{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-950273",
  "citation": "Res. 00531-2019 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Licencia municipal para agencia Kolbi del ICE en San Carlos",
  "title_en": "Municipal license for ICE's Kolbi agency in San Carlos",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección III, actúa como jerarca impropio en un recurso de apelación presentado por el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) contra la Municipalidad de San Carlos. La municipalidad exigió a la agencia Kolbi del ICE obtener una licencia comercial y pagar el impuesto de patente correspondiente para operar en el cantón. El ICE argumentó estar exento de dicho tributo en virtud de una exoneración genérica contenida en su ley de creación, Ley N° 449, y que sus actividades no generaban lucro pues las utilidades debían capitalizarse. El Tribunal rechazó ambos argumentos. Sostuvo que la exoneración original del ICE fue limitada por la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones N° 7293 de 1992 y la reforma al Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, de modo que no cubre impuestos creados posteriormente, como la Ley de Patentes de San Carlos N° 7773 de 1999. Además, determinó que la actividad de telecomunicaciones de Kolbi en un mercado competitivo es lucrativa y genera utilidades, por lo que está sujeta al pago de la patente municipal. Confirmó la resolución administrativa y dio por agotada la vía administrativa.",
  "summary_en": "The Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Section III, acting as an improper hierarchical authority, hears an appeal filed by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) against the Municipality of San Carlos. The municipality required ICE's Kolbi agency to obtain a commercial license and pay the corresponding patent tax to operate in the canton. ICE argued it was exempt from this tax due to a generic exemption in its founding law, Law No. 449, and that its activities were not for profit since the profits had to be capitalized. The Court rejected both arguments. It held that ICE's original exemption was limited by the Regulatory Law on Exemptions No. 7293 of 1992 and the reform to the Tax Code, so it does not cover taxes created subsequently, such as the San Carlos Patent Law No. 7773 of 1999. Furthermore, it determined that Kolbi's telecommunications activity in a competitive market is lucrative and generates profits, so it is subject to the municipal patent tax. It confirmed the administrative decision and declared the administrative process exhausted.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III",
  "date": "25/10/2019",
  "year": "2019",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "patente comercial",
    "exención tributaria",
    "hecho generador",
    "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
    "jerarca impropio",
    "agotamiento de la vía administrativa"
  ],
  "article_citations": [],
  "keywords_es": [
    "ICE",
    "Kolbi",
    "patente municipal",
    "licencia comercial",
    "exención tributaria",
    "Ley 7773",
    "Ley 7293",
    "Código Municipal",
    "actividad lucrativa",
    "telecomunicaciones",
    "San Carlos"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "ICE",
    "Kolbi",
    "municipal patent",
    "commercial license",
    "tax exemption",
    "Law 7773",
    "Law 7293",
    "Municipal Code",
    "profit-seeking activity",
    "telecommunications",
    "San Carlos"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido... a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido... En lo que atañe al agravio que reclama que el ICE no genera actividad lucrativa... la propia Ley No. 8660 reconoce expresamente que en materia de telecomunicaciones el ICE genera utilidades, puesto que le impone debe pagar impuesto sobre la renta, de modo que de esa rentabilidad se extrae la base imponible para determinar el quántum de ambos impuestos, sea el de renta y el de la patente comercial... Confunde la representación del ICE los conceptos de generación de utilidades con el destino o distribución de éstas",
  "excerpt_en": "the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree Law number 449 cannot claim to cover future taxes, even though it was so established... from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform of the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree Law number 449 cannot claim to cover future taxes, even though it was so established... Regarding the grievance claiming that ICE does not generate profit-generating activity... Law No. 8660 itself expressly recognizes that in telecommunications, ICE generates profits, since it imposes the obligation to pay income tax, so from that profitability the tax base is extracted to determine the amount of both taxes, income tax and commercial patent tax... ICE's representation confuses the concepts of profit generation with the destination or distribution thereof",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Court denied ICE's appeal and confirmed the obligation to obtain a municipal license and pay the commercial patent tax in San Carlos for its telecommunications activities.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal rechazó la apelación del ICE y confirmó la obligación de obtener licencia municipal y pagar la patente comercial en San Carlos por su actividad de telecomunicaciones."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree Law number 449 cannot claim to cover future taxes, even though it was so established",
      "quote_es": "a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law",
      "quote_es": "la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "ICE's representation confuses the concepts of generation of profits with the destination or distribution thereof",
      "quote_es": "Confunde la representación del ICE los conceptos de generación de utilidades con el destino o distribución de éstas"
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-11609",
      "citation": "Ley 449",
      "title_en": "ICE Creation Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "08/04/1949",
      "year": "1949"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-32135",
      "citation": "Ley 7293",
      "title_en": "Law Regulating Current Exemptions",
      "title_es": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "31/03/1992",
      "year": "1992"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-63786",
      "citation": "Ley 8660",
      "title_en": "Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "08/08/2008",
      "year": "2008"
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      "citation": "Ley 7794",
      "title_en": "Municipal Code",
      "title_es": "Código Municipal",
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      "date": "30/04/1998",
      "year": "1998"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-5561",
      "citation": "Ley 4574",
      "title_en": "Municipal Code",
      "title_es": "Código Municipal",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "04/05/1970",
      "year": "1970"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-6530",
      "citation": "Ley 4755",
      "title_en": "Tax Code of Norms and Procedures",
      "title_es": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "03/05/1971",
      "year": "1971"
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    {
      "id": "norm-40197",
      "citation": "Ley 7794",
      "title_en": "Municipal Code",
      "title_es": "Código Municipal",
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      "date": "30/04/1998",
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    {
      "id": "norm-5561",
      "citation": "Ley 4574",
      "title_en": "Municipal Code",
      "title_es": "Código Municipal",
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      "date": "04/05/1970",
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    {
      "id": "norm-63786",
      "citation": "Ley 8660",
      "title_en": "Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector Law",
      "title_es": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones",
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      "date": "08/08/2008",
      "year": "2008"
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    {
      "id": "norm-6530",
      "citation": "Ley 4755",
      "title_en": "Tax Code of Norms and Procedures",
      "title_es": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "03/05/1971",
      "year": "1971"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-11609",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Decreto Ley 449  Art. 20"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-32135",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7293  Art. 2 inciso l"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-63786",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 8660  Art. 18"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-950273",
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  "body_es_text": "Firmar Documento \n\nEXPEDIENTE:18-006425-1027-CA\n\nPROCESO: APELACIÓN EN JERARQUÍA\n\nRECURRENTE: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD\n\nRECURRIDA: MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN CARLOS \n\n \n\nN° 531-2019\n\nTRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA,SECCIÓN TERCERA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, ANEXO A. GOICOECHEA , a las siete horas cuarenta minutos del veinticinco de octubre del dos mil diecinueve.\n\nConoce este Tribunal, como jerarca impropio del recurso de apelación interpuesto por Nombre13825 , portador de la cédula de identidad CED11088, en representación del INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD, cédula jurídica CED318, contra la resolución número MSC-R.A.M.-0071-2018 de las doce horas del 9 de julio del 2018, que confirmó el oficio No. MSCAM-H-AT-PAT-229-2018 del 19 de junio del 2018, que comunicó a la agencia Kolbi del ICE que en aplicación del numeral 79 del Código Municipal, el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 7773 -Ley de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de San Carlos- , debía obtener licencia municipal y pagar el respectivo tributo que le autorice para el desarrollo de su actividad lucrativa en el cantón de San Carlos.-\n\nRedacta la jueza Nombre12928 ; y,\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.-Consideración preliminar respecto de la prescindencia de un elenco de hechos probados: En vista de las características del presente procedimiento se hace innecesaria la elaboración de un elenco de hechos probados, pues los únicos elementos fácticos de relevancia para la resolución del presente trámite, ya están consignados en el encabezado de esta resolución.\n\nII.- Motivos del recurso. En la presente causa, la representación del ICE sostiene sus agravios sobre la base de dos tesis en específico que se resumen de seguido. La primera de ellas arguye que la entidad se encuentra exenta del tributo por concepto de patente comercial, puesto que si bien el impuesto tiene sustento en los poderes conferidos constitucionalmente a los gobiernos locales en el numeral 121.13, desarrollados en el 79 del Código Municipal y en la Ley N°7341, el numeral 18 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas de Telecomunicaciones -Ley No. 8660 del 13 de agosto del 2008-, mantuvo las exoneraciones dispuestas por el legislador en el artículo 20 de su Ley de creación -Ley No. 449 del 8 de abril de 1949-, dejando incólume la exoneración de impuestos municipales. Considera que el ayuntamiento fue ayuno en su análisis al omitir esta última Ley, la cual entró en vigencia con posterioridad a la sentencia de la Sala Primera No. 0000037-F-04, utilizada como parte del fundamento del Alcalde para la decisión adoptada. Como segundo agravio, alega la inexistencia del hecho generador, lo cual deriva puesto que de los ordinales 17 de la Ley N°449 y 13 de la Ley N°8660, pues si bien en materia de telecomunicaciones la institución se ha incorporado al mercado competitivo, el legislador dispuso que las utilidades que genera deben ser capitalizadas para el cumplimiento de sus propios fines, posición que refuerza sobre la base del dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República, No. C-151-2007, que expresó esa misma postura ante una consulta emanada por la Municipalidad de Grecia. \n\nIII.- Sobre el fondo. En la presente causa, el Alcalde de San Carlos confirmó el oficio No. SCAM-H-AT-PAT-229-2018 del 19 de junio del 2018, dirigido por la Sección de Patentes a la agencia Kolbi del ICE. Entiende esta Cámara que el objeto de este procedimiento recursivo gira exclusivamente en torno a la actividad de venta de bienes y servicios relacionados con la materia de telecomunicaciones que desarrolla dicha agencia, y no a las restantes empresas y actividades del ICE. En razón de ello, a efecto de evitar confusiones debido al amplio espectro de competencias que el legislador asignó al ICE, todo el análisis que de seguido se realiza deberá ser referenciado y entendido únicamente respecto de dicha actividad. Las autoridades locales han venido sosteniendo que a pesar del texto desarrollado en los artículos 17 de la Ley N°449 y 13 de la ley N°8660, la entrada en competencia con las demás empresas de telecomunicaciones convierte en lucrativa la actividad desarrollada por el ICE, de modo que se encuadra dentro de los supuestos previstos en los ordinales 88 del Código Municipal y 1 de la Ley 7773. Con base en la sentencia No. 000037-F-04 de las 10:35 horas del 21 de enero del 2004 y el dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República No. C-296-2017, la Municipalidad sostuvo que la exoneración genérica subjetiva a favor del ICE que fue creada en la Ley N°449, solo alcanzaba los impuestos vigentes al momento de su ley de creación y los posteriores creados hasta la promulgación de la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones -Ley N°7293 del 3 de abril de 1992-, de modo que en aplicación del ordinal 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios que dispone que \"la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación\", la Ley de Tarifa de Impuestos para la Municipalidad de San Carlos -Ley N°7773 vigente desde el 21 de mayo de 1999-, sí le resulta aplicable el régimen impositivo al no prever la exoneración pretendida. Rechazó el Alcalde la posición externada en torno a la ausencia de la producción del hecho generador, puesto que el ICE es un operador y proveedor en un mercado competitivo conforme lo dispuso la Ley N° 8660, tal y como lo señaló la Procuraduría en el dictamen N-337-2015, entendiendo que el artículo 13 de esa ley solamente dispone lineamientos propios de actividad financiera y no tiene conexión con el caso en discusión. Como se aprecia, el acto ha sido ampliamente fundamentado, de modo que el agravio que acusa omisión en el análisis del texto de la Ley N°8660 no es de recibo, dado que la tesis esbozada por el Alcalde parte de una interpretación histórico-evolutiva del desarrollo legislativo atinente a la materia que le permitió arribar a la conclusión expresada, que difiere sustantivamente de la interpretación que hace la parte apelante de la legislación vigente. \n\nIV.- Sobre el nacimiento de las exenciones tributarias. En la relación jurídico impositiva, las obligaciones que asumen los contribuyentes consisten principalmente en la prestación del tributo de las obligaciones tributarias sustanciales, siendo la fuente de la obligación tributaria el hecho generador, el cual puede surgir únicamente por mandato de una ley, la que, en aras de la satisfacción de un interés público superior, destinado al cumplimiento de las obligaciones estatales, somete al contribuyente a un régimen de obligaciones adicionales. Aunado a la política de recaudación tributaria, los estados desarrollan otras estrategias de desarrollo por medio de las cuales se crean excepciones a la aplicación de los tributos, dentro de los que se encuentran los beneficios fiscales, que se entienden como la concesión de medidas fiscales proteccionistas, que pueden comprender diversos mecanismos o manifestaciones, tales como las exoneraciones tributarias o el otorgamiento de subvenciones de diversa índole, como por ejemplo, bonos del Estado para determinadas actividades (productivas o culturales), el acceso a créditos oficiales con tasas de interés reducidas y plazos dilatorios de amortización, las franquicias aduaneras, entre otros. Se trata entonces de \"medidas de apoyo o estímulo instrumental a través de un mecanismo desgravatorio del tributo\" (SOLER ROCH,M.T. Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria, Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20). En lo que a las exoneraciones se refiere, se busca impedir el nacimiento de la obligación tributaria -exención total-, o reducir la cuantía del tributo -exención parcial-, a través de bonificaciones o deducciones ante ciertos supuestos de hecho incluidos en el ámbito del hecho imponible cuya realización no da lugar al surgimiento de la obligación tributaria de pago, constituyendo una excepción a los efectos normales derivados de la realización de aquel. La norma de exención del tributo tiene la fuerza de enervar los efectos de la que lo crea, pues afecta, o al elemento subjetivo u objetivo del hecho imponible, o los elementos de cuantificación del tributo, o sea, en la base imponible (deducciones y reducciones) o en el tipo de gravamen. La teoría clásica de la exención define las exoneraciones como una dispensa legal de la obligación tributaria, sea como una derogación de la obligación de pago, no obstante producirse el hecho imponible, que es el efecto que producen, sea la excepción de la obligación de contribuir con los gastos públicos determinados sujetos (exoneración subjetiva), o a determinadas situaciones o hechos (exoneración objetiva). Así, la exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma contempla que en aquellos supuestos expresamente previstos por ella, no obstante producirse el hecho imponible, no se desarrolla su efecto principal: el deber de pagar el tributo u obligación tributaria. \n\nV. Partiendo del análisis anterior, debe indicarse que el ejercicio de actividades lucrativas exige la obtención, de previo, de una habilitación legal denominada licencia municipal. Desde la versión anterior del Código Municipal -Ley 4574 del 04 de mayo de 1970- en su ordinales 96 a 98, se sometió el ejercicio de toda actividad lucrativa a la obtención de dicha licencia y la sujetó al respectivo pago del tributo municipal (patente) para su ejercicio, dineros con los cuales los ayuntamientos solventan parte de los gastos ordinarios de su gestión sustantiva. Esas normas fueron reiteradas en los ordinales 88 a 91 -antes 79 a 82- del actual Código Municipal -Ley 7794 publicada en La Gaceta No. 94 del 18 de mayo de 1998- y, con base en ellas, las corporaciones locales han desarrollado sus textos normativos impositivos mediante la promulgación de leyes ordinarias que disponen el detalle de los elementos de la obligación tributaria (sujetos pasivo y activo, hecho generador), junto con todas las medidas adicionales de gestión y recaudación. En el supuesto de la Municipalidad de San Carlos, la Ley No. 7773, vigente desde el 1 de julio de 1999, dispuso en los numerales 1 y 3 la determinación del elemento subjetivo del impuesto y el método de cálculo del tributo, de modo que todas las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen a actividades lucrativas, deben pagar el tributo. Veamos: \n\nArtículo 1.- Las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen al ejercicio de actividades lucrativas en el cantón de San Carlos, estarán obligadas a pagar un impuesto de patentes, conforme a esta ley. \n\n \n\nArtículo 3°- Factores determinantes de la imposición\n\n Establécense como factores determinantes de la imposición, la renta líquida gravable y los ingresos brutos anuales que perciban las personas físicas o jurídicas afectas al impuesto, durante el período fiscal anterior al año que se grava. Se entiende por renta líquida gravable la que se aplica para el cobro del impuesto sobre la renta. Los ingresos brutos no incluyen lo recaudado por concepto del impuesto sobre las ventas. En el caso de establecimientos financieros y de correduría de bienes muebles e inmuebles, se consideran ingresos brutos los percibidos por concepto de comisiones e intereses.\n\n \n\nDe la lectura de dichas normas no se desprende que la Ley No. 7773 haya dispensado expresamente al ICE de la obligación de obtener licencia comercial y pagar la patente de rigor, de modo que ello nos lleva a revisar los agravios expresados por la parte apelante, que invoca la vigencia de otra normativa, según la cual, a su criterio, sí existe una exoneración genérica subjetiva a su favor. \n\nVI.- A efecto de determinar si el ICE se encuentra exonerado del tributo por concepto de licencia comercial en aplicación de su Ley constitutiva -Ley No. 449-, debe indicarse que esta Cámara se ha pronunciado en otras ocasiones anteriores en el sentido que la imposición de todos aquellos tributos nacidos sin un régimen de exenciones a favor del ICE con posterioridad a la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones -Ley No. 7293 del 3 de abril de 1992- en aplicación de los ordinales 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. En razón de los agravios esbozados y los fundamentos del acto que se impugna, es útil hacer referencia a los precedentes de esta Cámara, útiles en esta ocasión para efecto del impuesto por concepto de patente comercial. Dentro de otras, la resolución número 459-2012, de las quince horas treinta minutos del treinta y uno de octubre del dos mil doce, reiterada por este Tribunal en muchas ocasiones, resulta útil a los efectos de esta causa, pues aún cuando se analizó la imposición del Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles, el argumento es aplicable en esta causa, pues dicta lo siguiente:\n\n \n\nVo.- SOBRE LOS ALCANCES DE LA MODIFICACIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 63 DEL C.N.P.T. POR LA LEY 7293 Y SU INCIDENCIA EN LA EXENCIÓN GENÉRICA, SUBJETIVA Y A FUTURO PREVISTA EN EL NUMERAL 20 DEL DECRETO LEY 449. Este Tribunal considera que la entidad recurrente no está exenta de pagar el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, por las razones que de seguido se exponen. El Decreto Ley que crea el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, fue adicionado por Ley N° 764 de 25 de octubre de 1949, para efectos de establecer: “Artículo 20.- El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales y goza de franquicia postal y telegráfica”. Dicha norma, creó una exención genérica subjetiva que resultaba aplicable para todos los impuestos presentes y futuros que pudieran afectar al ICE, más la Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Ley N° 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992- eliminó esta última condición, pues en el artículo 2 inciso l) dispuso mantener únicamente las exenciones vigentes a la fecha de su promulgación a favor de todas las instituciones autónomas, resultando afectado el ICE en el tanto ostenta tal naturaleza, lo cual se reforzó con la reforma de los artículos 63 y 64 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -contenida en ese mismo cuerpo normativo-, que dispuso: \n\n“…ARTICULO 63: Límite de aplicación. Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación. (Así reformado por el artículo 50 de la ley Nº 7293 de 26 de marzo de 1992).\"\n\n\" ARTICULO 64.- Vigencia. La exención, aun cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado.”\n\nAsimismo, se sujetó su eficacia \"…al pleno acatamiento de los preceptos, requisitos y fines que regulan el otorgamiento, así como al correcto uso y destino previsto, de los bienes y servicios sobre los que haya recaído la exención que disfruta determinado sujeto…” (Artículo 37 de la Ley 7293). En consecuencia, se limitaron los efectos de la exoneración, de manera tal que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. De manera tal que la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley. Aplicando lo anterior a la situación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, se deriva que –en principio y sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660, que se analizará de seguido-, dicha institución se encontraría obligada al pago de todo tributo establecido con posterioridad a la Ley 7293, salvo en aquellos supuestos en que expresamente se haya otorgado una exención en su favor ver al respecto, la sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro)...\n\n \n\n...la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro, al indicar –en lo que interesa- que “…Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha (…)En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data…”. En consecuencia, a partir del 3 de abril de 1992, la exención genérica y subjetiva prevista a favor del ICE en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, se mantiene, aunque limitada en sus alcances y vigencia futuras a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 inciso l) de la Ley 7293 y 5, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.\"\n\n...\n\na partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido...\n\n \n\nVIIo.- CON RELACIÓN A LOS ALCANCES DE LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 18 DE LA LEY 8660 EN EL CASO DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES. \n\n... La Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (Ley 8660 que entró en vigencia a partir del 13 de agosto del 2008), establece en el artículo 18 que: “Artículo 18.- Tratamiento tributario. Cuando el ICE y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas. En los demás casos, se mantendrán vigentes las exenciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley N° 449 de 8 de abril de 1949, así como a cualesquiera otras que les confiera el ordenamiento. Se excluye del pago del impuesto sobre la renta el servicio telefónico básico tradicional”. (el resaltado es agregado). La norma transcrita contiene dos supuestos esenciales en materia tributaria con relación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: i) La regla general es la exención del pago de tributos, en consecuencia, dicha entidad conserva la exención contenida en el Decreto Ley que lo crea y cualquier otra Ley que le otorgue exoneración. No obstante, de conformidad con los principios de reserva de ley y de legalidad tributaria, la exención prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, queda limitada en sus alcances y vigencia, a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; ii) La excepción referida a la obligación de pago de los impuestos de renta y de ventas, la cual, está condicionada a la existencia de un mercado competitivo. Ahora bien, cabe aclarar que la Ley 8660 entró en vigencia a partir del 13 de agosto de 2008, sin que pueda ser de aplicación retroactiva, por ende, las reglas tributarias, incluida la exención de impuestos rige a partir de esa fecha, aunque –se insiste- limitada en sus alcances y vigencia a lo dispuesto en los artículos 2, 62, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Ello por cuanto, no podría sostenerse que el ICE recuperó una exención genérica, subjetiva y para tributos futuros –tal y como originalmente fue prevista en el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449-, toda vez que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido (ver en sentido similar, las resoluciones número 417-2012 de las catorce horas del once de octubre; 431-2012 de las catorce horas del dieciocho de octubre; 432-2012 de las catorce horas cinco minutos del dieciocho de octubre, todas del dos mil doce, dictadas por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). De tal manera, que lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660 no tiene la virtud de derogar para el caso concreto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo dispuesto en los artículos 5, 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos, que desarrollan a nivel legal los principios de reserva de ley en materia tributaria y de legalidad, previstos en los artículos 11 y 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, por lo que, la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley, lo que no sucede en el caso del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles. En ese sentido, este Tribunal considera que no puede válidamente alegarse que el ICE recuperó la exención genérica, subjetiva y para tributos futuros, tal y como fue prevista en el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449, y que en consecuencia, al tratarse la Ley 8660 de una ley especial prevalece sobre una ley general (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), toda vez que ello implicaría desaplicar para el caso concreto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, dos principios básico en materia tributaria, como lo son: i) Reserva de ley y Legalidad Tributaria, en el sentido de que la ley debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones (artículo 62 párrafo 1º del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); ii) Igualdad ante el impuesto y las cargas públicas, pues aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación –como en el caso de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles-, pues ello implicaría una limitación a futuro de la potestad tributaria del Estado, en detrimento de ese principio (artículo 18 in fine de la Constitución Política)...\"\n\nSiguiendo esa misma inteligencia, con posterioridad a la Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Ley N° 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992- se mantuvieron las exenciones vigentes a la fecha de su promulgación a favor de todas las instituciones autónomas. Varios años después entró a regir la Ley de Tarifas de Impuestos para la Municipalidad de San Carlos -Ley No. 7773 vigente desde el 21 de mayo de 1998-, que, como se indicó líneas atrás, carece de la exoneración pretendida por el ICE. Dada la existencia de una ley posterior que creó el impuesto sobre licencias comerciales en el cantón de San Carlos, el cual no contempló el régimen exonerativo pretendido, el impuesto recae necesariamente sobre la actividad comercial del ICE referida a la venta de bienes y servicios en materia de telecomunicaciones. De sobra está indicar que la parte apelante invoca extrañamente, en un aparente error material de su libelo recursivo, la aplicación de la Ley 7341, que es aplicable únicamente en el cantón de Los Chiles, norma que obviamente tiene una aplicabilidad territorial geográficamente delimitada por la división política cantonal, no pudiendo trascender al cantón de San Carlos. Por ende, el agravio que entiende que existe un régimen exonerativo a favor del ICE a efecto de dispensarle de su deber de obtener licencia municipal y pagar la patente, no es de recibo y debe ser rechazado.\n\nVII.- En lo que atañe al agravio que reclama que el ICE no genera actividad lucrativa, la tesis tiende a desarrollar un supuesto de no sujeción al tributo ante la ausencia del hecho generador previsto en el ordinal 88 del Código Municipal y en la Ley No. 7773. Sobre este particular debe indicarse que la propia Ley No. 8660 reconoce expresamente que en materia de telecomunicaciones el ICE genera utilidades, puesto que le impone debe pagar impuesto sobre la renta, de modo que de esa rentabilidad se extrae la base imponible para determinar el quántum de ambos impuestos, sea el de renta y el de la patente comercial, conforme lo dispone el numeral 3 de la Ley No. 7773 transcrito líneas atrás. Precisamente, el numeral 18 de la Ley No. 8660 dispone que \"Cuando el ICE y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas\". Confunde la representación del ICE los conceptos de generación de utilidades con el destino o distribución de éstas, puesto que una se produce antes que la otra, resultando que lo regulado en el numeral 17 de la referida Ley 8660 es el manejo que se ha de realizar con los excedentes que la actividad lucrativa depare, pues sin duda el giro comercial del ICE en materia de telecomunicaciones es netamente empresarial. Precisamente, esta Cámara se pronunció en una causa similar a la presente, en el sentido que las tiendas Kolbi están destinadas a generar utilidades, debido al régimen comercial de competencia en el que se encuentran inmersas, tal y como de seguido se transcribe el Voto 292-2018 de las trece horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del seis de julio del dos mil dieciocho:\n\n\"... Es criterio de esta Cámara que lleva razón la Alcaldesa Municipal de Heredia en cuanto a las precisiones efectuadas sobre el concepto de actividad lucrativa y utilidades, que efectivamente son generadas por el ICE en la industria de telecomunicaciones mediante sus tiendas \"kolbi\", así como lo reconoce la misma ley. Véase, que el argumento de la representación apelante, sobre la inexistencia de una actividad lucrativa en el caso concreto, es inclusive contradictorio con su fundamentación jurídica, ya que los mismos textos normativos de las leyes N°449 y N°8660, en sus artículos 17 y 13 respectivamente reconocen indubitablemente que el ICE genera utilidades -actividad lucrativa- y su dirección de inversión, por consiguiente pese a la obligatoriedad de la capitalización de estos excedentes, las utilidades existen, y por ende también la base imponible del impuesto de patente. Adicionalmente, cabe agregar que la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones N°8642, sobre la existencia de las utilidades y la separación contable de los servicios prestados, regula lo siguiente:\n\n\"ARTÍCULO 6.- Definiciones\n\nPara los efectos de esta Ley se define lo siguiente:\n\n(...)\n\n13)Orientación a costos: cálculo de los precios y las tarifas basados en los costos atribuibles a la prestación del servicio y de la infraestructura, los cuales deberán incluir una utilidad, en términos reales, no menor a la media de la industria nacional o internacional, en este último caso con mercados comparables...\"\n\n\"ARTÍCULO 37.- Ejecución de los fondos de Fonatel\n\n(...)\n\nLos operadores o proveedores que ejecuten recursos de Fonatel, deberán mantener un sistema de contabilidad de costos separada, de conformidad con lo que se establezca reglamentariamente, el cual deberá ser auditado, anualmente, por una firma de contadores públicos autorizados, debidamente acreditada ante la Sutel. Los costos de esta auditoría deberán ser cancelados por el operador o proveedor auditado....\"\n\n\"ARTÍCULO 51.- Servicios de información\n\nLos proveedores de servicios de información no estarán sujetos a las siguientes obligaciones:\n\n(...)\n\nb)Justificar sus precios de acuerdo con sus costos o registrarlos.\"\n\n\"ARTÍCULO 63.- Canon de reserva del espectro\n\nLos operadores de redes y los proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones deberán cancelar, anualmente, un canon de reserva del espectro radioeléctrico. Serán sujetos pasivos de esta tasa los operadores de redes o proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones,a los cuales se haya asignado bandas de frecuencias del espectro radioeléctrico, independientemente de que hagan uso de dichas bandas o no.\n\nEl monto por cancelar por parte de los concesionarios será calculado por la Sutel con consideración de los siguientes parámetros:\n\n(...)\n\nf)La utilidad para la sociedad asociada con la prestación de los servicios....\"\n\n \n\nA mayor abundamiento el Reglamento a la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones,decreto ejecutivo N°34765-MINAE, publicado en la gaceta N°186 del 26 de setiembre del 2008, establece: \n\n\"Artículo 31.-Contenido del contrato de concesión. El contrato de concesión incluirá, como mínimo, lo siguiente:\n\n(...)\n\nL.Obligación de mantener contabilidades separadas para cada servicio, en el caso en que se provean varios servicios bajo una misma concesión...\"\n\nDe lo anterior, se desprende con suficiente certeza que el ICE y sus empresas al ejercer el comercio de telecomunicaciones, deben exponer con transparencia sus utilidades, y llevar una contabilidad detallada sobre los servicios prestados, por lo que es falso el argumento expuesto en esta sede por el señor Nombre13825 sobre la imposibilidad de separar los ingresos del ICE en razón de los diferentes servicios prestados por la institución. Finalmente, se le debe recordar al apelante que las cargas que pesan sobre el contribuyente, por su sola razón de ser tal, son impuestas por Ley, el cual debe hacer ceder su esfera de intereses en favor de un interés público superior,consagrado en el ordinal 18 de la Carta Fundamental. Ya que por encima de las valoraciones que se puedan efectuar de los fondos públicos del ICE y el supuesto beneficio del Ayuntamiento por el pago del tributo, se encuentra la voluntad del legislador plasmada en esta Ley N°9023, que establece una clara intención de gravar las actividades desarrolladas por el recurrente, siendo que la dialéctica sobre el ámbito de significación de lo que pueda comprenderse como una imposibilidad de beneficiarse del presupuesto del ICE en contraste con la potestad tributaria municipal, pierde todo sentido para atender el presente conflicto, ya que es principio esencial de todo Estado de Derecho que los entes públicos están sometidos a las normas legales vigentes, sin poder desaplicarlas singularmente -principio de legalidad-. Por todo lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación presentado... contra la resolución AMH-661-17 dictada por la Alcaldía de Heredia el 22 de mayo del 2017, y siendo que no existe ulterior recurso se da por agotada la víaadministrativa.\n\nDe lo transcrito se desprende que el servicio de telecomunicaciones que brinda el ICE mediante su agencia Kolbi residida en San Carlos, está destinado a generar ganancias y, por ello, es una actividad lucrativa que para regularizarse debe obtener su licencia comercial debidamente expedida por la Municipalidad, honrando el pago de la patente de rigor. Es claro para esta Cámara que el dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República, No. C-151-2007, además de no ser vinculante ni siquiera para la Municipalidad de San Carlos -pues nació en razón de un consulta de la Municipalidad de Grecia-, menos aún lo es para esta jerarquía impropia, estimándolo por demás desactualizado en razón de que su fecha de emisión fue anterior a la Ley No. Placa903, desconociendo los alcances e impacto en el giro comercial del ICE en materia de telecomunicaciones. Por ello, los agravios expresados por la representación del ICE no son de recibo, de modo que esta Cámara coincide con la posición externada por las autoridades locales, de modo que el acto venido en alzada es conforme a derecho y, al carecer de vicios en sus elementos formales y sustanciales alegados, deberá ser confirmado. Al no haber ulterior recurso, se ha de dar por agotada la vía administrativa. \n\nVIII. De la copia del expediente y devolución de documentos. A lhaberse sustanciado esta sede en forma electrónica, queda a disposición de las partes obtener una copia integral que contiene tanto el expediente administrativo remitido por la Corporación Municipal así como la totalidad de las piezas que conforman la presente alzada, para lo cual deberá aportar el dispositivo electrónico de almacenamiento (llave maya o disco compacto). Asimismo, en caso que hubiere ingresado documentación física o electrónica (planos, fotografías, informes, etc) que permanezca aún en custodia elDespacho, podrá retirarla quien la aportó en un plazo de 30 días hábiles, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 12 del «Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial», aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión n.° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial n.° 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nSe declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto y en consecuencia, se confirma la resolución apelada. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.-\n\n \n\nNombre12928 \n\n \n\nNombre106228 ﻿ \n\n \n\n \n\nDocumento firmado por:\n\nNombre12928 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nNombre106228 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A\n\nNombre106228 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A",
  "body_en_text": "**FILE**: 18-006425-1027-CA\n\n**PROCEEDING**: HIERARCHICAL APPEAL\n\n**APPELLANT**: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD\n\n**RESPONDENT**: MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN CARLOS\n\n**N° 531-2019**\n\n**CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, THIRD SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ, ANNEX A. GOICOECHEA**, at seven hours forty minutes on the twenty-fifth of October, two thousand nineteen.\n\nThis Tribunal hears, as improper hierarchical superior, the appeal filed by Nombre13825, holder of identity card CED11088, on behalf of the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD, legal identification number CED318, against resolution number MSC-R.A.M.-0071-2018 of twelve hours on July 9, 2018, which confirmed official letter No. MSCAM-H-AT-PAT-229-2018 of June 19, 2018, which notified the Kolbi agency of ICE that in application of numeral 79 of the Código Municipal, article 1 of Law No. 7773 -Ley de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de San Carlos-, it was required to obtain a municipal license and pay the respective tax authorizing it to carry out its lucrative activity in the canton of San Carlos.-\n\nDrafted by Judge Nombre12928; and,\n\n**CONSIDERANDO**\n\n**I.- Preliminary consideration regarding the omission of a list of proven facts:** In view of the characteristics of this procedure, the preparation of a list of proven facts is unnecessary, as the only factual elements relevant to the resolution of this proceeding are already set out in the heading of this resolution.\n\n**II.- Grounds for the appeal.** In the present case, the representation of ICE bases its grievances on two specific theses, summarized below. The first argues that the entity is exempt from the tax for the concept of a business license (patente comercial), since although the tax is based on the powers constitutionally conferred on local governments in numeral 121.13, developed in numeral 79 of the Código Municipal and in Law No. 7341, numeral 18 of the Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas de Telecomunicaciones - Law No. 8660 of August 13, 2008 -, maintained the exemptions provided by the legislator in article 20 of its enabling Law - Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949 -, leaving intact the exemption from municipal taxes. It considers that the municipality was lacking in its analysis by omitting this latter Law, which came into force after the judgment of Sala Primera No. 0000037-F-04, used as part of the Mayor's basis for the decision adopted. As a second grievance, it alleges the non-existence of the taxable event (hecho generador), which derives from ordinals 17 of Law No. 449 and 13 of Law No. 8660, because although in the field of telecommunications the institution has joined the competitive market, the legislator provided that the profits it generates must be capitalized for the fulfillment of its own purposes, a position it reinforces based on the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, No. C-151-2007, which expressed that same position in response to a query from the Municipalidad de Grecia.\n\n**III.- On the merits.** In the present case, the Mayor of San Carlos confirmed official letter No. SCAM-H-AT-PAT-229-2018 of June 19, 2018, addressed by the Patentes Section to the Kolbi agency of ICE. This Chamber understands that the object of this appellate procedure revolves exclusively around the activity of selling goods and services related to telecommunications carried out by said agency, and not the other companies and activities of ICE. For this reason, to avoid confusion due to the broad spectrum of powers that the legislator assigned to ICE, all the analysis carried out below must be referenced and understood only with respect to said activity. The local authorities have been maintaining that despite the text developed in articles 17 of Law No. 449 and 13 of Law No. 8660, entering into competition with other telecommunications companies makes the activity carried out by ICE lucrative, so that it falls within the assumptions provided in ordinals 88 of the Código Municipal and 1 of Law 7773. Based on judgment No. 000037-F-04 of 10:35 a.m. on January 21, 2004, and the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República No. C-296-2017, the Municipality maintained that the generic subjective exemption in favor of ICE that was created in Law No. 449 only covered taxes in force at the time of its enabling law and subsequent taxes created up to the enactment of the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones - Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992 -, so that in application of ordinal 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which provides that \"the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation\", the Ley de Tarifa de Impuestos para la Municipalidad de San Carlos - Law No. 7773 in force since May 21, 1999 -, does have the tax regime applicable to it, as it does not provide for the intended exemption. The Mayor rejected the position expressed regarding the absence of the occurrence of the taxable event, since ICE is an operator and provider in a competitive market as provided by Law No. 8660, as noted by the Procuraduría in opinion N-337-2015, understanding that article 13 of that law only provides guidelines specific to financial activity and has no connection with the case under discussion. As can be seen, the act has been extensively reasoned, so the grievance alleging omission in the analysis of the text of Law No. 8660 is not receivable, given that the thesis outlined by the Mayor is based on a historical-evolutionary interpretation of the legislative development relevant to the matter that allowed him to reach the stated conclusion, which differs substantively from the interpretation made by the appellant of the legislation in force.\n\n**IV.- On the creation of tax exemptions.** In the tax legal relationship, the obligations assumed by taxpayers primarily consist of the payment of the tax of the substantive tax obligations, the source of the tax obligation being the taxable event, which can arise solely by mandate of a law, which, for the satisfaction of a higher public interest intended for the fulfillment of state obligations, subjects the taxpayer to a regime of additional obligations. In addition to tax collection policy, states develop other development strategies through which exceptions to the application of taxes are created, including tax benefits, which are understood as the granting of protectionist fiscal measures, which may include various mechanisms or manifestations, such as tax exemptions or the granting of subsidies of various kinds, for example, State bonds for certain activities (productive or cultural), access to official credits with reduced interest rates and extended amortization periods, customs franchises, among others. It is therefore a matter of \"support measures or instrumental stimulus through a tax relief mechanism\" (SOLER ROCH, M.T. Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria, Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20). As far as exemptions are concerned, the aim is to prevent the creation of the tax obligation - total exemption -, or to reduce the amount of the tax - partial exemption -, through rebates or deductions in the face of certain factual assumptions included in the scope of the taxable event whose realization does not give rise to the creation of the tax payment obligation, constituting an exception to the normal effects derived from the realization of that event. The tax exemption rule has the force to negate the effects of the rule that creates it, as it affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event, or the elements of quantification of the tax, that is, the tax base (deductions and reductions) or the tax rate. The classical theory of exemption defines exemptions as a legal dispensation from the tax obligation, that is, as a derogation from the payment obligation, despite the taxable event occurring, which is the effect they produce, that is, the exception from the obligation to contribute to public expenses for certain subjects (subjective exemption), or for certain situations or facts (objective exemption). Thus, a tax exemption takes place when a rule provides that in those cases expressly provided for by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its main effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation.\n\n**V.** Based on the foregoing analysis, it must be stated that carrying out lucrative activities requires the prior obtainment of a legal authorization called a municipal license. Since the previous version of the Código Municipal - Law 4574 of May 4, 1970 - in its ordinals 96 to 98, the exercise of any lucrative activity was subject to obtaining said license and subjected to the respective payment of the municipal tax (patente) for its exercise, funds with which the municipalities cover part of the ordinary expenses of their substantive management. These rules were reiterated in ordinals 88 to 91 - formerly 79 to 82 - of the current Código Municipal - Law 7794 published in La Gaceta No. 94 of May 18, 1998 - and, based on them, local corporations have developed their tax regulatory texts through the enactment of ordinary laws that provide the detail of the elements of the tax obligation (passive and active subjects, taxable event), along with all additional management and collection measures. In the case of the Municipalidad de San Carlos, Law No. 7773, in force since July 1, 1999, provided in numerals 1 and 3 the determination of the subjective element of the tax and the method of calculating the tax, so that all individuals or legal entities engaged in lucrative activities must pay the tax. Let us see:\n\nArticle 1.- Individuals or legal entities engaged in lucrative activities in the canton of San Carlos shall be obliged to pay a patent tax (impuesto de patentes), in accordance with this law.\n\nArticle 3°- Determining factors of the imposition\n\nThe determining factors of the imposition are established as the net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) and the annual gross income received by individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed. Net taxable income is understood as that applied for the collection of income tax (impuesto sobre la renta). Gross income does not include amounts collected for sales tax. In the case of financial and brokerage establishments for movable and immovable property, gross income is considered to be that received from commissions and interest.\n\nFrom reading these rules, it does not follow that Law No. 7773 expressly dispensed ICE from the obligation to obtain a business license and pay the corresponding patent, so this leads us to review the grievances expressed by the appellant, which invoke the validity of other regulations, according to which, in its view, a generic subjective exemption does exist in its favor.\n\n**VI.-** In order to determine whether ICE is exempt from the tax for the concept of a business license in application of its constitutive Law - Law No. 449 -, it must be stated that this Chamber has previously ruled on other occasions to the effect that the imposition of all those taxes created without a regime of exemptions in favor of ICE after the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones - Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992 - applies, by application of ordinals 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Due to the grievances outlined and the grounds of the act being challenged, it is useful to refer to the precedents of this Chamber, useful on this occasion for the purpose of the tax for the concept of a business license. Among others, resolution number 459-2012, of fifteen hours thirty minutes on October thirty-first, two thousand twelve, reiterated by this Tribunal on many occasions, is useful for the purposes of this case, because even though it analyzed the imposition of the Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles, the argument is applicable in this case, as it dictates the following:\n\nVo.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449. This Tribunal considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, for the reasons set out below. The Decree-Law creating the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was supplemented by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, to establish: \"Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.\" Said rule created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect ICE, but the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones - Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992 - eliminated this latter condition, since in article 2, subsection l) it provided for maintaining only the exemptions in force at the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions, affecting ICE insofar as it holds such nature, which was reinforced by the reform of articles 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios - contained in that same regulatory body -, which provided:\n\n\"…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (As amended by article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992).\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even if granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.\"\n\nLikewise, its effectiveness was subject \"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes governing the granting, as well as to the correct use and intended destination of the goods and services on which the exemption enjoyed by a particular subject has fallen…\" (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, the effects of the exemption were limited, in such a way that from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Código Tributario, it cannot seek to cover future taxes, even if so established. So that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law. Applying the above to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that – in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below -, said institution would be obliged to pay all taxes established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor (see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 handed down by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January twenty-first, two thousand four)...\n\n…the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment number 000037-F-04 handed down at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January twenty-first, two thousand four, by indicating – in what is relevant – that \"…Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under rules prior to those regulating the tax and retain the exemptions granted by rules prior to that date (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply to taxes created after that date…\". Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of ICE in article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 3) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 subsection l) of Law 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.\"\n\n...\n\nfrom the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Código Tributario, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 cannot seek to cover future taxes, even if so established...\n\nVIIo.- IN RELATION TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 IN THE CASE OF THE IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES.\n\n... The Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (Law 8660, which entered into force on August 13, 2008), establishes in article 18 that: \"Article 18.- Tax treatment. When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred by the legal system, shall remain in force. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" (emphasis added). The transcribed rule contains two essential assumptions in tax matters in relation to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: i) The general rule is the exemption from tax payment; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that creates it and any other Law granting it an exemption. However, in accordance with the principles of legal reservation and tax legality, the exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; ii) The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditional on the existence of a competitive market. Now, it should be clarified that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, without being able to be applied retroactively; therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, take effect from that date, although – it is insisted – limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. This is because it could not be argued that ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes – as originally provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449 -, given that from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Código Tributario, it cannot seek to cover future taxes, even if so established (see in a similar vein, resolutions number 417-2012 of fourteen hours on October eleventh; 431-2012 of fourteen hours on October eighteenth; 432-2012 of fourteen hours five minutes on October eighteenth, all from two thousand twelve, handed down by the Third Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). Thus, the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 do not have the power to repeal, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reservation in tax matters and legality, provided in articles 11 and 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, so that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles. In that sense, this Tribunal considers that it cannot validly be alleged that ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, being Law 8660 a special law, it prevails over a general law (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), since that would imply disapplying for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad two basic principles in tax matters, namely: i) Legal reservation and Tax Legality, in the sense that the law must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, its duration period, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or the taxes must be settled, or whether transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions (article 62, paragraph 1 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); ii) Equality before tax and public burdens, because even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation – as in the case of the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles -, as this would imply a future limitation of the State's taxing power, to the detriment of that principle (article 18 in fine of the Constitución Política)...\"\n\nFollowing that same reasoning, after the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones - Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992 - the exemptions in force at the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions were maintained. Several years later, the Ley de Tarifas de Impuestos para la Municipalidad de San Carlos - Law No. 7773 in force since May 21, 1998 - came into effect, which, as indicated above, lacks the exemption sought by ICE. Given the existence of a subsequent law that created the tax on business licenses in the canton of San Carlos, which did not include the intended exemption regime, the tax necessarily falls on ICE's commercial activity related to the sale of goods and services in the field of telecommunications. It goes without saying that the appellant strangely invokes, in an apparent material error in its appellate brief, the application of Law 7341, which is applicable only in the canton of Los Chiles, a rule that obviously has a territorial applicability geographically delimited by the cantonal political division, and cannot extend to the canton of San Carlos. Therefore, the grievance that understands that an exemption regime exists in favor of ICE to dispense it from its duty to obtain a municipal license and pay the patent is not receivable and must be rejected.\n\n**VII.-** Regarding the grievance claiming that ICE does not generate a lucrative activity, the thesis tends to develop an assumption of non-subjection to the tax due to the absence of the taxable event provided in ordinal 88 of the Código Municipal and in Law No. 7773. On this point, it must be stated that Law No. 8660 itself expressly recognizes that in the field of telecommunications, ICE generates profits, since it imposes that it must pay income tax, so that from this profitability the tax base is extracted to determine the quantum of both taxes, that is, the income tax and the business patent, as provided in numeral 3 of Law No. 7773 transcribed above. Precisely, numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 provides that \"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes.\" The representation of ICE confuses the concepts of generation of profits with the destination or distribution of these, since one occurs before the other, and what is regulated in numeral 17 of the aforementioned Law 8660 is the management that must be carried out with the surpluses that the lucrative activity yields, as the commercial activity of ICE in telecommunications is undoubtedly of a business nature. Precisely, this Chamber ruled in a case similar to the present one, to the effect that Kolbi stores are intended to generate profits, due to the competitive commercial regime in which they are immersed, as transcribed below from Voto 292-2018 of thirteen hours fifty-five minutes on July sixth, two thousand eighteen:\n\n\"... It is the criterion of this Chamber that the Mayor of Heredia is correct regarding the clarifications made on the concept of lucrative activity and profits, which are indeed generated by ICE in the telecommunications industry through its \"kolbi\" stores, as the law itself recognizes. See that the appellant's argument regarding the non-existence of a lucrative activity in the specific case is even contradictory to its legal basis, since the same normative texts of laws No. 449 and No. 8660, in their articles 17 and 13 respectively, undoubtedly recognize that ICE generates profits - lucrative activity - and its investment direction; therefore, despite the mandatory capitalization of these surpluses, profits exist, and therefore also the tax base for the patent tax. Additionally, it should be added that the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones No. 8642, regarding the existence of profits and the accounting separation of the services provided, regulates the following:\n\n\"ARTICLE 6.- Definitions\n\nFor the purposes of this Law, the following is defined:\n\n(...)\n\n13) Cost orientation: calculation of prices and tariffs based on the costs attributable to the provision of the service and the infrastructure, which must include a profit (utilidad), in real terms, not less than the average of the national or international industry, in the latter case with comparable markets...\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 37.- Execution of Fonatel funds\n\n(...)\n\nOperators or providers that execute Fonatel resources must maintain a separate cost accounting system, in accordance with what is established by regulation, which must be audited annually by a firm of authorized public accountants, duly accredited before Sutel. The costs of this audit must be paid by the audited operator or provider....\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 51.- Information services\n\nProviders of information services shall not be subject to the following obligations:\n\n(...)\n\nb) Justifying their prices according to their costs or registering them.\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 63.- Spectrum reservation fee\n\nNetwork operators and telecommunications service providers must pay, annually, a spectrum reservation fee (canon de reserva del espectro radioeléctrico). The taxable persons (sujetos pasivos) of this fee are network operators or telecommunications service providers to which frequency bands of the radioelectric spectrum have been assigned, regardless of whether they make use of said bands or not.\n\nThe amount to be paid by the concessionaires shall be calculated by Sutel considering the following parameters:\n\n(...)\n\nf) The utility (utilidad) for society associated with the provision of the services....\"\n\nFurthermore, the Reglamento a la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, Decreto Ejecutivo N°34765-MINAE, published in La Gaceta N°186 of September 26, 2008, establishes:\n\n\"Article 31.- Content of the concession contract.\n\nThe concession contract shall include, at a minimum, the following:\n\n(...)\n\nL. Obligation to maintain separate accounting for each service, in the event that several services are provided under a single concession...\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, it can be inferred with sufficient certainty that ICE and its companies, when engaging in the telecommunications business, must transparently disclose their profits and keep detailed accounting of the services provided. Therefore, the argument put forth in this venue by Mr. Nombre13825 regarding the impossibility of separating ICE's income based on the different services provided by the institution is false. Finally, the appellant must be reminded that the burdens borne by the taxpayer, by their very nature, are imposed by Law, and the taxpayer must yield their sphere of interests in favor of a superior public interest, enshrined in Article 18 of the Constitution. This is because, above any assessments that may be made of ICE's public funds and the supposed benefit to the Municipality from the payment of the tax, stands the will of the legislator embodied in this Law No. 9023, which establishes a clear intention to tax the activities carried out by the appellant. The dialectic regarding the scope of meaning of what might be understood as an impossibility of benefiting from ICE's budget, in contrast with municipal taxing power, loses all relevance for addressing the present conflict, as it is an essential principle of any Rule of Law that public entities are subject to the legal norms in force, without being able to disapply them individually —principle of legality—. For all the reasons stated, the appeal filed... against resolution AMH-661-17 issued by the Mayor's Office of Heredia on May 22, 2017, must be declared without merit, and as there is no further appeal, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted.\n\nFrom the transcribed text, it follows that the telecommunications service provided by ICE through its Kolbi agency located in San Carlos is intended to generate profits and, therefore, is a lucrative activity that, in order to be regularized, must obtain its commercial license duly issued by the Municipality, honoring the payment of the corresponding business license tax (patente). It is clear to this Chamber that the opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), No. C-151-2007, besides not being binding even for the Municipality of San Carlos—since it arose from an inquiry by the Municipality of Grecia—is even less so for this improper hierarchy, and is furthermore considered outdated given that its date of issuance was prior to Law No. 9023, ignoring the scope and impact on ICE's commercial activities in the telecommunications sector. Therefore, the grievances expressed by ICE's representation are not admissible. This Chamber agrees with the position taken by the local authorities, so the act brought on appeal is in accordance with the law and, lacking the alleged defects in its formal and substantial elements, shall be confirmed. As there is no further appeal, the administrative channel shall be deemed exhausted.\n\nVIII. Regarding the copy of the case file and return of documents. As this venue has been processed electronically, the parties may obtain a complete copy containing both the administrative file sent by the Municipal Corporation and all the documents forming the present appeal, for which purpose they must provide the electronic storage device (USB flash drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) was submitted and remains in the custody of the Office, the party who provided it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial”, approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal filed is declared without merit, and consequently, the appealed resolution is confirmed. The administrative channel is deemed exhausted.-\n\nNombre12928\n\nNombre106228 ﻿\n\nDocument signed by:\n\nNombre12928 , JUDGE DECISION-MAKER\n\nNombre106228 , JUDGE DECISION-MAKER\n\nNombre106228 , JUDGE DECISION-MAKER\n\nThe Decree-Law that created the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was amended by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, for the purpose of establishing: “Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.” Said provision created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect ICE, but the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, its Derogation and its Exceptions -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this latter condition, because in article 2, subsection l) it provided that only the exemptions in force on the date of its enactment would be maintained in favor of all autonomous institutions, thereby affecting ICE insofar as it holds such nature, which was reinforced by the amendment of articles 63 and 64 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures -contained in that same regulatory body-, which provided:\n\n“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (As amended by article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992).\"\n\" ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even if granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.”\n\nLikewise, its effectiveness was made subject \"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services upon which the exemption enjoyed by a specific subject has fallen…” (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code, it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established. Therefore, the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law. Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below–, said institution would be obligated to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption in its favor has been expressly granted. See in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four)...\n\n...the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, stating –in what is relevant– that “…Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment on, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under previous provisions to those that regulate the tax and shall conserve the exemptions granted by provisions prior to that date. (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply to taxes created after that date…”. Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of ICE in article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 2, subsection l) of Law 7293 and 5, 63 and 64 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures.\"\n\n...\n\nas of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established...\n\n**VII.- IN RELATION TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 IN THE CASE OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles).** \n... The Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (Law 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008), establishes in article 18 that: “**Article 18.- Tax treatment.** When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. **In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, shall remain in force, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system**. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.” (emphasis added). The transcribed provision contains two essential scenarios in tax matters in relation to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: **i)** The general rule is the exemption from payment of taxes; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that created it and any other Law granting it an exemption. However, in accordance with the principles of legal reservation (reserva de ley) and tax legality, the exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 5, 62, 63 and 64 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures; **ii)** The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned upon the existence of a competitive market. Now, it is worth clarifying that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, **without it being capable of retroactive application; therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, apply as of that date, although –it is reiterated– limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of articles 2, 62, 63 and 64 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures.** This is because it could not be sustained that ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes –as originally provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449–, given that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code, **it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established** (see in a similar vein, resolutions number 417-2012 of fourteen hours on October eleventh; 431-2012 of fourteen hours on October eighteenth; 432-2012 of fourteen hours five minutes on October eighteenth, all of two thousand twelve, issued by the Third Section of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Court). Thus, what is provided in article 18 of Law 8660 does not have the virtue of derogating, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of articles 5, 62 and 63 of the Code of Norms and Procedures, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reservation in tax matters and legality, provided in articles 11 and 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, therefore, **the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law, which is not the case for the Real Property Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles)**. In that sense, this Court considers that it cannot be validly alleged that ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, since Law 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Tax Code of Norms and Procedures), **since that would imply disapplying, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, two basic principles in tax matters**, which are: **i) Legal reservation and Tax Legality**, in the sense that the law must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or whether taxes must be liquidated, or if transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions (article 62, paragraph 1 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures); **ii) Equality before the tax and public burdens**, because even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation –as in the case of the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)–, since that would imply a future limitation of the State's taxing power, to the detriment of that principle (article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)...\n\nFollowing the same reasoning, after the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, its Derogation and its Exceptions -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992-, the exemptions in force at the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions were maintained. Several years later, the Law of Tax Tariffs for the Municipality of San Carlos -Law No. 7773 in force since May 21, 1998- came into effect, which, as indicated above, lacks the exemption sought by ICE. Given the existence of a subsequent law that created the tax on commercial licenses in the canton of San Carlos, which did not contemplate the exoneration regime sought, the tax necessarily falls on ICE's commercial activity related to the sale of goods and services in telecommunications. It goes without saying that the appellant party strangely invokes, in an apparent material error of its appeal brief, the application of Law 7341, which is applicable only in the canton of Los Chiles, a provision that obviously has territorial applicability geographically delimited by the cantonal political division, and cannot transcend to the canton of San Carlos. Therefore, the grievance that understands that a tax exemption regime exists in favor of ICE in order to dispense it from its duty to obtain a municipal license and pay the patent fee is not receivable and must be rejected.\n\n**VII.-** Regarding the grievance claiming that ICE does not generate a for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa), the thesis tends to develop a scenario of non-subjection to the tax due to the absence of the taxable event (hecho generador) provided in ordinal 88 of the Municipal Code and in Law No. 7773. On this point, it must be noted that Law No. 8660 itself expressly recognizes that in the area of telecommunications, ICE generates profits, since it imposes the obligation to pay income tax, so that from this profitability the taxable base is extracted to determine the quantum of both taxes, that is, the income tax and the commercial patent fee, as provided in numeral 3 of Law No. 7773 transcribed above. Precisely, numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 provides that **\"**When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes**\"**. ICE's representation confuses the concepts of profit generation with the destination or distribution of these profits, since one occurs before the other, with the result that what is regulated in numeral 17 of said Law 8660 is the management to be carried out with the surpluses that the for-profit activity yields, since without a doubt ICE's commercial line in telecommunications is purely entrepreneurial. Precisely, this Chamber ruled in a case similar to the present one, in the sense that the Kolbi stores are intended to generate profits, due to the competitive commercial regime in which they are immersed, as transcribed below from Voto 292-2018 of thirteen hours fifty-five minutes on July sixth, two thousand eighteen:\n\n\"... It is the opinion of this Chamber that the Mayor of Heredia is correct regarding the points made on the concept of for-profit activity and profits, which are effectively generated by ICE in the telecommunications industry through its 'kolbi' stores, as recognized by the law itself. See, that the argument of the appellant representation, regarding the non-existence of a for-profit activity in the specific case, is even contradictory to its legal foundation, since the same normative texts of Laws No. 449 and No. 8660, in their articles 17 and 13 respectively, undeniably recognize that ICE generates profits - for-profit activity - and their investment direction; therefore, despite the mandatory capitalization of these surpluses, the profits exist, and therefore also the taxable base of the patent tax. Additionally, it should be added that the General Telecommunications Law No. 8642, regarding the existence of profits and the separate accounting of services provided, regulates the following:\n\n\"ARTICLE 6.- Definitions\nFor the purposes of this Law, the following is defined:\n(...)\n13) Cost orientation: calculation of prices and tariffs based on the costs attributable to the provision of the service and the infrastructure, which must include a profit, in real terms, not less than the average of the national or international industry, in the latter case with comparable markets...\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 37.- Execution of Fonatel funds\n(...)\nOperators or providers that execute Fonatel resources must maintain a separate cost accounting system, in accordance with what is established by regulation, which must be audited annually by a firm of authorized public accountants, duly accredited before Sutel. The costs of this audit must be paid by the audited operator or provider....\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 51.- Information services\nInformation service providers shall not be subject to the following obligations:\n(...)\nb) Justify their prices according to their costs or register them.\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 63.- Spectrum reservation fee\nNetwork operators and telecommunications service providers must pay an annual spectrum reservation fee. The taxable subjects of this fee shall be the network operators or telecommunications service providers to which frequency bands of the radio spectrum have been assigned, regardless of whether or not they make use of said bands.\nThe amount to be paid by the concessionaires shall be calculated by Sutel considering the following parameters:\n(...)\nf) The utility for society associated with the provision of the services....\"\n\nFurthermore, the Regulation to the General Telecommunications Law, Decreto Ejecutivo N° 34765-MINAE, published in Gazette No. 186 of September 26, 2008, establishes:\n\"Article 31.- Content of the concession contract. The concession contract shall include, at a minimum, the following:\n(...)\nL. Obligation to maintain separate accounts for each service, in the case where several services are provided under a single concession...\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, it follows with sufficient certainty that ICE and its companies, when engaging in the telecommunications trade, must transparently disclose their profits and maintain detailed accounting for the services provided, so the argument presented in this venue by Mr. Nombre13825 regarding the impossibility of separating ICE's income due to the different services provided by the institution is false. Finally, it must be reminded to the appellant that the burdens weighing on the taxpayer, by their very reason for being such, are imposed by Law, to which they must cede their sphere of interests in favor of a superior public interest, enshrined in ordinal 18 of the Fundamental Charter. Since above the assessments that can be made of ICE's public funds and the supposed benefit to the Municipality from the payment of the tax, is the will of the legislator embodied in this Law No. 9023, which establishes a clear intention to tax the activities developed by the appellant, and the dialectic on the scope of meaning of what might be understood as an impossibility to benefit from ICE's budget in contrast with the municipal taxing power loses all meaning for addressing the present conflict, since it is an essential principle of any Rule of Law that public entities are subject to the current legal norms, without being able to singularly disapply them -principle of legality-. For all the reasons stated, the appeal filed... against resolution AMH-661-17 issued by the Mayor's Office of Heredia on May 22, 2017, must be declared without merit, and since there is no further appeal, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted.\n\nFrom the transcribed text, it follows that the telecommunications service provided by ICE through its Kolbi agency located in San Carlos is intended to generate earnings and, therefore, is a for-profit activity that, in order to be regularized, must obtain its commercial license duly issued by the Municipality, honoring the payment of the corresponding patent fee. It is clear to this Chamber that the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, No.\n\nC-151-2007, in addition to not being binding even for the Municipality of San Carlos —since it arose from a consultation by the Municipality of Grecia—, is even less so for this improper hierarchy, and this Chamber deems it outdated given that its date of issuance was prior to Law No. Placa903, disregarding the scope and impact on ICE's line of business in telecommunications. Therefore, the grievances expressed by ICE's representation are not admissible, such that this Chamber agrees with the position expressed by the local authorities, meaning the act brought on appeal is in accordance with the law and, lacking the alleged defects in its formal and substantial elements, it must be confirmed. As there is no further appeal, the administrative avenue is deemed exhausted.\n\n**VIII. On the copy of the case file and return of documents.** Since this venue was processed electronically, it is available to the parties to obtain a complete copy containing both the administrative case file sent by the Municipal Corporation and all the pieces that make up this appeal, for which purpose they must provide an electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, should physical or electronic documentation (blueprints, photographs, reports, etc.) have been submitted that remains in the custody of the Office, whoever submitted it may retrieve it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,\" approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe appeal filed is dismissed, and consequently, the appealed resolution is confirmed. The administrative avenue is deemed exhausted.\n\n \n\nNombre12928\n\n \n\nNombre106228 ﻿\n\n \n\n| Documento firmado por: | | |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| Nombre12928 | , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |\n| Nombre106228 | , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |\n| Nombre106228 | , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | |\n\nThose rules were reiterated in articles 88 to 91 —formerly 79 to 82— of the current Código Municipal —Ley 7794 published in La Gaceta No. 94 of May 18, 1998— and, based on them, local corporations have developed their tax regulatory texts through the enactment of ordinary laws that provide the detail of the elements of the tax obligation (passive and active subjects, taxable event (hecho generador)), together with all additional management and collection measures. In the case of the Municipalidad de San Carlos, Ley No. 7773, in force since July 1, 1999, provided in articles 1 and 3 the determination of the subjective element of the tax and the tax calculation method, such that all natural or legal persons engaged in for-profit activities must pay the tax. Let us see:\n\n**Artículo 1.-** *Natural or legal persons engaged in the exercise of for-profit activities in the canton of San Carlos shall be obligated to pay a patent tax (impuesto de patentes), in accordance with this law.*\n\n&nbsp;\n\n**Artículo 3°- Determining Factors for the Imposition**\n\n*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The taxable net income (renta líquida gravable) and the annual gross income received by the natural or legal persons subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year being taxed, are established as the determining factors for the imposition. Taxable net income is understood to be that which is applied for the collection of the income tax. Gross income does not include amounts collected for the sales tax. In the case of financial institutions and real and personal property brokerage firms, gross income is considered to be that received for commissions and interest.*\n\n&nbsp;\n\nFrom a reading of said rules, it does not follow that Ley No. 7773 expressly exempted ICE from the obligation to obtain a business license and pay the corresponding patent, which leads us to review the grievances expressed by the appellant, who invokes the validity of other regulations, according to which, in its view, a generic subjective exoneration in its favor does exist.\n\n**VI.-** In order to determine whether ICE is exempted from the tax for a business license in application of its organic law —Ley No. 449—, it must be noted that this Chamber has ruled on previous occasions in the sense that the imposition of all those taxes created without an exoneration regime in favor of ICE after the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones —Ley No. 7293 of April 3, 1992— in application of articles 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. By reason of the grievances outlined and the grounds for the act being challenged, it is useful to reference the precedents of this Chamber, useful on this occasion for the purpose of the tax for a commercial patent (patente comercial). Among others, ruling number 459-2012, of fifteen hours thirty minutes of October thirty-first, two thousand twelve, reiterated by this Tribunal on many occasions, is useful for the purposes of this case, because even though it analyzed the imposition of the Impuesto Sobre Bienes Inmuebles, the argument is applicable in this case, since it states the following:\n\n&nbsp;\n\n***Vo.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LEY 7293 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 20 OF DECRETO LEY 449.** This Tribunal considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, for the reasons set forth below. The Decreto Ley creating the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was supplemented by Ley N° 764 of October 25, 1949, for the purpose of establishing: “Artículo 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.” Said rule created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect ICE, but the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Ley N° 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this latter condition, because in article 2, subsection l) it provided that only the exemptions in force as of the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions would be maintained, which affected ICE insofar as it possesses such nature, which was reinforced by the reform of articles 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -contained in that same regulatory body-, which provided:*\n\n*“...ARTICULO 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (Thus amended by article 50 of Ley Nº 7293 of March 26, 1992).”*\n\n*“ARTICULO 64.- Validity. The exemption, even if granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.”*\n\n*Likewise, its effectiveness was made subject “...to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as the correct use and intended purpose, of the goods and services over which the exemption enjoyed by a particular subject has fallen…” (Artículo 37 of Ley 7293). Consequently, the effects of the exoneration were limited, such that upon the entry into force of Ley N° 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, it cannot seek to cover future taxes, even when so established. In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law. Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of article 18 of Ley 8660, which will be analyzed below–, said institution would be obligated to pay any tax established after Ley 7293, except in those cases where an exoneration has been expressly granted in its favor (see in this regard, ruling number 000037-F-04 issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, at ten hours thirty-five minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand four)...*\n\n&nbsp;\n\n*...the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in ruling number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand four, by indicating –in what is relevant– that “…Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under rules prior to those regulating the tax and retain the exonerations granted by rules prior to that date (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply to taxes created after that date…”. Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of ICE in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 3) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 subsection l) of Ley 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.\"*\n\n...\n\n*as of the entry into force of Ley N° 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449, cannot seek to cover future taxes, even when so established...*\n\n&nbsp;\n\n***VIIo.- IN RELATION TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LEY 8660 IN THE CASE OF THE IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES.***\n\n... *The Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector* (Ley 8660, which entered into force on August 13, 2008), establishes in Article 18 that: \"**Article 18.- Tax Treatment.** When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. **In all other cases, the exemptions granted in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others granted to them by the legal system, shall remain in force.** Traditional basic telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.\" (emphasis added). The transcribed rule contains two essential tax-related scenarios regarding the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: **i)** The general rule is exemption from tax payment; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that created it and any other Law granting it exoneration. However, in accordance with the principles of legal reserve and tax legality, the exemption provided for in Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; **ii)** The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned on the existence of a competitive market. Now, it should be clarified that Ley 8660 entered into force on August 13, 2008, **without being capable of retroactive application; therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, govern from that date, although—it is insisted—limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.** This is because it could not be maintained that ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes—as originally contemplated in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449—, since as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, **it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if it was so established** (see, in a similar sense, resolutions No. 417-2012 of 2:00 p.m. on October 11; 431-2012 of 2:00 p.m. on October 18; 432-2012 of 2:05 p.m. on October 18, all of 2012, issued by Section Three of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Court). Therefore, what is established in Article 18 of Ley 8660 does not have the power to derogate, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and legality, provided for in Articles 11 and 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, so **the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Real Property Tax.** In that sense, this Court believes it cannot be validly argued that ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as it was provided for in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, as Ley 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), **since that would imply disapplying, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, two basic principles in tax matters**, such as: **i) Legal Reserve and Tax Legality**, in the sense that the law *must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and if at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions* (Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures); **ii) Equality before taxes and public charges**, because even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation—as in the case of the Real Property Tax—, since that would imply a future limitation on the State's tax power, to the detriment of this principle (Article 18 *in fine* of the Political Constitution)...\"\n\nFollowing that same reasoning, after the Law Regulating All Existing Exemptions, its Derogation and its Exceptions - Ley N° 7293 of March 31, 1992 - the exemptions in force on the date of its enactment were maintained in favor of all autonomous institutions. Several years later, the Law on Tax Rates for the Municipality of San Carlos - Ley No. 7773, in force since May 21, 1998 - came into effect, which, as indicated above, lacks the exoneration sought by ICE. Given the existence of a later law that created the commercial license tax in the canton of San Carlos, which did not contemplate the intended exemptive regime, the tax necessarily falls on ICE's commercial activity related to the sale of goods and services in telecommunications. It goes without saying that the appellant party strangely invokes, in an apparent material error in its appellate brief, the application of Law 7341, which is applicable only in the canton of Los Chiles, a rule that obviously has territorial applicability geographically delimited by cantonal political division and cannot transcend to the canton of San Carlos. Therefore, the grievance that believes an exemptive regime exists in favor of ICE to absolve it of its duty to obtain a municipal license and pay the patent tax is not receivable and must be rejected.\n\n**VII.-** Regarding the grievance that claims ICE does not generate for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa), the thesis tends to develop an assumption of non-subjection to the tax due to the absence of the taxable event (hecho generador) provided for in numeral 88 of the Municipal Code and in Law No. 7773. On this matter, it must be indicated that Law No. 8660 itself expressly recognizes that in telecommunications matters ICE generates profits, since it imposes the obligation to pay income tax, so from that profitability the taxable base is extracted to determine the quantum of both taxes, that is, the income tax and the commercial patent tax, as provided in numeral 3 of Law No. 7773 transcribed above. Precisely, numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 provides that *\"When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes.\"* ICE's legal representation confuses the concepts of profit generation with the destination or distribution thereof, since one occurs before the other, with the result that what is regulated in numeral 17 of the referenced Law 8660 is the management to be carried out with the surpluses that the for-profit activity yields, as the commercial line of ICE in telecommunications matters is purely businesslike. Precisely, this Chamber ruled on a case similar to the present one, stating that the Kolbi stores are intended to generate profits, due to the commercial competition regime in which they are immersed, as transcribed below from Voto 292-2018 of 1:55 p.m. on July 6, 2018:\n\n\"*... It is the criterion of this Chamber that the Municipal Mayor of Heredia is correct regarding the clarifications made on the concept of for-profit activity and profits, which are effectively generated by ICE in the telecommunications industry through its 'kolbi' stores, as recognized by the law itself. See, that the appellant representative's argument about the nonexistence of a for-profit activity in this specific case is even contradictory to its legal basis, since the very legal texts of Laws No. 449 and No. 8660, in their Articles 17 and 13 respectively, undoubtedly recognize that ICE generates profits—for-profit activity—and their investment direction; consequently, despite the mandatory capitalization of these surpluses, the profits exist, and therefore also the taxable base for the patent tax. Additionally, it should be added that the General Telecommunications Law No. 8642, on the existence of profits and the accounting separation of services rendered, regulates the following:*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 6.- Definitions*\n\n*For the effects of this Law, the following is defined:*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*13) Cost orientation: calculation of prices and rates based on the costs attributable to the provision of the service and infrastructure, which must include a profit, in real terms, no less than the average of the national or international industry, in the latter case with comparable markets...\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 37.- Execution of Fonatel funds*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*Operators or providers that execute Fonatel resources must maintain a separate cost accounting system, in accordance with what is established by regulation, which must be audited annually by an authorized public accounting firm, duly accredited before Sutel. The costs of this audit must be paid by the audited operator or provider...\\\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 51.- Information services*\n\n*Information service providers shall not be subject to the following obligations:*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*b) Justify their prices according to their costs or record them.\\\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 63.- Spectrum reservation fee*\n\n*Network operators and telecommunications service providers must annually pay a spectrum reservation fee.*\"\n\nThe passive subjects of this tax shall be the network operators or providers of telecommunications services to which bands of frequencies of the radioelectric spectrum have been assigned, regardless of whether they make use of said bands or not.\n\nThe amount to be paid by the concessionaires shall be calculated by Sutel taking into consideration the following parameters:\n\n(...)\n\nf) The utility for society associated with the provision of the services....\"\n\nFurthermore, the Regulation to the General Telecommunications Law, Decreto Ejecutivo N°34765-MINAE, published in La Gaceta N°186 of September 26, 2008, establishes:\n\n\"Article 31.-Contents of the concession contract. The concession contract shall include, as a minimum, the following:\n\n(...)\n\nL. Obligation to maintain separate accounting for each service, in the event that several services are provided under a single concession...\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, it can be inferred with sufficient certainty that ICE and its companies, when engaging in the telecommunications trade, must transparently disclose their profits and keep detailed accounting of the services provided; therefore, the argument put forth in this venue by Mr. Juan Carlos Araya González regarding the impossibility of separating ICE's income based on the different services provided by the institution is false. Finally, the appellant must be reminded that the burdens borne by the taxpayer, for the very reason of being such, are imposed by Law, against which they must yield their sphere of interests in favor of a superior public interest, enshrined in ordinal 18 of the Fundamental Charter. For, above any assessments that may be made of ICE's public funds and the supposed benefit to the Municipality from the payment of the tax, lies the will of the legislator embodied in this Law N°9023, which establishes a clear intention to levy taxes on the activities carried out by the appellant, and the dialectic regarding the scope of significance of what may be understood as an impossibility to benefit from ICE's budget, in contrast with the municipal taxing power, loses all meaning for addressing the present conflict, given that it is an essential principle of any Rule of Law that public entities are subject to the legal norms in force, without being able to singly disapply them -principle of legality-. For all the reasons set forth, the appeal filed... against resolution AMH-661-17 issued by the Mayor's Office of Heredia on May 22, 2017, must be declared without merit, and since there is no further appeal, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted.\n\nFrom the foregoing transcription, it is clear that the telecommunications service provided by ICE through its Kolbi agency located in San Carlos is intended to generate profits and, therefore, is a lucrative activity which, to be regularized, must obtain its business license (licencia comercial) duly issued by the Municipality, honoring the payment of the corresponding patent tax (patente). It is clear to this Chamber that the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, No. C-151-2007, aside from not being binding even for the Municipality of San Carlos—since it arose from a query by the Municipality of Grecia—is even less so for this improper hierarchy, deeming it moreover outdated because its date of issuance was prior to Law No. 8660, failing to recognize the scope and impact on ICE's commercial line of business in telecommunications. Therefore, the grievances expressed by the representation of ICE are not admissible, so this Chamber agrees with the position expressed by the local authorities, meaning that the act brought on appeal is in accordance with the law and, lacking defects in its alleged formal and substantial elements, must be confirmed. As there is no further appeal, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted.\"\n\nIn the case of financial and brokerage establishments for movable and immovable property, gross income is considered to be that received from commissions and interest.\n\nFrom a reading of those rules, it does not follow that Law No. 7773 expressly released ICE from the obligation to obtain a business license and pay the corresponding patent fee, which therefore leads us to review the grievances expressed by the appellant, who invokes the validity of other regulations, under which, in its opinion, a generic subjective exemption in its favor does exist.\n\n**VI.-** In order to determine whether ICE is exempt from the tax for business licenses in application of its constitutive law—Law No. 449—it should be noted that this Chamber has ruled on other previous occasions to the effect that the imposition of all those taxes created without an exemption regime in favor of ICE after the Regulatory Law on Current Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions—Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992—applies provisions 62 and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. In view of the grievances outlined and the grounds for the act being challenged, it is useful to refer to the precedents of this Chamber, useful in this instance for purposes of the business patent tax. Among others, resolution number 459-2012, of fifteen hours thirty minutes on October thirty-one, two thousand twelve, reiterated by this Court on many occasions, is useful for the purposes of this case, because even though it analyzed the imposition of the Real Estate Tax, the argument is applicable in this case, as it provides the following:\n\n***Vo.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS INCIDENCE ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED FOR IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449.*** *This Court considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Estate Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree-Law creating the Costa Rican Electricity Institute was added to by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, to establish: “Article 20.- The Costa Rican Electricity Institute is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraph franking privileges”. That rule, <u>created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect ICE</u>, but the Regulatory Law on All Current Exemptions, their derogation, and their exceptions—Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992—eliminated this last condition, because in Article 2, subsection l) it <u>provided that only the exemptions in force on the date of its enactment would be maintained in favor of all autonomous institutions, which affected ICE insofar as it holds that nature, which was reinforced by the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures</u>—contained in that same regulatory body—which provided:*\n\n*“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (As amended by Article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992).\"*\n\n*\" ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be derogated or modified by a later law, without liability for the State.”*\n\n*Likewise, its effectiveness was made subject \"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services upon which the exemption enjoyed by a particular subject has fallen…” (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, <u>the effects of the exoneration were limited, such that from the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code</u>, **it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established**. Therefore, t<u>he exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law</u>. **Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, it follows that—in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below—, said institution would be obligated to pay all taxes established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor** (see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January twenty-one, two thousand four)...*\n\n*...the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January twenty-one, two thousand four, when indicating –in what is pertinent– that “…<u>Under this premise, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, and in the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under rules prior to those that regulate the tax, and they retain the exonerations granted by rules prior to that date</u> (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date…”. Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of ICE in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 2, subsection l) of Law 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.\"*\n\n*...*\n\n*as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, **cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established**...*\n\n***VIIo.- WITH REGARD TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 IN THE CASE OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX.***\n\n***...** *The Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (Law 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008), establishes in Article 18 that: “**Article 18.- Tax treatment.** When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. **In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force.** The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.” (the highlighting is added). The transcribed rule contains two essential provisions in tax matters in relation to the Costa Rican Electricity Institute: **i)** The general rule is the exemption from the payment of taxes; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that created it and any other Law granting it exoneration. <u>However, in accordance with the principles of legal reserve and tax legality, the exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures</u>; **ii)** The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned upon the existence of a competitive market. Now, it should be clarified that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, **and cannot be applied retroactively; therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, apply from that date, although –it is reiterated–** <u>limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. This is because</u> **it could not be sustained that ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes—as originally provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449—, since, as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code,** **it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established** (see in a similar vein, resolutions number 417-2012 of fourteen hours on October eleventh; 431-2012 of fourteen hours on October eighteenth; 432-2012 of fourteen hours five minutes on October eighteenth, all of two thousand twelve, issued by the Third Section of the Administrative and Civil Tax Court). Thus, what is provided in Article 18 of Law 8660 does not have the power to derogate for the specific case of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, what is provided in Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Rules and Procedures, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and legality, provided for in Articles 11 and 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; therefore, t<u>he exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Real Estate Tax</u>. In that sense, this Court considers that it cannot validly be alleged that ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, since Law 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), **since that would imply disapplying, for the specific case of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, two basic principles in tax matters**, which are: **i) Legal reserve and Tax Legality,** in the sense that the law <u>must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the period of their duration, and whether at the end or in the course of said period the goods can be released or whether the taxes must be paid, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions</u> (Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures); **ii)** **Equality before the tax and public burdens,** since even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation—as in the case of the Real Estate Tax—, since that would imply a limitation for the future on the State's taxing power, to the detriment of that principle (Article 18, in fine, of the Political Constitution)...\"\n\nFollowing that same reasoning, after the Regulatory Law on All Current Exonerations, their derogation, and their exceptions—Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992—the exemptions in force on the date of its enactment in favor of all autonomous institutions were maintained. Several years later, the Tax Rate Law for the Municipality of San Carlos—Law No. 7773, in force since May 21, 1998—entered into effect, which, as indicated above, lacks the exoneration sought by ICE. Given the existence of a later law that created the tax on business licenses in the canton of San Carlos, which did not contemplate the exemption regime sought, the tax necessarily falls upon the commercial activity of ICE regarding the sale of goods and services in the area of telecommunications. It goes without saying that the appellant party strangely invokes, in an apparent material error in its appellate brief, the application of Law 7341, which is applicable only in the canton of Los Chiles, a rule that obviously has territorial applicability geographically limited by the cantonal political division, and cannot extend to the canton of San Carlos. Therefore, the grievance that an exemption regime exists in favor of ICE to relieve it of its duty to obtain a municipal license and pay the patent fee is not acceptable and must be rejected.\n\n**VII.-** Regarding the grievance claiming that ICE does not generate for-profit activity, the thesis tends to develop a scenario of non-subjection to the tax in the absence of the taxable event provided for in numeral 88 of the Municipal Code and in Law No. 7773. On this particular point, it must be stated that Law No. 8660 itself expressly acknowledges that in the area of telecommunications, ICE generates profits, since it requires it to pay income tax, so that from that profitability the taxable base is extracted to determine the amount of both taxes, i.e., income tax and the business patent tax, pursuant to numeral 3 of Law No. 7773 transcribed above. Precisely, numeral 18 of Law No. 8660 provides that ***\"**When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes**\"*.** The representation of ICE confuses the concepts of profit generation with the destination or distribution of those profits, because one occurs before the other, and what is regulated in numeral 17 of the aforementioned Law 8660 is the management that must be carried out with the surplus that the for-profit activity yields, since without a doubt the commercial activity of ICE in the area of telecommunications is purely entrepreneurial. Precisely, this Chamber ruled in a case similar to the present one, to the effect that Kolbi stores are intended to generate profits, due to the commercial regime of competition in which they are immersed, as transcribed below in Vote 292-2018 of thirteen hours fifty-five minutes on July sixth, two thousand eighteen:\n\n*\"... It is the criterion of this Chamber that the Heredia Municipal Mayor is correct regarding the clarifications made on the concept of for-profit activity and profits, which are indeed generated by ICE in the telecommunications industry through its 'kolbi' stores, as the law itself acknowledges. Note that the argument of the appellant's representation, regarding the nonexistence of a for-profit activity in the specific case, is even contradictory to its legal foundation, since the same regulatory texts of Laws No. 449 and No. 8660, in their Articles 17 and 13 respectively, undeniably acknowledge that ICE generates profits—for-profit activity—and its direction of investment; therefore, despite the mandatory capitalization of these surpluses, the profits exist, and thus also the taxable base of the patent tax. Additionally, it should be added that the General Telecommunications Law No. 8642, regarding the existence of profits and the separate accounting for services provided, regulates the following:*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 6.- Definitions*\n\n*For the purposes of this Law, the following is defined:*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*13) Cost orientation: calculation of prices and rates based on the costs attributable to the provision of the service and infrastructure, which must include a profit, in real terms, no less than the average of the national or international industry, in the latter case with comparable markets...\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 37.- Execution of Fonatel funds*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*Operators or providers that execute Fonatel resources must maintain a separate cost accounting system, in accordance with what is established by regulation, which must be audited annually by a firm of authorized public accountants, duly accredited before Sutel. The costs of this audit must be paid by the audited operator or provider....\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 51.- Information services*\n\n*Providers of information services shall not be subject to the following obligations:*\n\n*(...)*\n\n*b) Justify their prices according to their costs or register them.\"*\n\n*\"ARTICLE 63.- Spectrum reservation fee*\n\n*Network operators and telecommunications service providers must pay an annual radio spectrum reservation fee.*\"\n\nThe passive subjects of this fee shall be the network operators or telecommunications service providers to whom bands of frequencies of the radio-electric spectrum have been assigned, regardless of whether they make use of said bands or not.\n\nThe amount to be paid by the concessionaires shall be calculated by Sutel taking into consideration the following parameters:\n\n(...)\n\nf) The utility to society associated with the provision of the services....\"\n\nFurther elaborating, the Regulation to the General Telecommunications Law, Executive Decree No. 34765-MINAE, published in Gazette No. 186 of September 26, 2008, establishes:\n\n\"Article 31.-Content of the concession contract. The concession contract shall include, at a minimum, the following:\n\n(...)\n\nL. Obligation to maintain separate accounts for each service, in the event that several services are provided under a single concession...\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, it can be inferred with sufficient certainty that ICE and its companies, when engaging in the telecommunications trade, must transparently disclose their profits and maintain detailed accounting of the services provided; therefore, the argument presented in this venue by Mr. Nombre13825 regarding the impossibility of separating ICE's income due to the different services provided by the institution is false. Finally, the appellant must be reminded that the burdens borne by the taxpayer, by their very nature as such, are imposed by Law, which must cause their sphere of interests to yield in favor of a superior public interest, enshrined in Article 18 of the Fundamental Charter. This is because, above any assessments that may be made of ICE's public funds and the Municipality's supposed benefit from the payment of the tax, lies the will of the legislator embodied in this Law No. 9023, which establishes a clear intention to levy taxes on the activities carried out by the appellant. Thus, the dialectic regarding the scope of meaning of what might be understood as an impossibility of benefiting from ICE's budget, as contrasted with the municipal taxing power, becomes entirely meaningless for addressing the present conflict, since it is an essential principle of any Rule of Law that public entities are subject to the prevailing legal norms, without being able to disapply them individually - principle of legality. For all the foregoing reasons, it is necessary to declare the appeal filed... against resolution AMH-661-17 issued by the Mayor's Office of Heredia on May 22, 2017, without merit, and since there is no further recourse, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted.\n\nFrom the transcribed text, it is clear that the telecommunications service provided by ICE through its Kolbi agency located in San Carlos is intended to generate profits and, therefore, is a lucrative activity which, in order to be regularized, must obtain its commercial license duly issued by the Municipality, honoring the payment of the corresponding business license tax. It is clear to this Chamber that the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, No. C-151-2007, besides not being binding even for the Municipality of San Carlos—since it arose from an inquiry by the Municipality of Grecia—is even less so for this improper hierarchy, furthermore considering it outdated given that its date of issuance predates Law No. Placa903, disregarding its scope and impact on ICE's commercial line of business in telecommunications. Therefore, the grievances expressed by ICE's representation are not acceptable, so this Chamber agrees with the position expressed by the local authorities; consequently, the act appealed is in accordance with the law and, lacking defects in its alleged formal and substantial elements, must be confirmed. As there is no further recourse, the administrative channel shall be deemed exhausted.\n\nVIII. Regarding the copy of the case file and return of documents. As this venue has been processed electronically, the parties are able to obtain a complete copy containing both the administrative case file referred by the Municipal Corporation and all the documents that constitute the present appeal, for which purpose they must provide the electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) was submitted and remains in the custody of this Office, the party who submitted it may retrieve it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the \"Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch,\" approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe appeal filed is declared without merit and, consequently, the appealed resolution is confirmed. The administrative channel is hereby deemed exhausted.\n\n \n\nNombre12928   \n\n \n\nNombre106228    ﻿      \n\n \n\n \n\n| Documento firmado por: |\n| --- |\n| Nombre12928  , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A |\n| Nombre106228  , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A |\n| Nombre106228  , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A |\n\n \n\n"
}