{ "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-944774", "citation": "Res. 00140-2019 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Improcedencia de prescripción en ampliación de cargos disciplinarios", "title_en": "Rejection of Statute of Limitations for Expanded Disciplinary Charges", "summary_es": "La Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo rechaza en todos sus extremos la demanda de una miscelánea del MOPT que impugnaba su despido sin responsabilidad patronal, basado en ausencias injustificadas y en el aporte de un comprobante médico alterado. La actora alegaba la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria del Estado para ampliar los hechos imputados, así como la falta de acreditación del motivo del despido. El Tribunal consideró que la ampliación de cargos por la alteración del documento no estaba prescrita, ya que el plazo mensual de prescripción comenzó a correr desde que la Administración tuvo conocimiento objetivo del hecho (20 de enero de 2014), y la ampliación se presentó el 27 de enero de 2014. Además, al tratarse de un tema de probidad, aplicaba un plazo de prescripción de cinco años según la Ley contra la Corrupción y la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría. En cuanto al motivo, el Tribunal encontró probada la existencia del hecho imputado mediante las pruebas del expediente disciplinario, que la demandante no logró desvirtuar, por lo que acogió la defensa de falta de derecho y declaró sin lugar la demanda, sin especial condena en costas.", "summary_en": "The Sixth Section of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal dismissed in its entirety the claim brought by a janitor from the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, who contested her dismissal without employer liability based on unjustified absences and submission of an altered medical certificate. The plaintiff argued the statute of limitations had expired regarding the State's disciplinary power to expand the charges, as well as the lack of proof of the grounds for dismissal. The Court held that the expansion of charges for document alteration was not time-barred, because the one-month limitation period started to run from when the Administration had objective knowledge of the fact (January 20, 2014), and the expansion was filed on January 27, 2014. Moreover, as the matter involved probity, a five-year statute of limitations applied under the Anti-Corruption Act and the Organic Law of the Comptroller General. Regarding the grounds for dismissal, the Court found the alleged facts duly proven by the evidence in the disciplinary file, which the plaintiff failed to rebut. Consequently, the Court upheld the defense of lack of right and dismissed the claim in its entirety, without special award of costs.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "01/11/2019", "year": "2019", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria", "ampliación de cargos", "falta de derecho", "probidad", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Código de Trabajo", "Ley contra la Corrupción No. 8422", "Ley General de Control Interno No. 8292", "despido sin responsabilidad patronal" ], "article_citations": [], "keywords_es": [ "prescripción disciplinaria", "ampliación de cargos", "despido sin responsabilidad patronal", "probidad", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Código de Trabajo", "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "alteración de comprobante", "ausencias injustificadas" ], "keywords_en": [ "disciplinary statute of limitations", "expansion of charges", "dismissal without employer liability", "probity", "Civil Service Statute", "Labor Code", "General Law of Public Administration", "Administrative Litigation Tribunal", "alteration of certificate", "unjustified absences" ], "excerpt_es": "VII.- ANÁLISIS ESPECÍFICO. Pues bien, en el caso concreto, [...] la ampliación respecto de la cual, se arguye prescripción, sea, acto No. 2014-0381, si bien es de fecha 27 de enero del 2014, como se ha señalado, su objeto no se relaciona con las ausencias injustificadas señaladas ut supra, sino con el aporte de un comprobante alterado. En orden al recuento fáctico que se ha detallado, tal descubrimiento fue posible, desde el plano objetivo, hasta el momento en que se rinde el oficio No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 del 20 de enero de 2014. Es decir, la ampliación incorpora a la gestión de despido una causa diversa a la ausencia injustificada, que por sí misma, el jerarca consideró reprochable con grado de gravedad, por infringir las normas que regulan la probidad en el ejercicio de la función pública. Para ello basta remitir al contenido de ese traslado de cargos, en el cual, luego de la formulación de los hechos, realiza una exposición de la postura sobre la cual estima lesionado el deber de probidad y con ello, la Ley No. 8422, dando como resultado, la pérdida de confianza. Así aclarado, desde el momento en que el jerarca puede conocer objetivamente de la alteración de ese comprobante de inasistencia, sea, en fecha 20 de enero del 2014, al momento en que se peticiona la ampliación de cargos en data 27 de enero del 2014, es más que indudable que no ha fenecido el plazo mensual que alega la petente. Con todo, por tratarse de un tema de probidad, en orden a lo regulado por el precepto 44 de la Ley No. 8422, que remite a la prescripción del ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428, el plazo aplicable para sancionar esa supuesta infracción, sería de cinco años. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo del cargo bajo examen.", "excerpt_en": "VII.- SPECIFIC ANALYSIS. Well, in the specific case, [...] the expansion with respect to which the statute of limitations is argued, that is, act No. 2014-0381, although dated January 27, 2014, as pointed out, its object is not related to the unjustified absences mentioned above, but to the submission of an altered certificate. According to the factual account detailed, such discovery was possible, objectively, only from the moment when official letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, was issued. That is to say, the expansion incorporates into the dismissal proceeding a cause distinct from the unjustified absence, which in itself the hierarch considered severely reprehensible, for violating the rules governing probity in the exercise of public functions. For this, it suffices to refer to the content of the statement of charges, in which, after setting out the facts, it explains the position on which it considers the duty of probity and, therefore, Law No. 8422, to have been breached, resulting in loss of trust. Thus clarified, from the moment when the hierarch can objectively know of the alteration of that absence certificate, i.e., on January 20, 2014, to the moment when the expansion of charges is requested on January 27, 2014, it is beyond doubt that the one-month period claimed by the plaintiff has not expired. Nevertheless, because this is a matter of probity, pursuant to the provisions of precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which refers to the statute of limitations under article 71 of Law No. 7428, the applicable period for sanctioning that alleged offense would be five years. Consequently, the charge under review must be dismissed.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The defense of lack of right is upheld and the claim is dismissed in its entirety, without special award of costs.", "summary_es": "Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho y se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, sin especial condenatoria en costas." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Artículo 99 del Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "quote_en": "The following shall prescribe within one month: ... c) Actions by Ministers to initiate the dismissal process of regular employees for just cause ... as of the day the cause for the sanction arose, or, where applicable, from when the corresponding facts or faults were known.", "quote_es": "Prescribirán en un mes: ... c) Las acciones de los Ministros para iniciar la gestión de despido de los servidores regulares por causa justificada ... a partir del día en que se dio causa para la sanción, o en su caso, desde que fueren conocidos los hechos o faltas correspondientes." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "the one-month period is calculated from the moment when the holder of the corrective power has the objective possibility of knowing the fault and, therefore, of exercising his power.", "quote_es": "el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "because this is a matter of probity, pursuant to the provisions of precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which refers to the statute of limitations under article 71 of Law No. 7428, the applicable period for sanctioning that alleged offense would be five years.", "quote_es": "por tratarse de un tema de probidad, en orden a lo regulado por el precepto 44 de la Ley No. 8422, que remite a la prescripción del ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428, el plazo aplicable para sancionar esa supuesta infracción, sería de cinco años." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-21629", "citation": "Ley 7428", "title_en": "Organic Law of the Comptroller General's Office", "title_es": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "doc_type": "law", "date": "07/09/1994", "year": "1994" }, { "id": "norm-49185", "citation": "Ley 8292", "title_en": "General Law on Internal Control", "title_es": "Ley General de Control Interno", "doc_type": "law", "date": "31/07/2002", "year": "2002" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-80985", "citation": "Ley 9343", "title_en": "Labor Procedural Reform", "title_es": "Reforma Procesal Laboral", "doc_type": "law", "date": "25/01/2016", "year": "2016" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-21629", "citation": "Ley 7428", "title_en": "Organic Law of the Comptroller General's Office", "title_es": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "doc_type": "law", "date": "07/09/1994", "year": "1994" }, { "id": "norm-49185", "citation": "Ley 8292", "title_en": "General Law on Internal Control", "title_es": "Ley General de Control Interno", "doc_type": "law", "date": "31/07/2002", "year": "2002" }, { "id": "norm-53738", "citation": "Ley 8422", "title_en": "Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office", "title_es": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "doc_type": "law", "date": "06/10/2004", "year": "2004" }, { "id": "norm-80985", "citation": "Ley 9343", "title_en": "Labor Procedural Reform", "title_es": "Reforma Procesal Laboral", "doc_type": "law", "date": "25/01/2016", "year": "2016" }, { "id": "norm-8975", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 1581", "title_en": "Civil Service Statute Regulation", "title_es": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "16/01/1955", "year": "1955" } ], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-944774", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-49185", "norm_num": "8292", "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002" }, { "doc_id": "norm-53738", "norm_num": "8422", "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004" }, { "doc_id": "norm-80985", "norm_num": "9343", "norm_name": "Reforma Procesal Laboral", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "25/01/2016" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8975", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "16/01/1955" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "EXPEDIENTE: 15-002978-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: [Nombre 001]\n\nDEMANDADO: El Estado.\n\nNo. 140-2019-VI.\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las ocho horas veinte minutos del primero de noviembre del dos mil diecinueve.\n\nProceso de puro derecho establecido por la señora [Nombre62 001], cédula de identidad número [CED62 ], representada por la licenciada Karen Carvajal Loaiza, cédula de identidad número CED12283, contra el Estado, representado en este proceso por la Licenciada Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, cédula de identidad número CED2807.\n\n \n\nRESULTANDO:\n\n 1.- En fecha 08 de abril del 2015, la accionante formula la demanda que ha dado origen al presente proceso para que en sentencia se disponga: \"a) Que se declare con lugar la presente demanda en todos sus extremos. b) Que se declare que el proceso administrativo que se llevó en contra de mi representada por parte de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, se encontraba prescrito a la hora de ampliar la gestión de despido y a la hora de notificar la sanción. c) Que el acto administrativo que decretó el despido de la servidora [Nombre62 001] no estuvo fundamentado, al no haberse demostrado alteración de documentos por parte de mi representada. d) Que se ordene la reinstalación inmediata de la señora [Nombre62 001] en su puesto de trabajo como miscelánea dentro del MOPT. e) Que se condene a las demandadas al pago de ambas costas de esta acción.\" En la audiencia preliminar precisó la pretensión b) en el sentido de anular la resolución AJDRES-046-2014 de las catorce horas del cuatro de febrero del dos mil catorce, Resolución 12318 de las siete horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de abril del dos mil catorce, Resolución 007-2015 TASC de las quince horas diez minutos del veintinueve de enero del dos mil quince, Oficio DGIRH-2015-1145-SP. De igual manera, en la pretensión d) precisó que peticionaba además el pago de salarios caídos, intereses e indexación sobre las sumas adeudadas desde el treinta de marzo del dos mil quince hasta su efectiva reinstalación. (Imágenes 44-49, 1-11 parte 7 y 8 del expediente, minuta de audiencia a partir de imagen 21 del expediente completo) De igual manera peticionó medida cautelar la reinstalación a su puesto de miscelánea en el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (en adelante MOPT).\n\n 2.- Conferido el traslado de ley sobre la medida cautelar, el Estado se opuso en los términos que consta a imágenes 22-37 del expediente, parte 8.\n\n 3.- Por resolución No. 1208-2015 de las 10 horas 05 minutos del 05 de mayo del 2015, el juzgador de la etapa de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la medida cautelar peticionada. No consta apelación formulada contra dicha decisión. (Imágenes 43-49 del expediente, parte 9)\n\n 4.- Conferido el traslado de la demanda, el Estado contestó de manera negativa. Opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 52-53, 1-21 del expediente, partes 9 y 10 respectivamente).\n\n 5.- La audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo fue celebrada el 19 de enero del 2016, con la asistencia de todas las partes. En esa fase, al no haber admitido prueba que debiera ser evacuada en juicio oral, el expediente fue declarado de puro derecho y las partes rindieron sus conclusiones. (Imágenes 21-23 del expediente completo)\n\n 6.- El expediente respectivo fue remitido a esta Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo para la emisión del fallo pertinente en fecha 08 de agosto del 2016, según consta en detalle del Sistema Escritorio Virtual, en el que consta la totalidad del expediente principal. \n\n 7.- Por resolución No. 0139-2016-VI de las 11 horas 30 minutos del 21 de septiembre del 2016, la Sección VI de este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo emitió sentencia de fondo en el presente asunto. (Imágenes 93-116 del principal)\n\n 8.- En virtud de recurso de casación formulado por la representación estatal, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, fungiendo como Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo, de conformidad con el transitorio I del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), en el voto No. 16-F-TC-2019 de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 06 de febrero del 2019 dispuso: \"POR TANTO. Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se anula el pronunciamiento combatido. En su lugar, resolviendo por el fondo, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho invocada por el Estado, sólo en cuanto a la prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción de despido contra la accionante; y se declara sin lugar la demanda sólo en cuanto a ese extremo. Reenvíese este asunto para que el Tribunal resuelva el resto de los alegatos en torno a los cuales aún no ha emitido pronunciamiento.\" (Imágenes 15- del principal)\n\n 9.- El expediente respectivo fue remitido a esta Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo para la emisión del fallo pertinente en fecha 02 de septiembre del 2019, según consta en detalle del Sistema Escritorio Virtual, en el que consta la totalidad del expediente principal. \n\n 10.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas.\n\nRedacta el juzgador Garita Navarro con el voto afirmativo de la juzgadora Abarca Gómez y el juez Aguilar Méndez; \n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\n I.- Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes: 1) La señora [Nombre62 001] ingresó a laborar para el Ministerio de Obras Pública el 16 de junio del año 1994 en la clase de puesto de Miscelánea. (Ver Certificación N°DGIRH-1856-2015-SP de fecha del 14 de abril del año 2015, que consta a imágenes 22-23 del expediente parte 10) 2) El 20 de diciembre del 2013 el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, señor Pedro Castro Fernández, presentó ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, formal gestión de Despido en contra de la accionante por supuestas ausencias injustificadas, aduciendo que no fue posible notificarle a la funcionaria una resolución de suspensión por tres días el 14 de octubre del 2013, siendo que desde esa fecha no se apersonó a laborar. En ese oficio, en lo medular se alegaba: A. Que mediante Oficio No DR3-13-227 del 21 de octubre de 2013, el Ing. Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional de Alajuela, informó al licenciado Christian Méndez Blanco que a la servidora [Nombre62 001] no se le había podido notificar la suspensión emitida mediante Resolución No 001267, de fecha 10 de octubre de 2013 del Despacho del señor Ministro, por cuanto dicha servidora no se ha había hecho presente a laborar desde el 14 de octubre de 2013, sin que hubiese presentado justificación alguna a esa Jefatura, por lo que se solicita tomar las medidas disciplinarias correspondientes. B. Que mediante Oficio No DRL-13- 0583 del 22 de octubre de 2013 el señor Nombre58535 , le remite el oficio antes mencionado al señor Nombre139064 , para que procediera conforme a derecho. C. Que mediante Oficio No DR3-13-2013 del 25 de octubre de 2013, dirigido al Ing. Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional, el señor Nombre139064 le indica que en vista de los comprobantes entregados a su persona por el señor Nombre136079 el día 24 de octubre de 2013 referente a la servidora [Nombre62 001], justificando las ausencias de los días 08, 14 y 17 de octubre de 2013 y una incapacidad del 21 al 28 de octubre de 2013, dichos comprobantes fueron entregados extemporáneamente, según el artículo 41 del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios. D) Que mediante Informe de Recomendaciones No DRL-2013-296 del 21 de noviembre de 2013 el Departamento de Relaciones Laborales recomienda desistir de incoar Procedimiento Administrativo Disciplinario contra la servidora [Nombre62 001]!, debido a que no se pudo establecer criterio de una presunta ausencia injustificada desde el 14 de octubre de 2013, ya que ello se debió a agentes fortuitos que se constataron como fue una suspensión disciplinaria a nivel institucional, citas médicas a dispensarios de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y aviso de incapacidad del mismo agente asegurador. E) Que ese Despacho mediante Resolución No 001507 de las 14:00 horas del día 19 de diciembre de 2013 dispuso apartarse de la recomendación emitida por el Órgano Instructor mediante el Informe de Recomendaciones No. DRL-2013-296 antes mencionado, y ordenar el inicio de un procedimiento de gestión de despido ante la Dirección497 contra la servidora [Nombre62 001]. (Hecho segundo de la demanda no controvertido, folios 1-10 del administrativo) 3) En fecha 08 de enero del 2014, se le notificó a la servidora resolución No. AJD-RES-005-2014 de las 11 horas del 06 de enero del 2014, que consiste en el traslado de cargos del expediente AJ-124-2013, por medio del cual se le imputaron los siguientes hechos: \" ... de conformidad con el oficio N° DR3-13-227 del 21 de octubre del 2013, el Ing. Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional de Alajuela, le informó al Lic. Cristhian Méndez Blanco, que no había sido posible notificar a la servidora [Nombre62 001], de la suspensión emitida de acuerdo con la resolución N° 001267, de fecha 10 de octubre del año en curso, ya que no se había presentado a laborar desde el 14 de octubre del 2013. Con el cual, se tiene que dicha funcionaria quebrantó todos los principios que deben orientar el actuar de la Administración, ya que una de las obligaciones principales que sujetan a los servidores públicos es la asistencia puntual a su trabajo, por lo que la violación a este deber sin ninguna justificación, constituye una falta grave, que afecta los intereses de este Ministerio\". (Folios 12-15 del administrativo) 4) Que mediante oficio 20140133 del 20 de enero la Dirección Jurídica del MOPT solicita a la Dirección del Laboratorio Clínico de la Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, detalle de las fechas en las que la accionante fue atendida en ese Laboratorio Clínico durante el mes de octubre del 2013. De igual manera, solicitó indicar si el comprobante que señala que la actora acompañó a Nombre139065 el día 18 de octubre del 2013, a efectos de que señale si ese Laboratorio consignó dicha justificación. (Folio 41 del administrativo) 5) Por nota ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 del 20 de enero del 2014, el Director del Laboratorio Clínico indicado en el hecho precedente indica que durante el mes de octubre del 2013 la actora fue atendida el día 04 de ese mes, presentándose a la ventanilla de servicio a las 06.47 horas. Además, señaló en cuanto al comprobante aportado: \"3. Vista la copia de Solicitud de Resultados de Análisis Clínicos, por usted aportada, debo manifestar que la justificación anotada al pie de dicha solicitud no corresponde con lo procedente en el Servicio. Dicho día no hubo problemas con el SIL y en caso de que en algún momento lo hubiese, se habría emitido el comprobante en la fórmula \"CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS\". (Folio 40 del administrativo) 6) Mediante escrito del 22 de enero del 2014, la apoderada legal de la accionante formula su descargo contra el traslado de cargos referido en el aparte previo. (Folios 21-25 del administrativo) 7) Que el día 04 de febrero de 2014 ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, por oficio 2014-0381,el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, presentó ampliación a la gestión de despido sin responsabilidad patronal en contra de la servidora [Nombre62 001], indicando lo siguiente: Que de acuerdo con el Oficio No ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 del 20 de enero de 2014, el Dr. Nombre139066 , Director del Laboratorio Clínico de la Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, se logró determinar que el comprobante aportado por la señora [Nombre62 001] para no presentarse a laborar el día 18 de octubre de 2013, el cual contiene una leyenda que indica \"Acompañante: [Nombre62 001] Hija\" fue alterado, ya que ese no es el procedimiento establecido en dicho Laboratorio Clínico para expedir comprobantes de asistencia, aunado a que la señora Nombre139065 , cédula CED108047, únicamente fue atendida en el Laboratorio Clínico el día 04 de octubre de 2013. (Folios 29-38 del administrativo) 8) Por resolución AJD-RES-046-2014 de las 14 horas del 04 de febrero del 2014, de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, comunicada a la accionante el 06 de febrero del 2014, se notifica el traslado de cargos sobre la ampliación de hechos. El 20 de febrero del 2014 la actora presenta escrito de descargo sobre ese particular. (Folios 48-77 del administrativo) 9) El 07 de marzo del 2014 se celebra audiencia oral y privada ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, en la cual comparecen como testigos los señores Nombre136079 , Nombre139066 , Nombre139064 . (Folios 101-111 del administrativo) 10) El día 13 de marzo del 2014 se celebró una segunda audiencia oral y privada, en la cual se recibió el testimonio del señor Nombre136080 , Nombre136081 y Nombre136082 . (Folios 128-135 del administrativo) 11) El 02 de abril del 2014 la actora en el presente proceso rindió las conclusiones dentro del proceso disciplinario N° AJ-124-2013, en las cuales además de los argumentos de fondo señalados interpuso la excepción de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria del Ministro al ampliar la acusación en su contra. (Folios 147-170 del administrativo) 12) Mediante resolución No. 12316 de las 19 horas 55 minutos del 28 de abril del 2014, el Tribunal de Servicio Civil dictó acto final dentro del procedimiento y dispuso: \"POR TANTO. En mérito de lo expuesto, disposiciones legales citadas y artículos 14 inciso a) y 190 inciso a) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil y 63 inciso a) de su Reglamento, SE DECLARA: CON LUGAR la gestión promovida por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para despedir a la servidora [Nombre62 001] de su puesto sin responsabilidad para el Estado. Consecuentemente, queda autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para despedir a la indicada servidora. Contra la presente resolución procede el recurso de apelación ante este Tribunal, con la debida expresión de agravios, de conformidad con lo que establece el artículo 44 y sus reformas, del Estatuto de Servicio Civil.\" En lo medular, tuvo como hechos probados los siguientes: \"...e) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] no se presentó a laborar del 15 al 18 de octubre de 2013, el día 14 de ese mes lo hizo en forma parcial, pues sólo aparece registrada la hora de entrada, la cual hizo a las 14:00 horas, sin informar previamente a sus superiores las razones que tenía para ausentarse ni aportar luego comprobante alguno para justificar dichas ausencias laborales. (Folios 128 y 129 del expediente de la gestión y 26 del legajo de pruebas); d) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] se le notificó el día 14 de octubre de 2013 a las 11:45 horas la Resolución No 001267 de las 7:06 horas del 10 de octubre de 2013 emitida por el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, en la que se acuerda una sanción disciplinaria, consistente en tres días de suspensión sin goce de salario. Dicha sanción y el rebajo de salario respectivo se le aplicó a la servidora recurrida durante los días del 22 al 24 de octubre de 2013.(Folios 02, 03 y 05 del legajo de pruebas); e) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] intentó justificar ante sus superiores la ausencia laboral en la que incurrió el día 18 de octubre de 2013, presentando la fotocopia de un formulario denominado \"Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos\" de la Clínica Dr. Nombre5497 de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y extendido a Nombre62 de Nombre139065 . En dicho documento se registra su fecha de emisión en forma manuscrita y dice \"18/1 0/13\", al compararse con una copia del documento original se indica que es del \"3/10/13\", con evidente alteración del día 18. (Folios 67 del expediente de la gestión y 23 del legajo de pruebas)\" Este acto fue comunicado a la actora el 14 de mayo del 2014. (Folios 208-217 del administrativo) 13) En escrito del 16 de mayo del 2014, la accionante presentó recurso de apelación contra el acto final referido en el aparte previo. (Folios 238-243 del administrativo) 14) Por resolución No.- 007-2015 TASC de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 29 de enero del 2015, el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil dispuso el rechazo de la medida apelativa formulada. Este acto fue notificado a la accionante y al MOPT en fecha 02 de febrero del 2015. (Folios 265-297 del administrativo) 15) Por oficio 20150577 del 12 de febrero del 2015, la Dirección Jurídica comunica a la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos la notificación del fallo No. 007-2015 TASC de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 29 de enero del 2015, del Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil. (Folios 331-332 del administrativo 2) 16) Por oficio DGIRH-1344-2015 del 19 de febrero del 2015, el Director de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos remite a la Dirección Jurídica para el debido trámite ante el Despacho del Ministro, acuerdo de despido de la demandante, cuyo borrador señala que el despido opera desde el 30 de marzo del 2015. (Folios 337-338 del administrativo 2) 17) Por oficio 20150820 del 25 de febrero del 2015 el Director de Asuntos Jurídicos remite al titular de la cartera de Obras Públicas y Transportes acuerdo de despido de la accionante, cuyo borrador señala que el despido opera desde el 30 de marzo del 2015 y con detalle de fecha de emisión del 26 de febrero del 2015. (Folios 339-340 del administrativo 2) 18) Mediante oficio DGIRH-2015-1145-SP del 11 de marzo del 2015 del Departamento de Gestión de Servicios de Personal, se indica a la actora: \"Me permito comunicarle Despido sin responsabilidad patronal a partir del 30 de marzo del 2015, de conformidad con la Resolución No. 007-2015-TASC de las quince horas diez minutos del día veintinueve del mes de enero del dos mil quince del Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil y oficio No. DGIRH-1344-2015 de fecha ·19 de febrero del 2015 de la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos. (...)\". Ese acto fue comunicado a la petente en fecha 16 de marzo del 2015 a las 10.40 horas. (Imagen 34 del expediente, parte 10)\n\n III.- Hechos no probados: De relevancia para este fallo se tiene el siguiente: 1) Que la actora justificara oportunamente las ausencias correspondientes a los días 15, 16, 17 y 18 de octubre del 2013. \n\n III- Objeto del proceso. La presente demanda tiene por objeto el análisis de validez del procedimiento que dispuso despedir con justa causa y sin responsabilidad para el Estado a la actora, con un rige a partir del 30 de marzo del 2015. La parte promovente señala una serie de alegaciones que en lo medular gravitan en el tema de la prescripción de la potestad de ejecutar el despido autorizado por el Tribunal de Servicio Civil y luego confirmado por el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, así como en la improcedencia de la sanción por la falta de demostración de motivo. Para un mejor orden del presente fallo, de seguido se ingresa al análisis de las alegaciones planteadas, lo que se realizará atendiendo al eje temático de fondo que las partes desarrollan, a fin de evitar análisis reiterativos o innecesarios. \n\n IV.- Sobre el alegato de prescripción de la potestad de sancionar. Sobre los efectos de lo analizado en sede casacional. Como se ha señalado en los resultandos de esta sentencia, inicialmente, en el fallo No. 0139-2016-VI de las 11 horas 30 minutos del 21 de septiembre del 2016, esta Sección VI de este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, emitió sentencia de fondo en el presente asunto, en la cual había considerado, en lo relevante: \"... la nulidad del oficio DGIRH-2015-1145-SP del 11 de marzo del 2015 del Departamento de Gestión de Servicios de Personal, que comunica a la demandante su despido sin responsabilidad patronal a partir del 30 de marzo del 2015, por haber prescrito la potestad para emitir ese último acto. Cabe destacar que el anterior análisis no supone, en modo alguno, el abordaje de las razones de fondo por las cuales fue decretado el despido en la sede del Tribunal del Servicio Civil, como tampoco la temática sobre la prescripción de la ampliación de cargos, dada la inexistencia de mérito o necesidad para ese análisis.\" Empero, dado el recurso de casación formulado por la representación estatal, en el voto No. 000016-F-TC-2019, de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 06 de febrero del 2019, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el ejercicio de sus competencias como Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo, de conformidad con el transitorio I del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), dispuso: \"POR TANTO. Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se anula el pronunciamiento combatido. En su lugar, resolviendo por el fondo, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho invocada por el Estado, sólo en cuanto a la prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción de despido contra la accionante; y se declara sin lugar la demanda sólo en cuanto a ese extremo. Reenvíese este asunto para que el Tribunal resuelva el resto de los alegatos en torno a los cuales aún no ha emitido pronunciamiento.\" Para ello estableció que el plazo aplicable a la fase de ejecución del acto disciplinario cuestionado, era el previsto por el canon 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sea, el de seis meses regulado para la caducidad del procedimiento. Desde esa arista de análisis, el tema relacionado a la prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar el acto de despido, es un tema respecto del cual ya ha recaído pronunciamiento de parte de la máxima instancia de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, para el tipo de materia que se analiza en este proceso, por lo cual, no cabe hacer nuevos señalamientos en esta sentencia sobre ese particular. Sin embargo, la misma instancia de casación reenvió el presente asunto para la definición y pronunciamiento de fondo de las demás cuestiones debatidas por las partes, tal y como fue precisado en el por tanto en ese fallo. Por ende, de seguido se ingresa a la ponderación de las cuestiones formuladas por la parte promovente, ajenas a la citada prescripción. \n\n V.- Sobre la prescripción en cuanto a la ampliación de cargos en la gestión de despido. En su demanda la accionante aduce la nulidad del despido al estimar que la potestad disciplinaria del Estado prescribió, en primera instancia, cuando el señor Ministro remitió la ampliación de la acusación en febrero del 2014, pese a haber conocido los hechos desde noviembre del 2013. En ese sentido expone que había transcurrido dos meses y medio desde que ese jerarca conoció de los hechos, hasta que presentó la ampliación de hechos nuevos. Estima que esa ampliación era improcedente, lo cual se alegó en su momento al presenta conclusiones y no fue tomado en cuenta en las resoluciones finales. Sobre esas alegaciones el Estado expresa, la gestión de despido fue planteada por el Ministro el 20 de diciembre del 2013, con fundamento en el oficio DR3-13-227 del 21 de octubre del 2013. Acota, la investigación y diligencias que realizó el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes previo a la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio por parte de la Dirección General del Servicio Civil y el Tribunal del Servicio Civil contra la actora constituyen una investigación preliminar de las faltas que se le endilgaron y por lo tanto no hay prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria por ampliar los hechos por los cuales se le investigaba en la Dirección General del Servicio Civil. Señala que la prescripción de la potestad no puede ocurrir dentro de la investigación preliminar, pues esta fase no forma parte del procedimiento. Cita algunos precedentes de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Sobre ese cargo en particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone.\n\n VI.- Sobre el elemento temporal en el ejercicio de las potestades correctivas administrativas de corte disciplinario. El análisis de validez de las conductas objeto de este proceso tiene como punto fundamental determinar si la gestión de ampliación de cargos que fuese planteada por el Ministro, en enero del 2014 ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil. Sobre el particular debe indicarse lo que de seguido se expone. En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se verá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que, por aspectos finalistas, se consideran imprescriptibles -v.gr., tutela de bienes demaniales-, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno -como el que se examina en este caso- están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de lo cual, puede fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo el funcionario público, quien, en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Con todo, en materia de empleo público, la prescripción negativa bien puede ser alegada como causal de nulidad del acto final sancionatorio, aún y cuando esa defensa no hubiere sido ejercitada de previo a la emisión de la voluntad pública. Así, la potestad correctiva no puede considerarse como una imprescriptible, tratando de justificar esa deducción en la regla del numeral 66.1 de la LGAP, sino que se trata de una sujeta a reglas de preclusión por factores temporales, según se visualiza en el inciso 3) de ese mismo numeral 66 de la Ley No. Placa1975. Ahora bien, es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este tipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, todos en los cuales, aplican reglas de ejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, pero con matices diversos. Se trata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de demarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto de que se trate. En ese contexto, se ha tenido por acreditado que la promovente contaba con un nombramiento como miscelánea en el MOPT, por lo que, tal vínculo jurídico se regula por las reglas del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, Ley No. 1581 y su reglamento (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 21 del 14 de diciembre de 1954). Desde este plano, el Reglamento del Estatuto, en el artículo 99 se indica: \"Prescribirán en un mes: a) ... b) ... c) Las acciones de los Ministros para iniciar la gestión de despido de los servidores regulares por causa justificada y para imponer las correcciones disciplinarias que autoricen la ley y los reglamentos interiores de trabajo, a partir del día en que se dio causa para la sanción, o en su caso, desde que fueren conocidos los hechos o faltas correspondientes.\" Por ende, en este caso, dada la fecha de los hechos, las faltas endilgadas se regían por la prescripción genérica fijada por el entonces vigente ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo, que se corresponde con el precepto 414 del actual y vigente Código de Trabajo (según reforma realizada por la Ley No. 9343), dada la remisión dispuesta por el numeral 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Esa normativa fija (y fijaba) un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva, entendido como la comunicación de las acciones dirigidas al ejercicio del poder correctivo interno. Ahora bien, resulta determinante el punto de partida del cómputo de ese plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular, el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo señalaba que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una etapa previa de investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Es el caso además de faltas que sean evidenciadas en informes de Auditoria Interna, pero cuya prosecución para efectos de sancionar, deban ser sometidas al jerarca respectivo. En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no. Cabe señalar que el plazo aludido se ensancha y amplía cuando se configure alguno de los supuestos que se encuentran regulados por normas especiales. Es el caso de las faltas que se encuentren reguladas por las normas especiales precisadas por el régimen de control interno, probidad en la función pública y gestión de la Hacienda Pública, en los cuales, acorde a lo regulado por la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, respectivamente, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y desde los momentos en que esas normas disponen), y no el plazo mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general laboral.\n\n VII.- Análisis específico. Pues bien, en el caso concreto, en el acto 2014-0381 del 27 de enero del 2014, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes al presentar la ampliación de imputación de cargos en contra de la accionante, ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, señaló que si bien los hechos base de la denuncia eran de fecha 18 de octubre del 2013, fecha de la ausencia injustificada, precisó en lo relevante al punto bajo examen, que de acuerdo con el Oficio No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 del 20 de enero de 2014, el Dr. Nombre139066 , Director del Laboratorio Clínico de la Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, se logró determinar que el comprobante aportado por la señora [Nombre62 001], para no presentarse a laborar el día 18 de octubre de 2013, el cual contiene una leyenda que indica \"Acompañante: [Nombre62 001] Hija\" fue alterado, ya que ese no es el procedimiento establecido en dicho Laboratorio Clínico para expedir comprobantes de asistencia, aunado a que la señora Nombre139065 , cédula CED108047, únicamente fue atendida en el Laboratorio Clínico el día 04 de octubre de 2013. Fue precisamente en orden a ese hallazgo en el que se derivaba una presunta alteración de ese documento aportado, que se requiere la ampliación a los hechos en las diligencias de despido sin responsabilidad patronal. En ese contexto, debe señalarse, la solicitud inicial de apertura de la gestión de despido dirigida por el jerarca ministerial a la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, resolución 2013-6785 fue emitida en data 18 de diciembre del 2013, y su objeto era disciplinar las ausencias registradas en fechas 14 al 18 de octubre del 2013, sin presentar justificación válida (folios 01-09 de la carpeta administrativa). Sin embargo, la ampliación respecto de la cual, se arguye prescripción, sea, acto No. 2014-0381, si bien es de fecha 27 de enero del 2014, como se ha señalado, su objeto no se relaciona con las ausencias injustificadas señaladas ut supra, sino con el aporte de un comprobante alterado. En orden al recuento fáctico que se ha detallado, tal descubrimiento fue posible, desde el plano objetivo, hasta el momento en que se rinde el oficio No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 del 20 de enero de 2014. Es decir, la ampliación incorpora a la gestión de despido una causa diversa a la ausencia injustificada, que por sí misma, el jerarca consideró reprochable con grado de gravedad, por infringir las normas que regulan la probidad en el ejercicio de la función pública. Para ello basta remitir al contenido de ese traslado de cargos, en el cual, luego de la formulación de los hechos, realiza una exposición de la postura sobre la cual estima lesionado el deber de probidad y con ello, la Ley No. Placa5670, dando como resultado, la pérdida de confianza. Así aclarado, desde el momento en que el jerarca puede conocer objetivamente de la alteración de ese comprobante de inasistencia, sea, en fecha 20 de enero del 2014, al momento en que se peticiona la ampliación de cargos en data 27 de enero del 2014, es más que indudable que no ha fenecido el plazo mensual que alega la petente. Con todo, por tratarse de un tema de probidad, en orden a lo regulado por el precepto 44 de la Ley No. 8422, que remite a la prescripción del ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428, el plazo aplicable para sancionar esa supuesta infracción, sería de cinco años. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo del cargo bajo examen. \n\n VIII.- Sobre la falta de acreditación del motivo. La otra incorrección que se presenta como base de esta demanda se refiere a la ausencia de acreditación de los hechos que han dado base al motivo. En ese orden la accionante señala que no se pudo corroborar los hechos base de su despido, a la vez que existe una indebida fundamentación de los actos en virtud de los cuales se dispuso su destitución. Por su parte el Estado aduce que la parte actora no logra evidenciar que existan los elementos de nulidad del acto administrativo en cuanto al motivo y fundamentación de su despido como esgrime. Por el contrario, la sanción impuesta a la accionante es la consecuencia jurídica razonable y proporcional de la conducta grave que se tuvo por acreditada, los cuales se encuentran debidamente tipificados y constituyen faltas graves y por lo tanto se sancionan con el despido. Todo acto administrativo ha de cumplir con una serie de exigencias formales y sustanciales que determinan su validez. Tales elementos pueden ser de orden formal, dentro de los cuales se incluyen el procedimiento administrativo, motivación y forma de manifestación. Desde el plano material, esos elementos se agrupan en subjetivos (que incluyen la competencia, investidura y la voluntad) y objetivos (en los que se comprende el motivo, contenido y fin). El motivo se constituye en el antecedente de hecho o de derecho que habilita, legitima o exige la adopción de la conducta administrativa. En orden a lo regulado por el ordinal 133 de la LGAP, el motivo ha de ser legítimo y existir real o jurídicamente al momento de dictar el acto, y en todo el curso de su vigencia. Precisamente el objeto mismo del procedimiento administrativo es establecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de base al motivo, según se desprende de los preceptos 214, 221 y 297 de la LGAP. Ordena el mandato 133.2 de la citada ley, que cuando no se encuentre regulado (ese elemento) deberá ser proporcionado al contenido. Su incidencia en el contenido del acto es innegable, ya que este último debe abarcar todas las cuestiones de hecho y de derecho surgidas del motivo, aunque no hayan sido debatidas por las partes (artículo 132.1 ejusdem). Incluso, el contenido debe ser correspondiente al motivo, lo que pone en evidencia la trascendencia estructural de esa relación como presupuesto de legitimidad del acto. En la especie, los hechos sobre los cuales gravitaba el procedimiento disciplinario y, por ende, que configurarían el motivo del eventual acto final, se relacionaban con las ausencias registradas en fechas 14 al 18 de octubre del 2013, sin presentar justificación válida, así como con el aporte de un comprobante alterado para pretender justificar algunas de esas ausencias. En ese orden, en la resolución No. AJD-RES-005-2014 de las 11 horas del 06 de enero del 2014, traslado de cargos del expediente AJ-124-2013, se intimaron los siguientes hechos: \" ... de conformidad con el oficio N° DR3-13-227 del 21 de octubre del 2013, el Ing. Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional de Alajuela, le informó al Lic. Cristhian Méndez Blanco, que no había sido posible notificar a la servidora [Nombre62 001], de la suspensión emitida de acuerdo con la resolución N° 001267, de fecha 10 de octubre del año en curso, ya que no se había presentado a laborar desde el 14 de octubre del 2013. Con el cual, se tiene que dicha funcionaria quebrantó todos los principios que deben orientar el actuar de la Administración, ya que una de las obligaciones principales que sujetan a los servidores públicos es la asistencia puntual a su trabajo, por lo que la violación a este deber sin ninguna justificación, constituye una falta grave, que afecta los intereses de este Ministerio\". (Folios 12-15 del administrativo) De igual manera, por oficio 2014-0381, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, presentó ampliación a la gestión de despido sin responsabilidad patronal en contra de la servidora [Nombre62 001], alegando la alteración de comprobante de asistencia a centro médico. Fue mediante la resolución AJD-RES-046-2014 de las 14 horas del 04 de febrero del 2014, de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, comunicada a la accionante el 06 de febrero del 2014, que se notifica el traslado de cargos sobre la ampliación de hechos. El 20 de febrero del 2014 la actora presenta escrito de descargo sobre ese particular. (Folios 48-77 del administrativo) Ahora bien, en el acto final de la causa disciplinaria, resolución No. 12316 de las 19 horas 55 minutos del 28 de abril del 2014, el Tribunal de Servicio Civil dispuso: \"... SE DECLARA: CON LUGAR la gestión promovida por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para despedir a la servidora [Nombre62 001] de su puesto sin responsabilidad para el Estado. Consecuentemente, queda autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para despedir a la indicada servidora. Contra la presente resolución procede el recurso de apelación ante este Tribunal, con la debida expresión de agravios, de conformidad con lo que establece el artículo 44 y sus reformas, del Estatuto de Servicio Civil.\" Para esos efectos, y en orden a la patología que se alega y que se analiza en este punto, ese acto tuvo por acreditados los siguientes aspectos fácticos: \"...e) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] no se presentó a laborar del 15 al 18 de octubre de 2013, el día 14 de ese mes lo hizo en forma parcial, pues sólo aparece registrada la hora de entrada, la cual hizo a las 14:00 horas, sin informar previamente a sus superiores las razones que tenía para ausentarse ni aportar luego comprobante alguno para justificar dichas ausencias laborales. (Folios 128 y 129 del expediente de la gestión y 26 del legajo de pruebas); d) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] se le notificó el día 14 de octubre de 2013 a las 11:45 horas la Resolución No 001267 de las 7:06 horas del 10 de octubre de 2013 emitida por el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, en la que se acuerda una sanción disciplinaria, consistente en tres días de suspensión sin goce de salario. Dicha sanción y el rebajo de salario respectivo se le aplicó a la servidora recurrida durante los días del 22 al 24 de octubre de 2013.(Folios 02, 03 y 05 del legajo de pruebas); e) Que la servidora [Nombre62 001] intentó justificar ante sus superiores la ausencia laboral en la que incurrió el día 18 de octubre de 2013, presentando la fotocopia de un formulario denominado \"Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos\" de la Clínica Dr. Nombre5497 de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y extendido a Nombre62 de Nombre139065 . En dicho documento se registra su fecha de emisión en forma manuscrita y dice \"18/1 0/13\", al compararse con una copia del documento original se indica que es del \"3/10/13\", con evidente alteración del día 18. (Folios 67 del expediente de la gestión y 23 del legajo de pruebas)...\" Este acto fue comunicado a la actora el 14 de mayo del 2014. (Folios 208-217 del administrativo). Tales derivaciones fácticas encontraron respaldo en las diversas probanzas admitidas y recabadas dentro de la causa disciplinaria, a las cuales la accionante tuvo acceso y las que pudo rebatir en ejercicio de su derecho de contradictorio. De lo dicho se desprende que en ese procedimiento se establecieron las circunstancias a partir de las cuales la Administración tuvo por acreditadas las causas que sustentaron la apertura del procedimiento disciplinario y que fueron oportunamente intimadas a la reclamante. La demandante no combate de manera directa el proceso intelectivo de ponderación probatoria que llevó a las citadas inferencias, empero, en sede administrativa, por escrito del 16 de mayo del 2014, presentó recurso de apelación contra el acto final, siendo que por resolución No. 007-2015 TASC de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 29 de enero del 2015, el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil dispuso el rechazo de la medida apelativa formulada. En ese particular, parte de las cuestiones debatidas gravitaban en torno al ejercicio analítico de los elementos de convicción, aspecto en el cual, esa instancia apelativa concluyó que no se advertían incorrecciones en la valoración de las pruebas. Sobre tal extremo dicho Tribunal Administrativo expresó de manera contundente: “… En tal sentido, el Tribunal de Servicio Civil tuvo por debidamente acreditada la ausencia injustificada a sus labores por parte de la accionante, de los cuatro días que corren del 15 al 18 de octubre de 2013, sin que resultara como justificación válida para el Juzgador, que la servidora hubiese interpretado que en dichas fechas se encontraba suspendida por tres días (del 15 al 17 de octubre) de conformidad con la notificación de la resolución Nº 001267 de 10 de octubre de 2013, que le fuera realizada el 14 de octubre por parte del notificador Nombre139067 . Citado como testigo el Sr. Nombre139067 -tal y como lo transcribe la resolución recurrida- señaló no haber indicado a la accionada la fecha a partir de la cual correría la suspensión comunicada pues, según lo manifestado, no era el Jefe de la Sra. [Nombre62 001]…\". Bajo esa tesitura, es consideración de esta Cámara que los actos cuestionados manifiestan con toda claridad los hechos y probanzas a partir de los cuales se tuvo por acreditada la falta intimada, relativa a las ausencias sin justificación ocurridas en el período del 15 al 18 de octubre del 2013, sin que la parte promovente haya podido rebatir tales circunstancias. Por otro lado, en lo que se refiere al segundo motivo del acto, sea, la alteración del documento de asistencia a centro médico, la misma resolución del Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil, ponderó: \"... En éste particular, el reproche a la accionada no se refiere a si la accionada (sic) se ausentó o no de sus labores en esa fecha, ¡lo que está en examen es su conducta en relación con la utilización de un comprobante de asistencia a servicios clínicos de su madre la Sra. Nombre139065 , el cual, según quedó demostrado, no contiene información real en cuanto a la fecha, misma que fue alterada, y que además pretendió utilizarse indebidamente para Justificar una ausencia. De esta forma, si no existe un documento idóneo que Justifique su ausencia y además se evidencia que la accionada utilizó un documento oficial de una institución pública con información alterada para beneficiarse, en un intento de engañar a su patrono, eso constituye una grave infracción a las normas Jurídicas vigentes y a las obligaciones del trabajador con su patrono ...\". Tal mención pone de manifiesto las consideraciones que llevaron a tener por acreditada esa otra falta imputada dentro de la causa disciplinaria. Para ello no debe dejarse de lado lo arriba indicado en cuanto a que el aporte de ese documento alterado se sustenta en otras probanzas aportadas al expediente administrativo y previamente conocidas por la petente. En efecto, como se ha señalado en el elenco de hechos probados, se tiene que ante la aportación del citado comprobante, por oficio No. 20140133 del 20 de enero de 2014, la Dirección Jurídica del MOPT solicita a la Dirección del Laboratorio Clínico de la Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, detalle de las fechas en las que la accionante fue atendida en ese Laboratorio Clínico durante el mes de octubre del 2013. De igual manera, solicitó indicar si el comprobante que señala que la actora acompañó a Nombre139065 el día 18 de octubre del 2013, a efectos de que señale si ese Laboratorio consignó dicha justificación. (Folio 41 del administrativo) Ante esa gestión, por nota ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 del 20 de enero del 2014, el Director del Laboratorio Clínico indicado en el hecho precedente indica que durante el mes de octubre del 2013 la actora fue atendida el día 04 de ese mes, presentándose a la ventanilla de servicio a las 06.47 horas. Además, señaló en cuanto al comprobante aportado: \"3. Vista la copia de Solicitud de Resultados de Análisis Clínicos, por usted aportada, debo manifestar que la justificación anotada al pie de dicha solicitud no corresponde con lo procedente en el Servicio. Dicho día no hubo problemas con el SIL y en caso de que en algún momento lo hubiese, se habría emitido el comprobante en la fórmula \"CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS\". (Folio 40 del administrativo) Fue justamente el contenido de ese último comunicado el que sustentó que mediante el oficio No. 2014-0381 de fecha 27 de enero del 2014, el Ministro de la cartera de Obras Públicas y Transportes, peticionara la ampliación de cargos en el procedimiento de despido sin responsabilidad patronal. Por ende, es claro que, dentro de la carpeta administrativa, existe la efectiva y debida acreditación de ese hecho intimado. Al tenor de esas consideraciones, es postura de este cuerpo colegiado que el acto final como el definitivo que lo prohija, contienen la referencia y sustento debido de las circunstancias que dieron base al motivo del acto, consistente en la acreditación de las conductas intimadas desde el traslado de cargos. Bajo esa comprensión, acreditado dicho motivo, como antecedente de hecho, el contenido de esas conductas se constituye en la consecuencia y reacción prevista a la comprobación de esas conductas. Ergo, ese contenido se ajusta sustancialmente a los límites que le impone el canon 132 de la LGAP, en cuanto a la correspondencia con el motivo se refiere y a su licitud. Sobre esta última condición, la accionante no rebate las cuestiones jurídicas sobre las cuales se sustenta la decisión de su despido sin responsabilidad patronal por las faltas cometidas. El mismo acto final señala que la decisión se adopta al socaire de un conjunto de preceptos legales y reglamentarios que la demanda no refuta ni combate, dentro de los cuales se mencionan los artículos 19, 71 inciso b) y 81 inciso g) y 1), del Código de Trabajo, 39, 43 y 80 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, 82 y 35 del Reglamento del Servicio Civil. Se insiste, la demanda no aporta agravios en torno a la indebida aplicación, errónea interpretación de esas normas, o bien, falta de aplicación de algún precepto normativo que llevara a conclusión o tratamiento diverso de su situación y en esos términos, no puede establecerse una eventual ilegitimidad del acto cuestionado, en cuanto ha sido objeto de debate. Cabe insistir que el tema relacionado a la preclusión de la potestad de ejecución del despido fue un aspecto ya resuelto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el ejercicio de sus competencias de Tribunal de Casación, en una proyección diversa a la originalmente adoptada por este Tribunal de Fondo, criterio que por la jerarquía de dicha instancia y al constituirse en la decisión última en esta jurisdicción, constituye la última y definitiva sobre ese particular y que por tanto, no puede ser analizada nuevamente. Así, siendo que se ha definido la improcedencia de la prescripción alegada en cuanto a esa ejecución, como tampoco se ha establecido el fenecimiento de la potestad de analizar lo relativo a la alteración del comprobante, ni la existencia de la patología acusada en cuanto a la acreditación de los hechos base del motivo de los actos reprochados, debe disponerse el rechazo de esos cargos bajo examen. \n\n IX.- Corolario. Análisis de las defensas opuestas. Conferido el traslado de ley, la representación del ente accionado contestó de manera negativa. Opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. Dicha defensa debe acogerse a plenitud, lo que lleva, sin más, al rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos. \n\n X.- Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, es consideración de este Tribunal que la parte vencida ha tenido motivo suficiente para litigar. Para ello basta señalar que las pretensiones de la accionante fueron inicialmente estimadas por el tema de la prescripción de la potestad de ejecución, tema en el cual, se presentan varias posturas de interpretación jurídica y que pone en evidencia la buena fe y causa legítima para la formulación de este proceso. Luego, lo debido es resolver el presente asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas. \n\n \n\nPOR TANTO.\n\n Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por la señora [Nombre 001] contra el Estado. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*\n\n \n\nEXPEDIENTE: 15-002978-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: [Nombre62 001]\n\nDEMANDADO: El Estado.\n\nIGWTHUP.JRGN 2019.\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento firmado por: \n\nROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nCYNTHIA ABARCA GOMEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nDANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A", "body_en_text": "FILE: 15-002978-1027-CA\n\nMATTER: PURE LAW PROCEEDING\n\nPLAINTIFF: [Name 001]\n\nDEFENDANT: The State.\n\nNo. 140-2019-VI.\n\nCONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, SIXTH SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at eight hours and twenty minutes on November first, two thousand nineteen.\n\nPure law proceeding brought by Mrs. [Name62 001], identity card number [CED62 ], represented by attorney Karen Carvajal Loaiza, identity card number CED12283, against the State, represented in this proceeding by attorney Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, identity card number CED2807.\n\nWHEREAS:\n\n1.- On April 8, 2015, the plaintiff filed the complaint that gave rise to this proceeding so that the judgment orders: \"a) That this complaint be upheld in its entirety. b) That it be declared that the administrative process carried out against my client by the Dirección General de Servicio Civil was time-barred at the time of expanding the dismissal action and at the time of notifying the sanction. c) That the administrative act that decreed the dismissal of the servant [Name62 001] was not substantiated, as the alteration of documents by my client was not demonstrated. d) That the immediate reinstatement of Mrs. [Name62 001] to her position as janitor (miscelánea) within the MOPT be ordered. e) That the defendants be ordered to pay both costs of this action.\" In the preliminary hearing, she specified claim b) as seeking to annul resolution AJDRES-046-2014 of fourteen hours on February fourth, two thousand fourteen, Resolution 12318 of seven hours fifty-five minutes on April twenty-eighth, two thousand fourteen, Resolution 007-2015 TASC of fifteen hours ten minutes on January twenty-ninth, two thousand fifteen, Official Letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP. Likewise, in claim d) she specified that she also sought the payment of back pay (salarios caídos), interest, and indexation on the sums owed from March thirtieth, two thousand fifteen until her effective reinstatement. (Images 44-49, 1-11 part 7 and 8 of the file, hearing minutes from image 21 of the complete file) She also requested the precautionary measure of reinstatement to her janitor (miscelánea) position at the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (hereinafter MOPT).\n\n2.- The State, upon being served with the precautionary measure, opposed it in the terms stated in images 22-37 of the file, part 8.\n\n3.- By resolution No. 1208-2015 of 10 hours 05 minutes on May 5, 2015, the judge in the procedural stage ordered the rejection of the requested precautionary measure. No appeal filed against said decision is on record. (Images 43-49 of the file, part 9)\n\n4.- Served with the complaint, the State responded negatively. It raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 52-53, 1-21 of the file, parts 9 and 10 respectively).\n\n5.- The preliminary hearing established in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was held on January 19, 2016, with the attendance of all parties. At that stage, having admitted no evidence to be presented at an oral trial, the file was declared a pure law matter and the parties presented their conclusions. (Images 21-23 of the complete file)\n\n6.- The respective file was remitted to this Sixth Section of the Contencioso-Administrative Tribunal for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on August 8, 2016, as detailed in the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the main file.\n\n7.- By resolution No. 0139-2016-VI of 11 hours 30 minutes on September 21, 2016, Section VI of this Contencioso-Administrative Tribunal issued a final judgment in this matter. (Images 93-116 of the main file)\n\n8.- Pursuant to a cassation appeal filed by the State's representation, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, acting as the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo, in accordance with Transitory Provision I of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), in ruling No. 16-F-TC-2019 of 10 hours 20 minutes on February 6, 2019 ordered: \"THEREFORE. The appeal is upheld. The contested pronouncement is annulled. In its place, resolving on the merits, the defense of lack of right invoked by the State is accepted, only regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to execute the dismissal sanction against the plaintiff; and the complaint is denied only with respect to that claim. This matter is remanded so that the Tribunal rules on the rest of the arguments on which it has not yet issued a pronouncement.\" (Images 15- of the main file)\n\n9.- The respective file was remitted to this Sixth Section of the Contencioso-Administrative Tribunal for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on September 2, 2019, as detailed in the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the main file.\n\n10.- No nullities requiring correction have been observed in the proceedings before this Tribunal.\n\nJudge Garita Navarro drafts with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Aguilar Méndez;\n\nCONSIDERING\n\nI.- Proven facts. The following are of relevance for the resolution of this proceeding: 1) Mrs. [Name62 001] began working for the Ministerio de Obras Pública on June 16, 1994, in the position class of Janitor (Miscelánea). (See Certification N°DGIRH-1856-2015-SP dated April 14, 2015, appearing in images 22-23 of file part 10) 2) On December 20, 2013, the Minister of Obras Públicas y Transportes, Mr. Pedro Castro Fernández, formally submitted a Dismissal action to the Dirección General de Servicio Civil against the plaintiff for alleged unjustified absences, arguing that it was not possible to notify the official of a three-day suspension resolution on October 14, 2013, and that since that date she did not report for work. In that official letter, the following was essentially alleged: A. That through Official Letter No DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional of Alajuela, informed attorney Christian Méndez Blanco that the suspension issued by Resolution No 001267, dated October 10, 2013 from the Office of the Minister, could not be notified to the servant [Name62 001] because said servant had not reported for work since October 14, 2013, without having presented any justification to that Office, for which reason the corresponding disciplinary measures were requested. B. That through Official Letter No DRL-13-0583 of October 22, 2013, Mr. Nombre58535 forwarded the aforementioned official letter to Mr. Nombre139064, so that he could proceed according to law. C. That through Official Letter No DR3-13-2013 of October 25, 2013, addressed to Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional, Mr. Nombre139064 indicated that in view of the receipts delivered to him by Mr. Nombre136079 on October 24, 2013 regarding servant [Name62 001], justifying the absences on October 8, 14, and 17, 2013, and a sick leave from October 21 to 28, 2013, said receipts were delivered late, according to article 41 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios. D) That through Recommendations Report No DRL-2013-296 of November 21, 2013, the Departamento de Relaciones Laborales recommended desisting from initiating a Disciplinary Administrative Procedure against servant [Name62 001]!, because a criterion of a presumed unjustified absence from October 14, 2013 could not be established, since it was due to fortuitous events that were verified, such as a disciplinary suspension at the institutional level, medical appointments at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social clinics, and a sick leave notice from the same insurer. E) That this Office, by Resolution No 001507 at 2:00 PM on December 19, 2013, decided to depart from the recommendation issued by the Instructing Body through the Recommendations Report No. DRL-2013-296 mentioned above, and ordered the initiation of a dismissal action proceeding before Dirección497 against servant [Name62 001]. (Uncontroverted second fact of the complaint, folios 1-10 of the administrative file) 3) On January 8, 2014, resolution No. AJD-RES-005-2014 of 11 hours on January 6, 2014, was notified to the servant, which constitutes the statement of charges in file AJ-124-2013, through which the following facts were imputed to her: \" ... according to official letter N° DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Subdirector Regional of Alajuela, informed attorney Cristhian Méndez Blanco that it had not been possible to notify servant [Name62 001] of the suspension issued by resolution N° 001267, dated October 10 of this year, as she had not reported for work since October 14, 2013. Therefore, it is held that said official violated all principles that must guide the actions of the Administration, since one of the main obligations binding public servants is punctual attendance at work, so the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes a serious fault affecting the interests of this Ministry\". (Folios 12-15 of the administrative file) 4) That by official letter 20140133 of January 20, the Dirección Jurídica of the MOPT requested the Dirección del Laboratorio Clínico of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo to provide details of the dates on which the plaintiff was treated at that Clinical Laboratory during October 2013. Likewise, it requested an indication of whether the receipt stating that the plaintiff accompanied Nombre139065 on October 18, 2013, was recorded as a justification by that Laboratory. (Folio 41 of the administrative file) 5) By note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory indicated in the preceding fact states that during October 2013, the plaintiff was treated on the 4th of that month, presenting herself at the service window at 06:47 hours. Additionally, regarding the receipt provided, he stated: \"3. Having viewed the copy of the Solicitud de Resultados de Análisis Clínicos provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the foot of said request does not correspond to what is proper in the Service. That day there were no problems with the SIL and if at any time there were, the receipt would have been issued on the 'CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS' form.\" (Folio 40 of the administrative file) 6) Through a written submission of January 22, 2014, the plaintiff's legal representative entered her defense against the statement of charges referred to in the previous section. (Folios 21-25 of the administrative file) 7) On February 4, 2014, before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, through official letter 2014-0381, the Minister of Obras Públicas y Transportes submitted an expansion to the dismissal action without employer liability against servant [Name62 001], stating the following: That according to Official Letter No ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Laboratorio Clínico of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, it was determined that the receipt provided by Mrs. [Name62 001] for not reporting to work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend stating \"Acompañante: [Name62 001] Hija\" was altered, since that is not the established procedure in said Clinical Laboratory to issue attendance receipts, in addition to the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only treated at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. (Folios 29-38 of the administrative file) 8) By resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 of 14 hours on February 4, 2014, from the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, the statement of charges for the expansion of facts was notified. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a defense brief on this matter. (Folios 48-77 of the administrative file) 9) On March 7, 2014, an oral and private hearing was held before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, at which Messrs. Nombre136079, Nombre139066, Nombre139064 appeared as witnesses. (Folios 101-111 of the administrative file) 10) On March 13, 2014, a second oral and private hearing was held, at which the testimony of Mr. Nombre136080, Nombre136081, and Nombre136082 was received. (Folios 128-135 of the administrative file) 11) On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff in this proceeding presented her conclusions within disciplinary proceeding N° AJ-124-2013, in which, in addition to the substantive arguments indicated, she raised the defense of statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción) of the Minister's disciplinary power to expand the accusation against her. (Folios 147-170 of the administrative file) 12) By resolution No. 12316 of 19 hours 55 minutes on April 28, 2014, the Tribunal de Servicio Civil issued the final act within the procedure and ordered: \"THEREFORE. Based on the foregoing, cited legal provisions, and articles 14 subsection a) and 190 subsection a) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and 63 subsection a) of its Regulation, IT IS DECLARED: UPHELD the action promoted by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes to dismiss the servant [Name62 001] from her position without liability for the State. Consequently, the Poder Ejecutivo is authorized to dismiss the indicated servant. The appeal for annulment is available against this resolution before this Tribunal, with the proper statement of grievances, in accordance with article 44 and its amendments, of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil.\" In essence, it held the following as proven facts: \"...e) That the servant [Name62 001] did not report for work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th of that month she did so partially, as only the entry time is recorded, which she made at 14:00 hours, without previously informing her superiors of the reasons she had to be absent, nor subsequently providing any receipt to justify said work absences. (Folios 128 and 129 of the action file and 26 of the evidence file); d) That servant [Name62 001] was notified on October 14, 2013 at 11:45 hours of Resolution No 001267 of 7:06 hours on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Obras Públicas y Transportes, in which a disciplinary sanction consisting of a three-day suspension without pay was agreed upon. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction was applied to the respondent servant during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Folios 02, 03 and 05 of the evidence file); e) That the servant [Name62 001] attempted to justify her work absence on October 18, 2013 to her superiors, by presenting a photocopy of a form called \"Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos\" from the Clínica Dr. Nombre5497 of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and issued to Nombre62 de Nombre139065. In said document, the date of issuance is registered in handwritten form and states '18/1 0/13'; when compared with a copy of the original document, it indicates it is from '3/10/13', with an evident alteration of the day 18. (Folios 67 of the action file and 23 of the evidence file)\" This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014. (Folios 208-217 of the administrative file) 13) In a written submission of May 16, 2014, the plaintiff filed an appeal against the final act referred to in the previous section. (Folios 238-243 of the administrative file) 14) By resolution No.- 007-2015 TASC of 15 hours 10 minutes on January 29, 2015, the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil ordered the rejection of the appeal filed. This act was notified to the plaintiff and the MOPT on February 2, 2015. (Folios 265-297 of the administrative file) 15) By official letter 20150577 of February 12, 2015, the Dirección Jurídica communicated to the Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos the notification of ruling No. 007-2015 TASC of 15 hours 10 minutes on January 29, 2015, from the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil. (Folios 331-332 of administrative file 2) 16) By official letter DGIRH-1344-2015 of February 19, 2015, the Director de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos sent the plaintiff's dismissal agreement to the Dirección Jurídica for due processing before the Office of the Minister, the draft of which indicates that the dismissal takes effect as of March 30, 2015. (Folios 337-338 of administrative file 2) 17) By official letter 20150820 of February 25, 2015, the Director de Asuntos Jurídicos sent the plaintiff's dismissal agreement to the head of the Obras Públicas y Transportes portfolio, the draft of which indicates that the dismissal takes effect as of March 30, 2015, and with an issuance date detail of February 26, 2015. (Folios 339-340 of administrative file 2) 18) By official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Departamento de Gestión de Servicios de Personal, the following was indicated to the plaintiff: \"I hereby communicate to you Dismissal without employer liability effective as of March 30, 2015, in accordance with Resolution No. 007-2015-TASC of fifteen hours ten minutes on the twenty-ninth day of January two thousand fifteen of the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil and official letter No. DGIRH-1344-2015 dated February 19, 2015 from the Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos. (...)\". This act was communicated to the petitioner on March 16, 2015 at 10:40 hours. (Image 34 of the file, part 10)\n\nIII.- Unproven facts: The following is of relevance for this ruling: 1) That the plaintiff timely justified the absences corresponding to October 15, 16, 17, and 18, 2013.\n\nIII- Purpose of the proceeding. The purpose of this complaint is to analyze the validity of the procedure that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal with just cause and without liability for the State, effective as of March 30, 2015. The plaintiff raises a series of allegations that essentially revolve around the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the power to execute the dismissal authorized by the Tribunal de Servicio Civil and later confirmed by the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, as well as the impropriety of the sanction due to the failure to demonstrate cause. For better organization of this ruling, we proceed to the analysis of the allegations raised, which will be conducted according to the substantive thematic axis developed by the parties, to avoid repetitive or unnecessary analysis.\n\nIV.- Regarding the claim of statute of limitations on the power to sanction. On the effects of what was analyzed at the cassation stage. As noted in the Whereas clauses of this judgment, initially, in ruling No. 0139-2016-VI of 11 hours 30 minutes on September 21, 2016, this Sixth Section of this Contencioso-Administrative Tribunal issued a final judgment in this matter, which had considered, relevantly: \"... the nullity of official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Departamento de Gestión de Servicios de Personal, which communicates to the plaintiff her dismissal without employer liability effective March 30, 2015, because the power to issue that last act had prescribed. It should be noted that the foregoing analysis does not, in any way, involve addressing the substantive reasons for which the dismissal was decreed at the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, nor the issue of the statute of limitations on the expansion of charges, given the lack of merit or necessity for such analysis.\" However, given the cassation appeal filed by the State's representation, in ruling No. 000016-F-TC-2019, of 10 hours 20 minutes on February 6, 2019, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the exercise of its powers as Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo, in accordance with Transitory Provision I of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), ordered: \"THEREFORE. The appeal is upheld. The contested pronouncement is annulled. In its place, resolving on the merits, the defense of lack of right invoked by the State is accepted, only regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power to execute the dismissal sanction against the plaintiff; and the complaint is denied only with respect to that claim. This matter is remanded so that the Tribunal rules on the rest of the arguments on which it has not yet issued a pronouncement.\" To this end, it established that the applicable period for the execution phase of the contested disciplinary act was that provided by canon 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, that is, the six-month period regulated for the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure. From this analytical standpoint, the issue related to the statute of limitations on the power to execute the dismissal act is a matter on which a pronouncement has already been made by the highest instance of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction for the type of matter analyzed in this proceeding, and therefore, no further observations on this point can be made in this judgment. However, the same cassation instance remanded this matter for the definition and substantive ruling on the other issues debated by the parties, as specified in the \"therefore\" part of that ruling. Consequently, we now proceed to weigh the issues raised by the plaintiff, other than the aforementioned statute of limitations (prescripción).\n\nV.- Regarding the statute of limitations regarding the expansion of charges in the dismissal action. In her complaint, the plaintiff argues the nullity of the dismissal, considering that the State's disciplinary power had become prescribed, in the first instance, when the Minister sent the expansion of the accusation in February 2014, despite having known the facts since November 2013. In this regard, she states that two and a half months had passed since that authority learned of the facts until he presented the expansion of new facts. She considers that this expansion was improper, which was argued at the time when presenting conclusions and was not considered in the final resolutions. Regarding these allegations, the State states that the dismissal action was filed by the Minister on December 20, 2013, based on official letter DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013. It notes that the investigation and proceedings carried out by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes prior to the processing of the sanctioning administrative procedure by the Dirección General del Servicio Civil and the Tribunal del Servicio Civil against the plaintiff constitute a preliminary investigation of the faults attributed to her, and therefore there is no statute of limitations on the sanctioning power for expanding the facts for which she was being investigated at the Dirección General del Servicio Civil. It points out that the statute of limitations on the power cannot occur within the preliminary investigation, as this phase is not part of the procedure. It cites some precedents from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Regarding this particular charge, the following should be noted.\n\nVI.- Regarding the temporal element in the exercise of disciplinary administrative corrective powers. The analysis of the validity of the conduct subject to this proceeding has as a fundamental point to determine if the action to expand the charges was filed by the Minister, in January 2014, before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil. The following must be stated on this matter. In civil service relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise cannot be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that establishes particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of article 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestrained in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic reasons, are considered imprescriptible -e.g., protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales)-, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise -as examined in this case- are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may lapse with the passage of the time established by the legal system without being implemented. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior, and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which their right to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Nevertheless, in public employment matters, the negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) may well be argued as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, even if this defense was not exercised prior to the issuance of the public will. Thus, the corrective power cannot be considered imprescriptible, trying to justify that deduction based on the rule of numeral 66.1 of the LGAP, but rather it is one subject to preclusion rules for temporal factors, as visualized in subsection 3) of that same numeral 66 of Law No. Placa1975. Now, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary procedures, all of which apply rules for the temporal exercise of faculties or powers, but with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity purposes, of demarcation criteria that allow addressing the discussed issues, depending on the scenario in question. In this context, it has been established that the plaintiff held an appointment as janitor (miscelánea) at the MOPT, and therefore, such legal relationship is governed by the rules of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, Law No. 1581 and its regulation (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 21 of December 14, 1954). From this plane, the Regulation of the Estatuto, in article 99, states: \"The following shall prescribe in one month: a) ... b) ... c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate the dismissal action of regular servants for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, from the day on which the cause for the sanction arose, or, as the case may be, from when the corresponding facts or faults were known.\" Therefore, in this case, given the date of the facts, the faults attributed were governed by the generic statute of limitations set by the then-current article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, which corresponds to precept 414 of the current and valid Código de Trabajo (according to the reform made by Law No. 9343), given the referral provided by numeral 51 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. This regulation sets (and set) a period of one month for the exercise of this repressive power, understood as the communication of the actions aimed at exercising the internal corrective power. Now, the starting point for calculating this prescriptive period is decisive. On this matter, numeral 603 of the Código de Trabajo stated that the period runs from when the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is calculated from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require a prior preliminary investigation stage, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the hierarchical superior. This is also the case for faults evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose further action for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective hierarchical superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication to the hierarchical superior of said report, since it is only at that moment that such holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings.\n\nHowever, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, since otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity or not. It is worth noting that the aforementioned time limit is widened and extended when any of the circumstances regulated by special norms are configured. This is the case of faults regulated by the special norms specified by the internal control regime, probity in public function, and Public Treasury management, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (Art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in public function, No. 8422 (Art. 44), and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, respectively, a special term of five years operates (according to the circumstances and from the moments those norms provide), and not the monthly term established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime.\n\nVII.- Specific analysis. Therefore, in the specific case, in act 2014-0381 of January 27, 2014, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, when presenting the expansion of the statement of charges (imputación de cargos) against the plaintiff, before the General Directorate of Civil Service, indicated that although the basic facts of the complaint were dated October 18, 2013, the date of the unjustified absence, he specified, regarding what is relevant to the point under examination, that according to Official Letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of the Marcial Rodríguez Conejo Clinic, it was determined that the voucher provided by Mrs. [Nombre62 001], to not report to work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend indicating \"Companion: [Nombre62 001] Daughter,\" was altered, since that is not the procedure established in said Clinical Laboratory to issue attendance vouchers, coupled with the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only attended at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. It was precisely based on that finding, from which a presumed alteration of that provided document was derived, that the expansion of the facts was requested in the proceedings for dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal). In that context, it must be noted, the initial request for opening the dismissal proceeding directed by the ministerial head to the General Directorate of Civil Service, resolution 2013-6785, was issued on December 18, 2013, and its purpose was to discipline the absences recorded from October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification (folios 01-09 of the administrative file). However, the expansion regarding which statute of limitations (prescripción) is argued, i.e., act No. 2014-0381, although it is dated January 27, 2014, as indicated, its purpose is not related to the unjustified absences mentioned ut supra, but rather to the provision of an altered voucher. According to the factual account that has been detailed, such discovery was possible, from an objective standpoint, only at the time when official letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, was submitted. That is, the expansion incorporates into the dismissal proceeding a cause different from the unjustified absence, which in itself, the head considered reprehensible to a serious degree, for violating the norms regulating probity in the exercise of public function. For this, it suffices to refer to the content of that transfer of charges, in which, after the formulation of the facts, it presents an exposition of the position under which it considers the duty of probity injured and, with it, Law No. Placa5670, resulting in a loss of trust. Thus clarified, from the moment the head could objectively know of the alteration of that non-attendance voucher, i.e., on January 20, 2014, to the moment the expansion of charges was requested on January 27, 2014, it is more than undoubtable that the monthly term alleged by the petitioner has not expired. However, as it is a matter of probity, according to what is regulated by precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which refers to the statute of limitations (prescripción) of ordinal 71 of Law No. 7428, the applicable term to sanction that alleged infraction would be five years. Consequently, the rejection of the charge under examination must be ordered.\n\nVIII.- Regarding the lack of accreditation of the grounds (motivo). The other incorrectness presented as the basis of this lawsuit refers to the absence of accreditation of the facts that have grounded the grounds (motivo). In that order, the plaintiff points out that the basic facts of her dismissal could not be corroborated, while there is an improper substantiation of the acts by virtue of which her dismissal was ordered. For its part, the State argues that the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the elements of nullity of the administrative act exist regarding the grounds (motivo) and substantiation of her dismissal as she contends. On the contrary, the sanction imposed on the plaintiff is the reasonable and proportional legal consequence of the serious conduct that was taken as accredited, which is duly typified and constitutes serious faults and therefore is sanctioned with dismissal. Every administrative act must comply with a series of formal and substantial requirements that determine its validity. Such elements can be of a formal nature, within which the administrative procedure, motivation, and form of manifestation are included. From a material standpoint, these elements are grouped into subjective (which include competence, investiture, and will) and objective (in which the grounds (motivo), content, and purpose are included). The grounds (motivo) constitute the factual or legal antecedent that enables, legitimizes, or requires the adoption of the administrative conduct. Regarding what is regulated by ordinal 133 of the LGAP, the grounds (motivo) must be legitimate and exist really or legally at the time of issuing the act, and throughout its entire validity. Precisely, the very purpose of the administrative procedure is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the grounds (motivo), as can be deduced from precepts 214, 221, and 297 of the LGAP. Mandate 133.2 of the cited law orders that when (that element) is not regulated, it must be proportionate to the content. Its incidence on the content of the act is undeniable, since the latter must encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds (motivo), even if they have not been debated by the parties (Article 132.1 ejusdem). Even the content must correspond to the grounds (motivo), which highlights the structural transcendence of that relationship as a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the act. In the case at hand, the facts upon which the disciplinary procedure gravitated and, therefore, that would configure the grounds (motivo) of the eventual final act, related to the absences recorded from October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification, as well as the provision of an altered voucher to try to justify some of those absences. In that order, in resolution No. AJD-RES-005-2014 at 11:00 a.m. on January 6, 2014, transfer of charges of file AJ-124-2013, the following facts were charged: \" ... in accordance with official letter No. DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Eng. Ernesto Soto Vega, Regional Subdirector of Alajuela, informed Mr. Cristhian Méndez Blanco that it had not been possible to notify the employee [Nombre62 001] of the suspension issued according to resolution No. 001267, dated October 10 of the current year, since she had not reported to work since October 14, 2013. With which, it is established that said official broke all the principles that must guide the Administration's actions, since one of the main obligations that bind public officials is punctual attendance to their work, so the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes a serious fault, which affects the interests of this Ministry.\" (Folios 12-15 of the administrative file) Likewise, by official letter 2014-0381, the Minister of Public Works and Transport presented an expansion to the dismissal proceeding without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) against the employee [Nombre62 001], alleging the alteration of a medical center attendance voucher. It was through resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 at 2:00 p.m. on February 4, 2014, of the General Directorate of Civil Service, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, that the transfer of charges regarding the expansion of facts was notified. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff filed a discharge brief regarding that particular matter. (Folios 48-77 of the administrative file) Now, in the final act of the disciplinary case, resolution No. 12316 at 7:55 p.m. on April 28, 2014, the Civil Service Tribunal ordered: \"... IT IS DECLARED: GRANTED the proceeding promoted by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to dismiss the employee [Nombre62 001] from her position without liability for the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss said employee. Against this resolution, the appeal is admissible before this Tribunal, with the due expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 and its amendments, of the Civil Service Statute.\" For those purposes, and in order to address the pathology that is alleged and analyzed at this point, that act took the following factual aspects as accredited: \"...e) That the employee [Nombre62 001] did not report to work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th of that month she did so partially, since only the entry time is recorded, which she made at 2:00 p.m., without previously informing her superiors of the reasons she had to be absent nor subsequently providing any voucher to justify said work absences. (Folios 128 and 129 of the proceeding file and 26 of the evidence dossier); d) That the employee [Nombre62 001] was notified on October 14, 2013, at 11:45 a.m. of Resolution No 001267 at 7:06 a.m. on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, in which a disciplinary sanction is agreed, consisting of three days of suspension without pay. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction were applied to the respondent employee during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Folios 02, 03, and 05 of the evidence dossier); e) That the employee [Nombre62 001] attempted to justify to her superiors the work absence she incurred on October 18, 2013, by presenting a photocopy of a form called \"Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos\" from the Dr. Nombre5497 Clinic of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and issued to Nombre62 of Nombre139065. In said document, its issuance date is recorded in handwriting and says \"18/1 0/13\"; upon comparison with a copy of the original document, it is indicated to be \"3/10/13\", with evident alteration of the 18th day. (Folios 67 of the proceeding file and 23 of the evidence dossier)...\" This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014. (Folios 208-217 of the administrative file). Such factual derivations found support in the various pieces of evidence admitted and gathered within the disciplinary case, which the plaintiff had access to and could refute in the exercise of her right of contradiction. From the foregoing, it is clear that in that procedure, the circumstances were established from which the Administration took as accredited the causes that supported the opening of the disciplinary procedure and which were timely charged to the claimant. The plaintiff does not directly combat the intellectual process of evidentiary weighing that led to the cited inferences; however, in the administrative venue, through a brief dated May 16, 2014, she filed an appeal against the final act, and by resolution No. 007-2015 TASC at 3:10 p.m. on January 29, 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of Civil Service ordered the rejection of the formulated appeal measure. In that particular, part of the debated issues gravitated around the analytical exercise of the elements of conviction, an aspect in which, that appellate instance concluded that no incorrectness was observed in the assessment of the evidence. Regarding that extreme, said Administrative Tribunal expressed forcefully: “… In that sense, the Civil Service Tribunal took as duly accredited the unjustified absence from her work by the plaintiff, for the four days running from October 15 to 18, 2013, without it resulting as valid justification for the Adjudicator that the employee had interpreted that on said dates she was suspended for three days (from October 15 to 17) in accordance with the notification of resolution No. 001267 of October 10, 2013, which had been carried out to her on October 14 by the notifier Nombre139067. Cited as a witness, Mr. Nombre139067 - as the appealed resolution transcribes - indicated he had not told the respondent the date from which the communicated suspension would run because, according to his statement, he was not the Head of Mrs. [Nombre62 001]…\". Under that reasoning, it is the consideration of this Chamber that the challenged acts manifest with complete clarity the facts and evidence from which the charged fault was taken as accredited, related to the absences without justification occurring from October 15 to 18, 2013, without the promoting party having been able to rebut such circumstances. On the other hand, regarding what refers to the second grounds (motivo) of the act, i.e., the alteration of the medical center attendance document, the same resolution of the Administrative Tribunal of Civil Service weighed: \"... In this particular, the reproach to the respondent does not refer to whether the respondent (sic) was absent or not from her duties on that date; what is under examination is her conduct in relation to the use of a clinical service attendance voucher for her mother, Mrs. Nombre139065, which, as was demonstrated, does not contain real information regarding the date, the same which was altered, and which was also improperly attempted to be used to justify an absence. In this way, if there is no suitable document that justifies her absence and it is further evidenced that the respondent used an official document from a public institution with altered information to benefit herself, in an attempt to deceive her employer, that constitutes a serious infraction of the prevailing legal norms and the obligations of the worker with her employer ...\". Such mention reveals the considerations that led to taking that other fault charged within the disciplinary case as accredited. For this, one must not leave aside what was indicated above regarding that the provision of that altered document is supported by other evidence provided to the administrative file and previously known by the petitioner. Indeed, as indicated in the list of proven facts, it is established that upon the provision of the cited voucher, through official letter No. 20140133 of January 20, 2014, the Legal Directorate of the MOPT requested the Directorate of the Clinical Laboratory of the Marcial Rodríguez Conejo Clinic to provide a detail of the dates on which the plaintiff was attended at that Clinical Laboratory during the month of October 2013. Similarly, it requested to indicate whether the voucher that states that the plaintiff accompanied Nombre139065 on October 18, 2013, was consigned by that Laboratory as justification. (Folio 41 of the administrative file) In response to that request, through note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory indicated in the preceding fact states that during the month of October 2013, the plaintiff was attended on the 4th of that month, appearing at the service window at 06:47 a.m. Furthermore, regarding the provided voucher, he stated: \"3. Viewing the copy of the Solicitud de Resultados de Análisis Clínicos, provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the foot of said request does not correspond to what is appropriate in the Service. That day there were no problems with the SIL and in the event that at some point there were, the voucher would have been issued on the form \"CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS.\"\" (Folio 40 of the administrative file) It was precisely the content of that last communication that supported that, through official letter No. 2014-0381 dated January 27, 2014, the Minister of the portfolio of Public Works and Transport requested the expansion of charges in the dismissal without employer liability proceeding. Therefore, it is clear that within the administrative file, the effective and due accreditation of that charged fact exists. In light of these considerations, it is the position of this collegiate body that the final act, as well as the definitive act that upholds it, contain the due reference and support for the circumstances that gave basis to the grounds (motivo) of the act, consisting of the accreditation of the conducts charged from the transfer of charges. Under that understanding, having accredited said grounds (motivo) as a factual antecedent, the content of those conducts constitutes the consequence and reaction foreseen upon the verification of those conducts. Ergo, that content substantially conforms to the limits imposed by canon 132 of the LGAP, regarding the correspondence with the grounds (motivo) and its lawfulness. Regarding this last condition, the plaintiff does not rebut the legal questions upon which the decision for her dismissal without employer liability for the committed faults is sustained. The final act itself indicates that the decision is adopted under the shelter of a set of legal and regulatory precepts that the lawsuit does not refute or combat, within which articles 19, 71 subsection b) and 81 subsections g) and l), of the Labor Code, 39, 43, and 80 of the Civil Service Statute, 82 and 35 of the Civil Service Regulation are mentioned. It is insisted, the lawsuit does not provide grievances regarding the improper application, erroneous interpretation of those norms, or the lack of application of any normative precept that would lead to a conclusion or treatment different from her situation, and in those terms, a possible illegitimacy of the challenged act, insofar as it has been the object of debate, cannot be established. It must be reiterated that the issue related to the preclusion of the power to execute the dismissal was an aspect already resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the exercise of its competencies as a Cassation Tribunal, in a different projection from the one originally adopted by this Trial Court, a criterion that, due to the hierarchy of that instance and by constituting the final decision in this jurisdiction, constitutes the last and definitive one on that particular and therefore, cannot be analyzed again. Thus, since the inadmissibility of the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) regarding that execution has been defined, as well as the expiration of the power to analyze matters relating to the alteration of the voucher has not been established, nor the existence of the accused pathology regarding the accreditation of the basic facts of the grounds (motivo) of the reproached acts, the rejection of those charges under examination must be ordered.\n\nIX.- Corollary. Analysis of the opposed defenses. Once the legal transfer was conferred, the representation of the defendant entity answered negatively. It opposed the defense of lack of right. Said defense must be accepted in full, which leads, without further ado, to the rejection of the lawsuit in all its extremes.\n\nX.- Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when there was, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is dictated by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, it is the consideration of this Tribunal that the losing party had sufficient reason to litigate. For this, it suffices to point out that the plaintiff's claims were initially estimated due to the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the power of execution, an issue on which various positions of legal interpretation are presented and which highlights the good faith and legitimate cause for the filing of this process. Therefore, the proper course is to resolve this matter without special condemnation in costs.\n\nPOR TANTO.\n\nThe defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mrs. [Nombre 001] against the State is declared without merit in all its extremes. It is resolved without special condemnation in costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*\n\nEXPEDIENTE: 15-002978-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: [Nombre62 001]\n\nDEMANDADO: El Estado.\n\nIGWTHUP.JRGN 2019.\n\n(Images 43-49 of the case file, part 9)\n\n**4.-** Once the lawsuit was served, the State answered in the negative. It raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 52-53, 1-21 of the case file, parts 9 and 10 respectively).\n\n**5.-** The preliminary hearing established in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was held on January 19, 2016, with the attendance of all parties. At that stage, since no evidence requiring presentation at an oral trial had been admitted, the case file was declared to be a matter of pure law and the parties rendered their conclusions. (Images 21-23 of the complete case file)\n\n**6.-** The respective case file was referred to this Sexta Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo for the issuance of the pertinent judgment on August 8, 2016, as recorded in the detail of the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the main case file.\n\n**7.-** By resolution No. 0139-2016-VI of 11:30 a.m. on September 21, 2016, Section VI of this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo issued a judgment on the merits in this matter. (Images 93-116 of the main case file)\n\n**8.-** By virtue of a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the State representation, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, acting as the Tribunal de Casación for Administrative Disputes, in accordance with Transitory Provision I of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), in vote No. 16-F-TC-2019 of 10:20 a.m. on February 6, 2019, ordered: \"*POR TANTO.* The appeal is granted. The contested ruling is annulled. In its place, resolving on the merits, the defense of lack of right invoked by the State is upheld, only regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the authority to execute the sanction of dismissal against the plaintiff; and the lawsuit is dismissed only with respect to that claim. This matter is remanded so that the Court may resolve the remaining allegations on which it has not yet issued a ruling.\" (Images 15- of the main case file)\n\n**9.-** The respective case file was referred to this Sexta Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo for the issuance of the pertinent judgment on September 2, 2019, as recorded in the detail of the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the main case file.\n\n**10.-** In the proceedings before this Court, no grounds for nullity requiring correction have been observed.\n\nAuthored by Judge Garita Navarro, with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Aguilar Méndez;\n\n**CONSIDERANDO**\n\n**I.- Proven facts.** The following are relevant for the resolution of this process: **1)** Mrs. [Nombre62 001] began working for the Ministry of Public Works on June 16, 1994, in the job classification of Miscelánea. (See Certification N°DGIRH-1856-2015-SP dated April 14, 2015, found at images 22-23 of the case file, part 10) **2)** On December 20, 2013, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Mr. Pedro Castro Fernández, filed a formal Dismissal Proceeding (gestión de Despido) against the plaintiff before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil for alleged unjustified absences, arguing that it was not possible to notify the employee of a three-day suspension resolution on October 14, 2013, and that she had not reported for work since that date. In that memorandum, the following was essentially alleged: A. That by Memorandum No. DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Deputy Regional Director of Alajuela, informed Attorney Christian Méndez Blanco that the suspension issued via Resolution No. 001267, dated October 10, 2013, from the Office of the Minister, could not be served upon the employee [Nombre62 001], as said employee had not appeared for work since October 14, 2013, without presenting any justification to that Office, and therefore, the corresponding disciplinary measures were requested. B. That by Memorandum No. DRL-13-0583 of October 22, 2013, Mr. Nombre58535 forwarded the aforementioned memorandum to Mr. Nombre139064, so that he could proceed according to law. C. That by Memorandum No. DR3-13-2013 of October 25, 2013, addressed to Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Deputy Regional Director, Mr. Nombre139064 indicates that in view of the vouchers delivered to him by Mr. Nombre136079 on October 24, 2013, regarding employee [Nombre62 001], justifying absences on October 8, 14, and 17, 2013, and a disability leave from October 21 to 28, 2013, said vouchers were delivered late, according to Article 41 of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios. D) That by Recommendations Report No. DRL-2013-296 of November 21, 2013, the Labor Relations Department recommended desisting from initiating a Disciplinary Administrative Procedure against employee [Nombre62 001], because a criterion of alleged unjustified absence since October 14, 2013, could not be established, since it was due to fortuitous events that were verified, such as a disciplinary suspension at the institutional level, medical appointments at clinics of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and a notice of disability leave from the same insuring agency. E) That this Office, by Resolution No. 001507 of 2:00 p.m. on December 19, 2013, decided to depart from the recommendation issued by the Instructing Body via the aforementioned Recommendations Report No. DRL-2013-296, and ordered the initiation of a dismissal proceeding before the Dirección497 against employee [Nombre62 001]. (Second claim of the lawsuit, not contested, folios 1-10 of the administrative file) **3)** On January 8, 2014, resolution No. AJD-RES-005-2014 of 11:00 a.m. on January 6, 2014, was served upon the employee, consisting of the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) from file AJ-124-2013, by which the following facts were imputed to her: *\"... according to memorandum No. DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Deputy Regional Director of Alajuela, informed Attorney Cristhian Méndez Blanco that it had not been possible to notify employee [Nombre62 001] of the suspension issued according to resolution No. 001267, dated October 10 of this year, since she had not appeared for work since October 14, 2013. Whereby, it is established that said employee violated all the principles that should guide the actions of the Administration, since one of the main obligations binding public servants is punctual attendance at work, therefore, the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes a serious offense, which affects the interests of this Ministry.\"* (Folios 12-15 of the administrative file) **4)** That by memorandum 20140133 of January 20, the Legal Directorate of the MOPT requested the Directorate of the Clinical Laboratory of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo to provide details of the dates on which the plaintiff was seen at that Clinical Laboratory during October 2013. Likewise, it requested to indicate whether the voucher stating that the plaintiff accompanied Nombre139065 on October 18, 2013, was such that the Laboratory recorded said justification. (Folio 41 of the administrative file) **5)** By note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory mentioned in the preceding fact indicated that during October 2013, the plaintiff was seen on the 4th of that month, presenting herself at the service window at 6:47 a.m. Furthermore, regarding the voucher provided, he stated: *\"3. Having seen the copy of the Request for Clinical Analysis Results provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the bottom of said request does not correspond to what is proper in the Service. On that day there were no problems with the SIL, and if at some point there had been, the voucher would have been issued on the form 'CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS'.\"* (Folio 40 of the administrative file) **6)** By a brief dated January 22, 2014, the plaintiff's legal representative submitted her defense (descargo) against the notice of charges referred to in the previous section. (Folios 21-25 of the administrative file) **7)** That on February 4, 2014, by memorandum 2014-0381 filed before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, the Minister of Public Works and Transport presented an expansion to the proceeding for dismissal without employer liability against employee [Nombre62 001], indicating the following: That according to Memorandum No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, it was determined that the voucher provided by Mrs. [Nombre62 001] for not reporting to work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend that says \"*Accompanied by: [Nombre62 001] Daughter*\" was altered, since that is not the procedure established in said Clinical Laboratory for issuing attendance vouchers, in addition to the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only seen at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. (Folios 29-38 of the administrative file) **8)** By resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 of 2:00 p.m. on February 4, 2014, from the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, the notice of charges regarding the expansion of facts was served. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff presented a defense brief on that matter. (Folios 48-77 of the administrative file) **9)** On March 7, 2014, an oral and private hearing was held before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, in which the following witnesses appeared: Messrs. Nombre136079, Nombre139066, Nombre139064. (Folios 101-111 of the administrative file) **10)** On March 13, 2014, a second oral and private hearing was held, in which the testimony of Mr. Nombre136080, Nombre136081 and Nombre136082 was received. (Folios 128-135 of the administrative file) **11)** On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff in this process rendered her conclusions within disciplinary proceeding No. AJ-124-2013, in which, in addition to the substantive arguments raised, she interposed the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the Minister's disciplinary authority to expand the charges against her. (Folios 147-170 of the administrative file) **12)** By resolution No. 12316 of 7:55 p.m. on April 28, 2014, the Tribunal de Servicio Civil issued a final act within the proceeding and ordered: \"*POR TANTO. By virtue of the foregoing, cited legal provisions, and articles 14 subsection a) and 190 subsection a) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and 63 subsection a) of its Reglamento,* **IT IS DECLARED: WITH MERIT** *the proceeding initiated by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to dismiss employee [Nombre62 001] from her position without liability to the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss the indicated employee. An appeal is available against this resolution before this Court, with the proper statement of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of article 44 and its amendments, of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil.*\" Essentially, the following were considered as proven facts: *\"...e) That employee [Nombre62 001] did not report for work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th of that month, she did so partially, since only the check-in time is recorded, which was at 2:00 p.m., without previously informing her supervisors of the reasons for her absence or subsequently providing any voucher to justify said work absences. (Folios 128 and 129 of the proceeding file and 26 of the evidence file);* **d)** *That employee [Nombre62 001] was served on October 14, 2013, at 11:45 a.m., with Resolution No. 001267 of 7:06 a.m. on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, agreeing to a disciplinary sanction consisting of three days of suspension without pay. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction were applied to the respondent employee during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Folios 02, 03 and 05 of the evidence file); e) That employee [Nombre62 001] attempted to justify to her supervisors the work absence incurred on October 18, 2013, by presenting a photocopy of a form called 'Request and Results of Clinical Analyses' from the Clínica Dr. Nombre5497 of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and issued to Nombre62 de Nombre139065. In said document, its issuance date is recorded in handwriting and states '18/10/13'; when compared with a copy of the original document, it indicates it is from '3/10/13', with an evident alteration of the day to 18. (Folios 67 of the proceeding file and 23 of the evidence file)*\" This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014.\n\n(Folios 208-217 of the administrative file) 13) In a brief dated May 16, 2014, the plaintiff filed an appeal against the final act referenced in the previous subsection. (Folios 238-243 of the administrative file) 14) By resolution No.- 007-2015 TASC of 15:10 on January 29, 2015, the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil ordered the rejection of the appeal filed. This act was notified to the plaintiff and to MOPT on February 2, 2015. (Folios 265-297 of the administrative file) 15) By official letter 20150577 of February 12, 2015, the Legal Directorate communicates to the Directorate of Institutional Human Resources Management the notification of ruling No. 007-2015 TASC of 15:10 on January 29, 2015, of the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil. (Folios 331-332 of administrative file 2) 16) By official letter DGIRH-1344-2015 of February 19, 2015, the Director of Institutional Human Resources Management forwards to the Legal Directorate for the appropriate procedure before the Office of the Minister, the dismissal agreement of the plaintiff, whose draft indicates that the dismissal takes effect as of March 30, 2015. (Folios 337-338 of administrative file 2) 17) By official letter 20150820 of February 25, 2015, the Director of Legal Affairs forwards to the head of the Public Works and Transport portfolio the dismissal agreement of the plaintiff, whose draft indicates that the dismissal takes effect as of March 30, 2015, and with a detail of the issuance date of February 26, 2015. (Folios 339-340 of administrative file 2) 18) Through official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Department of Personnel Services Management, the plaintiff is informed: \"I hereby communicate Dismissal without employer liability effective March 30, 2015, in accordance with Resolution No. 007-2015-TASC of fifteen hours ten minutes on the twenty-ninth day of January two thousand fifteen of the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil and official letter No. DGIRH-1344-2015 dated February 19, 2015, from the Directorate of Institutional Human Resources Management. (...)\". That act was communicated to the petitioner on March 16, 2015, at 10:40. (Image 34 of the file, part 10)\n\nIII.- Facts not proven: Of relevance to this ruling is the following: 1) That the plaintiff timely justified the absences corresponding to October 15, 16, 17, and 18, 2013.\n\nIII- Object of the process. The purpose of the present lawsuit is the analysis of the validity of the procedure that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal with just cause and without liability for the State, effective as of March 30, 2015. The moving party indicates a series of allegations that, in their core, revolve around the issue of the statute of limitations for the power to execute the dismissal authorized by the Tribunal de Servicio Civil and later confirmed by the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, as well as the inadmissibility of the sanction due to the lack of proof of cause. For a better organization of this ruling, the analysis of the allegations raised follows, which will be carried out considering the underlying thematic axis that the parties develop, in order to avoid repetitive or unnecessary analyses.\n\nIV.- Regarding the allegation of the statute of limitations for the power to sanction. Regarding the effects of what was analyzed in the cassation court. As indicated in the operative parts of this judgment, initially, in ruling No. 0139-2016-VI of 11:30 on September 21, 2016, this Section VI of this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo issued a judgment on the merits in this matter, in which it had considered, in the relevant part: \"... the nullity of official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Department of Personnel Services Management, which notifies the plaintiff of her dismissal without employer liability effective March 30, 2015, because the power to issue that final act had prescribed. It should be noted that the preceding analysis does not imply, in any way, addressing the substantive reasons for which the dismissal was decreed in the venue of the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, nor the issue of the statute of limitations regarding the expansion of charges, given the lack of merit or necessity for that analysis.\" However, given the cassation appeal filed by the State's representation, in judgment No. 000016-F-TC-2019, of 10:20 on February 6, 2019, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the exercise of its powers as the Court of Cassation for the Contencioso Administrativo, in accordance with transitory provision I of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), ordered: \"POR TANTO. The appeal is granted. The contested pronouncement is annulled. In its place, resolving on the merits, the defense of lack of right invoked by the State is upheld, only regarding the statute of limitations for the power to execute the dismissal sanction against the plaintiff; and the lawsuit is declared without merit only regarding that point. Remand this matter so that the Court resolves the rest of the allegations for which it has not yet issued a pronouncement.\" To this end, it established that the applicable period for the execution phase of the challenged disciplinary act was that provided for by canon 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, that is, the six-month period regulated for the expiration of the procedure. From this analytical perspective, the issue related to the statute of limitations for the power to execute the dismissal act is a matter on which a pronouncement has already been made by the highest instance of the contencioso administrativo jurisdiction, for the type of matter analyzed in this process, and therefore, no new observations on this particular point can be made in this judgment. However, the same cassation instance remanded the present matter for the definition and pronouncement on the merits of the other issues debated by the parties, as was specified in the \"por tanto\" of that ruling. Therefore, the weighing of the issues raised by the moving party, unrelated to the cited statute of limitations, follows.\n\nV.- Regarding the statute of limitations concerning the expansion of charges in the dismissal procedure. In her lawsuit, the plaintiff alleges the nullity of the dismissal, considering that the State's disciplinary power prescribed, in the first instance, when the Minister submitted the expansion of the accusation in February 2014, despite having known of the facts since November 2013. In this sense, she states that two and a half months had passed since that hierarch learned of the facts, until he presented the expansion of new facts. She considers that this expansion was inadmissible, which was argued at the time when conclusions were presented and was not taken into account in the final resolutions. Regarding these allegations, the State states that the dismissal proceeding was filed by the Minister on December 20, 2013, based on official letter DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013. It notes that the investigation and proceedings carried out by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes prior to the processing of the administrative sanctioning procedure by the Dirección General del Servicio Civil and the Tribunal del Servicio Civil against the plaintiff constitute a preliminary investigation of the faults attributed to her, and therefore there is no statute of limitations on the sanctioning power for expanding the facts for which she was investigated at the Dirección General del Servicio Civil. It points out that the statute of limitations on the power cannot occur within the preliminary investigation, as this phase is not part of the procedure. It cites some precedents from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Regarding this specific charge, the following must be stated.\n\nVI.- Regarding the temporal element in the exercise of administrative corrective powers of a disciplinary nature. The analysis of the validity of the conducts subject to this process has as a fundamental point to determine if the petition for expansion of charges that was filed by the Minister, in January 2014 before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil. On this point, the following must be stated. In civil service relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarch against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to a time factor, after which, such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that establishes particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of section 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible —e.g., protection of public domain assets—, those referring to the internal sanctioning exercise —such as the one examined in this case— are subject to temporal rules, by virtue of which they can expire due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being exercised. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarch and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, after which, their power to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Nevertheless, in matters of public employment, the negative statute of limitations can be alleged as a cause for nullity of the final sanctioning act, even if that defense had not been exercised prior to the issuance of the public will. Thus, the corrective power cannot be considered imprescriptible, trying to justify that deduction on the rule of section 66.1 of the LGAP, but rather it is one subject to preclusion rules due to temporal factors, as visualized in subsection 3) of that same section 66 of Law No. Placa1975. Now, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary procedures, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with diverse nuances. This concerns the necessary establishment, for the sake of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow the issues discussed to be addressed, depending on the scenario in question. In this context, it has been proven that the plaintiff had an appointment as a janitorial worker at MOPT, such that this legal relationship is regulated by the rules of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, Law No. 1581 and its regulation (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 21 of December 14, 1954). From this perspective, the Statute Regulation, in article 99, indicates: \"The following shall prescribe in one month: a) ... b) ... c) Actions by Ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings for regular servants for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, starting from the day on which cause for the sanction arose, or in its case, from when the corresponding facts or faults were known.\" Therefore, in this case, given the date of the facts, the faults attributed were governed by the general statute of limitations set by the then-current section 603 of the Labor Code, which corresponds to provision 414 of the current and effective Labor Code (according to the reform carried out by Law No. 9343), given the referral established by section 51 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. That regulation sets (and set) a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, understood as the communication of the actions directed at exercising the internal corrective power. Now, the starting point for calculating that prescriptive period is decisive. On this matter, section 603 of the Labor Code indicated that the period runs from when the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the referred monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the hierarch. This is also the case for faults that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective hierarch. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication to the hierarch of said report, since it is only at that moment that the holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade prescription, given that not in all scenarios that investigation would be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is essential to determine the relevance or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or else, to gather evidence aimed at clarifying its necessity or not. It should be noted that the referred period widens and extends when any of the scenarios regulated by special norms is configured. This is the case of faults that are regulated by the special norms specified by the internal control, probity in public office, and Public Finance management regime, in which, according to the regulation of the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), the Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, respectively, a special five-year period operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments those norms establish), and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code; it is reiterated, this being a special and subsequent regulation that prevails over the general labor regime.\n\nVII.- Specific Analysis. Well, in the specific case, in act 2014-0381 of January 27, 2014, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, when presenting the expansion of the imputation of charges against the plaintiff before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, indicated that although the facts underlying the complaint were dated October 18, 2013, the date of the unjustified absence, he specified, in the relevant part regarding the point under examination, that according to Official Letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, it was determined that the receipt provided by Mrs. [Nombre62 001], to not attend work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend indicating \"Acompañante: [Nombre62 001] Hija\" was altered, since that is not the established procedure in said Clinical Laboratory for issuing attendance receipts, coupled with the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only attended at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. It was precisely following that finding, from which a presumed alteration of that submitted document was derived, that the expansion of facts in the proceedings for dismissal without employer liability was requested. In this context, it must be noted that the initial request for opening the dismissal proceeding directed by the ministerial hierarch to the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, resolution 2013-6785 was issued on December 18, 2013, and its purpose was to discipline the absences recorded from October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification (folios 01-09 of the administrative folder). However, the expansion regarding which the statute of limitations is argued, namely, act No. 2014-0381, although dated January 27, 2014, as indicated, its purpose is not related to the unjustified absences noted ut supra, but rather to the submission of an altered receipt. According to the factual account that has been detailed, such discovery was possible, from an objective standpoint, only when official letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, was issued. That is, the expansion incorporates into the dismissal proceeding a cause distinct from the unjustified absence, which in itself, the hierarch considered reprehensible with a degree of gravity, for violating the norms that regulate probity in the exercise of public office. For this, it suffices to refer to the content of that notification of charges, in which, after the formulation of the facts, he presents a statement of the position by which he considers the duty of probity and, with it, Law No. Placa5670, to be harmed, resulting in a loss of trust. Thus clarified, from the moment the hierarch could objectively know of the alteration of that absence receipt, i.e., on January 20, 2014, to the moment the expansion of charges was requested on January 27, 2014, it is more than certain that the monthly period claimed by the petitioner has not elapsed. Nevertheless, as it is a matter of probity, pursuant to the regulation of provision 44 of Law No. 8422, which refers to the statute of limitations of section 71 of Law No. 7428, the applicable period for sanctioning that alleged infraction would be five years. Consequently, the rejection of the charge under examination must be ordered.\n\n**VIII.- Regarding the lack of accreditation of the grounds (motivo).** The other inaccuracy presented as the basis of this claim refers to the absence of accreditation of the facts that have given rise to the grounds. In that vein, the plaintiff indicates that the facts underlying her dismissal could not be corroborated, while at the same time there is an improper statement of reasons (fundamentación) for the acts by virtue of which her dismissal was ordered. For its part, the State argues that the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of elements of nullity of the administrative act regarding the grounds and statement of reasons for her dismissal as she alleges. On the contrary, the sanction imposed on the plaintiff is the reasonable and proportional legal consequence of the serious conduct that was deemed accredited, which is duly classified and constitutes serious misconduct and is therefore punishable by dismissal. Every administrative act must comply with a series of formal and substantive requirements that determine its validity. Such elements can be of a formal nature, within which are included the administrative procedure, statement of reasons (motivación), and form of expression. From the material standpoint, these elements are grouped into subjective (which include competence, authority, and will) and objective (which include the grounds, content, and purpose). The grounds (motivo) constitute the factual or legal antecedent that enables, legitimizes, or requires the adoption of the administrative conduct. As regulated by section 133 of the LGAP, the grounds must be legitimate and exist actually or legally at the time of issuing the act, and throughout the entire course of its validity. Precisely, the very object of the administrative procedure is to establish the material truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the grounds, as can be inferred from precepts 214, 221, and 297 of the LGAP. Mandate 133.2 of the cited law orders that when it (that element) is not regulated, it must be proportionate to the content. Its incidence on the content of the act is undeniable, since the latter must encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they have not been debated by the parties (article 132.1 ejusdem). Indeed, the content must correspond to the grounds, which highlights the structural importance of that relationship as a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the act. **In the species (En la especie)**, the facts upon which the disciplinary proceeding gravitated and, therefore, that would configure the grounds of the eventual final act, were related to the absences recorded on the dates of October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification, as well as to the provision of an altered voucher to attempt to justify some of those absences. In that vein, in Resolution No. AJD-RES-005-2014 of 11:00 hours on January 6, 2014, transfer of charges (traslado de cargos) of file AJ-124-2013, the following facts were formally charged: *\"... in accordance with official communication No. DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Regional Subdirector of Alajuela, informed Lic. Cristhian Méndez Blanco, that it had not been possible to notify the servant [Name62 001], of the suspension issued pursuant to Resolution No. 001267, dated October 10 of the current year, since she had not appeared for work since October 14, 2013. With which, it is established that said official breached all the principles that should guide the actions of the Administration, since one of the main obligations binding public servants is punctual attendance at work, and the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes serious misconduct, which affects the interests of this Ministry.\"* (Folios 12-15 of the administrative file) Likewise, through official communication 2014-0381, the Minister of Public Works and Transport presented an expansion to the petition for dismissal without employer liability against the servant [Name 62 001], alleging the alteration of a medical center attendance voucher. It was through Resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 of 14:00 hours on February 4, 2014, from the General Directorate of Civil Service, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, that the transfer of charges regarding the expansion of facts was notified. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a statement of defense regarding that particular matter. (Folios 48-77 of the administrative file) Now then, in the final act of the disciplinary cause, Resolution No. 12316 of 19 hours 55 minutes on April 28, 2014, the Civil Service Tribunal ordered: *\"... IT IS DECLARED: WITH MERIT the petition promoted by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to dismiss the servant [Name62 001] from her position without liability for the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss the indicated servant. Against this resolution, an appeal is available before this Tribunal, with the proper expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 and its amendments, of the Civil Service Statute.\"* For these purposes, and in order to address the defect alleged and analyzed at this point, that act deemed the following factual aspects as accredited: *\"...e) That the servant [Name62 001] did not report to work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th of that month she did so partially, as only the entry time appears recorded, which was at 14:00 hours, without previously informing her superiors of the reasons she had for being absent nor subsequently providing any voucher to justify said work absences. (Folios 128 and 129 of the petition file and 26 of the evidence dossier); d) That the servant [Name62 001] was notified on October 14, 2013, at 11:45 hours of Resolution No. 001267 of 7:06 hours on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, in which a disciplinary sanction is agreed, consisting of three days of suspension without pay. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction were applied to the defendant servant during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Folios 02, 03, and 05 of the evidence dossier); e) That the servant [Name62 001] attempted to justify before her superiors the work absence she incurred on October 18, 2013, by presenting a photocopy of a form called \"Clinical Analysis Request and Results\" from the Dr. Name5497 Clinic of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and issued to Name62 of Name139065. In said document, its date of issuance is recorded in handwriting and reads \"18/1 0/13\"; when compared with a copy of the original document, it indicates it is from \"3/10/13\", with an evident alteration of the 18th day. (Folios 67 of the petition file and 23 of the evidence dossier)...\"* This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014. (Folios 208-217 of the administrative file). Such factual derivations found support in the various pieces of evidence admitted and gathered within the disciplinary cause, to which the plaintiff had access and which she could refute in the exercise of her right to a contradictory hearing. From the foregoing, it follows that in that proceeding, the circumstances were established from which the Administration deemed the causes that supported the opening of the disciplinary proceeding to be accredited, and which were opportunely charged to the claimant. The plaintiff does not directly challenge the intellectual process of evidentiary weighing that led to the cited inferences; however, in the administrative venue, through a writing dated May 16, 2014, she filed an appeal against the final act, and by Resolution No. 007-2015 TASC of 15 hours 10 minutes on January 29, 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service ordered the rejection of the appellate measure formulated. In that regard, part of the debated issues gravitated around the analytical exercise of the elements of conviction, an aspect in which that appellate instance concluded that no inaccuracies were observed in the evaluation of the evidence. On this point, said Administrative Tribunal expressed forcefully: *\"… In this sense, the Civil Service Tribunal deemed duly accredited the unjustified absence from her duties by the plaintiff, for the four days running from October 15 to 18, 2013, without it being a valid justification for the Adjudicator that the servant had interpreted that on those dates she was suspended for three days (from the 15th to the 17th of October) in accordance with the notification of Resolution No. 001267 of October 10, 2013, which was carried out on October 14 by the notifier Name139067. Cited as a witness, Mr. Name139067 -as transcribed by the appealed resolution- indicated that he had not informed the defendant of the date on which the communicated suspension would run since, according to his statement, he was not the Boss of Mrs. [Name62 001]…\"* Under that thesis, it is the view of this Chamber that the questioned acts clearly manifest the facts and evidence from which the formally charged misconduct was deemed accredited, relating to the unjustified absences occurring in the period from October 15 to 18, 2013, without the plaintiff having been able to rebut such circumstances. On the other hand, regarding the second grounds for the act, that is, the alteration of the medical center attendance document, the same resolution of the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service weighed: *\"... In this regard, the reproach to the defendant does not refer to whether the defendant (sic) was absent or not from her duties on that date; what is under examination is her conduct regarding the use of an attendance voucher for clinical services for her mother, Mrs. Name139065, which, as was demonstrated, does not contain accurate information regarding the date, which was altered, and which was moreover intended to be used improperly to Justify an absence. Thus, if there is no suitable document that Justifies her absence and it is further evidenced that the defendant used an official document from a public institution with altered information to benefit herself, in an attempt to deceive her employer, this constitutes a serious infraction of the current Legal norms and the worker's obligations to her employer ...\"* Such mention reveals the considerations that led to deeming that other imputed misconduct accredited within the disciplinary cause. For this, one must not disregard what was indicated above regarding the fact that the provision of that altered document is supported by other evidence contributed to the administrative file and previously known to the petitioner. Indeed, as indicated in the list of proven facts, it is established that, upon the contribution of the cited voucher, through official communication No. 20140133 of January 20, 2014, the Legal Directorate of the MOPT requested the Directorate of the Clinical Laboratory of the Marcial Rodríguez Conejo Clinic to detail the dates on which the plaintiff was treated at that Clinical Laboratory during the month of October 2013. Likewise, it requested to indicate whether the voucher stating that the plaintiff accompanied Name139065 on October 18, 2013, was issued by that Laboratory for the purposes of specifying whether said justification was recorded. (Folio 41 of the administrative file) In response to that request, through note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory indicated in the preceding fact indicates that during the month of October 2013, the plaintiff was treated on the 4th day of that month, appearing at the service window at 06:47 hours. Additionally, he noted regarding the voucher provided: *\"3. In view of the copy of the Clinical Analysis Results Request, provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the foot of said request does not correspond to what is proper in the Service. That day there were no problems with the SIL and if at any time there had been, the voucher would have been issued on the \"MEDICAL SERVICE ATTENDANCE CONTROL\" form.* (Folio 40 of the administrative file) It was precisely the content of that last communication that supported the fact that through official communication No. 2014-0381 dated January 27, 2014, the Minister of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport requested the expansion of charges in the dismissal proceeding without employer liability. Therefore, it is clear that within the administrative file, there exists the effective and due accreditation of that charged fact. In light of these considerations, it is the position of this collegiate body that the final act, like the definitive one that upholds it, contains the proper reference and support for the circumstances that gave basis to the grounds of the act, consisting of the accreditation of the conduct charged since the transfer of charges. Under that understanding, having accredited said grounds, as a factual antecedent, the content of those conducts constitutes the consequence and reaction foreseen upon the verification of those conducts. Ergo, that content substantially conforms to the limits imposed by canon 132 of the LGAP, regarding the correspondence with the grounds and its lawfulness. On this last condition, the plaintiff does not challenge the legal questions upon which the decision of her dismissal without employer liability for the misconduct committed is based. The final act itself indicates that the decision is adopted under the shelter of a set of legal and regulatory precepts that the claim neither refutes nor challenges, among which Articles 19, 71(b) and 81(g) and (1) of the Labor Code, 39, 43, and 80 of the Civil Service Statute, 82 and 35 of the Civil Service Regulation are mentioned. It is reiterated, the claim does not provide grievances regarding the improper application, erroneous interpretation of those norms, or the failure to apply any normative precept that would lead to a different conclusion or treatment of her situation, and in those terms, an eventual illegitimacy of the questioned act cannot be established, insofar as it has been the subject of debate. It must be insisted that the issue related to the preclusion of the power to execute the dismissal was an aspect already resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a Court of Cassation, in a different projection from the one originally adopted by this Trial Court, a criterion which, due to the hierarchy of said instance and as it constitutes the final decision in this jurisdiction, constitutes the last and definitive one on that particular matter and which therefore cannot be analyzed again. Thus, given that the inadmissibility of the statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged regarding that execution has been defined, as well as the fact that the expiration of the power to analyze the matter related to the alteration of the voucher has not been established, nor has the existence of the defect accused regarding the accreditation of the underlying facts of the grounds of the reproached acts been established, the rejection of those charges under examination must be ordered.\n\n**IX.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised.** Upon the legal transfer, the representation of the defendant entity responded negatively. It raised the defense of lack of right. Said defense must be fully accepted, which leads, without more, to the rejection of the claim in all its aspects.\n\n**X.- Costs.** In accordance with section 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient cause to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence of whose existence the opposing party was unaware. In the species, it is the consideration of this Tribunal that the losing party has had sufficient cause to litigate. For this, it is enough to note that the plaintiff's claims were initially estimated for the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the execution power, an issue on which several legal interpretation positions exist, which demonstrates good faith and legitimate cause for the formulation of this process. Therefore, it is proper to resolve this matter without special condemnation for costs.\n\nPOR TANTO.\n\nThe defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the claim filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against the State is declared without merit in all its aspects. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs. **José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez.**\n\n*-*-*-*-*

 

EXPEDIENTE: 15-002978-1027-CA

ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO

ACTOR: [Nombre62 001]

DEMANDADO: El Estado.

IGWTHUP.JRGN 2019.

 

 

 

 

 

  

Documento firmado por:

ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A

CYNTHIA ABARCA GOMEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A

DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A

  

\n\nThus clarified, from the moment the head of the agency could objectively know of the alteration of that certificate of non-attendance, that is, on January 20, 2014, to the moment the expansion of charges is requested on January 27, 2014, it is more than undeniable that the monthly time limit alleged by the petitioner has not expired. Nevertheless, as this is a matter of probity, pursuant to the provisions of precept 44 of Ley No. 8422, which refers to the statute of limitations (prescripción) of ordinal 71 of Ley No. 7428, the applicable time limit for sanctioning that alleged infraction would be five years. Consequently, the rejection of the charge under examination must be ordered.

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VIII.- On the failure to substantiate the motive (motivo). The other inaccuracy presented as the basis of this claim refers to the absence of substantiation of the facts that have grounded the motive (motivo). In that regard, the plaintiff indicates that the underlying facts of her dismissal could not be corroborated, while there is an improper grounding of the acts by virtue of which her dismissal was ordered. For its part, the State argues that t

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he claimant failed to demonstrate that the elements of nullity of the administrative act exist regarding the motive (motivo) and the grounds for her dismissal as she alleges. On the contrary, the sanction imposed on the plaintiff is the reasonable and proportional legal consequence of the serious conduct that was deemed proven, which is duly classified and constitutes serious misconduct and is therefore sanctioned with dismissal. Every administrative act must comply with a series of formal and substantial requirements that determine its validity. Such elements can be of a formal nature, which include the administrative procedure, statement of reasons (motivación) and form of manifestation. From a material standpoint, these elements are grouped into subjective (which include competence, investiture and will) and objective (which comprise the motive (motivo), content and purpose). The motive (motivo) is constituted by the factual or legal antecedent that enables, legitimizes or requires the adoption of the administrative conduct. Pursuant to the provisions of ordinal 133 of the LGAP, the motive (motivo) must be legitimate and exist in reality or legally at the time of issuing the act, and throughout its validity. Precisely, the very object of the administrative procedure is to establish the material truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the motive (motivo), as is evident from precepts 214, 221 and 297 of the LGAP. Mandate 133.2 of the cited law orders that when it is not regulated (that element) it must be proportionate to the content. Its impact on the content of the act is undeniable, since the latter must encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the motive (motivo), even if they have not been debated by the parties (article 132.1 ejusdem). Furthermore, the content must correspond to the motive (motivo), which highlights the structural importance of that relationship as a prerequisite for the legality of the act.

\n\nAJD-RES-005-2014 of 11:00 a.m. on January 6, 2014, which consists of the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) from file AJ-124-2013, by means of which the following facts were imputed to her: *\"... in accordance with official letter No. DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Engineer Ernesto Soto Vega, Regional Subdirector of Alajuela, informed Lic. Cristhian Méndez Blanco that it had not been possible to notify the employee [Name62 001] of the suspension issued pursuant to resolution No. 001267, dated October 10 of the current year, as she had not reported to work since October 14, 2013. By which, it is held that said official breached all the principles that should guide the Administration's actions, since one of the main obligations binding public employees is punctual attendance at work, and therefore the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes a serious offense, which affects the interests of this Ministry.\"* (Pages 12-15 of the administrative file) **4)** That by official letter 20140133 of January 20, the MOPT Legal Directorate requested from the Directorate of the Clinical Laboratory of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, details of the dates on which the plaintiff was treated at that Clinical Laboratory during the month of October 2013. Similarly, it requested to indicate whether the receipt stating that the plaintiff accompanied Nombre139065 on October 18, 2013, was to specify whether that Laboratory recorded said justification. (Page 41 of the administrative file) **5)** By note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory indicated in the preceding fact states that during the month of October 2013, the plaintiff was treated on the 4th day of that month, presenting herself at the service window at 06:47 hours. Furthermore, regarding the receipt provided, he stated: *\"3. Having seen the copy of the Request for Clinical Analysis Results, provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the bottom of said request does not correspond to the proper procedure of the Service. On that day there were no problems with the SIL and if there had been at any time, the receipt would have been issued on the form 'CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS'.\"* (Page 40 of the administrative file) **6)** By means of a brief dated January 22, 2014, the plaintiff's legal representative formulates her defense (descargo) against the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) referred to in the previous section. (Pages 21-25 of the administrative file) **7)** That on February 4, 2014, before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, by official letter 2014-0381, the Minister of Public Works and Transport submitted an amplification (ampliación) to the petition for dismissal without employer liability against the employee [Name62 001], indicating the following: That according to Official Letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of the Clínica Marcial Rodríguez Conejo, it was determined that the receipt provided by Mrs. [Name62 001] for not reporting to work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend stating *\"Accompanying: [Name62 001] Daughter\"* was altered, as that is not the procedure established in said Clinical Laboratory for issuing attendance receipts, in addition to the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only treated at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. (Pages 29-38 of the administrative file) **8)** By resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 of 2:00 p.m. on February 4, 2014, from the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, the notice of charges (traslado de cargos) regarding the amplification of facts (ampliación de hechos) is notified. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff presents a brief of defense (descargo) on that matter. (Pages 48-77 of the administrative file) **9)** On March 7, 2014, an oral and private hearing is held before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, in which the following appear as witnesses: Mr. Nombre136079, Mr. Nombre139066, Mr. Nombre139064. (Pages 101-111 of the administrative file) **10)** On March 13, 2014, a second oral and private hearing was held, in which the testimony of Mr. Nombre136080, Mr. Nombre136081, and Mr. Nombre136082 was received. (Pages 128-135 of the administrative file) **11)** On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff in the present proceeding submitted her conclusions within disciplinary proceeding No. AJ-124-2013, in which, in addition to the substantive arguments raised, she interposed the defense (excepción) of prescription (prescripción) of the Minister's disciplinary power by amplifying the accusation against her. (Pages 147-170 of the administrative file) **12)** By resolution No. 12316 of 7:55 p.m. on April 28, 2014, the Tribunal de Servicio Civil issued the final act within the proceeding and ordered: *\"POR TANTO. By virtue of the foregoing, cited legal provisions, and articles 14 subsection a) and 190 subsection a) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and 63 subsection a) of its Reglamento de Servicio Civil, SE DECLARA: CON LUGAR the petition promoted by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to dismiss the employee [Name62 001] from her position without liability for the State. Consequently, the Poder Ejecutivo is authorized to dismiss the indicated employee. Against this resolution, an appeal for review (recurso de apelación) is available before this Tribunal, with the proper expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of article 44 and its amendments, of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil.\"* Essentially, it held the following as proven facts (hechos probados): *\"...e) That the employee [Name62 001] did not report to work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th day of that month she did so partially, as only the entry time is recorded, which was at 2:00 p.m., without previously informing her superiors of the reasons for her absence or subsequently providing any receipt to justify said work absences. (Pages 128 and 129 of the petition file and 26 of the evidence dossier); d) That the employee [Name62 001] was notified on October 14, 2013, at 11:45 a.m., of Resolution No. 001267 of 7:06 a.m. on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, in which a disciplinary sanction is agreed upon, consisting of three days of suspension without pay. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction were applied to the respondent employee during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Pages 02, 03 and 05 of the evidence dossier); e) That the employee [Name62 001] attempted to justify before her superiors the work absence incurred on October 18, 2013, by presenting a photocopy of a form called 'Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos' from the Clínica Dr. Nombre5497 of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and issued to Name62 of Nombre139065. In said document, its issuance date is recorded in handwriting and reads '18/1 0/13'; when compared with a copy of the original document, it indicates it is from '3/10/13', with evident alteration of the day 18. (Pages 67 of the petition file and 23 of the evidence dossier)\"* This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014. (Pages 208-217 of the administrative file) **13)** In a brief dated May 16, 2014, the plaintiff filed an appeal for review (recurso de apelación) against the final act referred to in the previous section. (Pages 238-243 of the administrative file) **14)** By resolution No. 007-2015 TASC of 3:10 p.m. on January 29, 2015, the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil ordered the rejection of the appeal measure formulated. This act was notified to the plaintiff and the MOPT on February 2, 2015. (Pages 265-297 of the administrative file) **15)** By official letter 20150577 of February 12, 2015, the Legal Directorate communicates to the Directorate of Institutional Human Resources Management the notification of ruling No. 007-2015 TASC of 3:10 p.m. on January 29, 2015, from the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil. (Pages 331-332 of administrative file 2) **16)** By official letter DGIRH-1344-2015 of February 19, 2015, the Director of Institutional Human Resources Management forwards to the Legal Directorate for due processing before the Minister's Office, the dismissal agreement for the plaintiff, whose draft states that the dismissal is effective from March 30, 2015. (Pages 337-338 of administrative file 2) **17)** By official letter 20150820 of February 25, 2015, the Director of Legal Affairs forwards to the head of the Public Works and Transport portfolio the dismissal agreement for the plaintiff, whose draft states that the dismissal is effective from March 30, 2015, and with an issuance date detail of February 26, 2015. (Pages 339-340 of administrative file 2) **18)** By official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Department of Personnel Services Management, the plaintiff is informed: *\"I hereby communicate your Dismissal without employer liability effective March 30, 2015, in accordance with Resolution No. 007-2015-TASC of fifteen hours ten minutes on the twenty-ninth day of the month of January of two thousand fifteen of the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil and official letter No. DGIRH-1344-2015 dated February 19, 2015, from the Directorate of Institutional Human Resources Management. (...).\"* That act was communicated to the petitioner on March 16, 2015, at 10:40 a.m. (Image 34 of the file, part 10)\n\n**III.- Facts not proven (Hechos no probados):** Of relevance to this ruling is the following: **1)** That the plaintiff timely justified the absences corresponding to the days October 15, 16, 17, and 18, 2013.\n\n**III- Object of the proceeding.** The present lawsuit seeks to analyze the validity of the procedure that ordered the dismissal with just cause and without liability for the State against the plaintiff, effective March 30, 2015. The petitioner points out a series of allegations that essentially revolve around the issue of the prescription (prescripción) of the power to execute the dismissal authorized by the Tribunal de Servicio Civil and later confirmed by the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, as well as the inappropriateness of the sanction due to the lack of demonstration of cause. For a better organization of this ruling, the analysis of the raised allegations follows, which will be carried out considering the underlying thematic axis developed by the parties, in order to avoid repetitive or unnecessary analysis.\n\n**IV.- Regarding the allegation of prescription (prescripción) of the power to sanction. On the effects of what was analyzed in the cassation instance.** As stated in the resultandos of this judgment, initially, in ruling No. 0139-2016-VI of 11:30 a.m. on September 21, 2016, this Section VI of this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo issued a substantive judgment in this matter, in which it had considered, relevantly: *\"...the nullity of official letter DGIRH-2015-1145-SP of March 11, 2015, from the Department of Personnel Services Management, which communicates to the plaintiff her dismissal without employer liability effective March 30, 2015, due to the prescription of the power to issue that last act. It should be noted that the foregoing analysis does not, in any way, involve addressing the substantive reasons for which the dismissal was decreed in the venue of the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, nor the topic of the prescription of the amplification of charges (ampliación de cargos), given the lack of merit or need for that analysis.\"* However, given the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) formulated by the State representation, in Voto No. 000016-F-TC-2019, of 10:20 a.m. on February 6, 2019, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the exercise of its powers as the Court of Cassation for the Administrative Litigation jurisdiction, in accordance with the first transitional provision (transitorio I) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), ordered: *\"POR TANTO. The appeal is declared with merit. The contested pronouncement is annulled. In its place, ruling on the merits, the defense of lack of right invoked by the State is upheld, only regarding the prescription of the power to execute the sanction of dismissal against the plaintiff; and the lawsuit is declared without merit only regarding that extreme. Remand this matter so that the Tribunal may decide the remaining allegations regarding which it has not yet issued a pronouncement.\"* For this, it established that the applicable period for the execution phase of the challenged disciplinary act was that provided for by canon 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, that is, the six-month period regulated for the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding. From this analytical perspective, the issue related to the prescription of the power to execute the act of dismissal is an issue upon which a pronouncement has already been made by the highest instance of the administrative litigation jurisdiction, for the type of matter analyzed in this proceeding, and therefore, no new observations on that particular point may be made in this judgment. However, the same cassation instance remanded this matter for the definition and substantive pronouncement on the other issues debated by the parties, as was specified in the por tanto of that ruling. Consequently, the weighing of the issues raised by the petitioner, apart from the cited prescription, follows.\n\n**V.- Regarding the prescription (prescripción) concerning the amplification of charges (ampliación de cargos) in the dismissal petition.** In her lawsuit, the plaintiff alleges the nullity of the dismissal, considering that the disciplinary power of the State prescribed, in the first instance, when the Minister sent the amplification of the accusation (ampliación de la acusación) in February 2014, despite having known the facts since November 2013. In this regard, she states that two and a half months had elapsed from when that superior became aware of the facts until he presented the amplification of new facts (ampliación de hechos nuevos). She considers that this amplification was improper, which was alleged at the time of submitting conclusions and was not taken into account in the final resolutions. Regarding these allegations, the State expresses that the dismissal petition was filed by the Minister on December 20, 2013, based on official letter DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013. It adds, the investigation and diligences carried out by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport prior to the processing of the administrative sanctioning procedure by the Dirección General del Servicio Civil and the Tribunal del Servicio Civil against the plaintiff constitute a preliminary investigation of the faults attributed to her, and therefore there is no prescription of the sanctioning power for amplifying the facts for which she was being investigated before the Dirección General del Servicio Civil. It points out that the prescription of the power cannot occur within the preliminary investigation, as this phase is not part of the procedure. It cites some precedents from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Regarding this particular charge, the following must be noted.\n\n**VI.- Regarding the temporal element in the exercise of administrative corrective powers of a disciplinary nature.** The analysis of the validity of the conduct subject to this proceeding has as a fundamental point to determine the validity of the amplification of charges (ampliación de cargos) petition that was filed by the Minister in January 2014 before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil. On this particular matter, the following must be indicated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the superior against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken.\n\nThis temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and the existence of a special legal framework that establishes particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of section 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic reasons, are considered imprescriptible—e.g., protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales)—those referring to internal sanctioning authority—such as the one examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may expire due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being exercised. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, the official’s power to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical authority emerges. Nevertheless, in public employment matters, negative prescription (prescripción negativa) may well be raised as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, even if that defense had not been exercised prior to the issuance of the public will. Thus, the corrective power cannot be considered imprescriptible, attempting to justify that deduction based on the rule of subsection 66.1 of the LGAP, but rather it is one subject to preclusion rules based on temporal factors, as seen in subparagraph 3) of that same section 66 of Law No. Placa1975. Now, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary procedures, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with different nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow the issues discussed to be addressed, depending on the scenario in question. In that context, it has been deemed proven that the plaintiff held an appointment as a miscellaneous worker (miscelánea) at the MOPT, so that legal relationship is governed by the rules of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), Law No. 1581 and its regulations (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 21 of December 14, 1954). From this standpoint, the Regulations of the Statute, in Article 99, states: \"The following shall prescribe in one month: a) ... b) ... c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate the dismissal process of regular employees for just cause and to impose disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, from the day on which cause for the sanction arose, or, as the case may be, from when the corresponding acts or faults were known.  \" Therefore, in this case, given the date of the facts, the alleged faults were governed by the generic statute of limitations (prescripción) set by the then-current section 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which corresponds to provision 414 of the current and effective Labor Code (according to the reform made by Law No. 9343), given the referral provided by section 51 of the Civil Service Statute. That regulation sets (and set) a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, understood as the communication of the actions directed at the exercise of the internal corrective power. Now, the starting point for calculating that prescriptive period is decisive. On this point, section 603 of the Labor Code stated that the period runs from when the cause for the dismissal arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is calculated from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know of the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require a prior preliminary investigation stage, the aforementioned one-month period runs from the moment when the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the superior. This is also the case for faults evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication to the superior of said report, since it is only at that moment that the authority can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not. It should be noted that the aforementioned period is extended and expanded when any of the scenarios regulated by special norms are configured. This is the case for faults that are regulated by the special norms specified by the internal control regime, probity in public office (probidad en la función pública), and Public Finance management, in which, according to the regulations of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública), No. 8422 (art. 44) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, respectively, a special five-year period applies (according to the scenarios and from the moments those norms provide), and not the one-month period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and subsequent regulation that prevails over the general labor framework.\n\n**VII.- Specific Analysis.** Well then, in the specific case, in act 2014-0381 of January 27, 2014, the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes), when presenting the expansion of charges against the plaintiff before the Directorate General of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil), stated that although the facts underlying the complaint dated back to October 18, 2013, the date of the unjustified absence, he specified, regarding the point under examination, that according to Official Letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, Dr. Nombre139066, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of the Marcial Rodríguez Conejo Clinic, it was determined that the receipt provided by Mrs. [Nombre62 001], to justify not reporting to work on October 18, 2013, which contains a legend stating \"Acompañante: [Nombre62 001] Hija,\" was altered, since that is not the procedure established in said Clinical Laboratory for issuing attendance receipts, in addition to the fact that Mrs. Nombre139065, ID CED108047, was only treated at the Clinical Laboratory on October 4, 2013. It was precisely based on that finding, from which a presumed alteration of that submitted document was derived, that the expansion of facts in the dismissal proceedings without employer liability was requested. In that context, it must be noted that the initial request to initiate the dismissal process directed by the ministerial superior to the Directorate General of Civil Service, resolution 2013-6785, was issued on December 18, 2013, and its purpose was to discipline the absences recorded from October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification (folios 01-09 of the administrative file). However, the expansion regarding which prescription is argued, i.e., act No. 2014-0381, although dated January 27, 2014, as noted, its purpose is not related to the unjustified absences mentioned *ut supra*, but rather to the submission of an altered receipt. Based on the factual account detailed, such discovery was possible, from an objective standpoint, only at the moment when official letter No. ASAN-MRC-LC005-2014 of January 20, 2014, was issued. That is, the expansion incorporates into the dismissal process a cause different from the unjustified absence, which, by itself, the superior considered objectionable with a degree of seriousness, for violating the rules that regulate probity in the exercise of public office. To verify this, it suffices to refer to the content of that notification of charges, in which, after formulating the facts, it provides an exposition of the position under which it considers the duty of probity violated and, with it, Law No. Placa5670, resulting in the loss of trust. Thus clarified, from the moment when the superior could objectively know of the alteration of that non-attendance receipt, i.e., on January 20, 2014, to the moment when the expansion of charges was requested on January 27, 2014, it is more than certain that the one-month period alleged by the plaintiff has not expired. Nevertheless, as it is a matter of probity, according to the regulation of provision 44 of Law No. 8422, which refers to the prescription of section 71 of Law No. 7428, the applicable period to sanction that alleged infraction would be five years. Consequently, the rejection of the charge under examination must be ordered.\n\n**VIII.- Regarding the Lack of Proof of the Grounds (motivo).** The other defect presented as the basis of this claim refers to the absence of proof of the facts that served as the grounds. In that vein, the plaintiff states that the facts giving rise to her dismissal could not be corroborated, while there is also an improper statement of reasons (fundamentación) for the acts by virtue of which her dismissal was ordered. For its part, the State argues that the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the elements of nullity of the administrative act exist with regard to the grounds and statement of reasons for her dismissal as she alleges. On the contrary, the sanction imposed on the plaintiff is the reasonable and proportional legal consequence of the serious conduct that was deemed proven, which is duly typified and constitutes serious faults and is therefore sanctioned with dismissal. Every administrative act must comply with a series of formal and substantial requirements that determine its validity. Such elements may be of a formal nature, within which are included the administrative procedure, reasoning (motivación), and form of manifestation. From the material plane, those elements are grouped into subjective (which include jurisdiction (competencia), authority (investidura), and will) and objective (which include the grounds (motivo), content, and purpose). The grounds constitute the factual or legal antecedent that enables, legitimizes, or demands the adoption of the administrative conduct. According to the regulation of section 133 of the LGAP, the grounds must be legitimate and must actually and legally exist at the time of issuing the act, and throughout the course of its validity. Precisely the very object of the administrative procedure is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the grounds, as follows from provisions 214, 221, and 297 of the LGAP. Mandate 133.2 of the cited law orders that, when not regulated (that element), it must be proportionate to the content. Its incidence on the content of the act is undeniable, since the latter must encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they were not debated by the parties (article 132.1 ejusdem). Indeed, the content must correspond to the grounds, which highlights the structural importance of that relationship as a prerequisite for the legality of the act. In the instant case, the facts upon which the disciplinary procedure revolved and, therefore, which would configure the grounds of the eventual final act, related to the absences recorded from October 14 to 18, 2013, without presenting valid justification, as well as the submission of an altered receipt to attempt to justify some of those absences. In that order, in resolution No. AJD-RES-005-2014 of 11:00 a.m. on January 6, 2014, notification of charges in file AJ-124-2013, the following facts were set forth: *\"...in accordance with official letter N° DR3-13-227 of October 21, 2013, Eng. Ernesto Soto Vega, Deputy Regional Director of Alajuela, informed Lic. Cristhian Méndez Blanco, that it had not been possible to notify the employee [Nombre62 001] of the suspension issued in accordance with resolution N° 001267, dated October 10 of the current year, since she had not reported to work since October 14, 2013. By which, it is held that said official breached all the principles that should guide the Administration's conduct, since one of the main obligations binding public servants is punctual attendance at work; therefore, the violation of this duty without any justification constitutes a serious fault, which affects the interests of this Ministry.\"* (Folios 12-15 of the administrative record) Similarly, by official letter 2014-0381, the Minister of Public Works and Transport presented an expansion of the dismissal process without employer liability against the employee [Nombre62 001], alleging the alteration of a medical center attendance receipt. It was through resolution AJD-RES-046-2014 of 2:00 p.m. on February 4, 2014, from the Directorate General of Civil Service, communicated to the plaintiff on February 6, 2014, that the notification of charges regarding the expansion of facts was served. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a statement of defense on that matter. (Folios 48-77 of the administrative record) Now, in the final act of the disciplinary cause, resolution No. 12316 of 7:55 p.m. on April 28, 2014, the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil) ordered: *\"...IT IS DECLARED: WITH MERIT the proceeding brought by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to dismiss the employee [Nombre62 001] from her position without liability for the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss the indicated employee. The appeal (recurso de apelación) is available against this resolution before this Tribunal, with the due expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of article 44 and its amendments, of the Civil Service Statute.\"* For these purposes, and in relation to the alleged defect analyzed at this point, that act deemed the following factual aspects proven: *\"...e) That the employee [Nombre62 001] did not report to work from October 15 to 18, 2013; on the 14th of that month she did so partially, as only the entry time is recorded, which she made at 2:00 p.m., without previously informing her superiors of her reasons for being absent or subsequently providing any receipt to justify said work absences. (Folios 128 and 129 of the proceeding file and 26 of the evidence file); d) That the employee [Nombre62 001] was notified on October 14, 2013, at 11:45 a.m. of Resolution No. 001267 of 7:06 a.m. on October 10, 2013, issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, in which a disciplinary sanction was ordered, consisting of three days of suspension without pay. Said sanction and the respective salary deduction were applied to the respondent employee during the days of October 22 to 24, 2013. (Folios 02, 03, and 05 of the evidence file); e) That the employee [Nombre62 001] attempted to justify before her superiors the work absence incurred on October 18, 2013, by presenting a photocopy of a form called \"Solicitud y Resultados de Análisis Clínicos\" from the Dr. Nombre5497 Clinic of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) and issued to Nombre62 of Nombre139065. In said document, its issuance date is recorded in handwritten form and reads \"18/1 0/13\"; when compared with a copy of the original document, it is indicated to be \"3/10/13\", with an evident alteration of the day 18. (Folios 67 of the proceeding file and 23 of the evidence file)...\"* This act was communicated to the plaintiff on May 14, 2014. (Folios 208-217 of the administrative record). Such factual findings were supported by the various pieces of evidence admitted and gathered within the disciplinary cause, to which the plaintiff had access and which she could refute in the exercise of her right to be heard. From the foregoing, it follows that in that procedure the circumstances were established from which the Administration deemed the causes proven that supported the opening of the disciplinary procedure and which were timely set forth to the claimant. The plaintiff does not directly challenge the intellectual process of weighing evidence that led to the cited inferences; however, in the administrative venue, by a document of May 16, 2014, she filed an appeal against the final act, and by resolution No. 007-2015 TASC of 3:10 p.m. on January 29, 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil) ordered the rejection of the filed appellate measure. In that regard, part of the debated issues revolved around the analytical exercise of the elements of conviction, an aspect in which that appellate body concluded that no incorrectness in the assessment of the evidence was observed. On that point, said Administrative Tribunal expressed forcefully: *\"… In that sense, the Civil Service Tribunal deemed duly proven the unjustified absence from her work by the plaintiff, for the four days running from October 15 to 18, 2013, without the employee’s interpretation that on said dates she was suspended for three days (from October 15 to 17) in accordance with the notification of resolution Nº 001267 of October 10, 2013, which was made to her on October 14 by the notifier Nombre139067, being considered valid justification for the Adjudicator. The notifier Mr. Nombre139067 – as transcribed by the appealed resolution – stated he had not indicated to the respondent the date from which the communicated suspension would run because, as stated, he was not the Head of Mrs. [Nombre62 001]…\"*. Under that approach, it is the consideration of this Chamber that the contested acts clearly manifest the facts and evidence from which the alleged fault was deemed proven, relating to the absences without justification occurring from October 15 to 18, 2013, without the plaintiff having been able to refute such circumstances. Furthermore, regarding the second grounds of the act, i.e., the alteration of the medical center attendance document, the same resolution of the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service weighed: *\"... In this particular, the reproach to the respondent does not refer to whether the respondent (sic) was absent or not from her work on that date; what is under examination is her conduct in relation to the use of a receipt for clinical services attendance for her mother, Mrs. Nombre139065, which, as demonstrated, does not contain real information regarding the date, the same having been altered, and which was also improperly attempted to be used to justify an absence. Thus, if there is no suitable document justifying her absence, and it is also evident that the respondent used an official document from a public institution with altered information to benefit herself, in an attempt to deceive her employer, that constitutes a serious infraction of the current legal norms and the worker's obligations to her employer...\".* Such mention highlights the considerations that led to deeming that other fault charged within the disciplinary cause as proven. For this, the above-mentioned indication must not be overlooked, regarding the fact that the submission of that altered document is supported by other evidence provided to the administrative file and previously known by the plaintiff. Indeed, as stated in the list of proven facts, it is noted that upon the submission of the cited receipt, by official letter No. 20140133 of January 20, 2014, the Legal Directorate of the MOPT requested from the Directorate of the Clinical Laboratory of the Marcial Rodríguez Conejo Clinic details of the dates on which the plaintiff was treated at that Clinical Laboratory during October 2013. Likewise, it requested to indicate whether the receipt stating that the plaintiff accompanied Nombre139065 on October 18, 2013, and to indicate whether that Laboratory recorded said justification. (Folio 41 of the administrative record) In response to that request, by note ASAN-MRC-LC-005-2014 of January 20, 2014, the Director of the Clinical Laboratory indicated in the preceding fact states that during October 2013, the plaintiff was treated on the 4th of that month, presenting herself at the service window at 6:47 a.m. In addition, regarding the submitted receipt, he stated: *\"3. Having seen the copy of the 'Solicitud de Resultados de Análisis Clínicos' provided by you, I must state that the justification noted at the foot of said request does not correspond to what is standard in the Service. On that day there were no problems with the LIS and if at any time there were, the receipt would have been issued on the 'CONTROL ASISTENCIA SERVICIO MÉDICOS' form.\"* (Folio 40 of the administrative record) It was precisely the content of that last communication that supported the fact that, through official letter No. 2014-0381 dated January 27, 2014, the Minister of the Public Works and Transport portfolio requested the expansion of charges in the dismissal procedure without employer liability. Therefore, it is clear that, within the administrative file, there is effective and due proof of that alleged fact. In light of these considerations, it is the position of this collegiate body that the final act as well as the definitive act that confirms it contain the proper reference and support for the circumstances that gave basis to the grounds of the act, consisting of the proof of the conducts alleged from the notification of charges. Under that understanding, once said grounds are proven, as a factual antecedent, the content of those conducts constitutes the consequence and reaction foreseen upon the verification of those conducts.\n\nErgo, that content substantially conforms to the limits imposed by canon 132 of the LGAP, as regards correspondence with the grounds and its lawfulness. Regarding this last condition, the plaintiff does not rebut the legal issues on which the decision for her dismissal without employer liability for the faults committed is based. The final act itself indicates that the decision is adopted under the shelter of a set of legal and regulatory precepts that the lawsuit neither refutes nor contests, among which are mentioned Articles 19, 71 subsection b), and 81 subsections g) and 1) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), 39, 43, and 80 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), and 82 and 35 of the Civil Service Regulations (Reglamento del Servicio Civil). It is reiterated, the lawsuit does not provide grievances concerning the improper application or erroneous interpretation of those norms, or the lack of application of any normative precept that would lead to a different conclusion or treatment of her situation, and in those terms, a potential illegitimacy of the challenged act, insofar as it has been subject to debate, cannot be established. It is worth insisting that the issue related to the preclusion (preclusión) of the power to execute the dismissal was an aspect already resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in the exercise of its competencies as a Court of Cassation, in a projection different from the one originally adopted by this Trial Court, a criterion that, due to the hierarchy of that instance and by constituting the final decision in this jurisdiction, constitutes the last and definitive decision on that particular point and therefore, cannot be analyzed again. Thus, since the inadmissibility of the statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged regarding that execution has been defined, and the expiration of the power to analyze matters relating to the alteration of the voucher has not been established, nor has the existence of the pathology alleged regarding the accreditation of the underlying facts for the grounds of the challenged acts been established, the dismissal of those charges under examination must be ordered.\n\nIX.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised. Having been granted the statutory transfer, the representation of the sued entity answered in the negative. It raised the defense of lack of right. Said defense must be fully accepted, which leads, without more, to the dismissal of the lawsuit in all its aspects.\n\nX.- Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only feasible when, in the opinion of the Court, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, it is the consideration of this Court that the losing party had sufficient reason to litigate. To this end, it suffices to note that the plaintiff's claims were initially estimated regarding the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the execution power, a topic on which various legal interpretation positions are presented and which highlights the good faith and legitimate cause for the filing of this process. Therefore, it is proper to resolve this matter without a special condemnation in costs.\n\nPOR TANTO.\n\nThe defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against the State is declared without merit in all its aspects. It is resolved without a special condemnation in costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*\n\nEXPEDIENTE: 15-002978-1027-CA\n\nASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO\n\nACTOR: [Nombre62 001]\n\nDEMANDADO: El Estado.\n\nIGWTHUP.JRGN 2019.\n\n| | |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| **Documento firmado por:** | |\n| ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |\n| CYNTHIA ABARCA GOMEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |\n| DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |" }