{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-1011-888930",
  "citation": "Res. 00025-2013 Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Viabilidad ambiental suspendida por Sala Constitucional no es acto final impugnable",
  "title_en": "Environmental viability suspended by Constitutional Chamber is not a final reviewable act",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo rechaza el recurso de casación presentado por Name Calling Disease Limitada contra el Estado. La empresa había solicitado la nulidad de una resolución de SETENA que exigía nuevos requisitos para reactivar la viabilidad ambiental de un proyecto de construcción parcialmente ubicado en la zona de amortiguamiento del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas. La viabilidad ambiental original había sido suspendida por orden de la Sala Constitucional, que también condicionó su validez a un estudio integral. El Tribunal confirma que la resolución impugnada por la actora es un acto de trámite sin efecto propio, pues se limita a indicar que el Plan de Gestión Ambiental debe reelaborarse conforme a las recomendaciones de dicho estudio, y la actora ya presentó las modificaciones, las cuales están pendientes de resolución. Al no ser un acto final, no es susceptible de impugnación judicial directa según el artículo 36 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Se imponen las costas a la recurrente.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious-Administrative Court of Cassation denies the cassation appeal filed by Name Calling Disease Limitada against the State. The company had sought the annulment of a SETENA resolution requiring new conditions to reactivate the environmental viability for a construction project partially located within the buffer zone of Las Baulas National Marine Park. The original viability had been suspended by order of the Constitutional Chamber, which also made its validity conditional on an integral study. The Court confirms that the challenged resolution is a mere procedural act without independent effect, as it only orders the Environmental Management Plan to be redrafted in accordance with the study's recommendations, and the petitioner has already submitted modifications that are pending resolution. Since it is not a final act, it is not directly challengeable in court under Article 36(c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. Costs are imposed on the appellant.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "date": "2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "procedural-environmental",
    "environmental-law-7554"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "procedural-environmental",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "viabilidad ambiental",
    "acto de trámite",
    "zona de amortiguamiento",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "estudio integral",
    "impugnación"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 36 inciso c",
      "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "viabilidad ambiental",
    "SETENA",
    "acto de trámite",
    "impugnación",
    "Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas",
    "zona de amortiguamiento",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "estudio integral",
    "Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo",
    "rechazo del recurso",
    "costas"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "environmental viability",
    "SETENA",
    "procedural act",
    "challenge",
    "Las Baulas National Marine Park",
    "buffer zone",
    "Constitutional Chamber",
    "integral study",
    "Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code",
    "appeal denied",
    "costs"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Nótese que tampoco se está ante un acto final o de uno de trámite con efecto propio, como la misma conducta de la actora refiere, pues sigue pendiente la aprobación o improbación de las modificaciones que presentó a su plan de gestión ambiental, con lo que no se cumple el presupuesto establecido en el artículo 36 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para acudir a esta sede. Además, contrario a lo que afirma, si bien en un inicio el permiso de construcción le fue otorgado, este está suspendido como consecuencia derivada de la orden emanada de la Sala Constitucional, pero según se ha expuesto, el procedimiento de autorización aún no está concluido, pues no se ha resuelto en torno a los ajustes requeridos, de modo que es menester que se dirima si la gestionante cumple o no con los requisitos, para que atendiendo a las ponderaciones sobrevenidas que fueron introducidas, para el sitio, por la Sala Constitucional, le sea aprobado –o no- su permiso de construcción. Esto implica, que como bien refirió el Tribunal, el acto impugnado es de trámite, y no tiene efecto propio, pues no niega ni aprueba el permiso de construcción por sí mismo, de modo que no puede atacarse aún en la vía jurisdiccional.",
  "excerpt_en": "Note that this is also not a final act or an intermediate act with its own effect, as the petitioner's own conduct indicates, since approval or rejection of the modifications she submitted to her environmental management plan is still pending, thus the prerequisite established in Article 36(c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code to appear before this court is not met. Moreover, contrary to what she asserts, although the construction permit was initially granted, it is suspended as a consequence of the order emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, but as it has been explained, the authorization proceeding is not yet concluded since the required adjustments have not been resolved; it is thus necessary to determine whether the petitioner meets the requirements or not, so that, in light of the supervening assessments introduced for the site by the Constitutional Chamber, her construction permit is approved —or not. This means, as the Court correctly stated, that the challenged act is a procedural one and has no effect of its own, since it does not deny or approve the construction permit by itself, and thus cannot yet be attacked through judicial review.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Cassation denied",
    "label_es": "Casación rechazada",
    "summary_en": "Cassation appeal denied. The challenged resolution is a procedural act without independent effect, thus not directly reviewable in court. Costs imposed on the appellant.",
    "summary_es": "Se rechaza el recurso de casación. La resolución impugnada es un acto de trámite sin efecto propio, por lo que no es susceptible de impugnación judicial directa. Costas a la actora."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The challenged act is a procedural one and has no effect of its own, since it does not deny or approve the construction permit by itself, and thus cannot yet be attacked through judicial review.",
      "quote_es": "el acto impugnado es de trámite, y no tiene efecto propio, pues no niega ni aprueba el permiso de construcción por sí mismo, de modo que no puede atacarse aún en la vía jurisdiccional."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "Approval or rejection of the modifications submitted to its environmental management plan is still pending; therefore, the prerequisite established in Article 36(c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code to appear before this court is not met.",
      "quote_es": "sigue pendiente la aprobación o improbación de las modificaciones que presentó a su plan de gestión ambiental, con lo que no se cumple el presupuesto establecido en el artículo 36 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para acudir a esta sede."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-888930",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "*100046311027CA*\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRES: 000025-F-TC-2013\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n TRIBUNAL\r\nDE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve\r\nhoras cinco minutos del tres de abril de dos mil trece. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Proceso\r\nde conocimiento declarado de puro derecho tramitado en el Tribunal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo por NAME CALLING DISEASE LIMITADA, representada por su\r\ngerente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, José Pablo\r\nArce Piñar, soltero, estudiante; contra el ESTADO, representada por su\r\nprocuradora, Gloria Solano Martínez, de estado civil ignorado, vecina de\r\nHeredia. Figuran además, como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte\r\nactora, los licenciados Rafael Enrique Cañas Coto y José Alberto Schroeder\r\nLeiva. Las personas físicas con mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas,\r\ncasados, abogados y vecinos de San José. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRESULTANDO\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 1. Con base en los hechos\r\nque expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, la parte actora estableció proceso\r\nde conocimiento declarado de purdo derecho, a fin de que en sentencia se\r\ndeclare: ” 1. Que se declare con lugar la presente demanda. 2. Que se\r\ndeclare la nulidad absoluta de la resolución 1342-2012-SETENA, en cuanto\r\nrequiere que mi representada cumpla con los requisitos adicionales para la\r\n“reactivación” de la vialidad ambiental que ya fue otorgada. 3. Que se declaren\r\ndisconformes con el Ordenamiento Jurídico todas las acciones efectuadas por la\r\nSecretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental relacionados con la solicitud de nuevos\r\nrequisitos para la “reactivación” de la vialidad ambiental que se le otorgó a\r\nmi representada mediante resolución 1862-2006-SETENA. 4. Que se modifique la\r\nconducta administrativa en este acto impugnada, y que por lo tanto, se\r\n“reactive” de inmediato la vialidad ambiental que ya le fue otorgada a mi\r\nrepresentada, la cual cumple con todos los requisitos legales ambientales\r\nestablecidos en nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. 5. En caso de que la SETENA no\r\n“reactive” de inmediato la vialidad ambiental ya otorgada al proyecto de mi\r\nrepresentada, que inicie el procedimiento respectivo de expropiación\r\ncompensación por imponer limitaciones no indemnizadas a la propiedad privada.\r\n6. Que se condene en costas personales y procesales al Estado.\" \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.\r\nLa\r\nrepresentación estatal contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las\r\nexcepciones de acto no susceptible de impugnación, falta de derecho, de\r\nlegitimación activa y de interés actual. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n3. La audiencia\r\npreliminar se efectuó a las 8 horas 27 minutos del 1° de noviembre de 2011,\r\noportunidad en que ambas partes hicieron uso de la palabra. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n4. El Tribunal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo y Civil de Hacienda, integrado por los jueces Christian Hess\r\nAraya, Cynthia Abarca Gómez y Roberto Garita Navarro; en sentencia no.\r\n17-2012-VI de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 1° de febrero de 2012, resolvió: “Se\r\nacoge la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación; por innecesario,\r\nse omite pronunciamiento sobre las excepciones de fondo opuestas. Se declara\r\nINADMISIBLE la demanda interpuesta por Name Calling Disease, Ltda., contra el\r\nEstado. Son ambas costas a cargo de la sociedad actora, con sus respectivos\r\nintereses contados a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia y hasta su efectivo\r\npago, sumas que se determinarán en ejecución de sentencia.” \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 5.\r\nLa parte actora formula recurso de casación indicando expresamente las razones\r\nen que se apoya para refutar la tesis del Tribunal.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n 6.\r\nEn los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de\r\nley. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRedacta el magistrado Solís Zelaya\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n I.\r\nName\r\nCalling Disease Limitada formuló proceso de conocimiento contra el Estado.\r\nSolicitó, en lo medular, la nulidad de la resolución no. 1342-2010-SETENA,\r\ndictada por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) del Ministerio de\r\nAmbiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, (MINAET) el 22 de junio de 2010; se\r\nrestablezca la eficacia plena de la viabilidad ambiental otorgada por la\r\nSecretaría en resolución no. 1862-2006-SETENA del 12 de octubre de 2006; y se\r\nle impongan ambas costas al Estado. Subsidiariamente pidió se ordene a la\r\nSETENA dar inicio al procedimiento de expropiación del inmueble de su propiedad,\r\ninscrito al folio real no. 42755-000. El Estado se opuso e invocó la\r\ndefensa previa de acto no impugnable, así como las excepciones de falta de\r\nlegitimación, de derecho y de interés actual. En la audiencia preliminar se\r\ndenegó la defensa de acto no susceptible de impugnación, pero la representante\r\ndel Estado la dejó reiterada para su examen en sentencia y se dispuso el\r\nproceso como de puro derecho. El Tribunal, al resolver el fondo de la\r\ncontroversia, acogió la defensa de acto no susceptible de impugnación y declaró\r\nla inadmisibilidad de la demanda. Disconforme con lo decidido, la parte actora\r\nacudió ante esta Sala, pero mediante auto de pase se dispuso que el\r\nconocimiento de este asunto corresponde al Tribunal de Casación. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n II. Formula un motivo de\r\ndisconformidad. El Tribunal pierde de vista que los precedentes en los que se\r\nfundamentó no se relacionan con el caso de su representada. La sentencia\r\n35-2009 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, refiere, no le es aplicable,\r\npues el permiso municipal de construcción para su proyecto está debidamente\r\naprobado, pero la construcción está paralizada por la suspensión de la\r\nviabilidad ambiental que previamente había otorgado la SETENA. El precedente\r\nmencionado, dice, establece que la viabilidad ambiental no genera efecto propio\r\ny es el permiso de construcción el acto que debe ser impugnado. Habría sido\r\nilógico que atacara el permiso, asegura, pues lo que produjo la paralización\r\nfue la suspensión de la viabilidad ambiental. La resolución de la SETENA que\r\nimpugna, comenta, sí produce efectos propios, en tanto hace imposible la\r\nfinalización de la construcción. El pronunciamiento 104-F-TC-2009 del Tribunal\r\nContencioso, narra, dispuso que las viabilidades ambientales no tienen efecto\r\npropio, por lo que debe impugnarse el permiso de construcción, pero en el sub\r\nlite los hechos son diferentes, por lo que la viabilidad ambiental sí tiene\r\nincidencia, pues en su caso, por las particularidades dichas, debería\r\nconsiderarse un acto de trámite “final” que hace imposible la continuación del\r\nproceso constructivo. En cambio, sostiene, en el precedente citado la\r\nviabilidad ambiental no estaba suspendida. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n III.\r\nEn lo que resulta de relevancia, y conforme al cuadro fáctico de la instancia\r\nprecedente, en torno al cual no existe disconformidad, Name Calling Disease\r\nLimitada es propietaria de un inmueble ubicado en el distrito Veintisiete de\r\nAbril, Cantón Santa Cruz, provincia de Guanacaste, inscrito al folio real\r\n42577-000, cuyo territorio está localizado en un 15%, de manera aproximada,\r\ndentro del Parque Nacional Marino las Baulas. La propietaria formalizó ante la\r\nSecretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA), una solicitud de evaluación\r\nambiental preliminar del proyecto denominado “Construcción de casa de habitación\r\ny piscina”, que se desarrollaría en la heredad. En la resolución no.\r\n1862-2006-SETENA del 12 de octubre de 2006, esa Secretaría aprobó el Plan de\r\nGestión Ambiental y la Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales\r\npresentados por la gestionante, y estableció una serie de obligaciones y\r\nrecomendaciones para la realización del proyecto. Entre las condiciones\r\nestablecidas estaba: “Construir la casa de habitación y piscina fuera de los\r\nlinderos del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas.” Mediante el oficio\r\nSG-AJ-838-2008-SETENA del 18 de julio de 2008, esa Secretaría comunicó “Orden\r\nde Paralización” del proyecto, en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por la Sala\r\nConstitucional en su sentencia no. 8666-2008 de las 17 horas 57 minutos del 21\r\nde mayo de ese año. El 26 de noviembre siguiente, la interesada consultó “si\r\npuedo continuar las labores de proceso constructivo para el proyecto de\r\nConstrucción de Casa de Habitación de Dos Niveles y una Piscina de uso privado\r\n(...)”. El órgano requerido contestó mediante la resolución no. \r\n1342-2010-SETENA del 22 de junio de 2010, que –en lo medular– dispone: “PRIMERO:\r\nCon base en las recomendaciones técnicas del ‘Estudio integral sobre el impacto\r\nque las construcciones y el desarrollo turístico y urbanístico en la zona de amortiguamiento\r\ndel Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, solicitado por la Sala Constitucional\r\nmediante Voto no. 2008-018529 del 16 de diciembre del 2008 y los CONSIDERANDOS\r\nSexto, Sétimo y Octavo, se declara con derecho a continuar con el proceso\r\ngestión de Evaluación Ambiental al Proyecto: Construcción de Casa de Habitación\r\ny una Piscina, (…) y se ordena que se reelabore el Pronóstico - Plan de Gestión\r\nAmbiental y la Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales, de manera que se\r\ntome como base en la reelaboración del PGA cada una de las recomendaciones\r\nemanadas en el estudio integral anteriormente señalado. / En caso de que no se\r\nreelabore el PGA presentado como se señaló en el punto anterior, el\r\ndesarrollador podrá presentar un nuevo expediente con el nuevo diseño del\r\nproyecto tomando en cuenta cada una de las recomendaciones emanadas en el\r\nestudio integral, con el fin de que la SETENA defina el instrumento de\r\nEvaluación de Impacto Ambiental a presentar. / De acogerse esta propuesta, el\r\ndesarrollador debe solicitar el archivo del expediente FEAP-1102-2005-SETENA.” \r\nEl 6 de julio de 2010, la interesada presentó a la SETENA un “Anexo al Plan\r\nde Gestión Ambiental / Proyecto Casa de Habitación y Piscina”, en el cual\r\nse indica que “De acuerdo con la resolución No. 1342-2010-Setena, (…)\r\nprocedemos a entregar, lo solicitado en el POR TANTO, numeral primero de\r\nreelaborar el Pronostico-Plan de Gestión Ambiental, incorporando las\r\nrecomendaciones emanadas del ‘Estudio Integral sobre el impacto que las\r\nconstrucciones y el desarrollo turístico y urbanístico en la zona de\r\namortiguamiento del Parque Marino Las Baulas’.” El documento va acompañado\r\nde una declaración jurada de compromisos ambientales. Finalmente, y también en\r\nlo que resulta de relevancia, se tuvo como indemostrado que la SETENA haya\r\nresuelto –favorable o desfavorablemente– la gestión presentada el 6 de julio de\r\n2010 por la interesada.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n IV.\r\nCon base en esos hechos, el Tribunal estimó que el asunto versaba sobre un\r\nacto no susceptible de impugnación. Al respecto, en primer término echó mano de\r\nuna extensa cita de un precedente suyo (no. 35-2009 de las 15 horas 9 minutos\r\ndel 14 de enero de 2009). Luego transcribió un extracto del fallo de este\r\nTribunal de Casación no. 104-F-TC-2009 de las 11 horas 10 minutos del 1 de\r\njunio de 2009, que se mantuvo en esa línea. Señaló después, que si bien la\r\nSETENA había otorgado la viabilidad ambiental al proyecto de la actora, y que\r\ntambién se le otorgó el permiso municipal de construcción, la sentencia no.\r\n8666-2008 de las 17 horas 57 minutos del 21 de mayo de 2008 de la Sala\r\nConstitucional dispuso: “POR TANTO: Se declara con lugar el recurso,\r\nen consecuencia se: a) (...). b) (...). c) Ordena a SONIA\r\nESPINOZA VALVERDE, en su calidad de Secretaria General de la Secretaría Técnica\r\nNacional Ambiental, o a quien ocupe este cargo, proceder en coordinación con el\r\nMinisterio de Ambiente y Energía, el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y\r\nAlcantarillados y las Municipalidades de Santa Cruz, Nandayure, Hojancha,\r\nNicoya y Carrillo, a realizar un estudio integral sobre el impacto que las\r\nconstrucciones y el desarrollo turístico y urbanístico en la zona de\r\namortiguamiento del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas producirían al ambiente y\r\nlas medidas necesarias a tomar, en donde se valore si conviene mejor también\r\nexpropiar las propiedades que se encuentren allí, y se indique expresamente el\r\nimpacto que el ruido, las luces, el uso de agua para consumo humano, las aguas\r\nnegras y servidas, la presencia humana y otros produciría sobre todo el\r\necosistema de la zona, en especial, la tortuga baula. Para lo cual se le otorga\r\nun plazo máximo de seis meses contados desde la comunicación de esta\r\nresolución, plazo dentro del cual el estudio mencionado debe estar concluido. d)\r\nOrdena dejar suspendidas y supeditar la validez de las viabilidades\r\nambientales otorgadas a las propiedades ubicadas dentro de la zona de\r\namortiguamiento (banda de 500 metros) del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas,\r\nhasta tanto no esté listo el estudio integral anterior. (...)” (El\r\nénfasis es suplido). Señaló entonces, que ese órgano dispuso no sólo la\r\nsuspensión de las viabilidades otorgadas, sino que además condicionó su validez\r\na la elaboración del estudio integral que también se exigió realizar. Esto\r\nquiere decir, agregó, que si una vez efectuado dicho análisis, se llegara a\r\nestablecer que alguna o algunas de las viabilidades otorgadas no eran conformes\r\ncon sus alcances, se debían adoptar las medidas necesarias para lograr su plena\r\ncompatibilidad con las conclusiones del estudio integral, y si esto no fuere\r\noportunamente cumplido, o se llegara a establecer la imposibilidad de alcanzar\r\nesa adecuación, el acto o actos tendrían que ser anulados. Refirió también que\r\nante esto, la SETENA le informó a la solicitante que dadas esas circunstancias,\r\ndebía satisfacer nuevos requisitos, lo que en criterio de los jueces equivalía\r\na que el Plan no era plenamente compatible con los hallazgos del estudio\r\nintegral, ante lo cual era inevitable disponer las medidas correctivas del\r\ncaso. Luego refirió: “Desde esa óptica, el acto impugnado ofreció dos\r\ncaminos posibles a la interesada (…) a saber: reelaborar el Pronóstico - Plan\r\nde Gestión Ambiental y la Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales o bien\r\npresentar una nueva gestión con el rediseño del proyecto, tomando en cuenta –en\r\nambas alternativas– cada una de las recomendaciones contenidas en el estudio\r\nintegral efectuado. Tal y como se reseñó en la relación de hechos probados, la\r\nempresa (…) ya optó por la primera vía, presentando a SETENA, el 6 de julio del\r\n2010, un nuevo Plan acompañado de la declaración jurada de compromisos\r\nambientales. No consta en autos si la SETENA ha resuelto algo sobre el\r\nparticular o no, pero está claro que lo que se disponga incidirá, a su vez,\r\nsobre lo que deba acordar la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz respecto del permiso\r\nconstructivo, lo cual –finalmente– evidentemente podrá ser objeto de\r\nimpugnación tanto en sede administrativa como judicial.”. A la luz de estos\r\nrazonamientos, más adelante concluyó: “En consecuencia, lo que procede es\r\nreafirmar la naturaleza de los actos pronunciados en el procedimiento ambiental\r\ncomo de trámite sin efecto propio, lo cual nos conduce a acoger la defensa\r\nprevia reiterada en su momento por el Estado y a declarar inadmisible la demanda\r\nen todos sus extremos.”. Todo este recuento evidencia, entonces, que el\r\npronunciamiento no hizo descansar su fundamento, como parece entenderlo la\r\nrecurrente, en la invocación de precedentes jurisprudenciales, pues teniendo\r\ncomo base esos antecedentes, indica, que en el caso concreto, una serie de\r\ncircunstancias sobrevenidas (fallo de la Sala Constitucional) obligaba a la\r\npetente a la readecuación de una serie de requisitos del permiso, los que debía\r\nvalorar, de nuevo, la SETENA, luego de lo cual, la Municipalidad debería\r\ndefinir lo que estimara correspondiente en torno al permiso de construcción.\r\nRefirió que la interesada había readecuado su proyecto, en apariencia, a las\r\nnuevas exigencias, y que aún su planteamiento no había sido resuelto por\r\naquella Secretaría. Cerró sus argumentos estableciendo que una vez que ese\r\nórgano dispusiera lo que se estimara pertinente, la Municipalidad emitiría sus\r\npropias valoraciones y se estaría, ahora sí, ante un acto final. La recurrente,\r\nen sus disconformidades, se constriñe a mencionar porqué los precedentes\r\ncitados por el órgano de la instancia precedente, distan de su caso. En sus\r\ncensuras no se observa ningún argumento dirigido a evidenciar que contrario a\r\nlo que señala el Tribunal, el trámite que formuló luego de las consecuencias\r\nderivadas del fallo de la Sala Constitucional, no esté pendiente de resolución,\r\nni que el permiso le haya sido negado con base en los nuevos requerimientos.\r\nNótese que tampoco se está ante un acto final o de uno de trámite con efecto\r\npropio, como la misma conducta de la actora refiere, pues sigue pendiente la\r\naprobación o improbación de las modificaciones que presentó a su plan de\r\ngestión ambiental, con lo que no se cumple el presupuesto establecido en el\r\nartículo 36 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para\r\nacudir a esta sede. Además, contrario a lo que afirma, si bien en un inicio el\r\npermiso de construcción le fue otorgado, este está suspendido como consecuencia\r\nderivada de la orden emanada de la Sala Constitucional, pero según se ha\r\nexpuesto, el procedimiento de autorización aún no está concluido, pues no se ha\r\nresuelto en torno a los ajustes requeridos, de modo que es menester que se\r\ndirima si la gestionante cumple o no con los requisitos, para que atendiendo a\r\nlas ponderaciones sobrevenidas que fueron introducidas, para el sitio, por la\r\nSala Constitucional, le sea aprobado –o no- su permiso de construcción. Esto\r\nimplica, que como bien refirió el Tribunal, el acto impugnado es de trámite, y\r\nno tiene efecto propio, pues no niega ni aprueba el permiso de construcción por\r\nsí mismo, de modo que no puede atacarse aún en la vía jurisdiccional. Con\r\ntodo, por las razones señaladas, no se observa el quebranto aducido, de modo\r\nque el recurso debe denegarse, imponiendo sus costas al promovente en los\r\ntérminos del artículo 150 inciso 3) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n Se\r\nrechaza el recurso de casación promovido por la parte actora, quien deberá\r\nsufragar las costas generadas con el ejercicio de esta instancia. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRomán Solís Zelaya\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nÓscar Eduardo González\r\nCamacho \r\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nJROSALES/RGONZALEZU\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos: (506)\r\n2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "*100046311027CA*\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA\n\nRES: 000025-F-TC-2013\n\nTRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, at nine hours five minutes on the third of April of two thousand thirteen.\n\nOrdinary proceeding declared purely a matter of law, processed in the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal by NAME CALLING DISEASE LIMITADA, represented by its manager with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact, José Pablo Arce Piñar, single, student; against the STATE, represented by its prosecutor, Gloria Solano Martínez, of unknown marital status, resident of Heredia. Also appearing as special judicial attorneys for the plaintiff are licensed attorneys Rafael Enrique Cañas Coto and José Alberto Schroeder Leiva. The natural persons are of legal age and with the noted exceptions, married, attorneys, and residents of San José.\n\nRESULTANDO\n\n1. Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the plaintiff initiated an ordinary proceeding declared purely a matter of law, so that in judgment it be declared: \"1. That the present lawsuit be granted. 2. That the absolute nullity of resolution 1342-2012-SETENA be declared, insofar as it requires my client to comply with additional requirements for the \"reactivation\" of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) that has already been granted. 3. That all actions taken by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental related to the request for new requirements for the \"reactivation\" of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) granted to my client through resolution 1862-2006-SETENA be declared non-conforming with the Legal System. 4. That the administrative conduct challenged in this act be modified, and that therefore, the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) already granted to my client, which complies with all legal environmental requirements established in our Legal System, be immediately \"reactivated\". 5. In the event that SETENA does not immediately \"reactivate\" the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) already granted to my client's project, that it initiates the respective expropriation compensation procedure for imposing uncompensated limitations on private property. 6. That the State be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs.\"\n\n2. The State's representation answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of act not subject to challenge, lack of right, lack of standing to sue, and lack of current interest.\n\n3. The preliminary hearing was held at 8 hours 27 minutes on November 1, 2011, at which time both parties spoke.\n\n4. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, composed of judges Christian Hess Araya, Cynthia Abarca Gómez, and Roberto Garita Navarro; in judgment no. 17-2012-VI at 14 hours 45 minutes on February 1, 2012, resolved: \"The preliminary defense of act not subject to challenge is upheld; as unnecessary, a ruling on the substantive defenses raised is omitted. The lawsuit filed by Name Calling Disease, Ltda., against the State is declared INADMISSIBLE. Both costs are borne by the plaintiff company, with their respective interest accruing from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, amounts to be determined in execution of judgment.\"\n\n5. The plaintiff files a cassation appeal expressly indicating the reasons relied upon to refute the Tribunal's thesis.\n\n6. In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\nMagistrate Solís Zelaya drafts.\n\nI. Name Calling Disease Limitada filed an ordinary proceeding against the State. It requested, in essence, the nullity of resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA, issued by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET) on June 22, 2010; that the full effectiveness of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) granted by the Secretariat in resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006, be restored; and that both costs be imposed on the State. In the alternative, it requested that SETENA be ordered to initiate the expropriation procedure for the property owned by it, registered on real folio no. 42755-000. The State opposed and invoked the preliminary defense of non-challengeable act, as well as the defenses of lack of standing, lack of right, and lack of current interest. At the preliminary hearing, the defense of act not subject to challenge was denied, but the State's representative reiterated it for examination in judgment, and the proceeding was ordered as purely a matter of law. The Tribunal, in resolving the merits of the controversy, upheld the defense of act not subject to challenge and declared the lawsuit inadmissible. Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff came before this Chamber, but by an order of referral it was determined that jurisdiction over this matter corresponds to the Tribunal de Casación.\n\nII. It formulates one ground of disagreement. The Tribunal loses sight of the fact that the precedents on which it relied are not related to its client's case. Judgment 35-2009 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, it argues, is not applicable, because the municipal construction permit (permiso de construcción) for its project is duly approved, but construction is halted due to the suspension of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) that SETENA had previously granted. The aforementioned precedent, it says, establishes that the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) does not generate its own effect and it is the construction permit (permiso de construcción) that is the act that must be challenged. It would have been illogical to attack the permit, it assures, because what caused the halt was the suspension of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). The SETENA resolution it challenges, it comments, does produce its own effects, insofar as it makes it impossible to complete construction. Ruling 104-F-TC-2009 of the Tribunal Contencioso, it recounts, held that environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) do not have their own effect, so the construction permit (permiso de construcción) must be challenged, but in the case at bar the facts are different, so the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) does have incidence, because in its case, due to the aforementioned particularities, it should be considered a \"final\" procedural act that makes it impossible to continue the construction process. In contrast, it maintains, in the cited precedent the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) was not suspended.\n\nIII. In what is relevant, and according to the factual framework of the preceding instance, regarding which there is no disagreement, Name Calling Disease Limitada is the owner of a property located in the Veintisiete de Abril district, Santa Cruz Canton, Guanacaste province, registered on real folio 42577-000, whose land is located approximately 15% within the Parque Nacional Marino las Baulas. The owner submitted to the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) a request for preliminary environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental preliminar) of the project called \"Construction of a dwelling house and pool\", to be developed on the estate. In resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006, that Secretariat approved the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments (Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales) submitted by the applicant, and established a series of obligations and recommendations for carrying out the project. Among the established conditions was: \"Build the dwelling house and pool outside the boundaries of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas.\" Through official letter SG-AJ-838-2008-SETENA of July 18, 2008, that Secretariat communicated a \"Stop Work Order\" for the project, in compliance with the order of the Sala Constitucional in its judgment no. 8666-2008 at 17 hours 57 minutes on May 21 of that year. On the following November 26, the interested party inquired \"if I can continue the construction process work for the project for the Construction of a Two-Level Dwelling House and a Private Use Pool (...)\". The consulted body responded through resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA of June 22, 2010, which –in essence– orders: \"FIRST: Based on the technical recommendations of the 'Comprehensive study on the impact of constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone (zona de amortiguamiento) of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas', requested by the Sala Constitucional through Voto no. 2008-018529 of December 16, 2008, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth CONSIDERANDOS, it is declared that the Project: Construction of a Dwelling House and a Pool, (...) has the right to continue with the Environmental Assessment management process, and it is ordered that the Prognosis - Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments (Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales) be re-elaborated, so that each of the recommendations issued in the comprehensive study previously mentioned is taken as a basis in the re-elaboration of the PGA. / In the event that the submitted PGA is not re-elaborated as indicated in the previous point, the developer may submit a new file with the new project design, taking into account each of the recommendations issued in the comprehensive study, so that SETENA may define the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) instrument to be submitted. / If this proposal is accepted, the developer must request the archiving of file FEAP-1102-2005-SETENA.\" On July 6, 2010, the interested party submitted to SETENA an \"Annex to the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) / Dwelling House and Pool Project\", in which it is indicated that \"In accordance with resolution No. 1342-2010-Setena, (...) we proceed to deliver, what was requested in the POR TANTO, first item, to re-elaborate the Prognosis-Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental), incorporating the recommendations issued from the 'Comprehensive Study on the impact of constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone (zona de amortiguamiento) of the Parque Marino Las Baulas'.\" The document is accompanied by a sworn declaration of environmental commitments (declaración jurada de compromisos ambientales). Finally, and also in what is relevant, it was considered unproven that SETENA had resolved –favorably or unfavorably– the request submitted on July 6, 2010, by the interested party.\n\nIV. Based on these facts, the Tribunal considered that the matter involved an act not subject to challenge. In this regard, first it employed an extensive citation from one of its own precedents (no. 35-2009 at 15 hours 9 minutes on January 14, 2009). Then it transcribed an excerpt from the ruling of this Tribunal de Casación no. 104-F-TC-2009 at 11 hours 10 minutes on June 1, 2009, which followed that same line. It then pointed out that although SETENA had granted the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) to the plaintiff's project, and that the municipal construction permit (permiso de construcción) was also granted, judgment no. 8666-2008 at 17 hours 57 minutes on May 21, 2008, of the Sala Constitucional ordered: \"POR TANTO: The appeal is granted, consequently it: a) (...). b) (...). c) Orders SONIA ESPINOZA VALVERDE, in her capacity as Secretaria General of the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, or whoever holds this position, to proceed in coordination with the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, and the Municipalities of Santa Cruz, Nandayure, Hojancha, Nicoya, and Carrillo, to carry out a comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone (zona de amortiguamiento) of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas would produce on the environment and the necessary measures to be taken, where it is assessed whether it is also advisable to expropriate the properties located there, and the impact that noise, lights, use of water for human consumption, black and gray waters, human presence, and others would produce on the entire ecosystem of the zone, especially the leatherback turtle (tortuga baula), is expressly indicated. For which a maximum period of six months is granted, counted from the notification of this resolution, a period within which the aforementioned study must be concluded. d) Orders that the validity of the environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) granted to the properties located within the buffer zone (band of 500 meters) of the Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas be suspended and made subject to the completion of the aforementioned comprehensive study. (...)\" (Emphasis supplied). It then noted that this body ordered not only the suspension of the granted viabilities (viabilidades), but also conditioned their validity on the preparation of the comprehensive study that was also ordered. This means, it added, that if once said analysis was completed, it were to be established that one or some of the granted viabilities (viabilidades) were not in accordance with its findings, the necessary measures had to be adopted to achieve their full compatibility with the conclusions of the comprehensive study, and if this were not timely fulfilled, or the impossibility of achieving that adequacy were to be established, the act or acts would have to be annulled. It also noted that in response to this, SETENA informed the applicant that given these circumstances, she had to satisfy new requirements, which in the judges' opinion meant that the Plan was not fully compatible with the findings of the comprehensive study, making it inevitable to order the corrective measures for the case. It then stated: \"From this perspective, the challenged act offered two possible paths to the interested party (...) namely: re-elaborate the Prognosis - Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments (Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales) or submit a new request with the redesign of the project, taking into account –in both alternatives– each of the recommendations contained in the comprehensive study carried out. As was outlined in the statement of proven facts, the company (...) already opted for the first path, submitting to SETENA, on July 6, 2010, a new Plan accompanied by the sworn declaration of environmental commitments (declaración jurada de compromisos ambientales). It does not appear in the record whether SETENA has resolved anything regarding this matter or not, but it is clear that what is decided will affect, in turn, what the Municipality of Santa Cruz must agree upon regarding the construction permit (permiso constructivo), which –finally– evidently may be subject to challenge both in administrative and judicial venues.\" In light of these reasonings, it later concluded: \"Consequently, what is appropriate is to reaffirm the nature of the acts issued in the environmental procedure as procedural without their own effect, which leads us to uphold the preliminary defense reiterated in its moment by the State and to declare the lawsuit inadmissible in all its parts.\" This entire recount thus demonstrates that the ruling did not base its foundation, as the appellant seems to understand it, on the invocation of jurisprudential precedents, for having those precedents as a basis, it indicates that in this specific case, a series of supervening circumstances (ruling of the Sala Constitucional) obligated the petitioner to readjust a series of permit requirements, which had to be assessed again by SETENA, after which the Municipality would have to decide what it deemed appropriate regarding the construction permit (permiso de construcción). It noted that the interested party had apparently adapted its project to the new requirements, and that its submission had not yet been resolved by that Secretariat. It closed its arguments by establishing that once that body decided what was deemed pertinent, the Municipality would issue its own assessments and it would then be, and only then, a final act. The appellant, in its disagreements, confines itself to mentioning why the precedents cited by the lower instance body differ from its case. In its criticisms, no argument is observed aimed at demonstrating that, contrary to what the Tribunal states, the procedure it initiated following the consequences derived from the Sala Constitucional ruling is not pending resolution, nor that the permit was denied based on the new requirements. Note that it is also not dealing with a final act or a procedural act with its own effect, as the plaintiff's own conduct indicates, because the approval or rejection of the modifications it presented to its environmental management plan (plan de gestión ambiental) is still pending, meaning the prerequisite established in Article 36(c) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for coming to this venue is not met. Furthermore, contrary to what it affirms, although initially the construction permit (permiso de construcción) was granted to it, this is suspended as a consequence derived from the order issued by the Sala Constitucional, but as has been explained, the authorization procedure is not yet concluded, as it has not been resolved regarding the required adjustments, so it is necessary that it be determined whether the applicant complies or not with the requirements, so that considering the supervening assessments that were introduced for the site by the Sala Constitucional, its construction permit (permiso de construcción) is approved –or not–. This implies, as the Tribunal well stated, that the challenged act is procedural, and does not have its own effect, because it does not deny or approve the construction permit (permiso de construcción) by itself, so it cannot yet be attacked in the jurisdictional venue. In any case, for the reasons stated, the alleged violation is not observed, so the appeal must be denied, imposing its costs on the appellant under the terms of Article 150(3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nThe cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff is rejected, who must bear the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.\n\nRomán Solís Zelaya\n\nÓscar Eduardo González Camacho\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nJROSALES/RGONZALEZU\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA\n\nTelephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\n**4.** The Administrative and Civil Tax Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), composed of Judges Christian Hess Araya, Cynthia Abarca Gómez, and Roberto Garita Navarro, in judgment no. 17-2012-VI at 2:45 p.m. on February 1, 2012, resolved: *“The preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge is upheld; as unnecessary, a ruling on the substantive defenses raised is omitted. The lawsuit filed by Name Calling Disease, Ltda., against the State is declared INADMISSIBLE. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiff company, with their respective interest calculated from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, sums to be determined in the execution of judgment.”*\n\n**5.** The plaintiff files a cassation appeal, expressly indicating the reasons on which it relies to refute the Court's thesis.\n\n**6.** In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\n**Judge Solís Zelaya writes**\n\n**I.** Name Calling Disease Limitada filed a declaratory proceeding against the State. It requested, essentially, the annulment of resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA, issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) of the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, MINAET) on June 22, 2010; that the full effectiveness of the environmental feasibility granted by the Secretariat in resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006, be restored; and that both costs be imposed on the State. Subsidiarily, it requested that SETENA be ordered to initiate the expropriation procedure for the property it owns, registered under real folio no. 42755-000. The State opposed and invoked the preliminary defense of an unappealable act, as well as the defenses of lack of standing, of right, and of current interest. At the preliminary hearing, the defense of an act not subject to challenge was denied, but the State's representative reiterated it for examination in the judgment, and the process was ordered as a matter of pure law. The Court, when resolving the merits of the controversy, upheld the defense of an act not subject to challenge and declared the lawsuit inadmissible. Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff came before this Chamber, but through an order of referral, it was determined that jurisdiction over this matter corresponds to the Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación).\n\n**II.** It formulates one ground of disagreement. The Court loses sight of the fact that the precedents on which it based its decision are not related to the case of its client. Judgment 35-2009 of the Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), it states, is not applicable, as the municipal construction permit for its project is duly approved, but construction is paralyzed due to the suspension of the environmental feasibility that SETENA had previously granted. The cited precedent, it says, establishes that environmental feasibility does not generate its own effect and it is the construction permit that must be challenged. It would have been illogical to attack the permit, it assures, because what caused the stoppage was the suspension of the environmental feasibility. The SETENA resolution it challenges, it comments, does produce its own effects, insofar as it makes the completion of the construction impossible. Ruling 104-F-TC-2009 of the Administrative Court, it recounts, held that environmental feasibilities have no effect of their own, so the construction permit must be challenged, but in the sub lite case the facts are different; therefore, the environmental feasibility does have an impact, since in its case, due to the aforesaid particularities, it should be considered a \"final\" procedural act that makes the continuation of the construction process impossible. In contrast, it maintains, in the cited precedent the environmental feasibility was not suspended.\n\n**III.** In what is relevant, and according to the factual framework of the preceding instance, regarding which there is no disagreement, Name Calling Disease Limitada is the owner of a property located in the Veintisiete de Abril district, Santa Cruz Canton, province of Guanacaste, registered under real folio 42577-000, the territory of which is located approximately 15% within the Las Baulas National Marine Park. The owner filed before the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) a request for a preliminary environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental preliminar) of the project called \"Construction of a dwelling house and swimming pool,\" to be developed on the estate. In resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006, that Secretariat approved the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental, PGA) and the Sworn Statement of Environmental Commitments (Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales) submitted by the applicant, and established a series of obligations and recommendations for carrying out the project. Among the conditions established was: *\"Construct the dwelling house and swimming pool outside the boundaries of the Las Baulas National Marine Park.\"* Through official letter SG-AJ-838-2008-SETENA of July 18, 2008, that Secretariat communicated a \"Stop Work Order\" for the project, in compliance with the order of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment no. 8666-2008 at 5:57 p.m. on May 21 of that year. On the following November 26, the interested party consulted *\"if I can continue the construction process work for the project of Construction of a Two-Level Dwelling House and a Private Use Swimming Pool (...)\".* The requested body replied through resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA of June 22, 2010, which –essentially– orders: *\"FIRST: Based on the technical recommendations of the 'Comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone of the Las Baulas National Marine Park have, requested by the Constitutional Chamber through Vote no. 2008-018529 of December 16, 2008, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Considering clauses (Considerandos), the Project: Construction of a Dwelling House and a Swimming Pool, (...) is declared with the right to continue with the Environmental Assessment management process, and it is ordered that the Forecast - Environmental Management Plan and the Sworn Statement of Environmental Commitments be re-elaborated, so that each of the recommendations issued in the aforementioned comprehensive study is taken as a basis in the re-elaboration of the PGA. / In the event that the PGA presented is not re-elaborated as indicated in the previous point, the developer may submit a new file with the new design of the project, taking into account each of the recommendations issued in the comprehensive study, in order for SETENA to define the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) instrument to be presented. / If this proposal is accepted, the developer must request the archiving of file FEAP-1102-2005-SETENA.\"* On July 6, 2010, the interested party submitted to SETENA an *\"Annex to the Environmental Management Plan / Dwelling House and Swimming Pool Project,\"* in which it is indicated that *\"In accordance with resolution No. 1342-2010-Setena, (...) we proceed to deliver what was requested in the POR TANTO clause, first section, of re-elaborating the Forecast-Environmental Management Plan, incorporating the recommendations issued from the 'Comprehensive Study on the impact that constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone of Las Baulas Marine Park have'.\"* The document is accompanied by a sworn statement of environmental commitments. Finally, and also in what is relevant, it was held as unproven that SETENA has resolved –favorably or unfavorably– the submission presented on July 6, 2010, by the interested party.\n\n**IV.** Based on these facts, the Court considered that the matter concerned an act not subject to challenge. In this regard, it first resorted to an extensive quotation from one of its own precedents (no. 35-2009 at 3:09 p.m. on January 14, 2009). It then transcribed an excerpt from this Cassation Court's ruling no. 104-F-TC-2009 at 11:10 a.m. on June 1, 2009, which maintained that same line. It then pointed out that although SETENA had granted environmental feasibility to the plaintiff's project, and that the municipal construction permit was also granted, judgment no. 8666-2008 at 5:57 p.m. on May 21, 2008, of the Constitutional Chamber ordered: *\"**POR TANTO:** The appeal is granted, consequently: **a)** (...). **b)** (...). **c)** Order SONIA ESPINOZA VALVERDE, in her capacity as Secretary General of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, or whoever holds this position, to proceed in coordination with the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, and the Municipalities of Santa Cruz, Nandayure, Hojancha, Nicoya, and Carrillo, to carry out a comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourist and urban development in the buffer zone of the Las Baulas National Marine Park would produce on the environment and the necessary measures to be taken, in which it is assessed whether it is also better to expropriate the properties located there, and the impact that noise, lights, the use of water for human consumption, black and gray water, human presence, and others would produce on the entire ecosystem of the area, especially the leatherback turtle, is expressly indicated. For which a maximum period of six months is granted, counted from the notification of this resolution, a period within which the aforementioned study must be completed. **d)** <u>Order to keep suspended and subject the validity of the environmental feasibilities granted to properties located within the buffer zone (500-meter band) of the Las Baulas National Marine Park, until the previous comprehensive study is ready</u>. (...)\"* (The emphasis is supplied). It then pointed out that this body ordered not only the suspension of the feasibilities granted, but also conditioned their validity on the preparation of the comprehensive study that it was also ordered to carry out. This means, it added, that if once said analysis was completed, it was established that one or some of the feasibilities granted were not in conformity with its findings, the necessary measures would have to be adopted to achieve their full compatibility with the conclusions of the comprehensive study, and if this were not timely complied with, or the impossibility of achieving that adequacy were established, the act or acts would have to be annulled. It also stated that in view of this, SETENA informed the applicant that given these circumstances, it had to satisfy new requirements, which in the judges' opinion was equivalent to the Plan not being fully compatible with the findings of the comprehensive study, making it inevitable to order the corrective measures for the case. It later stated: *\"From that perspective, the challenged act offered two possible paths to the interested party (…), namely: re-elaborate the Forecast - Environmental Management Plan and the Sworn Statement of Environmental Commitments or else submit a new application with the redesign of the project, taking into account –in both alternatives– each of the recommendations contained in the comprehensive study carried out. As outlined in the statement of proven facts, the company (…) already opted for the first route, submitting to SETENA, on July 6, 2010, a new Plan accompanied by the sworn statement of environmental commitments. The case file does not show whether SETENA has resolved anything on this matter or not, but it is clear that what is decided will have an impact, in turn, on what the Municipality of Santa Cruz must agree upon regarding the construction permit, which –finally– evidently may be subject to challenge both in administrative and judicial venues.\"*. In light of these reasonings, it later concluded: \"*Consequently, what is appropriate is to reaffirm the nature of the acts pronounced in the environmental procedure as procedural acts without their own effect, which leads us to uphold the preliminary defense reiterated in its moment by the State and to declare the lawsuit inadmissible in all its aspects.\".* This entire account shows, then, that the ruling did not base its reasoning, as the appellant seems to understand it, on the invocation of jurisprudential precedents, since, based on those antecedents, it indicates that in the specific case, a series of supervening circumstances (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber) forced the petitioner to readjust a series of permit requirements, which had to be assessed again by SETENA, after which the Municipality would have to define what it deemed appropriate regarding the construction permit. It stated that the interested party had readjusted its project, apparently, to the new demands, and that its proposal had still not been resolved by that Secretariat. It closed its arguments by establishing that once that body decided what was considered pertinent, the Municipality would issue its own assessments, and then, and only then, would there be a final act. The appellant, in its disagreements, confines itself to mentioning why the precedents cited by the body of the preceding instance are far from its case. In its objections, no argument is observed aimed at demonstrating that contrary to what the Court indicates, the procedure it formulated after the consequences derived from the Constitutional Chamber's ruling is not pending resolution, nor that the permit was denied based on the new requirements. Note that it is also not a case of a final act or a procedural act with its own effect, as the plaintiff's own conduct indicates, since the approval or rejection of the modifications it presented to its environmental management plan is still pending, so the prerequisite established in Article 36(c) of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) for coming to this venue is not met. Furthermore, contrary to what it affirms, although the construction permit was initially granted, it is suspended as a consequence derived from the order emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, but as has been explained, the authorization procedure is not yet concluded, since a decision has not been made regarding the required adjustments, so it is necessary to determine whether the applicant complies or not with the requirements, so that, in light of the supervening considerations that were introduced for the site by the Constitutional Chamber, its construction permit is approved –or not–. This implies, that as the Court rightly stated, the challenged act is a procedural act, and has no effect of its own, as it neither denies nor approves the construction permit by itself, so it cannot yet be attacked in the jurisdictional venue. Therefore, for the reasons stated, the alleged violation is not observed, so the appeal must be denied, imposing its costs on the appellant under the terms of Article 150(3) of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code.\n\n**POR TANTO**\n\nThe cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff is rejected, who must bear the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.\n\n**Román Solís Zelaya**\n\n**Óscar Eduardo González Camacho                  Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández**\n\nJROSALES/RGONZALEZU\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA\n\n**WHEREAS**\n\n**1.** Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the plaintiff filed an ordinary proceeding declared to be purely a matter of law, seeking a judgment declaring: *\"1. That this complaint be granted. 2. That the absolute nullity of resolution 1342-2012-SETENA be declared, insofar as it requires my represented party to meet additional requirements for the \"reactivation\" of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) that was already granted. 3. That all actions carried out by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) related to the request for new requirements for the \"reactivation\" of the environmental viability granted to my represented party through resolution 1862-2006-SETENA be declared non-conforming with the Legal System. 4. That the administrative conduct challenged in this act be modified, and therefore, that the environmental viability already granted to my represented party, which meets all environmental legal requirements established in our Legal System, be \"reactivated\" immediately. 5. In the event that SETENA does not immediately \"reactivate\" the environmental viability already granted to my represented party's project, that the respective expropriation procedure be initiated as compensation for imposing uncompensated limitations on private property. 6. That the State be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs.\"*\n\n**2.** The State representation answered the complaint negatively and raised the defenses of an act not subject to challenge, lack of right, lack of active standing, and lack of current interest.\n\n**3.** The preliminary hearing was held at 8 hours and 27 minutes on November 1, 2011, at which time both parties addressed the court.\n\n**4.** The Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), composed of judges Christian Hess Araya, Cynthia Abarca Gómez, and Roberto Garita Navarro; in judgment no. 17-2012-VI of 14 hours and 45 minutes on February 1, 2012, resolved: *\"The preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge is upheld; as unnecessary, a ruling on the substantive defenses raised is omitted. The complaint filed by Name Calling Disease, Ltda., against the State is declared INADMISSIBLE. Both costs are charged to the plaintiff company, with their respective interest counted from the finality of this judgment until their effective payment, sums to be determined in the execution of judgment.\"*\n\n**5.** The plaintiff filed a cassation appeal, expressly indicating the reasons relied upon to refute the Court's thesis.\n\n**6.** In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.\n\n**Justice Solís Zelaya writes**\n\n**I.** Name Calling Disease Limitada filed an ordinary proceeding against the State. It requested, in essence, the annulment of resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA, issued by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, MINAET) on June 22, 2010; the restoration of the full effectiveness of the environmental viability granted by the Secretariat in resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006; and that both costs be imposed on the State. In the alternative, it requested that SETENA be ordered to initiate the expropriation procedure for the property registered under real estate folio number 42755-000. The State opposed and invoked the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge, as well as the defenses of lack of standing, lack of right, and lack of current interest. At the preliminary hearing, the defense of an act not subject to challenge was denied, but the State representative reiterated it for examination in the judgment, and the proceeding was deemed a pure matter of law. The Court, when resolving the merits of the controversy, upheld the defense of an act not subject to challenge and declared the complaint inadmissible. Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff came before this Chamber, but by means of a referral order, it was determined that jurisdiction over this matter corresponds to the Court of Cassation.\n\n**II.** It formulates one ground of disagreement. The Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents on which it based its decision are not related to the case of its represented party. Judgment 35-2009 of the Administrative Contentious Court, it states, is not applicable to it, since the municipal construction permit for its project is duly approved, but construction is paralyzed due to the suspension of the environmental viability that SETENA had previously granted. The cited precedent, it says, establishes that environmental viability does not generate its own effect and that the construction permit is the act that must be challenged. It would have been illogical to attack the permit, it assures, because what produced the stoppage was the suspension of the environmental viability. The SETENA resolution it challenges, it comments, does produce its own effects, as it makes the completion of construction impossible. Ruling 104-F-TC-2009 of the Contentious Administrative Court, it recounts, held that environmental viabilities have no effect of their own, and therefore the construction permit must be challenged, but in the sub lite case the facts are different, so the environmental viability does have an impact, because in its case, given the aforementioned particularities, it should be considered a \"final\" administrative step (acto de trámite \"final\") that makes the continuation of the construction process impossible. In contrast, it maintains, in the cited precedent the environmental viability was not suspended.\n\n**III.** In what is relevant, and according to the factual framework of the prior instance, about which there is no disagreement, Name Calling Disease Limitada is the owner of a property located in the Veintisiete de Abril district, Santa Cruz Canton, province of Guanacaste, registered under real estate folio number 42577-000, whose territory is approximately 15% located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino las Baulas). The owner formalized before the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) a preliminary environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental preliminar) application for the project called \"Construction of a dwelling house and swimming pool,\" to be developed on the property. In resolution no. 1862-2006-SETENA of October 12, 2006, that Secretariat approved the Environmental Management Plan (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments (Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales) submitted by the applicant, and established a series of obligations and recommendations for carrying out the project. Among the conditions established was: *\"Build the dwelling house and swimming pool outside the boundaries of the Las Baulas National Marine Park.\"* Via official letter SG-AJ-838-2008-SETENA of July 18, 2008, that Secretariat communicated a \"Stop Work Order\" (Orden de Paralización) for the project, in compliance with the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber in its judgment no. 8666-2008 at 17 hours and 57 minutes on May 21 of that year. On the following November 26, the interested party consulted *\"if I can continue the construction process work for the project of Construction of a Two-Level Dwelling House and a Private Use Swimming Pool (...)\".* The requested body responded through resolution no. 1342-2010-SETENA of June 22, 2010, which –in essence– orders: *\"FIRST: Based on the technical recommendations of the 'Comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourism and urban development in the buffer zone (zona de amortiguamiento) of the Las Baulas National Marine Park, requested by the Constitutional Chamber through Vote no. 2008-018529 of December 16, 2008, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth CONSIDERING paragraphs, it is declared that the Environmental Assessment management process may continue for the Project: Construction of a Dwelling House and a Swimming Pool, (…) and it is ordered that the Environmental Management Plan (Pronóstico - Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments be re-elaborated, so that each of the recommendations emanating from the aforementioned comprehensive study is taken as a basis in the re-elaboration of the PGA. / In the event that the presented PGA is not re-elaborated as indicated in the previous point, the developer may submit a new file with the new project design, taking into account each of the recommendations emanating from the comprehensive study, so that SETENA can define the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) instrument to be submitted. / If this proposal is accepted, the developer must request the archiving of file FEAP-1102-2005-SETENA.\"* On July 6, 2010, the interested party submitted to SETENA an *\"Annex to the Environmental Management Plan / Dwelling House and Swimming Pool Project,\"* which indicates that *\"In accordance with resolution No. 1342-2010-Setena, (…) we proceed to deliver what was requested in the THEREFORE, first numeral, to re-elaborate the Environmental Management Plan Forecast, incorporating the recommendations emanating from the 'Comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourism and urban development in the buffer zone of the Las Baulas Marine Park'.\"* The document is accompanied by a sworn declaration of environmental commitments. Finally, and also in what is relevant, it was held as unproven that SETENA has resolved –favorably or unfavorably– the application submitted on July 6, 2010, by the interested party.\n\n**IV.** Based on these facts, the Court considered that the matter concerned an act not subject to challenge. In this regard, first it relied on an extensive quotation from one of its own precedents (no. 35-2009 at 15 hours and 9 minutes on January 14, 2009). Then it transcribed an excerpt from ruling no. 104-F-TC-2009 of this Court of Cassation at 11 hours and 10 minutes on June 1, 2009, which maintained that line. It then pointed out that although SETENA had granted environmental viability to the plaintiff's project, and the municipal construction permit was also granted, judgment no. 8666-2008 at 17 hours and 57 minutes on May 21, 2008, from the Constitutional Chamber ordered: *\"**THEREFORE:** The appeal is granted, consequently: **a)** (...). **b)** (...). **c)** Orders SONIA ESPINOZA VALVERDE, in her capacity as General Secretary of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, or whoever holds this position, to proceed in coordination with the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers and the Municipalities of Santa Cruz, Nandayure, Hojancha, Nicoya, and Carrillo, to carry out a comprehensive study on the impact that constructions and tourism and urban development in the buffer zone of the Las Baulas National Marine Park would produce on the environment and the necessary measures to be taken, where it is assessed whether it is also better to expropriate the properties located there, and expressly indicates the impact that noise, lights, the use of water for human consumption, black and sewage waters, human presence, and others would produce on the entire ecosystem of the area, especially the leatherback turtle (tortuga baula). For which a maximum period of six months is granted counted from the notification of this resolution, a period within which the aforementioned study must be completed. **d)** Orders the suspension and conditions the validity of the environmental viabilities granted to properties located within the buffer zone (500-meter band) of the Las Baulas National Marine Park, until the aforementioned comprehensive study is ready. (...)\"* (The emphasis is supplied). It then pointed out that this body ordered not only the suspension of the viabilities granted, but also conditioned their validity on the elaboration of the comprehensive study that was also required to be carried out. This means, it added, that if once said analysis was carried out, it were to be established that one or some of the viabilities granted were not in conformity with its findings, the necessary measures had to be adopted to achieve their full compatibility with the conclusions of the comprehensive study, and if this were not timely fulfilled, or the impossibility of achieving that adaptation were established, the act or acts would have to be annulled. It also referred that in light of this, SETENA informed the applicant that given these circumstances, she had to satisfy new requirements, which in the judges' opinion was equivalent to the Plan not being fully compatible with the findings of the comprehensive study, making it inevitable to order the corrective measures of the case. Then it stated: *\"From that perspective, the challenged act offered two possible paths to the interested party (…) namely: to re-elaborate the Environmental Management Plan (Pronóstico - Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and the Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments or to submit a new application with the redesign of the project, taking into account –in both alternatives– each of the recommendations contained in the comprehensive study carried out. As was outlined in the relation of proven facts, the company (…) already chose the first path, presenting to SETENA, on July 6, 2010, a new Plan accompanied by the sworn declaration of environmental commitments. It is not on record whether SETENA has resolved anything on the matter or not, but it is clear that what is decided will influence, in turn, what the Municipality of Santa Cruz must agree upon regarding the construction permit, which –finally– evidently may be subject to challenge both in administrative and judicial venues.\"*. In light of these reasonings, it later concluded: *\"Consequently, what is appropriate is to reaffirm the nature of the acts pronounced in the environmental procedure as administrative steps (actos de trámite) without their own effect, which leads us to uphold the preliminary defense reiterated at the time by the State and to declare the complaint inadmissible in all its aspects.\".* This entire recount thus shows that the ruling did not base its reasoning, as the appellant seems to understand, on the invocation of jurisprudential precedents, since based on those antecedents, it indicates that in the specific case, a series of supervening circumstances (a ruling by the Constitutional Chamber) obligated the petitioner to readjust a series of permit requirements, which SETENA had to evaluate again, after which the Municipality would have to decide what it deemed appropriate regarding the construction permit. It referred that the interested party had readjusted its project, apparently, to the new requirements, and that its submission had not yet been resolved by that Secretariat. It closed its arguments establishing that once that body decided what was deemed pertinent, the Municipality would issue its own assessments and one would be, now indeed, before a final act. The appellant, in its disagreements, restricts itself to mentioning why the precedents cited by the lower court body differ from its case. In its criticisms, no argument is observed aimed at demonstrating that, contrary to what the Court states, the procedure it formulated after the consequences derived from the Constitutional Chamber's ruling is not pending resolution, nor that the permit has been denied based on the new requirements. Note that neither is this a final act nor an administrative step with its own effect, as the plaintiff's own conduct indicates, since the approval or rejection of the modifications it presented to its environmental management plan is still pending, meaning the prerequisite established in article 36 subsection c) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) to resort to this venue is not met. Furthermore, contrary to what it affirms, although initially the construction permit was granted, it is suspended as a consequence derived from the order emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, but as has been stated, the authorization procedure is not yet concluded, as a decision has not been made regarding the required adjustments, so it is necessary to determine whether the applicant meets or does not meet the requirements, so that in consideration of the supervening considerations that were introduced for the site by the Constitutional Chamber, its construction permit is approved –or not–. This implies that, as the Court correctly stated, the challenged act is an administrative step, and has no effect of its own, as it neither denies nor approves the construction permit by itself, meaning it cannot be attacked yet in the jurisdictional venue. However, for the reasons stated, the alleged breach is not observed, so the appeal must be denied, imposing its costs on the appellant in the terms of article 150 subsection 3) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code.\n\n**THEREFORE**\n\nThe cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff is rejected, who must bear the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.\n\n**Román Solís Zelaya**\n\n**Óscar Eduardo González Camacho                          Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández**\n\nJROSALES/RGONZALEZU\n\nEXP: 10-004631-1027-CA\n\nTelephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr"
}