{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-944759", "citation": "Res. 00118-2019 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "ICE no tiene exención del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles", "title_en": "ICE Not Exempt from Property Tax", "summary_es": "La Sección VI del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo rechazó la demanda del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) contra la Municipalidad de Palmares, confirmando que el ICE está sujeto al pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles establecido en la Ley N° 7509. El Tribunal determinó que este impuesto es un tributo nuevo y distinto al antiguo impuesto territorial, creado en favor de las municipalidades, y que las exenciones genéricas otorgadas al ICE por su ley constitutiva (Decreto Ley N° 449) y la Ley N° 8660 no lo eximen, pues según el artículo 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, las exoneraciones no se extienden a tributos creados con posterioridad. Rechazó argumentos de no sujeción, aclarando la diferencia entre exención y no sujeción, y concluyó que no existe norma expresa que exonere al ICE de este impuesto municipal.", "summary_en": "The Sixth Section of the Administrative Contentious Court denied the claim of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) against the Municipality of Palmares, confirming that ICE is subject to the real estate tax established by Law No. 7509. The Court held this tax is a new and distinct levy from the former territorial tax, created in favor of municipalities, and that the generic exemptions granted to ICE by its founding law (Decree-Law No. 449) and Law No. 8660 do not apply, because under Article 63 of the Tax Code, exemptions do not extend to taxes created subsequently. It rejected non-subjection arguments, clarifying the difference between exemption and non-subjection, and concluded there is no express rule exempting ICE from this municipal tax.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "30/09/2019", "year": "2019", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles", "exención tributaria", "no sujeción", "sujeto activo", "tributo cedido", "CNPT", "reserva de ley", "ICE" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles", "ICE", "exención tributaria", "Ley 7509", "no sujeción", "Municipalidad de Palmares", "Artículo 63 CNPT", "reserva de ley", "tributo cedido", "impuesto territorial", "Ley 8660", "Decreto Ley 449" ], "keywords_en": [ "Real estate tax", "ICE", "tax exemption", "Law 7509", "non-subjection", "Municipality of Palmares", "Article 63 Tax Code", "legislative reservation", "ceded tax", "territorial tax", "Law 8660", "Decree-Law 449" ], "excerpt_es": "En suma, estima este Tribunal que en este caso en concreto, no existe norma alguna que conceda o reconozca a favor del ICE una exención del pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, por lo que, es claro que se encuentra sujetos al pago de dicho tributo en la circunscripción territorial local correspondiente. (...) Se reitera, la exención tributaria genérica y subjetiva que dispone el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley No. 449, no es aplicable al impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, dado que este último es posterior a la creación de ese beneficio tributario. Considerar que dicha exención genérica aplica para tributos que aún no habían sido creados al momento de su emisión, constituye una contravención a los límites que impone el ordinal 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios a la vez que supone (en el fondo) una negación a la potestad de crear y modificar tributos, que a la luz del ordinal 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, ostenta el Poder Legislativo.", "excerpt_en": "In sum, this Court finds that in this particular case, there is no rule whatsoever granting or recognizing in favor of ICE an exemption from payment of the real estate tax; therefore, it is clear that it is subject to payment of said tax in the corresponding local territorial jurisdiction. (...) It is reiterated that the generic and subjective tax exemption provided by Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 is not applicable to the real estate tax, since the latter was created after that tax benefit. Considering that such generic exemption applies to taxes that had not yet been created at the time of its issuance constitutes a violation of the limits imposed by Article 63 of the Tax Code and at the same time represents (in essence) a denial of the power to create and modify taxes, which, pursuant to Article 121, paragraph 13) of the Political Constitution, belongs to the Legislative Power.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "ICE's claim was denied; it was confirmed that the institute is subject to paying the real estate tax to the Municipality of Palmares, with no special award of costs.", "summary_es": "Se rechazó la demanda del ICE; se confirmó que el instituto está sujeto al pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles a favor de la Municipalidad de Palmares, sin especial condena en costas." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V, citando Art. 63 CNPT", "quote_en": "The exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.", "quote_es": "La exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "There is no rule whatsoever granting or recognizing in favor of ICE an exemption from payment of the real estate tax.", "quote_es": "No existe norma alguna que conceda o reconozca a favor del ICE una exención del pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles." }, { "context": "Considerando IX", "quote_en": "In exemption, the taxable event occurs or is verified, but then the tax obligation is waived or excluded by express legislative provision; whereas in non-subjection, the taxable event is not verified.", "quote_es": "En la exención, se produce o verifica el hecho generador, pero luego la obligación tributaria se dispensa o excluye por disposición expresa del legislador; mientras que en la no sujeción, el hecho imponible no se verifica." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-34914", "citation": "Ley 7509", "title_en": "Territorial Tax Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-11609", "citation": "Ley 449", "title_en": "ICE Creation Law", "title_es": "Ley de Creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "08/04/1949", "year": "1949" }, { "id": "norm-63786", "citation": "Ley 8660", "title_en": "Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector Law", "title_es": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones", "doc_type": "law", "date": "08/08/2008", "year": "2008" }, { "id": "norm-26598", "citation": "Ley 7509", "title_en": "Real Property Tax Law", "title_es": "Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-32135", "citation": "Ley 7293", "title_en": "Law Regulating Current Exemptions", "title_es": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes", "doc_type": "law", "date": "31/03/1992", "year": "1992" }, { "id": "norm-6530", "citation": "Ley 4755", "title_en": "Tax Code of Norms and Procedures", "title_es": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios", "doc_type": "law", "date": "03/05/1971", "year": "1971" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-11609", "citation": "Ley 449", "title_en": "ICE Creation Law", "title_es": "Ley de Creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "08/04/1949", "year": "1949" }, { "id": "norm-26598", "citation": "Ley 7509", "title_en": "Real Property Tax Law", "title_es": "Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-32135", "citation": "Ley 7293", "title_en": "Law Regulating Current Exemptions", "title_es": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes", "doc_type": "law", "date": "31/03/1992", "year": "1992" }, { "id": "norm-34914", "citation": "Ley 7509", "title_en": "Territorial Tax Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial", "doc_type": "law", "date": "09/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-63786", "citation": "Ley 8660", "title_en": "Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector Law", "title_es": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones", "doc_type": "law", "date": "08/08/2008", "year": "2008" }, { "id": "norm-6530", "citation": "Ley 4755", "title_en": "Tax Code of Norms and Procedures", "title_es": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios", "doc_type": "law", "date": "03/05/1971", "year": "1971" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-34914", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7509 Art. 4" }, { "target_id": "norm-11609", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Decreto Ley No. 449 Art. 20" }, { "target_id": "norm-63786", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley No. 8660 Art. 18" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-944759", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-11609", "norm_num": "449", "norm_name": "Ley de Creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "08/04/1949" }, { "doc_id": "norm-26598", "norm_num": "7509", "norm_name": "Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32135", "norm_num": "7293", "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "31/03/1992" }, { "doc_id": "norm-34914", "norm_num": "7509", "norm_name": "Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-63786", "norm_num": "8660", "norm_name": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "08/08/2008" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6530", "norm_num": "4755", "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "Firmar Documento \n\nEXPEDIENTE: 17-010687-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)\n\nDEMANDADO: Municipalidad de Palmares y el Estado (desistido).\n\n \n\nNo. 0118-2019-VI.\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las 08 horas 15 minutos del treinta de septiembre del dos mil diecinueve.\n\nProceso de puro derecho establecido por el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (en adelante ICE), representado en esta causa por su apoderado especial judicial, señor Juan Carlos Araya González, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED11088, contra la Municipalidad de Palmares, representada en este proceso por su apoderada especial judicial, Nombre135975 , carné de incorporación número CED107995 y contra el Estado, representado en este proceso por el procurador Esteban Alvarado Quesada, carné CED25764, respecto de quien se desistió. \n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n 1.- La presente demanda, planteada el 31 de octubre del 2017, se ha formulado para que en sentencia se disponga, pretensiones precisadas en fase de audiencia preliminar en el siguiente sentido: “- Solicito al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, sean atendidas nuestras pretensiones bajo el principio del debido proceso y se reconozca el régimen exonerado que posee mi representado en cuanto a la obligatoriedad de pago del impuesto de bienes inmuebles que pretende cobrar la municipalidad de palmares. - Se revoque en todos sus extremos, la resolución N° 485-2016 del 31 de octubre de 2016, emitida por parte de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, la cual confirma la resolución número A-007-2016 de las dieciséis horas del veintitrés de mayo del dos mil dieciséis del Alcalde Municipal de Palmares; así como los demás actos administrativos emitidos por la Alcaldía y otras dependencias de la Municipalidad de Palmares, por cuanto el ICE se encuentra exento del pago del impuesto de bienes inmuebles y por el perjuicio económico que ese cobro representa al Instituto. - Se ordene de inmediato la eliminación de dicho cobro en todos los sistemas manuales e informáticos que posee la Municipalidad de Palmares, en contra del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, para evitar futuros cobros por ese concepto. - Por último, solicito se condene al demandado al pago de ambas constas de este proceso judicial.” (Imágenes 389-404, 3-6 del expediente principal)\n\n 2.- Conferido el traslado de ley, el ente local accionado contestó de manera negativa y opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 58-80 del expediente)\n\n 3.- La audiencia preliminar prevista en el ordinal 90 del CPCA fue celebrada el 15 de mayo del 2018, con la asistencia de todas las partes. En esa fase, ante las manifestaciones de la entidad accionante, por resolución No. 849-2018-T de las 13 horas 44 minutos, se tuvo por desistida la demanda en contra del Estado. Fijadas las pretensiones y admitidas las pruebas, al no existir prueba que evacuar, de conformidad con el numeral 98.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el asunto fue declarado de puro derecho y las partes rindieron sus conclusiones. (Imágenes 3-6 del expediente principal). \n\n 4.- El expediente respectivo fue remitido a esta Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo para la emisión del fallo pertinente en fecha 10 de julio del 2017, según consta en el Sistema de Gestión y Escritorio Virtual. En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas.\n\n Redacta el juzgador Garita Navarro con el voto afirmativo de la juzgadora Abarca Gómez y el juez Aguilar Méndez.\n\n \n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\n I.- Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes: 1) Mediante aviso de cobro de fecha 27 de noviembre del 2015, el Departamento de Cobros de la Municipalidad de Palmares, comunicó al ICE el adeudo presentado en el pago del impuesto de bienes inmuebles por un total de ¢1.432.718.08 (un millón cuatrocientos treinta y dos mil setecientos dieciocho colones 08/100). (Hecho primero de la demanda no controvertido, folio 1 del administrativo) 2) En fecha 02 de diciembre del 2015 el ICE presentó ante ese departamento de la Municipalidad de Palmares, oficio N° 257-885-2015; en el que se opone al cobro del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. (Folios 7-14 del administrativo.) 3) Mediante oficio No. DCA-040-2016 del 27 de abril del 2016, se comunicó al ente accionante, por parte del Departamento de Cobros de la Municipalidad de Palmares, la obligatoriedad del ICE respecto al pago del impuesto de bienes inmuebles. (Folios 72-75 del administrativo) 4) En fecha 29 de abril del 2016, mediante el oficio No. 257-264-2016, el ICE interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio ante la Alcaldía Municipal de Palmares, en contra del oficio No. DCA-040-2016 de fecha 27 de abril del 2016. (Folios 79-84 del administrativo) 5) Mediante resolución No. DCA-RR-003-2016 del 16 de mayo del 2016 del Departamento de Cobros de la Municipalidad accionada, se declaró sin lugar el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto y eleva ante el Alcalde Municipal de Palmares el recurso de apelación para su conocimiento. (Folios 85-92 del legajo administrativo) 6) Por resolución número A 007-2016 del 23 de mayo del 2016, del Alcalde de Palmares, se declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación formulado en contra del oficio No. DCA-040-2016 de fecha 27 de abril del 2016. (Folios 97-101 del administrativo) 7) Mediante oficio N° 257-329-2016 del 25 de mayo del 2016, el ICE formuló recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio ante la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en contra de la resolución número A 007-2016 del 23 de mayo del 2016, del Alcalde de Palmares. (Folios 106-108 del administrativo) 8) Por resolución No. 009-2016 del 02 de junio del 2016, el Alcalde de Palmares rechazó el recurso de revocatoria y admitió el recurso de apelación ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección III. (Folios 109-113 del administrativo) 9) Mediante resolución N° 485-2016 de fecha 31 de octubre del 2016, la Sección III del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo dispuso declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación señalado ut supra y confirmar en todos los extremos la resolución número A 007-2016 del 23 de mayo del 2016, del Alcalde de Palmares, dando por agotada la Vía Administrativa. (Folios 116-137del expediente administrativo)\n\n II.- Hechos no probados. Ninguno de relevancia para este fallo.\n\n III.- Objeto del proceso. La presente causa estriba en determinar si el ICE se encuentra afecto o no al pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, fijado en la Ley No. 7509. El ICE señala, el impuesto a los terrenos e instalaciones no es un tributo nuevo, ya que nació con la promulgación de la Ley No. 27 del 02 de marzo de 1939. Expone, el que la Ley No. 7509 haya derogado aquella norma, no supone la creación de un nuevo tributo, pues el objeto sigue siendo el mismo. Compara el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 27 con el ordinal 2 de la Ley No. 7509. Asevera que la intención del legislador fue variar el nombre de la ley y dar una actualización, pero nunca cambio del presupuesto. Refiere al dictamen C-140-2001 del 21 de mayo del 2001 de la Procuraduría General de la República. Dice, pese a que ese órgano varió de criterio, se observa que ambas normas contemplan un régimen exonerativo que cubre a diferentes entes o instituciones que gozan de esa exoneración. Cita el ordinal 4 de la Ley sobre el impuesto territorial, que indicaba dentro de la lista de entidades exoneradas al ICE. Menciona que el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7509 señala que no están afectas al tributo las instituciones autónomas que por ley gocen de exención. Postula, es lógico razonar que al existir varias Instituciones autónomas y existiendo la posibilidad de crear otras, influye en la imposibilidad material de establecer taxativamente una lista de instituciones a las cuales pueda aplicarse la exoneración del impuesto y por ello ha quedado instituido de tal forma. Estima que el ICE se encuentra exento del pago de ese tributo desde la emisión de su Ley Constitutiva No. 449 del 08 de abril de 1949, ya que el ordinal 20 señala que está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales. Afirma que por ley especial cuenta con exención genérica de todo tributo, lo que incluye el de bienes inmuebles, situación que ha sido interpretada de manera distinta por el Órgano de Normalización Técnica del Ministerio de Hacienda, la Procuraduría General de la República y por la Sección III del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo. Cita el canon 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, norma que permite otorgar exenciones totales o parciales. Insiste que dicha exención viene reconocida por el Decreto-Ley 449 y el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7509. Afirma, lo dispuesto en el mandato 20 de la Ley Constitutiva fue reforzado por el artículo 18 de la Ley No. 8660 del 08 de agosto del 2008 al señalar que se mantienen vigentes esas exenciones. Estima que con la Ley No. 8660 se reitera la exención a favor del ICE, salvo en el impuesto de rentas y de ventas. Cita el dictamen C-171-2009 del 19 de junio del 2009 de la Procuraduría General de la República que afirmaba la vigencia de exenciones a favor del ICE, criterio que acota, luego fue \"extrañamente\" variado. Estima que esas posturas erradas han llevado a que los entes locales procedan al cobro indebido de ese tributo. Critica, la tesis de esas autoridades se fundamenta en que la Ley No. 7293 (reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes), estableció en su numeral 50 una modificación al canon 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en el sentido que las exenciones no se extienden a los tributos establecidos luego de su creación. Esas instancias consideran que, al promulgarse una nueva Ley del impuesto de bienes inmuebles, la cual es creada con posterioridad a la Ley de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones, produce efectos jurídicos en contra del ICE. Discrepara de esa interpretación. Estima que no puede aplicarse a este caso la analogía, por estar vedado por el mandato 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Agrega, el artículo 13 de la Ley N° 8660 viene a reforzar la Política Financiera del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, estableciéndose con claridad que el ICE no debe ser considerado como fuente productora de ingresos para el fisco, ni imponérsele restricción financiera alguna por parte del Estado o sus Instituciones. De seguido se ingresa al examen de los cargos formulados. \n\nIV.- Sobre las normas aplicables a la relación jurídica debatida. A efectos de realizar un abordaje del tema debatido, concentrado en el aspecto de si el ICE se encuentra sujeto al impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, un primer aspecto, determinante, es la referencia de las normas relativas a ese tributo, así como de las exenciones que fueron expuestas por las partes en este proceso. Ya en otras oportunidades, esta Sección del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre este tema en particular, entre otras, en las sentencias No. 024-2015-VI, No. 146-2015-VI y 154-2015-VI, dictadas a 8 horas 20 minutos del 11 de febrero, a las 16 horas 20 minutos del 31 de agosto y a las 9 horas 50 minutos del 18 de setiembre, todas del 2015, y posteriormente las No. 57-2016-VI de las 11 horas 35 minutos del 08 de abril del 2016, No. 97-2017-VI de las 14 horas 05 minutos del 31 de julio del 2017 y finalmente, la No. 94-2019-VI de las 10 horas 25 minutos del 31 de julio del 2019. En todos estos precedentes se ha señalado que, como primer aspecto, mediante la Ley No. 27 del 02 de marzo de 1939, se promulga la denominada Ley del Impuesto Territorial. Dicha norma creó un tributo a favor del fisco, sobre la propiedad inmueble (art. 1). En ese sentido, el artículo 2, respecto del hecho imponible señalaba: \"Están sujetos a este impuesto los terrenos, las instalaciones o construcciones fijas y permanentes y las plantaciones estables que en ellos existan. / Asimismo, el valor de todas las maquinarias y demás muebles que formen parte de un inmueble por ser necesarias para la explotación del negocio a que está destinado, deberá tomarse en cuenta con el inmueble propiamente dicho aunque tales maquinarias o muebles pueden fácilmente separarse del inmueble\" En cuanto a la tarifa del tributo, el ordinal 24 disponía que el impuesto a pagar era de \"un cuarto de uno por ciento anual sobre el avalúo de bienes\", determinado por el avalúo practicado por la Oficina de Tributación (artículos 3 y 5), sobre la tabla de valoración definida por el Poder Ejecutivo a través de Decreto Ejecutivo (artículo 6). La indicada dependencia (Oficina de Tributación) actuaba en condición de Administración Tributaria, siendo que el Poder Ejecutivo designaría \"las oficinas recaudadoras que crea necesario en toda la República, a fin de que en ellas se pague el impuesto\" (artículo 26). En el canon 4 se establecieron excepciones al deber material de pago, concretamente, las propiedades del Estado, de las municipalidades y de las Juntas de Educación, cuando por cualquier título, no estuviesen en manos de terceros; las propiedades dedicadas a la enseñanza, la beneficencia pública, las casas curales y templos dedicados a cualquier culto permitido por ley -excluyendo oratorios y capillas de propiedades particulares-; los edificios destinados a la legaciones diplomáticas y casas de habitación de Ministros Extranjeros, cuando estuviesen ocupadas por éstos y \"siempre que en el país respectivo se concedan iguales ventajas a las Legaciones y Ministros de Costa Rica\"; así como las propiedades con valor no superior a ¢4.000.00. (Colección de Leyes y Decretos del Primer Semestre, Tomo I, del año de mil novecientos treinta y nueve, folios 52 a 65). Ahora bien, en lo respecta al ente accionante, mediante el Decreto Ley No. 764, del 25 de octubre de 1949, la Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República, adicionó un artículo 20 al Decreto Ley No. 449, del 8 de abril de 1949 (que creó el ICE), para establecer una exoneración subjetiva general respecto de todos los impuestos nacionales y municipales, la franquicia postal y la telegráfica en favor de esa entidad pública (Colección de Leyes y Decretos, Segundo Semestre, Tomo II, del año de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, folio 545). Sin embargo, posteriormente, el 31 de marzo de 1992, se promulgó la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, No. 7293, norma que en su numeral 1 dispuso: \"Artículo 1°.- Derogatoria General. Se derogan todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes, decretos y normas legales referentes, entre otros impuestos, a los derechos arancelarios, a las ventas, a la renta, al consumo, al territorial, a la propiedad de vehículos, con las excepciones que indique la presente Ley. (...)\". Con todo, de esa derogatoria genérica, el artículo 2 inciso i) exceptuó el conjunto de exenciones que: \"i) Se hayan otorgado al Poder Ejecutivo, al Poder Judicial, al Poder Legislativo, al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a las instituciones descentralizadas, a las municipalidades, a las juntas de educación y administrativas de las instituciones públicas de enseñanza, a las empresas públicas estatales y municipales y a las universidades estatales.\" De igual manera, el precepto 34 ejusdem modificó el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial para tener como no afecto al impuesto, entre otros, los inmuebles titularidad del ICE. Asimismo, en este cuerpo legal, los artículos 50 y 52 reformaron los numerales 63 y 64 del CNPT, respectivamente, en el siguiente sentido: \"Artículo 63 -Límite de aplicación.- Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación\". \"Artículo 64.- Vigencia.- La exención, aun cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado\". Cabe destacar que la citada Ley No. 7293 fue publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 66, del 3 de abril de 1992, entrando en vigencia a partir de esa fecha (Sistema Costarricense de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI). Luego, el 09 de mayo de 1995 mediante la Ley No. 7509 se emite la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, publicada en La Gaceta No. 116 del 19 de junio de 1995. Esta fuente legal en su mandato 38 derogó en su totalidad la Ley del Impuesto Territorial. En el artículo 1 establece un impuesto en favor de las municipalidades, sobre la propiedad de los bienes inmuebles. Este aspecto genera un primer aspecto de diferencia sustancial con respecto al impuesto regulado por la Ley No. 27, ya que, a diferencia de aquella, en la que el sujeto activo era el Estado, en la actual Ley No. 7509, este papel y potestad es conferida a los entes locales. Así se desprende de los ordinales 3 y 9 ejusdem, normas que definen como Administración Tributaria a los citados ayuntamientos. En relación con los elementos de este impuesto, ya en las sentencias No. 146-2015-VI y 154-2015-VI precitadas, esta Sección VI ha indicado: \"(...)a.) sujeto activo: se establece \"..., en favor de las municipalidades\" (artículo 1), a las que en tal circunstancia, a cada una de las ochenta y un gobiernos locales del país, erige en Administración Tributaria (artículos 3 y 9), competencia que se entiende delimitada a su circunscripción territorial. Esta competencia se traduce en que son las municipalidades las encargadas de retener y percibir el citado impuesto, de conformidad con la doctrina del artículo 99 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, al tenor de lo que se le dota de potestades de fiscalización y recaudación de este tributo. Además, la ley les atribuye una serie de prerrogativas y deberes a fin de poder cumplir con la gestión de este tributo, entre ellas \"(…) realizar valoraciones de bienes inmuebles, facturar, recaudar y tramitar el cobro judicial y de administrar, en sus respectivos territorios, los tributos que genera la presente Ley. (…) (artículo 3). No obstante ello, cuenta con un órgano técnico y especializado, creado especialmente para asesorar a la Administración Tributaria (entiéndase, a cada municipalidad del país) en lo concerniente a la precisión y homogeneidad de los valores de las propiedades en todo el país, al crear al Órgano de Normalización Técnica (ONT), según adición a la ley (ahora artículo 12), al tenor del artículo 2 inciso c) de la Ley 7729, del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve; b.) objeto del tributo: lo son \"los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan\" (artículo 2); c.) sujetos pasivos: los establece el artículo 6 de esta Ley, que en lo que interesa dispone: \"a) Los propietarios con título inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. b) Los propietarios de finca, que no estén inscritos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. c) Los concesionarios, los permisionarios o los ocupantes de la franja fronteriza o de la zona marítimo terrestre, .... d) Los ocupantes o los poseedores con título, inscribible o no inscribible en el Registro Público, con más de un año y que se encuentren en las siguientes condiciones: poseedores, empresarios agrícolas, usufructuarios, aparceros rurales, esquilmos, prestatarios gratuitos de tierras y ocupantes en precario. ... e) Los parceleros del IDA [por el artículo 14 de la Ley número 9036, del once de mayo del dos mil doce, esta denominación se cambió por la de Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER)], después del quinto año y si el valor de la parcela es superior al monto fijado en el inciso f) del artículo 4 de esta Ley.\" d.) base imponible: conforme al numeral 23, se establece que \"(E)n todo el país, el porcentaje del impuesto será de un cuarto por ciento (0.25%) y se aplicará sobre el valor del inmueble registrado por la Administración Tributaria\"; y finalmente d.) exoneraciones: en lo que interesa a este asunto, entre otros, se estableció en el artículo 4, que \"(N)o están afectos a este impuesto: a.) Los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas que, por ley especial, gocen de exención.\" (El resaltado no es del original.) Dato importante es que se dispuso una doble reglamentación de este tributo, en atención a que le corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo el dictar el Decreto Ejecutivo correspondiente (lo que ya hizo, por el número 2760, del doce de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, y que como tal, debe entenderse y tenerse como normativa secundaria y subordinada (en todo) a la ley que le da sustento (doctrina derivada de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, entre otras, en sentencias número 1876-90, 0243-93, 5227-94, 2382-96, 6689-96 y 2856-2000); y la que que pueda adoptar cada municipalidad, para la completación de esa regulación (artículo 39), en ejercicio de su autonomía administrativa y tributaria establecida por la propia Carta Fundamental en su numeral 170 -de segundo grado, o de gobierno, según desarrollo de la sentencia constitucional número 5445-99-, de donde, bien pueden aprobar las normas de organización interna que requieran a fin de hacer efectivo el cobro y la recaudación del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Esta ley fue publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 116, del diecinueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, fecha a partir del cual se encuentra vigente. (...)\". Finalmente, el 8 de agosto del 2008, se aprobó la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, No. 8660, que en su artículo 18 dispone: \"Cuando el ICE y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas. En los demás casos, se mantendrán vigentes las exenciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley N.° 449. de 8 de abril de 1949, así como a cualesquiera otras que les confiera el ordenamiento. / Se excluye del pago del impuesto sobre la renta el servicio telefónico básico tradicional.\" Esta ley fue publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 156 del 13 de agosto del 2008, fecha a partir de la cual está vigente (Sistema Costarricense de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI). \n\nV.- Sobre la interpretación de las normas que establecen exenciones tributarias. La parte promovente postula que no debe cancelar el impuesto de bienes inmuebles pues se mantiene vigente la exención que desde un inicio establecía el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 27, así como por lo estatuido por el Decreto Ley 449, así como lo expresado por el canon 18 de la Ley No. 8660. El abordaje de esas argumentaciones exige la interpretación y ponderación de las normas arriba citadas, de cara a establecer si el tratamiento legal que se produce a partir de la emisión de la Ley No. 7509 y las posteriores regulaciones de la Ley No. 8660, permiten establecer la pervivencia de la exención subjetiva que el Decreto Ley 449 y el ordinal 4 de la ya derogada Ley No. 27 establecían a favor del ICE. Sobre los mecanismos de interpretación que han de aplicar en estas lides, esta Sección en el mencionado voto No. 57-2016-VI de las 11 horas 35 minutos del 08 de abril del 2016 expuso: \"...El numeral 6 del CNPT establece que las normas tributarias se deben interpretar con arreglo a todos los métodos admitidos por el Derecho Común e indica que la analogía es procedimiento admisible para llenar los vacíos legales pero que en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni exenciones. Por ende, en nuestro criterio la normativa tributaria debe aplicarse conforme a los mecanismos de interpretación normales, sin que exista criterio alguno que permita sostener criterios interpretativos como in dubio pro fisco, pro contribuyente u otros similares. Ahora, la determinación del mecanismo interpretativo aplicable frente a una determinada situación jurídica, es un tema que ha de valorarse en cada caso concreto. Para ello, debe atenderse a la finalidad misma de la norma, conforme a los parámetros que otorga el canon 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP) y el artículo 10 del Código Civil (en adelante CC). En esa línea, merece traer a colación lo dicho por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en el fallo No. 145 de las 10 horas 15 minutos del 22 de febrero del 2008, en el cual, sobre el tema de la interpretación de las normas tributarias indicó: \"(...) De allí que la labor hermenéutica de las normas que regulan las relaciones tributarias, debe realizarse dentro de los cauces de las reglas de la interpretación jurídica, comunes a todas las ramas del derecho acudiendo a sus diversos métodos, a fin de precisar los alcances y particularidades de un determinado mandato, de modo que la formulación hipotética, aplicada a la praxis diaria, cumpla su cometido intrínseco y el fin que ha dispuesto el legislador para su emisión. (...) En esta labor, de acuerdo al principio de igualdad constitucional, es claro que el intérprete debe ponderar las diversas variables que convergen en cada situación, dentro de ellas, la naturaleza de la disposición, procurando que su uso, en la forma y alcances que establezca, sea igual para todos los casos similares y evitar una aplicación material que burle la finalidad misma de su contenido. Los medios de que el operador jurídico se sirve para llevar a cabo este proceso, son substancialmente: filológico o gramatical, lógico, histórico, sociológico y finalista. El artículo 10 del Código Civil, al cual remite el canon 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en relación a la interpretación de las reglas tributarias, contempla estos elementos ... La exégesis de las normas tributarias, debe analizar en cada caso, el contenido de la norma, para establecer los cauces debidos de su aplicación, a tono con los parámetros ya señalados, a fin de que el mandato cumpla su cometido, se satisfaga la finalidad inmersa en la manifestación legislativa, sea imponer cargas tributarias, establecer marcos de beneficios y demás asuntos inherentes a la relación jurídico tributaria que de aquella se desprenda.\" Por ende, el operador jurídico ha de acudir a los mecanismos de interpretación que sean pertinentes en cada caso concreto, sin que pueda partirse, como criterio genérico de base, que la interpretación debe atender a una forma específica. En el contexto particular de la interpretación de las normas tributarias que establezcan exenciones o en general, beneficios fiscales, esa Sala Casacional en el fallo No. 399-F-2006, de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 28 de junio del 2006 señalo: \"V.- Interpretación de las normas tributarias y exenciones. Finalidad. La labor hermenéutica de las normas que regulen las relaciones tributarias, debe realizarse dentro de los causes de las reglas de la interpretación jurídica, comunes a todas las ramas del derecho acudiendo a sus diversos métodos, a fin de precisar los alcances y particularidades de un determinado mandato, de modo que la formulación hipotética, aplicada a la praxis diaria, cumpla su cometido intrínseco y el fin que ha dispuesto el legislador para su emisión. (…) Desde este plano, las normas tributarias no pueden ser consideradas excepcionales o bien, limitativas de los derechos de los particulares, dado que ese carácter llevaría a que su aplicación y por tanto su interpretación, fuese igualmente restrictivo. Tampoco resulta acertada esa forma interpretativa dentro del contexto de las disposiciones que establezcan exenciones o beneficios fiscales. (…) Esta Sala, hasta la fecha, había sostenido la tesis de que, conforme a lo dispuesto por el Código referido y el régimen jurídico propio de las exenciones, su interpretación debe ser restrictiva, en razón de que del contexto de los numerales 5, 6 en relación al citado ordinal 62, todos de aquel cuerpo legal, se desprende la protección al principio de legalidad en materia de exenciones, mediante la imposibilidad de interpretar ampliativamente las normas a ellas referidas. En este sentido entre muchas, sentencia no. 162, de las 15 horas 22 minutos del 25 de setiembre de 1991, no. 93 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 28 de agosto de 1996, no. 86 de las 15 horas del 19 de agosto de 1998 y no. 318 de las 9 horas del 19 de mayo del 2004. No obstante, con su nueva integración, y luego de una profunda reflexión del punto, llega a un criterio distinto al referido. La naturaleza y objeto de las normas del tipo aludido, en los términos ya expuestos, así como su régimen jurídico, no implica ni justifica que deban ser interpretadas con un prisma diferente al de las otras disposiciones tributarias, sea, con criterios especiales, pues a fin de cuentas, se reitera, son todas componentes de un mismo sistema que busca, en su dimensión teleológica, la equidad en las cargas contributivas. Para ello es necesario, en algunos casos, implementar normas que en el fondo, busquen el cumplimiento de los diversos principios con los que el constituyente ha revestido el sistema fiscal. (…)No obstante, el principio de legalidad tributaria al que están sujetos, no puede constituirse en un condicionante válido que justifique una interpretación especial (restrictiva), sino que debe ser ponderado en su correcta dimensión, esto es, solo por vía legal pueden crearse, su fuente de origen debe reunir las condiciones señaladas en el numeral 62 del citado Código y solo surten efectos si ocurre el hecho que ha sido preestablecido para su ocurrencia. Por tanto, la legalidad tributaria así vista, no es justificante de una consideración restrictiva de las gracias fiscales.” Con todo y esa apertura, es criterio de este Tribunal que lo anteriormente expuesto no supone, ni por asomo, una carta abierta que permita sostener una suerte de regla general de interpretaciones extensivas, ampliativas o bien finalistas frente a las normas de beneficios tributarios. Se insiste en que la norma tributaria, incluso la de exenciones, debe interpretarse con arreglo a los mecanismos normales de interpretación, según corresponda en cada caso contexto. Para ello, hay que tener claridad en que cualquier práctica interpretativa ha de partir del contexto gramatical de las normas. Esto no implica que la comprensión de la norma sea en todos los casos dentro de la forma denominada \"interpretación literal\". Por el contrario, la norma como expresión de lenguaje (jurídico en este caso) constituye a su vez el punto a partir del cual el operador jurídico inicia su ejercicio analítico frente a casos reales en los que ha de ser aplicada, pero a su vez, consiste en el límite de la decisión de ese intérprete autorizado (en razón de que su decisión busca la solución de un caso concreto mediante la aplicación de la norma analizada). La validez de las eventuales interpretaciones respecto de determinado canon se encuentra condicionada a la posibilidad de sustentar ese sentido u orientación comprensiva en el ámbito de permisibilidad gramatical de la norma. Dentro de esa dinámica, como primer paso en esa tarea hermenéutica, es indispensable ingresar a definir si la posición postulada por determinado intérprete es factible dentro del ámbito gramatical. Es decir, es necesario precisar los posibles sentidos jurídicos del precepto normativo. Desde ese plano, si la posición postulada atiende a un ánimo finalista, pero no encuentra respaldo en la composición gramatical de la norma, debe distinguirse lo que la norma permite de lo que el intérprete desea como regulación. Ciertamente la labor del agente jurídico es aplicar el derecho en la realidad (law in action) a los casos concretos que conozca, para lo cual, es innegable, la aplicación del derecho es una opción que ese intérprete realiza de los sentidos posibles de la norma. No obstante, se reitera, los marcos finalistas solo son viables en la medida en que la norma (como expresión de lenguaje), permita diversos sentidos posibles. VI.- También hay que tener presente que conforme al mandato 121 inciso 13) de la Carta Magna, se otorga a la Asamblea Legislativa la atribución exclusiva de “establecer los impuestos y contribuciones nacionales, y autorizar las municipales.” Este norma sirve de fundamento a los Principios de Reserva de Ley y Legalidad Tributaria, que se encuentran desarrollados, además, en los preceptos 5 y, en lo que a esta causa atañe, 62 del CNPT a fin de fijar de manera precisa y diáfana sus alcances y cobertura del citado postulado. En el artículo 5 del CNPT se dispone con claridad: “En cuestiones tributarias solo la ley puede: a) Crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir el hecho generador de la relación tributaria; establecer las tarifas de los tributos y sus bases de cálculo; e indicar el sujeto pasivo; b) Otorgar exenciones, reducciones o beneficios; (...)” Por su parte y tratándose de exenciones, el artículo 62 del CNPT, en su párrafo primero señala: “La ley que contemple exenciones debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones.” Lo anterior supone que la norma tributaria que otorgue beneficios fiscales, debe ser clara en su contenido, de manera que fije de manera diáfana el sujeto a favor de quien se emite, tributos exonerados, y demás elementos sustanciales que el citado precepto 62 exige. Sobre el alcance de estos principios, pueden consultarse el fallo de la Sala Primera No. 5 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 5 de enero del 2000, o bien, los votos Nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001 y 5504-2002, todos de la Sala Constitucional, que detallan el carácter relativo del citado principio de reserva de ley tributaria. Según lo ha señalado la Sala Primera, la reserva de ley en las normas de beneficios tributarios se sustenta en que las disposiciones de esta clase son las que se conocen como mandatos con presupuesto de hecho exclusivo, lo que implica, la imposibilidad de crear exenciones por mecanismos de integración, particularmente, la analogía. En el precitado fallo 399-2006, ese alto Tribunal sobre el tema tratado dispuso: “Ahora bien, esta última característica aludida (se refiere a la prohibición de analogía) supone que las exenciones y beneficios tributarios solo pueden concederse si el hecho concreto que se invoca, corresponde al supuesto fáctico de la norma autorizante y su otorgamiento es factible acorde al parámetro fijado por el legislador en la fuente de su creación. Por ende, cuando la norma imponga de forma clara e indubitable condiciones concretas para el disfrute o recepción de los efectos benevolentes del régimen fiscal, en su aplicación estos parámetros no podrán ser eludidos en tanto son parte inexorable del hecho condicionante que el ordenamiento ha fijado. Así visto, el efecto condicionado se producirá, cuando esos presupuestos fácticos estipulados en el mandato se hayan satisfecho. De este modo, el juzgador debe analizar en cada caso, con el cuidado de rigor, si el supuesto de hecho propuesto por el sujeto pasivo encuadra y coincide con el hecho exento dispuesto por la norma que prevé el beneficio, dentro de su contenido material. En esta confrontación, en tesis de principio, resulta improcedente ampliar los efectos de la norma a extremos que ella no contempla, ni que deriven de su contenido, como igualmente inviable por imperio de ley lo son las prácticas analógicas en este tipo de situaciones, pues surge el riesgo de incorporar dentro del hecho exento, supuestos que no contempla la ley, lo que atentaría contra el precitado principio de reserva legal que impera en estos campos.” Ergo, las normas que otorguen este tipo de beneficios deben contener un detalle claro y preciso de sus alcances. Pero, además, hay que considerar que al tenor del artículo 63 del CNPT las exoneraciones tienen un límite de aplicación fundamental (que no puede ser obviado al momento de interpretar las normas) en tanto únicamente se aplican respecto de los tributos ya establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico, motivo por el que no puede disponerse una exención abierta e incierta a futuro respecto de tributos que, incluso, no han sido creados por el legislador y que, por tanto, no han nacido a la vida jurídica y, por ende, no han adquirido vigencia. Esa disposición legal señala: \"Artículo 63.- Límite de aplicación: Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos con posterioridad a su creación.\" (Texto conforme a reforma dada al tenor del artículo 50 de la Ley número 7293, de treinta y uno de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, vigente a partir del tres de abril siguiente). En esa línea, el otorgamiento de una exención tributaria genera un derecho subjetivo a su disfrute en el período fiscal correspondiente, si se adapta a los términos y condiciones previstas en la ley que la establece; pero ello no implica que genere per se un derecho a su reconocimiento en el futuro, toda vez que el legislador está plenamente facultado para modificar, e inclusive, derogar las exenciones previamente reconocidas (como lo consideró la Sala Constitucional en sentencias No. 1341-93, No. 4844-94 y No. 2000-4261), como lo prevé el artículo 64 del mismo CNPT conforme al cual la exención, aún cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado.\" Estas consideraciones son plenamente aplicables al caso que se examina, a la vez que formulan y exponen criterios que se comparten, sin que exista motivo alguno para su variación, por lo que se tienen como parte del sustento jurídico que da apoyo al presente fallo. \n\n VI.- Sobre el caso concreto. La entidad demandante pretende que se reconozca la exoneración que, a su juicio, le confiere el ordenamiento jurídico respecto del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Para ello, peticiona la nulidad de la resolución N° 485-2016 del 31 de octubre de 2016, emitida por parte de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, la cual confirma la resolución número A-007-2016 de las dieciséis horas del veintitrés de mayo del dos mil dieciséis del Alcalde Municipal de Palmares; así como los demás actos administrativos emitidos por la Alcaldía y otras dependencias de la Municipalidad de Palmares, por cuanto, en su criterio, el ICE se encuentra exento del pago del impuesto de bienes inmuebles. Luego del examen de fondo de las diversas alegaciones presentadas por las partes en la fase escrita como en la oral de este proceso, este órgano colegiado mantiene la postura mostrada en los precedentes arriba mencionados, al estimar que no existe motivo alguno que justifique la variación de este criterio. Desde luego que esta Cámara comprende y reconoce que existen varias posturas sobre este particular. A modo de simple referencia, el ente accionante aporta las resoluciones No. 55-2017-VII de las 11 horas del 07 de agosto del 2017 y No. 100-2016-VII de las 09 horas 30 minutos del 12 de octubre del 2016, ambas de la Sección VII de este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en la que, con voto de mayoría, se acogió la tesis del ente público demandante y se dispuso la vigencia de la exoneración en el pago del tributo sobre bienes inmuebles, al estimar que la misma Ley de ese tributo, sea, la No. 7509, en conjunto con lo estatuido por la Ley de Modernización de Entidades del Sector de Telecomunicaciones, No. Placa903, reconocían la pervivencia de la dispensa fiscal bajo examen. En otra postura, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto No. 816-F-2018, dispuso que el ICE no debía cancelar ese impuesto local, pero no sobre la base de un análisis de exención fiscal, sino que desprendió la existencia de un supuesto de no sujeción. En dicho fallo, la citada Sala de Casación, haciendo referencia al artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, estimó: “En consecuencia, no cabe siquiera asumir que, respecto al ICE, se produzca el hecho generador del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, cuando en su numerales 1 y 2 imponen, a favor de los ayuntamientos, un impuesto sobre los terrenos, instalaciones o construcciones fijas o permanentes existentes allí, porque el hecho generador, según el precepto 31 del CNPT, constituye el presupuesto legal que tipifica el tributo y origina la obligación. En esta virtud, tampoco es dable considerar que entre el Fisco y ese instituto medie un vínculo tributario con obligación a cargo de éste de pagar el referido tributo…” Para ello, estimó ese alto Tribunal que el canon 18 de la Ley No. Placa903, dispuso que mantenía exenciones referidas a cuestiones ajenas a la competencia de servicios. A su vez, que era competencia del legislador definir el hecho generador y desde la Ley de Impuesto Territorial se había dispuesto que los inmuebles titularidad de ese ente público no estaban afectos al tributo, pues el hecho generador, previsto legalmente, no les incluía, tratamiento que, señala ese fallo, mantuvo la Ley No. 7509. De ese modo, ante la variabilidad de posturas formalmente adoptadas sobre el tema de examen, y de conformidad con el principio (y garantía) constitucional de independencia de criterio de las instancias jurisdiccionales (artículo 153 y 154 de la Carta Magna), dado que los precedentes y jurisprudencia emitidos por la Sala Primera de Casación, si bien son fuente innegable de Derecho, cuya finalidad es informar ese ordenamiento (artículo 9 del Código Civil) en definitiva, no son vinculantes, proyección que el Ordenamiento Jurídico nacional confiere únicamente a las decisiones de la Sala Constitucional, según se desprende del mandato 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, No. Placa20285. Por ende, con el respeto debido a las posturas alternas, este Tribunal opta por mantener la interpretación que del tema debatido ha realizado hasta el momento. Ello implica que, si bien se respeta la postura del ICE, en definitiva, tal y como lo ha manifestado en otras oportunidades, no la comparte por lo que de seguido se expone. Como primer aspecto, a diferencia de lo que postula el ente accionante, si bien existe semejanza en los tributos regulados en la Ley del impuesto territorial y la del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, paridad que puede asumirse a partir de la definición del hecho imponible, que muestra innegable parecido al gravar la titularidad o dominio de bienes inmuebles, del análisis a fondo de la estructura de ambos impuestos, se coligen diferencias que este cuerpo colegiado estima determinantes y sustanciales. Por un lado, existe una diferencia evidente en la definición del sujeto activo del tributo. En efecto, a tono con lo regulado por la Ley No. 27, el sujeto activo de la relación fiscal en el impuesto territorial era el Estado (Administración Central), en tanto que en orden a lo preceptuado por los cánones 3 y 9 de la Ley No. 7509, en el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, el sujeto activo está constituido por las municipalidades, instancias que por imperativo de esa ley, se constituyen en Administraciones Tributarias (y ya no la Dirección General de Tributación) con plena competencia tributaria para una efectiva gestión de ese tributo. En lo atinente al sujeto obligado (pasivo), el impuesto regulado por la Ley No. 7509 comprende no sólo a los propietarios de tierras (como establecía la Ley del impuesto Territorial), sino que esa condición se extiende a otros sujetos distintos de aquél, tales como concesionarios, permisionarios y ocupantes, pero no sólo de terrenos en régimen de propiedad privada, sino también, en relación a bienes de dominio público. En lo que toca al hecho generador, incluye no sólo la tenencia de terrenos y las instalaciones o construcciones fijas y permanentes en ellas -que antes comprendía también bienes muebles de producción-, sino además su ocupación. En definitiva, sólo se mantiene la misma base de cálculo -de un cuarto por ciento (0.25%) sobre el valor del inmueble-, para los dos tributos (el territorial y el de bienes inmuebles) pero esa identidad es insuficiente para estimar, como lo hace la entidad accionante, que se trata de un mismo impuesto ya que, insistimos, existió una modificación sustancial en los otros componentes esenciales del tributo. Por tales razones, tratándose de estructuras tributarias diferentes, como se ha explicado, no se comparte la postura de que la Ley No. 7509 se trató de una simple reforma a la Ley No. 27 y que por ende, constituyen el mismo tributo. Respecto de este tributo sobre bienes inmuebles, la Sala Constitucional ha considerado que se trata de un \"tributo de orden municipal en razón de su destino –únicamente–, pero no lo es en virtud de su procedimiento de origen o promulgación, dado que no nació de la iniciativa de los gobiernos locales, sino del ejercicio de la potestad tributaria otorgada a la Asamblea Legislativa, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, es decir, que es producto de la propia labor legislativa ordinaria. Cabe reiterar que la Asamblea Legislativa es soberana, en cuanto al uso del poder tributario, para establecer los impuestos que se requieran, sean estos nacionales o municipales.\" (Sentencia No. 5669-99). Por ende, estima esta Cámara que ante la variación sustancial de elementos medulares de la estructura tributaria, el impuesto creado mediante la Ley No. 7509 se trata de un nuevo tributo que, aunque creado por el Estado, este ha sido cedido a las municipalidades. Es decir, no es un tributo municipal en sentido estricto, en tanto no proviene del ejercicio de la potestad tributaria derivada y propia de las corporaciones municipales, conforme a la previsión de los numerales 121 inciso 13) y 170 del la Constitución Política. Sobre esta denominado (tributos cedidos), ya con anterioridad este Tribunal, en sentencia No. 1565-2009-VI, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 11 de agosto del 2009, indicó: \"(...) Si bien ambos son fuentes tributarias locales, los primeros son aquellos que, como se indicó, se crean por el procedimiento legislativo especial previsto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) constitucional, el cual se considera especial tanto por la iniciativa municipal como por la prohibición de enmienda que tiene la Asamblea Legislativa, que debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar el acuerdo municipal respectivo. Por su parte, la cesión de tributos es un mecanismo de financiamiento desarrollado principalmente por las Comunidades Autónomas Españolas. Se dice que en éstos, el Estado se reserva el poder tributario; mientras que la Comunidad Autónoma individualmente detenta la competencia sobre los rendimientos, a través de puntos de conexión de carácter territorial. Así, en la gestión del tributo cedido, la potestad tributaria la retiene el Estado, quien delega el ejercicio de la competencia en la Comunidad Autónoma, todo ello sin perjuicio de la “colaboración” que se puede establecer entre las Administraciones de ambos entes territoriales, Estado y Comunidad Autónoma. Según lo indicado, la cesión de tributos implica la delegación de competencias administrativas, sin perjuicio de la obligada coordinación y colaboración entre las Administraciones Tributarias. En el caso de Costa Rica, esta figura puede asociarse, a juicio de este órgano, con la situación del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, en virtud de las características propias de este tributo. Si bien emanan del ejercicio de la potestad normativa y tributaria del Estado, la competencia sobre la recaudación la tienen las Municipalidades, tomando en cuenta la ubicación del inmueble dentro del territorio municipal como punto de conexión. Asimismo, la potestad administrativa de gestión del impuesto también la tienen los municipios, sin que ello obste para que exista una coordinación con la Administración Tributaria Estatal, misma que, como se explicará, a la fecha se manifiesta en la existencia del Órgano de Normalización Técnica .... Debe señalarse que nuestra jurisprudencia [constitucional] ha admitido la figura de los tributos cedidos, cuando en el Voto 3930-95, señaló respecto de los tributos que crea el Estado en beneficio de las municipalidades “... Pero ello no quiere decir que el legislador no pueda dotar a las Municipalidades de recursos extraordinarios mediante un impuesto general a distribuir, como en el caso del impuesto territorial…\" . \n\nVII.- Por otro lado, la entidad demandante asevera que la exoneración del tributo sobre bienes inmuebles deriva de la exención general subjetiva del pago de todo tributo nacional o local otorgada al ICE por el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley No. 449 citado, el numeral 18 de la Ley No. 8660 citada y el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7509. Tal postura no es compartida por este órgano colegiado, en la medida en que de la comprensión armónica de ese conjunto de normas, no se desprende la exención aludida. En ese sentido, el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establece una exoneración respecto de los bienes del Estado, municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas, liberación del deber material fiscal que se condiciona a la existencia de regulación especial y expresa que así lo disponga. Tal señalamiento, en orden a lo que impone el canon 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, debe venir establecido de manera diáfana y precisa en una fuente legal. Empero, si bien se mira el ordinal 4 inciso a) de la Ley No. 7509, no confiere una exención fiscal a las entidades en ese mandato mencionadas, sino que condiciona ese beneficio a la existencia de ley especial que les otorgue expresamente la exención. Se impone por ende un principio de reserva de ley en otorgamiento de exenciones, como derivación de lo preceptuado en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Carta Fundamental así como 5, 6 y 62 del CNPT. A diferencia de lo que expone el ente accionante, el Decreto Ley No. 449 y el ordinal 18 de la Ley No. 8660, no configuran la base legitimante para el supuesto reconocimiento de una exención en cuanto al tributo objeto de análisis ya indicada. Si bien en su oportunidad el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley No. 449 concedió al ICE una exoneración genérica en el pago de los tributos locales y nacionales, tal dispensa resultaba válida para los tributos creados y vigentes a esa fecha, dentro de ellos, el impuesto territorial; empero, no puede colegirse que esa exención incluyera relaciones fiscales derivadas de tributos que aún no habían nacido a la vida jurídica, siendo este el caso del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, creado con posterioridad, en el año de 1995. En este punto, es menester reiterar que al emitirse la Ley No. 7509, y ante lo preceptuado por el artículo 38 inciso a) de ese cuerpo legal, el impuesto territorial fue derogado, lo que supuso, por relación de accesoriedad, el fenecimiento de la exención que sobre ese impuesto había sido otorgada. Por ello, tal marco legal no puede constituirse como la fuente de exención de un impuesto creado mucho tiempo después, ante lo cual, la exoneración genérica subjetiva que el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449, no sustenta la exención del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles. Conforme al numeral 63 del CNPT, las exenciones no pueden extenderse a tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación. Al tenor de lo anterior, los tributos nacionales y municipales exonerados al ICE al tenor del citado numeral 20 de la normativa de su creación, son los existentes a la fecha de adopción del citado Decreto Ley No. 764 (que, vía reforma, introdujo el artículo 20 al Decreto Ley No. 449 citado), sea, al 25 de octubre de 1949, siempre y cuando no haya habido una derogatoria o modificación de aquél régimen por mandato legal. Lo anterior es importante porque aún y cuando no ha sido derogada esta disposición, es lo cierto que sí ha sufrido múltiples reformas desde su fecha de vigencia. Así, está derogada en lo que se oponga a lo normado en los artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley No. 2151 del 13 de agosto de 1957, en relación a derechos de aduana. De igual modo, pueden mencionarse las derogatorias tácitas incluidas en el artículo 9 de la Ley No. 4513 del 2 de enero de 1970 respecto de todas las franquicias telegráficas y radiográficas; el canon 15 de la Ley No. 5870 del 11 de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y cinco, que suprime todas las franquicias postales; el ordinal 16 de la Ley No. 7088, del 30 de noviembre de 1987, el cual elimina las exenciones para la adquisición de vehículos; y claro está, los numerales 50 y 55 de la Ley No. 7293 supra citada, que reforman los artículos 63 y 64 del CNPT en lo relativo a exención de futuros impuestos. Cualquier otra exoneración cuyo reconocimiento pretenda esta institución, debe estar expresa y claramente establecida en una ley (formal y material), en aplicación directa de lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Carta Fundamental y los numerales 5, 6, 62, 63 y 64 del CNPT. Cabe agregar que lo anterior ha sido objeto de desarrollo por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto No. 37-F-04 de las 10 horas 35 minutos del 21 de enero del 2004, en los siguientes términos: \"(...) En este recuento normativo es indispensable analizar la Ley Reguladora de todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes N° 7293 del 3 de abril de 1992, a fin de determinar si ésta incidió de alguna manera sobre las exenciones concedidas al ICE. Su primer artículo expresa: “Se derogan todas las exoneraciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes, decretos y normas referentes, entre otros impuestos, a los arancelarios, a las ventas, a la renta, al consumo, al territorial, a la propiedad de vehículos, con las excepciones que indique la presente ley... únicamente quedarán vigentes las exenciones tributarias que se mencionan en el artículo siguiente.” El inciso l) del segundo artículo de la Ley 7293, excluye de la derogatoria a las exenciones otorgadas a las instituciones descentralizadas. Adicionalmente, en su artículo 63 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (reformado por el ordinal 50 de la Ley Nº 7293) señala que no pueden haber reglas que concedan exoneraciones, de fecha anterior a aquella data en la que se crea el tributo, ergo, la exoneración no puede ser anterior al impuesto. Esta regla tiene efectos a partir de su promulgación, esto es, el 3 de abril de 1992. Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha. No debe perderse de vista que la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, surge, entre otras cosas, con la finalidad de organizar la maraña de exenciones existentes a través de una elevada cantidad de leyes, sin embargo las restricciones a los beneficios que vinieron ostentando diversas actividades e instituciones, no pueden aplicarse con efecto retroactivo, por lo cual se mantienen las exoneraciones de impuesto concedidas antes de la entrada en vigencia de esa ley. En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data. Lo contrario entrañaría una repudiable aplicación retroactiva de la ley.\" Cabe agregar que tampoco el numeral 18 de la Ley No. 8660 citada otorga la exención en cuestión. Esa disposición legal dice en su literalidad: \"Cuando el ICE y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas. En los demás casos, se mantendrán vigentes las exenciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley N.° 449. de 8 de abril de 1949, así como a cualesquiera otras que les confiera el ordenamiento. Se excluye del pago del impuesto sobre la renta el servicio telefónico básico tradicional.\" Contrario a lo que alega el ICE, ese mandato no crea una exención tributaria sino que mantiene la vigencia de las que hayan sido otorgadas al ICE con anterioridad, ya sea como operador o proveedor de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad en condición librada a la libre competencia, supuesto en el cual se dejó sin exoneración al pago del Impuesto General sobre las Ventas (ahora Impuesto al Valor Agregado) y del Impuesto sobre la Renta y, en los demás casos, se remitió a las exoneraciones establecidas con ocasión del Decreto Ley No. 764 que adicionó el numeral 20 del Decreto-Ley No. 449. Corolario de lo anterior, con esta disposición tampoco recobran vida aquellas exoneraciones que hayan sido derogadas por otra ley. En suma, estima este Tribunal que en este caso en concreto, no existe norma alguna que conceda o reconozca a favor del ICE una exención del pago del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, por lo que, es claro que se encuentra sujetos al pago de dicho tributo en la circunscripción territorial local correspondiente.\n\n VIII.- Por las mismas razones, el cobro de ese impuesto sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria, no supone una interpretación indebida del artículo 63 del CNPT porque utilice la analogía para desvirtuar el espíritu del legislador contenida en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449. Por una parte, aún y cuando el método interpretativo de la analogía es válido en el Derecho Tributario, por su intermedio no puede establecerse ni un impuesto ni una exención, conforme se dispone en el párrafo segundo artículo 6 del CNPT que, en lo que interesa expresa: \"Artículo 6. Interpretación de las normas tributarias. (...) La analogía es procedimiento admisible para \"llenar los vacíos legales\" pero en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni exenciones. (...)\". Además, en este caso, la Municipalidad de Palmares llegó a la decisión de gravar los inmuebles propiedad del ICE en atención a lo dispuesto en los artículos 4 de la Ley No. 7509 en relación con el 20 del Decreto Ley No. 449, el 18 de la Ley No. 8660 y el numeral 63 del CNPT, por lo que no existe vacío legal que debiera ser suplido o complementado con ese mecanismo. Se reitera, la exención tributaria genérica y subjetiva que dispone el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley No. 449, no es aplicable al impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, dado que este último es posterior a la creación de ese beneficio tributario. Considerar que dicha exención genérica aplica para tributos que aún no habían sido creados al momento de su emisión, constituye una contravención a los límites que impone el ordinal 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios a la vez que supone (en el fondo) una negación a la potestad de crear y modificar tributos, que a la luz del ordinal 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, ostenta el Poder Legislativo. Esto supone, a no dudarlo, una negación a priori del poder propio de la potestad de crear tributos, y una reserva de desaplicación individual del deber de contribuir con el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas, que imponen los cánones 18 y 33 de la Carta Magna. No desconoce este Tribunal el conjunto de precedentes que aporta la accionante como sustento de su decisión, que incluyen posturas previas de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, sentencias del Juzgado Especializado de Cobro, así como de otras secciones de fondo de este Tribunal. Sin embargo, dada la independencia de criterio que se impone como máxima de garantía en el ejercicio jurisdiccional a tono con los numerales 153 y 154 de la Constitución Política, tales referentes no pueden condicionar la decisión de esta Cámara. Estas consideraciones tampoco decaen por lo estatuido por el artículo 13 de la Ley No. 8660. Esa norma indica: \"(...) Política financiera. Ni el Estado ni sus instituciones podrán imponer restricciones ni limitaciones financieras a las inversiones y al endeudamiento del ICE y sus empresas, que resulten ser ajenas o contrarias a esta Ley. Ni el Estado ni sus instituciones podrán solicitar ni exigir transferencias, ni superávit, ni compra de bonos; en general, no se podrá obligar al ICE y sus empresas a mantener depósitos en cuenta corriente, ni en títulos del gobierno. En caso de distribución de excedentes a favor del ICE o sus empresas, generados por la prestación o comercialización de productos o servicios de electricidad, telecomunicaciones, infocomunicaciones y servicios de información, así como la comercialización de otros productos y servicios desarrollados o comercializados por el ICE o sus empresas o por medio de alianzas con terceros, estos excedentes deberán ser capitalizados como reservas de desarrollo para el cumplimiento de sus fines. (...)\". Nótese que dicho mandato no refiere a tributos, ni a exenciones, que es lo que aquí se discute; sino únicamente a la imposibilidad de imponer restricciones o limitaciones financieras a las inversiones y endeudamiento del ICE, aspecto que es absolutamente diverso al ejercicio de la potestad tributaria y, por ello, no podría comprometerla. En rigor, la norma refiere a los lineamientos de la política financiera de la institución que no tienen ninguna relación ni incidencia con el ejercicio de la potestad tributaria ejercida por el legislador en este caso en favor de las Municipalidades, ni con las competencias que la Administración Tributaria local debe ejercer; ni guarda conexión alguna con el objeto de esta demanda. \n\nIX.- Por otro lado, no comparte esta Cámara la visión de no sujeción que se propone respecto del impuesto de bienes inmuebles. En efecto, la diferencia conceptual y sustancial entre las figuras de la no sujeción y la exoneración, ya fue objeto de precisión por parte de este cuerpo colegiado en el fallo No. 92-2019-VI precitado. En ese sentido se expuso en lo medular: “Primero: De la exoneración o exención tributaria: Se está ante una exención cuando una norma legal afecta, ya sea el elemento subjetivo u objetivo del hecho imponible, o los elementos de cuantificación del tributo, ya sea en la base imponible (deducciones o reducciones) o en el tipo de gravamen, de manera tal, que excepciona la obligación tributaria. (…) Por ello, la exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma de rango legal contempla que en aquellos supuestos expresamente previstos por ella, no obstante producirse el hecho imponible, no se desarrolla su efecto principal: sea el deber pagar el tributo u obligación tributaria. De tal forma que la estructura de la exoneración tributaria se caracteriza por contener un único mandato manifestado por dos preceptos, primero la sujeción, y de seguido, la exención; de manera que la obligación tributaria nace, pero no es exigible. Así, queda claro que la esencia de la exención no afecta el momento de nacimiento de la obligación, sino el de su exigibilidad. (…) Por otra parte, y de particular interés para lo que aquí se discute, debe tenerse presente que el artículo 62 del citado Código Tributario señala en su párrafo primero que “La ley que contemple exenciones debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones.” Lo anterior supone que la norma tributaria que otorgue beneficios fiscales, debe ser clara en su contenido, no solo al fijar el sujeto a favor de quien se emite, los bienes o servicios y tributos exonerados; sino que también debe establecer el plazo de vigencia de la exención y si una vez vencido éste procede la liberación de los tributos exonerados o por el contrario debe procederse a su pago, así como indicar si procede el traspaso del bien exonerado de tributos a un tercero distinto del beneficiario de la exención y las condiciones o requisitos que deben cumplirse para tales efectos. Ergo, las normas que otorguen este tipo de beneficios deben contener un detalle claro y preciso de sus alcances. (…) Segundo: De la \"no sujeción\" tributaria: Por otra parte, tratándose de la \"no sujeción\", ésta se da en los supuestos en los cuales no se verifica el hecho imponible, por tratarse de presupuestos que caen fuera de su órbita, aunque guarden proximidad con él. Por lo general, las normas que fijan una no sujeción tributaria, complementan la delimitación del hecho generador, pero en un sentido negativo, esto es, limitándose a aclarar que determinadas hipótesis no están comprendidas en la descripción del hecho generador. Desde esta perspectiva, si bien tanto la exoneración como la no sujeción tienen en común la no obligatoriedad del pago de un tributo, en cada supuesto esto lo es por un supuesto diverso; repetimos, en la exención, se produce o verifica el hecho generador, pero luego la obligación tributaria se dispensa o excluye por disposición expresa del legislador; mientras que en la no sujeción, el hecho imponible no se verifica, razón por la cual la norma que la establezca es meramente aclaratoria, de modo que, aunque no existiera, el efecto jurídico es el mismo, sea, que el supuesto de hecho no está sujeto a la obligación tributaria. De lo dicho queda claro, no puede confundirse la \"exoneración\" con la \"no sujeción\", en tanto ésta última se refiere a la no realización del hecho imponible descrito en la norma tributarias, es decir, no nace la obligación formal ni material tributaria. Así pues, resulta material y jurídicamente imposible que, tratándose de un mismo tributo y sujeto pasivo, se den al mismo tiempo la exoneración y la no sujeción, como parece argüir la representación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, demandante en este proceso.” Estas consideraciones permiten delimitar con claridad la diferencia básica entre ambas figuras, lo que supone, de modo esencial que, en la no sujeción, no se configura el hecho generador, por lo que, no nace la obligación tributaria. Ergo, al no existir relación fiscal entre las partes, el administrado no debe, si quiera, satisfacer deberes de tipo formal, como tampoco los materiales. Por su parte en la exención, como lo estipula el canon 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, el legislador dispensa al sujeto pasivo del deber material de contribuir (de manera total o parcial), pero perviven los deberes formales, dado que, a diferencia de la otra figura, se configura la conducta que tipifica el hecho generador, por lo que existe obligación tributaria. La comprensión que tiene este cuerpo colegiado del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, en concreto, sobre el hecho generador, previsto por el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7509, recae sobre \"los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan\". Luego el ordinal 4 señala que no se encuentran “afectos”, dentro de varios supuestos, los bienes de instituciones autónomas o semiautónomas, que por ley especial gocen de exención. La lógica de la relación que regula esa ley permite desprender que, si el elemento objetivo es la titularidad inmobiliaria, como regla general, la dispensa de la obligación se precisa con la técnica de la exención. De otro modo, se estaría frente al caso sui generis, en el que una sujeción, viene condicionada por una norma que haya otorgado una exención, es decir, se encontraría no sujeto del tributo, quien esté exento del mismo, lo que implica, de manera evidente, una falacia circular. Más simple, el presupuesto de hecho de la no sujeción sería estar exento de esa misma relación fiscal, lo que supone una contradicción lógica. De ahí que se estime que el presente caso estriba en determinar si el ICE se encuentra exento o no del impuesto creado por la Ley No. 7509, partiendo de que, como se ha señalado, a juicio de este Tribunal, se trata de un tributo diverso al que regulaba la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, No. 27. Ante ese dilema, se reitera, a la luz de las consideraciones planteadas, se concluye que el ICE no solamente se encuentra afecto (sujeto) a ese tributo, sino que, además, no existe norma expresa que permita colegir que existe exención sobre esa obligación. En consecuencia, la postura mostrada por las conductas públicas impugnadas, no muestran la disconformidad jurídica que se acusa, en la medida en que, grosso modo, parten de las mismas consideraciones que se han expuesto, para justificar el deber del ICE de cancelar el impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, por lo que, la pretensión anulatoria debe ser desestimada. De igual manera, no podría acogerse la pretensión de reconocer a favor del ente demandante un supuesto régimen de exoneración en cuanto al citado tributo, pues como se ha logrado establecer, dicho beneficio fiscal no se ampara en norma legal que así lo disponga o establezca. Tampoco sería atendible el ruego de eliminación de los cobros realizados por la Municipalidad de Palmares del impuesto en cuestión, que consten en todos los sistemas manuales e informáticos. Esas acciones propias de la gestión fiscal local, se amparan a legalidad, por las razones arriba apuntadas. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda. \n\n X.- Corolario. Análisis de las defensas opuestas. El representante del ente local opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. Esta excepción de fondo debe ser acogida al haberse establecido la validez de las conductas objeto de impugnación, así como de la improcedencia de las pretensiones formuladas. Se impone por ende el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos. \n\n XI.- Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, si bien en precedentes de este Tribunal se impuso la máxima de condena al vencido, la emisión de posturas alternas en cuanto al tema de fondo, pone en evidencia que se trata de un asunto en el que se presenta un motivo suficiente para litigar, por lo que lo debido es resolver el presente asunto sin especial condena en costas. \n\nPOR TANTO.\n\n Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad contra la Municipalidad de Palmares. Se resuelve sin especial condena en costas. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez.*-*-*-* \n\n \n\nEXPEDIENTE: 17-010687-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)\n\nDEMANDADO: Municipalidad de Palmares.\n\n \n\nIGWTHUP.JRGN 2019\n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento firmado por:\n\nROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nSILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nDANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A", "body_en_text": "**FIRM DOCUMENT**\n\n**CASE FILE:** 17-010687-1027-CA\n\n**MATTER:** PURE LAW PROCEEDING\n\n**PLAINTIFF:** Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)\n\n**DEFENDANT:** Municipalidad de Palmares and the State (dismissed).\n\n \n\n**No. 0118-2019-VI.**\n\n**CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, SECTION SIX, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ.** Goicoechea, at 08:15 on the thirtieth of September two thousand nineteen.\n\nA pure law proceeding established by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (hereinafter ICE), represented in this cause by its special judicial agent, Mr. Juan Carlos Araya González, bearer of identification number CED11088, against the Municipalidad de Palmares, represented in this proceeding by its special judicial agent, Nombre135975, bar number CED107995, and against the State, represented in this proceeding by the Procurador Esteban Alvarado Quesada, bar number CED25764, regarding whom the action has been dismissed.\n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**1.-** The present claim, filed on October 31, 2017, has been formulated so that the judgment provides, with the claims specified during the preliminary hearing phase, as follows: “- I request the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José to address our claims under the principle of due process and to recognize the exempt status that my principal possesses regarding the obligation to pay the tax on real property that the Municipalidad de Palmares intends to charge. - That resolution N° 485-2016 of October 31, 2016, issued by Section Three of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal, which confirms resolution number A-007-2016 at sixteen hours on May twenty-three, two thousand sixteen from the Municipal Alcalde of Palmares, be revoked in all its aspects; as well as the other administrative acts issued by the Alcaldía and other departments of the Municipalidad de Palmares, given that the ICE is exempt from the payment of the real property tax and due to the economic damage that this charge represents to the Institute. - That the deletion of said charge be ordered immediately in all the manual and computer systems maintained by the Municipalidad de Palmares against the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, to avoid future charges for this reason. - Finally, I request that the defendant be condemned to pay the costs of this judicial proceeding.” (Images 389-404, 3-6 of the main case file)\n\n**2.-** Having been granted the legal transfer, the sued local entity responded negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 58-80 of the case file)\n\n**3.-** The preliminary hearing provided for in article 90 of the CPCA was held on May 15, 2018, with the attendance of all parties. In that phase, given the statements of the plaintiff entity, by resolution No. 849-2018-T at 13:44 hours, the claim against the State was taken as dismissed. Once the claims were fixed and the evidence admitted, and there being no evidence to examine, in accordance with article 98.2 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, the matter was declared a pure law case and the parties presented their conclusions. (Images 3-6 of the main case file).\n\n**4.-** The respective case file was sent to this Sixth Section of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on July 10, 2017, as recorded in the Sistema de Gestión y Escritorio Virtual. No grounds for nullity needing correction have been observed in the proceedings before this Tribunal.\n\nDrafted by Judge Garita Navarro with the concurring vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Aguilar Méndez.\n\n \n\n**WHEREAS:**\n\n**I.- Proven facts.** Of relevance to the resolution of this proceeding, the following are held as proven: 1) By means of a payment notice dated November 27, 2015, the Collections Department of the Municipalidad de Palmares notified the ICE of the debt incurred for the payment of the real property tax in the total amount of ¢1,432,718.08 (one million four hundred thirty-two thousand seven hundred eighteen colones 08/100). (Uncontroverted first fact of the claim, folio 1 of the administrative file) 2) On December 2, 2015, the ICE filed before that department of the Municipalidad de Palmares, official letter N° 257-885-2015, in which it opposes the collection of the tax on real property. (Folios 7-14 of the administrative file.) 3) Through official letter No. DCA-040-2016 of April 27, 2016, the Collections Department of the Municipalidad de Palmares communicated to the plaintiff entity the ICE's obligation regarding the payment of the real property tax. (Folios 72-75 of the administrative file) 4) On April 29, 2016, through official letter No. 257-264-2016, the ICE filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal before the Alcaldía Municipal de Palmares, against official letter No. DCA-040-2016 dated April 27, 2016. (Folios 79-84 of the administrative file) 5) Through resolution No. DCA-RR-003-2016 of May 16, 2016, from the Collections Department of the sued Municipality, the reconsideration motion filed was declared without merit and the appeal was elevated to the Alcalde Municipal de Palmares for its consideration. (Folios 85-92 of the administrative file) 6) By resolution number A 007-2016 of May 23, 2016, from the Alcalde of Palmares, the appeal formulated against official letter No. DCA-040-2016 dated April 27, 2016, was declared without merit. (Folios 97-101 of the administrative file) 7) Through official letter N° 257-329-2016 of May 25, 2016, the ICE formulated a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal before the Third Section of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal, against resolution number A 007-2016 of May 23, 2016, from the Alcalde of Palmares. (Folios 106-108 of the administrative file) 8) By resolution No. 009-2016 of June 2, 2016, the Alcalde of Palmares rejected the reconsideration motion and admitted the appeal before the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal, Section III. (Folios 109-113 of the administrative file) 9) By resolution N° 485-2016 dated October 31, 2016, Section III of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal ordered the appeal referenced above to be declared without merit and confirmed in all aspects resolution number A 007-2016 of May 23, 2016, from the Alcalde of Palmares, considering the Administrative Channel exhausted. (Folios 116-137 of the administrative file)\n\n**II.- Facts not proven.** None of relevance for this ruling.\n\n**III.- Object of the proceeding.** The present case hinges on determining whether the ICE is subject to or exempt from the payment of the tax on real property, established in Law No. 7509. The ICE points out that the tax on land and installations is not a new tribute, as it was born with the enactment of Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939. It argues that having Law No. 7509 repealed that norm does not imply the creation of a new tribute, as the object remains the same. It compares article 2 of Law No. 27 with article 2 of Law No. 7509. It asserts that the legislator's intention was to change the name of the law and provide an update, but never change the budget item. It refers to opinion C-140-2001 of May 21, 2001, from the Procuraduría General de la República. It says that despite that body having changed its criteria, it is observed that both norms contemplate an exemption regime that covers different entities or institutions that enjoy that exemption. It cites article 4 of the Law on the territorial tax, which indicated the ICE within the list of exempted entities. It mentions that article 4 of Law No. 7509 states that autonomous institutions that by law enjoy an exemption are not subject to the tribute. It postulates that it is logical to reason that the existence of various Autonomous Institutions and the possibility of creating others, influences the material impossibility of exhaustively establishing a list of institutions to which the tax exemption may be applied, and that is why it has been formed in this way. It considers that the ICE has been exempt from paying this tax since the issuance of its Constitutive Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, given that article 20 states that it is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes. It affirms that, by special law, it has a generic exemption from all taxes, which includes the one on real property, a situation that has been interpreted differently by the Órgano de Normalización Técnica of the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Procuraduría General de la República, and by Section III of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal. It cites article 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, a norm that allows the granting of total or partial exemptions. It insists that this exemption is recognized by Decree-Law 449 and article 4 of Law No. 7509. It affirms that what is established in article 20 of the Constitutive Law was reinforced by Article 18 of Law No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, by stating that those exemptions remain in force. It considers that Law No. 8660 reiterates the exemption in favor of the ICE, except for the income and sales taxes. It cites opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009, from the Procuraduría General de la República that affirmed the validity of exemptions in favor of the ICE, a criterion which, it notes, was later \"strangely\" changed. It believes that these erroneous positions have led local entities to proceed with the improper collection of this tax. It criticizes the thesis of these authorities being based on the fact that Law No. 7293 (regulating all existing exemptions), established in its article 50 a modification to article 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, in the sense that exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation. These instances consider that upon enacting a new real property tax Law, which is created after the Law of all existing exemptions, its repeal and its exceptions, produce legal effects against the ICE. It disagrees with this interpretation. It believes that analogy cannot be applied in this case, as it is prohibited by article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. It adds that Article 13 of Law N° 8660 comes to reinforce the Financial Policy of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, clearly establishing that the ICE should not be considered a source of income for the treasury, nor should any financial restriction be imposed upon it by the State or its Institutions. The examination of the formulated charges follows.\n\n**IV.- On the norms applicable to the debated legal relationship.** For the purpose of addressing the debated issue, focused on whether the ICE is subject to the real property tax, a first, determining aspect is the reference to the norms related to this tax, as well as the exemptions that were argued by the parties in this proceeding. On other occasions, this Section of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal has had the opportunity to rule on this particular topic, among others, in judgments No. 024-2015-VI, No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, handed down at 08:20 on February 11, at 16:20 on August 31, and at 09:50 on September 18, all of 2015, and subsequently No. 57-2016-VI at 11:35 on April 8, 2016, No. 97-2017-VI at 14:05 on July 31, 2017, and finally, No. 94-2019-VI at 10:25 on July 31, 2019. In all these precedents, it has been pointed out that, as a first aspect, through Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, the so-called Ley del Impuesto Territorial was enacted. Said norm created a tribute in favor of the treasury on real property (Art. 1). In this sense, article 2, regarding the taxable event, stated: “Están sujetos a este impuesto los terrenos, las instalaciones o construcciones fijas y permanentes y las plantaciones estables que en ellos existan. / Asimismo, el valor de todas las maquinarias y demás muebles que formen parte de un inmueble por ser necesarias para la explotación del negocio a que está destinado, deberá tomarse en cuenta con el inmueble propiamente dicho aunque tales maquinarias o muebles pueden fácilmente separarse del inmueble” Regarding the tax rate, article 24 provided that the tax payable was “de un cuarto de uno por ciento anual sobre el avalúo de bienes”, determined by the appraisal carried out by the Oficina de Tributación (articles 3 and 5), based on the valuation table defined by the Executive Branch through an Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) (article 6). The indicated office (Oficina de Tributación) acted in the capacity of Tax Administration, with the Executive Branch designating “las oficinas recaudadoras que crea necesario en toda la República, a fin de que en ellas se pague el impuesto” (article 26). In article 4, exceptions to the material payment obligation were established, specifically, the properties of the State, the municipalities, and the Juntas de Educación, when, for any reason, they were not in the hands of third parties; properties dedicated to education, public charity, parish houses, and temples dedicated to any worship permitted by law - excluding oratories and chapels on private properties -; buildings intended for diplomatic legations and residences of Foreign Ministers, when occupied by them and “siempre que en el país respectivo se concedan iguales ventajas a las Legaciones y Ministros de Costa Rica”; as well as properties valued at no more than ¢4,000.00. (Colección de Leyes y Decretos del Primer Semestre, Tomo I, del año de mil novecientos treinta y nueve, folios 52 a 65).\n\nNow, with respect to the plaintiff entity, through Decree Law No. 764, of October 25, 1949, the Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República, added an article 20 to Decree Law No. 449, of April 8, 1949 (which created the ICE), to establish a general subjective exemption regarding all national and municipal taxes, postal franking, and telegraph rates in favor of that public entity (Colección de Leyes y Decretos, Segundo Semestre, Tomo II, del año de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, folio 545). However, subsequently, on March 31, 1992, the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, No. 7293 was enacted, a norm that in its article 1 provided: “Artículo 1°.- Derogatoria General. Se derogan todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes, decretos y normas legales referentes, entre otros impuestos, a los derechos arancelarios, a las ventas, a la renta, al consumo, al territorial, a la propiedad de vehículos, con las excepciones que indique la presente Ley. (...)”. Even so, from this generic repeal, Article 2, subsection i) excepted the set of exemptions that: “i) Se hayan otorgado al Poder Ejecutivo, al Poder Judicial, al Poder Legislativo, al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a las instituciones descentralizadas, a las municipalidades, a las juntas de educación y administrativas de las instituciones públicas de enseñanza, a las empresas públicas estatales y municipales y a las universidades estatales.” Likewise, article 34 ejusdem modified Article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial to deem real property owned by the ICE as not subject to the tax, among others. Also, in this body of laws, Articles 50 and 52 reformed articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT, respectively, in the following sense: “Artículo 63 -Límite de aplicación.- Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación”. “Artículo 64.- Vigencia.- La exención, aun cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado”. It should be noted that the cited Law No. 7293 was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 66, on April 3, 1992, entering into force from that date (Sistema Costarricense de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).\n\nLater, on May 9, 1995, by means of Law No. 7509, the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles was issued, published in La Gaceta No. 116 on June 19, 1995. This legal source, in its article 38, completely repealed the Ley del Impuesto Territorial. In Article 1, it establishes a tax in favor of the municipalities on the ownership of real property. This aspect generates a first point of substantial difference with respect to the tax regulated by Law No. 27, given that, unlike that one, where the active subject was the State, in the current Law No. 7509, this role and power is conferred upon the local entities. This is evident from articles 3 and 9 ejusdem, norms that define said municipalities as the Tax Administration. In relation to the elements of this tax, as already stated in the aforementioned judgments No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, this Section VI has indicated: “(...)a.) active subject: it is established '..., en favor de las municipalidades' (Article 1), which in such circumstance, each of the eighty-one local governments of the country, establishes as the Tax Administration (Articles 3 and 9), a competence understood as delimited to its territorial jurisdiction. This competence means that the municipalities are responsible for withholding and collecting the said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, according to which they are endowed with powers of inspection and collection of this tribute. In addition, the law attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to fulfill the management of this tribute, among them '(…) realizar valoraciones de bienes inmuebles, facturar, recaudar y tramitar el cobro judicial y de administrar, en sus respectivos territorios, los tributos que genera la presente Ley. (…) (Article 3). Notwithstanding this, it has a technical and specialized body, created specifically to advise the Tax Administration (that is, each municipality of the country) regarding the precision and homogeneity of property values throughout the country, by creating the Órgano de Normalización Técnica (ONT), according to an addition to the law (now Article 12), according to Article 2 subsection c) of Law 7729, of December fifteen, nineteen ninety-nine; b.) object of the tribute: these are 'los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan' (Article 2); c.) taxable persons: these are established by Article 6 of this Law, which as relevant provides: 'a) Los propietarios con título inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. b) Los propietarios de finca, que no estén inscritos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. c) Los concesionarios, los permisionarios o los ocupantes de la franja fronteriza o de la zona marítimo terrestre, .... d) Los ocupantes o los poseedores con título, inscribible o no inscribible en el Registro Público, con más de un año y que se encuentren en las siguientes condiciones: poseedores, empresarios agrícolas, usufructuarios, aparceros rurales, esquilmos, prestatarios gratuitos de tierras y ocupantes en precario. ... e) Los parceleros del IDA [by Article 14 of Law number 9036, of May eleven, two thousand twelve, this denomination was changed to Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER)], después del quinto año y si el valor de la parcela es superior al monto fijado en el inciso f) del artículo 4 de esta Ley.' d.) tax base: in accordance with article 23, it is established that '(E)n todo el país, el porcentaje del impuesto será de un cuarto por ciento (0.25%) y se aplicará sobre el valor del inmueble registrado por la Administración Tributaria'; and finally d.) exemptions: as relevant to this matter, among others, it was established in Article 4, that '(N)o están afectos a este impuesto: a.) Los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas que, por ley especial, gocen de exención.' (...) A key detail is that a dual regulation for this tax was established, given that the Executive Branch is responsible for issuing the corresponding Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) (which it has already done, by number 2760, of January twelve, nineteen ninety-nine, and which as such must be understood and taken as secondary and subordinate normative (in all respects) to the law that gives it support (doctrine derived from the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional, among others, in judgments number 1876-90, 0243-93, 5227-94, 2382-96, 6689-96 and 2856-2000); and the one that each municipality may adopt, for the completion of that regulation (Article 39), in exercise of its administrative and tax autonomy established by the Fundamental Charter itself in its article 170 -of second degree, or of government, according to the development in constitutional judgment number 5445-99-, whereby, they may well approve the internal organization norms they require in order to make effective the collection and receipt of the real property tax. This law was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 116, of June nineteen, nineteen ninety-five, date from which it has been in force. (...)”.\n\nFinally, on August 8, 2008, the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660 was approved, which in its Article 18 provides: \"When the ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree Law N.° 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred by the legal system, shall remain in force. / Basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" This law was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 156 on August 13, 2008, the date from which it is in force (Sistema Costarricense de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).\n\n**V.- On the interpretation of norms establishing tax exemptions.** The petitioning party postulates that it should not pay the real property tax because the exemption that previously established article 4 of Law No. 27 remains in force, as well as by what is established in Decree Law 449, and as expressed by Article 18 of Law No. 8660. Addressing these arguments requires the interpretation and weighing of the norms cited above, with a view to establishing whether the legal treatment produced from the issuance of Law No. 7509 and the subsequent regulations of Law No. 8660 allows for the survival of the subjective exemption that Decree Law 449 and article 4 of the now-repealed Law No. 27 established in favor of the ICE. Regarding the mechanisms of interpretation to be applied in these disputes, this Section, in the aforementioned vote No. 57-2016-VI at 11:35 on April 8, 2016, stated: \"...Article 6 of the CNPT establishes that tax norms must be interpreted in accordance with all the methods admitted by Common Law and indicates that analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but that by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created. Therefore, in our judgment, tax regulations must be applied in accordance with normal mechanisms of interpretation, without there being any criterion that allows sustaining interpretive criteria such as in dubio pro fisco, pro contribuyente, or similar ones. Now, the determination of the applicable interpretive mechanism in a given legal situation is a matter that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. To this end, one must attend to the very purpose of the norm, according to the parameters provided by Article 10 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP) and Article 10 of the Código Civil (hereinafter CC). In this vein, it is worth recalling what was said by the Primera Sala of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling No. 145 at 10:15 on February 22, 2008, in which, on the subject of the interpretation of tax norms, it indicated: '(...) Thus, the hermeneutic work on the norms that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its diverse methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily practice, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the goal that the legislator has established for its issuance. (...) In this work, according to the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the diverse variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, seeking that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, be equal for all similar cases and avoid a material application that undermines the very purpose of its content. The means the legal operator uses to carry out this process are substantially: philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and finalist. Article 10 of the Código Civil, to which article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios refers, in relation to the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements ... The exegesis of tax norms must analyze in each case, the content of the norm, to establish the proper channels of its application, in tune with the parameters already outlined, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, satisfies the teleological aspect embedded in the legislative manifestation, whether it is to impose tax burdens, establish frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent to the tax-legal relationship derived from it.' Therefore, the legal operator must resort to the mechanisms of interpretation that are pertinent in each specific case, without being able to assume, as a generic basic criterion, that interpretation must adhere to a specific form. In the particular context of interpreting tax norms that establish exemptions or, in general, fiscal benefits, that Casacional Chamber in ruling No. 399-F-2006, at 10:40 on June 28, 2006, stated: 'V.- Interpretation of tax norms and exemptions. Purpose. The hermeneutic work on the norms that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its diverse methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily practice, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the goal that the legislator has established for its issuance. (…) From this standpoint, tax norms cannot be considered exceptional or, rather, limiting the rights of individuals, given that such a character would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Nor is this interpretive form appropriate within the context of provisions that establish exemptions or fiscal benefits. (…) This Chamber, up to now, had sustained the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the cited Code and the specific legal regime of exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, because from the context of articles 5, 6 in relation to the cited article 62, all of that body of law, the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is protected, through the impossibility of interpreting the norms referring to them broadly. In this sense among many, judgment no. 162, at 15:22 on September 25, 1991, no. 93 at 15:30 on August 28, 1996, no. 86 at 15:00 on August 19, 1998 and no. 318 at 9:00 on May 19, 2004. However, with its new composition, and after a deep reflection on the point, it reaches a different criterion from that cited. The nature and object of the norms of the alluded type, in the already explained terms, as well as their legal regime, does not imply nor justify that they must be interpreted with a different lens from that of other tax provisions, i.e., with special criteria, since in the final analysis, it is reiterated, they are all components of a single system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in contributory burdens.'\"\n\nTo achieve this it is necessary, in some cases, to implement rules that, at heart, seek compliance with the various principles with which the constitution-maker has clad the tax system. (…)However, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject cannot constitute a valid condition that justifies a special (restrictive) interpretation, but must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by law, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the cited Code and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence takes place. Therefore, tax legality seen this way does not justify a restrictive consideration of tax benefits.” Notwithstanding that openness, it is the criterion of this Court that the foregoing does not suppose, by any stretch, an open letter that allows sustaining a sort of general rule of extensive, broad or purposive interpretations regarding tax benefit norms. It is reiterated that the tax norm, including that of exemptions, must be interpreted according to normal mechanisms of interpretation, as corresponds in each case context. To do so, it must be clear that any interpretive practice must start from the grammatical context of the norms. This does not imply that the understanding of the norm is in all cases within the form called “literal interpretation”. On the contrary, the norm as an expression of (legal in this case) language constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise in the face of real cases in which it must be applied, but at the same time, it consists of the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (by reason that their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed norm). The validity of eventual interpretations regarding a particular canon is conditioned on the possibility of sustaining that sense or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the norm. Within that dynamic, as a first step in that hermeneutic task, it is essential to begin by defining whether the position postulated by a particular interpreter is feasible within the grammatical scope. That is, it is necessary to specify the possible legal meanings of the normative precept. From that plane, if the postulated position attends to a purposive spirit, but finds no support in the grammatical composition of the norm, one must distinguish what the norm permits from what the interpreter desires as regulation. Certainly the labor of the legal agent is to apply the law in reality (law in action) to the specific cases they hear, for which, it is undeniable, the application of the law is a choice that that interpreter makes among the possible meanings of the norm. However, it is reiterated, purposive frameworks are only viable insofar as the norm (as an expression of language), permits diverse possible meanings. VI.- It must also be kept in mind that according to mandate 121 subsection 13) of the Magna Carta, the Legislative Assembly is granted the exclusive attribution to “establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.” This norm serves as the foundation for the Principles of Legal Reservation and Tax Legality, which are developed, moreover, in precepts 5 and, as far as this case concerns, 62 of the CNPT in order to fix precisely and clearly their scope and coverage of the cited postulate. Article 5 of the CNPT clearly provides: “In tax matters only the law may: a) Create, modify or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer; b) Grant exemptions, reductions or benefits; (...)” For its part and dealing with exemptions, Article 62 of the CNPT, in its first paragraph states: “The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods may be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.” The foregoing supposes that the tax norm that grants fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, so that it clearly fixes the subject in favor of whom it is issued, exempted taxes, and other substantial elements that the cited precept 62 requires. On the scope of these principles, one may consult ruling of the First Chamber No. 5 of 15 hours 30 minutes of January 5, 2000, or else, votes Nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001 and 5504-2002, all of the Constitutional Chamber, which detail the relative character of the cited principle of tax legal reservation. As the First Chamber has indicated, the legal reservation in tax benefit norms is sustained on the fact that provisions of this class are what are known as mandates with an exclusive factual presupposition, which implies the impossibility of creating exemptions through integration mechanisms, particularly, analogy. In the aforementioned ruling 399-2006, that high Court on the topic at hand provided: “Now, this last characteristic alluded to (it refers to the prohibition of analogy) supposes that tax exemptions and benefits may only be granted if the concrete fact invoked corresponds to the factual situation of the authorizing norm and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator in the source of its creation. Therefore, when the norm imposes clearly and indubitably concrete conditions for the enjoyment or receipt of the benevolent effects of the tax regime, in its application these parameters may not be eluded as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has fixed. Seen thus, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual presuppositions stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with due care, whether the situation of fact proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempt fact provided by the norm that establishes the benefit, within its material content. In this confrontation, as a matter of principle, it is improper to extend the effects of the norm to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices in this type of situation are unviable by legal mandate, since the risk arises of incorporating into the exempt fact situations that the law does not contemplate, which would contravene the aforementioned principle of legal reservation that governs in these fields.” Ergo, norms that grant this type of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. But, furthermore, it must be considered that pursuant to Article 63 of the CNPT exemptions have a fundamental limit of application (which cannot be obviated when interpreting the norms) in that they only apply with respect to taxes already established in the legal system, a reason for which an open and uncertain exemption for the future cannot be provided regarding taxes that have not even been created by the legislator and that, therefore, have not been born to legal life and, consequently, have not acquired force. That legal provision states: \"Article 63.- Limit of application: Even if there is express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.\" (Text according to reform given pursuant to Article 50 of Law number 7293, of March thirty-one, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of the following April third). In that line, the granting of a tax exemption generates a subjective right to its enjoyment in the corresponding fiscal period, if it adapts to the terms and conditions provided in the law that establishes it; but this does not imply that it generates per se a right to its recognition in the future, given that the legislator is fully authorized to modify, and even repeal, previously recognized exemptions (as the Constitutional Chamber considered in judgments No. 1341-93, No. 4844-94 and No. 2000-4261), as provided by Article 64 of the same CNPT according to which the exemption, even when it was granted in function of determined conditions of fact, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.\" These considerations are fully applicable to the case under examination, while they formulate and set forth criteria that are shared, with no reason existing for their variation, such that they are taken as part of the legal support that upholds this ruling.\n\nVI.- On the specific case. The plaintiff entity seeks recognition of the exemption that, in its judgment, the legal system confers upon it regarding the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). To that end, it petitions the annulment of resolution No. 485-2016 of October 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, which confirms resolution number A-007-2016 of sixteen hours of May twenty-third, two thousand sixteen of the Mayor of Palmares; as well as the other administrative acts issued by the Mayor's Office and other dependencies of the Municipality of Palmares, because, in its criterion, ICE is exempt from payment of the property tax. After the substantive examination of the various allegations presented by the parties in the written and oral phases of this proceeding, this collegiate body maintains the position shown in the precedents mentioned above, deeming that there is no reason whatsoever that justifies the variation of this criterion. Of course, this Chamber understands and recognizes that there are several positions on this particular matter. By way of simple reference, the plaintiff entity provides resolutions No. 55-2017-VII of 11 hours of August 7, 2017 and No. 100-2016-VII of 09 hours 30 minutes of October 12, 2016, both from Section VII of this Contentious Administrative Tribunal, in which, by majority vote, the thesis of the plaintiff public entity was upheld and the force of the exemption from payment of the tax on real property (tributo sobre bienes inmuebles) was ordered, deeming that the same Law of that tax, that is, No. 7509, jointly with that established by the Law for Modernization of Telecommunications Sector Entities, No. Placa903, recognized the survival of the fiscal dispensation under examination. In another position, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 816-F-2018, ordered that ICE should not pay that local tax, but not on the basis of an analysis of tax exemption, but rather inferred the existence of a situation of non-subjection (no sujeción). In said ruling, the cited Cassation Chamber, referring to Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law, held: “Consequently, one cannot even assume that, regarding ICE, the taxable event (hecho generador) of the Property Tax occurs, when its numerals 1 and 2 impose, in favor of the municipal governments, a tax on the lands, fixed or permanent installations or constructions existing there, because the taxable event, according to precept 31 of the CNPT, constitutes the legal presupposition that typifies the tax and originates the obligation. By virtue of this, nor is it feasible to consider that between the Treasury and that institute there is a tax relationship with an obligation on its part to pay the referred tax…” To that end, that high Court held that canon 18 of Law No. Placa903 provided that it maintained exemptions referring to matters outside the competence of services. In turn, that it was the legislator's competence to define the taxable event and since the Territorial Tax Law it had been provided that real properties owned by that public entity were not subject to the tax, because the taxable event, legally provided for, did not include them, a treatment that, that ruling states, Law No. 7509 maintained. Thus, given the variability of positions formally adopted on the topic under examination, and in accordance with the constitutional principle (and guarantee) of independence of criterion of the jurisdictional instances (Articles 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta), given that the precedents and jurisprudence issued by the First Cassation Chamber, although they are an undeniable source of Law, whose purpose is to inform that legal system (Article 9 of the Civil Code) are ultimately not binding, a projection that the national Legal System confers only to the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, as is inferred from mandate 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, No. Placa20285. Therefore, with due respect to the alternate positions, this Tribunal chooses to maintain the interpretation of the debated topic that it has performed until now. This implies that, although the position of ICE is respected, ultimately, as it has stated on other occasions, it does not share it for the reasons set forth below. As a first aspect, unlike what the plaintiff entity postulates, although there is similarity in the taxes regulated in the Territorial Tax Law and the Property Tax Law, a parity that can be assumed from the definition of the taxable event, which shows undeniable resemblance when taxing the ownership or dominion of real estate, from the in-depth analysis of the structure of both taxes, differences are inferred that this collegiate body deems decisive and substantial. On one hand, there is an evident difference in the definition of the active subject of the tax. In effect, in line with what is regulated by Law No. 27, the active subject of the tax relationship in the territorial tax was the State (Central Administration), while in order with what is prescribed by canons 3 and 9 of Law No. 7509, in the property tax, the active subject is constituted by the municipalities, entities that by imperative of that law, become Tax Administrations (and no longer the General Tax Directorate) with full tax competence for an effective management of that tax. Regarding the obligated subject (passive), the tax regulated by Law No. 7509 comprises not only the owners of lands (as the Territorial Tax Law established), but that condition extends to other subjects distinct from the former, such as concessionaires, permit holders and occupants, but not only of lands under private property regime, but also, in relation to public domain assets. As to the taxable event, it includes not only the holding of lands and fixed and permanent installations or constructions on them —which previously also included movable production assets—, but also their occupation. Ultimately, only the same calculation base —of one-quarter percent (0.25%) on the value of the property— is maintained for the two taxes (the territorial and the property tax) but that identity is insufficient to deem, as the plaintiff entity does, that it is the same tax since, we insist, there was a substantial modification in the other essential components of the tax. For such reasons, dealing with different tax structures, as has been explained, the position is not shared that Law No. 7509 was a simple reform to Law No. 27 and that therefore, they constitute the same tax. Regarding this property tax, the Constitutional Chamber has considered that it is a \"tax of municipal order by reason of its destination –only–, but it is not such by virtue of its procedure of origin or promulgation, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is the product of ordinary legislative work itself. It is worth reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of the tax power, to establish the taxes required, whether national or municipal.\" (Judgment No. 5669-99). Therefore, this Chamber holds that before the substantial variation of core elements of the tax structure, the tax created by Law No. 7509 is a new tax that, although created by the State, has been ceded to the municipalities. That is, it is not a municipal tax in the strict sense, insofar as it does not come from the exercise of the derived and own tax power of the municipal corporations, pursuant to the provision of numerals 121 subsection 13) and 170 of the Political Constitution. On this denomination (ceded taxes), previously this Tribunal, in judgment No. 1565-2009-VI, of 16 hours 15 minutes of August 11, 2009, indicated: \"(...) Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created by the special legislative procedure provided in Article 121 subsection 13) constitutional, which is considered special both due to the municipal initiative and the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the cession of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the individual Autonomous Community holds the competence over the yields, through connection points of a territorial nature. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the tax authority is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the 'collaboration' that may be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. As indicated, the cession of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competencies, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Property Tax, by virtue of the specific characteristics of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the normative and tax power of the State, the competence over collection is held by the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connection point. Likewise, the administrative power of tax management is also held by the municipalities, without this preventing the existence of coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, as will be explained, to date is manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body.... It should be noted that our [constitutional] jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Vote 3930-95, it stated regarding taxes that the State creates for the benefit of the municipalities “... But that does not mean that the legislator cannot endow the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…\\\" .\n\nVII.- On the other hand, the plaintiff entity asserts that the exemption from the tax on real property derives from the general subjective exemption from payment of any national or local tax granted to ICE by Article 20 of the cited Decree Law No. 449, numeral 18 of the cited Law No. 8660 and ordinal 4 of Law No. 7509. Such position is not shared by this collegiate body, insofar as from the harmonious understanding of that set of norms, the alluded exemption does not follow. In that sense, Article 4 of the Property Tax Law establishes an exemption regarding the assets of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions, a liberation from the material fiscal duty that is conditioned on the existence of special and express regulation that so provides. Such indication, in order to what canon 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures imposes, must be established clearly and precisely in a legal source. However, if one looks closely, ordinal 4 subsection a) of Law No. 7509 does not confer a tax exemption to the entities mentioned in that mandate, but rather conditions that benefit on the existence of a special law that expressly grants them the exemption. A principle of legal reservation in the granting of exemptions is therefore imposed, as a derivation of what is prescribed in Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter as well as 5, 6 and 62 of the CNPT. Contrary to what the plaintiff entity sets forth, Decree Law No. 449 and ordinal 18 of Law No. 8660 do not configure the legitimizing basis for the alleged recognition of an exemption regarding the tax under analysis already indicated. While in its time Article 20 of Decree Law No. 449 granted ICE a generic exemption from the payment of local and national taxes, such dispensation was valid for taxes created and in force as of that date, among them, the territorial tax; however, one cannot infer that this exemption included tax relationships derived from taxes that had not yet been born to legal life, this being the case of the property tax, created later, in the year 1995. On this point, it is necessary to reiterate that upon the issuance of Law No. 7509, and in view of what is prescribed by Article 38 subsection a) of that legal body, the territorial tax was repealed, which supposed, by relation of accessoriness, the expiry of the exemption that had been granted on that tax. Therefore, such legal framework cannot constitute the source of exemption of a tax created much later, in view of which, the generic subjective exemption that numeral 20 of Decree Law 449 does not underpin the exemption from the property tax. According to numeral 63 of the CNPT, exemptions may not extend to taxes established after their creation. Pursuant to the foregoing, the national and municipal taxes exempted for ICE under the cited numeral 20 of the regulation of its creation, are those existing at the date of adoption of the cited Decree Law No. 764 (which, via reform, introduced Article 20 to the cited Decree Law No. 449), that is, as of October 25, 1949, provided there has not been a repeal or modification of that regime by legal mandate. The foregoing is important because even when this provision has not been repealed, it is true that it has undergone multiple reforms since its effective date. Thus, it is repealed insofar as it opposes the norms in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 2151 of August 13, 1957, in relation to customs duties. Likewise, one may mention the tacit repeals included in Article 9 of Law No. 4513 of January 2, 1970 regarding all telegraph and radiograph franchises; canon 15 of Law No. 5870 of December 11, nineteen seventy-five, which suppresses all postal franchises; ordinal 16 of Law No. 7088, of November 30, 1987, which eliminates exemptions for the acquisition of vehicles; and of course, numerals 50 and 55 of the supra-cited Law No. 7293, which reform Articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT regarding exemption from future taxes. Any other exemption whose recognition this institution seeks must be expressly and clearly established in a (formal and material) law, in direct application of the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter and numerals 5, 6, 62, 63 and 64 of the CNPT. It is worth adding that the foregoing has been developed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 37-F-04 of 10 hours 35 minutes of January 21, 2004, in the following terms: \"(...) In this normative recount it is essential to analyze the Regulating Law of all Existing Exemptions No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, in order to determine if it had any incidence on the exemptions granted to ICE. Its first article states: “All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided in the different laws, decrees and norms concerning, among other taxes, customs duties, sales tax, income tax, consumption tax, territorial tax, vehicle property tax, are repealed, with the exceptions indicated in the present law... only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article will remain in force.” Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63 the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) states that there may not be rules that grant exemptions, dated prior to that date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment on, and towards the future, may not benefit from tax exemptions created under the cover of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they retain the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date. It must not be lost sight of that the Regulating Law of Existing Exemptions, Repeals and Exceptions, arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws, yet the restrictions on the benefits that diverse activities and institutions had been holding may not be applied with retroactive effect, for which reason the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently the restriction of canon 63 ibidem may only apply regarding taxes created after that date. The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law.\" It is worth adding that numeral 18 of the cited Law No. 8660 does not grant the exemption in question either. That legal provision literally states: \"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets of telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree Law No. 449. of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force. Basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" Contrary to what ICE claims, that mandate does not create a tax exemption but rather maintains the force of those that have been previously granted to ICE, whether as an operator or provider of telecommunications or electricity services and products under a condition subject to free competition, a situation in which the exemption from payment of the General Sales Tax (now Value Added Tax) and Income Tax was removed and, in other cases, it referred to the exemptions established on the occasion of Decree Law No. 764 which added numeral 20 of Decree-Law No. 449. As a corollary of the foregoing, with this provision neither do those exemptions that have been repealed by another law regain life. In sum, this Tribunal holds that in this specific case, no norm exists that grants or recognizes in favor of ICE an exemption from payment of the property tax, such that it is clear that it is subject to the payment of said tax in the corresponding local territorial circumscription.\n\nVIII.- For the same reasons, the collection of that tax on real property does not suppose an undue interpretation of Article 63 of the CNPT because it uses analogy to distort the spirit of the legislator contained in Article 20 of Decree Law 449. On the one hand, even though the interpretive method of analogy is valid in Tax Law, through it neither a tax nor an exemption can be established, as provided in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the CNPT which, in what is relevant states: \"Article 6. Interpretation of tax norms. (...) Analogy is an admissible procedure to 'fill legal gaps' but by virtue of it taxes or exemptions cannot be created. (...)\". Moreover, in this case, the Municipality of Palmares reached the decision to tax the real estate owned by ICE in attention to the provisions of Articles 4 of Law No. 7509 in relation to 20 of Decree Law No. 449, 18 of Law No. 8660 and numeral 63 of the CNPT, so there is no legal gap that had to be supplied or complemented with that mechanism. It is reiterated, the generic and subjective tax exemption provided by numeral 20 of Decree Law No. 449 is not applicable to the property tax, given that the latter is subsequent to the creation of that tax benefit.\n\nConsidering that such a generic exemption applies to taxes that had not even been created at the time of its issuance constitutes a contravention of the limits imposed by Article 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), while also implying (in essence) a denial of the power to create and modify taxes, which, in light of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, is held by the Legislative Branch. This undoubtedly implies an a priori denial of the very power inherent in the authority to create taxes, and a reservation of individual non-application of the duty to contribute to the support of public burdens imposed by canons 18 and 33 of the Magna Carta. This Court is not unaware of the set of precedents provided by the plaintiff as support for its decision, which include prior positions of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court (Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), rulings of the Specialized Collection Court (Juzgado Especializado de Cobro), as well as other substantive sections of this Court. However, given the independence of judgment imposed as a maximum guarantee in the jurisdictional exercise, in accordance with numerals 153 and 154 of the Political Constitution, such references cannot condition the decision of this Chamber. These considerations are not diminished by the provisions of Article 13 of Law No. 8660 either. That rule states: \"(...) Financial policy. Neither the State nor its institutions may impose financial restrictions or limitations on the investments and indebtedness of ICE and its companies that are foreign or contrary to this Law. Neither the State nor its institutions may request or demand transfers, surpluses, or bond purchases; in general, ICE and its companies may not be compelled to maintain deposits in checking accounts or government securities. In the event of distribution of surpluses in favor of ICE or its companies, generated by the provision or commercialization of electricity, telecommunications, infocommunications, and information services products or services, as well as the commercialization of other products and services developed or commercialized by ICE or its companies or through partnerships with third parties, these surpluses must be capitalized as development reserves for the fulfillment of their purposes. (...)\". It should be noted that this mandate does not refer to taxes, nor to exemptions, which is what is being discussed here; it refers solely to the impossibility of imposing financial restrictions or limitations on ICE's investments and indebtedness, an aspect that is absolutely different from the exercise of tax authority and, therefore, could not compromise it. Strictly speaking, the rule refers to the guidelines of the institution's financial policy, which have no relationship or impact on the exercise of tax authority exercised in this case by the legislator in favor of the Municipalities, nor on the powers that the local Tax Administration must exercise; nor does it bear any connection to the object of this lawsuit.\n\nIX.- On the other hand, this Chamber does not share the view of non-subjection (no sujeción) proposed regarding the real estate tax. Indeed, the conceptual and substantial difference between the concepts of non-subjection and exemption (exoneración) was already clarified by this collegiate body in the aforementioned ruling No. 92-2019-VI. In that sense, the core of the matter was set out: “First: On tax exemption (exoneración o exención tributaria): An exemption exists when a legal rule affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event (hecho imponible), or the elements for quantifying the tax, either in the taxable base (deductions or reductions) or in the tax rate, in such a way that it excepts the tax obligation. (…) Therefore, tax exemption occurs when a rule of legal rank provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its main effect does not develop: that is, the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. Thus, the structure of tax exemption is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested by two precepts: first, subjection (sujeción), and then, the exemption; so that the tax obligation arises, but is not enforceable. Thus, it is clear that the essence of the exemption does not affect the moment the obligation arises, but the moment of its enforceability. (…) Moreover, and of particular interest for what is discussed here, it must be kept in mind that Article 62 of the cited Tax Code states in its first paragraph that 'The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the duration period, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.' The foregoing implies that the tax rule granting fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, not only in establishing the subject in whose favor it is issued, the exempted goods or services and taxes; but also in establishing the period of validity of the exemption and whether, once it has expired, the release of the exempted taxes proceeds or, on the contrary, their payment must be made, as well as indicating whether the transfer of the tax-exempt good to a third party other than the beneficiary of the exemption proceeds, and the conditions or requirements that must be met for such purposes. Ergo, the rules granting this type of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. (…) Second: On tax 'non-subjection' (no sujeción tributaria): On the other hand, in the case of 'non-subjection', this occurs in scenarios where the taxable event is not verified, because they involve situations falling outside its scope, although they are proximate to it. Generally, rules establishing tax non-subjection complement the delimitation of the taxable event, but in a negative sense, that is, limiting themselves to clarifying that certain hypotheses are not included in the description of the taxable event. From this perspective, although both exemption and non-subjection share the commonality of the non-mandatory payment of a tax, in each scenario this is for a different reason; we repeat, in an exemption, the taxable event occurs or is verified, but then the tax obligation is dispensed or excluded by express provision of the legislator; whereas in non-subjection, the taxable event is not verified, which is why the rule establishing it is merely clarifying, so that, even if it did not exist, the legal effect is the same, i.e., the factual scenario is not subject to the tax obligation. From what has been said, it is clear that 'exemption' (exoneración) cannot be confused with 'non-subjection' (no sujeción), insofar as the latter refers to the non-occurrence of the taxable event described in the tax rules, that is, the formal or material tax obligation does not arise. Thus, it is materially and legally impossible for, in the case of the same tax and taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), exemption and non-subjection to occur simultaneously, as the representation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, plaintiff in this process, seems to argue.” These considerations allow the basic difference between both concepts to be clearly delimited, which essentially implies that, in non-subjection, the taxable event is not configured, and therefore, the tax obligation does not arise. Ergo, as no fiscal relationship exists between the parties, the taxpayer need not even comply with formal duties, nor material ones. In contrast, in an exemption, as stipulated by canon 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, the legislator dispenses the taxpayer from the material duty to contribute (totally or partially), but the formal duties survive, given that, unlike the other concept, the conduct that characterizes the taxable event is configured, so a tax obligation exists. This collegiate body's understanding of the real estate tax, specifically regarding the taxable event provided for in Article 4 of Law No. 7509, falls upon \"the land, the installations or fixed and permanent constructions that exist there\". Subsequently, Article 4 states that the property of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, which by special law enjoy exemption, are not found \"affected\" (afectos), among several scenarios. The logic of the relationship regulated by that law allows one to deduce that, if the objective element is real estate ownership, as a general rule, the dispensation from the obligation is specified by means of the exemption technique. Otherwise, one would be facing a sui generis case, in which subjection is conditioned by a rule that has granted an exemption; that is, an entity exempt from the tax would be found not subject to it, which evidently implies a circular fallacy. More simply, the factual scenario of non-subjection would be being exempt from that same fiscal relationship, which implies a logical contradiction. Hence, it is deemed that the present case hinges on determining whether ICE is exempt or not from the tax created by Law No. 7509, on the basis that, as indicated, in this Court's judgment, this is a tax different from the one regulated by the Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial), No. 27. Faced with this dilemma, it is reiterated, in light of the considerations raised, that it is concluded that ICE is not only affected (subject) to this tax, but that, additionally, no express rule exists that allows one to infer that an exemption exists for that obligation. Consequently, the position reflected in the challenged public conduct does not demonstrate the legal nonconformity alleged, to the extent that, broadly speaking, they are based on the same considerations that have been set forth to justify ICE's duty to pay the real estate tax, so the annulment claim must be dismissed. Likewise, the claim to recognize in favor of the plaintiff entity an alleged exemption regime regarding the cited tax could not be accepted, because as has been established, such fiscal benefit is not supported by any legal rule that so provides or establishes it. Nor would the request for the elimination of the charges made by the Municipality of Palmares for the tax in question, as recorded in all manual and computerized systems, be admissible. These actions, characteristic of local fiscal management, are lawful, for the reasons noted above. Consequently, the dismissal of the lawsuit must be ordered.\n\nX.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised. The representative of the local entity raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). This substantive objection must be upheld, since the validity of the challenged conduct has been established, as well as the inadmissibility of the claims formulated. Therefore, the dismissal of the lawsuit in all its aspects is imposed.\n\nXI.- Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The dispensation from this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued based on evidence the existence of which was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, although in precedents of this Court the maximum penalty was imposed on the losing party, the issuance of alternative positions on the substantive issue demonstrates that this is a matter in which there is sufficient reason to litigate, so the proper course is to resolve this matter without a special award of costs.\n\nPOR TANTO.\n\nThe defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad against the Municipality of Palmares is declared without merit in all its aspects. The matter is resolved without a special award of costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez.*-*-*-*\n\nEXPEDIENTE: 17-010687-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)\n\nDEMANDADO: Municipalidad de Palmares.\n\nIGWTHUP.JRGN 2019\n\nDocumento firmado por:\n\nROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nSILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nDANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\n**IV.- On the rules applicable to the legal relationship under debate.** For the purpose of addressing the debated issue, focused on the aspect of whether ICE is subject to the real property tax, a first, determining aspect is the reference to the rules relating to that tax, as well as the exemptions that were presented by the parties in this proceeding. On other occasions, this Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal has had the opportunity to rule on this particular issue, among others, in judgments No. 024-2015-VI, No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, handed down at 8:20 a.m. on February 11, at 4:20 p.m. on August 31, and at 9:50 a.m. on September 18, all of 2015, and subsequently No. 57-2016-VI at 11:35 a.m. on April 8, 2016, No. 97-2017-VI at 2:05 p.m. on July 31, 2017, and finally, No. 94-2019-VI at 10:25 a.m. on July 31, 2019. In all these precedents, it has been noted that, as a first aspect, through Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, the so-called Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial) was enacted. Said law created a tax in favor of the treasury, on real property (art. 1). In that sense, article 2, regarding the taxable event, stated: \"*The following are subject to this tax: land, fixed and permanent installations or constructions, and the stable plantations existing thereon. / Likewise, the value of all machinery and other movable goods that form part of an immovable property because they are necessary for the operation of the business to which it is destined, must be taken into account with the property itself even if such machinery or movable goods can easily be separated from the property*.\" Regarding the tax rate, ordinal 24 provided that the tax payable was \"*one-quarter of one percent annually on the appraisal value of the goods*,\" determined by the appraisal conducted by the Taxation Office (Taxation Office, Oficina de Tributación) (articles 3 and 5), based on the valuation table defined by the Executive Branch through an Executive Decree (article 6). The indicated dependency (Taxation Office) acted in the capacity of Tax Administration, with the Executive Branch being responsible for designating \"*the collecting offices it deems necessary throughout the Republic, so that the tax may be paid therein*\" (article 26). Canon 4 established exceptions to the material duty to pay, specifically, the properties of the State, the municipalities, and the Education Boards (Juntas de Educación), when, by any title, they were not in the hands of third parties; properties dedicated to education, public charity, parish houses and temples dedicated to any worship permitted by law -excluding oratories and chapels on private properties-; buildings intended for diplomatic legations and residences of Foreign Ministers, when occupied by them, and \"*provided that in the respective country equal advantages are granted to the Legations and Ministers of Costa Rica*\"; as well as properties with a value not exceeding ¢4,000.00. *(Collection of Laws and Decrees of the First Semester, Volume I, of the year nineteen thirty-nine, folios 52 to 65).* Now, regarding the plaintiff entity, through **Decree-Law No. 764** (Decreto Ley No. 764), of October 25, 1949, the Founding Junta of the Second Republic added an article 20 to **Decree-Law No. 449** (Decreto Ley No. 449), of April 8, 1949 (which created ICE), to establish a general subjective exemption with respect to all national and municipal taxes, postal and telegraphic franking privilege in favor of that public entity *(Collection of Laws and Decrees, Second Semester, Volume II, of the year nineteen forty-nine, folio 545).* However, subsequently, on March 31, 1992, the **Law Regulating Current Exemptions, Derogations and Exceptions** (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones), No. 7293, was enacted, a rule that in its numeral 1 provided: \"*Article 1°.- General Derogation. All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal rules referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, and vehicle property, are derogated, with the exceptions indicated in this Law. (...)*\". However, from this generic derogation, article 2 subsection i) excepted the set of exemptions that: \"*i) Have been granted to the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the decentralized institutions, the municipalities, the education boards and administrative boards of public educational institutions, the state and municipal public enterprises, and the state universities.*\" Likewise, precept 34 of the same body of law amended article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law to consider as non-subject to the tax, among others, the real properties owned by ICE. Furthermore, in this body of law, articles 50 and 52 reformed numerals 63 and 64 of the CNPT, respectively, in the following sense: \"***Article 63 -Limit of application.-*** *Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation*\". \"***Article 64.- Validity.-*** *The exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be derogated or modified by a later law, without liability for the State*\". It is noteworthy that the cited Law No. 7293 was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 66, of April 3, 1992, entering into force as of that date *(Costa Rican System of Current Legislation, SINALEVI).* Later, on May 9, 1995, through Law No. 7509, the Real Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) was issued, published in La Gaceta No. 116 of June 19, 1995. This legal source, in its mandate 38, completely derogated the Territorial Tax Law. Article 1 establishes a tax in favor of the municipalities, on the ownership of real property. This aspect generates a first aspect of substantial difference with respect to the tax regulated by Law No. 27, since, unlike that one, where the active subject was the State, in the current Law No. 7509, this role and power is conferred upon the local entities. This is evident from ordinals 3 and 9 of the same body of law, rules that define the cited municipal councils as the Tax Administration. In relation to the elements of this tax, as indicated in the aforementioned judgments No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, this Section VI has stated: *\"(...) **a.) active subject:** it is established '..., in favor of the municipalities' (article 1), which in such circumstance, each of the eighty-one local governments of the country, is established as the Tax Administration (articles 3 and 9), a competence understood to be limited to its territorial circumscription. This competence translates into the fact that the municipalities are responsible for retaining and receiving the cited tax, in accordance with the doctrine of article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, by virtue of which they are endowed with powers of inspection and collection of this tax. Furthermore, the law attributes a series of prerogatives and duties to them in order to be able to fulfill the management of this tax, among them '(…) carrying out valuations of real property, billing, collecting, and processing judicial collection and administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…) (article 3). Notwithstanding this, it has a technical and specialized body, created especially to advise the Tax Administration (understood as each municipality of the country) regarding the precision and homogeneity of property values throughout the country, by creating the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica, ONT), according to an addition to the law (now article 12), in accordance with article 2 subsection c) of Law 7729, of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-nine; **b.) object of the tax:** it is 'the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon' (article 2); **c.) passive subjects:** established by article 6 of this Law, which, in what is relevant, provides: 'a) Owners with title registered in the Public Property Registry. b) Owners of a farm (finca), who are not registered in the Public Property Registry. c) Concessionaires, permit holders, or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, .... d) Occupants or possessors with title, registrable or not registrable in the Public Registry, with more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, esquilmos, gratuitous land borrowers, and occupants in precarious tenure. ... e) The parceleros of the IDA [by article 14 of Law number 9036, of May eleventh, two thousand twelve, this denomination was changed to the Institute of Rural Development (INDER)], after the fifth year and if the value of the parcel is greater than the amount established in subsection f) of article 4 of this Law.' **d.) taxable base:** according to numeral 23, it is established that '(I)n the entire country, the tax percentage shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration'; and finally **d.) exemptions:** in what is relevant to this matter, among others, it was established in article 4, that '**(T)he following are not subject to this tax:** a.) The real properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions **that, by special law, enjoy exemption.**'* (The highlighting is not from the original.) *An important fact is that a double regulation of this tax was provided for, in consideration that it is the responsibility of the Executive Branch to issue the corresponding Executive Decree (which it has already done, through Decree number 2760, of January twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, and which as such, must be understood and considered as secondary and subordinate regulations (in everything) to the law that supports it (doctrine derived from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in judgments number 1876-90, 0243-93, 5227-94, 2382-96, 6689-96 and 2856-2000); and that which each municipality may adopt, for the completion of that regulation (article 39), in exercise of its administrative and tax autonomy established by the Fundamental Charter itself in its numeral 170 -of second degree, or government, according to the development of constitutional judgment number 5445-99-, from which, they may well approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make the collection and charging of the real property tax effective. This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 116, of June nineteenth, nineteen ninety-five, a date from which it is in force. (...)\".* Finally, on August 8, 2008, **the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities of the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660**, was approved, which in its article 18 provides: \"*When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, shall remain in force, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system. / The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.*\" This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008, a date from which it is in force *(Costa Rican System of Current Legislation, SINALEVI).*\n\n**V.- On the interpretation of the rules that establish tax exemptions.** The plaintiff postulates that it should not pay the real property tax because the exemption that ordinal 4 of Law No. 27 established from the beginning remains in force, as well as what is stipulated by Decree-Law 449, and what is expressed by canon 18 of Law No. 8660. Addressing these arguments requires the interpretation and weighting of the rules cited above, in order to establish whether the legal treatment that occurs from the issuance of Law No. 7509 and the later regulations of Law No. 8660, allows establishing the survival of the subjective exemption that Decree-Law 449 and ordinal 4 of the already derogated Law No. 27 established in favor of ICE. Regarding the interpretation mechanisms to be applied in these matters, this Section, in the aforementioned vote No. 57-2016-VI at 11:35 a.m. on April 8, 2016, stated: *\"...Numeral 6 of the CNPT establishes that tax rules must be interpreted according to all the methods admitted by Common Law and indicates that analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps but that by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created. Therefore, in our judgment, tax regulations must be applied in accordance with normal interpretation mechanisms, without there being any criterion that allows sustaining interpretive criteria such as in dubio pro fisco, pro taxpayer, or other similar ones. Now, the determination of the applicable interpretive mechanism in a given legal situation is a matter that must be assessed in each specific case. For this, attention must be paid to the very purpose of the rule, in accordance with the parameters provided by canon 10 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP) and article 10 of the Civil Code (Código Civil, hereinafter CC). Along these lines, it is worth bringing up what was said by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling No. 145 at 10:15 a.m. on February 22, 2008, in which, on the subject of the interpretation of tax rules, it stated: '(...) Hence, the hermeneutic work of the rules that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scopes and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has provided for its issuance. (...) In this work, according to the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that circumvents the very purpose of its content. The means that the legal operator uses to carry out this process are substantially: philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and finalist. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which canon 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures refers, in relation to the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements ... The exegesis of tax rules must analyze, in each case, the content of the rule, to establish the proper channels for its application, in accordance with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, satisfies the purpose immersed in the legislative manifestation, be it imposing tax burdens, establishing frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent in the legal-tax relationship that arises from it.' Therefore, the legal operator must resort to the interpretation mechanisms that are pertinent in each specific case, without it being possible to start from the generic base criterion that the interpretation must attend to a specific form. In the particular context of the interpretation of tax rules that establish exemptions or, in general, fiscal benefits, that Cassation Chamber in ruling No. 399-F-2006, at 10:40 a.m. on June 28, 2006, stated: '**V.- Interpretation of tax rules and exemptions. Purpose.** The hermeneutic work of the rules that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to their various methods, in order to specify the scopes and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has provided for its issuance. (…) From this standpoint, tax rules cannot be considered exceptional or, indeed, limiting the rights of individuals, given that such a character would mean that their application and therefore their interpretation would be equally restrictive. Such an interpretive form is not correct either within the context of provisions that establish exemptions or fiscal benefits. (…) This Chamber, until now, had sustained the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the referenced Code and the legal regime proper to exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, by reason that from the context of numerals 5, 6 in relation to the cited ordinal 62, all from that body of law, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is inferred, through the impossibility of extensively interpreting the rules referring to them. In this sense, among many, judgment no. 162, at 3:22 p.m. on September 25, 1991, no. 93 at 3:30 p.m. on August 28, 1996, no. 86 at 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 1998 and no. 318 at 9:00 a.m. on May 19, 2004. However, with its new composition, and after a deep reflection on the point, it reaches a different criterion from the one mentioned. The nature and object of norms of the type alluded to, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, neither implies nor justifies that they must be interpreted with a different prism from that of other tax provisions, that is, with special criteria, because ultimately, it is reiterated, they are all components of a single system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in contributive burdens. For this, it is necessary, in some cases, to implement norms that fundamentally seek the fulfillment of the various principles with which the constituent has clothed the fiscal system. (…)Nonetheless, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject cannot constitute a valid condition that justifies a special (restrictive) interpretation, but must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created through legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the cited Code, and they only produce effects if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence takes place. Therefore, tax legality viewed in this way is not a justification for a restrictive consideration of fiscal favors.' With all that and that openness, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the foregoing does not imply, not by a long shot, an open letter that allows sustaining a sort of general rule of extensive, broad, or indeed finalist interpretations regarding tax benefit rules. It is insisted that the tax rule, even that of exemptions, must be interpreted according to the normal mechanisms of interpretation, as appropriate in each case context. For this, it must be clear that any interpretive practice must start from the grammatical context of the rules. This does not imply that the understanding of the rule is in all cases within the form called 'literal interpretation.' On the contrary, the rule as an expression of language (legal in this case) constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins his analytical exercise in the face of real cases in which it must be applied, but in turn, it consists of the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (by reason that his decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed rule). The validity of eventual interpretations regarding a specific canon is conditioned on the possibility of sustaining that sense or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the rule. Within this dynamic, as a first step in this hermeneutic task, it is essential to enter into defining whether the position postulated by a specific interpreter is feasible within the grammatical scope. That is, it is necessary to specify the possible legal meanings of the normative precept. From that standpoint, if the postulated position attends to a finalist desire, but finds no support in the grammatical composition of the rule, a distinction must be made between what the rule permits and what the interpreter desires as regulation. Certainly the task of the legal agent is to apply the law in reality (law in action) to the specific cases he hears, for which, it is undeniable, the application of the law is an option that this interpreter makes from the possible meanings of the rule. However, it is reiterated, finalist frameworks are only viable to the extent that the rule (as an expression of language), allows various possible meanings.* ***VI.-*** *One must also bear in mind that according to mandate 121 subsection 13) of the Magna Carta, the Legislative Assembly is granted the exclusive attribution of 'establishing national taxes and contributions, and authorizing municipal ones.' This rule serves as the foundation for the Principles of Legal Reserve and Tax Legality, which are also developed in precepts 5 and, as far as this case is concerned, 62 of the CNPT in order to precisely and clearly set their scope and coverage of the cited postulate. In article 5 of the CNPT it is clearly provided: 'In tax matters only the law can:* ***a)*** *Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the triggering event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the passive subject;* ***b)*** *Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; (...)' For its part and in the case of exemptions, article 62 of the CNPT, in its first paragraph, states: 'The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the merchandise, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or in the course of said period the merchandise can be released or whether the taxes must be liquidated, or indeed whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.' The foregoing implies that the tax rule that grants fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, so that it clearly establishes the subject in whose favor it is issued, the taxes exempted, and other substantial elements that the cited precept 62 demands. On the scope of these principles, one may consult the ruling of the First Chamber No. 5 at 3:30 p.m. on January 5, 2000, or indeed, votes Nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001 and 5504-2002, all from the Constitutional Chamber, which detail the relative character of the cited principle of tax legal reserve.\"*\n\nAs the First Chamber has indicated, the legal reserve in tax benefit provisions is based on the fact that provisions of this kind are known as mandates with an exclusive factual predicate, which implies the impossibility of creating exemptions through mechanisms of integration, particularly analogy. In the aforementioned ruling 399-2006, that high Court on the matter at hand ordered: “Now then, this last characteristic alluded to (referring to the prohibition of analogy) means that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the specific fact invoked corresponds to the factual scenario of the authorizing provision and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator at the source of its creation. Therefore, when the provision imposes clearly and unequivocally concrete conditions for the enjoyment or reception of the benevolent effects of the tax regime, in its application these parameters may not be evaded as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Seen in this way, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual predicates stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. Thus, the judge must analyze in each case, with the utmost care, whether the factual scenario proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempted fact provided by the provision that establishes the benefit, within its material content. In this confrontation, as a matter of principle, it is improper to extend the effects of the provision to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices in this type of situation are equally unfeasible by mandate of law, since there arises the risk of incorporating within the exempted fact scenarios not contemplated by the law, which would contravene the aforementioned principle of legal reserve that prevails in these fields.\" *Ergo*, the provisions granting this type of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. But, in addition, it must be considered that pursuant to Article 63 of the CNPT, exoneration provisions have a fundamental limit of application (which cannot be ignored when interpreting the provisions) in that they only apply with respect to taxes already established in the legal system, for which reason an open and uncertain exemption cannot be provided for the future regarding taxes that have not even been created by the legislator and that, therefore, have not come into legal existence and, consequently, have not acquired validity. That legal provision states: \"**Article 63.- Limit of application:** Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.\" (Text as amended pursuant to Article 50 of Law Number 7293, of March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of April third following). Along these lines, the granting of a tax exemption generates a subjective right to its enjoyment in the corresponding fiscal period, if it conforms to the terms and conditions set forth in the law that establishes it; but this does not imply that it generates *per se* a right to its recognition in the future, since the legislator is fully empowered to modify, and even repeal, previously recognized exemptions (as the Constitutional Chamber considered in rulings No. 1341-93, No. 4844-94 and No. 2000-4261), as provided for in Article 64 of the same CNPT according to which the exemption, even if granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.\" These considerations are fully applicable to the case under examination, while formulating and setting forth criteria that are shared, there being no reason whatsoever for their variation, and they are therefore taken as part of the legal basis supporting this judgment.\n\n**VI.- Regarding the specific case.** The plaintiff entity seeks recognition of the exemption that, in its view, the legal system confers upon it regarding the immovable property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). To this end, it petitions the annulment of resolution No. 485-2016 of October 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, which confirms resolution number A-007-2016 at four o'clock in the afternoon of May twenty-third, two thousand sixteen, of the Municipal Mayor of Palmares; as well as the other administrative acts issued by the Mayor's Office and other dependencies of the Municipality of Palmares, because, in its view, the ICE is exempt from payment of the immovable property tax. After a substantive examination of the various allegations presented by the parties in both the written and oral phases of this proceeding, this collegiate body maintains the position shown in the precedents mentioned above, considering that there is no reason whatsoever that justifies a variation of this criterion. Of course, this Chamber understands and recognizes that there are several positions on this matter. By way of simple reference, the plaintiff entity provides rulings No. 55-2017-VII of 11 o'clock on August 7, 2017, and No. 100-2016-VII of 9 hours 30 minutes on October 12, 2016, both from Section VII of this Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, in which, by majority vote, the thesis of the plaintiff public entity was accepted and the validity of the exemption from payment of the tax on immovable property was ordered, considering that the Law of that tax itself, namely, No. 7509, together with what is established by the Law for the Modernization of Entities of the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660, recognized the survival of the tax dispensation under examination. In another position, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 816-F-2018, held that the ICE did not have to pay that local tax, but not based on an analysis of tax exemption, but rather deduced the existence of a circumstance of non-subjection (supuesto de no sujeción). In said ruling, the mentioned Court of Cassation, referring to Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial), considered: “*Consequently, it is not even possible to assume that, with respect to ICE, the chargeable event (hecho generador) of the Immovable Property Tax occurs, when its numerals 1 and 2 impose, in favor of the municipal councils, a tax on the lands, installations, or fixed or permanent constructions existing there, because the chargeable event, according to precept 31 of the CNPT, constitutes the legal predicate that typifies the tax and originates the obligation. By virtue of this, it is also not permissible to consider that between the Treasury and that institute there is a tax relationship with an obligation on the latter to pay the referred tax…*\" For this, that high Court considered that canon 18 of Law No. 8660 provided that it maintained exemptions referring to matters outside the competence of services. In turn, that it was the legislator's competence to define the chargeable event and since the Territorial Tax Law, it had been provided that the immovable property owned by that public entity was not subject to the tax, because the chargeable event, legally provided for, did not include them, a treatment that, that ruling indicates, Law No. 7509 maintained. Thus, given the variability of formally adopted positions on the matter under examination, and in accordance with the constitutional principle (and guarantee) of the independence of judgment of the jurisdictional instances (Article 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta), given that the precedents and jurisprudence issued by the First Chamber of Cassation, although an undeniable source of Law, whose purpose is to inform that legal system (Article 9 of the Civil Code) are, ultimately, not binding, a projection that the national Legal System confers only on the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, as is derived from mandate 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, No. 7135. Therefore, with all due respect to the alternative positions, this Tribunal opts to maintain the interpretation of the debated issue that it has made up to now. This implies that, although the position of the ICE is respected, ultimately, as it has stated on other occasions, the Tribunal does not share it for the reasons set forth below. As a first aspect, contrary to what the plaintiff entity postulates, although there is similarity in the taxes regulated in the Territorial Tax Law and the Immovable Property Tax Law, a parity that can be assumed from the definition of the taxable event (hecho imponible), which shows undeniable resemblance by taxing the title or ownership of immovable property, from an in-depth analysis of the structure of both taxes, differences are inferred that this collegiate body considers decisive and substantial. On one hand, there is an evident difference in the definition of the active subject (sujeto activo) of the tax. Indeed, in accordance with what is regulated by Law No. 27, the active subject of the tax relationship in the territorial tax was the State (Central Administration), whereas in order of what is prescribed by canons 3 and 9 of Law No. 7509, in the immovable property tax, the active subject is constituted by the municipalities, instances that by mandate of that law, become Tax Administrations (and no longer the Dirección General de Tributación) with full tax competence for effective management of that tax. Regarding the obligated subject (sujeto pasivo), the tax regulated by Law No. 7509 includes not only the owners of land (as the Territorial Tax Law established), but that condition extends to other subjects different from that one, such as concessionaires, permit holders, and occupants, but not only of land under a private property regime, but also, in relation to public domain property. Regarding the chargeable event (hecho generador), it includes not only the holding of land and the fixed and permanent installations or constructions on them – which previously also included movable production goods – but also its occupation. Ultimately, only the same calculation basis is maintained – of one quarter of one percent (0.25%) on the value of the immovable property – for the two taxes (the territorial and the immovable property tax) but that identity is insufficient to consider, as the plaintiff entity does, that they are the same tax since, we insist, there was a substantial modification in the other essential components of the tax. For these reasons, dealing with different tax structures, as has been explained, the position that Law No. 7509 was a simple reform to Law No. 27 and that, therefore, they constitute the same tax is not shared. Regarding this immovable property tax, the Constitutional Chamber has considered that it is a \"*tax of municipal order by reason of its destination –only–, but it is not so by virtue of its procedure of origin or enactment, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is a product of ordinary legislative work itself. It should be reiterated that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of the tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, whether these be national or municipal.*\" (Ruling No. 5669-99). Therefore, this Chamber considers that given the substantial variation of core elements of the tax structure, the tax created through Law No. 7509 is a new tax that, although created by the State, has been ceded to the municipalities. That is, it is not a municipal tax in the strict sense, insofar as it does not come from the exercise of the derived and own tax power of the municipal corporations, according to the provision of numerals 121 subsection 13) and 170 of the Political Constitution. Regarding these so-called (ceded taxes), this Tribunal previously, in ruling No. 1565-2009-VI, of 16 hours 15 minutes on August 11, 2009, indicated: \"(...) *Although both are local tax sources, the former are those which, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121 subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both due to the municipal initiative and the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or rejecting the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the cession of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the revenue, through connection points of a territorial nature. Thus, in the administration of the ceded tax, the tax power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the “collaboration” that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the cession of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this organ, with the situation of the Immovable Property Tax, by virtue of the own characteristics of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the regulatory and tax power of the State, the competence over collection is held by the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the immovable property within the municipal territory as a connection point. Likewise, the administrative power for the administration of the tax is also held by the municipalities, without this preventing coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, as will be explained, is currently manifested in the existence of the Órgano de Normalización Técnica .... It should be noted that our [constitutional] jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Vote 3930-95, it indicated regarding the taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities “... But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax...*\" *.*\n\n**VII.-** On the other hand, the plaintiff entity asserts that the exemption from the immovable property tax derives from the general subjective exemption from payment of all national or local taxes granted to the ICE by Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 cited, numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 cited, and ordinal 4 of Law No. 7509. Such a position is not shared by this collegiate body, to the extent that from the harmonious understanding of that set of provisions, the aforementioned exemption does not emerge. In that sense, Article 4 of the Immovable Property Tax Law establishes an exemption regarding property of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions, a release from the material tax duty that is conditioned on the existence of special and express regulation that so provides. Such a designation, in order of what canon 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures imposes, must be established transparently and precisely in a legal source. However, if one looks carefully, ordinal 4 subsection a) of Law No. 7509 does not confer a tax exemption on the entities mentioned in that mandate, but rather conditions that benefit on the existence of a special law that expressly grants them the exemption. A principle of legal reserve in the granting of exemptions is thus imposed, as a derivation of what is prescribed in Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter as well as 5, 6 and 62 of the CNPT. Contrary to what the plaintiff entity states, Decree-Law No. 449 and ordinal 18 of Law No. 8660 do not constitute the legitimizing basis for the supposed recognition of an exemption regarding the tax subject to analysis already indicated. Although in its time Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 granted the ICE a generic exemption in the payment of local and national taxes, such dispensation was valid for the taxes created and in force on that date, including the territorial tax; however, it cannot be inferred that this exemption included tax relationships derived from taxes that had not yet come into legal existence, this being the case of the immovable property tax, created later, in the year 1995. At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that upon the issuance of Law No. 7509, and given what is prescribed by Article 38 subsection a) of that legal body, the territorial tax was repealed, which entailed, by a relationship of accessoriness, the termination of the exemption that had been granted regarding that tax. Therefore, such a legal framework cannot constitute the source of exemption for a tax created much later, for which reason, the subjective generic exemption that numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449 provides does not support the exemption from the immovable property tax. According to numeral 63 of the CNPT, exemptions cannot be extended to taxes established after their creation. Pursuant to the foregoing, the national and municipal taxes exempted for the ICE under the cited numeral 20 of the regulation of its creation are those existing on the date of adoption of the cited Decree-Law No. 764 (which, via reform, introduced Article 20 to the cited Decree-Law No. 449), that is, on October 25, 1949, provided there has not been a repeal or modification of that regime by legal mandate. The foregoing is important because even though this provision has not been repealed, it is true that it has undergone multiple reforms since its effective date. Thus, it is repealed insofar as it conflicts with what is regulated in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 2151 of August 13, 1957, in relation to customs duties. Similarly, mention may be made of the tacit repeals included in Article 9 of Law No. 4513 of January 2, 1970, regarding all telegraphic and radiography franchises; canon 15 of Law No. 5870 of December eleventh, nineteen seventy-five, which suppresses all postal franchises; ordinal 16 of Law No. 7088, of November 30, 1987, which eliminates exemptions for the acquisition of vehicles; and of course, numerals 50 and 55 of Law No. 7293 cited above, which reform Articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT regarding exemption from future taxes. Any other exemption whose recognition this institution seeks must be expressly and clearly established in a law (formal and material), in direct application of the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter and numerals 5, 6, 62, 63 and 64 of the CNPT. It should be added that the foregoing has been the subject of development by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 37-F-04 of 10 hours 35 minutes on January 21, 2004, in the following terms: \"(...) *In this regulatory recount it is essential to analyze the Regulatory Law of All Existing Exemptions No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, in order to determine if it affected in some way the exemptions granted to the ICE. Its first article states: “All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees and norms referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, vehicle property, are repealed, with the exceptions indicated by this law... only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article will remain in force.” Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63 the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules that grant exemptions, dated prior to that date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects from its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, from that moment, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under provisions prior to those in which the tax is regulated and retain the exemptions granted under provisions prior to that date. It should not be lost from view that the Regulatory Law of Existing, Repealing and Excepting Exemptions arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws, however the restrictions to the benefits that various activities and institutions had been enjoying cannot be applied with retroactive effect, which is why the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply to taxes created after that date. The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law.*\" It must be added that neither does numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 cited grant the exemption in question. This legal provision says literally: \"*When the ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they will be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others that the legal system confers upon them, will remain in force. Basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.*\" Contrary to what the ICE alleges, this mandate does not create a tax exemption but rather maintains the validity of those that had been previously granted to the ICE, whether as an operator or provider of telecommunications or electricity services and products in a condition open to free competition, a scenario in which the exemption from payment of the General Sales Tax (now Value Added Tax) and Income Tax was removed and, in other cases, it referred to the exemptions established on the occasion of Decree-Law No. 764 which added numeral 20 of Decree-Law No. 449. As a corollary of the foregoing, with this provision, those exemptions that may have been repealed by another law do not regain life either. In summary, this Tribunal considers that in this specific case, there is no provision whatsoever that grants or recognizes in favor of the ICE an exemption from the payment of the immovable property tax, and therefore, it is clear that it is subject to the payment of said tax in the corresponding local territorial circumscription.\n\n**VIII.-** For the same reasons, the collection of that tax on immovable property does not constitute an improper interpretation of Article 63 of the CNPT because it uses analogy to distort the spirit of the legislator contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449. On one hand, even though the interpretive method of analogy is valid in Tax Law, through it neither a tax nor an exemption can be established, as provided in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the CNPT which, in what is relevant states: \"*Article 6. Interpretation of tax provisions. (...) Analogy is an admissible procedure to 'fill legal gaps' but by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created. (...)*\". Furthermore, in this case, the Municipality of Palmares reached the decision to tax the immovable property owned by the ICE in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4 of Law No. 7509 in relation to 20 of Decree-Law No. 449, 18 of Law No. 8660 and numeral 63 of the CNPT, and therefore there is no legal gap that needed to be filled or supplemented with that mechanism. It is reiterated, the generic and subjective tax exemption provided by numeral 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 is not applicable to the immovable property tax, given that the latter is subsequent to the creation of that tax benefit. Considering that said generic exemption applies to taxes that had not yet been created at the time of its issuance constitutes a contravention of the limits imposed by ordinal 63 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures while also implying (in substance) a denial of the power to create and modify taxes, which, in light of ordinal 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Power holds.\n\nThis, without a doubt, constitutes an a priori denial of the inherent power of the authority to create taxes, and a reservation of the individual non-application of the duty to contribute to the support of public burdens, as imposed by canons 18 and 33 of the Carta Magna. This Court is not unaware of the body of precedents offered by the plaintiff in support of its decision, which include prior positions of Section Three of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, judgments of the Juzgado Especializado de Cobro, as well as other trial sections of this Court. However, given the independence of judgment that is required as the paramount guarantee in the jurisdictional function in accordance with numerals 153 and 154 of the Constitución Política, such references cannot condition the decision of this Chamber. These considerations are also not diminished by the provisions of Article 13 of Law No. 8660. That rule states: \"(...) Financial policy. Neither the State nor its institutions may impose financial restrictions or limitations on the investments and indebtedness of ICE and its companies that are unrelated to or contrary to this Law. Neither the State nor its institutions may request or demand transfers, surpluses, or bond purchases; in general, ICE and its companies may not be compelled to hold deposits in checking accounts or government securities. In the event of distribution of surpluses in favor of ICE or its companies, generated by the provision or marketing of electricity, telecommunications, infocommunications and information services products or services, as well as the marketing of other products and services developed or marketed by ICE or its companies or through alliances with third parties, these surpluses must be capitalized as development reserves for the fulfillment of their purposes. (...)\". Note that said mandate does not refer to tributes, nor to exemptions, which is what is being discussed here; but only to the impossibility of imposing financial restrictions or limitations on ICE's investments and indebtedness, an aspect that is absolutely different from the exercise of the taxing power and, therefore, could not compromise it. Strictly speaking, the rule refers to the guidelines of the institution's financial policy, which have no relationship or impact on the exercise of the taxing power exercised by the legislator in this case in favor of the Municipalities, nor with the powers that the local Tax Administration must exercise; nor does it bear any connection to the object of this claim.\n\n**IX.-** On the other hand, this Chamber does not share the vision of non-subjection (no sujeción) proposed with respect to the real estate tax (impuesto de bienes inmuebles). Indeed, the conceptual and substantial difference between the concepts of non-subjection (no sujeción) and exoneration (exoneración) was already clarified by this collegiate body in ruling No. 92-2019-VI cited previously. In that regard, the core exposition was: “***First: On tax exoneration or exemption (exoneración or exención tributaria):*** *An exemption exists when a legal rule affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event (hecho imponible), or the quantification elements of the tax, either in the tax base (base imponible) (deductions or reductions) or in the tax rate, in such a way that it exempts the tax obligation (obligación tributaria). (…) Therefore, a tax exemption takes place when a rule of legal rank provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its principal effect does not arise: that is, the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. Thus, the structure of the tax exoneration is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested by two precepts: first, the subjection, and second, the exemption;* ***so the tax obligation is born, but is not enforceable*** *. *Thus, it is clear that the essence of the exemption does not affect the moment the obligation is born, but rather the moment of its enforceability*.* * (…) On the other hand, and of particular interest for what is discussed here, it must be remembered that Article 62 of the cited Código Tributario states in its first paragraph that “The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it includes, whether it is total or partial, the duration period, and if at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be paid, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.” The foregoing implies that the tax rule granting fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, not only in establishing the subject in whose favor it is issued and the exempt goods, services, and taxes, but also in establishing the validity period of the exemption and whether, once it expires, the release of the exempt taxes proceeds or, on the contrary, their payment must be made, as well as indicating whether the transfer of the tax-exempt good to a third party other than the exemption beneficiary is allowed and the conditions or requirements that must be met for these purposes. Ergo, the rules granting this type of benefit must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. (…)* ***Second: On tax \"non-subjection\" (no sujeción):*** *On the other hand, regarding \"non-subjection\", this occurs in cases where the taxable event* ***is not*** *verified, as they are situations that fall outside its orbit, although they may be close to it. Generally, rules establishing a tax non-subjection complement the delimitation of the generating event (hecho generador), but in a negative sense, that is, merely clarifying that certain hypotheses are not included in the description of the generating event. From this perspective, although both exoneration and non-subjection share the non-mandatory nature of paying a tax, in each case this is due to a different reason; we repeat, in an exemption, the generating event occurs or is verified, but then the tax obligation is waived or excluded by express provision of the legislator; whereas in non-subjection, the taxable event is not verified, which is why the rule establishing it is merely clarificatory, so that, even if it did not exist, the legal effect is the same, that is, the factual situation is not subject to the tax obligation. From what has been said, it is clear that \"exoneration\"* *cannot be confused with* *\"* *non-subjection* *\", since the latter refers to the non-realization of the taxable event described in the tax rules, meaning that neither the formal nor the material tax obligation is born. Thus, it is materially and legally impossible for, in relation to the same tax and passive subject (sujeto pasivo), exoneration and non-subjection to occur simultaneously, as the representation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the plaintiff in this proceeding, seems to argue.*” These considerations allow the basic difference between both concepts to be clearly delimited, which essentially means that, in non-subjection (no sujeción), the generating event (hecho generador) is not configured, and therefore, the tax obligation is not born. Ergo, since no tax relationship exists between the parties, the administered party need not even satisfy formal duties, nor material ones. On the other hand, in an exoneration (exención), as stipulated in canon 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the legislator dispenses the passive subject from the material duty to contribute (totally or partially), but the formal duties persist, since, unlike the other concept, the conduct that typifies the generating event is configured, meaning a tax obligation exists. This collegiate body's understanding of the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), specifically, regarding the generating event, provided by ordinal 4 of Law No. 7509, falls on \"*the lands, the fixed and permanent installations or constructions existing there*\". Then ordinal 4 indicates that they are not “subject” (\"afectos\"), among several cases, to the property of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, which by special law enjoy an exemption. The logic of the relationship regulated by that law allows one to infer that, if the objective element is real estate ownership, as a general rule, the dispensation from the obligation is specified using the technique of exemption (exención). Otherwise, one would be facing the sui generis case where a subjection is conditioned by a rule that has granted an exemption, meaning that a person exempt from the tax would be found to be non-subject to it, which obviously implies a circular fallacy. More simply, the prerequisite for non-subjection (no sujeción) would be being exempt from that same tax relationship, which constitutes a logical contradiction. Hence, it is considered that the present case involves determining whether ICE is exempt or not from the tax created by Law No. 7509, based on the fact that, as has been pointed out, in the judgment of this Court, it is a tax different from the one regulated by the Ley del Impuesto Territorial, No. 27. Faced with this dilemma, it is reiterated, in light of the considerations presented, that it is concluded that ICE is not only subject (\"afecto\") to that tax, but also that there is no express rule that allows one to deduce that an exemption exists regarding that obligation. Consequently, the position shown by the challenged public conduct does not demonstrate the legal nonconformity alleged, insofar as, roughly, it is based on the same considerations that have been set forth to justify ICE's duty to pay the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), meaning the annulment claim must be dismissed. Similarly, the claim to recognize in favor of the plaintiff entity an alleged exoneration regime regarding the cited tax could not be accepted, since, as has been established, said tax benefit is not covered by any legal rule that so provides or establishes. Nor would the request for elimination of the charges made by the Municipalidad de Palmares for the tax in question, appearing in all manual and computerized systems, be admissible. Those actions, inherent to local fiscal management, are covered by legality, for the reasons noted above. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim must be ordered.\n\n**X.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised.** The representative of the local entity raised the defense of lack of right. This substantive objection must be upheld since the validity of the challenged conduct has been established, as well as the inadmissibility of the formulated claims. Therefore, the rejection of the claim in all its parts is imposed.\n\n**XI.- Costs.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered on the basis of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the present case, although in this Court's precedents the maximum condemnation was imposed on the losing party, the issuance of differing positions on the substantive issue reveals that this is a matter presenting sufficient reason to litigate, and therefore, the proper course is to resolve this matter without a special condemnation for costs.\n\n**POR TANTO.**\n\nThe defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the claim filed by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad against the Municipalidad de Palmares is declared without merit in all its parts. It is resolved without a special condemnation for costs.\n\nJosé Roberto Garita Navarro/ Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez.*-*-*-*

 

EXPEDIENT: 17-010687-1027-CA

MATTER: PURE LEGAL PROCEEDING (PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO)

PLAINTIFF: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)

DEFENDANT: Municipalidad de Palmares.

 

IGWTHUP.JRGN 2019

 

 

Document signed by:

ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER

SILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER

DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER

 

\n\n \"III.- Purpose of the proceeding.\n\nThe present case hinges on determining whether ICE is subject to or exempt from the payment of the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), established in Law No. 7509. ICE points out that the tax on lands and installations is not a new tax, as it was created with the enactment of Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939. It argues that the fact that Law No. 7509 repealed that norm does not imply the creation of a new tax, since the object remains the same. It compares Article 2 of Law No. 27 with section 2 of Law No. 7509. It asserts that the legislator's intention was to change the name of the law and provide an update, but never to change the underlying assumption. It refers to opinion C-140-2001 of May 21, 2001, from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República). It states that, even though that body changed its criterion, it is observed that both norms contemplate an exemption regime (régimen exonerativo) that covers different entities or institutions that enjoy that exemption. It cites section 4 of the Law on Territorial Tax (Ley sobre el impuesto territorial), which listed ICE among the exempted entities. It mentions that section 4 of Law No. 7509 states that autonomous institutions that by law enjoy an exemption are not subject to the tax. It postulates that it is logical to reason that the existence of several Autonomous Institutions and the possibility of creating others influences the material impossibility of establishing an exhaustive list of institutions to which the tax exemption can be applied, and for that reason it has been instituted in such a form. It considers that ICE has been exempt from paying that tax since the issuance of its Constitutive Law (Ley Constitutiva) No. 449 of April 8, 1949, since section 20 states that it is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes. It affirms that by special law it has a generic exemption from all taxes, which includes the real estate tax, a situation that has been interpreted differently by the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica) of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and by Section III of the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). It cites canon 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), a norm that allows granting total or partial exemptions. It insists that said exemption is recognized by Decree-Law 449 and section 4 of Law No. 7509. It affirms that the provisions in mandate 20 of the Constitutive Law were reinforced by Article 18 of Law No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, by stating that those exemptions remain in force. It considers that Law No. 8660 reiterates the exemption in favor of ICE, except for the income and sales taxes. It cites opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009, from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which affirmed the validity of exemptions in favor of ICE, a criterion that, it notes, was later \"strangely\" changed. It considers that these erroneous positions have led local entities (entes locales) to improperly collect that tax. It criticizes that the thesis of those authorities is based on the fact that Law No. 7293 (regulating all valid exemptions), established in its numeral 50 a modification to canon 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, in the sense that exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation. Those instances consider that, upon the enactment of a new Real Estate Tax Law (Ley del impuesto de bienes inmuebles), which is created after the Law of all valid exemptions, its repeal and its exceptions, it produces legal effects against ICE. It disagrees with that interpretation. It considers that analogy cannot be applied to this case, as it is prohibited by mandate 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. It adds that Article 13 of Law No. 8660 reinforces the Financial Policy of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), clearly establishing that ICE should not be considered a source of revenue for the Treasury (fisco), nor should any financial restriction be imposed on it by the State or its Institutions.\n\nWe now proceed to the examination of the charges formulated.\n\n**IV.- On the applicable norms to the disputed legal relationship.** For the purpose of addressing the debated issue, focused on the aspect of whether ICE is subject to the real estate tax, a first, decisive aspect is the reference to the norms relating to that tax, as well as the exemptions that were presented by the parties in this process. On other occasions, this Section of the Administrative Litigation Court has had the opportunity to rule on this particular topic, among others, in judgments No. 024-2015-VI, No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, issued at 8:20 a.m. on February 11, at 4:20 p.m. on August 31, and at 9:50 a.m. on September 18, all of 2015, and subsequently Nos. 57-2016-VI at 11:35 a.m. on April 8, 2016, No. 97-2017-VI at 2:05 p.m. on July 31, 2017, and finally, No. 94-2019-VI at 10:25 a.m. on July 31, 2019. In all these precedents, it has been noted that, as a first aspect, by means of Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, the so-called Law of Territorial Tax (Ley del Impuesto Territorial) was enacted. Said norm created a tax in favor of the Treasury, on real property (art. 1). In that sense, Article 2, regarding the taxable event (hecho imponible), stated: \"*The following are subject to this tax: lands, fixed and permanent installations or constructions, and the stable plantations existing thereon. / Likewise, the value of all machinery and other movable goods that form part of a real estate because they are necessary for the exploitation of the business for which it is intended, must be taken into account with the real estate itself even though such machinery or movable goods can easily be separated from the real estate*\". Regarding the tax rate, section 24 provided that the tax payable was \"*one quarter of one percent annually on the appraisal of assets*\", determined by the appraisal carried out by the Tax Office (Oficina de Tributación) (Articles 3 and 5), based on the valuation table defined by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) through an Executive Decree (Article 6). The indicated agency (Tax Office) acted as a Tax Administration, with the Executive Branch being responsible for designating \"*the collecting offices it deems necessary throughout the Republic, so that the tax may be paid therein*\" (Article 26). In canon 4, exceptions to the material duty of payment were established, specifically: properties of the State, municipalities, and Education Boards (Juntas de Educación), when, for any reason, they were not in the hands of third parties; properties dedicated to education, public charity, parish houses, and temples dedicated to any worship permitted by law -excluding oratories and chapels of private properties-; buildings intended for diplomatic delegations and dwelling houses of Foreign Ministers, when occupied by them and \"*provided that in the respective country equal advantages are granted to the Legations and Ministers of Costa Rica*\"; as well as properties with a value not exceeding ¢4,000.00. *(Collection of Laws and Decrees of the First Semester, Volume I, of the year nineteen thirty-nine, folios 52 to 65).* Now, regarding the plaintiff entity, through **Decree Law No. 764**, of October 25, 1949, the Founding Junta of the Second Republic (Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República) added an article 20 to **Decree Law No. 449**, of April 8, 1949 (which created ICE), to establish a general subjective exemption regarding all national and municipal taxes, postage, and telegraphic franking in favor of that public entity *(Collection of Laws and Decrees, Second Semester, Volume II, of the year nineteen forty-nine, folio 545).* However, subsequently, on March 31, 1992, the **Law Regulating Valid Exemptions, Repeals, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones),** No. 7293, was enacted, a norm that in its numeral 1 provided: \"*Article 1.- General Repeal. All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal norms relating to, among other taxes, customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, vehicle property, are repealed, with the exceptions indicated in this Law. (...)*\". Nevertheless, from that generic repeal, Article 2 subsection i) excepted the set of exemptions that: \"*i) Have been granted to the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), decentralized institutions, municipalities, education boards and administrative boards of public educational institutions, state and municipal public companies, and state universities.*\" In the same way, precept 34 ejusdem modified Article 4 of the Law of Territorial Tax to include, among others, properties owned by ICE as not subject to the tax. Likewise, in this legal body, Articles 50 and 52 reformed numerals 63 and 64 of the CNPT, respectively, in the following sense: \"***Article 63 - Limit of application.-** Although there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation*\". \"* **Article 64.- Validity.-** The exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State*\". It should be noted that the cited Law No. 7293 was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 66, of April 3, 1992, entering into force as of that date *(Sistema Costarricense de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).* Then, on May 9, 1995, through Law No. 7509, the Law of Real Estate Tax (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) was issued, published in La Gaceta No. 116 of June 19, 1995. This legal source, in its mandate 38, totally repealed the Law of Territorial Tax. In Article 1 it establishes a tax in favor of the municipalities, on the ownership of real estate. This aspect generates a first element of substantial difference concerning the tax regulated by Law No. 27, since, unlike that one, where the active subject was the State, in the current Law No. 7509, this role and power are conferred upon the local entities. This follows from sections 3 and 9 ejusdem, norms that define the cited local councils as the Tax Administration. In relation to the elements of this tax, already in the aforementioned judgments No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, this Section VI has indicated: *\"(...)**a.) active subject:** it is established '..., in favor of the municipalities' (Article 1), which in such circumstance, each of the eighty-one local governments of the country, is established as a Tax Administration (Articles 3 and 9), a competence that is understood to be delimited to its territorial circumscription. This competence translates into the municipalities being in charge of withholding and collecting the cited tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, according to which they are endowed with powers of inspection and collection of this tax. Furthermore, the law attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to be able to manage this tax, among them '(...) conducting valuations of real estate, invoicing, collecting, and processing judicial collection and administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (...) (Article 3). Nevertheless, it has a technical and specialized body, created specifically to advise the Tax Administration (understood as each municipality of the country) regarding the precision and homogeneity of property values throughout the country, by creating the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica, ONT), according to the addition to the law (now Article 12), according to Article 2 subsection c) of Law 7729, of December fifteen, nineteen ninety-nine; **b.) object of the tax:** they are 'the lands, the installations or the fixed and permanent constructions that exist there' (Article 2); **c.) taxable persons (sujetos pasivos):** they are established by Article 6 of this Law, which as relevant provides: 'a) Owners with a title registered in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad). b) Owners of property, who are not registered in the Public Registry of Property. c) Concessionaires, permit holders, or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, ... . d) Occupants or possessors with a title, registrable or non-registrable in the Public Registry, for more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, perquisites, gratuitous land borrowers, and precarious occupants. ...*\n\ne) IDA parcel holders [by Article 14 of Law number 9036, of May 11, two thousand twelve, this designation was changed to the Rural Development Institute (INDER)], after the fifth year and if the value of the parcel exceeds the amount set in subsection f) of Article 4 of this Law.\" d.) tax base: pursuant to paragraph 23, it is established that \"(I)n the entire country, the tax percentage shall be one-quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration\"; and finally d.) exemptions: as relevant to this matter, among others, it was established in Article 4, that \"(T)he following are not subject to this tax: a.) Properties of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption.\" (The highlighting is not from the original.) An important fact is that a dual regulation of this tax was provided for, considering that the Executive Branch is responsible for issuing the corresponding Executive Decree (which it already did, under number 2760, of January 12, one thousand nine hundred ninety-nine, and as such, must be understood and considered as secondary and subordinate regulation (in all respects) to the law that supports it (doctrine derived from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in judgments number 1876-90, 0243-93, 5227-94, 2382-96, 6689-96 and 2856-2000)); and the regulations that each municipality may adopt, to complete that regulation (Article 39), in exercise of its administrative and tax autonomy established by the Fundamental Charter itself in its paragraph 170 -of second degree, or of government, according to the development of constitutional judgment number 5445-99-, whence, they may well approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make effective the collection and gathering of the Tax on Real Property. This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 116, of June 19, one thousand nine hundred ninety-five, date from which it is in force. (...)\".\n\nFinally, on August 8, 2008, the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660, was approved, which in its Article 18 provides: \"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions granted in Decree Law No. 449, of April 8, 1949, as well as any others granted to them by the legal system, shall remain in force. / Basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008, date from which it is in force (Costa Rican System of Legislation in Force, SINALEVI).\n\n**V.- On the interpretation of norms establishing tax exemptions.** The moving party contends that it should not pay the tax on real property because the exemption that the ordinal 4 of Law No. 27 originally established remains in force, as well as by what is stipulated by Decree Law 449, and by what is expressed by canon 18 of Law No. 8660. Addressing these arguments requires the interpretation and weighing of the norms cited above, with a view to establishing whether the legal treatment produced from the issuance of Law No. 7509 and the subsequent regulations of Law No. 8660, allows establishing the survival of the subjective exemption that Decree Law 449 and ordinal 4 of the now-repealed Law No. 27 established in favor of ICE. Regarding the interpretation mechanisms to be applied in these matters, this Section in the aforementioned vote No. 57-2016-VI of 11:35 a.m. on April 8, 2016 stated: \"...Paragraph 6 of the CNPT establishes that tax norms must be interpreted in accordance with all methods admitted by Common Law and indicates that analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps but that by virtue of it, neither taxes nor exemptions may be created. Therefore, in our view, tax regulations must be applied in accordance with normal interpretation mechanisms, without there being any criterion that allows sustaining interpretive principles such as in dubio pro fisco, pro taxpayer, or other similar ones. Now, the determination of the applicable interpretive mechanism in a given legal situation is a matter that must be assessed in each specific case. For this, the very purpose of the norm must be considered, in accordance with the parameters provided by canon 10 of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP) and Article 10 of the Civil Code (hereinafter CC). In this vein, it is worth bringing up what was stated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling No. 145 of 10:15 a.m. on February 22, 2008, in which, on the subject of the interpretation of tax norms, it indicated: '(...) Hence, the hermeneutic task of the norms that regulate tax relationships must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has assigned for its issuance. (...) In this task, in accordance with the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that frustrates the very purpose of its content. The means that the legal operator uses to carry out this process are substantially: philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and finalist. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which canon 6 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures refers, in relation to the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements... The exegesis of tax norms must analyze, in each case, the content of the norm, to establish the proper channels for its application, in line with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, satisfies the purpose immersed in the legislative manifestation, whether imposing tax burdens, establishing frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent to the legal-tax relationship derived from it.' Therefore, the legal operator must resort to the interpretation mechanisms that are pertinent in each specific case, without being able to start from the generic baseline criterion that interpretation must adhere to a specific form. In the particular context of the interpretation of tax norms that establish exemptions or, in general, tax benefits, that Cassation Chamber in ruling No. 399-F-2006, of 10:40 a.m. on June 28, 2006, stated: 'V.- Interpretation of tax norms and exemptions. Purpose. The hermeneutic task of the norms that regulate tax relationships must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has assigned for its issuance. (…) From this standpoint, tax norms cannot be considered exceptional or limiting the rights of individuals, given that this character would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Nor is this interpretive form accurate within the context of provisions that establish exemptions or tax benefits. (…) This Chamber, until now, had held the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Code and the legal regime of exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, because from the context of numerals 5, 6, in relation to the cited ordinal 62, all from that legal body, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is derived, through the impossibility of broadly interpreting the norms referring to them. In this sense, among many, judgment No. 162, of 3:22 p.m. on September 25, 1991, No. 93 of 3:30 p.m. on August 28, 1996, No. 86 of 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 1998, and No. 318 of 9:00 a.m. on May 19, 2004. However, with its new composition, and after a profound reflection on the point, it reaches a different criterion from the one mentioned. The nature and object of norms of the type alluded to, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, neither implies nor justifies that they must be interpreted with a different prism than that of other tax provisions, that is, with special criteria, since ultimately, it is reiterated, they are all components of the same system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in contributive burdens. For this, it is necessary, in some cases, to implement norms that fundamentally seek compliance with the various principles with which the constituent power has vested the fiscal system. (…) However, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject cannot constitute a valid condition justifying a special (restrictive) interpretation; rather, it must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the aforementioned Code, and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence happens. Therefore, tax legality seen in this way does not justify a restrictive consideration of fiscal benefits.' With all that openness, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the foregoing does not suppose, not by any means, an open letter that allows sustaining a kind of general rule of extensive, broad, or finalist interpretations regarding tax benefit norms. It is insisted that the tax norm, including exemptions, must be interpreted according to normal interpretation mechanisms, as appropriate in each case context. For this, it must be clear that any interpretive practice must start from the grammatical context of the norms. This does not imply that the understanding of the norm is, in all cases, within the form called 'literal interpretation'. On the contrary, the norm as an expression of (legal, in this case) language constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise in the face of real cases in which it must be applied, but at the same time, it consists of the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (because their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed norm). The validity of potential interpretations regarding a given canon is conditioned on the possibility of supporting that meaning or comprehensive orientation within the scope of the norm's grammatical permissibility. Within this dynamic, as a first step in that hermeneutic task, it is essential to begin defining whether the position postulated by a given interpreter is feasible within the grammatical scope. That is, it is necessary to specify the possible legal meanings of the normative precept. From that standpoint, if the postulated position attends to a finalist intention but finds no support in the grammatical composition of the norm, a distinction must be made between what the norm permits and what the interpreter desires as regulation. Certainly, the task of the legal agent is to apply the law in reality (law in action) to the specific cases they hear, for which, it is undeniable, the application of law is an option that this interpreter makes from the possible meanings of the norm. However, it is reiterated, finalist frameworks are only viable insofar as the norm (as an expression of language) allows various possible meanings. **VI.-** It must also be kept in mind that, in accordance with mandate 121 subsection 13) of the Magna Carta, the exclusive attribution is granted to the Legislative Assembly to “establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.” This norm serves as the foundation for the Principles of Legal Reserve and Tax Legality, which are also developed in precepts 5 and, as relevant to this case, 62 of the CNPT in order to fix precisely and clearly the scope and coverage of said postulate.\n\nIn Article 5 of the CNPT, it is clearly provided: \"In tax matters, only the law may: a) Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); b) Grant exemptions (exenciones), reductions, or benefits; (...)\" For its part, and in the case of exemptions, Article 62 of the CNPT, in its first paragraph, states: \"The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it covers, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods may be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.\" The foregoing implies that the tax rule granting fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, such that it transparently establishes the subject in whose favor it is issued, the exempted taxes, and other substantial elements required by the cited precept 62. Regarding the scope of these principles, one may consult ruling No. 5 of 15:30 hours on January 5, 2000, from the First Chamber, or else, votes Nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002, all from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which detail the relative nature of said principle of tax law reservation (reserva de ley tributaria). As the First Chamber has indicated, the reservation of law in tax benefit rules is based on the fact that provisions of this kind are what are known as mandates with an exclusive factual prerequisite, which implies the impossibility of creating exemptions through integration mechanisms, particularly, analogy. In the aforementioned ruling 399-2006, that high Court on the subject under discussion ordered: \"Now, this last characteristic alluded to (referring to the prohibition of analogy) supposes that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the concrete fact invoked corresponds to the factual scenario of the authorizing rule and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator at the source of its creation. Therefore, when the rule clearly and unmistakably imposes concrete conditions for the enjoyment or receipt of the benevolent effects of the fiscal regime, in its application these parameters cannot be circumvented as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Viewed thus, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual prerequisites stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with due care, whether the factual scenario proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempt fact provided by the rule that foresees the benefit, within its material content. In this confrontation, in principle, it is inappropriate to extend the effects of the rule to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices are unfeasible by operation of law in these types of situations, as the risk arises of incorporating into the exempt fact scenarios that the law does not contemplate, which would violate the aforementioned principle of legal reservation that governs in these fields.\" Ergo, the rules that grant this type of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. But, furthermore, it must be considered that pursuant to Article 63 of the CNPT, exemptions have a fundamental application limit (which cannot be ignored when interpreting the rules) insofar as they only apply to taxes already established in the legal system, which is why an open and uncertain exemption cannot be provided for the future regarding taxes that have not even been created by the legislator and that, therefore, have not come into legal existence and, thus, have not acquired validity. That legal provision states: \"Article 63.- Application limit: Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.\" (Text according to the reform given pursuant to Article 50 of Law number 7293, of March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of April third following). In this line, the granting of a tax exemption generates a subjective right to its enjoyment in the corresponding fiscal period, if it conforms to the terms and conditions provided in the law that establishes it; but this does not imply that it generates per se a right to its recognition in the future, since the legislator is fully empowered to modify, and even repeal, previously recognized exemptions (as considered by the Constitutional Chamber in judgments No. 1341-93, No. 4844-94, and No. 2000-4261), as provided for in Article 64 of the same CNPT, pursuant to which the exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by a later law, without responsibility for the State.\" These considerations are fully applicable to the case under examination, while formulating and setting forth criteria that are shared, there being no reason whatsoever for their variation, and thus they are taken as part of the legal support underpinning this judgment.\n\nVI.- On the concrete case. The plaintiff entity seeks recognition of the exemption (exoneración) that, in its opinion, the legal system confers upon it regarding the property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). To this end, it petitions for the nullity of resolution No. 485-2016 of October 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), which confirms resolution number A-007-2016 of sixteen hours on May twenty-third, two thousand sixteen, from the Mayor of the Municipality of Palmares (Alcalde Municipal de Palmares); as well as the other administrative acts issued by the Mayor's Office (Alcaldía) and other departments of the Municipality of Palmares, since, in its view, ICE is exempt from paying the property tax. After substantive examination of the various allegations presented by the parties in both the written and oral phases of this process, this collegiate body maintains the position shown in the aforementioned precedents, considering that there is no reason whatsoever that justifies varying this criterion. Of course, this Chamber understands and recognizes that there are several positions on this matter. By way of simple reference, the plaintiff entity provides resolutions No. 55-2017-VII of 11:00 hours on August 7, 2017, and No. 100-2016-VII of 09:30 hours on October 12, 2016, both from Section VII of this Administrative Appeals Tribunal, in which, by majority vote, the thesis of the plaintiff public entity was accepted and the validity of the exemption in the payment of the property tax was ordered, considering that the very Law on said tax, that is, No. 7509, in conjunction with what was established by the Law for the Modernization of Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660, recognized the survival of the fiscal dispensation under examination. In another position, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 816-F-2018, ordered that ICE did not have to pay that local tax, but not based on a tax exemption analysis, but rather deduced the existence of a scenario of non-subjection (no sujeción). In said ruling, the cited Cassation Chamber, referring to Article 4 of the Land Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial), considered: \"Consequently, it is not even possible to assume that, regarding ICE, the taxable event of the Property Tax occurs, when its numerals 1 and 2 impose, in favor of the municipalities, a tax on the lands, facilities, or fixed or permanent constructions existing there, because the taxable event, according to precept 31 of the CNPT, constitutes the legal prerequisite that typifies the tax and originates the obligation. By virtue of this, it is also not feasible to consider that between the Treasury and that institute there is a tax relationship with an obligation on the latter to pay said tax...\" For this, that high Court considered that canon 18 of Law No. 8660 established that it maintained exemptions referring to matters outside the competence of services. In turn, that it was the competence of the legislator to define the taxable event and since the Land Tax Law it had been provided that properties owned by that public entity were not subject to the tax, because the taxable event, legally foreseen, did not include them, a treatment that, this ruling points out, Law No. 7509 maintained. Thus, given the variability of formally adopted positions on the topic under examination, and in accordance with the constitutional principle (and guarantee) of independence of criterion of jurisdictional instances (Articles 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta), given that the precedents and jurisprudence issued by the First Cassation Chamber, while being an undeniable source of Law, whose purpose is to inform said legal system (Article 9 of the Civil Code), are ultimately not binding, a projection that the national Legal System confers only on the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, as deduced from mandate 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), No. 7503. Therefore, with due respect to the alternative positions, this Tribunal opts to maintain the interpretation that it has made of the debated topic to date. This implies that, although the position of ICE is respected, ultimately, as it has stated on other occasions, this Tribunal does not share it for the reasons set forth below. As a first aspect, contrary to what the plaintiff entity postulates, although there is similarity in the taxes regulated in the Land Tax Law and the Property Tax Law, parity that may be assumed from the definition of the taxable event (hecho imponible), which shows undeniable resemblance by taxing the ownership or domain of real estate, from the in-depth analysis of the structure of both taxes, differences are inferred that this collegiate body considers decisive and substantial. On one hand, there is an evident difference in the definition of the active subject (sujeto activo) of the tax. Indeed, in accordance with what is regulated by Law No. 27, the active subject of the tax relationship in the land tax was the State (Central Administration), whereas in order to what is precepted by canons 3 and 9 of Law No. 7509, in the property tax, the active subject is constituted by the municipalities, instances that by imperative of that law, become Tax Administrations (and no longer the General Directorate of Taxation) with full tax competence for an effective management of said tax. Regarding the obligated subject (pasivo), the tax regulated by Law No. 7509 includes not only landowners (as established by the Land Tax Law), but rather this condition extends to other subjects different from the former, such as concessionaires, permit holders, and occupants, but not only of lands under private property regime, but also, in relation to public domain goods. As for the taxable event, it includes not only the holding of lands and the fixed and permanent installations or constructions on them —which previously also included movable production goods—, but also their occupation. Ultimately, only the same calculation basis —a quarter of one percent (0.25%) on the property value—, is maintained for the two taxes (the land tax and the property tax), but this identity is insufficient to consider, as the plaintiff entity does, that it is the same tax, since, we insist, there was a substantial modification in the other essential components of the tax. For these reasons, dealing with different tax structures, as explained, we do not share the position that Law No. 7509 was a simple reform to Law No. 27 and that, therefore, they constitute the same tax. Regarding this property tax (tributo sobre bienes inmuebles), the Constitutional Chamber has considered that it is a \"tax of a municipal nature by reason of its destination —only—, but it is not so by virtue of its origin or promulgation procedure, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the taxing power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is the product of ordinary legislative labor itself. It is worth reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of taxing power, to establish the taxes that are required, whether these are national or municipal.\" (Judgment No. 5669-99). Therefore, this Chamber considers that given the substantial variation of core elements of the tax structure, the tax created by Law No. 7509 is a new tax that, although created by the State, has been transferred (cedido) to the municipalities. That is, it is not a municipal tax in the strict sense, insofar as it does not arise from the exercise of the derived and own taxing power of municipal corporations, according to the provision of numerals 121 subsection 13) and 170 of the Political Constitution. On this so-called (transferred taxes), this Tribunal has already previously, in judgment No. 1565-2009-VI, of 16:15 hours on August 11, 2009, indicated: \"(...) Although both are local tax sources, the former are those which, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121 subsection 13) constitutional, which is considered special both because of the municipal initiative and because of the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the transfer of taxes (cesión de tributos) is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the taxing power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds competence over the revenues, through points of connection of a territorial nature.\"\n\nThus, in the management of the ceded tax, the taxing power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the \"collaboration\" that may be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, the State and the Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the cession of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the opinion of this body, with the situation of the Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles), by virtue of the particular characteristics of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the normative and taxing power of the State, the competence over collection is held by the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connecting point. Likewise, the administrative power of tax management is also held by the municipalities, without this preventing coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, as will be explained, to date is manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body ... It should be noted that our [constitutional] jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95, it stated regarding the taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities: \"... But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…\"\n\n**VII.-** On the other hand, the plaintiff entity asserts that the exoneration from the property tax derives from the general subjective exemption from payment of any national or local tax granted to ICE by Article 20 of the cited Decreto Ley No. 449, numeral 18 of the cited Ley No. 8660, and ordinal 4 of Ley No. 7509. This position is not shared by this collegiate body, insofar as a harmonious understanding of that set of norms does not reveal the alluded exemption. In that sense, Article 4 of the Property Tax Law establishes an exoneration regarding the assets of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions, a release from the material tax duty that is conditioned on the existence of special and express regulation that so provides. Such indication, in accordance with what is imposed by canon 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, must be established in a clear and precise manner in a legal source. However, a close look at ordinal 4, subsection a) of Ley No. 7509, does not confer a tax exemption on the entities mentioned in that mandate, but rather conditions that benefit on the existence of a special law that expressly grants them the exemption. Therefore, a principle of legal reservation in the granting of exemptions is imposed, as a derivation of what is prescribed in Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Carta Fundamental as well as 5, 6, and 62 of the CNPT. Unlike what the plaintiff entity argues, Decreto Ley No. 449 and ordinal 18 of Ley No. 8660 do not constitute the legitimizing basis for the supposed recognition of an exemption regarding the tax under analysis already indicated. Although in its time Article 20 of Decreto Ley No. 449 granted ICE a generic exoneration from the payment of local and national taxes, such dispensation was valid for the taxes created and in force at that date, among them, the territorial tax; however, it cannot be inferred that this exemption included tax relationships derived from taxes that had not yet been born into legal life, this being the case of the property tax, created subsequently, in the year 1995. At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that upon the issuance of Ley No. 7509, and in view of what was prescribed by Article 38 subsection a) of that legal body, the territorial tax was repealed, which entailed, by relation of accessoriness, the termination of the exemption that had been granted on that tax. Therefore, such legal framework cannot be constituted as the source of exemption for a tax created much later, in view of which, the generic subjective exoneration that numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449 establishes does not support the exemption from the property tax. In accordance with numeral 63 of the CNPT, exemptions cannot be extended to taxes established after their creation. In light of the foregoing, the national and municipal taxes exempted for ICE under the cited numeral 20 of the regulation of its creation are those existing at the date of adoption of the cited Decreto Ley No. 764 (which, via reform, introduced Article 20 to the cited Decreto Ley No. 449), that is, as of October 25, 1949, provided there has not been a repeal or modification of that regime by legal mandate. The foregoing is important because even though this provision has not been repealed, the truth is that it has indeed undergone multiple reforms since its effective date. Thus, it is repealed in whatever opposes what is regulated in Articles 3 and 4 of Ley No. 2151 of August 13, 1957, in relation to customs duties. Similarly, the tacit repeals included in Article 9 of Ley No. 4513 of January 2, 1970, regarding all telegraphic and radiographic franchises; canon 15 of Ley No. 5870 of December 11, nineteen seventy-five, which suppresses all postal franchises; ordinal 16 of Ley No. 7088 of November 30, 1987, which eliminates the exemptions for the acquisition of vehicles; and of course, numerals 50 and 55 of the previously cited Ley No. 7293, which reform Articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT regarding exemption from future taxes, can be mentioned. Any other exoneration whose recognition this institution intends must be expressly and clearly established in a law (formal and material), in direct application of what is provided in Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Carta Fundamental and numerals 5, 6, 62, 63, and 64 of the CNPT. It should be added that the foregoing has been the subject of development by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in voto No. 37-F-04 of 10 hours 35 minutes on January 21, 2004, in the following terms: \"(...) In this regulatory recount, it is essential to analyze the Ley Reguladora de todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, in order to determine if it affected in any way the exemptions granted to ICE. Its first article states: 'All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and norms referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, and vehicle property taxes are repealed, with the exceptions indicated by this law... only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article will remain in force.' Subsection l) of the second article of Ley 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (reformed by ordinal 50 of Ley No. 7293) states that there can be no rules granting exemptions from a date prior to that on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be prior to the tax. This rule takes effect from its promulgation, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment on and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under norms prior to those regulating the tax, and they retain the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date. It should not be lost sight of that the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones arose, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws; however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been enjoying cannot be applied retroactively; therefore, the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply regarding taxes created after that date. The contrary would entail a reprehensible retroactive application of the law.\" It should be added that neither does numeral 18 of the cited Ley No. 8660 grant the exemption in question. That legal provision literally states: \"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decreto Ley No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred to them by the legal system, shall remain in force. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" Contrary to what ICE alleges, that mandate does not create a tax exemption but rather maintains the validity of those that were previously granted to ICE, whether as an operator or provider of telecommunications or electricity services and products in a condition open to free competition, an event in which the exoneration from the payment of the General Sales Tax (Impuesto General sobre las Ventas) (now Value Added Tax, Impuesto al Valor Agregado) and the Income Tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta) was removed, and in all other cases, it referred to the exemptions established on the occasion of Decreto Ley No. 764 that added numeral 20 to Decreto-Ley No. 449. As a corollary to the foregoing, with this provision, those exemptions that have been repealed by another law do not recover life either. In sum, this Tribunal considers that in this specific case, there is no norm whatsoever that grants or recognizes in favor of ICE an exemption from the payment of the property tax, so it is clear that it is subject to the payment of said tax in the corresponding local territorial jurisdiction.\n\n**VIII.-** For the same reasons, the collection of this tax on real property does not entail an improper interpretation of Article 63 of the CNPT because it uses analogy to distort the spirit of the legislator contained in Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449. On the one hand, even though the interpretative method of analogy is valid in Tax Law, neither a tax nor an exemption can be established through it, as provided in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the CNPT, which, of interest, states: \"Article 6. Interpretation of tax norms. (...) Analogy is an admissible procedure to 'fill legal gaps' but by virtue of it, neither taxes nor exemptions can be created. (...)\". Furthermore, in this case, the Municipality of Palmares reached the decision to tax the properties owned by ICE in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4 of Ley No. 7509 in relation to 20 of Decreto Ley No. 449, 18 of Ley No. 8660, and numeral 63 of the CNPT; therefore, there is no legal gap that should be filled or complemented with that mechanism. It is reiterated, the generic and subjective tax exemption provided by numeral 20 of Decreto Ley No. 449 is not applicable to the property tax, given that the latter is subsequent to the creation of that tax benefit. Considering that said generic exemption applies to taxes that had not yet been created at the time of its issuance constitutes a contravention of the limits imposed by ordinal 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, while simultaneously implying (in essence) a denial of the power to create and modify taxes, which, in light of ordinal 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, is held by the Legislative Branch. This entails, undoubtedly, an a priori denial of the inherent power of the authority to create taxes, and a reservation of individual disapplication of the duty to contribute to the support of public burdens, imposed by canons 18 and 33 of the Carta Magna. This Tribunal does not disregard the set of precedents provided by the plaintiff as support for its decision, which include prior positions of the Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, judgments from the Juzgado Especializado de Cobro, as well as other substantive sections of this Tribunal. However, given the independence of judgment that is imposed as a maxim of guarantee in the jurisdictional exercise, in tune with numerals 153 and 154 of the Constitución Política, such references cannot condition the decision of this Cámara. These considerations also do not decline due to what is established by Article 13 of Ley No. 8660. That norm indicates: \"(...) Financial policy. Neither the State nor its institutions may impose financial restrictions or limitations on the investments and indebtedness of ICE and its companies that are foreign or contrary to this Law. Neither the State nor its institutions may request or demand transfers, surplus, or bond purchases; in general, ICE and its companies cannot be forced to maintain deposits in checking accounts or in government securities. In the event of distribution of surpluses in favor of ICE or its companies, generated by the provision or commercialization of electricity, telecommunications, infocommunications, and information service products or services, as well as the commercialization of other products and services developed or commercialized by ICE or its companies or through alliances with third parties, these surpluses must be capitalized as development reserves for the fulfillment of its purposes. (...)\". Note that said mandate does not refer to taxes, nor to exemptions, which is what is discussed here; but only to the impossibility of imposing financial restrictions or limitations on ICE's investments and indebtedness, an aspect that is absolutely diverse from the exercise of the taxing power and, therefore, could not compromise it. Strictly speaking, the norm refers to the guidelines of the institution's financial policy, which have no relation or incidence with the exercise of the taxing power exercised by the legislator in this case in favor of the Municipalities, nor with the competences that the local Tax Administration must exercise; nor does it have any connection with the object of this lawsuit.\n\nIX.- On the other hand, this Chamber does not share the proposed view of non-subjection (no sujeción) regarding the real estate tax. Indeed, the conceptual and substantial difference between the figures of non-subjection (no sujeción) and exemption (exoneración) was already clarified by this collegiate body in the aforementioned ruling No. 92-2019-VI. In that sense, the core argument was set forth: \"First: Regarding the tax exemption or exoneration (exoneración o exención tributaria): An exemption (exención) exists when a legal rule affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event, or the elements for quantifying the tax, whether in the tax base (deductions or reductions) or in the tax rate, in such a way that it creates an exception to the tax obligation. (...) Therefore, a tax exemption (exención tributaria) takes place when a rule of legal rank provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, its main effect does not develop: that is, the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. In such a way that the structure of the tax exemption (exoneración tributaria) is characterized by containing a single mandate expressed through two precepts, first the subjection, and immediately after, the exemption (exención); so the tax obligation is born, but it is not enforceable. Thus, it is clear that the essence of the exemption (exención) does not affect the moment of birth of the obligation, but rather the moment of its enforceability. (...) On the other hand, and of particular interest for what is discussed here, it must be kept in mind that Article 62 of the cited Tax Code states in its first paragraph that 'The law that contemplates exemptions (exenciones) must specify the conditions and requirements established to grant them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the duration period, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or whether it can be authorized for transfer to third parties and under what conditions.' The foregoing assumes that the tax rule that grants fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, not only by establishing the subject in whose favor it is issued, the goods or services, and the exempted taxes; but it must also establish the validity period of the exemption (exención) and whether, once this has expired, the release of the exempted taxes proceeds or, on the contrary, their payment must be made, as well as indicate whether the transfer of the tax-exempt good to a third party other than the beneficiary of the exemption (exención) is permissible and the conditions or requirements that must be met for such purposes. Ergo, the rules that grant this type of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. (...) Second: Regarding tax 'non-subjection' (no sujeción tributaria): On the other hand, in the case of 'non-subjection' (no sujeción), this occurs in cases where the taxable event is not verified, as these are assumptions that fall outside its scope, even though they are close to it. Generally, the rules that establish a tax non-subjection (no sujeción tributaria) complement the delimitation of the taxable event, but in a negative sense, that is, merely clarifying that certain hypotheses are not included in the description of the taxable event. From this perspective, although both exemption (exoneración) and non-subjection (no sujeción) have in common the non-mandatory nature of paying a tax, in each case this is due to a different assumption; we repeat, in the exemption (exención), the taxable event occurs or is verified, but later the tax obligation is dispensed with or excluded by express provision of the legislator; while in non-subjection (no sujeción), the taxable event is not verified, which is why the rule establishing it is merely clarifying, so that, even if it did not exist, the legal effect is the same, that is, the factual situation is not subject to the tax obligation. From what has been said, it is clear that 'exemption' (exoneración) cannot be confused with 'non-subjection' (no sujeción), as the latter refers to the non-realization of the taxable event described in the tax rules, meaning the formal and material tax obligation is not born. Thus, it is materially and legally impossible that, for the same tax and taxpayer, exemption (exoneración) and non-subjection (no sujeción) occur at the same time, as the representation of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), plaintiff in this process, seems to argue.\" These considerations allow for a clear delimitation of the basic difference between both figures, which essentially means that, in non-subjection (no sujeción), the taxable event is not configured, so the tax obligation is not born. Ergo, since there is no fiscal relationship between the parties, the administered party does not even have to satisfy formal duties, nor material ones. For its part, in the exemption (exención), as stipulated in canon 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, the legislator dispenses the taxpayer from the material duty to contribute (totally or partially), but the formal duties survive, given that, unlike the other figure, the conduct that typifies the taxable event is configured, so a tax obligation exists. This collegiate body's understanding of the real estate tax, specifically, regarding the taxable event, provided for by ordinal 4 of Law No. 7509, falls on \"the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon.\" Then ordinal 4 indicates that the following are not \"subject (afectos),\" among several cases, the property of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, which by special law enjoy an exemption (exención). The logic of the relationship regulated by that law allows for the inference that, if the objective element is real estate ownership, as a general rule, the dispensation from the obligation is specified through the technique of exemption (exención). Otherwise, one would be facing the sui generis case\n\n, in which a subjection is conditioned by a rule that has granted an exemption (exención), that is, someone who is exempt from the tax would be found not subject to it, which implies, obviously, a circular fallacy. More simply, the factual basis of the non-subjection (no sujeción) would be being exempt from that same fiscal relationship, which constitutes a logical contradiction. Hence, it is considered that the present case boils down to determining whether ICE is exempt or not from the tax created by Law No. 7509, based on the fact that, as has been pointed out, in the judgment of this Court, this is a tax different from the one regulated by the Territorial Tax Law, No. 27. Faced with this dilemma, it is reiterated, in light of the considerations presented, it is concluded that ICE is not only subject (sujeto) to that tax, but also that there is no express rule that allows one to deduce that an exemption (exención) exists on that obligation. Consequently, the position shown by the challenged public conduct does not demonstrate the legal disagreement alleged, insofar as, roughly speaking, they are based on the same considerations that have been set forth to justify ICE's duty to pay the real estate tax, so the annulment claim must be dismissed. Likewise, the claim to recognize in favor of the plaintiff entity an alleged exemption (exoneración) regime regarding said tax could not be accepted, because as has been established, said fiscal benefit is not supported by any legal rule that so provides or establishes it. Nor would the request for the elimination of the charges made by the Municipality of Palmares for the tax in question, existing in all manual and computer systems, be admissible. These actions inherent to local fiscal management are protected by legality, for the reasons noted above. Consequently, the rejection of the lawsuit must be ordered.\"\n\nIt postulates, it is logical to reason that the existence of several autonomous Institutions and the possibility of creating others, influences the material impossibility of establishing an exhaustive list of institutions to which the tax exemption may be applied and for that reason it has been instituted in such a way. It considers that ICE has been exempt from payment of that tax since the issuance of its Constitutive Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, since article 20 indicates that it is exempt from payment of national and municipal taxes. It affirms that by special law it has a generic exemption from all taxes, which includes the real estate tax, a situation that has been interpreted differently by the Technical Standardization Body of the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and by Section III of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal. It cites article 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, a rule that allows granting total or partial exemptions. It insists that said exemption is recognized by Decree-Law 449 and article 4 of Law No. 7509. It affirms that the provision in article 20 of the Constitutive Law was reinforced by article 18 of Law No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, by stating that those exemptions remain in force. It considers that Law No. 8660 reiterates the exemption in favor of ICE, except for income and sales taxes. It cites opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009, of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which affirmed the validity of exemptions in favor of ICE, a criterion that, it notes, was later \"strangely\" changed. It considers that these erroneous positions have led local entities to proceed with the undue collection of that tax. It criticizes that the thesis of those authorities is based on Law No. 7293 (regulating all existing exemptions), which established in its article 50 a modification to article 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, in the sense that exemptions do not extend to taxes established after their creation. Those instances consider that, upon the enactment of a new real estate tax law, which is created after the Law of all existing exemptions, its repeal, and its exceptions, it produces legal effects against ICE. It disagrees with that interpretation. It considers that analogy cannot be applied to this case, as it is prohibited by article 6 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures. It adds that article 13 of Law No. 8660 reinforces the Financial Policy of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, clearly establishing that ICE should not be considered a source of income for the treasury, nor should any financial restriction be imposed on it by the State or its Institutions.\n\nThereafter, we proceed to the examination of the charges made.\n

IV.- On the rules applicable to the legal relationship under discussion. In order to address the debated issue, focused on the aspect of whether ICE is subject to the real estate tax, a first, determining aspect is the reference to the rules relating to that tax, as well as to the exemptions that were presented by the parties in this process. On other occasions, this Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal has had the opportunity to rule on this particular issue, among others, in judgments No. 024-2015-VI, No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, issued at 8 hours 20 minutes on February 11, at 16 hours 20 minutes on August 31, and at 9 hours 50 minutes on September 18, all of 2015, and subsequently No. 57-2016-VI at 11 hours 35 minutes on April 8, 2016, No. 97-2017-VI at 14 hours 05 minutes on July 31, 2017, and finally, No. 94-2019-VI at 10 hours 25 minutes on July 31, 2019. In all these precedents, it has been noted that, as a first aspect, by Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, the so-called Territorial Tax Law was enacted. Said law created a tax in favor of the treasury, on real property (art. 1). In this regard, article 2, regarding the taxable event, stated: \"Subject to this tax are the lands, the fixed and permanent installations or constructions, and the stable plantations existing thereon. / Likewise, the value of all machinery and other movable property that forms part of a real estate unit because it is necessary for the operation of the business to which it is destined, shall be taken into account with the properly said real estate, even if such machinery or movable property can easily be separated from the real estate.\" Regarding the tax rate, article 24 provided that the tax to be paid was \"one quarter of one percent annually on the appraisal of properties,\" determined by the appraisal carried out by the Taxation Office (articles 3 and 5), based on the valuation table defined by the Executive Branch through an Executive Decree (article 6). The indicated office (Taxation Office) acted as the Tax Administration, with the Executive Branch designating \"the collection offices it deems necessary throughout the Republic, so that the tax may be paid in them\" (article 26). Article 4 established exceptions to the material duty of payment, specifically, the properties of the State, the municipalities, and the Boards of Education, when, by any title, they were not in the hands of third parties; properties dedicated to education, public charity, parish houses and temples dedicated to any worship permitted by law -excluding oratories and chapels of private properties-; buildings intended for diplomatic legations and dwelling houses of Foreign Ministers, when occupied by them and \"provided that in the respective country equal advantages are granted to the Legations and Ministers of Costa Rica\"; as well as properties with a value not exceeding ₡4,000.00. (Collection of Laws and Decrees of the First Semester, Volume I, of the year nineteen thirty-nine, folios 52 to 65). Now, with respect to the plaintiff entity, by means of Decree-Law No. 764, of October 25, 1949, the Founding Junta of the Second Republic added an article 20 to Decree-Law No. 449, of April 8, 1949 (which created ICE), to establish a general subjective exoneration regarding all national and municipal taxes, postal and telegraphic franking in favor of that public entity (Collection of Laws and Decrees, Second Semester, Volume II, of the year nineteen forty-nine, folio 545). However, subsequently, on March 31, 1992, the Regulatory Law of Existing Exemptions, Repeals and Exceptions, No. 7293 was enacted, a law which in its article 1 provided: \"Article 1.- General Repeal. All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal rules relating, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, vehicle property, are repealed, with the exceptions indicated by this Law. (...)\". However, from that generic repeal, article 2, subsection i) excepted the set of exemptions that: \"i) Have been granted to the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to decentralized institutions, to municipalities, to the education and administrative boards of public educational institutions, to state and municipal public enterprises, and to state universities.\" Likewise, article 34 of the same law amended article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law to consider as not subject to the tax, among others, the real estate units owned by ICE. Also, in this legal body, articles 50 and 52 reformed articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT, respectively, in the following sense: \"Article 63 -Limit of application.- Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation\". \"Article 64.- Validity.- The exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by a later law, without liability to the State\". It is noteworthy that the cited Law No. 7293 was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 66, of April 3, 1992, entering into force as of that date (Costa Rican System of Legislation in Force, SINALEVI). Then, on May 9, 1995, through Law No. 7509, the Real Estate Tax Law was issued, published in La Gaceta No. 116 of June 19, 1995. This legal source in its article 38 completely repealed the Territorial Tax Law. Article 1 establishes a tax in favor of the municipalities, on the ownership of real estate. This aspect generates a first point of substantial difference with respect to the tax regulated by Law No. 27, since, unlike that one, in which the active subject was the State, in the current Law No. 7509, this role and power is conferred upon the local entities. This stems from articles 3 and 9 of the same law, rules that define said municipalities as the Tax Administration. Regarding the elements of this tax, in the aforementioned judgments No. 146-2015-VI and 154-2015-VI, this Section VI has indicated: \"(...)a.) active subject: it is established '..., in favor of the municipalities' (article 1), which in such circumstance, each one of the eighty-one local governments of the country, is established as a Tax Administration (articles 3 and 9), a competence that is understood to be delimited to its territorial circumscription. This competence translates into the municipalities being responsible for retaining and collecting the cited tax, in accordance with the doctrine of article 99 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, for which purpose they are empowered with inspection and collection powers over this tax. Furthermore, the law attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to fulfill the management of this tax, among them '(…) to carry out valuations of real estate, invoicing, collection and processing of judicial collection and to administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…) (article 3). Nevertheless, it has a technical and specialized body, created specifically to advise the Tax Administration (understood as each municipality in the country) in matters concerning the accuracy and homogeneity of property values throughout the country, by creating the Technical Standardization Body (ONT), according to an addition to the law (now article 12), by virtue of article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729, of December fifteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-nine; b.) object of the tax: it is 'the lands, the installations or the fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon' (article 2); c.) passive subjects: they are established by article 6 of this Law, which, as far as relevant, provides: 'a) The owners with title registered in the Public Property Registry. b) The owners of a farm, who are not registered in the Public Property Registry. c) The concessionaires, permitholders or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, .... d) The occupants or possessors with title, registrable or not registrable in the Public Registry, of more than one year and who are under the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, sharecroppers, keepers of livestock on shares, gratuitous land borrowers and precarious occupants. ... e) The parcel holders of the IDA [by article 14 of Law number 9036, of May eleventh, two thousand twelve, this denomination was changed to that of the Institute of Rural Development (INDER)], after the fifth year and if the value of the parcel exceeds the amount set in subsection f) of article 4 of this Law.' d.) taxable base: according to article 23, it is established that '(I)n all the country, the tax rate shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the real estate registered by the Tax Administration'; and finally d.) exemptions: as far as relevant to this matter, among others, it was established in article 4, that '(T)he following are not subject to this tax: a.) The real estate units of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption.' (Highlighting is not from the original.) An important fact is that a double regulation of this tax was provided for, given that the Executive Branch is responsible for issuing the corresponding Executive Decree (which it already did, by number 2760, of January twelfth, nineteen hundred ninety-nine, and which as such, must be understood and held as secondary and subordinate regulation (in all respects) to the law that supports it (doctrine derived from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in judgments number 1876-90, 0243-93, 5227-94, 2382-96, 6689-96 and 2856-2000); and that which each municipality may adopt for the completion of that regulation (article 39), in exercise of its administrative and tax autonomy established by the Fundamental Charter itself in its article 170 -of second degree, or of government, according to the development of constitutional judgment number 5445-99-, whence, they may well approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make the collection and perception of the real estate tax effective. This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 116, of June nineteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-five, date as of which it is in force. (...)\". Finally, on August 8, 2008, the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, No. 8660 was approved, which in its article 18 provides: \"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunication or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions granted in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force. / The traditional basic telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" This law was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 156 of August 13, 2008, date as of which it is in force (Costa Rican System of Legislation in Force, SINALEVI).

V.- On the interpretation of the rules that establish tax exemptions. The plaintiff party postulates that it should not pay the real estate tax because the exemption that article 4 of Law No. 27 established from the beginning remains in force, as well as by what was established by Decree-Law 449, and by what was expressed by article 18 of Law No. 8660. Addressing these arguments requires the interpretation and weighting of the rules cited above, in order to establish whether the legal treatment produced from the issuance of Law No. 7509 and the subsequent regulations of Law No. 8660, allows establishing the persistence of the subjective exemption that Decree-Law 449 and article 4 of the already repealed Law No. 27 established in favor of ICE. Regarding the interpretation mechanisms to be applied in these matters, this Section, in the mentioned ruling No. 57-2016-VI at 11 hours 35 minutes on April 8, 2016, stated: \"...Article 6 of the CNPT establishes that tax rules must be interpreted in accordance with all methods admitted by Common Law and indicates that analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps but that by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created. Therefore, in our view, tax regulations must be applied in accordance with normal interpretation mechanisms, without any criterion existing that allows supporting interpretive criteria such as in dubio pro fisco, pro taxpayer or other similar ones. Now, the determination of the applicable interpretive mechanism in the face of a specific legal situation is an issue that must be assessed in each specific case. To do this, one must attend to the very purpose of the rule, in accordance with the parameters provided by article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP) and article 10 of the Civil Code (hereinafter CC). In that line, it is worth mentioning what was said by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling No. 145 at 10 hours 15 minutes on February 22, 2008, in which, on the subject of the interpretation of tax rules, it stated: '(...) Hence, the hermeneutic task of the rules that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of juridical interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the aim that the legislator has determined for its issuance. (...) In this task, according to the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, including the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and prevents a material application that circumvents the very purpose of its content. The means that the legal operator uses to carry out this process are substantially: philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and teleological. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which article 6 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures refers regarding the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements ... The exegesis of tax rules must analyze, in each case, the content of the rule, to establish the due channels of its application, in line with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, satisfying the purpose immersed in the legislative manifestation, be it imposing tax burdens, establishing frameworks of benefits and other matters inherent to the tax legal relationship arising from it.' Therefore, the legal operator must resort to the interpretation mechanisms that are pertinent in each specific case, without it being possible to start, as a generic base criterion, that the interpretation must attend to a specific form. In the particular context of the interpretation of tax rules that establish exemptions or, in general, fiscal benefits, that Cassation Chamber in ruling No. 399-F-2006, at 10 hours 40 minutes on June 28, 2006, stated: 'V.- Interpretation of tax rules and exemptions. Purpose. The hermeneutic task of the rules that govern tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of juridical interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the aim that the legislator has determined for its issuance. (…) From this perspective, tax rules cannot be considered exceptional or restrictive of the rights of individuals, given that that character would lead to their application and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. Nor is that interpretive form correct within the context of the provisions that establish exemptions or fiscal benefits. (…) This Chamber, up to now, had upheld the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the referred Code and the legal regime specific to exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, because from the context of articles 5, 6 in relation to the cited article 62, all of that legal body, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions follows, through the impossibility of broadly interpreting the rules referring to them. In this sense, among many, judgment no. 162, at 15 hours 22 minutes on September 25, 1991, no. 93 at 15 hours 30 minutes on August 28, 1996, no. 86 at 15 hours on August 19 of 1998 and no. 318 at 9 hours on May 19, 2004. However, with its new integration, and after a deep reflection on the point, it arrives at a criterion different from the one referred to. The nature and object of the rules of the aforementioned type, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, does not imply nor justify that they must be interpreted with a different prism from that of the other tax provisions, that is, with special criteria, because ultimately, it is reiterated, they are all components of the same system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in the contributory burdens. For this it is necessary, in some cases, to implement rules that at their core, seek the fulfillment of the diverse principles with which the constituent power has vested the fiscal system. (…)However, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject, cannot constitute a valid condition that justifies a special (restrictive) interpretation, but must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by law, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in article 62 of the cited Code and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence takes place. Therefore, tax legality thus seen, is not justification for a restrictive consideration of fiscal benefits.” Despite this openness, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the above does not suppose, not by any means, an open letter that permits sustaining a sort of general rule of extensive, broad, or teleological interpretations in the face of tax benefit rules. It is reiterated that the tax rule, including that of exemptions, must be interpreted in accordance with normal interpretation mechanisms, as corresponds in each contextual case. For this, one must be clear that any interpretive practice must start from the grammatical context of the rules. This does not imply that the understanding of the rule is in all cases within the form called \"literal interpretation\". On the contrary, the rule as an expression of language (juridical in this case) constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise before real cases in which it must be applied, but at its same time, it constitutes the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (because their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed rule). The validity of eventual interpretations regarding a given article is conditioned by the possibility of sustaining that sense or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the rule. Within that dynamic, as a first step in this hermeneutic task, it is indispensable to begin by defining whether the position postulated by a given interpreter is feasible within the grammatical scope. That is, it is necessary to specify the possible juridical meanings of the normative precept. From that perspective, if the position postulated attends to a teleological intent, but finds no support in the grammatical composition of the rule, one must distinguish what the rule permits from what the interpreter desires as regulation. Certainly, the task of the legal agent is to apply the law in reality (law in action) to the specific cases they may hear, for which, it is undeniable, the application of the law is an option that that interpreter makes from the possible meanings of the rule. However, it is reiterated, the teleological frameworks are only viable to the extent that the rule (as an expression of language), allows for various possible meanings.\n\n**VI.-** It must also be borne in mind that, in accordance with mandate 121, subsection 13) of the Magna Carta, the Legislative Assembly is granted the exclusive power to “establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.” This provision serves as the foundation for the Principles of Legal Reserve and Tax Legality, which are also developed in precepts 5 and, insofar as this case is concerned, 62 of the CNPT in order to precisely and clearly define the scope and coverage of the aforementioned postulate. Article 5 of the CNPT clearly states: “In tax matters, only the law may: **a)** Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); **b)** Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; (...)” For its part and in dealing with exemptions, Article 62 of the CNPT, in its first paragraph, states: “The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the duration period, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.” The foregoing means that the tax provision granting fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, so that it transparently establishes the subject in whose favor it is issued, the exempted taxes, and other substantial elements required by the aforementioned precept 62. Regarding the scope of these principles, one may consult ruling No. 5 of the First Chamber issued at 15:30 on January 5, 2000, or votes Nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002, all from the Constitutional Chamber, which detail the relative nature of the aforementioned principle of tax legal reserve. As the First Chamber has noted, the legal reserve in provisions for tax benefits is based on the fact that such provisions are known as mandates with an exclusive factual presupposition, implying the impossibility of creating exemptions through integration mechanisms, particularly analogy. In the aforementioned ruling 399-2006, that high Court on the matter at hand held: “Now, this latter characteristic mentioned (referring to the prohibition of analogy) means that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the specific fact invoked corresponds to the factual scenario of the authorizing provision and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator at the source of its creation. Therefore, when the provision clearly and unequivocally imposes specific conditions for the enjoyment or reception of the benevolent effects of the fiscal regime, in its application these parameters may not be circumvented as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Seen this way, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual presuppositions stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. Thus, the judge must analyze in each case, with due care, whether the factual scenario proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempted event provided by the provision granting the benefit, within its material content. In this confrontation, as a matter of principle, it is inappropriate to extend the effects of the provision to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices in these types of situations are unfeasible by rule of law, since there is a risk of incorporating, within the exempted event, scenarios not contemplated by the law, which would violate the aforementioned principle of legal reserve that prevails in these fields.” Ergo, the provisions granting these types of benefits must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. But, in addition, it must be considered that under Article 63 of the CNPT, exemptions have a fundamental application limit (which cannot be ignored when interpreting the provisions) insofar as they only apply to taxes already established in the legal system, a reason for which an open and uncertain exemption cannot be provided for in the future regarding taxes that have not even been created by the legislator and that, therefore, have not come into legal existence and, consequently, have not taken effect. That legal provision states: \"**Article 63.- Application limit:** Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.\" (Text in accordance with the reform given under Article 50 of Law number 7293, of March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of the following April third). Along these lines, the granting of a tax exemption generates a subjective right to its enjoyment in the corresponding fiscal period, if it conforms to the terms and conditions set forth in the law establishing it; but this does not imply that it generates per se a right to its recognition in the future, since the legislator is fully empowered to modify, and even repeal, previously recognized exemptions (as considered by the Constitutional Chamber in judgments No. 1341-93, No. 4844-94, and No. 2000-4261), as provided in Article 64 of the same CNPT, according to which the exemption, even when granted based on certain de facto conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.\" These considerations are fully applicable to the case under examination, while they formulate and set forth criteria that are shared, without any reason for their variance, and they are therefore taken as part of the legal support underpinning this ruling.\n\n**VI.- On the specific case.** The plaintiff entity seeks recognition of the exemption that, in its view, the legal system confers upon it regarding the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). To this end, it petitions for the nullity of resolution No. 485-2016 of October 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Administrative Contentious Court, which confirms resolution number A-007-2016 at sixteen hours on May twenty-third, two thousand sixteen, of the Mayor of Palmares; as well as the other administrative acts issued by the Mayor's Office and other departments of the Municipality of Palmares, since, in its opinion, ICE is exempt from paying the real estate tax. After a substantive examination of the various allegations presented by the parties in both the written and oral phases of this proceeding, this collegiate body maintains the position shown in the precedents mentioned above, considering that there is no reason whatsoever justifying a variation of this criterion. Of course, this Chamber understands and recognizes that there are several positions on this matter. As a simple reference, the plaintiff entity provides resolutions No. 55-2017-VII at 11:00 on August 7, 2017, and No. 100-2016-VII at 9:30 on October 12, 2016, both from Section VII of this Administrative Contentious Court, in which, by a majority vote, the thesis of the plaintiff public entity was accepted and the validity of the exemption from the payment of the tax on real estate was ordered, considering that the very Law of said tax, that is, No. 7509, together with what is established by the Law for the Modernization of Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, No. Placa903, recognized the survival of the fiscal waiver under examination. In another position, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 816-F-2018, held that ICE was not required to pay that local tax, but not on the basis of a tax exemption analysis, but rather it inferred the existence of a scenario of non-subjection (no sujeción). In said ruling, the aforementioned Cassation Chamber, referring to Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law, stated: “*Consequently, it is not even possible to assume that, regarding ICE, the taxable event of the Tax on Real Estate occurs, when its numerals 1 and 2 impose, in favor of the municipalities, a tax on the lands, fixed or permanent installations or constructions existing there, because the taxable event, according to precept 31 of the CNPT, constitutes the legal presupposition that typifies the tax and originates the obligation. By virtue of this, it is also not feasible to consider that a tax relationship exists between the Treasury and that institute with an obligation on the latter to pay the aforementioned tax…*” To that end, that high Court considered that canon 18 of Law No. Placa903 provided that it maintained exemptions referring to matters unrelated to the competence of services. In turn, it was the legislator's competence to define the taxable event, and the Territorial Tax Law had provided that the real estate owned by that public entity was not subject to the tax, since the legally prescribed taxable event did not include them, a treatment that, that ruling notes, Law No. 7509 maintained. Thus, given the variability of formally adopted positions on the topic under examination, and in accordance with the constitutional principle (and guarantee) of jurisdictional independence of criteria (Articles 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta), given that the precedents and jurisprudence issued by the First Cassation Chamber, although an undeniable source of Law, whose purpose is to inform that legal system (Article 9 of the Civil Code), are ultimately not binding—a projection that the national Legal System confers only to the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, as inferred from mandate 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, No. Placa20285. Therefore, with due respect to the alternate positions, this Court opts to maintain the interpretation of the debated issue it has rendered thus far. This implies that, although ICE's position is respected, ultimately, as it has stated on other occasions, it does not share it for the reasons set forth below. As a first aspect, unlike what the plaintiff entity postulates, although there is a similarity in the taxes regulated in the Territorial Tax Law and the Real Estate Tax Law—parity that can be assumed from the definition of the chargeable event, which shows undeniable resemblance upon taxing the ownership or dominion of real estate—a thorough analysis of the structure of both taxes reveals differences that this collegiate body deems determining and substantial. On one hand, there is an evident difference in the definition of the active subject (sujeto activo) of the tax. Indeed, in accordance with what was regulated by Law No. 27, the active subject of the tax relationship in the territorial tax was the State (Central Administration), whereas pursuant to the provisions of canons 3 and 9 of Law No. 7509, in the real estate tax, the active subject is constituted by the municipalities, entities that, by mandate of that law, become Tax Administrations (and no longer the General Directorate of Taxation) with full tax competence for the effective management of that tax. Regarding the obligated subject (pasivo), the tax regulated by Law No. 7509 includes not only landowners (as established by the Territorial Tax Law), but that condition extends to other subjects other than the owner, such as concessionaires, permit holders, and occupants, not only of land under private property regime, but also in relation to public domain assets. Regarding the taxable event, it includes not only the holding of lands and the fixed and permanent installations or constructions on them—which previously also included movable production property—but also their occupation. In short, only the same calculation base—of one-quarter of one percent (0.25%) on the property value—is maintained for both taxes (the territorial and the real estate taxes), but that identity is insufficient to consider, as the plaintiff entity does, that they are the same tax since, we insist, there was a substantial modification in the other essential components of the tax. For these reasons, dealing with different tax structures, as has been explained, the position that Law No. 7509 was a simple reform to Law No. 27 and that, therefore, they constitute the same tax, is not shared. Regarding this tax on real estate, the Constitutional Chamber has considered it to be a \" *tax of municipal order by reason of its destination –only–, but it is not so by virtue of its original or enactment procedure, given that it was not born from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is a product of ordinary legislative work. It bears reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of the taxing power, to establish the taxes required, whether national or municipal.*\" (Judgment No. 5669-99). Therefore, this Chamber considers that given the substantial variation of core elements of the tax structure, the tax created through Law No. 7509 is a new tax that, although created by the State, has been ceded to the municipalities. That is, it is not a municipal tax in the strict sense, as it does not arise from the exercise of the derived and inherent taxing power of municipal corporations, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 121 subsection 13) and 170 of the Political Constitution. Regarding this denomination (ceded taxes), this Court previously, in judgment No. 1565-2009-VI, at 16:15 on August 11, 2009, indicated: \"(...) *Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created by the special legislative procedure foreseen in Article 121 subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both because of the municipal initiative and because of the prohibition of amendment imposed on the Legislative Assembly, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the cession of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the taxing power, while the individual Autonomous Community holds competence over the yields, through territorial points of connection. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the taxing power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the “collaboration” that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the cession of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competencies, without prejudice to the required coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Tax on Real Estate, by virtue of the specific characteristics of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the State's regulatory and taxing power, competence over collection lies with the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a point of connection. Likewise, the administrative power to manage the tax also belongs to the municipalities, without this preventing coordination with the State Tax Administration, the same one which, as will be explained, is currently manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body .... It should be noted that our [constitutional] jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Vote 3930-95, it stated regarding the taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities “...But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax...”*.\n\n**VII.-** Moreover, the plaintiff entity asserts that the exemption from the tax on real estate derives from the subjective general exemption from the payment of all national or local taxes granted to ICE by Article 20 of the cited Decree-Law No. 449, numeral 18 of the cited Law No. 8660, and ordinal 4 of Law No. 7509. Such a position is not shared by this collegiate body, insofar as from a harmonious understanding of that set of provisions, the aforementioned exemption does not arise. In that sense, Article 4 of the Law on Real Estate Tax establishes an exemption regarding the assets of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions, a release from the material tax duty that is conditioned upon the existence of special and express regulation that so provides. Such indication, in accordance with what canon 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures imposes, must be established in a clear and precise manner in a legal source. However, if one looks closely, ordinal 4 subsection a) of Law No. 7509 does not confer a tax exemption on the entities mentioned in that mandate, but rather conditions that benefit on the existence of a special law that expressly grants them the exemption. A principle of legal reserve in the granting of exemptions is therefore imposed, as a derivation of what is prescribed in Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter as well as 5, 6, and 62 of the CNPT. Contrary to what the plaintiff entity argues, Decree-Law No. 449 and ordinal 18 of Law No. 8660 do not constitute the legitimizing basis for the supposed recognition of an exemption regarding the tax under analysis, as already indicated. Although in its time Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 granted ICE a generic exemption from the payment of local and national taxes, such waiver was valid for the taxes created and in force at that date, among them, the territorial tax; however, it cannot be inferred that this exemption included tax relationships derived from taxes that had not yet come into legal existence, this being the case with the real estate tax, created later, in the year 1995. On this point, it is necessary to reiterate that upon the issuance of Law No. 7509, and given the provisions of Article 38 subsection a) of that legal body, the territorial tax was repealed, which meant, by accessory relationship, the termination of the exemption that had been granted regarding that tax. Therefore, such a legal framework cannot be constituted as the source of exemption for a tax created much later, in light of which, the subjective generic exemption of numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449 does not support the exemption from the real estate tax. In accordance with numeral 63 of the CNPT, exemptions cannot be extended to taxes established after its creation. In accordance with the foregoing, the national and municipal taxes exempted from ICE under the cited numeral 20 of the regulation of its creation are those existing at the date of adoption of the cited Decree-Law No. 764 (which, via reform, introduced Article 20 to the cited Decree-Law No. 449), that is, on October 25, 1949, provided there has been no repeal or modification of that regime by legal mandate. The foregoing is important because even though this provision has not been repealed, the truth is that it has undergone multiple reforms since its effective date. Thus, it is repealed insofar as it opposes what is provided in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 2151 of August 13, 1957, regarding customs duties. Likewise, mention may be made of the tacit repeals included in Article 9 of Law No. 4513 of January 2, 1970, regarding all telegraphic and radio-graphic franking privileges; canon 15 of Law No. 5870 of December 11, nineteen seventy-five, which suppresses all postal franking privileges; ordinal 16 of Law No. 7088, of November 30, 1987, which eliminates exemptions for the acquisition of vehicles; and of course, numerals 50 and 55 of the aforementioned Law No. 7293, which reform Articles 63 and 64 of the CNPT concerning exemption from future taxes. Any other exemption whose recognition this institution seeks must be expressly and clearly established in a law (formal and material), in direct application of the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter and numerals 5, 6, 62, 63, and 64 of the CNPT. It should be added that the foregoing has been the subject of development by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote No. 37-F-04 at 10:35 on January 21, 2004, in the following terms: \"(...) *In this regulatory recount, it is essential to analyze the Regulatory Law of all Existing Exemptions No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, in order to determine whether it had any impact on the exemptions granted to ICE. Its first article states: “All objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and related regulations concerning, among other taxes, customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, vehicle property taxes, are repealed, with the exceptions indicated in this law... only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article shall remain in force.” Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) states that there cannot be rules granting exemptions that predate the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be earlier than the tax. This rule takes effect from its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment on, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under provisions prior to those regulating the tax, and they retain the exemptions granted by provisions prior to that date. It must not be lost from view that the Regulatory Law of Existing Exemptions, Repeals, and Exceptions arose, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions across a high quantity of laws; however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been exhibiting cannot be applied retroactively, for which reason the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply regarding taxes created after that date. The contrary would imply a repudiable retroactive application of the law.*\" It should be added that neither does numeral 18 of the cited Law No. 8660 grant the exemption in question. That legal provision literally states: \"*When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, shall remain in force, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.*\" Contrary to what ICE alleges, that mandate does not create a tax exemption but rather maintains the validity of those that were granted to ICE previously, either as an operator or provider of telecommunications or electricity services and products in conditions open to free competition, a scenario in which the exemption from payment of the General Sales Tax (now Value Added Tax) and Income Tax was eliminated, and, in the other cases, it referred to the exemptions established on the occasion of Decree-Law No.\n\n764, which added subsection 20 of Decree-Law No. 449. As a corollary to the foregoing, this provision does not revive those exemptions that have been repealed by another law. In summary, this Court considers that in this specific case, there is no rule whatsoever that grants or recognizes in favor of ICE an exemption from the payment of the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), and therefore, it is clear that it is subject to the payment of said tax in the corresponding local territorial district.

 VIII.- For the same reasons, the collection of that tax on real property does not entail an improper interpretation of Article 63 of the CNPT because it uses analogy to distort the legislative intent contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449. On the one hand, even though the interpretive method of analogy is valid in Tax Law, it cannot be used to establish either a tax or an exemption, as provided in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the CNPT, which, in relevant part, states: \"Article 6. Interpretation of tax rules.  (...) Analogy is an admissible procedure to 'fill legal gaps,' but by virtue of it, taxes or exemptions cannot be created. (...)\" Furthermore, in this case, the Municipality of Palmares  reached the decision to tax the properties owned by ICE in consideration of the provisions set forth in Article 4 of Law No. 7509 in relation to Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449, Article 18 of Law No. 8660, and subsection 63 of the CNPT; therefore, there is no legal gap that needed to be supplied or complemented by that mechanism. It is reiterated that the generic and subjective tax exemption provided by subsection 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 is not applicable to the real estate tax, given that the latter is subsequent to the creation of that tax benefit. Considering that said generic exemption applies to taxes that had not yet been created at the time of its issuance constitutes a contravention of the limits imposed by Article 63 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), while simultaneously implying (in essence) a denial of the power to create and modify taxes, which, in light of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, is held by the Legislative Branch. This presupposes, without a doubt, an a priori denial of the inherent power to create taxes, and a reservation for the individual non-application of the duty to contribute to the support of public burdens, which is imposed by canons 18 and 33 of the Magna Carta. This Court is not unaware of the set of precedents provided by the plaintiff as support for its decision, which include prior positions of Section Three of the Administrative Litigation Court, judgments of the Specialized Collection Court, as well as other substantive sections of this Court. However, given the independence of judgment that is imposed as a paramount guarantee in the exercise of jurisdiction, in tune with articles 153 and 154 of the Political Constitution, such references cannot condition the decision of this Chamber. These considerations are also not diminished by the provisions of Article 13 of Law No. 8660. That rule states: \"(...) Financial policy.  Neither the State nor its institutions may impose financial restrictions or limitations on the investments and indebtedness of ICE and its companies that are extraneous or contrary to this Law. Neither the State nor its institutions may request or demand transfers, surpluses, or the purchase of bonds; in general, ICE and its companies may not be forced to maintain deposits in checking accounts or in government securities. In the event of distribution of surpluses in favor of ICE or its companies, generated by the provision or marketing of electricity, telecommunications, infocommunications, and information services products or services, as well as the marketing of other products and services developed or marketed by ICE or its companies or through alliances with third parties, these surpluses must be capitalized as development reserves for the fulfillment of their purposes. (...)\"It should be noted that said mandate does not refer to taxes or exemptions, which is what is at issue here, but only to the impossibility of imposing financial restrictions or limitations on the investments and indebtedness of ICE, an aspect that is absolutely distinct from the exercise of the tax authority and, therefore, could not compromise it. Strictly speaking, the rule refers to the guidelines of the institution's financial policy, which have no relation or impact on the exercise of the tax authority exercised by the legislator in this case in favor of the Municipalities, nor with the competencies that the local Tax Administration must exercise, nor does it have any connection with the object of this lawsuit.

IX.- On the other hand, this Chamber does not share the proposed vision of non-subjection (no sujeción) regarding the real estate tax. Indeed, the conceptual and substantial difference between the concepts of non-subjection and exoneration was already the subject of clarification by this collegiate body in the aforementioned judgment No. 92-2019-VI. In that sense, it was essentially stated: \"First: Regarding tax exoneration or exemption (exoneración o exención tributaria):  An exemption exists when a legal rule affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event (hecho imponible), or the elements for quantifying the tax, whether in the taxable base (base imponible, deductions or reductions) or in the tax rate, in such a way that it excepts the tax obligation. (…) Therefore, a tax exemption takes place when a rule of legal rank provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its main effect does not develop: that is, the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation. Thus, the structure of the tax exemption is characterized by containing a single mandate manifested by two precepts, first subjection (sujeción), and then, exemption; so that the tax obligation is born, but it is not enforceable. Thus, it is clear that the essence of the exemption does not affect the moment of birth of the obligation, but rather its enforceability. (…) On the other hand, and of particular interest for what is discussed here, it should be kept in mind that Article 62 of the cited Tax Code states in its first paragraph that 'The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.' The foregoing implies that the tax rule that grants fiscal benefits must be clear in its content, not only when establishing the subject in favor of whom it is issued, the exempted goods or services and taxes, but it must also establish the term of validity of the exemption and whether, once it expires, the release of the exempted taxes proceeds or, on the contrary, their payment must be made, as well as indicate whether the transfer of the tax-exempted good to a third party other than the beneficiary of the exemption proceeds and the conditions or requirements that must be met for such purposes. Ergo, the rules that grant this type of benefit must contain a clear and precise detail of their scope. (…) Second: Regarding tax 'non-subjection' (no sujeción): On the other hand, in the case of 'non-subjection,' it occurs in cases where the taxable event is not verified, because they are assumptions that fall outside its scope, even if they are close to it. Generally, the rules that establish tax non-subjection complement the delimitation of the triggering event (hecho generador), but in a negative sense, that is, merely clarifying that certain assumptions are not included in the description of the triggering event. From this perspective, although both exoneration and non-subjection have in common the non-mandatory nature of paying a tax, in each case this is due to a different assumption; we repeat, in exemption, the triggering event occurs or is verified, but then the tax obligation is dispensed or excluded by express provision of the legislator; while in non-subjection, the taxable event is not verified, which is why the rule that establishes it is merely clarifying, so that even if it did not exist, the legal effect is the same, that is, the factual assumption is not subject to the tax obligation. From what has been said, it is clear that 'exemption (exoneración)' cannot be confused with 'non-subjection (no sujeción),' as the latter refers to the non-realization of the taxable event described in the tax rules, that is, the formal or material tax obligation is not born. Thus, it is materially and legally impossible for, in the case of the same tax and taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), exoneration and non-subjection to occur at the same time, as the representation of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, the plaintiff in this proceeding, seems to argue.\" These considerations allow for a clear delimitation of the basic difference between the two concepts, which essentially means that, in non-subjection, the triggering event is not configured, and therefore, the tax obligation is not born. Ergo, as there is no fiscal relationship between the parties, the administered party does not even need to satisfy formal duties, nor material ones. For its part, in exemption, as stipulated in canon 62 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, the legislator dispenses the taxpayer from the material duty to contribute (totally or partially), but the formal duties survive, given that, unlike the other concept, the conduct that typifies the triggering event is configured, and therefore, a tax obligation exists. This collegiate body's understanding of the real estate tax, specifically, regarding the triggering event provided for by Article 4 of Law No. 7509, falls upon \"the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions that exist there\". Then Article 4 states that the property of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions that enjoy an exemption by special law is not \"affected\" within several assumptions. The logic of the relationship that this law regulates allows us to infer that, if the objective element is real estate ownership, as a general rule, the dispensation from the obligation is specified using the technique of exemption. Otherwise, we would be facing the sui generis case in which a subjection is conditioned by a rule that has granted an exemption; that is, one who is exempt from the tax would be found not subject to it, which evidently implies a circular fallacy. Simply put, the factual assumption of non-subjection would be to be exempt from that same fiscal relationship, which entails a logical contradiction. Hence, it is considered that the present case boils down to determining whether ICE is exempt or not from the tax created by Law No. 7509, starting from the basis that, as has been indicated, in the opinion of this Court, it is a tax distinct from the one regulated by the Territorial Tax Law, No. 27. Faced with this dilemma, it is reiterated, in light of the considerations raised, that it is concluded that ICE is not only affected (subject) to that tax but also that there is no express rule that allows us to conclude that an exemption exists regarding that obligation. Consequently, the position shown by the challenged public conduct does not show the alleged legal unconformity, insofar as, broadly speaking, it is based on the same considerations that have been set forth to justify ICE's duty to pay the real estate tax, and therefore, the annulment claim must be dismissed.  Similarly, the claim to recognize in favor of the plaintiff entity an alleged exemption regime regarding the cited tax could not be upheld, since, as has been established, said fiscal benefit is not supported by any legal rule that so provides or establishes it. Nor could the plea for the elimination of the charges made by the Municipality of Palmares for the tax in question, as recorded in all manual and computerized systems, be granted. Those actions inherent to local fiscal management are supported by legality, for the reasons noted above. Consequently, the dismissal of the lawsuit must be ordered.

 X.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised. The representative of the local entity raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). This substantive exception must be upheld, given that the validity of the challenged conduct has been established, as well as the inadmissibility of the claims made. The dismissal of the lawsuit in all its aspects is therefore required.

 XI.- Costs. In accordance with Article 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, although in precedents of this Court the maximum of condemning the losing party was imposed, the issuance of alternate positions regarding the substantive issue shows that this is a matter where a sufficient reason to litigate exists, and therefore, it is appropriate to resolve the present matter without special condemnation as to costs.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO),

 The defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity against the Municipality of Palmares is declared without merit in all its aspects. The matter is resolved without special condemnation as to costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez.*-*-*-*

 

FILE: 17-010687-1027-CA

MATTER: PROCEEDING ON PURE LEGAL ISSUES (PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO)

PLAINTIFF: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)

DEFENDANT: Municipalidad de Palmares.

 

IGWTHUP.JRGN 2019

 

 

Document signed by:

ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE

SILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE

DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE

 

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