areas. Likewise, neither the owners nor the accused can claim benefits derived from an illicit situation; therefore, not ordering the restitution of things to their prior state only perpetuates the crime. She refers that the owners of those lands, due to the kinship that binds them to the accused, cannot claim ignorance of the agricultural activities that were carried out on those lands. To support this reproach, the appellant cites various rulings from the Appellate Courts of Sentencing. She requests that the judgment be annulled and a retrial be ordered. The claim is dismissed. The point under discussion on appeal was also analyzed by the Trial Court in the judgment, and the Trial Court's decision is correct. As was well established in the ruling, and is not a subject of debate before this Appellate Chamber, it was proven that coffee and tomato plantations exist in the protection area of the spring (naciente) and the stream. Now then, as ordered by the Trial Court, the Attorney General’s Office’s request to order the elimination of said crops from those areas was denied, based on the following reasoning: “Although in the present matter, the Attorney General requested from the Court the restoration of the zone to its state prior to the crime, pursuant to, among others, numeral 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code and 50 of the Political Constitution, this Chamber considers that in the present case, it is impossible to order it, because, as inferred from the documentary evidence referring to the registry certifications incorporated in the debate, two of the properties have registered co-owners who were never brought into the process, nor were they given a hearing regarding its existence, so that, as owners of 50 percent of the properties, they could intervene as interested third parties in the process in defense of their patrimonial interests; and even more so in the third property, which appears in the name of a son of defendant [Name4], he was not given the opportunity to assert his rights as owner of 100 percent of the farm either; without any doubt, it is considered that had the indicated petition been granted, due process would have been flagrantly violated, given that a situation detrimental to the properties and rights of those defenseless registered owners would have been ordered. In any case, as was clearly made known to the defendants at the moment of the reading of the operative part; they, to this day, clearly understand, comprehend, and perfectly know that with respect to the existing spring (naciente) and the streams that appear on their lands, these have a protection area that must be respected, and they know that they cannot carry out any action or cultivation within those parts of the lands, because doing so could invade the protection area; given that, moreover, the ignorance they expressed in the present process, they know they cannot use again in their favor, knowing the legal consequences to which they could be exposed in the event of violating the protection areas of the indicated spring (naciente) and streams that exist on those parcels; for this reason, the Court, prevented by the reasons indicated from ordering the removal of the plantings located within the protection areas, appeals to the environmental conscience that is expected to prevail in farmers and hardworking people like each one of the defendants, who live from the products their lands yield, to proceed voluntarily to fully comply with the respect that must exist over the protection areas of the springs (nacientes) and streams, especially since they even make use of the former of these; striving NOT to affect the environment, for which they could even resort to the same officials of the Protection Areas Control System of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, seeking advice for these effects, in order to have each of the protection areas clearly delimited, setting them out on their parcels, to ensure their respect and integrity.” (Verbatim copy folios 230 back and 231 front).\n\nThe prior reasoning of the Trial Court is correct, since it was proven that there are other persons with full ownership rights over those properties and they were not called into the process for the purpose of asserting their rights. While it is true that protection areas cannot be held by any person, it is also clear that the Attorney General's Office's claim entails the issuance of an order with an obligation to act, specifically to eliminate the crops from the protected zones. By virtue of said claim, it was necessary for it to be directed to the persons who, by reason of the ownership right they hold over said lands, have the real and legal possibility of executing the actions ordered therein. Consider the disproportionate nature of ordering a person to eliminate crops located in a protection area if that person cannot access the land nor perform acts on it, because they do not possess a right over said property that empowers them to carry out those actions. In this understanding, in order for the order issued by a judicial authority to be effective and efficient, it is necessary to direct it to the person who has the standing to comply with it, and hence the necessity of having brought the owners of those parcels into the process. Additionally, as the first-instance panel correctly indicated, as of the judgment issued by the a quo, the accused must refrain from carrying out any type of harvesting, tilling, maintenance, or cultivation work in the protection areas located within those parcels, because now they do have knowledge that such activities cannot be carried out in those zones, and the respective public authority shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with the Law. Consequently, the claim raised is dismissed without merit.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal of the judgment filed by the Procuraduría General de la República is dismissed without merit.\n\n**Adriana Escalante Moncada**\n\n**Yadira Godínez Segura**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                [Nombre5]\n\n**Appellate Sentencing Judges**\n\n*Exp: 11-000461-0331-PE*\n*Contra: [Nombre1]*\n*Delito: INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL*\n*Ofendido: LOS RECURSOS NATURALES*\n*[Nombre34]*\n\nThat is, the examination of the typification requires a complete intellective process, which makes this figure a complex criminal type and hence the demonstration of both the objective and subjective elements requires a different assessment from those other criminal conducts that are described solely based on descriptive elements or normative elements of simple understanding from their social meaning. Hence, in this case, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber is correct and therefore the claim raised must be dismissed.”</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>\"\n        },\n        \"previousdocs\": [],\n        \"nextdocs\": []\n      }\n    ],\n    \"contenidosInteresOrden\": \"3\",\n    \"despacho\": \"Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón\",\n    \"despachoOrden\": \"43\",\n    \"enteSistematizador\": \"CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL\",\n    \"esCambioCriterio\": \"0\",\n    \"esCriterioUnificador\": \"0\",\n    \"esNotaSeparada\": \"0\",\n    \"esProtegida\": \"0\",\n    \"esResolucionClave\": \"0\",\n    \"esResolucionEstructural\": \"0\",\n    \"esResolucionOral\": \"0\",\n    \"esResolucionRelevante\": \"0\",\n    \"esVotoSalvado\": \"0\",\n    \"expediente\": \"110004610331PE\",\n    \"fecha\": \"2017-10-26\",\n    \"formatoDocumento\": \"ESCRITO\",\n    \"hora\": \"01:20\",\n    \"id\": \"sen-1-0034-727877\",\n    \"numeroDocumento\": \"00743\",\n    \"redactor\": \"Adriana María Escalante Moncada\",\n    \"sentenciasIgualSentido\": \"sen-1-0034-1207553\",\n    \"sourceName\": \"Documentos\",\n    \"subNumeroDocumento\": \"1\",\n    \"tipoDocumento\": \"SNT\",\n    \"tipoInformacion\": \"Resolución Judicial\",\n    \"tipoResolucion\": \"De Fondo\",\n    \"tipoTexto\": \"1\",\n    \"previousdocs\": [],\n    \"nextdocs\": [],\n    \"html\": \"<html><head><meta http-equiv=\\\"Content-Type\\\" content=\\\"text/html; charset=utf-8\\\" /><meta http-equiv=\\\"Content-Style-Type\\\" content=\\\"text/css\\\" /><meta name=\\\"generator\\\" content=\\\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\\\" /><title></title></head><body style=\\\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\\\"><div><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:144.6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-8.5pt; font-size:10pt\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> PODER</span><img src=\\\"ED172.001.png\\\" width=\\\"62\\\" height=\\\"84\\\" alt=\\\"graphic\\\" style=\\\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\\\" /><span>JUDICIAL</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:144.6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-144.6pt; font-size:10pt\\\"><span>TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA, III CIRCUITO JUDICIAL ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\\\"><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-weight:bold\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:'Comic Sans MS'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold\\\"> </span><span>Tel 2456-9069 ó [Telf1]</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:'Comic Sans MS'; font-size:8pt\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:'Comic Sans MS'; font-size:8pt\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:'Comic Sans MS'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold\\\">tapelacion-sra</span><span style=\\\"font-size:9pt; font-weight:bold\\\">@Poder-Judicial.go.cr</span><span> </span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>Fax 2456-90-29</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\\\"><span>_______________________________________________________________________________________</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">Exp: 11-000461-0331-PE</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">Res: 2017-00743</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SECCIÓN [Dirección1]. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">San Ramón, a las trece horas veinte minutos (01:20 p.m.) del veintiséis de octubre de dos mil diecisiete.</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">RECURSO DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">[Nombre1]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">,</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> mayor, costarricense, cédula CED1,</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">[Nombre2]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">mayor, costarricense, cédula CED2, conocido como [Nombre3]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">y</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">[Nombre4]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\\\">, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">mayor, costarricense,</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">cédula CED3, por el delito de </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL POR INVASIÓN A LA ZONA PROTECTORA DE UNA NACIENTE y UNA QUEBRADA </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">en perjuicio del </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">PATRIMONIO FORESTAL.</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">Adriana Escalante Moncada [Nombre5]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">y Yadira Godínez Segura</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">. Se apersonan en apelación de sentencia, la licenciada [Nombre6]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, Procuradora y el licenciado [Nombre7]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, defensor particular del imputado [Nombre8] .</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\"> RESULTANDO:</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">I.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">Que mediante sentencia número </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">33-TGRE-2016 </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">de las once horas del once de marzo de dos mil dieciséis, el Tribunal de Juicio de Grecia, resolvió:</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\"> \\\"POR TANTO:</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\"> De conformidad con lo expuesto y artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 8 incisos 1 y 2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 10 y 11 inciso 1 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 9 inciso 2 y 14 inciso 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 32, 42, 142, 184, 265, 267, 360 a 366 del Código Procesal Penal; 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 34, 45, del Código Penal; 33 inciso a) y 58 inciso a) de la Ley Forestal N° 7575; SE RESUELVE: a) declarar sin lugar la prescripción alegada por el Lic. [Nombre9]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">; b) en aplicación del Principio de In Dubio Pro Reo se absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre1]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">, [Nombre2]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">y [Nombre4]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\\\">por UN DELITO INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL POR INVASIÓN A LA ZONA PROTECTORA DE UNA NACIENTE Y UNA QUEBRADA que se acusó como cometido en daño de LOS RECURSOS FORESTALES; y c) declarar improcedente la restitución de las cosas al estado anterior, al no haberse brindado durante el proceso, a las copropietarias registrales de dos de los inmuebles, ni al titular de otro de ellos, la posibilidad de hacer valer sus derechos como terceros interesados. Se ordena levantar cualquier medida cautelar que pese sobre los imputados con ocasión de este proceso. Para la lectura integral de la sentencia se señalan las 16:00 del próximo viernes 18 de marzo de dos mil dieciséis. Notifíquese\\\" </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">(sic).</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">II.-</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, la licenciada [Nombre6]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, Procuradora, interpuso recurso de apelación de sentencia.</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">III.-</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\"> Que verificada la deliberación respectiva, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón, procedió a conocer del recurso.</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">IV.- </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">Redacta la jueza de apelación de sentencia [Nombre10] ; y,</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">CONSIDERANDO:</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">I. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">La licenciada [Nombre11]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, Procuradora de la República, en su carácter de actora civil, interpuso recurso de apelación de sentencia contra el fallo número 33-TGRE-2016, emitido a las 11:00 horas del 11 de marzo de 2016, dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Grecia, mediante la cual se absolvió de toda pena y responsabilidad a los encartados [Nombre1]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, [Nombre2]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">y [Nombre4]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">. </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">II. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">Mediante resolución de las 10:25 horas del 14 de setiembre de 2016, esta Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia, suspendió el trámite de la presente causa, en virtud de la acción de constitucionalidad que se ventila ante la Sala Constitucional, bajo la sumaria número 16-3607-0007-CO . Luego, la Sala Constitucional mediante voto número voto 16967-2016, declaró sin lugar la acción interpuesta, sin embargo, todavía no se encuentra redactado el fallo integral emitido por el alto Tribunal Constitucional. No obstante, a pesar que resta la redacción integral del voto antes reseñado, analizado el recurso planteado y por la forma en que se resolverá el mismo, se ordena reactivar el trámite de la presente sumaria. </span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%\\\"><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">III. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">En el </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">primer motivo </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">del recurso, la Procuradora invoca una insuficiente fundamentación e inobservancia de las reglas de la sana crítica. Detalla que en este caso ya se había realizado un primer debate y que en aquella ocasión el Tribunal de Juicio dictó una sentencia absolutoria en favor de los encartados, decisión que fue impugnada por la Procuraduría ante la Cámara de Apelación de Sentencia y como resultado de dicha gestión se anuló el primer fallo y se ordenó un nuevo juicio. Refiere que, en esta segunda ocasión, el Tribunal de Juicio de Grecia, volvió a dictar una sentencia absolutoria en favor de los imputados. Indica que en la decisión impugnada, el cuerpo juzgador, hizo una descripción somera de las declaraciones de los testigos [Nombre12]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, [Nombre13]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, Eliden Alc á [Nombre14]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">y [Nombre15]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">. Sostiene que a partir de esos testimonios, el Colegio de Jueces derivó que los funcionarios del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (en adelante IDA), no le informaron a los justiciables que los terrenos adjudicados a estos tenían algún tipo de limitación. También ataca que las personas juzgadoras de instancia hicieron un breve análisis de las declaraciones de [Nombre16]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">y [Nombre17]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura de Ganadería (en adelante MAG), para señalar que los encartados desconocían sobre la existencia de limitaciones para realizar siembras en las zonas de protección tanto de la quebrada como de la naciente. Añade que el Tribunal de Juicio volvió a dictar una sentencia absolutoria, decisión que a criterio de la recurrente adolece de falta de fundamentación por dos razones esenciales: i) El hecho de que las tierras hayan sido adjudicadas por el IDA , no significa que los encartados tuvieran que haberse representado falsamente un convencimiento de encontrarse en aptitud legal para trabajar la totalidad de la tierra, esto por cuanto no resulta válido alegar ignorancia de la ley. Además, detalla que los planos de dichas parcelas, que constan como prueba en el expediente , especifican que dichos terrenos están afectados a la Ley Forestal y sobre ese elemento de prueba no existe ponderación por parte de los jueces. Asimismo, estima que la prueba testimonial y documental, es conteste en señalar que era de conocimiento de los acusados la existencia de una naciente en el lugar de los hechos. Afirma que los testigos de [Nombre18]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">y [Nombre19]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">, indicaron que los propios imputados procuraron la supervivencia del citado cuerpo de agua, a través de trabajos de reforestación y de captación, destinados a que no solo el afloramiento continuara con brote de agua, sino que se hiciera más grande, a efectos de brindarle ese líquido a varias casas que se ubicaban en ese sector. Refiere que las anteriores circunstancias, permiten sostener que los justiciables conocían de su actuar ilícito y descarta el citado desconocimiento aludido por los encartados. ii) fustiga que en este caso se reitera el argumento de que los imputados recibieron asesoría de funcionarios del MAG dirigida exclusivamente a la actividad de agricultura y que no se les advirtió por parte de estos servidores públicos de alguna situación irregular, en relación con los cultivos existentes en las parcelas. Sostiene que el anterior razonamiento no se deriva de la prueba ya que el testigo [Nombre16]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\\\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\\\">hizo alusión a la necesidad de proteger la quebrada y la naciente. Objeta que la sentencia no desarrolla porqué a partir de la prueba se deriva la existencia de un error de prohibición. Indica que la sentencia carece de una debida fundamentación, y por ello lo procedente es anularla y ordenar el juicio de reenvío. </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\\\">Sin lugar el reclamo.That is, the examination of the elements of the crime (tipicidad) requires a complete intellective process, which makes this figure a complex criminal type and hence the demonstration of both the objective and subjective elements requires a different assessment from those other criminal conducts that are described solely based on descriptive elements or normative elements of simple understanding from their social meaning. Hence, in this case, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber is correct and therefore the claim raised must be dismissed.\n\nHaving analyzed the judgment and the reproach formulated by the appellant, these appellate judges find that it has adequate reasoning and a correct assessment of the evidence. In the case under review, as stated by the appellant, the Trial Court found the following facts of interest proven: \"**FIRST:** In Trojas de San Pedro de Valverde Vega, Grecia, the farm known as La Cooperativa or Virgencita is located, which corresponds to parcels adjudicated by the IDA. On said property, there is a spring (naciente) captured for human consumption and the stream (quebrada) that is a tributary of the Trojas River. **SECOND:** Parcel number 3, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to the defendant [Nombre1] and Mrs. [Nombre20]; and parcel number 4, whose real folio is CED4, was adjudicated to the accused [Nombre2], known as [Nombre3], and Mrs. [Nombre21]. **THIRD:** Without determining an exact date and time, but certainly before March 10, 2011, the defendants [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] invaded the protection area of the spring (naciente) captured for human consumption and of the Trojas River stream (quebrada). **FOURTH:** The accused [Nombre22] and [Nombre8] planted coffee and tomato crops within the protection area of the indicated spring (naciente) and stream (quebrada), carrying out maintenance work on said crops, weed cleaning, tying, and spraying with the application of chemical and natural products, among other activities, invading a total area of 4,989 square meters within the spring (naciente) protection zone and 4,265 square meters in the stream (quebrada) protection area, for a total of 9,264 square meters invaded. **FIFTH:** The defendant [Nombre23] planted tomato crops in a total area of 2,760 square meters, within the 100-meter protection zone of the captured spring (naciente), thus invading its protection area, which he did without having permits for such activity. Furthermore, he owns another parcel through which the stream (quebrada) tributary of the Trojas River passes, which originates from the Chico Cubero and Julio streams, whose protection area was also invaded by the accused, since he planted tomato crops within it, covering an extension of 3,540 square meters. **SIXTH:** The accused [Nombre2] planted tomato crops and a bean trellis, invading the protection area of the stream (quebrada) tributary of the Trojas River, affecting an area of 1,720 square meters with said planting. These crops are barely 48 meters from the watercourse, and there are others planted by the accused [Nombre24] at 43 meters distance. **SEVENTH:** The total area invaded by the planting and cultivation activities of coffee and tomatoes carried out by the accused [Nombre22] and [Nombre8] was 9,264 square meters.\" (Textual copy from folio 217 front and back of the main case file). From the previous factual framework, as well as from the intellectual reasoning of the judgment, it is clearly extracted that the Trial Court found the existence of a spring (naciente) and a stream (quebrada) on the farm known as \"La Cooperativa\" to be accredited. It was also proven that the defendants [Nombre1], [Nombre2], and [Nombre4] had knowledge that a spring (naciente) and a stream (quebrada) existed on said farm. Likewise, the judgment is extensive in explaining that, based on the documentary evidence, expert evidence, and the statements of officials [Nombre12], [Nombre13], and Eliden Alcá [Nombre14], it was demonstrated that the defendants [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] planted coffee and tomato crops on the parcels adjudicated by the IDA, which are located in the protection area of the spring (naciente) and the stream (quebrada) of the [Dirección2] Trojas. Also, the judging body found it proven that in a sector adjacent to the spring (naciente) and within its protection area, trees were planted, which form a small forest. On these aspects, the judgment is clear in expressing—and this derives from the evidence—that the three defendants acknowledged the existence of the spring (naciente), the stream (quebrada), and the coffee and tomato plantations. The foregoing allows us to deduce that there is no controversy regarding these events. The point of conflict, and the one attacked by the appellant, is the decision made by the Trial Chamber when it considered that a mistake of fact (error de tipo) existed in the case. In order to adequately resolve this aspect, a dogmatic review regarding the mistake of fact (error de tipo) and its difference from a mistake of law (error de prohibición) is necessary. In this sense, the dogmatic position is unanimous in indicating that ignorance or mistake about the existence of one or some of the objective elements of the criminal type excludes intent. The scholar [Nombre25] has expressed that \"a mistake of fact (error de tipo) occurs when the perpetrator is mistaken about a circumstance that is necessary to complete the legal type.\" (Roxin [Nombre26]. La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. Editorial Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2007, 1st edition, page 195). Likewise, since the criminal type is composed of normative and descriptive elements, it has been established that a mistake about any of these two categories of elements constitutes a mistake of fact (error de tipo). Here, the distinction between descriptive and normative elements of the criminal type deserves special attention. The first group is composed of those that can be perceived by the senses, meaning the form of knowledge is sensory perception, while the second category includes those elements that can only be apprehended through an evaluation. In relation to this second group, [Nombre25] details that the intellectual comprehension that characterizes typical intent in normative elements does not mean an exact legal subsumption into the concepts employed by the law, but rather it is sufficient that the content of the social meaning has been apprehended by the perpetrator. However, this author also adds that there are cases in which the content of the social meaning cannot be understood without a specific legal qualification. In these cases, the correct legal qualification belongs to the intellectual comprehension of the circumstance of the act in question and is a requirement of intent (In this sense, [Nombre27], Derecho Penal, Parte General tomo I. Editorial Civitas, 2nd edition, 1997, pages 459-462). For his part, and regarding what interests us for the correct resolution of the case under review, [Nombre25] has indicated that a mistake of law (error de prohibición) is configured \"when the perpetrator, knowing all the circumstances that fully complement the legal type, does not however draw from them the conclusion referring to a legal prohibition, but rather believes that their conduct is permitted.\" ([Nombre26] [Nombre28], La teoría del delito en la discusión actual. ibid, page 195). Once the previous concepts are specified, it is necessary to address the construction of the criminal type analyzed by the Trial Court. As stated in the accusation, the defendants were charged with the crime provided for and sanctioned in Article 58, subsection a) of the Ley Forestal, which establishes the following: “A prison sentence of three months to three years shall be imposed on anyone who: a) Invades a conservation or protection area, whatever its management category, or other forest areas or lands subject to the forest regime, whatever the occupied area; regardless of whether it involves private lands of the State or other organisms of the Public Administration or lands of private domain. The perpetrators or participants in the act shall not have the right to any compensation for any construction or work they have carried out on the invaded lands.” The typical action contemplated in this criminal [Nombre29] type is to invade, however, said verb does not have a legal definition in the Ley Forestal, nor in its regulations, so its definition must be sought in other sources. In this regard, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy indicates that invade is understood as “1. To break in, enter by force; 2. tr. To occupy a place abnormally or irregularly. The waters invaded the highway; 3. tr. Said of a thing: To enter and spread in a specific place or medium…”. From the previous conceptual precision, it follows then that the action sanctioned by subsection a) of Article 58 of the Ley Forestal is that of occupying, breaking into a conservation or protection area, regardless of whether it involves state or private lands, that is, invading implies acts of occupation of the site. Additionally, from the analysis of the cited criminal type, it is concluded that the concept of protection area or conservation zone constitutes a normative element, since its comprehension is not achieved through the senses, but rather its content requires a social understanding of its meaning. Furthermore, these appellate judges consider that said normative element cannot be understood without a specific legal qualification, meaning, to understand the meaning of said normative element, one must resort to the legal definition established in the Ley Forestal. Thus, the legislation in comment indicates in its Article 33 the following: “Protection areas. The following shall be declared protection areas: a) The areas that border permanent springs (nacientes), defined within a radius of one hundred meters measured horizontally. b) A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams (quebradas), or arroyos, if the terrain is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is uneven.” From the precisions made so far, and returning to the analysis of the specific case, it can be concluded that for the purposes of objective criminality, the typical action attributed to the defendants was that of invading the areas that border permanent springs (nacientes) within a radius of one hundred horizontal meters, or a strip of fifteen meters—rural zone—or ten horizontal meters—urban zone—on the banks of rivers. For a resolution of the case, the analysis of the conduct displayed by the defendants is not exhausted in the examination of the objective elements of the criminal type, but rather the subjective element, comprised of intent, must also be analyzed. This was the aspect that the Trial Court addressed, and based on said weighing, it concluded that a mistake of fact (error de tipo) existed because it could not be accredited with the required certainty that the defendants had knowledge that the actions they were carrying out were taking place in the protection area of a riverbank or a spring (naciente). The conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber is shared by this Court of Appeals, given that from the evidence, and especially from the statements of the accused [Nombre1] and [Nombre2], and from the testimonies of witnesses [Nombre16] and [Nombre30], it is extracted that the defendants received technical advice from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock during the performance of their activities related to the cultivation of said products. As deduced from the summary of evidence, witnesses [Nombre31] and [Nombre32] related the type of advice that [Nombre29] provided to the defendants. In this sense, the officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock indicated that they provided information regarding the techniques and procedures for planting tomatoes and coffee and carried out the respective supervisions. Contrary to what the appellant proposes, it does not derive from said testimonies with sufficient force that these public servants explained to the defendants what the protection area of the spring (naciente) or of the stream (quebrada) was and how far said protection zone extended. Nor is it deduced from those accounts that those officials informed or warned the accused that in certain areas of the adjudicated parcels they could not plant because those zones constituted protection areas. In this particular case, the testimony of witness [Nombre33] gains relevance; he alluded to the fact that the parcels under review in this case belong to a farm known as \"La Cooperativa,\" lands that have been used for planting different products over the course of 30 years. What has been said so far allows us to deduce that the thesis presented by the lower Court to acquit the defendants was limited to the fact that the evidence did not derive with the required certainty that the accused acted knowing that the zones in which the tomato and coffee plantations were made constituted protection areas, an element that is indispensable for the purposes of subjective criminality. On this particular point, it is necessary to specify that the verification of intent is another of the elements that must be accredited based on the evidence, and which derives from the factual circumstances surrounding a particular case. As stated, the technical advice that the accused received in this case does not allow us to conclude that they acted knowing that they were invading the protection zone of the spring (naciente) and the stream (quebrada) with the coffee and tomato plantations they planted in the parcels they were working. But, even so, if the appellant's thesis were admitted, in the sense that the defendants acted with intent—an extreme that has not been proven with the required certainty—the fact is that, in the opinion of these appellate judges, an invincible mistake of law (error de prohibición) could also be configured in this case, for the following reasons. If it were admitted that the accused acted intentionally, it would not be feasible to conclude that they acted knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the legal system (mistake of law (error de prohibición)), since as the accused declared, and there is no evidence to discredit their statement, they were advised by public officials at the time of carrying out the coffee and tomato cultivation, and therefore, it was not possible to know that their action was prohibited by the legal system, a situation that was impossible to overcome, since it was the very state authorities who advised them to carry out said agricultural activities. The error incurred by the appellant is that she presents her claim solely based on an analysis of the objective elements of the criminal type, ignoring that criminality also encompasses the component of intent. Additionally, and as has been developed in this judgment, the analysis of criminality in the crime under review implies that the judge, for the purposes of determining whether a conduct fits within said criminal figure, must carry out a series of evaluations and interpretations, which includes the analysis of the legal definition that exists in our legal system in relation to the concept of protection area. That is, the examination of criminality requires a whole intellectual process, which turns this figure into a complex criminal type, and hence, the demonstration of both the objective and subjective elements requires a different assessment from that of those other criminal conducts that are described only based on descriptive elements or normative elements of simple comprehension from their social meaning. Hence, in this case, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber is correct, and therefore, the claim raised must be dismissed.\n\n**IV.** In the **second ground,** the appellant alleges a lack of reasoning in the judgment regarding the denial to issue an order for the restitution of things to their prior state. She details that in the challenged decision, the collegiate body rejected the request of the Attorney General's Office, which petitioned for the elimination of the existing plantations in the protection zones. She criticizes the Trial Court's stance, because she considers that the judgment found the existence of a spring (naciente) and a stream (quebrada) to be proven, and it was also proven that the defendants made plantations in the protection zones of those water bodies. She specifies that, although the properties where said plantations are located do not belong to the accused, but to third-party owners in good faith, what is being defended and prosecuted is the invasion of the protection zone of those water bodies, areas that, although they are located on private properties, the third parties do not hold a right over those lands, and no one can possess those protection zones or areas. She considers that it is not essential to have the owners of those properties as intervening third parties in the process, since these people would not have the possibility of making a claim regarding the decisions made in the judgment about said protection areas. Likewise, neither the owners nor the accused can claim benefits derived from an illicit situation, so not ordering the restitution of things to their prior state is nothing but perpetuating the crime. She refers that the owners of those lands, due to the kinship that unites them with the accused, cannot claim ignorance of the agricultural activities that were carried out on those lands. To support this reproach, the appellant cites various rulings from the Sentence Appeals Courts. She requests that the judgment be annulled and a retrial be ordered. **The claim is dismissed.** The point under discussion on appeal was also analyzed by the Trial Court in the judgment, and the Trial Court's decision is correct. As was well established in the ruling, and is not a matter of debate before this Court of Appeals, it was proven that coffee and tomato plantations exist in the protection area of the spring (naciente) and the stream (quebrada). Now, as ordered by the Trial Court, the request of the Attorney General's Office to order the elimination of said crops from those areas was denied, based on the following reasoning: “Although in this matter, the Attorney General requested the Court for the restoration of the zone to its state prior to the crime, this in accordance with the provisions, among others, of numeral 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 50 of the Political Constitution, this Chamber considers that in the present case, there is an impossibility of ordering it, because as inferred from the documentary evidence referring to the registry certifications incorporated in the debate, two of the properties have registered co-owners who were never brought into the process, nor were they given notice of its existence, so that as owners of 50 percent of the properties, they could intervene as interested third parties in the process in defense of their patrimonial interests; and even more so in the third property, which is the one that appears in the name of a son of the accused [Nombre4], neither was he given the opportunity to assert his rights as 100 percent owner of the farm; without a doubt, it is considered that had the indicated petition been accepted, due process would have been flagrantly violated, as a situation detrimental to the properties and rights of those defenseless registered owners would have been ordered. In any case, as was clearly made known to the defendants at the time of reading the operative part; they are now clear, understand, and know perfectly that regarding the existing spring (naciente) and the streams (quebradas) on their lands, these have a protection area that must be respected, and they know that they cannot carry out any action or cultivation within those parts of the land, because by doing so they could invade the protection area; and, that ignorance they expressed in the present process, they know they can no longer use in their favor, knowing the legal consequences they could be exposed to in case of violating the protection areas of the indicated spring (naciente) and streams (quebradas) that exist in those parcels; for this reason, the Court, unable for the reasons indicated to order the removal of the crops located within the protection areas, appeals to the environmental conscience expected to prevail in farming and working people like each of the accused, who live off the products their land gives them, to proceed voluntarily to fully comply with the respect that must exist regarding the protection areas of the springs (nacientes) and streams (quebradas), especially since they even use the former; seeking NOT to affect the environment, for which they could even turn to the same officials of the Protection Area Control System of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, seeking advice for those purposes, in order to have each of the protection areas clearly delimited, setting them on their parcels, to ensure the respect and integrity of the same.” (textual copy folios 230 back and 231 front). The previous reasoning of the Trial Court is correct, since it was accredited that other persons exist with full property rights over said properties, and they were not called to the process to assert their rights. Although it is true that protection areas cannot be possessed by any person, it is also clear that the claim of the Attorney General's Office entails issuing an order with an obligation to act, specifically to eliminate the crops from the protected zones. By virtue of said claim, it was necessary that it be directed to the persons who, on occasion of the ownership rights they hold over said lands, have the real and legal possibility of executing the actions ordered.\n\nTake into consideration how disproportionate it would be to order a person to eliminate the crops located in a protection area (área de protección), if that person cannot access the land or perform acts on it, because they do not possess a right over said property that empowers them to carry out those actions. In this understanding, in order for the order issued by a judicial authority to be effective and efficient, it is necessary to direct it to the person who has the legitimacy to comply with it, and hence, the need to have brought the owners of those properties into the proceeding. Additionally, as the trial court panel correctly indicated, as of the judgment issued by the a quo, the defendants must refrain from carrying out any type of harvesting, tilling, maintenance, or cultivation work in the protection areas located on said parcels, because now they do have knowledge that such activities cannot be carried out in these zones, and compliance with the Law will be the responsibility of the respective public authority. Consequently, the claim raised is declared without merit.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal of the judgment filed by the Procuraduría General de la República is declared without merit.\n\n\n\n\n\nAdriana Escalante Moncada\n\n\n\nYadira Godínez Segura                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                [Nombre5] \n\nSentencing Appeal Judges\n\n\n\nExp: 11-000461-0331-PE\nContra: [Nombre1] \nDelito: INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL\nOfendido: LOS RECURSOS NATURALES\n[Nombre34]"
}